CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FROM William Sulzer Cornell University Library HG529 .G61 v.1 (Gold and silver documents olin 3 1924 030 192 920 HG G,to\ Date Due l.ta .. IHw-gu 194 1 J& N3VH-&4 »4F _1 KC* film r JUIL MWff ■ * The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://archive.org/details/cu31924030192920 IS THE SENATE OF THE UOTTED STATES. LETTER THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, IN RESPONSE To Senate resolution of August 16, 1893, relative to the redemption of Treasury notes issued under the act of July 14, 1890, and also relative to the exchange of gold coin for silver dollars. August. 18, 1893. —Laid on the table and ordered to be printed. Treasury Deparpment, Office of the Secretary, Washington, D. C, August 17, 1893.* The President of the Senate : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following reso- lution, adopted by the Senate on the 16th instant, viz: Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, directed to re- port to the Senate what amount, if any, of the Treasury notes issued under the act of July 14, 1890, commonly called the Sherman act, have been during the present month redeemed by the Government at the request of the holders thereof in silver dollars, and whether the holders of such notes were advised at the time of such re- demption that they could have gold instead of silver if they so desired. The Sec- retary of the Treasury is also directed to inform the Senate whether gold coin has been presented recently to the Treasury Department or any snbtreasury and silver dollars asked in exchange therefor; and, if so, if such exchanges have been made, and whether the Department would or could exchange silver dollars for gold coin if requested to do so by holders of gold. In response thereto I have the honor to say that during the present month Treasury notes issued under the act ot July 14, 1890, amounting to $714,636, have been redeemed by the Government in silver dollars. While I do not pretend to have knowledge of the degree of information possessed by the holders of the notes so redeemed, I am of the opinion that they were fully advised at the time of such redemption that they could have gold instead of silver, if they so desired. I base this opin- ion upon the general publicity which has been given to the terms of the act, no less than upon the instructions of this Department to the Treas- urer and assistant treasurers of the United .States, which have been to the effect that such notes were redeemable in silver iddnllkrs at the option of the holders. I am also supported in my bc^efj by the fact ^hat in the Z \ .,' REDEMPTION OF, TREASURY NOTES. ' circular of this Department issued to the public for their guidance in their dealings with the Treasury, and containing the regulations which govern the issue, redemption, and exchange of the paper currency and ^he gold-, silver, and minor coins of the United States, there is a para- graph which reads as follows : 4. Gold coin is issued in redemption of United States notes, in sums not less than. $50, by the assistant treasurers ijn New York and San Francisco, and in redemption of Treasury notes of^l890, in like sums, by the Treasurer and all the assistant treas- i urers. In further response to the resolution I' have to say that recently gold : coin has been presented at an office of this Department and silver dol- lars asked in exchange therefor, and that the exchange was not made ' for the reason that all the silver dollars in the Treasury at the time were required under the provisions of the laws relating to the currency to be held in the Treasury to cover outstanding silver certificates and Treas- ury notes issued under the act of July 14, 1890. At present the De- partment would not and could not exchange silver dollars for gold coin if requested to do so by holders of gold for the same reason; but if the condition of the funds of the Treasury were such as to afford a margin of silver dollars in excess of silver certificates and Treasury notes out- standing, such exchanges would be made. ! Bespectfully, yours, > J. Gr. Carlisle, ., Secretary. IS THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, LETTER THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, SHOWING Necessity for immediate appropriation of $300,000 for continuing recoin- a ff e of fractional silver coins. August 18, 1893. — Referred, to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be 1 , printed. Treasury Department, August 18, 1893. Sir : I have the honor to inclose herewith copy of a letter from the Treasurer of the United States, setting forth the necessity for an im- mediate appropriation of $300,000 for continuing the recoinage of frac- tional silver coins. I concur in the recommendation of the Treasurer, and respectfully request that an appropriation be made in the following terms : For re- coinage of the uncurrent fractional silver coins in the Treasury, to be ex- pended under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, three hundred thousand dollars, the same to be immediately available. The amount of fractional silver coins now in the Treasury available for recoinage is $10,000,000. Respectfully, yours, J. G. CARLISLE, Secretary. The President op the Senate. Treasury Department, Office of the Treasurer, Washington, D. C, August 9, 1893. Sir : I have the honor to advise you that the current appropriation for the "Recoinage of silver coins" is nearly exhausted, and in order to enable this office to meet the usual autumn demand for fractional silver coin it is respectfully suggested that Congress be asked to make an appropriation of at least $300,000 for that purpose at the earliest moment, and that it be made immediately available. Eespectfully, yours, D. N. Morgan, Treasurer United States. Hon. J. Gr- Carlisle, Secretary of the Treasury. O IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. LETTER TROM THE SECRETARY OF T-HE TREASURY, RELATIVE To the cost of recoining silver currency under the proposed, ratio of one to twenty. August 21, 1893.— Ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, Office of the Secretary, Washington, I). C, August 19, 1893. Sir : Beferring to our conversation relative to the probable cost inci- dent to the change from the present coining ratio between gold and silver (1 to 16 for the standard ^silver dollars, and 1 to 14.95 for subsid- iary silver) to a ratio of 1 to 20, you are respectfully informed that the number of silver dollars coined since 1878 aggregates 419,332,450. Without any allowance for abrasion, and loss incident to melting the \same, the coining value of these dollar^, at a ratio of 1 to 20, wordd be $333,222,162, or $84,110,228 less than their present face value. ;-. To recoin these dollars at a ratio of 1 to 20 would require the addi- tion of 81,376,700 ounces of new bullion, which, at the average price paid for silver under the act of July 14, 1890 ($0.93J), would cost $75,883,700., In addition to this I estimate that there would be a loss from abra- sion, and in the melting of these dollars, of at least $3,000,000, which amount, together with the difference in the face value of. the coins 1 ($84,110,288) would have to be reimbursed to the Treasury by an ap- propriation for that purpose. From the fact that the silver dollars are distributed throughout the country it would be necessary, as they are redeemed at the several sub- treasuries, to transport them to the mints, and the expense of transpor- tation for $300,000,000, the amount outside of the stock on hand at the •gubtreasuries and mints at Philadelphia, San Francisco, and New Or- leans, would average at least 1£ per cent or $4,500,000. 2 COST OF RECOINING SILVER CURRENCY. i ?$ «■'■...' ....-..•■ '.■<* I therefore estimate the cost of recoining the silver dollars already, coined as follows : 'New bullion to be added '.", •■■■■■■ .-'■-* $75,683,700 \Loss by abrasion and melting *-'--. ■-'- 3,000,000 Cost of coinage (labor, materials, etc. ) , 6, 290, 000 Copper for alloy ---- 68, 200 Transportation of dollars to mints , - - - 4, 500, 000 .^ Total ' 89,741,900 The stock of subsidiary silver coin in the country is ^estimated at $77,000,000, which at full weight would contain 55,699,875 ounces of fine silver. This, amount, at a ratio of 1 to 20, would coin $55,843,802, N or $21,156,197 less than the present face value. '■: To tecoin $77,000,000 of subsidiary silver into an equal* amount of fractional coin at a ratio of 1 to 20 would require the addition of 18,79.7,625 fine ounces, which, at $0.93J per fine ounce, the average price paid for silver under the act of July 14, 1890, would cost $17,528,785. There would be a loss of about 2j' per cent by abrasion from the face value, or about $1,925,000. y ' . I would, therefore, estimate the cost of recoining the subsidiary silver ; in the country, at a raito of 1 to 20, as follows : Ne,w bullion . : . : J .;5i: ; . . $17, 528, 785 Loss by abrasion \ 1,925,000 Cost of coinage (labor, materials, etc.) 2,500,000 Copper for alloy _ .: 15,636 Cost of transportation 1, 155, 000 , Total ..i '. 23,124,421 RECAPITULATION. Estimated cost of recoining silver dollars* $89, 741, 900 Estimated cost of recoining subsidiaj^ silver . 23, 124, 421 Total .... ; 112,866,321 Very respectfully,' Hon. Daniel W. Voorhees, J. G. Carlisle, Secretary. United States Seriate. 53d Congress, ) SENATE. ( Ex. Doc. 1st Session. ] \ No. 5. IN THE SENATE OE THE UNITED STATES. LETTER THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, IN RESPONSE To a resolution of the Senate August 21, 1893, relative to the purchase of silver bullion in the month of July, 1893. August 23, 1893, — Laid upon the table and ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, Office of the Secretary, Washington, D. C, August 23, 1893. Sir: In accordance with Senate resolution of August 21, 1893, as follows: Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he hereby is, directed to fur- nish the Senate with a statement giving the aggregate amount of silver bullion pur- chased under the act of July 14, 1890, during the month of July, 1893, together with the cdst thereof, the amount, date, and price of each purchase, and the name of the vendor. Also the aggregate amount of silver bullion offered for sale during the said month of July, the amount, date, and price of each offer,, and the name of the person making such offer. I have the honor to transmit herewith statement prepared by the Bu- reau of the Mint, giving in detail the information requested. Eespectfully, yours, ^ q ^^ Secretary of the Treasury. The President of the United States Senate. PURCHASE OF SILVER BULLION IN JULY, 1893. s s IS s 00 a o s co" lO • O .CO • •IA ■ eo pi did p ® t3 *-< n a £ £ OS 1 oco CM CO OS O O CO'. t-m e»o~ 010 CO 1* CO s OS d 00 CO "*" (M t- t- r4 t-' CO ITS IN Ol :5 ' 00 00 00 o'o" 00 tHtH O O O 1ft s 10" O O O O O O «f O" 0- ■ to" CO ■a § H =1 ft a ' t □9 O ATS O C3 epo- ^%& • a S3 w § 31 M n . a . pi CD" r& a . « ■0 d bD Solo CD § . 'SI += C +■ c c. < 1 C ! < p 40 ' CM 1 J£ CD O O a -♦- i c c < a 0) ft O O -*3 S a 1 Pi n re P a P c c c is c c c -s a, s c < 8? ' 0' § U CD CD+* P a c C IS c c C c c c O rfct t- o" ■EQ- XJ g 3 •3 g «^ P c c Price at -which offered per fine ounce. 00010 o o o in o w w w o 00 O'o o o © o m a> ooo-^* r- ioco oi»ioc»o 00 iaidq >o 00 10 10 xsol- so cqcqco as eo *tf c- t- t- c- t-t- t- t-t-t> b- l> t- v» 1 ■** • . ' £ CD 11' «o 0000 000 00000 00 000 00 »o 0000 000 00000 00 000 00 00 0000 000 00000 00 '000 00 So" 0" loo'o^ia 0" jci"oo" 0"" 0" 0" iniri~o""o" oad" o" o"o~o" o adco" .SCO CM WWlflH CO OOO CM »n W CM OU3 O CM *<*l 10 OOlO lO ifflSO jg rH CM rH rH rH CM i-H r-i i-l n3 CD Eta l ■g 4 : : , * jS OS 1.5 §| If g S« g 11 : S| * s 4 MS 1 .3 9° .S> ■« 5 ■aS ! §s>2 u o r < ? s Hislifgiisli c 9 1 1 !5 oh g . ■si 6 r «l,i iotfg.jS|fei*,S ■a g ' M- 1 .'8'S'S'S 5 a ISaSs f 5 IT CO 00 b ■> ^ • c PURCHASE OF SILVER BULLION IN JULY, 1893. o o 4 * 6 ^ hn P) o-5 g ® o © id Pi .g'J.tJrO ■ O ^ t- t- fr- m o o c- O CO ©■* © © o -m ■Ofr- © o © CO 3 %% in p =3 o O 11 g "S| a- - +5 fl B « £3 m £ oJ A- pq si FP ffl t» .S.S 2 ■"§833 1 09 * A .* All PURCHASE OF SILVER BULLION IN JULY, 1893. T3 1 Cost of amount delivered. CO o> c: i-H 00 O SS t* co" o ,t^ oi St- cs m co oo g U3 to ifi C- rH S ^T o" o" of in QC- IS ifl 91 N CO CO O 00 ■N in m i-t CO' ■ -<* of o" r-i m - — — m m O 00 ODO 00 in CM O OS CO of en" in oi c» CO of * Oi Price paid per fine ounce. * O C in it t- £ o «■ o. o o' o o o t- t- CO OS CO OCM CO cs . o ooo o ooo o ooo C- t- t- l> CO I— a its m o o cn 1 o o o o o o o" o"' cm m in 00 00 p ° oin m« 0* t3 % ■§ Li a. Si a o J3 cm O 11 i .§ i '■ ■m.9 .a -g^ ,§00 Sjj =3.5 b{g 2 .&«.&. §1* »"= .s .6 Po - C m W3 t4 CD i . 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Doo 1st Session. ) . \ ^' iq EST THE SENATE OE THE ' UNITED STATES. LETTER FROM « V THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, / TRANSMITTING, - In answer to a resolution of the Senate of September 1, 1893', a statement, of the amount of silver bull ion purchased by the Treasury Department under the act of July 14, 1890, etc. September 11, 1893. —Ordered to lie on the table and be printed. Treasury Department, • Office of the Secretary, Washington, JD. C, September 11, 1893. Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following * resolution passed by the Senate September 1, 1893 : Mesolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury he, and he hereby is, directed to "'£ furnish the Senate with a statement giving the aggregate amount of silver bullion'' $ purchased under the Act of July 14, 1890, during the month of August, 1893, to-,- gether with the cost thereof, the amount, date, and price of each purchase, and the - name of the vendor. Also the aggregate amount of silver bullion offered for sale during the said month of August, the amount, date, and price of each offer, and the name of the person making such offer, and how paid for. In reply I transmit statement prepared by the Bureau of the Mint giving in detail the information called for. All silver purchased under the, Act of July 14, 1890, has been paid for in Treasury notes. The delay in furnishing this' information more promptly was occasioned by the, fact that returns have only been received to-day of silver delivered at San Francisco Mint on purchases made on the 28th and 30th ultimo. Eespectfully yours, J. G. Carlisle, The President of the United States Senate. SILVER BULLION. »11 -I* O §"3 © i-i(M S3 t- C- O -* CO t-00© Ct3 w p cu « a SB -15 8 J'S'S 9 5 O p ® p 00 O « Go <3 P ft H WNN C- OS'* CO tjf CJO coo o © o o © o a o O P<# o O 15 P p as W) O R r ^2 cS /j pq Mffl Ml -ace a o O T2 ' T3 a O « 3 O ■ I *» * ;oc.5 t * i. n t3 is ~ •91* ■d Pi M P SlSK .9 f .9 * * P".9 'S * - T3 ~>ti ~T3 flSftSft O H j) M J) O P O P O o o o o o fl :n o o o C* I>l> silver Bullion. 10 r~na as -hco O 00 TO t^" HO m on OOt>0 t—r- "*co L-ttCO in OlOIOiA © © ©o OO ©© 00*0"; ■-—■ _ _■ _■ ij ._> w woo 00 to ^p .3 Jig r o •tf fcb 80 £° If ggo W!*i 00 ooco =33 aw o e -_ § = &*» so S £0 o ffl 1— I CO T* coca o ci o wad i> nee CO CO CO OOO OOO O © O o c 3 ■ 2S* 1 * 3 as c5 fl a_o "C-3 s c3 hog w w ■3 M S H hp a g«3 a? 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CM CO C-OS -^1 ■ as co as cc OS © CO © O >H CC "* iC CM CO O 'OS OS CM CO c- fl ? ^ 5&S 3 CO O lO !cm CO COCO . in '. t> so* d cm 00 © tP ■*& -^ v Tf co as ■* CO CO ■ m CO © t- to ■ in co »n l— os t- § S 3 e • to CM ^O CM ■ in co n* in co © S t> a \$ eo" of ©7 ■ ©" to" ©"in 3" ! in" ©" of ©\ m" s s s" -3 -* in W . CO CM ifiM 10 1 c- in co in -^ *=! in u-inm CM CM CM CM ■ If in mm ■" ' in win 10 in in in m' iri Price paidpe .. fine ounce. . CM t- t- 1> t- ■ t- L e- 1- i> t- t- fr- t- c- u-j if.OO . m S CO CO CO 1 CO CO CO CO CO CO -* C- t- t- t- b- t- t-c- c- < fr- fr- t- fr- t-t- t- t> t- t- © ^>^ o o o o © © © • O © O© © 3 © ' © 4 o ■ o o© © © © © © © 3 (3 O © o © ©© 3 © - 3 00 © © © © O §1 © co" < ©"©'©" ■■* to co m , 3" ,co o""m ©" in 3 © e e in © IO O © 2-3 *0 cm in eo in t m t- © m-«n eo rH CM in 3 S -. 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OS - S ° fe r ■3o3 c - m i= Si 43 ^ OW^ 5 02 <1 W M ^ a 'J* a^ w^ti k M 3 ; CC P'lE CD en co cm co co co ro co co CN CM CNCMWCM in Ifi IT CM C\ in in inmoc NN fICIC at CO CO 00 CO ©■ 5M CM CM CM CO CO © © G co co or p SILVER BULLION. vCN rH-* o os oeo k CD a tj< too* 53 to t- oa (71 «s 00 CO ISO ,_, tm -me© rH O HO l> t- COO CO t- CO o iH o o« CO CO JO-* CO CO CO If CO m « fc- fc- •*n "* t- t- O oo o o o-o o o en w *-t ', O CM c- CO O -f 00 CO 00 « ■ &D A < « • £ .d* 1 - a " ' >o o . .— .— >, Ml « w *e : • 5 : s ^ 1G : < fc- • ^H t> o ■E6- T3 ' Id! © © o fl ■ o : o ia O CM u> m t- c- o o o o o o o o o t-T o < eo~ co ia ' CO Sf-sls 13115 (0 ■a 1 0) I 1 .=1 s s 1 g j "4 Wft o o « ro I 1 V O 53d Congress, i ■ SENATE. *, Mis. Doc. 1st Session. \ > No. 11. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. ■/' . /. August 14, 1893. — Ordered to lie on the table and be printed. ' Mr. -STEWART^presented the. following editorial, printed in the New- York Eecorder, of August 13, 1893 : n GIVE US FREE SILVER. The Eecorder believes that the time has come when the will of the people must be enforced alike upon Congress and the President, and the mints of /the United "States be thrown open to the free coinage of silver ' The financial and business situation is admittedly^badT, There is no. need to exaggerate it. It might be worse. It will become worse, much worse, unless Congress and Presided t Cleveland can get together and relieve the -existing commercial congestion by prompt and adequate egislation. '/■ ' The President admits in his recent message that the repeal ot the silver purchase law of 1890 will not fully meet the exigencies of our situation. It is confessed on all hands that to simply repeal the Sher- man act and stop there will not leave our currency upon a satisfactory, basis, or provide for a safe and sufficient circulating medium. The business of this country can not be done upon a purely gold basis There is too much .business to be done, and too little gold to- do it with, to justify the .experiment of a currency based wholly on one- metal, and that one the scarcer and dearer of the two. The total dis-, ifranchisement of silver as a money metal, which seems to be the aim of the gold extremists at Washington, means a violent and ruinous- contraction of values. Th« mere threat of it has already given the first sharp twist to the screws of contraction. . " To persist in the total elimination of silver from our currency is mad- ness. The lead of the gold monometallism has been followed iar " enough. It is time to call a halt and demand that silver shall be put ' back°into the place it heldibr eighty years, from the formation of the Government down to 1873, and be made again one of the two mam pillars of the American system of currency and coinage • It is evident that his party in Congress is not fully with the Presi- ■ dent, and will not act upon his initiative unless he will assent to a pro- 'vSi by which silver snail be retained as a partner with gold on a- lust and fair ratio in the metallic basis of agnation's money. Congress- fenofready and willing to repeal the act of 1890 until the Resident on Ms side is prepared to give his assent to a new law based on bimetallic principles; restoring silver as a money metal and reestablishing the d °£ht Se perilous feature of the situation at Washington. If the 2' , FREE, SILVER. ■', ''''■•: ' President and Congress cannot harmonize their view?, and act together without long debate and delay, the crisis through which the, trade and industry of the country are passing must and will grow more acute, Is there any way of bringing them together? Only, as The Eecorder thinks, by putting such a pressure of public opinion upon them both as will compel them to meet on middle ground and take decisive action. The President is not justified in asking for the unconditional repeal of the present silver law. To postpone the definite readjustment oi our currency laws, leaving silver demonetized and its use as a stand- ard money metal wholly prohibited, would, in The Eecorder's'opinion, precipitate a financial and business catastrophe compared with which all past, panics would seem to have been mere bugaboos. Absolute gold monometallism spells ruin, universal and unsparing rnin, for the people of this country. Congress is right in demanding securities for the silver already coined and represented in our paper circulation, and a guarantee for the permanent retention of both metals and the historic double stand- ard, at a ratio to be fixed with a' due regard to the existing conditions of the currencies and coinages of the world. Congress stands for the American people in this matter. It is their dearest interests which it is defending in defending their constitutional currency — gold and silver. The single gold- standard has neyer been sanctioned or desired by the people of this country. Their will has been over and over again expressed to the contrary at every election and in every Congress for sixteen years past. Their determination that silver shall not be out- lawed at the mints has been clearly and forcibly shown by overwhelm 1 ing majorities in both branches of Congress. , It never was stronger ' than it is to-day. ' The clamor bf the money changers,, the usurers, and the stock gam- blers, inspired by the English (influences that radiate from Lombard street and which represent the organized rapacity of the world, has not shaken the faith of the American masses one iota in the honesty, the justice, the fairness, and, above all, the vital necessity of maintaining silver side by side with gold in their national money system. ~ ' There may have been a change in the relative measuring values of the two metals. That has often occurred in the course of history. But that change, whatever it may be, can be corrected by a change in the ratio of/coinage from the present 16 to 1 to, say, 19 or even 20 to 1. It does not justify the total abolition of silver as a standard money metal. .England is reported to be at this moment exchanging her gold, for In- dian silver on the,basis of 22 to 1, showing that even the leading gold standard country recognizes that silver possesses an exchangeable value with gold at some ratio that can be fixed. And we may be sure that the Bank of England, in fixing it at 22 to 1, has been as unfair to sil- , ver and as partial to gold as it has dared, to be. ' The Eecorder earnestly calls for a general expression of the popular will loud and clear and general .enough to make the President and Con- gress understand that the people demand immediate relief from the stifling and stagnating currency conditions from which they are noAV suffering; and that,, while they want the act of 1890 repealed, they alsc want the free coinage of silver 'restored at such new ratio as the wisdom of Congress may see fit to fix. • The money power has spoken for gold monometallism, and Tfct'. Cleve- land' seems to be its executive echo. Now let the people be heard anc FREE SILVER. , ^ 3 Mr. Cleveland be clearly informed that Congress, and not 1 he, represents the national will on this matter of admitting silver as well as gold to the mints. , - G-en. Grant once said 1 , speaking from the same chair now filled by Mr. Cleveland: "I have no policy to enforce against the will of the people." The Eecorder recommends Mr. Cleveland to adopt the same attithde on this money question, for it is„the only one that is worthy, of an American President. Congress is the repository of the people's la'w- ! making power, and it correctly represents them in resisting the single 1 gold standard crusade, at whose head Mr. Cleveland |has apparently placed himself. He can do the nation no better service at this grave crisis in its financial and business history than to yield gracefully and say with Grant: "I have no policy to enforce against the will of the people." It is of the very first importance that the present state of affairs should not be long continued. Business is benumbed in every branch, currency and coin are alike in hiding, exchange is difficult to effect for want of money to do it with, perfectly sound banks are embarrassed themselves and can not give ordinary accommodations to their deposit tors, trade is clogged and hampered at every turn, mills and workshops are closing in large numbers, and even the most solvent and flourish- ing firms find it hard to draw on their deposited moneys in such form as to meet their weekly 'pay rolls in the usual way, ' * ThisMs the situation, and it is not improving but growing worse with every day's delay at Washington. Bad as it is, it would become infinitely worse if Congress were to yield to the single gold standard movement and surrender the cause of , silver. Such a surrender would mean disaster to all classes except the vultures that always flesh their beaks deepest and gorge themselves fullest on a field that is strewn with the victims of a vast commercial and industrial calamity. The merchant and the manufacturer, the big business man 1 and the small tradesman, the great mass alike of em' ployers and employed, the professional man,- the brain-worker and' the brawn-worker, and more than all, the laborer and the wage-earner in every occupation, will all be drawn down together in the vortex of con- traction if silver is outlawed. To make gold the sole standard and the only currency is to diminish the volume of our money by one-half. That is contraction; and con- traction means the complete paralysis of all enterprise, the utter eol- ; lapse of credit, the complete prostration of trade from New York to California, and the consignment of meriods of working people in every city and State in the Union to idleness and starvation. The Eecorder pleads with all its power that this whirlpool of con- / traction may not be opened. President Cleveland and Congress must get together and prevent it. The people must raise their voices now and demand their own salvation. If silver be not restored quickly to free coinage, the most optimistic man can not look forward six months with- out fear. Millions of unemployed, wageless men, with their wives and children crying for bread that can not be earned for them, will be hard to reason with. But they will have to be reasoned with if silver is outlawed from the mints. And it will bridle to tell them that it was thought best to starve them in order to place the country on the same gold standard footing as England. Eepeal the act of 1890, readmit silver to free coinage at a new and reasonable ratio, and do it quickly. That, and nothing less than that, '4 FREE SILVER. will put the business of the country firmly- on. its feet again, give new heart to capital, new hope to labor, and restore good times throughout the land. » % If this be not done and the antisilver madness prevail, the prosper- ity of/the country can not be recalled, and its pea&e will soon be in seri- ous peril. 53d Congress, ) ' SENATE. c Ex. Doc 1st Session. ) *\ ^' 0i -q IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, In response to Senate resolution of September 5, 1893, requesting infor- mation concerning the redemption in silver of notes issued under the ' Sherman act; and other information concerning the subject of silver coinage. September 12, 1893.— Laid on the table and ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, \ September 8, 1893. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following resolu- tion of the Senate, adopted on the 5th instant : , Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be directed to furnish to the Senate full information on the following subjects : First. Whether the Treasury Department haH, at any time, redeemed any portion of the Treasury notes provided for by the act of July 14, 1890, commonly known as the Sherman act, in silver coin, and if so, when and what amount has been thus redeemed ? Second. What amount in coinage value of silver bullion purchased by the Treas- ury Department under the act of July 14, 1890, and subject to coinage, in the discre- tion of the Secretary of the Treasury, remains uncoined, and why said silver bullion has not been coined and paid out, in accordance with the provisions of said act ? Third. Whether any part, and, if so, what part of the paper money redeemed in gold by the Treasury Department since March 4, 1893, was canceled after redemption or in any manner withheld from general circulation? In response, I have to say: First. The sum of $1,273,2,67 in the Treasury notes provided for by the act of July 14, 1890, commonly known as the Sherman act^ was redeemed in silver coin during the month of August, 1893, and the further sum of $200,607 during tlie past sgRea days of the present month, making in all $1,473,874 of such nottes so redeemed. Second. Silver bullion of the coinage vajae of $174,061,242, pur- chased by the Treasury Department under the; act of July 14, 1890, and subject to coinage, is now held in the Treasury. Under the pro- ' visions of section 3 of the act a coinage of $36,087,185 has been ex- ecuted, and a gain or seigniorage of $6,691,109 arising therefrom has been accounted for and paid into the Treasury. The remainder of the bullion purchased under the act has not been coined for the reason that no further coinage has been necessary to provide for the redemp- tion of the notes in silver. 2 1 REDEMPTION OF TREASURY ' NOTES IN SILVER COTN, $. Third. With the exception of gold certificates, of which the amount in circulation on March 4, 1893, was $114,719,749, and at this date is $80,323,017, no part of the paper money redeemed in gold by the Treas- ury Department since March 4, 1893, has been canceled after redemp- tion, or in any .manner withheld from general circulation. The decrease of the volume of gold certificates is the net result of all of the opera- tions of the Treasury affecting them, and has been caused chiefly by the suspension of their issue, in accordance with the proviso in section 12 of the act approved July 12, 1882, "that the Secretary of the Treas- ury shall suspend the issue of such gold certificates whenever the amount of gold coin and gold bullion in the Treasury reserved for the redemption of United States notes falls below one hundred millions of. dollars." . , . Eespectfully yours, J. G-. Carlisle, Secretary, The President op the Senate. / 53d Congress, t SENATE, ( Mis. Doc. , 1st Session. J ■> \ No. 16. IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES. August 14, 1893. — Referred to the Committee on Finance to accompany S. 294, and ordered to be printed. Mr. Yoorhbes presented the following: LETTER OP SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY RECOMMENDING THE PASSAGE OF THE BILL (S. 294), TO PROVIDE FOR ISSUE OF CIRCULATING NOTES TO NATIONAL BANKS. Treasury Department, Office op the Secretary, ,. WasMngtori, D. C, August 11, 1893. My Dear Sir: Your favor 1 of the 10th. instant, inclosing form of a bill " to provide for the issue of circulating notes to national banks," and asking the views of the Secretary of the Treasury as to the advisa- bility of its passage, is received. The enactment of such a law as proposed would enable the national banks to issue and put in circulation at once, on bonds already de- posited with the Treasurer of the United States, .about $19,000,000 in currency in addition to the amount now authorized, and this, in my opinion, would afford a very considerable measure of relief to the country under existing circumstances. I therefore recommend the passage of the bill. Eespectfully yours, J. G. Carlisle^ Secretary. ■ Hoii. D. W. Voorhees, , Chairman, Committee on Finance, United States Senate. ^ 53d Congress, i SENATE. '( Mis. Doc 1st Session. ( ) No. 16 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. .-.- August 14, 1893. — Referred to the Committee on Finance to accompany S. 294, and ordered to be printed. Mr. Voorhees presented the following: LETTER OP SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY RECOMMENDING THE PASSAGE OF THE BILL (S. 294), TO PROVIDE FOR ISSUE OF CIRCULATING' NOTES TO NATIONAL BANKS. Treasury Department, Office of the' Secretary, Washington, D. C, August 11, 1,893. My Dear Sir: Your favor of the lOtli instant, inclosing form of a ( . bill "to provide for the issue of circulating notes to national banks," and asking the views of the Secretary of the Treasury as to the advisa- bility of its passage, is received. The enactment of such a law as proposed would enable the national banks to issue and put in circulation at once, on bonds already de- posited with the Treasurer of the United States, about $19,000,000 in currency in addition to the amount now authorized, and, this, in, my opinion, would afford a very considerable measure of relief to the country under existing circumstances. I therefore recommend the passage of the bill. Respectfully yours, J. G. Carlisle, f ^ Secretary. Hon. D. W. VOORHEES, ' « i Chairman, Committee on Finance, United States Senate. 53d Congress, ), 1st Session. ) SENATE. ( Mis. Doc. \ No. 17. IN" THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. STATEMENT OF, THE IN SINCE THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA. PRESENTED BY MR. VEST. August 14, 1893.— Ordered to be printed. WASHINGTON: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 189 3. N PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND SILVER. I & C? 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', < Ex. Doc. 1st Session. \ So. 18. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. LETTER PROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, TRANSMITTING, }: In response to Senate resolution of September 19, 1893, a statement of the amount of Government bonds purchased since 1879, etc. September 27, 1893. —Ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, Office of the Secretary, Washington, D. ft, September 26, 1893. > Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Senate resolution, dated the 19th instant, as follows: Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, directed to in- form the Senate when and in what amounts Government bonds have been purchased since the year 1879, and what was the rate and the aggregate amount of premium paid on such purchases. Second. Whether at any time or times, and when; since the year 18 (9, any (jovern- ment bonds have been purchased without the notice required by law. Third What amount of public moneys, by years, has been deposited m national banks since the year 1879, and whether and what amount of interest was paid,, by, the banks for the Use of such moneys. In reply to the first paragraph thereof a table is herewith transmit- < ted showing the amount of United States bonds purchased in each fis-., cal year since 1879, together with the average price and the aggregate amount of premium paid for the bonds of each class. It will be ob- served that no bonds were purchased in the fiscal years 1882 to l»»/, inclusive. During that period there were outstanding bonds which had become redeemable at the pleasure of the Government, and the surplus revenues were applied to their redemption at par. There have been no purchases since 1891. . In reply to the second paragraph I have to state that there is no law requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to give public notice of the pur- chase, by the Government, of United States bonds; but. that there have been no such purchases since 1879 except in pursuance of public notice. GOVERNMENT BONDS PURCHASED SINGE 1879. The amount of the balance of public moneys held by the national-bank depositaries at the close of business June 30 of each year since and ' including 1879 is as follows: 1887 .' $19, 190, 076. 79 1888 54,913,489.74' 1889 .< 43, 305*, 511. 91 1890... 26,994,464.70 1891. : 22, 900, 329. 65 1892 12,559,446.61 1893. •:' 12,393,071,11 1879 $7,183,403.42 1880 7,999,953.86 1881..' 8,933,550.79 1882 •. 9,610,432.86 1883.... 10,030,698.33 1884 .-... 10,716,144.17 1885 .....10,985,141.34 1886 14,036,632.18 3S"o, amount of interest has been paid by national-bank depositaries for , the use of- the public moneys deposited therewith. Eespectiully, yours, J. G. Carlisle, Secretary. , The President op the United States Senate. - • , Statement of United States honds purchased each fiscal year since 1879. , . ,. V . . FISCAL YEAE 1880. ■• Description. Amount purchased. Average -price. Net premium. Loan of February, 1861 . . ^Oregon war debt JUoan of July and August, 1861 {Loan of 1863 Funded loan of 1881 : * ... ' Fundedloan of 1907 i Total.. j FISCAL YEAE 1881. Loan of February, 1861 : Oregon war debt . •- Loan of July and August, 1861 .....1.'. .. 'loan of 1863.., .......,..:' , Funded loan of 1881 ." ./.'...■ Total .' ' FISCAL YEAE 1888. 4 per cent consols of 1907 .' i. . 4| per cent consols of 1891 '' ' FISCAL TEAR 1889. 4 per cent consols of 1907 4£per cent consols of 1891 FISCAL YEAE i890. j : '. i - 4 per cent consols, of 1907 '....,... if per cent consols of 1891 .'..,.. FISCAL YEAE 1891. 4 per cent consols of 1907 .' 1 4fc per cent consols 1891 ,. $2, ; 837, 000 202,550 32, 064, 250 12, 797, 150 23, 575, 450 .1,500,000 $102. 62 104. 08 104. 29 104. 29 , 102. 80 v 108. 37 $74,161.95 ' 8, 273. 02 1, 3,76, 085. 04 549,035.18 662, 206. 97 125, 558. 26 - 72, 976,400 2, 795, 320. 42 $7, 775, 000 54, 250 16, 712,450 7, 057, 100 20, 023, 550 51, 622, 350 $100. 659 102.59 102! 87 102. 83 101. 60 $51 277.58 1, 408. 65 488, 876. 11 199,514.62 320, 171. 82" 1, 061, 248. 78 $23, 671, 350 27, 792, 950 5125. 92 + $6,135,628.42 107. 67 + 2, 135, 214. 04 $38, 106, 400 82, 568, 050 $128. 66 + 107. tWb 10, 926, 757. 78 6, 365, 604. 87 $73. 923, 500 30, 623, 250 SU25.53 + 104.66 ■+ $18, 876, 923. 19 1, 427, 30Q. 87 $42, 641, 250 2, 533, 950 $124. 23 102. 77 $10, 331, 138. 99 70,081.62 53d Congress, 1st Session. SENATE. ( Ex. Doo. ( No. 21. IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES. LETTEK FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, STATING, IN REPLY ■To Senate resolution of September 26, 1893, the amount of silver bullion exported during the months of July and August, 1893. v October 3, 1893.— Laid on the table and ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, Office of the Secretary, Washington, D. C, October .2, 1893. Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following 1 , resolution adopted by the Senate September 26, 1893 : ' ^Beaolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be; and he hereby is, directed to in- form the Senate what amount of silver bullion , was exported during the months of ; July and August, 1893, together with the dates and amounts of such exports. In reply I have the honor to state that the exports of silver bullion were as follows : Pine ounces. 1893. Julv 3 5 , 645,659 372, 009 401, 447 7 11 : 1 . 760, 100 350, 237 12 ,. 17 .' 493, 472 18. 70, 800 19 : 489, 538 20 '.; 216. 789 21 107, 586 383, 418 24, ' ' Jg.ii ; 50, 517 26. ..-.: 89, 641 /87 287. 089 28 ; . 323, 025 '29 40, 893 31 301, 926 5, 383, 146 287, 261 Total 5, 670, 407 1893. August 1 2 4 7 8 10 11 13 16 18 21 22 24 25 28 30 Total New York.. San Francisco (no dates) Niagara (no dates) Total Fine ounces. , 145, 532 52,429 , 308, 370 256; 999 162/462 64, 511 188, 329 63, 558 35, 157 175, 911 . 347,357 1(6, 169 2200980 138, 777 419, 396 86, 957 , 782, 894 328, 459 6,094 Very respectfully, The President of the Senate. J. G. Carlisle, Secretary: I 53d Congress, > SENATE. c Mis. Doc. 1st Session. \ '< > No. 25. US THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. August 21, 1893, — Ordered to be printed. Mr. Teller presented the following LETTER PROM FREDERICK C. TyAITE, RELATIVE TO CAUSE OF FINANCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSION. Washington, D. C, August 17, 1893. Dear Sir : As has been well said, the President, in his message to Congress, "proposes to rehabilitate the crippled banks, to reopen the abandoned industries, to rescue from idleness and want the starving laborers, to restore securities to their former strength and affluence, and to set up confidence where fear and frenzy riot now, by the simple process of repealing the Sherman act, and thereby retaining in the Treasury the $3,000,000 or $3,500,000 which hitherto has been put into. circulation each month through its operation." If, instead of seeking; an opportunity to criticise, our desire is to find out. the cause of this industrial depression, which has raised armies of the unemployed in many silver as well as in every gold-using nation on the globe, we have bat to investigate the affairs of that people among whom it has been most severe, namely, of the" Argentine Eepublic. ■ According to Mulhall, the total wealth of the people in the Argentine Eepublic, before the collapse, equaled but 2,545 million dollars, m gold, while "according to the last report of the Michigan bureau of labor, their debt equaled the incredible total of 2,191 million dollars in depre- ciated currency, or over 50 per cent of their entire wealth; including the inflated land values. It was this almost unprecedented amount of debt which caused the utter collapse. Moreover, every economist who has spent years investigating the subject is well aware that the "unearned land values," like bonds and stock*, are simply evidences of wealth being in the main mere inflation based upon the results at the labor and the capital employed in building free roads, bridges, canals and harbors, and furnishing light, sewerage, water, order, protection agaiust fire, etc See it is very plain that the collapse in the Argentine was made all the more overwhelming by the fact that, when there was a Seed for a basis on which her mighty debt could rest, the land values fled, and public improvements, order, and protection ^J^™ *g» things of the past. In other countries the crisis has not been so dis^ astrous, but it has in every case been in proportion to the amount of de From history we notice that, whether we turn our attention to the centaries of prehistoric human'experience which the author of the Pen- tateuch had in mind when he penned the immortal twenty-fifth chapter of Leviticus, or to the dawn of Grecian or Eoman history, the revolution^ U FINANCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSION. [ and rebellions in our mother country, or to the financial crises of mod-,, ^ ern times, such as those in our own' country in 1*818, 1837, 1857, 1873,;; and 1893-'94, or to famine-stricken Eussia, the one great fact which in every instance towers above every other history-creating fact is debt.. Let us note the gre,at increase during the last twelve years "in the private indebtedness of our own people, and contrast it with the mod-- est increase of scarcely CO per cent in our wealth, nearly- half of which was' but a fictitious rise in speculative ground values. As for the funded debt', those of the railroads increased from 2,392 million dollars in 1880 to 5,463 millions in 1892, according to Poor's Manual, an increase '-■' of 129 per cent, while the current debt has nearly doubled in the last > seven years. The funded debts of other companies were very small in 1880, but many of them have since assumed magnitude, especially dur- ing the last few years ; as, for instance, those of the telephone, tele*- graph, and street railway companies, and public water, gas, and elec- ' trie-lighting and power companies. During the same, time the loans and overdrafts of national banks increased from 994 million dollars to 2,171 millions, while those of other banks; exclusive of private banks and of real estate mortgages, in- '"■ creased from 378 millions to 1,189 millions. The most astonishing in- crease of all, however, is in the real estate mortgage indebtedness, as disclosed by .the investigations of the Eleventh Census. Let us remem- . foer that this is largely the debt of the hardest working and, the poor- est paid of all our American citizens, namely, the tanners and the laborers who are trying to ,obtain a home of their own by honest toil. ' In the twenty-one States for which the mortgage indebtedness has been tabulated the aggregate amount in, force at the close of 1889 was 4,547 millions with the great States of Ohio, Texas, and California and whole groups of lesser States yet to be heard from. The grand aggregate will be no less than 6,300 millions. The aggregate in 1880 was only about 2,500 millions. Last year, after turning the' scale at 8,000 millions, the mortgage indebtedness continued its upward flight, not being contented with an increase of 220 per cent, or nearly four times the increase in the true value of real estate. In a word, the total net private indebtedness of the American peo- ple equaled, in 1880, but 6,750 million dollars. Last September it amounted to 19,700 millions, an' increase of 13,000 millions in the short i period of twelve years. K < These mute figures tell the tale. Our manufacturing and mining in- dustries have been stimulated under the intoxicating influence of pro- tection, while our farmers have been compelled to borrow to meet deficits. Our land values have been bolstered up by booms and ruth- less real estate speculation -all over the West and South. Bailroads have been built to forestall competitors, to raise the value of land, and ; to build cities where none were needed. Bonds and watered stocks have been ruthlessly floated for the purpose of wrecking valuable^ properties. In order to indicate how universal such practices have be- come I may say that my investigations in the Census Office forced me to the conclusion that the liabilities of the railroad companies equaled fully 85 per cent, or 5,000 million dollars more, than their total assets. With this conclusion all experts practically agree. In short, things have been overdone, and the periodic settling day has come. This is the giant fact that stares our country in the face to-day. > The industrial depressions of over four thousand years, under every civili- sation known to history, havebeen, one and all, due to the innate power which debt has Of piling itself up until it reaches a volume which the FINANCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSION. 3 existing civilization can not support. Ten months ago our private indebtedness reached that awful climax. During seven months we re- duced that mighty load of debt by a few score millions, which, together with the reduction of the la^t three months, amounts to hundreds of millions. The unpleasant^ fact, which must be bravely met, is, that we shall pot haye t prosperity again until at least a thousand millions of this indebtedness shall have been wiped <>ut of existence, and probably not until property which is to day valued at thousands of millions shall have passed, at a great sacrifice, from the hands of the poor and mid- dle classes to the hands of the men who hold the money. As yet we have but touched the outskirts of this world- wide commer- cial crisis. We are now beginning to, sail through it. However, we shall not be called upon to pass through the black center as have the golden republics of Australia, because the indebtedness of our people has not been piled up with such' blind recklessness, and because, in general, there have been some bounds to the fictitious inflation of land values. , , The total capital of. all banks suspending during the three months ending July 28' aggregated for the whole United States only $38,951,033, while in the six weeks ending May 16 the liabilities of the banks of issue, which were crushed to the wall in Melbourne alone, amounted to over $300,000,000, a sum nearly equal to the total deposits : in the sixty-four banks forming the clearing house of New York Oity. Melbourne is a city about the size of slow, pay-as-you-go, Baltimore, which does. not know what a bank failure is., Even before the crisis, merely as a result of the storm which preceded, Melbourne's population had been reduced by more than twenty thousand, and the land values were already disappearing beneath the assessed valuation, and, in many quarters, even beneath the mortgaged indebtedness, when the eity was suddenly overtaken by one of the most gigantic financial col- lapses in modern times-^a collapse which shook the very foundations < of credit the whole world around, locked up the gold of the -Bast, and set England's surplus afloat for the rescue of the doomed continent. Europe was already^ deep in difficulties on account of the Panama collapse and the unsettled condition of affairs in the Argentine. The guarantors of the Baring failure had just extended their guarantees to retide matters over. The continuation of the fight among the great banking houses for a sufficient supply out of Europe's insufficient store of gold compelled England to look towards America. Aided by the excessive trading of our overhopeful merchants, England, by curtailing her purchases of our produce and by selling bur securities, replenished her gold supply. Moreover, the floating of the gold bonds of Austria had shoved large bodies of American securities back upon -our own market and increased the outflow of gold. This draining of our supply and the fall of prices led to hoarding money of- every description. One month after the crisis struck Melbourne; during the week of bank holiday, proclaimed by the government to give the people time to cool down: just as the collapse, which had been confined .to Melbourne, opened its maw as though about to engulf the whole continent, New Zealand and all ; then, as the giant banks of Australia were falling right and left, the great commercial centers of the United States were shaken. Two weeks later flashed across the wires the added news that five banks, with liabilities amounting to over $125,000,000, had gone down m three davs. In certain of our Western cities, whose condition since 1888 has been that of a collapse-in-suspense, the banks and business housesbegan 4 >.: . FINANCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSION. to close their doors, although their assets seemed to be large, at leasts to those who have hot taken in the world-wide situation and have not given years to the study of fictitious land values as a basis of mortgaged indebtedness. , , . My only apology for not accepting the* general explanation of the cause of this crisis and for not falling in with the lovely little panacea, by which all nations that have either a Sherman act to repeal or silver to demonetize may enter into the millenium of prosperity, is that I find nothing to support such theories; whereas, I have the facts by which I can demonstrate the accuracy of every statement made above. Very truly yours, Frederick 0. Waite. ' .' Hon. Henry M. Teller, United 'States Senate. 53d Congress, V ' SENATE. r Ex Doc 1st Session. ( ..1&W-% i No. 26." IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. 'LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, TRANSMITTING, In response to Senate resolution of September 28, 1893, statement of the annual interest on Government bonds on which interest has been antici- pated by the Treasury Department. October 11, 1893.— Ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, October 9, 1893: The President op the Senate : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following resolu- tion adopted by the Senate on the 28th ultimo, viz : JSesolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury he, and he is hereby directed to inform the Senate when, in what amount, and under what circumstances the Treas- ury Department has anticipated the payment of the annual interest on Government bonds since the 1st of July, 1880. ' In response thereto I have the honor to inclose herewith a state- ment, giving in detail and by fiscal years the payments of interest on the public debt before maturity since June 30, 1 880. The authority for advance payments of interest is contained in the following extract of the act of March 17, 1864 (section 3699, K. S.), viz: The Secretary of the Treasury may anticipate the payment of interest on the pub-, lie debt by a period not exceeding one year, from time to time, either with or with- out a rebate of interest upon the coupons, as to him may seem expedient. An order issued by the Department under this act that coupons would be paid on presentation sixty days before maturity, upon a rebate of interest, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, is still unre- voked, but has rarely been taken advantage of since 1880, the total amount of coupons presented under the order not exceeding $1,000. On two occasions, November 10, 1886, and August 3, 1887, the Depart- ment offered to prepay interest with a rebate of less than 6 per cent for periods from one to five months, and the sum realized from this source and covered into the Treasury amounted to $9,763.44. With these exceptions, the disbursements noted in the statement were made without deduction or expense to the holders of the bonds. In reviewing the circumstances under which interest has been pre- paid, it is assumed that the scope of the inquiry will be covered by con. 2 ANNUAL INTEREST ON GOVERNMENT BONDS. > 1 ^ sidering only payments in advance for periods exceeding six or seven days. / When interest was anticipated even for so short a period, it is proper t6 say that the conditions of the Treasury, and of the businessbf the ' country, were such as to make the exercise of the power advisable, if noli imperative. , In furtherance of the plan matured and put into operation by the Secretary of the Treasury in the spring of 1881, to reduce the 5 and 6 per cent loans to a loan payable at the option of the Government and bearing interest at 3J per cent per annum, the Department gave notice . on April 11, 1881, that on 6 per cent bonds of the loans of July and August, 1861, and of March 3, 1863, presented for continuance at the lower rate on or before May 10, 1881, the interest to July 1, 1881} would be prepaid at once. Under this offer there was paid during the months of April, May, and June $5,258,613 for interest payable July 1, 1881, on $175,287,100 6 per cent bonds. For like reasons and as an induce- ment to holders of the 5 per cent bonds to accept in lieu of their pay- ment on August 12, 1881, bonds bearing interest at 3£ per cent per annum, the Treasury offered on May 12, 1881, to, prepay on receipt of,' the 5 per cents surrendered for continuance on or before the 1st day of July, 1881, the interest to August 12, 1881. The sum so expended prior to August 12, 1881, for interest due then on 1401,504,900 5 per cent bonds, amounted to $5,542,231.27, and to effect the prompt presentation of called bonds^ of that class maturing October 1, 1881, holders were offered on August 22, 1881, payment of principal with interest to October 1, 1881, resulting in an expenditure of $366,- 055.94 for advauce interest on $17,541,250 bonds. With a constantly growing surplus in the Treasury over the ordinary expenses of the Government, and with the usual demand for money in the fall, the Department} to afford relief, on September 24, 1881, not only called in for payment on December 24, 1881, $20,000,000 in bonds, but on the same day announced its readiness, to redeem, weekly during October, $2,000,000 in 3£ per cent bonds, called or uncalled, with inter- est to date of redemption. Under like conditions holders of this class of bonds maturing on November 1, 1883, under call of July 26, 1883, were notified on August 15, 1883, that, commencing with August 22, $5,000,000 would be accepted weekly for redemption, i and interest, allowed to date of maturity of call. The amountprepaid during August, September, and- October, 1883,foT interest on the bonds presented, was . $220,969.62. Again, towards the, close of 1886, the commercial and financial situa- tion called for prompt action. Though profitable and beneficial employment had been found for the proceeds of surplus taxation in the retirement of over $54,000,000 in 3 per cent bonds during the four months of July, August, Septem- ber, and October, 1886, the cash balance in the Treasury, after pay- ment of the current expenses and obligations of the Government, had been diminished only . by about $8,540,000, or from $287,513,959 on July 1, 1886, to $278,970,868 on November 1, 1886, a large portion of the proceeds of called, bonds being left in the Treasury to redeem bank- note circulation, thus in a measure frustrating the efforts of the De- partment to reduce the cash accumulations through the medium of bond calls. To meet the exigency and prevent serious embarrassment, the De- partment on November 10, 1886, gave notice that the interest falling due December 1 and January 1 would be prepaid, and in this manner ANNUAL INTEREST ON GOVERNMENT BONDS. 3 the sum of $8,735,743.23 was returned to the channels of trade ' during: November and December, 1886, with great benefit to the country and. without embarrassment to the Treasury. The Financial Chronicle, of November 13, 1886, made the following: comments on the " financial situation : " There is, however, such an inquiry from the interior for crop and other pur- poses as to keep the bank reserves from accumulating to any great extent, and! until the outflow ceases or is counterbalanced by large supplies, there can be no'" important change. The payment by the Treasury without rebate of the December interest, amounting to $2,812,500, and with a rebate of 3 per cent per annum on the January interest, aggregating $9,528,400, will, with the other disbursements at this season of the year, distribute considerable money among individuals and corpora- tions, and of course tend to relieve the pressure;but the surplus revenue is so large' now (the debt reduction last month being $13,20 ',619) that accumulations in the Treasury are rapid. ' In May, 1887, the last of the bonds redeemable at the pleasure of the Government were called; there was no way of putting out again among the people the surplus, except by the purchase, of bonds at a premium or by deposits in national bank depositories. On account of the fact that there was no legislation upon the subject, except a provision in an annual appropriation act, which was con- strued by some to be temporary in its nature, the Secretary of the Treasury entertained doubts as to his authority to purchase bonds not required for the sinking-fund, and, therefore, as a means of relieving' the monetary stringency then existing, he gave notice on August 3, 1887, that the interest due on the public debt September 1, October 1, December 1, 1887, and January 1, 1888, would be prepaid on and after August 15, 1887; $10,682,706.40 was disbursed under this offer. The circumstances under which prepayments of interest were deemed advisable during the fall of 1890 and extending up to September 2, 1891, are fully described by the Comptroller of the Currency in the Finance Eeport for 1891, p. 324: "Agricultural interests were in an unsatisfactory condition; overtrading and unhealthful expansion were everywhere apparent." Immense sums from the Atlantic and Middle States and from abroad had been invested iii loans on city, suburban, and farm property, and in manufacturing and industrial enterprises. The failures of several banks in New York, simultaneously with the announcement that the house of Baring Brothers in London, known throughout the world for its conservatism and strength, had found itself inextricably entangled, brought about a situation which demanded prompt and liberal action by the Department. , The circulars published on July 19, August 19, 21, 30, September 6 and 13, and December 6, 1890, offering to purchase 4 and 4£ per cent bonds, and inviting the surrender for redemption of 4£.per cent bonds with prepayment of interest to May 31, 1891, >and August 31, 1891, had for their object the relief of the severe monetary stringency. The operations of the Treasury, rendered imperative not only by the financial and commercial interests of the country but by the largely increased revenues due to pending' changes in tariff legislation and to the act of July 14, 1890, which added to the available cash balance over $54,000,000, resulted in the release of over $100,000,000, of which $18,403,307.77 represented interest paid before maturity. The prepayment from July 14 to September 1, 1891, of $260,505 51, for interest due September 2, 1891, was offered as an inducement to holders of 4£ per cent bonds to accept, in lieu of payment, bonds at tne rate of 2 per cent per annum. 4 ANNUAL INTEREST ON GOVERNMENT BONDS. ; , , During the recent monetary stringency and general depression of business it was deemed advisable to anticipate the interest- due July 1 and September 1, 1893, and $4,981,845.90 and $21,820.25 were dis- bursed a few days in advance of date of maturity. " ■ Eespectfully yours, J. G-. Carlisle, ._]■*• Secretary. "?| Statement of interest prepaid on the public debt from July 1, 1880, to October 1, 189S. When due. Title of loan. Amount. When prepaid. Apr. 1, 1881 May 1, 1881 May 21,1881 July 1, 1881 Do. Do. Att 12, 1881 Do'.'.'.'.'.'.'. Oct. 1, 1881 Do Apr. 1, : Hov. 1, Do. Do. Dec. Jan. Do. Do. 1, 1886 1„1887 Julv 1 Sept. Oct. Do Dec. 1, 1887 1, 1887 Jan.' Do. Do. 1. 1887 1. 1888 4 per cent consols of 1907. - . 5 per cent funded loanofl8Sl do , Total, 1881 . Loans of July and August, 1861. and of March 3, 1863. do do $235, 555. 50 3,"219, 963. 00 1, 803, 094. 50 5 per centfunded loan of 1881 dp . .do . 3, 194, 916. 17 2, 213, 334. 01 133.981.09 5 per cent funded loan of 1881 do 152, 477. 39 213, 578. 55 Total, 1882 4 per cent consols of 1907. Funded loan of 1881, con- tinued at 3J per cent. do -----do 77, 172. 21 107, 288. 29 36, 509. 12 4£ per cent funded loan of 1891. 4 per cent consols of 1907 -do . Bonds issued in aid of Pa- cific railway companies. 879, 936. 50 4, 319, 324. 00 1, 604, 700. 00 Total, 1887. 4 per cent consols of 1907 — Bonds issued in aid of Pa- cific railway companies. 4* per cent funded loan of ., 1891. 4 per cent consols of 1907 do 3, 865, 251. 50 1, 356, 159. 60 807, 206. 50 4, 309, 268. 00 Do. Do. 4J per cent funded loan of 1891. 4 per cenl; consols of 1907 do Bonds issued in aid of Pa- cific railway companies. do .....do ....; 723, 786. 50 3, 308, 079. 00 53,400.00 76, '800. 00 928, 520. 40 Total, 1888 . Sept. 1,1890 Oct. 1, 1890 Do 4J per cent funded loan of 1891. 4 per cent consols of 1907 do 2, 959, 726. 00 1, 085, 847. 00 $3, 039, 250. 00 24, 561. 01 28, 136. 06 3, 091, 947. 07 5, 258, 613. 00 5, 542, 231. 27 11, 186, 900. 21 3, 980, 726. 00 220, 969. 62 1, 931, 782. 73 6, 803, 960. 50 8, 735, 743. 23 5, 221, 411. 10 222, 935. 00 5, 116, 474. 50 252, 711. 00 5, 090, 585. 90 15, 9Q4, 117. 50 141, 819. J6 4, 045, 573. 00 From Mar. 26 to 31. 1881. Apr., 1881. From May 1 to 20, 1881. From Apr. 27 to 30, 1881. May, 1881. June, 1881. June, 1881. July, 1881. From Aug. 1 to 11, 1881. From Aug. 22 to 31, 1881. September, 1881. From Mar, 20 to 31, 1883. From Aug. 15 to 31, 1883. September, 1883. October, 1883. / From JTov. 11 to 30, 1886. From Dec. 1 to 31, 1886. From Dec. 16 to 31, M86. From Dec. 21 to 31, 1886. From June 25 to 30, 1887. Do. From Aug. 15 to 31, 1887. From Aug. 15to Sept. 24,1887. From Sept. 26 to 30, 1887. ■ From Aug. 15 to Not. 30, 1887. From Ang.15, to Nov.23,1887. From Dec. 28 to 31, 1887. , From Aug. 15 to 31, 1887. September, 1887. From Dec. 28 to 31, 1887. From Aug. 25 to |1, 1890. From Sept. 10 to 30, 1890. From Sept. 18 to 30, 1890. ANNUAL, INTEREST ON GOVERNMENT BONDS. Statement of interest prepaid on the public debt, eic— Continued'. "When due. Title of loan. Amount. "When prepaid. Dec. 1, 1890 Do. Do. Do. i\ per cent funded loan of • 1891. do do do $5, 604. 37 373, 459. 08 64,673.44 31, 379. 06 Jan. 1, 1891 D« Mar. 1, 1891 4 per cent consols of 1907. . . , Bonds issued in aid of Pa- cific railway companies. 41 per cent funded loan of 1891. 2, 991, 686. 00 1,530,050.40 Do- Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. -do. .do . .do. .do. -do. .do. 5, 604. 37 373, 459. 08 64, 673. 44 31, 397. 06 22, 628. 81 19, 009. 69 18,556.25 Apr. 1, June 1, Do- Do. Do. Do- Do. Do- Do. Do. Do. 1891 1891 July 1, 1891 Do Sept. 1, 1891 Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Sept. 2,1891 Do July 1, 1893 Do 4 per cent consols of 1907 . . . -Uf per cent funded loan of 1891, -do. .do. .do . -do. .do. -do. -do. -do. .do. Total, 1891 - 4 per cent consols of 1907 — Bonds issued in aid of Pa- cific railway companies. 4i per cent funded loan of 1891. .do. .do. .do. -do. -do. -do. -do- -do. .do. .do. Total, 1892. Sept. 1, 1893 4 per cent consols of 1907. . Bonds issued in aid of Pa- cific railway companies. Funded loan of 1891, con- tinued at 2 per cent. Total, 1804 part. 5, 604. 38 373, 459. 08 64, 673. 44 31,397.06 22, 628. 81 19, 009. 69 18,556.25 22, 376. 81 29, 783. 25 2, 731. 50 2, 988, 915. 00 1, 530, 050. 40 373, 459. 08 64, 673. 44 31, 397. 06 22, 628. 81 19, 009. 69 18, 556. 25 22, 376. 81 29, 783. 25 2, 731. 50 $475, 133. 95 4, 521, 736. 40 535, 328. 70 2, 989, 915. 00 590, 220. 27 13, 299, 726. 50 4,518,965.40 93, 978. 27 166, 527. 24, 3,358,135.50 1,623,710.40 584, 615. 89 260, 505. 51 5, 364, 086. 80 4, 981, 845. 90 21, 820. 35 5, 003, 666. 15 I From Aug. 20 to 31, 1890. September, 1890. October, 1890. November, 1890. From Sept. 10 to Oct. 10, 1890. Do. From Aug-20 to 31, 1890. September, 1890. October, 1890. November, 1890. December, 189d. January, 1891. February, 1891. From Sept. 10 to Oct. 10, 1890. From Aug. 20 to 31, 1890. September, 1890. October, 1890. November, 1890. December, 1890. January, 189! , February, 1891. March, 1891. April, 1891. May, 1891. From Sept. 10 to Oct. 10, 1890. Do. September, 1890. October, 1890. November, 1890. December, 189q. January, 1891. February, 1891. March, 1891. April. 1891. May, 1891. From July 14 to 31, 1891. From Aug. 1 to Sept. 1 , 1891. From June 26 to 30, 1893. Do. From Aug. 24 to 31, : BECAPITUXATION BY FISCAL TBAES Fiscal year— 1881 1882 1883 - 1884 1887 1888 1891 - ; 1892 ■ From July 1, 1893, to Oct. 1, 1893 Aggregate ... $3,091,947.07' ... 11,166,900.21 ... 3,980,726.00 220; 969. 62 ... 8,735,743.23 ... 15,904,117.50 ... 13,299,726.50 ... 5,364,086.80 ... 5,003,666.15 ... 66,767,883.08 53d Congress, ) SENATE. ( Ex. Doc. 1st Session. ] \ No. 28. IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES. LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, IN REPLY TO A resolution of the Senate of October 2, 1893, calling for a statement giving the aggregate amount of silver bullion purchased during Septem- ber, 1893, together with the cost thereof, the amount, the date, and price of each purchase, etc. October 14, 1893. — Laid on the table and ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, Office of the Secretary, Washington, B. C, October 14, 1893. The President of the Senate: Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following resolution adopted by the Senate October 2, 1893 : Besolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he hereby is, directed to fiuv nish the Senate "with a statement giving the aggregate amount of silver bullion purchased under the act of July fourteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety, during the month of September, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, together with the cost thereof, the amount, date, and price of each purchase, and the name of the vendor. Also the aggregate amount of silver bullion offered for sale during the said month, the amountf date, and price of each offer, and the name of the person making such offer. In reply I transmit statement, prepared by the Bureau of the Mint, giving in detail the information called for. The delay in furnishing this information more promptly was occa- sioned by the fact that returns of local purchases at the mint at ban Francisco were only received to-day. , Eespectfully yours, ^ & 0AELIgLE) Secretary. '2 PURCHASE OF SILVER BULLION. ''"$ o ■gaS Spa 2 a ■ 2|l III S P 9 a Pi« g t>Nin oo to o co to CO CO "^ CO ^ CO t* O r- II r ooo ooo ooo ooo ooo ooo o"o"iri~ ■l-H G" « to hj3H ■3 3 &,f is* 53 a w | a *sa ' bo fcj a a -° d! ft ■*■% .■» -gaga ^ 9+3,3 bij S.S-3 •8 i e a^ wl |«] wsa ?s w o a o S n ..Sl3 5<1 CO Q. 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S "*t- t> t- t- t-t>c- t> c- ■W- 43 . ■O OO o ooooc c c o fl'tf go OO o oo o o c cz c o © go oo o o o ooc c c o o *-> e- l> O o" 3^ oo o inMo"o"c ir I r-t m MTtiooff t- os OS © £ 1 M eg ■4 oW ^ S'S Pt3^ « J' 8 -JS! N i > 5 h I 1 1 : i * 1 i d ? t i 8-1* A"* a '■ 3 2 » I l-sl-s "c + F c 1 c ) 1 I 3 3 -ci c4cq O SffiOIAC 1 c i e 3 CO , s &,-* s r P 3 P< X 53d Congress, ) SENATE. ( Mis. Doo. 1st Session. I \ No. 29. IN THE' SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES. August 22, 1893. — Ordered to be printed. Mr. Hoar presented the following LETTER FROM ERNEST SEYD TO SAMUEL HOOPER ON THE SUB- JECT OP COINAGE I have the bill before me, and Mr. Latham kindly sent me a copy of your remarks respecting my book and inviting my suggestions. I cheerfully respond to this invitation and beg to submit to you the following re- marks. (I shall pass over those sections in reference to which I have no remarks to make, and point to others requiring notice.) I . , » La Princes Street Bank, London, February 17, 1872. To Samuel Hooper, Esq., M. C. : Dear Sir: You were kind enough to forward to Mr. Alfred Latham a 1 copy of your coinage bill for the United States, to be sent to me, and you expressed a wish to receive criticisms on its provisions. Sec 14 The issue of a variety of gold coins, such as the $20, $10, $5, $d, $<% and $1 pieces, is injudicious. True, the $20 piece is a magnificent coin, but for ordinary purposes in obtaining change it is less useful than four $5 pieces, for laro-e transactions connected with international trade the $20 pieces are the most convenient coins for melting down, and that is the fate of the majority of them. The $1 gold piece, on the other hand, is. much too small. Its wear is excessive, and it soon becomes totally unfit for a standard of value. The Jrench 5-francs gold piece has already been condemned for this very reason. A variety of coins must also be objected to for another reason, viz: That connected with the handling of the pieces it prevents the use of the "weighing scales." On pages 161, 165, of my book "Suggestions in reference to the metallic currency of the United States," 1 speak of this matter at length, and I think the remarks therein made are worthy of attention. «,„:,. ™i„„ r i,vn ton I can quite understand that Americans, accustomed to see their splendid $20 piece and the $1 piece, do not folly appreciate the weight of these objections but it must be borne in mind that the American public have only had a short period, Z from 1849 to 1861, in which they bad anything like dealing m gold money, since which time, through^ war, they have been so much habituate^ to rr 'money, whereas we in England, accustomed to vigorous dealings in gold ' have Crnei experience, and are better able to appreciate these distinctions and ^rimportencefrom practical and economical points of view. And from thew points of view the question of a variety of gold coins is not an Eng ish or an Ameri- can one, bit one of cosmopolitan importance also, for there are principles involved ^In'Eneland we only issue sovereigns and half sovereigns; but we complain and with iust reason, of the latter piecf (see X's letter in English, page 40, of German Lnrpllet which I send herewith, wherein the issue of the one-half sovereign is fitffiv called a legislative error). The German new coinage will consist princi- pally of the 20-mar^ and only a limited number of 10-mark pieces w,ll be Ssued The French have coined 100 francs and 40 fran* pieces only as f'show ^pieces," and the 5 francs gold pieces will be given up. 2 COINAGE. "■■-',$ '"-'? - 1 think that America. ought to coin only $10 and $5, or $5 and $2| pieces, certainly.' not more than $10, $5, and $2J, and that the $20, $3, and $1 pieces onght not- to be coined, excepting as show pieces, in limited quantities. The suggestion that'$2Q ; pieces can be coined cheaper, has no foundation worth mentioning. The question of a variety of coins has also a most important bearing on the abrasion of the pieces and 'their consequent lightness; In the bill I find nothing; whatever making provision for this ; and I may perhaps be pardoned for charging this omission to the account of the general want of thorough experience made- in America in re£ erenee to gold coin. ' Where are the provisions for limiting the current weight of gold coins ? May they' be abrased or light to any extent and still continue legal tender? And, if not, who is to bear the cost of their reinstatement f ' In England the individual holder must bear the loss ; if the sovereign is under weight by three-quarters of a grain it is cut up and the owner loses the difference. In France the state has hitherto withdrawn light gold, but sparingly; on the rest the coinage is young-, and the question will now be postponed because of the paper issue. In Germany the new coinage bill provides for the reinstatement of worn coins by the state; but the question is open; for, as the state has conquered the gold and, issues it at its own option, it can afford such a liability. It is, however, aeknowl- * edged that the business "of making coins light" and obtaining new ones for them may become extensive. The English system, in regard to light coins, is the only true one. Attempts were made by Mr. Lowe to levy 1 per cent, mintage, so as to provide a fund from which 5 ) the recoinage loss on old pieces by the state might be recouped. The proposal,; 1 however, as it deserved, fell through as absurd. The controversy on that .score has been published by the Bank of England. The letters in English (printed in the German pamphlet) again refer to the matter. The allowance for light coin made here is 3£ grains, i. e., the mint weight of the * sovereign being 123.274 grains, it ceases to be legal currency when below 122| grains.' 1 ; Thepublic offices, "and the Bank of England's issue department, weigh out light pieces and cut them by a machine. The owner can receive the pieces, so cut, back >" again, or sell them to the bank as standard bullion, at 77.9 per ounce. Some people complain, of this, but all who have fully studied the .subject, agree that it is the only true way of settlement, and that the coinage can' thus be kept in fair order. The $20 piece ought not to.be allowed to lose more than 2, grains, the $10 1J grains, - the $5 i grain, the, $3 and $2£ £ grain, the $1 J grain, and you will now at once perceive how very necessary it is that the variety of the pieces should be as restricted as possible, so as to save trouble to the public departments and the Treas- ; ury. I do not know how you intend to treat this matter, and whether this plan of •keeping the gold coinage in order may not excite much opposition. The favorite idea of those opposed to this system is, that the state itself shouldpay ; for light coins, either by a direct appropriation from the revenue, or by apylying the ' "profits" of themint on the token coinage for this purpose. In this country it has been 1 shown that the state has no such obligation ; that by so doing it would only encourage the sweating of the coin, and as for the profit on the minor coinage, you will find that it can not be brought into accord with the wear and tear of the gold coin. We look upon all these suggestions as "hocus pocus." I think, therefore, that your public departments ought to cheek the gold received by them, taking out the light pieces and defacing them by a Btamp, but that the mint should undertake to buy these pieces by weight, giving new ones for them. And if the mint does not charge the one fifth per cent brassage on such light coin, but makes the exchange by weight gratis, it makes a sacrifice in the matter which is already beyond its immediate functions; and this policy may be adopted as a com- promise between the holders of light coin and the state. It can not be asserted, for instance, that gold pieces of one-half or one-quarter dol- lar could be used, hence the idea of a limit in size must be maintained, and there can only be one true limit, so to speak. This true'limit excludes the one dollar piece at once; indeed, the two and one-half-dollar piece is somewhat below it, and all Euro- pean mmt masters agree with me that a gold piece of about three and three-quarter dollars should be the smallest. Unfortunately, almost all the monetary systems are : committed to smaller pieces. Bearing in mind, however, that the one-dollar piece is absolutely away from this limit, it would seem to be injudicious to select it as "unit of value;" it would be like starting with an "imperfect" thing. In.section 14 I find the expression "of the one-dollar piece or unit of value." The" term "unit of value" (rather vague wherever used) might best be taken as implying a * standard of value. Now, the one-dollar gold piece is not a suitable piece, as experi- ence shows, and such experience does not rest on mere practical results, but on COINAGE. 3 to i f} 1 i I ! 1 1 fff COUIle0 1 te ?* itll .? 16tall . ur 8'y and fixed mechanical laws, having reference, Inftle'Srnrof'slrce t^T™* V °™ ° f ^ ^^ StrU ° tUre ^° !*«* M^m^.i ™w£ e W ^f T y coin 1 of /' denominational" value should be selected t?v« ^^ c + 1 a al ,T a ? u . ator ; Jhe true valuator is the bullion itself by weight, irrespec- div1 R inn^ MT n lnt X pi6CeS ' and , as . th e weight of the latter is led off from the divisions of the ounce, the ounce itself is the proper starting point. This practice £SE3™ ^ **}? larg6 8tat6S; ^ US iD EnglanS, 480 ounc? S P st a ndard gol d P =l 869 plt„5 i - ( i* ese fi £!^ s are , 80 S lven be cause they are without fractions) in fi™ ^ ? d0 ^ an i ?°° fine gold = 3,100 francs ; in Germany (new law) the mint lb tt»ti H ( ° ne " h ,o lf kll0 " ) = 465 thalers or i' 395 mar H and so might the United withou d fractions) °' m0eS standard ( 9 °°) = $800 (thjs gives correct proportions Hence section 14 might commence: "That the standard weight of gold coins shall be in the proportion of 43 ounces of standard gold to $800, viz, thf weight of the double eagle, etc "leaving out "or unit .of value" in line 8. And if in addition thereto you could introduce "provided that the double eagle, the $3 and the $1 piecebe manufactured and issued only by an express order from the Secretarv of the Treasury." Thus you would not abolish- these three pieces, but give libertv to try the more restricted variety. - i ■ The policy of using the ounce of bullion as the standard of value can best be appreciated by those who are fully acquainted with vigorous dealings and holdings in bullion, and the necessity and economy involved in acquiring and retaining it in this respect America fails signally; the want of a suitable "reservoir" for hold- ing bullion during the phases of international exchanges, without coining it, leads; to unnecessary mint operations and to losses, direct and indirect, in American com- merce. In Europe we have large central banks (banks of England, France, and Prussia), which, by their note issue, thus hold uncoined bullion, receiving and part- ing with it. In my book (Suggestions, etc.) I have endeavored to make this clear. It is very possible that Americans are opposed to such a central bank for a national issue based on bullion (as I have proposed it), and that as long as the Treasury must , continue its policy of selling gold in the market against greenbacks the way is not - clearly seen. Nevertheless, that is no reason why some such system of " reservoir " for bullion should not be established by the Treasury through the Mint or vice versa. I know what your usual Mint certificates are which carry with them the time taken by the mint in making the coinl I think that the system can be made to go further. Sup- posing, for instance, that such a clause as this were introduced into the bill: "Sec. — . That it shall be lawful for the Secretary of the Treasury to issuer through the Director of the Mint, bullion certificates' (payable to bearer) of gold bullion deposited at the Mint, such certificates 1 stating the value of the bullion so deposited, upon the owner of such bullion paying the coinage charge thereon in United States gold coin; and if the value of such deposit exceeds the sum of $20,000 the Director of the Mint, at the option of the owner, shall have the right of paying the fractional sum above the last $1,000 in coin, issuing the certificate for a round sum in thousandths and deducting the coinage charge therefrom; and if the amount deposited be below $20,000, the owner of such bullion shall pay such addi- tional sum in United States gold coin as will complete a round sum in thousandths. Provided, That at the option of the Director of the Mint such certificates shall be paid on presentation, either in bullion or coin, or in such proportions of bullion and coin as he may deem fit : And, provided also, That if the owner of such bullion chooses to be paid in coin he shall receive in exchange thereof a mint certificate specifying the time when such coin will be ready for delivery." I do not know whether I have worded this section in American bill style, but I think I can show you its advantages : - 1. It will entirely do away with the necessity of keeping a special mint fund as provided by section 50. 2. It relieves the State of uselessly coining the gold, for the greater portion of American coins go to European melting pots (see Suggestions, pages 24 and 25), and the monthly sales of gold are absorbed that way. 3. The Government will make the profit of one-fifth per cent coinage charge, without having coined (a similar profit is made by the Banks of England and France, which buy gold less the supposed coining charge and sell it at mint value). 4. The owners of such bullion certificates will be paid at once, and for shipment to Europe bullion is more profitable to them. (See suggestions, pages 197 and 198.) 5. If coin is insisted upon by the holders, they can get it on the usual terms by the ordinary coin certificates. 6. The provisions for the "rounding off" of the certificates in thousands I think are very useful and necessary in order to make these instruments convenient and popular, and the provisions as to the right of the mint to insist upon a balance of 1: , ' ~ COINAGE. \ loin to make up a round sum below 20,000 (or less) is, 'of course, expedient. For urns above that amount the' mint might keep a small reserve of coin. 7. The United States Treasury would, of course, hold the gold instead of the mint md might also hold the certificates so as to maintain its control over the gold market bs long as requisite. I am convinced that this system will enable the 1 Governmeut to effect great saving n minting gold, lead, to regular operations in supply, retain bullion in the country, md be much more satisfactory to the exchange market and the public. Superior to this policy 1 hold the establisnrent of a large central bank (Sugges- ions, p. 68), but in the meantime I think that the above Clause might well be ncluded in the mint bill. Sec. 25. Assayer. — It is essential in every mint law that the inspector of bul- ioh should know " how the assay of gold" is to be stated. Is the assay to be in 1,000 . >arts or one-half of thousandth parts, or in ten-thousandth parts. . " The importance if this will at once be apparent to you, when I state that by the thousandth assay tn importerwould obtain say $9,990 for a-certain parcel of bullion, whereas if the ien-thousandth part was stated he might obtain $9,999, or $9 more. In the United States assays are stated at two-thousandths fine, in France at ten- housandths fine. -Why should the United States assayers not state the assay in the lame way as the French ? >. I am perfectly well aware that the American assayers assert (in print and in peech) that they can not assay so fine, and that the liability to error ranges between i >ne and two ten- thousandths. If the American assayers were subject to the same ;ompetition as ours are here, they would soon learn how to do it. I underline these vords in the hope that you will not allow yourself to be jostled out of the wish to >romote accuracy. , We have made numerous experiments here in Europe, and find that although di- rergencies will occur of one-tenth per mille and occasionally two-tenths per niille, ret that on the whole, the assays agree, and that at all events, the purchaser of bullion tan not lose, because he has an almost entire one ten-thousandth part as a margin. !n France, the tariff for qualities of gold is at one ten-thousandth fine, and the assays it the Bank of France corresponded with the independent assays of the mint, for a soihage of 100 millions of francs (gold) within 132 francs, and that in favor of the tank. 'French assayers pretend to go to one one-hundred- thousandth fine, and I am satiet * ied that it can be fairly done; yet in America the one two-thousandth is still main- sairied. Even the British mint has always assayed to one-thirty-second grain fine, iquivalent to one twenty-five-hundredth fine, and the Bank of England, in conse- quence of a pamphlet which I wrote (see Suggestions, p. 174) altered its assay lystem to one thirty-three-hundredth fine, although it is not a Government concern. Vll bur British and continental assayers state assays to one ten- thousandth fine ; . leveral go to one one-hundred-thousandth pa- ts (in half .005). I think that the least Americans can do is the, adoption of the one ten-thousandth jart; rely upon it — all opposition in this is captious. I trust that there are. really icientific men in the States able to make such accurate assays ; but I maintain that f even they are unable to vindicate the rights of scientific, accuracy and if they ;ontinue to insist upon errors between one and three ten-thousandth the system shouM, leverthele'ss beadopted, because, as said before, the Mint or thepurehaser of bullion ;an not on the average go wrong, and above that he has an entire one ten-thousandth reserved. So in section 25 atthe end of line 2there should be the words: "in tenths )f milliemes" — a technical term perfectly understood. Sec. 26. In my bpok " Suggestions, etc.," 1 recommend a coinage charge of one- ;enth per cent, and if the organization and machinery of state mints were perfected [See "Improvements in the process of coining" in the Society of Arts Journal sent herewith) that rate would cover the actual working expenses. I am opposed to the so-called absolute free coinage, and I am glad to observe that you propose one-fifth per cent at all events as an installment, and ! I hope it will not be increased. The charges for refining, melting, etc., ought to be put at as low a figure as possible, or even at a sacrifice to the Mint. Sec. 36. The "allowance" or remedy for gold of only one one-thousandth in fine- less is an improvement; in England and France it is two one-thousandths. This ad- vance in favor of accuracy in America strengthens my demand for assaying to one ten-thousandth part fine, as remarked on section 25. Sec. 39. The allowanqe for deviation in' ,the weight of the half eagle is in ac- cordance with the practice here, but for the $2.50 and $1 pieces it is far too large; ;he $2.50 piece ought to have but one-eighth or one-sixth the dollar, say one-tenth )f a grain. Sec. 46. Allows to the melter and refiner one- thousandth part of weight for a;old and one and one-half-thousandth for silver waste, and to the coiner one-half- thousandth for gold and one-thousandth for silver waste. These are enormous al- COINAGE. i K l " th^t'exten^ 1 "' 5 * 1 ' ^ "^ 0pinion ' are taQ taniount only to' "legalizing pilfering" to .,^ alt °P therre PU diat e the suggestion that any material can be absolutely lost in. the melting or coming. I admit that during the process of melting, copper may oxidize, but in that case the gold or silver alloy becomes finer, as th? assay by ™ne ™r a ,n^ f W< £ ld ^iV Care ™ manipulation and proper heating less^M this fh?™Z\ « h a f* 6r aU ' ^ m ^ lter th °roughly knows his business, h? can find ont the average oxidation, and should be allowed to make a slight surcharge of copper say one-tenth per mill, to counterpoise it. ^ copper, m ^ e ^ eV ^ P0 f a ^ i0n ''. 0f ^- r ? S°l d and silv6r oaly takes place when the metal is Z?,H ™! a ?'• and P ar * 10les o* it, by stirring, go up the flue, where they can be found. Inw subject has been well tested here and elsewhere, and the evaporation has been found so infinitesimal that one one-hundred-thousandth part will cover it over and over again, notwithstanding all the assertions and statistics of other mint officers. Supposing, then, that the above-mentioned surcharge of copper is so that a loss of weight to one-tenth per mill becomes possible, and making a liberal allowance for so-called evaporation," I maintain that a loss of one-eighth per mill ought co cover the whole ; yet your bill allows eight times as much for gold and twelve times as much lor silver. But it will be said, "There are spillings in casting, and trace's of metal adhere to ttie pot, etc. I know all that; but they can all be got out of the "sweepings," they can not disappear, and if I allow another one-eighth per mill, i. e., one-fourth per mill for absolute (?) loss in melting, all these contingencies are covered: the rest, the three-fourths and 1£ per mill,, are simply stolen. Under melting and refining I presume that you understand the melting and bringing ' to standard of gold, but not the process of "parting" by acids, here called refining, :£ r ™? Se ' P artln S" operations, properly speaking, are separate from the business of the Mint, and conducted by private refiners. The parting process does not give any loss; on the contrary as the assay is always higher, it yields more gold. (The spill- ing and dropping about of metal can he altogether avoided if the plan of casting plates be adopted,, as recommended in my paper in the Journal of the Society of Arts, page 178, for the whole melting pot can be emptied at once into the mold.) You are, no doubt, in possession of a book on the British Mint, written by Mr. G. F. Ansell, wherein you will find this business of losses well laid open. On page 101 of that book is a condensed statement showing that the highest loss ever made by that mint in melting is not quite four-tenths per mill (in 1868-'69) whilst in the " years 1857-1866 it was as low as sixteen and one-half one-hundredths per rnille (Mr. Ansell then managing the mint), and the high loss of four-tenths per mille is clearly owing to the fact that the work is badly done, and that frequent spillings are "pur- posely" made. Yet you would give them permanent authority to lose one-tenth per cent. I assert that a conscientious melter, one who looks well after the men, does not require sueh an allowance. In the coining department no loss whatever is possible, unless the work is done bad purposely. Slight traces will sometimes color the rollers, or the oil may carry with it small atoms, but any bits or strips, no matter how small, must be found in the sweepings. The statement on page 101 of Mr. AnselKs book shows that from , 1851 to 1857 the losses in the coining department of the British Mint were very high (when several prosecutions for pilfering were instituted); since then, as the statement shows, they have been very trifling, and during Mr. Ansell's time there were slight gains, as there should be, lor the 1,000 sovereigns (previously weighed singly) may be short only by 5 grains, to produce the average of grains stated on 1,000,000 pieces. , .The. lowest total loss in melting, standarding, and coining in England since 1857 is 140 per million and the highest 330, yet your bill allows a margin of 1,500 per million. And if you take into account that the assay at the mints in the United States is stated at only one one-half thousandth, giving an average surplus of one- fourth or 250 against the British Mint margin of one thirty-second grain fine, one- eighth or 125 average, the, total allow;ed by you, would be 1,650 per million. This is so extravagant and extraordinary that I must protest against it, notwith- standing all the experience and statements of the mint authorities. ' Compare this allowance, for instance, with the French Mint law. The French contractors receive 6.70 francs for coining 3,100 francs— 2,170 per million. ' They are credited and debited with over and under weight, they take the metal at one ten thousandth part of assay, and in the trials of their coins they are rigorously cred- ited and debited with fineness over or below the one ten thousandth part, i. e., if the coin assays, say 900.2, they are credited with the "two;" if, say 899.7 they are debited by 3. They are consequently bound hand and foot and dare not allow any waste. If they conceded 1,650 per million out of the 2,170, they would only have oner half per mille left. ^KJLVtJWtrj. It may be alleged that pilfering by the men can not be prevented. Let me assuresifg pou it can. The French contractors do it and turn out their men if they find any ,™ musual discrepancy, and tlje men know that they must not rob, the employeTs.i""In ■! ;he British Mint there is no such guard, and if in the United States you actually j Legalize the allowance of 1,500 per million, you may depend upon its being made. | lse of. . ': , The best plan is to make no allowance at -all, but let the published returns speak For themselves, or if limits be thought advisable, let them be fixed at no more than, me-third of the rates named by the bill, with the understanding if the losses exceed "'■ ;hese rates • that an inquiry shall take place, which, if' not,clearing up the matter, • will lead to the discharging of the men. I maintain that if the responsible melters md coiners earnestly take the trouble to show the men how to melt, cast, and coin ^and no one should be so appointed unless by his own hands he can show and train men), they may prove " how gold and silver can not be lost," and that must stand as i precedent for future proceedings. The discharge of men should not be feared; a working chief melter and coiner can always train new hands, if he has a mind to lo so. I know very well that in enlarging upon this subject I touch upon an often-dia-' ; jussed chronio mint sore, but I know that I am right. . - ; In pleading then for legal enactments in favor qf the one ten-thousandth part ,«! issay, far better machinery, and the avoidance of "legalizing" waste, I request you to recognize my wish that the' United States may succeed in vindicating the princi- ples of "accuracy" in their mints. v Sec. 50. I think that if the suggestion in reference to the bullion certificates alluded to before be adopted the fund in question will be but a very moderate one. • SEc. 51. I now come to the most important part of the bill, that of the valuation ; which, according to section 15, omits the coinage of the silver dollar and confirms the debased silver coinage of half dollars and below, under the tender limit of $5. [ am aware, of course^ that through the amendment of 1853 the same debased soinage was already established; but although the actual coinage of /the silver dollar had practically ceased, still that piece was not abolished by law. As this new bill presumably repeals all previous enactments, I suppose that the total -j abolition of the silver dollar is contemplated. In my book (Suggestions) I enter fully into the discussion of this matter and show the gigantic consequences to international as well as national trade through '.•-,• the demonetization of silver, to which the United States would thus lend a helping • hand, and for'a number of years this subject of the abolition of silver as tender coin iaB occupied the attention of European economists. It is the question of the age, md takes precedence of every other matter involved in monetary science. Unfortunately the subject requires not only a thoroughly practical knowledge, of ">' ixchange matters, the, principles of valuation, for which very few people have in- ilination, and so it happens that even the framers of mint bills do not grasp its mportance, as I have found before. You yourself, in your letter to Mr. Latham, re- ferring to my book, make the remark : "As to the theory of the double valuation, I lo not understand it.'" I infer from this that you have remained a stranger to the jontroversy, that you have not as yet formed an opinion as to the merits of it, and ;hat you have framed your bill in favor of the absolute gold valuation according to ihat which has been of late the practice in the United States if not the law. Permit me to beg that you will first investigate the question of double' versus angle valuation. Chapter in of my book, "Suggestions," etc., opens the question,. ," : ippendix, Notes viii (page 201) the consequences Of the gold valuation, and IX (page '-* !12) the injustice of the gold valuation. Treat the matter in their international and , lational aspects,, and they may fursish you sufficient materials for reflection. Other writers, such as Mr., Wolowski, in France, and several other French, Dutch, ' '-, md German authorities, defend the double valuation on the same grounds. The great portion of English economists defend the gold valuation but sevetaLof [. ;hem have lately come over to my views, and one of them, the most important and a itaunch defender of English institutions, to whom I shall presently allude, has igreed with me as to the advisability of modifying the English' gold valuation, which is even less strict than that adopted by your bill for America. These pages lo not afford room for the whole discussion of the subject ; therefore, I beg you will •ead the parts of the books quoted, so as to form an opinion of it. Apart from the theory, why should America have given up her silver dollar? The '■■", ;ause of its disappearance from circulation is due to the original error of there being ' ;oo much silver in the piece (see page 52 of Suggestions), That cause would have been emoyed if the dollar weighed 400. grains, that being the true proportion of 1 to 15* ;old to silver, instead of fl2£ grains as by the old law. Why should it not be reintroduced at' its true full weight of 400 grains and become igam one of the active agents of commerce? The charge of weight as against the ndi vidual piece does not hold good when two half dollars are of nearly equal weight COINAGE. 7 and same value. Railways and steam transport large masses with great facility when compared with previous times. Do you fear its undue exportation ? If so exported, America will get its equivalent for it and the rich silver mines of the country can give any fresh supply of it; there- fore the more it is exported the better it is for America. I think that the United States, with both her gold and silver mines, is in the emi- nently favorable position of upholding the full use of both'gold and silver,' and that the double valuation (as it existed before) would be of great benefit to the country ; but you may, nevertheless, giving way to the one-sided arguments of English econo- mists incline to the gold valuation and express the fear "that if America adopts the silver dollar and lays itself open to the coining of these pieces for the public to whatever quantity of silver may be sent in from coinage from abroad, and if full, legal-tender value is given to such pieces, it may be placed in danger of losing gold and obtaining too much silver currency." That is the only fear to be apprehended, and certainly as long as England and other countries are in conflict as to the systems of valuation this may be the case. France, however, by her system of double valuation accumulated more gold bul- lion than any nation has ever had, having within the last twenty years coined two and one-half times as much as England, aud if the universal valuation was a double one, i. e., both metals in equal use, these fluctuations would altogether cease. Against this danger of too much silver America can guard itself without the total abolition of the full-valued silver dollar. It is but necessary so to modify the severity of the gold of valuation as to admit of a reasonable use of silver dollars. . Supposing that a certain amount of silver dollars of full value (400 grains) were issued, coined for the owner at a charge of say 1 per cent mintage, and that the limit of tender for such pieces were fixed at say $50 to $100, would this in any way interfere with the supremacy of the gold valuation? I contend that the gold valu- ation would remain supreme with either of these restrictions, viz, either a certain limited issue and giving full-tender weights to the coin, or with unrestricted issue limiting the tender value. Both restrictions combined will undoubtedly prevent any excess, and if under them certain amounts were so issued and used the issue of more might be made dependent thereon; so that while for the present the gold valuations were maintained in full force the door would not be shut' abruptly and forever on silver; and pending the future international settlement of a. universal system of valuation the pure double valuation might be found not only practicable but necessary. I urge this upon you not only on cosmopolitan grounds but also in the interest of American silver mines, for [if America, so important a part of the world, rushes blindly and irrevocably into the gold valuation and thus contributes to the general terrible error, the value of silver must fall greatly (see appendix, note 8, the consequence of the gold valu- ation-), and all the arrangements made, even with the debased silver coinage, fall to pieces. America then should hesitate to enter upon this course without a full previous investigation of the immensely important considerations appertaining thereto. The proper issue of silver dollars might be provided for in the bill by the intro- duction between sections 14 and 15 of some such — Sec. — . "That of the silver coin the weight of the $1 piece shall be 400 grains, which coin shall be legal tender at its denominational value to any amount not exceed- ing $100 (or $50)." And this would have to be followed between sections 21 and 22 by — SeC. — . " That the charge foT converting standard silver into silver dollars, when- ever,the mint is ready according" to section — , to coin such silver dollars, shall be one per cent." ' _, The object of these clauses will be apparent to you. The Secretary ot the lreas- ury mav commence, for instance, by authorizing the coining of one million ot silver dollars." The holders of the silver bullion would gladly pay the 1 per cent charge rather than send the bars to Europe. What risk would the holders of these dollars run? Even supposing that the public -positively refused to take these coins the holders could sell them as silver to Europe ; but I believe that they would be welcomed even without the law of tender. And, if yon succeed by the force of legal tender in compelling people to take in payment coins debased by 4 to 5 per cent to tne amount of $5, why should not you succeed in placing coins of full and honest value into healthy circulation? .... So, if the first million succeeded, the Secretary then might authorize more, encour- aging it even, whilst at any time, by ceasing his advertisement, he could foreclose the Mint against an excessive importation of silver from abroad. You will also perceive that -the reintroduction of the silver dollar is a necessity, seeing that the $1 gold piece is an unsuitable coin, and that it can take place with- out disturbing clauses 14 and 15, the latter providing for the issue of debased halt dollars, quarters, and dimes as they are now. 8 • COINAGE. , v :?f Indeed I must wish also that the half dollar should"be of full value so that the is- * sue of those pieces should not he guided by the more or less faulty human judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury, but by the pure action between supply and de- mand. I put the "supply"'first as the active "demand creating" element in all matters of commercial intercourse. But as the. debased half dollar is already in use it may be best not to disturb it now, whilst the whole silver dollar can be intro- duced again without any disturbance ih~the other coinage. I quite recognize the necessity of giving the character of tokens to copper coins and to lower class silver coins. What I contend is, that " enough is the evil thereof," and that it is wrong to extend this character of tokens to coins which, like the dol- lar and half dollar, are so important in social intercourse, and where supply should not be restricted by unfavorable laws. I may now mention that Mr. Win. Newmarch.T. E. s., who, as president of the economical branch of the Social Science Congress, lately delivered an oration on ihe advantages which he supposed England had derived from the gold valuation,' nevertheless agrees with me that we in England might with advantage issue a full- valued 4s. piece without disturbing the gold valuation, and that we might thereby militate against the evil of a constant or periodical scarcity of silver coin, in the hands of the lower classes and a correspondingly constant or periodical sole surplus in the hands of bankers, In a lecture delivered before the Statistical Society in February, 1871, on "Cur- rency Laws and Pauperism," I showed that excessive poverty and idleness, in Eng- land among the lower classes was due to the restricted supply of mediums of ex- change suitable to their wants as menus of intercourse between themselves, and that the scarcity' of silver coin was the consequence of the severe laws oppressing the use and debasing the. value of this kind of money. (The substance of this lecture is contained in appendix, note 9, "Injustice of the gold valuation," in Sug- festions, etc.) I there proposed, as a mitigating measure the issue of full-valued s., pieces, and I have from many well-informed quarters received sufficient en- couragement to anticipate that in spite of the strong prejudice and want of spirit of inquiry prevailing in England in reference to such questions it will be seriously considered. Now the United States gold valuation is even more severe than in England, for whilst here the limit for silver is £2, or $10, it is but five with you. _ ' I venture, therefore, to recommend to" you the introduction of these clauses in faVor of the silver dollar. At all events, I hope you will fully investigate this sub- ject before you commit America to this course of the one-sided gold valuation. Men like yourself, on framing a coinage bill, undertake a gigantic responsibility, which strongly affects, not only a whole nation's welfare and happiness, but also that of the world at large. Pray do not despise this language. The deep study of all the principles and' interest connected with the organization of social life warrants it. Obscure as this subject is to many people they succeed in establishing their work, and when it once stands it is like a fate decreed, to which all must bow because they do not' see its evils clearly, and it is difficult to amend it. N'ay, as an existing thing it is defended and elevated into a principle, although the original principles on which it was founded were quite at variance with the subsequent facts. In this respect the English legislation of 1816 which established the gold val ua- tion furnishes a striking example. At that time nobody dreamed of California and Australia, andas the literature of the time' shows a comparative scarcity of gold was anticipated and England urged to secure a share by its now system. But how com- pletely have the conditions been reversed! , So with Michael Chevalier in 1850. First he wro'te down gold and recommended its demonetization; then he turned the table upon silver. Now he is in doubt, inclining to Wolowski's views. From England, of course, you will, for some years to come yet, hear views in favor, of gold valuation, and altogether, you must expect from here the tendency of making tokens of all the lower classes of coin. Our esteemed mutual friend, Mr. Alfred Latham, even goes so far, as to declare that the half-sovereign might be made a token. Where are the principles which justify such a view! Do they lie deeper than the natural sense of equity, or is the suggestion one arising from surface ex- perience? I imagine that there can be but one truth and that this truth can not be supplanted by mere expedients which, in violating it, draw consequences after them of which their authors can not give an account, because, forsooth, -they mis- take a certain degree of prosperity as brought about by these very measures, whereas that prosperity rests on quite different grounds, and would be greater if these un- justifiable violations of truth did not irrevocably damage the interests of certain sections of the community. The whole question of token currency, or rather that of the portion of token currency in any monetary system, is as yet in its infancy. Historical experience and plain common sense havo, however, established the fact that the levying of V '■""'"' '.'■' COINAGE. , 9 seigniorage on all descr-iptions of coins is impossible, and that the so-called standard coins at least must be of full value. On the other hand, experience has shown that copper coins and the lower class 6ilver coins can be issued with a heavy seigniorage, without any apparent damage to the interests of those who use them principally. Yet that this damage does nev- ertheless exist is plainly shown ; the conversion of the masses of copper coin into standard coin, for instance, is very difficult. In the brewery business here there are firms who sometimes hold £5.000 or £6,000 in copper and small coins, and can not pay them away. The loss of interest and working power on eapital thus accruing must be charged on their manufacture, i. e. , the consuming poor must pay more for it, and are thus uilduly taxed. Again, as the issue of such copper coin is more according to the good and bad judgment of the au- thorities, the large sums thus accumulating withdraw a portion of the means of ex- change supposed to be measured out for the intercourse of those who require them. I will, however, concede that the issue of such debased copper coins can not be avoided, and that the evil must be borne; and here I must remark that section 33 of the bill which authori zes the United States mints to redeem copper coin in national currency is a proper measure, for it will prevent the accumulation of copper coins in private hands, and give the holders, though in a roundabout way andnot without charges of forwarding, etc., the chance of converting it. In Europe, we follow a , different policy; the mints undertake no such obligation, and do not redeem copper coin for this reason: the stamps of their copper coin can be so well imitated that the Mint itself, especially if the coin appears to be a little worn, can not distinguish false pieces from their own,~and as the mauufacture itBelf leaves about 60 per cent clear profit, forgers would set to work, provided that they could 'freely dispose of such pieces. Fortunately it is impossible here to dispose of copper coin by way of tender value for.more than a few shillings at a time; hence, the thing does not pay (nevertheless false copper coins are known to exist). But if, as you contemplate by section 33, the mint is to redeem copper coins in sums above $50, i.,e., giving them, so to speak, their tender value, you may be sure that false coins will soon take advantage of this facility. So that, although I call it a proper measure for one purpose, it will bear its penalty in another way, and I am, on the whole, inclined to favor our European policy, provided that the evil of seigniorage be not attached to the higher class coins, viz, the full valued standard or gold pieces and large silver coins and confined only to copper and the lower class silver coins. For in this extreme extension of the ap- plication of seigniorage lies the whole error. ■ ' i When those who favor a full valued silver coinage plead 'their cause on the ground that the principles of justice and logic demand that a whole' Lhing (say a standard coin) can only be divided injfco parts of equal value, and that those parts ought again to give the whole in substance or in true equivalent value, they are told why, then, you must include the copper coin as a standard, and permit anybody to make payments of say $50,000 in copper coins, and that would not do. We-quite agree with this, but we allege on the other hand that " enough is the evil thereof," and that the necessity of thus limiting the tender value of copper 1 is no justification for also and entirely limiting the tender value of silver, for if it be maintained that no interest can suffer when the coin concerned is of the value of 2 or 4 shillings, we have the right to say that yon might extend seigniorage to pieces of 10 or 20 shillings in value, which, we have all agreed, can not be done. The question, then,; between these two views is one of degree, and the thing to be determined is where is the right point of value below which token currency may be admissible and above which the medium of exchange must be of full value? , What should govern this decision ? The advocates of the gold valuation say "gold," i. e., they decide the point in question according to the usually recognized proportions of value between gold and silver as 1 to 15*, and say thereby "we also gain a unity of value." Now, the basis of prices as between commodities and the precious metals has nothing to do with the proportionate value of gold and silver ; it is so far immaterial whether a measure of value Of 4 shillings (or more or less) be made of gold or silver or any other material,, and so these proportions between gold and silver can not.furnish the principle upon which the question is to be decided. ■ i. We, on the other hand, say the decision should be governed by the idea that this ' evil of token, currency must be suppressed as much as possible, and that as a thing essentially bad, contradictory, and unjust it must be kept under even at the sacri- fice of the supposed advantage of a unity of standard. And this includes the idea, that whereas those who are able to deal in gold complain of silver as too heavy tor the. pocket, they must nevertheless bear with this inconvenience for the sake ot those who deal principally in silver. - -,..,. v-i-x ■ , „t. As to the idea of unity of standard, although we dispute its validity, inasmuch as we allege that for the maintenance of the just value of gold silver is a necessary 10 ) COINAGE. -",. " adjunct whose value must not be suppressed, we might for a moment admit this consideration: If there were gold enough in the world to furnish all the means We feel and know that this free supply does not only encourage our international trade, but. also (and what is more important) our own inland intercourse between ourselves, as it encourages consumption and production. The universal presence of sovereigns increase the demand for consumption. i It is evident, however, that the benefit of this enhanced consumption can, in the first place, be enjoyed only by those who can afford to deal in sovereigns, i. e., by those who are wealthy enough to consume twenty times as much as others — those to whom the sovereign is' no more than a shilling to others. For the purposes of this latter class (those to whom the shilling is as important as the sovereign to the wealthier) it would thus seem reasonable that the shilling should also be supplied with the same freedom, so that the consumption pro rata COINAGE.^ / 11 should be guided by the same rules, encouraging in its turn production and labor. A very large section of our poorer community is benefited no doubt by the supply of gold com ^coming into this country, as also the, industrial classes laboring for the international trade* and the inland consumption of the wealthier; but this is, so to speak, only a partial matter, for by far more important is the consuming power of the people themselves. . More than three-fourths of the inhabitants of this country for their daily V weekly transactions use silver coin— must give silver coin, because the amounts involved can not be paid in gold! True, if an individual in that class receives a sovereign he can get it changed (though not without trouble, and even at times with the tax of a glass of beer as an excuse) ; but that 4 is notthe point, for this ques- tion of change for one ( or more sovereigns stands apart from the great question of the universal supply of the less valuable mediums of exchange for the purpose of -encouraging and developing consumption and production between this three-fourths of the nation themselves. Thus, whilst for the reasons given, we supply gold coin freely, we in England fol- low the directly contrary course with regard to the less valuable mediums of ex- change. We debase them, limit their tender value, close ingress and egress, and thus confine the whole of this great national intercourse between the majority of our peo- ple to within a narrow compass or cage, in which -it becomes crippled. Hence, the want of supply limits consumption, the want "of consumption limits production ; hence idleness, poverty, demoralization, and crime. Tom, Dick, and Harry, with their wives and families, stand idle and become demoralized, not, forsooth, that there is a want of food in this country, for there is enough to eat, but because there are not mediums of exchange sufficient to set the one going to produce something for the other— some of those many things, beyond meat and drink, which, made from cheap and abundant raw material, assist and comfort in bearing life, keeping the one as well as the other to God-ordained modest labor and morality, and profiting both. And for- the prevention and violation of these sacred rights, I hold responsible the men or soi-disant economists who have framed our monetary laws, who insist on saying and try to prove by all the sophistry in their power that a despoiled shilling is nevertheless not a despoiled shilling, and that they may rdb Peier to pay Paul' with impunity. Men of that class, who have made their fortunes in international trade, have no other eye for anything else than custom-house statistics, orthe v rules of competition in our manufacturing districts. They overlook altogether the minor and far more important life of the people themselves and say to them, " Here, we want gold, you must be content with bad silver, and we can not give you much, because it is incon- venient to us," and with this, offal, which even in that sense is not supplied freely, and is kept within very narrow and unnatural limits, the people must be satisfied. A curious feature in connection with this matter is the often-repeated saying,, " There is no demand for silver." Blowing hot and blowing cold. First praising supply of gold, then calling for a demand of silver before it is supplied. I say the demand for silver hasjoeen destroyed, the strength to use it is gone, pauperism is too great to make a demand such as would satisfy the authorities. And what kind of form must the " demand" take in order to force a supply ? How far must the agony go in order to burst its bounds. Some time ago a general cry arose throughout the country on account of the scarcity of silver. There were people who ascribed this to Col. Tomlin's efforts to agitate the subject, as if that gentleman had bought up and hidden many millions of silver. But the demand seemed genuine, for it was im- possible in some parts of England to find silver. The authorities took care to show; that the demand was accidental and promised that as soon as the mint had finished coining gold, in a few months, it would coin silver! Yet during this time the demand had to wait, and many hundred thousands and millions of modest transactions between the poorer and industrial classes, from which they might derive comfort and sustenance, could not take place. This accidental d«mand for silver was a mighty effort of the crippled intercourse, caused by offers for mutual exchange, which exchange could not take place because the means were absent. The sick man tried to rise and had a craving for nourishment ; he fell down again because it could not be given him when he wanted it. Since then the Mint has coined much silver, but the demand is gone again and our bankers will soon cry out and complain of too much silver. Lessons like these are lost upon our econo- mists. Who can wonder that they utterly failed to recognize the silent suffering of > our poor classes, less versed in social economy than themselves, when they refused even to-profit by such manifestations which ho completely bear out all that we, the advocates of the double valuation, have brought forward ? And if you bear in mind the great gulf that exists in Europe between the ruling classes and the people, the deep root of prejudice against their rising, the peculiar kind of charity and charitable social economy whose, stock arguments rest on abuse of the lower classes with just so-much effort for elevating them as "caution" may admit, you might come to the Conclusion that scarcely anything short of rebellion will be lound strong enouglrto serve the authorities as sufficient manifestations of demand for " silver." To this point I am certain we must ultimately come. Grave political questions may occupy the world for some years to come, but this question^ will be one of the rest. Kebellions for similar objects have happened before-in the present age when international commerce and more "refined" tradirfg reduces margins to more mathe- matical precisions and thus leads to a more definite and clearer appreciation of differences in theory and practice; and the glaring injustice perpetrated by such proceedings as here laid bare will be recognized with unerring force. And although England has been prosperous and though her prosperity is vaunted as a truthian ..opposition to what I have here said, yet it will be recognized that this prosperity isi due to other causes and is not due to the monetary laws, but that her excessive] pauperism can be 'traced to their injustice ; and, although I hope that England will' . continue prosperous, yet I anticipate that this prosperity will be enhanced by a reform in her monetary laws, i. e., by the adoption of the double valuation. It may: ' be alleged, indeed, that as a universal trader England would have done much better with the double valuation. » You may, or may not, be disposed to attach some value to these remarks respect- ing the systems of valuation, but you may think that America, so favorably situated as regards immigration and resources, -neednot regard the delicate distinction in the matter. But if the remark^ here made are true and if you bear in mind that in many matters of social truths we look, to America 4 with great hopes and watch her example, you may feel disposed on cosmopolitan grounds- to consider the matter. On national grounds you may also come to the conclusion frhat inasmuch as many of the most thickly populated and industrial districts of America resemble districts inj Europe and have before them an extensive future, the effects here set forth are worth' guarding against. I may call upon you to do so when I remind you that the system of valuation proposed in your bill is more severe than the English one, because you limit the tender value of silver to one half of what it is here ; hence the supply of this coin must be more unnaturally restricted. - Permit, me also to call your attention to another matter connected with this con- troversy in your bill. Section 33 authorizes the Mint to redeem copper coins. Why should not silver coins be thus redeemed? Section 29 says: "It shall be lawful to transmit parcels, etc., under regulations." Why is not that as clearly stated as with copper? Bothj descriptions are tokens, and the fact that silver coin 'contains comparatively more value than copper coin is of little consequence, for in its character as mere token it might indeed contain less. I have no doubt that here you are in a quandary, and fearing that silver "privately coined," or "artificially abraded," might be presented' in large quantities to the Mint, you guard yourself by the indefinite regulations to be proposed by the Director of the Mint. The thing is a sort of Gordian knot, a consequence of the whole unjust system of the gold valuation, which can all be avoided if you 'take the course previously recommended by me, viz, " that of issuing a full-valued silver dollar as the piece, to stand between' your gold coin and your debased silver coinage." I am myself, as you will perceive from my writings, and others with me, in favor; y of tne full and complete adoption of the double valuation, giving full legal tendeS: to coins as low even as one-fourth dollar in value, believing that this is the only true system upon which a future universal system of coinage can be based (see Sug- gestions, p. 167). Nevertheless, recognizing the difficulty of carrying this point s,\ present, and in order to enable you to uphold the essential features of the gold valu- ation, I limit my recommendation to the issue of this single full-valued dollar piece, ' under the proposed restriction of tender value to $50 or $100, partly for enabling you, without drawback or inconvenience whatever, to widen or to close the valuation question at any time, and partly in order to relieve you of the unsuitable obligations of the Mint to redeem a surplus of either the token silver 1 or the token copper coin- age. ' . For if such a full-valued silver dollar is issued there will be no need of so many half and quarter dollars. The sordid consideration, that the Mint would thus make less profit will not, I trust, interfere with this consideration. The matter should be left to its natural development, and if more half dollars are wanted it might be found j suitable to convert the whole dollars as they are presented for the purpose to the .- profit of the Mint. I think that such a whole dollar would be the bridge, and that if it were issued the Government might (like we do here) altogether drop the obligation of redeeming; silver tokens (whatever regulations maybe contemplated) excepting such as are worn light and defaced, and the equalizing tendency of the issue might even com- pensate for the dangerous necessity of redeeming copper coins, which, as here, might be left to be dealt with by the public. COINAGE. 13 I trust these lengthy remarks will not be tedious to you. The frankness with ( which you asked for criticism on the hill has induced me to make them; and when a man's life has been passed in the study and the practical handling of a matter like this he can not well help in bringing forward as much as he hopes may he use- " ful; and in the case of the United States, where I have lived many years and where 1 have studied social economy' from.an American point of view and am now able to extend this View, I imagine that that which I have proposed to yon is not con- trary to American habits and customs. The national currency has no doubt changed some of the conceptions in reference to money, but the original truth that solid, full-^ ' valued currency is the best will ultimately assert its authority. 1: I am, dear sir, yours, very obediently, , ft • Ernbst Seyd. P. S.^-I have sent to you in pareels, by bookp.ost, addressed : Samuel Hooper, esq., •M. C., Bullion and Foreign Exchanges; Suggestions on American Coinage ; Demone- : tization of Silver, several pamphlets, reference to which is made in this letter. M Session^ \ — — ■ j Jfi* in >. i. 29. IF THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES. LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, IN RESPONSE To Senate inquiry of the 9th instant relative to the redemption of silver certificates in gold, etc. October 19, 1893.— Referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, October 17, 1893. The President of the Senate : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following resolu- tion, adopted by the Senate on the 9th instant, viz : Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury he, and he is hereby, directed to inform the Senate whether silver dollars or silver coin certificates have been redeemed by the Treasury Department or exchanged for gold or paper that is by law or prac- tice of the Government redeemable in gold. In response thereto I have the honor to say that the law providing for the redemption or exchange of silver certificates, which requires that such certificates shall be redeemed or exchanged in kind or for standard silver dollars, has, so far as this Department has information, been strictly complied with by the Treasurer of the United States and the various sub treasury offices, and no gold coin has been given in return for such certificates or standard silver dollars. Conditions have, how- ever, existed in the New York and San Francisco subtreasuries which required that payments, in redemption of silver certificates and stand- ard silver dollars deposited with those offices, be made in moneys other than those specified by law for the purpose, but such cases have been infrequent, and the amounts paid for such redemptions or exchanges in United States paper, which by law or the practice of the Depart- ment is exchangeable for gold coin, have been comparatively insignifi- cant. In the early history of the standard silver dollar and silver certifi- cate many of the latter were paid out at San Francisco in exchange for deposits of gold coin, but the amount can not be given. Under the provisions of Department circular dated September 18, 1880, gold coin was received at New York for which silver certificates REDEMPTION OF SILVER CERTIFICATES IN GOLD. were paid in exchange elsewhere, as the depositor requested, during ;he fiscal years from 1880 to 1885, in the following amounts : 1880 ---- $13,870,000 L881 15,887,000 L882 11,000,000 L883 • 19,132,000 1884 20,515,000 L885 575,000 Total - 80,979,000 Exchanges under the circular were discontinued in January, 1885. Bowever, the Department made some exchanges in the transaction of iaily business during the following years to the amount named : 1886 $2,641,000 1887 6,266,022 1888 1,564,140 1889.: 986,680 For subsequent years the data are not complete, but from the best information obtainable it is believed the amount will not exceed $2,000,000 per annum. Standard silver dollars coined under the act of 1878 have been exchanged for gold or paper redeemable in gold from 1879 to the present bime, but the amount of the various classes so received previous to 1887 can not be given. From 1887 to 1889 the amount was as follows : 1887 $9,449,603 1888 10,448,833 1889 9,122,854 For subsequent years the data are not complete, but the amounts will average about the same as that of the three years named, which is $9,673,763 per annum. The following summary is therefore submitted as the most complete statement that can be furnished with respect to the amounts of gold coin and paper redeemable in gold received in exchange for silver cer- tificates and standard silver dollars : Fiscal year. For silver cer- tificates. For stand- ard dollars. Total. 1880 $13, 870, 000 15, 887, 000 11, 000, 000 19, 132, 000 20, 515, 000 575, 000 2, 641, 000 6, 266, 022 1, 564, 140 986, 680 $13,870,000 15, 887, 000 1881 1882 11 000,000 1883 19,132,000 20, 515, 000 575, 000 2, 641, 000 15, 715, 625 12, 012, 973 10, 109, 534 1884 1885 1886 1887 $9, 449, 603 10, 448, 833 9, 122, 854 1888 1889 1890 to 1893 (estimated) 92, 436, 842 8, 000, 000 29, 021, 290 38, 400, 000 121, 458, 132 46, 400, 00 Total 100, 436, 842 67, 421, 290 167,858,132 Respectfully yours, J. G. Carlisle, Secretary. D. N. M. 1st Session. J I No 30 ' IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. LETTER THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, IN RESPONSE To Senate resolution of September 23, 1893, as to number of standard sil- ver dollars coined under the act of February 38, 1878, and July 14, 1890, exported and imported, etc. October 19, 1893.— Referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, Office of the Secretary, Washington, D. C, October 17, 1893. Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following resolution, passed by the Senate under date of September 22, 1893 : Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby directed to report to the Senate as early as possible the following information as approximately accurate as practicable : The number of coined standard silver dollars of our own mintage under the laws of February 28, 1878, and July 14, 1§90, exported and imported since Feb- ruary 28, 1878, the number of such dollars recoined in our mints, and the, uumber consumed in the United States in industrial uses. And the amount of United States coined gold exported and imported since 1870, and the amount of such "coined gold recoined in our mints, and the amount of such coined gold consumed in the United States in industrial uses. And whether the amount of^xcess, if any, of such exports over imports, and the amount of such recoinage, and the amount of such coined gold and silver consumed in industrial uses, have been taken into account and deducted from the total coinage in the estimates of such coins in existence in our country. And respectfully reply, as follows : (1) The number of silver dollars coined under the acts of February 28, 1878, and July 1 4, 1890, exported and imported since February 28, 1878, is not known, as returns of domestic coin exported or imported are not entered at the custom-houses by denominations. The number of silver dollars coined under the acts of February 28, 1878, and July 14, 1890, deposited at the mints for recoinage has been 132.018. No estimate has been made of the standard silver dollars coined under the acts referred to used in the industrial arts in the United States, but it is believed that the number is very small, as so much more bullion could be purchased by the dollar than it contains. Bullion would, therefore, be purchased and used in lieu of the coin wherever it was practicable to obtain the same. (2) The amount of United States gold coin exported from January 1, 1870, to October 1, 1893, was $571,881,770. The amount of United j States gold coin imported from January 1, 1878, to October 1, 1893,1 was $126,943,885. Prior to January 1, 1878, the imports of United ' States gold coin were not separated in the custom-house returns from 1 foreign gold coin. The amount of United States gold coin consumed in the industrial \ arts from 1870 to 1892, inclusive, as estimated by the Bureau of the : Mint, has been $82,375,000. j (3) In estimating the amount of silver dollars coined since February j 28, 1878, in the country no deductions have been made either for ) exports or for use in the industrial arts in the United States, nor any : allowance for recoinage, as it has heretofore been believed that the number of silver dollars coined in 1873 and prior years in circulation exceeded the amount of silver dollars coined since' 1878. exported, recoined, and used in the industrial arts. In estimating the stock of gold coin in the country, the. amount exported and recoined, as well as the amount estimated as used in the industrial arts in the United States, is deducted from the last estimate while the amount imported and coined is added. The starting point of the estimate of the present stock of coin in the United States was July 1, 1873, as estimated by Dr. Henry E. Linder- , man, then Director of the Mint. At that period there was no gold coin in active circulation in the United States except on the Pacific coast, and the estimate comprised only the metallic stock in the Treas- <| ury and in the national banks, with an estimate of twenty millions as the minimum of gold coin in use on the Pacific coast. Since, the estimates have from year to year been arrived at by adding to the stock of gold coin at that date the annual coinage and imports less the amount ■: of United States coin withdrawn for recoinage, exported, and the amount estimated to have been used in the industrial arts and then adding the imports and coinage. Respectfully yours, J. G. Carlisle, Secretary, The President op the Senate. 53d C6ngress, ) SENATE. (Mis.Doo. 1st Session. J { ;Nb. 31. IK THE SENATE OE THE UNITED STATES. AtfGUST 25, 1893.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Vest presented the following LETTER OP THE DIRECTOR OF THE MINT SUBMITTING A STATE- MENT RELATIVE TO THE COST AND COINING VALUE OF SILVER PURCHASED UNDER THE ACTS OF FEBRUARY 28, 1878, AND JULY 14, 1890. Treasury Department, Bureau op the Mint, Washington, D. C, August 21, 1893. " Sir : I reply to your telegram of to-day as follows : The total amount of silver purchased under the act of July 14, 1890, to August 16, was 161,521,000 ounces; cost, $150,669,457; coining value, $208,835,232. The difference between cost and coining value is $58,165,783. Of this silver there was on hand August 16, 133,161,375 ounces, costing $121,217,677. The difference between cost and coining value is $50,950,565. The amount of silver dollars coined from silver purchased under the act of July 14, 1890, has been $36,087,185, upon which the gross seign- iorage was $6,977,068.75. The amount of Treasury notesissued to August 16, 1893, in payment for silver bullion was $150,115,985, and that amount is still, out- standing. , . ' Up to August 1, 1893, the amount of Treasury notes redeemed in gold was $49,184,160, and-since August 3, 1893, $714,636 in Treasury notes have been redeemed in silver dollars, this being the first redemption of these notes in silver. The amount of silver purchased under the act of February 28, 1878. was 291,272,019 ounces of fine silver, costing $308,199,262. The number of silver dollars coined under that act was $378,166,793. upon which the gross seigniorage was $69,967,531. Verv respectfully, J E. E. Preston, Acting Director of the Mint. Hon. George G. Vest, United States Senate. 53d Congress, ., 1st Session. SENATE. Mis. Doc. No. 34. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. August 28, 1803.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Oookbell presented the following, LETTER PROM R. E. PRESTON, ACTING- DIRECTOR OP THE MINT; TRANSMITTING- STATEMENTS OF THE PRODUCTION AND COIN- AGES OF THE PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD FOR THE YEARS 1873-1892. Treasury Department, Bureau of the Mint, Washington, D. C, August 28, 1893. Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith the statement requested by yon. No allowances have been made for recoinages whatever. Very respectfully, E. E, Preston, Acting Director of the Mint. Hon. Francis M. Oockrell, United States Senate. Production and coinages of the principal countries of the world for the years 1873-t89£. 1873. Countries. Gold. Production. Coinage, Silver. Production. Ooinage. United States -j , Mexico Great Britain - Australasia India France $36, 000, 000 Italy. * Switzerland - Spam . Portugal Netherlands 1 Germany Austria-Hungary Norway '. Sweden Denmark Russia.-.. : Turkey Japan. - Central and South America. Belgium All other countries Total . 42,485,881 $57, 022, 747 636, 738 16, 471, 000 11, 253, 781 154, 730 $35, 750, 000 25, 010, 808 3, 938, 000 22, 184, 348 9, 352, 781 255, 823 97, 700 140, 490, 041 2, 487, 073 421, 504 1, 388, 548 1, 552, 372 12, 107, 964 5, 946, 404 *4, 811, 704 15, 572, 532 7, 081, 313 11,846,470 112, 563, 249 257, 630, 802 94, 126, 214 $4, 024, 748 22, 626, 065 s 5, 263. 966 19, 373, 181 29, 847, 266 8, 158, 869 3, 228, 375 437, 425 5, 542. 648 559, 370 5, 376, 797 201*893 520, 079 810, 620 4, 014, 139 21, 559, 025 131, 514, 464 * Includes Mexico. 2 PRODUCTION AND COINAGES OF THE PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES. '-1 Production and coinages of the principal countries of the icorld, e,tc. —Continued. 18S-4. Countries. -United States.. Mexico . . . .- — Great Britain. Australasia — India France Italy. Switzerland '. ; - . Spain . | ... Portugal Netherlands Germany 'Austria- Hungary Norway "*. Sweden Denmark Russia '- TCurkey .-'.-. . ■ Japan. r Central and South America. Belgium : All other countries / ■ Total -. Gold: Production*. Coinage $33; 500, 000 37,097,307 22, 184, 348 *4, 811, 704 7, 081, 313 254, 630 081, 949 112, 706 536, 367 75, 421 693, 702 142,-448 352, 781 255, 823 97, 700 264, 756 075, 949 421. 504 388, 548 "552. 372 722, 820 11,758,911 104, 674, 672. | 135, 778, 387 Silver. Production. Coinage.'** $37, 300, 000 25, 010, 808 5, 946, 404 15, 572, 532 .11, 846, 470 95, 6/76, 214 $6„851,777 ,17, 021, 405 4,334,124.: 11, 533, 639 11,579,230 11, 580, 000 3, 228, 375 437,423 12,859,705 11,026,926 4, 789, 554 201, 893 520, 079 810, 620 3, 840, 482 i 102, 931, 232 . 18*57 United States. Mexico ...I... ■ Great .Britain . Australasia. . . India France Italy. Switzerland . Spain- Portugal Netherlands V Germany : fSAustria-Hurigary Norway S wed en . .' 4 . Denmark 1 ■ Russia Turkey — '- Japan . ---. Central and South America. Belgium All other countries Total . $33, 400, 000 35, 458, 404 $33,553,965 866, 019 1, 183. 844 19, 514, 665r 68, 296 45, 338. 016 433, 177 22, 1S4, 348 % 811, 704 7,081,313 9, 352, 781 16,521,210 39, 608, 103 1, 911, 2*7 506, 623 1, 823, 721 17, 142, 693 1, 273, 580 283, 462 15, 958, 217 102,935,769 '205,340,209 . 90,076,214 $31, 700, 000 25,010,808, 5, 946, 404 11,846,470 $10,070,368 ' 19,386,958 : 2, 890, 701 /i 23; 830, 686 14,475,000,: 9,650,000' ,' ~*v(5 3,228,375- I 17,871,203 6,905,339! 249, 400 1, 223, 000 783, 121 3,814,805 1, 330, 821 3,747,457 2,876,608 123,143,842 1876. I $39, 900, 000 $38, 178, 962 806, 417 22, 856, 238 18, 186, 111 $30, 800, 000 -24, 977,^60 $19, 126, 502 19,460,562 1,082,086 32, 669, 078 - 12, 410, 636 10, 163, 634 6, 948, 000 34, 063, 180 415, 830 6,457,800 37,943,031 2, 453, 622 52,6, 365 63, 889 32.m 509', 9, 151, 407 290, 970 , 5, 809, 215 2, 940, 028 7,782,205 22, 330, 560 42,"842, 525 381, 744 18,480 7, 988, 973 *4, 785, 120 14, 546, 000 "12,468, 6bb T " '181,410 2,084,289. 10, 633, 600 110, 318, 358 213, 119, 278 96, 600, 775 126, 577, 164 * Includes Mexico . PRODUCTION AND COINAGES. OF THE PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES. Production and coinage of the principal countries of- the world, etc.— Continued. 1877. , - Gold. ( I Silver. Production. Coinage. Production. Coinage, $46, 897, 390 996,898' $28, 549, 625, 890 4, 776, 314 15, 168, 881 27,018,940 2, 048, 29, 018, 223 49, 249, 960 954,956 72, 375 17, 949 3, 474, 4, 488, 341 26, 784, 401 3, 725, 861 58,: 7, 210, ' 8, 036, i 2U4, 697 1,196,278 6, 135, 877 2, 119, 948 188, 052 54, 038 2,658 27, 226, 668 467, 844 265, 840 6,' 072, 346 690. 602 334, 720 22, 797, 430 706, 649 2, 459, 415 • 3, 895, : 157,: 1, 993, 800 2, 078, 380 Total . „ 113, 947, 173 173, 675, 555 81, 046, 665 78, 402, 1 1878. United States . ? Mexico ...' Great Britain Australasia India i France Italy Switzerland Spain „ Portugal ~. Netherlands Germany -.Austria-Hungary /Norway .-.' Sweden Denmark Russia r Turkey Japan Central and South America . Belgium J All uther countries $51, 206, 360 999, 898 29, 018, 223 $49, 786, 052 691, 998 10, 376, 571 16, 898, 684 760, 927 35, 766, 393 1, 224, 639 $45, 281, 385 27, 018, 940 208, 019 i , 222, 230 6,001 27,907,889 » 293, 762 190, 250 29, 742, 879 2, 600, 563 744, 352 1, 317, 555 5, 227, 219 ' 2,022,879 166, 270 52, 708 27, 564, 735 474, 876 v 295,74fe 6, 0.72, 245 -1, 993, 800 396, 087 58. 320 9, 863,.844 728, 846 11, 812, 725 2, Q78, 380 Total . 188, 386, 611 94, 882, 177 1879. United States. - Mexico. ..-"---. ■ Great Britain- . - v Australasia. . - : — India -" - K France , Italy : Switzerland Spain Portugal Netherlands Germany ,- Austria-Hungary - . Norway Sweden Denmark Russia Turkey Japan .- " Central and South America - -Belgium • All other countries $38, 899, 958 989, 161 29, 018, 223 72?375 $39, 080, 080 658, 206 170, 571 20, 210, 574 402 5, 494, 834 565, 355 $40, 812, 13,2 25, 167, 763 17, 949 257, 865 1, 062, 031 262, 451 2, 403, 223 11, 043, 120 1, 001, 592 1, 994 "28,'55i,"028 5, 570, 380 2, 002, 727 166, 270 62, 435 ,473, 519 • 466, 548 6, 450, 503 509,942 38,318 916. 400 11, 812, 725 2, 078, 380 Total . 90,752,811 | 89,080,' 4 v PRODUCTION AND COINAGES OF THE PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES. Production and coinages of 'the -principal countries of the world, etc. — Contirnied. 18SO. Countries. Gold. Production. Coinage. Silver. Production. Coinage, United States Mexico Great Britain , Australasia India * France Italy Switzerland Spain Portugal ^Netherlands - - 'Germany Austria- Hungary . l i . ■ Norway Sweden Denmark Russia Turkey Japan - , Central and South America. .. Belgium ...'' . . -V All other countries *. . Total. $36, 000, 000 989, 160 $62, 308, 279 28, 765, 000 72,' 375 20, 196, 228 ■ 22, 151', 334 69, 670 $39, 200, 000 25, 167, 763 227, 125 $27,409,706 : ""3,'705,'878; '"46," 005!,' 173. 1 4997997 232, 610 1. 094, 596 33, 113 719, 680 259, 313 6, 662, 153 2, 468, 029 17, 949 "a," 096," 228 3.'323 752, 992 7, 730, 617 1, 994, 880 184, 360 54,527 28, 551, 028 4,918 466, 548 7, 448, 339 460, 365 463, 322 473, 519 71. 441 916, 400 17, 501, 972 68, 205 149, 725, 081 96, 704, 978 268,955 133,920 40, 200 8,373,563 499 223, 094 2, 076, 955 2,226,392 150, 639 . 84, 611, 974 I SSI. $.14, 700, 000. 858, 909 $96, 850, 890 438, 778 $43,000,0*00 27, 675, 540 $27,839(203 1 24,139,023 ' 4,852,523 ■' 30, 690, 000 i^&JS), 115 164, 983 20,682,625 . 418,231 3, 253, 988 1, 299, 554' 72, 375 17, 949 1, 598, 346 ' 21. 057,' 127 245, 160 3, 096, 220 3,080,193 ■ Germanv v - - 232; 610 1, 240, 808 1, 634, 189 ' 2, 429, 998 7,771,'304 1, 303, 280 199, 987 48, 875 9,028,671' 28, 930 -XT ° J 665 340, 275 1 290, 137 ' 24, 371, 343 .4, 918 , '466,548 7, 296, 176 332, 198 71, 441 916, 400 17,501,972 490, 585 146, 939 4, 514, 043 4, 990, 983 38, 055 3,-088,726 68, 205 5, 927, 800 , Total 103,023,078- 147, 015, 275 102, 168, 354 108,010,086 * 1SS2. United States Mexico Great Britain Australasia India France Italy Switzerland Spain Portugal Netherlands Germany Austria- Hungary Norway 1 '. Sweden Denmark : , Russia : Turkey Japan ' ' Central and South Anlerica. Belgium All other countries : Total . $32, 500, 000 936, 223 31, 955, 017 72,"375 249, 890 1, 050, 068 11, 298 23, 867, 935 6,646 632, 520 7, 625, 942 3. 088, 726 101, 996, 640 ,887, 685 452, 590 18, 701, '.'59 170, 543 I 722,206 1, 996, 310 162, 000 3,167,085 2, 829, 590 39,; 2, 960, 056 565, 645 25,508 2, 016, 117 99, 697, 170 $46 800,000 ' 29, 237, 798 594. 053 17, 949 3, 096, 220 8, 934, 652 1, 958, 224 244, 954 62; 350 323, 427 89, 916 877, 772 19, 413, 225 68.205 111, 802, 337 $27, 972, 035 25, 146, 200 1, 021, 381 29, 386. 828-, 223, 853 10,671,842 608,312,. 6,407,157' 3, 122, 819 69, 680 17 f 707 : 4,367,393 1, 771, 173 110,785,934 PRODUCTION AND COINAGES OP- THE PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES. 5 Production and coinages of the principal eountries of the world, etc.— Continued. 1883. Countries. United States Mexico Great Britain Australasia India . ..; France Italy Switzerland Spain'. Portugal , Netherlands Germany Austria- Hungary. Norway Sweden Denmark - Russia '.t Turkey.' Japan i; Central and South America. ^Belgium All other countries Total . Gold. Production. $30, 000, ooo 956, 000 . 1,000 27,150,000 304, 000 1, 088, 000 '25, 000 20, 119, 000 7.000 193, 000 8, 429, 000 7, 026, 000 Coinage. S29, 241, 990 407, 600 6,83 1, 169 19, 903, 722 , 67, 044 785,027. 965, 000 ■ 3, 327, 235- 217, 080 21, 002, 897 , 2,154,.390 192, 708 436, 619 12, 793, 575 1, 344. 640 544,290 4, 583, 011 47, 117 104, 845, 114 Silver. Production, $46, 200, 000 29, 569, 000 .353, 000 150, 000 264.000 1, 216, 000 2,-258, 000 5, 930, 000 '2, 024, 000 235, 000 66, 000 415, 000 55, 000 538, 000 25, 796, 000 19, 000 115, 088, 000 Coinage. $29, 245. 24, 083, 6, 201, 921 517 24, 927, 400, 81, ' 594, 5,552, 37, 250, 095 564 191 520 468 44, ;3, 120, 4^.038, 000 892 148 ' 605, ! ,579 109, 306, 705 1884. United States Mexico Great Britain .' Australasia India France Italy _ Switzerland Spain. Portugal Netherlands Germany Austria-Hungary Norway Sweden 'Denmark Kussia , :.'. Turkey Japan Central and South America . Belgium All other countries Total . $30, 800, 000 l.,183,000 28, 284, 000 4,000 369, 000 1, 102, 000 13, 000 21, 874, 000 7.0Q0 197,(00 9, 765, 000 , 006, 100 $23, 991, 756 328, 698 11, 309, 819 22,196,106 4,-983, 004 186, 840 13, 723, 494 2, 444, 004 1,022,420 'i8,~6i5,'074 "569," 4^6 101,694,000 | 99,432,795 $48, 800, 000 27, 258, 000 335, 000 188, 000 245, 000 1, 216, 000 2, 258, 000 6, 650, 009 2, 049. 000 265, 000 75,000 389, 000 55, 000 975. 000 19, 796, 000 219. 000 $28, S34, 25, 377, 3, 204, 378 824 17, 553, 23, 2, 121 031 100 o::i 6, 738, 971 182. 114. , 987, 910 319 781 132, 784 746 3, 599, 1, 400, 912 949 820, C ,000i 95^832,084 United States Mexico Great Britain Australasia.. India France '.: Italy , Switzerland" --.-' ; ■ Spain Portugal Netherlands Germany- -. Austria-Hungary Norway '. Sweden Denmark Bussia Turkey Japan -j,-- Central and South America. Belgfiumf — All other countries - - ■ 188.3. Total.--.,.. .■ 108; 435, 600 31, 800, 000 867, 000 •J7, 439, 000 135, 000 129, 600 916, 000 1, 179, 000 31. 000 24, 500, 000 "' 7,000 176,000 8, 756, 000 12, 500, 000 $27, 773, n 12 423, 250 14, 366, 677 21, 694, 857 106, 987 55,854 635, 873 2, 435, 108 246, 240 280, 000 1, 939, 443 2, 791, 958 33, 500 "20,' 685," 852. 1, 004, 005 1, 120, 318 164,648 •95, 757. 582 $51, 600, 000 32, 112, 000 316, 000 1, 048, 000 2. 120. 000 1, 406, 350 2, 258, 000 1, 021, 000 2. 192, 200- 299,000, 96, «'00 646', 000 55, 000 960, 000 22, 053, 600 . 262,000 118., 445, 150 $28,962,176 25, 840, 727 {, 310. 719 48, 487, 114 ""230." 831' 3, 678. 314 80, 400 577,, 664 4. 147, 659 53,600 78, 281 6, 312, 927 2, 521, 882 1, 279, 511 126, 764, 574 6 " PRODUCTION AND COINAGES OF THE PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES." Production and coinages of the principal ^countries of the\world, ete.^-Continued. '" 188«. ; Countries. Gold. I Silver.' • Production. Coinage. Production. United States Mexico - -- Great Britain ; . Australasia ' , India ' - France. ..!.' Italy ...--.-.. Switzerland .-.-:.. Spain '*.., Portugal - ': Netherlands .'■....... Germany .'..- Austria-Hungary , Norway .' I L Sweden r ,-; . $35, 000, 000 614,000 $28; 945, 542 367, 490 26, 425, 0QO • 421, 600 22, 524, 505 $51, 000, 000 33, 000, 000 420, 750 1, 222, 000 s t 129,600 708, 000 1, 179, 000 Denmark . , .Russia! - .' Turkey Japan Oentrf(,l(arid South America. Belgium : j . . All other countries 45, 000 4. 455, 733 '227,771 965,' 000 2, 369, 765 179, 626 217, 847 8,506, 210 2, 684, 139 539. 484 982, 188 1. 944. 5"i0 '1.406, .,50 1, 066, 000 2, 192, 200 299, 000 128, 000 20, 518, 000 7,000 327, 235 7, 521, 000 14, 761, 717 3,-652,000 900, 165 2, 0?3, 498 528, 100 55,000 1, 340, 000 23, 543, 450 13, .268, 442 289; 500 341. 000 Total ! 106,163,877 94, 042, 070 120,626.800 124,854, 1S8T. ' United States Mexico... Great Britain -\ Australasia * India .'..-. France Italy Switzerland Spain Portugal Netherlands Germany Austria* Huirgary Norway Sweden ': .' Denmark .' Russia Turkey .*■_ Japan * ' : : . . Central and South American Belgium All other countries. Total . / $33, 1)00, 000 , 824,000 1,000' 27, 327, 600 820, 000 129, 600 1, 496, 000 1, 247, 450 55, 550/ 20, 092, 000 7,000 375, 000 8,301,518 12, 598, 237 105, 774, 95.5 $23, 972, 383 I 398, 647 9, 728, 498 24, 122, 267 - 4,249 4, 760, 960 270, 000 163.831 2§, 135, 270 2, 669, 750 314, 830 "26,169,276 897, 420 9, 198, 730 246, 354 124, 992, 465 $53, 357, 000 37, 570, 000 414, 100 266, 900 2, 257, 300 1, 406, 350 2, 440, 000 1, 311, 798 2, 218, 900 214, 000 242, 250 562; 000 55, 000 1, 332,. 650 20, 163, 090 469, 640 124, 280, 978 1888. United States Mexico . . Great Britain Australasia India : Prance , Italy , Switzerland Spain Portugal Netherlands Germany Austria-Hungary Norway Sweden Denmark .' Russia. ,-j. ., Turkey L..\ 1 Japan Central and South America. Belgium ,. All other countries .1 Total .' 110,196,915 $3B.U5,000 074,000 146, 000 ?8, 560, 660 676, 563 98, 000 1, 190, 963 1, 209, 572 , 50, 000 21, 302, 000 ,' 7, 000 403, 000 7, 792, 198 14, 611, 959 $311 380, 808 300, 480 9, 893, 373 24,415, 230 108, 216 106. 949 469, 750 16, 984 - 102, 600 ", 143, 051 34, 340, 722 2, 747, 633 20, 460, 491 66, 000 ,. 974, 335' 9, 045, 077 257, 154 134, 828, 853 $59, 195, 000 41, 373, 000 376, 000 5, 000, 000 2, 053, 000 1,454 2,140,400 1, 332, 022 2, 166, 440 214, 000 193, 000 604, 000 55, 000 1, 763, 140 23, 854, 957 385, 000 140, 706, 413 '.-»- PRODUCTION AND COINAGES OF THE PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES. ' 7 i - . • Production and coinages of the principal countries of the world, etc. — Continued. 1889. '..*', Gold. Silver. Production. Coinage. Production. Coinage. - $32, 800, 000 700, 000 64, 400 33, 086, 700 1, 502, 600 266, 000 100, 000 $21, 413, 931 319, 907 3fi, 502, 536 29, 325, 529 110, 328 3, 373, 215 $64, 646, 000 '47, 544, 000 395, 700 8, 500, 000 $35, 496,-683 25, 294, 726 10, 827, 602 37, 937, 814 71 SO, 20S 3, 364, 000 337; 000 386, 000 3, 378, 631 96, 120 823, 943'- 48, 166, 245 3, 294, 987 2, 140, 400 4, 7*0. 029 030, 400 8, 012, 500 2, 188. 000 214 000 177, 400 17t; 079 - 4, 528. 259 1, 461, 000 48, 900 1,080,040 . 27, 607 23, 905, 600 7, 000 518, 400 9, 105, 000 IS, 855, 097 133, 500 55, 000 1, 791, 900 22, 164, 200 Turkey - ./. 1, 775, 010 9, 516, 359 4, !14, 677 ■ 19, 863, 600 495, ooq , 4, 165, 792 Total 123, 489, 200 168, 901, 519 162, 159, 200 139. 242, 595 1890. United States . Mexico Great Britain . Australasia . : . India France Italy Switzerland... Spain. $32, 845, 000 767, 000 3,000 29, 808, 000 2, 000, 000 ,123,000 100, 000 Portugal Netherlands Germany Austria-Hungary Norway Sweden Denmark — Kussia Turkey Japan -. '^..J'. Central and South America - Belgium All other countries 1, 398, 500 58, 500 Total ,■--- 120,465,300 25, 484, 000 , 7,000 9, 887, 000- 10, 238, 300 7, 746, 000 $20, 467, 1'82 284, 859 37,375,479 25, 702, 600 3, 976, 340 263, 329 482, 50,0 9, 049, 569 407; 100 23, 835, 512 2,818,750 833, 432 547, 931 21, 726, 239 44, 840 1, 194, 050 86, 093 149,095,865 $70, 465, 000 50, 356, 000 377, 200 10, 731, 300 2, 955, 600 337, 000 7, 567, 500 2, 103, 500 230, 200 173, 700 138, 200 55,000 25, 594, 400 "518," 666' $39, 202, 908 24, 081, 192 8,332,233 1,091 279, 850 1,479,152 540, 000 198, 990 3, 857, 118 120. 600 253, 867 7, 296, 645 4,397,115 1, 446, 315 , 151, 032, 820 1891, TJnited States ■ Mexico ■'Great Britain .Australasia ■ ' India ....: SianceJ. Italy ----- Switzerland Spain Portugal Netherlands Germany Austria-Hungary Norway -. Sweden Denmark Kussia '.. Turkey :'. .--■ Japan , .Central aiud'South America. Belgium - All other countries .-•--- Total 126,158,800 $33, 175, 000 1, 000, 000 67, 000 31, 399, 000 2, 495, 000 133, 000 100, 000 1, 517, 900 ""73.166 24, 131, 500 ' 7,000 508, 400 9, 606,'300- 21, 945, 600 $29, 222, 005 280, 565 32, 720, «33 26, 389, 044 117, 411 3, 362, 450 250, 000 386,000 169, 560 14,086,800 , 2,885,561 2, 110, 981 3, 342, 000 1, P83, 725 126, 279 2, 777, 000 119, 310, 014 $75, 416, 500 • 53,000,000 377, 200 12, 929, 300 2, 955, 600 337, 000 2, 140, 400 7, 979, 500 2, 186, 000" 235, 400 152,-000 575, 500 65, 000 1, 798, 800 25, 518, 000 518, 000 186, 174, 200 $27, 518, 857 24, 493, 071 •5, 141, 594 32, 670, 498 144, 750 12,242,000 7, 277, 040 367, 000 1, 139, 252 3,356,394 " (B.34,000 22, 000 121, 750 2,690,902 432,400 8, 523,904 2, 302, 441 6, 930, 230 135, 508, 083 ritUtlU(JXJ.Ul> n.mu UU11NAU1SB UH' THE JfJCUI* Ul'rjSJLi :'""' . _;f % f Production and coinages of the principal countries of the world, etc. — Continued. , 1892. Countries. United States *■ "Mexico ■ ! Great Britain • Australasia India France Italy...-: 1 Switzerland Spain Portugal Netherlands Germany Austria-Hungary , Norway ' .Sweden ''Denmark .„.Kussia - , Turkey ■ Japan J ; Central and South America . - Belgium...:..' .' All other countries Gold. Production. Coinage. $33, 000, 000 1, 147, 500 66, 600 33, 870, 800 3, 057, 900 133, 000 94, 280 Total ^ 130,816,627 1, 399, 648 73, 100 23, 546, 000 7,000 508, 400 10, 167, 821 23, 744, 578 $34, 787, 223 "34, 787, 223 Silver. Production. Coinage. [ $74, 989, 900 59, 000, 000 255, 650 17, 375, 677 2. 955, 600 U, 146, 370 2, 140, 400 7, 921, 330 2, 161, 951 235, 400 152, 000 550, 000 55, 000 1, 798, 800 25, 460, 000 407, 100 196, 605, 184 $12, 641, 07 12, 641, 07 RECAPITULATION. Calendar 'y ears. • * Gold. ' "';: Silver." - Production. Coinage, Production. Coinage." "l873 "..'. $112, 563, 249 104,674,672 102, 935, 769 110, 318, 358 113, 947, 173 , 119,-092, 786 L07, 385, 421 106, 436, 786 103, 023, 078 101,996,640 95, 392, 000 101, 694, 000 108, 485, 600 106, 163, 877 105,774,955 110, 196, 915 123, 489, 200 ' 120, 465, 300 126) 158, 800 130, 816, 627 $257, 630, 802 ' 135,778,387 205, 340, 209 213, 119, 278 . 173,675, 555 188, 386, 611 90, 752, 811 149, 725, 081 147, 015, 275 99,697,170 104, 845, 114 99', 432, 795 95, 757, 582 94, 642, 070 124, 992, 465 134, 828, 853 168, 901, 519 149, 095, 865 119,310,014 *34, 787, 223 $94, 126, 214 95, 676, 214 90,076, 214 96, 600, 775 81, 040, 665 94, 882, 177 89, 080, 680 96, 704, 978 102,168,354 111, 802, 337 115i 088, OQ0 110, 773, 000 118,445,150 , 120,626,800 • 124, 280, 978 140, 706, 413 162, 159, 200 173, 743, 000 186, 174, 200 •196; 605, 184 $131,544,46 102,931, 23 123, 143, 84 123, 577, 16 78, 402, 64 161,191,91 104, 888, 31 84, 611, 97 108, 010, 08 110,785,98 109, 306, 7C ■1875 .. . 1876. ,1877 1878 .' 1879 . . 1880 1881. 1882...... 1883 :,... 1884 -. 95, 832, 08 126, 764, 51 124, 854, 1( 163, 411, 35 , 134,922,3"! 139, 242, 5! - 151. 032, 8! 135, 508,08 *12, 641, o; .. 1885 1886 .., 1887 '.-' 1888 : - 1889 1890 '. 1891 , 1892 . . , ■ \ , ■/ Total .' 2, 210, 961, 206 2, 787, 714, 679 2, 400, 760, 533 2, 322. 603, 3i * United States only* Bureau op the; Mint, August 28, 1893. 53b Oongkess, ) ' SENATE. ( Mis': Doc; 1st Session, j " , s •>. " t No. 35. IN" THE" SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MONETARY SYSTEMS AND APPROXIMATE STOCKS OF. MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AID PER CAPITA IF THE PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. PRESENTED BY MR. COCKRELL. August 28, 1893. — Ordered to be printed. WASHINGTON: •GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1893. APPROXIMATE STOCKS OF MONEY IN THE PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES. 3 -*QdoodooJ-*ci(Ooso!00ooi>N^tc-<*i ' O -* CO rH OjiiH 'W >-t ff5 i-l i~i |H W M I-H i-H 3(DOOO)^!M •MOO IOODtH — ^ ri :i x iri -f -i c a -ix m ■ fflND-^OSTTHnJi- ft^SNOffliO S3 1-3 -** SOO c 3 O O C 3 O O C o o O =3 oo O O C ■*oc H OO -o o 3 OO O O O O 3 O O O O O O 30 O O OO O ~o~©"© o o o*" o o o o o o o o © o o o o © © o o ooopo © © © © © ©"© o© o" o o o o o o o oo o o © o o o o o o o"©" O O o o a©o©©o©©o©oooo©' 30000000000000000000 <_ _ 30000000000000000000000 o o o o oo ooooooooosoooooooooooo 0000000000=00000000000 osaoooooooooooomooooooo lonaor m o o o o m (M c-i m © © © O t- i-H oo o o o o ©"©" o o <=- i>o o o o o o o o o o o"o"o c OOOC O o o c o oo oo 3-tHMWOOO oooo c o o o o c o o o o <; o"o ©~©~ o o o o CI o o o o © oo o o o o o o o o oo o o O CO o © © © © o o o o o © oo© © oo o o o o oo oo o o o o o o O ©"# O ' O O o o 00 o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o O O o o o o o O O O O o o o o o © o o o o o in o o o o o 3000000000000000©© 5000000000QOOOOOOO 300000000000000000 30000U300O0000O000O 300000000000000000 300000000000000000 HOOOlOrJiONOOOiratMOOOOlD 3 ITS 00 O N r-i rH O O O O O O A.2 3 O O 3 O O O o o o oo oooooooooooooooc oooooooooooooooooo oooooooooooooooooo 300000000 0. OOOOOOOOO ?o OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO ■HOOOJOOOWtOOOOOOOOOOO ficn«o>-'^oiraQomo-*cococ^-ijit-'- "^ tH ^i CO ^ rH rH 00 30 COCO 00 OS 00 cor3«cooeo oo wooco (NO t* -* -# -•# -m n3 m -«f >n m . . oo o o-o 03oeob^ H -lrH.-lr-11-I.Hi-I.HrHrH"* 343 oo oo o o o""o o o oo oo o o in o - s i S© ri .2 8,3 J* g S o o o o Hi-ii-iiH o o o o o *^ -— +3 -t- +3 'o'o'o ■e-a, o'o CBOctOO ! i-9 nj ® P fl.S i^ N $11 DHDC 3 o EH 53d Congress, 1st Session. Senate. Mis. Doc. No. 36. IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES. August 28, 1893.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Cockrell presented the following STATEMENT OP THE PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND SILVER IN THE ■WORLD, 1792-1892. Production of gold and silver in the world, 1792-189%. Calendar years. Gold. Silver (coining, value). 1792-1800 1801-1810 1811-1820 1821-1830 1831-1840..... 1841-1848 1849 1 '- 1850 1851 , , '- - > 1852 1853 18(54 -' 1855 - 1856 , 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 , 1864 1865 1866 1867 ; 1868 1869 -> 1870 1871 •1872 1873 1874 - 1875 1876 1877 - 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 - v 1883 1884 -. - 1885 ' 1886 t 1887 '■ 1888 - 1889 i - 1890 1891 ' 1892 -., Total $106, 407, 00!; 118, 152, 000 76,063,000 94. 479, 000 I 134,841,000 291, 144, 000 27, 100, 000 44, 450, 000 67, 600„000 132, 750, 0Q0 155,450,000 127. 450, 000 135, 075, 000 147,600,000 133, 275, 000 124, 650, 000 124, 850, 000 119, 250,000 113, 800, 000 107, 750, 000 106j 950, 000 113, 000, 000 120,200,000 121, 100, 000 104,025,000 109, 725, 000 106, 225, 000 106, 850, 000 107, 000, 000 99, ,600, 000 96, 200, 000 90, 750, 000 97, 500,;000 103, '(OO, 000 114, 000, 000 119. 000, 000 109, 000, 000 106, 500, 000 103, 000, 000 102, 000, 000 , 95, 400, 000 101, 700,' 000 108, 400, 000 106, 000, 000 105, 775, 000 1 10, 197, 000 123, 489, 000 118; 150, 000 120, 519, 000 130, 817, 000 $328, 860, 000 371, 677, 000 224, 786, 000' 191.444,000 247, 930, 000 259, 520, 000 39, 000, 000 39, 000, 000 45, 000, 000 40, 600, 000 40, 600, odo 40, 600, 0Q0 40, 600, 000 40, 650, 000 40, 650, 000 40. 650, 000 40, 750, 000 40,800,000 44, 700, 000 . 45, 200, 000' 49, 200, 000 51. 700, 000 > 51, 950, 000 50, 750, 000 54, 225, 000 50„225, 000 47; 500,000 51, 575, 000 61 ! 050, 000 65, 250, 000 81, 800, 000 71, 500, 000 80, 500, 000 87, 600, 000 81, 000. 000 95, 000, 000 96, 000, 000 96, 700, 000 102, 000, 000 111, 800, 000 115, 300, 000 105, 500, 000 118, 500, 000 120, 600, 000 124^81, 000 140, 706, 000 162,159,000 172, 235, 000 186, 733, 000 196, 605, 000 $435, 267, 489, 829. 300, 849, 285, 923, 382, 771, 550, 664, 66, 100, 83, 450, 107, 600, 173, 350 ' 196, 050, 108, 050, 175, 675, 188, 250, 173,925, 165, 300, 165,300, 160; 050, 158, 500, 152, 950, 156, 150. 164, 700] 172, 159, 171, 850. 158,250, 159, 950, 153, 725, 158, 425,1 168, 050, 164,850, 178, 000, 162, 250, 178, 000, 191, 300, 195, ooo; 214, 000, 205 000, 203, 200, 205, 000, 213, 800, 210i 700, 207, 200, 226, 900, 226, 600, 230, 056, 250, 903, 285, 648, 285, 385, 307, 252, 327, 422, 000 ' 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 , 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 :' 000 000 ' odB 000 000 000 000 0Q0, ooo 1 000 000 ooo • 000 000 000 1)00. 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 ouo 5, 633, 908. 000 j 5, 077, 961, 000 10, 711, 869, 000 Treasury Department, •v . -. Bureau. of the Mint, Auguttt 16, 1S9S. 53d Congress, ) SENATE. (Mis. Doc. 1st Session. J ./< V, ( No. 47. IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED 'STATES. September 6, 1893. — Ordered to be printed. Mr. Allen presented the following MEMORIAL OF A. WOLCOTT, OF WOLCOTT, IND. NO INTERNATIONAL BIMETALLISM INCLUDING GREAT BRITAIN IS POSSIBLE. Iii Englana, since the time of the civil war, in the days of Cromwell and Charles the First, near two hundred years ago, the steady work- ings of agriculture, manufactures, and other productive employments have had little direct disturbance from military interference, and the exchanges of the merchants have been unhindered. During the same time, in continental Europe, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and other nationalities have been fought over many, many times.* Mutually they have devastated and wasted their fields of agriculture; their manufac- turing cities have been captured, sacked, and burned, and their stores of merchandise have been seized and carried away. These countries have been impoverished, by withdrawal from theindustrial pursuits of millions of men, who have been engaged in war, and they have been further im- poverished by the direct and vast expenditures of war. On the other hand, England, safe in her insular seclusion, rich in an abundance of coal and iron, the valued and necessary elements of me- chanical and manufacturing force, with a people of great capacity and energy, has for near two hundred years sold her- surplus productions ' to' the governments and people of the different European nations in time of war at war prices. In all ages, history informs us, the nations of wealth have been the manufacturing and commercial nations. England, with the special advantages she has possessed, has become, beyond a/fl example in history, the richest nation in thejworld in money wealth. Fifteen years ago Eicardo, .an eminent political economist ancj statistician, estimated that the people of Great Britain enjoyed investments among other nations to the amount of $7,500,000,000, on which was paid to the people of England, , in. interest and dividends 5 per cent per annum, or $375,000,000. Mr. Gladstone, in a recent speech in Parliament, in opposition to bimetallism, estimated the amount of investments by people of Great Britain in other countries at $10,00Q,00O,O00. At 5 per cent this would give the Eng- lish an interest and dividend account from nations foreign to Britain of $500,000,000 a year. Mr. Gladstone further said ""the amount was constantly increasing; that they owed nobody and everybody owed them, and with such ad- vantages as they possessed it would be folly for them to adopt bimetal- lism." It .would be so great a folly for England, that England is sure 2 MEMORIAL OF A. WOLCOTT. to maintain the advantage which she enjoys in the single gold sta ard. There is no chance for universal international bimetallisms England wedded to the single gold standard, by her Vast money im estsiand the profits derived therefrom. The annual income of few- tions of Europe eqrfal their annual expenses. Such do not really o themselves. It is estimated that 22,000,000 of soldiers are maintaii at an annual expense of $800,000,000 by different nations of continei Europe. England now owning of securities and properties of ot nations to the amount of $10,000,000,000, with an annual income fr them of $500,000,000, is probably as rich in money as all the resi Europe combined, as nearly all European nations are heavily indebt ' and most of them have ho money surplus. England insists upon single gold standard; and' England is able, from her cdndition of i: versal creditor to maintain her. position. Therefore.no internatio bimetallism including Great Britain is possible. Under present c ditions the United States has not free choice. Necessity is dictat The gold basis is but a trap. There is an insufficient supply of gold to meet the wants of this nati with money actually on a gold basis, and of the other nations which: striving to get on a gold basis, as is proven by the struggle for 1 possession of gold, and by the distressing derangements' exten si v prevailing in different part's of the world, wholly owing to an insufficii gold suj>ply for those seeking g"old. Witness the downfall inj securities of the Argentine Bepublic and the' ruin of the old and m rich banking house of Baring Brothers, of London, England; the fin; cial wreck of Italy striving for a gold basis; the purchase of gold a money use by agricultural Austria, with the expense of her gn armies, near 2,000,000 of men, a gold basis which Austria will ne? be able to maintain anymore successfully than did Italy; and thewii spread, extensive bankruptcies and financial ruin in Australia. . these indebted and overborrowed nations were encouraged by thegn money lenders of Europe to assume to be upon a gold basisj with( the possibility of gold to maintain such basis. But for such encoura, ments the efforts to become established on a gold basis could never hi been tried., In the, wreckages of the great properties, securities, a estates^ which the mpney lenders have wrought, they can buy at th own price things of greatest value. " What matters it to them what destruction they bring upon others they secure their many "pounds of flesh," and blood as well., W( near and more interesting to us is the financial condition of our 1 country. Ever since the close of the late civil war the United 'Stai > has presented to European money lenders the safest, most extensf and most profitable fields for investments of money. South Anieri Africa, add Australia, compared with the United States, have not be very mvitmg fields for investments, and while these countries have, we know, received some European moneys, tl^e. United States 1 received very much more. - Hugh McGulloch, Secretary of the Treasury,' in his report for the v< 1868, estimated that Europe then held $850,000,000 of American se nties, "on the greater part on which interest was being paid in gol He says railroad and other stocks are not included in this estima He further says : ''We are even now increasing our debt to Europe the rate of $60,000,000 to $70,000,000 per annum in gold beari bonds." He further says : " Of the $1,300,000,000 of the gold and sib products ot California and the Territories, produced since 1848 have exported $1,100,000,000." ' J MEMORIAL OF A. WOLCOTT. 3 Was this vast export, of t gold and silver, largely gold, in any part really due to the Sherman silver law, enacted in 1890? The Monetary Commission, appointed by the Government of the United States in 1S76, estimated that the foreign indebtedness of the United States could not then be less than $2,000,000,000. Since 1876 foreign investments, mostly English, have continued to increase very largely. . Mr. Gladstone claims for Great Britain ownership outside of Britain to the amount of ten billion ($10,000,000,000) dollars, which is mostly on a gold basis. That indebtedness;, including ownership of different properties, can not now be less than §4,000,000,000 or $5,000,000,000 in, the United States. As there are in all the world but about $3,000,000,000 in gold, in money, on a gold basis, Great Britain completely dominates the world. World-wide .financial disorders are prevailing, owing to the efforts of money lenders, for their own profit, to establish gold as a single and universal money standard, without the gold being in existence to meet such extensive and universal use, even if gold were equally distributed among the nations of the earth. Much more serious than a general lack of gold for all the world's monetary uses is the"unequal distribution of gold among the various nations. Some have much, others but little, some none. As related to us, Great Britain has the financial strength of a great creditor nation ; the United States the financial weakness of a great debtor nation. Our gold can be called from us whenever the interests^ necessities, or caprices of foreign investors or creditors dictate the call; And we are helpless to resist these calls as long as we, in practice, maintain the single gold standard; as witness the current financial , history of the day. On the single gold standard, with the present great demand for and the limited supply of gold, no debtor nation can main- tain such gold standard as against a creditor nation^ except by suffer- ance. Practically the United States are borrowing gold on call. In this regard we have no independence whatever. Let the United States, by . legal enactments or otherwise, make gold the exclusive money basis and we will be a completely Vuined people. As the result of what has been done by the Government of the United States already and as the result of what is foreshadowed the industries of the country have, been paralyzed, business men have been bankrupted, laboring men have been thrown out of employment, and a universal depreciation of property values has occurred East, West, Forth, and South — every- where throughout the United States — and to an amount withiu the last six months, equal to the whole money cost of the late war. For whose benefit is this? Not the people of industry, for they are suffering. This wreck and ruin is for the profit of the money lenders of Europe and the United States. Out of the depreciated property , values in railroad and every other kinds of investments the money- lenders select their prey at their own prices, and those who before were exhorbitantly rich become richer at the expense of and by sacrificing the men of industry, who are the stay and support of the nation. The mpney lenders and their advocates say they do not want cheap money. For once they have not lied. They do not want cheap money. They want it as dear as by any possibility they can make it. But there ~ is no cheap money in the United. States. Of whatever material it may be, in whatever form it may exist, to whatever issue in money form the laws give the money function, all is equally money in the United 4 , MEMORIAL" OF A. WdLCOTT. . States, to pay all debts and obligations, and t^o purchase all kinds ai forms of property. What can onr people desire more ? What can thi have better? . In the effort to exclude silver from the -money use iu the Unit< States, which the money lenders falsely call cheap money, the mom lenders have made cheap labor, cheap farms, cheap .factories, chei wheat, cheap corn; cheap cotton, cheap everything among us that h; its value measured by money; and a cheap nation, for all we have seen to be in the market, at the depreciated prices fixed by the money lender The gold monometallists falsely claim that the export of gold caused solely by the existence of the silver certificates, issued und< what is called the Sherman law of 1890. The Director of the Mint, : his report for 1892 (p. 43), states " The heavy export of gpld coi menced in 1888, aggregating to July, 1889, $61,435,989. In the sunim of 1890 another movement commenced, which continued for two month with a total export in that brief period of $15,672,982." THE SHERMAN LAW HAD NOT THEN BEEN ENACTED. As a result of the collapse of the Argentine Republic's securities i 1890 the failure of the English banking house of faring Brothers i ^ 1891, gold was exported to the amount of $70,233,494.. Xo S hernia . law in this. Gold was taken because it was needed. Besides we have had large balances of trade against the Unite ■ States. English failures in Australia have occurred and also gold di mands in Austria. These are the sufficient causes for the export < gold from the United States; not the Sherman law, which has had r, more necessary influence than the " idle wind." The direct effect of a ■ withdrawals of gold from the Treasury, on deposit of legal-tender p; per currency, is to reduce the. volume. of our circulating medium to tl extent of such deposits (as ordinarily the current receipts of theTrea ury equal the disbursements), unless such deposits in the Treasury i legal-tender paper money shall be loaned to or ' be deposited by tit Secretary of the Treasury in banks, to be loaned by them. And if another $100,000,000 or any other amount of Govenmei bonds shall be negotiated for gold, to be deposited in the Treasury 1 . reenforce the gold supply, such gold deposits pan be drawn out I • deposit m the Treasury of legal-tender paper currency, and to the e: tent of any such last-named deposits there would result a certain an direct reduction of the circulating medium. As the gold is drawn fro; the Treasury paper money takes its place and is retired from use, i shown by the necessity for the large issues of clearing-house ce tificates by the banks of the city of ffew York, which certificates ai in place of currency, and by the generally shortened supply of cu rency among all the banks of the country. If the United States sha have such a supply of money as will properly represent its proper! values, and such as is required for the best condition of its producth interests and exchanges, imperative necessity demands that the bas ■ \ J? l U ^portion to the extent of the country, the number « inhabitants, the .amount of property and business which require money representation regardless of all interests, except the interest Sn ™ JT pl %° f tLe T ^ 1 - ted . SUtes - T ^ ere are methods by whicH can meet our foreign obligation without the folly of self-destruction The purchasing clause of the Sherman law should not be Jepea le( except m fevor of some law that will assure to the American peon e fcller supply of money for Americans, and that, would be a2 ' MEMORIAL OF A. WOLCOTT. . 5 law, with the coin to circulate. With Great Britain's holdings of $10,000,000,000 of investments outside of Great Britain, with probably / one-half of all such holdings in the United States, much of them calling for gold payments, with but $3,600,000,000 of gold among all the, na- tions of the earth, we have conditions that leave the money 'markets of the United States "subject to being cornered at any time, which is in effect a corner of all our property of every kind that is in the market, causing the stoppage of business and the destruction of values, as we are now sadly experiencing. On a gold basis, under the condition now upon us, we can not avoid, these disasters whenever the goldholders choose to inflict them. Therefore, as we have no independent power to cdhtrol the supplies of gold, no single gold standard is neither prac- , ticable nor possible for the United States. Witness the recent large exportation of gold, which we would not have permitted if avoidable, creating a money corner of great strin- gency, to which designing men have added a destructive and terrible panic by misrepresentations designed for such effect. Eecently there has been added to the single gold-standard countries vast and populous India; two-thirds as populous as all Europe, a peo- ple, too, known to be great hoarders of money. ' If the gold supply for all nations (only $3,600,000,000) was before much short of what was needed; how will other nations fare with India's 260,000,000 of people added to those striving for gold? Those now short of an adequate supply of gold will be reduced to increased destitution of that scarce metal. But the supreme evil in our unfortunate situation is that our' rulers do not appear. to apprehend our financial conditions. The Sherman law, which, though faulty, need not here be criticised, was, by the administration of President Harrison, and is, by the pres- ent administration, enforced contrary to the plain and proper sense of one of its most important provisions; that which declares' that it is the policy of the Government of the United States- to maintain the, parity of gold .and silver. Whoever has received from the Government a silver certificate, or otherwise obtained, the same, has taken it subject to the law of re- demption in silver. Such holder has neither legal nor moral right to insist upon anything but silver in the redemption of such certificates. The Government^ under the circumstances, should do as a private indi- vidual would do, where it had both legal and moral right on its side; it should be governed by its own interest and convenience. The Government had abundance of silver, it had not abundance of gold. On the contrary the lack of gold amounted to financial distress, affecting our whole country and people. The payment of gold to the holders of silver certificates, under the facts as they have existed, was a maladministration of thejlaw. Fifty million dollars of gold needlessly paid, where silver was due, has done much to shorten the Treasury supply of gold and to produce the panic. The intention of the Treasury Department to continue this policy is a present national calamity. It is not a maintaining of the parity of gold and silver, or even an attempt at so maintaining such parity. The enemies of silver have been permitted to work their will against it. The occasion of recent gold imports has been no general balance of trade in our favor. It has been of gold sent here to pay for our secu- rities, sold to foreigners,, at the lowest prices of a destructive panic. It b >' :'''■-■■ . MEMORIAL OF A. WOLCOTT. ■' :_ ■ ; \, ' ■ -v is robber money sent by foreigners to obtain the property of Americ at half their intrinsic value. i The Question of complete bimetallism is a question of vital intei to all the people of ' property, industry, and labor in the United, Sta ; We a^e now virtually a financial dependency of Great Britain. The history of Britain in the treatment of those in her power '. been a long history of cruelty and 'oppression. We are now victi How long are we to remain such % A. WOLOOTT, , y' (J ' Wolcott, Inc 53d Congress, ) SENATE. ( Mis. Doc. 1st Session. $ j jfo, so > IK THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. September 15, 1893.— Ordered to lie on the table and be printed. Mr. Voorhees presented the following RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT A CONVENTION OF REPRESENTA- TIVES OP BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS PRAYING FOR THE IM- MEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL REPEAL OP THE PURCHASING CLAUSE OP THE ACT OF JULY 14. 1890. Washington, D. C, September 12, 1893. Whereas the 'serious monetary and industrial distress prevailing throughout the country has rendered necessary the calling together at the national capital of, this convention of representatives of business organizations from all sections of the United States; and Whereas the evils from which the country is suffering arp in large measure attributable to the effects of the silver law of 1890, known as the Sherman silver law, under the operations of which doubt has been cast upon the permanency of our monetary standard, and there has arisen widespread apprehension and alarm, causing a withdrawal of capital and the hoarding of money, and in this way bringing about'a serious scarcity in the circulating medium ; and Whereas the President of the United States, in his message sub T mitted to Congress on August 8, has clearly pointed out the only means of giving immediate relief, and has urged the prompt and unconditional repeal of so much of said law as provides for the continued purchases of silver; and Whereas the prompt and emphatic action of the House of Repre- sentatives in passing a bill for the repeal of the purchasing clause of said law has already produced markedly beneficial results in stimula- ting the renewal of confidence and the revival' of all classes of busi- ness ; and ' Whereas it is proper at a time like this that there" should be an ex- pression of opinion from the business bodies and institutions of the country : Therefore, be it by this convention Resolved, That w& heartily commend and , indorse the President's ' message and the decisive action of the House of Representatives in passing an act in accordance with his recommendations, and we earn- estly urge upon the Senate of the United States the necessity of speedily and unconditionally concurring in said action. Resolved further, That it is the conviction of the business organiza- tions represented by this convention that any considerable delay on the part of the Senate or any failure by it to repeal the purchasing clause of said law will plunge the business interests of the country 2 RE.PEAL OF PURCHASING CLAUSE OF ACT OF JULY 14, 1890.' 'into a more serious crisis than that from which they are now beginnii to emerge. Resolved further, That it is the opinion of this convention that tl only action in regard to this matter which it is desirable for Congre to take at this time is the speedyand unconditional repeal: of the pi] chasing clause of Said law, leavingfor future consideration any furth effort at financial legislation, so that it may proceed with the cauti< and deliberation which is demanded by the vital importance of the su ject to the welfare of the country; and to this end this conventk recommends the appointment of an expert nonpartisan commission suggest the needed legislation. Resolved further, That these resolutions be printed and , that copi be sent to the President of the United States, to the President ai members of the Senate, and to the Speaker and members of the Houi of Eepresentatives. ■ , , Thos. Morrison, ,; Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce. G-eo. E. Leighton, St. Louis Commercial Club. J. Bandolph Anderson,; Savannah Board of Trade. Wat. E. Tucker, • Philadelphia Board of 'Trade, Herbert W. Ladd, Providence Board of Trade. William C. Cornwell, Buffalo Merchants' Exchange. Ltnde Harrison, New Haven Chamber of Commerce. Darwin E. James, , New York Board of Trade and Transportation. Jonathan A. Lane, Boston Merchants' Association. H. E. Paine, Scranton Board of Trade. J. Randolph Tucker, Jr., Richmond, Chamber of Commerce. A. J. Corcoran^ Jersey City Board of Trade. B. O. Stanard, St. Louis, 53d Congress, 1st Session. SENATE. < Mis.Doo. \ No. 52. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. September 15, 1893.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Teller presented the following STATEMENT FROM THE ACTING DIRECTOR OP THE MINT SHOW- ING THE PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND SILVER OP ARIZONA, CALI- FORNIA, COLORADO, IDAHO, MONTANA, NEVADA, UTAH, AND NEW MEXICO. Production of gold and silver of Arizona, California, Colwado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah, and New Mexico. Note. — Previous to 1848 the gold product of the United States was estimated to have been $14,440,000 , not distributed by States and Tferritories. (Ures Dictionary of Arts, Mines, etc., Vol. it, p. 647.) (Raymond, 1874, p. 544.) California. ' Nevada. - Gold. Silver. Gold. Silver, From 1848 to 1873, inclusive a $985, ,800, 000 c 20, 300, 000 - c 17, 753, 000 15, 799, 000 15, 000, 000 15,261,000 17, 600, 000 a$63, 146, 000 ciZ35, 452, 000 /10, 000, 000 ' 215, 000 18, 000, 000 19, 547, 000 9, 000, 000 b $86, 462, 000 1874 1875e 21| 795, 000 44,991,000 26, 000, 000 28, 130, 000 12, 560, 000 $1, 505, 000 i, qoo, ooo 2, 373, 000 2, 400, 000 1877 e ..; 1878 e 1879c Total 1, 087, 513, 000 7, 278, 000 155, 360, 000 219, 938, 000 1880 ..... 17, 500, 000 18, 200, 000 16, 800, 000 14,120,000 13, 600, 000 12, 700, 000 ±4, 725, 000 13, 400, 000 12, 750, 000 13, 000, 000 12, 500, 000 12, 600, 000 12, 000,000 1, 100, 000 750, 000 845, 000 1, 460, 000 3, 000, 000 2, 500, 000 1, 400, 000 1, '500, 000 1, 400, 000 1, 034, 000 1, 164, 000 970, 000 465, 000 4, 800, 000 2, 250, 000 2, 000, 000 2, 520, 000 3, 500, 000 3, 100, 000 3, 090, 000 2, 500, 000 3, 526, 000 3, 000, 000 2, 800, 000 2, 050, 000 1, 571, 000 10, 900, 000 7, 060, 000 1881 1882 6, 750, 000 5, 430, 000 1883 1884 5, 600, 000 1885 6, 000, 000 1886 .' 5, 000, 000 1887 4, 900, 000 1888 7, 000, 000 1889 : 6, 206, 000 1890 5, 754, 000 1891 1... 4,551,000 1892 2, 901, 000 Total 183, 895, 000 1, 087, 513, 000 17, 588, 000 7, 278, 000 36, 706, 000 155, 360, 000 78, 052, 000 1 219, 938, 000 1, 271, 408, 0*00 24,866,000 192, 066, 000 297, 990, 000 aFrom 1848 to 1873, inclusive, the gold product of California was estimated to have been$985,800,000 and the product of other States and Territories $254,950,000, and,of this amount $63,146, 000 was from' the Comstock Lode, Nevada. &The silver product from 1848 to 1873, inclusive, was estimated to have been $186,050,000, not dis- tributed. by States and Territories, and of this amount $86,462,000 was from the Comstock Lode, Nevada. cGold and silver. (Baymond.j d Of this amount" $8,«90, 900 gold and $13,486,000 silver was from the Comstock Lode, Nevada. eFiscal year. , /Estimate of Dr. E. E. Linderman. 2 PRODUCTION OF GOLD AND SILVER OF ARIZONA, ETC. ; f Production of gold and silver of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Net Utah, and New Mexico — Continued. Colorado. Gold. Silver. Montana. Gold. Silver. Idaho. Gold. Sil ,1874 18756. .'....' 18766 1877b 18786 "18796 , I Total 1880 1881 1.. 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 :... Total Grand total 0$5, 189, 000 '2,800,000 3, 150, 000 ,3, 000, 000 3, 366, 000 3, 225, 000 $2, 672, 000 3, 130, 000 4, 500, 000 5, 395, 000 11, 700, 000 6$4, 355, 000 3, 438, 000 3, 078, 000 3, 200, 000 2, 261, 000 2, 500, 000 6$161, 000 682, 000 1,133,000 750, OffO 1, 670, 000 2, 225, 000 a$l, 880,000 2, 000, 000 1, 053, 000 . 1, 500, 000 1, 15ft 000 ' 1, 200, 000 $5( 3( 2! i 2( 20, 730, 000 27, 397, 000 18, 832, 000 6, 621, 000 8,783,000 1,9( 3, 200, 000 3, 300, 000 3,360,000 4, 100, 000 4, 250, 000 4, 200, 000 4, '450, 000 4, 000, 000 3, 758, 000 3; 500, 000 4, 150, 000 '4, 600, 000 5, 300, 000 17,000,000 17, 160, 000 16, 500, 000 17, 370, 000 16, OjlO, 000 15,800,000 16, 000, 000 15, 000, 000 19, 000, 000 20, 687, 00b 24, 307, 000 27, 358, 000 31, 030, 000 2, 400, 000 2, 330, 000 2, 550, 000 1, 800, 000 ' 2,170,000 -3, 300, 000 4, 425, 000 5, 230, 000 ' 4, 200, 000 3, 500, 000 3, 300, 000 2, 890, 000 2, 891, 000 52, 168, 000 20, 730, OpO 253,212,000 27,397,000 40, 986, 000 18, 832, 000 72, 898, 000 280, 609, 000 59, 818, 000 2, 500, 000 2, 630, 000 4, 370, 000 6, 000, 000 7, 000, 000 10, 060, 000 12, 400, 000 15,500,000 17, 000, 000 19, 394, 000 20, 364. 000' ,21, 139; 000 22,432,000 1, 980, 1, 700, 1, 500, 1, 400, 1, 250, 1, 800, 1, 800, 1, 900, 2, 400, 2,000, 1, 850, I 1, 680, 1,721, « 1,3C 2,0( 2,1C 2,7S 3,5t 3,6t 3,01 3,0C 4,3£ 4,7E 5,21 4,09 160, 789, 000 6, 621, 000 22,981,000 8, 783, 000 40,15 1,90 167. 41,0, 000 31, 7647000 42, ( Gold. Total -...,. J 4,201,000 J 5, 338, 000 Grand total. 98, 790, 000 29, 163, 000 9, 539, 000 j 127, 953, 000 New Mexico. 052, 000 014, 000 9, 066, 000 Silver. c$2, 027, 000 501), 000 500, 000 • 600,000 3, 627, 000 ■ 425,000 275, 000 1, 800, 000 • 2. 845, 000 3, 000, 000 3, 000, 000 2, 300, 000 2, 300, 000 1, 200, 000 1,461,000 1, 681, 000 1, 713; 000 1, 390, 000 23, 390, 000 3, 627, 000 27, 017, 000 Arizona. Gold. o$487, 000 700, 000 1, 000, 000 300, 000 500, 000 800, 000 3, 787, 000 400, 000 1, 060, 000 1, 065, 000 950, 000 930, 000 880, 000 1, 110, 000 -830,000 872, 000 900, 000 1, 000, 000 975. 000 1, 070; 000 Silv 50 50 3,00 3,55 7,85 2,00 7,30 7,50 5,20 4,50 3,80 3,40 3,80 3,00 , 1,93 1,29 1,!:. 1,37 12, 042, 000 3, 787, 000 15, 829, 000 47,01 7,85 54,86 a Gold and silver. (Kaymond.) 6 Fiscal year. . c Wells, Fargo & Co. statement. Total gold'. t1 R j. „, Total silver ' V' £?„'?! ' / E. E. Preston, .„ Actinq Director Min Bureau of the Mint, September 6, 1893. ' 53d Congress, ) SENATE. f c Mis.Doo. 1st Session. J ' \ No. 55. , IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED S'TATES. September 16, 1893.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Oockrell presented the folio wing STATEMENT SHOWING THE RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OP THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1893. Receipts of the United States, fiscal year 1893. Customs...:. '. $203; 355, 016. 73 Internal, revenue 161, 027, 623. 93 Miscellaneous : Sales of public lands $3, 182, 089. 78 Revenues of District of Columbia. . , 3, 111, 742. 27 Proceeds 10-year funding bonds, District of Co- y» lumbia .'. : 405, 164. 00 Reimbursement and payment of interest by Dis- trict of Columbia on one-half cost of water supply -.,..' 89,531.03 Police and firemen's relief funds, District of Co- 89, 531. 03 lumbia - 21,362.47 Sale of bonds, guarantee fund, District of Co- lumbia -., 26,784.60 Profits on coinage, deduction^ on bullion deposits, assays, etc .- 2,349,471.15 Tax on circulation of national banks '. 1, 392, 623. 63 . Sinking funds^ Pacific railroads 2, 052, 488. 39 Reimbursement of interest by Pacific railroads. . 971, 832. 68 ' Immigrant fund.. J. 288,219.68 Proeeeds of sale of Government property 164, 703. 48 Sale of old custom-bouse, Milwaukee, Wis ....... 71, 526. 37 Sale of old custom-bouse, Pittsburg, Pa 433, 500. 00 , Spanish indemnityfund :.... 28,500.00 Consular fees, : ., - 871,694.93 Custom-house fees,... .*. '-. 487,689.67 Customs fines, penalties, and forfeitures; 221, 652. 87 Customs emolument fees 97,577.34 Tax on sealskins 23,972.60 Relief of sick, disabled, and destitute seamen-.... 4,377.21 - Trust fund interest for support of schools in SouthCarolina : 2,522.50 Reimbursement on account of national bank re- demption agency, salaries and expenses 103,263.25 Worktione by Bureau of EngravingandPrinting. 25,559.29 Assessment upon^owners for deaths on ship board. 970. 00 ; Soldiers' Home permanent fund 162, 733. 05 Sales ordnance material, powder, projectiles, and , small arms 26,187.26 Tolls, St. Marys Falls Canal 35, 249. 90 • Sale of buildings, abandoned military reserva- , tions - '.-.'-.: 1,349.,10 Reimbursement by Chicago, Rock Island and Pa- cifioR. R. Co., on account of repairs, Rocklsland ' bridge....... -• 74,910.34 2 RECEIPTS AND .EXPENDITURES. ! -'*C Receipts of the United Slates, fiscal year 1893 — Continued.. Miscellaneous; — Continued. Payment by Metropolitan Southern and Wash- i, ington Southern' R. R. Cos. for right of way across United States grounds $4, 983. 00 Dividend paid by Exchange National Bank, Nor- folk, Va., on account of Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers '.- 506.56 Clothing and small stores, Naval "Hospital, Navy • pension, and pay of the Navy deposit furies .... 962, 780. 53 Sale of condemned Navy IVessels, material : 1, 138. 35 Fees on letters patent ~- -'-'-, 1, 295,' 313. 55 Fees of registers and receivers of land offices 989, 208. $4 Deposits by individuals for 'expenses surveying • public lands, .-. ...... 156,282.46 Revenues Hot Springs', Ark., Yellowstone National P Park, and proceeds of town-site entries for schools in Oklahoma. . . , '.. ' 24, 431. '22 Depredations on public lands i • 21, 148. 01 Proceeds of sales of Indian lands and interest on • 'deferred payments '..'.„' , 779, 310. 73 Interest on Indian trust fund stocks and reim- , bursement of interest on nonpaying stocks 25, 875. 52 , •'■' 'Indian trust fund ...i ' ' 28,625.00 ' . Reimbursement on account of appraisal of certain Indian reservations : 5,724.71 Reimbursement of excess of appropriation of . ' , March 3, 1891, on account of Choctaws and ) CMckasaws for lands '.- 1 48, 800. 00 i Bequest by WilJiaiBvW. Merriam, deceased „ ' 81, 200. o'o ■ , Miscellaneous unenumerated items ... ^ .. .' 282,411.00 $21, 436, 98 385,819,62 Expenditures of the United States, fiscal year 1893. ■) CIVIL AND MISCELLANEOUS. Legislative: - \ Senate, salaries and expenses 1 166 273. 89 House of Representatives, salaries and expenses. 2, 478' 248. 18 Legislative miscellaneous 50 100. 16 Public Printer, including public printing and '■ binding L... 3,235,052.33 .Library ot Congress, including new Library \ building. , 594,722.13 . Botanic Garden 23 893. 46 Coiirtof Claims, including payment of judgments 759^ 766.' 92 Executive Office: , . ' ~ 8,308,05' Salaries and. expenses ■. ..I..'. 102 200 00 Preventing spread of epidemic diseases . '....'.'' 185' 973] 02 Civil Service Commission : ' 4l'443]4g State Department : ' 329 ' 61 ' Salaries and contingent expenses 141 909 g7 Foreign intercourse ..../. "."."". 1 977' 042 90 Treasury Department: 2,138,95: Salaries and contingent expenses... q -rss cms qq Independent treasury ....... . - ----- MS' «qHo ; Mints and assay offices 1 ikk'^qS? ■>■■ Territorial governments ""' 'SS„ ' Internal revenue— . ^I4,85b.l9 Expenses of collecting! ' a qin aoq rq Bounty on sugar....f...., tf 876' M0 88 E t^ a d i° f dire0t tax levied under aot August ' ' ' 5 ' 1861 •--. '■- '--- 816,315:65 ■ RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES. , v I ■ * Expenditures of the United States, fiscal year 1893 — Continuod. Treasury Department— Continued. , Internal revenue — Continued. Refund of land sold for direct tax in South Carolina $278,234.42 Miscellaneous reliefs; etc 56, 062. 20 Customs service — . Expenses of collecting revenue 6, 796, 076. 36 Repayment to importers excess of deposits . . 2, 898, 370. 14 Debentures and' drawbacks .'. 1 3, 574, 151. 72 Expenses of regulating immigration 228, 975.29 Alien contract-labor laws 1 64, 954. 12 Chinese exclusion act.. r ... 76,237.53 Shipping service ' 60, 527. 52 Revenue-cutter service 922,097.36 • Miscellaneous, reliefs, and reimbursements.. 183,424.28 Marine Hospital Service 548, 961. 22 Quarantine service -85, 894. 28 Life-Saving Service. i.. 1,258,526.55 Light-House Establishment, including salaries of , keepers of lights, expenses, and light stations . . 2, 684, 853. 00 Coast and Geodetic Survey, 465, 540. 03 , Steamboat-inspection service 301, 534. 36 Bureau of Engraving and Printing , 1,039,842.57 Public Buildings — Court-houses, post-offices, etc 4, 853, 407. 06 Repairs and preservation of public buildings. 197, 389. 53 Pay of assistant custodians and janitors 704, 040. 67 Furniture and repairs of same 251,173.12 Fuel, lights, and water ^785,987.85 Heating apparatus and repairs i . 108, 714. 89 Vaults, safes, and locks, plans, inspecting fur- - ; niture, and vault construction . - 77, 611. 22 Sinking funds, Pacific railroads ...... ^ 1, 977, 296. 71 Expenses of Treasury notes 266, 657. 15 Distinctive paper and other expenses, United , States securities ,....' 59,421.32 Eepoinage of gold and transportation. .„'- 263, 671. 07 Suppressing counterfeiting and Other crimes 73, 501. 42 Smithsonian Institution, including North Ameri- can Ethnology 125,976.82 Propagation of food fishes, including fish hatch- erie?. 319,800.65 National Museum 166,414.44 Interstate Commerce Commission 240, 827. 45 World's Fair expenses j 2,711,258.51 Zoological Park, District of Columbia 50, 390. 20 Treasury, miscellaneous "... - 104,305.91 District of Columbia 6,232,681.02 $60,684,048.49" War Department : i Salaries and contingent of offices 1, 957, 540. 43 Salaries, fuel, and lights, State, War, and Navy> Department-building ■--.'. 159, 820. 54 Maintenance Washington Monument 11, 197. 34 Trenton Battle Monument 20,000.00 Fishways at Great Falls ,. 15,000.00 Garfield. Hospital 14,999.85 Miscellaneous - 53,296.72 Salaries and expenses, buildings and grounds,. under chief engineer 150, 860. 50 2,3,82,715.37 Navy Department : Salaries and contingent expenses - 386, 854. 60 Interior Department.: i Salaries and contingent expenses 4, 762, 902. 62 Public Lands — Salaries and contingent, offices of surveyors- general T 142,749.67 4 -• '• RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES. n Expenditures of the United States, fiscal year 1893 — Continued. Interior Department — Continued. Public Lands— Continued. Contingent expenses, land offices $169, 609. 04 Salaries and commissions of registers and re- ceivers 533, 537. 34 Protecting public lands, timber, etc 132, 804. 90 Surveying public lands ,< 366,966.30 ( Geological survey and maps 435, 043. 64 Protection and improvement of Hot Springs.. , 42,113.65 Repayment for lands erroneously sold 50, 343. 67 v Deposits by individuals for surveying lands . . 104, 949. 61 Five, three", and two per cent funds of net pro- ceeds of sales of public lands in States 247, 604. 58 Miscellaneous public lands 95,993.11. Goverment' Hospital for the Insane 298, 583. 22 Columbia Institution for Deaf and Dumb 52, 500. 00 ' Howard University 29,499.37 Freedman's Hospital and Asylum 47, 515. 55 Maryland Institution for Instruction of the Blind. 6, 358. 32 Capitol repairs,, grounds, righting, etc 126, 000. 87 Colleges for agriculture and the mechanic arts. : . 912, 000. 00 Eleventh Census ,..../..... -. . . 1,'012, 653. 86i — Eleventh Census-, farms, homes, and mortgages.. . 159, 915. 80 Miscellaneous 21,855*10 ' • - $9,751,516.2! Post-Office Department : , Salaries and contingent expenses 86*1, 122. 87 Deficiency in postal revenues 5, 946, 795. 19 i Mail transportation, Pacific railroads 1, 615, 229. 20 Miscellaneous 1, 408. 61 ; .8, 424, 555. 87 Department of Agriculture : Salaries and expenses, including Weather Bureau, $905,379.81, and agricultural and experiment stations, $721,898.14 3,141,880.73 Department of Dabor: v I Salaries and expenses 179 689. 18 Department of Justice : , Salaries and contingent expenses 207, 955. 89 . Defending suits in claims against the United States 33, 098. 15 Defense in Indian depredation claims 26, 014. 69 • Prosecution of crimes, violation of acts, and frauds 37, 975. 68 Fees, supervisors of elections 608, 698. 39 — . — 913,742.80 -Judicial : > Salaries Supreme Court, circuit and district courts, court of appeals, district attorneys, and marshals « 775,010.09" ± ees and expenses of marshals, fe,es of district at- torneys, clerks, commissioners, jurors, wit- nesses, pay of bailiffs, and miscellaneous ex- P enses 6,316,169.58 , ; 7, 091, 179. 67 Total civil and miscellaneous 103 732 799. 27 War — Military Establishment : ' UUli Pay Department 13 615 177 lg Commissary Department l'608'306 37 Quartermaster's Department, including supplies" ' ' and incidental expenses, $2,892,090.85 ; Armv transportation, $3,071,401.15 ; clothing and equipage, $1,098,034.35 ; barracks and quarters, $669,485.12;andnationalcemeteries,$209,196.71. 8,095 768 44 Medical Department w jso ao signal service ;;;;. ;;;;;;;;:; 3 b 2 i: 8 u RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES. y 5 / -- Expenditures of the United States, fiscal year 1893-^-Gorrbirm6i. War — Military Establishment — Continued. Ordnance Department, including armament of »- fortifications, $1,710,637.32 ; manufacture of arms, $302,121.81; arming and equipping mili- tia, $449,680.86-; gun and mortar batteries, $792,228.11 ; and Army gun factory,$494,841.98-. . $4, 827, 732. 78 , Military Academy, current expenses and build- ' i ings and grounds -. 227,128.65 Engineer Department : Sites for fortifications and" seaooast defenses. 643,088.97 Preservation and repair of fortifications, plans, etc.....:... 58,650.86 Torpedoes for harbor defense 1 14, 430. 07 Miscellaneous items .- 23, 538.. 31 Rivers and harbors , 14,799,835.98 War — miscellaneous: Expenses of recruiting ' 120, 515. 87 Military posts 593,443.24 Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park. « 191, 760. 83 Publication of .official records, War. of the Rebellion 230,900.39 Support military prison Fort Leavenworth, K^ns ,....-.' 75,533.28 Support National Home for Disabled Volun-, * tear Soldiers.. <... ,2,478,651.67 * State or Territorial homes for disabled- volun- teer soldiers 699,090.10 Soldiers' Home, Washington, D. C 365, 754.45 Damages by improvement of Fox and Wis- consin rivers.. ..A. 13,9,957.83 Claims for stores, property, horses, etc., lost in the military service 110, 498. 69 Miscellaneous items and reliefs 203,261.34 — — $49,641,773.47 .Navy — Naval Establishment: ' Pay of the Navy...... 7,190,828.95 Pay, miscellaneous "....■ :-._..'. 287, 028. 27 Pay, Navy deposit fund . :' .......... 147,852 00 Naval Academy, pay and expenses 211,744.63 Marine Corps, pay and expenses 894,841.02 Increase of the Navy . .' 15,030,226.74 Bureau of Yards and Docks ' 1, 209, 762. 70 Equipment 861,414.98 Navigation : 245,617.41 Construction and Repair 994, 423. 28 Ordnance 449,788.29 Steam Engineering. 753,836.34 Supplies and Accounts ^. 1,505,843.92 Medicine and Surgery 223, 916. 40 , Expenses, international naval review . . . , 44, 539. 43 Miscellaneous itenis and reliefs . i : :.. 84, 420.07 . ; , / . 30,136,084.43 Pensions.... 159, 357, 557. 87 v Indians: . , , • • • Current and .contingent expenses, including pay of agents, interpreters, and inspectors 175, 704. 93 Fulfilling treaties and. supports, treaty .stipula- tions ''...., 2,879,122.75 Miscellaneous supports < : 539, 406. 20 Trust funds, interest and principal accounts 1, 780, 456. 94 Incidental expenses of Indian service. ... . 101,738.49 . Support of Indian schools : 2,324,173.07 , Miscellaneous expenses of Indian service : Payment to Choctaws for lands 2, 243, 587. 50 , Payment to Chickasaws for lands * 747, 862. 50 . \ Judgments, Indian depredation claims 462, 899. 47 Purchase and transportation of Indian sup- plies..:.-,....'.: .... : 342,675.27 b , ,' , RECEIPTS' AND EXPENDITURES. ■ ' , I ir ? ■■.■'■ , l , s '• ■'.<] ' Expenditures of the United States, fiscal year 189S— Continuea Indians — Continued. / •- , Miscellaneous expenses of Indian service — Cont'd. ' > Pay of Indian police./. $128,692.19 Pay of judges, Indian courts, , farmers, ma- trons, etc .:..--,„- '81,y577..73 . ■■ V- Indian moneys, proceeds of labor 97,864.18 . >• , 'V Civilization, education, etc., of the Sioux... 371,022.54 Chippewas of Minnesota, relief and civiliza- tion, surveys, damages, etc . .' 241, 235. 00 Standing Rock and Cheyenne .River Indians, for ponies .....:... -. ...:.... 198, 133. 35 Miscellaneous items and payments 629, 195. 16 $13,345,347. Interest on the public debt 23, 389, 201. 46 ( Interest on Pacific Railroad bonds '. 3, 875, 190. 72 / 4 - , 27,264,392. Total 383,477,954. 53d Congress, ): SENATE. (Mis.Dod. 1st Session. ) \ No. 61. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. September 21, 1893.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Cockrell presented the following LETTER PROM THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE MINT, GIVING THE AMOUNT AND COST AND COINING VALUE IN SILVER DOLLARS, AND AMOUNT COINED, OP SILVER PURCHASED UNDER THE ACT OF JULY 14, 1890, TO SEPTEMBER 1, 1893. Treasury Department, i ' Bureau of the Mint, Washington, D. C, September 8, 1893. Sir: I have to reply to your verbal inquiries of to-day as follows: (1) Amount and cost and coining value in silver dollars of silver pur- chased under the act of July 14, 1890 to September 1, 1893, is. as fol- ; lows: Fineounces 163,047,664 Cost : $151,804,170 Coining value ..! $210,809, 100 (2) Amount of such bullion coined to date is as follows: Fine ounces '. 27, 911, 182. 14 Cost $29,110,116.25 Dollars coined - 36, 087, 185 Seigniorage on same ....._ .....'. $6,977,068.75 The cost in Treasury notes of silver purchased to September 1, 1893, is given in answer to first question. The amount of Treasury notes issued tp September 8, 1893, was $152,007,933, redeemed in standard silver dollars and retired $1,517,574, peaving outstanding $150,490,359. If all the bullion purchased under the act of July 14,1890, to September 1, 1893, were coined, the number of silver dollars in excess of the Treasury notes now outstanding would be $60,318,741. In this" statement no allowance whatever is made for wastage by the operative officers of the mints manufacturing the dollars. Respectfully yours, R. E. Preston^ Acting Director of the Mint. Hon. P. M. Cockrell, United States Senate. 53d Congress,') SENATE. ( Mis. Ddq. , 1st Session. j ( No. 68. / IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. September 29, 1893. — Ordered to be printed. Mr. Camekon presented the following s ' MEMORIAL PROM THE BUSINESS MEN OF PHILADELPHIA IN RE- LATION TO TARIFF AND FINANCIAL LEGISLATION. Philadelphia, September 18, 1893. « To the Senators of the United States: Gentlemen: The American people have not experienced, since/ 1857, such a prostration of industrial, agricultural, and transportation enter- : prises as that which has existed during the present year. Many have been brought to ruin, and all have suffered loss except the small cliques of capitalists whose interests are promoted by dear money and scant supply of money.' : These cliques, who seek to control the financial, industrial, and trans- portation business of the country by monopolizing combinations and various methods of dishonest overcapitalization* and by overcharges for services rendered, now assail the national integrity at two points, through its industries and its money. Controlling many of the trans'- - portation lines, banks, trust companies, and even savings banks, and not a few of the public journals, they now make this assault upon the • tariff system and upon the money of the country. They propose to march toward free trade, and to abandon the national policy main- tained so long, under which we have had protection against foreign cheap labor. * They propose to force such changes in the rates of tariff duties as will close many mills and factories, prostrate large , agricultural and pastoral industries, and reduce well-paid and independent American labor to the level of underpaid European labor, to increase the reve- nues of the country by increased importations, and thus to further im- poverish the country by sending out of it large masses of gold to pay • for manufactures invited here through reductions in the rates of duties. They propose to appreciate the value of the gold dollar by the demone- i tization of silver; in this way they will increase the burdens of the debtor classes, and increase also the price paid for all manufactures and raw materials bought in foreign countries. Unless Americans are ready to abandon an independent position among nations and to accept a position of dependence upon England and Germany, the two great creditor nations of the world whose capi- i talists stand behind and support the present attack upon us, they must refuse to surrender-the protective system and refuse as well to accept 'gold monometallism. They must maintain an intelligent, broad, and scientific application of the protective principle to the customs-revenue system of the country. They must denounce and suppress those do- 2 ( ' TARIFF AND FINANCIAL LEGISLATION. mestic "trusts" and combinations which are designed and create control and check domestic production and to prevent domestic coi tition, destroying thus at home the very benefit which protection a the frontier line is intended to secure. Protection is a national q * tion, not a class question; protective duties are not imposed for, ,' aid of manufactures, but for the public advantage of diversified m tries, the industrial independence of the nation, and the mam ten am comfort and intelligence amongst the mass of the people. The United States must continue to use gold and silver as mc at an>agreed ratio, and must maintain their parity. To abandon si would be to enslave its people to the money-lenders of the Euro] ' capitalist nations. Under these circumstances the people appeal to you, gentlemei to legislate as to preserve the protective character of the tariff and ■ integrity of silvdr as a money metal. 1 As to the former, your assurance of the maintenance of existing toms duties will restore confidence, reestablish industrial activity employ the hosts of idle work people, and preserve the home ma for home products, The country,, at this tremendous crisis, neec ■ have its industrial system conserved and not assailed. ! As to silver, I propose to you these practical measures : (1) That the United States shall admit silver bullion from Amer mines to coinage in its mints upon the payment, by the owner, i :'; seigniorage absorbing three-fourths of the difference between the : ket (London) price of the bullion and its value when coined. (2) That foreign silver shall be.admitted only for coinage purposi a seigniorage absorbing all of the difference between the market (, ■ don) price and its value when coined. (3) That the United States shall invite, at once a conference those nations of the world which have not committed themselves to monometallism. This would include especially the nations of North South America, Japan, and China, and in Europe, France, Eussia, others., These nations are deeply interested, as we are, in resisting attempt tp increase the power of gold through degradation of power of silver, and many of them; particularly those of America eastern Asia, are those to whom we may most easily and advanl ously sell the excess of our manufacturing industries. Such a co ence should exclude England and Germany ; its conclusions, wit them, would direct the money policy of the world, preserve the ii , ' rity of bimetallism, and prevent the enslavement of the United Si . and others by the capitalist classes of the two great creditor natioi ; I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, Wharton Barki We, the undersigned, approve and indorse what Mr. Barker has in the above letter. James Dobson. Barnes & Beyer. James Pollock. Stinson Brothers. James Doak, Jr. Adolph Woll. George Campbell. Samuel White. Charles Heber Clark. James Gillinder. John Bromlets Sons. Alexander Crow, Jr. W. T. Smith & Son. Thomas ShAw_ HoYle, Harrison & Kate. Wm. B. Bement. Stead & Miller. ' Jas. & Geo. D. Bromley. William Sqholes & Son. ' Gxrus Elder. TARIFF AND FINANCIAL LEGISLATION. W. H. PFAHLER, , , , American and Dauphin sts. Bob't S. Irwin. Geo. H. Carpenter, 307-310 Girard Building. J. K. Bougher. Louis N. D. Williams. Howland Croft, Howland C»opt, Sons & Co. Waldron J. Cheynet. Geo. Brooks & Son. W. W. Hanna, 50 North Front street. Edwin A. Gaskill. C. A. Fuebush. W. W. Marshall, ■ 1629 Girard avenue. s Michael Bkeslin. Wm.' Carroll, M. D. Wi'. H. Wanamaker. Thomas Firth, Of Fietb & Foster Bros. Walter T. Bradley,. A. W. Steffan. J. H. Hall. < Alexander Balph. W. H. Sharp. Pennington Way. J. O. Kerbaugh. John H. Foster. Alfred Marshall, ' 1156 Beach street-. Eiohard Campion. Wm. H. Hurley, Jr., &,Co. 109 South Third street. Wm. H. Hurley, 1433 Arch street. G. T. Harrop, 1023 Market street. James H. Gay. John Pilling. Thomas Boggs & Son, Trenton ave. and Sergeant st. Wm. Kedward. The James Coven Company, Feank A.. Coven, Secretary Savanac Silk Milli. Howard Evans. Alfred Foster. Wm. H. Smith. Wm. S. Taylor. Eichard Hey & Son. Henry W. Both. Harry S. Lucas. , , A. Platt & Bro. James Moir, (Jonshohoclcen,- Pa. G. Martin Brill. The Penn Iron Eoofing and Corrugating Co., Limited. L v . Lewis Saoendorfb, Vice-Prerident and Manager^ C. J. Matthews, 119 North Fourth street. Whetstone &"Co., * 911 Filbert street. Carson & Hamill, _. i Albert Crenshaw, A. H. Leser, Trustees. Henry C. Dinoee, . ,Twenty-sixth and York streets. Wm. S. Ehodes. Thos. S. Brown, 2106 Wood street. Wilmer. Atkinson. The Schlichter Jute Cordage Co. Isaac Schlichter, Prt. John G. Qroxton. John H. Lorimer. Alan Wood, Jr. Wm. H. Grundy. Chas. M McCloud. Chas. S. Gibbon. , Edward Tredick. ^ Thos. A. Pearce & Co. , , 1716 N. 5th St. Thomas J. Martin. John Blood & Co. Jas. S. Cochran & Bro. Eichard C. Eemmey. Eobert Carson. Edward S. Jackson. Stanton H. Hackett. Thos. H. Wilson. James Hoop. SamuEl Leonard Kent. Eobt. H. Foerderer. C. Bailey. E. B. Mills, 205 Wistef St. Alfred E. Burk. Fred M. Walton & Co.,^ 617 and 619 Sansom St. Everett H. Brown. F. W. McDowell, 28 South Sixth street. Henry T. Kent. Henry Handy. P. P. Bowles, d024 Chestnut street. Harry E. Lincoln. Barton Gem ml E. E. Mann & Co. 4 TARIFF AND FINANCIAL LEGISLATION. Charles Illingsworth. 0. A. Bragg. How'd L. Haines, 135 North Seventh street. John W. Boughton, f 1207 Chestnut street. : y W. H. FOLWELL. ; • Chas. W, Miller, 33 Letitia street. K T. Folwell. Wm. W. Goodwin, 1016 Filbert street. Samuel LeEsJ . 3410 Spring Garden street. Joseph C. Hance. / Charles Delany. E. M. Cooper. Jos. E. Foster, 2115, Howard street. ' x " "V^m. L. Martin. Gilbert Parker. John B. White. Henry Holmes. Wesley Stead. Amos H/ Hall, Second ap. Cambria street. •Chas. K. Bobinson, i , 26 South Fifteenth" street. Charles Barclay, 617 Drexel Building. i Chas. W. Ledig, President. The Ledig' Mandfactubing Company. J. S. Harley. W. W.Finn, Jr„ Of Geo. Bkanson & Co. . John Lane. . V. CSweatMan. John Hamilton, Howard and Lehigh avenue. A. B. Elsasser. Philip H. Fowler. Fulton and Walker CoMPi Z. Xatlob Eiohakds, Secretary and Treasurer. G. A. BlSLER, J128-336 Julianna street. J. M. Steele, ;SVm. Steele & Soh. J. D. Blackwood.' Chester L. Smith. James Brown, President, Southwarh Mills Compam J. W. Albizitti. v , Henry CArey Baird. James A. Palmer, 1513 Filbert street, PhiU phia Steam Heating C pany. Jos. B. Craig, ; 'Of Eshleman & Ceaig, Shirtmakers. A. H. POSTEL, Of Postel & Gilebee and C. H. Pi & Co. Henry W. Scattergood. Wm. T. Mc^eely: ' James Dalton. , THos. A. JJarris & Co. ' J. Warren Hale.. Henry M. Wirz. Cheney Kilburn. \ C, S. Garrett, 2itos.'20 and 22 Decatur sti Jos. M. Adams, Areola Mills, Manaywnk. Jos. W. Scull. \ John H. Lorimer. Bichard F. Loper. H. L. Butler, 1600 Hamilton street. 53d Congress, ) SENATE. ( Mis. Doc. 1st Session. j { No. 89. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. October 17, 1893.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Teller presented the fallowing paper from the Journal of the Society of Arts : PROCEEDINGS OE THE SOCIETY. INDIAN SECTION. i Thursday, January 19, 1893;" Sir Theodore Cracraft Hope, K. c. s. I., C I. E., in the chair. The paper read was — THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. By J. Bare Robertson. In a period like the present of widespread depression in trade and industry, and amongst the people generally, the question as to whether this can be traced to any special cause or causes is one of the highest importance. Numerous controversies have been, and are being carried on as to these causes, and out of the conflicting masses of argument and fact, of error and confusion, there is gradually emerging the cardi- nal idea that the predominant cause is the appreciation that gold has undergone in the last twenty years. In 1885 and 1886 a royal com- mission sat to inquire into the depression of trade and industry, but it practically failed to find any adequate cause for the troubles to which the inquiry extended. In its third report, however, the question of the altered relations between gold and silver was prominently brought forward; it was accepted as proved that the average prices of com- modities in gpld money countries had fallen, and that the gold price of silver had fallen, and it was stated that as this depression extended to other countriei, and was therefore not the outcome of merely local causes or conditions, the appreciation of gold would be a cause sufficient to account for most of the phenomena into which they had been inquiring. And they recommended that a special commission should be appointed to inquire into the recent changes in the value of the precious metals. But it is very important in passing to emphasise the fact that outside of the questions of the precious metals and the currency, no adequate cause was found to account for the depression. Yet the depression was there to be accounted for, because the com- missioners were fully convinced of the extreme gravity of the situation/. TJ1JS UUKKiSJNUX Jb"KUtilji!iM.. And since, that time the conviction has deepened that the chief of the depression is the appreciation of gold. A special roya mission to inquire into recent changes in the relative values ( precious metals has collected a large mass of opinions and facts < subject, and has found that the gold prices of commodities and ver have undergone a very considerable fall, which is equivalent t ing that there has been a considerable increase in the purchasing ; of gold over commodities and silver. It is, however, one thing to this as a fact, it is a very different thing to make it so clear to pc apprehension that its full significance will be completely graspe understood. It will be generally regarded as a truism that thei great advantage .in the prices of commodities being cheap. T things cheap, without any sacrifice of quality, is looked upon as i the great objects to be aimed at in life. And when it is seen that has been a fall in the prices of the leading commodities, it is assumed that that ought to be a sign of prosperous times-. If 1 are very cheap, then everyone can get so much more of them ft same money. What more, it may be thought, can be needed to home the conclusion that low prices are a great advantage, and spondingly that' high prices are a great disadvantage? But when we Gome to look more closely at the subject we se there are different kinds of low prices. We have low prices of-, for example, as the result of an abundant harvest, or we hav prices of articles as the result of some economy that has been ef in the cost of their production. The prices of grain, and of these articles, will therefore be relatively cheaper than those of otto whichthere has been no abundant harvest, no excessive supply, •economy in the cost of their production. On the other hand, if is a deficient harvest, or if some articles can only be produced greater cost than formerly, then the prices of the articles so at will be higher. These changes — and they are going on and must continually — are relative changes, that is, some price are highei tively to a certain general level, and some are lower relatively ti level, and so prices rise and fall in endless diversity. These ch in regard to the prices of commodities are due solely to deman supply in connection with these commodities. They are natural ch: and they are inevitable. They are not produced under any af1 conditions of restraint, they are produced under the complete libf mankind to use their best judgdment in selecting and following i most advantageous fields of production or of occupation that are able for the application of their labour, or their capital. Unde: conditions of freedom, more will be produced of some articles rela to the population than of other articles as compared with former and less will be produced of some articles than in former years, all this is done under free judgment, free production or occupatic free competition. Under this system one man may become r another man may become poor, but all have a free field and ai chance according to their means, their capacities, and their oppc ties. In this country we do not attempt to interfere with prices, he high or low, except in the few cases in which we impose taxat: articles for the purposes of revenue, and in these cases we ti whole quantity consumed in the country.. In every other coui the world, taxes are imposed for purposes of protection, and thus of the natural prices, as we know them, are interfered with 1 .arbitrary system of tariffs for the protection of local trade and inc THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 5 Still, that does not prevent, nor should it, prices of commodities from rising and falling in obedience to demand and supply, as modified by the arbitrary effects of tariffs. So that, for our present purpose, prices under free trade and those under protection may be placed in the same category. The prices of individual commodities under either system rise and. fall in accordance with distinct and ascertainable causes in connection with demand and supply. But there is another class of low prices intimately mixed up with, yet originating in causes totally distinct from, the low prices of the system of demand and supply. The distinction between those two classes of low prices is one that is hardly sufficiently considered or understood by the general public. This confusion of two distinct things in the popu- lar mind, and the neglect almost altogether of what, in currency con- siderations like the present, is by far the more important of the two elements, have hitherto formed an insuperable difficulty in the way of a popular apprehension of the momentous questions at issue. If we take the average prices of a considerable number of leading com- modities year by year, we may find that' these average prices have, as a whole, risen very materially over a period of years, or that they have fallen very materially. This v will be more intelligible if 'we explain the system of index numbers of the Economist newspaper. The prices of 22 leading wholesale commodities were tabulated from the year 1845 to 1850, and the average price for these years of each article was called 100, so that with 22 articles the total index number was 2,200. On January 1 of each subsequent year, the prices were taken, and in each case the article was represented by a number above or below 100, according as the price had risen or fallen, and the sum of the 22 num- bers was the total index number set down year by year. This total index number, therefore, merged all prices high and low in a single figure, and a glance indicated, year by year, how the general level of prices was moving, whether upward or downward. Some articles might rise in price, and others might fall, but the total index number only showed how, on the, average,' and as a whole, the total prices had risen or fallen. Now, it will be evident that the prices that rose above the original 100 of 1845 to 1850 might have been bal- anced by those that fell below that figure; and so we might have had in the total no very great variation year by year from the original 2,200. So loi^g as some prices go up, and others go down, we can not say whether the purchasing power of our money is increasing or dimin- ishing; but when we see the total index number going up or going down, then we know that our money is buying less or buying more of general commodities'than it did before. The total index number of the prices of the 22 articles, from 1845 to 1850, was 2,200, but, in 1864, it reached its highest point, namely, 3,78-7; in 1870 it was 2,689 ; whereas, in 1886, it was 2,023, the lowest point since these figures were first tab- ulated. The meaning of this was that, in 1845" to 1850, certain quan- tities of the 22 articles could have been purchased for £2,200; in 1864 it would have taken £3,787 to purchase the same quantities ; in 1870, £2,689; whereas, in 1886, £2,023 would have sufficed. From 1850, therefore, to 1879, gold had diminished in purchasing power, because it took £3,787 in 1864 and £2,689 in 1870 to purchase what only required £2,200 in 1845 to 1850. But, as in 1886 it only required £2,023 to do the same, gold has enormously increased in purchasing power, as com- pared with 1864 and 1870, and had considerably increased as compared with 1845 to 1850. At this point, therefore, attention is again drawn to the distinction 4 THE CUEBENCY PEOBLEM. between a range of prices, some low and others high, followin conditions of supply and demand of the 22 commodities, and coi ally changing relatively to each other, but in which the total number does not vary much, from year to year, and a range of ] continually changing relatively to each other, but, in which the index number has, for example, fallen from 3,787 in 1864, or 2,< 1870, to 2,023 in 1886. When the total index number is comparal stationary year by year in this country, the purchasing power of over general commodities is steady; but when the total index nu falls enormously between one period and another, then the purch power of gold over commodities has increased enormously; and the total index number falls, for example, 30 per cent., that means in addition to the rise and fall in prices, due to the operation of si and demand, there is "a fall of 30 per cent, in all prices, both higl low, due to the increase in the purchasing power of gold. Starti a given period, like 1845 to 1850, if the same proportion was maint between the amount of money in circulation and the uses of the p for money, the same general" level of average prices would be i tained. But, if larger quantities of money flow into circulation from ab as was the case from 1850 till 1870 from the Oalifornian and Austi gold-fields, then, while prices will rise and fall relatively to each c the general level. of prices will also rise in correspondence witl increased quantity of money in circulation, so that all the indiv prices, high or low,, relatively, will rise higher than they would c wise have done. This ,is very strikingly exemplified by the com prices during the influx of the gold from California and Australia. 22 articles, valued, in 1845 to 1850, at £2,200, rose in price; so tha the 8 years from 1858 to 1865, the yearly average was £3,038; di the 10 years from 1866 to 1875, it was £2',877; in the 10 years, 187 1885, it was £2,419 ; in 1886, it was £2,023 ; on July 1, 1892, it was £2 and on January 1, 1893, it was £2,120. So that we see how this i of gold raised prices, without any regard to the changes in rel prices, due to supply and demand, a"s affecting commodities; a] each of these periods the purchasing power of gold changed, until average prices have fallen considerably below those of the exceed depressed times, before the gold discoveries in 1849 and 1850. Di the last 18 years, our supplies of gold have fallen off greatly, as pared with the period from 1850 to 1870, and the number of coui using gold money has considerably increased, and, consequently our general level of prices has fallen very much, as shown by the index. number. The purchasing power of gold' has correspond increased; and this will be more completely exhibited in the tabl lowing. The object is to compare the various ranges of prices a period before Germany began to demonetize silver and to adopl f^J ^ sta ? dard > U P to the present time. The five years, from to 1869, have been chosen for this purpose; and the total index bers during these years give an> annual average of 3,102 for tl articles. In the table, in order to render the movements of the i number clearer, we have taken 3,102 as equal to 100, and mad other calculations accordingly, so as to deal in percentages, w oc, flgUres m T C0 ^™ n 1 show the movements of English prices i: ?892 nlZL Si 1886 *& had faUen 35 P er ceBt -> and ™ J*™» 1892, the to£al fall was 31 per cent., on July 1 33 per cent an wSi°f^| 8year i 2 per cent - Therefore" it fs Absolutely I testable that between the first period and the last date in the t THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. O gold -had so much increased in purchasing power that £68 would pur- chase the same quantities of the 22 staple commodities of the Econo- mist as would have required £100 in the period from 1865 to 1869; and a glance at the table will show the varying course year by year of the fall in prices. Passing to column 2, we have here the Economist index numbers valued in par silver in London at the current rates. After 1872 the quantity of silver that could have been bought for gold increased, and so commodities were worth a higher silver price than the gold price, as compared with the period before 1873. The gold index number and the silver index number both started at 100, and they , continued the same until 1873, when the effect of the adoption of the gold standard by Germany, and the demonetisation of silver began to be felt, and after this France, and the other members of the Latin Union demone-. tised silver. In consequence of these movements, the gold valuation of prices and the silver valuation began to diverge from each other, until on January 1, 1893, the gold valuation had fallen to 68, while the silver valuation stood at 107. . This will perhaps be made clearer if we state that while at the end 68 ounces of gold would purchase as much of the staple commodities as 100 ounces at the beginning of the period under review, in the case of silver 101 ounces would on July 1, 1892, purchase as much as 100 ounces did at the beginning, and 107 rupees would purchase in London on January 1, 1893, as much as 100 rupees did in, the former period. Table I. jThe "Economist" index numbers of 22 leading com- modities. Column 1. — Index num- bers. Gold prices Jan- uary 1. 100 = 3102. Column 2. — Prices in col- umn 1, as valued in London in 1 bar silver. Coluronj3. — Increase in purchasing power of fold, as own by prices in column 1. Column 4. — Increase in purchasing power of silver,- as shown by prices in column 2. Mr: Sauerbeck's index numbers. 45 leading commodities. Gold prices. Average of year. Gold value ' of bar silver in London. Average of year. 100 = 60.84(2. per ounce. 1865 to 1869 . 1870. -•- 1871 1872 1873..'. 1874J 1875 1«76 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882... 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 July 1, 1892 . Oct. 1,1892.: 100 87 83 91 95 93 90 87 88 81 71 82 77 78 75 72 72 71 72 72 69 68 67 100 87 95 94 91 87 95 91 91 90 86 82 84 87 90 95 107 101 105 Per cent. Par. 15 20 10 5 8 11 15 14 23 41 22 30 28 33 39 47 54 , 51 , 39 41 39 39 45 47 50 , 51 Per cent. Par. 15 20 10 4 5 6 5 8 10 15 5 10 . 10 11 16 22 19 15 2 —1* 2 11 5 —7* 1 100 96 100 109 111 102 96 95 94 87 85 84 82 76 72 69 68 70 72 72 72 67.8 100 99.6 99.7 99.2 97.4 95.8 93.3 86.7 90.2 86.4 84.2 85.9 95.0 84.9 83.1 83.3 79.9 74.6 73.3 70.4 70.2 78.4 74.1 65.3 65.9 62.7 *JDecrease'in purchasing power, that is, depreciation of 1 per cent., 5 per cent., 7 per cent. .6 THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. Now let us pause for a moment and estimate the enormous signi cance of this result of the movements of "gold and silver prices durii the last quarter of a century. The foreign producer in a silver mon country like India, sends his merchandise to London in competitii with English merchandise, and sells it side by side with the Bngli merchandise in the same market, and it may be out of the same wai house. The foreign and the English goods have been sold in Londi for a quarter of a century on exactly the same conditions, and at exact the same price for equal qualities. But the English producer wl began by getting £100 for a certain quantity of his produce no gets only £68 for every £100 that he formerly received; whereas t] Indian producer, selling at the same gold price in London as the En lish producer, received on July 1, 101 rupees for every 100 rupees th he received in the period from 1865 to 1869, and on January!, 188 he received 107 rupees. The consequence is, that with all conditions demand and supply of commodities arfecting equally both foreign ai domestic merchandise, within a quarter of a century the domestic pi ducer was receiving in July 33 per cent., and in January 32 per cent, le money for his merchandise in the London market than he received at tl beginning of the period, whereas the Indian producer was receiving 1 p cent, more of his money in July and 7 per cent, more in January thi he received in London at the beginning of the period. It must 1 remembered that we are dealing with commodities in this country, ai not with exclusively Indian products, the object being to contrast go prices and silver prices in the same market. Further, it is most important to remark that the purchasing power silver, the money of the Indian producer, had not depreciated in rega] to commodities until 1892. A glance at column 2 will show that silv prices had fallen, that is, that the purchasing power of silver hi increased during the whole period except in 1889, and on July 1, 189 when it required 101 ounces of silver to purchase what formerly requiri 100 ounces, and it is only since that time that a depreciation, amour, ing in all to 7 per cent., has taken place. 'So that in London silv prices have risen to a small extent. But gold prices which were on par with silver prices up to 1872, are now 32 per cent, lower than th< were in 1865 to 1869. Passing now to column 3, it will be seen that, in its command ov commodities, gold had increased in purchasing power to the extent 54 per cent, in 1886, and to 47 per cent, at the end of the period, sum of £68 will now purchase what formerly required £100, and in cc umn 3 we see year by year the changes in the purchasing power of gol In 1872 £100 would purchase commodities which, in 1865 to 1869, wou have cost £110, in 1§82 it would purchase £128 worth, and in 1886 £1j worth. On 1st July, 1892, £100 would purchase what would have fc • merly cost £150, and on 1st January, 1893, what would have former cost £147. While it is almost universally stated that silver has depreciated, glance at column 4 will show that, except on three occasions, silver h during the last twenty-three years been appreciated. In 1872, silv and gold were together, and 100 ounces of silver would purchase as nun as 110 ounces would have purchased in 1865 to 1869; in 1882, the 1 ounces had also a purchasing power of 110 ounces; in 1886, of 1 ounces; and on July 1, 1892, the 100 ounces had a purchasing pow of 99 ounces) and on January 1, 1893, of 93A ounces of the value fro 1865 to 1869. In corroboration of the fall in the gold prices of commodities, we a THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 7 indebted, to Mr. A. Sauerbeck for the index numbers of forty-five lead- ing commodities in London which are included in the foregoing table. The final results are almost exactly the same as those of the Economist. His figures for the period from 1865 to 1869 average 100, and his figure for 1892 is 68 against the 69 of the Economist, on January L, 1892, and 68 on January 1, 1893. Mr. Sauerbeck's figure for September is 66.8; and this he declares to be the lowest touched during this century. A further fact has now to be recorded. The gold price of silver fell during the period under notice, from 60£d. to 40§d., on July 1, 1892, and this was a fall from 100 to 66.4, while commodities fell to 67 : so that here we have the extraordinary result of the Economist's 22 com- modities, Mr. Sauerbeck's 45 commodities, and bar silver in London, all steadily falling for a quarter of a century, and in July, 1892, all arriving at practically the same point, namely, 67. Considering the immense field for variations, the correspondence between the three was something which we could hardly have regarded as possible. But it is a striking evidence of the extraordinary stability of silver in its pur- chasing power over commodities as compared with gold during such a long period, and of its steadiness as a standard of value. On the other hand, the fall in the gold price of commodities, and of silver, to the extent of 32 per cent., is an equally striking evidence of the instability of gold during the same period, and of its entire unreliability as a stan- dard of value. In considering the movements of gold prices and silver prices it has been thought better to take the articles as valued both in gold and in silver in London, and so we have recorded the figures as if both a gold currency by itself and a silver currency by itself were in operation in this country. It is most important to point out that the difference between the index number of gold prices and that of silver prices is solely and exclusively a difference of currency. It is so often stated when comparing gold prices and silver prices in separate countries that there are many disturbing elements to be taken into account, that both gold and silver prices in London have been expressly calculated so as to make an exact comparison of the action of gold and silver on prices in the same market where there are no disturbing elements. But while the limits of our space forbid the presentation of the details of the 22 commodities separately, there is one paramount article of production, both in this country and in India, the particulars of which it will be highly interesting to present in some detail. I refer to wheat. There has recently been a lengthened correspondence in the Times on wheat-growing, and the profits and losses arising therefrom; and in this controversy the leading agriculturists of the country have explained their view, although it does not seem that they propounded any available remedy for the extraordinary depression in the prices of grain. In fact, they have failed to give any account of causes sufficient to produce the depression. It is believed, nevertheless, that the princi- pal cause of the troubles from which our agriculturists are suffering can be shown. The following table gives the movements in the prices of Indian and British wheat since 1873. The Indian figures are taken from the Government of India's publication, "Prices and Wages in India," 1892, p. 125. The, prices of the two classes of wheat for Jan- uary, 1873, have been taken as 100 in the official tables, and the gold prices are calculated from the table in the Economist. It may be explained that the index number of the latter for wheat was taken at 100 for the period from 1845 to 1850; that in 1865 to 1869 the average of the five years was again 100; and that in 1872 and in 1873 it was <8 THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 104. In the following table, for the sake of exact comparison with t] Indian per-centages, the 104 of the Economist in 1873 has been tak< to be equal to 100, and the other figures calculated accordingly: , Table II. Indian and British Prices of Wheat. Bombay prices. London prices. Tear, i Column 1. khandwa ' Seoni, January. Column 2. No. 1, soft white, January. Column 3. The Economist Gold Prices. January 1st. Column , Column valued i bar silve 1871 57 87 100 -77 74 76 90 106 131 137 82 81 88 66 , 6 6 81 ■97 100 103 90 93 118 , 91 87 86 ' 100 75 80 84 93 119 116 115 96 97 87 86 74 80 89 . 86 95 - 84 87 103 92 96 100 100 111 77 81 93 94 72 85 79 81 74 70 58 55 63 56 55 54 59 67 76 57 47 96 1872 ' 100 1873 101 1874, 4 114 1875 81 1876 88 1877 '. 98 1878 106 1879 87 1880 98 1881 93 1882 1 94 1883 89 1884 81 1885 .* . . 1886 70 1887 84 1888 76 1889 78 1890 73 1891 73 1892 i 93 88 July 1st, 1892 86 Jan. 1st, 1893 74 The average price of Indian wheat during the 22 years, with 100 i the price for 1873, was 91£ for both classes, and in January, 1892, tl two classes stood at 118 and 103 , respectively. On January 1st, 189: the London gold price, which in 1872 and 1873 was at 100, had falle to 67, on July 1st, 1892, it had fallen to 57, and on January 1st, 1893, i low as 47. But, when the silver price in London is examined, it vs see that it stood at 100 in 1872, the same as the gold price; and when tl latter stood, in January last, at 67, the silver price was at 93; ar when it fell further, in July, to 57, the silver price was at 86, thoug now the prices are respectively 47 and 74. On the pther hand, tl average silver price of the 20 years was 88, as compared with the Boi bay average of 91£, and this higher price in India might be parti accounted for by the fall during the period in freight and other chargl from Bombay to London. But it is hot expected that there should I an identical price as between Bombay and the silver valuation in Lo: don, because the wheat is valued in markets widely apart and wil great opportunities of practical variation in price in connection wil the varying charges of transfer to London as well as in connection wi1 local conditions of demand and supply in India itself. But it is noi the less satisfactory to find that the silver price in London is only l per cent, less than that in Bombay on an average of the last twent two years, and it must be remembered that any decrease in charg between Bombay and London would add to the price in Bombay. I it might possibly be thought that this difference is in some way co THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 9 ■fleeted with the ordinary shipping charges, it may be well to point out that the Bombay prices and the English gold and silver prices all started at 100, and thus the Bombay price would only be affected by economies in transit charges. In the above table, column 3 represents the gross returns to the British wheat-grower, and column 4 represents the gross returns in silver in London to the Indian wheat- grower. The English grower and the Indian grower both started in 1872 by getting 100, but by 1886 the former was only getting £55 for the quantity of wheat that in 1873 brought him £100, while the Indian grower in 1886 was getting 78 rupees for what had formerly yielded him 100 rupees. On July 1st, 1892, when the English grower was only receiving £57 instead of £100, the Indian grower was receiving 86 rupees as against 100 in 1872. The Indian grower who started in 1872 by getting the same price as the '. English grower, received in July 1892 in London 51 per cent, more in his money than the English grower received in his, and on January 1st, 1893, he received 57 per cent. more. If the English currency had. been of silver and the Indian currency had been of gold, then their positions would have been reversed. The English grower would in that case now be receiving £74 where he receives but £47, and the Indian grower would be receiving but 47 rupees where he is really receiving 74. And it must be recollected that silver, so far from being depricated in purchasing power as against wheat is considerably appre- ciated, that is in July the Indian grower only received 86 rupees in London for wheat which in 1873 brought him 100 rupees, though on January 1st, 1892, he received 93 rupees, so that no claim whatever can be made that the difference is due to the deprication of silver. In fact the figures in both of the foregoing tables show beyond the possibility of being successfully disputed, that silver, as regards its purchasing power over the 22 commodities and over wheat, has been greater in nearly all of the last 22 years than in 1865 to 1869, but gold is shown to have increased in purchasing power to a far greater degree than silver. In England and in India therefore we have two distinct currencies which have both appreciated in purchasing power over the leading commo- dities, but the index number of the silver valuation in London of the 22 commodities, though at the beginning of 1892 not up to the level at which it stood 20 years ago, had nevertheless on July 1st just reached 1 per cent, above the former level, and on January 1st 7 per cent., after remaining during nearly the whole period below it. Now a great deal is said of the competition of wheat from the plains of Russia and India, and from the prairies of the United States. It is so evident that very large quantities are being poured in at every har- bor, that most people accept this fact as conclusive that that is the cause of the low prices in this country. 10 THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, the following table w show certain figures of very great importance in this controversy: , Table III. Wheat. — United Kingdom. Per head of the population. Net im- ports per annum. Home pro- duce per annum. Total for- eign and home pro- duce per annum. Gazetfii price pe quarter Average of 8 years, 1872-79 . 1884 1885. 1886 1887 1889 1890 1891 Average of 8 years, 1884-'91 . 1st Jan., 1893 lbs. 184. 68 191. 57 237. 81 187. 79 223. 63 223. 49 219. 03 226. 38 244.06 219. 23 lbs. 172. 77* 144. 75 139. 33 109. 93 131. 26 127. 30 128. 65 127. 79 124. 58 129. 20 lbs. 357. 45 336. 32 377. 20 297. 72 354. 89 350. 79 347. 68 35'4. 17 368. 64 348.43 51 21 35 8 32 10 31 32 6 31 10 ■ 29 9 31 11 37 32 10 25 8 * This figure 172.77 is calculated from Lawns aud Gilbert's figures in "Journal of the Statistic Society," vol. 43, 1880, p. 330, while the 184.68 is calculated from figures in the " Statistical Abstrad The net imports from 1884 to 1891 are from the " Statistical Abstract," and the home produce is c culated at 63 lbs. per bushel from Tables given there. But there are no official figures for t home produce of wheat before 1884, and Lawes and Gilbert's only come down to 1879. This is t reason of the gap from 1880 to 1883. It will thus be seen that in the eight years, 1872-79, the total *quai tfty of wheat consumed in this country was 357.45 lbs. per head of tl population, at the average price per quarter of 51s. 2d., whereas in tl eight years, 1884-91, the consumption per head of the population wa only 348.43 lbs., and yet the average price was as low as. 32s. lOd. Th was a fall on the average of 36 per cent. Can it possibly be that wit a less consumption, that is with less wheat' sold in the markets of tl United Kingdom in the latter period than in the former, there can t any contention that the smaller supply per head of the population com only bring 32s: 10d., while a larger supply in the earlier period shoul bring 51s. 2d., if the cause was only one of supply and demand ? Thes figures are conclusive that the fall in price is not really due to excessn supply, because there was no excessive total supply. It is true that tt foreign wheat has increased very considerably in the latter period^ bi the total amount has not increased, and, therefore, if the question wei one solely of demand and supply, why should the price have fallen i If a clear indication were wanted as to excessive supplies of whes as compared with other commodities, reference might be made to co umns 1 and 2 in Table I., and to columns 3 and 4 in Table II. It wi be seen that in the former Table 100 is the average of 1865 to 1869, an as we have already explained, the Economist index number for whei from 1865 to 1869 is 100, and the figure for 1872 and 1873 is 104, whicl however, was changed to 100, so as to bring the comparison in exact lir with the Indian official figures for 1873. But taking January 1st, 189: in Table I., we have the 22 commodities standing at 69 for gold, and S for silver, and if in Table II. the difference between 100 and 104 added, so as to make comparison of 100 for wheat from 1865 to 186 then the special wheat figures will be 70 and 97 for gold and silv< respectively, on January 1st, 1892, against 69 and 95 for the 22 cor THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 11 modities. This clearly demonstrates that wheat at that date was rather higher in comparative price than the average of the 22 commodi- ties, and therefore that the wheat grower, grievous though his troubles might be, was slightly better oft' as to his relative price than the other producers in the leading industries of the country. Since then, wheat has, however, fallen much more than the average of the 22 commodities. "When the relative positions of the Indian and English growers of wheat are compared, though they both sell at the same relative price in London, the Indian has an immense advantage in one thing, and only one thing: he has a currency rather appreciated in the last quarterof a century, but still that yields him now, in silver, 57 per cent, more of his money than the English grower is getting in gold, as compared with prices ruling from 1865 to 1869. He does not sell at a very low price in his own money, as we see he was getting 97 rupees in January, 1892, against 100 rupees twenty- five years ago. If the English grower could only have got £97 at the beginning of 1892, and been on the same foot- ing as to present and past returns as the Indian, it is perfectly certain we should not have heard anything of excessive competition ; but where the English grower has been so grievously injured is, that while the prices of wheat have fallen to such a low point in 25 years, his rent r wages, and other expenses have not fallen in a corresponding degree, or, rather, they did not fall as the price of wheat fell. He has been • taught, by leading authorities on this question, that the fall has been due to bad seasons, to excessive competition from abrbad, and toother causes; and he has been led to hope that the present state of things will, if let alone, right itself, and another era of prosperity soon spring up. But it is a fact that the yield of wheat per acre in all the wheat- growing countries of the world beyond these shores is gradually diminishing, and the populations of the world are nearly all increas- ing, and some of them very rapidly, and thus requiring larger supplies of wheat. When, however, the English grpwer sees, in the midst of his adversity, and at a time when he regards, wheat growing as something almost to be despaired of, that the Indian grower is in the enjoyment of a much higher relative price and a very high degree of prosperity from his wheat fields, the former will perhaps begin to think that it can not be wheat growing that is so unprofitable that there must be some other cause apart from occasional bad seasons, or from the demand or supply of wheat throughout the world, with which the English grower has to contend, and from which the Indian grower is free. The Causes of the Pall in Gold Prices. The question thus naturally arises as to the cause or causes that have led to this fall. Judging from the operation of the laws of supply and demand, one might expect to find that there is less gold in circula- tion compared with the transactions in which gold, or money on the gold standard, is required, than was the case twenty-five years ago. It can be said with positive certainty that if there had been more money in circulation in the gold standard countries during the last twenty-five years, prices would have been higher, indeed prices would have been maintained at the level of twenty-five years ago if there had been money enough to effect that object. And therefore conversely, if average gold prices have fallen, it is because the supply of gold in the gold money countries has fallen oft' relatively to the transactions requiring the use of money. This will very probably be disputed,' if one may judge from the writings of latter-day commentators on the currency, though hardly any proposition in the whole field of monetary science has had such 12 THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. •conclusive practical illustration in all countries and all ages, and beer so universally accepted. There are the words inflation and contraction •of the currency to describe the phenomena referred to, and it will hardlj ■be doubted that abundance of historical examples of both conditions can be found, and at present the Indian rupee is at approximate!} the same level of purchasing power as it was 25 years ago, yet its for mer gold price was Is. lid., and it is now Is. 3d. But while the gold price of th6 rupee has thus fallen so much, gold prices of commodities in , this country have also fallen very greatly. On the other hand prices in the Argentine Eepublic, to take one example, are enormously inflated, and so we have before us as compared with the period from 1865 tc 1869, stable prices in India, low prices in England, and high prices it the Argentine Eepublic, all in accordance with a stable currency, a contracted currency, and an inflated currency. When the civil wai closed in the United States, prices in greenbacks were very much hjghei , than in gold because of the excessive quantity of paper money in cir- culation, but in 1879, when specie payments were resumed, the differ- ence between gold prices and greenback prices had disappeared. Th€ cause of this disappearance was partly the contraption of the paper cur- rency, and partly the increase of population and of business requiring more money. Chili has just raised money by loan to enable it to with- draw part of its paper money, arid thus reduce the volume of its cur- rency so as to bring it to the level of gold, the paper currency having been over issued in nominal amount as compared with the gold stand- ard, and thus depreciated below the level of gold, that is, causing prices for commodities in paper mohey to be higher than in gold. The Indian Government are considering whether they should not raise the gold value of the silver rupee by suspending the coinage oi silver, that is, by contracting the silver currency until the rupee rises to the fixed gold price. The quantity theory of money is so perfectly recognized in practice, that the Indian Government do not for a momenl doubt that the contraction of the rupee currency would raise the gold value of the rupee. But in estimating the causes of the fall in the gold prices of com modities, we are confronted with the opinion expressed in Part II. ol the final Report of the Gold and Silver Commission by the members who favored monometallism as follows: " We believe the fall [in the gold prices of commodities] to he mainly due, at al ©vents, to circumstances independent of changes in the production of, or demand for the precious metals, or the altered relation of silver to gold." This passage is quoted in the Economist of October 29, 1892, to con fute Mr. A. J. Balfour's contention in his speech at Manchester oi October 27 last, when he said — "And can we claim that great quality for a standard [namely, ' as a permanem record of the debts and obligations lasting through long periods of time '] which, bj the admission even of the monometallists themselves j has appreciated in some li years no less than 30 or 35 per cent , and of whose appreciation no man living unde: the existing- system can prophesy the limits 9 " , We find, also, the same passage doing duty in the Indian Press anc ■with the Indian Currency Association in a way that brings it dowr from the region of mere fugitive theory to the decisive test of a pro posal to apply it to the, case of the Indian currency. Accepting an( following up the views quoted above from the Monometallic Commis sioners, they argue thus : — "It is reasonable, therefore, to infer that the introduction of a gold standard wil not injuriously affect prices in India, as suggested by th,e Currency Association especially if the chaDge be gradual." THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 13: This proposal is perfectly reasonable, if the Monometallic Commis- sioners are fight in saying that the fall in gold prices is mainly due to circumstances, independent of changes in the production of a demand for the precious metals. If the fall in gold prices has little or nothing to do with changes in regard to gold and silver, then the argument is- unanswerable, that a contraction of the Indian currency and a rise in the gold price of the rupee will not injuriously affect Indian prices. To carry tMs argument to the concrete case proposed in India— namely, to suspend the coinage of silver, and gradually by this means contract the currency, until the rupee shall be worth Is. 6d. or Is. 8d., instead of Is. 3d., as at present, the contention of the Monometallic Commission- ers being that, as the fall in the gold prices of commodities and of silver is mainly due to circumstances, independent of changes in the- precious metals, the Indian advocates of a gold standard say, there- fore, that the rise in gold price of the rupee will be independent of changes in the precious metals, and will not be attended by any mate- rial change in Indian prices; and thus the contraction of the rupee- from Is. 3d. to Is. 8d. can be carried, with little change, and with per- fect safety. This would be, however, to assume that Is. 8d. is the same as Is. 3d.; while a glance at a table of cost of Indian commodities laid down in London would at once show that, with a fixed gold price in London, and a change in #ie rupee from Is. 3d. to Is. 6d. or Is. 8d., the- price of an article in India must be correspondingly lower. When we come to positive figures, imaginary conditions must give way. We must, therefbrej protest emphatically against this dangerous doc- trine, promulgated by the conservative monometallic members of the Gold and Silver Commission, because in the whole report this is the only really dangerous doctrine which receives any commendation. But our friends in India have already given it a serious blow, by proposing to act upon it, because we may feel perfectly assured that no states- man, either in India or in this country, would for a momeut approve of any attempt to take the risk of such a step being followed by little or no change. If a gold standard or a gold currency is to be introduced into India, it will be on the ground that every change in the volume of ■ the currency relative to the business in which currency may be i required, shall make a change in Indian prices. If the gold price of the rupee is to be raised by suspension of the rupee coinage, Indian prices must fall in a corresponding degree, and it is for those interested in Indian prices to say whether they are prepared for such a fall. The question of a gold standard for India is not at present being discussed, and it is only touched upon here as illustrating the action on prices of changes in the volume of a country's currency. The present point is, therefore, to emphasise that no Indian or British statesman will venture to recommend or adopt for India a monetary policy which does hot take- into account the quantity theory of money as the sole, or almost the sole, instrument in producing changes in the average prices of com- modities. Changes in the volume of money, or in the transactons to be carried out by money, have as complete an effect on the prices of commodities as changes in the supply of and demand for commodities. Two distinct things are being dealt with — money and commodities — and both are- widely distributed over the world. There are from time to time changes ,in the quantity and in the uses of money, and there are also changes in the supply of and in the demand for commodities ; but whatever their independent fluctuations may be, there is always a relation between money and each commodity, and this relation is expressed in. 14 THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. the pri6e of the article. There is, however, a distinction to be draw namely, that while each commodity is only one of an almost innnnu able variety of articles to which a price is always attached, the o article money is always being offered against, and measured again! all existing commodities. So while at any one time the money of t gold standard, for example, has only one value, or one purchasii power, the commodities in which it is valued, and*to which it affixes value, have as varied a price, or purchasing power, as against mone or against each other, as there are commodities in existence. Thi money is being continually measured against all purchasable artick- and its purchasing power is thus tested and adjusted daily and hour to thousands of articles. But each of these articles being only one thousands, it is impossible that each separate commodity should : rapidly and exactly adjust the changes in its -price to the changes : demand and supply in regard to the article as is the case with mone; which is all the time measuring itself against all commodities, and tin keeping the volume of money in circulation continually and complete' adjusted to the transactions to be carried out by money. It would be strange indeed if demand and supply could regula the prices of thousands of articles, and that yet demand and supp! in regard to the single article money, in which they are all valuei should not have a corresponding influence. The truth is, that from tl necessities of the, case, demand and supply are more potent and moi rapid in their action on the one universal article'money than they ai on the varying prices of numerous commodities. Money is seeking f< and measuring commodities, and commodities are seeking for and mea uring money, and so there is continual competition between then They are both subject to the conditions of supply and demand, and 1 those who- doubt this, we would take a homely illustration and as] which of the two limbs of a pair of scissors does the cutting? Thej are two limbs essential to one operation, namely, cutting, and there ai two, conditions, the volume of money and the volume of transactior to be performed by money, essential to the price of one or of all article It is true that one limb of the scissors may be sharper than the othe and may thus contribute more to the cutting ; and it is also true ths the volume or purchasing power of money is more active in adjustin itself to changes in supply and demand than a vast number of commi dities can be with their endless fluctnations^because the purchasin power of money over commodities is the average of all these fluctuation In^ support of this undoubted fact of the greater sensitiveness < money to changes in its volume and uses, that is, to its supply an demand, than of commodities to changes in supply and deniani we might .instance the effect produced at the Bank of England c the arrival of £2,000,000 or £3,000^000 of gold. If the internal trad of the country is not in a position to absorb it, the bank is forced 1 "lower its rate of discount until, by means of the foreign exchange; the gold is drained away. The effect of the arrival of the gold is cles and unmistakeable, and its departure is equally so. And if we tat gold bullion or coin as an article of international trade, there is n other article in the whole field of commerce that is so mobile, whos exact value in the markets of the world is so well known from day 1 day as gold, because it is the material of the standard money of tt leading nations of the world. Of all. articles of commerce gold : bought and sold by bullion dealers atthe narrowest margin of profit; moves from one country to another at a smaller advancA in price tha any other < article of commerce, and it moves with a rapidity that r other article in practice can equal. The variations in the price of go! THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 15 are minute, but it is more sensitive to a small change in price than any other article. Th,e consequence is that there is no article so completely adjusted in purchasing power to its supply and its uses as gold. If the gold prices of commodities fall unduly in the United States, gold will at once flow by the fastest mail routes to take advantage of the low prices; but if the gold prices rise unduly in the United States, commodities can only be moved to these markets after considerable delay, to take advantage of the high prices. It is incontestable, there- fore, that money is far more mobile than commodities, and is more easily and completely adjusted in its volume to its uses than commodi- ties are to changes in demand and supply. The consequence of this is that, other conditions remaining the same, the average prices of commodities will fall in proportion to the contraction of the volume of the currency in which they are valued. Table IV. Prtiduction in the World of the Precious Metals. - Gold per an- num. Silver per an- num. Total gold and silver per annum. Silver pur- chased by the United States and coined into dollars or held in,bullion, and thus used as gold, per annum. 1846. 1850. - £ 5, 850, 000 18, 650, 000 29, 880. 000 24. 720, 000 22, 700, 000 23, 700, 000 22, 040, 000 22, 060, 000 20, 540, 000 23, 409, 000 25, 060, 000 £ 6, '500, 000 8, 300, 000 8, 120, 000 8, 300, 000 10, 060, 000 10, 520, 000 13, 460, 000 *18, 828, 000 *22, 868, 000 *31, 460, 000 *37, 120, 000 £ 12, 350, 000 27, 450, 000 38, 000, 000 33, 020, 000 32, 760, 000 34, 220, 000 35, 550, 000 40, 888, 000 43, 408* 000 54, 869, 000 62, 180, 000 £ f 1852-56 > 1857-61..: 1862-66 °2 1867 71 m a < 1872-76 o* 1877-81 k *4, 215. 000 *5; 772, 000 ft 1882-86 fe ,1887-91 18911 *14, 066, 000 * These are coining values at the United States ratio of 16 to 1 of gold, that is about 59d. per stand- ard ounce of silver. The commercial values of the silver production per annum are £16,647,000, £19,135,P00, £23,860,000, and £28,365,000, respectively. t The figures for 1891 are repeated by themselves, to show the latest returns, particularly as regards the purchases of the United States. The next question to be considered is the production of gold and silver, and Table IV gives an abstract of the figures from 1846 till 1891. The above figures from 1846 to 1876, are those of Sir Hector Hay, and those from 1877 to 1891 are from the report of the Director of the United States Mint. As this country is on the gold standard, and as we have no gold mines of our own, the following table will show the movements of gold since 1858, when the official statistics of gold first began to be recorded: — Table V. United Kingdom. — Gold Periods of five years. Total net imports. Total net exports. Average per annum. 1858 62 . £ 16, 203, 057 32, 131, 547 18, 159, 364 15, 513, 292 £ £ 1 1863-67 , J 1878-82 J 3, 864, 277 159, 401 \ 402, 368 1883-87 1888-92 26, 310, 032 5, 262, 006 16 THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. These figures are based on the details given in the StatisticaLAbstra< except for 1892, which is from the Board of Trade returns. Thcaverage net import per annum in the twenty years, from 18 to 1877, was £4,100,363, and in the ten years from 1878 till 1887, duru which there was no balance Of gold in our favour, the net export p ^annum was £402,368. Tlere was thus a total deficiency of £45,000,01 "of gold between 1878 and 1887, as compared with the average of fcl twenty years from 1858 to 1877. The five years, however, from 181 till 1892, show a net import per annum of -£5,262,006. It must be co sidered that, with the increased population of the later periods, it wou have required a larger amount of gold to maintain the same level prices as in the period from 1858 to 1867i whereas there has been s enormous decrease. Even if allowance is made for the economy in tl use of money by the development of banking facilities, we should 1 entitled, from the above figures, to assume with perfect certainty thi , there must have been a considerable fall in the gold prices of con modities, not only in this country but wherever the gold standard pr vailed. And it must be remembered that while we exported gold i the extent of £4,023,678, in the ten years from 1878 to 1887, the go: used in the arts during, that period, estimated at £24,000,000, had to I withdrawn from the gold in circulation, so that we thus account for positive withdrawal from the stock of gold in circulation in this countr amounting to £28,000,000, whereas we ought to have had the £28,000,OC and £17,000,000 in addition for new coinage. The reason why it we impossible we could have obtained the same supply of gold was thi Germany, Sweden and Norway, Holland, the United States, and Ita] all changed from silver or paper money to gold, and they made a ne demand for gold amounting, to about £225,000,000, without any new < increased supplies of the metal in the world, and, inded, in the face i a falling off in its annual production. Thus, the countries formerly c the gold standard could get none of the annual supply from the mine and had to submit to a serious contraction of their gold currencies. Sir Eobert Peel's celebrated question was, what is a pound? and i that question he replied that it was " a quantity of the precious metal of certain weight and certain fineness." He did not say it was goli though be afterwards recommended gold. It is. commonly assume that a pound or a sovereign is a standard of valuej when in reality it only a piece of coined gold of certified weight and fineness. So far fro: having a permanent uniform purchasing power, what the prices of con modities $how is that a sovereign will purchase 50 per cent, more tha it did 25 years ago. It is, however, in common use as a measure < value, though an examination of, the prices of the last 30 years woul show how fluctuating its purchasing power has been, namely, in tl proportion of 3787 in 1864 to 2120 in 1893, accordingto the Economist figures. On account of these fluctuations, and the extremly low poii to which the range of average prices of commodities has now fallen, tl important question to which attention has for the last 16 years bee directed, is the instability of gold as a standard of value. In the " Monetary Question of 1892," by Mr. Ottomar Haupt, thei are some very important statistics in regard to the supply of money i the world. Mr. Haupt is one of the highest living authorities on mon tary statistics, -and we gladly avail ourselves of his labours to illustra our subject. He has made calculations for the end of 1885 and for tl end of 1891, of the money in the following countries, namely, Austri Belgium, England,,Prance, Germany, Holland, Italy, Portugal, Eussi Scandinavia, Spain, Turkey, other European countries, United State THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 17 and Australia. Deducting from the total amount given by him, the amounts apportioned to Austria and Russia, as neither of these had the gold standard, though they had large quantities of both gold and silver, we arrive at the following figures : — Table VI. Money in the Gold Standard Countries. End of 1885. Gold ! £608, 000, 000 Silver..:. I 263,000,000 Silver fractional currency 98, 000, 000 Uncovered paper money ' I 205,000,000 '£1, 174, 000, 000 I End of 1891. £644, 000, 000 320, 000, 000 91, 000, 000 240, 000, 000 £1, 295, 000, 000 There are a few countries left out, regarding which it is difficult to arrive at precise figures; but, nevertheless, the above may be taken as a close approximation to the amount of money in the world's currencies that were on the gold standard at the end of 1885 and of 1891. The answer, then, that we make to the question " What is a pound ? " is that it is £1 sterling in £1,295,000 sterling, all circulating the same as if they were entirely gold, and carrying on the monetary business named above. These countries, being on the gold standard, have all t^he same relative prices. But, when the above figures are examined, it is seen that, at the end of 1891, the actual gold entering into the money of the gold standard countries was less than one-half of the whole of the money in these countries. To that extent, therefore, the term gold standard is a misnomer, because it is really a standard of gold, silver, and paper money, It might perhaps be thought that the £644,000 of gold deter- mined the value of the silver, the fractional currency, and the uncovered paper money, and that these followed the value of gold without them- selves affecting the value of gold. But it is not so ; the £644,000 of gold is the supply of gold that went to determine its purchasing power as part of £1,295,000,000, all valued as gold. The annual supply of gold from the mines, if taken at £25,000, is a mere fraction of the stock at any time, and so it has very little effect upon the purchasing power of gold, particularly as about one-half of it is absorbed in the arts, and only about £12,500 can be available for new coinage, and for keeping up the wear and tear of the coinage; so that only this latter amount can have any effect upon prices, that is, less than 1 per cent, of the gold standard of £1,295,000. Then it must be remembered that the popula- tion in the gold countries are increasing, and thus requiring more money ; while, since the beginning of 1892, Austria-Hungary has entered upon the gold standard; and it will require to accumulate about £20,000,000 of new gold, that is, nearly two years of the total gold supply available for coinage, leaving no new gold for coinage in the other gold standard countries during that time. The reason why the term gold standard is used in these circumstances , is because gold alone in these countries has the privilege of being coined for private holders. The silver, the fractional currency, and the uncov- ered paper money exist by regulation of the Governments. The latter ■ are bound to coin all the gold that may be offered for that purpose, and so the term gold standard is applied to the money in these countries. It is evident, however, that if the money of these countries was confined S. Mis. 89 -2 18 THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. to gold, its purchasing power would be enormously greater than a present, and the prices of commodities which were at 100 in the perio from 1865 to 1869, as in the table calculated from the Economist's figures and at 09 in 1892, would be at 30, or thereabouts, and wheat, instead c being at 26s., would be at probably, 12s. per quarter. The additior however, of £650,000,000 of money that is not gold, but yet passes a if it were gold, to the £644,000,000 of actual gold, makes it possible tha ■ wheat should be at 26s. instead of 12s., and the Economist index numbe for the 22 commodities at £68, instead of at £30. This addition reduce the purchasing power of gold by more than one-half, that is, causes th gold prices of commodities to stand at more than double what the would be if the money consisted solely of gold. But to bring whea back to 45s., and the prices of the Economist from £68, in 1893, to £10( which was the average of the years from 1865 to 1869, would require a addition to the money at present in gold standard countries of abou £400,000,000. It is certain that we can not hope to get additional sm; plies of gold to bring this about, and so, if any material improvemen in general prices is to take place, it can only be by additions of silve or of uncovered notes'. > Already, silver forms part of the gold standard to the value ( £320,000,000 in dollars, 5 franc pieces, &c, and £91,000,000 in sina change; and in order to find silver enough to add to the gold standarc so as to restore the prices of the period from 1865 to 1869, it woul require more than all the silver of India, China, Japan, the Strait! and Mexico, that is, the whole of the silver standard countriei to be added to the money of the* gold standard countries. It i an utter impossibility that the prices of a quarter of a century ago ca be restored again, there is not metallic money in the world to restoi them; and it can be asserted, with perfect safety, that there never wi be sufficient of the precious metals to provide for the increased, an still increasing, populations in the gold standard countries,. and t raise prices to anything like their former level. The known facts rela ing to the gold and silver mining industry lead us to expeet that, for time, the production of both metals may be increased, but they giver encouragement whatever to the idea that their production will 1 enormously or permanently increased; and, without an enormoi increase in their united production, and the more extended use of silvt in the currencies of the present gold standard countries, there can 1 no return to former prices. It is beyond the bounds of reasonab expectation that £400,000,000 of new money can be added to the go] standard from the gold and silver mines, in addition to the presei supply, and, therefore, a return to the prices from 1865 to 1869 physically impossible. If we consider certain broad facts in relation to the demand for ai the supply of gold, it will be evident that the fall in prices is due the deficiency of gold in the gold -standard countries. The followii countries that were, in 1885 and 1891, on the gold standard, were, the period from 1865 to 1869, on a 'silver standard or a paper mom standard, namely, Germany, Holland, Italy, Scandinavia, and tl United States. At the end of 1885, according to Mr. Haupt's figure the amount of gold in these countries, which had all adopted the go standard since 1871, was £254,000,000; and, if we deduct £44,000,OC as probably representing the amount of gold in these countries befo they changed to the gold standard, we have then £210,000,000 of go! g^hich, if these countries had continued on the money systems they h; -previous to 1871, would have flowed into Great Britain, France, B THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 19 /gium, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the British Colonies. These latter countries had, at the end of 1885, about £354,000,000 of gold amongst them; but, if they had had also the £210,000,000 of new gold at that time held by the countries which changed to the gold standard after 1871, their total holdings of gold would have been £564,000,000. At the end of 1891, Germany, and the other countries which have joined the gold standard since 1871, held £250,000,000 of new gold; while the above-named countries — Great Britain, France, &c. — had £350,000,000; whereas, if the £250,000,000 had flowed into the latter countries, they would have had £600,000,000 of gold. The following table will show the distribution of the stock of gold: — Table VII. Countries on the gold standard before 1871. End of 1885. End of 1891. £354, 000, 000 " £350. 000, 000 Countries which adopted the gold standard since 1S71. 44, 000, 000 210, 000, 000 44, 000, 000 250, 000, 000 £254, 000, 000 £294, 000, 000 .£608, 000, 000 £644, 000, 000 It is evident, therefore, that while 1 the annual supply of gold, had fal- len off considerably, though it is now increasing, the countries on the gold standard before 1871 might have maintained a range of prices not much lower than those ruling from 1865 to 1869, if the distribution of the annual supply of gold had continued the same as before 1871. But the above table shows that out of £644,000,000 of gold in the gold coun- tries, £250,000,000 have been appropriated by countries which, before 1871, were not on the gold standard, and thus the countries which were on the gold standard had, at the end of 1891, only £350,000,000 of gold, instead of £600,000,000. It is needless to argue that there is no very great falling off in the annual supply of gold, when the countries that formerly received the most of it receive now less than three-fifths of it. In considering the increased demand for gold, the amount in Govern- ment treasuries and banks ought to be taken into account. Professor Soetbeer has made an elaborate investigation into this subject, begin- ning with 1877, when he found the amount to be £144,000,000, and at his last date, in 1885, it was £252,000,000. Mr. Haupt's calculations since that time give the amount for 1886 at £227,000,000, and at the beginning of 1892 at £312,000,000. We know that within the last two years there has been an increase of the gold reserve in the banks in this country. This additional amount since 1877, that is, £168,000,000, has, therefore, been withdrawn from the active circulation, and there is so much less money acting upon the prices of commodities. This is equivalent to a contraction of the currency. 20 THE CURRENCY PEOBLEM. The statistics of our gold coins in circulation are very imperfect it may be of interest to bring together a series of estimates, mac different times by various authorities :— Table VIII. Estimates of stock of Gold Coins in the United Kingdom. Date. Total amount. Per Of] nlai Newmarch ]Sewmarch Miller* Jevons May * Gray* Palgrave Childers Haupt Goschen Martin and Palgrave Fremantle Haupt 1844 1856 1858 1868 1872 1876 1883 1H84 1885 1889 1890 S, 46, 000, 72 500, 90, 000, 80, 000, 107, 637, 122, 368, '100, 000, 95, 000, 100, 000, 73, 000, 69, 000, 105, 000, 105, 000, 000 000 1 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000* 000 000 * Officials of the Bank of England. ■ t £70,000,000 to £75,000,000. % Their calculation is that the maximum amount will not exceed £75,000,000. It must be borne in mind that the above figures do not include bullion or foreign coin at the Bank of England. 'It will be seen that the Bank of England estimate for 1872 £107,637,000, and for 1876, £122,386,000. The bullion and foreign c not included in the above, will vary in amount, but it will probabl from £10,000,000 to £15,000,000. Following the estimate of Mr. Ma 1872, and of Mr. Gray in 1876, Mr. Palgrave's estimate at £100,000 in 1883, Mr. Childer's at £95,000,000 in 1884, Mr. Goschen'f £73,000,000 in 1889, and Messrs. Martin and Palgrave's at £69,000 in 1890— with a qualification that it. can not exceed £75,000,000- seem, looking to the movements of gold, to be approximately on same general basis. I am strongly of opinion that these estimates nearer the truth than that of Sir Charles Fremantle at £105,000,00 1890, and those of Mr. Haupt in 1885 and 1891 at £100,000,000 £105,000,000 respectively, all of which I regard as too high. Table IX. India. Five years ended March 31. 1860-61 1865-69' 1870-74 : 1875-79 : 1880-84 1885-89 1890 1891 1892 "";. - * Yearly average of 15 years. Average gold value ■ of the rupee. d. 11.85 11.43 10.80 8.975 7.775 6.287 4.566 6.089 4.733 Average net imports of gold per annum. Ex. 889, 538 835, 117 073, 776 639, 595 128, 613 083, 670 615, 304 636, 172 413, 792 Average net impoi silver per annul 10, 181, 9, 981, 3, 598, 6, 408, 6, 205, 6, 896, 10, 937, 14, 175, 9,^022, 349 Ex. 7,! 503,! 876) 136 \ 11, 378. 184 S t Average of 3 years only. THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. Coinage of Silver. 21 Total coinage per | annum. Recoined rupees per annum. Bullion, &c.,i. e., new coinage per annum. 1860-64 > ,:, 8. 1865-69 7, 1870-74 ! 3. 1875-79 '• 7. 1880-84 ./. ■ 5. 1885-89 ' 7. 1890 . 1891. 1892. Ex. 733, 995 900, 929 446, 617 421, 864 372, 955 759, 403 551, 158 163, 474 553, 970 Ex. 152,486 151, 211 27, 865 51, 072 469, 890 441, 509 619, 042 305. 195 581, 509 749, 718 418, 752 370, 792 903, 065 317, 894 932, 116 858, 279 Ex. I 6,583,326* !•■ 530, 584* 8, 781, 455t * Yearly average of 15 years. ' f As the separate figures for bullion coined in 1892 are not yet obtainable, the total amount of coin- age has been taken for this average, so the actual figures will be rather less. As India is a typical silver standard country, the statistics in Table IX., in regard to silver in particular, and also to gold, will throw some light on the quantities of silver that were imported into India, and those that were coined, and the imports of gold and the relation of sil- ver to its valuation in gold. The five columns of net imports and coinage are the official figures of the India Office. It will be seen from the above tables that, during the five years from 1870 to 1874, the average net imports of silver per annum were only Bx.3,598,271, and the new coinage from bullion was only Kx.3,418,752, a great deal less than at any other period of the 33 years under review, yet it was in September, 1873, that the French Government began to postpone the dates for the payment of the "bons de monnaie" issued at the mint in exchange for silver tendered for coinage. Notwithstand- ing this check on the flow of silver in France, and the delay in pay- ment which was increased until the final suspension of coinage for pri- vate individuals in 1876, it will be seen that this abnormally low coin- age in India, from 18/0 to 1874, was not followed by any abnormally high coinage during the next fifteen years, as the average per annum was only Bx.6,530,584. It is true that the steps taken to interfere with the previous free conditions of the coinage of silver in France, in Septem- ber, 1873, warnedPrince Bismarck thatFrance was unwilling to take into its circulation the silver that Germany wished to get rid of, and this caused him to retain a large amount of silver which it was his inten- tion to sell but for this closing of the French mint. As, however, India had an open mint during the whole period, and was bound to coin all the silver offered, it must be evident that if there had been increased quantities of silver pressing on the world's markets, and causing that metal to become depreciated, they must have flowed to the open mints of India. Yet we see that nothing "of the kind took place, and that, in presence of increased populations iii India, the coinage of rupees from bullion rather declined in amount in the 15 years from 1875 to 1889 as compared with the 15 years from 1860 to 1874. We might therefore expect that, with increasing population and greater development by railway and other agencies in India, it would have required an increased amount of coinage to maintain the former level of prices, and thus as no such increased coinage of silver took place, we should expect silver to become somewhat appreciated and silver prices to fall, and the Indian officials testify that prices did fall. We have already shown that English prices of commodities, valued in silver, fell until 1886 when 22 , THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. they rose to par, but they declined again, though in 1892 they rose, ai are now above par. It will further be observed that the coinage frc bullion in 1891 rose to Ex.12,858,279, but then that was followed 1892 by a total coinage of only Bx.5,553,970. Silver has, however^ nc for the first time become somewhat depreciated. The years of cour end at March 31st. To sum up the leading facts in regard to gold, there is the und: puted evidence of statistics to demonstrate that the gold prices commodities have fallen from 30 to 33 per cent, since the period fro 1865 to 1869, that is, gold has increased in purchasing power from • to 50 per cent. We have shown that the supply of gold from the min had fallen off as compared with the period from 1852 to 1861, thouj the supply is now increasing; that for the ten years, 1878 to 1887, th country did not receive on balance any gold at all, but exporti £4,023,678, and thus had a deficient supply in that period of £45,000,00 that since 1871 a number of countries with large populatipns, whi< before that time did not possess the gold standard, had adopted it, ai at the beginning of 1892 they had £44,000,000 of old gold, ai £250,000,000 of new gold, without any additional supplies having T)e< obtained from the mines; that the countries on the gold standard befo 1871 have therefore been deprived of £250,000,000 of gold since 187 which they would have received had the monetary systems existh before 1871 continued from 18fl till 1891; that the populations in tl countries on the gold standard before 1871 have gone on increasin and to them have been added, in the demand for gold, both the popul tions of the countries which adopted the gold standard since 1871, ai the increase thereto since that time ; that there has been a large increai in the use of gold in the arts in the last twenty years ; that the amoui of gold, namely £168,000,000, which has been added since 1877 to tl gold reserves of banks and Government treasuries, has thus propo tionately diminished the amount available throughout the world for tl maintenance of prices; and that our own gold coinage in circulate has been considerably reduced in the last sixteen years, while the po ulation has considerably increased. Against these important figures, proving the fall in prices and tl falling off in the amount of gold in the gold standard countries ava: able for the maintenance of prices, the only consideration that can 1 adduced as tending to counteract the fall in prices is the greater eco omy in the use of gold in consequence of increased banking facilitie but this cause, though well entitled to consideration, was neverthele . in operation before 1871 as well as since. While it would take too much space to enter into details regardii the practical effects of th;s appreciation of gold, it will suffice to gr some indication of the enormous injury it has inflicted, if it is stat< that the transfer of wealth from the landed. and propertied classes, ar from the mercantile, manufacturing, and producing classes generally : the United Kingdom, to the holders of securities, mortgages, annuitie &c, cannot be less than £2,000,000,000, due solely to the appreciate of gold. It is already a question how much further the holders securities are to receive the assistance of a continually contracting en rency co enable them „ to go on absorbing further and further the weali of the producing classes. If no other relief can be obtained, it may 1 necessary to fix a commodity standard instead of a money standai for long-dated payments, as has been recommended by the princip economists of the last hundred years. Such a colossal unearned incr ment as has accrued to the holders of securities valued in gold durii THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 23. the last twenty years, in Europe and the United States, amounting t(r not less thanfrom £7,000,000,000 to £9,000,000,000, is entirely unpar- alleled in the history of the world, and all other public questions sink into utter insignificance compared with it. On the other hand^ silver in Loudon, after having for the' last 20 years increased in purchasing power to some extent, as compared with the period from 1865 to 1869, thus showing that it had appreciated and not depreciated, has now returned to a lower level of purchasing power, that is, a higer level of prices, than 25 years ago. The net imports of silver into India and the coinage of new silver have continued so steady that they give no support to the theory that silver has depreciated in regard to commodities, except to a small extent since 1892. There is now, therefore, a divergence between the purchasing power of silver and that of gold to the extent of more than 50 per cent, as compared with the ratio between the two metals up to 1873, that is formerly £100 in gold would purchase a certain amount of silver, now £100 will pur- chase more than 50 per cent, in addition. The amount of silver money in India, China, Japan, the Straits, and Mexico may be estimated to be about £390,000,000, while the silver money in the gold standard countries has already been stated at £320,000,000 for dollars, five franc pieces and other full legal tender money, and £91,000,000 for silver small change, making in all £411,000,000. The amount of silver in the gold standard countries is thus larger than the amount in the silver standard countries. And yet, though the £644,000,000 of gold is assisted by £651,000,000 of sil- ver and paper money, so as to make up the gold standard, we find that after a fall in prices of more than 30 per cent., the tendency is still, downwards. This shows beyond a doubt that there is not enough money in the gold standard countries to maintain the range of prices, and the very serious question arises as to how much further prices will fall under the existing system in the gold standard countries. As the evil has been brought about by deficiency in the supply of money, the steady fall in prices can only be arrested by some increase in the vol- ume of money, and the only means of increasing the volume of money that has been recommended is by the gold standard countries of Europe adding more silver to the present circulation. There is no other prac- tical proposal at present formulated, and this was the object that brought the Brussels Conference together, namely, to increase the use of silver in the gold standard countries, so as to arrest the fall in gold prices and in the gold price of silver and therefore of the rupee; and the Conference gave an almost unanimous support to the idea of the - great-importance of increasing the use of silver in the gold countries. But besides the increased use of silver circulating as gold, there is another important point on which it can hardly be said that there is any division of opinion, and that is the fixing of a par of exchange between the silver countries and the gold countries, so as to put an end to the fluctuations between gold and silver. This is, without doubt, a very difficult question, because any ratio between the metals near the present ratio, will fix permanently on India and the other silver coun- " tries the present greatly increased burden in silver of their gold obli- gations, by fixing a permanently low gold price for the rupee; while a ratio that will relieve India of its unjust burden by materially raising the gold price of the rupee, will cause a fall in Indian prices of com- modities. Still, the danger of a further fall in the gold price of the .rupee, owing to the further appreciation of gold and the depreciation of silver which began, to a slight extent, in 1892, and which we may 24 THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. ■expect to continue if the United States should suspend the purchase/ silver, is so great that the position of the Indian Government is ver perplexing. If the European gold countries were to purchase a sul stantial amount of silver annually, and put it into circulation, ths "would be a benefit both to Europe and to India and the other silvt countries. It would arrest the fall of gold prices and of the gold value < the rupee, and give time to Europe to see the effect of its increased us of silver. It is evident that the present difficulty is one exclusivel arising from the deficiency of gold, or money passing as gold; and s long as the United States continue to coin silver at the present rat< there will not be any serious difficulty in the internal trade of the si ver standard countries, except in regard to obligations to be paid i gold. The following figures may be taken as a rough estimate of th amount of silver money in the silver countries: Table X. Silver Money in Silver Standard Countries in 189%. India -. -. £180, 000, 0C China 150, 000, 0( Japan 20, 000, 0( Straits , 24, 000, 0( Mexico 16, 000, M £390, 000, OC This is the valuation in gold, and in comparison with it the tots amount of gold, silver, and paper money in the gold standard countrie ' is £1,295,000,000. The currency problem, therefore, presents itself i four, distinct questions, namely (1), how is the money in the gold stanc ard countries to be increased; (2), how are the silver standard coui tries to be protected against the demonetisation of silver in the Unit© States and in Europe, as well as from the probable increase of silve from the mines; (3), how is a fixed par of exchange to be establish© (between gold and silver, that is between the £1,295,000,000 of mone; in the gold standard countries, and the £390,000,000 of money in th silver standard countries; and (4) what should be the ratio betwee gold and silver for the fixed par of exchange. It has already bee pointed out that it would require £400,000,000 of money, that is mor than all the money in the. silver standard countries, to' be added to th £1,295,000,000 in the gold standard countries, if the object were t restore the range of the gold prices of commodities that existed in th period from 1865 to 1869. That will give a broad and general ides without pretending to exactness, as to our position in regard to gol prices in 1865 to 1869, and our position in regard to gold prices at th present time. But the gold countries and the silver countries can only deal wit what they have, and so whatever par of exchange might be fixe between gold and silver, it is impossible for the gold standard countrie ever again to reach the range of prices of the period from 1865 to 186! There is not gold and silver enough produced at present to restore th former range of prices, and there is practically no hope that sufficiei gold and silver will ever be produced. The populations of the world o the gold standard are increasing so rapidly that they have entirely on run the world's supply of gold, and even with the ■ assistance ( £411,000,000 of silver money, and £240,000,000 of uncovered papt money, that- is of paper money in circulation against which no specie i held, the fall in prices continues at an alarming rate. It is further t THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 25 - be observed, as shown in the Table IV of the world's production of gold and silver, that of the £37,120,000 of silver in 1891, as estimated at the coining value in the United States of 16 to 1 of gold, the United States are now purchasing £14,000,000, and adding it to the £25,000,000 of gold, and thus making the supply of gold £39,000,000, and the sup- ply of silver only £23,000,000, and yet the range of gold prices in Sep- tember last was, according to Mr. Sauerbeck, the lowest of the century. If the United States were to abandon their purchases of silver, the effect would be to withdraw £14,000,000 of money per annum from the gold standard countries and to make a large addition to the money of the silver standard countries. This would be an injury to the gold countries by withholding part of the present insufficient supply of money, and it would be an injury to the silver countries by throwing upon them additional silver that they do not require, for the purpose of maintaining their present range of prices. Any policy of the kind would materially widen still further the divergence between silver and gold, and be an enormous injustice to the small number of silver money countries. The proposal of Mr. Alfred de Bothschild, at the Brussels Conference, is therefore based upon the fact that the monetary difficul- ties are exclusively in connection with the gold standard, though silver is menaced by the possible action of the United States, and he proposes that the direction in which a remedy should be sought is in the coinage of a considerable amount of silver annually by the gold countries of Europe in conjunction with the United States, which at present is the only gold standard country that is trying, by coining a large amount of silver, to increase the total amount of money in the gold standard coun- tries, and thus arrest the fall in gold prices. It is evident that as the monetary difficulty is caused by contraction of the gold currency, the remedy can only be found in some policy that will arrest this contrac- tion, and thus arrest the fall of gold prices. As there has been no recommendation of increased issues of paper money, the only way in which the money of the gold standard countries can be increased is by the addition of silver. Now, as a matter of fact, with £1,295,000,000 of money in the gold standard countries, and £390,000,000 of silver in the silver standard countries, it would be impossible to raise gold prices to any high point, under any ratio between silver and gold that has ever been proposed. It is safe to say that, even if the French ratio of 1 to 15 J could be restored at once, gold prices of commodities would not rise more than 10 per cent., though the gold price of silver would rise from Is. 3d. to Is. lid., or thereabouts, and Indian prices would undergo a considerable though not a corresponding fall. But it is very doubtful whether the ratio even of 1 to 15J would, if it was arrived at by degrees over the next ten years, do more than maintain the present level of the prices of commodities, and it might fail to maintain even the present level. Austria is coming on to the gold standard, Chili is following the same policy, and Bussia may do so in the near future. If the United States were to suspend the coinage of silver dollars, and Europe were to refuse to add full legal tender silver to the gold standard, that is, in addition to the fractional silver currency that all gold countries coin, it is quite certain, notwithstanding some increase in the annual supply of gold, that the present level of the gold prices of commodities could not be maintained, at least for any length of time. Therefore it is imperative that more silver should be added to the gold standard in Europe, so as to arrest the fall in gold prices, and there need be no fear of adding silver, because if even the maximum quantity were added, the rise in 26 THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. prices would be very limited, though, it would impar^ some new lifi the depressed trade and industry of the country. Mr. de Eothschi proposal for the European gold standard countries to purchase, s £5,000,000 of silver annually for five years, at a price not to exceed 4 per ounce, will, if the United States continue their present coinage of ver, arrest the fall in the gold value of the rupee, because the puree will affect silver, though it is doubtful if it will have much effect the gold prices of commodities, as the amount added to £1,295,000, will be so small; but for the time it will be a benefit, as well as experience, which is much wanted in this country, The quantify silver to be purchased is, however, too small, though this is at leas ' step in the right direction. The objection to it is, that it is a policy which is not based on ; principle, though in an imperfect manner it aims at the object in vi namely, of adding silver to the money of the gold countries, ant keeping back unnecessary additions to the money of the silver co tries ; but it fixes an annual sum, irrespectively of the amount of sil that may be produced, and it does not lead to any fixed par of exchai between silver and gold. As, however, the fact that Mr. deRothscl put forward thjs proposal, coupled with a recommendation to raise < legal tender of silver from £2 to £5, it is to be presumed that our g ernment, which alone in Europe has opposed all monetary reform in last 16 years, is willing to take part in the carrying out of such a poli and if so, that is in all probability the most that can be obtained present. This country would raise the limit of tender of silver to , without any change in our coins, but the other countries would, presume, add to their full legal tender sijver, and not merely to tl small change. It is hardly necessary to point out that if the Uni States and France were to demonetise their dollars and 5 franc'piec amounting to nearly £240,000,000, there would be a further contractioi the money of the gold standard to an extent that could not fail to br: additional disaster on Europe and the United States. Even if tl were only to re-coin their silver at something near the present ratio would be a serious contraction of the gold currencies, as the £240,000,1 would then bere-coined into about £160,000,000, by this act strikingou existence £80,000,000 of the present money in the gold countries. A avoidable diminution of the quantity of money in the gold counti ought, in the strongest manner, to be deprecated, as the civilised wo is interested in the full legal tender silver coins in the gold counti remaining as they are, and not being re-coined into heavier weights a fewer pieces, that is a less amount of money. It is a most difficult problem to reconcile, under any proposal, interests of India with those of the gold standard countries. Then no solution possible that will favour both, and briug with it no dn backs. The only solution that would not in any way be a drawback India would be the addition of about £400,000,000 of new money in gold standard countries, as this would restore the purchasing powei gold to the status quo of 1865 to 1869, and the purchasing power' of rupee is just about the same as it was during that period. But thi, impossible. To landowners, farmers, owners of house property, n chants, manufacturers, and producers generally, the fall in the gold ve ation is in great measure irrevocable, there can be no possible approi to the prices of twenty years ago, and there is reason to fear that th may be a further fall in gold prices of land and commodities. Mr. Eothschild's proposal is before us, it has presumably the approva the, Government, it was received favourably at the Monetary Com THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 27 ence, it is a step in the right direction, and as there is no other pro- posal equally available, it would be well if it were accepted and acted on without delay. Mr. de Foville's proposal of silver warrants stands on a very different footing, as the value of the warrants, if I under- , stand the proposal rightly, would fluctuate with the value of silver, and thus remain merely a commodity with a fluctuating gold value. Mr. de Eothschild's proposal, on the other hand, would, as I under- stand it, add' the silver to be purchased to the existing silver money of full legal tender in the gold money countries, except in the case of this country, which would add to its existing silver coins, and this new silver would be coined into a definite amount of money, and would pass as gold, like the existing full legal-tender silver coins. If, however, our monetary policy is to be based upon a permanent and automatic principle, bimetallism must be adopted, and it is certain that, if Mr. de Rothschild's proposal is accepted and acted upon, the experience that will be gained^ will lead to bimetallism. It will be a matter for arrangement between the Governments as to the ratio to be adopted, but whatever ratio is decided upon will establish a fixed par ' of exchange between silver and gold, between the silver countries and the gold countries; and all the countries using the precious metals as money will thus have the same relative prices of commodities, and the same purchasing power in their money. The bimetallic system is get- ting better understood, and we can not doubt that it will ultimately prevail. The adoption of it would render unnecessary in India any gold currency or gold standard without gold. If, however, a gold, standard should be decided on for India, without bimetallism, then, for , reasons that I gave 12 years ago, in the Westminster Review,* I prefer a gold standard without gold. In considering the question of the regulation of the Indian currency, and Mr. Lindsay's proposal to make the Bank of England responsible for it, there are various weighty objections to any system that withdraws from the Government in India, the complete regulation of the currency. If the coinage of silver is lo- be limited or suspended, so as to arrest the fall in the gold value of the rupee, or to raise it to a higher gold value, the duty and responsibility of carrying out this policy ought to devolve upon the Indian Govern- ment on the spot. It would, however, be very much better for India if bimetallism were adopted rather than any limitation or suspension of coinage that would sever it from the other silver standard countries that lie so near it, by a divergence between the rupee and the silver money of the Straits, China, and Japan. But if India decided to cut- adrift from the other silver countries, total suspension of coinage might be too drastic a measure, and it might be found more prudent to pur- chase and coin a fixed amount of silver per annum, larger or smaller in proportion as the object might be to arrest the further fall of the gold value of the rupee, or to raise its gold value— a question for the Indian Government and people.' But it may be well to point out an important distinction between the action of bimetallism and the action of, the suspension or limitation of the coinage in India. Under bimetallism the gold value of the rupee could be raised to any figure, say, for example, to Is. lid., but Indian prices Would not fall proportionately^ as Is. lid. is to Is. 3d., or 23 to 15, '• The reason is that under bimetallism, while the rupee went to Is. lid., gold prices of commodities would rise and silver prices would fall until they came to a meeting point. Gold pri ces would probably rise * October, 1880, article "East Indian Currency and Exchange." 28 THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. I about 10 per cent., while silver prices would fall about 20 to 25 per cen But if under suspension of the coinage the rupee was put up to Is. lid Indian silver prices would fall 30 to 35 per cent., for the simple reasc -that gold prices would remain entirely unaffected, and thus'silvi prices would require to fall just as far as the rupee rose. If under tl suspension of coinage the rupee is raised to Is. 8d. or Is. 8Jd., India silver prices would fall as far as they would do under bimetallism, wil the rupee raised to Is. lid. , This is one of the extremely importai advantages that India would' gain by bimetallism as compared wit suspension of the coinage, and if the other advantages of bimetallis; are considered, its importance to India at whatever ratio may t agreed upon is overwhelming. The progress that bimetallism has made in the last ten years mui be regarded as very satisfactory. Sir Louis Mallet, one of the del gates at the Paris Monetary Conference of 1881, at which the Unite States and the fourteen leading countries of Europe were represents has recorded his opinion " that, on the occasion of the Monetary Coi ference of 1881 at Paris, it appeared probable that, if the assent of h< Majesty's Government could have been obtained, such an arrangeinei as I have suggested (namely, bimetallism) would have been acceptah to the other Powers." So that, at that Conference, bimetallism was s thoroughly understood and accepted, that Sir Louis Mallet regarde all the other representatives, except those of our own Government, i prepared to accept on behalf of their Governments a proposal f< bimetallism. Then our own Gold and Silver Commission of 1886 to 18* found unanimously that bimetallism had, in the 200 years ended i 1873, preserved the ratio between silver and gold, so that it did u( vary more than 3 per cent, above or 3 per cent, below the tixed ratio i 1 to 15£. The six inonometallist Commissioners favoured bimetallisi for every country except our own, and recommended that, to facilital this object, the Bank of England should hold one-fifth of its specie i sirver, as permitted by the Bank Charter Act of 1844. Sir John Lul bock and Mr. Birch, however, appended a note expressing a doul whether the ratio could be permanently maintained. In the late Coi ference at Brussels, bimetallism was advocated by all the America representatives and by M. Tirard, now French Minister of Finance, ar. many of the European representatives. Last October Mr. A. J. Bajtfbu M. P., made a special speech at Manchester in favour of bimetallism, ar Mr. Henry, Chaplin, M. P., advocated its adoption at the. Agricultur: Conference in London in December, and thus we find- it increasing] understood and increasingly accepted. It is true that there are some vi lent opponents of the principle who would wish us to believe that the sy tern never was, and never could be successful, and that the leading Go ■ernments and leading statesmen of the age are supporting a foolish pr pbsal. Indeed, during thelast year a volume was published by Dr. Giffe: entitled " The Case against Bimetallism," in which the crownir demonstration in favour of his views consists in ten pages of' month •quotations, from 1820 to 1847, of the' premium on gold in Paris. Tl contention in the volume is that as gold was at a premium for pu poses of export, the French standard was one of silver, and not of tl two metals. Dr. Giffen speaks of " the transition from one standard the other occurring, at a flash." But this scheme of bimetallism beii an alternating standard, and of the change from the one to the oth at a flash is purely imaginary, and indeed is a complete misconceptk -of the operation of bimetallism in France. Table XI, p. 231, shoi the annual amount of gold and silver tendered at the French Mir THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. 29 from 1806 till 1875, under the law of 1803, that is, during, practically, the modern bimetallic period. Table XI. Gold and Silver Coined in France Converted at £1 per 25 Francs. Period of Five Years. Gold average per Annum. Silver average per Armum. 1806-1C £1, 201, 136 3, 299, 503 1, 951, 604 465, 748 293, 976 826, 149 689, 857 159, 326 1, 294, 337 12, 669, 263 21, 605, 465 7, 667, 357 9, 546, 561 2, 475, 213 Total Gold. £322,993,410 £1, 884, 737 1811 15 1816 20 993, 111 3, 526, 432 5, 032, 004 6, 576, 120 1821 25 -• 1826-30 1 '.. 1831-35 1836-40 1841-45 3, 033, 286 1846-50 1851 55 1,431,755 1856-60 1 666. 651 1861 65 175^ 08& 3, 402, 020 1866 70 1871 75 1 ' 2, 742, 776 Total Silver. £217,640,234 1803-75 - Now this is the entire coinage of gold and silver from 1803 till 1875, and up till 1873, when interference with the system first began, the whole of this gold and of this silver was tendered at the French Mint on the ratio of 1 ounce of gold to 15£ ounces of silver. There was not a single year during the whole period in which silver was not ten- dered and. coined, and gold was coined in every year except 1872 and 1883. It will be seen that on the resumption of specie payments by this country in 1821, the coinage of gold in France fell off in a very marked degree, and on the influx of gold from 1851 the coinage of silver fell off. So that the whole of the gold and silver coined in France from 1803 to 1875, amounting to the enormous sum of £322,993,410 of the former, and £217,640,234/of the latter, was tendered at the French Mint without premium and without discount for either metal, and it is certainly a complete vindication of the effectiveness of bimetallism that the French Mint should have received and coined in 73 years £540,633,644 of gold and silver at the value of 15£ to 1 -for equal weights. Mr. Henry Hucks Gibbs, iu a late pamphlet* clearly shows, amongst other interesting points, that the money price to be obtained for gold and silver at the French Mint was as exactly fixed for both metals, and continued so from 1803 to 1873, as the price of £3 17s. 9d. - is for the ounce of gold at the Bank of England, and owners of silver in London, sending it to the French Mint, knew exactly what amount of English money they would receive for it at a given rate of exchange on Paris. Further, in the ordinary financial, banking, and commercial business of France, apart from the trade in bullion, coined money of gold or silver was never either at a premium or a discount, and this statement is not made without complete inquiry into the facts. Dr. Giffen imagines when gold or silver bullion or coin was at a premium for export, that in the banking and trading transactions of France a profit could be made by paying in the metal that was- not at a premium for export. But the French people , apart from the bullion * " The Fall in the Gold Price of Silver, and the Closing of the French Mint." 3U THE CURRENCY PROBLEM. \ dealers, were totally unaffected by the premium for export, and in thi whole period never knew anything of the alternating standard whic' Dr. Giffen and others have conjured up out of their imagination, or c debts being paid in either more or less than legal tender money, golc silver, or paper, any more than the customer of a London Bank know when he sees in the papers that there is a premium on gold in Londor He has no knowledge of it whatever from his bank account, andneithe had the customer of any French bank in the period under considers tion. With most of the leading Governments and the leading, Statesmen o Europe, the United States and India perfectly convinced of the effect iveness of bimetallism, and willing to adopt it if all the principal couu tries will join in an international arrangement; with bimetallism as tin sole remedy discovered by the Gtfid and Silver Commission, after sit ting for two years, in which they failed to find any defence for mono metallism as it has operated during the last 19 years, it is not neces sary to enter into any elaborate vindication of the bimetallic system While Mr. de Rothschild's proposal, or something akin to it, will,' fo: the present, give a breathing time in, the divergence between gold an< silver, it is nevertheless to bimetallism that we must come at last, i the nations of the world are to have equally, and without favour o: prejudice, the benefit of all the gold and silver available for coinage with a fixed par of exchange between silver and gold; and a singli money standard, and the same relative prices in all countries using th< precious metals as money. Without bimetallism, as we have seen dur ing the last nineteen years, these advantages cannot be obtained, ant therefore it is that we regard the final triumph of bimetallism as inevi table. 53d Congress, > SENATE. ( Mis Doc 1st Session, j { No. 91. ' IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES. October 17, 1893 (Calendar day, October 30, 1893). -Referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed. Mr. Sherman presented the following: CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY RELATIVE TO THE DISPOSITION OF THE SEIGNIORAGE ARISING FROM THE COINAGE OF SILVER PURCHASED UNDER THE ACT OF JULY 14, 1890. United States Senate, Washington, D. C, October 23, 1893. Dear Sir : Will you be kind enough to advise me upon the follow- ing points : (1) What amount, if any, of the Treasury notes issued under the act of July 14, 1890, have been redeemed in gold or silver coin upon the demand of the holder, as provided in the last clause of the second section of that act ? (2) Has the silver bullion purchased under the first clause of the third section of that act prior to the 1st of July, 1891, been coined into standard silver dollars ? If so, how many such dollars have been coined ? Did any seigniorage accrue from such coinage;, and, if so, what disposition has been made of it ? (3) Has any silver bullion purchased under the provisions of that act been coined into silver dollars since the 1st day of July, 1891, and, if so, how many, and what gain or seigniorage, if any, has accrued there- from, and has it been accounted for and paid into the Treasury? (4) What has been the construction of the Department in respect to seigniorage under the Bland act and also under the act of July 14, 1890? Is such seigniorage represented by bullion or coin in the Treas- *ury, and, if so, has it been expended as current revenue 1 ? Eor want of time I avail myself of this mode of inquiry, rather than by resolution of the Senate. I wish the information in such form that I may use it in debate. Very respectfully yours, John Sherman. Hon. J. G. Carlisle, Secretary of the Treasury. 2 coinage of silver. Treasury Department, Office of the Secretary, Washington, D. C, October 21, 1893. Sir: I have to reply to the inquiries contained in your letter of tl 23d instant as follows : (1) The amount of Treasury notes issued under the act of July 1 1890, redeemed in gold and silver coin to date upon the demand of th holder, as provided in the last clause of the second section of said ac has been, in gold coin, $52,395,840; in silver dollars, $2,224,192, an notes for the latter amount canceled. (2) The amount of silver bullion purchased under the first clause i the act of July 14, 1890, from the date the same took effect to June 31 1891, was 48,393,113.05 fine ounces, costing $50,574,498.40. Froj August 13, 1890, to June 30, 1891, there was consumed of this bullio in the coinage of 27,292,475 silver dollars 21,109,023.63 fine ounces, cos iug $22,747,860.42, giving a seigniorage of $4,544,614.58. Of this seigi iorage $^5,466.43 was used to reimburse the bullion fund of the mil for 24,545.69 ounces wasted by the operative officers and for silver sol in sweepings, the balance being accounted for and paid into the Treai ury as a miscellaneous receipt. (3) Of the silver bullion purchased under the act of July 14, 1891 the amount consumed in the coinage since the 1st day of July, 189 has been 6,808,232.96 fine ounces, costing $6,362,326.19. The numbt of silver dollars coined therefrom has been 8,794,810, giving a seignio age of $2,432,483.81. From this there has been paid for the wastage ( the operative officers and loss on sale of sweeps, $35,383.49. The) was also paid for the expenses of distribution $77,447.47, the balanc being paid into the Treasury as a miscellaneous' receipt and used intl payment ot current expenses. (4) The act of February 28, 1878, provided that '• any gain or seignio age arising from this coinage shall be accounted for and paid into tl Treasury as provided for under existing laws relative to the subsidiai coinage." (bee section 3526, Eevised Statutes.) This act provided tki the gain or seigniorage on the coinage of silver bullion for the subsid ■ ary coinage should be credited to a special fund, denominated tl -' silver-profit fund," which fund should be charged with the wastag and expenses of distribution, after which the balance remaining to tl credit of the fund was to be paid into the Treasury at least twice year. The construction of the Department in regard to accounting for th seigniorage accruing on the coinage of silver dollars under the act i February 28, 1878, has been strictly in accordance with the pfovisioi of section 3526, Eevised Statutes, and the same course was pursued i accounting for the seigniorage accruing on the coinage of silver dolla; under the act of July 14, 1890, until September 8, 1893, when my attei tion was called to the fact that this act made no provision for the pa; ment of any expenses from the seigniorage, but provided that " any gai or seigniorage arising from such coinage shall be paid into the Trea ury." Instructions were, therefore, given that no expenses whatevi should be paid from such seigniorage, either for the wastage of tl operative officers at the mints or for expenses of distribution. All seigniorage so far paid into the Treasury has been represent* coin. The seigniorage on the coinage of silver dollars, both under tl act of February 28, 1878, and July 14, 1890, has been declared by tl mints at the end of each month. There has been no coinage of silv COINAGE OF SILVER. 3 dollars since May, 1893, except $200, proof pieces, by the Philadelphia Mint. The balance of silyer bullion on hand October 1, 1893, was 137,666,257 fine ounces, costing $124,561,428.24. Add to this the amount that will be purchased in October, say 1,800,000 ounces, at an estimated cost of $1,327,500, and it will give a balance on hand November 1, 1893, of 139,466,257 fine ounces, costing $125,888,929. The coining value of this amount would be $180,320,008, and the seigniorage thereon $54,431,080. Should 4,500,000 ounces be purchased from November 1 to October 1, 1894, it would make a total of 49,500,000 ounces, which, at the present market price of silver, say 74 cents, would cost $36,630,000. The coining value of this bullion would be $65,000,000; the seigniorage on same, $28,370,000. This would make the total seigniorage on bullion to be coined of $82,801,080. Add to this the seigniorage on bullion coined up to date, $6,977,098, will give the total seigniorage on bullion purchased under the act of July 14, 1890, of $89,778,178. Eespectfully, yours, J. G. Carlisle, Secretary. Hon. John Sherman, United States Senate. IN" THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, RETURNING Without his approval House bill No. 4956, entitled "An act directing the coinage of the silver bullion held in the Treasury, and for other purposes." In the Senate of the United States, May 12, 1896. Resolved, That there he printed in document form, for the use of the Senate, 1,000 copies of the message of the President of March 29, 1894, returning without his approval House bill No. 4956, entitled "An act directing the coinage of the silver bullion held in the Treasury, and for other purposes," and the bill as vetoed by the President. Attest: Wm. E. Cox, Secretary. To the Souse of Representatives : I return without my approval House bill numbered 4956, entitled "An act directing the coinage of the silver bullion held in the Treasury, and for other purposes." My strong desire to avoid disagreement with those in both Houses of Congress who have supported this bill would lead me to approve it if I could believe that the public good would not be thereby endan- gered, and that such action on my part would be a proper discharge of official duty. Inasmuch, however, as I am unable to satisfy myself that the proposed legislation is either wise or opportune, my concep- tion of the obligations and responsibilities attached to the great office I hold forbids the indulgence of my personal desire, and inexorably confines me to that course which is dictated by my reason aud judg- ment, and pointed out by a sincere purpose to protect and promote the general interests of our people. The financial disturbance which swept over the country during the last year was unparalleled in its severity and disastrous consequences. There seemed to be almost an entire displacement of faith in our finan- cial ability and a loss of confidence in our fiscal policy. Among those who attempted to assign causes for our distress it was very generally conceded that the operation of a provision of law then in force which required the Government to purchase monthly a large amount of silver bullion and issue its notes in payment therefor, was either entirely, or to a large extent, responsible for our condition. This led to the repeal, on the 1st day of November, 1893, of this statutory provision. We had, however, fallen so low in the depths of depression, and tidimity and apprehension had so completely gained control in finan- cial circles, that our rapid recuperation could not be reasonably Z COINAGE OF SILVER BULLION. expected. Our recovery has, nevertheless, steadily progressed, an though less than five months have elapsed since the repeal of the mi chievous silver -purchase requirement, a wholesome improvement unmistakably apparent. Confidence in our absolute solvency is to sue an extent reinstated and faith in our disposition to adhere to sour financial methods is so far restored as to produce the most encouragin results both at home and abroad. The wheels of domestic industi have been slowly set in motion and the tide of foreign investment hj again started in our direction. Our recovery being so well under way, nothing should be done j check our convalescence; nor should we forget that a relapse at th time would almost surely reduce us to a lower stage of financial di tress than that from which we are just emerging. I believe that if the bill under consideration should become a law, would be regarded as a retrogression from the financial intentions ind cated by our recent repeal of the provision forcing silver-bullion pu: chases; that it would weaken, if it did not destroy, returning faith an confidence in our sound financial tendencies, and that as a consequenc our progress to renewed business health would be unfortunately checke and a return to our recent distressing plight seriously threatened. This proposed legislation is so related to the currency condition growing out of the law compelling the purchase of silver by the Go^ eminent that a glance at such conditions and a partial review of tl law referred to may not be unprofitable. Between the 14th day of August, 1890, when the law became open tive, and the 1st day of November, 1893, when the clause it containe directing the purchase of silver was repealed, there was purchased b the Secretary of the Treasury more than 168,000,000 ounces of silv< bullion. In payment for this bullion the Government issued its Trea ury notes of various denpminations, amounting to nearly $156,000,001 which notes were immediately added to the currency in circulatio among our people. Such notes were by the law made legal tender i payment of all debts, public and private, except when otherwis expressly stipulated, and were made receivable for customs, taxes, an all public dues, and when so received might be reissued. They wei also permitted to be held by banking associations as a part of the: lawful reserves. On the demand of the holders these Treasury notes were to b redeemed in gold or silver coin in the discretion of the Secretary of tl Treasury; but it was declared as a part of this redemption pro visio that it was "the established policy of the United States to maintai thetwo metals on a parity with «ach other upon the present legal rati or such ratio as may be provided by law." Themoney coined from sue bullion was to be standard silver dollars, and after directing theimmi diatei coinage of a little less than 28,000^000 ounces, the law provide that as much of the remaining bullion should be thereafter coined s might be necessary to provide for the redemption of the Treasury noto issued on its purchase, and that "any gain or seigniorage arising froi such coinage shall be accounted for and paid into the Treasury." This gain or seigniorage evidently indicates so much of the bullio owned by the Government as should remain after using a sufficier amount to coin as many standard silver dollars as should equal in nun ber the dollars represented by the Treasury notes issued in payment < the entire quantity of bullion. These Treasury notes now outstandin and in circulation amount to. $152,951 ,280, and although there has be« thus far but a comparatively small amount of this bullion coined, yi COINAGE OF SILVER BULLION. B the so-called gain or seigniorage, as above defined, which would arise ironi the coinage of the entire mass, has been easily ascertained to be a quantity of bullion sufficient to make when coined 55,156,681 standard silver dollars. Considering the present intrinsic relation between gold and silver, the maintenance of the parity between the two metals, as mentioned in this law, can mean nothing less than the maintenance of such a parity in the estimation and confidence of the people who use our money in their daily transactions. Manifestly the maintenance of this parity can only be accomplished, so far as it is affected by these Treasury notes, and in the estimation of the holders of the same, by giving to such holders, on their redemption, the coin, whether it is gold or silver, which they prefer. It follows that while in terms the law leaves the choice of coin to be paid on such redemption to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, the exercise of this discretion, if opposed to the demands of the holder, is entirely inconsistent with the effective and beneficial maintenance of the parity between the two metals. If both gold and silver are to serve us as money, and if they together are to supply to our people a safe and stable currency, the necessity of preserving this parity is obvious. Such necessity has been repeatedly conceded in the platforms of both political parties and in our Federal statutes. It is nowhere more emphatically recognized than in the recent law which repealed the provision under which the bullion now on hand was purchased. This law insists upon the "maintenance of the parity in value of the coins of the two metals and the equal power of every dollar at all times in the markets and in the payment of debts." The Secretary of the Treasury has therefore, for the best of reasons, not only promptly complied with every demand for the redemption of these Treasury notes in gold, but the present situation, as well as the letter and spirit of the law, appear plainly to justify, if they do not enjoin upon him, a continuation of such redemption. The conditions I have endeavored to present may be thus summarized : First. The Government has purchased and now has on hand sufficient silver bullion to permit the coinage of all the silver dollars necessary to redeem, in such dollars, the Treasury notes issued for the purchase of said silver bullion and enough besides to coin, as gain or seigniorage, 55,156,681 additional standard silver dollars. Second. There are outstanding and now in circulation Treasury notes issued in payment of the bullion purchased amounting to $152,951,280. These notes are legal tender in payment of all debts, public and pri- vate, except when otherwise expressly stipulated; they are receivable for customs, taxes, and all public dues; when held by banking associa- tions they may be counted as part of their lawful reserves, and they are redeemed by the Government in gold at the option of the holders. These advantageous attributes were deliberately attached to these notes at the time of their issue. They are fully understood by our people to whom such notes have been distributed as currency, and have inspired confidence in their safety and value, and have undoubtedly thus induced their continued and contented use as money, instead of anxiety for their redemption. Having referred to some incidents which I deem relevant to the sub- ject, it remains for me to submit a specific statement of my objections to the bill now under consideration. This bill consists of two sections, excluding one which merely appro- priates a sum sufficient to carry the act into effect. The first section 4 COINAGE OP SILVER BULLION. provides for the immediate coinage of the silver bullion in the Treasui which represents the so-called gain or seigniorage, or which would arii from the coinage of all the bullion on hand, which gain or seigniorag this section declares to be $55,156,681. It directs that the moneys coined or the certificates issued thereon shall be used in the paymei of public expenditures, and provides that if the needs of the Treasui demand it, the Secretary of the Treasury may in his discretion issi silver certificates in excess of such coinage, not exceeding the amoui of seigniorage in said section authorized to be coined. The second section directs that as soon as possible after the coinaj of this seigniorage the remainder of the bullion held by the Governmei sh all be coined into legal-tender standard silver dollars an d that they sha be held in the Treasury for the redemption of the Treasury notes issue in the purchase of said bullion. It provides that as fast as the bullio shall be coined for the redemption of said notes, they shall not be rei sued but shall be canceled and destroyed in amounts equal to the coi held at any time in the Treasury derived from the coinage provided fo and that silver certificates shall be issued on such coin in the mann< now provided by law. It is, however, especially declared in said s& tion that the act shall not be construed to change existing laws relatin to the legal-tender character or mode of redemption of the Treasur notes issued for the purchase of the silver bullion to be coined. The entire bill is most unfortunately constructed. Nearly every sei tence presents uncertainty and invites controversy as to its meanin and intent. The first section is especially faulty in this respect, and is extremely doubtful whether its language will permit the consumnii tion of its supposed purposes. I am led to believe that the promotei of the bill intended in this section to provide for the coinage of th bullion constituting the gain or seigniorage, as it is called, into stan( ard silver dollars ; and yet there is positively nothing in the section 1 prevent its coinage into any description of silver coins now authorize under any existing law. I suppose this section was also intended, in case the needs of th Treasury called for money faster than the seigniorage bullion coul actually be coined, to permit the issue of silver certificates in advanc of such coinage; but its language would seem to permit the issuanc of such certificates to double the amount of seigniorage as stated, on< half of which would not represent an ounce of silver in the Treasur; The debate upon this section in the Congress developed an earnest an positive difference of opinion as to its object and meaning. In an event, I am clear that the present perplexities and embarrassments ( the Secretary of the Treasury ought not to be augmented by devolvin upon him the execution of a law so uncertain and confused. I am not willing, however, to rest my objection to this section solel on these grounds; in my judgment sound finance does not commen a further infusion of silver into our currency at this time unaccon panied by further adequate provision for the maintenance in our Treai ury of a safe gold reserve. Doubts also arise as to the meaning and construction of the secon section of the bill. If the silver dollars therein directed to be coine are, as the section provides, to be held in the Treasury for theredem] tion of Treasury notes, it is suggested that, strictly speaking, certil cates can not beissued on such coin "in the manner now provided b law," because these dollars are money held in the Treasury for th express purpose of redeeming Treasury notes, on demand, which woul ordinarily mean that they were set apart for the purpose of substitu COINAGE OP SILVER BULLION. 5 ing them for these Treasury notes. They are not, therefore, held in such a way as to furnish a basis for certificates according to any pro- vision of existing law. If, however, silver certificates can properly be issued upon these dol- lars, there is nothing in the section to indicate the characteristics and functions of these certificates. If they were to be of the same charac- ter as silver certificates in circulation under existing laws they would at best be receivable only for customs, taxes, and all public dues; and under the language of this section it is, to say the least, extremely doubtful whether the certificates it contemplates would be lawfully received even for such purposes. Whatever else may be said of the uncertainties of expression in this bill, they certainly ought not to be found in legislation affecting sub- jects so important and far-reaching as our finances and currency. In stating other and more important reasons for my disapproval of this section, I shall, however, assume that under its provisions the Treasury notes issued in payment for silver bullion will continue to be redeemed as heretofore in silver or gold at the option of the holders ; and that if when they are presented for redemption, or reach the Treasury in any other manner, there are in the Treasury coined silver dollars equal in nominal value to such Treasury notes, then and in that case the notes will be destroyed, and silver certificates to an equal amount be substituted. I am convinced that this scheme is ill advised and dangerous. As an ultimate result of its operation Treasury notes which are legal tender for all debts, public and private, and which are redeemable in gold or silver, at the option of the holder, will be replaced by silver certificates which, whatever may be their character and description, will have none of these qualities. In anticipation of this result, and as an immediate effect, the Treasury notes will naturally appreciate in value and desira- bility. The fact that gold can be realized upon them, and the further fact that their destruction has been decreed when they reach the Treasury, must tend to their withdrawal from general circulation to be immediately presented for gold redemption, or to be hoarded for pre- sentation at a more convenient season. The sequel of both operations will be a large addition to the silver currency in our circulation and a corresponding reduction of gold in the Treasury. The argument has been made that these things will not occur at once, because a long time must elapse before the coinage of anything but the seigniorage can be eutered upon. If the physical effects of the execution of the second section of this bill are not to be realized until far in the future, this may furnish a strong reason why it should not be passed so much in advance; but the postponement of its actual operation can not prevent the fear and loss of confidence and nervous precaution which would immediately follow its passage and bring about its worst consequences. I regard this section of the bill as embodying a plan by which the Government will be obliged to pay out its scanty store of gold for no other purpose than to force an unnatural addition of silver money into the hands of our people. This is an exact reversal of the policy which safe finance dictates, if we are to preserve parity between gold and silver and main- tain sensible bimetallism. We have now outstanding more than $338,000,000 in silver certifi- cates issued under existing laws. They are serving the purpose of money usefully and without question. Our gold reserve, amounting to only a little more than $100,000,000, is directly charged with the 6 COINAGE OF SILVER BULLION. redemption of $346,000,000 of United States notes. When it is pr< posed to inflate our silver currency it is a time for strengthening our gol reserve instead of depleting it. I can not conceive of a longer ste toward silver monometallism than we take when we spend our gold 1 buy silver certificates for circulation, especially in view of the pract cal difficulties surrounding the replenishment of our gold. This leads me to earnestly present the desirability of granting t the Secretary of the Treasury a better power than now exists to issu bonds to protect our gold reserve when for any reason it should b necessary. Our currency is in such a confused condition and our final cial affairs are apt to assume at any time so critical a position that : seems to me such a course is dictated by ordinary prudence. I am not insensible to the arguments in favor of coining the bullio seigniorage now in the Treasury, and I believe it could be done safel and with advantage, if the Secretary of the Treasury had the power 1 issue bonds at a low rate of interest under authority in substitution ( that now existing and better suited to the protection of the Treasury. I hope a way will present itself in the near future for the adjustmei of our monetary affairs in such a comprehensive and conservative mai ner as will accord to silver its proper place in our currency; but in tl meantime I am extremely solicitous that whatever action we take o this subject may be such as to prevent loss and discouragement to or people at home, and the destruction of confidence in our financii management abroad. G-rover Cleveland. Executive Mansion, March 29, 1894. [H. K. 4956, 1'ifty-tWrd Congress, second session.] An Act directing the coinage of the tilver bullion held in the Treasury, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Ameri in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately cause be coined as fast as possible the silver bullion held in the Treasury, purchased und the Act of July fourteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety, entitled "An Actdirectii the purchase of silver bullion and the issuing of Treasury notes thereon, and f other purposes," to the amount of the gain or seigniorage of such bullion, to wi The sum of fifty-five million one hundred and fifty-six thousand six hundred ai eighty-one dollars, and such coin or the silver certificates issued thereon shall used in the payment of public expenditures, and the Secretary of the Treasury ma in his discretion, if the needs of the Treasury demand it, issue silver certificates excess of such coinage : Provided, That said excess shall not exceed the amount the seigniorage as herein authorized to be coined. Sec. 2. After the coinage provided for in the first section of this Act, the remaind of the silver bullion purchased in pursuance of said Act of July the fourteent eighteen hundred and ninety, shall be coined into legal-tender standard silver d< lars as fast as possible, and the coin shall be held in the Treasury for the redempti of the Treasury notes issued in the purchase of said bullion. That as fast as t bullion shall be coined for the redemption of said notes, the notes shall not be re sued, but shall be canceled and destroyed in amounts equal to the coin held at a: time in the Treasury, derived from the coinage herein provided for and silver certi cates shall be issued on such coin in the manner so provided by law : Provided, TI this act shall not be construed to change existing law relating to the legal-tenc character or mode of redemption of the Treasury notes issued under said Act of Jx fourteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety. Sec. 3. That a sufficient sum of money is hereby appropriated to carry into eff< the provisions of this Act. 53d Congress, ) SENATE. i Ex. Doc 2A Session. j \ jj 0i g. IN THE SENATE OP THE "UNITED STATES. LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, TRANSMITTING A statement of the aggregate "amount of silver bullion purchased in October, 1893. December 12, 1893.— Ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, Office of the Secretary, Washington, D. C, December 8, 1893. Sir: Acknowledging the receipt of the resolution passed by the Senate November 1, 1893, as follows : Sesolred, That the Secretary of the Treasury he, and he hereby is, directed to fur- nish the Senate with a statement giving the aggregate amount of silver bullion purchased under the act of July 14, 1890, during the month of October, 1893, together with the cost thereof, the amount, date, and price of each purchase, and the name of the vender. Also the aggregate amount of silver bullion offered for sale during said month, the amount, date, and price of each offer, and the name of the person making such offer, and how paid for. I have the honor to transmit herewith a statement giving the infor- mation requested. The purchases of silver bullion during the month of October were paid for with Treasury notes as required by the act of July 14, 1890. Very respectfully, J. GL Carlisle, Secretary. The President of the Senate. 2 AMOUNT OF SILVER BULLION .PURCHASED IN OCTOBER, 1893. <=«£ « S fe 13 OP ax) as §££ 2 » ft a > o 4JS" omto -# ID© i-ICD OS hMCO ■:■ ■ ■+ i- oiam Ift »C5 ift o ■* oc 1« 4.S- «o I© ^ CO ooo o o o ooo o o o o o o OlA CO lOr I •o->£ log. Hoco Fd Szs ■d'* I'd": •SSI'S ■Si © m a O ©. ! fi §la fi ! ■ H3 H S . Ml a^goSs 3<1 So I 5 " 13 t4 ' Zj SO O p O O ■ © 53 © C^h rt o o r C'C o ffl r C F C ; ■ ©-5 . • : :« : : © 5 a -a ,« s * © «-P ■ ' SJS w v w w S J3 w £S : : : :4& : :fi- p* F © ft© t- D- t- 1> I- t- o o m ic win caw .- -n -t< >* -* t-t-t- C- 1- WiOlO O «i »ft ift OlClC'l OS C! 71 (M -#■•*-<*"* CO-*-"* "* i* C- C- C- t> Off C- t> ^0 oo oo o oo o ©ooo ooo ooo ooo oo o o oo oooo ooo oo oooo ooo oo oooo ooo oo oo o o o o o o o o o o oo o oc OS w w w >» T3 c 0T3 ©£ li. :d> :o)zi 0|§ e8 -crib o <* SI" - 61 ' Op • a> § ;1^ W :5w ^ (S © o I'm (>ito WO! Is*. !3W : us OKI a o 'ai ssfo .s m a aS O P I y'S ^ Sin K o : ■* cowl's B -al 3 >J -S.S i-la'3125 AMOUNT OF SILVER BULLION PURCHASED IN OCTOBER, 1893. 3 coao,"%&§ +5 o 3TJ oa © c3 8<3jl|J3fc ■a # a S o go K — H « S .2 I <& -S WHi-aWSJ B o at) IN a W -:|g .£ ^« = a ■*■£ o a ,|ScoM H zi to" 0)000 «=> ©•=> O'ti'w'C oo O o O ' ■ ■ ©CO Ort < : 111 r'4 ■S g ooooS.ooooS.Soo-eS.so 2 « o o o 25 o = o o rCtfC M'C^r^i^ fl'TSr-!^ p.P'O'T- PrSf^-;-^ fltS^r^-^r— • • • ■ ™ ~ • ■ ■ ^ 3 • •O^nfl i^H • • '2h3 ■ • ■ ■ . • ■ lOtfl ■ • • Q O < ' Q a G) >cT(D i < lUffl ■ • ' ■ :# t-t- t-C-t-t-C-t- C-t-t-t- t-t-t-L- l>t- t>t- CO CO 303100 ^1 ""fl'CSO^u o o oirs CO CO coco t- l> t-c- oo oooooo oo oooooo oo oooooo o o o o o o o o OOO o o o o o o o o o oooo ooooo ooc ooooo ooc ooooo oo 30 O -O o o 1 o o o 1 o o o OOOO OOOO oooo u go WW o^iziWW^ O * c3 oO C3 <3 ® S/H :<3 go^^^- Kg a-2 O C3 ,? aM* «d'Ss ■"IgtJ : a f!' • ) ^^*^' •3.S a ■s Sana's '"a^^aS^ all- 8 * SPSt W3^oW , d i^^ •805 s s ■=»B a'3 S ■f j go a o •a S 3 M -8 § Si 9 (V, £ f 4 AMOUNT OF SILVER BULLION PURCHASED IN OCTOBER, 1893. o ■to S|.fc ~ 3 ll"3 - O .i © 00 © t-CM © © .rt P ■ ' • fflrf P ■ • * Hfi © to © © CO NesiN i-l © © © © © © © © © ©o © © © ©o© o© © © © © © ©o o©oo© © © ©"©"©"©"©" e4*©~ wo© wio ^ SENATE. ( Ex. Doc. '' 2d Session. ] \ No. 91. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1ETTEE FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, IN RESPONSE TO . I The Senate resolution of March, 28, 1894, relative to the currency and the productions of India, Russia, and the Argentine Republic during certain years. May 8, 1894.— Referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, Office cf the Secretary, Washington, D. C, May 7, 1894. Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the- receipt of the following resolution adopted by the Senate March 28, 1891: In the Senate of the United States, March 28, 1894.- Revolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, directed to send to the Senate, at his earliest convenience, answers to the following inquiries accord- ing to the best information now in his Department: , -,-. . First. Whether any change has been made in the weight, fineness, or otherwise, in the legal-tender value of the coined silver money used by the people oi India, Russia, o? the Argentine Republic, for the transaction of their domestic business; and if so when and to what extent, and by what authority of law, during the past ^^econd^wiiether prices for the chief products of said .countries, 'like wheat, cotton, etc., have advanced or declined in their prices, when exchanged m their home markets for the legal-tender silver or paper money in common nse among their people, and if so how much, during the past twenty years. . , - . , , Third. Whether the production, export, or the manufacture of the products of said countries have increased or decreased, and if so, how much, m the qua ntity ; and value of each, during the past twenty years, using their annual r . e ?«* B *°»°?*"5 amounts produce*, exported, and manufactured, and their legal -*« d « "J;«£. d paper monev to ascertain their home prices for the four years ^^^IflL^lv as compared with like averages between 1888 and 1893, as a basis on which to answer these inquiries. To the above I respectfully submit the following replies: Answer to first inquiry: . ,1, (1) Indian There has been no change in the weight, fineness, or legal- tender power of the silver coins of India during the last twenty years, or.'indeed, rince the law of August 17, 1835, which established the pres- ste, 2 CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPU1 ent monetary system of that country, with the. single silver stan< went into force on September 1, 1835.- That law provided thai company rupee, a name which it introduced, should weigh a new Indian tola, or 180 grains, $i or .916§ fine-^that is— that it should tain 165 grains of pure silver. The act of the Governor-General of India, in council of June 26, did not change the weight, fineness, or legal tender power of the n although it closed the Indian mints to the free coinage of silver v and after the date of its passage. Silver may, however, still be cc in India, on Government account, and the Government holds i , ready to furnish new rupees to individuals in exchange for gold, a rate of one silver rupee for 16d. in gold, or 15 rupees for 1 pound 6 ing. i (2) Russia. — Twenty years ago, and up to the 1st of January, . the monetary system of Eussia was that established by the law of , 20 (old style), corresponding to our 2d of July, 1810. Under this Eussia had the sijver standard, the rouble containing 20.7315 gr or 319.9286 grains, with a fineness of .868-j 1 ,,-, or a fine weight of 17, grams, or 277.7161 grains. The coinage of silver, however, was pended in Eussia by the law of September, 1876. The law of December 17, 1885, which went into force on the first of 1886, introduced the double standard, and made the weight oi silver rouble 19.90' grams, or 307.0968 grains, with a fineness of and its' fine weight, therefore, 17.9961 grams,, or 277.7161 grains , same as it had been under the law of 1810, ]STo silver was coined, ever, on private account, under the new law. Its coinage on pri > account continued suspended. The actual currency of the country since 1854 has been paper "c roubles," which are sometimes also called "silver roubles." (3) Argentine Republic. — Twenty years ago,' and up to 1881, Argentine Bepu'blic had a very incoherent monetary system. - peso fuerte, of 100 ceutavos, divided into 8 reals, was the un account. - But that unit was represented, at least, in the Province of Bu ; Ayres and.Corrientes, only by paper money of various kinds, that tuated in value. Apart from this paper money, and from the metallic piasters \* , still circulated to a limited extent, in the other provinces of the-Ee lie, commercial operations were carried on in foreign coins. In 1875, the Congress of the Eepublic, decreed the coinage of nati money based on the gold peso fuerte, or pataca, fineness .900, weig If grams and divided into centimos. It was intended that this .. age should embrace: In gold, 5, 10, and 20 piaster pieces; in silv piece of one piaster, .900 fine, of the legal weight of 25 grams, decimal divisions of a proportional weight. Tiie economic condi of the country, however, were such that the law of 1875 could nc carried out. Tbe monetary law of JSTovember 5, 1881, retained as the unit, the piaster, divisible into centimes, but lowered its weight to 1.6189 gr that is exactly the weight of the French 5-franc gold pieces. Silver was made legal tender only to the amount of 10 pesos. 1 tically, therefore, the country has, legally, the gold standard.- actual money, however, is a depreciated paper, fluctuating great value. The following table shows the weight and fineness of the silver of the Argentine Eepublic up to 1881 and thereafter: ; flURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 3 Weight and fineness of the silver coins of the Argentine Republic. , Coins. (1) Under the Argentine Confederation (accord • ing to assays) : -/, Peso of Cordoba , Quarter peso of Cordoba. .. Peso of 1838 and 1839 laverage) <2) Pieces of the Provinces of Kio de la Plata : Peso of 1828, worst samples Peso of 1828, better samples r - . Peso *>f 1828, best samples ,^.-.\ Half-peso of 1815 Half-peso of 1813-'16 '. (3) Silver coins under the law of 1881 : teso ,.. >' 50-Cf nljavos :. }\ ■ " 20-centavos r ,...'*; \'f 10-centayos , . . . j -U -. 5-centavos -.,,.. G-rams. 26. 0670 6. 7000 26. 6972 24. 6226 27. 0860 26. 6324 13. 2838 6. 3503 25. 0000 12. 5000 5. 0000 2. 5000 1. 2500 Grains. 402. 265 103. 394 411. 991 379. 975 417.991 410. 991 204. 995 97. 997 385. 800 192. 900 77. 160 38. 580 39.290 Fineness (thousandths). .900 .800 .915 .800 .822 .900 .900 .900 .900 .900 Find weight, grains. 362. 039 82. 715 376. 971 327. 539 334. 392 337. 834 182. 036 86. 826 347. 220 173. 610 69.444' 34. 722 17.361 Answers to the second inquiry: (1) As to India. — In India the rupee price of such 'important articles as rice, wheat, linseed, and gunny bags has risen during the last 'twenty years. The rupee price of other important articles has fallen, ' as, for instance, of raw cotton, cotton yarn, hides, indigo, opium, and tea. Three other articles of minor importance have also fallen in price during the la st twenty years. The folio win g index-number tables show the extent of the rise or fall iu the prices of the above articles for the periods mentioned, their prices in March, 1£>73, being taken to repre- sent 100:- I. — Table showing the course of the prices of the articles which have risen during the years 1887-92, as compared with their price in March, 1873. Articles.- 1873 (March). 1887. 1888. 1889. 1890. 1891. 1892. Wheat : 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 97 83 103 106 97 101 137 , 118 98 100 88 110 115 104 95 153 141 125 103 89 131 144 112 112 192 203 126 90 81 144 154 111 100 197 186 118 93 87 147 143 103 97 1&6 115 93 118 103 Rice: 162 169 Linseed : 110 112 Jute : Picked 236 231 132 / II.— Table slwiving the course of the prices of the articles which have fallen during the years 1887-9$, as compared with their price in March, 1873. Articles. Cotton : Broach , Yarns, 20's T cloth.... Hides, cow Indigo, good Opium, Bengal Oiiium, Malwa Tea, good Souchong 1873. (March). 1887. 1888. 1889. 1890. 1891. 1892. 100, 85 95 1 93 95 84 75 100 69 74 79 74 70 65 100 76 • 77 77 77 77 77 100 87 76 76 72 65 66 100 70 82 93 76 86 • 74 100 84 85 91 83 81 89 100 90 100 98 88 87 88 100 55 50 52 50 50 41 4 CURRENCY, 'ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUB: III. — Table showing the course of the prices of certain articles of minor importance u have fallen during the period 1876-9%, as compared with that pf ice in March, 187, Articles. . Saltpeter . ... Shellac, middling Silk, raw Sardah. 1873 (March), 100 100 100 1880. 1891. See Report of Indian Currency Committee, pp. 161, etc. , \2) As to Russia. — I And that the average prices of some of the p cipal articles of Russian production during the years 1873-'77, as c pared with their average price during the period 1887-'91 have fall while those of others have risen. The prices which have fallen those of wheat, rye, barley, oats, yarn, leather, and raw wool. Those which have risen are the, prices of maize, pease, groats, flc flax, and hemp. The following table shows how the credit-rouble prices of the a cles above mentioaed fluctuated during the years 1873-'77, and 18 '91, the last year for which I find data at present attainable. The prices 1 in the table are wholesale export prices. IV.- -Table showing the prices of some of the principal articles of Russian produi during the periods lS7S-'77, and 1887-91. Articles. born and "wheat per ehetv'ert Itye '...1 do. Barley do. Oats do. Maize 1 do. Pease do. , Groats do- ' Flour do . Flax ./ 1 per pood Hemp .-. .do- . Yarn...: do. Xeather, untanned . . .do . . Wool, raw do. . Rubles. 11.55 6.67 6.20 4.12 6.29 7.79 8.30 9.95 4.50 2. 96 25.45 10.88 10:99 Rubles. 10.50 7.68 6.30 4.45 ' 7.13 9.57 8.03 12.40 4.83 3.48 25.04 12.42 10.77 1875. L Rubles. 10.41 7.02 5.99 4.80 6.71 8.40 1.90 14.15 4.89 ' 3.70, 37.16 12.72 9.83 I 1870. Rubles. 11.02 7.08 6.13 4.70 4.76 8.67 9.54 10.93 4.81 3.49 0.01 13.23 10.13 1877. Rubles. 12.00 8.40 6.82 5.14 5.47 7.82 16.36 11.78 5163 4.55 6.93 • 10. 73 16. 70 Ave] 1873- Rub Articles. ,Corn and wheat Per chetvert Eye do.. Barley ., do. . Oats do. . Maize : do. . . ; Peas — ,. do... Groats do. . . Flour do... Flax per pood . Hemp do. . Tarn do . . Leather, amtanned do. . . AVool, raw ., do... 10.72 6.30 5.92 4.00 6.49 9.56 12.57 15.33 5.56 5.06 5.14 10.22 8.82 1888. Roubles. 10.40 5. 6.-1 5.95 3.75 6., 64 9.89 11.61 14.89 5.39 5.10 4.37 11.60 10.51 Roubles. 10.13 5.90 5.75 3.87 7.34 9.10 12.88 18.37 5.16 5.08 4.64 12.80 10.89 1890. Roubles. 9.84 0. 1)0* 6.06 1 i. 16 ; 7.27 9.00 ' 12.00 17.42 4.71 5.00 4.22 11.80 Roubles. 10.56 7.90 0.96 4.15 6.95 9.08 ■ 14. 17 15.84 4.27 4.82 3.50 9.97 7.61 Aver I887-I Roul 1 1 (.3) As to the Argentine Republic— I find no official data at hand the prices of the principal articles of Argentine production as far bs as twenty or even ten years ago. But even if the prices of the princi products of that country ten or twenty years ago were readily attaina they could not well be compared with thejr prices to-day, for the reas ifTCTKRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 5 that the present currency of the Eepublic is very different from what it was a decade and two decades ago, as has been intimated in my answer to the first inquiry. COMMERCIAL STATISTICS. I*;, Beplying to the last paragraph of the resolution, I have caused to be (prepared in the Bureau of Statistics the trade figures of the principal ■i articles of import and expert constituting the foreign commerce of the three countries named. These figures are taken from the official returns ,.' of the respective countries, and are as, complete in their scope as a gen- eral survey of the matter will permit. By taking the leading articles a more definite result is reached. The aggregate of quantities and values of articles of lesser importance will not modify the conclusions, obtained from a study of the principal items. The commercial statis- ,' tics of British India in full detail are published from year to year under the direction of that Government. To reprint them for a period of twenty years would be a task involving so much labor find expense that.; " I have judged a summary to be better adapted to meet the question of the Senate. • A very full study of the relation of trade figures to prices and the fall in the market value of silver was made by the Herschel : Commission on Indian Currency, and is, therefore, at the command of the Senate. Yours respectfully, J. G-. Carlisle, , Secretary. , The President of the Senate of the United States. . Imports into Russia. is. :■ £vv ! , 'Articles. Year. Quantities. Values. Articles. Year. Quantities.. Values. , Agricultural ma- ;,. ' chinery. 1867 1868 1869 18,70 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 »1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 18S7 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 Poods. Rubles. 1, 426, 355 2, 102, 167 711, 366 875, 085 1, 042, 828 1,522,203 1,546,479 2, 809, 004 3, 151, 960 1, 628, 885 1,231,130 3, 641, 435 , 3,999,863 5, 502, 000 7, 948, 000 5, 925, 000 5, 617, 000 5, 784, 000 2, 428, 000 1, 314, 000 1, 742, 000 2, 644, 000 2, 958, 000 2, 519, 000 2, 037, 000 571,210 69V233 961, 127 1, 150, 082 1, 354, 246 2, 891, 328 2, 831, 629 Hooks, maps, en- gravings, etc. Cement and lime . - . ! 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 lfc89 1890 1891 1867 i868 1869 1870 ■1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 Poods.' Rubles. 2,897,480 3,471,40,2' 3, 930, 019 «, 491, 227 , 4, 026, 216 5, 113, 494 4, 051; 000 3, 213, 000 4, 892, OH" 4, 639,000 4, 758, 000 2, 800, 000 2, 877, 000, 2, U59, 000/ 2, 148, 000 2, 163, obb 2, 065, 000 2, 247, 000 1, 082, 971 1. 217, 271 2.807,121 3; 370, 543 3, 721, 240 3, 360, 069 3, 780, 723 4, 501, 768 5, 608, 802 4, 808, 246 3, 677, 871 5, 040, 284 8, 411, 217 8.258,542 541,485 108, 637 1, 403, 562 1, 685, 275 1, 860, 618 2, 230, 997 ' 1,723,683' Books, maps, en- gravings, etc. 2, 479, 373 2, 784, 229 2, 127; 626 1, 188, 283 1872 1873 2, 518, 515 UUltltJii\i;i, lilU,, UJJ J.JNJU1A, KUSS1A, AJNJJ AKUEJNTIJN.E nmtrum Imports into Russia — Continued. Articles. Cement and lime. Chemicals and drugs. v Year Coal and coke. Coffee . 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 Quantities. Poods. 4, 973, 046 5, 908, 995 6, 840, 000 7,104,000 5, 881, 000 ,5„560, 000 6,541,000 5, '719, 000 5, 330, 000 6, 990, 000 6, 278, 000 949, 629 1, 610, 147 1, 206, 546 1, 661, 887 1, 968, 158 2, 139, 146 2, 533, 400 2, 569, 230 2, 676, 441 2, 806, 670 1, 893, 017 3,136,685 3,357,182 3, 460, 679 3,419,323 4, 013, 733 4, 385, 000 4, 936, ,000 4, 624, 000 4, 830, 000 4, 687, 000 4, 933, 000 5, 164, 000 4, 915, 000 3, 899, 000 49, 000, 952 35, 217,;011 48, 992, 931 51, 569, 996 75, 550, 745 64, 782; 528 50, 854, 034 63, 283, 746 63, 490, 753 91,'424, 939 90, 367, 840 111,113,041 90, 665, 908 |117, 264, 780 109, 274, 000 105, 574, 000 138, 310, 000 116, 760, 000 111,502.000 113, 467, 000 95, 710, 000 105, 456, 000 1126,327,000 ,106,122,000 1106,081,000 407, 193 317, 928 466, 664 440; 461 492, 132 447, 680 409, 470 443, 065 457, 396 500, 589 287, 038 447, 221 472, 448 500, 064 424, 431 508. 877 387, 000 506, 000 470, 000 456, 00p Values. Rubles. 1,007,000 1, 684, 000 1, 906, 000 2, 925, 000 2, 001, 000 1, 474. 000 1, 599, 000 1, 273, 000 1,263,000 1, 424, 000 1, 266, 000 2, 687, 097 3, 713, 794 3, 112, 754 "4, 233, 185 5,095,376 6, 252, 249 10, 772, 354 9, 718, 676 13, 804, 087 6, 499, 538 5, 249, 132 20, 667, 502 22, 078, 719 18,532,000 18, 043, 000 25, 907, 000 15, 322, 000 15, 734, 000 13/694,000 12,821.000 12, 133, 000 11, 665, 000 12, 555/000 12, 091, 000 11,053,000 2, 450, 050 1, 760, 857 7, 348, 928 7,735,497 11, 332, 610 10, 598, 208 10, 503, 918 8, 947, 901 8,719,859 12, 446, 692 12, 98,9, 405 17, 059, 213 12, 855, 308 17, 605, 000 14. 751, 000 15, 478, 000 18, 137, 000 15, 955, 000 15, 451, 000 13, 458, 000 11, 314, 000 12, 960, 000 15, 132, 000 12, 429, 000 12, 036, 000 4, 479, 128 3, 497, 195 5, 133, 297 4,845,082 5, 413, 458 4, 970, 866 5, 034, 264 5, 415, 598 5, 638, 110 5, 617,' 074 3,211,317 5, 704, 782 6,;840, 401 7,129,000 6, 107, 000 7, 626, 000 '6, 541, 000 8, 61^, 000 7, 429, 000 6, 051, 000 Articles. Year . Quantities Tali Poods. Rub\ Coffee 1887 1888 317, 000 386, 000 4,07! 5, 16! 1889 355, 000 4,80! 1890 , 388, 000 5,57i 1891 345, 000 5,231 Cotton : Raw 1867 2, 535, 991 2, 398, 335 38, 03! 35. 974 1868 1869 2, 973,.634 ■35,68: 1870 2, 605, 827 31; 26£ 1871 4, 002, 143 48, 02E 1872 3, 393, 001 46, 88: 1873 3, 393, 945 37, 551 1874 4, 454, 758 53, 962 , 1875 4, 980, 687 52, 562 1876 4, 538, 879 38,948 1877 3,679,556 1 35,323 1878 6, 330, 433 67, 893 1879 5,720,055 60, 004 1880 4, 886, 560 51, 951 1881 8, 217, 308 84, 499 1882 6, 710, 200 72,417 1883 8,090,000 93, 864 1884 6, 277, 000 76, 176 1885 i 6, 378, 000 65, 967 1886 7, 2J8, 000 71, 986 a 1887 10, 055, 000 96, 536 1888 6, 890,'000 68, 248, 1889 8, 620, 000 83, 509 1890 7. 995, 000 79, 121, 1891 7, 131, 000 69, 397, Yarn , . '. 1867 152, 850 139, 745 4, 742, 4, 343, 1868 1869 164, 972 5, 192, 1870 204, 744 6, 554, 1871 258,582 8, 290, 1872 304, 653 12, 607; 1873 314, 962 13, 643, 1874 331, 938, 13, 475, 1875 359, 116 15, 296, 187S 330, 594 14, 472, 1877 157, 803 5, 987, 1878 503, 614 18, 768, 1879 874, 619 30, 428, 1880 568, 419 ' 20, 785, 1881 380,626 ! 14,267, 1882 355, 148 ; 15, 224, 1883 • 226,000 | 10,438, 1884 167, 000 8, 542, 1885 172,000 '< 7,775, 1886 169,000! 7,690, 1887 219,000 ' 9,644, 1888 263,000 '■ 10,225, 1889 271,000 ' 9,837, 1890 228,000 1 8,609, 1891 148,000 | 4.868. Manufactures 1867 1868 3, 957, 3 9!U of.' 1869 --♦ 4,064, 1870 1871 1872 7,312, 1873 ,1874 .---! 6,113, 1875 1876 5, 184, 2, 037, 1877 1878 4, 649, 5, 990, 1879 1880 6, 027, 4, 712, 5, 446, 3, 890, 3, 395, 2; 977, 2, 318, 1881 * 1882 1883 1884 x 1885 1886 1887 , •:< 1,843, ' 1, 519, ' 1888 1889 2, 134, 1,913, 1890 .,.. 1891 1, 706, i P«RE v NCY, ETC., OP INDIA, RUSSIA, A#D ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 7 •■;. .. Imports into Mussia — Continued. Articles. ! \ ear Engines, machin- ery, and parts. Fish: Herring salt- ed in barrels. Fruit and veget- Furs. 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874, 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 U871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874, 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 Quantities, Poods. 1, 92?, 827 2, 489, 199 1, 970, 448 2, 199, 849 2, 063, 475 2, 447, 222 2, 930, 342 2,511,044 1.928,111 3, 219, 834 2, 507, 139 4, 015. 769 1, 418, 671 1, 896, 211 1, 857, 000 1,590,000 1,376,000 1, 566, 000 1, 363, 000 1, 647, 000 2, 092, 000 1, 941, 000 2, 121, 000 Barrels. 337, 928 326, 552 , 320, 016 328, 199 283, 871 502, 935 359, 855 430, 430 432, 622 364, 694 211,878 427, 275 336, 504 507, 670 244, 584 PoopZs. 4, 253, 000 5, 878, 000 4, 967, 000 4, 889, 000 5, 146, 000 4, 617, 000 5, 969, 000 5, 431, 000 4, 683, 000 Values. Rubles. 15, 022, 67i 16,321.206 16, 922, 932 21, 827, 889 16, 036, 426 16, 280, 827 18, 148, 085 .17,266.356 31, 826, 605 19, 9U4, 937 20,363,712 43. 178, 858 29. 522, 563 45, 816, 000 15, 134, 000 20, 914, 000 19, 729, 000 1-6, 849, 000 11, 938, 000 14, 451, 000 13, 258, 000 16, 090, 000 19, 486, 000 18. 030, 000 18, 776, 000 3, 186, 997 3, 109. 865 3, 200, 160 3, 281, 990 2,838,710 5, 283, 409 4. 249, 978 ,5,095,600 4, 832, 255 4, 037, 127 2 955, 638 5, 362, 449 4, 347, 087 6, 302, 000 6, 822, 000 3, 073, 000 6, 875, 8, 644, 6. 021, 6, 921, 6, 675. 6, 082, 8, 001, 7, 622, 6, 439, 5,249, 6, 560, 7. 239, 6, 722, 8, 474. 11, 331, 10,478, 9. 767, 10, 266, 12, 367, 5, 626, 9, 094, 11, 137, 10, 422, 10, 525, 12, 017, 11,840, 11, 915, 10, 106, 9, 041, (,, 244, 5, 884, 6. 764, 5, 941 5,441, 2, 178, 1, 859, 3, 441. 3, 635, Articles. Year. Quantities. 1 Values. Furs. Glass and glass ware. Indigo . Iron : Pig- 1871 Poods. 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 i 1880 \ 1881 ! 1882 ! 1883 1884 1885 1 1886 1887 1888 ; 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1 1869 1870 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 48, 171 1868 49, 203 1869 47, 029 1870 40, 997 1871 59, 557 1872 53, 417 1873 44,725 1874 53, 421 1875 46, 246 1876 42, 481 1877 35, 772 1878 47, 171 1879 48, 723 1880 36, 742 1881 54, 900 1882 45, 934 1883 43, 000 1884 45,000 1885 42, 000 1886 32, 000 1887 35, 000 1.888 50, 000 1889 53, 000 1890 55, 000 1891 42, 000 1867 1, 134, 274 1868 1,863,194 1869 1, 934, 057 1870 1,834,110 1871 2, 923, 305 1872 1, 624, 547 1873 2, 334, 657 1874 2, 795, 215 1875 3, 508, 069 Rubles. 3,782,173 3, 656, 082 3, 099, 216 3, 955, 686 4, 840, 358 4, 219, 747 2, 690, 008 5, 537,1)15 4, 728, 613 . 4,064,000 3, 909, 000. 5, 404, 000 8, 048, 000 7, 639, 000 4, 074, 000 8, 378, 000 3,516,000 4, 172, 000 4, 654, 000 4, 569, 000 4, 042, 000 1, 118, 667 1,185,872 1, 078, 972, 1, 347, 506 1,704,822 2, 554, 371 3, 005, 871 ' 3,032,375, 3,' 496, 087 3, 179, 422 1,238,896 2, 812, 556 3, 759, 350/ 4, 142, 000 2, 526, 000 3, 328, 00O 3; 049,006 2, 757, 000, 2, 717, 000 2, 387, COO 1,716,000 1. 302, 00O • 1, 746, 000 1, 590, 000 1, 524, 000 5, 198, 698 5, 301, 376 6. 113, 851 5, 329, 663 7, 742, 415 4, 595, 363 5, 083, 678 6, 008, 714 4, 803, 509 4,684,879 4, 871, 827 5, 083, 392 4, 849, 628 4, 098, (.100. 6, 205, 000 5, 762, 00O 5, 624, 000 6, 306, 000 4, 995, 000 3, 654, 000 3, 791, 000 5, 975, 00O 6, 507, 000 6, 539. 00O 4, 818', 000 850, 708 1, 397, 397 1,160,435 1, 100, 463 1,753,982 1, 011, 305, 1, 422, 704 1, 553, 460 2, 439, 420 uuruxEiiNiii, Jiiu., UJ! 11>LUA, KUSS1A, AJND AKUJiJNTlJM^ xtriiruj?: Imports into Russia — Continued. ,. Articles. Year Quantities. 1 Values. Articles. Year Quantities Tal Iron— Continued. I Poods. Rubles. | Iron — Continued. Foods. Bui Pig.-... 1876 2, 965, 032 1, 816, 526 Steel, otter 1880 2. 393, 607 15, 2( 1877 3,229,269 ; 1,850,946 than rails. 1881 630, 341 1,9S 1878 6, 395, 697 4, 485, 618 1882 281, 055 1, If 1879 ll, 317, 642 6, 844, 497- 1883 231, Q00 9£ 1880 14, 887, 296 9, 055, 000 1884 339', 009 1, 4E 1881 14, 293, 486 9, 200, 681 1885 268, 000 1,12 ,. 1882 13, 363, .352 9, 657, 000 1886 507, 000 2,31 . V . ! 1883 14, 491; 000 9, 626, 000 1887 586, 000 1,89 1884 17, 330, 000 11, 243, 000 1888 562, 000 2,22 1885 13, 509, 000 8, 729, 000 1889 860, 000 2,97 r 1886 14, 510, 000 8, 212, 000 1890 847. 000 2,84 1887 8, 785, 000 5,543,000 v 1891 665, 000 2,74 1888 4,541,000 2, 499, 0P0 3, 938, 000 1867 511, 719 1,53 2,06 1889 6, 363, 000 1868 388, 073 1890 7,569,000 4, 839, 000 1869 755, 269 2,26 1891 4, 586, 000 2, 837, 000 1870 841, 426 _ 2,52 .Hods, sheet, etc 1867 11, 484, 730 ' 1 15, 433, 071 1871 585, 986 1,75 :' A 1868 7, 221, 705 9, 952, 862 1872 708, 730 2,07 1869 2,511,042 4, 446, 766 1873 921,266 2,37 1870 4, 196, 624 6,460,596 1874 1, 041, 110 2,93 1871 6, 909, 031 10.423,385 1875 948, 306 .2,05 t * 1872 4, 705, 630 8,645,251 / 1876 ■ 1, 492, 485 3,33 1873 6, 339, 176 11, 205, 626 1877 1, 120, 266 3,12 i 1874 6, 441, 612 9, 745, 809 1878 1, 238, 150 3,73 1875 7, 248, 616 12, 241, 304 1879 1,178,318 3.64 1876 6, 990. 837 11, 762, 963 1880 1, 009, 315 2,94 1877 4, 52>i, 698 8, 048, 316 1881 1,111,381 2,87 1878 7,179,449 12, 100, 066 1882 958, 362 2,32' r 1879 8, 403. 069 14, 065, 251 1883 1, 123, 000 2,39: 1880 9,419.527 17, 101), 000 1884 1,107,000 2, 34i 1881 1 6.485,971 11,960,000 1885 668, 000 1,731 1882 6, 708, 803 13, 223, 000 1886 812, 000 1, 83; , 1883 6, 472, 000 14, 053, 000 1887 1, 076, 000 2,42. 1884 4, 871, 000 10; 368, 000 1888 1,146,000 2,651 1'885 3,878,000 8. 616, 000 1889 1,179,-000 3,06' i .1886 4,025,000 8, 799, 000 1890 . 1,263,000 3,09; 1887 2, 798, 000 5, 717, 000 1891 1, 123, 000 2,88! 1888 ^3, 263, 000i 6,910,000 Lace, cotton 1867 1,065 52: l 1889 4„513, 000 ,9, 049, 000 1868 863 42! 1890 4, 905, 000 9,423,000 1869 4,500 83< j ' 1891 3, 124, 000 6, 509, 000 1870 4, 341 84: Ttails 1867 (a) , (a) ■ Jfl) 1871 1872 i 5, 984 ■7, 347 1,24' 1,52 1868 ' ' > ' 1869 12, 705, 960 12, 705, 960 1873 8,201 1,941 1 1870 13,939,401 13, 939, 401 1874 9,396 2,141 1871 6, 981, 786 6, 981, 786 1875 .9, 943 1,921 1872 :6 002,167 7, 285, 541 1876 7,346 1,341 i 1873 7, 119, 175 9. 528, 360 i 1877 2,888 62! ' i L874 5, 224, 596 5j 808, 310 1878 6, 864 1,46< i 1875 3, 548, 523 4, 040, 779 I 1879 8,584 1,521 1876 1,631(899 1, 984, 654/ 1880 8, 300 1, 341 i877 1, 029| 084 998, 574 1881 6,878 1,17] 1878 347, 824 , 460, 564 1882 8,963 1,86( 1879 169, 106 234, 013 1883 7,400 1, 54< 1880 282, 538 478, 000 ( 1884 ' 5,600; • 1, 32( 1881 - 58, 278 154, 415 )• 1885 6,800 1,091 1882 55, 114 156, 000 1886 8, 000 1,13! 1883 /39, 000 109,000 1887 6,000 881 1884 11, 000 . 30, 000 1888 4,000 79: 1885 37, 000 47, 000 1889 2,000 54! 1886 23, 000 59, 000 1890 2,000 40c 1887 6,000 10, 000 , 1891 2,000 52( 1888 1889 9,000 14, 000 22, 000 33, 000 Linen, manufac- tures of. 1867 1868 3, 53J , 4,01s 2,804 v 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 44,000 27, 000 194, 660 182, 900 154, 842 . 223,110 812, 355 276, 913 209,'l93 97, 000 71, 000 924, 647 868, 772 735, 496 1,059,765 3, 858, 692 1, 367, 336 . 1, 339, 115 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1870 1877 3, 46E Steel 4.26C 5, 165 5 74= 7,605 5, 68C 5,38! 5,107 9, 08f Steel, other than rails. 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 421,910 1, 198, 880 641, 366 671,383 1,091,613- 1,712,825 2, 184, 902 4, 064, 103 4, 172, 951 4, 348, 295 7,263,680 10, 690, 435 1 1878 1879' 1880 1881 1882 1883 7,814 7, 37E 5, 67c 3,95( 2.918 (a) Included in rods, sheets, etc. CUEEENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, EUSSIA, AND AEGENTINE EEPDBLIC. 9 Imports into Russia — Continued. Articles. Linen, manufac- ' tures of. Metal wares. Oil: Petroleum, etc Other than mineral. 1884 1886, 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1S87 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 '1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 -1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 Quantities. | Values. Articles. Foods. 552,497 792,000 1. 099, 472 1,440,971 1, 720,420 1, 798, 273 2,716.381 2, 532, 395 2, 660, 996 2,678,931 1, 722, 688 2, 004, 067 1, 719, 890 1, 445, 558 1, 213, 182 1,046,817 459, 000 276, 000" 142, 000 41,000 15, 000 12, 000 14, 000 8,000 19,000 1 975, 273 1, 088, 383 1, 112, 880 1, 228, 197 1, 481, 074 1, 625, 718 1, 491, 974 1, 621, 755 1. 867, 305 1, 928, 601 1, 036, 762 1, 339, 252 1, 467, 981 1. 524, 198 1,274,750 1, 399. 496 1, 548, 000 1, 471, 000 1, 117, 000 938, 000 703, 000 607, 000 679, 000 Rubles. 3, 823, 000 4,354,000 3, 937, 000 2, 113, 000 1, 608, 000 1,682,000 1, 300. 000 1, 067, 000 14, 709, 268 17,865,330 29, 106, 640 25,551,941 18, 277. 180 20, 363, 629 , 30, 352, 567 ' 26, 922, 205 28, 021, 777 26, 924, 518 17, 193, 604 "27, 039. 322 21, 244, 631 15, 419, 000 24, 837, 000 29, 687, 000 22, 437, 000 20, 409, 000 14, 708. 000 16, 285, 000 11, 878, 000 13,' 752, 000 14, 625. 000 14, 487, 000 13, 908, 000 2, 209, 976 3, 168, 001 4, 397, 891 5, 763, 885 6,881,685 5, 647, 233 10, 313, 607 8, 018, 802 7,590,023 9, 157( 934 5, 749, 641 7, 112, 617 4, 965, 977 4, 072, 000 3, 847, 000 2, 766, 000 1, 226, 000 738, 000 389, 000 1 128, 000 ' 56, 000 55, 000 50, 000 31, 000 66, 000 7, 318, 113 8, 167, 580 9. 956, 431 10, 910, 503 13, 120, 788 14, 092, 673 12, 807, 064 14, 742, 450 12, 426, 062 11, 449, 931 8, 690, 132 13, 930, 193 15, 109, 274 14, 553, 000 12, 300, 000 14. 236, 000 16, 763, 000 it, 317, 000 10, 913, 000 9, 217, 000 , 8, 213, 000 7,194,000 6. 344, 000 Oil— Continued. Other than mineral. Plants and seeds . . Kice. Salt, table. Silt: Kaw, thrown, etc. Year. 1890 1891 1867 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 188U 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887^ 1888 1889 1890 1891; 1867 1868 1809 1870 3871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 18S7 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 Quantities.! Values,. Poods. 646, 000 654, 000 120, 797 134. 612 251, 902 281,496 ' 321, 629 392, 948 .328,837 385, 000 455; 859 495. 588 479, 212 503, 034 593, 223 672, 366 806,403 906,324 925, 000 1, 314. 000 1, 956, 000 2, 5:46. 000 1, 915, 000 1, 692, 000 1, 791, 000 2, 101, 000 2, 062, 000 347, 683 345, 717' 442, 835 267, 318 615, 293 296, 788 ; , 718, 058 735, 235 621, 373 633, 583 264, 400 506, 625 593, 759 1 936, 527 760, 102 804, 517 785, 000 791, 000 669, 000 376, 000 79, 000 104, 000 123,.000 110,000 131,000- 11, 426, 829 10, 266, 863 11, 288, ,670 10, 453, 720 11,832,324 11, 712, 536 12, 407, 558 12, 145, 976 11, 826, 170 17, 279, 925 6, 180, 850 ; 10, 057, 170 9, 949, 821 9, 059, 770 11, 368, 798 10, 290, 747 9, 470, 000 5, 330, 000 2, 648, 000 1, 407, 000 887.000 706, 000 1,405,000 1, 050. 000 832, 000 15, 290 11, 867 14, 806 20, 959 Rubles. , , 5, 714. 000 5,790,000 2,778,244 ,3,096,076 4, 030, 427 4, 503, 945 5,146,071 2,163,554 ; 970,486 1, 218, 472 1, 489, 034 2, 041, 250 2,080,949' 2,130,749 2, 208, 433 2. 419, 000 2, 406, 000 3,217,000 3, 962, 000 4,334,000 6, 690, 000 ' 8, 619; 000 4, 867, 000 4,965,000 4, 630, 000 4,913,000 4,608,000 - 1,251(559 1, 244, 598 ' , 1, 594. 199 962,340 , 2, 215, 050 1, 706, 221 1, 927, 606 1, 812, 296 1, 687, 225 1,733,07(1 „ 656, 227' 1,569, 721 v 2,065,267" 3, 518', 000 2,797. 000v- 2, 940; 000 2,989,000 i 3,130,000 ' 2, 458, 000 V 1, 434', 000 228„000 312, 000 ■■ 380,0190 , 396, 000 427, 000 2, 284, '603 2, 252, 687 4, 514, 311 i 4, 181, 460 4,732,924 7, 140, 120 7, '372, 915 7, 212, 589 6, 913, 138 8, 351, 584 3, 440, 439 , 6, 846, 863 6,554,752 6, 161, 000 7,129,000 6, 675, 000 5, 852, 000 3, 244, 000 1, 120, 000 631, 000 , 293, 000 228, 000 421, 000 289, 000 222, 000 5, 107, 564 4, 285, 103 5,441,799 7, 263, 694 Iiiiporis into- Russia — Continued. Articles. \ Year. Quantities. Values. Articles. Tear. Quantities. Val jSilk— Continued. Poods. Rubles. Poods. Pu Haw, thrown, 1871 15, 756 6, 663, 601 Tobaceo, in/leaves 1876 509, 968 17,5 v etc. 1872 16, 596 6, 507, 527 and stalks. 1877 82, 562 1,2, 1873 15, 030 8, 053, 319 1878 84, 627 4,3, 1874 15, 955 7, 539, 480 1879 99, 495 4,2; 1875 18, 292 16, 076 9, 367, 611 1880 143, 354 8,6, 1876 7, 955, 855 1881 72, 612 4,2! 1877 10, 227 3, 237, 717 1882 95, 196 5,2: 1878 27, 390 11. 905, 955 1883 86, 000 4,41 1879 34, 224 14, 055, 178 1884 80, 000 4,2! 1880 30, 712 11, 025, 000 1885 76, 000 3.91 1881 25, 786 10, 857, OOo 1886 76, 000 3,«l 1882 25, 596 10, 543, 000 1887 70, 000 2,9: 1883 ■27, 000 10, 671, 000 1888 54, 000 2,01 1884 27, 000 9, 981, 000 1889 62, 000 2,51 1885- 28, 000 •1, 089, 000 1890 59, 000 2,1: 1886 27, 000 6, 940, 000 1891 52, 000 1,9: 29, 000 7, 894, 000 ,11, 156, 000 10, 474, 000 8, 651, 000 9, 007, 000 1867 i; 3i 1,51 ' 1869 1,5: 1870 1,71 1891 45, 000 1871 2,01 1867 - 5, 012, 567 5, 422, 540 4, 001, 796 4, 020, 446 5, 251, 811 1872 5,6! of. 1868 1873 5,2! 5,6! 6,01 3,01 1869 1874 1870 1875 1871 1876 1872 7, 120, 402 1877 1,7! 1873 5, 689, 584 5. 661, 256 6, 664, 354 1878 5, Of 1874 1875 1879 1880 5,7( 4,71 1876 4, 579, 434 1, 747, 066 3, 046, 785 1881 1877 1882 5,1; 1878 1883 3,61 1879 3, 132. 385 3. 488^ 000 3,7i 2,3; 2,1! 1,8! 2,45 3,4( 3,64 2,7! 1880 1881 2, 252, 000 , 1886 , 1882 2, 208, 000 . 2,216,000 , 2,246,000 1, 965, 000 1883 1884 1885 1889 1890 1886 1,599,000 1891 1887 1, 380, 000 Wearing apparel, ready-made. 1867 1888 1, 362, 000 1868 7( 1889 1, 859, 000 1,2! 1,21 1,7: 2,0! 1,91 1890 1, 765, 000 1 1891 , 1, 375, 000 Tea 1867 465, 587 515, 807 573, 988 14, 345, 575 15, 895, 149 17, 424, 101 1872 1873 1874 1868 1869 2, If 1870 v 543,036 16, 464, 014 1875 2,4! 1871 690, 240 20, 957, 510 1876 1,8! 1872 1873 1874 1875' 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 790, 443 729. 998 720, 579 794, 121 942, 976 373, 686 la, 023 855, 701 1, 146, 041 35, 163, 064 32, 948, 370 21, 398, 355 38, 603, 861 39, 375, 553 16, 126, 664 35, 615, 011 40, 581, 008 63, 648, 000 4 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1,35 2,7c 2,li 2,5( 1,9! 2,3i 2,8( 3, If 3, It 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 625^339 838,030 907, 000 989, 000 769, 000 924, 000 37, 410, 000 48, 091, 000 52, 447, 000 56,898,000 29, 244, 000 35, 693, 000 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 2,01 1,01 51 6] 5( 54 1887 607, 000 15, 153, 000 Wine: ' 1888 ,695, 000 14, 407, 000 In casks 1867 666, 646 5,5! 1889 702, 000 14, 320, 000 1868 695,490 fl,8< 1890 835, 000 17, 079, 000 1869 677, 229 5,6! 1891 744, 000 IB, 364, 000 1870 719,'860 6, Oi Tobacco, in leaves 1867 141, 983 2, 981, 673 1871 876, 964 7,31 9,4: and stalks. 1868 122, 022 2, 562, 483 1872 1, 096, 467 1869 185, 425 3, 893, 939 1873 1, 069, 409 11,6" 1870 173, 506 ; 3, 643, 635 1874 958, 051 11,. 0' 1871 181, 979 3,821,561 1875 1, 028, 130 12,8: 1872 220, 539 8, 845, 289 1876 1, 542, 618 13, 41 1873 225, 094 / 4, 453, 297 1877 294, 833 2,61 1874 231, 540 6, 946, 446 1878 724, 226 - 7,4! 1875 253, 007 7, 639, 344 1879- ,' 898, 573 9,61 PfefcENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 11 Imports into Riiaaia — Continued. Articles. Wine — Continued. s - In casks Tear. 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 arkling 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1883 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 Quantities/ Values. •Wool: Raw and yarn ,- -Manufactures ■ of. 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 I 1876 ! 1 1877 ! 1878 1879 ! 1880 i 1881 : 1882 ' 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 ,1890 1891 -1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 18,73 Poods. 1, 144, 677 828, 000 889, 000 530, 000 431, 000 379,000 364,000 391, 000 514, 000 510, 000 Bottles. 813, 552 884, 612 999,220 1, 033, 824 1, 079, 247 1, 195, 970 1, 191, 940 1, 159, 383 1, 123, 552 1,570,914 189, 277 562, 424 749, 639 1, 100, 359 359,864 572, 847 612, 000 609, 000 437, 000 454, 000 444,000 423, 000 447, 000 520,000 484, 000 Poods: 196, 823 138. 410 295, 311 349, 653 380, 411 383, 662 470, 441 536, 057 648, 532 443, 367 355, 182 794, 561 979, 127 821, 754 747, 658 807, 916 610, 000 503, 000 626, 000 550, 000 504, 000 • 786, 000 702, 000 557, 000 454, 000 RlthUx. 14, 936, 000 9, 819, 000 11, 140, 000 14, 519, 000 15, 728, 000 6, 902, 000 5, 279, 000 4,577,000 4, 317, 000 4. 447, 000 5, 239, 000 5, 725, 000 1, 220, 329 1, 326, 925 1, 498, 830 1, 550, 740 1, 618, 870 2, 784, 834 3. 277, 854, 3,099.887 2, 559, 212 3, 459, 772 476, 947 1, 494, 512 2, 165, 309 3, 087, 000 1, 371, 000 2, 460', 000 2.448, 000 2, 469, 000 2, 187, 000 1, 473, 000 1, 586, 000 1, 432, 000 1, 570, 000 1, 959, 000 1, 521, 000 8, 542, 695 9, 759, 974 11, 097, 046 13, 086, 022 13,810,629 15,161,663 13,282, 227 16, 468, 323 19, 775, 260 12, 725, 406 11, 526, 607 24, 487, 205 29, 694, 183 24, 405, 000 24, 052, 000 18, 717, 000 22, 431, 000 18, 607, 000 21, 449, 000 18, 555, 000 23, 051, 000 24, 571, 000 20, 938, 000 20, 686, 000 15, 993, 000 6, 195, 822 6, 133, 355 9, 019, 556 8, 556,. 684. 10, 109, 705 14, 199, 542 12, 752 234 Articles. Year. Quantities. Values Wool— Continued. Manufactures of. Total merchandise, European frontier. Total bullion and specie, European frontier. 1874 1875 1876 1877 ' 1878 1879 1880 1X81 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1S88 1889 1890 1891 1807 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1K7!) 1880 1881 1882 ]R8:i 1884 1885 188B 1887 Poods. 1890 1891 1S67 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 Rubles. 13, 329, 492 16, 120, 057 12,635,560 6,536,367 10, 536, 940 12,331,290 12,103,000 7, 711, 000 8, 964, 000 6,520,000 5,467,000 4, 628, 000 3, 682, 000 2,680, 000 2, 308, 000 3, 277, 00O 3,325,000 3, 361, 000 232, 791, 000 239, 892, 000 319, 375, 000 309, 130, 000 344,570,000 407, 657, 000 412. 476, 000 440, 153,000 498, 886, 000 442, 789, 000 291, 461, 000 557, 715, 000 548, 212, 000 578, 334, 000 476, 134, 000 518, 363, 000 513, 709, 000 486,251,000 381, 403, 000 373, 913, 000 41, 080, 000 330, 570, 000 371,562,000 357, 011, 000 320, 818, 000 Gold rubles. 33, 229, 000 38, 835, 000 2, 310s 000 2, 283, 000 7,168,000 ' 12, 969, 000 19, 898, 000 15, 981, 000 5, 786, 000 4, 646, 000 10, 236. 000 16, 086,000 13, 874, 000 ll,399i000 8, 876*000 9, 149, 000 v 5, 927, 000 5, 320, 000 5,902,000 5, 803, 000 4, 736, 000 29, 519, 000 9, 349, 000 20, 663, 000 77,463,000 IZ CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE nturv Exported from, Russia. v Articles. Tear Quantities. Values. Articles. Tear. Quantities. , V ADimals : No. •Rubles. ' Foods. X 1867 1868 4,427 10, 041 354, 160 803, 280 1872 1873 Ill, 560 120, 529 5, 2, 1869 19, 418 1, 262, 170 1874 101, 526 3, 1870 20, 029 1, 301, 885 ' 1875 133, 933 4, J871 10, 632 691, 080 1876 114, 753 3, 1872 13, 432 914, 131 1877 139; 836 3, 1873 18, 986 1, 606, 5lb 1878 140, 98,3 4, 1874 24, 711 1, 906, 373 ■'' 1879 115, 336 3, 1875 33, 343 2, 113, 143 1880 130, 993 4, 1876 , 42, 195 2, 859, 524 1881 123,460 4, 1877 370 35, 835 > 1882 131, 469 5, 1878- 15, 648 1, 150, 850 ^ ■ 1883 , 145,000 5, 1879 32, 970 2, 327, 021 1884 ■163,000 5, 1880 22, 331 1, 576, 000 1885 137, 000 5, 1881 23, 577 1, 671,000 -* t 1886 139,000 6, 1882 39, 295 2, 733, 000 1887, 150; 000 7, 1883 45, 000 3, 609, 000 1888 163, 000 9, 1884 40, 000 3, 412, 000 1889 168, 000 10, 1885 33,500 . 2,744,000 1890 155, 000 9, 1886 25, 500 2, 785, 000 1891 161, 000 7, 1887 20, 600 2, 570; 000 Butter 1867 146, 959 1, 1888 ' 41, 072 4, 573, 000 1868' 192, 365 2fl, 678 1, 1889 36, 788 4, 354, 000 1869 1, 1890 43, 099 4, 149, 000 1870 167, 666 , 1, ' 1891 54, 974 5, 206, 000 1871 237, 401 1, Other 1867 276, 829 3, 938, 251 1872 144, 075 1, 1868 356, 491 6, 181, 995 1873 112, 925 1, 1869 426,'399 7, 608/172 1874 . 156, 945 ■ 1, 1870 '486, 670 7, 216, 643 1 1875 163, 051 1, 1871 ' 533, 745 6, 358, 264 1876 181, 586 1, 1872 ,703,592 10, 159, 755 1877 185, 663 1, 1873 806,251 10, 667, 544 •1878. 174, 110 1, 1874 606, 493 7, 664, 906 1879 198, 953 1, 1875 748, 976 9, 624, 295 1880 187,551 1 155,826 1, ' 1876 810, 778 11, 766, 633 1881 1, 1877 1, 055, 384 15, 724, 367 1882 214,907 2 1878 1, 420, 247 16, 793, 184 1883 290, 000 3.' .1879 1, 116, 129 14, 546, 725 1884- 210, 000 2,' 1880 1, 140, 575 13, 497,:000 1885 227. 000 1,1 1881 674, 47S 10..026, 000 1886 267, 000 2, 1882 1, 013, 434 14, 853, 000 1887 307, 000 3, 1883 2, 970, 000 12, 290, 000 1888 383, 000 4, 1884 '2, 723, 000 10, 337, 000 , 1889 425, 000 4, 1885 2, 862, 000 11, 368, 000 , 1890 293, 000 3, - > 1886 3, 016, 000 8,-528, 000 1891 416, 000 4, 1887 4,383,000 9, 399, 000 1867 100, 112 1888 5,390;000 8, 135, 000 , ' 1 1868 116; 017 1889 6, 813, 000 8, 388, 000 ' 1869 132, 710 1890 ,5,871,000 6, 411, 000 1870 136, 405 ■1 1891 6, 498, 850 10, 306, 000 1871 , 128, 367 ' 1 Poods. 1872 140, 111 1, Brandy and corn 1867' 81, 504 342, 317 1873 154,224 1, ' spirit. 1868 68, 790 288, 918 1874 106,989 1, 1869- 175, 027 350, 054 /' 1875 96,903 1, \ 1870 647, 516 1,295,032 1876 92, 299 1871 499, 325 998,650 1877 57, 569 .1, 1 . 1872 655, 763 2, 009, 870 1878 124, 877 1, I 1873 707;] 00 2, 722, 666 1879 201, 746 1, / 1874 1,939,075 6, 690, 519 1880 185, 223 2, 1875 1, 505, 621 4, 383, 717 >. 1881 174, 245 2, 1876 1, 367; 409 2, 355, 027 1882 226, 016 3, 1877 1, 760, 509 4, 424, 720 1883 251, 000 3, 1878 1, 175, 108 2,190,450 1 '. 1884 304, 000 3, 1879 1, 905, 479 4, 684, 954 1885 155, 000 1, 1880 1, 495, 120 3; 846, 000 .1886 - , 168, 000 1, 1881 623, 489 1,044,000 1887 186, 000 2, 1882 1,838,586 6, 619, 000 1888, 230, 000 2, 1883 10, 235,000 5, 869, 000 7, '900, 000 1889 1890 1891 242, 000 199, 000 238, 000 Ohetverts. 8, 612, 391 6, 754, 452 6, 366, 816 9, 649, 728 11, 526, 404 9, 847, 839 6, 957, 164' 2, 2, 2, 1884 t 1885 1 1886 8, 985, 600 8, 775, 000 7, 813, 000 5, 773, 000 5, 744-000 5, 344, 000 3, 033, 729 .Breadstuff's : 1887 Wheat 1867 61,. 1888 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 47! 63, 96, 115, 99, 1889 1890 1891 Bristles- 1867 87, 680 1868 90, 506 3, i31, 506 ,1873 80, 1869 89, 490 8, 949, 000 ~* 1874 8, 122, 799 85, i LS1SS . 86, 112 8, 611, 200 1875 9, 528, 583 99, 1871 98, 607 9,860,700 1876 9, 236. 518 101, MJERENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBUC. 13 Exported from Russia — Continued. ' Articles. Breadstuffs— Uoii'd. ] Wheat ' 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881- 1882 1883 1S84 I 1885 1 1886 I 1887 t 1888 1889 1890 3891 Kve ..: 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 Barley ., Oats. 188b 1881 1885 1886 1887 1888 f8S9 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881' i 1882 I 1883 ! 1884 1885 | 180B I 1887 j 1888 j 1889 1 1890 I 1891 .1 1867 I 1868 1870 7871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 Chetverts. 8. 658, 261 17, 265, 944 13, 921, 880 6, 139, 297 8, 222, 397 12, 822, 957 14, 066, 000 11, 371, 000 15, 406, 000 8, 666. 000 13, 062, 000 21, 174, 000 18, 007, 000 16, 607, 000 16„206, 000 3, 368. 611 1, 867, 597 1, 154, 507 3, 042, 096 3-, 900, 729 2. 728, 361 .7, 389, 182 9, 707, 673 ' 5, 710, 971 8, 071, 433 9, 997, 397 10, 010, 996 12, 020, 956 5, 967. 444 4, 258, 272 5, 649, 722 7, 683, 000 7, 662, 000 8, -340, 000 7, 225, 000 8, 617, 000 11, 796. 000 9, 059, 000 8, 220, 000 7, 200, 000 551, 191 699, 751 636, 874 1, 879, 216 1, 442, 493 1, 097, 214 1, 160,717 2. 174, 804 1, 466, 286 1,-473, 004 2, 136, 224 4. 556, 126 2, 881, 587 1, 743, 845 2, 585, 372 3, 399, 007 4, 983, 000 4, 241, 000 3,844,000 4, 126, 000 5, 854, 000 .. 7,' 930, 000 6, 241, 000 5, 543, 000 4, 338, 000 1, 875, 811 2, 278, 710 1,550,704 4. 173, 307 4, 742, 788 1, 396, 868 3, 437, 940 5,373,119 4, 900, 419 5, 230, 088 7, 621, 099 7, 629, 722 7, 795, 148 7, 196, 339 6, 508, 861 Rubles. 104,431,894' 204, 483, 165 185, 768, 316 89, 059, 000 119, 265, 000 166, 404, 000 170, 194, 000 129, 932, 000 144, 671, 000 90, 715, 000 140, 041, 000 220, 409, 000 182, 485, 000 163, 514, 000 171,230,000 18,527,373 10, 271, 792 7, 792, 920 20, 534, 142 26, 329, 913 17, 644, 686 49, 348, 467 74, 577, 856 40, 141, 535 57, 208, 150 84, 029, 697 76,228,011 96, 251, 725 65, 193', 000 48, 055, 000 51, 329, 000 67, 864, 000 66, 238, 000 58, 317, 000 47, 550, 000 54, 363, Q00 67, 093, 000 53, 496, 000 49, 366, 000 56,935,000 2,755,955 3, 498, 756 3, 134, 370 9, 396, 080 7, 212, 465 5, 326, 315 7, 2dl, 222 13, 848, 657 8, 784, 743 9, 043^ 044 14, 577, 858 26, 989, 879 18,196,448 13,641,000 16, 668,000 25, 502, 000 33, 590, 000 28, 980, 000 24, 907, 000 25, 953, 000 34, 668, 0C0 47,221,000 35, 894, 000 33. 599. 000 30. 220, 000 5, 815, 013 7, 063, 998 6,202,816 16, 693, 228 18, 971, 152 4, 770, 583 14, 275, 949 24, 962, 077 23,531,484 24, 947, 157 39, 224, 928 38. 425, 738 39, 880, 452 36, 645, 000 41, 279, 000 Articles. Breadstuff** — Oon'd. Oats Coni. Groats. Tear. 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 ,1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1K8:-. Quantities. Values. Chetverts. 9, 393, 453 10, 029, 000 10,147,000 6, 285, 000 5, 775, 000 10, 169, 000 14, 648, 000 11, 569, 000 8, 186, 000 7, 517, 000 94, 822 172, 658 163, 929 1, 111, 925 577, 820 416, 101 663, 990 134, 826 . 120, 964 376, 800 502, 060 998, 313 1, 558, 392 1,417,059 1, 358, 825 1, 646. 764 1, 109. 000 1,714,000 903, 000 1, 970, 000 2, 976, 000 1,689,000 2; 059. 000 1, 436, 000- 2, 092, 000 28, 060 66, 191 78, 667 234, 744 112, 974 60, 537 173, 377 363, 350 176, 172 107, 736 319, 059 222, 247 195. 745 154, 183 129, 543 462, 653 383, 000 324, 000 296, 000 179, 000 419, 000 644, 000 441, 000 375, 000 665, 000 2,796 40, 700 51, 980 49, 522 292, 947 65, 155 441,131 245, 034 , 747, 790 345, 9301 481, 398 616, 939 581, 876 316. 802 257. 520 313, 100 248, 000 270, 000 100. 000 57, 000 liubles. 47, 075, 000 52, 110, 000 52, 773, 000 29, 633, 00O 26, 457* 000 40, 686,' 000 55, 025, 000 44, 771, 000 34, 080, 000 31,264,000 521, 122 949, 619 1. 106, 521 7„505,494 3, 900, 284 2, 202, 227 4, 179,414 961, 770 810, 433 1, 766, 108 2. 747, 582 4, 215, 508 7, 806, 067 10, 304, 000 6, 418, 000 14,366,000 8, 728, 000 14, 433, 000 6, 128. 000 12, 644, 000 19, 339, 000 11, 227, 000 15,126,060';, 10,451,000.', 14, 545, OOO 168, SCO .,' 397,146 786, 670 2, 347, 440 I,' 129, 740 498, 164 1,359,761 ' 3, 480,1473 1, 579. 969 934,066 2,497,000 1, 993, 682 1, 541, 515 1,450,000 1,218,000 3,965,000'' 3,781,' 00Q 3, 079. 000 2, 652, 000 1, 634, 000 3, 907, 000 6, 371, 000 4, 017, 000 3, 378, 000 6,038,000 ' / 28, 798 419, 211 623, 760' 594, 264 3, 515, 364 810, 905 ' 3, 689, 959 1,968,360 3, 334, 035 3, 302, 786 7, 880, 319 6, 237,,444 6, 528, 376 3, 736, 000 3, 752, 000 . 4, 109, P00 2. 900. 000 3, 440, 000 1,165; 000 767, 000 , 14 v CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REP Exported from SuSaia — Continued. Articles. Tear. Quantities. Values. Articles. Tear Quantities Breadstuff's— Cou'd. Chetverts. , Rubles. .Flax — Continued. Poods. ! 1887 ' 134,000 1, 684, 000 Tow 1891 1, 339, 000 1 1888 ! 222,000 2, 579, 000 1867 8,566 ' , 1889 132.000 1,701,000 1868 2i,S57 : 1890 | 155,000 1, 860„000 1869 19,911 ! 1891 105, 000 1, 488, 000 1870 106, 418 Flour 1867 495, 350 4, 953, 500 1871 115, 009 1868 296, 982 2, 969, 820 1872 339, 079 1869 293, 825 3, 232, 075, * 1873 215,828 1870 718, 430 7, 902, 730 1874 144,874 1871 ' 526, 762 5, 794, 382 1875 6,635 .1872 220, 305 2, 913, 309 '", 1876 38,867 1873 , 805, 746 3, 043, 890 ' ' ' 1877 47, 994 1874 1 405, 702 5< .059, 032 1878 11,803 1875 296, 307 4, '193, 513 1 1879 5,934 1876 334, 182 3, 653, 214 1880 *14,462 1877 1878 1879 636, 933 400, 277 347,482 7, 505, 382 5, 238, 216 . 4, 170, 639 , 1881 1882 1883 , r- ' 1880 255, 049 4,120,000 1884 1881 1882 196,490 280, 047 2, 915, 000 5, 082, 000 1885 • 1886 ,1883 ■238, 000 4, 174, 000 ' 1887 1884 274, 000 6, 337, 000, 1888 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 500, 000 364, 000 ' 366, 000 400, 000 '307, 000 8, 143, 000 5, 996, 000 5, 588, 000 5. 957, 000 5,642,000 Fur skins . .- 1889 1890 1891 1867 1808 . 28, 090 40, 981 1 v \ 1890 243, 000 '4, 234, 000 1869 42, 134 1891 254, 000 Poods. 4, 02,5, 000 / 1870 1871 -38, 316 929, 766 ; Flax 1867 4, 956, 967 19, 827, 868 29,030.108 1872 81, 226 38, 373 1868 7, 257, 527 1873 ] 1869 5, 974, 024 '32, 857, 136 1874 23, 311 1870 '■ 10, 381, 449 57, 097, 968 1875 30, 791 ; 1871 9,035,049 49, 582, 768 1876 44, 780 ; 1872 7, 23.8, 837 7; 914, 394 1877 51, 229 i * 1873 . 9, 041, 480 4t)i 753, 782 1878 37, 888 1874 9, 989, 270 48, 29o,<855 1879 62, 815 ; 1875 ,9, 451, 0.90 46,:28l,'606 1880 80, 215 * ; 1876 6,/821,718 32.851,493 1881 90, 683 1 3877 11/210,277 .63, 179,. 956 1882. 79,100 1878 9,739,'615 56, 519,^16 1883 82, 000 1879 11, 255, 952 69.6B9,i073 1884 242, 000 1880 9, 591, 868 55, 570„ 000 1885 123,000 1881 12, 976, 727 69. 783, 000 1886 307, 000 i 1882 12, 133, 001 65, 485, 000 1887 209,000 ; 1883 10, 942, 000 56, 735, 000 1888 238,j000 ; 1884 11, 111, 000 58, 716, 000- 1889 339,000 i 1885 9, 346, 000 47, 155, 000 1890 369,000 1886 7,080,000 38, 484, 000 1891 445, 000 f 1887 8, 550, 000 47, 595, 000 1867 2, 891, 894 ' 2, 699, 746 j 1888" 11, 268, 000 60, 749, 000 1868 i 1889 1 If 210, 000 57, 901, 000 1869 ' 3,129,154 1( 1890 12, 093, 000 56, 963, 000 1870 3, 285, 123 U 1891 11, 309, 000 48, 381, 000 1871 3, 651, 924 15 Tow 1867 543, 501 1, 331, 577 % 293, 628 1872' 1873 3, 790, 080 3, 776, 270 ]] 11 1868 936, 175 ' 1869 1, 067, 265 2, 668, 164 1874, ' 3, 808, 892 u 1870 1, 130, 959 2, 827, 397 1875' . 154, 855 i] 1871 40, 428 1, 828, 645 1876 2,673,563 c 1872 '775, 530 2, 808, 403 < i 1877 3, 392, 383 li 1873 610, 545 1, 762, 186 1878 3,034,250 is i 1874 691, 549 2, 040, 695 1879 3, 660, 199 is 1875 639, 641 2, 052, 997 1880 3, 826, 996 i^ , '. i 1876 1, 591, 882 . 4, 673, 070 1881 4, 740, 257- j! , 1877 1, 622, 112 4, i83,701 ; 1882 3, 756, 556 K 1878 1, 161, 779 4, 147, 292 ' '" Y ' 1883 3, 745, 000 1' 1879 1, 281, 713 4,442,715 ' . ■ > 1884 2, 851, 000 1c 1880 1,530,587 5, 254, 000 1885 3, 056, 000 li 1881 1, 856, 313 6,909,000 1886 2, 343, 000 11 1882 1,506,349 5, 453/000 1887 3,837,000. 1( 1883" 1, 487, 000 5. 402, 000 1888 3, 296, 000 1( 1884 1, 668, 000 6, 075, 000 1889 4, 044, 000 2( 1885 1, 911, 000 5, 821, 000 1890 3, 282, 000 1( 1886 1, 487, 000 , 4, 448, 000 1891 3, 395, 000 ■ 385, 833 311, 971- 216, 899 1( 1887 1888 1, 841, 000 1,845,000 ■ 5, 442/000 5, 7-73, 000 Tarn 1867 1868 1 ] 1889 1, 225, 000 4, 279, 000 1869 1890 1, 145, 000 3, 686, 000 1870 '2b0, 071 ^CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 15 Exported from -Russia— Continued , Articles. Year. Quantities. Values. Articles. Seeds, oleaginous— Continued^ Year. Quantities. Values. Hemp — Continued. Poods. Mubles. > 1871 168, 465 , 673, 860 Chetverts. Hublcs. 1872 165. 335 , 767, 800 Linseed 1875 2, 553, 271 28, 696, 454 1873 181. 054 064, 021 1876 2,126,493 23, 804. 738 1874 146, 223 1, 739, 871 " 1877 1, 709. 265 22, 722, 064 1875 ■ 222,411 1, 038, 595 1878 2, 684, 032 35, 919, 372 1876 271, 967 1, 522, 359 1879 2, 966, 402 41,076,592 1877 276, 378 1,359,274 i 1880 2, 485, 003 37,277.000 1878 317, 855 1,769,988 1881 2, 367, 033 32, 277, 000 1879 221. 818 873, 467 1882 ' 2,980,075 37, 347, 000 1880 191, 675 1,511,000 1883 2,251,000 29,821.000 1881 297, 71-t 1, 294, 000 1884 1,670,000 21,452,000 1882 215, 676 2, 444, 000 1885 740, 000 8, 608, 000 18-3 306, 000 2, 336, 000 1886 1, 134, 000 14. 545, 000 1884 141, 000 1, 244, 000 1887 2, 169, 000 26, 871, 000 x 1885 112, 000 476, 000 485, 000 1888 27, 477, 000 1886 117, 000 1K89 28. 662, 000 25, 792, 000 19, 584, 000 1, 093, 323 1887 144, 006 "741,000 1890 1888 101, 000 442, 000 776 000 1891 1889 167. 00Q 139, 000 Other 1867 T88, 504 199.405 1890 586, 000 1868 1, 156, 547 1891 131, 000 458, 000 1869 149, 597 ' 1, 495, 970 Leather, untainted. 1867 267, 058 1, 948, 331 1870 156, 571 1, 565, 710 1868 383. 382 3,001,604 1871 341, 951 3. 419, 510 1869. 404, 812 4, 213, 378 1872 383, 160 2, 820. 475 1870 209, 918 - 2. 266, 185 1873 231..902 3, 013, 900 1871 165, 255 1, 833, 106 1874 370, 464 3, 136, 758 .1872 267, 588 3. 200, 734 1875 434, 611 2, 865, 648 1873 349, 183 3, 782, 017 ' 1876 315, 959 2,063,902 1874 266, 488 3, 311, 620 1877 192, 859 1, 885, 165 1875 231,378 2, 944, 516 1878 916, 172 8, 814, 774 1876 218, 188" 2, 887, 753 1879 685, 757 7,765,818 '1877 ,297,091 3, 187, 054 1880 765, 051 7, 505, 000 1878 207, 938 2, 820, 771 , 1881 555, 560 5, 921, 000 "* 1879 248, 201 3, 557, 326 1882 610, 732 5, 719, 000 1880 382. 098 4, 369, 000 1883 459,000 4, 595, 000 1881 371, 783 3, 640. 000 1884 343, 000 3, 502, 000 1882 422, 447 4, 132i 000 1885 315. 000 2, 588, 000 1883 433. 000 4, 951, 000 1886 448, 000 3, 479, 000 1884 328, 000 4, 024, 000 1887 653, 000 6, 617,'000 1885 1886 327, 01)0 393 000 3, 817, 000 1888 6, 367, 000 4^ S37J 000 5,458, 000 4, 386, 000 4, 085. 000 1889 6, 026, 000 1887 1888 1889 534', 000 378, 000 316, 000 1890 1Q, 818, 000 "7, 815, 000 1891 Sugar: * Poods. 1890 443, 000 5, 239, 000 Raw and re- 1867 6 55 1891 762, 000 7, 597, 000 fined. " 1868 4, 192 38, 986 Metals, un wrought 1867 539, 054 l; 421, 633 , 1869 442 3, 094 1868 546, 646 1,414,567 1870 1,688 ' 11,816 1869 455,166 1,947,630 1871 • 7, 697 1 53, 879 1870 754. 515 I, 888, 480 1872 611 i , 4,292 1871 363, 735 1,214,917 1873 1,243 i 3,381 1872 1, 245, 328 4, 024, 588 1874 4 ! ,' 29 1873 1, 087. 098 2, 352, 479 1875' 20 136 1874 1875 481,822 409, 924 1, 878, 778 1, 628, 221 1876 496, 100 2, 015, 001 1877 3,609,417 14,949,203 1876 980, 733 958, 800 1878 243, 867 1, 013, 143 1877 235, 996 719, 326 1879 144,395 : 566,891 1878 328, 680 678, 318 1880 104,577 ' 386,000 1879 681, 256 ' 1. 021, 368 1881 1,372 ; 5,500 1880' 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 8, 306, 385 214, 938 481, 680 187, 710 195, 031 194, 000 204, 000 ■ -201, 000 71,000 103. 0011 133,000 8, 328, 000 817, 000 3, 160, 000 1,023,000 1, 218 000 2, 138, 000 1, 889. 000 2, 006, 000 1, 574, 000 . 2, 041, 000 2, 231, OI'O 1882 1883 417 2, 000 1884 t 1885 1886 1, 268, 000 j 5, 062, 000 1887 1888 :::::i:::::::::. 1889 1890 "! " *' ;" " ' " \ 1891 Kefined 1867 Seeds, oleaginous : 1891 85, 000 Chetverts. 1, 791, 252 2, 607, 587 2. 583, 513 2, 261, 865 2, 395, 251 2; 250. 107 1, 985, 000 1868 1869 1867 1868 1869 18, 360, 342 26, 727, 769 31, 002, 156 27, 142, 380 28, 743, 012 22, 293, 548 1870 1871 1872 1873 1870 1874 1875 1871 1872 ' 18, 850 1,467,906 1873 1874 2, 429, 971 2, 851, 042 27, 716, 888 31, 767, 662 1876 1877 3,362 282, 485 10 (JUKK.KJNUY, ET(J., UF IJNJJIA, KUSSIA, AND ABGENTUNii JKJ&ruj Exported from Russia — Continued. ' .5 Sugar — Continued. .■-Refined Tallow . "Wood, of all kinds \ Wool, raw . Tear. 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1890 1801 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876- 1877 .1878 -1879 1880 ,1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870, 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 ■ — r Quantities, Poods. 53, 726 15,518 34, 699 49,444 94, 525 SjOOO 34, Q00 2, 800, 000 3, 223,000 - 3,582,000 4, 229, 000 3, 511, 000 1,741,000 5, 744, 000 2, 956, 572 2, 439, 919 1,671,178 1, 329, 976 931, 976 655, 548 784, 922 544, 690 ' 411, 585 666, 407 1, 110, 729 619, 301 357, 198 426,539 284, 784 380, 301 / 231,000 ,204, 000 185, 000 274, 000 218, 000 ' 187, 000 228, 000 233, 000 201, 000 762,985 '858, 170 ' 924, 173 896, 282 974,129 1.199.800 678, 183 Values. JRubleg. | 323,388 I ' 94, 651 186,'00O 250, 300 584, 000 67, 000 229, 000 13, 903, 000 10, 027, 000 13,898,000 16, 398, 000 13, 745, 00U 6, 727, 000 23, 293, 000 11,826,288 9, 759, 676 8, 355, 890 6, 649, 880 4, 659, 880 ,2, 914, 839 3, 897, 213 2, 695, 992 ,1,974,769 3, 159, 112 6, 083, 075 3, 347, 344 1, 953, 066 2, 319, 000 1, 465, 000 2, 184, 000 1,409,000 1, 219, 000 873, 000 1, 103, 000 907, 000 928, 000 1, 069, 000 1, 061, 000 905,000 10, 660, 753 12, 521, 251 11, 638, 334 13, 145, 568 14, 026, 284 22, 404, 229 29, 904, 582 33, 596, 636 27, 226, 355 31, 035, 664 31, 336. 641 ' 30, 454, 093 25, 240, 795 32, 906, 000 29, 635, 000 35, 044, 000 37,941,000 35. 153, 000 23, 349, 000 23. 747, 000 27, 296, 000 38,204.000 54, 863, 000 53, 024, 000 43, 366, 000 9, 613, 615 11, 424, 978 7, 667, 055 7,867,015- 7, 625, 760 13, 995, 311 7, 453, 992 ArticleB. Wool, raw . Total merchandise (European* fron- tier. Total bullion and specie(European ■ frontier. 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882. 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 iaso 1891 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878: 1879 1880 1881 1S82 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 Quantities 1890 1891 Poods. ' 1,053,936 879, 598 1,179,688 1,339,682 1, 093, 939 953, 468 1, 441, 466 1, 015, 862 1, 208, 984 1, 860, 000 1,674,000 1,433,000 2,296,000 1,760,000 1, 192, 000 2, 168, 000 1,651,000 1, 816, 000 Vi i?l 11, 8, 11, 22,: 11,! 10,! 13,1 II,: 12,1 17,1 1511 12, ( 20, i 15, i 12, i 23, ( 14, 1 13, i Si ru 207, e 209, I 247, C 342, t |352, i 311,5 '345, i '411, 2 360,6 379,2 508,2 596,5 606,4 476,3 481,3 590,7 607,7 550,5 497,9 436,5 568,5 728,0 685,0 610,4 627.3 Gold: 12,1 3,4 14,1 , 22,8 16,3 5,7 13,1 16,0 26,1 101,8 18 2 10,8 7,1 24,2 66,4 76,6 19.6 3,4 6,8 14,1 18,6 34,4 17. ,4 17,8 1 CURRENCY, ETC., OP INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 17 - Imports (a) into British India. r [From the statistical abstract for tile several colonial and other possessions of the United Kingdom.] Principal articles. Apparel . "Books, paper, and stationery. Years end- ing Mar. 31— Goal and coke. 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 18936 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 18936 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 Quantities. Tons. 385, 331 349, 927 437, 023 286, 180 374, 167 324, 638 359, 903 356, 997 379, 144 519, 579 601, 159 475, 960 587, 928 683, 768 637, 124 628, 824 708, 358 741, 129 790, 930 765, 668 848, 878 833, 478 £ 439, 417 497, 891 451, 230 601, 578, 620. G15. 524, 557, 510, 531, 658, 641, 843. 931 1, 142. 1, 131. 1, 175. 1,213: 1, 259. 1, 259: 436. 447. 414. 423. 413. 428. 475, 472. 448. 463. 567, 511. 523, 725, 739, 625, 685. 676. 819 848. 854, 877. 937. 928. 853. 715. 544. 467, 514. 497. 740, 571 258 220 456 961 899 597 522 031 446 404 752 697 437 732 428 376 333 207 509 403 881 978 851 912 233 959 003 u27 968 619 355 991 728 739 860 936 431 863 401 441 612 145 510 638 711 500 704 984 863 477 096 794 942 026 Principal articles. Coal and coke . Cotton twist and yarn. Years' end- ing Quantities Mar. 31— ! ! Cotton manufac- tures. Drugs and medi- cines. a Exclusive of frontier trade. S. Ex. 91 2 665, 535 931, 710 1, 008, 155 889, 477 1, 138, 208 1, 239, 855 1, 020, 044 1, 019, 883 1, 163, 790 1, 267, 213 1,308,415 1, 316, 615 1, 663, 911 1,907,213 6 Subject to correction. 1890 1891 1892 18936 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 i 1887 I 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 18936 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 18936 1868 Tons. 601, 670 784, 664 736, 971 648, 185 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 e Including chemicals Values. £ 1, 308. 1, 543. 1, 250; 1, 141, 2, 698, 2, 779. 2, 715, 3, 357, 2,424, 2, 628, 2, 628, 3, 157, 2, 794, 2, 733, 2, 850, 2, 779, 2, 745, 3, 699, 3, 222, , 3, 378, 3, 465, 3, 360! 3, 172, 3, 318, 3, 581, 3, 746, 3, 482, 3, 514, 2. 683, 14, 999, 16, 072, 13, 555, 15, 687, 15, 058, 14, 605, 15, 155, 16, 263, 16, 450, 15, 991, 17, 322, 14, 126, 16, 915, 22, 910, 20, 772, 21, 431, 21, 642, 21, 197, 21, 110. 25, 846, 23, 924, 27, 764, 26, 391, 27, 241, 25, 174, 22, 942, C254, C222, o210, c239, 236, 315, 271. 297, 287, 307, 291, 277, 310, 327, 381, 391, 362, 358. 590 442 493 450 350 934 370 393 522 296 969 780 769 514 403 772 306 177 065 190 943 420 083 377 906 797 529 362 620 850 917 551 846 476 811 953 666 500 212 718 313 784 511 717 099 872 388 414 545 508 468 508 399 987 852 015 565 715 167 984 353 254 885 765 692 721 975 463 075 :,:-» 888 673 844 278 Imports (a) into British India — Continued. Principal articles. Drugs and medi- cines. Fruits and vegeta- bles. .Crlass' and manu- factures of. -Jewelry, precious stones, and plate'. ((?) Tears end- j ing ! Quantities. Mar. ' 31-1 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 18111 1892 18936 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886, 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893! 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1870 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1369 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 Tons. Values. 340. 384. 337. 430. 390. 479. 482j 473. 3C4, 227. 345, 371. 265 263 279 234. c70. 93 89. 102. 90, 136. 158. 211. 22:;. 132. 173. 201. 241, 271. 2)7 178. 134. 143. 230. 271 308. 276. 240. 297, 333 318 349, 280, 291, 318, 329, 380, 454 483, 560, 499; 505, 500. 578, 658, 647, 650, 728, 670. 244; 231 264! 176. 210, 221. 171. 190. 176. 197. 223, 166. 193. 421, Principal articles. Jewelry, precious s t oil es, and plate, (d) Malt liquors. Machinery millwork. and Metals :" Copper brass. and ■a Exclusive of frontier trade. -6 Subject to correction. Years end- ing Mar. 31— 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886' 1887 1888 1889 1890 1801 1892 1893ct 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 Quantities Tons. Gallons. 2, 268, 298 1,652,893 1, 747, 721 1, 365, 303 1, 323, 927 1,536,496 1, 435, 345 1; 481, 698 1, 143, 157 1, 176, 922 1, 328, 077 1, 089, 211 1, 065, 347 1, 152, 678 1,199,395 1, 170, 554 1, 261, 444 1, 066, 913 1, 299, 408 1, 715, 638 2, 138, 518 2, 398, 580 2, 797, 965 2, 785, 574 2, 973, 943 3, 052, 894 Cwt. d Including plate from 1873 to 1893. c Exclusive of dried fruits, etc., from 1893, see Provisions. 187 Currency, etc., of india, Russia, and argentine republic. 19 r Imports (a) into British India — Continued. Years Tears end- end- Principal articles. ing Mar. 31— Quantities.. Values. Principal articles. ing Mar. 31— Quantities. Values. Metals — Cont'd. Gwt. £ Metals— Cont'd. Tons. £ Copper and 1876 243, 476 279, 605 1, 256 !)2i 1871 114, 837 87, 126 78, 638 1877 1,443 1,551 1,322 549 1872 1878 330, 469 819 1873 1879 296, 887 396, 452 393, 242 762 1874 1880 1,674 00R 1875 1881 1,680 884 1876 4,108 88, 996 1882 347, 612 1, 52] 437 1877 5,432 112, 245 1883 462, 060 2,003 064 1878 4,373 81, 063 1884 548, 052 2,294 401 1879 3,574 65, 671 1885 566, 209 2,138 056 1880 4,798 84, 547 1886 662, 728 2,140 070 1881 4,152 74, 409 1887 626, 055 2,043 258 1882 8,740 132, 097 1888 541, 928 2,048 536 1883 10, 645 163, 415 1889 108, 637 618 568 1884 12, 671 181, 379 1890 580, 954 2,294 019 1885 14, 496 185, 555 1891 459, 285 1,892 527 1886 13, 939 174, 572 1892 522, 099 2,154 445 1887 17, 466 209, 862 18936 433, 250 1,840 133 1888 21, 046 258, 811 \ Tons. V 1889 27, 119 344, 589 1868 1869 1,461 1,425 300 655 1890 1891 23, 420 35, 273 328, 440 472, 188 1870 1,188 799 841 752 086 1892 38, 652 459, 525 1871 1872 1873 895 490 576 Tin. 18936 1868 1809 1870 31, 140 386, 130 146, 075 156, 377 1871 141, 742 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 101, 192 112, 559 121, 886 118, 252 105, 558 1,424 1,528 1,435 1,446 1,229 598 406 561 015 385 1872 116, 209 1873 1874 1875 1876 36, 159 169, 236 1881 133, 280 1,547 541 1877 37, 296 180, 794 1882 122, 626 1,414 384 1878 48, 671 222, 157 1883 157, 597 1,870 494 1879 34, 989 151, 740 1884 179, 183 2,140 491 , 1880 20, 840 98, 846 1885 180, 114 2,014 909 1881 30, 957 ' 177, 383 1886 174, 660 1.934 888 1882 26, 977 169, 715 1887 164, 019 1,782 990 1883 42, 718 277, 306 1888 216, 079 2,447 395 1884 235, 417 1889 200, 140 2,515 179 1885 41, 177 222, 454 \-.i ■ 1890 180, 420 2,414 317 1886 36, 826 221, 813 1891 193, 828 2,562 307 1887 38, 357 267, 878 1892 184, 024 2,321 284 1888 20, 940 169, 278 18936 179, 536 2,436 071 1390 39, 841 255, 545 284, 553 Spelter 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 204 192 137 122 123 121 49 47 82 259 805 045 205 791 917 523 464 651 720 1891 1892 18936 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 41, 984 38, 830 37, 603 Owt. 278, 302 264, 331 296, 034 59, 118 1877 1874 1878 1875 / 1879 360 701 235 669 066 015 459 008 195 5)4 477 435 614 877 1876 1 1880 1877 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 18936 135, 880 127, 383 132, 647 113, 248 149, 131 180, 201 134, 327 64, 706 83. 889 111, 944 118, 851 115, 782 Tons: 135 125 128 101 136 184 148 84 113 177 192 185 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 52, 757 66, 463 73, 499 56, 782 67, 381 73, 583 - 82, 564 104, 324 76, 555 95, 283 111, 990 113, 130 105, 433 97, 110 111, 593 106, 296 93, 105 96, 497 101, 104 105, 596 117, 163 85, 413 119, 773 150, 409 158, 863 153, 490 Steel 1868 83 371 1891 1892 103, 039 147, 906 - 1869 1870 111 166 937 377 18936 113. 076 correction. 155,707 a Exclu sive o: frontier tra de. o Subject to ZU UUKKjKJNCY, JBTU., (J*' INDIA, RUSSIA* AND AKGENTINJS antrum Imports (a) into British India — Continued. Principal articles. Provisions. Years end- Mar. Si- Railway materials Salt. 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893c 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893c 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 Quantities. Civt. Tons. 245, 286 266, 566 272, 818 227, 610 306, 839 276, 847 279, 246 277, 085 365, 252 298, 776 254, 231 274, 180 352, 238 373, 376 357, 224 338, 065 383, 090 412, 839 Values. 417, 442 423, 897 398, 810 o Exclusive of frontier trade. b Inclusive of dried fruits, etc., from 1876 to 1893. c Subject to correction. £ 351, 452 337, 610 331, 186 305, 320 349, 224 351, 474 372, 867 363, 627 6713, 838 661, 059 858, 797 975, 835 1, 048, 832 920, 182 1, 053, 083 1, 087, 186 1, 033, 931 1, 103, 321 1, 191, 882 1,179,474 1, 504, 436 1, 588, 103 1, 596, 565 1, 476, «70 1, 771, 793 1, 862, 054 2, 464, 966 1, 591, 813 1, 217, 334 1, 466, 068 516, 996 327, 466 439, 339 538, 962 599, 770 691. 908 907, 002 1, 046, 832 1,033,049 1, 117, 765 '1,079,509 1, 116, 434 1, 633, 283 1, 592, 620 2, 018, 065 1,435,124 2, 577, 603 2, 493, 239 1,821,337 2,001,853 1, 484, 173 1, 032, 939 677, 473 729, 270 750, 095 715, 892 913, 915 828, 703 835, 354 755, 771 600, 934 430, 890 401, 366 593, 612 762, 532 1 665, 517 569, 067 515, 184 623, 011 649, 233 596, 048 768, 987 795, 521 882, 130 Principal articles. Years end- ing- Mar, 31 — Salt. Silk, raw. Silk goods . Spices . 1890 1891 1892 1893c 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893c 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 18S0 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893c 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 .1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 Quantities, Tom. 410, 808 395, 243 373, 953 360,008 Pounds. 1, 627, 996 1, 959, 951 2, 016, 726 2, 328, 854 1, 799, 591 1, 930, 910 2, 282, 758 2, 469, 255 2, 457, 244 1. 461, 069 2, 102, 930 1, 813, 999 2, 005, 020 2, 511, 802 1, 760, 595 2, 386, 150 2, 210, 893 1, 831, 702 1, 732, 559 1, 737, 891 2, 598, 597 2, 045, 569 2, 360, 467- 2, 406, 239 2, 701, 069 2, 292, 846 45, 203, 984 36, 690, 768 35, 797, 216 29, 994, 944 31, 893, 232 36, 690, 240 26, 149, 088 25, 659, 648 28, 534, 053 29, 368, 456 33, 123, 137 36, 816, 063 33, 444. 205 37, 906, 762 34, 776, 134 33, 463, 96J 37, 405, 271 39, 749, 713 See Fruits and Vegetables. CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBMC. %\ Imports (a) into British India — Continued. rears end- Principal articles. ing Mar. 31— Quantities. Tallies. 1 Pounds. £ 1886 52, 727, 670 718, 679 1887 38, 587, 464 663, 845 1888 43, Oil, 198 931, 518 « 1889 51, 788, 845 855, 228 1890 52, 830, 819 852. 350 1891 51, 637, 169 813, 115 1892' 58, 543, 588 797, 196 18936 48, 510, 623 Ballons. 623.633 1868 601, 610 455, 174 1869 681, 182 549, 819 1870 713, 437 564, 378 1871 461 323 385, 900 1872 671, 626 560, 485 1873 723, 609 553, 884 1874 608, 824 488, 597 1875 674, 987 553, 833 1876 704, 874 603, 476 1877 654, 527 622, 184 1878 737,714 647, 661 1879 692, 384 540, 785 -1880 814, 334 659, 120 1881 848. 238 663, 184 1882 842, 739 610, 827 1883 849, 169 674, 969 1884 894, 420 682, 098 1885 857, 970 629, 632 1886 936, 984 667, 693 1887 1, 064, 386 770, 599 1888 .1,084,487 743, 305 1889 1, 119, 367 730, 027 1890 1, 100, 413 673, 742 1891 1, 055, 984 665, 144 1892 1, 010, 247 655, 606 18936 ] , 057, 221 Owt. 681, 635 1868 434, 306 536, 884 1869 525, 985 653, 611 1870 572, 134 715, 553 1871 440, 684 555, 801 1872 562, 559 709, 779 1873 342, 450 440, 146 1874 435, 570 558, 978 1875 395, 715 516, 564 1876 613; 151 895, 927 1877 258. 105 403, 556 1878 475, 105 798, 036 1879 923. 381 1, 480, 881 1880 652, 009 1, 068, 788 1881 986, 331 1,611,157 1882 775, 982 1, 243, 756 1883 672, 672 1,086,961 1884 736, 909 1, 148, 370 1885 1, 616, 874 2, 140, 838 1886 1, 171, 186 1, 458, 097 1887 1 1,749,555 2, 080, 540 1888 1, 808, 479 2, 113, 617 1889 1, 617, 710 1, 790, 939 1890 1, 723, 112 2, 200. 049 1891 2, 931, 901 3, 399, 886 1892 2, 213, 125 2, 561, 996 18936 1,959,818 Pounds. 2, 625, 683 Tea 1868 2, 526, 840 253, 364 1869 2, 029, 054 201, 987 1870 1, 668, 567 166, 522 1871 1, 140, 552 114, 055 1872 2, 025, 129 202, 513 1873 2, 465, 761 246, 576 1874 1, 828, 571 182, 859 1875 1,701,475 169, 982 1876 2, 771, 204 247, 566 1877 1, 755, 300 140, 110 1878 2, 323, 033 190, 611 1879 1, 822, 345 130, 518 1880 2, 534, 518 212, 062 a Ex elusiv< > of frontier trade. Principal articles. Shears end- ing Mar. 31— Quantities. Pounds. 3, 322, 407 2, 845, 212 2, 751, 085 3, 065, 170 3, 874, 412 4, 005, 637 4, 214, 342 3, 623, 872 4, 767, 004 5, 382, 851 4, 470, 008 6, 353, 017 6, 022, 883 Values. Tea 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 18936 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 18936 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 18936 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 £ 271, 309 Woolen goods Wines and liqueurs Total value of prin- cipal and other articles of mer- chandise. 199, 691 193, 052 237, 614 325, 548 304. 259 324. 260 260, 418 317, 937 363, 681 325, 141 443, 161 443, 336 601, 957 764, 173 596, 713 583, 220 514, 194 719, 530 668, 911 557, 585 869, 760 811, 652 782, 781 878, 042 \ 927, 876 1, 299, 130 1, 121, 232 984, 873 1, 217, 053 1, 234, 340 1, 391, 862 1, 528, 865 1, 715, 755 1,561,950 1, 455, 235 1, 818, 213 1, 762, 032 1, 523, 343 476, 406 574, 040 548,329 433, 337 495, 783 511, 864 476, 196 476, 610 520, 544 410, 744 436, 020 414, 174 392, 731 435, 316 410, 112 384, 570 401, 278 336, 070 328, 022 333, 121 344, 842 340. 113 326, 837 336, 754 339, 573 309, 400 35, 705, 783 > 35, 990, 142 32, 927, 520 34, 469, 119 32,091,850, 31, 874, 625 33, 819, 828 36, 222, 113 38, 891, 656 37, 440, 631 41, 464, 185 6 Subject to correction. 22 v CURRENCY, ETC., OP INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPU1 Imports (a) into British India — Continued. Principal articles. Year end- ing Mar. 31— Quantities. Values. Principal articles. Tear end- ing Mar. 31— Quantities. Va Tdtal value of prin- ' cipal and other articles of mer- chandise. 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 18936 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1881 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 18936 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 Pounds. & 37, 800, 594 41, 166, 003 53, 116, 770 49, 113, 374 52, 095, 711 55, 279, 348 55, 703, 072 55, 655, 865 61, 777, 351 65, 004, 612 69, 440, 467 61, 197, 489 71, 975, 370 69, 432, 383 66, 278, 622 11, 775, 374 15, 155, 954 13, 954, 807 5, 444, 823 11, 573, 813 4, 556, 585 5, 792, 534 8, 141, 047 5, 300, 722 11, 436, 120 17, 355, 459 7, 056, 749 11, 655, 395 8, 988, 214 11, 322, 781 13, 453, 157 12, 877, 964 13, 888, 198 16,477,801 11, 053, 319 13, 825, 856 13, 844, 960 17, 459, 501 21, 934, 486 14, 722, 662 17, 009, 810 4, 775, 924 5, 176, 976 5, 690, 400 2, 782, 574 3, 573, 778 2, 622, 371 Total bullion and specie— Cont'd. Gold... 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883' 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 Founds. 1,1i 2,0 1 1,8 1,4 1,5 1 4 2 3 6 4,8 ?, n 5 4 4 7 3,0 2,8 Total bullion and specie. 3 ?, 3 1 ' 5,0 6,5 4 1 6 9 9 9 8 9, 2,6 8 1 9 4,1 fi 3 4 9 9 15 7 5 5 9 6 6 3 6 4 8 3 7,4 9 1 1" 3 8,? Gold 10,5 10,7 12,3 15,4 10,6 a Exclusive of frontier trade. b Subject to corrections. Exports from British India. Principal articles. Year. Quantities. "Values. Principal articles. Year. Quantities. Va Cwt. £ Cwt. 1868 1869 296, 332 426, 685 761, 345 1, 121, 032 Coffee 1886 1887 376, 702 374, 951 1,3 1,5 1870 322, 152 870, 189 1888 275, 583 - 1,5 1871 301,935 809, 701 1889 367, 486 1,8 1872 507, 296 1, 380, 410 1890 241, 688 1,5 1873 375, 887 1, 146, 219 1891 235, 016 1,4 1874 367, 132 1, 499, 496 1892 316, 197 2,0 1875 312, 874 1, 307, 919 1893 299, 387 2,0 i 1876 373, 499 1, 633, 395 Coir, and manufac- 1868 90, 700 1877 304, 158 1, 353, 588 tures of. 1869 216, 439 1878 298, 587 1, 344, 638 1870 171, 627 1879 342, 268 1, 548, 481 1871 103, 264 1880 361, 037 1, 633, 032 1872 130, 441 1881 370, 713 1, 602, 594 1873 183, 715 i 1882 351, 981 1, 460, 729 1874 163, 235 1883 364, 008 1, 419, 131 1875 153, 132 1884 351, 910 1, 470, 301 1876 111, 476 1885 342, 682 1, 287, 977 1877 176,684 CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 23 Exports from British India — Continued. Principal articles. Year. Quantities I 3oir, and manu- factures of. Cotton, raw . m. t Cotton twist and yarn. Cotton tares. 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1.876 1877 1878 1879 1880 Cwt. 141,024 189, 782 132, 570 129, 913 230, 299 173, 209 176, 930 239, 379 207, 224 220, 969 186, 405 212, 072 278, 362 245, 373 318, 547 296, 598 5, 482, 643 6, 228, 846 4, 953, 879 5, 157, 150 7, 225, 411 4, 412, 629 4, 499, 698 5, 600, 086 5, 010, 785 4, 557, 914 3, 460, 568 2, 966, 569 3, 948, 476 4, 541, 548 5, 629, 544 6, 170, 173 5, 987, 278 5, 069, 713 4, 191, 604 5, 435, 862 5, 374, 856 5,331,581 6, 321, 378 5, 924, 987 4, 429, 679 4', 789, 201 "Values. £ 148, 595 187, 726 117, 110 104, 741 192, 248 152, 129 156, 526 215, 004 184, 531 199, 184 166, 537 185, 883 247, 601 210, 657 265, 407 260, 431 20, 092, 570 20, 149, 825 19, 079, 138 19, 460, 899 21, 272, 430 14, 022, 858 13, 212, 241 15, 257. 342 13, 280, 959 11, 746, 184 9, 387, 354 7, 914, 091 11,145,453 13, 241, 744 14, 941, 423 16, 055, 758 14, 401, 902 13, 295, 124 10, 782, 021 13, 475, 962 14, 413, 544 15, 045, 679 18, 713, 395 16, 533, 943 10, 763, 558 12, 743, 679 175, 775 128, 183 122, 619 159,247 121, 469 137, 936 181, 173 203, 817 324, 376 425, 726 744, 791 937, 678 1. 163, 946 1, 330, 051 1, 410, 737 1, 874, 464 2, 013, 019 2, 506, 617 2, 841, 555 3, 418, 008 4, 146, 731 5,318,614 5, 840, 114 6, 627, 165 5, 884, 698 6, 864, 305 1, 259, 683 1, 211, 638 1, 176, 138 1, 250, 766 1, 070, 214 1, 279, 626 1, 414, 197 1, 426, 539 1, 380, 577 1, 509, 472 1. 550, 288 1 . 644, 125 1. 573, 970 Principal articles. Cotton manufac- tures. Dyes (other than lac). Year. Quantities. Grain: Wheat - Hides and skins . . - 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1S71 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 ! 1882 1883 ; 1884 1885 1886 1887 , 1888 1889 1890 ! 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 187!) 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 Cwt. , 299, 385 275, 481 78, 208 248, 522 637, 090 394, 010 1, 755, 954 1, 073, 655 2, 510, 768 5, 586, 604 6, 373; 168 1, 056, 720 2, 201, 515 7, 444, 375 19, 901, 005 14, 193, 763 21, 001, 412 15, 850, 881 21, 068, 924 22, 263, 624 13, 538, 169 17, 611, 408 13, 802, 209 14, 320, 496 30, 306, 700 14, 973, 453 No. 9, 487, 464 11, 104, 039 13, 675, 997 16, 300, 150 20, 044, 607 22, 996, 617 19, 297, 051 18, 162, 851 19,444,133 19, 804. 121 Cwt. 905, 972 809, 322 958, 723 812, 590 Values. £ 1, 777, 975- 1, 914, 549 2, 093, 146 2, 326, 018- 2, 080, 017 2, 248, 973- 2, 436, 344 2, 798, 854- 2, 872, 631 2, 733, 369 2, 869, 769" 3, 081, 16T 3, 060, 054- 1, 922, 272; 3, 080, 861 3,342,685 3, 404, 661 3, 956, 869 3, 692. 329 3, 724, 582 2, 790, 550 3, 015, 462 3, 249, 478 3. 879, 630) 3. 360, 621 3, 225, 131 3, 793, 399 4, 720, 671 4, 171, 435 4, 913, 58S 4, 416, 124 4, 510, 366 4, 341, 887 4, 696, 713 4, 696, 019 4, 561 '457 3, 661, 747 3, 997, 552 4, 964, 676 101, 308 98, 760. 32, 924 103, 833 235, 645 167, 690 827, 606 491, 451 906, 331 1, 957, 640 2,873,765 520, 138 1, 124, 267 3, 277, 942 8, 869, 562 6, 088, 814 8, 895, 811 6, 316, 018 8, 005, 331 8, 625, 986 5, 562, 373 7, 523, 280 5, 792, 615 6, 042, 426 14, 382, 002 7, 440, 384 988, 282 1, 252, 898 1,691,330 2, 020, 819 2, 525, 925 2, 921, 910 2, 618, 358 2, 677, 767 2, 944, 933 3, 000, 552 3, 757, 480 3, 097, 561 3, 738, 455 3, 735, 646 24 CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBL] Exports from British India — Continued. Principal, articles . Year.j Quantities i Values. Civt. £. 1882 815, 490 3, 950, 052 1883 866, 450 4, 444, 946 1884 916, 318 4, 666, 788 > 1885 1, 010, 869 4, 936, 509 1S86 1,106,891 5, 336, 229 1887 991, 808 5, 149, 357 1888 883, 740 4, 860, 380 1889 848, 550 4, 746, 007 1890 785, 346 4, 524, 362 1891 826. 778 4, 698, 772 1892 873, 704 5, 186, 738 1893 873.142 5, 591, 935 Jewelry" and pre- 95, 652 1869 40, 139 plate. 37, 779 42, 653 3872 1873 53, 999 54, 161 1874 50, 822 1875 ■ 90, 825 ' 1876 80, 888 1877 48, 370 1878 108, 208 1879 68, 080 1880 68, 970 1881 54, 058 1882 63, 208 1883 65, 177 1884 1885 / 58, 929 58, 070 1886 63, 268 1887 50. 971 52, 994 69, 529 52, 886 1888 1889 1890 1801 56, 525 1892 1893 54, 726 59, 334 1868 : 2,057,442 1, 309, 537 1869 1 3,363,648 1, 891, 899 I 1870 | 3,361,852 1,984,495 * 1871 ! 3,754,083 2, 577, 553 1872 I 6,133.813 4, 117, 308 1873 , 7,080,912 4, 142, 548 1874 : 6, 127, 279 3, 436, 015 1875 ; 5,493,957 3, 246, 882 1876 : 5, 206, 570 2, 805, 340 1877 4, 533, 255 2, 636, 647 1878 ; 5, 450, 276 3, 518, 114 1879 . 6,021,382 3, 800, 426 1880 ! 6,680,670 4, 370, 032 1881 5, 809, 815 3, 934, 030 1882 7, 510, 314 5, 030; 302 1883 10, 348, 909 5, 846, 926 1884 7, 017, 985 4, 592, 635 1885 8, 368, 686 4, 661, 368 1886 7, 782, 435 4, 355, 362 4, 869, 815 1887 8, 306. 708 1888 9, 638, 117 6, 040, 379 1889 10,553,143 7,897,154 , 1890 10, 255i 904 8, 639, 861 1891 11, 985, 967 7, 602, 010 1892 8, 532, 430 6, 848, 494 1893 10, 537, 512 7, 944, 223 Jute, manufactures 1868 291, 555 (including gun- 1869 187, 542 205, 923 344, 752 1870 1871 1872 1873 188, 859 189, 541 201, 669 1874 1875 238, 640 1876 489, 181 719,478 ; 771,127 1 1877 1878 1879 1, 098, 434 | 1,195,362 , 1, 130, 672 1, 097, 589 i 1,487,831 | 1.334,231 1880 1881 1 1883 1884 Principal articles. Jute,manufactures (including gun- nies). Oils. Opium . 1SS5 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 ]891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 Quantities Gwt. 87, 13!) 74, 955 88, 683 85, 518 93, 364 82, 908 88, 727 94, 746 88, 350 130, 775 92, 822 91, 200 105, 507 , 92, 190 89, 338 91, 798 91, 963 86, 578 87, 956 CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 25 ,, Exports from British India — Continued. Principal articles. Opium. Bice (including paddy). Saltpeter . Tear. Seeds . 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1X79 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 j 1881 1882 1 1883 1884 i 1885 | 1886 1887 1 1888 i 1889 i 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 Quantities. Values. Chests. 95, 839 90, 096 87, 789 85, 166 85, 753 87, 558 75, 384 Owt. 12, 697, 983 15, 377, 073 10, 614, 644 16, 087, 813 17, 311, 285 23, 293, 956 20, 245. 385 17, 392. 938 20, 416, 032 19, 911, 334 18, 428, 625 21, 250, 232 22, 166, 308 27, 266, 051 28, 888, 436 31, 258, 288 27, 040, 330 22, 051, 826 28, 222, 598 26, 879, 272 28, 533, 057 23, 144, 641 27, 098, 906 34, 963, 341 33, 166, 929 27, 938, 325 329, 986 397, 019 490, 116 482, 940 432, 210 518, 982 451, 197 553. 330 415, 091 466, 218 389, 002 382, 405 509, 372 352, 995 354, 860 399, 565 491, 668 451, 917 402, 174 397, 572 386, 396 420, 503 422, 229 399, 690 389, 185 443, 931 4, 108, 542 3, 984, 541 4, 379, 784 6, 737, 674 5, 124, 765 2, 779, 243 4, 433, 270 6, 074, 756 10, 507, 404 9, 583, 169 12, 187, 618 7, 211, 790 7, 246, 182 10, 303, 776 10,482,512 13, 147, 982 17, 357, 884 18, 259, 931 17, 319, 898 15, 906, 515 16, OSi, 801 £ 11, 077, 669 10, 067, 764 10, 508, 082 10, 115, 936 9, 261, 815 9, 562, 261 9, 255, 014 3,647, 4, 210, 3, 020, 4, 203, 4, 499, 5, 761, 5, 549, 4, 765, 5, 311, 5, 815, 6, 950, 8, 978, 8, 402, 9, 057, 8, 308, 8, 476, 8, 363, 7, 192, 9,247, 8, 836, 9, 291, 7, 915, 10, 110, 12, 877, 13, 385, 12, 391, 256, 310, 394, 440, 397, 536, 464, 501, 348, 381, 379 , 361, 469, 351, 359, 388, 464, 425, 370. 376, 364, 401, 411, 380, 305, 438. 2, 160, 1, 994, 2.308, 3, 522, 2, 728, 1, 508, 2, 361, 3, 235, 5, 462, 5, 319, 7, 360, 4, 682, 4, 781, 6, 392, 6, 064, 7, 205, 10, 086, 10, 752, 9, 975, 9, 222, 9, 399, 008 925 270 Sol 101 030 798 334 095 221 380 951 756 159 175 327 280 325 126 827 080 408 482 739 971 894 301 758 870 554 251 314 974 468 956 700 002 766 797 728 437 766 410 000 200 091 016 801 276 059 618 940 572 888 942 305 788 339 451 950 Principal articles. Seeds . Silk, raw. Silk goods . Spices . Year. Quantities. 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1X83 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 I860 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 18,81 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 Owt. 15, 572, 172 15,798,271 14, 801, 857 19, 165, 688 16, 510, 989 2, 226, 201 2, 463, 937 2, 594, 701 2, 280, 159 1, 987, 867 2. 373, 939 2, 392, 230 1, 730, 769 1, 417, 313 1, 568, 490 1, 658, 005 1, 534, 715 1, 673, 203 1, 509, 606 1, 274, 511 1, 523, 345 1, 733, 187 1, 709, 285 1, 523, 224 1, 708, 529 1,734,386 2, 233, 746 2, 206. 023 1, 905. 909 1, 782, 438 1, 929, 374 Values. Pounds. 17, 334, 128 19, 351, 360 22, 079, 456 33, 602, 352 16. 421, 552 25, 868, 304 17. 059, 952 25, 266, 851 18, 247, 955 14, 306, 269 23, 382, 834 18,651,301 17, 671, 838 15, 144, 303 20, 947, 105 18, 514, 377 22,767,190 25. 422, 848 33, 321, 707 28, 703, 565 28. 933, 734 26, 198, 322 £ 9, 564, 217 10, 631, 247 9, 345, 991 12,210,541 11, 633, 374 1, 553, 229 1, 362, 381 1, 561, 512 1, 351, 346 1, 130, 709 1, 305, 487 1, 225, 599 796, 676 452, 370 835, 748 750, 439 623, 871 604, 287 618. 287 443, 427 596,838 671, 555 509, 322 365, 617 520, 363 522, 894 561, 495 673, 769 561, 093 556, 125 654, 799 97, 344 145, 784 142, 062 160, 425 164, 825 199, 804 239, 865 255,4871 260, 811 238, 394 168, 738 195, 897 248, 825 250, 256 250, 535 306, 928 315, 375 359, 465 366, 102 355, 698 425, 824 352, 939 318, 479 267, 858 250, 939 268, 942 ZD (JUKKJSJNUK, JSTU., OJb 1 INDIA, KUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE KVSTUt Exports from British India — Continued. Principal articles. Tear . Quantities Values. Principal articles. Year Quantities . Vo Pounds. £ Pounds. - 1891 26, 958, 198 523, 809 1868 16, 580. 575 ( 1892 25, 848, 498 439, 157 1869 20, 392, 634 ( 1893 27, 349, 568 Owt. 645, 089 1870 1871 13,327,836 19, 432, 838 ( 1868 C3, 187 450, 051 128, 703 1872 24, 250, 904 i 1869 410, 974 1873 20, 821, 652 I 1870 385, 638 327, 325 295/076 1874 20, 981, 198 c 1871 346, 300 1875 21,443,135 c 1872 419, 282 347, 635 1876 24, 138, 636 1,1 1873 671, 659 542, 395 1877 24, 588, 131 1,1 1874 337, 465 281, 743 1878 23, 612. 983- S 1875 559, 267 394, 384 1879 27, 791, 684 1,1 1876 507, 403 377, 387, 1880 28, 666, 852 1,1 1877 1, 144, 467 999, 503 1881 25, 748, 121 1,1 1878 908, 212 850, 567 1882 26, 757, 352 1,0 1879 368, 546 350, 425 1883 26, 380, 327 1,0 1880 373, 242 289, 099 1884 25, 235, 180 9 1881 644, 531 507, 065 1885 25, 530, 173 9 1882 988, 341 723, 640 1886 31, 328, 347 1,2 1883 1, 428, 360 989, 069 1887 33, 749, 121 1,3 1884 1, 777, 157 1, 179, 720 ,1888 35, 084, 143 1,4 1885 1, 251, 059 791, 362 1889 35,117,816 1,5 1886 1,331,103 730, 825 1890 38, 272, 528 1,7 1887 1, 144, 718 702, 020 1891 34, 133, 059 1,5 1888 1, 195, 804 648, 869 1892 35, 655, 479 1,6 1889 1, 183, 203 761, 044 1893 37, 116, 699 1 7 1890 1891 1892 1893 1, 615, 996 985, 309 1, 137, 186 1, 064, 900 1, 184, 791 615, 221 701,045 835, 995 vv oolen manufac- tures. 1868 1869 1870 1871 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 Pounds. 7, 811, 429 11, 480, 213 12, 754, 022 13, 232, 232 17,460,138 17, 920, 439 19, 442, 279 21, 392, 760 ' 24, 561, 826 27, 925, 400 33. 656, 715 34, 800, 027 38, 405, 632 46. 918, 539 49, 255, 342 58, 233, 345 60, 473, 113 65, 147, 897 69, 666, 116 80, 557, 329 88, 982, 346 99, 339, 868 729,714 983, 757 1, 080, 515 1, 139, 703 1, 482, 186 1, 690, 926 1, 754, 618 1, 963, 550 2, 183, 881 2, 620, 140 3,061,867 3, 170, 118 3, 072, 244 3, 099, 887 3, 662, 859 3, 738, 842 4, 134, 221 4, 137, 351 4, 397, 177 4, 883, 143 5, 302, 446 5, 473, 137 5, 445, 488 5, 504, 294 6, 283, 870 6, 620, 499 128, 178 286, 645 156,123 256, 494 326, 030 386, 019 415, 904 366, 399 471, 627 373, 878 458, 792 321, 868 340, 144 545, 831 566, 717 672, 477 582, 686 582, 712 614, 891 302, 507 474, 005 664, 093 874, 711 557, 884 614, 379 695, 259 Total valueof prin- cipal and other articles of mer- chandise. Total bullion and specie. 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 J.884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869' 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 Tea 3! 50>81 53, Of 1890 105,609,533 1891 1110,194,819 1892 123,518,069 1893 jll8, 131, 184 ' 52,41 55.3E 63.2C 55,25 54, 98 56, 3E 58,08 61,01 65,22 60,93 67,21 74,58 81,96 83,48 88,17 83,25 83,88 88,47 Timber, wood, and 1868 1869 1870 manufactures of 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 ! 90,54 | 97,04 1 103,46 1 100,22 108, 17 106, 57 1,57 1,39 1,04 2,22 1,47 CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 27 Exports from British India — Continued. Principal articles. Tear. Quantities. Values. Principal articles. Year Quantities. Values. 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 Pounds. & 1, 298, 079 1, 914, 071 1, 625, 309 2, 200, 236 4, 029, 898 2, 210, 996 .3,982,228 2, 035, 148 1, 440, 141 1, 099, 747 1, 042, 059 Total bullion and specie— Cont'd. Gold 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 188:! 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 Pounds, specie. & 106, 236 328, 606 656, 493 243, 572 305, 154 455, 724 864, 660 1, 705, 137 1, 010, 307 1, 405, 489 1, 377, 956 944, 070 1, 720. 312 1,467,660 1, 219, 070 1, 647, 902 1, 970, 630 1, 108, 238 1,720,516 1, 604, 624 1, 784, 347 1, 906, 322 1, 213, 179 3, 286, 686 6, 958, 924 166, 457 17,624 1, 908, 986 2, 793, 536 1, 100, 198 1, 623, 005 1, 735, 259 1,423,582 1, 087, 339 877, 795 1, 003, 355 1, 864, 391 779, 632 1, 064, 023 1,351,052 1, 479, 193 1, 450, 598 1, 258, 518 1,581,549 Gold / 98, 283 500, 453 8,434 79, 009 266, 169 215,701 291, 250 1, 236, 362 1, 110, 798 2, 359, 223 299, 889 16, 859 12, 408 164, 264 6,952 , T 1881 1882 1883 1884 Imports into Argentine Republic. Articles. Year. Quantities. Values. Articles. Year. Quantities. Values. Kilos. Dollars. Dozens. Dollars. 2, 149, 304 2, 601, 680 2, 446, 023 3, 181, 810 2, 933, 344 687, 242 750, 691 1889 1890 1891 977, 002 912, 870 1892 1880 Liters. 1881 2, 575, 100 806, 936 Spirits, distilled, 1876 7, 750, 150 1, 067, 549 1882 3. 450, 216 1, 069, 713 and liquors, in 1877 9, 346, 015 1, 203, 320 1883 3, 366, 502 1, 067, 098 casks. 1878 8, 533, 198 1, 185, 887 1884 4, 263, 579 1, 372, 833 1879 8, 084, 741 1, 073, 404 1885 6, 462, 014 1,373,548 1880 9, 048, 477 1, 072, 766 1886 4, 351, 529 1, 507, 914 1881 9,068,116 1, 116, 880 1887 5, 646, 026 1, 976, 109 1882 6, 158, 672 785, 730 1888 4, 898, 097 1, 567, 379 1883 7, 546, 170 1, 091, 618 1889 6, 631, 788 2, 121, 981 1884 9, 689, 344 1, 071, 784 1890 5, 111, 828 1, 686, 955 1885 3, 597, 542 575, 241 1891 2, 742, 676 905, 088 1886 661, 429 210,227 1892 5, 967, 556 1,969,293 1887 345, 483 115, 850 Dozens. 1888 1, 036, 514 188, 420 Olive oil, in bottles. • 1876 18, 763 54, 120 1889 242, 001 39, 658 1877 13, 777 31, 697 1890 426, 161 68, 239 1878 14, 447 37, 041 1891 59, 980 11, 121 1879 15, 674 43, 174 1892 65,087 10, 184 1880 13, 983 37, 147 Dozens. Dollars." 1881 8,244 20, 854 Spirits, distilled, 1876 255, 134 751, 426 1882 28, 325 74, 703 and liquors, in 1877 232, 537 703, 277 1883 6,243 18, 561 bottles. 1878 227; 289 720, 140 1884 4,397 12, 856 1879 208, 518 694, 638 1885 4,264 12,970 1880 132, 735 532, 052 1886 7,203 21, 621 1881 117, 341 511, 625 1887 1888 1882 1883 155, 362 211, 620 567, 928 t 959, 505 * National money. SO UUKKJJiJNUI, JUTD., UF 1JND1A, KUSSIA, AND AKUJSJN TUN J!i Kii-f Imports imto Argentine Republic — Continued. Articles. Year. Quantities. Values. Articles. Year. Quantities. Dozens. Dollars. Animals— Cont'd. Dozens. Spirits, distilled, and liquors, in 1884 303, 054 1, 282, 041 Cattle 1878 39 1885 197, 478 945, 623 1879 53 bottles. 1886 129, 678 707, 996 1880 807 1887 30, 306 138, 720 1881 4,784 1888 19, 736 86, 710 1882 17,571 1889 30, 183 127, 192 1883 51, 040 1890 11, 688 58, 639 1884 3,544 1891 3,374 16, 204 1885 2,007 1892 3,806 Kilos. 19, 576 / 1886 1887 1,463 942 Wire for hoops 1876 5, 426, 398 451, 330 1888 4,527 1877 5, 162, 618 499, 462 1889 628 1878 5, 499, 158 404, 670 1890 362 1879 9, 688, 574 620, 046 1891 103 1880 13, 447, 570 796, 116 1892 1881 21, 847, 157 1, 332, 950 Kilos. 1882 14, 434, 179 1, 180, 323 Rice 1876 6, 386, 956 1883 19, 727, 103 1, 328, 484 1877 7, 774, 130 1884 22, 323, 080 1, 584, 512 1878 - 7,832,497 1885 22, 359, 663 1, 514, 374 1879 8, 067, 153 1886 19, 855, 561 1, 294, 282 1880 9, 238, 931 1887 35, 145, 425 1, 863, 420 1881 10, 218, 984 1888 28, 323, 076 1, 515, 368 1882 7, 922, 302 1889 39, 414, 060 1, 983, 194 1883 10, 600, 191 1890 10, 205, 369 571, 132 1884 12, 268, 014 1891 21, 846, 753 1, 158, 577 1885 12, 556, 741 1892 41, 118, 837 2, 226, 648 1886 11, 378, 432 Animals : Asses ...\.. Number. 1887 16, 099, 471 1876' 1888 13,593,796 15, 924, 311 17, 579, 478 11, 836, 362 1877 1889 1878 1890 1879 20 2,170 1891 1880 5 1,308 1892 15, 220, 221 1881 1 21 Sugar, br.own 1876, 6, 619, 136 1882 9 1,343 1877 9, 779, 566 1883 32 2,000 1878 " 7, 598, 050 1884 28 3,656 1879 6, 408, 841 1885 15 440 1880 7, 439, 307 1880 5 640 1881 6, 805, 756 1887 20 650 1882 5, 733, 004 1888 9 1,010 1883 3, 066, 310 1889 1884 4, 347, 900 936, 983 1890 11 340 1885 1891 8 630 1886 - 2, 189 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 8 3 2 14 7 500 3, 100 ' 372 1,245" 3,410 1 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1880 1881 4 65 1,860 14, 231 Sugar, refined 1892 1876 12, 612, 662 ; 1882 1,764 32, 230 1877 11, 413, 227 ; 1883 1,679 81, 486 1878 13, 019, 409 ; 1884 885 69, 151 1879 14, 898, 591 I 1885 >487 21, 708 1880 11, 547, 818 ; 1886 '857 24, 910 1881 17, 568, 704 ; 1887 1,506 102, 744 1882 14, 745, 172 I 1888 99Q 86, 985 1883 20, 068, 524 r 1889 547 73, 138 1884 28, 595, 445 i 1890 535 224, 572 1885 17, 983, 161 1891 121 83, 394 1886 18, 242, 831 ; 1892 187 32, 065 1887 22, 912, 687 L Sheep 1876 13 40, 300 413 1888 1889 18, 637, 650 33, 030, 577 1877 8 1 1878 179 12; 932 1890 26, 427, 779 1 1879 430 12, 080 1891 11, 198, 912 : 1880 133 9,061 1892 18, 324, 045 i 1881 2,028. 30, 406 Sugar, candy 1876 2, 079, 707 1882 9,298 75, 050 1877 X 078, 465 1883 34, 257 54, 968 1878 1, 578, 433 1884 24, 698 145, 721 1879 1, 621, 065 1885 15, 455 62. 411 1880 1, 641, 022 1886 18, 716 61, 863 1881 1, 921, 004 1887 46, 316 129, 020 1882 1, 929, 770 1888 3,351 51,245 1883 883, 996 1889 19, 479 43, 107 1884 1, 966, 772 1890 1,030 81,410 1885 117, 401 1891 1,909 46, 920 1886 10, 161 , 1892 82, 982 312, 015 1887 18, 066 Cattle 1876 ' 4 1,757 1888 764, 903 1877 1889 1, 436, 329 URRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA; RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 29 Imports into Argentine Republic — Continued. Articles. \ Year, ugar, candy landle, stearine . . . Quantities. 3ocoa and choco- late. Lime . Coal. 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 Values. Kilos. 3,113,249 1, 636, 721 1, 447, 581 406, 619 460, 131 526, 959 650, 110 488, 820 474, 133 486. 367 748, 004 1, 108, 520 353, 999 436, 738 708, 401 589, 508 407, 510. 678, 339 72, 927 144,944 45, 882 64,396 72, 385 115, 139 113, 562 130, 412 103, 315 146, 031 152, 770 212, 740 259, 148 281, 074 319,707 442, 099 312, 482 122, 586 173, 341 1, 245, 097 1, 288, 525 1, 401, 202 1, 456, 381 1. 804, 784 1, 886, 553 1, 784, 048 1, 746, 612 2, 275, 350 2, 439, 476 2, 931, 488 3, 026, 214 3, 175, 349 2, 746, 524 3,151,550 1, 864, 605 2, 654, 679 3, 019, 955 4, 156, 409 1, 137, 892 902, 188 504, 878 42, 374 3,928 319,151 941, 302 378. 853 Hectoliters. 9,796 10, 852 9,217 7,330 8,703 2,316 Articles. 54, 010, 144 64, 114, 258 58, 945, 372 65, 745, 775 62, 823, 268 89, 293, 462 105, 873, 208 111,_438, 079 138, 494, 544 Dollars. 404, 750 212, 773 188, 205 146, 009 152, 569 162, 040 / 203,420 123, 376 101, 650 183, 271 210, 184 323, 328 100, 264 65, 511 212, 520 176, 852 122, 203 203, 411 21, 878 43, 486 28, 126 34, 258 34, 698 50, 356 47, 982 53, 498 65, 058 75, 217 96, 130 121, 758 152, 793 162, 492 210, 293 113, 491 178, 371 35, 361 83, 074 324, 861 388, 023 436, 009 461, 177 515, 209 556, 302 448, 954 503, 568 691, 227 750, 964 878, 124 875, 688 918, 920 803, 183 846, 781 530, 946 747, 618 18, 860 25, 211 13, 299 4,837 2,019 169 137 4,617 6,378 2,567 7,422 7,922 6,728 <5,350 6,357 2,085 639, 302 822, 428 698, 541 690, 474 648, 177 892, 935 1,058,732 1, U4, 381 1, 384, 945 Coal . Coke.. Tin, in blocks, etc. Phosphoric matches Flour and starch . . Iron and steel, un- manufactured. 1 rear. Quantities. Values. Hectoliters. Dollars. 1885 268,073,260 2,770,471 1886 215,122,300 2, 151, 223 1887 407,986,617 4, 079, 866 1888 333,798,549 3, 337, 985 1889 658,054,486 6, 515, 141 1890 514,582,061 5, 145, 820 1891 350,680,989 3, 506, 809 1892 520,771,418 5, 207, 713 Kilos. 1876 110, 082 2,212 1877 67, 128 1,388 1878 1, 412, 843 10, 644 1879 9, 484, 178 121, 387 1880 15, 983, 872 197, 794 1881 10, 606, 083 133, 208 1882 932, 533 27, 552 1883 1, 687, 543 28, 688 1884 721, 046 12, 258 1885 440, 261 7,485 1886 705, 412 11, 992 1887 1, 104, 318 18, 773 1888 2, 007, 481 34, 127 1889 2, 610, 340 44, 031 1890 1, 816, 380 30, 872 1891 2, 982, 452 50, 694 1892 1, 366, 358 23, 227 1876 13, 530 8,719 1877 12, 502 6,179 1878 14, 672 6,102 1879 22, 925 10, 628 1880 36, 735 15, 485 1881 39, 630 18, 454 1882 13, 158 32, 794 1883 43, 893 18, 248 1884 64, 878 24, 545 1K85 158, 075 40, 253 1886 145, 288 58, 614 1887 43, 613 17, 445 > 1888 62, 105 26, 084 1889 74,124 31, 133 1890 133, 387 56, 025 1891 36, 885 15, 492 1892 51,232 Gross. 21, 517 1876 362, 303 449, 257 1877 320, 213 397, 065 1878 292. 766 363, 031 1879 403, 500 500, 341 1880 300, 965 373, 197 1881 279, 620 346, 731 1882 275, 570 321,401 1883 375, 390 315, 425 1884 249, 249 Kilos. 187, 090 1885 115.076 82, 075 1886 76, 821 28,224 1887 149, 430 56, 605 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 5, 024, 621 429,923 1877 2, 581, 924 235, 485 1878 1, 437, 728 151, 532 1879 2, 619, 951 268, 486, 1880 5, 611, 273 456, 168 1881 4, 674, 529 335, 691 1882 3, 067, 950 324, 829 1883 3, 290, 271 319, 736 1884 5, 094, 276 397, 160 1885 852, 858 143, 732 1886 1, 377, 437 235, 240 1887 1, 002, 538 170, 481 1888 934, 902 165, 441 1889 i 972,415 163,312 1890 1,112,485 208, 419 1891 364, 075 71, 859 1892 611, 663 120, 299 1876 6, 409, 600 398, 043 1877 8, 888, 182 563, 841 &»*. '■,!... 30 CURRENCY, ETC V OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REF Imports into Argentine Republic — Continued. Articles. Tear Quantities Values. Articles. Tear Quantities Kilos. Dollars. Kilos. Iron and steel, un- 1878 8, 448, 646 530, 783 Cigarettes of all kinds. 1887 7,246 manufactured. 1879 7, 832, 263 406, 778 1888 12, 629 1880 9, 080, 648 524, 658 1889 8,921 1881 12, 470, 818 754, 574 1890 3,144 1882 16, 329, 918 942, 800 1891 1,258 1883 22, 721, 857 1, 408, 362 1892 202 1884 34, 761, 185 2, 153, 725 Cigars of all kinds 1876 71, 395 1885 33, 483, 837 3, 384, 984 1877 44,226 1886 45, 942, 652 2, 689, 005 1878 59, 091 1887 36, 471, 357 1,544,«22 1879 45, 163 1888 67, 332, 546 2, 947, 049 1880 47, 223 1889 89, 220, 712 3, 165, 836 1881 1, 253, 628 1890 24, 326, 100 970, 342 1882 103, 954 1891 12, 363, 077 518, 976 1883 108, 674 1892 28, 034, 017 1, 163, 227 1884 156, 632 'Tin plate, unmanu- 1876 313, 135 50, 980 i 1885 192, 063 factured. 1877 269, 544 37, 794 1886 153, 995 1878 456, 922 69, 823 1887 257, 200 1879 474, 321 52, 063 1888 301, 458 1880 436, 677 42, 653 1889 342, 654 1881 883, 286 92, 961 1890 478, 833 1882 727, 005 75, 630 1891 32, 200 1883 964, 315 95, 142 1892 25, 501 1884 975, 483 96, 294 Copper and bronze, 1885 1, 919, 449 199, 797 ■ unmanufactured. 1876 8,353 1886 1, 804, 126 180,413 1877 7,262 1887 1, 729, 842 155, 688 1878 27, 192 1888 1, 390, 821 111, 265 1879 20, 408 1889 1, 922, 137 151, 628 1880 16, 828 1890 1, 959, 176 157, 389 1881 22, 146 1891 1, 398, 298 114, 584 1882 24, 729 1892 1, 337, 163 Liter i. 124, 378 1883 1884 149, 404 '60, 040 Beer, in casks 1876 35, 317 5,127 1885 59, 214 1877 47, 655 7,183 1886 141, 801 1878 21, 670 2,961 1887 71, 949 1879 6,612 972 1888 131, 995 1880 33, 863 5,488 1889 116, 732 1881 24, 657 3,188 1890 65, 544 1882' 18, 865 2,937 1891 39, 363 1883 60, 712 15, 409 1892 61, 333 1884 91,249 15, 394 1876 49, 749 1885 95, 299 39, 538 1877 48,687 1886 100, 343 16, 557 1878 37, 432 1887 52, 812 8,978 1879 22, 245 1888 524, 792 90, 213 1880 26, 123 1889 647, 456 110,607 1881 41, 504 1890 92, 736 15, 760 1882 48, 518 1891 3,290 559 1883 132, 205 1892 25 4 1884 62,419 Beer, in bottles 1876 Dozens. 125, 244 253, 199 1885 1886 59, 695 63, 515 1877 62, 209 126, 638 1887 75, 226 1878 87, 692 187, 555 1888 44,286 1879 64, 307 132, 559 1889 79, 186 1880 90, 309 219, 786 1890 57, 633 • 1881 140, 100 327, 930 1891 44,624 1882 157, 611 391, 640 1892 60, 742 1883 241, 660 569, 457 Mineral oil .' 1876 3, 364, 225 1884 349, 547 810, 323 1877 4, 814, 557 1885 204, 896 461, 978 1878 4, 639, 025 1886 218, 531> 508, 083 1879 4, 279, 779 5, 595,651 1887 280, 997 654, 723 1880 1888 249, 701 581, 793 1881 9, 027, 953 1889 462, 245 1, 077, 032 1882 6, 951, 532 1890 320, 626 747, 059 1883 5, 078, 844 1891 17, 968 41,864 1884 7, 635, 048 1892 3,829 8,919 1885 5, 161, 799 Cigarettes of all kinds. 1876 M. 15, 519 27, 703 1886 1887 12, 856, 830 17, 869, 719 1877 7,484 14, 071 1888 14, 124, 976 1878 11, 316 18, 377 1889 18, 165, 516 1879 8,762 17, 090 1890 16, 677, 577 1880 6,211 •12,574 1891 10, 354, 212 1881 3,763 11, 137 1892 16, 100, 303 1882 3,007 8, 054 1876 42, 256 1883 2,133 8,230 1877 46, 836 1884 1878 1879 64, 230 23, 456 Kilos. 1885 4,377 5,607 1880 15, 810 1886 6,236 8,489 1 1881 32,450 URRENCY, ETC.,' OP INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 31 Imports into Argentine Bepublie+Contim\ed. -' Articles. fear. Quantities. Values. Articles. Year. Quantities. Values. Kilos. Dollars. Kilos. Dollars. [op's 1882 27, 928 14, 626 Tobacco, unmanu- 1876 1 1, 694, 029 ■ 657, 941 1883 23, 361 11, 029 factured. 1877 ; 3, 412, 599 1, 012, 955 1884 14,070 14, 304 1878 I 2,281,586' 803, 020 1885 31, 398 21, 893 1879 ! 2,535,072 719,829 1886 54, 609 38, 226 1880 1 2,439,661 715, 519 1887 34, 988 17, 493 1881 2,507,250 678, 502 1888 63, 766 31, 883 1882 1 3, 729, 999 826, 710 1889 56, 773 28, 390 1883 ! 4, 650, 901 1,015,298 1890 • 77, 019 38, 554 1884 1 3,276,402 845, 140 1891 43, 868 21, 874 1885 3, 858, 330 964, 281 ]892 42, 615 Gross 1 . 21, 306 1886 ! 6,061,258 1887 ! 4,962,258 1, 253, 948 1, 145, 003 1876 3,218 19, 165 I 1» 1888 ! 3,598,141 1, 045, 288 1877 2.382 17, 049 1889 i 4,482,351 1, 090, 896 1878 5,920 27, 074 1890 | 7, 037, 091 1, 678, 341 1879 3,773 33, 660 1891 1 3,221,662 390, 304 1880 4,562 39, 985 1892 | 5,463,793 589, 103 1881 5,683 3,843 46, 281 38, 409 1376 | 195, 199 196, 272 305, 883 1882 1877 312,870 1883 4,949 51. 950 1878 195, 915 195, 616 1884 6,116 62, 872 1879 ' 307,564 312, 044 1885 3,737 33,414 1880 280, 800 283, 701 1886 1,226 18, 389 1881 , 288,948 281, 954 1887 2,726 40, 890 1882 , 256,259 228, 403 1888 2, 232. 33, 480 1883 370,029, 365, 692 1889 2,507 37, 605 1884 495,759 495, 759 1890 2,245 33, 675 1885 309, 394 309, 394 1891 83 1,245 1886 \ 487, 275 487, 275 1892 10 Kilos. 150 1887 : 624, 789 1888 i 668,618 624,789 668, 618 Lead, unmanu- 1876 44,485 6,832 1889 ! 459,296 459, 296 factured. 1877 45,539 4,525 1890 508,388 508, 388 1878 63, 516 10, 077 1891 1 264, 026 264, 026 1879' 42, 466 6,008 1892 814, 791 814, 791 1880 251, 201 27, 119 M. 1881 320, 895 33. 534 1876 2,217 83, 549 1882 263, 445 27, 800 1877 3,569 129, 498 1883 526, 704 48, 494 1878 2, 744, 96, 206 1884 579, 391 53, 667 1879 1, 904 73, 406 1885 743, 122 72, 041 1880 | 2,596 96, 880 1886 675, 297 65, 507 1881 3, 030 125, 096 1887 951(301 76, 204 1882 3,050 129, 865 1888 869, 282 67, 334 1883 2,975 109, 976 1889 1, 829, 855 160, 708- 1884 4,866 174,945, 1890 4, 789, 096 338, 612 1885 3,974 183, 594 1891 61, 624 5,789 1386 6,595 329, 813 1892 1, 347, 039 96, 368 1887 5,303 265, 150 Cheese 1876 1877 398, 334 381, 223 174, 698 162,*995 1888 1889 2,109 1,398 105, 450 69, 9C0 1878 595,052 303, 851 1890 2,090 104, 500 1879 335, 564 145, 828 1891 791 39, 550 1880 568, 111 254, 459 1892 464 23, 200 1881 644, 163 249, 439 Kilos. 1882 764, 074 367, 977 Cotton textures 1876 1, 485, 664 1, 133, 416 1883 751, 148 418, 427 1877 3, 211, 604 2. 255, 703 1884 1, 043, 170 601, 236 1878 2, 992, 192 2, 220, 867 1885 1, 009, 104 595, 322 ' 1879 4, 760, 170 4, 022, 224 1886 1, 052, 615 628, 740 1880 5, 501, 299 4, 510, 674 1887 1888 1889 1, 697, 961 1, 578, 917 1, 654, 077 1, 073, 629 998, 214 954, 682 1881 1882 1883 6, 893, 587 6, 967, 488 7,735,420 5, 536, 534 5, 826, 550 6, 702, 179 1890 1891 1892 1, 188, 655 154, 452 317. 684 593, 967 76, 212 158, 845 1884 1885 1886 7, 731, 650 7, 455, 708 5, 277, 485 6,571,448 6, 438, 339 3, 688, 715 1876 44, 017, 057 379, 038 1887 7, 181, 859 5, 078, 595 1877 1878 47, 317, 757 39, 669, 363 444, 413 , 331,662 1888 1889 6, 890, 609 6, 379, Ml 5, 052, 507 4, 975, 607 1879 1880 1881 33, 389, 099 32, 762, 744 24, 669, 108 332, 815 211,049 275, 756 1890 1891 1892 6, 866, 004 5, 637, 935 13, 648, 299 5, 675, 105 4, 644, 806 11, 383, 959 1882 188:! 1884 29, 550, 283 22, 437, 336 50, 075, 707 185, 525 149, 296 307, 733 Cotton textures — 1876 1877 1878 Meter. 43, 469, 033 19, 232, 278 28, 379, 241 4, 239, 012 1, 955, 345 2, 842, 115 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 474, 994 470, 845 348, 981 391, 779 603, 829 731, 735 512, 640 622,273 294, 678 291, 922 216, 368 242, 903 374, 401 453, 675 317, 820 385, 807 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1 1886 32, 805, 500 11,210,100 7, 663, 012 9, 757, 068 10, 880, 958 11, 511, 691 3, 262, 802 1, 654, 196 3, 519, 980 1, 365, 434 1, 166, 515 1, 163, 892 644,896 1, 362, 736 317, 304 211, 961 32 CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REP Imports into Argentine Republic— Continued. Articles. Year . Quantities . Values. Articles. Year . Quantities Meters. Dollars. Sq. meters. Cotton textures . . 1887 Glass window 1879 164, 343 71, 139 1888 1880 1 1889 1881 170, 579 209, 545 1890 1882 1891 1883 225, 192 272, 904 521, 058 1892 1884 Kilos. 1885 "Wool textures 1876 1886 444, 305 526, 905 588, 417 414, 122 1877 1887 1878 1888 1879 36, 397 145, 259 1889 1880 45, 023 162, 040 1890 402, 182 1881 76, 800 244, 556 1891 182, 920 1882 74, 114 232, 171 1892 378, 407 1883 90, 077 215, 276 Kilos. 1884 80, 001 258, 847 Yerba paraguaya 1876 1, 607, 368 1885 933, 547 2, 085, 436 (Paraguay tea). 1877 2, 815, 190 1886 267, 712 740, 083 1878 2, 828, 135 1887 439, 276 1,079,284 1879 3, 061, 030 1888 346, 503 967, 835 1880 4, 951, 555 1889 349, 406 965, 752 1881 5, 173, 277 1890 294, 194 844, 859 1882 6, 179, 524 1891 223, 475 572, 325 1883 6, 293, 108 1892 455, 086 Meters. 1, 222, 123 1884 1885 6, 314, 887 4, 355, 849 Wool textures 1876 1, 206, 333 259, 883 1886 6, 761, 825 1877 2, 306, 032 436, 924 1887 6, 519, 731 1878 2, 037, 908 436, 009 1888 8, 088, 491 1879 1,174,414 282, 990 1889 6, 936, 096 1880 836, 977 216, 657 1890 7, 627, 668 1881 1, 570, 484 1, 375, 209 1891 ■7, 563, 336 1882 2, 585, 451 1, 598, 941 Yerba Paranagua' . . 1892,. 1876 8, 929, 946 1883 2, 473, 862 1, 812, 005 6, 650, 054 1884 2, 868, 378 2, 124, 247 1877 8, 826, 174 1885 834, 037 745, 303 1878 6, 411, 846 1886 34, 400 13, 182 1879 10, 170, 666 ' 1887 1880 9, 019, 510 8, 354, 413 6, 754, 079 9, 115, 997 - 10, 326, 951 1888 1881 1889 1882 1883 1890 1891 1884 1892 1885 1886 9, 830, 877 11, 059, 796 ] Kilos. ] 1876 1,827 35, 835 1887 13, 565, 427 J ' 1877 6,025 83,764 1888 9, 751, 602 1878 8,424 131, 873 1889 13, 837, 059 ] 1879 6,815 118, 502 1890 15, 847, 891 ] 1880 9,862 114, 886 1891 10, 262, 255 ] 1881 10, 557 204, 334 1892 14, 279, 622 J 1882 9,026 172, 768 Liters. 1883 9,802 220, 326 "Wine, in casks 1876 48, 214, 126 J " 1884 16, 905 299, 476 1877 65, 018, 772 6 1885 22, 892 332, 198 1878 54,413, 922 i 1886 36, 752 482, 894 1879 54,683,1782 4 1887 55, 131 796, 568 1880 51, 863, 718 4 1888 46, 419 777, 209 1881 68, 770, 817 s 1889 70, 231 1, 163, 415 1882 51, 104, 193 4 1890 27, 383 477, 203 1883 62, 863, 267 e 1891 13, 128 231, 260 1884 80, 699, 077 'i 1892 29, 319 457, 753 1885 57, 155, 300 £ Cement, hydraulic. 1876 2, 904, 044 59, 721 1886 128, 474, 264 2 1877 1; 985, 164 42, 581 1887 07, 345, 701 1C 1878 3, 064, 020 74, 367 1888 181, 966, 294 s 1879 4, 430, 110 90, 813 1889 05, 650, 072 c 1880 3,585,234 63, 671 1890 86,505,380 s 1881 4, 148, 952 95, 769 1891 32, 352, 637 a 1882 8, 626, 739 197, 529 1892 51, 869, 584 E 1883 13, 247, 718 300, 015 Dozens. 1884 12, 979, 366 293, 220 Wine in bottles 1876 91, 110 1885 20, 544, 222 472, 632 1877 81, 808 1886 30, 151, 305 603, 026 1878 ' 103. 229 1887 28, 977, 759 579,555. 1879 95, 347 1888 33, 718, 836 674, 375 1880 90, 392 1889 44, 078, 716 899, 568 1881 111, 183 1890 24, 651, 478 394, 423 1882 106, 128 1891 18, 794, 160 300, 710 1883 79, 682 1892 23, 637, 679 Sq. meters. 378, 199 1884 1885 58, 001 77, 030 Glass, window 1876 155, 979 73, 183 1886 14,224 1877 131, 934 64, 494 1887 106, 116 1878 204,191 97, 161 1888 94, 273 CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 33 Imports into Argentine Republic— Continued. Values. Dollars. .142,2411,812 67, 207, 780 91, 481, 163 (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 3, 837, 738 2, 122, 922 1, 598, 284 4, 545. 709 6,148,427 19, 408, 809 9, 088, 939 44, 613, 897 15, 576. 906 6, 946, 812 8, 885, 388 6,345,816 (a) (a) (a) la) (a) 458, 498 659, 854 ,S36, 684 364.511 157. 824 1, 226. 853 659, 657 196, 253 172, 853 204,439 370, 220 174, 532 Artioles. Year. 1889 1890 1891 1892 ,1876 1877 1878 1879 1S80 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 Quantities. Values. Articles. Year. 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 Quantities. Dozens. 109, 918 95, 614 7, 503 12, 642 Kilos. 253, 345 345, 641 213, 748 362, 291 285, 774 562, 908 429, 933 654, 804 983, 430 1. 054. 618 1, 705. 573 1, 695, 256 1, 424, 872 2, 782, 903 1,011,589 963, 996 1, 394, 251 Dollars. 779, 214 725, 037 40, 976 60, 508 37, 095 49, 910 32, 574 33,044 25, 682 51, 877 48,735 71, 339 107, 909 109, 339 170.456 156, 491 113, 544 235, 747 96, 142 85,915 117, 966 Dollars.* 36, 070, 023 40, 443, 424 43,759,125 46, 363, 593 45, 535, 880 55, 705, 927 61, 246, 045 80, 435, 828 94, 056, 144 92, 221, 969 95. 408, 745 117, 352, 125 128, 412, 110 164, 569, 884 Total imports — Con . Merchandise. .. Gold Kilos. Total imports : * National money. a Not stated. Exports from Argentine Republic. [Fjrora "Estadistica del Commercio " and "de la Republica Argentina."] Articles. Year. Quantities. Values. Articles. Year. Quantities. Kilos. Dollars.* Kilos. 1876 24, 748 1888 1, 325, 725 •1877 891, 666 101,780 1889 2,382,186 1878 815,592 94. 872 1890 2, 833, 704 1879 422, 625 51,641 1891 6, 525, 123 1880 300, 381 38, 178 1892 22. 058, 241 1881 199, 278 26, 141 1882 542, 602 67, 179 Animals : Number. 1876 12, 127 1884 551,957 82, 576 1877 17, 717 1885 197, 486 29, 622 1878 8,486 1886 113,446 13, 714 1879 5, 762 ', 1887 131, 069 18, 350 18-0 11,401 1888 130, 498 20,266 1881 12, 198 I 1889 97, 276 21, 887 1882 9,046 1890 97, 065 9,707 1883 1-1, 675 1891 71, 754 7,534 1884 8,916 1892 49, 697 5,989 1885 11, 316 1876 1877 249, 748 2, 355, 324 5, 092 65, 929 1886 1887 8,581 6,200 1878 2. 661, 686 60, 006 1888 9,632 1879 2, 191, 121 45, 832 1889 8,821 1880 1881 1890 1891 6, 793 6, 793 1, 347, 289 38, 687 1882 1, 678, 008 29, 264 1892 10, 185 1883 1881 2, 909. 846 3, 226, 762 43, 647 58, 948 Cattle 1876 1877 109,726 169, 445 1885 5, 738, 090 87. 48" 1878 1886 2, 661, 423 4n. ,;,5 ij 1879 422, 573 1887 4, 194, 777 02, 921 1 1880 Values. Dollars. 33,132 69, 082 28, 337 120,715 290, 849 74, 848 143,159 40, (.27 29, 747 58,012 73, 900 55,761 23, 500 17. ,"32 22. 032 17, 162 12.400 19 852 88 1-0 07. . 67, 930 101 870 2, 837. 426 3,214.570 2, 024, 737 1, 730, 826 1,730,751 * National money. 34 CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA, AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. Exports from Argentine Iiepufilic — Continued. Articles. Year. Quantities. Values. Articles. Year. Quantities Values. Animals — Cont'd. Number. Dollars. Number. Dollars. 1881 1882 84, 638 53, 995 1, 693, 180 1, 120, 824 Hides of horses, dry. 1876 1877 52, 160 45, 037 67,545 43, 130 1883 92. 523 1, 795, 186 1878 33, 687 31, 475 1884 78, 455 1, 810, 833 1879 66, 919 ! 68, 589 1885 96, 175 2, 345, 313 1P80 149, 948 154, 947 1886 128,405 2, 203, 150 1881 125, 152 129, 324 1887 70, 707 l,415,62i 1882 35, 134 52, 066 1888 94, 726 1,798,251 1883 38, 211 57,450 1889 139, 637 3, 194, 113 1884 72, 325 134, 762 1890 150, 003 3, 579, 456 1885 43, 770 65, 651 1891 171, 105 3, 997, 270 1886 43, 089 86, 178 1892 125, 458 2, 624, 675 1 1887 115, 618 231,236 Sheep 1876 17, 320 25, 767 1888 49, 850 84,744 77, 487 1877 65, 462 64, 125 1889 40, 358 1878 14, 028 24, 004 1890 54. 716 82. 074 1879 38, 768 59, 373 1891 97, 517 117, 020 1880 20, 993 25, 654 1892 113, 948 142, 278 1881 18, 686 33,413 Hides of horses, 1876 143,708 343, 985 1882 19, 027 36, 681 salted. 1877 217, 260 450, 932 1883 38, 257 53, 503 1878 168, 092 347, 399 1884 50, 003 70, 472 1879 150, 510 233, 298 1885 42, 235 58, 552 1880 176, 937 321, 147 1886 26, 751 41, 557 1881 155, 416 289, 254 1887 29, 413 42, 884 1882 178, 715 377, 699 1888 22. 616 34, 685 1883 221, 156 540, 912 1889 19, 527 66, 520 1884 209, 126 413, 963 1890 50, 002 159, 428 1885 329, 595 682, 260 1891 114,691 387. 545 1886 235, 706 587,271 1892 40, 100 170, 422 1887 209, 252 523, 128 M ules 1876 14, 796 456, 227 484, 029 1888 208, 655 156, 616 815,840 759, 588 1877 16, 228 1889 1878 16, 621 305, 486 1890 173, 161 519,483 1879 14, 270 278, 862 1891 259, 689 814,726 1880 17, 500 348, 071 1802 127. 442 380, 274 1881 14, 574 274, 716 Hides, goat 1876 573, 317 306,704 1882 89, 609 226, 118 1877 617, 864 322, 682 1883 10,111 261,776 1878 609, 808 312, 686 1884 6,400 100, 930 1879 747, 947 511. 164 1885 6,685 106, 960 1880 1, 557, 794 768, 802 1886 8, 893 142, 782 1881 609, 892 368, 462 1887 6,445 103, 178 1882 697, 006 473, 882 1888 6.893 100, 816 1883 830, 960 940,470 1889 12,104 242, 080 1884 931, 070 1, 017, 046 1890 11,755 244, 350 1885 1, 744, 772 1, 081, 762 1891 14, 703 410, 794 1886 504, 540 306,577 1892 16. 514 333, 040 1887 766, 900 460, 140 Hides of cattle, 1876 1, 689, 046 4, 945, 055 1888 770, 366 585, 478 dry. 1877 1, 725, 844 4, 290, 988 1889 1,045,280 821,590" 1878 1,611,715 4, 052, 820 1890 1.462,111 1, 023, 478 1879 1, 668, 328 5, 040, 653 1891 963. 231 577,939 1880 2, 203, 260 7, 964, 970 1892 907, 540 493,647 1881 1, 718, 720 6, 462, 795 Kilos. 1882 1, 454, 942 5, 805, 392 Hides, otter 1876 43, 734 12, 202 1883 I, 392, 948 5, 255, 927 1877 78, 337 58, 811 1884 1, 700, 905 5, 854, 306 ' 1878 70, 398 55, 194 1885 1, 931, 092 7, 511, 919 1879 329, 580 271, 910 1886 1,813,183 6, 267, 592 ! 1880 532, 098 438, 928 1887 2, 508, 500 8, 408, 742 1881 213, 172 132, 086 1888 2, 609, 428 10, 046, 281 1882 144, 191 111.515 1889 2,424,596 8, 448, 069 1 1883 491, 217 392,770 1890 3, 053, 649 5, 759, 745 i 1884 407, 549 244,405 1891 2, 678, 905 4,444,043 1885 322, 901 193,737 1892 2, 845, 189 6, 056, 865 i 1886 550, 946 275,273 Hides of cattle, 1876 635, 820 3, 263, 269 [ 1887 943, 047 471,523 salted. 1877 762, 688 3, 174, 455 1888 448, 911 300,770 1878 627, 087 2, 591, 939 1 1889 102, 431 133, 160 1879 668, 201 3,380,786 i 1890 429, 044 214, 522 1880 588, 039 3, 296, 830 1891 852, 749 895,386 1881 473, 650 2, 676, 391 1892 412, 722 379, 144 1882 490, 485 2, 696, 645 ! -Horns of cattle 1876 3, 056, 000 62, 829 1883 517, 270 2,800,443 | 1877 3,862,000' 79,384 1884 642, 804 2, 923, 602 1878 2, 998, 454 61,916 1885 811, 679 4, 488, 204 , 1879 2, 706, 780 133, 419 1886 724, 794 3, 649, 287 ' 1880 2, 966, 416 194,840 1887 699, 837 3,639,095 i 1881 2, 903, 041 154,242 1888 797, 192 4, 584, 728 1882 1, 410, 983 214,761 1889 966, 177 5,250,945 1 1883 921, 473 139,273 1890 1, 294, 109 5,171,473 | 1884 851, 911 118,795 ' 1891 1, 262, 502 4, 160, 348 1885 142, 120 159, 896 1892 1, 068, 611 3,901,454 : 1886 1, 167, 685 149, 431 CURRENCY, ETC., OF INDIA, RUSSIA,'AND ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 35 Exports from Argentine Republic — Continued. Articles. Tear. Quantities. Values. Articles. Year. Quantities. Values. Kilos. Dollars. Kilos. Dollars. Horns of cattle — 1887 1, 426, 934 182, 026 Copper, in bars 1883 307, 671 103, 870 1888 1, 683, 768 229, 666 1884 173, 230 69, 372 1889 1, 756, 710 278, 614 1885 170, 014 67, 996 1890 2, 289, 806 137, 388 1886 190, 955 76, 781 1891 2, 428, 008 116, 554 1887 143, 287 57, 315 1892 1, 851, 203 101,081 1888 115, 770 46, 308 Beef 1876 1877 29, 666, 210 38, 732, 623 2, 091, 220 2, 802, 741 1889 1890 56, 390 102, 392 22, 556 40, 957 1878 33, 600, 293 2, 444, 774 1891 90, 791 36, 316 1879 32, 336, 252 2, 908, 501 1892 55. 175 22, 070 1880 26, 116, 479 22,412,631 3, 078, 342 Wool pelts 1876 27, 597, 973 4, 634, 758 1881 2, 631, 606 1877 27, 849, 009 4, 064, 754 1882 26, 966, 613 3, 881, 459 1878 27, 848, 592 4, 031, 149 1883 21, 543, 200 2, 814, 411 1879 25, 088, 878 4, 097, 864 1884 18, 869, 993 2, 456, 997 1880 29, 077. 187 5,455,327 1885 32, 055, 835 4, 204, 077 1881 22, 339, 591 4, 639, 437 1886 37, 388, 200 3, 738, 820 1882 22, 353, 021 4, 231, 718 1887 23, 984, 243 2, 398, 424 1883 26, 564, 619 5, 035, 886 1888 26, 449. 055 3, 456, 787 1884 24, 938, 623 5, 484, 952 1889 41, 767, 860 6, 139, 875 1885 31, 336, 894 6, 267, 377 1890 43, 481, 156 3, 913, 304 1886 35, 3U 899 6, 350, 671 1891 39, 635, 035 3,587,153 1887 30, 447, 716 6, 698, 408 1892 44, 699, 424 4, 100, 488 1888 28, 054, 616 5, 610, 923 Barley 1876 1877 16, 052 463 1889 1890 36, 378, 835 27, 148, 432 11, 386, 593 6, 787, 108 1878 30, 698 1,684 1891 24, 169, 950 7, 250, 985 1879 240, 537 10, 378 1892 32, 060, 586 9, 618, 175 1880 1881 556, 133 255, 610 37, 364 19, 099 Flour 1876 1877 353, 441 218, 124 33, 069 20, 419 1882 1, 100, 063 33, 408 1878 2, 919, 793 300, 282 1883 177, 909 3,558 1879 1, 603, 045 160, 304 1884 362, 358 7,251 1880 1, 428, 046 104, 811 1885 2, 109, 368 42, 189 1881 1, 287, 396 109, 360 1886 876, 283 17, 523 1882 548, 779 40, 494 1887 825, 816 16, 516 1883 4.844,385 343, 099 1888 234, 746 6, 596 1884 3, 734, 389 261, 406 1889 231, 286 7,818 1885 7, 447, 077 521, 295 1890 1, 308, 627 13, 871 1886 5, 262, 222 362, 807 1891 137, 422 3,435 1S87 5, 401, 096 378, 076 1892 996, 897 15,416 1888 6, 392, 442 639,244 Bone ash and bones 1876 33, 234, 837 365, 453 1889 3, 360, 886 510,853 1877 52, 304, 685 559, 952 1890 12, 017, 875 600, 894 1878 39, 231, 010 404, 253 1891 7, 015, 388 491, 077 1879 36, 430, 207 523, 381 1892 18, 049, 136 1, 024, 041 1880 27, 692, 477 34, 763, 049 444, 992 1876 89, 259, 122 20, 332, 387 1881 589, 246 1877 97, 310, 463 18, 707, 218 1882 28, 212, 508 796, 634 1878 81, 708, 196 15, 215, 358 1883 25, 798, 365 508, 474 1879 91,951,094 22, 330, 388 1884 28, 255, 486 621, 619 1880 97,145,801 27, 467, 671 1885 35, 423, 768 782, 464 1881 103, 876, 955 31,446,495 1886 31, 369, 145 583, 055 1882 111, 009, 796 29, 978, 960 1887 25, 546, 972 396, 635 1883 118, 403, 668 29, 600, 918 1888 40, 042, 079 919, 855 1884 114, 344, 648 32, 005, 819 i 1889 27, 680, 373 653, 857 1885 128, 393, 264 35, 950, 111 1890 38, 787, 647 620, 602 1886 132, 130, 496 31, 711, 604 1891 57, 086, 986 677, 658 1887 109, 164, 383 32,749,315 1892 44, 761, 204 561, 749 1888 131, 743, 339 44, 858, 606 Hair 1876 1877 2, 074, 762 1, 943, 565 925, 711 707, 640 1889 1890 141, 774, 435 118, 405, 604 56, 709, 774 35,521,681 1878 1, 910, 885 691, 085 1891 138, 605, 838 38, 809, 635 1879 1880 2, 372, 962 2, 253, 411 791, 971 765, 474 Flax 1892 1876 154, 635, 035 44, 326, 060 1881 1, 870, 105 778, 5i5 1877 1882 4, 053, 717 911, 942 1878 104, 279 7,107 1883 1, 535, 247 691, 057 1879 246, 034 20, 338 . * 1884 1, 732, 875 867, 487 1880 957, 999 98, 668 1885 1886 1887 2, 009, 298 1, 714, 174 1, 977, 281 1, 004, 649 775, 977 988,643 1881 1882 1883 fi, 394, 618 23, 351, 794 23, 061, 736 624, 534 1, 705, 047 1, 153, 087 1888 2,019,212 1, 257, 970 1884 33, 991, 650 1, 699, 583 1889 1, 794, 622 1, 157, 525 1885 69, 426, 104 3,<471, 305 1890 2, 324, 215 929, 686 1886 37, 689, 967 1, 825, 199 1891 2,341,177 725, 765 1887 81, 208, 176 4, 060, 409 Copper, in bars 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 2, 138, 732 790, 227 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 40, 222, 888 28, 195, 816 30, 720, 636 12, 213, 303 42, 987, 142 2, 131, 813 1, 607, 162 13, 578 407, 847 409, 740 4,207 89, 134 140, 979 1, 228, 825 610, 665 2, 546, 220 1880 1881 1882 176, 685 492, 825 463, 626 57, 319 152, 777 129, 951 1876 1877 1878 8, 058, 369 9, 817, 605 17, 064, 044 298, 329 1 329, 366 . 185, 349 Exports from, Argentine Republic— Continued. Articles. Year. Quantities Values. Articles. Year Quantities V; 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1810 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1800 1891 1892 1876 1877 1'878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 Kilos. 29, 521, 317 15, 032, 015 25, 052, 189 107, 327, 155 18, 634, 351 133,710,088 197, 859, 612 231, 660, 300 361,844,305 162,037,510 432, 590, 679 707, 281, 955 65, 909, 903 445, 935, 009 3, 996, 593 6, 722, 345 8, 417, 139 5, 337, 554 9,221,319 2. 352, 563 10, 771, 847 11, 460, 500 11, 846, 071 11, 765, 011 12, 408, 450 12, 375, 411 9, 250, 988 20, 434, 032 19, 121, 723 30, 003, 920 39, 209, 121 51, 075 58, 819 66,444 54, 762 72, 229 45, 238 55, 338 42, 375 30, 764 34,710 25, 953 28, 006 42, 247 31, 505 31, 900 52. 028 57, 705 37, 463, 333 27,4:11.217 21, 097, 022 15, 454, 011 11, 868. 989 10, 687, 170 18, 434, 134 15,814,636 14, 335. 715 23. 260, 234 12, 701, 661 7, 169, 649 14. 802. 873 18.319,282 17, 361. 989 20. 725, 111 19, 879, 429 20, 868 199, 611 Dollars. 458, 286 297, 884 559, 094 2,212,511 372, 804 2, 274, 201 3, 957, 191 4, 653, 421 7, 236, 886 5, 444, 164 12, 977, 721 14, 145, 639 1, 449, 996 8, 561, 231 105, 496 219, 570 130, 648 105, 625 190, 852 38, 526 137, 106 137, 531 142, 153 165,587 149,414 148, 5116 238, 308 572, 173 198. 866 270, 036 374, 428 106, 925 108, 854 109.511 101, 733 161, 098 186, 165 143, 037 127, 125 53, 838 60, 741 36, 335 39, 208 76, 286 74, 983 32, 538 62. 434 66, 359 5, 829, 365 4, 168, 892 3, 283. 724 2, 090, 717 1,810,810 1,475,806 2, 789, 341 2, 372, 040 2, 15U, 228 3, 489, 169 1,715,158 788 777 2, 140, 393 3, 297, 471 1,996,629 I 2, 383, 388 2, 263, 729 997 7,335, Wheat . 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 18K1 1882 1883 1884 1885 1880 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 Kilos. 2, 547, 438 25,669,317 1, 165, 628 157, 078 1, 705, 292 60, 754, 677 108,499,228 78, 493, 392 37, 864, 413 237, 865, 925 178, 928, 549 22, 806, 373 327, 894, 151 395, 555, 180 470, 109, 617 B; Pasto aeco (dry food). Total exports ; Merchandise.. - Gold . 1,1 2,: i.f 9,i 8,i 1, £ 9,f 15, i 14, e 44,7 37, E 49,3 58 3 57,9 60,3 60 ' 83,8 69,8 81,4 100,1 90,1 Ostrich feathers- - . 99,7 113, 8 ( 1 ( (' ( ( ! 2,5 1,2 2,8' 2,4 6,6 7,8: 9,4 8,4: 27,8 5,01 Tallow 1,81 (* 5! 1,0- 2, Oi 2,01 1,71 5: 4( 2' 6] Wheat 2' li * *Nots c lated. 53b Congress, v ; SENATE. M'Sessidn. j < \ No. 95. IE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. Phbeuaky 20, 1894.— Referred to the Committee on Education and Labor and ordered !■' . to be printed. Mr. KYle presented the following : . A SOLUTION OF THE LABOR PROBLEM. ' , [Copyrighted a'nd all rights reserved by "William Howard, 928 T street SW., Washington!, D- C] The chronic straggle for better wages ■ is not a strife between labor and capital, for labor itself is capital, but a contest to decide whether '' the employer or the employed shall own and control human labor. Or, stated differently, a, contest to decide whether rates' of wages shall be regulated by the business necessities, of the employer or by the life necessities of the employed. , ' . To the employer human labor is a marketable coniniodity subject in its price to the law of supply and demand. But human labor is practi- cally the humau being, they can not be separated; to ; merchandise the one is to merchandise, the other. We sacrificed a million of lives and , thousands of millions of 'treasure to destroy Southern traffic in human $ beings for the sake of their labor, yet, so far as the welfare of the indus- trian is concerned, it is immaterial whether chattel law enables a man ' to sell his fellow-man or whether business. laws and usages obbge men to sell themselves to the highest bidder, the result (slavery) is the same however much the latter form of sale may be disgaised, under a fictitious freedom of action. , To the industrian his labor is an exclusive possession, his natural sapital, over which no one save himself has any proprietary rights, and Tor the use of which on behalf of others he expects a return not in accordance with mercantile formulae but in, accordance with Wha£ he needs to meet the imperative obligations imposed upon him by nature, society, and the state. 1 The community wherein the industrian is born, or to which he goes for employment, has, long prior to his birth, decided through hoary justom, social usages, and legal codes that he shall wear clothing, live recently, educate his children, support his family, provide against old ige, pay for his food, his drink, raiment, light, fuel, rent, taxes, and 1 )ther communistic claims. Failing these in part or in whole he exposes iiinself to distressing consequences, ranging from social obloquy and Jontempt to, the public degradation of arrest and imprisonment; also lis physical'and mentalneeds call for suitable recreation and pleasure. Eo properly meet these unavoidable duties and demands the remunera- ;ion for his labor must be based on his own life necessities and not upon he business necessities of his employer. What was formerly a common idea respecting the relaltive importance )f the sun and earth is now a common idea respecting the relative mportance of the industrials life necessities and the employer's busi- 2 A , ABSOLUTION OP THE LABOR PROBLEM. ness necessities. : "V?Ve now admit, that our coinpari;tively ihsigniflcanJH globe is nbt the center. of the uni verse, holding sway over all _oth^|| heavenly bodies; but we have yet, to admit that the comparatively in sigm nificant business necessities of the employer hold the same relation to- enormous masses of industrial life necessities that our earth does to the, •' solar system. To continue the comparison astronomers of old, by par- tially correcting their unsuspected error with the use of cycles, epicy- . cles, and other ingenious devices, were able to make tolerably accurate \ ■: forecasts of certain ordinary celestial phenomena; likewise the present - unsuspected erroneous belief concerning the vast superiority of a man's ; . business necessities over his fellow-men's life necessities is unwittingly •" partially corrected by means of ingenious devices known as cooperation, ' ', arbitration, and trades unions, which, with their auxiliary strikes, boy- ' ' cots, and lockouts, are not, under favoring conditions, always disapitf pointing. , ,^ ■-% , . COOPERATION. The industrian aspires to reach through cooperation the envied, condition of his employer. He seldom reflects that cooperation exists,*! wherever a number are congregated to produce" by their united. efforts ; t certain industrial fruits; and, therefore, if cooperation could solve the labor problem there would now be no 1 such problem to solve. -A man- ufactufingplaut costing $5,000,000 and employing 10,000 hands requires, ,.,. ; : in order to earn 6 per cent dividend, or $300,000 a year, an average profit : ; • of only 10 cents a day on the labor of each industrian. Certainly this 1 is cooperation in , the best sense of the term, for the. employes would hardly take the risks of the markets and their own business incapacity by conducting the works themselves for the sake 6f chancing to add ■ only $30 a year to each one's income; yet the owners of the plant ? separately reap much more than any of the industrians. Again, an enteTprise worth a million is capitalized by unscrupulous managers at i, ,,; five. millions, and employes 2,00. t men, whose wages, are, on an average, cut down 50 cents a day in order that a 6 per cent' annual dividendjof $300,000 may be declared on the fictitious capital; nevertheless, if the ? 2,000 industrians managed the enterprise themselves they eould not work together, that is, cooperate, more- than under the original man : agement. Evidently the need is codistribution, not cooperation.^ There are cit$ railways the first cost of which was but half the par , value of the shares, yet these are worth now several times their par * value, a price due, to " charging the public high fares and to paying x small wages for long hours of severe daily toil. Mqst of our great '■' railway, telephone, and telegraph companies/ present a similar history; ( their bonded debts recklessly swollen and their stocks l i watered " without 'stint until the ink-built values of the properties are four and five, times greater than their actual cost. The difference between what would sufiace for a 6 per cent dividend ^on this actual cost and .the actual j earnings of these corporations represents what the industrians and ., the general public together lose by such financiering. And yet where a*re to be found vaster cooperative concerns than these,,, with their, hun- ', dreds of thousands of industrians, each performing his allotted task*;! for the production of industrial fruit? Unquestionably these and a' ..multitude of similar examples prove that what we need, is not more cooperation but a more equitable distribution of what cooperation pro- * .'duces. The remedy lies in basing wages on the life necessities of the indus- '■ trian instead of upon the business- necessities of the corporation, firm,, ' A SOLUTION OF THE LAB03 PROBLEM. $' or individual. Then it will be immaterial what fictitious values a,ve- r placed on' corporate property or what may be the condition of an employer's business affairs. There is no idea more absurd than that a man's wages should be regulated by the financial ability of his employer; that he must be held responsible in his wages, must be made account- able in his life necessities for the condition of another's business, over which he has no control, in which he is allowed no interest, and about which He is never consulted. v There is a kind of cooperation which consists in customers destroy; ing the business of worthy retailers by combining to purchase directly from wholesale dealers — a proceeding which tends to beggar a large,, enterprising class of people without ultimately benefiting the innova- tors, for their reduced cost of living only tempts the employer to make- a proportional reduction in their wages. There would be no strong inducement toward this form of cooperation if wages were based, as they should be, on the life necessities of the industrian. It is no solu- tion of the labor problem to ruin one class of industrians to benefit another. ARBITRATION. Arbitration, whether voluntary or compulsory, has invariably failed to meet the expectations of even its mildest advocates. In Pennsyl- vania the Wallace arbitration act is become a dead letter. In New- York, of the many hundred strikes which occurred prior to 1887, only 11 were submitted to the State arbitrators, who of these settled but 7; and during the following year they adjusted 1 out of 1,604 strikes- for higher wages. Elsewhere throughout the Union reports concern- ' ing arbitration are equally discouraging, all the more significant that they who refuse the alleged benefits of arbitration arp the. most intel- ligent of their class and anxious to adopt any measures that will ter- minate the chronic /warfare between employer and employed. Compulsory arbitration has never been attempted in the United? 'States, but in 1878 the French authorities smothered by this means 35,000 labor disputes, and a few years later the number this quieted; Reached 263,090. It is not surprising that the immense amount of indus- trial discontent and suffering these hundreds of thousands of cases 'Teveal should at length have vented themselves in uprisings, which called for a libera^ use of "the resources of civilization " to suppress*. Belgium still feels the effect of the riots, insurrections, and bloodshed flprovoked by miseries which had accumulated under a prolonged course of this "empirical medicine; and England, where arbitration^ though not compulsory by law, has always been so by custom, is now the theater of an industrial crusade against the tyranny of want and misery that has been for years fostered by this favorite panacea, which simply dams back the sources of discontent until the enormous pressure breaks down the artificial barrier. Arbitration, whether voluntary or compulsory, fails, because it assumes that for the industrian half a loaf is better than no bread, or, in other words, that slow starvation is preferable to quick perishing; as if the relative merits of slow starvation and quick perishing were the points • at issue. It fails through striving to subordinate the immensely impor- tant life necessities of the industrian to the comparatively insignificant business necessities of the employer. It fails because inapplicable until *after the appearance of industrial discontent, for that can be no solution Of the labor problem which requires as one of its conditions the presence- of what .. Should tint exist. 4 A SOLUTION OF THE LABOR; PROBLEM. TRADES UNIONS. Trades unions have'done more for, the industrial classes than all other labor devices combined, chiefly because of the remedial legislation they have provoked through the publicity given by them to the misery and injustice entailed upon the iudustrian by reason of an inefficient State . protection. .The condition of the workman only thirty years ago, com- pared with his present status, well attests the good effected within that •' period by trades unions. * Wanting, hpwev er, in the necessary legal authority to enforce their usually laudable purposes they are, and always will be, unable to permanently establish of themselves a comprehensive, automatic' system of wage remuneration. All past experience has taught that nothing they have advocated or struggled for has acquired , stability or become really beneficial without formal Government sanc- tion, thereby indicating that their wisest course is to create through; 'fact and argument a favorable public Opinion concerning contemplated!! reforms or concessions, and then throw the weight of a great united effort on the side of that political party which is most friendly x to their ^ cause. . ' ' ■ " : i Trades unions, hdwever,,are chiefly organized to coerce the employer,, .. into granting remunerative wages. The individual worker is so wholly ' merged and lost to view amid the enormous mass of wage- earners, that'? it is impossible for him alone toimprove his industrial condition. He is therefore obliged to form, with his fellows,' associations sufficiently large|S united, and determined to command attention, if not always success. ,•'- '** These associations, resting as they do on the self-evident truth thai wages should be regulated by the'life necessities of the industrian, nat- ' -urally excite the hostility pf, the employer, with whom it is an axiom * that rates of wages must be based on his business necessities. Evi- v dently, such antagonistic ideas', arising as they do from wholly opposite %? views, can never become reconciled, however much. the contestants themselves may desire it. Hence, no matter how cliorough the defeat or victory in a strike, lockout^ or boycott, the. result, even to the win-, ; ners, is usually achieved at a great loss of time, money and trade inter- ; ests without any lasting settlement of the great question at issue. At best, the ensuing peace is a temporary truce, a m'ere armed neutrality which either party must, even against its inclinations, break at short li -notice, regardless of pledges and agreements, whenever mutations in finance, trade, and ■ commerce on the one hand, or the changes these give rise to in the cost of living, on the other, oncemore arouse the slum- bering dispute about wages ; a dispute to be again temporarily settled^ after a heart-burning struggle, which, though it may terminate in a'? 1 hand-shaking all arpund, does not absolve the participants from keep- ing their powder" dry nor from sleeping on their arms. Trades unions ; ' have improved wages only by resorting to open or threatened strikes;,,; they have never formulated a successful, wage- system which dispensed; I with strikes, nor have strikes ever led to any' successful plan for doing without them. Hence, strikes multiply with the growth of industrial life. Though not always sp brutally managed as 'formerly, still they foster between employer and employed no less illfeeling, and thus draw ever more heavily upon, the valuable time and slender resources of the indus- trian, in order that he may get and keep what the law of the land should guarantee him without charge or trouble. That both sides, in spite of their bitter, chronic hostility, should be: -? equally anxious for a better bond of peace than a fear of, the evil each * may do to the other shows' the hopelessness of their ever reaching a At SOLUTION _OF THE LABOB PROBLEM. > £ final, amicable adjustment of their difficulties. Notwithstanding i mutually sincere desire to end the strife between them, they will, uuti : checked by a" higher authority than their own, continue indefinitely tc deal in these threats, coercion, strikes, boycotts, lockouts, hollow truces and short-lived treaties, because their disagreement arises from a linn honest belief in two wholly opposite, irreconcilable ideas'. The employe] would place the cart before the horse; would have the little greate: i than the big; would make earth overtop the universe; or, in othei words, would have his self-created business necessities deemed o; vaster importance than the ' industrial's God-created life necessities On the other hand,' the industrian justly contends that a man's lifi necessities are infinitely more important than another man's business necessities; that all mankind is vitally interested in the former, bu only a comparatively few are concerned about the latter; that as th< Almighty created life necessities, they must be properly satisfied ai He ordains, or else boundless, unspeakable evils follow; but that busi ness necessities being of man's own devising, he Can profitably mole and modify them to suit a labor system based on the immensely supe ,' rior claims of the industrials life necessities. Many look for a natural termination of this chronic warfare in th< results of man's mechanical genius. Thousands dream of a near-b; £/ millenium when steam, iron, and electricity shall enable mankind 1 1< I enjoy life as a long summer day without a care, a pain, or privation a delusion born of a false belief in what has not yet been discovered— a labor-saving machine. The marvelous mechanisms, so-named, dc " singly what otherwise would require many hands; but for every work man they have displaced hundreds of others have found occupation ii new spheres of industry these so-called labor saving machines hay created. The advent of the sewing machine, for example, gave rise t< a popular belief that Hood's "Song of the Shirt" could, ere long, b applied to every seamstress in the land, whereas the extraordinar; excellence, quickness, and cheapness of its work stimulated the deman< for clothing and other made-up goods of every description to such i degree that an immense impetus was imparted to the raising, market j^ing,, manufacturing, and fashioning of the raw material, thereby neces |%'Mtating the enlistment of new armies of industrians, not only to perforn ,',, this vast additional labor, but also to build and equip more mills, fac tories, furnaces, warehouses, stores, ships, dwellings, and railways t< meet the exigencies of the enormous business opened up through tb direct and indirect influence of this single invention, whose wonderfu story, however, only parallels that of nearly every other successfu economic contrivance — contrivances which, instead of exhaustinj human ingenuity, stimulate it to produce others for conducting mor - speedily the new industries Created by their predecessors; so thai judging from past and present experience, the time approaches whei the entire population, the larger it,groWs, Will have its energies taxe< higher and higher to accomplish the infinitely multiplied tasks set b, what we erroneously term labor-saving machines; in proof of which ..the multitudes now steadily engaged in useful occupations farexcee* those of any other period, ancient or modern, for no era besides ou own can beast of such vast hives of industry, where thousands are bus, < jnight and day, everyone of whom owes his employment to and take ^'•'advantage of some miscalled labor-saving machine. - : In view of this vast industrial growth, how is it. possible tor trade unions to determine of themselves the labor problem? Were they ;lei in numbers, and did the few embrace the entire labor world, they mign fi A SOLCTION OF THE 'LApOE PBGBLEM. ■succeed; but as an endless variety and number of occupations require thousands of trades unions to represent millions of workers, it is idle to. •expect that Harmonious federation and that implicit obedience to central ; authority which are absolutely essential to the attainment of a com-, mou purpose. And, as if the unruliness of the rank and file, as well as the jealousies ^nd selfish aspirations of those in power, to say noth- ing of possible venality and incapacity, were not sufficient to .cripple any federation, it must also contend against a ceaseless crumbling: away through the constant merging of its best elements into the class j of employers, for American industrians comprise no Hindoo-like Caste; !,' from which death alone can release them. If, however, an spite of':' all these apparently insuperable drawbacks, such a federation did sue- ' • oeed, at all points,, so that the head of it could rule, as with a rod of iron, every industrial assembly from Maine to California, what would -become pf our republican institutions with such a despotic ijnperiuttiin ' ■imperio exercising autocratic sovereignty within the heart of the nation 1 ? Thus trades unions, unless united, can do little, towards a. • national industrial emancipation ; and, if united, would become a .serious 4 menace to the safety of the state. A NATIONAL UNIT OF VALUE FOE LABOB. The state may not favoreither side as against the other, nor refuse; . xhem like protection ; yet, because of their ceaseless antagonism, thou- . sands and tens of thousands of innocent persons are in constant danger.' of beggary or bankruptcy, and the community of being brought to the . verge of anarchy. That the happiness and prosperity of the people ;; and the safety of the commonwealth should be thus continually risked i because two classes are at feud over a question they can never agree-; H'upon is something the law of self-preservation' emphatically -forbids^ :■■ And as the disputants have had innumerable opportunities to finally ysettle what is now proven to be an irreconcilable difference,, it is evi- ,, fdent nothing remains but to forbid either side from henceforth having any voice in the matter.' The state to facilitate business and to preserve peace has, been obliged, to establish national units of value for money, weight, measure, and time. Likewise for the same imperative, beneficient purpose the ■* estate should establish a ndtional ■unit pf value for labor, and thereby '-enable the iudustrian, without consulting his employer, to always earn what his life necessities, demand; and also enable the employer, with- out consulting the industrian, to always pay -only what his true busi- ness necessities require. Thus will the employer and employed be placed on the same impar- tial, neutral footing with regard to wages, as they now are with regard : to weights, measure, time, 'and money. Neither buyer nor seller has the right to decide what shall be the length of the yard or weight- of >'. the pound; nor for the same reason should either employer or indus- trian be allowed to decide what wages shall or shall not be paid for, ' human labor. Had buyers and sellers before transacting business, to agree upon what should be the length of the yard, weight of the pound, ■■•' or fineness of the coin, there would be the same endless wrangling and : discord between them that there is now between employer and indus-y ( •Man over what wages should be paid for labor in a contemplated work'. A hew departure is always foreshadowed, .always preceded, to, a limited extent, by what bears to it the relation of a tadpole to a buhV: frog; that is to say, a resemblance to something antecedent yet very '. A SOLUTION OF THE LABOR PROBLEM. 7 different from it in being applicable to broader, higher, and more varied purposes. In this sense a national unit of value for labor rill be the culmination of that industrial tendency which now seeks to regulate the pay of the industrian by means of units of value, or, as they are commonly termed, sliding scales for wages, - These units of value or sliding scales are a fixed, mercantile quan- tity — a ton, bushel, keg, or yard — of what the industrian produces; to which a previously-determined price is affixed, aud then as its subse- quent market value rises above or falls below this price, so do wages slide up or down from a rate that corresponds to the price affixed N to the~ton, bushel, or other limited mercantile quantity. This is an important advance beyond the usual haphazard, hand-to- mouth method of adjusting wages, yet its defects prevent its general acceptance and render it, wherever adopted, of only limited utility. It makes the wages of the industrian depend upon the condition of his imme- diate employer's business instead of upon the general industrial condition of the nation. It enables the employer to have the affixed price, of the unit determined by his own business necessities instead of by the industrian's life necessities, and usually at so high a figure as to forestall any probable rise^ thereby reducing the chances of an increase while multiplying those of. a decrease in wages. It Avould fail to mate- rially benefit the industrian even though the scale price of the unit were determined by his life necessities, because the goods or articles, of which certain limited quantities constitute these units of value,, are not of such universal necessity that the market price of any of them can affect or reflect the general cost of living. The nail-makers, for instance, whose wages are regulated by the keg price of that article may, owing to a fall in its market value, suffer privations unknown to workers in more prosperous occupations, or the price of nails may not decline, yet from general causes the cost of living may, be so greatly increased as to render the nail-maker's wages inadequate to meet his fjphavoidable obligations. A truly national unit of value for labor would be so universal and far-reaching in its character and nature that its jmark'et price would index and measure the cost of living to every worker in every occupation. The present method obliges industrians to support at great expense many labor organizations in order to secure, renew, and enforce the observance of contracts with employers; a spe- cies of coercion' extremely galling to the latter, especially to railway corporations, who naturally resent dictation as to their management from outsiders, and therefore seize every opportunity and use every means to free themselves from this thraldom. A national unit of valu< for labor, established by law, and equally binding upon all, withoul respect of person or occupation, would occasion no more heart burning between employer and employed than do the national units of value foi weight and measure occasion disputes between buyer and seller^ Th< present method is also objectionable in that it calls for as many differenl units-of value or sliding' scales tor wages as there are mechanical pur suits, thereby distributing our industrians among numberless cliques each with its own selfish interests and jealousies, thus keeping alive throughout the industrial world discords as annoying and continuous as would afflict our financial world had each State- of the Union its owi; peculiar unit of value for money. What the Federal national unit o value for money has done and is doing for our financial world, so wij a national unit of value for labor accomplish for our industrial world establish harmony among our industrians through the absence ot irri tating differences. Lastly, the present units of value or sliding scales 8 , : ; ,. A SOLUTION OP *JHiE. LABOE\ PROBLEM. for 'wages, being fixed ^mercantile quantities of what the industriailpr o- duces and designed to regulate wages in particular occupation, areii not available for occupations which furnish nothing wherefronl iesfcreV' ate units of value for Tabor such as pertain to railway, mercantile, telH graph and Kindred enterprises, of which our railways alone einploy| over 700, OQO industrians, whose pay should be based on what is needed' to meet, the requirements of their life necessities. A national unit of value or labor should, as the name implies, be applicable to all indus-| triahs in every walk of life. Only an article so universally used and of so far-reaching an: influ- ence that its market price indexes and measures the cost of living ,to every industrian can suitably serve as a national unit of value for labor;' Such an article is wheat flour. From the earliest historical times the'! price of this has been a keynote to the price of every othef necessary of life; the same general causes which affect the normal price of floury- never fail ultimately to proportionally affect quotations for all other" staples, so that taking the year through from January to Decembfe^j it will be found that normal fluctuations in the price of floury whether dub?;) to general causes of to causes pertaining to itself alone, are ultimately followed by corresponding changes in the cost of every other necessary, of life. Under the. form of wheat it represents field labor, the starting , point of human progress, and under its own form it represents skilleet| labor ; it thus becomes ah exponent of all labor from the most primitff'e to the highest mechanical efforts of the trained eye, hand, and braslJ$p- The following are examples taken from an 1880 census report of the relation existing between the rise and the fall in the price of flour and;,, 'the rise and fall ' in, 1 other necessaries of life; the statistics here used r ; however, were not gotten up with a view to such a comparison. In Boston the retail price of flour, in 1868 was $9.75 per barrel, at the i same time beef for roasting was 28 cents and for soup 5 cents peK pound. In 1872 and 1873 flour was, $6.70, roasting beef 20 cents, and! soup beef 4 cents. In 1880 flour was quoted at $4.50, roasting beef 11 ■ cents, and soup beef at 3 cents'. With flour at $9.75 and at $5, the ; fofequarter of veal was 12 cents and 8 cents per pound. At the same periods fresh pork was 14 cents and 7j: cents, lard 17 cents and 8J ii cents, beans 13 cents and 7 cents. At Rock Island, 111., flour in 1868$ was $12 a barrel, roasting beef 15 cents a pound. In 1871 this had^ fallen to 13 cents, with flour at $10 a barrel, and in 1880 it was 12 cents, * with "flour at $8 a barrel; salt pork for the same periods ranged from : 15 to 13 and to 12 cents per pound; sugar, yellow O, was 18 cents, with!') flour at $12, and 13 cents when flour was $8 a barrel. At Leavenworth, ',» Kans., flour from 1871 to 1880 kept steadily between $6.75 and $6.5^ per barrel. 'jp>uring the same period roasting beef did not vary from 9 cents per pound, while soup beef fluctuated between 5 cents and 4£ ' cents per pound, potatoes ranged from 60 to 65 cents per bushel, fresh pork did hot vary from 9 cents per -pound, hams ranged from 12£to9 cents. At Lawrencburg,.Ind., flour between 1868 and 1886 ranged fforn-i $12 to $7 per barrelin the same period, bacon ranged from 20 to 13^ ; .cents, hams 22 to 16 cents, lard 20 to 12 cents, potatoes $1.40 to 97' cents, beans 13 to 10 cents. , \ .,;,;> • None of the foregoing quotations, taken at random, can be implicitly'!; relied_upon, because the most of them are for. a particular day in the* year, instead of being the average of daily prices for the entire year ^ and, are shop or store keepers' reports instead of ofncial, 1 market reporfM and, therefore, influenced by the exigencies of customers and the stored keepers methods of doing business ; nevertheless, in spite of theBe| SOLUTION OF THE LABOR PROBLEM. 9 l&rawbacks, they illustrate, if imperfectly, the tendency of the neces- saries of life to keep pace in range of prices with variations in the price of flour; and therefore, to that extent, demonstrate the soundness and feasibility of the plan here advocated. A careful though not wholly exhaustive inquiry, extending over the past twenty-five years, shows that he who performs the least skilled manual work requires an amount of pay equal to the cost of 60 pounds t in bulk of good family flour in the locality where his work is done. That is to say : The market price of this quantity of flour represents the daily cost of, living to him who digs' cellars^ chops Wood, carries a ^hod, wheels a barrow or does any labor calling for the least mental effort , and lowest mechanical skill. Therefore, 60 pounds of good family flour in bulk would constitute a true national unit of value for labor throughout the United States, and might be, termed a "wage," ; just as "3 barley corns, round and dry, laid end to end," constitute si the national. unit of value for measure termed an "inch," and the weight of "32 wheat seeds in the ear" equaled that of the English English penny. This proposed unit of value for labor, called a "wage," would be the lowest pay that could be legally given an adult for one day's leastjskilled manual work. If the market price of the wage (60 pounds of flour) were 2 cents a pound, the least skilled manual laborer would receive $1.20 a day; if 3 cents a pound, he would get $1.80 a day; but $1.20, with flour at 2 cents a pound, would buy as much of the necessaries of life as $1.80 with flour at 3 cents a pound. < Or if the market price of flour jn Montana were 3 J cents, a pound and in New Hampshire 2£ cents a pound, the unskilled manual worker in Montana would get $2.10 a day,, and the New "Hampshire laborer $1.50 a day; but $1.50 a day with flour at 2£ cents a jiound would purchase of the necessaries of life in New Hampshire as much as $2.10 in Montana, with flour there at 3£ xents per pound ; for as the normal price of flour, so proportionally would become the price of all other essentials. Thus, no matter what fluctua- |rtions occurred in the- cost of the necessaries of life, the wages of the g'industrian would always have the same purchasing power. *** "'•■It would be as easy to build up from the single wage 'a, wage-table of values for all superior grades of labor, as it has been to construct from the second all the higher divisions of time, and from the inch all the greater lengths of measurement ;' for though multitudes of- strikes and lockouts, as well as the wretched condition of thousands of industriansy testify to the insufficiency of present rates of pay, still 1 the proportional •. values accorded* to the various grades of labor may, be deemed practi- fically correct. For example: The pay of the ore-digger in a certain locality is lh cents a day, and that of the master carpenter $2.25, or three times as much,~both confessedly poor pay; yet the relative values attached to the two occupations are not disproportionate ; hence, as the ore-digger would be entitled to 1 wage per diem, the carpenter would receive 3 wages for the same period of work; so that, should, flour in that locality be 2 cents a pound, the ore-digger would get $1.20 and his friend the carpenter $3.60 a day. Again, in a certain locality, the yard hand of a mill receives $1 a day, or at the rate of $26 a month; and a countinghouse clerk $40 a month; then since the yard hand would get at the rate of 26 wages a month, the elerk would be entitled to 40 wages a month,- which, with flour at 2 J cents a pound would bring • him $60 a month, while the yard hand would receive $l*.50.a day, or at '{.the rate of $39 a month. 10 A SOLUTION OF < THE LABOR PROBLEM. ,The following table of weekly payments to window-glass worKefifin New Jersey illustrates more fully how present rates of w.ages Qan.he' used to construct pay tables based v on the wage or national unil|of value for labor. Opposite the names of occupations in the first coruffim are the rates of pay these now bring; the third column shows the number of wages or units of value for labor each industrial woul<$ receive under the new system; and the last column indicates what his; pay would be with flour at 2£ cents a pound, equal to $1.50 a waget ,-jj Present pay. dumber of wages under new system. Pay under ney systemtwith , flour at 2|'cent8., Blowers Do Do ....:.... Gatherers ' Do Do Cutters Do Do JFIatteners Do Do ...,. Master shearers . Do:......... Do ...'.. .... Shearers .. Potniakers Do Packers Do Engineers , ,' Do... Carpenters, Blacksmiths ■ Clerks. .1 Teamsters Laborers • Itelpers (children) $30. 00 28. 00 27.00 20.00, 19.00 18. 00 * 25.' 00 24.00 23.00 30.00 27.00 25.00 30.00 27.00 24.00 10.00 ' 20. 00 12.00 ' 11.00 10.00 10. 00, • 9.00 15,00 . 12. 00 12,00 8. .20 7.50 3.75 24 22-4 21-6 16 15-2 nri 20 19-2 18-4 24 21-6 20' ,24 21-6 19-2 7-2 12 9-6 9-6 6-6 $36. 00 33.60 32.40 24.00 22.80 21.60 30.00 28.80 27.60 36. 00' 32.40 30. 00 36. 0i 32.40 28.80 12.00 -24.00 14.40 13.20 1 12. 00 12.00 10.80 18:00 14. 40 14.40' 9.90* 9.00 4.50 , It will be noted that the twenty-eight industrians, representing nearly as many grades of labor,, in the foregoing list are each apportioned, as many units or wages && their present, pay exceeds that of the laborer,. who 1 , furnishing the. least skilled manual work, would, under the new system, be entitled to 1 wage a day or 6 wages a week. Thus, the best blowers now receive $30 a week; or four times the laborer's pres^i entpay of 1 $7.50 a week; consequently they would be entitled to % wages, or four times the laborer's 6 wages,. The carpenters get' $15 a^ week, or twice the laborer's pay; therefore they would get twice thej laborers 6 wages, or 12 wages a week. The helpers (all children) are . ,paid $3,75 a week, or half the laborers pay, and therefore would be paid half the laborer's 6 wages, or 3 wages a Week. The shearers earn $10 a week, or one and a third times more than the laborer, and hence, would earn one and a third-times the laborer's wages, or & wages a, weekjj After this manner tables could be framed in any locality,: setting forth the number of daily, weekly, or monthly wages; that is to say, the)" number of units of value due for every industrial occupation, a tasW, no greater than thafrof determining the present pay of industrians. Such tables once framed would seldom require revision, since, the relan. tive standing of industrial pursuits, alters very slowly. The principal, if not only changes in long periods, would be the adding of new and dropping of superseded occupations. '"' But while the number of wages per day, week, or month accorded to each grade of industry would remain constant, the pay each indus-, A SOLUTION OF THE LABOR PROBLEM. 11 -I***' •' ' - • - ■ , %ian should receive would depend upon the market price of the 60 pounds of flour constituting the wage or national Unit of value for labor \, hence the pay of the industrial! could never be a fixed Govern- mentirate, but would be regulated by the untramnieled laws of finance and trade. As it would not always be convenient in making payments to follow the slight daily, weekly, or monthly variations in the market price of sflour, the averaged daily quotations during a half or whole year could be accepted as the market price for the following six or twelve months. For obvious reasons both employer and employed would be interested in abolishing speculation or gambling in breadstuffs. Any friction which might at first occur iu the application of this proposed solution of the labor problem, would disappear after the new method of pay- ments had been applied to the raising, (preparing, and making of flour. ISince every state has already a system of flour inspection to prevent fraud, it would be no more difficult or expensive to maintain an uniform grade of flour than it is now. The grade here had in view is that made froimKo. 2 wheat. ■ By making it illegal to pay an industrian less for his services than a prescribed number of wages or units, he will be debarred from compet- ing for work at less than the legal rates. Competition or underbidding on the part of the industrian never multiplies the places he covets. 3?or he who can employ only a hundred does not, as a rule, augment the {number of his hands because a thousand' are competing for the places ,'at his disposal. He takes advantage of the competition to reduce /wages, but the idle industrians are not thereby made less numerous;, [Underbidding simply enables the employer to reap, temporarily, greater profits, and the industrian to bear, permanently, greater hardships. The seekers after employment may tempt moneyd men to start addi- tional industries with -such low-priced labor, but the result, sooner or later, is disastrous not pnly to them, but to all kindred industries they 'have undermined with the cheap products qf unpaid labor. Industries can be sustained only by sustaining the purchasing power of buyers; and as our buyers, are, by a very large majority, industrians, it follows that low wages to them mean small purchases, and small purchases lead in turn to the closing of mills, factories, and workshops, with the, more serious resultof throwing many additional thousands out of employment, thereby still further curtailing the buying facilities of the people and thus Aggravating the evil many fold, until general bankruptcy supervenes, with bank vaults full of idle money, warehouses loaded with unpurchas- abhj goods, former happy homes filled with pain and privation, and our highways thronged, with anxious, despairing industrians vainly seek- ing employment. Then the catastrophe is charged to overproduction, ■when it is'underconsumption, due to loss of purchasing power in the people for want of a national preventive against regulating wages by, the business necessities of the employer instead of by the life necessi- ties of the employed. The panic of 1873 has not yet been repeated, because trades, unions have, though imperfectly, acted as barriers against the suicidal tend- ency of -industrians to first cripple, then destroy their ptirchasmg power by a reckless underbidding against each other for work. Trades unions, however, for reasons already given, can only postpone, can not .prevent the inevitable; portends of which are even now, gathering on the national horizon. High wages do not by any means provoke correspondingly high prices, because a percentage of increase in wages is much greater on 12 A SOLUTION OF THE LABOR PROBLEM. the original amount of wages than on the amount of industrial produol turned out 1 ; a 20 per ceirt advance, for instance, on, $1,000 a week o: wage?, is only an increase of 2 per cent on the cost of $10,000 wortb'i 'goods produced. in that time by those wlio receive these wages. Owing however, to the low, rates paid for labor by other manufacturers, no on< of them may pay more lest he lose what little profit a fierce competition has spared. Thus it is evident, that if all employers would simultane ously add to the pay of the industrian what is needed to support \the grade of civilization to which his labor belongs, and increase the cof| of their goods or services to cover this additional pay, there would fol- low an improved, steady, uniform demand sufficient to insure the employer fair profits and the industrian remunerative work,, But an ample, sad experience has demonstrated that employers can no more act thus in concert than could buyers and sellers always unanimously determine among themselves what should be'the length of the yardoi weighty of the pound; and, therefore, since the State, to promote the welfare of buyers arid sellers,, has been obliged to establish a national unit of value for weight, time, money, and measure, so, likewise, should it establish a national xrnit of value for labor,' to promote the lasting welfare of both employer and employed. In this connection, it ought to be remembered that it is immaterial tc what height prices reach, provided the people have the means wheafe- with to meet them; for it is not the price of an article, but his ability to pay the, price, which concerns the buyer. Of this an instance was afforded in the early days of our civil war; then bread sold at 3 cents a loaf, yet the streets of New York were paraded by starving inditstrians crying "bread or blood!" A few months later bread sold at 10 cents a loaf, yet everybody was contented. , Bread at 3 cents was dearer to the penniless than bread at 10 cents to him who had ample means. When one considers the many requisites which are essential* to the; proper maintenance of the- simplest grades of civilization in our midst, the extremely low prices now ruling for textile and other skilled man- ufactures must be accepted as a proof that the wages now paid for labor are far from sufBcent to meet the demands of the 'grades of civili- zation to which the labor belongs; for this reason the goods are abnormally cheap, and, for the same reason, they who make them are unable to buy them. By the term civilization is here meant the cdmmuni%tic product oj man's mentality and life conditions. As no two persons have exactl| the same mentality or life conditions, it follows there are as many grades of pivilization in a community as there are individuals; also, with every change between infancy and death, in each person's mentality and life conditions, or either of them, there occurs a corresponding grade of civilization; but, since the members of a community are all subjected to certain common mental and physical influences, there results a general civilization characteristic of the communityitself ; yet, within the limits of that civilization, each member of the community has a grade peculiarly his or her own, just as the foliage of a tree tells us by its general characteristics what the tree js, although no two leaves of that foliage can be found which, line for line and shade for shade, are exactly alike. When we speak of a people being savage, barbar- ous, feemibarbarous, half-civilized, civilized, highly civilized,, or enligfotfj ened, we thus designate the resultant product of their mentality and life conditions. Our heterogeneous population contains examples oi nearly all these; therefore the greater, necessity for a national unit oi SOLUTION OV THE LABOR PROBLEM. ' 13 ^gir labor, based on the requirements of the lowest grade of civili- ToB,;tb act'as-an impartial measure of the worth of each person's "Jrih 'the degree of that person's mentality and life conditions, ip* one can successfully prosecute a calling that is beyond his mental sfsp, or at variance with his life conditions; hence his grade of civili- ,tiou determines the nature of the occupation that is most congenial jbest suited to him, thus indicating that the support and, conse : [Ufentiy, the preservation of his civilization, depends upon the remuner- ation he gets for his labor; from which the inference is clear that the sole. ( . "it will abolish invidious distinctions as regards sex, age ? or domestic condition, the accomplished work itself being alone .considered, with- , out reference to the performer being male or female, young or old, sin- gle or married. " v • . It will prevent the industrian from being any longer responsible m , his wages for the employer's incapacity, recklessness, misfortune, trick- eries or dishonesties, but make him amenable in his wages only to ''those business vicissitudes which arise from the general financial and ffommercial condition of the nation. * K' It will secure the industrian againstsinking below that communistic plane to which he is rightly entitled. , It will destroy those habits of dissipation and improvidence to which the industrian is prone when obliged to struggle incessantly with the mmt 'and privation that ever attend, upon insufficient wages. ' Ijrtlt will embrace all classes of industrians, from the clerk to the hod- 14 A SOLUTION OF THE LABOR PROBLEM. carrier, and provide everyone with adequate pay agreeably to thl? necessities of the grade of civilization to which the labor of the nndtfii Man belongs. "^ It will benefit employers by placing them all on the same level with* respect to the wages to be paid for similar -services, and thus preylfffl the unscrupulous from undercutting and ruining the conscientifW dealer by paying starvation wages. It will relieve the employer from the dictation,- exactions, threats, strikes, and; boycotts of irresponsible organizations, thereby prevent-l ing a repetition of the losses to which these now subject him. , , ,-Ja It will enable the employer to estimate with reasonable certainS •■ the prospective worth of enterprises which are to, rely chiefly uporp industrial labor. - -..,i It will oblige the employer to act honestly in his business relationsg since he may- no longer count upon fleecing the industrian in order to , bolster watered stock, to sustain inordinately swollen bonded debts, or to make good his losses at business gambling. . ;) It will provide the employer with a far wider and more profitable! market for bis wares, merchandise, and services, by reason of thef I- national wealth then becoming more equitably distributed amQng the-' masses, upon whose purchasing power chiefly -rests the success and prosperity of our industries. . 4* It will promote the welfare of both employer arid industrian by piitd ting a period' to that iniquitous gambling in the necessaries of lilraj which seriously disturb and often endanger legitimate business. ■■* It will benefit the nation by stopping the immigration of pauper labor; for as this could not be employed at a less price than Americas labor , the latter would naturally be preferred. ■ $» It will steadily and healthfully increase the. national, wealth and,, prosperity by developing existing and introducing new 1 industries;: through the encouragement a constantly augmenting and well-paid pop- ? - ulation always gives. . ' »| It will take the labor question out of politics and render coercive .: measures on the part of indiistrians, or retaliation on the part, of employers, things of the past, thereby greatly promoting national tranquillity. J It will elevate national morality by abating those crimes and niisd|§ meanors which are due to the industrials inability to gratify the mm- tality and life conditions imposed upon him by the state* - ,_■■. It will promote national intelligence and culture by preventing the* industrian from sinking below the grade of civilization with which an obligatory communistic and social education has endowed him. It will unitize, make a common brotherhood of our industrians and 1 employers, through the impartial application of a wage system to' all, without reference to the nature of the' industries or the persons who : conduct them. ,' " '■ . , ■'- ., And a national unit of value for labor will confer ah inestimable boon'* upon our people by destroying the last vestige of man's servitude to ■ man, ( ■ Wm. Howard. ;? Bethlehem, Pa., U. S. A., October, 1890. . ; 53d Congress, j SENATE. ( mis. Doc. 2d Session. J \ No. 160. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. April 23, 1894. — Ordered to be printed. Mr. Aldrich presented the following REPORT OP HEARING OP "WAGE-EARNING WOMEN BEFORE SENATORS JUSTIN S. MORRILL, JOHN SHERMAN, WILLIAM B. ALLISON, AND NELSON W. ALDRICH, MINORITY MEMBERS, FINANCE COMMITTEE, IT. S. SENATE, MARCH 29, 1894. There were present also Senator Joseph E. Hawley, of Connecti- cut, and Senators George F. Hoar and Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, and others. Mrs. J. Ellen Foster, of Iowa, with 16 wage-earning women of Massachusetts and Ehode Island, appeared (as above stated), and pre- sented the following memorial, petition, and testimony : MEMORIAL. Washington, D. G., March 29, 1894. Senators Justin S. Morrill, John Sherman, William B. Allison, Nelson W. Aldrich, Minority Members, Finance Committee, U. 8. Senate : We, your petitioners, respectfully state,that we came to the city of Washington two days ago for the purpose of showing to the Finance Committee of the IT. S. Senate the causes and the reasons which impel us to protest against the enactment of the Wilson bill, now being con- sidered. We presented our written request in person to the Hon. Daniel W. Voorhees, chairman of the committee, asking a hearing before the committee, a copy of which is hereinafter inserted. He declined to hear us because ot the committee rule, made some time ago. We therefore now come to you, minority members of this committee, and most respectfully ask that we may present our cause to you, and through you to the IT. S. Senate. The interests we represent are great; the welfare of 2,000,000 wage- earning women, and the comfort of multitudes of homes are threatened by this proposed change in the American industrial system. We await your reply. Eespectfully, / J. Ellen Foster, For herself amd other petitioners. '■ m, _ 2 MEMORIAL OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN. PETITION. Washington, D. C, March .28, 1894. T / Senator Daniel W. Voorhees, _ - Chairman Subcommittee Finance Committee, JJ. S. Senate. , Whereas by the enactment of the Wilson bill, now being considered , by the TJ. S. Senate, the wages of mill and factory operatives will be essentially lowered and general comfort and prosperity materially ". reduced; Therefore, we women and women wage-earners respectfully ask to' be heard by your honorable committee, that we may have an oppbr- ,■:,: tunity to show whereiii the passage of this bill will bring great hard-;, ship to more than 2,000,000 wage-earning women, and those depend- ent upon them, and great distress to multitudes of others. Direct representation not being granted to women, -we make this special request. The right of petition is our only recourse. With this we come, to you. < Please indicate at an early hour to-day or to-morrow, and the place where, at your pleasure, such hearing may be had. Eespectfully, J. Ellen Foster, Iowa. i Helen V. Boswell, N. Y. Harriet Branch, woolen-sewer, East Greenwich, E. I. Annie M. Devriaux, jeweler, Providence, E. I. Mary J. By an, cotton-weaver, Woonsocket, B. 1. Minnie Spearin, cotton inspector, Manville, B. I. Hannah E. Ey an, spinner, New, Bedford, Mass. EmilY S. Young, jeweler, Prqvidence, E. I. , • r >>| Margaret Wright, carpet-setter, Boston, Mass. " -\-ij> Elizabeth Tyler, carpet-weaver, Boston, Mass. ■ n Florence Briggs, cotton -weaver, Anthony, E. I. - Mary Brooks, cotton-weaver, Fitchburg, Mass. , Anges Pohlman, cotton-weaver, Fitchburg^ Mass. Martha Haworth, cotton-weaver, New Bedford, Mass. Alice Jukes, net and twine, Cambridge, Mass. Amy Lees, cotton-weaver, New Bedford, Mass. . d Edith Wolstencrapt, cotton- weaver, Taunton, Mass. ' ,| Hattie Freeman, worsted : sewer, Woonsocket, E. I. ?,< Remarks of Mrs. J: Mien Foster. Senators: As stated in the memorial and petition already pre- sented, over 2,000,000 of wage-earning women in this country are suffering and will suffer from the industrial revolution proposed by the Wilson bill. It is not always remembered by those who know the facts, how large a proportion of the wage-earners of the country are women. The interests of women which will be affected by this bill have been only incidentally considered during the pendency of this measure. In every representation of industrial life the hoary fiction appears in dim or bold outline, that only men are breadwinners; that women are protected from the contest for material support by the- strong arms and stout hearts of fathers, brothers, husbands, sons, and that the excepr tions to this rule are few or unnecessary. , \ MEMORIAL OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN. 3 i The women here— with the exception of 2 or 3— not only support themselves, but provide food, raiment, and shelter for aged parents .younger brothers and sisters, and for their own children. The United States census gives the actual number of wage earning women m this country as 2,647,157. The occupations are divided into four classes: First, agriculture; second,, professional and personal services; third, trade and transportation ;' fourth, manufactures mechanical and mining industries. This does not include the many women who work at home, or those whose foolish pride leads them to conceal their trades and places of work. ■ No one of these interests is independent of the others. If one is weakened, all suffer. When the factory "shuts down" the woman •operative has no "pay-day envelope" from which to. take money for holiday or everyday clothes and to pay her board, or, if she be a home- deeper, her rent and grocery bill. When the shopkeeper's receipts are thus depleted he cuts down the wages of the girl who stands behind the counter, or tells her he needs her no longer; the butcher and the baker do the same; the dressmaker, the milliner, the plain sewer, or the sewing-machine operative, women bookkeepers, stenographers, and typewriters, all, are in less demand and reduce their expenses to the limit of actual necessity. Farm women must sell their butter and eggs and other produce, if at all, at lower price. Girls, boys, men, and women are thus daily added to the army of the unemployed, to be supported by those who still exist on lowered wages from the paralyzed industries, which, a year and a half ago, were in healthy and happy activity, or the famishing host must be humiliated and fed at charity soup houses. The interdependence of industrial life is thus shocked at every point, and none who are a part of its vital . energies can escape. Only two classes of people are' unaffected by the industrial life of the nation : These are criminals who live by plunder and personal assault, and the " •dependent classes in public and private institutions. This is why, out •of the distress of the present and for fear of the future, these women have come to Washington to give their testimony and to make their personal protest against the passage of the Wilson bill. They are Americans, though not all born under the stars and stripes. They are not of the dregs of Old World civilization. They do not ask charity. " They are self-respecting workers. The present adminis- tration, through the Chief Executive, has said that "wages must find their level," and Congressman Black, of Illinois, voicing this senti- ment, said on the floor of the House of EepresentatiVes. when the Wilson bill was before that body, that he would have " wages have their natural play all over the world." Against this "play of wages," these women protest. They require ■and demand 'higher wages than are paid elsewhere in the world, < because of the larger life which American institutions have given to women as well as men. The elevation of labor which is both the •cause and the result of political liberty, has elevated women. Labor can not be elevated, except through good wages, and wages which increase as productive wealth is increased. In the degradation of labor women are crowded to "the wall first. The " play of wages all over the world " means that the labor of these hard-working, intelligent, self-respecting women, who are bearing their full share of the country's work, and are daily adding to its wealth, 4 ' MEMORIAL OP WAGE-EARNING WOMEN. shall be put in competition with the work of the beast-of-burdena women of the Old World. > The rate of wages paid determines the respect in which labor is heldj. the respect in which labor is held is a never-failing index of woman's position in the social order. A nation may always be rated by 1 the- character of its women. If by the adoption of free trade^ the labor of women and of men is degraded, this Republic will not long hold its- proud place among the nations. Also, we wish to show that the high prices paid wage earners has- mot increased the price of the goods manufactured. On the contrary, manufactured goods, made by the women here present before you, have- steadily decreased in price; note, especially,, carpets and textile fabrics;.. A friend said to me a while since, when I spoke of the distressing con- ditions among certain carpet weavers in New York City who had been out of work for many weeks, "Well, more people use carpets than make- carpets ; if wages are cut down we will get our carpets cheaper." In the face of this plausible supposition we set the fact that carpets- were never so cheap as now. How it is possible that high wages do , not increase the price of goods is called the "tariff riddle." But the- riddle can be easily solved by the facts of industrial history. High wages make a great army of consumers; the use of machinery so increases production that this demand may be supplied and prices kept down while wages are kept up. Those who will take the trouble to study the question will soon see- the philosophy which produces this result — this ripe fruit of Ameri : can economics. We ask those who are too indolent or preoccupied t6" look deeper than the surface of things to hear the testimony of these- women as it will be presented to the Senate by the honorable members^ of this committee, who have, in justice to the claims of women workers,, granted this hearing. ' Some of these women have worked in other countries. They know the wages paid there, and the discomforts and hardships which afflict- the industrial classes. They love the lands where they were born; the- Eatherland is still the home land. Scotland and England are still ," bonnie" and "merry," but for all that, they would not return to the- wages paid and the conditions of living there. They say with a touch- ing eloquence, to me more convincing than free-trade pleas based on systems of Old World economics, "it is far better for women here." It is this human side, this home side of industrial economics, which we present by these witnesses. 'The American workman or workwoman is not a mere human machine, valuable in proportion as' wages — the fuel which generates the force which runs the machine — are reduced; he or she is a consumer of the- wealth produced; the elevation of the working classes creates demand and furnishes supply. The difference in home comforts and social conditions of producers- here and in any other country is sometimes illustrated by the phrase- ology of legislation and of philanthropic movements. I have heard statesmen in the British House of Commons argue, and humanitarians in Exeter Hall, London, plead for better "housings for the poor." Under the dome of this Capitol, in the Senate chamber, oyer which the -stars and stripes wave, and in our great auditoriums^ our statesmen and publicists demand, not "housings for the poor," but homes for the people. Free-trade theories are built on the former, the American protective tariff system builds and defends the latter. MEMORIAL OF WAGEKEARNING WOMEN. 5 "' These women come from the homes of the people. I ask you to hear *heir testimony. (In answer to a question of Senator Aldrich, as to how these women .came to Washington, Mrs. Foster stated) — In 1888, when the MoKinley bill was pending, I brought some women to Washington to testify about work and wages; they were heard by .the Senate Finance Committee; the result was good: I had no idea then that it would ever be proposed by the Congress of the United States to bring the wages of American laborers to Old World levels.. The attempt has, however, been made and with disastrous results. I have seen much of the suffering, among women, thus caused. I was three months of last winter in New York City among its wage earners. I saw mothers, with babies in their arms, and little children about them in a starving condition, because husbands and fathers had no work; young girls defenseless, without work and without money 1 , in winter in a great city, exposed to the temptations which that means; these were the scenes which I daily witnessed and which impelled me io do what I could to bring the condition of working women to the consideration of the United States Senate. ■ For this purpose I went to Massachusetts and Rhode Island, and "through the courtesy of superintendents of rooms and foremen of depart- ments in factories, I was allowed to see the women at their work. They ■came to me in their work clothes with the dust of the loom upon them. I told them that I thought their testimony would help defeat the Wil- son bill; that I was president of the Woman's Republican Association -of the United States, a society for the education of women in the affairs of G-overnment, and for the defense of woman's work and wages; I told ithem I would, for the society, take them to Washington and bring them back to their homes again. They asked, "What shall we say?" I answered, " Just. tell the Sena- tors the way things are." To their plea that they could not make ^speeches, I replied, 'i'You will not have to make speeches; simply tell the conditions of work and wages which you know to be true." These women feel that they are standing, not for themselves only, -but for a multitude of wage earners behind them. Some w«re chosen by their companions. This is why and how they have come. TESTIMONY. Mrs. Harriet Branch, East Greenwich, B. I., woolen sewer. Q. Mrs. Branch, what is your employment? — A. I am a woolen ;sewer. Q. Where do you work?— A. I have had no work for the last three weeks, but I have not lost my situation. , I expect to go back as soon •as the work increases. The mill has not stopped altogether. Q. How long have you been a woolen sewer?— A. I have worked in the Phoenix woolen mill for ten years. Q. What wages did you receive at the mill?— A. My pay was $9 and $10 a week. I now earn $3, and sometimes $1.90 per week in plain ■sewing: some weeks not anything, Q. Do you know the cause of the reduction at the mill?— A. I do not; the only thing I know is that the reduction is so I have not got work. If I have no work I can not earn the money. The girls in our mill feel terribly about the reduction. There are twenty-five or thirty an my room alone that are , supporting the mother, father or children. 6 MEMORIAL OP WAGE-EARNING WOMEN, " ■ ^ Of course, when they get only $4 a week, you can tell yourself how far $4 a week will go with a family of two or three. - , . Q. (Senator Aldrich.) Have you any family dependent on you for " support?— A. I support myself and my daughter,. 14 years- old., She does not work in the mill; she goes to school. All I have is what I make for myself and her. . ' Q. Were you born in this country 1 ?— A. I was born in Scotland.. Q. (Senator Allison.) How do you get on in this country as^compared with the old country ?— A. In the old country we were kept down by < not having the money to spend. Of course in this country we have much better advantage of getting along and being onewith thepeople- In the old country we had not that. As. long as we appear as ladies in; this country we can be ladies; but in the old country it is different. Here women have a dignity and they do not like to go elsewhere. In the old country the servant girls are considered above/ the mill hands. There the working class are a certain class, and they are kept distinct. Miss Florence Briggs, Anthony, B. I., cotton wecwer. Q. At what do you work 1 ?— A. I make cotton cloths; I am a weaver. Q. 'How long have you done this kind of work?;— A I have wouked twelve years in the place where I urn now. Q. What wages do you make"'— A.. Only $6.50 or $7 now, where before the cut down I got $8 and over. Q. Do you work by the day or by piecework? — A. By piecework. Q. When were your wages cut down ? — A. A short time ago ; I think it was in January. The works have not been stopped ; they have been running full time 1 , but they talk now of stopping if this Wilson bill is- passed. ' Q. Are any of your family dependent on you for support? — A. I help- take care of my mother and myself. Our small farm is the only other- means of support. , Mrs. Mary Brook's, Fitcliburg, Mass., cotton weaver. Q. Where do you live? — A. Fitckburg, Mass. Q. What do you do?— A. I am a cotton weaver. Q. How long have you been in this country? — A.. I have only been< in this co.untry three years. I came from Glasgow. There I worked at weaving cotton, just the same work as I do here. Q. What were your wages there and here? — A. I have a dollar here- , for a shilling at home for the same kind^of work. Q. (Senator Aldrich.) How did you live. in Glasgow as compared with Fitcliburg? — A. We do not live over there the same as we do- here. Smaller rooms, smaller houses, not the same comforts. For two years I made f 10 a week here, and since the "cut-down $7.50 &> week. The cut-down came last fall. I do not know why. The mills- .,; stopped for two months, shut down and then put down prices, besides- Q. (Senator Allison.) Do you support any one besides yourself? — A. I have 2 little boys to care for, beside myself; the youngest one - 3, the oldest one 5. I pay for their keep* out of the wages I make. I could not do this there. That is the reason I am here; my mother came along with me. Q. (Senator Allison.) What did you state about the wages in Scot-' land? — A. The wages there were about a shilling, as compared with a» f* MEMORIAL OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN. 'dollar here. That was the ordinary pay there. I could save nothing at home; that was by the piece; we only ran 2 looms at home. Q. (Senator Aldrich.) Do you work harder here than at home 1 ? — A. No'; I would, rather run 6 looms here than 3 at home; they are heavy looms, they are different kinds of looms altogether. I could do 4 looms' here better than 2 at home. Q. (Senator Aldrich.) Do 'you know about the cost of living in Glasgow? — A. Yes; I kept house in Glasgow and ran my own house- hold ; there were 2 in the family. I had 1 room and kitchen. We paid 12J shillings a month for rent; $10 a month for rent here. We have 6 rooms here for the $10. Q. (Senator Allison.) How about the furniture? — A. The furniture was respectable, but I could not get any luxuries there; had to confine ourselves to food and necessaries of clothing. Q. (Senator Aldrich.) Could you have any musical instruments? — A. No; we could not have any musical instruments or spend' any- thing out of the bare necessaries of life. I lived there in the same way as the others; there was as much labor over there in working as here. Q. Is it any better, here?, — A. Yes, indeed; the first nine months I was here I saved $150, besides keeping myself and children. Over there I could, not save enough to bring me to this country without the help of my mother. If I had not had my mother to help me I do not believe I would ever have gotten here. Miss Hattie Freeman, Woonsocket, B. J., worsted server. u Q. Where do you live? — A. Woonsocket, E. I. Q. What do you do? — A. I work in the Harris Woolen Company, 1 Ehode Island. I am a worsted sewer. Q. What pay do you get? — A. I make $7.50 a week. It is day work. We have short time but no reduction in price. The mill had a reduction - but not the sewers. Beside short time, they have been stopped and then they started again, but they expect another reduction of 20 per cent; that is what they had before, v The sewers get the most day pay; the weavers make the most by the piecework. Q. Do you support anyone beside yourself ?— A, I take care of my mother, and we can live comfortably on what I make. I pay $9 per mouth rent for six rooms, for just me and mother. Mrs. Amy Lees, New Bedford, Mass., cotton-weaver. Q. What do you do?— A. I am a cotton-weaver. Q. Where have you worked?— A. In this country and in Lancashire, England. 1 have worked seven years in this country. Q. What was your pay there and what is it here?— A. Over there I made about 15 and 16 shillings a week off three looms. Here $8.50 .oft seven looms. , Q. (Senator Aldrich.) Is the work harder here?— A. Ihe work here is a little harder, but not much. I worked in Blackburn, ting- land. I live with my husband. , Q. 'Senator Allison.) What about the cost of living there and here?— A. It costs more to live here than there, because we have better and more things to eat here than there. , , !' Q. Why?— A. We could not afford them in England. Q. Would you like to go back to England to live?— A. No; I would : sooner be in this country. , 8 MEMORIAL OP WAGE-EARNING WOMEN. ' Alice Juices, Cambridge, Mass., net and twine maker, ' Q. In what industry are you engaged 1 ? — A. I have been fifteen year^l with the American Knitting and Twine Company. I work on a knit-^ ting machine. The work is piecework. / 4 Q. How much can you make in a week? — A. Before the reduction! made f8 a week. I make $6.50 to $7 now. I am on full time but reduced wages, and expect more reduction if the Wilson bill goes through. Q. In what branch of the business are you engaged? — A. I make gilling nets. v They are made out of linen. There are a, number made of cotton, but the greatest number, probably, is made of the linen flax. 1 Q. Have you ever worked in the old country? — A. I have worked in the old country, but not on the same work. In Birmingham I worked L in Gillotfs pen manufactory. • ,/; Q. (Senator Allison] : Do you know the wages paid in England for": work similar to that which you do here? — A. Yes; the pay over there is 6 shillings a week for the same work on the flax machine. Here we 'get $7 in place of 6 shillings. Q. "Were you -able to live as well on what you received there? — A. "No, indeed. You can exist on 6 shillings a week, but you can not live . on it; because it is not living. We survive, that is all. It is the cus- tom of the country. But of course you do not get any chance of becom- ing any better. Q. Do you support anyone beside yourself? — A. I have my mother to take care of. I help to take care of her. .My sister works in the same mill, 'and with her help we keep home. Q. Have you' been able to save anything % — A. Yes ; I have been able , to save since I have been in this business, and we have built a house with the money we have got. But with another reduction, of course, we could not save. We saved up $1,000 between us, and we paid that much on the house we builtr. Q. Do you live in the house you built?— A. Yes; we live in our own house. , Mrs. Agnes Pohlman, Fitchburg, Mass., eotton-weaver. Q. Mrs. Pohlman, what do you do and where are you from? — A. I am a cotton-weaver from Fitchburg, Mass., but I do not, work there just now, because the mills are shut down ; they have had a very hard* ' time there since last summer — lots of suffering with no work. If the mill is shut down, all the business is shut down, everything is down. , So we had very hard times since last summer, aiid we had lots of poor j to help. It is just as bad there now. I could not get work, and that is the reason I am not working now. Q. (Senator Aldeich.) Is anyone dependent upon you? — A. Yes; my boy. He goes to school. I am able to take care of him when I get , work. Q. Are you from Germany?— A. Yes; I was born in Germany. I did not work very much there, because I was very young when I came from there. Q. (Senator Aldrich.) What about the manner of living there and here?— A. I know we could not live there as we live here, and if I had to go there and work I Would not do it, because we can live higher here. I wish we could soon have our old good times again, so that people could get work and live like they used to do. There are a lot of women out of work in our place. MEMORIAL OP WASE-EARNING WOMEN. 9' Wiss Hannah E. Eyan, New Bedford, Massi, cotton-spinner. Q. Miss Eyan, tell the Senators about your work, — A. I am a spinner in the New Bedford Cotton Manufacturers' Company. I have worked there thirteen years. Q. Were you born in this country'?— A. Was born in New Bedford. Q. Whatare your wages?— A; My wages now are $5.50 a week. Two years ago I got over $6, but we were cut down in October, and they now speak of another cut down if the Wilson bill passes. If we do not kill the Wilson bill, it will kill us. The girls in the milL know if the bill passes we will be reduced again. We can not live on less than |5 a week. Q. Have you anyone, to support?— A. Yes; I have my mother and brother and sister to support. My brother works part of the time, but work is slack. In July it started with work for four days in the week. Miss Minnie Spearin, Manville, E. I., cotton inspector. Q. In what occupation are you engaged f— A. I am an inspector of cotton goods. I work by the week. I inspect the fine goods, such as you make muslin aprons out of, and see that they are perfect before they are sent away. Q. What wages do you make? — A. I make the average wages. !•! had formerly $6.42 per week ; now I make $5.92. .< Q. Has phere been a cut down in the mill where you work? — A. The wages were cut down last fall 10 per cent. The works have not kept Dn full time since. Last April there was a strike among the spinners, and they have never done so well since. We were raised 10 per cent two years ago this April and cut down last fall. I do not know the i cause of the cut down. Q. Are you supporting anyone beside yourself ? — A. I support myself. I am not helping anyone. i Miss Annie M. Devereaux, Providence, E. I., Jeweler. Q. What is your work, Miss Devereaux? — A. I am a chain-maker in the jewelry establishment of The Kent & Stanley Company, Provi : ience. Q. Do you work by the day or the piece? — A. I work by the piece. , _, [ average $9 a week, usually more; but I have been on short time a long while and do not make so much. The wages are the same, but it is short time. The loss is in short hours — same pay, but short hours. <^. Do yon know -the cause of the short hours? — A. Because our > business is dependent upon the general prosperity of other trades. The general depression has affected us. I live at home, and there is no me dependent on me. Miss Umily S. Young, Providence, E. I., Jeweler. Q. What is your work, Miss Young?— A. I am shipping clerk for the manufacturing jewelers, Potter & Bufflngton, Providence. I have irorked there sixteen years, not in that department, but for that firm. My work is by the day or we,eki Q. What do you receive per week?— A. 1 receive $10 a week. '-- Q. Is your business good at the present time?— A. In all the years ;hat I bave worked there I hatfe not known them to work so short 10 MEMORIAL OF' WAGE-EARNING WOMEN". hours as they. are working now; never. Of course, now and then a? day or job work, but the shop seems to be almost closed. «™ Q. (Senator Aldrich.) Could you estimate the reduction ?— A. 4f| least 50 per cent from now and two years ago. • Q. Miss Young, are you dependent on your self for support 1 ? — A. YeSj. I am dependent on myself for support; my sister and I together sup» port ourselves. Miss Mary J. Ryan, Woonsochet, B. I., cotton-weaver. Q. Miss Eyan, please state your business. — A. I am a cotton -weaver. I have worked twenty- three years for the Social Manufacturing Com- pany. I have always done weaving. Q. What has been your average wages'? — A. I averaged $10 a week until September, 1893. In October, $9 a week— $1.50 a day. Q. ,Why did your wages fall from $10 to $9?— A. The depression in business, owing to the tariff question, caused the works to be stopped for two weeks, and for four months following the work was slack. They 1 stopped last October. Then they ran on full time, but had a Scarcity of work. Q, (Senator Aldrich). Explain what you mean by that 1 ? — A. I mean that you can run four or five or six looms, but if you have only two or three looms, you will be there and your time will be taken up, but you will not earn so much. Q. Do you know why the work was slack during the time you have mentioned? — A. I was never told why the work was slack, but I learned through the press. - - Q. (Senator Aldrich) : Have you been able to save anything from your wages. A. Yes, I have been .able to save something in these years, but I have not saved anything for nine inonths. If this Wilson bill goes into effect, we suppose our wages to be reduced. Q. Do you support any one beside yourself? — A. There is no one dependent on me alone. Two sisters and myself work together iD the mill; we all work together and have everything that is required, with comfort. We work together in the mill, and all come together in the home. Miss Edith Wolstencroft, Taunton r Mass., cotton weaver. Q. Please state what kind of work you do?— A. I work at the Whit-' tenton Manufacturing Company, on gingham weaving. Q. What wages can you make? — A. I can make $8 on the javerage a week. Q. Have you ever worked in any other country? — A. I was born in' England. I worked in England. I worked on velvets at home at Oldham. I made from 16 to 18 shillings a week. I had 2 looms. I work two hours more now a week than I did at home. Fifty-eight hours now, fifty-six over there. Q. (Senator Aldrich.) What is the difference in the cost of living here and in England ?-^-A. I think some things are cheaper at home and some more expensive. The clothing is a good deal heavier at home than it is here. The climate is so much different. It is damp, heavy,. . foggy weather there; of course it is clearer here. Q. (Senator Allison.) How about the rent? — A. We have a tene- ment, 4 rooms for 2, and pay $7 a month. We had the same num- ber of rooms in,theold country, but it was not as comfortable; we <1 MEMORIAL OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN. Ill iaid 5 shillings a week at home, that is, $1.25 a week. We had not , he same conveniences at home as we have here. Q. (Senator Allison.) Who do you support beside yourself?— A. I iave my mother to keep. We are able tp-get on pretty well and keep- Louse. 1 get on better in this country. I could not keep my mother ,t home. It is better living here; I would not go back again and work here. Mrs-. Martha Haworth, Neio Bedford, Mass., cotton-weaver. Q. What is your work?— A. I am a weaver in a cotton-mill. I have- leen five years where I now work. Q. What wages can you make?— A. I now average about $8.50; I »ade $10 and $11 in good times. It is not short time; it is short pay. Q. Have you any one to care for but yourself ?— A. I have one little jirl dependent on me for support. She is 9 years old ; she is in school. keep house with the little girl. Q. How do the wages you make here compare with those deceived ar the same work in the old country? — A. I do not know the wages of' hose who had the same sort of work, in the country I came from. Mrs. Elizabeth Tyler, Boston, Mass., carpet-weaver. Q. Mrs. Tyler, please tell the committee where you work.— A. I work ,t the Roxbury Carpet Mills. It was twenty one years last November ince I began there. Q. Whatwagesdoyouget?— A. I average my wages for 1892 and 1893 p to the last of August at $8 and some odd cents. Since that time- he average pay, up to the present time, has been about $3.50 ; I formerly lade something over $8 t a week. I work by the piece. Q. What was the cause of this difference? — A. The mill has been losed down twice; the first time 6 weeks, the last time 4. There was 10 per cent reduction on the 9tk of October. Q. (Senator Aldrich.) Have you always worked in this country? — - l. I was born in England. I worked there for the John Bright's con- ern. Q. (Senator Aldrich.) How do wages paid there compare with wages aid here? — A. They paid a penny a yard, which would be equal to 2 Bnts; whereas our former price here was 3| cents for weaving a yardv. b is now 10 per cent less. Q. (Senator Aldrich.) What do you know about the conditions of ving in the two countries ? — A. We could not live in this country on the ages paid in England. I have conversed with several that have come ■om England, and have worked there, and they are unanimous in say- ig that they do not want to go back to the old country to work. It )8ts a girl $5 a week for Jboard and lodging, and then there are the inci- ental expenses. When we have work we can save a little; we can try nd have a little laid by for the future. If they want to ruin this mntry let them pass a free-trade bill. If the protection and the tariff re taken off the carpet industry, I say carpet industry, because I now more about that industry than any other, the manufacturer here- ill not be able to compete with the foreign manufacturer, and wages ! course will have to come down; it will be impossible for the people i Boston to live on the wages that will be paid; they can not do it;: leir living is too high. We want to do all we can to defeat the filson bill. 112'; MEMORIAL OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN. Miss Margaret Wright, Boston, Mass., earpet setter. ' Q. Miss Wright, what is your avocation 1 ? — A. I work in the. setting room of the Boxbury Carpet Works. I have worked twenty years in •■ that one place. I am a carpet setter. - i Q. Please explain your work? — A. I make the patterns such as are hi the carpet on this floor. Every day, I learn son* new pattern as a gen; , Mrs. J. Ellen Foster : Senators : All the women have given their testimony. It has been iistudied, direct, sincere. By their language, decorum, intelligence,.- nd evident understanding of their work they have shown you what he American system of economics can do and does do for the average 1 forking woman and for the home she lives in. We thank God for the healthful and happy conditions which have • xisted in this country. 'We pray that they may soon be restored. , We thank you, Senators, for your patient hearing. We knew we- ad a right to come, and as citizens of the Bepublic, a right to be heard ; ut we are-not unmindful of the consideration which you — Bepnblican > iinority members of the committee — have shown us, which has made- ur task less difficult. We realize that we have been honored by the close attention of the, lder members of this committee and of the Senate — Senators Morrill nd Sherman — and by the discriminating questions of Senators Allison* nd Aldrich. Again we thank you. 53d Congress, ) SENATE. ( Mis. Doc. 2d Session. J ) No. 210. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. June 14, 1894. — Referred to the Committee oa the Census and ordered to be printed. Mr. Kyle presented the following ARTICLE ON "CENSUS DISTRIBUTION OP THE GOLD AND SILVER BY STATES," PREPARED BY FREDERICK C. WAITE. WHAT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SAY. I have read the manuscript copy of an article entitled " Census distribution of gold and silver by States," prepared by Mr. Frederick C. Waite, late special agent of Eleventh Census in charge of statistics of true wealth. Mr. Waite's ability and standing as a statistician are a sufficient guarantee as to the reliability of his state- ments and the value of his contribution to the statistics of the country. The article should receive a wide circulation. W. M. Springer. I have read your article entitled ' ' Census distribution of gold and silver by States," and was instructed as well as interested. I have frequently charged that the people are systematically deprived of truthful information concerning the amount of money in circulation in the United States, and your showing makes the matter plain. W. A. Pefper. I think it most excellent. Mr. Waite, from his service as statistician of the Cen- sus Bureau and his high educational standing, is well fitted to perform the task he has undertaken. James H. Kyle. Census Distribution op the Gold and Silver by States. The long-expected census volumes are at last beginning to appear. Their tens of thousand of pages of facts and fiction will soon go forth to wield au influence, directly or indirectly, upon the thoughts of the whole American people. What kind of an influence will it be I Are those pages to enlighten or to deceive is a question of vital importance to every American citizen. Newspapers, magazines, and party platforms are read with a reserva- tion; laws come and go: but the census volumes come to stay, and to be consulted by our leaders of thought, who, not having so much as seen the inside of the Census Office, never think of questioning the accuracy of the figures. Much less do they consider themselves com- petent to undertake the delicate task of passing judgment upon its hundred million ems of figures and text. Hence it seems necessary that someone who has had a knowledge of the inside workings ot tne •Census Office should take the trouble to give the American people tne benefit of a few plain facts, especially as the Eleventh Census has cost 2 CENSUS DISTRIBUTION OF THE GOLD AND SILVER BY STATES. the American toilers three-fourths as many million dollars as all the previous censuses combined. It is unfair to criticise the preliminary census figures, and especially such -as are labled ''untrue." A bulletin has, however, recently appeared which is labled "true." At any rate the word "true" is repeated seventeen times in tbe little bulletin numbered 379. Of the dozens of columns of figures labeled "true" in large capitals, all, as I propose to prove, are full of errors. Leaving for later consideration the columns of figures in which the errors roll up into the thousands of millions, I will in this preliminary article confine myself to a criticism of the figures in the fifth column of table 1, which purports to give the amount of "gold and silver, coin and bullion," by States. These fig- ures were entirely worked up under the supervision of Col. Carroll D. Wright, who says on page 2 that the total for the United States is the amount as reported by the Director of the Mint for June 30, 1890. It was $1,158,774,948, and was taken from page 162 of the Finance Eeport. By reading the millions in the following table, omitting the thousands, we may get an idea of how it was made up and where it was located: Treasury $667,901,379 National banks (July) 85, 307, 645 Other banks and in circulation 405,565,924 Total 1,158,774,948 On the first page of this bulletin Col. Wright says: "The amounts are distributed among the respective States where the property is located without reference to ownership." To see whether his state- ment be correct or incorrect concerning the very first item, we have but to turn to the report of the IT. S. Treasurer. On pages '40 and 41 the Treasurer gives an itemized statement showing the exact location of this $667,901,379. He says that the amount of gold and silver in the subtreasury and assay office at New York City was $201,378,386. As Col. Wright puts the total in the State of New York at only $176,941,588, it is impossible that he included this $201,378,386 laying in the subtreasury and assay office at New York City. The Treasurer says that the amount of gold and silver in the mint and subtreasury at Philadelphia was $94,429,652. The banks of Pennsylvania reported $12,146,848. As the amount in sight in Penn- sylvania was the sum of $106,576,500, it is plain that Col. Wright did not include them both, for his estimate of the total located in Pennsyl- vania was only $99,700,483. The mint and subtreasury at New Orleans, La., contained $26,496,874. Col. Wright, however, put the total in the State of Louisiana at only $17,785,914. In strange contrast are his figures for Mississippi. Although the total amount of coin in sight was only $147,264, he accredited the State with $19,365,860. This is nearly $2,000,000 more than he accredited to Louisiana, which had- nearly two hundred times as much coin in sight as Mississippi, a larger number of white inhabitants, a smaller number of colored people, and very much more wealth. In the Southern States the total in sight equaled only from 1 to 5 per cent of Col. Wright's estimate, whereas in every State containing an important subtreasury the amount in sight was even greater than Col. Wright's total. We will now examine the basis upon which he put up his fallacious figures. A table on page 164 of the Finance Eeport gives, by States, the amount of gold coin in banks not national on December 31, 1889. • J-ne Report of the Comptroller of the Currency gives, on page 160, the CENSUS DISTRIBUTION OK THE GOLD AND SILVER BY STATES. 3 amounts of coin in national banks on October 2, 1890. Although these figures are not for June 30, the census date, they represent fairly well the location of the $116,6S7,392 in banks on that date; but this is only one-tenth of the total. It, however, represented all the coin in sight in each of the States except the few which contained subtreasuries. Had Col. Wright added, in the case of those few, the immense amounts in the branches of the Treasury located therein, he would have had an accurate statement of the location of seven-tenths of the gold and sil- ver in the country as a basis for his estimate. He or his clerk, how- ever, threw facts to the wind, and taking the figures giving the location of the one-tenth in banks added, not only in the case of the few States in which subtreasuries were located, but in the case of the others also, an amount equal to the coin certificates in the national banks located therein. He must have known that these certificates were not coin, and that the gold which the clearing-house certificates represented had been counted already, and, moreover, that as millions of the Treasury certificates were in States not containing a subtreasury, he by count- ing the certificates accredited the coin to the wrong State. So much for the two tenths. How did Col. "Wright apportion the eight- tenths"? Let the figures answer. Adding together these three items : Coin in national banks (October) $85,474,975 Gold in other banks 31, 212, 417 Certificates in national banks 110, 433, 884 He bad 227,121,276 Subtracting it from the total 1, 15*, 774, 948 He bad left 931,653,672 As though the whole of this vast amount of coin and bullion was in the pockets of the people, he divided by 62,622,250, the population of the United States, and found that the remaining eight tenths equaled about a quarter of a cent less than $14.88 for each man, woman, and child in the country. He therefore computed his estimates of the amount of coin in each State by adding to the amount in sight, includ- ing coin certificates, an amount equal to $14.88 multiplied by the num- ber of inhabitants in the State. As we have the figures giving the actual distribution by States of not only the one- tenth in the banks reporting, but also of the six-tenths in the Treasury, we would be able to see how wide of the mark the "$14.88 per capita" apportionment scheme has lead Col. Wright, if we could find out how the remaining three-tenths, or, as we shall call it, the amount in circulation, was distributed among the various sections of the country. As the total amount whose location is unknown was $374,186,177, it equaled for the whole country $5.97| per capita. Using estimates of the amount on the Pacific slope made by the Director of the Mint, we see that east of the Rocky Mountains it did not average more than $5.50. The amount in the South was much less, probably only about $3 per capita, as may be inferred from a study of the facts at hand. Of the moneys in national banks, which, by the way, are but the reflection of those in circulation, coin constituted in the South only two-sevenths of the total, while in the North, outside of cities with subtreasuries, it constituted three- sevenths. Strange as it may seem at first, an examination indicates that the ratio holds good concerning the moneys in circulation. Hence in the rural North, if the total ^cir- culation equaled $14 or $15 per capita the amount of coin is $6 or $6.44 ; 4 CENSUS DISTRIBUTION OF THE GOLD AND SILVER BY STATES. and if the total money in circulation in the South equaled $10.50 or $14, the amount of coin equaled $3 or $4 per capita. . When we take into consideration the fact that the railroad companies alone held on June 30, 1890, $307,874,188 in cash and current assets combined, and that immense sums were in the tills of merchants and the vaults of corporations in our great cities, and that the total amount of money in the United States outside of the Treasury and the 11,000 banks equaled about $14.84 per capita, we must admit that these smaller figures are probably nearer the truth, if we are to make a proper allowance for the larger supply of moneyan our great cities. Census guesses of per capita amount of gold and silre the facts. in each State paralleled Kural South, 12 Rural North, 16 City States, 10 Ohio Illinois Massachusetts Missouri Maryland Pennsylvania Louisiana New York California j - . District of Columbia Census figuring. Basis. Coin cer- tificates national banks. Coin in banks re- porting. $lto$ lto Census Sura plus $14.88 per capita. Actual amount. That in banks and treas ury plus $6,' or $3 per capita. $15 1 4 3 ] 1 2 3' 12 1 10 12 13 15 17 20 30 42 •100 751 Actual amount in treasury. 10 18 24 34 72 767 * $16 in lieu of circulation. In the third column of the foregoing table are the census figures giv' ing the amount of gold and silver in the various sections reduced to a per capita basis. As already pointed out they were made up by add- ing to the sum of column 1, "coin certificates," and column 2, "coin in banks," $14.88 per capita in lieu of circulation. Columns 2 and 5, giving 1 the amount reported by banks and by the Treasury, are put in bold- faced type to indicate that they are fact and that all estimates which are to be of value must be founded upon them as a basis. Hence the fourth column, which is an approximate statement of the actual amount located in each section is made up by adding to their sum the amounts already agreed upon in lieu of circulation, namely, $3 per capita in the rural South and $6 in the other States east of the Eocky Mountains. From the second column we see that in the rural States of the South the total amount of coin in sight ranged from 1 dime per capita in Mississippi and Arkansas to nearly 8 dimes in Texas and Ken- tucky. Hence, as the average per capita amount in circulation, that is, the amount not in sight east of the Eocky Mountains is only $5.50 and probably not over $3 in the rural South, the total amount of gold and silver was probably only a few dimes over $3 per capita or only a fifth as great as the census guess. Nebraska, Minnesota, Connecti- cut, and Ehode Island had $2 per capita in sight and the other 12 States of the rural North $1. As the amount in circulation can not be , CENSUS DISTRIBUTION OF THE GOLD AND SILVER BY STATES. 5 over $6 the total in none of these States was half as much as the cen- sus guess. In the case of Ohio,. Illinois, and Massachusetts we see by adding $6 per capita in lieu of circulation to the amount in the banks reporting and in the Treasury that the total is only three-fifths as great as the census guess. For Missouri and Maryland the census estimates are nearer the truth. When we come to Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and New York, as we have seen already, the census total was even less than the amount in sight. California is credited with • only $32,674,449, although the mint and subtreasury at San Francisco alone contained $93,642,013. The banks reported $14,285,695, and the coin in circulation equaled about $16 per capita. Thus the total in the State was about $100 per capita, whereas the census guess is only $27. To cap the climax Col. Wright put the total amount of "gold and sil- ver coin and bullion" located in the District of Columbia at $5,266,300, although the Treasury building alone contained $176,647,933. It is a little surprising that the Commissioner of Labor, whose office has been for years diametrically across from the Treasury building, should have been totally ignorant of the fact that the Government had accu- mulated there the greatest pile of silver that had ever been heaped up in the whole history of mankind. Moreover, on the part of his chief census guesser, such ignorance is incredible, as he was actually y employed in the Treasury for almost eighteen years and was the Assist- ant Secretary for two years. We see, however, that it was the States with subtreasuries that con- tained the gold and silver which Col. Wright incorrectly apportioned among the rural States. He who would excuse such ignorance on the ground that the census guessers had imbibed their erroneous ideas from the people, can go down the street of any city in the land and accost the first ignorant fellow that he meets and ask him where the $1 ,200,000,000 of gold and silver in the country is located. The reply will be: "Veil, I dunno e'zactly, but I s'pose that a heap on't is held in New Yo'k, Philadelphy and San Francisky, and by the Gov'ment at Vashington." Such a reply would be in accordance with the opinions of the whole American people. It would be correct, because these four cities actually contained over half of all the gold and silver in the country, and three- fourths of the total that was in sight. Moreover, it would be fairly accurate, whereas the census figures in the case of the District of Columbia are less than one-thirtieth of what they should be, and in the case of all but four States and Territories have missed the mark by upwards of 50 per cent, and in the South by from 300 to 400 per cent. The deadly fact, however, is not that the census figures are erro- neous, but as we will see in later articles that dozens of columns of figures in this and other census bulletins bear the imprint of a machine and not of a brain. When the total amount of coin and paper money outside of the Treasury and the 11,000 banks equaled only $14.84 per capita it was not a mark of brain power to suppose that the portion which was coin equaled $14.88. Neither did brains dictate that the amount m the South was as great as in California. Moreover, when the census- guesser came to the Indian Territory, just as we might have expected of a machine, he added to the amount of coin and certificates m the banks nothing in lieu of circulation, because the population table which he was using was blank for "that Territory. In fact, the Territory had a seventh as many inhabitants as Mississippi, a seventh as much com 6 CENSUS DISTRIBUTION OF THE GOLD AND SILVER BY STATES. in sight, and probably a seventh as much in circulation, and yet the census-guesser, by mechanically following his population table, accred- ited only one- thousandth as much coin to the Indian Territory as to Mississippi. The census-guessing machine which thus accredited nothing to the Indian Territory in lieu of circulation would have done likewise in the case of New York if the population table had been blank for that State. Since the Census Office has published under the label true statements so diametrically opposed to truth, reason, and common sense, upon sub- jects concerning which the opinions of the people are fairly correct, what must we think of its management under the present head who has said repeatedly : " My friend Porter is not a statistician, but I stand for statistical integrity." Frederick 0. Waite. ■SJSSST} SENAm |»j?r No. 262. IK THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES August 11, 1894.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Teller presented the following: THE EVIDENCE OP A CROWN COLONY ON GOLD AND SILVER PRICES— BIMETALLISM IN RELATION TO AGRICUL- TURAL DEPRESSION. [An address delivered before the London Chamber of Commerce, on the 24th of Julv bvSI Isemonger, colonial treasurer and member of council of the Straits Settlements.] ' ' The great importance of the question of the rate of exchange between gold and silver is so universally admitted, arid the urgency of finding a solution to the problem of how to control their divergencies is so acutely felt in many quarters, that I have been induced to accept your kind permission to address this chamber in order to lay before you some particulars of the working conditions of a Crown colony, whose currency is silver alone, hoping that what I have to say may throw some light on the effect of the fall in silver exchange upon British trade. I refer to the colony of the Straits Settlements, which you are aware is at the extreme end of the Malay Peninsula. This colony consists of the islands of Singapore and Penang ; Malacca, province Wellesley, and the Dindings on the mainland. The area is about 1,500 square miles; the population nearly 600,000. These settlements were formerly established by India; the island of Penang was purchased from a Malay rajah, a little over a hundred years ago, as a convenient port for the ships of the East India Com- pany on their way to and from China. Singapore was acquired in 1819 by Sir Stamford Raffles, who recognized the great importance of its position as a naval station at the entrance of the China Sea. Malacca has a history of its own ; formerly a rich Malay kingdom, the emporium of the far east, it was conquered by the Portuguese, and afterwards passed into the hands of the Dutch. From the latter we finally took it by treaty in exchange for another , settlement in Sumatra in 1825. The settlements remained Indian, governed by East India Company's "officers, and garrisoned by Indian troops, till 1867, when they were created a Crown colony and transferred to Imperial rule. The general importance of the colony has since then greatly increased from various causes; the opening of the Suez Canal facilitated and largely developed its commerce. Its new relations toward the Malay states have opened up a large field for the employment of British capi- tal and an output for its trade, and this advantage is capable of large increase when the peninsula is more developed and railways are extended. The strategical importance of Singapore as a coaling sta- tion for our navy has also greatly risen, and strong fortifications have been built to defend this. In 1874 the experiment was tried of appointing British residents to I QOLD ANP SILVEE PRICES. the neighboring native states to assist in their government. These states were, and are still, under the rule of native Malay chiefs, but until we intervened they were in a continual state of disturbance from internal disputes, generally on a question of succession. Chinese from our settlements went in to trade and to mine, and they became mixed up in these disputes and in mining quarrels with each other, commonly ending in fights which were sometimes even extended to our settle- ments. In fact, we suffered from having uncivilization and absence of law next door to us, and were compelled to introduce order in our own interests. The policy of establishing British residents, and of advanc- ing money to assist the native states in the commencement of govern- ment, was initiated by Sir Andrew Clarke, of the royal engineers,. who was at that time governor. This policy was continued and* enlarged upon by the late Sir Frederick Weld, who took the keenest interest in the matter, and whose experience as a pioneer and statesman in New Zealand rendered him capable of taking a large" view of the heeds of a new country, and who wisely and liberally invested with a view to the future. The success of the native states has surpassed all anticipations. With the establishment of British protection capital and population poured in, the principal states speedily became self-supporting, and now have a large revenue, more than sufficing their needs. The climate of the peninsula is fairly good; constant rainfall and breezes, both from sea and from the high mountains, which run down its center, keep it much cooler than would be imagined from its position in the tropics. It is very damp, but to this we owe the comparative absence of serious epidemics and also the great charm and beauty of luxu- riant vegetation. The colony is an agglomeration of all nations; their flags may be seen flying in the roadsteads, and a walk through the streets of Singa- pore will show the traveler specimens of almost every nationality under the sun. The Malays, the indigenous population, are an agri- cultural and simple people, who form but an insignificant part of the trading community. They fish, grow rice and fruit, and collect jungle produce. Amongst the foreigners those in largest number are the Chinese, who furnish the bulk of the working population, as well as of the shopkeepers. The colony has a large export trade to Europe of produce collected from neighboring countries, such as Siam, Borneo, Sumatra, and the native states of the Malay Peninsula. The chief products of the colony are tin, coffee, sugar, tapioca, gam- bier, and rattans. Tea cultivation is being tried. The tin mining in the Straits has assumed large proportions; it is the chief industry, and is said to supply 75 per cent of the consumption of the world. 1 can not vouch for the absolute correctness of this assertion, but it is certain that the yield is very large. The colony has hitherto been very flourishing; its revenue, until the last few years, had steadily increased; trade prospered, and new industries sprang up. For some years past, however, in common with India, it has felt the effect of the fall in exchange, and the European mercantile community has made more than one appeal to the govern- ment on the subject of currency. During the last few years they have echoed loudly the complaints of their English brethren with regard to depression and almost stagnation of trade. At last the prospect of impending legislation to protect Indian currency led the Singapore Chamber of Commerce, in January, 1893, to request that the interests GOLD AND SILVER PRICES. $ of the Straits Settlements might be considered in connection with any- proposed changes for India. This was not done. The action of India in June, which separated the rupee from silver in attempting to secure a gold basis, caused an immediate and considerable fall in the value of the dollar. The chamber of commerce again addressed the colonial government, representing the fears it entertained of further fall by the contemplated repeal of the Sherman Act, and stating that any further serious fall "could not fail to prove disastrous to the general, economic, and commercial interests of the colony," and prayed for a " consideration of such remedial measures as may secure the colony and its commerce from financial disaster." This resulted in the appointment, by direction of the secretary of state, of a committee to consider the currency of the Straits Settle- ments, on which I had the honor to serve. I should begin by stating that in spite of its close connection with India, the currency in the Straits has always been the dollar, no doubt because of the convenience of this coin with surrounding trade. In the Indian days an attempt to introduce the rupee was made without success. The currency in use consists of notes of the local banks, the Mexican dollar, the Japanese yen, and subsidiary silver and copper coin furnished by the government. Eepresentatives of all classes were examined by the committee, bank- ers, merchants, planters, miners, and traders of all sorts, composed of English, German, Swiss, Dutch, Chinese, Indian, and Arab. The views of the community proved to be as conflicting as their interests were varied. The evidence taken, however, was interesting and valuable, as it made clear who obtained the profits and where the losses fell from low exchange. Fixity of exchange was desired by a large majority. Some desired a gold basis, others a silver one, but the largest interests represented desired the silver basis. The English or European investor, and the merchant whose prin- cipal trade is in merchandise produced in gold countries, were urgent in seeking the arrest of silver from further decline, and desired to obtain fixity of exchange by establishing a gold basis of value. With the above were associated in interest the Indian and Arab traders. They showed that their trade had shrunk, that investments in the colony from England had been withdrawn, and that property in the colony was ruinously depreciated as to its gold value, and that the English capitalist could no longer be induced to invest his gold, as it was uncertain what the profit might be and as the capital itself might melt away. I will quote you the evidence of the head of one of the principal German firms : The settlement is suffering from the present low rate of exchange, at least the import trade. The uncertainty in exchange makes it very difficult for importers to hring that quantity of goods into the colony which they would hring if things were otherwise. "At present they have to expect a loss before getting back their money for the goods they import. European capital is certainly shut out of the place— the want of capital causes trade to be stagnant. " * * I do not see that the loss caused to the import trade by the fall in exchange has been counterbalanced by the extra profit on exports. The shrinkage in the import trade directly attects the European merchant here; the improvement in the export trade does not benent him, hut only the native producer. The strongest evidence was given on the subject of loss on British capital invested in the colony. One witness, a planter, asserted that the amount of capital which had yearly to be written off far outweighed any profit that planters could make from the enhanced value of prod- uce. The final report of the committee pointed to the check to BntisU 4 GOLD AND SILVER PRICES. investments as perhaps the greatest loss the colony had suffered. _But this is inevitable; the result of uncertain silver must be to shut British capital out of silver-using countries. Under present circumstances the planter is as unwilling to borrow gold capital as the European capital- ist is tO' lend it. If we wish to advance in silver countries we must have silver returnable at fixed value to work with. Just as the English trader is handicapped in trade so is the English investor handicapped as to the value of property. Then we obtained the evidence of the merchants whose preponder- ance of business is in the export of native produce. These were willing to follow the fortunes of silver, accepting the disadvantages of imports from Europe for the counterbalancing profits on exports. Next we came to those interested in silver alone, notably the Chinese, in whose hands is a large proportion of the trade of the colony. These people have supplanted the English investor, to their own benefit, at the loss of the latter. The Chinaman is entirely independent of gold produce. The dollar to him is practically nearly as valuable as it was in 1873. China produces his food, his clothes, his tea, and tobacco, and when luxuries from gold countries become too dear he dispenses with them. Perhaps, however, the most amusing downright advocate of low exchange was the principal partner of the Tin Smelting Company, a large and profitable business in Singapore. He said : I believe a rise in the value of silver would act prejudicially on the tin producers ; a number of mines which produce at present prices could not produce at lower ones. All I can say is that the present low price of silver, by adding materially to the gains of the producer, enables him to work inferior mines. * * * I should say, let things go their way and find their level; if the dollar went down to 6 own country, levied an export duty on its fabrics. This has been stopped, and Japan is meeting our manufacturers on their own ground; China is said to be following her example. Like the tin-smelter whom I mentioned before, producers in silver countries may well say, " Let the dollar go to 6d., and we shall be able to supply the whole world." But here, in the heart of the city of Lon- don, the men who conduct the greatest commercial transactions of the world should be fully alive to the tremendous revolution which low silver is working. This is not a matter to be put aside as a fad or a theory. Time is an object, for every year makes the situation more difficult, and should the silver countries learn to supply themselves in all things, our trade may never be recovered. May I hope that the evidence which I have laid before you of the direct working influence of silver in a British colony may be useful, and that the time may not be far distant when this country will act upon the opinion of Mr. Lidderdale, quoted by Mr. Balfour at the Mansion House, that — It is absolutely necessary that the monetary function of silver should be restored, if the commerce of the world is to be carried on under healthy conditions and upon a solid and permanent basis. U. S. Senate, Washington, D. O., June 11, 1894. My Dear Sir : Your invitation comes at a moment when Congress requires the attendance of its members. I should be glad to accept it, for we have entered a troubled time and we need mutual counsel and support; but whatever I am to say can be said only in writing. 8 GOLD AND SILVER PRICES. This is not a moment for stimulating bitterness or inflaming passions. We need all our powers of forbearance and self-control. Let us give credit to our opponents at least for good intentions, even though they give no credit to us. All Europe and all America are in trouble. Every- one admits that the world stands on the edge of revolution — social and political; but everyone shrinks from it. Neither North nor South, neither East nor West, neither capitalist nor laborer, wishes to create caste or classes or to spread misery, oppression, or violence. We all see danger before us. We all desire to avoid it. Our only dispute is about the path. To those of us who have had chiefly in mind the struggle between silver and gold that is the question which, for the 'moment, presses hardest. The single gold standard seems to us to be working ruin with violence that nothing can stand. If its influence is to continue for the future at the rate of its action during the twenty years since the gold stand- ard took possession of the world some generation, not very remote, will see in the broad continent of America only a half dozen overgrown cities keeping guard over a mass of capital and lending it out to a population of dependent laborers on the mortgage of their growing crops and unfinished handiwork. Such sights have been common enough in the world's history; but against it we all rebel. Rich and poor alike; Republicans, Democrats, Populists; labor and capital; railways, churches and colleges — all alike, and all in solid good faith, shrink from such a future as that. This agreement is the best part of the situation. At least we can be sure that no one is deliberately conspiring against our safety. Even on the burning ground of silver and gold we agree in principle. No party and no party leader has ever approved of the single gold stand- ard. Not one American in a hundred believes in it. We are more unanimous in hostility to it than we are on any other question in poli- tics. A vast majority in all parties agree that the single gold standard has been, is, and will be, a national disaster of the worst kind. What is still more strange, almost the whole world sympathizes with us. Nine-tenths of mankind are hostile to the single gold standard. Our 70,000,000 people are unanimous against it. Most of the great European nations and their governments dislike it. South America rejects it. The whole of Asia knows only silver, and India, which contains five- sixths of all the subjects of the British Crown, is as hostile to it as our- selves. Yet the bankers of London have said that we must submit, and we have submitted. So strange a spectacle has never been seen in our history. Argu- ment, and even the compiilsive proof brought by world-wide ruin, seems to be helpless against this astonishing power. What is the use of argu- ment when we are all convinced, and whe,n at least nine-tenths of the civilized and uncivilized world agree*? England holds us to the single gold standard by the force of her capital alone, more despotically than she could hold us to her empire in 1776. The mere threat of her dis- pleasure paralyzes mankind. The most instructive point of all is that our great majority consists of the interests in the world which have been from time immemorial reckoned as the safest and most conservative. The whole agricultural class; the whole class or classes of small, proprietors, the farmers that make the bulk and sinew of our race; the artisan whose interests are bound up in the success of our manufac- tures; all these join hands with what is left of their old enemies, the GOLD AND SILVEE PRICES. landed aristocracy of Europe, to protest against a revolution made for the benefit of money lenders alone. On the other hand, that revolution is more radical than any which has been accomplished by professed revolutionists. Had all the des- potic .governments that have existed in a thousand years united their intelligence to set class against class, to breed corruption, to stimulate violence, and to shatter the foundations of society, they could have invented no device more effective than this decree which at one stroke doubled the value of capital, destroyed the value of industry, and swept the small proprietor everywhere into bankruptcy. The whole conservative force of the world protests against so violent and despotic a change. We protest against it the more because we know enough of politics to fear the reaction against such extrava- gance. We see the risks to which the gold mania is exposing lis. We have reason to know the popular feeling, and we do not believe that, the single gold standard can be long maintained. We want real money — coin — carrying intrinsic value; yet if England succeeds in her obstinate effort to destroy the value. of silver for coinage, nothing can save us from paper. England may well succeed ; she seems already to be on the point of success greater than her Government wanted; and, in that case, irredeemable paper — fiat money — stares us square in the face. Something, then, must be decided, and quickly, for delay itself is likely to be decision. The Republican party must either fix the single standard on the nation or reject it. This time we can no longer escape the issue, and whatever we do must be done openly. Where a great policy is'to be entered upon the straightforward path is the best. The Eepablican. party held power for a whole generation, and during all that time made only one fatal mistake. Under the influence of the banking interest, acting in what was then believed to be the true interest of the country, the party fell into the foreign conspiracy for making a single gold standard, and, what was worse, did it with a foreign air of conspiracy. We can not afford to repeat that error. The time has come for decision, and the decision must be open. No such moment can recur. You can act with confidence that your judgment is at least as good as that of other men. Neither the banking interest nor any other interest has, for the time, a right toclairn superior knowl- edge or wisdom. In view of the ruin they have wrought, and the vaster ruin that they threaten, no risk that in their opinion you may seem to run can cause a moment's fear. Even those who oppose the return of the Republican party to its old principles will admit that those principles would give it power for another generation. We need only be true to ourselves; we need only assert and maintain our own convictions and no other parcy, born or unborn, can take the field from us as long as we choose to hold it. No other party can represent as we do the whole national instinct; all our industries, all our popular energies ; all our conservative caution. As long as the Republican party holds to its duty of representing the whole nation, it must hold sway unless something greater than the nation can be found to overthrow it. "The task before us is to restore normal activity to our industry; to b^eak down the barriers of sectionalism; to check the increasing ten- sion between rich and poor; to relieve agriculture, and to save the small farmer and manufacturer-— in a word, to smooth away the threat- ening dangers of social discontent. The Republican party alone has power to do this and to carry on our society for at least one more gener- 10 GOLD AND SILVER PRICES. ation without further disaster. You have only to adopt a platform o: four words and' to take your stand on it firmly, courageously, witl honest determination to be true to it. The party has always maintained the national principle of a high tariff. You, whose deepest and besl interests depend upon its success, have alone the power to add "fret silver." Very truly, yours, J. D. Cameron. Andrew B. Humphrey, Esq., Secretary National Republican League, Denver, Colo. BIMETALLISM IN RELATION TO AGRICULTURAL DEPRESSION. [Address by the Eight Hon. Henrv Chaplin, M.P., to the Scottish Chamber of Agriculture, May 30 1894.] The Eight Hon. Henry Chaplin, M. p., ex-president of the board o; agriculture, delivered an address on May 30, 1894, in the Queen Streel Hall, Edinburgh, under the auspices of the Scottish Chamber of Agri- culture, on "Bimetallism in relation to agricultural depression.' There was a large attendance. THE ADDRESS. Mr. Chairman, ladies, and gentlemen: I am very grateful, indeed, to you for the kindly welcome you have given me this afternoon, and perhaps you will allow me to begin by saying this, that wher I was asked to visit Edinburgh in order to address you upon the question which is to be the subject of our discussion this afternoon, if was with somewhat mingled feelings that I received your invitation, I was very sensible of the honor you had done me, and it was a matter of the greatest satisfaction to 'me to think that this question was becoming a subject of such interest in Scotland, and that it was engag- ing the minds and the keen intelligence of so hard-headed and acute a race as the people of your country. [Applause.] But I had great diffidence in deciding to accept your invitation, and for this reason: The subject itself is one of great complexity; .it is no easy task to ■explain it clearly to those who are uninitiated, and there is no question in the world which gives rise to such bitter animosity and to such burning controversies between the two opposing parties. The battle of the standards, as it is called, has been waging now for many years, and although bimetallists are no longer subject to the same abuse as formerly, I am happy to think that that phase of ignorance and folly has passed away, and although bimetallists, in face of overwhelming difficulties, have been steadily making way, it certainly has not lessened the animosity of their opponents. In fact, I often think that it is very for- tunate for us that we do not happen to be living still in the days of the dark ages [laughter] for I am quite confident if we were, that the conveners of this meeting, probably your chairman, and most certainly the member for Sleaford, would have been burned at the stake, if that were possible, by our monometallic opponents before I could escape from Edin burgh to-morrow [laughter] for the economic heresies I am going to pro pound to you to-night. But be that as it may, it happens that I have had some opportunities, as a member of the gold and silver commis GOLD AND SILVER PRICES. 11 sign and otherwise, of acquiring information on this question. I can say with perfect truth that I have given much attention to it, and I have come to the deliberate conclusion that it is a matter of surpassing interest to the great industry which you represent [applause] and I own that I am heartily glad of the opportunity of pressing upon you to-night the views I hold myself upon this question, and of the truth of whicb I am entirely convinced. Let me add this also, gentlemen, that while it will be my object to speak, I hope, in no dogmatic spirit, and with all the diffidence which is becoming in discussing an abstruse and highly complicated question, I do most earnestly desire to press upon you with complete conviction, and as strongly and as clearly as I can, the reasons which have guided me in forming the conclusions which I have done on this vast and enormous question. For if I can convince you that the bimetallic party are right in their contentions, why, then, the magnitude and the importance of this question can not be exag- gerated, for it touches, and it must and will affect, every industry and every- other question you can think of. ["Hear, hear."] And now, gentlemen, without further preface, I will turn to the consideration of the subject on which you have invited me to address you. It is entitled "Bimetallism in relation to agricultural depression." That is to be the theme of our discussion to-night, and, I hope, of many subsequent discussions in your association. I think that I shall best be able to explain my general views upon the subject by submitting to you the following propositions. They are three in number, and my contentions are as follows: First, that the cause of agricultural depression is chiefly to be found in the heavy fall which has occurred in recent years, and which is still progressing in the prices of agricultural produce of almost every description, and so long as this decline in prices is con- tinued, any real and permanent return of agricultural prosperity is practically hopeless for the future. Secondly, that this continued drop im prices has been consequent upon, and is mainly due to, the great monetary changes on the continent, which resulted in the abandonment of the bimetallic system, trader which, and under the full effects of which, the entire business of this couutry and the world was carried on prior to 1873. And lastly, that in order to arrest this continuous and progressive fall, it is desirable to revert to the system which pre- vailed up till 1873, and under which the summit of agricultural and industrial prosperity was reached and successfully, maintained throughout the whole of the United Kingdom. [Applause.] Now, gentlemen, that is a summary of the views which I intend to submit to you, and it is on my ability to make good the several propositions which they embrace that I shall rest my claim to your support for the opinions which I hold. EXISTENCE OF AGRICULTURAL DEPRESSION. Now, as to the existence of agricultural depression, I apprehend that there is no difference of opinion. It is a painful and undoubted fact, which too many of you, I fear, have realized by practical experi- ence already, and which, so far as 1 know, is not disputed or denied by anyone. There are other subjects, I am well aware, that very properly engage the attention of agriculturists at the present time, in addi- tion to the question of prices. For instance, there is the question of land tenure for one; there is the question of the amendment of the agri- cultural holdings act for another ["Hear!" "Hear!"], and then there is another very important subject, viz, the undue burden of the rates and 12 GOLD AND SILVER PRICES. taxation upon land [applause], and so on with many others. Many o them are very important and deserving of careful consideration ; and wit] regard to one and all of them I hope that you will always find me foremos among those who are ready to lend a willing ear to any well-considere< propositions for their amendment or alteration. [Applause.] But Id not think that anyone has ever cited any of them as direct causes o agricultural depression, and probably for this reason, that we kno\ from past experience that they have been coexistent with periods o the greatest agricultural prosperity. I submit, then, gentlemen, fc begin with, that I am right in tracing agricultural depression in th main to the general fall in the prices of your produce, and that is ai opinion which at all events is very widely shared. It was the purpor and effect of the main and principal resolution which was unanimous!; adopted by the great conference which was held at St. James's Hall 01 the 7th and 8th of December, 1892, and in my recollection there ha. certainly never been a gathering of agriculturists of like importance For that conference, of some 1,500 or 2,000 people, was composed delegates from no less than 250 agricultural associations assemble) together from all parts of the kingdom. And I may tell you thi besides, that it is also the uuanimous testimony of every witness wh up till now has come before the royal agricultural commission — am Mr. Gilmour and Mr. Clay will bear me out in this— which is inquirinj at this moment into the whole question of agricultural depression ; and indeed, it is really unnecessary to argue the point, for I do not think tha there is anyone who seriously disputes it. I assume then, gentlemei that up to this point I shall carry the assent of this meeting with me But there is another feature in this fall of prices to which I must cal marked attention, and which is perhaps of chief importance, namely that this fall has been hitherto progressive, and no one knows or cai foresee where and when it is to end. If they could, if any one of yoi could be assured that you had once touched bottom, and that, low a they are now, prices would remain stable and steady in the future then it might be possible on land of reasonable quality to conduc your industry on a business-like and stable footing. Fresh arrange ments could be made, a general adjustment would take place in rent in wages, in expenses, and in all outgoings, and the business would g< on as before. It would be a terrible state of things, and it wouli entail. enormous suffering. The present generation of farmers and cul tivators would most of them be ruined and pass away; but, still, i once you could be certain that prices had touched bottom, why, then after a general readjustment, such as I describe on a certain quality land, the industry could go on and be prosecuted in the future, alway upon the condition that prices had reached their lowest level, am could be counted upon to remain steady in the future. But thai unhappily, is not the case. The fall of prices has been continuous noi for many years, and it is still progressing. And in order to see this yen have only to look at the evidence of what is known as the system c index numbers. Perhaps I ought to explain to you what that system is It is a system by which you ascertain what has been the average ris or fall in the prices of a certain number of different articles over given number of years. The method you adopt is this: You take certain number of articles, 50 or 100 say, more or less, as many as yo like, and the price of each of them at a given date is represented by standard number, say 100. Any variations in the prices of these sej arate articles which occur in each year afterwards are made a note 0: Thereupon you add to or subtract from the standard number in eac GOLD AND SILVER PRICES. . 13 case, according as there has been a rise or fall, and by adding together the numbers so obtained you get a general average of what the rise or fall upon the whole of these articles has been. Many different tables of prices have been compiled iu recent years upon this system by a number of eminent men. The best known of them are the tables of the Economist newspaper, of Dr. Soetbeer, of Mr. Giffen, of Dr. Sauerbeck, M. Palgrave, and others, and they all show very much the same result, namely, that the prices of commodities geuerally have been steadily falling now for many years. The latest table I have seen —that of Mr. Sauerbeck— shows that from 1873 to 1893 the fall has been rather over 40 per cent, and it still continues in 1894. Now, take the case of one article alone, of wheat, for instance. Wheat, in spite of everything, is still an important crop in some of our Scottish and English counties. There are some parts of Great Britain where the laud is capable of growing first-rate crops of wheat, but where it is fit for very little else. Now, what has been the course of the prices of , wheat for several years past ? You will probably remember that when Mr. Clare Eead and Mr. Albert Pell went out as subcommissioners to America for the Eiehmond Commission in 1879, they left America under the impression that wheat would not be sent to England from America in the future under 40s. a quarter. It began to fall, however, shortly afterward below that price, and it went on falling till it • reached 30s. some two or three years ago; and I remember quite well pointing out to the great conference at St. James's Hall sixteen months ago that it had then come down to 25s., and I saw no reason why it should not fall to 20s. Well, now, what is the latest intelligence we have on that point ? On December 12, of last year I got this infor- mation from a friend, a reliable correspondent at Bristol, who is kind enough to keep me well informed upon these matters. He wrote as "follows: Several of onr leading corn importers have purchased cargoes of sound, dry Rus- sian wheat for delivery in February, March, and April next at 22s. 6d. and 23s. per quarter of 492 pounds, and to-day sundry cargoes and parcels of similar wheat are on offer and obtainable at 22s. 3d. The impression here is that bottom has at last been touched, but he added a word of caution, the same impression existed when wheat was 30s. a quarter. [Laughter.] But I have a later communication than that from the same authority, -as late as May 9, and again he writes : My friends on the Corn Exchange tell me to-day that the record has again been beaten. River Plate wheats, f. a. q. (meaning fair average quality), are offered at 20s. per quarter. And coming later still, to the 22d of this month, I received this memorandum last week from the city of London: •Messrs. Ralli Bros, sold recently red Kurrachee wheat, May and June shipments to Hull, at 19s^3d. per 492 pounds. This was superior, and would make fair average quality worth only 18s. 6 13, 043 1, 602, 876 380, 971 10, 698 155, 223 83, 587 631, 183 12, 687 46, 662 102, 982 25, 885 62, 780 1, 136, 068 3, 536, 362 Countries to which 1891. 18! 2. 1893. 1894. which imported. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Tons. 18, 475 48, 150 10, 060 3,195 3,180 8,304 83, 892 2,215 1,740 710, 834 122, 865 17,410 61, 364 35.724 246, 907 18, 188 9,037 38, 117 4,201 30, 869 $57, 538 145, 901 30, 020 10, 000 9,960 41, 118 274, 416 6,920 5,473 2, 037, 484 600. 477 49, 880 163, 821 94, 037 682, 268 47, 897 79, 764 118, 659 17,634 121, 264 Tons. 41, 069 40, 170 3,771 4,363 2,861 4,473 86, 621 3,782 3,000 831, 046 114, 979 20, 186 56, 856 43,209 357, 219 17, 865 9,435 24, 552 5,164 29, 875 $128, 293 124, 213 11, 981 18, 568 9,380 23, 377 295, 989 11,816 9,348 2, 381, 937 542, 694 59, 808 149, 882 113, 360 984, 957 47, 717 105, 698 74, 685 22, 120 113, 675 Tons. 22, 866 39, 721 1,805 6,209 919 7,726 66, 185 1,920 5,775 994, 594 158, 139 12, 959 37, 004 32, 290 309, 684 17, 990 8,741 30, 203 3,877 13, 949 $72, 080 122, 327 5,545 22. 475 3,494 33, 702 246, 418 5,976 30, 622 2, 499, 446 730, 396 39, 562 99, 564 84, 808 837, 218 48, 065 96, 622 95, 147 20, 147 55, 920 Tons. 20, 236 32, 613 2,795 6,205 2,363 4,771 47,471 2,445 1,879 1, 442, 292 122, 506 32, 155 41, 460 38, 861 308, 894 15, 179 7,435 25, 396 6,369 16, 996 $64, 570 101, 880 10, 033 Netherlands 19, 309 8,883 28,446 Emited Kingdom : England Scotland Ireland Dominion of Canada 156. 956 7,416 6,053 3, 035, 926 430, 486 West Indies : British* Danish Frencht Spanish — Cuba Puerto Kico Brazil 64, 213 110, 670 102, 643 830, 684 41, 252 31,457 all other countries Total 1, 474, 727 4, 594, 531 1, 700, 496 5, 229, 498 1, 773, 556 5, 149, 534 2, 178, 321 5, 252, 375 IMPOKTS. Couu tries to which 1875. 1876. 1877. 1878. exported and from which imported. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. United Kingdom : England Scotland Tons. 103, 154 14, 952 $488, 378 53, 552 Tons. 83, 541 20,549 $362, 374 56, 310 Tons. 150*240 33, 943 350 174, 045 $455, 894 91, 527 1,035 693, 911 Tons. 164, 760 24, 547 289 265, 794 12 $492, 537 58, 348 580 924,899 30 Dominion of Canada Mexico 181, 942 3 697, 673 23 178, 421 317 719, 238 1,666 26 138, 666 75 533, 225 aJ] other countries . 141, 549 559, 071 125, 025 468, 303 123, 055 459, 793 1 Total........ 441, 600 1, 798, 697 407, 853 1, 607, 891 497, 270 1,775,667 578, 457 1, 936, 187 ! RATES OP DUTY IMPOSED BY CERTAIN COUNTRIES. Statement of the exports {domestic) and imports of bituminous coal, etc. — Continued. IMPORTS— Continued. Countries to which exported and from which imported. 1879. 1880. 1881. 1882. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value., United Kingdom : England Scotland Ireland Dominion of Canada Tons. 114, 450 23, 934 3 235, 920 $355, 887 59, 196 10 866, 192 Tons. 102, 792 14. 688 60 269, 058 9 $321, 126 39, 253 194 882, 726 35 Tons. 217, 160 30, 092 50 340, 062 34 $677, 385 84, 416 128 991, 551 170 Tons. 333, 286 57, 575 2 290, 096 16 8 170, 351 $848, 742 127, 100 5 778,267 35 20 All other countries . 117, 166 443, 181 90, 910 350, 171 89, 962 255, 324. 435, 129 Total 491,473 1, 724, 466 477, 517 1, 593, 505 677, 360 2, 008, 974 851, 334 2, 189, 298 Countries to which exported and from which imported. 1883. 1884. 1885. 1886. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. United Kingdom : England Scotland Tons. 203,072 33, 905 $564, 669 140, 628 Tonn. 219, 429 51, 557 2,798 318, 071 359 $682, 916 186, 204 6,638 1, 007, 354 1,376 Tons. 199, 726 59, 284 200 317, 269 18, 009 $643, 347 175, 168 400 1,074,029 65, 555 Tons. 182, 438 34, 374 1 312, 508 81, 670 $563, 115 111, 898 4 Dominion of Canada Mexico 312, 783 53 13 172, 869 836, 317 125 60 544, 173 1, 014, 116 208,347 All other countries 228, 052 673, 676 223, 430 635, 180 233, 370 654,474 Total 722, R95 2, 085, 972 820, 266 2, 558, 164 817, 918 2, 593, 679 824, 361 2,551,954 Countries to which exported and from which imported. 1887. 1888. 1889. 1890. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value.'' United Kingdom : England Scotland Tons. 212, 727 36, 825 $510, 918 122, 091 Tons. 138, 722 29, 649 $354, 354 129, 373 Tons. 87, 155 46, 196 1 434, 741 88, 071 13, 628 486,037 $24,4, 062 164, 228 4 1, 842, 466 267, 836 57, 037 1, 353, 612 Tons. ■35, 769. 10, 954 $134,272 ! 49,736 Dominion of Canada 332, 942 1,517 o 322, 621 1, 153, 604 4,897 10 923, 922 374, 833 364 1,320 '332,616 1,^426,049 1,209 5,521 930, 235 483| 239 44, 852 4,852 355, 527 1,769,420 139, 835 15,921 978,5.76 All other countries . Total 906, 634 2, 715, 442 877, 504 2, 846, 741 1, 155, 829 3, 929, 245 935, 193 3, 087, 760 Countries to which exported and from which imported. 1891. 1892. 1893. 1894. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. Quantity. Value. United Kingdom : England Scotland Tons. 110, 340 22, 184 $369, 142 90, 934 Ton's. 167, 743 66, 804' 501 680, 388 56,611 4,660 355, 257 $553, 804 190, 226 806 2, 480, 555 176, 549 14, 768 956, 371 Tons. 125, 569 25, 681 $389, 145 75, 528 Tons. 89; 690 29, 665 104 771, 306 49, 949 13, 206 194,534 .$262,861 76; 911 310 Dominion of Canada 650, 926 39, 310 24, 466 207. 843 2, 334, 775 129, 970 86, 442 577, 010 648, 992 9,795 4,630 287, 564 2, 401, 826 26, 672 8,544 712, 487 2, 774, 524 117, 120 29,000 443.387 All other countries Total 1, 055, 069 3, 588, 273 1,331,964 4, 373, 079 1, 102, 231 3, 614, 202 1, 148, 454 3, 704, 113 Teeasuey Depaktmentt, Bureau of Statistics, August 17, 1894. J. ~N. Whitney, Acting Chief of Bureau. BATES OF DUTY IMPOSED BY CERTAIN COUNTRIES. 7 Reports of bituminous coal of domestic product to the Dominion of Canada and to Mexico by customs districts, during the year ending June SO, 1894. Customs districts. To-Nova Scotia : New York, N.Y. Boston. Mass Total. To Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, and Northwest Territory : Buffalo Creek, N. Y Champlain, N. Y ' Detroit, Mich -"•' Cuyahoga, Ohio Brie, Pa * 'if'i Genesee, N. Y Huron, Mich Miami, Ohio Michigan, Mich Niagara, N. Y . . . .North and South Dakota Oswegatchie, N. Y Sandusky, Ohio , 1 Superior, Mich 'i- Vermont Philadelphia, Pa . Baltimore, Md Norfolk and Portsmouth, Va Total . To British Columbia: San Francisco, Cal . - Montana and Idaho . Puget Sound, Wash. . "Willamette, Oreg To 9VS Me Total Mexico : New York, N.Y , Philadelphia, Pa San Francisco, Cal Arizona Brazos de Santiago, Tex Corpus Christi, Tex Mobile, Ala Newport News, Va Paso del Norte, Tex Pensacola, Ma Saluria, Tex Baltimore, Md Norfolk and Portsmouth, Va. Total . Quantity Tons. 210 12 222 593, 217 3,479 200, 706 169, 493 3,050 125, 259 44, 691 22, 220 2 248, 769 10, 120 1,178 5,698 703 926 3,000 3,048 6,010 Value. 1, 443, 569 17, 259 137 3,717 3 24,345 11, 307 11,952 744 32, 883 35 18, 69J 1,430 1, 149, 889 7,441 318, 994 446, 728 6,932 375, 777 134, 233 35, 989 3 464, 476 34, 818 4,950 12, 173 2,00a 3,402 7,500 7,620 18, 030 3, 030, 958 1, 883 . 235 711 1,237 17 40, 683 1,507 14, 742 30 91, 978 35, 420 40, 737 6,072 134, 909 160 57,641 6,590 122, 506 430, 486 Imports of bituminous coal from the Dominion of Canada, by customs districts, during the year ending June 30, 1894. Customs districts. Quantity "From Nova Scotia: - New Bedford, Mass . Newburyport, Mass > Passamaquoddy, Me Portland, Me ., Salem, Mass ; Wajdoboro, Me ' Portsmouth, N. H Plymouth and Falmouth, Me. ' ■ New York "> ; Boston, Mass^ Aroostook, Me Bangor, Me Belfast, Me Total 57 Value. Tone. 1,722 $3, 272 1,554 1,756 4,367 4,043 2,357 3,495 1,129 1,113 285 297 2,548 4,700 315 634 20, 278 38, 389 16, 116 29, 654 15- 33 6,903 21, 476 376 684 57, 965 109, 546 8 EATES OF DUTY IMPOSED BY CERTAIN COUNTRIES. Imports of bituminous coal from the Dominion of Canada, eic— Continued. , Customs districts. Quantity. Value. From Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, and Northwest Territory Detroit, Mich Champlain, N . Y Montana and Idaho North and South Dakota Oswegatchie, N. Y Vermont Total From British Columbia : , San Francisco, Gal „ Willamette, Oreg Puget Sound, "Wash Alaska - Los Angeles, Cal San Diego, Cal Oregon, Oreg Total Tons. 1 3, 146 30,481) 9 2,702 2,965 $4 9,517 67, 607 49 8,380 9,048 506, 715 710 2,798 21, 875 102, 461 39, 276 200 2,350 9,517 78,761 355, 995 156,781 700 674, 035 2, 570, 313 Imports into the United States for consumption of the following articles, and the duty collected thereon. BITUMINOUS COAL AND SHALE. 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 Quantity. Value. Rate of duty. Amount of duty received. ._» 1_ Tone. 436,714 400, 631. 60 495,815.58 572, 845. 68 486, 500. 83 471, 817. 56 652, 963. 13 795, 721. 81 645, 924. 27 748, 995. 12 768, 477. 21 774, 799. 90 872, 652. 29 843, 001. 16 1. 130, 421. 25 908, 608. 55 1, 031, 560. 05 1, 309, 974. 56 1,090,374.12 1. 131, 239. 04 601.16 846. 22 940. 98 660. 00 208. 00 311.99 199.18 373. 21 554. 72 228. 40 432.15 318. 35 087. 39 562. 34 168. 02 366. 47 932. 3\ 180. 46 037. 72 600. 79 75 cents per ton do ...do ....do ....do ... do ....do ....do ....do ....do ....do ....do ....do ...do ....do ....do ....do ....do .'. ....do ....do $327, 535. 50 300,473.72 371,861.71 429,634.34 364,875.67 353,863.46 489,722.43 596/7M.27 484. 443. 24 561,746.35 576,357.89 581,099.98 654. 488. 25 632, 250. 88 847,815.94 (i81.45fi.48 773,670.12 982,480.93 817, 780. 59 848, 429. 35 COKE. 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 .1882 .1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 934 1, 843. 50 3, 632. 36 5, 907. 05 5,388 4, 506. 10 13, 580. 10 13, 324. 75 18, 423 12,931.43 18, 728 24, 305 31, 127. 41 38,713.05 25, 421. 27 28, 333. 63 22, 964. 10 42,761.47 26, 599. 80 31, 918. 44 $9, 648. 00 8, 656. 00 16, 686. 46 24, 186. 00 24, 748. 16 18, 406. 00 04, 987. 38 53, 244. 03 113, 113. 69 36, 277. 98 64 813.89 78, 678. 00 91, 756. 95 113, 491. 74 79, 402. 01 115,953.44 118,752.52 192, 688. 00 87, 238. 09 90, 448. 89 25 per cent. ....do ....do ....do ....do .--.do ....do ....do ....do... . 20 per cent — do ....do ....do .-.do ....do ....do ....do ....do ....do..'... ....do $2,412.00 2,164.17 4,171.62 6,046.50 6, 187. 04 4,601.50 16,246.84 13,311.01 28,278.43 7, 255. 59 12,962.77 / 15,735.60 18,351.38 22,698.35 15, 880. 39 23,190.68 23, 750, 51 38, 537. 60 17,447.62 18,089.77 RATES OF DOTY IMPOSED BY CERTAIN COUNTRIES. 9 Imports into the United States for consumption of the following articles, and the duty eoUeoted thereon — Continued. CULM OF COAL, OB SLACK. Year. Quantity. Value. Rate of duty. Amount of duty received. 1875 Tons. 5, 645. 70 4, 260. 00 3, 801. 00 5, 179. 35 4, 538. 30 6, 122. 82 25, 094. 25 60, 769. 84 76, 635. 25 69, 148. 81 48, 044. 09 45, 132. 47 36, 292. 80 36, 121. 52 25, 300. 70 26, 608. 11 24, 746. 34 19, 193. 90 14, 692. 55 7. 357. 59 $8, 257. 25 4, 772. 92 4, 223. 01 5, 270. 05 4, 295. 23 5, 775. 24 20, 768. 22 51, 316. 02 70, 596. 74 59, 451. 65 41, 355. 50 50, 799. 35 27, 313. 97 24, 624. 00 15, 562. 00 16, 654. 95 26, 767. 69 17, 265. 67 15, 366. 55 10, 920. 84 40 cents per ton - . $2, 258. 26 1, 704. 00 1, 520. 40 2, 071. 74 1, 815. 32 2, 449. 14 do 1878 '. do 1879 do do 1881 do 1882 . do 24, 307. 98 30, 654. 04 20, 744. 65 14, 414. 22 1883 do 1884 30 cents per ton . . 1886 do 1887 do 10, 887. 83 10, 836. 46 1888 . -do 1889 ...do 1890 . . .do 7, 982. 45 1891 do 1892 ....do. do 5, 758. 17 4, 407. 75 2, 207. 58 1893 1894 do IKON ORE, INCLUDING MANGANIFEROUS IRON ORE, ALSO THE DROSS OR RESID- UUM FROM BURNT PYRITES. 1875. 1876. 1877. 1878. 1879 1880. 1881. 1882. 1883. 1884 1885. 1886 1887. 1888 1889 1890 1891. 1892 1893 1894. 56, 17, 30, 28, 150, 416, 625, 577, 609, 551, 419, 70], ,137, 915, 646, ., 156, 950, 999, 677, 171. 654. 75 284.50 668. 68 212. 26 197. 05 174. 75 761. 44 118. 79 322. 00 272. 55 041. 05 862. 13 165. 34 321. 02 796. 87 730. 56 447. 13 436. 76 301. 57 377. 02 1, 173. 1, 733, 1, 655. 1, 587. 1, 244. 945. 1, 268! 2, 091. 1, 770. 1, 457; 2, 407. 2, 372. 2, 465, 1, 189, 331 061. 70 665. 93 216. 54 383. 48 345. 00 842. 00 125. 97 693. 00 597. 20 337. 20 683. 48 591. 37 316. 00 947. 00 002. 50 514. 00 754. 00 497. 00 635. 75 867. 00 20 per cent do ....do ....do ....do ....do ..-.do ....do ...do 75 cents per ton do ....do ...do ....do ....do ....do ....do ....do ....do ....do $29, 212. 34 11, 133. 18 16, 643. 29 12, 076. 69 73, 069. 00 234, 768. 40 348,625.19 331, 138. 60 317,519.44 413, 454. 40 314, 280. 79 526,405.61 852, 874. 03 686, 490. 76 485, 097. 65 867, 547. 93 712, 835. 37 749, 576. 82 507, 976. 19 128, 532. 85 IRON ORE-CHROMATE OF IRON, OR CHROMIC ORE. 1884 2, 676. 75 12 3, 356- 1, 403. 70 4,440.20 5,470 663. 45 4, 092. 50 5, 893. 50 6, 000. 34 3, 558. 08 $73, 586. 00 239. 00 43, 731. 00 20, 812.'00 46, 735. 00 50, 665. 00 8, 190. 00 56, 982. 00 126, 074. 00 54, 698. 00 34, 357. 00 do $11, 637. 90 1885 35.85 ....do 6/559.65 1887 ....do ....do . 3,121.80 1888 7, 010. 25 1889 ....do 7, 599. 75 1890 ....do 1, 128. 50 1891 ....do 8, 547. 30 ....do 18, 941. 10 ....do 8, 204. 70 1894 ....do 5, 153. 55 10 BATES OF DUTY IMPOSED BY CERTAIN COUNTRIES. Sates of import duty levied by the tariffs of the several colonial and other possessions of , the United Kingdom, according to the latest returns, etc. .[From British Statistical Abstract Colonial Possessions.] Possessions. Coals. Possessions. Coals. *ls. \2s. fid. per ton. ■ >2s. per ton. * With an additional charge of 10 per cent on the duty so leviable, t Coke and patent fuel 3s. per ton. J Per ton of 2,000 pounds. § Anthracite, free; bituminous, 2s. 8d. per ton of 2,000 pounds; bituminous dust, 20 per cent ad valorem. H At St. John's, Harbor Grace, and Carbonear, 1*. 3d. Other ports free. Department of State, Washington, August 20, 1894. Sir: That portion of your inquiry relating to the "rates of duty imposed by countries exporting coal and iron ore to the United States on such articles when imported into those countries," has been referred to this Department by the Bureau of Statistics of the Treasury Depart- ment, and in compliance with such reference I have the honor to trans- mit such information as is contained in the consular and other reports reports covering the inquiry under consideration. Statement showing the. quantities and value of coal imported into the United States from the principal countries during the fiscal year 1893, and the rates of duty imposed by said countries upon coal imported thereinto: Imports of coal into the United States. Valne. Rates of duty imposed by said countries on coal, ^f^awim Imported from — Dominion of Canada $2,402,000 712, 000 464, 000 26, 000 8,000 2,000 60 cents per ton.) Free. Free. Free. Free. United Kingdom Total . 3, 614, 000 KATES OF DUTY IMPOSED BY CERTAIN COUNTRIES. 11 Statement showing the imports of iron ore into the United States from the principal coun- tries during the fiscal year 189S, and the rates of duty imposed oy said countries upon iron ore imported thereinto. Imports of iron ore into the United States. Kates of duty imposed by said countries on iron ore. Imported from — Cuba Spain Italy Great Britain Algeria Turkey in Europe . Greece Portugal Canada Newfoundland Turkey in Asia All other countries Total Free. $0.0579 per ton. Free. Free. Free. 8 per cent. Free. 54 cents per ton. Free. 8 per cent ad valorem. A careful search through the files of the Department fails to show that any of the foregoing foreign countries have paid „a royalty or imposed an export tax on coal or iron ore exported therefrom during the past twenty years. Very respectfully, John M. Biddle, Acting Chief Clerk. Hon. Francis M. Cockrell, U. 8. Senate. 53d Congress, ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. (Report 2A Session. ] { No _ 353 ^ COINAGE OP THE SILVER BULLION HELD IN THE TREAS- URY. February 3, 1894.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Bland, from the Committee on Coinage, Weights, and Measures, submitted the following REPORT: [To accompany H. E. 4956.1 The Committee on Coinage, Weights, and Measures, to whom was referred House bill 4956, submit the following report: The bill, No. 4956, provides for the issuing of silver certificates in amount equal to the gain or seigniorage that may accrue on the coinage of the silver bullion now in the Treasury purchased under the act of July 14, 1890. This seigniorage is stated by the Secretary of the Treasury in his last annual report to be $55,156,861. The object of the bill is to make immediately available for the cur- rent expenses of the Government this amount of money. The certifi- cates are authorized to be issued on the bullion and in advance of the coinage should the exigencies of the Treasury require it. It is not likely, however, that this will be necessary, since the bullion may be coined at the rate of four to six millions per month if necessary. There is no question at all that the coinage can be executed far beyond any probability whatever of the demand for their redemption in silver dollars. The bill in no respect alters the final result that would be obtained by the execution of the law of July 14, 1890, authorizing the purchase and disposition of this bullion. Section 3 of the act provides as follows : That the Secretary of the Treasury shall each month coin two million ounces of the silver bullion purchased under the provisions of this act into standard silver dollars until the first day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, and after that time he shall coin of the silver bullion purchased under the provisions of this act as much as may be necessary to provide for the redemption of the Treasury notes herein provided for, and any gain or seigniorage arising from such coinage shall be accounted for and paid into the Treasury. It is clear that this bullion was dedicated to the redemption of the Treasury notes issued in the purchase of the bullion by the coinage of the bullion for such redemption, and that the law itself provides for the payment of any gain or seigniorage into the Treasury. The bill does not change the terms of the law in this respect, but simply hastens its execution. This view of the law is held by the Sec- 2 - COINAGE OF THE SILVER BULLION. retary of the Treasury and so stated in his annual report, above men- tioned, on p. 53, as follows : The act of July 14, 1890, that the Treasury notes issued in payment for silver bul- lion shall be redeemed in gold or siloer coin at the discretion of the Secretary, and when so redeemed may be reissued ; but the same act also provides that no greater or less amount of such notes shall be outstanding at any time than the cost of the sil- ver bullion and the standard silver dollars coined therefrom then held in the Treas- ury purchased by such notes, and, consequently, when these notes are redeemed with silver coined from the bullion purchased under the act, they can not be reissued, but must be retired aud canceled, for otherwise there would be a greater amount of notes outstanding than the cost of the bullion and coined dollars "then held in the Treasury." In this manner notes to the amount of $2,625,984 have been retired and canceled since August last, and standard silver dollars have taken their place in the circulation. As stated before, the bill does not change the final result that would follow from the execution of the act of July 14, 1890, but is designed to facilitate and hasten its execution. The fact that the Secretary of the Treasury has asked for the authority to issue two hundred millions' worth of short- time bonds, and for authority to use, at his, discretion, the proceeds for the payment of the current expenses of the Govern- ment, is in itself a sufficient reason for the passage of the bill, thus utilizing the assets now in the Treasury instead of incurring the bur- den of a further bonded debt. It is believed that the amount of funds provided by the bill will be ample to tide over any exigency that may arise until Congress shall meet next December. By that time we will be in a position to estimate with greater precision the effect the fiscal legislation of this session will have upon the revenues. The following from the Director of the Mint will show approximately the amount of silver dollars that can be coined per month: Treasury Department, January 29, 1894. Hon. E. P. Bland: Largest number of silver dollars coined in any one month under Bland act, $3,600,265. Under Sherman act, $2,676,000. R. E. Preston, Director Mint., No doubt by running extra hours near twice the aniount could be coined. It is not at all probable that a demand for silver dollars will be equal in amount that might be coined from month to month. If such should be the case there could be no possibility of a demand that would endanger the policy of the bill, which is that the coin now held in the Treasury for the redemption of the certificates may be used. The monthly statement for the past month of January shows that there are now in the Treasury 363,597,057 silver dollars ; silver certificates outstanding against said coin $336,919,504, showing a difference of $26,677,553 of silver dollars in excess of silver certificates that are available for the redemption of the. silver certificates. Should it be necessary to issue $55,000,000 worth of certificates in excess of the amount now authorized by law we would still have an ample reserve of coin in the Treasury for their redemption. The annual report of the Director of the Mint for the year 1893, on page 6, shows a total coinage of 419,332,550 standard silver dollars. If certifi- cates to the amount were issued, together with the amount authorized by the bill, there would be, in round numbers, $474,000,000 of certifi- cates on a reserve of $419,000,000 of coin. COINAGE OF THE SILVER BULLION. 3 This would be more than ample for.all redemption purposes, but, as stated before, the bullion can be coined from time to time, so as to have a dollar in coin behind every certificate, at least this can be so after the first two orthree months from the passage of the bill. Under exist- ing law no particular silver dollar is held for the redemption of any- specified certificate. The coin deposited is a special bailment or trust, only in the sense that there shall be no more certificates issued than there are dollars held for purposes of redemption. The bill does not contemplate any change in this regard, except for a short period and for the special purpose of making immediately available the certificates issued on the gain or seigniorage specified. It is recommended by the committee that the bill do pass. Mr. Charles W. Stone, of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on Coinage, Weights, and Measures, submitted the following as the VIEWS OF THE MINORITY: (To accompany the bill H. E. 4956.) There are in the U. S. Treasury 140,699,853 fine ounces of silver, for the purchase of which and other silver bullion heretofore coined there were given Treasury notes issued under the act of 1890, and of which $153,085,151 are now outstanding. This silver bullion now in the Treasury cost the G-overament $126,- 758,280 and its coinage value is $181,914,961, although its present mar- ket value is only $97,156,052. Bearing these figures in mind, we proceed to the consideration of the bill referred to the committee. Its propositions are twofold, first, the issuing of silver certificates against the "seigniorage," so called, and the subsequent coinage thereof, and second, the coinage of the silver bullion in the Treasury exclusive of the so-called ''seigniorage" and the subsequent issuing of silver certificates therefor, and incidentally the destruction instead of the reissue of the Treasury notes thereafter redeemed. It will be noticed that an entirely different order of proceeding is prescribed for different portions of the silver bullion on haDd, divided by a supposed distinction between the " seigniorage " and the bulk of the bullion, and hence the two sections of the bill, so distinct from each other, may be considered separately. The first section deals with what is termed the l .' seigniorage," and proceeds on an entirely erroneous conception of what seigniorage is. Without going into the derivation of the word or the learning of the lexicographers, it is safe to say that under every definition ever given! in connection with money up to this time seigniorage is a result of/ coinage and only comes into existence when coinage has been actually completed. An examination of the use of the word in our statutes will verify this assertion. The act of 1890, under which all the bullion now in the Treasury was purchased, provides as follows: That the Secretary of the Treasury shall each month coin two million ounces of the silver bullion purchased under the provisions of this act into standard silver •dollars until the first day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, and after that time he shall coin of the silver bullion purchased under the provisions of this act as much as may be necessary to provide for the redemption of the Treasury notes herein provided for, and any gain Or seigniorage arising from such coinage shall be accounted for and paid into the Treasury. The act of 1878 provides "and any gain or seigniorage arising from this coinage shall be accounted for and paid into the Treasury as pro- vided for under, existing laws relating to the subsidiary coinage," and exactly the same phraseology is found in the act of 1876 providing for the issue of certain silver coins. Eeferring to the act of 1853, providing for this subsidiary coinage and being the first law authorizing the purchase of silver bullion for coinage purposes, we find it provided that the Director of the Mint " shall charge himself with the gain arising from the coining of such bullion into coins of nominal value exceeding the intrinsic value thereof." COINAGE OF THE SILVER BULLION. 5 Although this measure of the gain arising to the Government from sil- ver coinage remained authoritative for twenty years, it is not accurate as the "intrinsic" value was a varying element in the comparison and did not always mark the real gain correctly. Hence, in the Eevised Stat- utes of 1874, the phraseology was changed as follows: "The gain aris- ing from the coinage of bullion purchased into coins of greater nominal or face value than the cost," and this may be accepted as the modern American idea of seigniorage. Hence it will be seen that there is and can be no "seigniorage" of bullion as long as it remains bullion, and the first section of the bill seeks to deal with something which does not exist. But the majority of the committee, erroneously as we think, seek to change and broaden the meaning of the word seigniorage to cover the difference between the cost of the bullion on hand and its estimated coiuage value, or what it would produce if coined. This difference, however, is not substance, not bullion, not coin, not anything tangible or corporeal, it is simply the faith and credit of the natiou. Pour hun- dred and twelve and one-half grains of standard silver are not a dollar. They only become such when they have engrafted upon them the guar- antee of the Government, not simply of the amount and purity of the silver, but that its exchangeable value shall always be and remain 100 cents, not in other silver simply, but in any money of the nation. Whenever the Government is unable to make good this guarantee the coin sinks at once to its commercial value. The real intrinsic value of the bullion in the Treasury can not be increased by legislation. You can increase its exchangeable value by adding the . element of the nation's credit, and that increased value remains so long as the credit remains intact, but you can give equal exchangeable value to copper by the same process, only that a larger element of national credit must be added. You can go further and issue intrinsically worthless paper certificates or obligations based entirely on the credit of the nation, and while that credit remains unimpaired and untarnished these obligations become a part of the currency, equally acceptable with the hybrid certificates issued against a combination of the real value of the bullion and the added credit of the nation, as proposed by this bill. Any of these devices for- an enlarged currency can be resorted to in an emergency if the necessity of the nation requires, but the credit of the nation ought never be traded upon except in case of necessity, and then it should be done boldly and frankly, with no juggling or sleight-of-hand devices to mis- lead the people as to the real nature of the transaction. If such neces- sity exists to day let it be frankly stated and fairly demonstrated and not hidden behind manufactured definitions and false methods tending to mislead the people. IX should be noted that this bill does not contemplate any increase of the metallic money in circulation, but rather a further issue of paper currency in the form of silver certificates. What is a silver certificate? It is not a note or obligation, but simply a statement of fact. The act of 1878 provided that "any holder of coin," authorized by said act, might deposit it with the Treasurer of the United States and receive a certificate stating the fact that such coin had been deposited. Such certificate reads as follows : This certifies that there has been deposited in the Treasury of the United States one silver dollar, payable to the bearer on demand. , Washington, I). C. .T. 'Fount. Tubman. D. N. Morgan. Reais*er of the Treasury. Treasurer of the United Stated. 6 - COINAGE OP THE SILVER BULLION. This bill requires the Secretary of the Treasury to issue $55,156,681 of such certificates when uot one single silver dollar for which such cer- tificates are to issue has been deposited in ihe Treasury. Every cer- tificate would bear on its face a lie. What emergency has arisen that justifies such disregard of truth and fact? The existing law, while defining the trust imposed on the silver bullion in the Treasury, gives to the Secretary of the Treasury abun- dant power to coin it just as rapidly as necessary to comply with the terms of this trust, arid makes the seigniorage available as fast as, by such coinage, it comes into existence. No further legislation on the subject is necessary. Abundant legal power now exists. It is only the embarrassment of the financial situa- tion that prevents its exercise, as is fully evident from the recent report of the Secretary of the Treasury. His strong statement of the difficulty encountered in keeping in circulation the silver dollars and silver certificates is only another demonstration of the impolicy of at this time forcing the substitution of silver certificates for the Treasury notes in our currency as contemplated by this bill. It may be properly noted that this bill does not in any way enlarge the market for silver, nor benefit the silver owner, nor contemplate the use of any more silver as money than is already represented in our currency.' It simply provides for the "watering" (if we may use a term which has obtained a recognized and definite meaning in financial nomenclature) to the extent of $55,000,000 of the paper now in circu- lation and representing the silver bullion in the Treasury, and this, too, when the amount of this outstanding paper already exceeds the real value of the bullion which it represents by over $56,000,000. This bill has two very evident purposes. First, to authorize the issuing of practically fiat paper currency by the Government to the amount of $55,158,161 to aid in meeting the impending and existing deficit, to be used, as expressed in the bill, "for the payment of the current expenditures of the Government," and second, to replace the present Treasury notes with an exclusively silver,obligation and increase the preponderance of the silver element in our national currency. We dissent from the wisdom and propriety of either purpose. If there is, and is likely to be, a deficit in the Treasury, the one honest, straightforward course is to provide revenue sufficient to meet it, and the other frank mode of proceeding is to authorize the issuance of the obligations of the Government^ and. honestly say they are based on the nation's credit, and issued to meet its necessities, and not seek to obscure the issue by any such devious devices as are embodied in this bill. The second purpose is equally unwise. The outstanding Treasury notes are payable in gold or silver, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, bearing in mind the declared policy of the Government to maintain the parity between the two metals upon the legal ratio, but the intimation of a purpose by the Secretary of the Treasury to pay these obligations in silver only was one of the important factors which unsettled confidence and produced distrust in the early months of last summer. The speedy and forced redemption of the Treasury notes would either quickly exhaust the Government's store of gold, which is not now equal to one-half the volume of the outstanding Treasury notes, to say nothing of the greenbacks and gold certificates, and thus force a resort to sale of more bonds to replenish it, or the Government would be forced to redeem only in silver, and when the fear of silver payments wrenched the nation's credit who can estimate the results of COINAGE OF THE SILVER BULLION. 7 the actual fact of such payments. The consummation of this policy would be surely taking a long stride forward in our financial progress toward an exclusively silver basis. The minority of your committee do not regard sporadic and frag- mentary financial legislation as wise. Our monetary system, so far as silver forms a part of it, ought either to be let alone until the forces operating and that must continue to operate on other nations shall force them to a willingness to cooperate in proper and wise interna- tional action fixing the relations of gold and silver in the monetary systems of the world on a basis universally recognized and respected, and thus made stable and permanent, or if this country is to act by and for itself alone, regardless of its relations to the commercial world, it should be by well considered, conservative, and comprehensive legisla- tion simplifying and readjusting our entire monetary system ; and in the view of the minority of your committee the passage of this bill would be an obstacle in the way of the attainment of either of these ends. M. X. Johnson. Charles Tracey. Nelson Dingley, Je. Michael D. Barter. J. Frank aldrich. I. Eayneu. A. L. Hager. Charles W. Stone. 53d Congress, ) SENATE. e Mis. Doc. 3d Session. ) j N 0i 86. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. February 1, 1895. — Referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed. Mr. Turpib presented the following MEMORIAL OP ANSON WOLCOTT, OF THE TOWN OF WOLCOTT, IND., ON THE STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. To the Senate of the United States: Tour memorialist respectfully represents to this honorable body that he is a native-born citizen of the United States, and has always resided therein; that for more than fifty years he has been an owner of prop- erty and been actively engaged in business in the United States; that, owing to unwise laws relating to our national finances, he has at vari- ous times suffered greatly in his business affairs, and suffered great depreciations in the value of his property, and that at the same time all other business men and property owners have likewise suffered. "Wherefore, your memorialist begs leave to state his case to this hon- orable body, and begs permission, so far as such history relates to our national finances, to discuss generally the subject of finances, in the broad light of our own history and the history of other nations with which the United States are commercially and financially connected. The beginning of the most modern epoch in the history of the world's finances relates back only to the discovery by the Spanish nation of the American continent, and to the stores of gold and silver accumu- • lated, for many centuries, by the aboriginal inhabitants of America — especially those of Chile, Peru, Bolivia, New Granada, Central Amer- ica, and Mexico. At the time of the discovery of gold and silver in America the world's supply of the so-called precious metals had become very small, though it continued to be— excepting only subsidiary copper, and some- times lead coins— the only generally recognized legal-tender money of the world. Spain not only seized upon the accumulated stores of gold and silver possessed by the Indians, but Spain drew vast revenues from her American colonies, by the enslavement of the Indians, for work in gold and silver mines— work enforced with the most barbarous cruelty. The outpouring of the metallic wealth of America into Europe changed the general monetary condition of Europe. Next only to Spain— and perhaps first of all— England profited by this sudden inflow of the metallic wealth. Spain and England, during these years of American treasure production, were nearly always at war, and the treasure ships of Spain, watched and waylaid by .English war ships, were very often captured. Thus the rich freights of silver and gold intended for Cadiz in Spain reached London or Liverpool. '2 STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. When Spain and England were not at war joint stock companies for capturing Spanish treasure ships were formed in England, especially among the aristocracy of that country, and even Queen Elizabeth is said to have been a stockholder in such enterprises. These companies sent out swift-sailing, powerfully armed vessels, which under the name of buccaneers, captured and took to England the treasure-laden gal- leons intended for Spain. So, in peace or war, many of the Spanish vessels laden with treasures, from the ports of America to those of Spain, went not to Spain with their precious cargoes, but to England. These greatconquests of treasures aided in considerable degree to estab- lish England's supremacy in the modern financial world; for she has become thereby, and by reason of her safe insular position and great stores of coal an'l iron (nature's mechanical and manufacturing forces), enabled to produce the wares of merchandise cheaply and to trade profitably. As early as 1745, in the days^of Frederick the Great, of Prussia, when all the nations of Europe, in different combinations or antagonisms, were at war, " The English ministry" says Guizot, in his history of France, (vol. 5, p. 226) " laid down the law for all, because it laid down the money." The predominant wealth of England, in 1745, has so increased since then that she has now become a mighty, oppres- sive power among the nations of the earth — creditor as she is to nearly all of them. The foundation of the wealth of the French nation, with her present $800,000,000 in gold and $700,000,000 in silver— about one-fifth of all the world possesses of gold and silver — is modern, but not less affirma- tive. For three-quarters of a century, before the advent of that mighty genius of war and government, Napoleon Boneparte, the financial con- dition of France was as wretched as can be conceived. Guizot's His- tory of France (vol. 5, p. 142) says that in 1723 " the supposed value of all the coin circulating in the kingdom of France was estimated at only seven or eight millions." This monetary poverty of France, sup; plemented by John Law's wild Mississippi scheme — and later by the discredited French assignats — was the condition in which Napoleon found the financial affairs of France. He soon asserted himself as the military master of all Southern and Western Europe. He fought all, whipped all, and robbed all; and he made France — England alone excepted — by far the richest of the nations of modern Europe. The French,who are an industrious and frugal people, retained the wealth supplied by the conquests of Napoleon and increased their store, and they amazed the world by paying promptly, in 1870, a war fine to Ger- many of 5,000,000,000 of francs— nearly $1,000,000,000 in gold. Among the creditor nations may now be classed England, France, Germany, Holland, and Belgium. But England has the supreme condition. All the other principal nations of the world are debtors, and the people of the United States are most largely debtor of all— debtor in an aggregate amount of not less than $5,000,000,000, and probably more. The power of the creditor nations over the debtor is great, and it may be made omnipotent, for the destruction of the debtor, unless protected by wise and suitable defensive legislation. In 1797, and during the Napoleonic wars, the Bank of England, and that means all England, suspended specie payments. This suspension continued until 1821. Yet, when in England, all the gold and silver combined were not sufficient to redeem the paper currency, in 1816— five years before the resumption of specie payments— England demone- zed silver, making specie resumption more difficult and the time of sumption more distant. STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 3 This demonetization of silver was not in the interest of the people generally — manufacturers, merchants, or workmen. It was not in the interests of resumption, nor was it intended so to be. English money dealers in 1816, holding domestic and foreign credits in very large amounts, desired, by getting on the single gold standard, when resump- tion should take place, to profit doubly. This was accomplished by having the credits held by the money classes made payable in gold alone, though all the debts had been created on the double standard of gold and silver. Thus, reducing the volume of money in which their credits' could be paid, English bankers were enabled to impose a burden of debt upon their debtors far beyond the original contracts. England, by reason of her creditor position, maintained alone, as against the world, from 1816 to 1870 (54 years), the single gold standard — to her great profit, as shown by her rich accumulations of money during such period. If the single gold standard had not been profitable to England she would have abandoned her solitary gold policy, and conformed to the bimetallic system 1 of other nations. England's policy against that of all Europe, from 1816 to 1870, was for herself only, as being suited and most profitable to her creditor condition. By the inverse effect of the same law it was least suitable, and most burdensome, to her debtors. The Director of the United States Mint, in his report of June 30, 1893 (p. 23), says the causes of the great decline of silver, stated briefly, are as follows: "Germany, in 1871 and 1873, enacted laws demonetizing silver, making gold the sole standard of value; and, to procure the amount of gold necessary for the purpose of coinage, sold, between 1873 and 1879, large amounts of silver." This was after pay- ment of $1,000,000,000 in gold, the war fine exacted of France in 1870. Thus Germany, always theretofore a silver country, on receiving the $1,000,000,000 from France, was enabled, by reason of this increase of her metallic wealth, to change to the gold standard, which, unwisely for the general interests of the masses of the German people, she did. Great industrial and financial suffering immediately followed the change. In truth, most of the French indemnity fund went, not to the German people, but into the German imperial treasury. Thus the people lost their silver, but got but little of the French gold or its equivalent. Nearly all other European nations have since adopted the single gold standard. But by what influence ! Not by the choice of the peo- ple of the respective countries of Europe, for they were never consulted; but by the arbitrary dictation of royal orders and imperial decrees, backed by standing armies, at the instance of the creditor interests. Not for the good of the people, but to their extreme injury. It is known to the well-informed on business and financial subjects, that almost everywhere in Europe, there has been for the last twenty years, and now is, great business depression and financial derangement to the extent of general distress among all the people. Only money-creditors and money dealers have profited, and do profit. Their accumulations have been very great ; while all other classes have suffered. Two or three influential ministers of state, in each country, became convinced— by such arguments, it is feared, as too often dull the conscience and satisfy the understanding of statesmen in Europe— that the single gold stand- ard was what was most desired, and forthwith decrees were issued pro- viding for that standard; which decrees were sustained by all the powers of government, including large bodies of police and soldiery. To the great syndicates who hold the bonds and manipulate tne credits of a nation of thirty or forty millions of people, the ^Place- ment of bimetallism by the single standard of gold means additional 4 STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. value to their securities, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars^ for which they could well afford to pay twenty, thirty, or even fifty mil- lions of dollars. Probably not so much as $50,000,000 was ever paid; but the syndicates manipulated the finances of European nations all the same; and all have been injured, except the financiers. The act of destroying half the money of the people was done regard- less of the knowledge, desires, or interests of the people, though sub- jecting them to very great wrong and hardship. Our bankers, news- papers, and politicians, following the example of Europe, cry out, "Behold civilized Europe ! See what she has done ! See what has been done in finances there ! The Europeans have demonetized silver ! It must be right, for they are civilized nations ! Let us hasten to fol- low their civilized example." Is Europe really so highly " civilized?" Take note of the civilization of Italy, Austria, and Eussia, soldier-ridden and semibarbarous. These are all nations desperately struggling for a gold basis, and unable to stand upon such basis with steadiness and security, or even to stand on it at all. Strange as it may appear, such arguments as these are put forth in America to influence our people — and really do influence many to desire a single gold standard — when the whole actual condi- tion in Europe is a logical, irrefutable argument in favor of bimet- allism. It might as well be argued that because Europe has emperors, kings, and aristocracies, therefore we should change our institutions to be in accord with theirs; for they are "civilized!" All the evil financial legislation which has cursed European nations, that the holders of bonds might profit while their people have been reduced to wretched poverty, as has been done in the United States by the same causes, has been accomplished under the smooth hypocritical pretenses of a supreme regard for the good of the people. John Milton, the well-informed historian of hell, quotes, in " Paradise Lost," the politic devil as saying: I under fair pretense of friendly acts, And words of glozing courtesy, wind me Into the easy-nearted man, and hug Him into snares. Europe has given us lessons. It may now be permissible to review the financial history of the United States. In colonial times Great Britain made various foreign coins, as those of Peru, Mexico, and some other countries, legal-tender money in this country. After the Eevolutionary war , (February 9, 1793) it was declared by act of Congress that all foreign gold and silver coins should pass current as money in the United States, and be a legal tender for all debts and demands. On June 25, 1834, Congress enacted that from and after the passage of the act the silver dollars of Mexico, Peru, Chile, Central America, Brazil, and the 5-franc pieces of France, should pass current as money, and be of legal value. On June 28, 1834, a bill was passed, enacting, that the gold coins of Great Britain, Por- tugal, Brazil, France, Spain, Mexico, and Colombia, should pass current as money, and be receivable for the payment of all debts and demands. On January 28, 1837, an act was passed which provided ( sec. 9 ) that silver dollars, half-dollars, quarter-dollars, dimes, and half-dimes should be legal tender for all sums whatever. But a change was inau- gurated in our financial policy in February, 1853. An act was then passed reducing the fineness of the United States silver half-dollar, quarter-dollar, dime, and half-dimes; and, from an unlimited legal ten- STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 5 der, they became legal tender for only $5, the amount of the coiuage, to be regulated by the Secretary of the Treasury. This law of 1853 considerably diminished the supply of metallic money. On the 21st of February, 1857, another fatal act was passed, which repealed all former acts authorizing the currency of foreign gold and silver coins as legal tender in payment of debts. This act destroyed, as money in the United States, a vast amount of foreign gold and silver coins then in use; and this repealing and demonetizing act but shortly preceded the great and destructive panic of 1857. If not the sole cause thereof it was largely instrumental in producing and maintaining that panic, a panic by which, among other things, very large amounts of the best securities of the country and other properties passed from the hands of the men of business and industry into the hands of the money-lending classes who caused the law of 1857 to be enacted, by which they so much profited. The people did not ask for this money- destroying law of 1857. It was not the subject of previous political or public discussion. Unknown to the farmers, manufacturers, merchants, and toilers of the land, the money-lending classes, with the stealthy- movements of the plunder-seeking burglar, sprung their trap of rob- bery. The report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 189H (p. 313) says that from January 1, 1858, the circulation of the whole country shrunk from $214,688,892 to $155,208,714— equal to $59,000,000 of loss in money. As a further result of the panic, the revenues of the United States Government, which in 1857 were $68,965,313, declined in 1858 to $40,655,366, a loss of $22,300,000. Then, as now, the revenues of the Government fell off as the business of the country became depressed, and as the earning and consuming power of the people was cut down through a change in the volume and value of money. And until the beginning of the late war there was no full recovery from the effects of the panic of 1857— artificially produced by an uncalled-for destruc- tion of gold and silver coin money, by force of statute law. It is a maxim in law and ethics that the natural effects following an act are presumed to have been intended. The demonetizing law of 1857 was meant for robbery, and was robbery. But few panics occur which have not been preceded and caused by legislation tending directly to create panics. Such legislation is ordinarily induced by those who will profit by it, and that is only the creditor and money- lending classes. A panic is usually a financial trap, set and sprung with the purpose of gain to some by means of loss to others. The grain and provision corners of the Chicago Board of Trade, and the stock and bond corners of the Kew York Stock Board, in which for- tunes are made and wrecked, are enterprises of the robber class. But these are pigmies compared with the colossal corners in the values ot all property, effected by legislative changes in the volume and the value of money, by which whole nations are made to suffer. The train robber ditches the train to rob the passengers. 11 a tew passengers are killed, that is a result natural to that class of specula- tive enterprises. So is a panic produced, that money creditors and moneylenders may gather to themselves the best stocks, bonds, and other properties of the country most cheaply, making m a very short time, by destructive processes, profits equal to the interest and ordinary profits on money for many years, but by the ruin and destruction ot the business and laboring classes, who are the foundation and pillars on which society rests and is sustained. Financial cyclones, premeditated and wrought by force of law, are terribly destructive agencies, except 6 STATE OP THE NATIONAL FINANCES. to the money creditors and money lenders — the expert engineers, who* direct the work of havoc and ruin. • The statistical abstract of the United States, published in 1892, states (on p. 56) that from the year 1848 to 1857, inclusive, imports of foreign merchandise into the United States, each year, exceeded the* exports from the United States to the amount of $343,513,980. For the same years the excess of exports from the United States of gold and sil- ver coin and bullion amounted to $281,972,036. (See p. 59.) Under these very adverse commercial and financial conditions, which left the country with large foreign debt balances, and almost entirely without metallic money, the law of February 21, 1853, was passed, limiting our sub- sidiary silver coin to $5 as legal tender, and destroying absolutely its legal-tender value in all large transactions. In addition, as we have seen, the law of Congress of February 21, 1857, was passed, that law which repealed all former acts that had authorized the currency of gold and silver coin, and had made them legai tender in payment of all debts. Under the trade and financial conditions then existing, what could follow such legislation but a terrific panic 1 ? If any intelligence governed the movers of those laws, the panic was the result of deliber- ate plans, which were ruthlessly executed^ Passing from the year 1827 to the close of the war we find, by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, Hugh McCulloch, for 1867 (p. 27), this statement: On the 31st day of August, 1865, the public debt reached its highest point, and was made up of the. following items, to wit: Funded debt $1 109, 568, 191 Matured debt 1, 503, 020 Temporary loans 107, 148,713 Certificates of indebtedness 85, 093, 000 Total 1,303,312,924 And the following amounts which were used as money : Five per cent notes $33, 954, 230 Compound interest legal-tender notes 217, 024, 160 United States legal-tender notes 433,160,569 Fractional currency 26, 344, 742 Seven-thirty notes 830, 000, 000 Total 1,540,483,701 The $830,000,000 of 7.3 notes were not all legal tender, but they were in use as money. Horace Maynard, who was in Congress when these notes were issued, stated afterwards, when chairman of the Com- mittee on Banking and Currency (as reported in the Congressional Eecord of March 21, 1874), that "these, issues were engraved and pre- pared in form to circulate as money, and did in fact so circulate." Hon. F. B. Spinner, Treasurer of the United States at the time of the issue of these notes, in a letter written by him to the editor of the Chicago Journal of Commerce, testified as follows : Mohawk, N. Y., August 17, 1876. Dear Sir: Yout letter of the 15 instant has been received. In answer, I have to- say that the 7.30 Treasury notes were intended, prepared, issued, and used as currency. Very respectfully, yours, F. E. Spinner. To the then existing aggregate of Government money issues $1, 540, 483, 701 Add national-hank notes outstanding August 31, 1865 176 2i3, 075 Total 1,716,696,776 STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 7" That is, on.August 31, 1865, we find a United States paper-currency circulation of the above amount, but no coin whatever, except in the Pacific Coast States; and with this large money supply there was a prosperity which rapidly disappeared, as the money disappeared, by funding and contraction. Page 28 of the Keport of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1867 states the aggregate of the liabilities of the United States, August 31, 1865, including the forms used as currency,, at $2,845,907,626, a sum equal to nearly one-half of all the gold and sih ver coin in the whole world. Notwithstanding this fact, immediately after the close of the war' of 1861 — or so early as 1866— the money lenders began frantic and impracticable efforts to force these large amounts- ' of United States obligations suddenly to par in coin. Their contem- plated purpose was impossible of attainment, and their futile effort, resulted in immeasurable injury to the values of property, to the inter- ests of all kinds of business, and to laborers of every description. During the war a million of men were enrolled as soldiers, and these having been taken from the various industrial pursuits of the*, country it was impossible ior the remaining labor forces of the United States alone to feed, clothe, arm, equip, and otherwise support this- vast war force. Aid from foreign countries was had in addition to> home supplies. The United States had been impoverished by the war and a great debt had been incurred. There was little or no develop- ment of our cities, towns, or farms, and only in manufactures for the- supply of the materials of war had there been progress. The country not having been self-supporting during the war, the excess of foreign goods imported into the United States above exports from the United States from 1861 to 1865, inclusive, was $339,053,649 ; arid the excess of exports of gold and silver coin and bullion from the United States above imports of gold and silver to the United States for the same period was $230,159,177. In these facts the conditions essential to a resumption of specie payments did not, by any conceivable possibility r exist. The coin value of the greenbacks, and of most of the interest- bearing securities of the United States — these having been issued for greenbacks or their equivalent, and being payable in greenbacks — kept the same level of market values, depreciating as the war continued and the debt increased, till, finally, $1 in gold was worth $2.84 in green- backs and in the securities in which greenbacks had been invested. By thesuccessful termination of the war, Government credits and secu- rities appreciated in value over 100 per cent, and the premium on gold fell almost immediately to 40 per cent, and continued to decline as time progressed. Eealizing, as they had, vast profits on their Government investments by the improved values resulting from the success of the war — which certainly should have satisfied them — the holders of Gov- ernment securities, notwithstanding such profits, at once began by legislative artifice to force their securities to coin values, by laws having in view an immediate return to specie payments and retiring the green- backs from all use as money. Impoverished as the United States had been by the war, and owing an aggregate of debt equal to half the gold , and silver coin of the world, and there being no gold or silver coin in circulation, United States securities could not at once nor very soon be forced to par in coin. Inherent in the •condition of things, it was an impossibility. Long years would be required to place the obli- gations of the United States on a coin basis. But the evil results of the vain and recklessly selfish attempt were painfully practical. At the close of the war the interest-bearing forms of our currency were mostly in the hands of United States merchants and bankers and ."pp 8 STATE OP THE NATIONAL FINANCES. : V foreign bankers, and the money remaining to the people was only United States notes (greenbacks), fractional currency, and national-bank notes. • The report of the Comptroller of the Currency, December 3, 1866 (p. 32), states that all the specie in all the national banks, in October, 1866, was'' only $8,170,836. What a basis for specie resumption by the banks) Y< Tet, with this very small amount of money in the banks, to enable them to maintain their notes at par in coin, on the 12th of April, 1866, an act providing for the redemption and cancellation of the United States legal-tender notes was enacted by the Congress of the United Statesy .': .w. This was in pursuance of an affirmative policy to redeem the greenbacks entirely, and to cancel them, which, under the then existing conditions, would, have left the people without any legal-tender money whatever j; ■ '<'v. What cared the money plunderers that no specie was in circulation and that national-bank notes were not legal tender, or how muck others might suffer if they could gain? This law was enforced till $44,000,000 of the greenbacks had been retired and the evils of the law and the sufferings under it had become intolerable, when the law was condemned, and repealed February 4, 1868. But so obviously had experience shown the impolicy and injustice of the law, that, subse- quently, the retired greenbacks, much needed as they were,, were in < , part reissued. Why was this impracticable and destructive law of 'April 12, 1866, ever enacted! The people were not consulted. They were as prosperous as was possible, and were contented. But those who had purchased Government obligations at great discounts, for v \ greenbacks or their equivalents, and who had already profited more -than 100 per cent on their investments, desired to force the Govern- ment obligations they held to par in coin. Insatiable, reasonless rapacity was the motive force that impelled the making of this law. As the principal of these obligations was mostly payable in green- backs or coin, if the greenbacks could be destroyed they all became coin obligations. By the disappearance from currency use of all forms of interest-bearing, legal-tender money, and other forms of interest- bearing currency which existed at the close of the war, hard times came upon the people. But they were destined to see harder times. Though the. unwise, unjust, and wholly impracticable law of April 12, 1866, for retiring the greenbacks had been condemned and repealed, those holding large Government obligations, payable in greenbacks or coin, did not rest with their defeat. The repealing act of February 4, 1868, still left the greenbacks in use. March 12, 1869, an act was passed by the,Congress of the United States entitled "An act to strengthen the public credit^" which, among other things, asserted : It is hereby provided and declared, that the faith of the United States is solemnly, pledged to the payment in coin, or its equivalent, of all the obligations of the United States, not bearing interest, known as United States notes (greenbacks). And the United States also solemnly pledges itself to make provision at the earliest prac- tical period for the redemption of -the United States nDtes^ in coin. There was no provision for their reissue. Absolute and permanent destruction of the United States notes was intended. This measure was never discussed before the people. The popular interests were not consulted. The people did not desire the redemption of the green- backs. The national credit did not need strengthening. It was first- class as it was. This legislation was intented for the single purpose of making United States bonds, which, by the laws under which they had been issued, were payable in greenbacks or coin, payable in coin exclusively. It was solely a bondholders' law. For, be it remembered, there was yet no coin iu circulation in the United States except in the STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 9 Pacific Coast States. A universal suspension of specie payments still prevailed. All the national banks combined had but' a very small sum in coin, and that in part was subsidiary silver, legal tender for only $5. From 1866 to 1869, inclusive, the excess of imports of merchandise from foreign countries into the United States amounted to $394,079,722 more than the total of our exports of merchandise to foreign countries. For the same years, the gold and silver coin and bullion exported from the United States to foreign countries, in excess of the gold and sil- ver coin and bullion from foreign countries imported into the United -States, aggregated $231,078,114. (See Statistical Abstract of the United States published in 1892, pp. 55, 59.) Thus, there continued to be large balances of trade against the United States for excessive imports of foreign merchandise, and large exports of gold and silver coin and bullion, on account of merchandise balances; and still a suspension of specie payments. It was under such imprac- ticable conditions that the public-credit act of 1869 was enacted for utterly eliminating the greenbacks from the currency of the country. The United States was at peace at home and abroad. There was no exigency, no call to improve the public credit. Only those holding United States bonds and other credits could possibly be benefited by this law of 1869, enacted under the influence of credit holders for their single and exclusive benefit. The people had unlimited confidence in the greenbacks. The loss of the greenbacks would be property and business ruin ; for there was no other money in use, as coin did not cir- culate and national-bank notes were not legal tender. The law of 1869 having been passed, for retiring the greenbacks and insuring in the future that Government obligations should be paid in coin, almost immediately thereafter — April 25, 1870 — another bill was introduced into the Congress of the United States, which, having been postponed from time to time, ultimately became a law in February, 1873. That law demonetized silver. Thus, when full effect should have been given to the law of 1869, for retiring the greenbacks and. making the obligations of the United States payable in coin alone, the act of 1873, which demonetized silver, made all these obligations pay- able in gold only. The bond holder's selfish consummation, gold, was supposed to be assured. But, to realize this audacious result contemplated by the holders of Government bonds and other obligations, it became necessary to give practical effect to the law of 1869, which had pledged the Gov- ernment to redeem the greenbacks in coin; for the greenbacks still remained the cherished money of the people. With all this wonderful legislation to make coin the only legal-tender money, and to suppress all other forms of money, specie payments were still suspended, for all the gold and silver in the land were not sufficient for specie payments. In fact, there was no specie in circulation except the little in the Pacific Coast States, and all the national banks in the United States held only $19,900,000 in coin. (See Statistical Abstract, 1892, p. 39.) From 1869 to 1873, including the latter year, when silver was demonetized, according to the Statistical Abstract for 1892, page 56, it appears that the aggregate imports of merchandise from foreign countries into the United States in excess of exports from the United States was $422,663,925, and the aggregate of exports to foreign countries by the. United States of gold and silver -coin and bullion in excess of imports of gold and silver coin and bullion into the United States was $238,169,933. (See Statistical Abstract, 1892, pp. 56, 59.) These were the financial and trade conditions between the United 10 STATE OP THE NATIONAL FINANCES. States and foreign countries when silver was carelessly or wickedly- demonetized in 1873. Eespecting the foregoing facts, it may be sum- marized thus : A very large balance of trade was against the United States for imported merchandise; a very large balance of exported gold and silver coin and bullion was against the United States, and there was a state of suspension of specie payments which had continued for twelve years. Thus, when we had an insufficiency of both gold and silver in the country to enable the Government of the United States to resume specie payments, the extraordinary spectacle was presented of an act of Congress demonetizing silver. What could not be done with both gold and silver the law attempted to do with gold alone. This act was said to have been a sly trick inspired by a profound and heartless rascality, which somehow passed Congress unnoticed by any of the many of our distinguished statesmen, then in Congress, and by President Grant, who signed the bill, so that it became a law September 2, 1873, when all the coin in all the national banks in the United States was only $19,900,000. (Statistical Abstract, 1892, p. 39.) This law embarassed our finances greatly, and delayed resump- tion of specie payments for several years. The distress and discontent produced amoTJg the people prevented further immediate destructive legislation concerning our finances. A rest, for a time, was necessary, to avoid attracting too much public attention to the work of ruin already done — for certain ruin it proved to be. The serpent, the most crafty beast of the field, is a slow-swallower. The deceitful tactics of delay were invoked by the crafty plotters. Another effort was soon made in the direction of the single gold standard to be exclusively at the expense of the people of the United States, and for the benefit only of holders of money credits. In 1874 a bill was introduced into Congress, which finally became the law of January 14, 1875, which, next in the order of tragic legis- lative error and industrial destruction, provided as follows : By section 3 of the act all the laws limiting the number, location, and circulation of national banks were repealed, and a law was enacted which gave unlimited circulation to national-bank notes ; and it was made the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury " to redeem United States legal-tender notes, in excess of $300,000,000, to the amount of 80 per cent of the national-bank notes which should be issued under this law ; " audit was provided that " on and after the 1st day of January, 1879, the Sec- retary of the Treasury shall redeem in coin the United States legal- tender notes, then outstanding, on their presentation for redemption at the office of the assistant treasurer of the United States in the city of 'New York." * For this redemption the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to use any surplus revenue not otherwise appropriated, and to sell such bonds as were described in the act of Congress of July 14, 1870. During the period from 1873 to 1875 there continued to be a suspension of specie payments. The export and import trade in foreign merchan- dise was about a balanced account, but the exports of gold and silver coin and bullion from the United States to foreign countries exceeded the imports of gold and silver coins and bullion into the United States, in the years 1874 and 1875 by $109,406,924. (See Statistical Abstract, 1892, p. 59.) And all the national banks had in coin October 1, 1875, was only $8,100,000. (Statistical Abstract for 1892, p. 39.) This was a very discouraging condition of facts, as specie payments were still suspended; and it did not vindicate the wisdom of the law of July 14, STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCE^. 11 1875, but condemned it as an outrageous violation of all the laws of prudence. In fact, the conditions were such that an execution of such law was a total impossibility, and so obvious was this impossibility that it is plainly apparent that the execution of the law, in due form, was never intended. This law was inspired by the single professed purpose of retiring the greenbacks, and giving to the national banks the entire circulation of the country, on a gold basis — with a reckless disregard as to its prac- ticability, or its effects upon property values, business interests, or, the employment or wages of laborers. Though the act of July 14, 1875, was professedly intended to confer upon the national banks, exclu- sively, the power to issue the currency for the whole United States, to be maintained upon a gold basis, yet, October 1, 1875, all the national banks in the United States had in their possession only $8,100,000 in specie; and most of that specie was in silver trade dollars, coined under tne law of 1873, and subsidiary silver' coin, legal tender for $5 only.' And there still remained a general suspension of specie payments. Eeckless wickedness and easy carelessness were the promoters of this terrible law of destructive mistakes. The law of July, 1875, in its effects, did not realize the results our hopeful legislators professed that they expected, though it is not exactly certain what was expected, with so little specie in all the banks and no specie in circulation. New national banks were organized after the law of 1875 took effect, and some of the banks increased their issues of bank notes; but there still remained the continued condition of a universal suspension of specie payments, except in the Pacific Coast States. On October 2, 1876, all the national banks of the United States held in specie only $21,400,000; on October 1, 1877, these banks held only $22,700,000 in specie; and on October 1, 1878, they held about $30,700,000. (See Statistical Abstract, 1892, p. 39.) And in each instance most of the national-bank holdings of specie were in silver coin, legal tender for only $5. The national banks, after their first comparatively small issues of national-bank notes, instead of increasing these issues, began to retire them; for they soon perceived, as these notes must be redeemed on presentation in full legal-tender money — which was United States notes or gold coin — silver having been demonetized— that with a gen- eral suspension of specie payments still universally prevailing in the country, and with but very little gold possessed or to be had by the national banks if the greenbacks should be retired, the national bank notes could not be redeemed at all. And so, while the law of 1873 prevented all increase in the legal-tender silver dollars, and only per- mitted subsidiary silver coin, legal tender for but $5— and that to be coined in the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury— the necessary practical effect of the law of 1875 was to reduce the volume of both national-bank notes and United States notes very materially. The report of the Comptroller of Currency for 1877, page 155, pre- sents this summary: "Total amount of national-bank notes outstand- ing January 14, 1875, $357,861,450. Amount outstanding to date of report, December 3, 1877, $319,219,599, showing a decrease of $32,641,851." , J „ . „ ia _- During these periods there had been issued under the law of ls/o, new national-bank notes to the amount of $38,324,640, and as the law required that United States legal-tender notes to the amount ot 80 per cent of all the notes issued to the national banks should be retired, 12 STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. there was retired under this law $30,659,712 of United States legal-"'' tender notes (greenbacks). A total decrease of national-bank notes and United States legal-tender notes from 1875 to 1877, inclusive, of; $63,301,563, was the result of the practical operations of the imprac- tical law of January, 1875 — as was naturally anticipated by those who intelligently favored these wreck-producing measures. There was still a universal suspension of specie payments throughout the United States, except in the Pacific Coast States. There could be no increase of legal-tender silver dollars, because silver had been demonetized under the law of 1873, and there was no material increase in gold coin. In the meantime the population of the country had increased at the average ratio of about 3J per cent per annum, to that extent enlarging the monetary necessities of the country, while the money supply had been decreased $63,301,563. The direct results of this mistaken and unfortunate legislation were of the most distressing character. The prices of all properties declined, and forced idleness succeeded to busy industry. Men by thousands, unable to find their customary employment at home, sought employ- ment elsewhere. The highways were filled with tramps — these, mostly horiest labor seekers, vainly sought for work by which they might live in the G-od-ordained way, "by the sweat of their brows" — for business' stagnation prevailed everywhere throughout the land, and laborers could find no occupation. One class only benefited by the otherwise general ruin. That class was the great money lenders in Europe and in the United States. The bond-holders' law of 1875, like the mills of the Gods, ground "exceeding fine," and the producing classes of the people were pulverized. Again in our history, hundreds, if not thousands of millions of dol- lars of the best properties and securities of our people passed from the hands of the men of industry, who are the foundations and pillars of our social and political edifice, to the hands of those who toil not, but who, having control of vast sums of money and credits, trapped their industrious but unwary neighbors by the force of laws intended for such purpose, and despoiled them of their possessions, which pos- sessions were the honest products of long years of toil and prudent economy. The law of 1873, demonetizing silver, and the law of 1875 for destroy* ing our greenback legal-tender money, having wrought their intended evil work of spoliation, ruin, and destruction to the property of the country, to the industries of the country, and to the men of industry, were condemned and repealed in 1878. They were laws of error run mad. They had been weighed and found wanting. The, weights by which they had been judged were the sufferings and miseries of the people. In 1878 the Bland- Allison Act, so called, was enacted, which directed the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase, at the market price thereof; "silver bullion, not less than two millions of dollars nor more than four million of dollars worth per month ; and to coin the same into , silver dollars, the same to be a legal tender at their nominal value for all debts and dues, public and private, except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contracts." Section 3 of the same act provided that persons holding such coin "may deposit the same with the Treasurer of the United States and receive certificates therefor, which certificates shall be receivable for customs, taxes, and all public dues." These certificates were made redeemable in silver coin, but they are not legal tenders; nor in any STATE OP THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 13 legal sense are they money, though the silver coins in which they must be redeemed, on presentation, are legal-tender money. April 29, 1878, a bill was introduced into Congress, which subsequently became a law, which law forbid from and after its passage any further "retiring, canceling, or destroying of United States legal-tender notes," and provided that they should "be reissued and kept in circulation,? and should be received for duties on imports. A law was also enacted authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to sell, in the markets $150,000,000 of United States bonds, at par in gold, and deposit the proceeds of such sales in the United States Treasury, as a fund for redeeming United States legal-tender notes. With the law of destruction, demonetizing silver, in 1873, and the law retiring the greenbacks in February, 1875, both repealed, and the enactment of the laws providing for and assuring a fuller supply of the needed money, without which the industries of the country could not possibly be maintained, all our property values advanced, business enterprises and labor interests revived, and became very nourishing; the hitherto idle workshops resumed work in all branches of manu- facturing, and every form of business and of occupation prospered; where despondency, distress, gloom and despair had prevailed, cheer- fulness and happiness again smiled benignantly throughout the land; and the angelic people of the United States, forgetting and forgiving the injuries and miseries they had needlessly suffered, thanked God for the blessing of being permitted to live under a Government so wise and so good. From the time of the passage of the Bland-Allison Act — which restored the silver dollar as a legal tender and provided for the liberal coinage of the same — tind the repeal of the law for retiring the green- backs — both laws enacted in 1878 and remaining in force till 1890, twelve years — there were no financial disturbances and no business derangements, and much valuable property had been created, and there was money to be made. The time 1 had come when another wrecking panic could be worked profitably. But it was not easy, under the prosperous, regular workings of the laws as they were in the beginning of the year 1890, to create a panic; and so the laws had to be changed, that a new era of destruction and plunder might be inaugurated, through cautious laws, which should again, though covertly, assert the supremacy of the impractical, impossible, single gold standard in the United States — so very largely debtor, as the United States were, to the single gold standard nations of Europe — debtor in an aggregate amount of not less than $5,000,000,000, and probably more, from which there accrued annually against the United States demands for inter- est and dividends aggregating not less than $250,000,000 a year, to be accounted for in Europe, where the investments were held. In respect to foreign liabilities, this established condition existed, and unless the balance of trade in foreign merchandise in behalf of the United States should exceed the imports into the United States, this $250,000,000 must annually be paid in money, or in new interest-bear- ing securities, at the option of our foreign creditors. July 14, 1890, an act of Congress was passed, which, by section 5, repealed so much of the Bland- Allison Act of February 28, 1878, as required the monthly purchase and coinage of not less than $2,000,000 nor more than $4,000,000 worth of silver bullion. The Bland- Allison Act arbitrarily required the purchase of the silver bullion at its market price, what- ever that price might be; and such act did not attempt in any manner to establish market prices. It left the Secretary of the Treasury no 14 STATE OP THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 'discretion. The law of July 14, 1890, repealed the Bland-. Allison Act of 1878, and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase,, from time to time, silver bullion to the aggregate, amount of 4,500,000 ounces, or so much thereof as might be offered} in each month, at the market price thereof, not exceeding $1 per ounce. This law starts out by limit- ing purchases of silver bullion by the Government to what might be offered to the Secretary of the Treasury. He is not to seek the silver, , and if not offered, however much it may be needed by the people, it was not to be purchased by the Secretary. This law further placed a limitation on the value of silver. " It shall not be purchased at more than $1 per ounce." These discriminating provisions of the law were, in, their nature, hostile to the use of silver, and necessarily depreciated silver in its market value. This effect so ' obviously and naturally resulted from the operations of the law, that the intention of* the promoters of the law was, beyond doubt, hostile to silver. The present Secretary of the Treasury also, instead of being governed by the market value of silver bullion as quoted in the New York and London bullion markets, or any other markets, in several instances disregarded all market quotations, and himself made arbi- ' trary offers for silver bullion, at prices lower than any quoted market , value in the world; and therefore he made no purchases, and issued no Treasury notes, though a money panic imperiously demanded relief by a supply of more money. The Secretary of the Treasury construed the law as giving him a right to establish by himself, alone, the market price of silver bullion. This was a bold usurpation of authority, and was a plain violation of the law in letter and spirit. It was directly hostile to the use of silver as a money metal, and was intended so to be. The law of 1890 and its mode of execution and nonexecution were insidious but positive move- ments in favor of the arbitrary, deficient, poverty-producing single gold standard; and it can not be construed otherwise. It was a dis- crimination in favor of those having invested money as against all the interests of labor, property production, and property values. In payment for the silver bullion which should be purchased under this act the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to issue Treas- ury notes. "Such Treasury notes shall be a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, except where otherwise expressly stipu- lated in the contract; and shall be received for customs, taxes, and all public dues; and they maybe counted as the lawful reserves of the national banks." Upon the demand of the holders of any such Treas- ury notes "the Secretary of the Treasury shall redeem such notes in gold or silver coin, at his discretion; it being the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio, or for a fixed ratio, as may be pro- vided for by law." This last provision contemplates as a distinct pur- pose future depreciation of silver in its ratio to gold by force of laws to be enacted for that purpose. This law is subtle and treacherous, and it is contradictory in its pro- visions. It states in section 2 that it is the established policy of the United States to maintain gold and silver on a parity with each other; but the laws of the United States provide for free and unlimited coin- age of gold. This act gives no free and unlimited coinage of silver, but places silver under stringent limitations as to coinage, Kbne is to be coined except what the Secretary of the Treasury purchases on offerings made to him. He is not authorized to go into the market to purchase, provided silver is not offered, and he can not, on offers made to him, STATE OP THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 15 purchase silver bullion at more than $1 per ounce under any condi- tions, even if a higher price rules the markets of the world. Great are the disabilities put upon silver in this act, while gold has free and unlimited coinage. Judged by the existence of silver- subsidiary coin, legal tender for only $10; judged by the demonetization of silver by the act of 1873; judged by the limitations and restrictions placed upon silver by the Bland- Allison Act of 1878, and judged by the silver-discrediting pro- visions of the law of 1890, as compared with free and unlimited coinage of gold, when section 2 of the act of 1890 asserts that it is the estab- lished policy of the United States to maintain at a parity the metals, gold and. silver, there was made an intentionally deceptive and false assertion to mislead the public mind; for parity, under the condi- tions, was an impossibility. On the contrary, the laws here quoted emphatically and arbitrarily create a disparity between gold and silver — in their certain effects appreciating gold and depreciating silver. Beyond anypossible doubt, the ordinary and fair meaning of the terms " to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other" is, that they shall be kept on an equality of values by the positive action of the United States; and that, if monetary conditions should at any time tend to impair this equality of values by any demand for either gold or silver coins more than for the other, or if any other cause should exist, which would disturb parity, the Secretary of the Treasury should, by the express letter of this law, uphold the coin which was tending to a relative depreciation of value by all lawful means ; so that, having in his discretion the power to pay gold or silver, should there be such a demand for either coin as would disturb the parity of values, to main- tain the parity, he should pay out the coin for which there was least demand, and by this increased use promote the value of that com that . parity might be maintained between the two metals, as by law it was provided. With silver in abundance in. the Treasury and gold short, the Secretary of the Treasury should pay silver. Ever since the passage of this law there has been a comparative short- ness in the gold supply and plenty of silver. B at contrary to the plain meaning of the law, as it stands expressed on the statute books, for the preservation of the parity in the value of gold and silver the unnustak-; able meaning of the law has been violated. There has been no attempt to maintain a parity of gold and silver values, and as a result wide dis- parity between gold and silver has been created by the unlawful prac- tices of the Treasury Department. If the law had read that "upon the demand of the holder of such Treasury notes the Secretary shall redeem such notes in gold or silver coin in the discretion of the person holding such Treasury notes, it bein g the established policy of the United States that no attempt shall be made to maintain any parity between gold and silver coin," the Secretary of the Treasury would have done just exactly what he has done. Not the discretion of the Secretary, as provided by law, but the unquestioned discretion of the holders of the Treasury notes has governed in these transactions with the Treasury Depart- ment ever since the law of 1890 was enacted.' ■ This law is said to have been a « makeshift," The history of its per- formance justifies the discreditable appellation bestowed upon it. it was meant to mislead and deceive. Pretending to have been in the interests of silver for the use of the people its Provisions were hostile to silver, and so far as possible its executionwas enforc ed «s a gold- standard law whenever discriminations could be made against silver 16 STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. and in favor of gold, with bo end to the evil results of this maladmin- istration of the law. Obligations of the Government lawfully payable in silver coin, when the Government had silver coin in abundance, have been paid in gold coin to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars, when the Government had not the gold with which to pay without disturbing the Government credits. Such payments have forced the Government to the money markets for the sale of bonds to obtain gold, which the Government would not have needed had the Government paid silver where it had the lawful right to pay it. While Government credit has been disturbed, destructive financial disturbances have occurred in general business, and are now ocurring, from such ill-advised, unwise, and wrongful use of the discretionary powers vested in the Secretary of the Treasury, who should have been the guardian of the Treasury and protector of the interests of the people, and not their destroyer. In 1888 the Argentine Republic in South America, having previously borrowed large sums of money on a gold basis — money to be used in works of internal impr6vements — became unable to meet its gold obli- gations. The amount upon which default was made was said to have been about $250,000,000, on securities held by the banking house of Baring Bros., in England. Now, all the gold in the world, as estimated by the Director of the Mint, in his report of June 30, 1893 (p. 49), is only $3,900,000,000. Of this amount, by estimation — France had $800,000,000 The United States , 661,000,000 Germany ' '. 618, 000, 000 Great Britain .' 540,000,000 Russia 432,000,000 And the rest was held among the various nations of the earth. All of this gold was in use, and was wanted in the countries named. None had any gold they desired to spare ; and so this failure of the Argentine Republic to meet its obligations for $250,000,000 in gold — obligations held in England — made a great disturbance, and was severely felt throughout the financial world. It especially disturbed England; for it was a sudden call for nearly one-half of all the gold supply credited to England by the report of the Director of the Mint. Though England is estimated as carrying or holding in gold only $540,000,000, "England is the great creditor nation of the world," said Mr. Gladstone in a speech in the English Parliament, published in the London Standard March 1, 1892. He said in that speech, " England owes nobody, and everybody owes England." He estimated England's investments in countries outside of Great Britain at $10,000,000,000; and he further said the amount was constantly increasing. This enormous sum due to England is payable mostly on a gold basis, and equals in amount two and one-half times all the world's supply of gold. It is nearly twenty times as much as England, on an average, currently holds of gold, as is estimated by the Director of the Mint in his report of 1893. An exceedingly large amount of these English, investments is in the United States. When England needs gold, cred- itor nation as she is, for such vast sums as above stated she has only to call upon her debtors to supply her wants. In Australia, in 1890, there were financial troubles similar to those of the Argentine Eepublic, and demands for larger amounts payable in gold. Then Italy appeared in the European money market, asking for gold. Next Austria made demands for gold, to refund her public STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 17 debt. Eussia also bought gold, to increase her treasury reserves. Thus there were several large national demands for gold in the short period of a few years— all to be supplied out of the world's small stock of ODly $3,900,000,000. While these demands existed, onr own United States and the people thereof were debtor to foreign bankers and capi- talists, on account of their various investments in this country, to an amount of $5,000,000,000 or more. The stringent demands for gold, created by the conditions just related, induced United States creditors to call on their debtors in this country for the gold to meet the urgent demands our creditors had in Europe against themselves. These, and these only, were the causes of the recent large exports of gold from the United States to Europe. The report of the Director of the Mint for 1892 (p. 42) states that the United" States exported gold in 1888 and 1889 to the amount $61,435,989; in. 1890, $15,672,98:3 ; in 1891, $70,233,494. The report of the Director of the Mint for 1893 states, that the exports of gold for 1892 were $142,654, and for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1893, the exports were $86,897,275. Very much more gold has been exported from the United States since the above dates. Outside of mistaken legislation, the real cause which disturbs Amer- ican finances is our great indebtedness to Europe; and no legislation will amend our monetary condition that does not recognize this situa- tion. Our legislation must be for a debtor people, who have in a degree lost financial independence by the magnitude of their debts. The legis- lation can not be palliative. It must be radical} and have in view a restoration of our financial independence as against all foreign policies not in accord with the necessities of our condition. "America for Americans!" Ourselves for ourselves! limited only by the laws of integrity. This, for us, is a necessary financial principle, which must underlie all judicious monetary legislation. Our financial weakness is in the $5,000,000,000 or more of European investments in the United States, calling for $250,000,000 or more each year, payable to those who, living in Europe, hold these investments. Our strength lies in our population of 70,000,000 of industrious, vigor- ous, intelligent people, in possession of a country continental in its vastness and more productive than are any two nations in all Europe; and in our commerce in merchandise with foreign nations, amounting annually to about $1,000,000,000 in exports. Our commercial strength must provide for our financial weakness. This is our field of legisla- tion, and there is no other that will or can relieve' us from financial destruction, resulting, as it will in time, from our large foreign indebted- ness. If balances shall from year to year accrue against the United States, our gold will surely follow these balances if we have gold with which to pay them. Increased investments will create increased indebt- edness, and thus add to the sum of adverse balances against us held in Europe. The exportation of gold, which have been enumerated, having been far in excess of any current supply the United States possessed, pro- duced a very great stringency in the money markets throughout the United States. This stringency became a general panic only by the action of the banks of the country and the great daily newspapers, which are almost wholly owned by the money rings (and which manu- facture and control public opinion), aided by some of our public men, who loudly and clamorously asserted that the exportation of gold was caused entirely by fears of the too great production of silver money, under the law of July 14, 1890, and who insisted upon a repeal of that S. Mis. 86 — -2 18 STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. law. In truth, the demand for gold to be exported 1 to the European markets arose only from the financial disturbances of the gold equilib- rium in Europe, by reason of the causes before stated. Creditors of tine United States took gold from the United States because it wa& their right to take it, and because they much needed it to readjust their own disordered finances. The gold would have gone with or without the law of 1890, as it had gone many times before at the call of foreign creditors, as hereinbefore related. There are persons -who strangely argue, as most of the exported gold is drawn from the Treasury by means of Treasury notes, that if these notes should be canceled no gold could be exported, as though those ■ entitled to gold would not be able to obtain it under any form of cur- rency so long as gold payments are ma iiitained, The argument is an attempt to mislead public intelligence, and might do so were it not so stupidly absurd. By those who created the panic the immense, actual, and pressing demands for gold in Europe were not considered; nor was the debtor condition of the United States considered, by which Europeans had a right to call gold from us, debtors, to relieve their pressing wants.. And so the single-gold-standard men created a panic to enable them to repeal the silver-purchasing clause of the law of 1890. They suc- ceeded in their effort, but at what a fearful cost to the country! No- discernable good can be seen as the result of this repeal, but financial earthquakes and cyclones have shattered the fabric of our industrial institutions and buried millions of people in the ruins. It is estimated that between April 27 and the 30th day of December, 1893, "more than 15,000 bankruptcies and suspensions of commercial and industrial companies , had taken place, and that more than 600 banking institutions had been seriously injured, or wholly ruined. The- total amount involved in the bankruptcies and suspensions of these companies' and institutions is estimated at $750,000,000. Of railroad property, $1,200,000,000, during that period, passed into the hands of receivers ! Three millions of men, Women, and young persons, at work in shops, factories, and mills April 27, 1893, were out of work January 1, 1894, and many of them hungry and suffering. This num- ber has increased, and the sufferings have increased. It is said that the clearing-house exchanges of the various cities of the country show a diminution from April, 1893, to January, 1894, of $7,000,000,000, andi by July, 1894, the diminution was $10,000,000,000. This is undeniable proof of a value- destroying paralysis of business, and the consequent and necessary distress of the people. At this immense cost to the country the single gold- standard men triumphed, and the silver-pur- chasing clause of the law of July 14, 1890, requiring 4,500,000 ounces of silver to be purchased monthly and Treasury notes to be issued there- for to the people, was repealed. August 28, 1893, the bill passed the House; October 30, 1893, it passed the Senate. It was signed by the President November 1. Up to the present time, who has gained by this panic and the immense- destruction of values in property of every kind 1 Only money lenders,, who had money loaned on the safest and most profitable securities — money-lenders, the parties who engineered this wreck-producing panic — money-lenders ready to seize upon the spoils of the wreckage thay had produced, by which the best of bonds, stocks, and other securities, by many hundreds of millions, passed from the hands of embarrassed and, impoverished men of business and industry to the hands of the wreckers who had, been the careful planners and architects of this premediated STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 19 i financial havoc. As yet no light of improvement shines upon the country, blighted by the curse of impractical or selfishly unholy finan- cial legislation. With -all the evils accomplished, more evil legislation is sought to be enforced upon the country. The single gold standard for our country, which has but little gold and much debt, and which has annual demands upon it for $250,000,000 to be paid to foreigners, in foreign countries — who hold $5,000,000,000 or more of investments in the United States — can not be maintained in the United States. The more it is tried under present conditions the more injuries will be inflicted upon the people. The only way by which we can meet these demands is to meet them by an increase of our production of the various kinds of merchandise which the United States exports; so as to enable us, by our large expor- tations, in excess of imports, to liquidate these liabilities against us. The vital question in American finances is the application of that system, whatever it may be, which will give us the largest, most uni- form, and permanent supply of money, in order that production and trade may most largely and most steadily flourish, and be least affected by those vicissitudes which are caused by variations in the volume or value of money. Constancy in money supplies is the basis, and only basis, of steadiness in all production and in all commerce. The annual supply of gold, of $35,000,000, the total production of the United States mines, is but one-seventh of the $250,000,000 of interest and dividends which we have to pay annually in Europe; so that if all the gold we produce were used for the purpose of such payments, and nothing were retained for our own use, there would be but one- seventh of a sufficiency of gold to meet foreign interest demands. The bullion value of all our annual silver production is only as much more ; aud if we exported all the gold and silver produced from our mines, the whole would be but two-sevenths of our annual dues in Europe on European investments here; so that we can not possibly pay in actual gold and silver. Our exports, in amount to meet our obligations, can only be of the classes of production called merchan- dise. To export them, they must be produced; to be produced, our industries must be regularly employed and steadily maintained; and this requires, for the best conditions, a regular, constant, and reliable money supply, sufficient in amount to meet the demands of business fully and without stint. Without the money supply, the result is impossible. Money is as necessary to business as food is to sustain the living body. It is advocated by men favoring all supply and con-, trol of paper money by the banks that the volume should be "elastic." This theory is true only on one hypothesis; and that is, that business also, which depends for its life on money, should be elastic and flexible, succeeding sometimes and failing at others. If we would have values of property permanent and steady, manufacturers seasonably and uni- formly employed, laborers regularly busy, and would have, our farmers in receipt of remunerative prices for horses, cattle, hogs, sheep, cotton, rice, sugar, grain, hay, etc., our money, above all things, should have the staying qualities that give steadiness and certainty m volume and. value. ... . , If we would have uncertainty in all these things— variations, quick fluctuations, and panics— give us " an elastic currency," which specu- lators can increase or decrease as they may desire, to promote or destroy values, to work corners in stocks, cotton, grain, or provisions, and to hurry up panics, where robbery among ruins will be most profitable. Then give the bankers full control of the currency of the 20 STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. V country, with conditions favorable to "^elasticity," so that their money machine may grind up or down, as suits their selfish, unscrupulous designs. If we would have our country steadily prosper, give us a good sup- ply of money, regular and constant, the best we can have, and some- thing we can surely have, and not an impractical ideal only. On no account give us a currency to rest on the quicksands of elasticity.* Even the discretionary powers of the Secretary of the Treasury should be taken from him; because, in the nature of things, if he has discre- tionary powers over the volume of our money he has necessarily dis- cretionary powers over its value and the values of all property, and he becomes a machine to work "elasticity" into our financial affairs. Above all things, our money should stay by us, solid as the granite foundations of the earth, whose " elasticity " is manifested only by the force of earthquakes. With variations of seasons, varied market conditions at home and abroad, we will have all the change in our affairs that will be of advantage to us ^without " elasticity " in our currency, to be worked from harmony to discords by banking specu- lators or secretaries of the Treasury. Let us establish our system upon a basis which natural forces will govern, where our immense financial interests, involving in some degree the value of all our $70,000,000,000 of property, and in some degree the prosperity and happiness of all our 70,000,000 of people, will be best promoted. We will find the natural supplies of gold and silver, which have been man's money material through all the ages of history,. much more steady and uniform in their supplies for man's monetary use than any artificial work of man possibly can be. As the sum of all the accumulated stocks of gold and silver in the world are about equal, each to the other, on a basis of 16 of silver to 1 of gold, by weight — though in some periods more gold has been pro- duced, and in others more silver— the average for centuries of produc- tion, to the present time, may well be called a safe standard. If either falls short in production, the money demands of the world will be best subserved by the increase of the other. This conclusion is for no class,, but for all as just and fair. Free and unlimited coinage of gold and silver, with full legal-tender qualities, is required by the best interests of mankind, for all coun- tries and for each country. The money lenders are the exception. Monometallism of gold or silver either will best subserve the purpose of making money valuable by reducing the supply. The sameresu.lt would occur if silver were the solemoney,or if gold were the single money. The broad interests of humanity require both, for the single reason that there is not a sufficiency of either alone to meet man's necessities for money. If nature had supplied but one of these metals, as a money material silver would have been the better of the two, as the more abundant. As both are needed by man, let nature's supplies be the regulator of their use, for nature has no interests to subserve in hostil- ity to man; whereas men, by inconstant, imperfect, and changeable laws, favorable to some classes and hostile to others, will, if permitted, do in the future what he has done in the past, do the work of ignorance,, folly, and supreme injustice, that some may gain much, though that much is wrested directly from others as really as though the work were robbery, by aid of the knife or bludgeon. The industries can not highly flourish on an insufficient supply of money. Without some money the industries can exist only in very primitive, restricted forms, and limited to use by the producer, or to barter, at or near the places of production. STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 21 There are those who favor a bank currency, for the alleged reason- that our present monetary system is compounded of several elements- gold and silver coin, gold certificates, silver certificates. United States notes, Treasury notes, and national-bank notes; and they would retire gold certificates, silver certificates, United States notes, and Treasury notes, because of their variety, and would confer all power to supply the currency for the country upon the national banks. Simply that there is variety of form, or heterogenousness, is no reason for depriving the country of the valuable services of these forms of money. If there are several rocks in the pile, they are all absolutely financial rocks— strong and enduring as our Government, which sus- tains them by all the resources and powers it possesses. To withdraw these forms of money, sustained directly by our country's vastresourcesy and the authority of the laws, because heterogenous, and substitute therefor national-bank notes altogether, because they are homogenous in form, would be like placing a pile of sand, or sawdust, where the solid rocks of our national money now are. We are in a condition of financial weakness, and if the strong support of our Government were withdrawn our position would be one of great peril and certain fail- ure. If we would have stability and safety in money, so largely debtor as we are to foreign people, we must, in ordinary times, even, and especially in financial emergencies, have the direct support of our Government. Under existing conditions banking corporations absolutely can not uphold the fabric of our monetary credit and supply our currency. If no debts existed payable in foreign lands, and no balances of trade, we* would not suffer so very disastrously, with bank-note currency properly supported. But, as things are, $5,000,000,000 owing to people in Europe,. requiring cash balances from us of $250,000,000 each year, only the Government of the United States is our safe anchor; and the cable that connects our money forms thereto must be direct and strong. But the suffering bankers — are they not to be pitied? Truly, their wrecking enterprises in money could not be so frequent nor so deadly as though the currency were all or in part, theirs, to contract and expand in the working of money corners and panics, where business enterprises and property values are destroyed. Gleaning among the ruins of a defunct prosperity is, to some, a profitable and congenial industry. The prosperity of the country, about which so much has been said and written, has, for the last fifteen years especially, been that of appearance more than of reality. Uur country has been largely deveL oped by borrowing money from Europe, and the show ot wealth and development is the debtor's display of his creditor's money. The day . of delusion is over. The hard reality of overwhelming debt is upon, •us— indebtedness to foreign people, who remove the earnings of their investments to other and distant lands. And how are we to pay these foreign creditors and retain money sufficient for our absolute business HGOGSsifjlfS ^ There is only one way. We must have free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver. But it is said we can not maintain such coinage except by the cooperation of all the nations by international agreement. There is no good sense in this position. At the conclusion of the bimetallic conference in 1878 the collective opinion of all the European delegates, save only those of Italy, was presented by the president of the conference, Mr. Leon Say, and as 22 STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. reported in the Annual Beport of the Director of the Mint for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1893 (p. 106), is in theise words: First. That it was necessary to preserve in the world the monetary function of .silver as well as of gold, but that the choice of one or the other, or both simultane- ously, should be governed by the special situation of each State, or group of States. Second. That this question of the restriction of the coinage of silver should also be left to the discretion of each State, or group of States. Third. That the differences of opinion that had appeared (in the conference) 'excluded the adoption of a coin ratio between the two metals. Bach nation should therefore be governed by its own particular con- dition as to what financial system will best represent the interests of the nation. Nothing could be said more wisely. Ours is a vast country, a populous country, and a qountry of great resources, but it is a debtor country. And in this country, large, populous, and rich in stores of wealth to be developed by labor, there must be, for the best conditions,.an ample fund of money, constant in supply and permanent in value; and if we shall fall short in this condition of money supply, we shall, to the extent of our failure, fall short of success in its highest ana most perfecb results. As a debtor nation, liable to be called at any time to pay money to our creditors, who are residents of foreign and distant ■countries, we must be ready at any time to meet the money calls of these foreign creditors and have money remaining to ourselves to meet the exacting demands of our productive and commercial interests. That means a great deal of money. But have it we must, or suffer the fearful penalties of great financial fluctuations, business losses, and sometimes fearful panics. Or, what is far better and easier, we must have a supply of ready money for use in our industries, full and ample, and constantly ready for employment, such as will give the greatest effective activity to all our business affairs — farming, manu- facturing, everything, in fact. Thus, and thus only, we can always have our exportations of mer- chandise to foreign countries exceed our importations from foreign countries sufficiently to meet the demands of our foreign creditors upon us. Then all will be easy; and if our exports of merchandise shall exceed our importations sufficiently, we may reduce our foreign indebt- edness. But our money must be real and standard money, and not fictitious forms of credit money, which from their nature are inconstant and irregular in supply and varying in value, with sometimes no value, and are no sure foundation for, and support of, the values of property, nor any assurance of the means of regular development in •our various industrial occupations. The fictitious forms of credit money are the sure harbingers of deranged markets, irregular productions, fluctuating values, and destructive panics. For such credit forms of money are not money in reality, and when actual money is needed this substitute proves a wretched, worthless, and flighty deception, ruinous to all who trust and rely upon it. Unrestricted bimetallism in the United States would solve all our finan- cial problems. Our mine productions of gold need not be discussed; for, as gold is a universal money, it can be its own guardian. In rela- tion to silver, the mines of the United States produce yearly about $35,000,000 in bullion at present value. If uncoined, we might export all this $35,000,000 of bullion. But if coined, we would lose that export.; because, as coined money, its value would be more than its bullion value for export ; and so it would remain in use in the United States as money. Let us thank God that it would stay. But we would lose $35,000,000 •of export bullion ; $35,000,000 is but a very small portion of the total STATE OF. THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 2$ yearly wealth production of the United States. The amount of our yearly productions is variously estimated at from 110,000,000,000 to $14,000,000,000. A medium would be $12,000,000,000. This $35,000,000 of silver bullion production annually is only about one four-hundredth part of the total of all our productions— a very insignificant part indeed. We export of merchandise annually to foreign countries about $1,000,000,000. Should we lose, by coinage, the export of this $35,000, 000- of silver bullion, the loss would be but 3 per cent of the gross amount of our exports. Now, if by coining this silver bullion into full legal -tender money we add annually this amount of active money capital to the existing supply of the country, at present ruinously insufficient in money, who- can doubt that its stimulating, promotive effect upon our industries would add much more than $35,000,000 to the exportable merchandise our country would produce each year ? The United States would have a double gain, increased money at home and increased exports to foreign countries. The full remonetization of silver would solve the whole financial problem successfully, ,and in no case could harm result. With unlimited gold and silver coinage and all our forms of paper currency issued by the United States Government, supported by the solid strength, the wealth, credit, and legal force of United States laws,, panics would be no more. The best days of our former prosperity would be restored to us, and would remain with us so long as we should maintain this natural and rational policy in our national finances. A creditor nation can maintain its own financial standard independently of all other nations. England, a creditor nation, has the single gold standard as her choice. Holland, a rich and creditor nation, maintained the single silver stand- ard from 1847 to 1875, a period of twenty-eight years. France, a credi- tor nation, has bimetallism. All are independent creditor nations, and' each can do as it pleases as to forms or systems of money. But a debtor nation like the United States must choose its own independent financial standard, according to the requirements of its actual trade, financial, and property conditions, or run the risk of being destroyed by the money demands of its creditors — demands made in a form which the debtor may not be able to meet. With the single gold standard controlled wholly by creditor classes, and these mostly foreigners, the volume of money and the demand and supply of it can be worked so artificially that money corners, affecting property values, and the values of all the industrial forces of the country are subject to the will of the unscrupulous gamblers in money. But the single gold standard, associated with currency supplies to be furnished to the country by banks only, would be a double-barreled engine of destruction, from whose devastating effects nothing could escape. ' No steady, permanent prosperity is possible to the United States, so largely debtor to foreign dealers in money, except on the broad basis of a money supply bo be assured by the free and unlimited coinage of gold and silver on a basis of 16 to 1, which has substantially been the world's basis for centuries. This country never needed this supply more than it now needs it. And never, even in the terrible struggle of the late civil war, have the • interests of the country had more urgent need of the wealth and strength of the United States Government, as the reliable supporter of the credit and value of our paper money, than now. The abandonment of bimet- allism by this Administration, and the attempt to confer upon banks 24 STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. the high prerogative, of supplying the people with their paper money, have brought industrial destruction upon the nation. Let the people hasten to abandon these wild schemes of folly and wickedness. Give us not weak theories, but substantial bimetallism and Government paper money only that will stay with us at all times and under all con- ditions in our time of supreme necessity. Notwithstanding universal financial distress in the United States, it is asserted that there is plenty of money — that the banks in the cities have large amounts of idle money. This is not in any sense true as to the large amounts stated; and in all senses it is false as to the owner- ship of the funds the banks hold. The public sworn statements made by the officers of the banks show that the banks generally have loaned all their own capital and have loaned a large amount of their depos- its; and that the money now lying in the banks belongs not to the banks, but to their depositors, for which the banks are actual debtors. The more deposits the banks hold the more the banks owe. Have not 600 banks failed within the last eighteen months because they had loaned the money belonging to their depositors, and, when called upon to do so, could not pay their depositors? The banks have a fiction 'of accounts which show aggregate deposits in all the banks in the United States of $4,000,000,000. On this state- ment, the banks are utterly insolvent; because this stated aggregate •qf debts due to depositors is three times the amount of all the money in the United .States by which such deposit debts could be paid. This statement, paraded as a statement of wealth, is really a state- 'ment of money poverty. Fortunately, as an accurate statement, it is not true. For illustration, a country bank in Kockford, 111., has an extra deposit of $50,000. The country bank sends this $50,000, as a deposit, to a Chicago bank. The Chicago bank sends the same $50,000, as a deposit, to a New York bank. The deposit is counted over three times, and behold the $50,000 has become $150,000; and thus the country is made to have "lots of money." The statements made by the Secretary of the Treasury of the actual money in the Uiiited States greatly misleads and deceives. It is in part a fictitious statement. The silver certificates are not legal tender at all, nor are they money. They are stated as money at $336,924,000. There is a statement, of the old fractional notes as being in circulation to the amount of $6,896,000. They are nofin circulation at all, and $29,615,000 of lost national-bank notes make no response to that amount of money deposited for their redemption, which has been lying in the United. States Treasury since 1890. The above items, as to amounts, are taken from Secretary Carlisle's report, December 31, 1894. The above $29,615,000 national-bank notes can not be found for redemption. The loss in the last thirty-three years on the outstanding national-bank notes, where redemption has not been attempted, is probably in amount not less than $21,000,000. Put down as probably lost, in all the last thirty- three years, out of our greenback money, not less than $45,000,000. Our subsidiary coins, legal tender for no more than $10 (see law of 1879), and therefore not money usable in the large transactions of business, are stated to be $76,000,000. The bank statements of the United States, in their total, and the Treasury of the United States, do not show, in all, an amount of gold equal to $300,000,000. It can not be said that the amount is greater, because there is no proof of the existence of any larger amount. If this is correct, the gold shortage is $300,000,000 less than the public STATE OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 25 statements pretend to show. The country has not the money it is sup- posed to have, by a total shortage of $815,435,000. Is it a wonder there is a money famine"? How long can our little stock of $300,000,000 of gold last in liquidat- ing interest and dividend dues in Europe to an amount of $250,000,000 each year. We must have free and unlimited coinage of gold and silver, arid must have the needed volume of paper money supplied by the Government of the United States, or the ruin of our country, already so far and so dreadfully advanced, will soon terminate in the overthrow of all the best elements of our civilization ; and the history of the old republics of Greece and Eome will be the history of the great American Eepub- lic. " It was; but, alas ! it is not." The report of the Director of the Mint for 1893 (p. 167) estimates the entire world's production of gold for 1890 at only $118,848,700; for the year 1891 at $126,183,500, and for 1892 at $ 138,861,000. The United States only sees that part of this gold supply which the United States produces. But if the United States had to itself, alone,' the world's entire annual production of gold, that entire amount would be only about one-half of what the United States owes annually to Europe, on Euro- pean investments in this country. Eapidly, very rapidly, the wealth of the United States is being transferred to Europe. The big estates in New York and Europe, hundreds of millions of dollars, in the hands of single banking houses are not the accumulations of legitimate earn- ings, but are the profits of money corners and panics — the detestable work of wreckage and law-contrived piracy, which have absorbed in large degree the accumulated wealth of the world. The single gold basis is a perpetual corner of money, affecting destructively all values, all business, and all property, the comfort of the homes of our people, and all that is best and dearest in the ordinary life of our American citizenship and civilization. Wherefore, by reason of the facts hereinbefore stated, your memo- rialist respectfully requests this honorable Senate to cause laws to be enacted which will relieve and protect your memorialist and other peo- ple of the United States— laws which will provide for the free and unlimited coinage of silver with a ratio of 16 ounces of silver to 1 ounce of gold, and make such silver coinage receivable for customs and all other dues to the Government of the United States, and lull legal-tender money. There can not be any parity between gold and silver coin except by equal coinage laws; nor can there ever be any general prosperity for our unfortunately much-indebted country except by such laws. Anson WolcotT- February 1, 1895. O S. Mis. 86- — 3 53d Congress, ) SEjSATE. (Mis.Doc. 3d Session. J | jf o_ 9^ ' IN THE £,ui'tf ATE OP THE UNITED STATES. February 6, 1895.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Teller presented the following PAPERS. THE REAL CAUSES OP AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS. [By Mr. R. Laoey Everett, M. P., Radical member for the Woodbridge Division of Suffolk.] Subject : The effects resulting from gold monometallism on the prices of agricultural produce, and the relief to be obtained for the present agricultural depression by the restoration of silver, under an international agreement, to its former legal-ten- der power, through open mints for the coinage of both precious metals at a fixed ratio. We all know that for sometime past farming in this country has heen in a very bad way. Mivch of our land is not farmed near as well as it was farmers not being able to And the money with which to pay wages. In most neighborhoods a good deal of land which was under the plow has been put down to grass. In some counties, as Essex, Hampshire, Wiltshire, etc., a good deal has been abandoned altogether, and the farmhouses, premises, and cottages are going to ruin. In many hundreds, if not thousands, of villages to-day cottages to which indus- trious, honest laborers once took home their brides, and in which they lived and brought up their families, may be seen standing empty, with windows broken or boarded up, and no prospect of finding new tenants. The laborers and their families who once lived in them have been driven to the towns to increase the already too fierce competition for employment there. The losses farmers have had to suffer may be counted by scores of millions of pounds, and those of. the landlords by hundreds of millions. Numbers of farmers — many of them once well off — have lost all the savings of a lifetime, and are now bankrupt, broken-hearted, and ruined. Many of the landlords have had to reduce their establish- ments, and some are no longer able to live in their old homes, but have had to let them to strangers. Village tradesmen are finding their trade falling away; the incomes of the clergy and of the ministers of the dis- senting chapels are drying up. Everywhere in the villages there is shrinkage and pinching. Why is this? Why are things so different from what they were a few years ago? There may be several contributory causes— but the chief beyond all question is the fall in prices. Year by year, the produce of the farm has sold for less and less, thus reducing the income of the villages. If there is not the income from the land it of course can not be spent. The farmer suffers first, as he is the seller of most of the produce. Prom him the loss passes on to the other classes. There can be no real improvement in the state of our villages unless the fall of prices is 2 REAL CAUSES OF AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS. stayed. Agri culture can riot possibly revive while the returns of the cultivator of the soil get smaller each year. I am going to try and show what has caused the fall in prices which . has been going ou now with little check for the last fifteen or twenty years, and which shows no sign of having come to an end. The expla- nation is perfectly clear and simple when we know all the facts. What do we mean by " price? " By "price" we mean the quantity of money which what we sell will exchange for. When we sell any. thing we may be said to have made a "deal" with somebody. He takes our gobds and we take his money. We often haggle a good deal before the " deal" is finished. When it is finished the buyer takes our goods and gives us in exchange as much as it is agreed of his money. Thus you will see that every sale is really a barter, a barter of what we have to sell for money. Money is half Of every bargain ; and if any- thing happens to money to raise its value it has just the same effect on the bargain as if something had happened to what we sell. We know that if there were to be very deficient harvests throughout the world for two or three years that would make corn scarce and send up the price. Just so, if for several years the harvest of money is very deficient money goes up in value, and anybody wanting any has to give more produce for it. Now this is just what has happened to money during the last twenty years. All that while there have been short harvests of it. Well, there, I think I hear you say, " I never heard of the harvest of money; I have heard of the corn harvest and the hay harvest, of fruit gathering, of the hop picking, of the potato harvest, but I never yet heard of the money harvest." 1 do not wonder at your answer. I have myself often seen the reapers and the mo wers in the corn and the hay fields ; I have seen the hop pickers, and the potato diggers here at home, and the grape gatherers in the vineyards abroad, but I never saw the gathering in of the money harvest. All the same there is a money harvest; it is certain money comes from somewhere. Where does it come from 1 We will not trouble about the coppers, they are not Of much account; but the silver and the gold money— where^ does it come from? Why, it comes out of the mines, which are found in different countries, and is washed out of the sands or crushed out of the rocks, often with much toil and hard labor. In mpst of the mines both the precious metals are found together; but some produce only one or only the other. The finding of these mines is very much a matter of chance. About three hundred and fifty years ago a poor Indian in South America, scrambling up the side of a steep cliff in pursuit of a wounded deer, was helping himself up by laying hold on the bushes which grew out of the soil, when one of them came up by the roots and let him down with it in his hand. Looking at it, when he picked himself up at the bottom, he saw something shining at the root. Climbing up again to see the place where it had grown, he saw silver shining in the earth. This was how the famous silver mines of Potosi were discovered. From these— all through Queen Elizabeth's, reign, and right away through the two following centuries— immense quantities of silver flowed into England and Europe. Through all those years there was a plentiful harvest of silver each year.- What followed from this? I will tell yo,u. When Queen Elizabeth began to reign it took more than a bushel of wheat to buy a shilling. When, she died, a bushel would buy nearly 3. In the next century and the next, the harvests of silver still continuing good, a bushel came REAL CAUSES OF AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS. 3 to exchange one year with another for about 4 shillings. It did not take any more labor to grow a bushel of wheat at the end of the time than at the beginning. But silver had become more plentiful, there- fore a bushel of wheat would exchange for more of it. Now, let me tell you something about the harvest of gold. In Janu- ary, 1848, a miller was digging a trench to make a channel for the waste water from his mill to run in, in California, one of the States of North America. When he left off at night he let the water in to wash away some of the soil while" he slept. When he came back in the morn- ing and turned the water off so that he could go ou with his work, he noticed some yellow-looking stones which the water in its washing had left behind. Picking them up, he found them extraordinarily heavy. Why, says he to himself, surely this must be gold. He took his find to be examined, and indeed it was gold. This was the beginning of the wonderful gold discoveries in California which we used to hear so much about. Two or three years later, by accident also, gold was discovered in Australia. During the next twenty years there was the most abundant yearly harvest of gold which the world has ever had. During the early part of this century the harvest of gold from the world's mines was only about enough to make 2,000,000 sovereigns a year. On the average of the twenty years fol- lowing the great gold discoveries it rose to enough to make 30,000,000, ■ or ten times as much. Curiously enough, the corn laws were taken off just before the gold discoveries began. When they were taken off the farmers and land- owners of those days said, "Now we shall be ruined by foreign com- petition." I am old enough to remember well what fears there were. For a few years things were very bad. In the county where I live there were bitter complaints, and wages on farms went down to 8s. a week. And even with those miserable wages employment was very hard to get. To this day I remember how my heart ached at the sight of the sor- rowful faces of men with families to keep at home, who came beg- ging to be set on, but whom none of the farmers wanted. ,God knows how bad I felt when I had to tell them from my father that he could not set them on. Some of those faces haunt me to this day. Things were as fiat then in the towns as on the farms. Men could not go there and get work as they have been able to do in later years. But about 1853 the new gold began to tell, and from that time for the next twenty -five years farmin g never looked back. Instead of agri- culture being ruined under free trade, as it had been feared, it throve' better than it had ever done before, and the towns throve just as well. There never was such a time of prosperity through the world as in that quarter of a century, from 1853 to 1878. The produce of the land- taking it all round— the corn, the wool, and the meat together, instead of falling in price, on the whole, rose. The product of an acre of land brought to the farmer more money. The income of each village, year by year, steadily increased. The farmer got the advantage first, then the landlord and the other classes began to share. The laborer was the last to get the full benefit, just as he has been the last to feel the full brunt of the present evil times now, but the benefit came m the end to him too. , As the income from land kept increasing in those good times, employ- ment began to increase, labor was in demand, then wages began to move upward, and the independence of the laborer greatly increased. If one farmer did not want a man another did. And besides this, ever -more and more men were wanted in the towns, for the towns throve as 4 , REAL CAUSES OF" AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS. well as the country. The new flood of gold brought these blessed fruits. As money multiplied everyone found money easier to get. Incomes kept increasing instead of decreasing. Abundant money showed itself a friend to industry, production, and labor. In those days Government kept taking off' taxes, and yet those that were left produced an increasing national income each year. Those were the happy years of surpluses, instead of deficits, in the national exchequer. The wonderful prosperity of those years led to the people being better fed, better clothed, better housed, better taught, and better employed , than they had ever been before. It is the wealth gained in those years which has kept the country going as well as it has gone through the terrible losses of the last few disastrous years. An abundant harvest of money, then, is a go,od thing. Most of the readers of the Cable, I expect and hope,, are readers of the Bible too. There is one striking illustration there of the blessings abundant money brings. 1 I refer to the story of King Solomon's reign. We read that "Be made silver as stones for abundance in Jerusalem." We read also that "The people were many, as the sand which' is by , the sea in multitude, eating and drinking aud making merry." We read, too, that "They dwelt safely, every man under his vine and under his fig tree, all the days of King Solombn." .Increase of num- bers, plenty, security, happiness, these were their portion during those years of abundant money. May we not say, " Happy is the people that . is in such a case." But now there is another thing I want to point out to you. The precious metals do not become money till they have been through, the mint and are coined. If they are not allowed to be coined they do not become money at all, and their plentiful production is of comparatively little profit to any but their owners. In all past times that ever I read of until now, the nations were only too glad to have silver and gold brought to their mints to be turned into money; they welcomed either or both as a blessing. In order to have good yearly harvests of money, there must be abundant produce from the mines, and there must also be open mints to coin that produce. I think this is plain to see. This brings me to the explanation of why times are so different now from what they were; of why the produce of our farms exchanges yearly for less and less money than it used to do; of why the incomes of most of us keep going down instead of up. The explanation is perfectly simple. Taking the two precious metals together, the annual harvest of the mines during the last twenty years has been very good ; it has increased, not fallen off. But in country after country, beginning with Germany in 1873, and finishing with India in 1893, mints have been wholly or partially closed against silver. One-half of the pld source of supply of money has been cut off. The natural and inevitable effect of this has been that year by year money in all these countries keeps increasing in value. An artifical scarcity of it has been created in them by law. The result is, that year by year we have to give more and more wheat, or barley, or wool, or potatoes, or whatever we produce, in order to get money. And if we have fixed rents to pay, or interest, or taxes, evil indeed is our case. For, where we used to be able to pay with 100 bushels pf corn, we have now to give 150. The brunt of this fell first upon employers; it is now begin- ning to come upon the workingman. But I think I hear the reader of the Cable say: "But whoever could have put forth the idea of closing the mints?" Well may you say so, HEAL CAUSES OP AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS. 5 Does not everyone desire money 1 Does not every toiler in the count™ desire to get as much of it as possible for his ^C if he works for *ages, or for his produce if he lives by selling that? Can anvbodv look upon shillings or half crowns as other than good things" 7 7 wiS n £ C ti Untry w 1 her \ mi »ts have been thus closld has it been by the wish of the people. >a, indeed; on the contrary, it has been done behind their backs. And the real fathers of this strange new policv I to S rthtt e if tLT^iH^n "^ lenders - ■ Th W ^ve Khe^it to see that if they could shorten the annual harvest of money it would - add to their riches The less money there is the more labor and the more of the products of labor their money would buy. Each sovereign they possessed would become more and more valuable, and would buy more of the result of men's sweat and toil. • y Kings and rulers, who, alas, too often are borrowers, and under obli- gations to the great money lenders, unhappily are often more ready to listen to the owners of millions of money than they are to the wishes of dumb milUons of men. So the money lords have had their way,' and the groaning toilers-on the land and on the sea— have seen their incomes and their employment dwindling away. On farms, in lactones, in- foundries, in mines, the toiler has to produce more and ever more out- put m exchange for his old rate of wage. If be can not do this his employment dries up, and he must either emigrate or starve. And the man who owes money has to give the fruit of a great deal more toil to redeem his debts or to keep up the interest upon it. What the people should do now is therefore very plain. They should demand to have free coinage restored to them, and so an end put to the present artificial famine of money. Why should man's law, passed for the benefit of money lenders 1 , deprive us of the free use of nature's treasure annually brought up out of the mines ? The root of the agricultural depression we are suffering under now is undoubtedly the fall in prices, the less and less, money which we get for our produce. Let the supply of money become free again and it would very quickly become more plentiful, so that our. produce and labor would buy more of it, just as they did years ago in Queen Eliz- abeth's reign, and since during the progress of the great gold discov- eries in Queen Victoria's reign. It is as foolish to limit the supply of money as it would be to limit the supply of food or clothing or light or air. What everybody wants and what no one can do without ought to be quite free. Every silver coin and every gold coin which is in circulation is as a good angel to him that has it. Let us have as many of these good things as the yearly harvest of the mines and open mints will enable to be produced. Money is the very life of industry, of employment, and of production. The people's blessings should be upon the head of him who helps to make money abundant, and their curses on him who artificially makes it scarce. The restoration of free coinage would do more than anything else that can be done to bring back prosperity to our laud. By making money more abundant we should increase the reward of industry. We are disheartened now because we continually have to give more and more labor or produce for money. With money in full and free supply, what we have to sell, whether it is our labor or our produce, would bring us more money instead of less, to our great encouragement and profit. Free coinage for both silver and gold should be our demand from the Government of the country. I hope everyone of you will press the demand on any parliamentary candidate who asks for your vote. 6 REAL CAUSES OF AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS. It is believed that the, other great nations would gladly join with England in returning to free coinage if England will only show herself willing to join with them. Some of our cleverest public men, like Mr. Balfour, Mr. Courtney, and Mr. Chaplin, are in favor of this course. So are most of the Lancashire members, of both sides of politics, as they believe it would help this country in trading with the East, where silver money only is used. All, or nearly all', the professors of political economy in our colleges believe it would help our industries and com- merce, and especially the great industry of agriculture. The teachers of political economy (dead as well as living) are agreed as to the effect of an increase or decrease of money. David Hume says : In every kingdom into which money begins to flow in greater abundance than formerly everything takes a new face, labor and industry gain new life, the mer- chant becomes more enterprising, the manufacturer becomes more diligent and skill- ful, and eve,n the farmer follows his plow with greater alacrity and attention. Adam Smith says: The quantity of goods or labor which a given quantity of gold or silver will exchange for depends always upon the fertility or barrenness of the mines which happen to be known about the time when such exchanges are made. And Ricardo : l That commodities rise or fall in price in proportion to the increase or diminution of money I assume as a fact that is incontrovertible. In reading not long since about the great agricultural depression which began" in England soon after 1819 I lit upon the following interesting story. A committee of the House of Commons was ■ sitting to inquire into the causes of the distress, just as a royal commission is sitting now. Among other witnesses whom it called to give evidence was Mr. Attwood, a banker in Birmingham, who was also M. P. for Whitehaven. This is what passed, he tells us, when they began to examine him : I remember that in April, 1821, I was examined before the agricultural commit- tee of the House of Commons. They told me openly and publicly that they had passed a resolution that they would not inquire iuto the currency (the money) part of the question, and that I must confine my observations to the agricultural part of it. "Good God!'' said I; "gentlemen, what are you? Are you not a committee appointed by the House of Commons to inquire 'into the cause of the distress of agriculture?" "Certainly," said they. "And what is the distress of agriculture?" said I; "is it not the low price of agri- cultural produce ? " "Undoubtedly," said they. "Is there any other distress in agriculture except the low price of agricultural - produce?" i & " Certainly not." " What is the low price of agricultural produce? Is it not the small quantity of money or currency which agricultural produce commands in the market? " " Most certainly it is." "Why, then," said I, "do you mean to say that you have passed » resolution declaring that you will not inquire into the very subject which you are expressly appointed to inquire into?" I could get no further answer than this. When I read this I am bound to say 1 thought that Mr. Attwoodhad a great deal the best of the argument with the committee. It will be noted that there was a "currency" or "money "question tlien. It arose in this way. England went to war with France at the end of last century. After a little the fear arose that an invasion of this country by Bonaparte would be attempted. Then everybody who had REAL CAUSES OF AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS. 7 any silver or gold began to board it, not knowing what was going td happen to other kinds of property. , As the country could not go on without money, the Government took to issuing paper money for. daily use. They put out £1 and £2 notes, and these came to be the principal money in use. I have heard an old farmer say he could remember his mother, who was the treasurer' of their family, wearing a great apron with pockets in front of it, in which she used to keep her £1 notes. Well, these notes were the money in gen- eral use in England for twenty years down to 1819. And it was when in that year a law was passed to do away with these notes that the great agricultural distress of those times began. The notes being stopped, merchants, maltsters, millers, etc., had to find silver or gold ("hard cash" as it was called) to pay the farmer for his produce. As hard cash was not near so plentiful as the notes had been, down thump came the price of produce, and though corn laws were put on to stop any wheat from coming in from abroad when the price was below 8s a quarter, that is 10s a bushel, yet by 1822 the price had come down to about half that sum. Owing to the doing away of so much money, a scarcity of money was created, and everyone who wanted money had to give more of his prod- uce or of his toil to obtain it. This was the currency question that Mr. Attwood spoke of. It was the doing away of the £1 notes that in his view, and in the view of most of the great statesmen of those days of both political parties, caused the agricultural distress. A dreadful time, indeed, of suffering they had then. Farmers were ruined whole- sale. Land went out of cultivation just as it is going now; trade in the towns became terribly bad. Thousands of men in the villages and towns had to stand about idle because they could not get work. Wages went down to starvation point. The workhouses were filled with able- bodied men and women who, not being able to obtain employment, had to go there to escape starvation. And many an unfortunate man who was willing to work bat could not get it to do became tempted to steal, or to break the machines which he thought were taking the bread out of his mouth, or to set fire to property in revenge. Many of these unfortunate people died upon the gallows, for our laws were terribly cruel to evildoers then. There was nearly civil war in this country in some of the years between 1819 and 1833; and it was chiefly caused, as may be read in the history of those times, by the fall in prices caused by the doing away with the old abundant supply of the people's money. History is repeating itself now. The supply of money has been>cut short by law, and in consequence prices measured by money keep going down. The plain remedy is to make money free again. Let mints be again — as they used to be — free to coin silver as well as gold. This is what is meant by " bimetallism." I wish that word had never come into use, as a great many people don't know what it means. It really means returning to the unrestricted use of the two metals, silver and gold; and until that free use is returned to, the probability is that the fall in prices will continue. The general level of prices depends on the greater or less ,plentifulness of money in circulation — and money, of course, can not be so plentiful when one metal only is the source of our supply instead of the two. Our distress is that we don't get money enough for our produce. The natural remedy is to restore the free use of silver as well as gold. There is the clearest evidence to prove that since mints began to be closed against silver gold has risen in value 50 per cent, and gold being the standard by which we measure value, no wonder that prices have fallen as low as they have. 8 REAL" CAUSES OF AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS. Labor's Demand for Honest Money. The following will be read at all labor meetings in the United States to-day: To the Members of Organised Labor and All Other Producers and Toil- 1 ers Throughout the United States: In view of the general distress now prevailing throughout our coun- try, which has existed for so many years, and which will continue until remedial legislation is enacted, and all this occurring, too, at a time when our granaries are full to repletion, and when, in the natural order of things, our producers and' toilers should be enjoying to the, full the fruit of their hard and conscientious labors, it seems to us that the time has come for united action on the part of those who create the wealth of the country. - The respective demands and platforms of principles of our several organizations set forth our opinions as to the causes that have brought about this condition of things. Inasmuch as the leading repr.esenta.' , tives and friends of all our organizations have placed one of the causes of the tribulations of our beloved Republic to the departure of our Government from the wise bimetallic financial policy of Washington, Jefferson, and Hamilton, and the substitution therefor of the present monometallic policy recommended by European money owners and advocated by their American allies, we, the undersigned officers of industrial, agricultural, and commercial organizations, have thought it best, at this particular time, to submit for your careful consideration a synopsis of the legislation respecting the precious metals enacted in this country since the foundation of this Government that you may judge for yourselves as to what portion of such legislation was enacted in the interest of the producing and what, in the interest of the non- producing classes, and as to whether or not the shrewd manipulators of our finances foresaw that the result of their work would be to largely help in the subjugation of the people. Whatever the object, certain it is that before the, demonetization of silver and the enactment of other financial legislation which our organizations condemn 3,50Q bushels of wheat or 35,000 pounds of cotton was the annual pay for our Congressmen and Senators, while to-day 10,000 bushels of wheat or 100,000 pounds of cotton barely suffice. Before demonetization 35,000 bushels of wheat or 350,000 pounds of cotton per year would have paid the salary of the President; to-day he receives the equiva- lent of 100,000 bushels of wheat or 1,000,000 pounds of cotton, and in. like proportion is it with all other fixed salaries and incomes. Was such legislation just?' Was it honest! Does it not necessarily follow that the demoralization of the food-producing sections of the country through failure to procure reasonable prices for their products causes the manufacturing sections to accumulate excessive stocks, and in consequence of a poor market hundreds of thousands of operatives are necessarily thrown out of employment, thus robbing them of the power, even at the low prices, to purchase the necessaries of life? Again, is it not obvious to every one that the striking down of one- half of the world's volume of money makes the remaining half a com- paratively easy matter for capitalists to control and manipulate, and the toilers, to obtain money for the purchase of their food supplies, are placed entirely at the mercy of the foreign and American money sharks, who, by contracting the currency; can force a panic or famine in money at their supreme will? Would they be guilty of such a crime? We only say in reply, look REAL CAUSES OP AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS. 9 at our present helpless coudition. Does it not seem to you, in the light of the facts here given, that where in the midst of plenty there is widespread suffering and unhappiness there is considerable meat in the refrain from Wall street : "Dig on, ye toilers, dig; the legislative button that we press will do the rest?" PRECIOUS METAL LEGISLATION. The first coinage law enacted under the Constitution as recommended by .Hamilton, concurred in by Jefferson, and approved by Washington, provided for the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver, the silver dollar containing 371£ grains of pure metal. In 1837 the mint laws were revised and a standard for both gold and silver was made nine-tenths fine — that is, nine-tenths pure metal and one part alloy — the number of pure silver grains to the dollar remain- ■; ing unaltered, viz, 371 J grains. This law abolished our present ratio of 16 to 1. In August, 1865, the public debt, which grew out of the war, reached its highest point; the debt, lesscashinthetreasury, being $2,756,431,000. This debt was not payable in gold. No bonds or other govermental . obligations were ever made specifically payable in gold. The interest on the bonds was made payable in com; the greater portion of the principal of the original bonds in lawful money and of the .refunding ' bonds in coin — not gold coin, but coin of either gold or silver. In 1869 the principal of the bonded debt was also made payable in coin. In 1870 the standard of coin was by the refunding act nominated, in the bond, that is to say, all of the obligations of the United States were then declared payable in either gold or silver, of the present ratio," at the option, not of the bondholders, but of the people of the United States. ' All of the acts passed since the close of the civil war, it will be observed, were in the interest of the bondholders and against that of the producers and toilers. But it remained for the year 1873 to witness the crowning blow of all. In that year an innocent appearing bill entitled "An act revising the laws relative to the mint, assay offices, and coinage of the United States" was successfully smuggled through Congress. That bill purposely omitted from the list of coins to be minted the silver dollar. By that clandestine act, of which the people and the people's repre- sentatives were ignorant, and the subsequent act of 1874, adopting the revised statutes, silver was demonetized and the world's volume of ulti- mate redemption money was reduced from about seven billions to three and one-half billions. In 1878, after the discovery of the crime of 1873, Congress passed what is known as the Bland bill. This bill was vetoed by President Hayes (John Sherman being Secretary of the Treasury), and Congress passed the bill over the veto. The act added to our volume of money over 370,000,000 standard silver dollars. In 1890 what is known as the Sherman Act was passed as a sub- stitute for the Bland Act of 1878. This law further increased our volume of money over $150,000,000. ^ ,. * n Under the Bland and Sherman laws over $500,000,000, or about $9 per capita, were added to our volume of money. As all reflecting men are agreed that the present distress is due to a scarcity of money, we must leave it to the imagination as to what would now be our condition 10 REAL CAUSES OF AGRICULTURAL DISTRESS. if the gold-standard men had had their way, and our present insuf- ficient volume of money was $500,000,000 less. The Sherman bill was adding over $50,000,000 a year to the money of the country, when, in 1893, its repeal was imperiously demanded by European financiers through their American allies, and although the people's representatives made one of the grandest efforts ever witnessed in behalf of the producers and toilers of our country, yet the power of the financial institutions of Europe was so great that our people were cbmpelled to submit to temporary defeat. Now the question is, what do the tens of millions of victims in this country to the diabolical gold standard policy of Lombard and Wall streets propose doing about it? Submit to subjugation or demand in" no uncertain tones the immediate restoratioh of silver as standard money? No; they will no longer' submit to such injustice! And, there- fore, we earnestly recommend the adoption of the following resolution: We demand of the present Congress the immediate return to the money of the Constitution as established by our fathers by restoring the, free and unlimited coin- age of both gold and silver at the present ratio of 16 to 1, the coins of both metals to be equally full legal tender for all debts, public and private, as before the fraudulent demonetization of silver in 1873. We also condemn the increase of the national debt in time of peace, and the use of interest-bearing bonds at any time. J. E. Sovereign, G. M. W. K. ofL. Jno. W. Hayes, Gen{. Secy. Treas. Knights of Labor. By authority and on behalf of the American Federation of Labor, I hereby indorse the above. Sam'l Gompers, President, American Federation of Labor. John MoBride, President United Mine Workers of America. ■ • In indorsing this resolution I do so believing it to be cleariy in the direct interest of all wage earners. F. W. Arnold, Grand Secretary and Treasurer ' Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. Marion Butler, Pres. 1ST. F. A. and I. U. P. J. McGuire, Gen. Sec'y United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. Henry H. Trenor, Gen'l Pres'd't United Brotherhood Carpenters and Joiners of America. P. M. Arthur, G. C.F.B.ofL.F. Every day's delay to remonetize silver subjects those in authority to the charge of being in sympathy with the conspirators who committed the crime ot demonetizing silver in 1873. C. A. Bolinson, Pres. Farmers 1 Mutual Benefit Association. Frank P. Sargent, Grand Master Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen. 53d Congress, 3d Session. SENATE. f Mis. Doo. \ No.ioi IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. February 12, 1895.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Cockbbll presented the following: Tbeasuey Depabtment, Office of Compteollee of the Cuebency, Washington, D. C, January US, 'lS9S. M ZZalU^t^V^ e Z°7 Ptr f}t r °{ ihe ^reney, showing the condition of the 0fDecemUv.l89l *' ** Cl ° Se ° f lusiness on Wednesday, the 19th day BESOTJECES. Loans and discounts Overdrafts ] U. S. bonds to secure circulation. U.S. bonds to secure TJ. S. deposits -TJ. S. bonds on 'hand Premiums on U. S. bonds '.'.'.'. Stocks, securities, etc Banking ■ house, furniture, and fixtures. Other real estate and mortgages owned Due from national banks (not re- serve agents) Due from State banks and bank- ers Due from approved reserve agents Checks and other cash items Exchanges for clearing house Bills of other national banks Fractional paper currency, nick- els, and cents Lawful money reserve in bank, viz: Gold coin. $144,898,047.13 Gold Treasury certificates . . 29, 677, 720. 00 6-old clearing- house certifi- cates 31,219,000.00 Silver dollars . . 6, 954, 778. 00 Silver Treasury certificates . . 29, 743, 446. 00 Silver fractional coin 5,548,231.62 Dollars. 1, 974, 623, 974. 28 17, 289, 149. 17 195, 735, 950. 00 15, 051, 000. 00 20, 760, 350. 00 16, 130, 000. 69 197, 328, 354. 09 75, 400, 976. 70 23, 258, 812. 77 124, 798, 322. 39 30, 962, 557. 31 234, 331, 340. 54 13, 051, 055. 46 80, 869, 202. 29 18, 252, 596. 00 885, 072. 59 Total specie. 218, 041, 222. 75 Legal- tender notes 119, 513, 472. 00 U.S. certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes 37,090,000.00 Five per cent redemption fund with Treasurer Due from U. S. Treasurer 374, 644, 694. 75 8, 542, 386. 94 1, 289, 077. 14 Total 3,423,474,873.11 LIABILITIES. Capital stock paid in. . Dollars. 666,271,045.00 Surplus fund 244,937,179.48 Undivided profits, less expenses and taxes paid 95,887,436.80 National-bank notes issued.. * $175, 335, 800. 00 Less amount on band 5,998,729.00 ^ Amount outstanding State bank notes outstanding . . . i, 337, 071. 00 66, 290. 50 Due to other national banks 334, 619, 221. 24 Due to State banks and bankers. 180, 345, 566. 56 Dividends unpaid. 1, 130, 390. 38 Individual deposits 1, 695, 489, 346. 08 V. S. deposits 10, 151, 402. 66 DepositsoftJ.S.disbursingoffiCers 3, 865. 339. 58 Notes and bills rediscounted 7, 682, 509. 06 Bills payable 11,471,551.05 Liabilities other than those above stated 2, 220, 523. 72 Total 3,423,474,873.11 The amount of circulation outstanding at the date named, as shown by the books of this office, was $206,390,056,- which amount includes the notes of insolvent banks, of those in voluntary liqui- dation, and of those which have deposited legal-tender notes under the acts of June 20, 1874, and July 12, 1882, for the purpose of retiring their circulation. James H. Eckels, Comptroller. CONDITION OP NATIONAL BANKS. "S? ■1 s 8 (5 5 5 ?*1 111 d CO 5 tut OS CD O H ® I" is . 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CO . .. f^NOlOtSHiftH o-^^cBQOiflX^^xr^aio^- ' amvioacoHino co i-< cm iicnt-^'CAc'COtoincnocbOffi M>D-ifi!D"" " ■--"-'• 5 -*wcs O CO OOCNOlOifiOCOCO 't- i-H -*C»CM 3WNHHM ^ J O O CONDITION OP NATIONAL BANKS. 8 s 6h £3 H to [--*©t-l>'*i- -i Ol X ffl i^ IO ffl lO CR CO lO r-t CO O © i-< 00 O © i-i f-f CM cqi-(,©*>Jci © © © © lO o ■^IftOOOOO nlflOOOOO co cm co m in © © to" od of so ■* ©"©" ■m t' o ca « to i* CO l> r-C CO © >-l CO to" co in t£ afoTio CO © ©o CO © 3 ©© c oinae H CO CO CI 3 © © © © a in© © © 5 CO -# W © f^fTr-Tof©** ■i to in 1 CO t>CO © © © © i~©"ff4"in oTmiri"© 3©OOOOT\|eO<~l(-< SCOCftTK^t- iSSzi to © r-t © © o ll ipHH HI." .sill "fislslsB H5 ft 2 o 9 B •^ -a: o 53d Congress, ) SENATE. ( Mis. Doo. 3d Session. J } No. 136. IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES. February 26, 1895.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Cockrell presented the following: THE FALL OF PRICES— THE CAUSE AND THE CURE. [An address by President E. Benjamin Andrews before the Manufacturers' Club of Philadelphia, on Monday, February 18, 1894.] Gentlemen of the Manufacturers' Club: That a very great fall in general prices has occurred since 1873 is, uncontested; bnt the baneful effect of that fall is not so widely seen. Some, indeed, deny that fall in prices is an evil, and deem it an advan- tage instead. Such people confuse falling prices with falling costs, two things which are perfectly distinct. The amount of labor necessary to produce the great commodities of life may be lessening from year to year, and yet the prices, the money values of those things, be increas- ing. Costs and prices may rise or fall together, or one may rise as the other falls. The costs of things were falling in the sixteenth century, when American silver was first getting distributed in Europe; but prices were then rapidly rising. Likewise between 1850 and 1873 costs were falling more rapidly than now; but prices were ,not falling; they were rising. Even when the two movements coincide, as at the present time, they are not to be identified. A lowering of the costs of things is always advantageous, meaning an easier living for mankind. A fall 1 of general prices is always a curse. 1 beg also to emphasize the fact that it is the fall in prices which is mischievous, and not the lowness of the prices after they have fallen. While, during its progress, a general fall of prices, however caused, is always unfortunate, and while the effects of such a fall may be grievous and continue long, yet a low range of prices when attained, considered apart from all the causes which made it low, may be as desirable as a high range of prices. . .-,.,,. In the observation which I make, therefore, I have m inmd falling prices, not falling costs, and falling prices, instead of low prices; and my immediate purpose is to set forth how unfortunately, in many ways, a fall in general prices works. . I say, first, that falling prices, such as are now occurring throughout the gold-using world, work outrageous injustice. Appalling is the moral wrong which the fall of prices since 1873 has wrought. Think of all those time contracts, which form so prominent a feature of modern business. Probably 70 per cent of the world's commercial transactions are based on some sort of deferred payment or credit. It is estimated that a trillion and a half dollars' worth of these deferred payments are outstanding at this time. Appreciating money is occasioning injustice in case of every one of these obligations. Ihe business friction proceeding from this source I mention presently; 2 THE FALL OF PRICES — THE OAUSE AND THE CURE. here I hold up to view the fraud of the system; how increase in the value of money robs debtors. It forces every one of them to pay more than he covenanted to pay, not more dollars but more value, the given number of dollars embodying greater value at the date of payment than at date of contract. In these days debtors must struggle hard to be able to pay what they honestly owe. A money system which forces them to pay from 10 to 50 per cent blood money is devilish indeed. NATIONAL DEBT BURDENS. On September 1, 1865, our national debt was about $2,750,000,000. It could then have, been paid off with 18,000,000 bales of cotton or 25,000,000 tons of bar iron. When it had been reduced to a billion and a quarter of dollars, 30,000,000 bales of cotton or 32,000,000 tons of iron would have been required to pay it. In other words, while a nominal shrinkage of about 55 per cent had taken place in the debt, it had, as measured in either of these two world staples, actually been enlarged by some 50 per cent, all this unearned purchasing power going to the holders of botfds. Between 1870 and 1884 the public debt decreased not far from three- quarters of a billion dollars, yet if we take wheat, corn, beef, oats, coal, cotton, and bar iron together as the standard, and they make not a bad standard, the debt did not decrease, but-increased not less than 50 per cent. In the Westminster Review for October, 1880, Mr. Barr Bobertson computes that the British national debt at £775,000,000 was in 1880 represented by a volume of staples which in 1873 or 1874 would prob- ably have cost £890,000,000, so that the fall in prices between 1874 and 1880 affected a gratuitous distribution among consol holders of about £115,000,000 at the expense of the tax-payiDg public. He says : The whole amount of the British Government's expenditure in the financial year 1878-79, being £85,000,000, represented a purchasing power of at least £12,000,000 more than the same .amount of money would have done in 1873-74; when the total expenditure was £77,000,000, so that between 1873-74 and 1877-78 the burden of taxation in the United Kingdom increased by a purchasing power of £20,700,000, though the nominal increase was but £8,000,000. Say, if you please — what in now and then a case may be true, though it is not true generally — that the larger batch of commodities now needed to pay a given debt cost no more labor than the smaller batches which would have sufficed to pay it' long ago. But where is the justice of a money arrangement which throws all the benefits of improved facilities in industry into creditor's hands and utterly forbids debtors to share in the improvement? THE CLOG ON PRODUCTION. I declare next that a fall in general prices places a fatal clog, handi- cap, or brake upon the creation of wealth. Making all due allowance for subsidiary difficulties, the radical business trouble from which this and other countries on the gold standard are now suffering is, I believe, that, owing to the increasing scarcity of full money, goods of nearly all sorts are having to be sold at smaller and smaller prices. The blight upon our business originates in that scarcity of full or exportable money, leading to a continuous and discouraging fall in general prices, which first made production and credit business less and less profitable, and now at last makes them less and less possible. THE PALL OF PEICES THE CAUSE AND THE CURE. 3 Every business is affected more or less with certain fixed charges, levying upon it the burden of an absolute number of dollars. Taxes and mortgages illustrate this. These burdens can not be lightened when assets and profits fall. You continue liable to pay them dollar for dollar; that is, immensely to overpay them so far as value is con- cerned, no matter how much your income may have shrunk. Your assets little by little dwindle away, while your liabilities remain what they were. This circumstance infinitely aggravates the load which great bonded industries like railways have to carry, and vastly aids to multiply receivership. A manufacturer usually considers it safe, if necessary, to borrow, say, 50 per cent on the security of his plant. The decline of prices which began in 1873 caught many who had done so. In a multitude of cases the decline has swept away the owner's portion of the capital, leaving only enough to pay the loans. Suppose a ship or a factory built at a cost of $100,000, of which $50,000 were borrowed. It is now worth not over $60,000, or 40 per cent less than cost. The mortgage, therefore, represents five-sixths of the value instead of half, the owner's interests having sunk to $10,000 instead of $50,000. As trade is unprofitable, many a man so burdened fails to pay the interest. Then the mortgage is foreclosed, the property is forced off at just sufficient to cover the loan, and he is ruined. This process exactly describes the condition of innumerable business men in this and other countries hav- ing a gold standard. A great portion of the country's capital has thus silently passed into the hands of mortgagees and bondholders. The dis- couragement which this state of things produces is intense. After it has gone on for years a kind of hopelessness oppresses the commercial community. Nearly all advance enterprises come to a standstill, many works are closed, labor is paid less or thrown out of employment alto- gether, strikes are frequent, and the utmost distress prevails. It is out of order to rejoin that the vicissitude described merely transfers wealth from one possessor to another, and does not change the nation's aggregate welfare. Were this all it would be bad enough. The craft of the pickpocket or card sharper is in no wise innocuous because it _ only transfers wealth from one pocket to another. The prosperity of the nation depends upon the security men may feel in retaining the . products of their industry. Nothing affects it more vitally than unjust alienation. But the process set forth is much more than a mere trans- fer of goods from owner to owner; it prevents production, and that on a truly colossal scale. . Falling prices (appreciating money) set up a special, positive motive for abstaining from productive industry. This is the impulse to hoard. Appreciation of money tempts holders of money and of titles certain to be paid in money to cling to these and not invest in industry, it intensifies the demand for bonds and depresses that for stocks. Ihe present is the age of bondholders. That all are so anxious to invest m bonds is, from an industrial point of view, an alarming symptom. It there is anywhere to be had a mortgage on wealth already realized or practically certain to be realized, everyone rushes for it, while new undertakings which would once have been thought full of promise, and would be so still but for the money difficulty,responsible capitalists avoid ' unless thev can engage in them under some special shelter or guaranty, ' Ske a St or a #er| high tariff. Irresponsible, feeble and [ignorant industrialists, to be sure, go on trying to produce unsheltered Some • of them bv sweating their wage workers, have some success, their winnings, howeTer, spf edily falling into bondholders' pockets. One set 4 THE FALL OF PEICES THE CAUSE AND THE CURE. of weak producers fails, another rises and runs the same course. Always some are making the endeavor. The bondholder never fails of supporters. For my part I pity the class of brave, small industrial- ists quite as much as I do the men who toil for wages. They are a sort Of serfs. Gentlemen, a business situation which thus coddles the bond- holder and snubs the stockholder can not be healthy. In this risk to industry from having to produce against a falling market, this bondholder instinct, and this hoarding motive or impulse to clutch at gold-paying paper and not let go save when return in kind is sure, we see the reason why our banks overflow with funds which they can not loan, and our streets with hungry men willing to work, but unable to find strong employees who have heart for productive enter- prises. THE BLIGHT UPON FARMING. The first victims to falling prices are producers of the weakest class. These are the farmers — weakest because possessing the least capital and unable either to combine or to stop producing. Hence the agrarian distress in every farming country and section of the gold-using world. Hence the efforts of the farmers everywhere to better their condition through various political devices. The staple of Australia is wool, whose exportation, so profitable until 1873, made that continent very prosperous. A large British debt was contracted. But between 1873 and 1888 wool fell from 33 to 16 cents. The whole clip for a year is now insufficient to pay the annual interest On Australia's British-held debt. Panic rose in 1888, but was lulled for a time by reborrowing at high rates. But it came. In January, 1893, 40,000 houses were to rent in Melbourne, the population having decreased in 1892 by over 17,000. The exodus continued and even increased in 1893. Now it is our turn. The United States pays, mainly in farm produce, at least $100,000,000 a year iir foreign interest. This was a light burden in 1873, when wheat brought $1.85 a bushel in London and $1.15 on the farm. In 18S9 it had fallen to $1.03 in London and 69 cents on the farm. The yield for 1889 was about 340,000,000 bushels, which came to some $115,000,000 less than it would have brought sixteen years earlier, to say nothing of the lower income in freights, which had to be suffered in order to get it marketed at all. For the year 1893 our Wheat brought the farmers only 54 cents, the lowest price ever known till then. In 1894 it was lower still. The New York price of wheat, No. 2, red, for 1894, averaging the fifty-two weekly averages, was 60.4 cents. The price On the farm can not have been far from 40 cents. The London price was 22s. lOd. a quarter, a fall of ,3s. 6d. from 1893. In 1881, 383,000,000 bushels sold for $456,000,000. In 1893, 396,000,000 bushels sold for but $213,000,000, a shrinkage of $243,000,000. The money yield per acre of wheat has fallen in twenty years from $13.16 to $6, or about 54 per cent. Cotton prices have fallen very much like wheat prices. The cotton crop of 1893, 6,600,000 bales of about 470 pounds each, brought the producer not over 6 cents a pound, or about $186,000,000. By the price of 1873, viz, 16 cents, it would have brought over 310 millions more, viz, 496J millions. The money yield per acre of cotton has in twenty years fallen from $28 to $10.65, or about 62 per cent. The money yield per acre of wheat, corn, oats, hay, and cotton, taken together, has fallen in twenty years from $15.65 to $8.15, or about 48 per cent. From 1873 to 1889 the nation's paying power was reduced at least THE FALL OP PRICES — THE CAUSE AND THE CURE. 5 one-third. We could no longer liquidate our foreign interest in wheat and cotton, and had to begin sending gold abroad, a movement inten- sified in that England has been drawing in the principal of her loans; her net imports of gold having been for 1887 £600,000; for 1888, £800,000; for 1889, £3,000,000; for 1890, £9,000,000. The agricultural classes, sections, and nations impoverished, lose power to purchase of the manufacturing classes, sections, or nations, and so these, with the middle men, carriers, and merchants, also grow poor. Adversity comes over the entire world of producers. The only people able to prosper are the very small class who create noth- ing but live upon income from loans. Even these, though they may profit for a time, can not escape loss if money continues to grow precious. Failures and repudiation must ensue. Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Argentina have already defaulted on their bonds. Mexico has virtually threatened to do the same. It is believed that Italy was kept from repudiation last winter only by the use of British gold to bribe legislators to vote new taxes. The richest money lenders on earth, the Bothschilds, appear to have concluded that their su»est way to realize satisfactorily upon their loans is to check the rise of gold by increasing the world's stock of silver money. At the Brussels Confer- ence Alfred Rothschild earnestly argued for such a policy. THE CONDITION OF EUROPE. I maintain, thirdly, that falling prices in any country, at the very same time that they lessen such country's ability to compete with others, invite against it disastrous competition from lands differently situated. In Europe agriculture is at the lowest ebb ever seen by living men. All silver countries can send their produce there. As silver has not with them lost in purchasing power, and as they receive the same amount of it for one sovereign, mark, or franc, as once they did for two, they can prosper themselves while starving European farmers. Europe's other productive industries suffer from the same cause. European merchants grading with silver countries, find on the one hand their capital invested there reduced by one-half, and on the other that, the par of exchange being destroyed, their present trade with those countries is, if not destroyed, a mere matter of gambling chance. Sir Thomas Sutherland, presiding at the last annual meeting of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, after calling attention to the extra- ordinary advantages which silver couutries now possess in manufactur- ing—noticing Bombay as a rival to Manchester, Japan, with its s'plendid supply of coal, as making enormous strides in cotton and other manu- factures, and Shanghai as having entered upon similar enterprises on a large scale, said : There can not be the slightest doubt that this low value of silver, if it continues, must tend to check exports from Europe to those countries, and must stimulate industrial and manufacturing activity in the far East. It is impossible to foresee to what this mav eventually tend; but there may possibly be in this room at the present moment some gentleman young enough to live to see the Peninsula and Oriental ships built on the banks of the Yang-tse-Kiang instead of the banks of the Clyde, or the Tees, or the Tyne. The first spinning mill in Japan was built in 1863, with 5,456 spin- (31.6S At the end of 1883 there were 16 mills with 43,700 spindles; 1888, 24 mills with 88,140 spindles; 1892, 39 mills with 403,314 spindles; 1893, 46 mills with about 600,000 spindles. From 5,000 spindles to 600,000 in thirty years is rapid progress. 6 THE FALL OP PRICES — THE PAUSE AND, THE CUKE.. i The bimetalist members of the late German silver commission placed , on the record of the twenty-first session the following solemn declara- tions : i A setback to German agriculture is manifest, referable, on the one band, to the necessity of selling a constantly increasing amount of depreciated agricultural products in order to pay wages, interest, rent, leases, taxes ; and on the other hand, to the increased power of competition on the part of other countries, silver countries, that is, and countries on a money baBis of depreciated paper, In proportion as their silver or paper loses in power to buy, gold, these countries, enjoying jn effect a high export premium, are able to throw their native products upon the world's markets at prices far beneath what it costs German farmers to produce them, so plunging these latter in deep distress. The demonetization of silver is also working a more and more visible injury to German manufacturing industry : (a) On account of the ever-lessening ability of the farmer class to purchase manu- factured products. (6) On account of the decrease in exports to silver lands and of the consequent recoil upon the home market of the articles hitherto exported thither. (c) On account of the competition offered by the rapidly developed manufactur- ing plants of silver lands, favored by the low cost of production there and by the premium upon exportation therefrom produced by the fall in the gold price of silver. Unless mean? are taken to prevent, it will not be long before the manufactured products of the silver countries will find the German market. To import Indian yarn into Germany is already a paying operation. I could recite innumerable testimonies of the same tenor with these .'■ did time permit and occasion demand. It is facts like these which have led the Reichstag within a few days to vote for an international monetary conference. THE UNITED STATES A VICTIM. Stupidly as the ignorant may overlook it, and persistently as those interested in maintaining the sole gold standard may deny it, the United States is a victim of this same silver land competition. That it is which so lowers the price of wheat and cotton, or narrows the market for them. The acreage under these staples, to be sure, keeps up fairly ' well, though the price falls. Certain writers therefore allege that cheaper production accounts for the fall. If farmers could not afford to sell at these low prices, it is argued, they would stop raising. That is, I believe, a total misconception. The farmers continue these crops, . not because they can, in the sense that the crops pay, but because, being tied to their farms, usually mortgaged, they must continue, how- ' ever petty their income, and try to make up by the quantity raised the loss suffered in fall of price. I find in the February 2, 1895, Farm, Field and Fireside, a Chicago ' weekly, the following, under the title > KXTINCTION OF THE AMERICAN FARMER. Is the sturdy, self-respecting, independent American farmer decreasing in number ■ and being replaced by the poor,starveling renter ? A careful student of conditions here anfl abroad, Mr. F. P. Powers, says that he is; that economic conditions in America are fast approximating those in Europe; that the class which has furnished all the great men of our nation's history, the class to whom we look for all the vigor, the, , honesty, the individuality which has made our nation great, is disappearing as the English yeomanry disappeared, and is giving place to a sort of feeble,-dependent, unprogressive peasantry. Mr. Powers quotes figures which can not be gainsaid. , Between 1880 and 1890 the number of owning farmers decreased in almost every New England State, and the number of tenant farmers increased. In each of these States there was a marked increase in the percentage of farmers who plowed, the, fields of another man, and in the sweat of whose brow somebody in Boston ate cake. In the six States, in the ten years, the owning farmers diminished 24,117 and the tenant farmers, increased 7,246. The percentage of tenant farmers in Massachusetts, though not large in 1890, was nearly double what it was in 1880. Oyer 17 per cent of the farmers in Vermont and Connecticut and 25 per cent of the farmers in Rhode Island were tenats in 1890. In the Western States the same process is going on. THE FALL OF PRICES THE CAUSE AND THE CURE. 7 The dependence of prices in America upon the gold price of silver, in the case of articles whose surplus competes in London with the pro- duce of silver countries, is very direct. One might suppose that the larger market would rule, and that the London (gold) price would remain steady instead of being itself fixed by the silver price. But it is not so, and this for a reason which Mr. G. Jamieson, British consul- general at Shanghai, gives in an article in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, London, for December, 1893. He says : It is a well-known fact in the commercial world that it is much easier to lower prices than to raise them. If you can afford to go down a half-penny, a bargain is much more easily struck than if you are bound to stand out for a rise of a half- penny. It would seem, then, to be a general rule that the adjustments following on a fall of exchange are always made along the line of least resistance, and that, there- fore, it is not the China (or India) price that rises, but the London prices that fall. Merchants find it easier to buy Asiatic produce at the old prices and sell it in London at a concession than to stand out for old prices at home in order to pay more to the producer From this point of view it is really silver that rules the world. It is the purchas- ing power of the cheaper metal that determines the prices all over. Just as in a bimetallic country the cheaper metal will drive out the dearer toward her mono- metallic neighbor, so, as between countries of different standards, will the prices prevailing in the countries of the cheaper metal drag down prices all over to their own level. And, reasoning forward from the experiences of the past, it would not, perhaps, be too rash to suppose that the prices of commodities in Europe, so far as they can be drawn in any fair quantities from silver-using countries, must continue to decline with every further fall in (the gold price of) silver. PAPER-MONEY COUNTRIES. It is not silver countries alone whose exports crowd those of gold lands. Worse pressure, if possible, proceeds from countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Argentina, whose crushing gold debts have driven them to a paper-money basis. The depreciation of their paper acts as a premium on exportation from these countries to gold- standard countries, depressing in these latter, first the prices of inter- national commodities, and indirectly the prices of many other com- modities. If in Spain, say, gold rises from paper par to 125 above, a Parisian wine merchant can buy with a given number of napoleons 25 per cent more Spanish exchange than before. As it will take a long time for Spanish paper money to lose any of its purchasing power in the rural districts, and as, therefore, each paper peseta will practically buy as much wine after the rise of gold as it would before, the Frenchman's gold laid out in Spain brings him a quarter more wine than before. Therefore any part of the demand on him that he can supply with Spanish wine he is sure to cover in this way instead of purchasing in Prance itself. The French raisers of brands previously competing with Spanish are driven from the market, while all French wine producers suffer more or less. The same is true in case of several other commodities. Paper- money countries having this advantage are doubtless laying up wrath against the day of wrath unless, indeed, as many of them will certainly do if the craze tor gold continues, they give up all idea of returning to specie; but in the meantime they immensely gain at the expense oi neighboring States whose money is at gold par. Precisely this is the explanation of the Argentine wheat shipments, which have of late become so enormous as to alarm United States and Russian farmers. In 1892 Argentina exported only about 25.000,000 bushels. In 1893 the shipments rose to 45,000,000 bushels; in 1894, it is said, to /o,000,000. The export for this year will probably show an even greater advance. 8 THE FALL OP PRICES — THE CAUSE AND THE CURE. Who are bur chief competitors for the tin industry? Not Cornwall or Australia, but the Straits and Bolivia — both silver countries. Bolivia sent to Liverpool 224 tons of tin in 1885; in 1894, 3,482 tons. In 1873 the Straits Settlement shipped 6,963 tons; in 1894 it shipped 46,640 tons. Australia, a gold country, exported 11,121 tons in 1893; in 1894 only 5,824 tons. Cornwall used to produce annually 10,000 tons ; last year its product was but 8,000. Moreover, while the tin industry of the Straits is most flourishing, that of Cornwall is the despair of every- body connected with it. NEED OP FOREIGN MARKETS. Manufacturing in general is interested in this question. All parties agree with Governor McKinley's remark at Eochester on Lincoln's birthday, that " We want a foreign market for our surplus products of manufacture and agriculture." Some would promote foreign trade by reciprocity and by subsidies upon steamship lines to foreign countries. Others prefer the method of reducing duties. But no intelligent Amer- ican will deny that in some way or other exports from the United States of America must be increased if the prosperity of our country is to go on. A very great part of the new exports must go to lands on the silver basis, as China, Japan, Mexico, Central and South America. We ought to be the principal manuiacturers for all those regions. No other great manufacturing nation is so near them. But to utilize this gigantic possibility we must be quick, or those parts of the world will have supplied themselves. At many a point in India and China, as well as in Mexico and further south, the tall chim- neys already smoke and the clatter of machinery is heard. Soon, unless the currency problem is settled, the teeming millions there will cease to buy of the En.glish or of ourselves. , It is in this fact that the patriotic advocates of domestic free silver find their inspiration. Aware of the absolute necessity resting upon this country to extend its foreign markets, they would take advantage of England's folly in continuing the regime of falling prices. They would place the United States at the head of the silver-using nations to do their manufacturing. ''Let us break off commercial relations with Europe," they say, "if only we can establish such relations with that vast world where manufacturing is either nonexistent or inchoate, and must grow, if at all, with difficulty; and let us create for those populations all their manufactured articles, taking in return those things which they can produce so much more easily than we." Much as this proposal has been ridiculed it has great force. The thought in itself is magnificent. We no doubt have an opportunity by the means suggested to "dish" England in the markets of the 'world. If this could be accomplished without involving other difficul- ties it would be the finest commercial coup d'etat ever effected. So much reason attends the notion that it seems to me sheer madness to oppose to it a policy like England's present one, of stubbornly adhering' to money based on gold alone. TRUSTS AND TARIFFS. Fourthly, we see in the fall of prices and the accompanying danger to business the true cause of the world-wide movement, so astounding to free traders, £or trusts and what we should once have called inordi- nate tariffs. This phenomenon marks the precise period, since 1873, during which money has been swelling in value and goods losing in THE FALL OF PRICES— THE CAUSE AND THE CURE. 9 value. New South Wales, till 1891 ever the free trader's welcome nwW y t' S ^ CC T bS t0 th f drift The reason of ^ is Perfectly obvious ' JfJu * d ^ n "8' rade Prices, production is extra hazardous and needs shelter. When prices threaten or begin to Ml, when stock depre ciates upon manufacturers' hands, they iuevitably' struggle to avert these results, welcoming any resource that can aid. UnablS to compass * Zt^ 0the 7 ls e t\ey agitate for high tariffs. I unhesitatingly avow the conviction that had prices since the war been stationary or only slowly advancing, the rise in United States tariff rates culmina- ting ■ m the McKinley law would never have been so much as thought of. lhese rates have been lowered somewhat, aud if the change had been preceded by proper monetary reform the reduction might be per- manent, and, perhaps, in a little time, with tbe approval of all, made greater still. But 1 fear that it can not be permanent. I would say to my Democratic friends, begging them note well the prophesy, that, unless monetary reform comes soon, the tariff which they have been at such great pains to give us will speedily be ripped in pieces and rates of duty be imposed higher than those of the McKinley act. I believe this inevitable. Mark my words : A low -tariff policy can never be estab- lished in these United States so long as gold alone continues the basis of our currency. By no means all those crying for highest protection, whether here or in Europe, are addicted to protection as a general policy. Many such are, in theory, free traders, i. e., they would advocate free trade were prices stable or rising. Willingness to subject your country's industries to nor- mal foreign competition is one thing; quite another is it to do so when your competitors are helped to beat you by a home bonus on exporta- tion, as is the case with all exporters from silver and paper lands today. In France these " opportunists" protectionists are a powerful and growing party. Their logic is as yet imperfectly understood in this country; but men are mastering it niore and more, and' it will insure to the protectionist ranks armies of recruits in every Congress and Presidential election till general prices cease falling. THE REMEDY. Such, gentlemen, is my diagnosis of our. present industrial disease. In my belief a true cause of morbid conditions in the body industrial has been laid bare. The extrusion of silver from service as full money greatly reduced the amount of the world's money available for ultimate liquidation — reduced it absolutely and reduced it far more relatively to those needs for fundamental money which rise from the growth of popu- lation and business. A distressing appreciation of money per unit has ensued, meaning a tremendous drop in prices. This disastrously handi- caps all production. It does not entirely prevent production. Nothing short of killing off the race could do that. But it renders production indefinitely feeble compared with what it would be but for the handi- cap. The world needs an addition to its fundamental money; not more bank notes, not more token coinage; not more full legal-tender tokens like our silver dollars and the French 6cus, but money that can do everything that any money can do. We need, I say, a greater bulk of money that is exportable, good in ultimate settlements, suitable for bank and Government reserves. A stop must be put to this ubiquitous rush and clutch for gold; the passion for hoarding must be cured. It can only be done by' abolishing the legal primacy of gold. This is the proper prescription for our patient. The only question is whether he 10 THE FALL OP PRICES THE CAUSE AND THE CURE. can be induced to try the remedy. My belief is that the rehabilitation of silver as full money by a few of. the great commercial States of the world would furnish it. If so, that course is most desirable. THE INCREASED GOLD 'SUPPLY. In saying this I am not forgetting the gratifying new output of gold last year and this in South Africa, Australia, and the United States. This does not lessen in the slightest our need to make silver again full money. It is interesting to notice the joy with which the new gold is hailed by men who have been assuring us for years that no more money is needed; that the quantity theory of money is exploded; that prices are not fixed by money but by credit, and that every fall in prices ought to be hailed with hallelujahs. Their welcome to this increase of the world's monetary stock justifies their good sense at the expense of their consistency. The veteran French economist M. Leroy-Beaulieu is one convert. So recently as 1889 he held, as many Americans hold, that the fall of prices, which he declared a blessing, proceeded not from a diminution in the supply of money, but solely from progress in the industrial arts, cheaper transportation, and overproduction. He has now changed his view. He believes that the new gold will cause each grain of gdld in the world to lose its value, to wit, will provoke a rise in general prices; and that " all the countries on a basis of depre- ciated money and suffering from low exchanges will be able to better 1 their monetary situation and come back to a solid monetary standard." So Mr. Henry Binns, in the London Economist for last December 29, anticipates a " considerable rise" in prices from the increasing supplies of gold, and views the rise as a ground not of "alarm, but of congratu- lation." Our American monetary theorists of the gold school must admonish M. Leroy-Beaulieu. Prom their- point of view his allegations are fatally heretical. To me, however, they are most welcome, only I can not agree with M. Leroy-Beaulieu in the expectation that gold alone will stay the fall of prices or heal the disordered exchanges now prevailing between gold countries and silver or paper countries. Thus, though 1893 brought forth $4,250,000 more gold than 1892, prices dur- ing 1894 did not rise, but fell 10 per cent. The prophecies of a future annual output of gold very much exceeding that of 1893 — $155,522,000-^- rest on no solid foundation. They are made largely in the interest of speculation.. Eight South African mines of which I have read, posses- sing a capital of only $75,500,000, though they have as yeb paid no dividend at all , are floating stock which, at the rates at which it is quoted, foots up $215,430,000. UNITED STATES MINT STATISTICS. In his last report the Director of our Mint presents some very inter- esting figures touching the gold outlook; but I do not think all his deductions from them quite sound. He concludes that the value of the. gold alone which in 1873 was available for coinage purposes in the western nations exceeded by $7,000,00.0 the total value of gold and silver both available for coinage, on the average, in the years 1866-1873. Were this true, the fact would but serve to illustrate how insignificant so slight an increase is in view of the advance that has meantime occurred in population and business; because, as just stated, prices fell in 1884 instead of rising. THE PALL OP PRICES— THE CAUSE AND THE CUEE. II But I believe Mr. Preston mistaken in his conclusion and in a num- ber of data which help him to it. (1) While from the world's gold yield for 1893 he properly deducts Russia's product of 37,325 kilograms as now serving no monetary end, ■ he does not deduct India's product of 5,738 kilograms ($3,813,600). (2) While in estimating the industrial use of gold and silver in 1871-1873, which he naturally wishes to make as large as possible, that the monetary gold and silver of those years may seem the smaller, he unhesitatingly uses Soetbeer's estimate; on the other hand, in esti- mating the corresponding figure for gold in 1893 he first scales Soet- beer's outside estimate by 10,000 kilograms, then averaging this result ■ with three less trustworthy estimates, one of which, Ottomar Haupt's r I consider of little value. Haupt's data, the poorest of all, Mr. Pres- ton, in case of three important countries, duplicates in the United States estimate, thus weighing them twice in the result arrived at, and doubling the power of whatever error they may contain. Suess's esti- mate, which agrees with Soetbeer's outside figure of 120,000 kilograms, is ignored altogether. Thus, instead of Soetbeer's outside estimate of 120,000 kilograms of gold as used industrially, etc.; in each recent year, he places the figure at 91,125 kilograms. (3) Except as to three countries, Mr. Preston makes no allowance for any increase in the industrial consumption of gold in 1893 over that of preceding years. But it is probable that this was very considerable, since consumers of gold were mainly people who little felt the hard times, which indeed began only when the year was half over, and since the appreciation of gold, by making the possession of gold ware a badge of wealth, probably increases rather than decreases the per capita num- ber of grains of it yearly purchased for such purposes. GOLD IN THE ARTS. My belief is that the gold used up yearly for art, industry, and hoard- ing considerably exceeds Dr. Soetbeer's extreme estimate of 120,000 kilograms. I so judge because.of a general habit — overlooked, I think,, even by Soetbeer, far the most careful statistician who has examined the subject — which small jewelers have of using up gold coins coming 1 to them in trade or bought at banks. Such coins must aggregate a vast sum, of which the big jewelers, whom alone statisticians consult, would be quite ignorant. To show that I am not criticising for the sake of criticising, a too common custom, which I despise, I, remind you that Soetbeer, the ablest authority on the subject, among the last words he ever wrote said, in 1891 or 1892 : , Although it can not be demonstrated that the use of gold in arts, hoards, and export to the East consumes the entire output from the mines each year, yet, on the other hand, it can not be demonstrated that it does not do so. Allowing for the jeweler's habit, which I have referred to, and for some increase of consumption in 1893 beyond that of preceding years, I should place the gold going to arts, industry, and hoards in 1893 at least so high as 125,000 kilograms. Not insisting on this, however, let us simply take Soetbeer's figures for 1891, viz, 120,000 kilograms, equal- ing $79,752,000. Adding to this the Russian and Indian, product for 1893, we have, as the sum of gold put in that year to nonmonetary service, and therefore to be deducted from the total product of the world, $108,565,600, instead of $88,000,000, the amount deducted by Mr. Pres- ton. The monetary part of the 1893 gold product of $155,522,000 was therefore only $46,956,400, and not $67,522,000, as concluded by the 12 THE FALL OF PRICES — THE CAUSE AND THE CURE. Director of the Mint. The increment to the western world's money stock for 1893, instead of being $7,000,000 more than that of one of the years just preceding the demonetization of silver, was less by $13,605,575 than the average of those years. When we consider with this the world's increase in population a'nd wealth since 1873, England,.a repre- sentative country, having gained 7,000,000 souls and increased her com- merce, spite of the fall in prices, from 470,000,000 sterling to 681,000,000, it is not strange that prices fell 10 per cent in 1894. GOLD ALONE INSUFFICIENT. I am happy to join the Director of the Mint in his belief that the yearly output of gold is likely to increase for a number of years; and though nonmonetary consumption will increase, too, I presume that the s part going to replenish the monetary supply will be not a little aug- mented. But there are three colossal and obdufate reasons why one can not expect our business distress to be relieved by gold alone. ■ Suppose the new gold to succeed in stopping for a single year the fall in prices. No one can imagine the immense spur and enlargement to industry which would immediately ensue. Let prices cease to fall, let investments in enterprises for producing wealth again become safe, as before 1870, let the stockholder again have a chance to make something as well as the bondholder, let the loaning of European and United States capital in China, Japan, India, and Mexico cease to be a form of gambling, and a volume of new industry would spring up to which the slight increment of gold money that started it, enlarged by all the credit that could be based upon this, would be utterly inadequate, making a renewed fall of prices the quick and sure sequel. So vast an amount of business would be called into life by an "arrest in the fall of prices that the utmost amount of money which the coinage of gold and silver both could furnish would be necessary to sustain it. No inflation, I am persuaded, could result from the free coinage of both metals, could it be made general. Both together would perhaps be able to sustain prices, but would not sensibly raise prices. A second reason why gold alone can not check the fall of prices is that the moment the metal obviously becomes at all plentiful, Austria and India will purchase vast sums that they may place themselves com- pletely on a gold platform. Japan also would probably attempt to change from silver to gold. If this did not turn the gold plenty to penury again, other silver nations would do the same. You can not per- manently maintain the gold standard anywhere unless yon can do it everywhere. The world of commerce will not brook division into mon- etary hemispheres. It will not tolerate the chaos of one basal money for the "West and another for the East, one for wealthy centers and one for cruder communities, one for the motherland, the other for colonies. In kind, all the griefs which are moving India to try and place her feet upon gold press Mexico, all Central and South America, Ceylon, Mau- ritius, the Straits, Japan, and China to do the same; and no possible increase to the world's stock of gold will enable it to be so spread out. The conflict for gold, if it is not paired with silver, must be not only irrepressible, but more and more bitter without end. A third reason for denying that gold alone can heal the world's monetary lesion is as follows: Prof. Shield Mckerson makes it extremely probable that when silver falls in value, as it probably did to some extent during 1893 and 1894, and falls, too, in consequence ot causes directly affecting itself and not in the first instance reaehin THE FALL OP PRICES THE CAUSE AND THE CURE. 13 gold at all, still the gold prices of international commodities are deter- mined by their silver prices. That is, suppose some cause in the gold- price world to be so affecting the relation of gold to commodities at large that, if you could annul all influence from the silver-price world, gold would cease to rise in value; yet, since you can not annul that influ- ence, if silver goes on falling in relation to gold, gold will, in fact, not cease to rise in value, but the gold prices, in gold lands, of all commodi- ties in which gold and silver lands compete, will continue to fall. Were silver again standard money everywhere, the demand for it would be so great that its marginal cost, and so its value in the world's trade, would not fall but probably rise, prices in silver falling to corre- spond; but if silver remain full money in the silver lands only, exclud- ing India, the demauds for it can all be met at such a marginal cost as will permit the gold price of silver to fall and prices in silver lands to rise, slowly, for an indefinite time, if not forever; this fall, through the whole of its extent, pulling down general prices in gold lands. Facing the three considerations thus presented, I can not but think the hope of monetary relief from gold alone wild and visionary in the extreme. But while the new gold does not modify in the slightest the need of restoring silver to its old role as full money, it triumphantly answers the only argument which, with me, ever had any weight against trying to restore silver. Hans Forssel, of Sweden, following Professor Lexis, argued in the Monetary Conference of 1892 that however large any international pool of gold and silver might be, making it perfectly impossible for its gold to leak out of it, its gold might become so scarce as to be lost in it. This objection to bimetallist effort then had some force,, but the output of new gold now deprives it of all validity what- ever. 53d Congress, > SENATE. r Mis Doo 3d Session. f | No ' 144 " EST THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. Makch 1, 1895.— Referred to the Committee on Education and Labor and ordered to be printed. Mr. Kyle presented the following MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION, BY W. A. CROFFITT, WASHINGTON, D. C. Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate. Gentlemen : In these days of agitation and tumult the comprehen- sive effort which you are making and the many-sided investigations which you are conducting in your efforts to arrive at a solution which shall give to both employer and employed justice and rest should have the earnest cooperation of all men. Before permanent peace can come we must solve the questions: Who are the producers! How are wages regulated? Is labor a commodity"? Does the laborer receive his just share of the total product? Are the rich getting richer, and the poor poorer? Does coercion applied to employers tend to increase the rate of wages? Is the private ownership of land beneficial? Does machin- ery benefit the poor man? Can one man earn a million dollars? Are large aggregations of capital and the consolidation of corporations a benefit or an injury to the public? Can poverty be abolished? Ought the importation of Cheap labor to be prohibited ? Ought all boys to be encouraged to learn trades? Ought criminals to be permitted to work at competitive industries? What are the chief industrial agencies? Not till these vital questions can be approximately answered will the the day of tranquillity arrive, and he is a public benefactor whose sys- tematic work and thought shall hasten, even by an hour, its blessed coming. It is to these questions that this memorial will address itself, and if they shall be treated chronologically to some extent, rather than in the order in which they have been mentioned, it will be only for the purpose of making the argument easier to follow and the conclusions clearer. WAGES IN THE YEAR 1925. Prospects ahead.— High wages and public prosperity go together; so all efforts of the economists should be directed to securing a continuous increase of the wages of laboring men. Believe me, gentlemen, this memorial would not have been begun had I not had in mind a method by means of which the earnings of the manual laborer can be vastly increased during the present generation. I do not allege that this method would result in a reconciliation of the laborer with the capital- ist, or an abolition of the agitation and tumult above referred to; but I mean so to set forth its merits as to carry the conviction to your minds 2 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION.. that if rigorously adhered to it will result in doubling the wages of every laboring man by the year 1925. According to this calculation, the skilled laborer who during the last five years has commanded from $3 to $5 a day, will, under the beneficent working of the policy I am about to advocate, receive from $6 to $10 per day iu 1925; that is to say, the children of the present laboring classes will, in thirty years from now, receive twice as much wages as their fathers command to-day THE CONDITION OP THINGS SIXTY-FIVE TEARS AGO. How people lived. — Let me go back a little : What was the condition of labor sixty-five years ago, in 1830? There were no such divisions of toil as are seen to-day; of specialized workers there were very few. Three-fourths of all the people were farmers or farmers' families. Every farmer did the most of his own work; every farmer's wife the most of her's. Nine-tenths of all that was wanted which the farmer could not raise upon his acres was bought by him in barter at the nearest village and was made there. In that village was a shoemaker, who fashioned the shoes and the harness of the neighborhood from leather which he procured at the tannery hard by; a hatter, who made the headgear worn within a radius of 10 miles ; a blacksmith, who shod the horses, manufactured the carts and wagons and plows, made the hinges, latches, keys, nails, and irons, and all the ironwork that went to the construction and equipment of a house, and often furnished the table with its knives and forks; a little factory where satinet, jeans, and other rude fabrics of wool and cotton were woven ; a carpenter, who made all the parts of ,the house which the farmer and blacksmith were unequal to, and fashioned the furniture for use in it. Hardly anything was owned that was not homemade. The father of the family was fortuhate if he could afford a broadcloth coat, and the mother of the family if she could afford one silk dress, for they cost $40 or $50 apiece, and were made to last for ten years. These were the "halcyon days." These were the " good old times." But the rays of light are highly refracted that pass through the hazy atmosphere of half a century, and if we draw a little nearer to those times we find shadows which from the laboring man's point of view do not seem so attractive. In fact, life was repulsive and threadbare. The average house of sixty-five years ago was no better than a well- kept barn of to-day. It had no carpet except a homemade rag carpet in one room. It had no curtains or tablecloths. The chairs were of the plainest pine. The tables and bedsteads were made by the village carpenter or by the farmer himself. The beds were of straw and ropes of hemp. There could hardly be said to be any luxuries of any kind. The dwellings of those who in rustic neighborhoods were called "rich" were naked and mean, cold and uninviting, compared with the dwelling of the average laborer of to-day. Wages, which had been regularly increasing since the English- speaking race emerged from a condition of slavery, were still distress- ingly low. The rude labor of the untrained along the Atlantic States of America received from 10 to 30 cents a day. I can not say " com- manded," for the untrained are never in a position to command any- thing, and tens of thousands of them toiled for scanty board and were glad to get it. Skilled labor at the time I am speaking of commanded $1 a day, when there was a demand for it. This was about twice as much as the most skillful manual laborer could command the first year of the century; but the year 1830 was MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 3 not without its agitations. Waves of discontent ran with continuous murmur throughout the ranks of the industrious. Meetings were held to denounce greedy employers and to demand fair play and justice in the division of the net product. Glib orators alleged that the labor- ing man was virtually a serf, that his rights as a free man had been constantly diminishing from the beginning of the century, and were taken away from him, and that his wages had been never so low as at the time when the orator was speaking; but they who had taken pains to inform themselves of the history of labor knew that the wages of the skilled workman which were $1 a day then had only been 50 cents a day during the first years of the century, and were still lower than even that, during the decade preceding the revolution. Men who consulted the memory of their fathers and grandfathers found out that ''the good old times" were really the bad old times, and that the laboring man's condition had been bettering and his wages increasing from the first. So they plodded on, confideet that industry, energy, ingenuity, and fidelity would result in still better wages and still better times. I am indebted to my father for some of this information, for (a young man) he worked at the bench as a skilled mechanic in 1830. His wage was $1 a day — the highest paid in Connecticut. It enabled him to give his little family a precarious living, and a report which became current in the neighborhood, that a journeyman of his craft could earn $1.25 a day in Montreal, wrought upon his ambition and gave him a new resolve. In the middle of a hard winter he made his most difficult way through the ice and snow of an almost trackless forest to the St. Lawrence, and stayed a year away from friends and home in order to add 25 cents a day to his reveuue. Agitation and complaint were incessant. Strikes were not uncom- mon. Poverty seemed almost universal. Beggars were distressingly numerous. The Cassandras and Jeremiahs of the time prognosticated misery for the land, and declared that there never had been so many men unemployed. Many panaceas were offered to cure the evils believed to exist; but the prevailing system of competitive industry was not changed. Skilled or unskilled, hopeful or hopeless, despairing or con- fident of a brighter future, toilers continued to toil and to accept the wage automatically assigned to them in the adjustment of supply and ^haiwages were paid.— What was the result* Did all things rush to ruin? Did pauperism increase and beggars multiply] Did work diminish in quantity and wages grow less and less 1 ? No; the very opposite of this occurred for thirty years. Wages increased ; not, indeed, with perfect regularity from year to year, but by irregular zigzags, like all other changes in which human nature is a factor. Some years, as in 1837 and 1838, wages went down because the de struc- tion of pub ic confidence resulted in diminished manufactures, and a constantlv increasing body of workmen had to divide among them- Ses a smallef product. But such incomplete statistics as were kept ^"tSfSSiSiY^that the reward of toil and the corresponding ■ comfort of the toiler was considerably greater from decade to decade, so that £y 1800 the wages of the skilled ^^mmT^ being an average of $2 per day as contrasted with $1 per day lor the same class of labor in 1830. . .t,-.^^,,.,, hntalmnst And not only had these wages doubled during ^Fty^B,tat dmost everything that wages would buy had diminished m price Ttas is one of the beneficent paradoxes of the industrial pi oblem ^6 marveUras transformations of the lands and the peoples of the earth due to steam 4 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. had begun plainly to manifest themselves. The distant was brought near. The produce of the far-off prairie, the uninhabited wilderness, the lonely island in the sea, found a market. So that not only did the working man of 1860 get far more than ever before for his labor, but he bought almost all commodities cheaper than ever before. One hour of toil on the part of the skilled laborer in 1860 bought about three times as much of those things which the laborer wanted for himself and his family as one hour's labor bought thirty years before. It followed, of course, that more people were at work, because increased wages mean increased demand; increased demand means more work, i. e., work for more people. But wages were still low. Only a small per- centage of toilers were sufficiently skilled to command their $2 a day. The majority were, as to-day, unskilled, and unskilled toilers must accept what they can get, because the supply of their kind is well-nigh inexhaustible. During those years my father, on his Connecticut farm, hired as many efficient men as he wanted for $8 a month and their board the year, rouud; they were strong, alert, industrious, willing, obedient, but neither mind, eye, or muscle was trained to any of that difficult work which the world demands and for which it offers large rewards. I believe there was more agitation and discontent in the ranks of the workers in 1860 than there was in 1830, although the coudition of the laboring man had been made so much more comfortable. It was widely and loudly asserted that the laboring man was a slave; that wages were lower than they had ever been before; that the price of all mer- chandise was higher than ever before; that poverty was increasing with frightful rapidity, and that manufacturers and all thrifty and success- ful men were greedy cormorants devouring the substance of the people. In this dire extremity some of the boldest proposed socialism as a remedy for all the evils, that is, a division of all the property among all the people, so that the man who had spent his money or had not earned it should have just as much as the industrious and the frugal. But this did not seem generally attractive and the old competitive sys- tem was retained for thirty -five years more. THE CONDITION OF THINGS THIRTY-FIVE YEARS AGO. Wages double again. — Now let us see what happened in these thirty- five years, from 1860 to 1895. Various things happened not calculated to promote the public weal; among other things the most terrible and destructive civil war in history, costing nearly a million lives and $10,000,000,000. This debt brought in its train a stupendous load of taxation, vastly diminishing the productive power and resources of the people. But in spite of all burdens and impediments, wages doubled again between 1860 and 1890, so that in the latter year skilled laborers by the hundred thousand commanded and received $4 per day apeice. Indeed, some men engaged in more difficult operations where higher skill was required have obtained much more than this. Tables have been com- piled showing the condition of the workingman in America as far as wages is concerned during the last four decades. The figures are only approximate, but they are pretty nearly correct, as they were obtained from those reports of ideal excellence resulting from the investigations of Gen. Carroll D. Wright of the United States Bureau of Labor, sup- plemented and confirmed by the reports of the State commissioners of labor of New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, and other States. The MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 5 compiler of one of the most valuable, the reports of Massachusetts, says: The average wages and prices by years for the various occupations and articles named are based upon over 4,600 statements, representing over 9,000 original quota- tions of wages, and nearly 25,000 statements, representing 120,000 original quotations of prices, from 56 towns and cities of tke Statt*. Some figures on the subject. — Statistics before 1850 are most incomplete and are made up largely from the recollections of men. But these col- lected in large numbers and through a wide range of employments, show that not only the wages of the skilled laborer, of whom I have been speaking, but the average of all wages had increased tremendously. The wages of the unskilled, of course, had scarcely increased at all, for the mere hewers of wood and drawers of water are always plentiful, and their remuneration is always meager. The men and women of some little skill shared the general improve- ment, and these included the factory hands in all the larger work- shops. But the greatest change was the increase in the wages of men of special training — the journeyman carpenter and builder, the carriage maker, the master mason, the deft iron and tin worker, the typesetter and printer — and the wages of these doubled each thirty years. LOOKING BACKWARD. Wages by decades. — The bureau of labor statistics of Massachusetts shows that, taking the whole working population. Th,e total increase of wages from — Per cent, 1850 to 1860 15 1860 to 1870 18 1870 to 1880 13 That is to say, the wages paid in the State increased 46 per cent in thirty years, the increase of skilled wages during that time being more than double this, and the wages of the untaught remaining sta- tionary. Decline in price of commodities. — In the meantime the following decline of prices of coininoaities took place: Decline of prices : Per cent, 1837 to 1850 12 1850 to 1860 , 9 1860 to 1883 -' 18 In other words, the prices of commodities were nearly 40 per cent less in 1883 than they had been forty-three years before. It is a curious and most welcome paradox that, while the wages of the laboring man increase, the prices of all he makes and all he needs to buy correspond- ingly diminish. Average annual wage of employee.— -The average annual wages of factory hands in the United States increased, as nearly as can be gath- ered from accessible statistics, as follows : 1850 : I860 272 1870 310 1880 j46 1890 405 That is to say, the wage of the average factory hand increased more than 60 per cent in forty years, while provisions and clothing declined 40 per cent in price. Under these conditions one hour's labor m 1890, even ot 6 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. the half-skilled factory hand; would buy more than twice as much of the things he wanted as an hour's labor would procure in 1850. Improvement in other matters. — Inthemeantime, too, all the conditions of existencehavebettered. Thereis fourtimesas much tea, coffee, sugar, and butter used, to the population, as there was fifty years ago. There are five times as many children sent to school, to the population, as there were then. The hours of labor have been shortened from thirteen hours to ten. There is fifteen times as much money deposited in savings banks, to the population. The working classes have large additions to their means; and the increase of working-class incomes is much greater than the increase of capital. There are only half as many criminals as there were then in proportion to the population; statistics show that there are more people employed, and it is probable that there are fewer even of paupers and tramps. Net result. — "We are led, then, to this remarkable conclusion : That the -skilled workman is at least four times as well off as he was at the beginning of this century; that even the average wage- earner is to-day, far better paid, better fed, and better clad than ever before in the history of the world, and that his wages will continue to increase and his condition to improve under the operation of the competitive system of industry. THESIS. The remainder of this memorial will be chiefly occupied with the consideration of the question whether this gain in wages has corre- spondingly improved the condition of the wage earner. To this end, and to guide our footsteps along definite paths as we go forward, let me lay down a thesis — a series of propositions which it is my purpose to demonstrate and illustrate. I. Labor is a commodity, like flour or cotton cloth, and it should be bought iu the cheapest market and sold in the dearest. . II. Wages are automatically regulated by reciprocal want, that is, by the chances for investment and the supply of workers, and any particular wage is always'a compromise between the highest sum which the capitalist will pay rather than forego the chance of profit, and the lowest price which the laborer will accept rather than forego the chance of employment. III. Every application of force or coercion by laborers to employers, either by law or through trades unions, tends invariably to reduce wages by diminishing the total sum paid for service. IV. The ownership of land depends upon precisely the same prin- ciples as does the ownership of houses, horses or any other property; therefore, to appropriate it without full compensation is robbery. V. Among agents of production, labor is not the chief, but is really the third m importance, inventive talent being the first, and capital the second. _ VI. The greatest material blessing of this age is machinery, because it works far cheaper and faster than any workingman, producing a vastly greater product, and lives on less. VII. Wealthy manufacturers and large corporations serve the public cheaper than small manufacturers and small corporations; and there- fore large aggregations of capital and the consolidation of corporations are to be encouraged. VIII. The menace of want is the mildest stimulus adequate to keep men at work with the industry essential to a tolerable degree of com- MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 7 fort, therefore, poverty will never be abolished, but it will continually be diminished. IX. Avarice and parsimony are virtues, because their exercise results in increasing the nonconsumable wealth of the world. X. All efforts to diminish production, whether by destroying machin- ery, reducing the reward of inventors, prohibiting the importation of cheap labor, limiting railroad building, preventing boys from learning trades, or keeping criminals in enforced idleness, are hostile to the wel- fare of society. XI. Our present competitive system of labor may be assumed to be the best attainable, because all other proposed industrial methods have been tried by the human race and have failed. LABOR A COMMODITY. Let us take these propositions up and consider them in their order: (I) Labor is a commodity like flour or cotton cloth and should be bought in the cheapest market and sold in the. dearest. From this statement follows the corollary that every workingman should obtain all he can for his services, and that every employer should pay the market price for labor, and no more. This, as we all know, is what happens under our present competitive system. The price of the abor supply depends upon the demand for service just as the price of very commodity in the world depends upon the number of those who want it and are able to buy it. One of the new-fashioned principles of morality which are set up by some classes as a standard of human action is that the purchaser of labor can not properly be gaided by the same ethics as the purchaser of commodities ; that the hirer of human service can not, in establishing prices, be governed by the same motives as the man who goes to market. "Of course," they say, "a man buying a bushel of potatoes in the market would not think of paying more for them than the owner demanded, or more than the same potatoes could be had for from another seller. But to buy human service," they con- tinue, "is altogether a more sacred thing. This is dealing in human strength and agility, human skill and knowledge, human bodies and souls, and to drive a sharp bargain for these is infamous." But the potatoes in the market are the net result of this same human exertion — of this same skill and sagacity— and exposure, self-denial and suffering may have gone to their production. Is the toil, which has produced the bushel of potatoes less entitled to consideration merely because it is one step farther off ? Is human labor less " sacred" after it has gone into the potatoes than before ? Indeed, the toil that has gone into a product is the only toil'that can properly be called labor at all. Labor is not labor until it is expended; before that it is only potentiality— the possibility of becoming labor. It seems to me, undoubtedly it will seem to any one, that strength which has been brought to bear, and skill which has been actually put into the production of commodities which will minister to human com- fort are quite as much entitled to consideration and high respect as that strength and skill which waits and bids for a buyer. So, labor- that is, potential exertion— must be regarded as a commodity like flour or cotton cloth, to be sold to the man who will give most for it. Ine equitable price of shoes is what A, who wants them, is willing to pay, and B, who owns them, is willing to take. The equitable price of labor is what C, who has muscle, and perhaps skill, is willing to work for, and § MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. D, who wants the service of muscle and perhaps skill, is willing to pay. Neither bargain has or ought to have anything to do with the pur- chaser's generosity, or charity, or wealth, or with the expensivenesS of the seller's habits, or the number of his children. There may, indeed, be cases in which sympathy will become an element in the purchase, as a shopper may, in rare instances, pay more for a commodity than he could buy it for elsewhere, on account of representations that the huck- ster has a large family who are suffering from want, or that for some reason he or they are in some dire distress. But the rule still holds that labor is a commodity, like any other thing that may possess value, and that the employer should buy it as cheap as he can and the work- man sell it as dear as he can. It is in this amicable conflict of oppos- ing interests that all the valuable markets. of the world are established. And it must hot be forgotten that when a thing is sold it is no longer owned by the seller. When labor is disposed of and money taken for it, its results belong exclusively to the purchaser. This truth may be trite, but it can not be too often repeated or too earnestly enforced. Many workingmen seem to think that they own the property after they have taken the stipulated pay for the labor which fashioned it. Even a man so thoughtful and intelligent as John Stuart Mill, addressing an audience of laborers in London, said to them: "As I was coming into your hall a handsome carriage whirled' by drawn by two white horses and driven and attended by men in livery. Inside was a woman richly dressed. It passed rapidly up the hill and turned into the grounds of yonder palace. Who built that^carriage? You did. Who raised those horses? You did. Who wove the garments that enveloped that fash- ionable lady? You did. Who erected yonder palace and laid out the surrounding grounds ? You did. Why should you not own them now !" This is the speech of a demagogue from the lips of a philosopher. His false assumption was that because his auditors fashioned the things spoken of therefore they still owned them. He neglected to state that having once owned them all they had irrevocably sold them. Every man who wrought upon the fabrics or the coach or the palace had indeed thereby become the owner of a small fraction, but he sold that fraction and transferred it to another, both in fact and in justice, when he took his pay for the work that went into it. When a man sells his toil it is no longer his. And when a printer goes on strike and still insists that the case which he has abandoned is his case, and that no other man shall be permitted to set type at it, he is entitled to no more considera- tion in equity than a burglar who enters a house or a robber who holds up a train. THE LAW OP WAGES. (II) Wages are automatically regulated by reciprocal want— that is, by the chances for investment and the supply of worlcers. "Not at all!" exclaim Henry George, John Most, and the other labor agitators of our time, who always agitate and, perhaps, sometimes labor; "wages are not established by any principle at all, or any law, economic of otherwise, except the will of the rapacious employer, who Axes wages at a point that may, perhaps, keep his serfs from starvation, and who cares for nothing else." This is a grave allegation. If it is true, employers are barbarians. Let us examine it. Let us see whether wages paid depend on supply and demand or on somebody's arbitrary will. MEMORIAL, ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 9, Three women's wages—Fifty years ago there were born in three neigh- boring houses three girls, Julie, Adelina, and Mary. The parents of all were poor, and not able to give their children any unusual advan- tages. Julie grew to womanhood without having learned any useful art except plain sewing Mary took a little more naturally Jbooks and when old enough she learned the rudiments of the printer's trade and became a typesetter. Adelina might not have been more fortunate than either on arriving at womanhood had she not been gifted with a superb voice, and been able to attain, through instruction, to the divine art of song. When they arrived at 30 Mary was earning $1 a dav in New York as a typesetter; Julie was barely able to eke out the slen- derest possible subsistence by earning 20 cents a day in a sweatshop in Bleecker street, while Adelina was singing for $2,000 a night What was the cause of this tremendous disparity? Did employers reduce- Julie to 20 cents a day because they were cruel and malignant, and give Mary $1 a day because they were merciful? And wiry did not Adelina Patti's managers oppress her? She had a smaller family than either of the others, and could, if need were, live on less. Thefactis,of course, thattheworld paidforwhatitwanted. It wanted some books and newspapers, and a skillful typesetter is the result of an active brain and years of study and training, so that those who wanted the types set had to pay accordingly. A good deal of plain sewing is also required by the world, but plain sewing is not a difficult accom- plishment, and a hundred thousand can do plain sewing where one can set type. When a printer wants an additional typesetter there are only ten or twenty ready to take the case, but when plain sewing is wanted . there are a thousand eager rivals for the job. Mr. Sovereign, of the- Knights of Labor, says, " It is a curious and humiliating fact that the more needy a man is the less wages he can command from the greedy cormorants of capital." This recallsthe sage remark of Mrs. Partington, that hens would never lay when eggs were dear, but always began as soon as they got cheap. For, of course, the inability to command wages does not result from neediness, but neediness results from inability to command wages. To return to the three women and their contrasted condition. Why does Patti command $2,000 or $5,000 a night? Not because her employers are sentimental or sympathetic; not because she has a large family; not because she has a vote, or no vote; but because nature and art have conspired to endow her with a marvelous equipment, which enables her to give to the world such entertainment as they can not get elsewhere. She possesses a very rare combination: great physical strength, enabling her to endure much fatigue; great beauty of face- and form, rendering her personality attractive; a sympathetic vivacity,, enabling her to fascinate and hold an audience; a strong dramatic instinct; a mouth and throat cavity containing a superb organ of song; great industry and persistent application, the right teacher, the wealthy backer, the devoted director, and the melodious je ne sais quoi which can not be defined, but which produces the unparalleled singer. If there were but one woman in the world who could do plain sewing,, she would command very high wages, if the demand for costumes should continue ; and if there were a million Pattis each one would probably command only 20 cents a day, like the poor woman who ekes out a painful subsistence on Bleecker street. Each one is paid pre- cisely according to the demand. Ought low wages to be raised f— "What," says the agitator, "ought not a woman who makes a shirt to have more than 10 cents for her 10 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. labor!" That would seem to depend on what is meant by the word ■"ought." Should her employer pay her more than he does? If it is ' answered that he should, the question arises, who is to make him do it? and the next questio'n is, would it be for the interest of society for himto pay more? There are a hundred so-called "sweat factories "within a square mile in New York City, where women work for wages pitifully small. Now, let us suppose that one of these manufacturers becomes convinced of his error and he says, "Henceforth I will pay 25 cents apiece for making these shirts, instead of 10 cents," and he follows the word with the deed. What becomes of him? Why, his philanthropic purpose leads to his ruin. He becomes bankrupt in a month and the poor women, instead of getting 10 cents apiece for making shirts, get nothing at all. The same sad end would resultif two or ten or any number of these manufacturers of cheap goods were to reform and raise their prices; for the first unit in the industrial procession is the consumer, and whatever is demanded will surely be produced. It is the wish of an enlightened humanity that every toiler could receive $10 a day for his work, and the deplorable condition of struggling sewing women in some of our large industrial centers is calculated to wring the heart. But before abolishing the "sweat shops," reformers should substitute something better, if they would not increase the misery which we all deplore. Why high wages are paid. — Mr. T. V. Powderly once called attention to the fact that Mr. Thomas A. Scott was receiving a salary of $50,000 a year as president of the Pennsylvania Eailroad, while the common .workingmen upon the line were receiving only $1 a day each. "And," he added, "they work a good deal harder than he does." It is one of the laws of industrial economics that the man who gets the lowest wages is usually compelled to work (physically) the hardest; his toil is generally the coarsest, the most odious, and the most severe. The labor- ers who get high wages are those whose heads save their hands; and those who get the very highest are those who do not at all use their muscles in the process. Mr. Scott was not paid $150 a day because, as Mr. Powderly thought, he "had a cinch on the directors," or because he was in possession of an amount of power which enabled him to defraud the company, but because, from a hard-working boy, without a dollar in the world, he had come into the possession of an amount of knowl- edge which made him the natural commander of the resources of the road. He knew its strength and its weakness, its history and its resources, its various ramifications, its relations to other roads, its out- lets, its feeders, its tributary country that could be made to increase its revenues; he thus knew better how to manage it so as to make it yield an income than any other living man, and the stockholders believed that he was better worth $50,000 a year than a man who knew just enough to operate a brake or wheel a barrel up a plank was worth a dollar a day. CAN WAGES BE EORCED UP? (Ill) Every application of force or coercion by laborers to employers, either by late or through tradesunions, tends invariably to reduce wages by diminishing the total sum paid for services. The "wage fund." — Tliere is no such thing as a " wage fund" created by the laborer. Wages are paid out of the capital invested, and not out of the profits accruing; because wages are paid just the same whether there is a profit or not. Wages are paid out of money previ- MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 11 ously earned and saved in the hope on the part of the employer that his venture may prove profitable. It would be preposterous to suppose that laborers are paid out of the profits of an enterprise which has been carried to its conclusion only with a loss of $100,000. A few years ago an ingenious ship carpenter in Liverpool conceived the idea of constructing a ship with oscillating cabins so hung that they would have a compensating motion opposite to the movement of the ship, and, by keeping the floor always horizontal, would prevent seasickness. He illustrated his project with such ingenuity and advo- cated it with such pertinacity that he induced capitalists to put half a million dollars into the construction of the steamer. The payment of wages, of course, began at once in reimbursing the architects and designers. Probably no one will claim that these wages were paid from the profit, for it was two years before tne great contrivance was finished. Were other wages paid fiom the profits during those two years! Obviously not. They were paid out of the capital which hope- ful men had subscribed and which they expected to increase. Were the sailors who managed the ship after it was finished paid out of the profits? Apparently not; for it was a dead loss from the beginning. The first trial trip demonstrated it to be a total failure and the money that had gone into it a total loss. Have the $100,000,000 that have been put into the Panama Canal and paid out as wages been taken from the profits — the so-called " wage fund?" No; wages are paid just as the stock of a factory is bought, out of the capital which is therein ventured, the savings of intelligent and thrifty men. Are wages drawn from profits t — Mr. Henry George writes a chapter to prove the proposition "That wages instead of being drawn from capital are in reality drawn from the product of the labor for which they are paid." If this were indeed true, no project would seem too large for the poorest man to undertake. If wages were paid from the profits earned by the workers, it could not be necessary to pay them till the profits had accrued ; so to carry forward a vast enterprise like the Hoosac Tunnel or the Nicaragua Canal, all that it would be neces- sary to furnish would be the tools. Is it possible that Mr. George means what he says? If so, he must think all sorts of cooperative enterprises easy of realization, for it would not be necessary to pay any laborer till the goods were made and sold. Coercion and interest. — Coercion of any kind applied to employers has a tendency to cause a withdrawal of capital from all projects the result of which is doubtful. The withdrawal of capital results in the employment of fewer men, and this in turn in lower wages. In Cali- fornia and Australia when laws were passed to limit the rate of interest they had exactly the opposite effect. Men who before had charged 10 per cent legally, now, in the face of a prohibitory law, charged 12 or 15 per cent, the excess above the rate previously charged being to reim- burse themselves in case the penalty of usury was exacted. In Con- necticut and New York the same result followed endeavors to enforce the laws against usury. Instead of interest being diminished in the interest of the borrower it was oppressively increased. Whenever and wherever statute laws are enacted for the purpose of repealing economic laws, the interests of business men will assert themselves in attempts to elude or circumvent the enactments of the State. Statutes and wages.— So it is in regard to the laws of competitive industry. They are beyond statutes and can neither be repealed nor controlled. If Congress were to pass a law prescribing that every skilled laborer should have sj?5 a clay, and every unskilled laborer $2 a 12 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. day next year, and enact heavy penalties against any employer who should pay less, the inevitable result would be not to increase wages, but to "diminish wages, and if every legislature in the United States should reenact the decree of Congress, and then if every court, sheriff, policeman, and constable should earnestly and sincerely combine to enforce these legislative expedients, and punish the violators of the law, the whole comprehensive effort would result in a scale of wages lower than ever before paid, and an amount of misery which is incal- culable ; for employers would either elude the law or they would hoard their capital and abstain from active business. Trades unions. — Every trades union does, in a partial way, just what a mandatory law would do. The Federation of Trades, the Knights of Labor, and every other combination of men who league themselves together for the purpose of exacting wages which they can not otherwise command, always tend to limit production and to lower wages. They are largely responsible for panics; they cause enterprise to shrink from experiment; theyinduce the relinquishment of large schemes of improve- ment. Before their touch capital, sensitive as the mimosa, withdraws and shrivels ' within itself; wealth retires; men who have not saved any money are in distress, and there results at last that universal lack of cpnfidence which characterizes hard times. THE "SINGLE TAX" ON LAND. IV. The ownership of land depends upon precisely the same principles as does the ownership of houses, horses, or any other property ; therefore to appropriate it without full compensation is robbery. The origin of title. — All rights of property are rooted in appropria- tion. Seizure is the origin of every title. Our savage ancestors held everything in common. They were Socialists, as all savages are Social- ists. Bach tribe owned in common all the territory which it could dom- inate, and owned also all the forests, lakes, rivers, and wild animals included therein. Their right to the land was maintained by war; their right to the animals was asserted by capture. After some thousand or mil-lion of years a little progress was made, for it was discovered that where all men owned everything, no man ever owned anything, and where any man could at anytime go to the " universal granary," as Henry George calls land, incessant hunger prevailed. The first man who had this gl'eam of enlightenment followed it up by catching a wild animal, fighting off his neighbors, and keeping it as his own, to feed and clothe his family. This was the beginning of the right to per- sonal property, it was also the beginning of civilization : for civiliza- tion may be rudely but not inaccurately defined as the desire to own something. It was the same with land. When needed for flocks and herds, land was appropriated and retained for exclusive use. Generally, nobody else wanted it. If others did want it, they were repelled. After land had thus been for centuries held in fee by a tribe or family, some man, moved by the acquisitive spirit, determined to make a small piece of territory his own. Nobody else coveted it, or, coveting, was able to take it, and it became private property. All the land now held as pri- vate property in the United States acquired its first title by being appropriated — that is, by being taken up, fenced in, and held by some man at a time when no other man wanted it. The present holder acquired it by purchase or inheritance. MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 13 That the owners of land have conferred an immense benefit on society by thus seizing, bequeathing, defending, and owning land there can be no question. If the State had seized all land and withheld it from private ownership, renting only as it was needed, the frontier of American life would to day scarcely have crossed the Alleghanies. All our people would have clustered along the Atlantic coast and there would have " been no Chicago, Cincinnati, or Minneapolis — no Pacific railroad, and only a feeble collection of hamlets in California, for the great premium offered to the successful emigraut and pioneer would not have existed. Has man produced land in any proper sense of the word ? This depends, of course, on what a producer is. No author of any country or time has answered this and cognate questions so fully as has Van Buren Denslow, LL. D., in his great work, The Principles of Economic Philos- ophy. It should find its way to the library table of every thoughtful man. * Definition of production. — Who are producers? should be the very first question in labor's catechism. It must be definitely answered before it can be decided who is overpaid and who is underpaid; before it can be known what are the rights of the employer or the employed; before the relation of railroads to the people can be defined ; before any rate of wages can be scientifically established; before we can judge whether freedom of trade is wise or unwise ; before we can be certain that speculators in land or in wheat are socially beneficial or injurious. Back of the charter of eVery corporation, and back of the protest of every strike, is the primary question, Who is the producer? "A producer is a man who makes something," replies the rapid gen- eralizer. But when this quick definition is challenged he halts and considers ; and on reflection and investigation he finds that no man can actually "make" anything. With accurate definitions no man can " make" a table. Nature has provided every table in its unassembled form. All that man can do is to find the pieces and put them together. He finds wood in the forest, fells it, hews it, saws it, planes it, fashions it, takes bits of iron, which nature also has provided, and nails the pieces of wood to each other, and lo ! it is a table. It all came from the ground. He may proceed to add drawers to it, he may put casters on it, he may glue it, he may mortise it, he may turn the legs in a lathe, and carve it with tools that he brought from the ground, and color it with dyes that he brought from the ground, and varnish it with varnish that he brought from the ground, and trim it with brass that he brought from the ground, but all this time he has not " made" anything. No man can "make" a shoe. All that a man can do is to win the pelt of a skin-bearing animal, tan it, stain it, cut it, oil it, and bend it to the shape of the foot. Man can make nothing. All that any man can do is to select, reject, divide, combine, saw, paint, carve, polish, embroider, gild, and decorate. This statement may seem commonplace, but it is necessary constantly to remember that, in producing, man can only "brine- forward," as the dictionary has it. Thus it is obvious that the definition, "a producer is a man who makes something,"is not only inadequate but inaccurate. So the rapid generalizer will try again: "A producer is a man who changes some- thing." This comes more nearly to being correct, but it is still faulty, tor a man may labor long and diligently, and may change many things and yet produce nothing. I¥ . otto . The rapid generalizer sees by this time that all man can do to mattei is to move it, but he does not seem yet to have got a glimpse of the 14 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. whole truth, which is that what that particular man whom we call a producer does to matter is to move it in the right direction. We have now obtained this fuller definition : "A producer is a man who moves matter froin a place where it is worth less to a place where it is worth more." A producer always transports matter in the direc- tion of demand, All production, then, is simply transportation — trans- portation by nature and by man. The farmer moves to the field manure to fertilize it and water to irrigate it; then he moves thither the grains of wheat and places them in the ground; nature moves the chit to stalk and the stalk to bearded repository; the farmer reappears and moves the ripened grain to stack, then to thrasher, then to sack, then to cart, then to station and to train, the train moves it to mill, the miller to barrel and to train again, to jobber, to retailer, and at last to the individual consumer. And here it should be noticed that the railroad does to the wheat precisely what the farmer does — moves it a step toward the waiting oven. Both are producers. There is one other sort of producer: the man who does not move . matter, but who stores it. The man who builds an elevator to hold and shelter a million bushels of wheat till it shall be wanted is one of these; the man who keeps a wine cellar stored with unripe wine till it is wanted is another; the man who buys land and keeps it until it is wanted is another. In the last analysis, then, let us agree to this definition : "A pro- ducer is a man who moves matter, either through space or time, in the direction of demand. If a man moves matter unwisely and encounters no demand he is not a producer. If he grows a crop of corn which he uses for fuel instead of food; if he carries ice-cream freezers to Greenland and finds no market; if he ships warming pans to Madagascar and confronts no need for them; if he sends a cargo of shoes to the Society Islands and finds society preferably barefoot; if he buys $10,000 worth of trinkets for the Zulus and discovers, on attempting to deliver them, that Zulu fashions have changed; if he lays out a city where no lots can be sold, or builds a railroad where there is no transportation, in each of these cases he is not a producer, but he is a consumer, and money is exacted from him, the inevitable penalty of a lack of foresight. Profit is the premium which society pays for an accurate guess and society does not pay the man who guesses wrong. The tremendous price to-day commanded by an acre of land on Broadway. jS'ew York, is the precise premium that society pays for the prescience of past owners which enabled them dimly to foresee and pro- vide lor the future demand. In all business transactions it is the man who is able to supply the demand the most exactly who gets the most money. This very week some shrewd pioneer in Colorado is locating a farm on which in a generation a great city shall cluster, and then the squatter will reap the reward of his accurate guess. Unearned increment.— -The' few doctrinaires who hold that no man should be permitted to own land, but that all land should be confis- cated to the State, assure us that land is not "produced" in any sense, but that it acquires its chief value from the people around it^that is, that its increasing value is "unearned increment.' 7 If this method of acquiring value were peculiar to land, the fact might have an impor- tant significance. But the presence of a surrounding population is just what gives value to everything. The value of an article always depends upon its being at the right place at the right time. A pint of diamonds are valueless to a drowning man; a gold watch is valueless MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 15 to a Kalmuck ; the most elaborately wrought Japanese screen or grand piano would be worthless on a raft at sea or in an uninhabited forest These trite facts are mentioned in order to emphasize the truth, too often forgotten that the value of anything depends directly on the number of people who want it and are near enough to enter into com- petition to obtain it. "It is the great mass of the landless who confer the chief value on land " excla.ms Mr. Henry George, triumphantly. The assertion can not be denied. And it is the great mass of the hatless who confer the chief value on hats. If it were not for the shoeless, present or pros- pective shoes would have no value. It is the people who are not sun- plied who confer the chief value on everything. It is the houseless who give value to houses. It is the hungry who give value to food.- It is the insufficiently clad who give value to clothes. From this is derived the corollary that nothing 'has any intrinsic value. All values are extrinsic. Gold has no more intrinsic value than a lily; the value of each depends entirely on how much it is wanted. A hoe has no more intrinsic value than the weed it cuts down ; and the weed has as much as the shaft of maize that supersedes it. All values are extrinsic; they are not contained within, but are conferred from without. "Unearned increment" is a phrase much blown upon the air in these days. It is alleged to mean that portion of real estate values which results from an increase of population, as when land in Minnesota doubles in price every five years on account of immigration. The trouble with the euphonious phrase is that this increment of land is not unearned. The increment of land, like that of all other values, is earned. Indeed, an increase in the value of land is much more truly earned than is that of portable things, for their value depends some- what on taste, on caprice, and on fantastic and adventitious conditions, while its value exactly follows the law of increased population and cumulative demand. The increased value of a man's land is no more "unearned" than is that of his store if he has built it on a prominent corner, or that of his horse if he has bought a high-bred colt and trained him for the track, or that of his book if he has written one that the reading public wants. John Stuart Mill, in a moment of inadvertence, invented the term "unearned increment," and Henry George has much exploited it; but when these twain had gained such popularity or notoriety that at least one book of each sold by the hun- dred thousand, the income was promptly put into their pockets, though it was as truly "unearned increment" as the increased value of the costliest corner lot in Chicago or the richest quarter section in Dakota. For it is the great mass of the bookless who confer the chief value on books. So it happens that all gains of all kinds are quite as much "unearned increment" as the gains on land are that is, all profit results from the proximity of people who want the thing that is for sale, the value being entirely due to them and not at all to the labor that has gone into it. If this sort of "unearned increment" is to be divided among the crowd, all things must be divided — not only land, but whatever comes out of land — horses and cattle, houses and factories, furniture, food, and clothing. Want the cause of value. — The conclusion that value results wholly from want and not at all from labor is verified by every man's daily experience. Food attained its highest value in the Persian famine and at Andersonville and in the Arctic den of ice where Greely was 16 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. imprisoned. How much is the thing wanted? That is the only ques- tion. How much or how little it has cost is of no consequence. Not a cent's worth of value is ever created by labor, but things that pos- sess value are fashioned by labor whenever it is wisely directed. A thousand men working hard to dig a canal where no water can be got to fill it, or to build a hill where it would be only an obstruction, or to launch an ocean steamer in Lake Tahoe, or to erect a city in the Desert of Sahara, would not create any value whatever, though they worked industriously to the end of time. Ferdinand de Lesseps has put more than a hundred million dollars into the Panama Canal project, and he has thereby become, not a producer bat a tremendous consumer; all the vast labor of years has created nothing of value. Want, hot labor, is the test and measure of value. In fact, labor diminishes value instead of increasing it. The chief function of intelligent labor is to destroy values by supplying the demand. A man employs laborers to build him a house, and when the house is finished the value of their labor as housebuilders is completely destroyed until somebody wants another house.- There is a glut in the silk-hat market, and straightway silk-hat formers and finishers are laid off; the demand is supplied and the value of the labor which supplied it is thereby destroyed. The current phrase of mechanics — " to work yourself out of a job " — is a recognition of the fact that labor destroys value instead of creating it. And let it be always remembered that all men who move matter, either in space or time, in the direction of demand, are producers; and the man who seizes primitive land when nobody else wants it, or buys occupied land when it is of little worth, and holds it and protects it and pays taxes on it until the, demand for it is greater, is a producer in exactly the same sense as is the farmer who grows a crop or the shoe- maker who fabricates a shoe. Profit and loss. — The man who thinks he foresees that city lots in Min- neapolis are going to be needed more in some future year than they are this year, and who buys and holds them to that end, is as truly a pro- ducer as is the Wethersfield seedman who plants a hundred acres of onions because he conjectures that onion seed will be scarce next year. If either one should guess wrong, if onion seed should be plenty instead of scarce next year, or if the lots should be coveted by fewer people instead of by more, as frequently happens, then the experimenter will suffer loss — the penalty which a thrifty world visits upon its false prophets. Loss results from miscalculation. Over production means simply bad guessing. If production, in the last analysis, is always either the storage or the transportation of matter, and is never anything else, it follows that railroads and land owners, equally with farmers and mechanics, are producers, and that the service which the railroad performs in carrying grain to market is precisely coordinate with that previously rendered by the farmer who sowed and reaped it and carted it to the depot. Production includes all labor which brings the wanted nearer to the wanter. Dealing in futures. — And this gives rise to the question whether there are not other producers whom we have not recognized — the men who produce the product. I mean those who count the consumers and stim- ulate production by defining prices for months in advance. Dealers in futures, the men who now buy and sell next fall's wheat and cotton, are widely regarded with abhorrence as robbers and spoliators. But they have a most important and beneficent function in commercial life. MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 17 They regulate the supply. They are the enterprising census takers of the economic world, who by their conflicting conjectures establish an ever varying but always definite market. Indeed, these dealers in futures may correctly be called producers, for they produce a very great and very valuable commodity, viz., a uniform price over entire continents, for all buyers and sellers, at each minute of time, making allowance for cost of transportation. This commodes all, for it makes it easier because safer for farmers to produce grain; planters, cotton; ranchers, cattle; millers, flour. Pianos, carriages, watches, and furni- ture are far less perishable than food, yet their prices fluctuate through, a much wider range, mainly because they are not touched by dealers in futures. Having no prices that are fixed by long and studious calcu- lation, they are bought and sold at rates depending on fashion, whim, or mood, or on a helpless market that is liable to be much overstocked or much understocked. Dealers in futures succeed in serving both the public and themselves when they are enabled to make an approximately correct guess at the world's needs and preferences next year. Is land scarce f — The advocates of what is called the "single tax" — that is, the confiscation of all the land — claim that land is getting scarce and that the landless are in a desperate strait. Let us see : The countries of western Europe support from 150 to 450 people to the square mile. The United States has about 18 people to the square mile — less than a tenth as many. We have 200,000,000 acres of fertile and arable land still in the hands of the Government or of corporations, to be had .at a price exceedingly low; we have 600,000,000 such acres that have never felt the touch of a plow. A man desiring to become a pioneer on wild land can go to Minnesota on the cars and buy such land of the railroads at a cost far less than that paid by the emigrant-wagon homesteader of fifty years ago who made his laborious and difficult way to Illinois and obtained his land for nothing. The earth is not getting crowded. All the people who inhabit it, of all nations and races and climes, could stand on Long Island, and each one would have room enough to be comfortable. All who have lived and died since Adam could have been buried on the surface of the State of Texas, and each coffin would have 12 square feet of room. All the men and women in the United States could stand in the streets of Washington at one time. It is as preposterous for a iarmer to complain of being crowded in this spacious and luxuriant land as for a nautilus to complain of being crowded while floating on the bosom of the tremendous ocean. ABILITY THE CHIEF FACTOR IN PRODUCTION. (V) Among agents of production labor is not the chief, but is really the third 'in importance, inventive talent being the first and capital the second. Ingenuity.— Besides the producers mentioned in the last section of this memorial there is another class whom I have not alluded to, a class immeasurably more important than any other, more important, in fact, than all the others put together. The tool with, which this class works is ingenuity. Ingenuity at the present time produces at lea§t five times as much as labor does, demonstrating the immense superiority of mind to muscle. I use the word ingenuity not only as defining the motive power of an Edison, a Morse, an Ericsson, a Bell; but that of all the great captains of industry like Vanderbilt, Scott, Garrett, Armour, Carnegie, the directors of iron mills, cotton factories, S. Mis. 144 2 18 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. steamships, and railroads, who by their sagacity vastly increase the product of the muscle and the machinery which they employ. This factor in production it is which enables us to buy clothing and furni- ture for one-half which the same things cost fifty years ago ; to go to Europe for $30 in five days, when before it cost six months, or a for- tune; to ride from Georgetown to the Navy- Yard for 5 cents, when fifty years ago it cost a dollar or two ; to dress twice or thrice as well and comfortably as the average employer of fifty years ago ; to have carpets on our floors and curtains at our windows, which in our fathers' time were only attainable by the wealthy. Who produces the surplus f—ln 1840 each 10,000,000 of our popula- tion produced $625,000,000, or $62.50 per head; in 1894 each 10,000,000 produced $1,500,000,000, or $150 a head; two and a half times as much. What is the cause of this difference 1 ? Obviously it is not labor; for, instead of working harder, the laborers of the present generation do not work nearly so hard or so long as those of 1840. If it is not labor that makes the difference, what is it ? What element or factor was it in our industrial system which produced the $875,000,000 surplus last year? As obviously it was ' sagacity, or ingenuity, or ability — whatever you please to call that combination of nerve and brain, of forecast and audac- ity, which more than doubled the product. The aggregate of machinery in the United States is equal to 'the combined effort of 800,000,000 men, and the result of the superintendence of labor which works out profit by preventing waste and devising short cuts is probably equal to as many more. The net outcome of this calculation is that if the capitalists of the United States could be abolished, the laboring men would virtually be reduced to penury. In having had their wages doubled during the last thirty years, while the price of almost every commodity has gone down, the laborers of America are better off to-day in dollars and cents and in the purchasing power of dollars and cents than they would have been in 1860 if the entire wealth of the nation had been confiscated _ and divided up among them; and if the dream of socialists could be realized, and all the property of every kind could be divided up equally among the people of the United States to-day, the workingmen of the country would not have as much as their children will have in thirty years from now by the operation of the beneficent system of competition which has enriched and blessed this generation. MACHINERY. (VI) The greatest material blessing of this age is machinery, because it worlcsfar cheaper and faster than any worlcingman, producing a vastly greater product, and lives on less. The development of machinery and the multiplication of mechanical contrivances have gone forward pari passu, with the increase of wages and the improvement in the condition of the workingman. Is any fur- ther statement necessary to show that invention is the best friend of the poor f Twenty-five years ago Gladstone estimated that the machin- ery of the British Islands created an annual product of manufactured goods equal to what could have been made by 300,000,000 toiling with their hands. The machinery of the United States annually produces an output something like three times as great. The paradox. — Trains start upon our railroads every morning so heavy and so numerous that they could not be drawn if our entire pop- ulation, men, women, and children, were harnessed for the purpose. MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 19 Yet the wages of men and even the price of horses have doubled since the locomotive was set upon the track as their competitor. At first in New York State especially, rails were torn up, bridges burned, and trains destroyed, the riotous farmers insisting that the new motor would destroy the value of horses and degrade human labor. The exact oppo- site, as everybody knows, was the result. A sewing machine which can do the work of twenty women is in every home ; yet the wages of women especially for all hand work requiring skill, have been largely increased since its advent. A mowing machine or a gang plow will do the work 6f many men, yet farm wages have increased in their very presence. A California reaper will do the work of a hundred men easily; it cir- cuits the field and automatically cuts, thrashes, and winnows the wheat, and puts it in sacks ready for the train. Yet farm wages are nowhere else so high as in California. When Patrick Bell set his reaper into an English wheat field, the excited sickle reapers broke over the hedges and captured and burned up the machine. But those who lived ten years longer saw that it was a blessing to all. Is the automatic loom a disavantage? No; the number of those employed on looms is pro- portionately far less, but their wages are much higher and all the other workers in the world are tremendously benefited by the increased cheap-, ness of fabrics. Does the gang saw rob the lumberman who used to* split out boards with wedges? No; it has raised his wages and it has enabled men to live in houses who before dwelt in shanties of bark or in hovels of mud. The poor man's friend. — Machinery is not, as many seem to think, "labor saving." Machinery is want saving, time saving, luxury pro- viding, misery preventing, pauper relieving; but instead of diminish- ing the amount of work to be done, it broadens the horizon of toil and multiplies its avenues. It supplements the poor man's skill, lengthens the poor man's arm, and decorates the poor man's home. If a single machine could be set up on Manhattan Island so tre- mendous in its effectiveness that, unaided, it could manufacture all the clothes worn by all the men, women, and children in the United States, so strong that it would never wear out, and so simple that a girl could run and manage it, it would be an untold blessing. A good many spinners, weavers, dyers, and tailors would be thrown out of employ- ment, and would be temporarily inconvenienced and even injured, until they could adapt themselves to other work ; but a suit of clothes could be bought for $2 instead of $12, and the benefit to the public would be immeasurable and incalculable. Mr. Powderly thinks that it is a degradation that the mechanic no longer fabricates all the parts of a shoe and has become, instead, " merely the feeder of a machine." He is mistaken. The change is an elevation and exaltation. The transition requires thought, study, and constant vigilance. The machine driver is vastly more intelligent than the old hand worker. He rises more and more above drudgery, as he makes insensate iron his slave. He is as far superior to the mere hand fashioner as the modern architect is above the savage who builds his rude tepee of bark. Machinery is not going to reduce workingmen to beggary; it is going to lift them up and better their condition, as it always has done. It is stronger than an elephant and quicker than an antelope. Instead of oppressing the poor man, it helps him in every way. Instead of rob- bing and impoverishing the land, it enriches it, making the dream of yesterday the realization of to day, the unattainable luxury of to-day the abundant possession of to-morrow. 20 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. CORPORATIONS AND MONOPOLIES. (VII.) Wealthy manufacturers and large corporations serve the public cheaper than small manufacturers and small corporations, and, therefore, large aggregations of capital and the consolidation of fiorporations are to be encouraged. Colossal fortunes in the hands of the few are not to be deplored. Without much private avarice there would be no civilization. Without great wealth there would be no railroads, no steamships, no telegraph's, no cities, no literature, no art. Old proverbs corrected.— -It used to be thought by all that as wealth accumulated men decayed; that the love of money was the root of all evil; that avarice was a vice; that the world would be better off if the division of property could be more nearly equal; that great riches were a curse to society; that the millionaire capitalist was a sort of bandit king, who plundered the people by methods which were sometimes legal but always highly immoral, and under whose tyrannical exactions industry was paralyzed and laboring men were impoverished. But it is now known that the desire to own property is the chief difference •between the savage and the enlightened man ; that aggregations of money in the hands of individuals are an inestimable blessing to society, for without them there could be no public improvements or private enterprises, no railroads or steamsKps, or telegraphs; no cities, no leisure class, no schools, colleges, literature, art; in short, no civiliza- tion. The one man to whom the community owes most is the capitalist, not the generous man who gives, but the penurious man who saves and invests, so that his property reproduces and multiplies itself instead of being consumed. It is now known that civilization is the result of labor put in motion by wealth; that wealth springs from self-denial; that self-denial springs from avarice, and that avarice is the divine child of an aspiring discontent. Monopolies. — Unquestionably some real monopolies ought to be pro- hibited, by law, but neither a steam railroad nor a telegraph line can possibly be a monopoly any more than a steamship company which is free to carve its commercial history in a thousand invisible paths upon the surface of the deep. "So railroad or telegraph has a monopoly of more than a few rods wide, and as soon as it is known that either pays a net profit of 10 per cent on the investment, competition will fling down another track or set up another wire at its side. A street railroad and a city gas company, indeed, are generally monopolies. They occupy streets to the exclusion of others, and every city ought either to establish its own gas company and its own street railroads at the expense of the citizens and for their benefit, or it ought itself to fix the rates of service and levy a tax upon the' companies besides. But what are called "monopolies" are generally not monop- olies at all, but economical concentrations of labor. Benefit of combination. — The concentration of the railways in America has been accompanied by a tremendous decline in the cost of transpor- tation. The concentration of the telegraphs has been similarly benefi- cial. Thirty years ago it cost $13 to telegraph from the Atlantic to the Pacific Coast; now the largest tariff exacted for any message in this country is $1. The greater the concentration of capital used in pro- duction, the smaller is the toll which it exacts from the community for its use. An apple woman on the street who is possessed of only 25 cents and invests it all in fruit would have to make 100 per cent on her property each day to keep herself above serious want. A boy who has MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 21 a dollar could get along very well on 50 per cent a day profit— selling his fruit for less than she and making twice as much. An Italian with a handcart and. $5 worth of fruit would make $1.50 a day if he charged only 25 per cent advance. The man with a fruit store on the avenue equipped with $100 worth of fruit could sell it at 5 per cent advance and make ( a very reasonable profit if he sold out every day. The job- ber, with a train load from California, or Florida, or New Jersey, would regard his venture as a success if he were certain of 1 per cent profit on each consignment, or, .say, 20 per cent a year on his capital. But the man who gathers the fruit from the growers and sends it to all quarters of the world would be amply content with a profit of 10 per cent a year, and after he had made the sale he would lend his savings at a profit of 5 per cent a year. Thus it is that the man who has the largest posses- sion serves society at the cheapest rate. It is the difference between the wholesale and the retail methods of business, and it illustrates with great precision the benefit which accrues to society from being served by large and wealthy corporations. Some examples. — It is now known that consolidation is a public benefit. New York City is full of houses for rent, but there is one class of houses there which are always preferred by tenants, because, other things equal, they are cheaper. These are the thousand houses owned by Mr. Astor. The greatest oil company in the world furnishes oil cheaper than it was ever furnished before — probably cheaper than it could be furnished by any other means of distribution; the greatest- telegraph company in the world sends dispatches cheaper than any of the score of companies from which it sprung, and cheaper than any of the telegraphs in the world which are operated or owned by govern- ment; "merchant princes" greatly reduce both the profits and losses of merchandising and the cost of goods to the consumer, and therefore, while they crush out small .dealers, their seryice is a tremendous public benefit. One trunk line, the net result of a combination of thirteen railroads, carries passengers at lower fares than any other road in the world — lower even than is required by law — and transports freight so cheaply that it has driven from successful competition a canal that was built by the State and is free to all ! The Government has reduced the price of postage only one-half in a third of a century, and delivers letters at a loss of millions of dollars a year; but freight from Chicago to New York costs less than one-fifth what it did then, and desperate competition keeps the rate at the lowest possible point. When the Erie Canal was the sole dependence for transportation, the cost of carrying wheat from Buffalo to New York City was 30 cents a bushel; today it is 2£ cents a bushel. And before socialists can rationally demand an abolition of the competitive system, and a reconstruction of the industrial methods of society, they must exhibit somewhere in the world one railroad which is owned by a State and is managed as wisely and as thriftily as are the great trunk roads of the United States. POVERTY AS A MOTIVE POWER. (VIII.) The menace of want is the mildest stimulus adequate to keep men at work with the industry essential to a tolerable degree of comfort; therefore, poverty will never he abolished, but it will continually be diminished. If man were "free" to work or not work.— We very often hear : " The present competitive system of industry might work well enough it man were free to make contracts, but he is so hedged about by want 22 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. that it is mockery to call him free. He must work or > starve, and he must work at such wages as he can get." This is rather an arraign- ment of nature and her savage environments than of man and his system of industry. It is a stern fact — perhaps a sad fact — that if a man either will not or can not earn his own living he will go naked and starve to death unless his needs are supplied by somebody else. But is it not exactly this condition of things which makes man work at all? If all men had all they wanted, how long would it be before one would render to another the obsequious service for which wages are paid? If there was no want in the world and no probability of want, 5 how soon would another railroad be built on which we could ride 10 miles for 5 cents? If all needs were supplied, how long should we wait in the morning for a 5-cent cup of coffee from a distant island of the sea ' or a 2-cent newspaper containing as much matter as the whole Bible? "Nay, if no man had any unsatisfied needs, should we ever have another cup of coffee after the present home supply was exhausted ? Should we ever buy another great newspaper for 2 cents? A few years ago a distinguished promoter made a contract to build a railroad in Peru. He said to himself, before leaving New York, "The cuts are heavy and we must span deep gorges, but labor there brings only 10 cents a day and I can make money on the contract.?' On reaching Peru he inquired and found that, as he had been informed, nobody paid more than 10 or 15 cents a day for the native working- man; but on inquiring further he ascertained that the native working- man would not work much at that wage or any other. Why should he work much ? It was not necessary. He could waken in the morning, pick and eat for breakfast, dinner, and supper, mangoes or bananas growing almost without cultivation, and lie down to sleep under the same tree at night. The beguiled and deceived and astonished con- tractor had to send to New York and get a supply of workmen from Castle Garden — men who lived in a cold and bleak land and therefore were "not free to contract." The penniless. — Poverty is always akin to misery, and there will always be a considerable fraction of the people who either can not or will not support themselves. There are probably no more tramps to the population than there have ever been, indeed the statistics gath- ered by labor bureaus show that a. larger proportion of people have been employed .during the last five years than ever before. But the penury that is witli us is a very obvious thing. It appeals to us; it afflicts us; and we have no means, except through industrial tables, of comparing it with the similar misery of other days. What is to be done with it? To this there is but one practical answer: All men and women who are unable by their labor to support themselves and their families must be classified with other defectives— with the lame, the deformed, and the blind— and they must be supported and cared for by their more fortunate fellows. This assistance may be called charity, or may be labeled with the kindlier name of justice. The result is the same, and it is inevitable. But the duty of society is not less obvious; every child should be taught how to work profitably, how to do something of which the workl stands in need. This .would amelior- ate the distresses of coming davs in the time of our children and grandchildren. MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 23 , the money-Getting propensity. (IX) Avarice and parsimony are virtues, because their exercise results in increasing the nonconsumable wealth of the world. Before proceeding to a consideration of this section, perhaps it should be said that I merely mean by avarice a desire to get property, and by parsimony a desire to keep property. Under this head, then, I shall speak briefly not only of the benefi- cence of parsimony, but of the beneficence of avarice— of the utilities of money getting as well as of money saving, and of the functions of wealth in the economies of society. In this discussion we use the words capital and labor in their popular sense, though that use is likely to be misleading. Gapital.^Coricectlj speaking, there is no such person as capital. Capital is a scarecrow which Karl Marx set up and Henry George has decorated with new terrors. It is represented as a merciless pillager, bent on robbing and oppressing the poor, driving the industrious with an overseer's whip, and starving the unskillful ; a tyrant, cruel, remorse- less, and bloodthirsty, happy only when he is extending the hours of painful toil and snatching a crust from the mouth of penury. He is represented as enacting all. law as an instrument of his cruelty, and owning all the judges, juries, courts, jails, lawyers, editors, police, and inilitia as a part of his domain. This scarecrow called capital is a fiction of the inflamed imagination of this time. There is no such person. ' Capital is nothing more nor less than savings, and whenever a mechanic buys himself a dinner, or a brakeman buys himself a pair of shoes, he is investing capital in the employment of labor. Moreover, capital is not a millionaire. Savings is a child of the multitude, and it stands for money acquired by persist- ent and painful work and kept by self-denial. All great corporations are owned by the thrifty middle class. The Merrimac cotton factory is owned by 2,500 shareholders, of whom more than 1,000 own only one share apiece, and hundreds are employees who have, by a most rigid economy, saved the money and put it where they believed it would pro- cure for them a. small income. The New York Central and Pennsylva- nia railroads have more than 20,000 shareholders each, of whom a third are women or trustees for orphans. Those two roads have more owners than the total number of their employees, so any contest as to wages is not a contest of the many against the few, as Henry George puts it, but of the many against the more. Money represents accumulated property, and accumulated property results from savings. For all practical purposes, then, it may be said, that savings is another name for wealth, or property resting, and for capital, or property at work. It may be added that wealth is the power to command the equivalent services of our fellow-men. Avarice and parsimony.— -In this discussion, as in almost any review of fundamental principles, it is necessary to redefine or modify the vague definitions of the dictionary. The dictionary plumply declares that both avarice and parsimony are vices; but that valuable treasury generally adopts the conventional rather than the philosophical mean- ing of words, and proclaims definitions which are superficial and appar- ent rather than those which are final. The lexicographer defines words rather than the things which the words stand for. Why virtues ?— It may be said, then, that both parsimony and avarice are generally virtues, because they result in augmenting the noncon- 24 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. sumable wealth of the world. If a man who has no family puts forth so much and such well-aimed productive energy that he receives an income of $5,000 a year for it, and if he saves all of it except $100 a 1 year, and makes that $100 a year shelter, clothe, and feed him, he may be called a miser, but he is injuring nobody, unless it be possibly himself. He is, in fact, a public benefactor and philanthropist when compared with the man who receives $5,000 a year and spends it all for fashion- able clothes, sumptuous dinners, theater parties, journeyings for pleasure, and a suite of luxurious rooms, because the one consumes all that he earns, while the other produces $4,900 a year and makes a present of it to the world. If all the workers who have landed or been born on this continent since Columbus had earned each $5,000 a year by mining and selling the product to Europe, and had consumed it all each year, this land would still be a tangled, unkempt wilderness ; we should have no cities, no schools, no architecture, no farms, no homes, no plows to turn up the arable acres to the sun. Civilization is the daughter of saving. If all the thirty-five million men and women in this land to-day should earn $1,000 apiece annually and save $500 of it, the wealth of the United States would double in the next five years, and at the advent of the new century we should mark our enormous holdings at $150,000,000,000. Such a result would mean, merely, that the people of this decade had practiced self-denial for the benefit of their children — that is, had deprived themselves of immediate enjoyment for the sake of the pleasure which attends the consciousness of being able to com- mand the services of others. The story of two boys. — Something less than eighty years ago, two boys, Cornelius Vanderbilt and Jacob Von Strom, hired out for 50 cents a day apiece, to row a passenger boat, called a pirogue, between Staten Island and New York City. They were strong, honest, willing boys, but they had different ideas of life. One half of the wage went for board and clothes, and the other 25 cents — well, Jacob spent 5 cents a day for tobacco, 5 cents a day for cider, 10 cents a day for more stylish clothes, and the residue for other agreeable luxuries. Cornelius bought neither cider nor tobacco and wore clothes that were just as comfortable as those of his companion, but less stylish, and he saved one-half of his entire wages— $90 a year. So Jacob, according to his nature, had a better time, but Cornelius had more money and each was presumably satisfied. At the end of the first year Cornelius bought his master's pirogues and hired Jacob, clearing at the end of thesecoudtwelve-months $250, and liv- ing just as frugally as before. Now he buys 4 pirogues with his savings,- and launches them on the bay, rowing one of them himself and hiring men to row the others, and at the end of the third year he finds himself m possession of a net income of $3,000. He rises from wages of 50 cents a day to a profit of $10 a day. Jacob meets his assembled cronies at the grocery store in the evening and declaims upon the arrogance of capital, but he goes on drinking his 5 cents' worth of daily cider, chewing his 5 cents' worth of daily tobacco, buying new clothes while his employer wears old ones, and spending the rest of his pittance at the occasional dance at Bergen Point or on the 'Kill Von Kull. Jacob died at the oar after formulating a scheme for an equitable division of property between the rich and the poor, while Cornelius had a career resulting directly from avarice and parsimony and enfold- ing and illustrating within itself all the functions and relations of which it is the purpose of this memorial to speak. MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR, QUESTION. 25 Origin of a family.— The Vanderbilt family had dwelt on Staten Island a century and a half before it blossomed. The standard of its existence was simple. In its very mode of life it was preparing for a colossal output. They were practicing an untiring industry and an economy that knew no bounds. They were wrestling with all the indescribable difficulties of a new settlement. They had attached them- selves to a persecuted church. They were delving in an inhospitable soil, and facing hostile elements, and inuring themselves to hardship and exposure, and thus getting the muscles of steel, the unflinching pluck, and the unconquerable will that move and mold the world. Unconsciously, nerve by nerve, and fiber by liber, and brain cell by brain cell, they were building up the man who was to illustrate their name. Generation after generation the Vanderbilts had fed their stock and tilled their tough acres and asked no more. They had stood suc- cessively, father and son, on the same green hillside and looked down the bay through that open gateway, the Narrows, to the sea beyond, without desiring to occupy it. They had glanced languidly up the bay to the shining city in the distance without burning to get a mortgage on it. They had gazed joyously around upon the opulent earth without resolving to own it. Indeed, during all these years, the members of this family do not seem to have cherished any ambition of any kind, except to pay their taxes promptly, go to church regularly, and get to heaven at last. With' this they were satisfied. The fruit of the family tree was not yet ripe, but it was ripening. The man had not yet come who, filled with divine greed, would go forth on a magnificent crusade of conquest; who, inspired by personal avarice, would enter into the commercial emulations of his time with beneficent results; who, determined to be master, would become pre- eminently the servant of his countrymen ; who, aiming only to push forward his own interests, would mysteriously advance the interests of all, promoting traffic and transit, increasing the general wealth and thrift, and augmenting the universal comfort beyond the dreams of philanthropy. Such a man, at the end of the fourth generation, made his appearance in the person of Cornelius Vanderbilt. Commodore Vanderbilt was not a professional philanthropist. Though a man of kindly feelings and benevolent practices, he was a rigid utilitarian, and served others mainly through what seemed mere service of himself. Avarice moved him, but the result was the general good. He was probably the best example that this century has afforded of the great benefits which conspicuous capitalists always confer upon the community in the studied acquisition and the halt- involuntary distribution of their wealth. Charity.— -It was once thought that a man's personal virtues were to be gauged by the amount of his promiscuous charities, and that it was clearly the duty of every man who was rich to give to every man who was penniless, but we have learned in recent days that charity can wisely be dispensed only through intelligent organization, and that street alms giving is a mischievous evil, multiplying supplicants instead of diminishing their number. Even organic charity is merely a nega- tive good, stirring the sympathetic impulses of the race ^ support those who through profligacy or misfortune continue to impoverish i the world. He who builds a factory confers ten times more good ^than _he who builds an almshouse, and he who launches a steamship or equips a railroad does far more for the comfort and happiness of mankind than he who endows an asylum. The dominant benefactors of the 26 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. world are those unerring pilots of finance — those untitled princes of industry — who ceaselessly strive to aggrandize themselves and so most richly benefit others, who renew with vitality the commercial arteries of the world's life, and who hoard up great aggregations of capital and keep it busy in the employment, of multitudes of workers. These con- siderations are to be taken heed of when men are being classified in the broad valhalla of the dead. The worth of his money. — Moreover, it is a serious mistake to suppose that a man as rich as the Yanderbilts can ever get what is called " the worth of his money." Mr. William H. Vanderbilt was of an equable and bouyant temper, but he sometimes spoke bitterly of this limita- tion. Beferring to a neighbor, he would say: "He isn't worth a hun- dredth part as much as I am, but he has more of the real pleasures of life than I have. His house is as comfortable as mine, even if it didn't cost so much ; his team is about as good as mine ; his opera box is next to mine; his health is better than mine, and he will probably outlive me. And he can trust his friends." It is one of the curious compensations of nature that a man can not employ for his own comfort and benefit more than a small sum of money, and that all that he acquires and invests above that sum must go to the benefit and comfort of others. Mr. Vanderbilt was probably worth 500 tons of solid gold when he died — more than would have accumu- lated if his male ancestors in a direct line had had salaries of $30,000 a year each since the coming of Adam and had saved it all — so much money that he could not have counted it in ten years at the rate of a dollar a second if he had counted night and day, Sundays and all. He never handled his money. He never saw it. He was never in its pres- ence. In fact, he never had it. It was in the hands of strangers and was used by them for their own benefit, they paying him $5,000,000 or $6,000,000 a year for the privilege. But even of this five or six millions he never saw a tithe. Ninety-nine cents out of every dollar he " owned " were in the hands and coffers of others, employed mainly for their exclusive advantage. In ministering to his own real and imaginary wants he could not use more than a small fraction of his income. He constantly overworked, and violated many of the laws of health, in order to get and keep his fortune; and for wages he received as Stephen Girard grimly put it, only his "board and. clothes," unless we count among his imponder- able assets the reputation of being a dishonest and dangerous man. The laborer who wheels gravel on a railroad and who can eat three solid meals every day and sleep soundly every night gets higher wages than a dyspeptic king. To enjoy his wealth relatively Mr. Vanderbilt ought to have been able to eat and drink a thousand times as effectively and sleep a thou- sand times as refreshingly and appreciate the beauties of nature and the marvels of art a thousand times as much as a poor man. But, as a matter of fact, this " magnate" dressed no better than his clerk, and ate less than his coachman. He drank chiefly milk. He could sleep in only one room, like others. He had little taste for books and not time enough to read the newspapers. Envy and ignorance had raised up an army of enemies about him. The public press stormed at him like a harridan and covered the dead walls with infamous carica- tures representing him as a vampire, a dragon, a Gorgon, a Silenus, a Moloch, a malevolent Hurlothrumbo. He was a victim of insomnia and indigestion. The jockey, Anxiety, rode him with whip and spur. He was in constant peril of apoplexy. He could not take needful exercise t MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 27 by walking in the park for fear of being accosted by tramps or insulted by socialistic philosophers. Every week his life was threatened by anonymous letters. He kept a magnificent servants' boarding house on Fifth avenue, where he made his- home, and superbly equipped a stable, whose advantages inured chiefly to the benefit of his employees. He organized the finest picture gallery in America for the enjoyment of lovers of art, but was compelled to limit his hospitality by the fact that some of the guests rifled the conservatory of its choicest flowers, scratched the Meissoniers with the ends of their parasols, invaded the private apartments of the mansion, and carried away portable things as souvenirs of the visit. An enormous fortune is a heavy burden to bear; to be very rich invites attacks, cares, responsibilities, intrusions, and annoyances for which there is no adequate offset. A creator. — A man like Commodore Vanderbilt, indeed, has, as a par- tial compensation, the large satisfaction of feeling that he has given the human race a magnificent endowment in adding to the wealth of the world. He was not a juggler, who managed by a cunning trick to transfer to himself the wealth of others; he created property that did not before have an existence. When he stepped from the deck upon land the best railroads in the United States had been paralyzed and driven to bankruptcy by blunderers and plunderers. They were largely in the hands of mien who cared nothing for them except as they could be made serviceable in the reckless games of Wall street. • Whether they could meet the demands of traffic was regarded by these desper- ate gamblers as of no consequence. Thieves had pillaged the Erie road till its stock was sold for 3 cents on a dollar. Michigan Southern was at 5, and Central at 6. The Commodore introduced a new policy. Instead of taking money out of the roads, he put millions into them. Instead of breaking them down, he built them up. Instead of robbing them, he renovated them and raised them from the grave. He equipped them anew, trusting that the public would respond and give him his money back. He dragged together worthless fragments and made them one. He con- solidated parallel roads that were apart and belonged together. He cut down every possible expense, and subjected them to the economic supervision of one despotic will. He fearlessly staked all upon the venture, and upon the belief that the war for the Union would end in ' the defeat of secession. How he benefited the icorld.— In both he was right. The South was beaten. The public responded. The stock mounted to par and beyond. His roads had all they could do, and he made millions a year from the investment of his marvelous brain. And he made these millions as legitimately as an artisan fashions a hat from wool or a chair from wood. He received better pay than the artisan, not only because he risked his money where the mechanic risks nothing, but because he invested his consummate brain. For everv million dollars that he added to his personal fortune it is demonstrable that he added $2,000,000 to the wealth of the farmers of the West by securing to them 5 cents more for every bushel of wheat they sold, and $2,000,000 to the wealth of New England by saving its people 20 cents upon every barrel of flour they consumed. One of the commonest and most pernicious errors is the assumption that the human hand is the chief factor in the creation of wealth, and from this error springs much of the noisy remonstrance of our time. It is not the hand, but the brain, that is the real creator. It was 28 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. Michael Angelo that built St. Peters, not the forgotten workmen who, executing the will of the great master, borne to them through a dozen skilled architects and master artisans, hewed the stone -to lines that had been accurately drawn for them. The unit of service underlying all is the faithful workman; but a brigade of workmen can not do as much effective good as is done by one strong and intelligent capitalist, whose money employs and whose sagacity directs and renders fruitful the sterile hand. The chief productiveness of the world is due mainly to the skill that plans, the audacity that risks, and the prescience that sees through the heart of the future. So to those captains of industry who succeed in their financial ventures should go that premium called profit which society offers to superior foresight. The needed qualities. — It will be noticed that during every minute of Commodore Vanderbilt's career his entire capital was risked and he faced the chance of losing it. If his one little boat had swamped in Buttermilk Channel he would in an hour have lost nearly all he pos- sessed. So, when he invested his first $1,000 in a sloop, and his first $10,000 in half of a steamboat. He was always menaced, while Jacob Von Strom got his wage and Staten Island got its ferry without risk- ing anything whatever. The four qualities, then, which preeminently fit a man to direct indus- try and therein to benefit society, are — 1. Avarice : This gives him a glimpse of the power of money in social dynamics, especially as a lever of personal aggrandizement. He sees how it will enable him and his family to command, automatically, the services of the toilers in every land, to whom it carries equivalent serv- ices; but he seldom or never sees that all of his receipts above his disbursements go infallibly to promote the comfort and happiness of others to whom he is connected by no other bonds save the strong eco- nomic cable which runs in grooves of self-interest between producer and consumer throughout the whole commercial plexus. 2. Parsimony: This inclines him to save what he earns — to crucify to-day for the sake of to-morrow — to devote the minimum of his means to personal consumption and the maximum to reproduction; in other words, to sacrifice himself for society. 3. Prescience : That is, the sagacity to foresee future values. This enables him to adjust the purchases and the transmutations of one month to the needs of the next, to buy only what he can sell, and to help manufacture that most valuable of all artificial contrivances— a trustworthy market. 4. Courage : This prompts him to invest his money, at the risk of losing it, when the risk promises profit. And the possession of these four rare gifts it is which confers on man the right to stand at the industrial helm, and which enables him, while accumulating a fortune for himself, to save fortunes for the world; to economize the output and increase the product; to shorten the distance between producer and consumer, to estimate the demand before it takes form, and weigh the harvest before the wheat is sown; and, though he' possess the philosophy of a gradgrind and the sympathies of a skin- flint, to become as a part of the vast automatic engine of production and distribution, a benefactor of his kind. MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 29 THE EFFECT OF TRADES UNIONS. (X.) All efforts to diminish production, whether by destroyinq machinery ^reducing the reward of inventors, prohibiting the importation of cheap labor, limiting railroad building, preventing boys from learnina trades, or keeping criminals in enforced idleness, are hostile to the welfare of society. ■' J Laboring men can have more wages only by increasing the national product. That should be obvious. So any course of action which diminishes the product is to the disadvantage of laboring men. Here is a table, approximately correct, which should prove a stimulant to the reader : Total wealth of United States $65,000,000,000 Total population of United States 65 000 000 Average property .'.".'...'.'.'.'.'.'..'. ' l 000 Annual product of ability and labor 10 000 000' 000 Deduct from this : Fortaxespaid $700,000,000 For wear and tear 1,300,000,000 For profit to capital (4 per cent) 2, 600, 000, 000 4, 600, 000, 000 Balance to divide among producers 5 400 000 000 Total number of producers ' is' 000' 000 Therefore, average yearly wages ' '300 In order to get more by "sharing profits" more would have to be produced; for the laboring man now gets all there is minus taxes, wear and tear, and 4 per cent interest on capital. Can the amount of the product to be divided be increased by pre- venting people from working? Indolence, wherever found, is an injury to all laboring men. Every man ought to be a producer in some way, for if he does not labor he is necessarily a barnacle, and will have to be supported by somebody else. If A does not support himself, B, C, and B have got to support him, whether he is in jail or out. Every convict ought, of course, to work, gud to work as hard as he can, in order that he may support himself instead of being a burden on the thrifty, law abiding, and industrious. If he will not work, or is not permitted to work, he must be carried as a dead weight and at arm's length. Of course, shoes made in prison help to supply the general market, but no more so than if the men were out of prison and were engaged in the same trade. To prohibit prisoners from supporting themselves is just as senseless as it would be for the other shoemakers of this country to build a wall around Lynn and support its inhabitants in idleness. Children in factories. — Children do not go at severe work for the fun of it any more than adults do; they engage in toil under the spur 6f want and because their natural protectors either can not or will not support them. As a rule it would be better if young children need not work in factories ; better for them and for the civilization to which they must contribute. They should have time to rest, and grow, and study. But suppose this desirable leisure should not be attainable. Suppose that a little boy is an orphan, and a little girl's father a drunkard who starves and neglects her. What then ? It is far better that children should work and work hard than be sup- ported by charity, and all laws which arbitrarily forbid the employment of needy children are cruel and infamous. Nobody has any right to prohibit the employment of children except him who is willing to take them to his home and supply their wants. 30 MEMOEllL on the labor question. Manual training schools. — Instead of preventing - children from earn- ing a living, society ought to educate every child in the rudiments of useful toil. Our schools misuse their splendid opportunity. The child who is going out hungry and naked into life is taught, not how to feed and clothe himself by ministering to the wants of the world, but how to stand an examination in grammar and algebra and history, which have to him little more than a sentimental value. Nature has fixed hard conditions to existence. She says to every penniless child "You shall not live in comfort unless you learn how to do some difficult thing which the world wants done, and for which it is willing to pay." And then,' in answer to this inexorable law, we send our children to school to learn how to solve mathematical problems, and how to detect ungrammatical sentences -in Paradise Lost. What a mockery it is ! Every schoolhouse ought to be divided through the middle, and half of the time of the teachers be given to instruction of the industrial arts,, in making patterns, in drawing, in constructing and using machines, in ironwork, woodwork and leather work, so that on going forth from school the pupil shall know something of the competitive industries of his time, be capable of making something which the world wants made and doing some difficult thing which few can do. And to prevent an ambitious boy from learning a self-supporting trade when he has an opportunity to do so, ought to be made a felony. Oheaj) labor. — Under prevailing conditions cheap labor is a benefit to everybody, excepting, perhaps, the person who performs it. If a man could and would work for a cent a day, and support himself on that, he would be benefiting the State by increasing its wealth, and he would benefit the State exactly the amount of the difference between the price of his services and the current price paid for the services of others. If a European should land on a wharf in Hew York, lay down a $20 gold piece, and return home on the steamer that brought him, he would be increasing the wealth of this country just the amount of f 20, providing the gold piece was found and expended. If a European should land on our soil and perform $40 worth of work for $20, and then return to Europe, he would have increased the wealth of the country just as much as the man who laid down the gold piece, viz, $20. If he should do work worth $40 and accept only $10 for it, he would be making a present of $30 to this country. This is exactly what every foreigner does who comes here and works for less than current wages, and the beneficial result is just the same, whether he has migrated voluntarily or has been "imported" — whatever that may mean. The Chinese are at least as moral as our hoodlums. Are they not more moral, more respectable, quieter, and cleaner? They seldom get into poorhouse or jail; and a man who can work at the expense of a spoonful of rice a day is no more the enemy of labor than the machine that can live on a spoonful of oil. A man who opposes the immigration of cheap laborers must, if he be logical and honest, oppose the construction of any more machines and the further operation of those which we have. Foreigners have sup- planted Americans at half of the lathes, looms, forges, and plows of the land, and the whole country is richer and happier because of it. They have doubled the population of New York; they have created Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Louis, and called from barrenness the great central West. If Ah Sing could manage to exist on our soil, spending next to nothing, sleeping as compactly as a stick of cord wood, wearing only a leathern apron, drinking only brook water and eating only the MEMORIAL OKT THE LABOR QUESTION. 31 rats which he is supposed to kill by night and cook in the sun as he works; even then, how could he live cheaper than the pegging machine? The more cheap labor we get, from any source, the better it is for the country. And what sort of lunacy is it which excludes from our country for- eigners who have hired themselves out before starting from home— who have had the prudence and sagacity to seek an employer and make a contract with him, so that they know definitely what wages they are to receive and are very certain not to get into our poorhouses and pretty certain not to get into our jails? Think of the indescrib- able folly which repels such skillful and provident men as enemies of our society, as despoilers of our wealth ! When shall we learn that the amount of work to be done has no metes and bounds, but is limit- less, and that increasing employment no more diminishes wages or monoplizes opportunity than the quickening warmth of the vernal sun diminishes the fruitage of summer. OTHER PROPOSED METHODS. (XI) Our present competitive system of labor may be assumed to be the best attainable, because all other proposed industrial methods have been tried by the human race and have failed. Evolution results in the greatest economy of effort in industry, as it does in the modifications and readjustments of biology. After infinite experimentation, reaching through centuries of pain, man has at last elaborated a great automatic machine of reciprocal helpfulness, Which makes the pearl fisher of Oeylon, the tea grower of Mahchooria, the vinedresser of Cyprus, the cane cutter of Cuba, the weary toiler on the spice islands, bend in willing service of strange peoples on the opposite side of the planet. Xo other machine has ever been devised which would do this so well or which would do this at all. Let us look at some of the plans proposed : Profit sharing. — Some people imagine that the condition of working- men would be improved by the .general adoption of a system of profit sharing. This seems plausible and attractive until one begins to think about it. The conclusion is founded on a delusion — on the assumption that most business ventures are profitable. As a matter of fact, most business ventures are unprofitable, and a large majority of business men go into bankruptcy. Profit sharing would have no significance and nojustice unless accompanied by loss sharing. If the workingman is permitted to share possible profits he must give bonds to share possi- ble losses. To mention this is to show its absurdity. A mere contract to share profits and losses would be of no reciprocal value, for it could be enforced against the average capitalist in case of gain, and could not be enforced against the average employee in case of loss. A few philanthropic gentlemen, whose sagacity has firmly established a paying business, may share their profits with their workingmen if they feel so inclined. Such an act is founded on a Quixotic generosity, not on justice. It is splendid, as other people's benevolence always is, but it is not business; and it can never become an example to be followed by the projectors of thousands of enterprises whose success depends on personal shrewdness, indefatigable industry, and close frugality. The 22,000 stockholders of the New York Central Eailroad might elect to divide their profits with their workmen on the line, and accept a 3 per cent dividend instead of a 6; but how would division be managed by the stockholders of hundreds of bankrupt railroads who have never seen a dividend, but have constantly been called on for assessments? 32 MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. Eailroads are considered as universally opulent and prosperous insti- tutions by all who know nothing about them. Those who have studied them know very well that they are generally unprofitable, and that they have been, ever since 1840, about the most unremunerative prop- erty held in the world. Poor's Manual is everywhere regarded as an authority on railroads. The Manual for 1886 alleged that of the 2,200 railroads in the United States, only 415 had paid any dividend of any sort since 1876 — that is, more than four-fifths of them had made no return to investors. Since that time they have fared even worse, for Poor's Manual for 1893 states that of the 2,324 railroads in the United States only 353 have paid a dividend since 1886 — about one in seven. The dividends paid last year were uot more than 1£ per cent on the value of the roads— less than half what the Government pays for the money it borrows. The fact is that the railroads of the country last year did not make as much money as the grocery stores of the country, taking the figures of Bradstreet as a basis for the estimate. This is a very bad showing for monopolists and extortionists. If the laboring men of the land had been boimd in a profit-and-loss sharing contract with the railroad companies during the last ten years they would have netted a loss of more than $600,000,000. Cooperation. — The policy of cooperation has elements of hope in it. Workingmen can combine together and win a profit wholly for them- selves whenever they can contribute the necessary capital from their own savings, and then manage the business with sufficient sagacity, energy, and honesty. There are tens of thousands of workingmen pos- sessing shrewdness, thrift, ability, and undoubted integrity, and it seems a pity that they have not, somewhere in the world, built many railroads and great manufacturing plants, and conducted large enter- prises to success. The attempt has often been made, and has almost always failed. To raise the necessary capital has not proved the chief difficulty; the chief difficulty has been to so handle the capital as to make it yield a profit. The reasons for this seem to be twofold : To find men capable of successfully managing who have not themselves already become employers, and to find intelligent and sober workingmen willing to render obedient service under a superintendent from their own ranks. These difficulties have not always been insuperable. Coopera- tive projects have occasionally succeeded, and wherever tried, they must have the goodwill of all who wish for the progressive welfare of society. Socialism.— A deadly enemy of labor is socialism. It is a wolf, in sheep's clothing; a destructive principle with a high-sounding name. The underlying theory of socialism is that all private property should be abolished and that all property should be owned by society; that is, by the public. Property is of two kinds— labor and capital. When Proudhon uttered the war cry, " La propria, c'est le vol " (property is robbery), he did not include labor or the ability to labor in his definition of the word property. But the laboring man is as truly a man of property as is the capitalist. The scheme of socialism is that the public shall own all the labor and all the capital, and that it shall take care of all the laborers and all the capitalists and manage all their business affairs for them. The present order of society is called individualism, by which every man owns his own labor and his own capital (which together constitute his property), and every man takes the responsibility of his own business and of his own and family's support. ' In the present order of society there can be such a thing as individual independence and constitutional liberty. In the proposed order of MEMORIAL ON THE LABOR QUESTION. 33. society, although every man is to have enough to eat and drink and wear, and a bed to lie on, and a roof over his head (if the aggregate earnings furnish enough), yet every man must be a town pauper. Peo- ple now in the poorhouse have enough to eat and drink and wear, and good beds and tight roofs, but they are town paupers still. In the pro- posed order of things there can be no personal independence or consti- tutional liberty ; the rank and file will all be slaves ; everyone must do as the superintendents and managers, who would become a kind of aristocracy, should order them to do; and this aristocracy will serve out to them their food*, their politics, and their religion with the same spoon. All the men will be men of the town, all the women will be women of the town, all the children will be children of the town. All will be paupers and slaves except the aristocrats. This is the enter- tainment to which socialism is sending out cards of invitation to the workingmen. It has its missionaries in every direction ; it creeps into many labor organizations. Every association which deprives the laborer of absolute free control of his personal labor is socialistic in its spirit and tendency, and every laboring man should therefore wage a war of extermination against it. The Constitution of the United States is the mighty friend of labor, and it is the uncompromising enemy of socialism. It was ordained " to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." It forbids private property to be taken for public use without just com- pensation. It forbids conspiracy and duress. It is the grand bulwark of the laborer's liberty and property. And socialism, whatever form it takes, is wholly incompatible with its provisions. Moreover, socialism, or a community of property, has been abun- dantly tried. It is now beiug tried by every savage and barbarous race of men. The Kalmucks, of central Tartary, are trying it; the Bedonians are trying it; the Patagonians and Esquimaux are trying it; our own red men of the West are trying it, and their social and industrial condition is the outcome of it. The natives of Polynesia have always tried it, and they persist in it. It may be adapted to the needs of savage life; it certainly seems calculated to prolong the savage state. And wherever " every man owns an undivided portion of his mother earth," as Mr. George tenderly expressed it, slavery generally exists, and a large majority of the people are always hungry. FINALLY. The torch of experience shines out of the past and illumines the pathway of the future. What has been foreshadows what is to be. Eeasoning from the analogies of yesterday, we are able dimly to see the outline of to-morrow and of the days that are to come. Therefore we infer that — As the slcilled workman's wages have doubled during the last thirty years, so under better conditions, they will more than double again during the next thirty, and early in the next century skilled labor will command from §6 to $8 per day. But increasing ambition will probably keep pace with increasing comfort; discontent will probably grow as pain diminishes, and wishes multiply as wants become fewer, so that there will be as many trades unions, as mauy agrarian orators, and as many and as ferocious strikes for higher wages and efforts to prevent other men from working when every skilled laborer gets $8 a day adhere ^now^ Washington, D. C, March 2, 1895. S. Mis. 144 3 13d Congress, ) HOUSE OF EEPEESENTATIVES. ( Ex. Doo. 3d Session. 5 (No. 257. Condition of the national finances. MESSAGE ., . FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, RELATING TO The condition of the national finances. JaNTJART 28, 1895.— Referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and ordered to be printed. To the Senate and House of Representatives: In my last annual message I commended to the serious consideration of Congress the condition of our national finances, and in connection with the subject indorsed a plan of currency legislation which at that time seemed to furnish protection against impending danger. This. plan has not been approved by the Congress. In the meantime the- situation has so changed, and the emergency now appears so threat- ening, that I deem it my duty to ask at the hands of the legislative branch of the Government such prompt aud effective action as will restore confidence in our financial soundness and avert business disas- ter and universal distress among our people. Whatever may be .the merits of the plan outlined in my annual message as a remedy for ills then existing, and as a safeguard against the depletion of the gold reserve then in the Treasury I am now con- vinced that its reception by the Congress and our present advanced stage of financial perplexity necessitate additional or f^t tepriabOT- With natural resources unlimited in variety and productive strength and with a people whose activity and enterprise seek only a fair oppor- tunity to achieve national success and greatness" our p ™SJJ»^* not be checked by a false financial policy and a heedless dimegaid of sound monetary laws, uor should the timidity and fear which they engender stand in the way of our prosperity. It ishardly disputed that this predicament confronts us ^J'^nol fore, no one in any degree responsible for th e making an d ex, ecu^n of laws should fail to see a patriotic duty m honestly and sincerely our 2 CONMTION OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. attempting to relieve the situation. Manifestly this effort will not suc- ceed unless it is made untrammeled by the prejudice of partisanship and with a steadfast determination to resist the temptation to accomplish party advantage. W>e may well iemember that if we are threatened with financial difficulties all our people in every station of life are con- cerned; and surely those who suffer will not receive the promotion of party interests as an excuse for permitting our present troubles to advance to a disastrous conclusion . It is also of the utmost importance that we approach the study of the problems presented as free as pos : sible from the tyranny of preconceived opinions, to the end that it) a common danger we may be able to seBk with unclouded vision a safe and reasonable protection. The real trouble which confronts us consists in a lack of confidence, widespread and constantly increasing, in the continuing ability or dis- position of the Government to pay its obligations in gold. This lack of confidence grows to some extent out of the palpable and apparent' ■ embarrassment attending the efforts of the Government under exist- ing laws to procure gold, and to a greater extent out of the impossi- bility of either keeping it in the Treasury or canceling obligations by its expenditure after it is obtained. The only way left open to the Government for procuring gold is by the issue and sale of its bonds. The only bonds that can be so issued were authorized nearly twenty -five years ago, and are not Well calcu- lated to meet our present needs. Among other disadvantages, they are made payable in coin, instead of specifically in gold, which, in existing conditions, detracts largely and in an increasing ratio from their desir- ability as investments. It is by no means certain that bonds of this description can much longer be disposed of at a price creditable to the financial character of our Government. The most dangerous and irritating feature of the situation, however, remains to be mentioned. ■ It is found in the means by which the Treasury is despoiled of the gold thus obtained without canceling a single Government obligation and solely for the benefit of those who find profit in shipping it abroad or whose fears induce them to hoard it at home. We have outstanding about five hundred millions of cur- rency notes of the Government for which gold may be demanded, and, curiously enough, the law requires that when presented and, ,in fact, redeemed and paid in gold, they shall be reissued. Thus the same notes may do duty many times in drawing gold from the Treasury; nor can the process be arrested as long as private parties, for profit or otherwise, see an advantage in repeating the operation. More than $300,000,000 in these notes have already been redeemed in gold, and notwithstanding such redemption they are all still outstanding. Since the 17th day of January, 1894, our bonded interest-bearing debt has been increased $100,000,000 for the purpose of obtaining gold to replenish our coin reserve. Two issues were made amountingto fifty millions each— CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 3 ■ one in January and the other in November. As a result of the first issue . there was realized something more than $58,000,000 in gold. Between that issue and the succeeding one in November, comprising a period of about ten months, nearly 8103,000,000 in gold were drawn from the Treasury. This made the second issue necessary, and upon that more thau fifty-eight millions in gold was again realized. Between the date of this second issue and the present time, covering a period of only about two months, more than $69,000,000 in gold have been, drawn from the Treasury. These large sums of gold were expended without any cancellation of Government obligations or in any permanent way benefiting our people or improving our pecuniary situation. The financial events of the past year suggest facts and conditions which should certainly arrest attention. More than $172,000,000 in gold have been drawn out of the Treasury during the year for the purpose of shipment abroad or hoarding at , home. While nearly one hundred and three millions of this amount was drawn out during the first, ten months of the year, a sum aggregating more than two-thirds of that amount, being about sixty-nine millions, was drawn out during the following two months, thus indicating a marked acceleration of the depleting process with the lapse of time. The obligations upon which this gold has been drawn from the Treas- ury are still outstanding and are available for use in repeating the exhausting operation with shorter intervals as our perplexities accu- mulate. Conditions are certainly supervening tending to make, the bonds which may be issued to replenish our gold less useful for that purpose. An adequate gold reserve is in all circumstances absolutely essential to the upholding of our public credit and to the maintenance of our high national character. Our gold reserve has again reached such a stage of diminution as to require its speedy reenforcement. The aggravations that must inevitably follow present conditions and methods will certainly lead to misfortune and loss, not only to our national credit and prosperity and to financial enterprise, but to those of our people who seek employment as a means of livelihood, and to those whose only capital is their daily labor. It will hardly do to say that a simple increase of revenue will cure our troubles. The apprehension now existing and constantly increas- ing as to our financial ability does not rest upon a calculation of our revenue. The time has passed when the eyes of investors abroad and our people at home were fixed upon the revenues of the Government. Changed conditions have attracted their attention to the gold of the ' Government. There need be no fear that we can not pay our current expenses with such money as we have. There is now in the Treasury a comfortable surplus of more than $63,000,000, but it is not in gold, and therefore does not meet our difficulty. 4 CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. I can not see that differences of opinion concerning the extent to which silver ought to be coined or used in our currency should interfere with the counsels of those whose duty it is to rectify evils now apparent in our financial situation. They have to consider the question of national credit, and the consequences that will follow from its collapse. Whatever ideas may be insisted upon as to silver or bimetallism, a proper solution of the question now pressing upon us only requires a recognition of gold as well as silver, and a concession of its importance, Tightfully or wrongfully acquired, as a basis of national credit, a neces- sity in the honorable discharge of our obligations payable in gold, and a badge of solvency. I do not understand that the real friends of sil- ver desire a condition that might follow inaction or neglect to appre- ciate the meaning of the present exigency, if it should result in the entire banishment of gold from our financial and currency arrange- ments. Besides the Treasury notes, which certainly should be paid in gold, amounting to nearly $500,000,000, there will fall due in 1904 one hun- dred millions of bonds issued during the last year, for which we have received gold, and in 1907 nearly six hundred millions of 4 percent bonds issued in 1877. . Shall the payment of these obligations in gold be repudiated? If they are to be paid in such a manner as the preser- vation of our national honor and national solvency demands, we should not destroy or even imperil our ability to supply ourselves with gold for that purpose. While I am not unfriendly to silver, and while I desire to see it rec- ognized to such an extent as is consistent with financial safety and the preservation of national honor and credit, I am not willing to see gold entirely banished from our currency and finances. To avert such a consequence I believe thorough and radical remedial legislation should be promptly passed. 1 therefore beg the Congress to give the subject immediate attention. In my opinion the Secretary of the Treasury should be authorized. to issue bonds of the Government for the purpose of procuring and main- taining a sufficient gold reserve and the redemption and cancellation of the United States legal-tender notes and the Treasury notes issued for the purchase of silver under the law of July 14, 1890. We should be relieved from the humiliating process of issuing bonds to procure gold to be immediately and repeatedly drawn out on these obligations for purposes not related to the benefit of our Government or our peo- ple. The principal and interest of these bopds should be payable on their face in gold, because they should be sold only for gold or its rep- resentative, and because there would now probably be difficulty in favorably disposing of bonds not containing this stipulation. I suggest that the bonds be issued in denominations of twenty and fifty dol- lars and their multiples and that they bear interest at a rate not exceed- ing 3 per cent per annum. I do not see why they should not be pay- CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL FINANCES. 5 able fifty years from their date. We of the present generation have large amounts to pay if we meet our obligations, and long bonds are most salable. The Secretary of the Treasury might well be permitted, at his discretion, to receive on the sale of bonds the legal- tender and Treasury notes to be retired, and, of course, when they are thus retired or redeemed in gold they should be canceled. These bonds under existing laws could be deposited by national banks as security for circulation; and such banks should be allowed to issue circulation up to the face value of these or any other bonds so deposited, except bonds outstanding bearing only 2 per cent interest, and which sell in the market at less than par. National banks should not be allowed to take out circulating notes of a less denomination than $10, and when such as are now outstanding reach the Treasury, except for redemption and retirement, they should be canceled and notes of the denomination of $10 and upward issued in their stead. Silver cer- tificates of the denomination of $10 and upward should be replaced by certificates of denominations under $10. As a constant means for the maintenance of a reasonable supply of gold in the Treasury our duties on imports should be paid in gold, allowing all other dues to the Government to be paid in any other form of money. I believe all the provisions I have suggested should be embodied in our laws if we are to enjoy a complete reinstatement of a sound finan- cial condition. They need not interfere with any currency scheme providing for the increase of the circulating medium through the agency of national or State banks that may commend itself to the Congress, since they can easily be adjusted to such a scheme. Objec- tion has been made to the issuance of interest-bearing obligations for the purpose of retiring the noninterest-bearing legal-tender notes. In point of fact, however, these notes have burdened us with a large load, of interest, and it is still accumulating. The aggregate interest on the original issue of bonds, the proceeds of which in gold consti- tuted the reserve for the payment of these notes, amounted to $70,326,250 on January 1, 1893, and the annual charge for interest on these bonds and those issued for the same purpose during the last year will be $9,145,000, dating from January 1, 1895. While the cancellation of these notes would not relieve us from the obligations already incurred on their account, these figures are given by way of suggesting that their existence has not been free from inter- est charges and that the longer they are outstanding, judging from the experience of the last year, the more expensive they will become. In conclusion, I desire to frankly confess my reluctance to issuing more bonds in present circumstances and with no better results than have lately followed that course. I can not, however, refrain from adding to an assurance of my anxiety to cooperate with the present 6 CONDITION OP THE NATIONAL FINANCES. Congress in any reasonable measure of relief, an expression of my determination to leave nothing undone which furnishes a hope for improving the situation or checking a suspicion of our disinclination or disability to meet with the strictest honor every national obligation, Grover Cleveland. Executive Mansion, Janua/ry 28, 1895. 54th Congress, ) SENATE. 5 Document 1st Session. ) i No. 29. IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES. December 16, 1895.— Ordered to be nriuted. Mr. Teller presented the following PAPER ON GOLD MONOMETALLISM. THE EASTERN BIMETALLIC LEAOHJE — GOLD MONOMETALLISM; THE UPAS TREE OF GREAT BRITAIN; FURTHER NOTES ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE BLIGHTING EFFECT ON BRITISH INDUSTRIES; WITH A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF THE COST OF MONOMETALLISM. [By EL Kopsch, F. It. G-. S., member of the EasterD Bimetallic League.] In an address on "Bimetallism and the industrial classes," delivered at the Athenaeum Hall, Melbourne, on February 5, 1895, by Mr. More- ton Freweh, he observed that the silver question is less an economic than a race question. It is to be regretted that the wage earning classes of Great Britain, Europe, and the United States do not appreciate this view of the subject, as the thoughtless demonetization of silver has brought about a one sided contest for industrial supremacy between the "yellow man with the white money" and the white man with the yellow money, as Mr. Stead so aptly puts it in his book, The Splendid . Paupers, for it is a contest in which the white man is destined to be hopelesslv defeated so long as our legislators see fit to provide their armies of skilled laborers with a weapon— gold— possessing only a quarter of the power of the same implement when used by the Asiatic. In fact, it is tantamount to equipping for combat two battalions of equally skilled men, but providing one with a single round of ball cartridge and the other with four rounds a head, seeing that in the West a gold dollar or 5s. piece will only employ one skilled artisan for a day, whereas in the East it will provide four and five men. Long before the fall in exchange with Asia and other silver-using countries, it was apparent to the workingmen of the States, Australia, and Canada that on their own soil it was hopeless to endeavor to com- pete with immigrant Eastern labor, even when the dollar was worth 4s. and the rupee 2s.; consequently the Governments of those countries restricted or prohibited the admission of Chinese into their nelds ol labor. Yet with this evidence of the impossibility of competing on equal terms with Asiatic workmen in our own countries, our statesmen and financial ministers imagine that Western artisans and mechanics can still hold their own against Indian, Chinese, and Japanese cheap home labor, now rendered still cheaper by low -exchange plus labor- saving machinery. But if the press, statesmen, bankers, and the intel- ligent trading classes can not be brought to comprehend the danger bLtting the industries of the countries of the West, it seems scarcely 2 GOLD MONOMETALLISM. likely that the poor miner and wage earner will ever be induced to believe that his impoverishment, lack or loss of employment, is due to the black and yellow man dwelling 10,000 miles away; people of "whom he may have heard, yet never seen, but who are being protected and urged on by his own rulers to pauperise and starve him out. Well may the British and Western laborer ask himself the question: Are his "pastors and masters" dealing with him fairly and squarely? To him it must appear as if he were being tricked in a barefaced way when he discovers that he is paid in a coin bearing a double value; that is, a gold sovereign worth only 20s. in England, but equal to 40s. in the hands of his black or yellow brother workman. The best way to enlighten the Western workingman on the complex currency question is to present him with a table of scale of wages paid in white money (silver) to the yellow man, and let him compare these rates with the minimum he himself receives. Table of wages. — Daily wages in Japan. [2s. = $1.]' Average (silver) 24 days. Carpenters Plasterers Stone masons Sawyers Roofers* shingles Roofers, tiles -*. - Mat makers Screen makers Paper hangers or pasters Joiners _" Tailors, native clothes Tailors, foreign clothes Dyers Cotton bowers o Blacksmiths '. Potters , t Laquer workers .' Oil pressers Tobaccocutters Printera Ship carpenters Compositors ' Workers in distilleries Workers in soy (sauce) factories Agricultural laborers : Men Women Silkworm attendants : Men Women Silk reelers Tea workers l)ay laborers Average monthly wages {without food) . Cents. 32 32 36 31 30 24 30 30 32 30 28 7.68 8.64 7.44 7.20 5.76 7.20 7.20 7.68 7.20 6.72 11.76 6.00 5.76 7.44 7.20 7.20 6.24 6.48 6.48 8.10 6.90 7.20 5.76 4.56 2.88 5.28 3.60 3.84 7.44 5.28 Weavers : Men Women Confectioners Agriculturists : Men Women Men servants Women servants English money. e. d. GOLD MONOMETALLISM. 3 When exchange was 4s. = $1 the sterling equivalent of Asiatic wages was of course double the- figures given in the second column. These figures are the average of rates obtained in different districts. Of laborers whose work is only periodical, such as of those employed in tea, silk, and sake (native wine) factories, the rates represent the aver- age for the season. If the wages in dollars are divided by 2, they will represent the approximate value in United States gold. Let him carefully peruse the foregoing table, issued by the statistical bureau of Japan, showing the average daily wages paid in 1892 to various Japanese handicraftsmen. The labor market of Japan is taken for an example, as the details are already published and because Japan- ese workmen are unquestionably the most skilled artisans in Asia. Moreover, rates of wages paid to Japanese apply to Chinese, while natives of India work for even less But when scanning this table it should not be forgotten that prior to 1873 the silver dollar or white money, in which the yellow men are paid, exchanged for more than 4s. English money, although now it is only equal to 2s. Still, to the Asiatic, though his wages only represent half the sterling or gold equivalent iu 1873, his earnings in silver are worth just as much to him as wheu the dollar exchanged for 4s. He gets no more silver for his labors, but can sell his wares in Europe, say, at 2s. and prosper, while his British competitor must charge 4s. for his labor. Thus protected by exchange, the Asiatic successfully cuts out his white brother workmen iu every branch of industry. This table of wages will afford the European work- men serious matter for reflection. That the Chinese and other Orientals can live on half the wages needed by white men for mere subsistence is no fault of our legislation ; but the Government is solely to blame for demonetizing silver and thus reducing the gold equivalent of Eastern wages to a degree which renders it simply impossible for Western artisans to compete in the same market. Strange to say, such papers as the Times and Economist, representing free-trade principles, seem too obtuse to apprehend the danger to British industries, while pro- tectionist countries, such as the United States, foresee the peril, as proclaimed by The Press of New York, in its issue of the 17th of Decem- ber, last, in an article headed "China and protection," from which the following is an extract: It may be added that Chinese development will make it all the more necessary for the United States to adhere rigidly to the policy of protection ; for it would he quite useless to exclude Chinese lahorers if we should admit without protective duties the products of Chinese cheap labor. With Asia coming into line as a rival of Europe in the manufacturing field, protection becomes » question ot self-preservation lor the American workingnian. The San Francisco Weekly Chronicle of April 18, 1895, comprehends and explains the situation iu an article entitled "Menaced by silver- using countries." „,.,,.■, ^ j >-■ „ In this paper it is not intended to again refer to the threatened extinc- tion of British textile industries consequent upon the depreciation ol silver. The fatal results have been demonstrated and discussed in forcible language in other pamphlets issued by the Eastern Bimetallic League. It will suffice to say, as the Manchester Guardian of January 2, last, attests, that while Lancashire spinning mills are ™gri a loss, the prospectuses of the new China mills reckon on 30 per cent dl In d stead of reverting to the competition between East and West in tex- tiles, it may be as interesting to note the effect of the appreciation of 4 GOLD MONOMETALLISM. gold on the domestic expenditure of foreign residents in Far Cathay. This might he summed up in one sentence : Every article itnported.from gold standard countries has risen 50 per cent in price. But illustra- tions are more convincing than general statements. Though expatriated in the East and gaining a livelihood in silver 'currency, the young Britisher still delights in getting supplies from home when possible. His fondness for field sports and beer, the bever- age of his youth, remains undiminished; he prefers his malt liquor to other kinds. But a paternal government has now cut off this cheap home association from his sous in exile; so most of the toilers for the aggrandizement of "Little Britain," except the opulent, are reduced to taking local or Japanese brewed beer. What an excellent picture for Bunch! John Bull hugging his useless bags of gold, turning his back -ou silver. His stalwart sons toiling in the East thirsting for their native beer, but unable to buy it at J. B.'s extortionate price. Young Japan stepping forward, tankard in hand, to supply Britishers' wants abroad! Yet the hopbine twineth not in Japan or Far Cathay, and "malt" is not found in the native dictionary. In a circular issued by a Shanghai wine merchant, the following are the prices of both kinds of beer, per 4-dozen case : Bass's ale, $17=34s.; Japanese beer, $I0=20s.; local beer, $8 = 16s. It may be said, What trifles! Admitted; but they indicate the downward course of British export trade. In 1885 the foreign resi- dents in China, excluding Hongkong, numbered 6,698; in 1894 they aggregated 9,350. For 1885 the London board-of-trade returns give the export to China, excluding Hongkong, of beer and ale at 1,765 barrels, and 1,230 in 1893 ; of course, the cheaper Japanese and Eastern brewed beers supply this deficiency, because, at present exchange, British beer is simply "not in it," Note also the falling off in the demand for wines from 34,000 gallons in 1889 to 25,000 gallons in 1893. In a paper published last September by the League the writer hazarded the opinion that the shipbuilding 'industry of England is doomed to suffer from the appreciation of gold as acutely as the textile manufactories. Since expressing this view, no less authorities than the chairman of the P. and O. Company and a director of the China Mutual Steam Navigation Company have indorsed this opinion, as shown in the following extract from the last report of the latter shipping company, published in the London and China Express of March 8. Mr. Maitland stated : Sir Thomas Sutherland, at the meeting of the P. and O. Company, remarked that perhaps some of the younger shareholders present might live to see their steamers built on the banks of the Yang-tse-Kiang or in the harbors of Japan. This was recei ved with some merriment, and a great many people looked upon the remark as a joke ; but, gentlemen, it is no joke. After inquiries and calculations, I am prepared to assert that the large oeean-going steamers might be built for less money and equally efficiently in China or Japan at the present time. Certainly the material, such as steel plates, etc., would have to be shipped out, and perhaps one or two superintend- ents would have to go Out to look after the construction of the steamers, but there is an abundance of well-skilled labor to be had out there. I will give you a rough illustration of what I mean. Supposing the cost of a steamer to be £50,000, a moder- ate estimate for labor would be £12,000. Take the wages for labor on the Clyde at 30s. a week, which is a low estimate, as many workmen receive 7s. 6d. a day, and then take wages in the East at $5 a week, which is high, being equal to 10s. a week, we find that in this item of £12,000, there would be a saving of two-thirds, or an economy of £8,000 in labor alone. Against this certainly there would be the ship- ping of material, such as steel plates, which would cost, say, £2,400, and then there would be the payment of two or three skilled men specially sent out to superintend, which I will put down at £1,000 or £1,500, making together under £4,000, so that there would still be a saving of £4,000 in favor of building in the East. I will give you another case. We are thinking of sending out or building a tug steamer to assiBt boats over the Woosung Bar, and it would no doubt be profitable. We have got GOLD MONOMETALLISM. 5 estimates for building in this country and for building in the East, and I may tell you that we can build considerably cheaper in the East, including boilers, -engines, and everything. These gentlemen, are -facts and not theories. But this is not the time- or place to go into this important question, but it certainly does require the serious consideration of every thoughtful business man. It would appear as if we were on the eve of something being clone for the silver or currency question, which, although I would not say it is at the bottom or the sole cause of our agricultural and indus- trial troubles, at any rate I am quite certain that it is the chief one, and unless something is very promptly done, my impression is that the gigantic unemployed labor question will increase tremendously, while those who ought to be helping us out ot the difficulty are looking on and seeing one large industry after another leav- ing the country. These remarks are not the utterances of essay writers but of prac- tical men of business. Let the Times an cL Economist gainsay suck facts ! * The shipbuilding yards in south China turned out and engined tea small steamers during the year 1894. Gold monometallism is baneful enough to drive the flag off the sea> and to compass the enslavement of the British seamen by the Asiatic. In a pamphlet issued last year the writer stated that Chinese cheap silver-paid labor had driven every European sailor and fireman from the decks and stokeholds of coasting steamers. The appreciation of gold enables the Oriental to seek a wider sphere, and to try his hand at man- ning our ocean steamers. A recent issue of the North-China Daily News states: The China Mutual S. N. Co. are trying an experiment with Chinese sailors for their vessels, and are sending on to Loudon by the Pingsiiey and Oanfa twenty-four deck hands who will man these two vessels on their return voyage to China. How it would gladden the hearts of the widows of our shipwrecked seamen to find a berth for their "fatherless bairns" as steward or cabin- boy on board some of the great Eastern liners. But the scarcity of gold compels the ship owner to take the daily bread of the fatherless and widow and give it to Asiatics. The cheapness and excellence of the Chinese servants, paid in silrer, who act as saloon and bedroom stewards, is a point which invariably draws favorable comment. They make perfect servants, and, in their clean, fresh-looking uniform robes, with their native picturesqueness, they form a marked contrast to what one generally finds at Bea. — (Extract from handbook of C. P. R. Co.'s Royal Mail Steamship Line. The italics are inserted.) [In connection with ships and shipping it is currently reported on the best authority, though we can not trace the source beyond " the Club," and the report is given with all reserve, that, influenced by the forecast of events portrayed by Sir T. Sutherland at the last meeting of the P. and O. Company, a syndicate of influential capitalists (silver) in China and Japan have submitted a tender to the Postmaster-General for the aext contract mail service between the United Kingdom and the East. We are not in possession of the details of this original scheme, but give the substance of it as told to us. The war being at an end, Japan, for the present, has no further use for her flotilla of swift cruisers, largely augmented by the surrender of the Chinese squadron and the purchase of 77 steam-transports. But Japan being desirous to keep her ships and seamen in training at small cost, the aforesaid syndicate of enter- prising merchants are negotiating with the Admiralty in Toyko to charter the very fastest vessels of this fleet with the object of under- taking the mail service, under agreement with the British Government (the United States and Europe to be approached later on), between the United Kingdom, Asia, and Australia. Having ascertained that it 6 GOLD MONOMETALLISM. costs the British exchequer the preposterous (from a silver standpoint) animal suih of £434,000 (see post office estimates) for the Contract Packet Service to the East, they have tendered to undertake the serv-. ice, now performed at the above charge by the P. and O. Steam Navi- gation Company, for precisely half that sum! Incredible as it may appear, this proposal is perfectly practicable, as will be apparent to all, except to monometallists, even without the explanation subjoined: (1) The syndicate operating in a silver-standard country has no prin- cipal charges whatever payable in gold. Freight from Europe may be paid in appreciated gold or silver; if the latter currency, no Western company can then compete. (2) The purchasing power in the Bast of the silver dollar, though only ■worth 2s., being just as great as in 1872, will consequently provide the same quantity of labor and materials as when it exchanged for 4s. Therefore, estimating the cost of the subsidized packet service at £434,000, at exchange (£1=$10.00)=$4,340,000; syndicate's tender $2,170,000 at 2s.=£217,000 or annual saving to British exchequer of £217,000. That their tender will be accepted there can be no doubt, for after this exposure of the monometallic system of plundering the exchequer the taxpayers will insist upon it. Indeed, it is reported that the chan- cellor of the exchequer is so enraptured at this audacious but unique conception, nay, miraculous system of financing, whereby an appalling budget deficit is, as if by magic, transformed into a surplus, that a baronetcy will be offered to the president of the syndicate. The smile on the careworn visage of the chancellor on receiving this, tender sur- passed that of the immortalized Ah Sin. Of course the splendid fleet of the P. and O. Steam Navigation Com- pany will be laid up, the shareholders ruined by gold monometallism, and the flag that flaunted the motto Quis separabit will be forever furled, while that of the Rising Sun will flutter in its- place. The first contract packet despatched with mails to London will be the 20-knot cruiser Tien Kwang, i. e., "Light from Asia." Thousands of Britain's manly tars and other employees will be thrown out of work and reduced to penury, "but that is a mere detail which the state officials will not perceive or consider; indeed, the sole aim and object of gold monometallism appears to be the speedy ruin of British commerce and industries. "But England will always, produce something," as Sir H. M. Meysey-Thompson says, is the conviction of theoppon nts of bimetallism, even when manufacturers and producers have disappeared. Perhaps this "something" refers to machinery or surgical instruments. Let us hope so; but according to the latest accounts the new cotton mills are getting their ginning machinery made locally; and it is well known that silver-standard Japan can offer gold-using Great Britain a splendid case of keen-bladed post mortem instruments for one-seventh of the price, at present exchange, of the same implements made in Sheffield. Encouraged by the high approval and acceptance by the post-office officials of their first suggestion, the syndicate, implored by the tax- beridden residents of the Eastern silver-using British colonies, sub mitted a tentative scheme to the British war office for relieving the colonial exchequer and effecting an incalculable saving in the military expenditure of the United Kingdom. The substance of the proposition GOLD MONOMETALLISM. 7 is sketched hereunder. The island of Formosa* being ceded to Japan becomes next-door neighbor to Hongkong, whose local government, like that of the .Straits, has been terribly exercised and distressed to meet the demands, literally " sweated" (Hongkong and the Straits are in tbe tropics) out of the depleted Treasury on account ot extra military con- tribution necessitated by the fall in exchange. Touched by the repre- sentations of the syndicate, which explained this '• squeezing" process — somewhat akin to footbinding — to which the unfortunate inhabitants had to submit at the hands of a cruel monometallic-hearted step- mother, and animated by deep sympathy with the critical financial condition of this sterile, plague-stricken islet, now overshadowed by the lofty and majestic jNlount Sylvia — the Fujiyama of Formosa — the war office in Tokyo generously consented to relieve the strain put upon the colon- ial finances, consequent upon the appreciation of gold, and agreed to detach, on loan, a regiment of the crack Jiu-ko (i. e., silver standard) division, now in garrison in South Formosa, only sixteen hours steam from Hongkong. The modest charge for these troops, as compared with the cost of keeping up the monometallic legion from home, is sum- marized hereunder : Syndicate estimate. — 1,000 Jiu-ko men at $2.50 a man per month = $2,500, or $30,000 a year; at L's. =£3,000. British estimate — 1,000 men of the monometallic division at Is. per diem =£50 per day, or £18,550 a year; at exchequer, $1()=£1 =$185,000. Saving, if paid by the Hongkong treasury, $155,000, or £15,500 if defrayed by the imperial exchequer. Of course this immense economy is explained by the fact that the Jinkos are maintained in so-called depreciated silver, and the men of the monometallic legion in appre- ciated gold. The Horse Guards, never very intelligent about financial questions, at last perceive that cheap silver may become a dangerous foe, seeing that in the East six men can be provided at the cost of equipping one paid in gold. Jinkos, afloat or ashore, small and cheap as they are, may not be despised. The shares of the syndicate have risen to a fabulous premium, for the chancellors of European exchequers are fast awakening to the fact that with silver at the present price the operations of the syndicate are capable of limitless expansion, and that the yellow man threatens to monopolize the industries of the universe.] To turn suddenly from steamers and armies to the attractions ot a lady's drawing-room seems a rapid transition, but it will serve to show the widespread and all pervading baneful influence of the appreciation of gold. i According to a letter signed "Junius," which went the round of the Chinese press, it is reported that rather than see Formosa pass to Japan, the Beautiful Isle " worth a dozen islands like Cyprus, was offered to Great Britain, as being the weakest power hi the Pacific, for the nominal sum of $100,000,000 or at exchange &. per dollar, equal £10,000,000. But the vis.tm of the treasury officials being j: mn- diced from a prolonged study of chrysology, they confused the sign ($) for dollars with (£) that for pounds, and refused the offer; thus, the island was lost to the British and the nation deprived of a useful object lesson illustrative of the omnipo- tent power of gold, with silver quoted at 30d. per ounce to get a good bargain On the devoted isfanders learning that ovao™™™*™™* ^?}^!^?^* petitioned to he brought under British rule and protection on the same conditions as CvnrS Ib administered, hut when the minister of foreign affairs read the appeal he mlSy remark -I^eMadagascans might object." Bhac Les. of Disraeli Prop- erly administered and developed, the surplus revenue ^f this gem ^ of tlie Pacific^ and ffrannrv of China would have made good the budget deficit of the Indian doyeinmenx. As it Tf tL session of F^mosa will probably entail a loss to the Ind.an opium reve- ^eof^Es" ^,m000?Terived ^ ^(T A ^'^^ ^Sf^^ in that island, if prohibited opium is excluded from lormoba as it is throughout Japan. 8 GOLD MONOMETALLISM. Plato says that music affects considerably the constitution of the State: Confucius was of the same opinion. He said, "Music should not be neglected for a moment by any one," and the great old sage instances the husband playing and wife singing as typical of conjugal felicity. Dame Europa inclined to concur; but that sordid Old Lady of Threadneedle street, squatting on her bags of unproductive gold, was heard to mutter "conjugal felicity! fiddlesticks! what could that old pagan know about it!" So she determines that Britain's fair daughters, exiled in heathen lands, shall be robbed of the delights of music, "that craving of a loving soul," at least it shall not be supplied by a "Broad wood" or other English instrument, for the appreciation of gold places such pleasures beyond the means of residents in the Far East. However, Ah Sin, with his keen commercial instinct, and known to the world for his smile that is " child-like and bland," comes to the rescue with his cheap skilled labor paid for in the " white dross," sniffed at Mrs. Britannia, and offers to supply sweet harmony to the hearts and hearths of Britons exiled in wintry North-China, despite the old dame's faith in the omnipotence of gold and disbelief in silver, as will be seen from the following extract taken from the North-China Herald of 20th April, 1895, headed— A NEW SHANGHAI 1NDUSTKY. Though low exchange is a sad affliction to residents in China generally, it encour- ages manufactures on the spot for which we used to rely upon Europe, us the bimet- allists point out so strongly; and one instance of this can be found in Messrs. S. Moutrio &, C'o.'s establishment. Formerly the firm used to import all their' pianos from Europe, but owing to the great fall in exchange and the cheapness of labor in the East, the firm seriously considered the possibility of making the piano for the most part in Shanghai, importing for the purpose certain essential parts which can only be satisfactorily made at home, and Mr. Sydenham Montrie's long experi- ence in Broadwood's establishment in London and his lengthened residence i . the 1 East eminently fitted him to carry this project into fulfillment. First of all Mr. Moutrie set about procuring the proper wood for the purpose, and this he found could he obtained from Japan, of a quality that was in every way suitable. Of course the greatest care is taken that the wood is thoroughly seasoned, which is done on the Shanghai prer/'ises. Mr. Moutrie was fortunate in obtaining a Japan wood that makes an excellent sounding board, which is a very important matter. «The wrest plank, into which the keys for tuning are driven, and also the iron frame, metal tuning plate, action, keys, and strings are imported from Europe, the freight being comparatively much less than if they formed part of an entire instrument; and this enables the firm to complete in their Shanghai workroom an instrument which is in every way as good as one that could be imported. One of these can now be seen in the Nanking Road. It is a cottage piano in solid hardwood case, ebonized, with an iron frame, metal tuning plates, check action, celluloid keys, being 3 feet 9-J inches in height, 4 feet 6 inches in width, and 1 foot 11 inches in depth. In addition to the iron frame, this piano has a very solid wooden frame, with seven thick wooden pillars running to the top of the instrument, while the wrest plank — which bears the tension of the strings, estimated in this piano to be about fourteen tons— is supported by the iron frame, and bolted right through the wooden pillars at the top, thus effectually preventing the wrest plank from moving down or curling over, which frequently happens in pianos of this description when proper precautionary measures are not taken. The continued fall in exchange, and the high rate of freight that has to be paid on an instrument when shipped from Europe in a complete condition, rendered it impossible for Messrs. S. Moutrie &. Co. to oiler a home-made piano at a lower cost than £40, and if even a' discount of 10 per cent was allowed, the net cost of £36 represented, at the rale of exchange recently touched, say 2s. 8£d., 265 taels, and yet a similar and equally good piano which is turned out in Shanghai now can be sold for 200 taels, or, with allowance of cash discount, 180 taels (£24 7s.). This fact is very significant, and it is probable that before long we shall not only have our pianos manufactured in Shanghai, but many other necessary articles which were formerly obtained direct from Europe. What next ? Probably the sweet strains in Belgravia of a fine-toned China-made piano costing under £25, exported by Moutrie & Co. r Shanghai. GOLD MONOMETALLISM. 9 Amongst other necessary articles formerly imported from England bat now made locally, carriages may be mentioned. The Shanghai Municipal Eeport for 1894 shows that 5,522 carriage licenses (exclud- ing private equipages) were issued, or an average of 460 per month. This affords another striking instance of the appreciation of gold, forcing a people, who never saw a vehicle other than a wheelbarrow, to import materials and make carriages almost as smart in appearance as a Long Acre turn-out, and at less than half the cost. At the St. George's fete 260 carriages, chiefly broughams, entered the gates, of which probably not one-tenth were imported vehicles. The young Englishman loves to harness a speedy Mongolian pony to a stylish trap, but Dame Europa, egged on by that blind old crone in Thread- needle street, declares he shall not have one from the old country even if the carriage-builders are ruined; for has she not reduced the price of English oats to 13s. a quarter, when years ago they cost over £1? What matters if men are unemployed? Horses will have cheap fodder. Apropos of wood for pianos and carriages, it is singular that Canada, the land of forests, can not supply disafforested China with timber at less cost than home-grown lumber. As one rolls along west of Calgary in the C. P. E. cars, the traveler is as amazed at the abundance of dead and live timber bordering the rails as surprised at the absence of wood along the 1,000 miles or more of the Yangtsze Eiver navigable to steamers. When exchange was high a promising timber trade with Canada was growing up, but tlie enhanced price of gold has nearly annihilated it. According to the returns of the department of agri- culture, Ottawa, the exports of wood to China in 1877-79 were valued at $59,400; in 1893, $9,900; yet building of all kinds has advanced in the East by leaps and bounds. Despite the scarcity of forests and the absence of such a thing as a steam saw mill, Chinese poles are floated down the mighty Yangtsze fully 1,300 miles from Western China in rafts longer, wider, and as deep as the largest Atlantic " grayhound." In fact, they are drifting villages, worked by crews mustering from 120 to 200 men, who ofteu. take a year to make the voyage from the forests to the sea. Tet they can lay down these poles here cheaper than the Canadian transports his spars, though cut by small Niagaras of water power and hauled or imported by steam. What a triumph for silver ! Poor indeed have been the results, so far as improving Canada's timber trade in the East, by extending the great C. P. E. to the Pacific Coast. Behold C. P. E. $100 shares at $38; a huge outlet for timber, wood, and char- coal in China, whose millions burn reeds, grass, and cotton stalks for fuel; forests washed by the Pacific; timber rotting on both sides of the line, but made unmarketable in this vast woodless Empire because Lom- bard street and finance ministers are hypnotised and rendered impotent by devotion to their golden goddess. But for the blight of gold mono- metallism the demand for wood would be as inexhaustible as the supply. Well, indeed, may the Celestial query the vaunted advantages of trans- port by rail and steamer when he finds that he can work cheaper by hand, and raft his timber over 1,000 miles by manual labor at less cost than the Canadian by rail and ocean transport. But the yellow man, though an idolater, knows nothing of the curse of gold fetishism. He says: "Take my gold, which is a mere commodity, like pigs' bristles. We sold you £2,044,000 in gold bullion last year. Add it to your hoard, and much good may it do you. We, with our silver at present quota- tions, can beat you out of the field of competition in all your own special industries." 10 GOLD MONOMETALLISM. Why Canada and the United States can not export lumber to the great markets of the far East is explained in the annexed extract from a letter by Mr. W. S. Wetmore, the president of this league, addressed to the San Francisco Chronicle and reprinted in the North China Daily News of 25th February last: Twenty years ago the trade was in a flourishing condition, with every prospect of an immense development, as the lumber was extensively used for building purposes. Now there is comparatively little done in it, and the few vessels that arrive in the course of a year with cargoes bring sufficient for supplying the requirement of the docks and ship-repairing yards, to which the consumption has recently been almost confined at the present high cost. I hand you a memorandum showing the comparative cost of Oregon pine laid down here in 1880 and 1894, the latter based on prices quoted in September last by one of the principal mills in Portland for a cargo of standard assortment, which are about the same as they were in 1880 : Comparative cost of 1,000,000 feet of lumber laid down in Shanghai. 1880. Taels. Cost, f.o.b., g. $12,200, at 83| 10,187 Freight at £4 at exchange 5s. lfd 15,578 Marine insurance, g. $300 at 83J 250 Import duty at 7 mace 777 Commission 3 per cent on sales at 29 taels 870 Measuring 150 C. 1. d. Shanghai 1 27,812 1894. Costf. o. b. g. $12,200 at 145 17,690 Freight at £2 5s. at exchange 2s. lOd .-. 15,883 Marine insurance, g. $300 at 155 485 Import duty, at 7 mace 777 Commission, 3 per cent on sales, at 29 taels 870 Measuring 150 C. Ld. Shanghai 35,855 From this you will observe: First, that whereas the, cost of 1,000,000 feet on board ship in 1880 and this year is the same, viz., $12,200 gold currency, the cost in Shang- hai currency in the former year was only 10,187 taels, agains.t 17,690 taels in 1894, that is, 71 taels per mil more on the latter than on the former state; second, that whereas the rate of freight in 1880 was £4 per 1,000 feet, it is now only £2 5s., and this a maximum ; and yet the freight in taels is actually higher at the present time than it was then, so that, although the ship-owner gets £1 15s. less than before, this does not cheapen the, cost of the lumber to the consumer. While, however, on the above quotations the lumber costs 35.85 taels per mil, laid down, as against 27.81 taels in 1880, the sale is greatly restricted, and, in fact, the Chinese will not buy in any considerable, quantity at over 28 to 29 taels per mil, which was about the qnotation current in 1880, because Japanese and native boards and lumber, which are suitable for most of their requirements, can be had so much ■cheaper. In order to furnish the lumber here at prices which the Chinese can afford to pay, the mill-owner has (as, I presume, is sometimes done) to make a concession of about $3.50 in his price, and the ship-owner to accept the reduced rate of 40 shillings. For whose benefit? Not the Chinaman's, for he has to pay as much for the lumber as formerly, while the mill-owner gets only three-fourths of his old price and the ship- owner half his former freight, the differences being a sacrifice to the Moloch of gold monometallism. If exchange were the same as in 1880, with prices and freights at the present fig- ures on the Pacific Coast, lumber could be laid down here at 20 taels or less, which would doubtless lead to a very large increase in the business, particularly if China is to be opened up to industrial enterprises on a large scale, which is generally ■expected as the outcome of the existing war with Japan. To bimetallists it is amusing to read of monometallic, colonies cher- ishing the hope of finding a market for their surplus products in China. GOLD MONOMETALLISM. 11 We hear of Canada indulging in the belief of a possible large trade with this Empire in matches, and of young Australia counting upon the Bast taking off her superabundant stocks of wool and other products. As if such were practicable with silver demonetized ! The reverse of this prospect of things is far more probable. Canada and Australia are more likely to be flooded with cheap Oriental-made lucifers, and China is more capable of destroying than developing Australia's wool trade. Before the fall in exchange the Board of Trade Returns record a con- siderable export of matches to China. In 1887 the trade was assessed at £21,000; in 1893, nil. For 1886 the total export from the United Kingdom was valued at £251,000; in 1893 at £157,000. That the extinction of the Eastern demand has been accelerated if not caused by the upas of monometallism, there can be little doubt. This recalls to mind the outcry raised by the poverty-stricken matchmakers of London, who forced the chancellor of the exchequer, Mr. Lowe, to abandon his proposed tax on matches. If those unfortunate people could be made to understand and believe that the then threatened tax was a trifling burden as compared with the cruel and deadly impost called monometallism inflicted on their labor, they and the 1,750,000 starving unemployed would never cease clamoring for a repeal of the currency laws or hurling anathemas at their legislators— men who in specious language denounce andpass enactments against the "sweater;" yet they are the Government sweaters, for they knowingly and wit- tingly support a currency system tenfold harder and harsher on the white wage-earning classes than any sweating system invented by a Hebrew. The operatives can strike against the individual "sweater," but the Government sweaters, who pay a bounty to theyellow and black man to starve and ruin England's industrial classes, work as invisibly and insidiously as the deadly exhalations of the upas tree, to which baneful and life destroying plant the influence of gold monometallism on British industries may be compared. Enlightened Europe and the United States recognize the iniquity of supporting national or Gov- ernment sweating laws. They now view the practice with abhorrence and wish to abandon it by favoring bimetallism— the sole remedy— but England, the liberator and apostle of manumission, persists in sup- porting her sweatiug system and degrading the working classes to the level of serfs— serfs, because the Government, by refusing to restore silver to its old value, has reduced the sterling rate of the black and vellow man's wages (without hurting him in the least) to the figures shown in the table, and thus compel British laborers to starve or toil for the same pay as the Hindoos, in order to be able to compete with the products of Asiatic looms and factories. On the same page of the Board of Trade Returns we notice a remark- able decrease in another once flourishing British industry, killed by monometallism. We refer to the umbrella trade The Chinese dandy who swaggers up the Nanking road is as vain of his light and slender London-made umbrella as his compeer, thePiccaddlj ^ swell The former used to indent on London for supplies worth £1*,900 in 188o and m 1889 when exchange was favorable, he ordered a consignment worth ^oO^bufwhen^s was the case last year, the native gi Med youth is a'sked to pay $7.50 for a 15s. umbrella, for which he used to .pay $3.50, because, forsooth, goldhas risen, he poll telyes daims "P y a °"- I don't want iUand transfers his custom to a shop we re Je caii get neat article of local or Japanese make or les s than! • ^JJ^JJf the shipment of British umbrellas to China dwindled to £4 ^™ ™»£ Ab uno disce omnes! Meanwhile Japan, uninfluei ced by exchange, supplied this market with 362,000 umbrellas during 1894. a 12 GOLD MONOMETALLISM. As to China or Japan becoming a market for wool, as the colonies anticipate, unless Australia votes for bimetallism and so underbids the Celestial, the prospect remains remote indeed. China is a wool-produc- ing country, and, stimulated by low exchange, became an exporter in 1894 to the extent of 270,000 hundredweight. The sheep pastures in roadless Mongolia are distant from the coast, but, as was remarked in connection with timber rafting on the Yangtze, the cost of transport even by camels, which bring the wool to Tientsin, the port of shipment, is a very small item when reduced to a gold equivalent at present exchange. But now that the Trans-Siberian Eailway, under the new treaty with Japan, by which Manchuria reverts to China, will run through the fertile pastures of silver-standard Mongolia, wool, both Siberian and Mongolian, will doubtless, ere many years, be shipped from Vladivostock at prices defying competition. Australia's staple trade must then be prepared to face a blow as crushing as that hurled at Lancashire by Ethiopians, the "dwarfs," and Chang the giant's country- men. According to the Japan Weekly Mail of May 4 it is stated that during the war the little Empire of Japan acquired 77 steamers, aggre- gating 123,111 tons burden. This tonnage will seek employment. The ships will doubtless be navigated by crews paid in silver at a quarter of the wages, payable in gold, required by occidental seamen, and be sup- plied with native fuel, costing less than half the price of New South Wales coal. Toung Australia can calculate at what rate Asiatic wool can be placed on the London and United States market, and decide for himself whether it is best to remonetize silver — that is, advocate bimet- allism — or continue to favor and protect the yellow man with his white money by adhering to a single gold standard. The comparative price, of Asiatic and Australian coal leads one to the subject of metals. Au extract from the China Express of March 29, 1895, reveals the deplora- ble condition of the Cornish tin trade induced by the blight of the appreciation of gold. A useful object lesson in the competition between gold West and silver East has just been afforded by the meetings of the two principal Cornish tin mines. The Dolcoath showed a loss of £5,101 on twelve months' working, while the Carn Brea had to confess to an expenditure of £5,535 in excess of income. In both of these cases — they may be accepted as fair samples of the industry throughout Cornwall — tho sole cause of fraaucial disaster is the abnormal cheapness of black tiu conse- quent upon importations from the Straits, which pay the Chinese well. A good many of the smaller mines in Cornwall are already shut down, and both from Cam- borne and Redruth the miners are emigrating to South Africa. Bich deposits of tin, located " South of the Clouds" (Yunnan), are now profitably mined in that far-distant Chinese province. Last year 47,000 hundredweight were shipped to Hongkong. Luckily for the Brit- ish tin/ industry, the mines in this province are distant from the sea upstream some thirty-five days traveling (twenty-five by river and ten by land) via Haiphong, French Tonkin, and the Bed Eiver ; downstream the transport from the mines can probably be made in twenty days. Min- ing is conducted in the most primitive method, but if the new treaty with Japan sanctions mining concessions as well as other industries, Prance and Japan will be sure to develop that source of wealth and improve the means of transport. At present exchange this new supply will inean still lower gold prices of British tin. Eiver steamers are now constructed in silver-using French Tonkin to ascend the Eed Eiver, which rises close to the mining districts. Ocean steamers will ere long no doubt be constructed in the same place and be supplied with fuel from the coal mines in that vicinity. Stimulated by gold monometallism, we may therefore expect to see tin produced in GOLD MONOMETALLISM. 13 territory situated at an altitude of 2,000 feet "South of the Clouds," conveyed in ships built in Tonkiu to Lands Eud at less cost than that mined in the Duchy of Cornwall. Sir T. Sutherland's predictions will then be realized. Yet we are a great commercial nation. Before concluding these notes, it will not be out of place to offer a few remarks on tho price of the material on which they are printed. The manufacture of printing paper has become a prominent industry iu Japan, and at current rates of exchange is driving the imported article out of the held. Pew foreign newspapers in the Orient now use Euro- pean paper. Indian and Japanese mills have supplanted the Western fabricant. A leading Eastern journal which was provided with paper made by the same mill supplying The Times is constrained, owing to the appreciation of gold, to use paper of precisely the same quality, made in Japan, thereby effecting a saving in price of 32 per cent. Turning to the Board of Trade Returns, we find in 1889 the total exports of British paper was 928.000 hundredweight and in 1893 only 852,000 hundredweight, the decline in the value of shipments aggregating £269,000 within five years. When the British paper industry is ruined and The Times is printed on paper made in India or Japan, then perhaps that great organ will wish it had taken a saner view of bimetallism. Shanghai, June 13, 1895. 54th Congress,) SENATE. (Document 1st Session. ) | No. 30. IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES. December 16, 1895.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Stewart presented the following PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. [Injury to British trade and manufactures.— The paper by George Jamieson, esq (H. B. M. s consul-general at Shanghai, China), which won the bimetallic prize offered by Sir Henry M. Meysey-Thompson in 1894, together with two other papers on the same subject by Thomas Holyoake Box (Yokohama), and David Octavias Croal (London).— Also a preface and sequel by Sir Henry M. Meysey-Thompson. Bart., M. P.] ' PEEFACE. By Sir Heney Meysey-Thompson. In introducing to the public the following excellent papers on the subject of the injury done to the trade and manufactures of England by the divergence in value between gold and silver, I will say only a very few words in explanation of my reasons for offering a prize. Fifteen years ago I had come to the conclusion that if the value of gold, as measured by silver and commodities were to continue to rise, the inevitable consequence must be the banishment of all our great manufacturing industries from England, to find a home in the silver- using countries of the East and elsewhere. This theory I and others proclaimed from the housetops, but we found that we might as well have been crying in the wilderness; no one would listen to us. Yet the theory is very simple, and seemed to us quite conclusive. What is the question? It is one simply and solely of locality. The manufactures of the world will certainly be carried on somewhere ; where is that somewhere to be? Now, we have all to make up our minds : (1) Do we wisb that the home and principal seat of the great manufac- turing industries of the world — the cotton, woolen, worsted, linen, jute, iron and steel, machinery, leather, clothing, pottery, glass, and many others, including all our existing agricultural industries — should con- tinue to be in the United Kingdom as hitherto, and that they should be carried on by English, Scotch, Irish, and Welsh workmen; or do we wish to see them banished to the soil of India, China, Japan and Mexico, and carried on by Indian, Mexican, Chinese, and Japanese workmen? (2) Is it certain that our present monometallic policy must drive these industries away from the soil of the United Kingdom, and cause them to be carried on, instead, on the soil of India, China, Japan, and Mexico. Let us compare England and China in the year 1869, and again in 1894, to take a round quarter-century of time. Let us suppose that an 2 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. independent capitalist, resident, say, in America, and caring nothing either for England or China, were hesitating in which country to set up a manufactory. Let us suppose that he made inquiry as to the cost of labor in the two countries, and that he was told the amount of labor required to make a given quantity of cloth would cost him 1 sovereign in England or 4 ounces of silver in China, he would say: "The value of silver is 5 shillings per ounce; 4 ounces of silver cost £1 ; my sover- eign would purchase the same amount of labor either in England or China. I prefer England." Now let us look at 1894. Gold wages have certainly not fallen in England; we have conclusive evidence that silver wages have not risen in China; therefore, if the same man inquired now, he would still be told that the labor required to make a given amount of cloth would cost him 1 sovereign in England, or 4 ounces of silver in China. He would say: "Silver has fallen from 5s. to less than 2 shillings 6 pence per ounce; therefore, for half a sovereign I can buy 4 ounces of silver and, as far as the cost of labor is concerned, I can now get as much cloth made in China for half a sovereign as I can get made in England for a sovereign. I prefer China." The public would not stop to listen; but "dogged does it." We hammered away, making a convert here and there, until now even Sir William Harcourt admits that the professors of political economy are on our side. During the last two years I have had information sent me from many parts of the world that the manufacturing and agricul- tural industries in silver-using countries are advancing by leaps and bounds, while in England and other gold-using countries they are mostly stagnant and declining. Now, I said to myself, we have no longer to rely on theory; we have hard, practical facts to point to. Some one should put these facts in a way in which our great industrial population can understand them. Let them once grasp the fact that employment is slipping from their hands into those of Chinese and Japanese, and the thing is done. Thehour has come. Can we find the man ? It was in order to And the man that I offered my prize. I hope that the readers of these essays will agree that in Mr. Jamieson, Her Britannic Majesty's consul-gen- eral for China, excellently supported as he is by Mr. Croal and Mr. Box, the man is found. CONDITIONS OF THE PRIZE. Sir Henry Mey Bey-Thompson offers a bimetallic prize of. a silver cup or silver plate, value £25, and £25 in sovereigns, for the paper which points out most clearly and plainly: (1) The great loss and injury which is being inflicted on the producers of this country by the extraordinary rise in the value of gold as compared with that of silver during the last twenty years, consequent on changes in the laws regulating the use of gold and silver as money in various countries. (2) The immense temptation and inducement which this rise in the value of gold holds out to capitalists in silver-using countries to develop their coal mines and to- erect machinery for the purpose of supplying themselves and other silver-using countries with the manufactured articles which this country has for long been in the habit of supplying them with. (o) "When the result of this rise in the value of gold has been a rise in the silver price of our manufactures. (6) When the result has been a fall in the gold price of them. (3) That in the competitive manufacturing industries of the world this divergence of value between gold and silver must inevitably lead to the substitution of the cheap labor of silver-using countries for the more highly paid labor of gold-using ones, a substitution which is already rapidly taking place, and which, unless some inter- national agreement is come to at once, must lead to the ruin of many of our indus- tries and the throwing out of employment of tens of thousands of our workmen. PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 3 All the papers must be in English, and either printed or typewritten, and Ibe sent in before the 30th of September, 1894, to Sir Henry Meysey-Thompson, M. P., Kirby Hall, York. No paper must exceed in length twelve pages of the Nineteenth Century Review. The right is reserved to Sir Henry and to the Bimetallic League to publish or reprint all or any part of the article which wins the prize in any form they please, without any further payment to the author of it. BIMETALLIC PRIZE COMPETITION. Paper submitted by Geo. Jamibson, H. B. M. consul-general, Shanghai, China:' winner of the prize. Viewing the world as a whole, the observed facts during the past twenty years may be stated as follows : (1) Prices (wholesale) of nearly all commodities have fallen in gold- using countries. This fall coincided roughly, step by step, with the fall in the gold value of silver up to the end of 1892. Since that date silver has fallen more rapidly than commodities, but the latter appear to be still falling. 1 (2) Wages, rents, and taxes in gold-using countries have not varied, or have varied only within narrow limits, due to temporary and local causes. Agricultural rents should, perhaps, be excepted; but these are subject only to periodical revision. (3) Eetail prices (into which wages, rent, and taxes enter largely 1 ) have not fallen to the same extent as wholesale prices; in many cases they have not fallen at all. (4) Prices (wholesale) of all commodities in silver-using countries have remained approximately steady during the period, and this whether the articles were produced in the country itself or imported. In the case of articles imported from gold-using countries, however, there has been, since the middle of 1893, a rise in silver prices, corresponding to the divergence between silver and commodities noted in No. 1. (5) "Wages, rent, and taxes have not varied in silver-using countries, or have varied only within narrow limits, and from causes unconnected with the relation of gold to silver. . (6) Eetail prices in those countries have not varied, except in the case of articles purchased at retail in gold-using countries, which have risen in proportion to the rise in gold. . In so far as these propositions refer to facts observable m England, it is unnecessary to offer any remark with regard to prices and wagesan silver-using countries, especially the Asiatic countries, which are by tar of the greatest importance to us, I would refer to the following publi- cations : " Prices and Wases in India." Statistical Department, Calcutta, 1893. "Prices of Commodities in China." Consular Reports, Miscellaneous Senes, No. 305, 1893. The various statistical publications of the Chinese and Japanese Governments. It is impossible in this short paper to do more than '"ThfnrstquesS'on is, in what way and to what extent have producers in England suffered loss by the demonetization of silver? The loss to producers is the lowered value of their produce, while wages, rents, a nd all outgoings remain the same as before. 'Index No. , 1892, silver 6.54, commodities 68; Sauerbeck's tables, appendix, 1894, silver 4.68, commodities 63. 4 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. . What, then, ai e the causes which have contributed to lower the prices of commodities in England and other gold-using countries, specially of agricultural produce? Any alteratii m of prices must be due to causes affecting the demand, or to causes affecting the supply, or to changes in the currency itself. ; It will readily be admitted that there is no falling off in demand. The world generally is growing in wealth and population, and so far as de- mand alone is concerned prices should be rising. The cause or causes must therefore be sought in the other two elements. The causes are, I would submit, the following, and I enumerate them in what I consider the order of importance as affecting agricultural pro- duce, beginning with the one which has the least effect: (1) The first is cheap ocean freights and a lessening of cost of pro- duction through improvements in machinery, new chemical discoveries, and other scientific advances. (2) The appreciation of gold consequent upon the demonetization' of silver. (3) An enlarged area of supply consequent on the relative cheapness of silver to gold. As silver prices in Asiatic countries have not risen, the produce of those countries can be laid down in England at almost Asiatic prices. I shall briefly remark on each of these in order. (1) Lowered cost of transport and production. This cause is often put forward as being the principal element in the case, and it is neces- sary to notice it, as it has doubtless had some effect. But it may be pointed out that this cause, or set of causes rather, had been in operation long before 1873, and did not prevent a great rise of prices between 1850 and 1873. Had these been the only agents working for a fall, all other thiDgs being equal, though in some commodities the fall might have been considerable, it is very improbable that prices all over would have been reduced more than a few points, possibly 3 to 5 per cent. (2) The appreciation of gold. It will readily be admitted that if gold were the only currency in the world a sudden augmentation or diminution of the mass by, say, one- half would raise or lower prices in nearly the same proportion. Now, ■when gold and silver circulated side by side, at a fixed ratio maintained by the open mints of the Latin union, the metallic medium may be deemed to have been, for all practical purposes, either all gold or all sil- ver. For example, suppose there are a; ounces of gold in circulation, as currency in the world, and y ounces of silver, and that 1 ounce of gold exchanges for 16 ounces of silver; then the metallic medium, in terms of gold, would be f x+ |L \ ounces, and in silver, would be (I6x+y) ounces. The two terms would be perfectly interchangeable, and the world might be said in effect to be monometallic. Prices in gold would adjust them- selves in relation to the mass f x +A \ and prices in silver in rela- tion to the mass (l&x+y), and how much was x, and how much was y, would be perfectly immaterial. Eelatively to one another the volume of either might vary indefinitely, without having any effect upon prices, which would vary only iu relation to the mass of the two. , Such in effect was the state of the world up to. 1873. The value of the whole of x was then, as we know, approximately equal to the whole of y, but that was quite accidental and had not always been so. By the breaking of the bimetallic link the silver-using and the gold- using portions of the world parted company. In the;gold-using portion PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 5 prices began to adjust themselves in relation to the mass x, and in the silver using portion in relation to the mass y, or, to speak more correctlv in relation to that mass of y which for the time being entered into their currency. Now, had the two halves of the world been approximately equal in wealth, population, and extent of commerce, the adjustment might have been effected without any great disturbance of prices. One would have parted with its gold, and the other with its silver, as a fair exchange, and no harm would have been done to anybody. As a matter of fact, however, the two halves were very unequal, the gold-using half being immensely superior; and, moreover, tbis half was owner of a great part of the floating silver, and of the silver-producing mines. Anxious as gold countries might be to get rid of their surplus silver, they would not part with it for nothing; and ready and anxious as silver-using countries might be to get silver, they could only get it for value of some sort, either by way of loans, or in settlement of the annual balance of trade. This is a process that takes time. Silver- using countries for the most part are making additions to their stock of silver year by year; but they are absorbing it only slowly. Conse- quently prices in those countries conform themselves, not to the whole mass of y in the world, but only to that part of it which has found its way into their circulation. I may here remark in passing that this seems to explain quite satis- factorily how it is that prices and wages have risen so little in those countries, contrary to what was generally expected. In India, where the additions to the currency have been considerable, there has been some rise in the price of food and wages, particularly in those classes of skilled labor which the new industries have called into existence. So in Japan the same thing may be observed in a smaller degree. In China, on the contrary, there has been no import of silver to speak of, and no chaDge whatever in prices and wages. Nor is there likely to be any material change in this respect, whatever the relative value of gold and silver may be; though, of course, the lower silver goes, the easier in a way will it be for China and the other silver countries named to get it. In gold-using countries, on the other hand, which have voluntarily restricted their circulation to gold, inasmuch as the mass x is manifestly insufficient to carry the commerce and industries formerly borne by x plus- a considerable portion of y, prices, of course, have fallen. The quantity x has to be spread over a greater area, and as the annual additions are only sufficient to repair waste and to meet the increased demand due to the natural growth of trade, the value necessarily appreciates. What the exact percentage due to this cause may be I do not ven- ture to attempt to estimate. Whatever it may be, it ought to affect all commodities alike, and also, though more slowly, wages. (,'5) The other cause which I have named has been and continues to be the principal factor in cheapening the prices of produce, especially produce of the cereal class. A very few words will suffice to make this clear. In the years pre- ceding 1873, when the rupee was at 2 shillings nearly, the price of Indian wheat in Bombay was approximately 10 shillings per hundred- weight, and the Gazette price of English wheat in London was about 54 shillings per quarter, equal 12 shillings and 4 pence per hundred- weight. Allowing for quality and costs of transport, these prices may be deemed equivalents. When the rupee exchange fell to 1 shilling D PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. and sixpence, Indian wheat, the silver price of which in Bombay has, with temporary fluctuations, remained constant, 1 would cost in Bom- bay about 7 shillings per hundredweight and could be laid down in London for something like 8 shillings and 6 pence. All the other sources of supply remained open as before, the supply for the time being was greater than the demand, and consequently the price fell to the level of the lowest market. Again the exchange value of the rupee falls to, say, 1 shilling and 1 penny. Indian wheat can now be laid down in London at nearly half the sterling price of 1873 (costs of trans- port having also in the meantime been greatly reduced), and conse- quently the price of wheat all over falls to a corresponding point. This is a fair illustration of what has been going all over the world. We draw our supplies from all countries wherever they can be procured most cheaply. By each successive drop in the gold value of silver, a greater and greater amount of produce has been admitted from India and other silver countries, and always at a cheaper rate.- Had the rupee retained its old value, of 2 shillings, it is perfectly certain that no wheat could be imported from India at present rates. There is no reason to suppose that the rupee price in Bombay would have been materially different from what it has been. Had the gold value of the rupee not fallen, the area of grain supply would never have widened as it has done; demand and supply would have been more evenly balanced, and the variations in price would have been confined within small limits. The same reasoning that applies to grain applies to every other article that can be supplied freely from silver-standard countries. The silver prices in those countries have, as. the experience of twenty .years has shown us, remained approximately steady, and necessarily the gold price has fallen. In no article, however, has the correspondence ibetween the price of silver and the price of the article been so complete as in grain. In 1873, when the price of silver was 60 pence, wheat stood at 54 shillings. To-day silver is 28J pence and wheat 24 shillings, being a drop in the one case of 52.5 per cent, and in the other of 55.6 per cent. It is simply the old law of supply and demand. Increase the area of' supply, and you have, for the time being, the supply outrunning the demand. With an excessive supply, the cost of production iu the cheapest area must determine the price of the whole. So long as Indian wheat can be laid down at 23 shillings a quarter, it is impossible for English farmers to get a higher price, quality for quality. India, by itself, of course, could not provide enough wheat to supply the whole English demand, but that is not the point. All the other sources, whence England drew her supplies before the fall in silver, still continue to send wheat forward, and it is the cheap rate at which the excess sup- ply from India and other silver countries is offered that governs the market. The lower silver goes, the cheaper and cheaper does this excess supply become. And there is no help for it, until either silver begins to rise again, or until some portions of the earth are thrown out of wheat cultivation and the demand again overtakes the supply. But it may be said, granting that the cheapening of produce is hard on the agriculturist, it must be a very good thing for the country at large, especially for the manufacturing portion, who get the same wages, and therefore can live so much better. This seeming prosperity, how- ever, can be but short lived, for— 'Official quotation: Wheat No. 1, soft, per candy, 1873, R. 34 S 0: wheat No. 1, sort, per candy, 1893, R. 32 11 1. (Prices and Wages in India.) PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 7 II. The rise in the value of gold holds out an immense temptation to the capitalists of silver countries to develop their coal mines, and to erect machinery for the purpose of supplying themselves and other silver countries with the manufactured articles which this country has long been in the habit of supplying them with. The inducement to this lies in the fact that wages in all silver-using countries, formerly cheap, have now, by the fall in silver become 50 per cent cheaper, relatively to gold wages, or, to put it in a different form,, that wages in gold-usiog countries have, through the appreciation of gold become 100 per cent dearer than they were relatively to silver wages. Prices of commodities regulate themselves automatically, and from day to day. Given an equilibrium of prices at any moment between a , silver-using and a gold -using country, any subsequent fall in silver must have one or other of two results — either the gold price must fall, or the silver price must rise. The exchangeable value of any article is, within a certain limit representing costs of transport, necessarily the same all the world over. A bale of cotton, for example, has the same exchangeable value in Liverpool, Bombay, or New Orleans, allowing for a certain fixed margin, representing costs of transport, merchants' profit, and duty, if any. In bulky articles this margin is of course considerable, but that does not affect the principle. Whenever the article, for any reason, becomes cheaper in one place than in another, there is a profit in exporting it. A flow sets in from the cheaper to the the dearer, until the ordinary equilibrium is restored. With wages, however, it is different. The price of a day's labor in Bombay bears no relation to the price in Liverpool, even assuming the quality to be equal. If, indeed, we could import a cargo of coolies as easily as we import a bale or cargo of cotton the adjustment would be rapid. But the standard of wages iu any country is regulated on very different principles. The law of supply and demand, which governs wages, is not international, like the law for commodities, but national or even provincial. And in England, where the rights of labor are so well guarded by trade-unionism and a sympathetic legislature, even the law of supply and demand has not free scope. An employer of labor must pay the recognized wages or close his mill. Adjustments in the direction of a fall can only be brought about by concerted action, and usually after a strike or lockout, or other painful and expensive process. , Let us see, now, how these principles work out m our trade witn silver-using countries, say China, to take a familiar example. The result of a fall in silver must be, as I have said, that either the silver price in China must rise, or the gold price in England must fall, or else it must be partly the one and partly the other. An English merchant who ships cotton manufactures to China can only do so on terms that pay in the long run. If the buying price in Manchester keeps firm he must get such a higher silver price in China as will counteract the fall in exchange. If silver falls 10 per cent he must demand a 10 per cent higher silver rate, other things being equal if the Manchester market falls 10 per cent he will be able to .sell at th& old silver rate, or if the Manchester market tails o per cent he will be °TKb^Jd 5 S prices, during the twenty ye.rs up to the end of 1892 hTs ?een that go!d prices have falle, .and silver P™ have remained steady. Since the beginning of 1893, however, there ^ ; been a change The Manchester price has been steadier, and con se- qutotiythefilVer Price has risen. The following table, compiled from 8 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. the published market reports in Shanghai, shows the variations in silver prices of Manchester goods for the last fourteen years. The prices of 1882 are taken as 100 : 1882 100 1883 98 1884 99 1885 99 1886 99 1887 103 1888 108 1889 100 1890 95 1891 97 1892...., 99 1893, June 115 1893, December 139 1894, June 138 The rise, as will be seen, was as much as 38 per cent. Possibly this will not be maintained ; . but undoubtedly a very considerable rise, which looks like being permanent, has been established. Let us consider, first, the effects when the gold price falls., and by consequence the silver price is steady. Suppose two cotton mills working, the one in England and the other in Japan or China, and competing with one another for the sale of their productions, and contrast the position of the two in 1873 and in 1893. Let us assume that in 1873 they were competing on even terms — that is, that each realized to the owners the same profit. In 1894 each employs the same amount of labor as it did in 1873, which the English pays for in gold at the old rates, and the Japanese in silver also at the old rates. The Japanese mill owner still pays for his men, as he used to, 18 to 20 cents a day, and for his women 8 to 10 cents a day. In 1873 that meant 9 to 10 pence per day for men, and 4 to 5 pence for women. Now, it means just one-half — that is, 4 to 5 pence and 2 to 2J pence. Multiply this over 2,000 mill hands, and see what the saving will be on labor alone. But this is not all. The same advantage accrues on the coal bill. Japanese coals cost them, say, $4 to $5 a ton, which meant 16 to 20 shillings. They still can be got at $4 to $5 a ton, but that now only means 8 to 10 shillings. The same thing applies to rent, wages, taxes, and all fixed charges whatsoever. They are all payable in silver, and have nowise varied with the rise in gold. Only in the single item of raw material is the old equality maintained. Both are free to buy that wherever they can find it cheapest on the world's market, the only advantage being proximity to the best source of sup- ply and, consequently, economy of transport. Now, so long as the gold price went on falling, and the silver price consequently kept steady, there was no great manifest advantage result- ing to the Japanese manufacturer from a fall in exchange. He contin- ued to get the same prices for his products, and his outlay was the. same, year by year, both being in silver. Any improvement he could effect by economy of management or by getting his raw material cheaper, would be so much extra profit; otherwise his position was unaffected. In any case exchange fluctuations would not trouble him. The English manufacturer, on the other hand, has to meet the same fixed expenditure from ever decreasing returns. He is able to buy his raw material cheaper, owing to the general fall in commodities, but his wages bill, his rent, his interest on borrowed capital, his rates and taxes, have all to be met as before. His profits begin to dwindle; it is only by the greatest economy of management that he can keep open at all. The best mills only manage to pay a fair profit ; the worst struggle to the verge of bankruptcy, always hoping for a turn. of the tide, and finally are forced to close. Suppose, in the second place, that the silver price rises, and, as a consequence, the gold price remains steady. PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 9 The gold manufacturer -is, for the time being, in an easier position. Hisreturns do not fall off, and, though his expenses are the same, he is in a position to profit by any economy of manufacture or manage- But the silver manufacturer is, so to speak, on clover. All his work- ing expenses are on the old scale, and he is thus a clear gainer bv the extra price he gets for his products. If silver prices have risen, say 10 per cent, his profits will be increased by just 10 per cent on his turn- over. The natural result of this will be to attract more capital, more mills will be built, and the output will increase. Competition will lower prices, and the gold manufacturer will again be driven into a corner. Whatever happens the manufacturer in the silver-standard country has a great advantage, and simply for this reason, that he can obtain his labor at half the cost relatively to gold wages, which he formerly paid. And this advantage must remain to him (unless silver can in the meantime be brought back to something like its old value) until either wages in gold countries have fallen f,0 per cent or till they have risen 100 per cent in silver using countries, or till some common meeting ground has been found between the two. In other words, the old equilibrium will not be restored until the standard of living and com- fort among the working classes in England has greatly fallen, or till the standard in silver using countries has greatly risen. There is only one item that militates against the manufacturer in silver countries, and that is the enhanced cost of his new machinery* It so happens that at present all or nearly all manufacturing machinery has to be procured from England or Europe, and the lower silver goes the more of it do Eastern manufacturers require to purchase this por- tion of their plant. As to this I would only make two remarks. In the first place the gold price of machinery has itself greatly fallen with the general fall in prices. In the second place the dearer machinery is the better will it pay silver capitalists to make that, too, in their own country. In the foregoing discussion the form of industry specially in view was the manufacture of textiles, but it will be apparent that the same argument applies to the making of machinery, and, indeed, of almost every article which we have been in the habit of supplying silver countries with. In all industries where rough mechanical labor forms a principal ingredient, there is an obvious advantage. The building and repairing of ships might be quoted as an instance, and it is worthy of note that at the last annual meeting of one of our steamboat com- panies the chairman informed his shareholders thatalarge saving had tieen effected by having their ships docked in the East instead of in England. The same stimulus is given to open coal mines and to develop the natural resources of those countries. If native and foreign coal,, twenty years ago, sold at about equivalent rates, the former would be to-day some 50 per cent cheaper, simply through currency changes. As a 'matter of fact it is now well known that the whole trade of the East is supplied by Japanese and Chinese coal. The former, indeed, is being sent to San Francisco and Bombay, and the time may not be far distant when it will be sent through the canal and even to England itself. III. The result of all this must be that in the competitive manufac- turing industries of the world the divergence of value between gold and silver will inevitably lead to a gradual transfer of the seat of all "10 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. the great manufactures from gold-using to silver-using countries, and, if England persists in excluding herself from the benefits of an abun- dant supply of the international media of exchange, to the ruin of our national industries. As competitors with one another for the sale of their products on the world's market, the nations that can for any reason produce most cheaply are bound to win in the long run. Hitherto we have been able to do this from a combination of causes. Cheap iron, cheap coal, scientific improvements in machinery, skilled workmen, and economy in the combination of labor, have for a long time enabled us to main- tain an industrial supremacy, and yet to pay our workmen higher wages than were paid in any other country. And had this currency trouble never arisen, there is not the least doubt but that we should easily have held our own. • But the momentous economic change implied in the divergence of the old value of gold and silver by as much as 50 per cent has entirely altered the cpnditions. Coal is not any longer relatively cheap in England, nor is iron. Labor is 100 per cent dearer in relation to silver wages than it was. We have' no monopoly of scientific machinery. Oriental nations can buy the best that is produced, and they can engage skilled workmen to teach the natives how to beat us at our own trade. And though I have insisted on the element of wages as being, as I believe it is, the most important factor in the case, it is not the only advantage that silver-using countries have. Rents, taxes, rates, and all fixed obligations whatever are light and easily discharged, whereas in gold countries they are heavy, and tend to become heavier with every further appreciation of the metal. The consequence of all this is what might be expected, while old, established industries in England are in many cases barely paying "expenses, new and rival industries in the far East are springing up broadcast, and, in spite of inexperience and extravagance of manage- ment, are paying handsome returns to their owners. In the report of the Yokohama Chamber of Commerce, dated May 5, 1894, the following statistics are given : The first spinning mill in Japan was erected in 1863 with 5,456 spin- dles. At end of 1883 there were 16 mills with 43,700 spindles; 1888, 24 mills with 88,140 spindles; 1892,39 mills with 403,314 spindles; and 1893, 46 mills with about 600,000 spindles. The same report adds, a still more rapid increase is expected in the near future. Large orders, it is known, have been placed for more machinery; some for yarns of the finer qualities. In the consular report on trade at Kobe, for 1892, a return is given of the dividends paid during the preceding twelve months by 21 mills in Osaka. The average dividend was 18 per cent; the highest being 28 per cent, and the lowest 8 per cent. The dividends for 1893, as reported from time to time in the Japan newspapers, appear, to have been ••equally good or better. According to a recent number of the Japan ■Gazette, 11 mills, whose names are given, paid an average dividend of "16 per cent for the first six months of 1894, as compared with 12 per •cent for the corresponding period of 1893. Compare this with the account of the cotton trade in England, as given in the Economist of Februarv 17 of this. year. I can not afford room to quote passages, but briefly, the balance sheets of 93 spinning companies m Oldham show a net total loss of £72,768 in 1893, against a like net loss of £104,664 in 1892. At the end of 1890 only 8 of these PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 11 companies bad adverse balaiices, arid these amounted to only £8,412; at the close of 1891, 49 companies had adverse balances amounting to £142,767 ; and at the close of 1893, 63 companies had realized a tdtal loss of £366,800 on their working. account. Surely there is something seriously alarming in these figures. Have our manufacturers, with all their accumulated wealth of experience, become so effete that they allow themselves to be beaten at their own trade by amateur spinners in Japan? Or is it not that there is some enormous difference in the economic conditions of the two countries which enables the Eastern manufacturer to win without effort while the Western is struggling his hardest to get even a place in the race? It has not unfrequently been said that it is some consolation to us, in the midst of all our depression of trade, to find that other coun- tries — such as Germany and. the United States — are in an equally bad condition. But I would venture to suggest that this exactly empha- sizes the present contention, viz, that the countries that are suffering by reason of the fall in silver are the gold-standard countries, and those that are reaping the benefit are the silver countries. If India is pointed to as a silver country that is in an embarrassed condition I would reply that the whole of her trouble comes from the fact of her owing a large foreign debt in gold, which is quite accidental. Had her debt been payable in silver, as it might have been, and but for her relation to England probably would have been, she would now be in an excellent position. Taxation, in that case, would have been light; trade and manufactures would have been increasing, as they are, and all circumstances would have been favorable to the rapid accumulation of wealth. China, which has long lagged behind in the industrial race, is also waking up to the situation. At the present moment three large facto- ries are being erected at the port from which I write, covering many acres of ground, aud before another year is out, two or three hundred thousand spindles will be at work. That the ordinary Chinese coolie can be readily converted into an efficient mill hand has been abun- dantly proved. His patient endurance of labor is well known, as also his frugal habits. The present rate of wages, with which he is well content, may be put, in English money, at from 3 to 5 pence per day. The supply of labor is so enormous, and the extent of the country is so vast, that many years must elapse before there can be any material rise in wages. . , ,, _, , ,. „ But it may be urged, granting that India and other Eastern nations can make their own coarser and commoner yarns and cloths, the com- ■petition is after all confined to these grades and they can not touch us in the finer qualities. It is no doubt true that hitherto the competition has been mainly in the class of goods mentioned, but there is no reason whatever why it should be confined to that. It there is any force at all in the argument adduced it extends toM™^* ^™? whatever. The only reason why Eastern mills have hitherto devoted themselves to the lower counts of spinnings is that native ^cotton « most suited for this quality, and that the greatest ; profit -was fa .be made iu this branch of the industry. But there is no reason why American and Egyptian cotton should not be imported when required, alftTs imported nto England. No doubt a good many years will Sapse LfTthese Easter/mills can oust us from the potior ,we now occupy as manufacturers of the medium and finer fabrics. But that things are tending that way there can be no doubt. Mr. Obonor, 12 PAPKR ON THE- SILVER QUESTION. assistant secretary to the Government of India, in his Beview of the Trade for 1892-93, says: The influences that affected the market for yarns, affected also the market for piece goods, which continue to exhibit a nonprogressive character. The trade in unbleached goods is smaller than it has been since 1883, and in neither white nor colored goods is any advance apparent for many years. It mnst be inferred that as suggested in the Review of Trade for 1890-91, imported piece goods are gradually being superseded by local manufactures. And again, page 36 : There is no doubt, looking at the course of trade over a series of years, the com- petition of Indian mills is telling on the import of Manchester goods. The mills are gradually beginning to make the medium class of goods, which form the bulk of the imports, and they are also beginning to bleach and dye their goods. The process described by Mr. O'Couor will be hastened by the devel- opment of yarn spinning in the far East. The principal outlet for Bombay yarns has been Ohina and Japan. As these markets are closed to them, as they will be in a few years by the progress of local mills, the Bombay mill owners must devote themselves more and more to the medium and finer kinds of cloth, which in turn will oust the Manchester products. But the object of this paper is not to show the rate of speed, at which these changes may be expected to arrive, but to show the tendency and drift of things, as the inevitable consequence of the monetary dis- turbance. There are, of course, other elements that count, and which may for a period postpone the catastrophe or mitigate its effects. Intel- ligence, organization, abundant supply of capital may enable a manu- facturer to hold his own or even succeed against economic advantages favoring his competitor. England has all these on her side, and doubt- less will make a good fight for it. But our mauufacturers are fighting against odds. They are handi- capped in the race, aud many changes and adjustments are inevitable. Many forms of industry will have to be abandoned altogether, and though new forms may take their place, much capital will be lost and , much suffering entailed. But why should our people be handicapped 1 What national advan- tage can be shown at all commensurate to the great evils that are evi- dent? It has, unfortunately, become ingrained in the English mind that gold monometallism is inseparable from our national prosperity^ But should we not have prospered all the same up to 1873 had we been bimetallic, as France was ! We should have enjoyed all the advantages of a fixed par of exchange none the less by being ourselves a party to the league. And has the nation prospered so much since 1873 that we are justified in glorying in monometallism ! Some individuals have prospered, no doubt. All those who have a realized capital in gold have benefited. But for the bulk of the nation, for the industries which are the life and soul of the couutry, the change has been almost an unmixed evil. Geo. Jamieson. THE RISE IN THE VALUE OF GOLD. By Thomas Holyoakk Box. (1) The great loss and injury which is being inflicted on the British producers by the extraordinary rise in the value of gold as compared with that of silver during the last twenty years, consequent on changes in the laws regulating the use of gold and silver as monev in various countries. PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 13 There is nothing which has caused so much injury to British pro- ducers of to-day comparable to the rise in the value of gold compared to silver; but the injury already inflicted, although very considerable, is insignificant to what it will be unless some speedy means are found to alter the currency system of the world. The mighty dollar — the sil- ver dollar, I mean — is becoming almighty by its cheapness, compared to gold, and unless it« evil influence on British industries is thoroughly understood by the working classes, and its power promptly crippled, it will soon bring about the greatest commercial revolution the world has ever known. The East, with its teeming millions, has, by farseeing minds, been looked to as the future great and permanent market for British goods; consequently it is most necessary tliat every Englishman should know what changes are taking place, and which owe their existence entirely to cheap silver. When a fixed ratio existed between gold and silver, the silver dollar was worth about 4 shillings and 2 pence, and the rupee .: shillings and 1 pence. Now the former is worth only 2 shillings and tbe latter 1 shil- ling, or less than one-half of their original value in gold, with a ten- dency still to decline. Considering that the silver value of food and labor in the East has varied little within the last twenty years, and especially in the interior where the teeming millions live, it will be read- ily understood that the extraordinary rise in the silver price of gold has greatly diminished and impeded the consumption of British-made goods and considerably reduced their gold prices. The conservatism of the Oriental is proverbial, and it takes a great deal to make him change. But he loves money, and consequently feels the more keenly the great advance in the prices of British -made goods in his own silver currency during the last twenty years. The value of money in the East is considerable in its purchasing powers, so far as native products are concerned, and out of all propor- tion to what it is in England. An Oriental can buy all the necessaries of life for a few cents per day, and therefore knows and realizes the value of money far more than an Englishman does. He counts the cost of everything, not only to the cent but the tenth part of a cent. A cent is now worth less than an English farthing, and there is a coin m everyday use all over the East of the value of one-tenth of a cent only. This great purchasing power in general of money in, the East must always be kept in mind, in order to properly understand the influence the great rise in the silver price of gold has on the Oriental when pur- chasing foreign goods. To buy such goods always means the spending of a lot of money, and he only buys them as luxuries or as absolute necessities, according to their nature. English goods were the first introduced into the East, and they acquired a wide reputation. Ihe Oriental, once satisfied with an article, always uses it if he can get it at a reasonable price. You may show him another, and it may be a better one; but he knows the old make, and will have it again and again in spite of all persuasion to the contrary. Tins is why so many well-known brands hold their own against new goods In order to explain the more dearly the d»«Wj^ft™ g^ are taking place, I will use the dollar as a unit. We will put it down as beinff worth, roughly, 4 shillings, or $5 to the pound. Aslonjas silver remained at a fixed ratio with gold, it was compara- tively eafy to do business in the East. If prices rose in gold ^they wonld naturally rise in silver; and if the Oriental could not afford toSuy, 'hekaeTwh^a^d was 'content to wait till prices came down 14 PAPER ON THE SILVER . QUESTION. again ; but when silver began to fall in its ratio tp gold, the silver price, or selling price in the East, of British-made goods began to rise without any visible reason to the Oriental. For a time he was bewildered. To him a dollar was a dollar, and he could not see why an article which still only cost 4 shillings should be worth more than a dollar in silver,.. ^ It was useless to try to explain it. He could not and would not under- stand, and rather than pay more he would do without the goods. Indeed, it is a well-known fact that for a considerable time merchants were obliged to forego their profits in order to dispose of their goods.. f The English manufacturer was continually advised of this, but he would not bring down his prices, and eventually the merchant had to demand more silver. Then the Oriental began to look about . for cheaper goods. He did not like it at all. It was against his nature to change; he had used English goods for a long time and had got accustomed to them ; but he could not pay the increased price in his silver money, so he bought continental goods instead. The English manufacturer was duly informed of this, but he usually replied that the Oriental would soon find out his mistake; that the continental goods were rubbish, and if once tried would never be bought again. It was the English manufacturer who had to find out his mistake; for the Oriental, once having the continental goods, made them suit his purpose, and continued to buy them because of their cheapness. There is little doubt that the rise in the value of gold compared with silver has been the main cause of the great growth of the continental trade with the East, and that the German and Belgian iron and steel industries in particular owe most of their success to it, for once having , got a, footing in the market they were ever ready to undersell the British merchant in order to keep their trade. But silver still continued to fall, and although prices in Europe fell too, their gold price did not fall in proportion to the fall in the gold value of silver, and the Oriental was again perplexed. He found the conti- nental goods, even, too dear for his small means; but in the meantime he had studied the vexed problem of the fluctuations in the relative value of gold and silver. Food and labor cost him about the same as they had done, but British and continental goods were continually getting dearer in silver 'through the decline in its value as compared . with that of gold, and seemed likely to continue doing so. If he could, only manufacture similar goods himself, he could make plenty of money out of it,' and that was what he wanted most. Pressed by necessity and the bright prospects, he commenced, very clandestinely, of course, , Oriental fashion. It would not do to let anyone know; it must be kept a profound secret. They must not be known as his make, or they would not. sell. They must have a foreign appearance, and be palmed off as . foreign made; so he started with such as were sold by the label or wrapper. Wonderful imitations they were— the wrappers I mean— but the goods themselves positive rubbish. The "primitive way in which they were produced and the inferior materials of which they were made could not make them otherwise; but in, their foreign dress they sold, and the whole interior districts were soon flooded with them. Of course they were all British imitations, such as Bass's beer, Guiness's stout, Exshaw's brandy, and even Pears's soap, and they could all be bought in a dozen different makes, but with labels apparently perfectly genuine, and in some cases actually put up in the original bottles and wrappers. His intention, of course, was only to impose on his own countrymen, for the Oriental, living in the interiors with no knowledge of European . PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 15 writing, deceived by the appearance of the label, would be quite satis- fled with the quality of the goods. But by degrees they reached the seaports and got into European hands. In India steps were soon taken to punish the guilty, and in China the squeeze of the mandarin greatly reduced the profits. But in Japan there was no redress, there being no protection for foreign patents and trade-marks; the govern- ments declined to interfere, and when diplomatic stress was brought to bear on them they openly encouraged it, declaring that foreigners had no right to complain; that the goods would not sell without foreign labels, and to stop the use of such labels would be to destroy the indus- tries of Japan. Thus was inflicted upon British producers the greatest blow ever aimed at their trade in the far Bast. For a time the confu- sion was great and the complaints severe, but, encouraged by success and supported by the Government, the Japanese set to work to improve the quality and appearance of their productions. Machinery was imported and the best European skill obtained. Weaving, at which they were already adepts, has been greatly improved and adapted to European styles, and silks and cotton goods are largely exported to all parts of the world. Large breweries have been built, which supply excellent beer in quantities not only sufficient to supply the demand of the country, but shipped largely to China and the Straits Settlements. Dockyards have been made where the largest ships can be built and repaired, and iron foundries and engine shops under European super- vision turn out the best of work. A scheme is also on foot to erect large iron and steel works, subsidized by the Government, where plates, rails, etc., can be produced for shipbuilding and railway purposes, and so great has been the improvement in the quality of household requis- ites that European ladies, who five or six years ago would have spurned anything Japanese made, now do most of their shopping in the native stores, while merchants, who for years have imported only British prod- ucts and manufactures, are seeking customers all over the world for the new goods being made in Japan. The assistance rendered by the Japanese Government to native manu- factures and producers, not only in declining to interfere with their using foreign patents and trade-marks, but in many instances subsidizing and fostering their industries, has made Japan the foremost manufac- turing nation of the East. But its power to compete in the markets of the world is solely due to the cheapness of the price of silver as com- pared with that of gold. Those goods which had to be clothed in a foreign dress in order to command a sale have been improved, and by the use of machinery and the aid of foreign help and experience, till they can now hold their own in their native costume. But it is to the cheapness of the value of silver, as compared with that of gold, that they owe their power to compete in the markets of the world. (2) The immense temptation and inducement which this rise in the value of gold holds out to capitalists in silver-using countries to develop their coal mines and to erect machinery for the purpose of supplying themselves and other silver-using countries with the manufactured articles which Great Britain has so long been in the habit of supplying them with. , . ,_ _ , , . „ There is an ever-growing demand for coal m the East, and especially by the British steamship companies trading there. Although it exists: within easy reach of most of the ports, it could not be got at a profit, and there was little inducement to get it while a fixed ratio existed between gold and silver which kept up the gold value of the silver dol- lar The Japanese Government tried the experiment and spent large 16 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. sums of money in opening mines, but they gave up the enterprise and sold the concerns to private companies at a great sacrifice to avoid further loss. The gold value of the silver dollar was then worth about 4 shillings. Cardiff coal was used all over the East, with an occa- sional cargo from Australia. Its cost, with freight, was about 40 shil- lings per ton laid down at the ports, or $10 per ton in silver. But ten years ago the value of the dollar had fallen to 3 shillings 4 pence iu gold, which raised the price of coal to $12 per ton in silver, although still costing only 40 shillings per ton in gold. The Japanese coal, how- ever, could be got for less than $10, and a few cargo steamers com- menced to use it. It was mostly surface coal and of inferior quality, but as most of the freight between the Eastern ports is earned in silver this rise of $2 per ton in the silver price of Cardiff coal, with no corresponding rise in the rate of freights to meet it, was a seri- ous matter with the steamship companies, and they began to con- sider the necessity of using cheaper coal. The increased demand for Japanese coal made its production remunerative, and capitalists were ready to invest their capital in order to develop an industry which offered such inducements. As the rise in the value of gold con- tinued so did the price of Cardiff coal increase, while, by the aid of machinery and an improved system of mining, the Japanese coal got cheaper. Some of the finest plants in the world have been laid down in Japan, the lower seams worked, and a good quality of coal found, little inferior to Welsh or English. Railways have been built to convey it to convenient ports, and mines opened all over the country. The result is that while the silver price of Cardiff coal has increased to $15 and $16 per ton, in spite of its reduced cost in gold, Japanese coal of very good, quality can be bought at $3 per ton, and even less. Consequently the British coal trade in the East has practically ceased, and the millions of tons it would have supplied annually had silver remained at a fixed ratio with gold are now procured from Japan, for all steamers trading to the East use that fuel east of the Suez Canal. And what has been done in the coal trade is being attempted, and so far very successfully, with manufactured goods, although the progress ' is much slower. In the former case the demand, was ou the spot, and those who bought it were well acquainted with the advantages offered, while in the latter markets have to be found, goods sent out and tried, and numerous changes and alterations made to suit the varied wants. But the progress is nevertheless rapid, and the success so encouraging that capitalists are eager to invest their money in industries of almost every kind. Twenty years ago any connection with trade was con- sidered degrading in the eyes of the Japanese, and no respectable per- son would have anything to do with it. The very lowest only were in it, and they were looked on as beings contaminated by some loathsome' disease. To day it is the " El Dorado" of the highest and most intelli- gent. What can have brought about the change, except the profits already derived, and now eagerly sought for in the manufacture of goods which hitherto had been purchased from Great Britain and the Continent. A comparison of the relative values of gold and silver twenty years ago with those of to-day will the better enable us to understand the positions of the producers of Great Britain and Japan at the present time. The original value of £1 sterling was about $5 in silver, the value at the present time of £1 sterling is about $10 in silver, so that if British goods cost the same to produce now as they did twenty years ago they would be worth just double the amount in silver. PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 17 The original value of the dollar was 4 shillings, or, say, $5 to the pound sterling ; now the value of the dollar is only 2 shillings, or, say, $10 to the pound sterling, so that supposing it costs the same to produce goods in the Ea»t now as it did twenty years ago, they can be sold for half the diiiiouuu m gold. The result is that goods produced in gold-using countries have become double their price m silver, and those produced in silver-using countries reduced to half their price in gold. The effect requires no explanation. It is argued that the cheap produce from the East, such as sugar, rice grain, tea, etc., enables the British producer to live cheaper, and con' ; sequently produce cheaper. This is good so far as it goes, but it can not possibly go far enough to enable him to compete with the cheap Eastern labor. If he could produce at half the gold price he did twenty years ago he would still be only on a level with the Oriental. The fact is that goods produced in gold-using countries are dear in silver-using countries and are the less in demand, while those produced in silver- using countries are cheap in gold-using countries, and their consump- tion is continually increasing. The result is that in the former trade is declining and unprofitable, with plenty of cheap money lying idle: in the latter, trade is plentiful and profitable, capital scarce and dividends large. It will be seen that the result of this rise in the value of gold has almost invariably meant a rise in the silver value of British manufac- tures. I know of no British industry which has been able to so econo- mize in its methods of production as to be able to regularly supply its goods to Eastern countries at fixed silver prices. If such should exist, I can positively assert that no rival enterprise has been started against it unless possibly it may be something specially required for Govern- ment use which would be difficult to get in times of war, and is made at a greater cost than it could be imported to insure its possession at all times. (3) That in the competitive' manufacturing industries of the world the divergence of value between gold and silver must inevitably lead to the substitution of the cheap labor of silver-using countries for the more highly paid labor of gold-using ones — a substitution which is already taking place, and, unless some international agreement be come to at once, must lead to the ruin of many British industries, and the throwing out of employment of tens of thousands of work people. If no one man were as good as another, under the same conditions and in the same field, the one who could do the work cheapest would gener- ally get the most of it to do. Such is nature's law, and, unless impeded, soon works out its own end, just as water finds its own level. The inven- tion of steam and its application of machinery gave the British pro- ducer an advantage, and he was not slow to turn it to good account and build up for himself the firstposition among the manufacturing countries of the world. Oobden tried by his system of free trade to permanently secure to the British nation this position. If other countries would fol- low suit, so much the better, for the cheaper British goods could be sold so much greater would be the demand for them, while cheap produce was the very thing she wanted to enable her to cheapen her production. Nothing could have been better ; but other countries would not take the bait. They could not compete successfully with British goods ; so after England had adopted free trade, instead of following suit as Cobden had expected they would, they turned round and increased their duties in order to . protect and foster their industries. This was not an unmixed blessing to them, for it raised the prices of their imports S. Doc. 30 2 18 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. without in any way diminishing those of their exports. It, however, seriously hampered British trade and considerably diminished the growth of it. But in the East the results are entirely different. There are no duties of serious consideration, aud they could not be increased at will; in fact, there were no industries to protect, and consequently no necessity to increase them. The great thing was to get British goods as cheap as they could. But the continual rise in the value of gold, as compared with that of silver, has changed everything. British goods got so dear in their silver value that the Oriental was forced to make for himself, and the decline in the value of the white metal has so helped him in his work that he can not only, make sufficient for himself, but is able to export them to advantage. The rise in the value of gold has doubled the silver price of British goods in the East, and has made their use almost prohibitive, while the fall in the value of silver has brought down by over a half the gold price of Oriental goods in gold-using coun- tries, and is continually increasing the demand for them. The condi- tions are so unequal that it seems impossible to continue the struggle long. It is like handicapping the champion by giving to his opponent half the distance of the race. The impossibility of the European competing with the Oriental in the open field has been proved in America. The Chinese there by their low wages so monopolized labor that they had to be excluded from the country, or the European workmen would have starved or been driven out. But the European countries are not threatened with the laborer himself (as the Americans were, where he knew the price of European labor, and could learn, understand, how much he should get himself), but with the products of that labor done at Oriental wages. Besides, it would be easy enough to refuse to employ an Oriental to do your work while it is difficult to decline to buy goods made by him, especi- ally as they improve in quality and get cheaper in price. The tempta- tion to buy them becomes all the greater as the money earned by the British workmen get less. He is the more prone to do so, and declines to buy his own made but dearer goods. Protective countries are better off. They can impose increased duties on Oriental goods, and so stop them from flooding their markets. But England with her free trade has no defense, and the brunt of the burden will fall upon her workmen. The evil is getting greater. Every farthing in the increase of the price of gold as compared with that of silver makes British goods 1 per cent dearer in the East, while everyfarthing decrease in the price of silver makes Oriental goods 1 per cent cheaper in gold- using countries. These new industries are growing very rapidly in Japan, and what is being done there can and will be done in China, India, and other places. Once well established the Oriental will hold on to them in spite of all opposition, and unless some speedyremedy is found to alter the currency system of the world their products will be spread broadcast all over the world to the ruin of British industries and untold disaster to thousands and thousands of workmen. Thomas Holtoake Box. Yokohama, August 21, 1894. P. S. — Since writing this paper a new treaty has been published, made between Great Britain and Japan, by which the latter country will be allowed to increase its duties on British products to the extent of 10 per cent after five years from the date of the treaty. , This will be a further blow to British commerce and the workingman. PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 19 THE PALL IN SILVER AND ITS EFFECT ON BRITISH TRADE. By David Octavius Ckoal. In the later clays of September this year a gentleman of some au- thority as a financial writer suggested to a mercantile audience inter- ested in Eastern trade that in supporting a reform of tbe monetary standard they were on the wrong tack. "Instead of reasoning," he remarked, "from currency to commerce, which in nine cases out of ten became mere metaphysics, let them reason from commerce to currency, which would be business." The challenge was daring and hardly judicious, coming as it did from a supporter of the existing monetary status. " As a rule, the advocates of the existing system pre- fer to avoid the commercial side of the question, for reasons that are obvious. They content themselves with the argument, or rather the assumption, that British interests must suffer through a change in standards because the value of our capital invested abroad and the return obtained from it must be depreciated. The commercial side of the picture they studiously neglect. It is highly desirable that we should obtain the biggest possible return from our foreign investments, provided we do not break our debtors by making honest fulfillment of their obligations too onerous; but it is equally desirable, indeed more so, that the capital actively employed in industry should not be permitted to become less remunerative through the change in monetary conditions that has been going ou during the past quarter of a century. It is the purpose of this paper to inquire whether the dislocation of monetary standards can be proved to have been detrimental to British industry and trade; and if that be established to discover to what extent our interests have suffered, and how far losses already sustained may be irremediable. It need hardly be said that, enormous as is our stake as a creditor country, it is of less importance than our industrial and commercial interests. Capital invested in home or foreign funds is passive, whereas money employed in manufactures is reproductive, creating work and wages, furnishing freight to railways and steam- boats, and generally bringing prosperity in its train. If then, in deter- mining whether or not a change in, monetary policy should be made, we had to choose between slightly infringing on the interests of funded capital or sacrificing those of our industrial organism, there could be little doubt in which direction the scale should turn. Eeference has been made to the neglect of the trade aspect ot the monetary problem by the single-standard men, but the reformers must also bear some share of responsibility for refraining from placing this side of the question before the public. It is true that the Lancashire movement in favor of bimetallism is inspired by a bitter experience of the evils which the dislocation of the world's standards has brought on the cotton industry. Lancashire has been convinced by the resistless logic of the emptying pocket, but the inert mass of public opinion must be stirred by the presentation of clear and tangible proofs of the injury that has already been done to the national trade by the fall m silver. Five-sixths of the intelligent population of the country do not under- stand the simple principles which account for the detrimental influence of falling and irregular exchanges on our foreign trade. Yet , these prm- ciples have less in common with abstruse economical science than with every clay common sense. It stands to reason that if in India a rupee, in China a tael, in Mexico and Central and South Arnica a do liar, to-dav buys as much rice or wheat, or other necessity, as in time past £e natSSof these countries will expect these coins to buy as much 20 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. cloth or similar goods, and will resent having to pay more for thein. Moreover, as in these countries wages remain virtually unchanged, the inhabitants are actually not in possession of greater wealth to spend on such articles. It follows equally that if an importer of foreign goods into such countries can nowadays only realize about half as much as formerly for the rupee, the tael, or the dollar in the currency in which he calculates, and in which the cost of producing the goods is paid, he must eit,.er abandon the business, submit to have his profl s pruned to vanishing points, or take steps to secure a complete readjustment of the terms on which the goods are made and s6ld. Since the fall in silver began over twenty years ago,the gold-basis - manufacturer, dealing with silver countries, has been trying hard to adopt the last alternative as a means of avoiding the second and post- poning the first, with a wonderful degree of success. Circumstances have helped him up to a certain point. Money has become less valu- able, and so he has been able to borrow capital at rather easier rates. Communication and transit are more rapid and less expensive. Machinery has been improved and the potentialities of cheaper productions have consequently been increased. All these factors nave combined to make it possible up to a certain point to bring prices of manufactured goods within reach of the purchasing power of silver-using consumers. So long as the decline in silver was grad- ual the gold-basis manufacturer suffered only moderately, his enter- prise and resolution enabling him to recoup himself by econonres in production, by modifying his views of fair profits, and by reducing hrs 'Standard of living. But when, through the action of some Gov- ernments and the inaction of others, silver began to fall by pence where before it had fallen by fractions, the limit of readjustment was reached. It can not be denied that the position of the cottnn indus- try—which has the biggest and most direct stake in our trade with silver countries — is exceedingly precarious. The situation and the attitude of the Lane shire manufacturer were clearly set forth by Mr. William Taylor, of Blackburn, at the recent bimetallic conference in London. "The difficulty that presented itself," he said, "*as this — that a fall in the exchange from 1 .shilling 3 pence to 1 shilling 1| pence caused a loss of 6 pence per piece of cloth worth 5 shil- lings. Who had to 1 se the 6 pence*? The fight for the 6 pence went on until it was adjusted, and in his experience it always ended in the manufacturer getting the worst of it. Why? Because the buyer could wait and the manufacturer could not, except by stopping his mill, thereby throwing his work people out of employment. Before he would do that, he would submit to considerable loss, in the hope that trade might soon improve." Having thus stated generally how the fall in silver tends to injure our great industries, it will be well to endeavor to give concrete examples from actual experience, and to show to what extent our interests have already suffered. It is to China that we must look for the most cogent example of the injury .done to British trade by the fall in silver. It is the custom of those who preach the infallibility of the single gold standard to explain thedeclinein the profitablecharacter of our commerce with silver countries by reference to the improved means of transit and communication, and other social and economic changes, that have been proceeding coinci- dently with the depreciation of silver. But in China there has been no appreciable alteration in social habits or economic conditions during the lastquarterofacentury. ThatisonereasonwhyChiuaaffordssosuitable a ground for working out the point under discussion. But there is an eveu PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 21 stronger reason. Thanks to the well-directed diligence of Mr. Jamiesoa, British consul at Shanghai, it has been proved, as effectually as precise and careful figures can prove anything, that the purchasing price of silver in relation to commodities of native origin has hardly varied within the last twenty years. This is a matter of tirst-rate importance to the present inquiry. It establishes that the Chinese find that the tael of silver purchases to-day practically the same quantity of native produce as it has always done in their experience. Thus, nothing has occurred to reconcile them to an alteration in the price of the few staples of foreign manufacture which they use freely. It implies that if the foreign pro- ducer desires to retain Chinese custom he must endeavor to bring his goods into the market at or about the same figure as he did before sil- ver fell. The Chinaman expects to-day as much for the tael as he did twenty years ago, but the tael he paid then was worth 6 shillings 8 pence to the seller, whereas it is now worth less than half that amount in gold. As a matter of fact until very recently indeed, the silver price of for- eign commodities tended to decline in China. A piece of grey shirtings which in 1870-1874 brought 1.18 Haikwan taels,in 1892 brought only 1.01, so that the producer had not only to face the fall in the exchange value of the money received for his goods, but had to be satisfied with a reduced sum in the depreciated currency. Consul Jamieson, whose information is drawn from "Chamber of Commerce price lists and other contempo- raneous market reports," points out that until last year the Manchester prices of cotton goods, such as are most used in China fell almost pari passu with the decline in silver. "An ordinary piece of shirtings," he writes, "which in 1872-]874 cost from 10 shillings to 10 shillings 6 pence in Manchester, is now invoiced out at 6 shillings to 6 shillings 2 pence." From figures of actual sales at Shanghai he shows that medium shirtings selling at 1.72 Shanghai taels in 18S8, sold at 1.70 in January last year. Shortly afterwards prices began to rise, the idea being that Lancashire merchants were stimulated to raise their lists by the steadier value of the rupee. By December the same shirtings had risen to LM2 taels, and the result is apparent in the diminished pur- chases of cotton pieces in China last year. From the British consular reports, from sixteen of the principal treaty ports, I find that the imports of white and grey shirtings and T cloths fell from 16,459,174 pieces in 1892 to 11,124,585 in 1893. These figures do not cover the entire trade of China, and Mr. Kopsch, statistical secretary of the imperial maritime customs, gives the diminution in these three leading articles as 3,175,000 pieces. Mr. Kopsch's statistics exclude imports from silver-using countries, and so we may take them as fairly representing the loss sustained by gold basis manufacturers in China in a single fear. That loss is sensational enough and it seems to show beyond doubt that if English manufacturers desire ^to ^ntam their trade with China at its old magnitude m point of bulk they m ust be content with a smaller return in point of money D rectly they attempt to obtain better prices down drops the quantity of goods sold. To all appearance Ihe attempt to force up ■ pric« haste tied, if we are to iud°-e bv the values in the board of trade retums tor &TL? h» this' year. In . the six months Ohto to* from us 254,954,100 vards of cotton piece goods of all descriptions of a total value of £2,357,753 which works oat at an a ve rage of 2 21 uence r>er vard. In the corresponding half of 1893 a similar cai Stlongivlsthe average value at 2.50 pence per yard ™eddfeg race of roughly a farthing per yard was equivalent on the 255,000,000 22 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. yards to over £265,570. It would be a mistake to lay much stress on figures obtained by lumping together all classes of cotton pieces in this way, but, making all due allowance for the rough-and-ready method, the result is certainly a striking illustration of the sacrifices which a leading industry has to undergo in maintaining its hold in Chinese markets. But, it may be asked, is it certain that the contraction in the importa- tion of European, chiefly English, goods into China is due to the fall in exchange'? , In reply I will cite the evidence of a number of our con- suls, whose reports are virtually unanimous. But first it may be well to quote a pointed passage from the 1893 report of Mr. Kopsch, of the imperial Chinese customs, of whose figures I have already made use. Mr. Kopsch writes : To the observer in the East it seems inexplicable tha+ the gold-currency countries,, while striving to extend their trade, should resolutely ignore the fact, so clearly demonstrated by the decline in the demand for piece goods, that to the millions in China the tael, or ounce of silver, is still a tael of undiminished purchasing power, whether the sterling value be 6 shillings or 3 shillings, and that so soon as the disr credited tael fails to buy the same quantity of foreign goods as heretofore the con- sumer ceases to be a customer and will supply his own wants by manufacturing textiles from home-grown materials. To the point raised in the last clause. I shall return later ; meantime it is. enough to say that Mr. Kopsch speaks with authority. Consul Warren, of Hankow, attributes the " sudden collapse " of cotton imports almost entirely to " the steady fall in exchange, native dealers refusing to give the higher prices which importers were obliged to ask." Consul Allen, testifies from Cliefoo that the English manufacturer " can not afford to sell at the rate in silver which used to pay him a profit, and the Chinese customer can not afford to buy as much as he did, and so trade must diminish." Consul Mansfield, of Foochow, opines that " the fall in silver will, if it continues, .speedily handicap Manchester out of the market." Such quotations might be multiplied indefinitely, for each consul reiterates the same opinion in some shape or form. Many of them refer to the extent to which native and Japanese competition is ousting Eng- lish goods, bnt that is a department of the inqury which will be dealt with separately. The opinion of trained observers on the spot — men who have no interest in misrepresenting facts and tendencies, and whose reports are made to a Government which has little desire to be put in possession of such unpalatable truths — is unanimously that British goods are losing ground in China solely because of the fall in exchange. But it may be triumphantly asked by a single-standard critic, How comes it that in the first six months of 1894, the exports of cotton piece goods to China were greater than in the first half of 1893? That is a troublesome question to deal with. If I reply that the comparison is affected by the strike in Lancashire, early in 1893, the critic would claim that the same fact vitiated any conclusions I might draw from a decrease in 1893 as compared with 1892. So it would if I were arguing solely from these figures, and not in the light of disinterested expert testimony from China. And at best the critic would score little, for the larger exports simply illustrate the deter- mina^ipn of our manufacturers to hold the field as long as they can, even at a loss. I have shown by calculations, based on the board of trade figures, that the value of these exports has fallen though the quantities have increased, a clear proof that the trade is less profit-, ' able — in other words, that our manufacturers are suffering losses. PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 23 In all other silver countries British manufacturers are meeting the sTsVq^ fv. aS , m G JTt J? Ja P an there was a d ^rea S e of SrSSPi S the 7 a i ue of Bntlsh sports in 1891 ; in 1892 the decrease * \ faoQ 1' ' and , tne separate reports of the various consuls show that in 1893 the same tendency was, visible. At the same time the imports of the country in general increased, all the growth being in goods from other silver countries Mr. Spring Eice, of the Tokyo legation, points out that m 1892 English manufacturers received the same return in sterling for 118 yards of piece goods as they did for 108 yards in 1890, a very appreciable loss. Consul Troup, of Yokohama, writing in May 111 St j S3jVS '. Since the further fall in exchange, which has taken place since the close of last year, the import trade in manufactures has been stagnant, and to what extent the Japanese consumer will be prepared to rise to the advanced dollar price of imports is not yet evident. To say the least, the trade in imports seems likely to suffer great restrictions, and in the case of articles which come into competition with home Jap- anese manufactures, probable extinction. • At several of the Japanese ports the arrivals of English cotton cloths have dwindled to nothing. Similar reports come from Korea, in which our trade interest is now quite microscopic, though it was of some value before the fall in silver shut us out of the market. From other Eastern countries we receive the same story. Reporting on the trade of the Straits Settlements in 1892, the governor referred to tlie reduc- tion in the imports of cotton pieces, and of European goods generally, as due to the decline in exchange. Our consuls in Siam repeat the tale. Acting Consul Joly, at Macao, attributes the decrease in imports from England to the fall in silver. The people in Macao are poor and must have cheap goods, and ours are beyond their pocket. Hence they have turned first to cheap German stuffs and still more to Japanese manu- factures. Leaving Asia for Central and South America we encounter precisely similar evidence. Unfortunately, the statistics of imports are not so careful, trustworthy, or up to date as those in China, but our consuls do their best to make up for the shortcomings of native officials. From Mexico, Mr. Lional Garden some time ago sent an exhaustive report on the effect of the fall in silver, in which he dwelt on the increasing cost of foreign goods in the native currency, giving elaborate tables which showed how the purchasing power of the population is curtailed at each fall in the value of the dollar. Consul Chapman, at Vera Cruz, testifies to the decline of British trade, and expresses a belief that it must go on diminishing unless some change speedily takes place in the monetary conditions. He illustrates how importing houses, while obtaining bigger prices in silver, suffered " an actual loss when the profit has to be accounted for in gold." In Costa Rica we find the dollar value of English goods rising while the sterling yield is diminishing. From Guatemala and Venezuela our consuls send simila.r wails over the decay of British trade, and in fact the experience is universal in countries on a silver basis, countries many of them only half developed and partially exploited— the very markets in which we should have expected our commercial dealings to expand as years went on, but for this insuper- able obstacle of exchange, which is a greater bar to trade than the most comprehensive and onerous tariffs, for it knows no free list. A glance through the figures of our exports to silver countries in the last ten years, as given in the Statistical Abstract of the United Kingdom just published, will show to the most casual observer how infinitely more profitable our trade with them was in 1890 and 1891, the two most recent years of high silver, than in any immediately before or after. 24 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. That British manufacturers and exporters are not only losing money from the fall in silver, but are actually losing established markets, seems undeniable in the light of the figures already cited. It falls now to examine how far we are being supplanted in silver-using countries; in other words, how far our loss of trade is likely to be permanent. It is well known that the cotton spinning and weaving industries of Bombay were brought into existence and fostered by the fall in silver. Wages were paid in silver, and thus the cost of production was so much smaller that Bombay yarn became a dangerous competitor with the Lancashire article in all Eastern markets. To-day, in turn, the Bombay manu- facturers find serious rivals in the cotton mills of Japan and China. It does not form part of the present inquiry to consider the effect on Bombay of the separation effected in June, 1893, between the value of the rupee and that of silver; but there is abundant evidence, both in the Indian trade and navigation returns, and in the reports from China, that the change was inimical to trade between the two. "The dislocation in exchange," writes Mr. Kopsch, in his valuable report on the Chinese trade of last year, " brought about by according a fictitious value to the rupee, and closing the Indian mints to the coin- age of silver, has resulted, as predicted, in a very serious falling off in the entire trade from India to China." This is germane to the particu- lar subject now under review, for it illustrates how immediate is the effect on commerce of a breach between the monetary standards of two countries. Japan has been the first of far Eastern countries to see that with silver-paid labor it is easy to compete with the products of Western industry. Consul Enslie, of Hiogo, remarks: One phase of English industries with regard to the far East, inevitable but intensely interesting, and of the most vital importance, is that for some years past the importers of the manufactured articles and those of the manufacturing machin- ery have been competing side by side, much to the steadily increasing detriment of the former. This reference is, of course, meant to apply to cotton yarn and cotton- spinning machinery. Our consul at Yokohama notes the same phenomenon of English machinery arriving to enable the Japanese to compete with Engr lish cotton and other articles. Consul Enslie shows that in 1883 Japan's imports of raw cotton were only 2,808,348 pounds, whereas in 1893 they were 154,442,368 pounds. IVIr. De Bunsen, secretary to the British legation in Tokyo, in reporting on Japanese trade of 1892 drew the attention of the foreign secretary to the " alteration which has taken place in the trade of Japan in the last few years, owing to the progress of Japanese industries. The imports of raw material are increasing at the expense of the imports of manufactured goods. While the ster- ling value of the imports has increased 19 per cent since 1887, the value of the import of cotton yarn and piece goods has decreased 17 per cent, the value of the import of woolen goods is stationary. On the other haud, Japan imported last year eleven times the quantity of raw cotton imported in 1887, and since the same year her export of fabrics manufactured in Japan has increased nearly 400 per cent. In the far East Japan has now become a competitor With England in cer- tain lines of cotton goods." The competition of Japanese goods has also,- according to the same authority, reacted on the imports of wool- ens, which are decreasing. In the 1892 consular report from Hiogo particulars were given of 21 cotton mills, only 3 of which paid divi- dends of less than 12 per cent (none below 8 per cent), while 10 of them paid over 20 per cent. The 1893 report shows that 2 of the mills which only paid 8 and 9 per cent in 1892 had improved their profits to 10 and 12J per cent respectively. ]STor do the Japanese confine their PAPER OX THE SILVER QUESTION. 25 rivalry with Europeans to cotton, much of which goes to China to compete with us. They have successfully introduced the manufacture of beer, gunpowder, saddlery, cement, matches, printing paper, soap, bricks, and leather, besides minor sundries, with the result that imports of these articles from Europe have practically died out. And they are supplying goods of these classes to all the neighboring silver countries. The latest consular reports also indicate that Japan will soon be inde- pendent of foreign iron and sugar. Not only that, but it is mentioned by our consul at Mngpo, that the machinery used for cleaning and ginning raw cotton there is supplied by the Japanese. From Macao we learn that cheap Japanese imitations of European goods of all sorts flood the bazaars. Even sleepy, unenterprising China has awakened to the fact that she can successfully and profitably make her own cotton yarn and cloth. The building of mills has been kept back through the extreme caution of the Chinese. They fear that a recovery in silver might rob them of their advantage in the native market, and might enable later compet- itors to buy European machinery more cheaply, and so cut the pioneers out. The lowness of exchange has thus helped us by retarding Chi- nese investments in machinery. But in 1892 two mills were in full operation in Shanghai, one confining itself to the manufacture of yarn, the other both spinning and weaving. The first employed 15,000 spindles and turned out 2,000,000 pounds of yarn in 1892, the second employed 25.000 spindles and 550 looms, producing in 1892 1,000,000 pounds of yarn and 4,000,000 yards of drills and sheetings. This mill was burned in October, 1893, but rebuilding was begun at once, and the new machinery includes 100,000 spindles and 1,500 looms. Three other mills are in course of construction, and by the end of this year Shanghai is expected to have 150,000 spindles running. In April, 1893 r a mill of 700 looms was opened at Hankow, and a spinning mill is being erected, the machinery having already arrived from Kn gland. Partic- ulars of the output of the factory are not obtainable. But our con- suls at various ports note a striking increase in the arrivals of native cloth, most notable in 1892, for the burning of the Shanghai mill made a big difference last year. At Mngpo, a cotton mill opened in 1892. earned an acknowledged profit of $L0,000 last year, and our consul thinks this is greatly understated. A spinning mill is now nearing completion at Ningpo. Even at Chungking, right in the interior, a proiect is on foot for the establishment of a cotton mill, and the capital had been largely subscribed at the date of the latest consular report. Like the Japanese, the Chinese have also turned their attention to the manufacture of Portland cement, and a well-equipped mill has been for several years at work near Tientsin, with which it is connected by railway, and a factory in the same own supplies local requirements in the way of matches, which formerly were imported These straws show which way the wind is blowing, and it has set in a direction that bodes no good to English manufacturers but much P 6 ™™*?* ^"ft^ha Mexico is doiug precisely the same as Japan and China ,. At Orizaba, in the State of Vera Cruz, "will be found some of the + fines t Bngh sh- made machinery; and cotton prints are now turned out as good as if not superior to, the imported article. The production of these mills has been affected by the great difference in exchange; sales have in- creased ^consMerablydurilg the last three years, whilst profits have been verv^r Some of thl shares of cotton factories in Mexico are at been very rair. °"™» u ^ „ So wr ites our consul at Vera Cruz, ^£&!££^&Sto»& at first these mills used imported •26 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. raw cotton almost exclusively, " the fall in silver has caused more atten- tion to be given to this article, and the factories at Orizaba are now using home-grown cotton as much as possible." A jute factory is on the point of being opened at Orizaba. The Mexican Financier of a recent date, in announcing the inauguration of a new factory, remarked : Just as Europe is forcing the Orientals to manufacture for themselves by the anti- silver policy now favored there, so here on this continent the silver-using countries are being forced to make everything possible for themselves. What do we see in Mexico to-day but a well-marked movement in the direction of a home supply of many articles of prime necessity— in paper, textiles, soap, iron goods, etc. The com- 'bination of governments and great bankers against silver is certain, ultimately, if •persisted in, greatly to injure the business of the manufacturers of Europe. The silver standard nations will keep more of their money at home, It is needless to multiply examples further, for no one with the slight- est regard for facts can deny that new industries, fostered by the bonus which a depreciated currency gives to home manufacturers, are spring- ing up in all the silver countries. In the meantime they are only par- tially satisfying the needs of their own compatriots, but before long they will not only be able to supply their own native markets but those of their neighbors. Quite a new interchange trade is springing up between the silver countries. The cultivation of raw cotton is making great strides in China, much of it being shipped to Japan, whence some returns in the shape of piece goods. Japan is not only sending cottons and sundries of all sorts to the silver peoples in far Eastern seas, but it is supplying machinery and implements to some portions of China, and to Oorea, as our consular reports show. We have seen how profit- able are the cotton factories of Japan, of China, and of Mexico, their dividends high, their shares at substantial premiums. Compare this with the unhappy state of cotton companies in Lancashire. I have ■referred to a dozen reports issued in one day at the end of June, show- ing the position of as many spinning companies in and near Old- ham. Of these ten showed an adverse balance, and only two were able to pay dividends. This is unfortunately a fair representation of the state of the cotton industry in Lancashire — an industry giving employ- ment to hundreds of thousands of people and furnishing a very large proportion of our entire foreign trade. Many attempts are made to prove that the contraction of our trade with silver countries, and the extension of manufactures there, have little or nothing to do with the depreciation in silver. A few months ago Dr. Giffen, of the board of trade, compiled a report on the progress of the foreign trade of the United Kingdom in recent years. There he showed that in 1884-85 goods from this country constituted 25 per cent of the whole imports of China, whereas in 1890-1892 our proportion fell to 21 per cent. In the case of Japan the fall was from 45 to 34 per cent. It was agreeable to discover that we had not lost ground to our European competitors in these markets, but there were other features less welcome. "It should be remarked;" wrote Dr. Giffen, "that the chief increase in the relative proportion of the imports into Japan has gone to Korea, to India, and to other minor countries which are geographically much nearer than ourselves." This explanation struck Dr. Giffen as so happy and forcible that he repeated it. But it may fairly be asked if these other countries have in the last seven years become geographically nearer Japan than they were before. If there has been a change in the distribution of Eastern trade we should surely look for an explanation to those condi- tions which have altered and not to those which are immutable. It is childish to assume that Eastern peoples have only awakened within the PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 27 last few years to the consciousness that they are nearer one another than to Europe. What they have become alive to is the existence of the barrier of exchange between them and Europe. If Dr. G-iffen's ingenuous principle were carried to its legitimate conclusion, it would follow that the reduction in trade between India and Japan during the last fifteen months was due to an enlargement of the geographical distance between them and not to the creation of a new monetary standard in India. The immediate shrinkage in Indian exports to China and Japan which followed the monetary change of June, 1893, to which the Indian trade returns and the consular reports from the far East bear concurrent testimony, affords unequivocal proof that commerce is more rapidly and seriously influenced by exchange than by tariffs or "geographical" situation. Yet, while our industries are languishing and our exports contracting, the official statisticians enter- tain us with the shibboleths of an effete and exploded school of economic thought. It is no pleasure to anyone to dwell on the decay of British commerce with any portion of the globe, but it is a duty to recognize facts, however hard, to endeavor to ascertain the causes, and if possible to prescribe a remedy. So long as we are content to accept the fallacy that geography and distance are the determining factors in the distribu- tion of trade between nations we shall have to go on deploring the steady decadence of our commercial preeminence, perhaps even of our indus- trial existence. The scheme of this paper requires that the disastrous effect on our trade of the fall in' silver should be examined from two points of view: (a) When there has been, through the appreciation of gold, a rise in the silver price of our goods; and (b) when there has been a fall in the gold price of them. It is rather difficult to maintain the distinction between the two sets of circumstances; but exam- ples of both have been given in the course of this paper. I have produced evidence from Chinese reports and statistics to show that when, in 1893, Lancashire exporters endeavored to raise their price lists, the consumption of their manufactures at once declined. The evidence from Mexico is to precisely the same effect. The board of trade returns for the first six months of the present year confirm the view of our consuls. In the first six months of 1892 the average value of cotton piece goods shipped to Mexico was 2.65 pence per yard, and the exports were fairly large. In 1893 the average value rose fractionally to 2.67 pence per yard, and there was a decrease of 3,000,000 yards in the shipments to Mexico. In the first half of this year the average value per yard at export had fallen to 2.50 pence, and the shipments rose 2,500,000 yards Thus, whenever the ffold price was raised— and consequently the silver equivalent- there was a sharp decline in our cotton piece goods trade with Mexico; whenever Lancashire, conceded lower prices a recovery took place. I have already giv«n the result of similar calculations m the case of China. The same characteristic may be observed in our ship* ment^ of cotton yarn. In the first half of 1892 the value o yarn sent to Bombay was 9.89 pence per pound. A year later it rose to 10.50 pence and the shipments were less than half. This year the price has fanen'again tS 9.61 pence, and a considerable recovery occurred m the volame?f trade, though the 1892 level was not attained. In the case of the Straits Settlements precisely the same thing occ urred ; In J893 th « nrire rose to 11.15 pence from 10.59 pence in 1892, and the shipments Sf vam fell to less than half of the former volume, f**/**** *™> age price has fallen again to 9.42 pence per pound and the exports have 28 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. exceeded the 1892 figure. These are merely representative instances, the selection of them being distributed over India, the Straits, China, and Mexico to show the universality of the experience. If a dimin- ished volume of exports coincident with au advance in price and an improvement in shipments concurrent with a fall in price do not indi- cate the direct operation of cause and effect, it would be hard to discover what else they do illustrate. It seems clearly demonstrated that a rise in the silver price of English goods in silver countries at once reduces the consumption and stimulates the efforts of their populations to pro- vide similar manufactures for themselves. A reduction in the gold price, made in order to secure our hold on markets slipping from our grasp, means an enormous diminution in the remunerative character of our trade. I have already pointed out that had the piece goods shipped to China in the first six months of this year been invoiced at the prices current in the same period of 1893, the result would have been an increase in the sterling return of £263,000, or over 11 per cent, on goods valued for export at £2,357,750. The argument from commerce to cur- rency which the bimetallists are challenged to take up does not tell in favor of the maintenance of the existing monetary standards. No attempt has been made in this paper to run through the whole gamut of British trade and industry so as to show to what extent individual manufacturing interests have been injured through the fall in silver. What is true of the cotton trade is true of all others, though as our exports of miscellaneous goods to silver countries are too small to be separately specified in board of trade returns, or other authorita- tive publications, it is not so easy to detect and exhibit the restrictive influence on our outward commerce of falling exchanges. We have seen that Japan is supplying hardware as well as textiles to herself and her neighbors. Japanese coal competes, even on the Pacific Coast of South America, not only with coal from Cardiff, but with ship- ments from New South Wales. The Indian coal fields have been de- veloped to such an extent that Welsh fuel has almost disappeared from Calcutta. No doubt the construction of railways has helped toward this, but if the Indian coal were not dug by miners paid in silver it could not even now be laid down in Calcutta on terms to com- pete with Cardiff, due allowance being made for the superior steam- raising qualities of the latter, which enables it to command a better price than the indigenous product. In the train of coal, manufacturing industries are always to be found. Consul Bnslie, of Tokyo, gives inter- esting particulars regarding the experimental production of iron in Japan, and hints that the country, which now imports much iron, may become self supporting in that respect. When the Eastern markets for coal, iron, and cotton are being gradually filched from us, not so much by the superior enterprise of our rivals, but by the insidious influence of a monetary revolution, it behooves us to reconsider our position. Itmay be said that English investors must not be made to suffer because Lan- cashire and Yorkshire desire to maintain their profits. But profits have already almost disappeared from the cotton spinning and weaving industries, and the wages fund is being trenched upon. There is no difference of opinion between operatives and employers in Lancashire as to the impossibility of improving wages, and it is ddubtful if they can even be maintained at their present level. The country has already experienced what a starving Lancashire means, and memory must be short indeed if the recollection of the cotton famine has died out. No one in those days would have ventured to say that the woe of Lan- cashire was not a national question. The loss inflicted on our trade PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 29 by the fall ia silver is not confined to the County Palatine, but even if it were the urgent necessity for action could not be gainsaid. Govern- ments have admitted that the sufferings of officials from the fall in the rupee demanded redress; can they remain much longer deaf to the appeal of a shrinking commerce, or indifferent to the threatening ruin of industries that employ millions of British capital and bring bread to thousands of British mouths ? David Ootavius Croal. SEQUEL. By Sir Henry Meysey-Tho.mpsox. Now, having read these papers, 1 hope we have all made up our minds — (1) That we do wish the home and principal seat of the great manu- facturing industries of the world — the cotton, woolen, worsted, linen, jute, iron and steel, machinery, glass, pottery, leather, clothing, and many others — should continue to be in the United Kingdom, as hitherto, and that they should be carried on by English, Scotch, Irish, and Welsh workmen; and we do not wish to see them banished to the soil of India, China, Japan, and Mexico, and carried on by Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and Mexican workmen. (2) That at this present actual moment work is being done by Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and Mexican workmen which would have been at this present actual moment in the hands of English, Scotch, Irish, and Welsh workmen if the divergence of value between silver and gold had not taken place, or if the English Government did not obstinately oppose any reform of the present monetary laws. (3) That it is certain that our present monometallic policy must tend to drive these industries away from the soil of the United Kingdom, and cause them to be carried on, instead, on the soil of India, China, and Japan. Now, as the banishment of these manufacturing industries would be a tremendous loss to England and other gold-using countries, let us see if we can find any advantage which they gain by the present system sufficient to compensate them for this loss. Let us take first the case of the other gold-using countries of Europe, which are mostly what are called debtor countries. It seems to me that they are almost entirely losers by the present monetary system, and that the attitude of these countries toward the question would seem absolutely incomprehensible to any one who lost sight of the fact that the interests of peoples and of governments are not always identical. Here you have States owing large sums of money in the form of national debts, on which interest has to be paid annually in gold. Every producer in the country has to lay aside every year a certain portion of what he produces in order to pay his share of the interest on the debt. How much of his produce he has to lay aside depends upon price, that is to say, on whether gold is plentiful and cheap, or scarce and dear. If plentiful and cheap, he has to give little produce; if scarce and dear, he has to give a great deal. . Now, if these countries had had, instead of paying gold to their cred- itors, to pay an annual tribute of so many tons of lead to one country, let us suppose England, the situation would then have been grasped 30 PAPER. ON THE SILVER QUESTION. at once. Everyone -would have seen at once that the proportion of his produce which he would have to give annually to buy his share of the lead would depend on whether lead was plentiful and cheap or scarce and dear, and the supply of lead in the world would have become at once a source of interest to every taxpayer. Governments would have been urged to offer rewards for the discovery of new sources of lead supply, and to give subventions to lead miners. Anyone who discovered a substitute for the use of lead would be looked upon as a public bene- factor, while anyone who wasted lead unnecessarily would be looked upon as an enemy to his country. Yet, though abundance or scarcity of the metal in question has exactly the same effect on the producer, whether the tribute has to be paid in lead or gold, what has been the most surprising attitude of debtor governments toward this question'? Not only have they done nothing to encourage an increase in the supply of gold, but they have, themselves, gone into the market and, setting up a gold standard and coinage raised the price of gold against themselves and their own subjects by making that scarcer and dearer which was already scarce and dear enough. You will say "this was the work of madmen;" and so it would have been if it had been done by the people themselves ; it was not, however, done by the people, but by the governments. The governments were in a difficult position. The interest on their debts had to be paid in gold. They received their revenue in silver or paper, and they had to pay every year more silver and more paper in order to buy the same amount in gold. What was to be done 1 ? Increase the taxes'? No: increase of taxation breeds discontent. Discontent turns out govern- ments, and self-preservation is the first law of nature. If a man had to pay 10 florins, or 10 francs, or 10 thalers, where he paid 8 before, he could not help knowing that his taxes were increased; but if he still continued to pay 8 florins, or 8 francs, or 8 thalers, on a gold basis, he thought he was paying the same amount, although his real loss, meas- ured by the sacrifice of produce he had to make, was very likely much greater than the difference between eight and ten. Probably he had to sacrifice twelve pounds of wool, or twelve quarters of wheat, or twelve tons of iron, or lead, or tin where he had only to sac- rifice eight before. But the fall in the price of produce was not ascribed to the government— T though the burden of taxation, or in other words the sacrifice of produce by the taxpayer, was really increased by 50 per cent. What the taxpayers abroad actually did was to call on their govern- ments for heavy protective duties, which were accordingly imposed and still exist, causing great injury and loss to manufacturers in England. It is difficult to blame the governments, as they were in a very difficult position, and we must never forget that it has been the action of England, and England alone, which has prevented an international agreement being come to which would have put an end to all these difficulties. Personally, I think foreign governments are most to blame for not having had the pluck to form an international agreement for the use of silver and gold among themselves, together with the United States of America, leaving out England altogether. However that may be, I can not help thinking that the divergence of value between silver and gold has been almost an unmixed evil to all gold-using countries outside England. Now let us take the case of England and try to find some compen- sating advantages for the loss of employment to her manufacturers and PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. 31, workmen. You may naturally say, What other countries lost England must have gained. England is, on the balance, a creditor country. If other countries have had to pay more produce to liquidate the annual interest on their gold debt, England must have received more. > But what is England— or the United Kingdom, if you prefer it? A foreign state has to pay interest on a national debt which affects the whole body of taxpayers. The state in England has no national invest- , ments abroad— receives no interest from abroad. The state has no property, nothing but debts, and very large debts, too; and in conse- quence of the scarcity of gold everyone in England who has to pay a portion of the annual interest on the national debt has to sacrifice a great deal more of his produce than he used to do. Tou may say gold is not scarce because there is a great deal in the Bank of England, and, no doubt, if you want to borrow somebody else's gold on good security, you can borrow it very easily at a low '. rate of interest. But try and get some gold for your own by selling a field, or a bouse, or a few quarters of corn, or some lead or tin or iron, or some cotton or linen or jute goods, and you will soon find out whether gold is cheap and plentiful or not. It is evident it is not the State that gains by the fall in the value of produce. Whois it, then, you mean when you talk of England gaining? Tou mean certain individual lenders of money resident in this country. And have they gained? On the whole I should doubt it. So many governments, municipalities, and individuals in foreign countries have either gone bankrupt, repudiated or reduced the interest on their debts, and so many more seem likely to do so if the fall in silver continues, that I should doubt if the general body of individual lenders of money in this country has really benefited by the divergence in value between gold and silver and the consequent fall of prices. We may admit at once that those who are receiving their interest in full are benefiting very largely, and in a way they never expected when they lent the money; every 100 sovereigns they receive in interest now commanding double as much wheat, wool, tea, silver, iron, lead, tin, and many other things as it did formerly. Then there is another class who at any rate think they benefit by the present state of things, and that is the class of .London bankers and financiers. They say that the fact that London is the only market in. the world where gold can always be obtained iu large quantities and with ease is an advantage to them and has helped to make London the financial center of the world. It is possible that they are right, and that the present system enriches lenders of and dealers in money. On the other hand, this very fact of our stock of gold being open at all times to attack from any quarter is a very great disadvantage to the producing classes of this country, who are all borrowers of money, because a sudden demand for gold from any quarter of the world may send up suddenly the rate of discount, though there may be nothing in the state of affairs in England to cause or warrant a rise. Now, I do not myself believe that London could remain the financial center of the world if she lost her manufactures and consequently a large portion of her trade; but do we wish to see our producers disap- pear from this country, even if it were to become the paradise of individual lenders of money and financiers of various nationalities? Now. I can fancy I hear some one object " but England would always produce something. Even if our cottons and woolens and linens, and most of our other manufactures are banished, we shall still produce something. They will send us all these things from abroad, and we shall have to send them something in return." 32 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. But, my friend, that is exactly where you make a mistake; and one of the very matters which I think we ought to keep most prominently before us in discussing this matter is the restriction of our exports owing to the indebtedness of certain foreign individuals and govern- ments to individual lenders of money in this country, and the very serious way' in which the rise in the value of gold has increased and aggravated this restriction. In the very short space I have at my disposal I can only indicate the limits within which this restriction works. If no one ever lent any money to any foreign individual or government, and no long credit were given in international trade, it is evident that the imports and exports (including the precious metals) would exactly balance one another. 1 But from the first occasion on which an individual in this country lent £100 to someone abroad, something in the way of cash or produce (and we know practically that all interest from abroad is paid in prod- uce) had to be sent to England in satisfaction of the interest on the debt, and for this nothing in the shape, of export goes out in return. This has gone on until the income drawn by individual lenders of money from foreign Governments, companies, and individuals, or sent here as a return on capital invested abroad amounts, it is estimated, to about 100 millions sterling annually, and of course in return for this hundred millions' worth of imports no exports go out. The limit of this restriction on our exports would, of course, be reached if individual lenders of money resident in England (or, of course, individuals associated as companies) could get every other , nation of the world so deeply into their debt that all the inhabitants of those countries would have to work as their serfs,* sending to England annually, in satisfaction of the interest on their debts, everything they could produce beyond the bare necessaries of life; There could then be no exports from England; because if all other nations had to send all their surplus produce to England in satisfaction of their debt they could send nothing in exchange for our exports. This is, of course, the extreme limit that could be reached in theory, and will never be reached in practice. But every fall in the gold price of commodities carries us nearer and nearer to it. The price of some of our great staple articles- of import, such as wheat, wool, iron, lead, and tin have fallen more than one-half duriug the last twenty years; consequently double the amount of them has to be sent to satisfy the interest due to individual lenders of money in this country — that is, double the amount of the products of other countries come into this country without any exports going out in exchange for them. Of course, if gold rises still more in value, and these commodities fall another one-half, then tour times as much of the surplus products of other countries will be at the disposal of individual lenders of money, and the restriction of our exports will be increased fourfold. The more that silver and other produce fall in value the more com- modities produced by cheap labor abroad will be thrown upon our markets in competition with our home industries, and be sent here merely as interest upon debts for which nothing whatever is exported in return. 1 Of course there would always tie payments to private individuals, or companies, for personal services, shipping, freights, etc., abroad; and sums of money would be carried from one country to another by emigrants and immigrants ; but these pay- ments would tend to balance one another, and would not interfere with the general principle. PAPER ON THE SILVEK QUESTION. 3£J Besides, what we want is as many industries as possible established here on the soil of England. Foreign trade is good, but it is good because it is trade, not because it is foreign. Home trade is much better. What does foreign trade mean ! It means one set of producers living in England, another set of producers living abroad, and these two sets of producers exchanging their products. What does home trade mean'? It means two sets of producers, both living in England and exchanging their products. If there were a manufactory of silk established at Calais, and exchanging the finished silk exclusively with England, that would be good. But it would be better if an English capitalist purchased the business, transported the machinery to Dover, and set up an English manufactory with English workmen there instead. " Why," yon may say, " would it be better, supposing the price of the finished silk remained the same? The silk would then exchange for exactly the same amount of commodities produced in England as before." That is true of the products, but how about the producers'? Every one employed by the factory, in the first case, would be living in France, living in French houses, wearing French clothes, eating French food, using French railways and French banks, paying French taxes, and fighting French battles in time of war. In the second case, everyone employed in the factory would be living in England, in English houses, wearing English clothes, eating English food, using English railways and English banks, paying English taxes, and fighting for England in time of war. Is there' no advantage in having both sets of producers living in England, even in the cases where for what we import we export some- thing in exchange? To hear some people talk one is driven to the conclusion that their wish and aim for the future of the United Kingdom is that it should become as quickly as possible a country where no wheat is grown, no barley, and no oats; where no sheep are shorn and no cattle fattened (I suppose they would keep a few cows to supply milk and a few heus to lay fresh eggs for the families of capitalists) ; where no cotton, no linen, worsteds, or woolens would be manufactured; where all mines and all industries of iron and steel would be closed and idle— a country where no one could afford to live except individual lenders of money to other countries and their servants, everything they wanted in the way of commodities being sent them cheaper from abroad than it could be produced in this country, and sent not in return for exports but in sat- isfaction of the interest on their debts. If this is the ideal of the English working man he has nothing to do but to sit still and allow our present monetary system to continue, and he will have the satisfaction of feeling that his inaction is helping to bring it to pass, without even the trouble of using his vote. If his sons and his grandsons in a few years' time abuse him for having allowed employments and manufactories to be banished from Sand which, if he had exerted himself to use his vote, might easily have bee'n™ned, he will at any rate have the sa ^factum- o feeling that he has avoided the risk of giving himself a headache by studying tdtSlWi. anyone who has followed me thus far that I hotemv^ving this prize has fulfilled one of its objects, that is to sav to^nduce Mm to take an interest in the subject; and: I hope he S no{ leave it until he has thoroughly made up his mind how employ- S. Doc. 30 3 34 PAPER ON THE SILVER QUESTION. ment in England is likely to be affected by the fact that 100 ounces of silver will now, buy as much labor in China as it did prior to 1873. That during the fifty years before 1873 it took £25 to buy 100 ounces of silver. ,,,... That in 1895 it takes little over £11 to buy 100 ounces of silver. That in consequence of this, labor in a cotton mill in the East now costs less than half . as much in English sovereigns as it did for fifty years before 1873; and if the reader is convinced, as I am, that a con- tinued fall in the price of silver means the banishment of the great man- ufacturing industries of the world from the soil of the United Kingdom to the soil of India, China; Japan, and Mexico,, to be carried on by Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and Mexican workmen instead of the workmen of England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, then I hope he will recognize his obligation, as a genuine lover of his country, to do all in his power to promote a speedy reform of the present most unsatisfactory mone- tary conditions of the world. H. M. Meysey-Thomp^on. THE IRON TRADE AND THE FALL IN THE VALUE OF SILVER. The consular report of Mr. Hall, Her Britannic Majesty's consul at Hakodate, Yezo (one of the Japanese islands), has just been issued as a parliamentary paper, and the following, extract from it may be of interest to English manufacturers, especially those engaged in the iron and steel industries : In conclusion, the broad fact revealed by the statistics is that while the industry and home' 'trade of the island is prospering apace, the foreign trade is declining. The cause of such a phenomenon is usually more difficult to ascertain than the fact itself; but in the present instance a concrete case may serve to indicate in what direction the cause is to belooked for. Seven years ago, when this port was supplied with waterworks, some 1,500 tons of iron pipes were imported from England, at a cost of £4 4s., then equal to $28, a ton. This year, owing to the rapid growth of the town, a second parallel line of pipes is required; and if ordered from England the cost would be £4, equal to $40, a ton, the value of silver as against commodities in this country having in the interval remained virtually the same. ' No wonder that the native manufacture of iron pipes is being pushed on amain! And this is an .example of what is going on all along the line of imports from England and the West. The chasm between the two- masses of the world's currency created by the West's recent expulsion of silver is acting as a subtle, automatic protective tariff t6 the silver-using countries of the East, checking on the one side the growth of trade, and changing on the other the natural economic course of industries. The appre- hension that gold money would be driven out of use if linked along with silver as legal tender is alleged as the main reason for the toleration of this block in the chan- nel of the world s business. The question is doubtless a complicated one, on which only experts and competent intellects are entitled to be heard.. Sir Isaac Newton, when master of the mint, had occasion to consider it; and it is on record that he believed that the apprehended evil could be obviated by the expedient of establish- ' ing a par of exchange between the two metals the same for all countries. 54th Congress, > SENATE. , Document 1st /Session. ) \ ^ 0> q% IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES. January 9, 1896.— Referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed. The Vice-President presented the following LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ACKNOWL- EDGING RECEIPT OF SENATE RESOLUTION, DATED DECEMBER 31, 1895, RELATIVE TO OBLIGATIONS ISSUED BY THE GOVERN- MENT SINCE MARCH 4, 1879. Treasury Department, Office of the " Secretary, Washington D. C, January 8, 1896. Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Senate resolution, dated the 31st ultimo, as follows : Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, directed to report to the Senate a statement containing a copy of each obligation issued by the Government since March 4, 1879, with a reference by title and date to the laws, respectively, authorizing such issues, and showing the amount of each issue, and the amount now outstanding, properly classified, and including Treasury notes of every kind, bonds, and certificates for currency, silver, and gold. In reply, the Senate is respectfully informed that the information called for "is being prepared and that it will be transmitted as soon as possible, but that, owing to the necessity of examining many old rec- ords of the Department, it is thought that the work will require about thirty days. Bespectfully, yours, J. G-. Carlisle, Secretary. The President of the Senate. 54th Congress, ) SENATE. ( Document 1st Session. ) ' ( No. 184. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES^ Maech 25, 1896. — Ordered to be printed. Mr. Cockeell presented the following LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, DATED JANU- ARY 16, 1896, ADDRESSED TO HIM, RELATIVE TO THE AMOUNT OF SILVER BULLION NOW ON HAND, THE COST OF THE SAME, AND THE COINAGE VALUE IF COINED INTO DOLLARS, AND THE AMOUNT OF SEIGNIORAGE IF SO COINED, ETC. Treasury Department, Office of the Secretary, Washington, D. C, January 16, 1896. Sir : In reply to your inquiries of the 14th instant, I have to submit the following : (1) Aggregate amount of silver bullion purchased under the laws of July 14, 1890, in ounces; the cost of the same in Treasury notes, and the coinage value of the same if coined into dollars, and the amount of the seigniorage 1 ? Answer : Amount of silver bullion purchased fine ounces . . 168, 674, 682. 53 Cost in Treasury notes «», *», 002. 25 Coinage value in silver dollars 218, 084, 438 . 00 Seigniorage on same if coined w, xoo, *ao. to (2) The aggregate amount of such silver bullion now on hand, in ounces ; the cost of the same in dollars and cents, and the coinage value of the same if coined into dollars, and the amount of seigniorage if so coined ? Answer: Amount of silver bullion on hand January 1, 1896 fine ounces . . 137, 639, 299. 36 Cost in Treasury notes ' - *, _„' g g ^' ggg' qq Coinage value in silver dollars - > ., al ' . 7 . ' __ Seigniorage on same if coined o6,ssi, in. io (3) The total amount of such bullion coined up to January 1, 1896, in ounces; the cost of the same; the amount so coined in dollars and cents, and the amount of seigniorage thereon 1 ? Answer : Amount of silver bullion used in coinage to January 1, 1896, fine ^ ^ gQ ounces "_; $31' 791 759. 36 Cost of the same .---- 40 044,364.00 Number of silver dollars coined g 252, 604. 64 Seigniorage on same ' (4) The total amount of such bullion, in ounces, coined prioi ■ tc .March 1,1893; the cost of the same; the amount so coined in dollars and cents, and the amount of the seigniorage thereon I Amount of silver bullion used in coinage prior to March 1, 1893, fine ^ ^ gg ounces $28', 826^ 659. 66 Cost of the same... -..------. ------------- ___ 35.661,720.00 Silver dollars coined prior to March 1, 18yd „ g35j 060 g4 Seis-nioraee on same 2 COINAGE VALUE OP SILVER BULLION, ETC. (5) The amount of such bullion, in ounces, coined since March 1, 1893, to January 1, 1890; the cost of the same; the amount in dollars and cents so coined, and the amount of the seigniorage thereon 1 ? Answer : Amount of silver bullion used in coinage from March 1, 1893, to Janu- nr-cl ]oqr fineounces.. 3,389,701.22 Cost of same ".".""."."..."-' $2,965,099.64 Silver dollars coined 'from March 1, 1893, to January 1, 1896 4, 382, 644. 00 Seigniorage on same *■> ""> 544. 36 (6) The total amount of the Treasury notes issued in the purchase of the bullion now outstanding and the amount of such notes redeemed in silver and canceled prior to March 4, 1893, and the amount so redeemed and canceled since March 4, 1893? Answer : Treasury notes now outstanding $137, 538, 280 Amount of such redeemed prior to March 4, 1893 N one, ^ Amount of such redeemed since March 4, 1893 18, 392, 722 - (7) The amount of such Treasury notes redeemed in gold prior to March 4, 1893, giving date and place of the first redemption of such notes in gold? Answer: Treasury notes redeemed in gold prior to March 1, 1893 $34, 138, 473 Date and place of first redemption, October 14, 1891 ; Boston. (8) The amount of such Treasury notes redeemed in gold since March 4, 1893, and the principal places at which so redeemed! Answer. Treasury notes redeemed in gold from March 1, 1893, to December 31, 1895 : At Washington '- - - - - $85, 362 At Baltimore 309,812 At New York 25,182,016 At Philadelphia 5,292,448 At Boston 10,631,221 At Cincinnati 23,580 At Chicago 263,680 At St. Louis 376,164 At New Orleans 445, 660 At San Francisco 444,650 Total 43,054,593 (9) The amount of standard silver dollars and silver certificates exchanged for gold or paper redeemable in gold, from October 17, 1 893 — the date of Secretary Carlisle's letter to "The President of the Senate, Senate Doc. No. 29, Fifty- third Congress, first session; " Coinage Laws, p. 328— up to January 1, 1896? Answer. Gold coin and gold certificates received at the offices of the Treasury in exchange for other kinds of money, from July 1, 1893, to December 31, 1895 : For national-bank notes $36,890 For United States notes 53,023,615 For Treasury notes 7,808,317 For silver certificates 10, 000, 710 For standard silver dollars 1, 529, 668 For fractional silver coin 6, 983, 284 For minor coin 126,961 Total 69,509,445 (10) Whether any Treasury Department Circular has been issued since January, 1885, inviting, or directly authorizing, the exchange of silver COINAGE VALUE OP SILVER BULLION, ETC. 3 dollars and silver certificates for gold or paper redeemable in gold, and, if so, copy of such circular or circulars. Answer. Inclosed herewith, Department Circular No. 162, covering the issue and redemption of currency. Yery respectfully, J. G-. Carlisle, Secretary. Hon. F. M. COOKBELL, United States Senate. Treasury Department, March 6, 1896. Hon. F. M. Cockrell: Number of silver dollars coined from January 1 to March 1, 1896, 1,500,000, and total amount of Treasury notes redeemed in silver dollars and canceled to date, $19,387,722. E. E. Preston, Director of the Mint. " Td'. Mil 54th Congress, > SENATE. c Document 1st Session. J \ No. 235. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. Apkil 29, 1896.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Teller presented the following LETTERS FROM MR. BEN BUTTERWORTH, OF WASHINGTON, D. C, AND MR. SAMUEL J. RITCHIE, OF AKRON, OHIO, UPON THE SIL- VER QUESTION AND UPON THE GENERAL FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT, AS OF LATE PURSUED. WASHINGTON, D. C, March 26, 1896. Hon. Henry M. Teller, United States Senate, Washington, D. G. : I forwarded to you some days ago a letter I received from Mr. Samuel J. Bitchie, of Akron, Ohio. Mr. Ritchie is a man of large business experience, and has had extended opportunity to study men and measures both in our country and abroad. He is a careful student and shrewd observer, and hence I read his letters with interest. In the letter he gives the reasons that induce the belief that the demonetization of silver and the closing of the mints was not in accord with sound financial policy nor yet consistent with a just desire on the part of the capitalists who forced the policy upon the country that it should be in the interest of the mass of the people, but that, on the con- trary, it was in effect a scheme — no matter by what other name it may be called— which operated and could only operate to promote the interests of tbe few at the cost of the vast majority who produce the wealth of the nation but are powerless to control tbe press and the politics of the country to protect their interests, having only the ballot which unhappily has become such a merchantable commodity as not to be a readily available agency to secure needed reforms. Our apparent inability as a nation to accomplish satisfactory results by adopting and adhering to a policy which does not conform to that which obtains among the other leading commercial nations of the world made me doubt the wisdom of making the experiment. I thought until recently that, possibly, if Congress should proclaim to the world our fixed determination to pay every debt in gold or its equivalent, confi- dence would be restored and our industries be quickened, and the gloomy conditions pass away. But I am satisfied that those of us who indulged that hope were in error. Every honest citizen must feel an anxious concern that we shall not place ourselves in the attitude of endeavoring to cancel our obligations to foreign creditors without fully paying them. 2 THE SILVER QUESTION. But it has developed that we are likely to be less solicitous about the rights of our own people than we are about the advantages of capital- ists of other nations, to whom our countrymen are indebted. The creditor nations of Europe bought from us the greater part of the more than $5,000,000,000, par value, of our securities, with money or currency which they now utterly refuse to accept in payment of either the interest or the principal of debt. Such refusal by foreign creditors would be defensible and proper if our currency with which we had a right to pay our debts had become depreciated or undervalued by any act of the debtors. But so far from that being so, the fact is exactly the reverse; the creditor has appre- ciated and overvalued the only coin he will (so he says) accept in payment. ' England and other creditor nations, that is, the money power of those nations (which must be distinguished fromxthe will or preference of the people), as a means of increasing the value of their credits, suc- ceeded in securing the demonetization of one-half the world's money of ultimate redemption and payment, and closed the miuts against silver, knowing when they did it that one-fourth of the gold money of the world was locked in the vaults of certain nations as a war fund, and hence not serving the purpose of money as a circulating medium, and obviously by this speculative- measure the value of the money used to buy of us was greatly reduced in debt-paying power, so that when we come to pay those creditors we find they have so manipu- lated the money of the world that they have reduced the market value of everything we have to sell to raise money to pay with, and by the demonetization scheme increased the purchasing power of the money they will accept in payment, and demand of the farmers and others who produce the wealth of our country two bushels instead of one, two pounds instead of one that was their due, and take three acres in fore- closure instead of the one they might in justice appropriate for the debt. In other words they demand a dollar that has only half the debt- paying and double the purchasing power of the dollar they loaned us, and which in justice they are bound to accept in payment of what we owe them. Thus the lender, after the loan, arbitrarily fixes the value of the money with which the borrower must pay. The fact that many of those who control the aggregated and massed capital of this country found it to their advantage to aid in this work -can not commend it or them to the favor of the people. It requires a quality in us other than common honesty to consent to such a wrong. An honest purpose to pay the last poor scruple that is due our creditors is wholly consistent with a refusal to permit the creditors to reduce the volume of money available for business purposes by one- half — take one-fourth of the balance out of circulation — thus in effect substantially reducing the debt-paying power of the money loaned to us, and at the same time doubling the purchasing power of the bal- ance, and compelling payment in the money thus overvalued; that is, compelling double payment. This is on the theory that the producer and debtor has some odds and ends of rights that capitalistic combines ought to respect, whether they do or not. Unfortunately, the multitude that have to "bear the heat and the burden" have small opportunity to be heard in the council, and they find the ballot a slow and very uncertain means of correcting the evil. THE SILVER QUESTION. 3 Beyond that they are lashed to a partisan machine, and the machine is controlled by combines. They have no mii/y, and hence find them- selves bought out and sold out as' often j/aVpolitical interests or exi- gencies demand. ^ ' y If it is not for the debtor to fix the Wue of tWmoney with which he pays, just as little is it the r|ght of the creditor to fix the value of the money he will receivp in paynrent. j / There is quite as little excuse for the le^galized defrauding of the fanners and other producers of bur country as there is reason for pluck- ing the money changers of London. Neither act can be justified or tolerated. ,. But the producers /Save not tried/to pluck the money changers, but the capitalistic com«iiiea>in Engla/fd and other nations have not only endeavored, bat, a/ded^Sy allies inour own country, have succeeded, by manipulating iSje/in/ney of t^re world, in fleecing every farmer and every other producer of wealtn in the United States. If it be admitted that the single gold standard is better, it does not follow that we should establish it in reckless disregard of the vast inter- ests of those who would be utterly destroyed or plundered by the manner of making the change. If the Government can not take a foot of ground or a dollar's worth of other property from a citizen without just com- pensation first paid, on what theory of justice may Congress needlessly destroy the value of the property of vast communities, and compel every debtor in the nation to pay double the amount he owes, by reduc- ing by one-half the debt-paying power of the money of the country and doubling the purchasing power of the balance"? Unfortunately, the debtor is powerless to defend himself against the wrong. The infantry, artillery, and cavalry of the press and politics are under the control of the money power demanding the change. If we protest against the wrong and refuse to submit to it, can it be possible that our English creditors will not see their way clear to call an international council and remonetize silver, and give that metal its proper place as a money coin, as a step necessary to maintain the just value of their holdings, even as they hurried to increase the value of the money they expected to receive for those holdings? That it would be just, can not be doubted. Naturally enough the capitalistic combines of our own country have been swift to second the efforts of similar combines abroad, and their interests are the same and hence they act in concert and proclaim that their course is wise and just. The answer is that it lias resulted most disastrously to the mass of our people and conditions are growing worse. The policv has been promoted in the name of an honest dollar, tne descriptive 'term "honest" being used for what has proved to be the dishonest purpose of fleecing every producer m the land, until tlie people, debt ridden, tax ridden, monopoly ridden, and mortgaged to the lip, are in a state of rebellion. . . Was ever an honest dollar made to perform a mission so dishonest S Mr Ititchie's letter states the case not a, whit too strongly. He presents the facts and figures, and with almost brutal frankness, but nothing less forcible will arouse, in time, needful resistance to the blighting influences that are keeping general prosperity in exile and confining to a few the blessings that remain, and each day making needful reforms. more difficult. . , What has transpired before my eyes during the past few years has compelled me to modify my views on the silver question, though not on the tariff. 4 THE SILVER QUESTION. Nothing can be more natural and appropriate than an alliance between those who favor an extreme tariff and those who oppose bimetallism. The triumph of such an alliance would hasten the condition in our own country which would present a people divided into two classes — " beasts of burden and beasts of prey." Nor could there be a more just and. useful union than one between the supporters of a just and reasonable tariff and those who champion bimetallism. It would be a holy alliance in the interest of the many — those who are in the last analysis the nation, the state, the people. We thought a year or two ago there were rifts in the clouds through which we could see some encouraging signs of returning prosperity? but not only have those signs disappeared, but there is no longer per- ceptible even a rift in the clouds, which seem to be gathering with increasing density and blackness and promise a storm which will con- vince the controlling influences on both sides of the Atlantic that it is indeed a " condition and not a theory that confronts us." If, outside of those to whom. general adversity affords a coveted opportunity to thrive and grow fat, we could find anybody who is in some degree hopeful that we are moving in the general direction of prosperous conditions, that we are merely getting rid of surplus stock, the result of overproduction, we might feel less solicitude about the future and become more readily reconciled to the policy of those whose financial and economic plans present, in practical test, higher evidence of theoretical possibilities for the future than they do of practical use- fulness in the present. If the testimony that comes to us from bench and bar, from mill and factory, field and farm, forest and stream, store and shop, church and schoolhouse means anything, it is made clear to every intelligent appre- hension that there can be no well-grounded hope of permanent pros- perity for the mass of the people until the omnipotent power of monopolistic combines is broken, and they cease to dictate the legisla- tive and administrative policy of the national and the 'several State governments. If the facts contained in Mr. Eitchie's letter are severe it must be remembered that facts are sometimes brutal things, but that is not the fault of the speaker or writer who publishes them. In traveling through the several States I find that persons employed in the various industries and avocations of life, those whom Lincoln was accustomed to call the plain people, and who are the salt of the earth and strength of this nation, in estimating the character and effect of the influences that have gained supreme control in this nation, feel and speak as Mr. Eitchie does, and they realize that the representatives of the monopolistic combines in one form and another have too firm a grip on the legislative and administrative branches of the national and State governments for that grip to be easily torn loose. Their power in the social circle is great; in politics, omnipotent; it is controlling in business; it owns or controls the press, and is naturally influential with the pulpit; so it results that they are for the time masters of the agencies that guide and mold private opinion and con- trol public judgment and public action; and it results, inevitably, that there is left to the plain people only a beggarly account of the agencies and instrumentalities with which to fight their battles and protect their rights. The judiciary, indeed, is left, but unhappily there is too much reason to fear that the confidence of the people in that last stronghold of free- men for the defense of their rights is being affected by the general THE SILVER QUESTION. 5 demoralization, and may be slowly undermined. This is less, if in any degree, the fault of the judges than of the general demoralization that the* influence and corrupt use of wealth in other departments has induced. Tou know perfectly well, and it would be mere affectation to deny it, that nothing is more generally believed than that the great national conventions about to assemble will be controlled by monopolistic com- bines. That each convention will endeavor, with mere words and phrases, that like the Delphic oracle, have two interpretations and mean one thing or another, as the vindication of the oracular utterance may demand, to satisfy the political requirements of the situation, instead of courageously meeting the just expectations of the people. Tou know that each year our politics become more corrupt, and worthy men affect to reject the moral certainty of the fact because competent legal proof is not offered. For all this they shall be brought unto judgment. As an inevitable result the foundations upon which rest the only living hope of preserving Our form of government are being surely undermined by the corrupting influences and power of wealth in the hands and under the control of men who either fail to understand or are indifferent to the fact that our free institutions can not survive long after such influences become (and they are fast becoming) supreme in the land. We hear it asserted on all sides that a great political party — a party of victory, of prestige, and honor — will be seized by the representatives of monopolies and combines, who will advance the money to control nominations and elections ou the distinct understanding that there will be such legislation as will enable them to recoup, by appropriating revenues collected from the people without being liable for embezzle- • ment. And the farmers and producers of the country are urged to assist in this scheme for despoiling themselves, and, I may add, that vast numbers of them listen to the siren song, and, like the victim of the opium habit, in order to enjoy a pleasing delusion, risk the ruin that follows. Extreme protectionists urge legislation in the interest of enabling men to be employed by others. It would be wiser to so legislate that a larger number of men could employ themselves, thus increasing the number of citizens who have a stake in the soil, an interest in an industry, as independent proprietors, thus making them the guardians of social order and the pillars of the state. Reducing the number of independent citizens and multiplying over and over again those who are dependent is not wise. Such a policy hangs all our clothes on one nail— that is, a few employ- ers and armies of employees. Work for the many, but profit for the few. If the one nail gives way all the clothes fall. If the one employer for any reason fails, an army of citizens are short of bread. Independentmonopolistsatoneendanddependentcitizensattheother does not present the most encouraging outlook in a country with institu- tions like ours, especially in the absence of a larger measure of justice and humanity and purer politics. God speed the day when our Government shall part company with socialistic paternalism, and go out of the banking business and stand, as it ought to, as guardian of the peace; con. our money, gold and silver, and let us, without molestation, work out our ^ own salvation using the boundless resources and vast opportunity with which heaven ^Tnt^utfo^k'is not encouraging when the great corporations of the 6 THE SILVER QUESTION. country testify that they have to provide a fund to pay ransom to legis- lative and administrative bandits to prevent legislative and administra 1 tive spoliation. And on the other hand, nobody doubts that corpora- tions, combines, and syndicates secure and hold franchises and privi- leges, and defeat needful legislation, all in derogation of the rights and interests of the masses of the people, and do this by the corrupt use of money. The citizen who does not know of these things is too ignorant to feel their influence, and the citizen who is conscious of the presence of these influences and does not resist their control does not merit the rights of an American freeman. And the conviction is growing that the demonetization of one-half the money of the world, no matter what theoretical financiers may say, is — and was, by those who were chief contrivers of the manner of its accomplishment, intended to be — a scheme to increase by legislative enactment the wealth of those who are already wealthy and the power of those already too powerful. That it has done so is certain ; that it has taken from the farmer and confiscated half the product of his fields is sure. And now, as a meas- ure of relief he is urged to tax himself still further as a means to increase his assets. If it be said that our securities will come pouring home for payment or to be thrown on the market, and thus intensify the panic, in case we insist on a return to bimetallism, the answer is, so far as the panic is concerned, that our people are already at the bottom and have been for more than four years; there is no lower depth to reach, they are stand- ing on bed rock. The farmer can't sell his crops for enough to pay for the implements with which he tills the soil. The herdsman can not get enough for his beef to pay for the feed the animal eats. The combines fix the price of the steer at the farmer's pasture and regulate the price of meat at the butcher's stall. Thus the candle of the producer and consumer is burned at both ends. The taxgatherer takes what the usurer leaves. In fact, conditions could hardly be worse. Let the securities come, and pay them with the money and currency of the country, even as we accepted that money and currency from the lenders. We have not in the whole United States enough gold to pay 15 per cent of the face value of the securities held in Europe. If the holders desire to kill the goose that lays the golden egg, let them first learn that that goose has been pressed and squeezed to the limit, and will lay no more eggs that lack a substantia] alloy of silver. It will be well for some people to learn that the" producers of a coun- try, who make its wealth, may ultimately get very tired of being mere pawns upon political and financial chessboards. The plain people may not be able to point out the details of a better way than the one by which they have been fleeced; not because there is not a better way, but because they are not experts in politics and finance; but they know they are fleeced, and they know who does the fleecing, and can convince those who do know the better way that it will be for their advantage, and promote the prosperity and happiness of all our people, promptly to adopt it. If the truth of what I say concerning the demonetization of silver as a money metal needed. confirmation from abroad, it would be found in the writings of" financiers and economists of London, who are laboring to reconcile the common people of England to the change by pointing THE SILVER QUESTION. 7 out to them the enormous profits Bnglaucl has derived from the increase of the purchasing power of gold, an abundance of which she (that is r her capitalists) has, by the demonetization of silver, and an abundance of which we (that is, the producers) had and have. The English financier and capitalist says to his countrymen : The United States Government has consented to compel her citizens to pay us in gold all their debts, public and private; and not only that, but her ever redeemable but never redeemed — and that will not stay redeemed — greenback can be so manipulated as to compel the Government to sup- ply the gold for that purpose, and hence she sells us bonds to get the gold ; and, better still, each dollar of gold we pay for the bonds comes back to us on the next steamer that sails from New York; and, better yet, we have by our financial scheme enabled you Englishmen to buy American produce at half the price and accept demonetized silver or painted rags in payment, while we make them pay what they owe us in- gold, the purchasing power of which we have doubled by demonetizing silver. All this is far from encouraging to my countrymen, and ringing reso- lutions and speeches, which are the working capital for juggling poli- tics, and sage advice by boards of trade will not cure the evil resulting from a vicious policy that, as above stated, burns our candle at both ends. Nor will we find relief in a system of taxation supposed to be less onerous because indirect, but which compels the man who holds the plow, or stands at the anvil, or the throttle of an engine to pay as much or more than the millionaire to support the Government. Nor will we find ultimately they are wise who, in the name of liberty and! patriotism provoke a foreign war, intended by some as a means of extending the area of human freedom, and by others for the purpose of legalizing the butchery of men who have grown impatient of wrong and are in a state of feverish discontent, and whose children would have to be taxed to pay the bonds issued to defray the expense of a foreign war waged to legalize the killing of their sires. If it is proposed to inaugurate a war with a foreign power as a means of securing sufficient blood letting to reduce the fever heat among- our people caused by conditions which ought not and need not have been,, it would be well at the same time to burn the schoolhouses and dismiss the teachers, so the children may not learn that justice will not permit the legal killing of the discontented as a means of allaying the dis- content. It is impossible but that offenses will come, but woe unto, him through whom they come. Is it not folly to suppose that the capitalists of England— and they are the capitalists of the world— will be easily persuaded to agree or cJLentSbimetallism? Why should they? How is it to their interest to do so while we consent to make it to their advantage to refuse? They have doubled the value of their credits by demonetizing silver, and thns in effect doubled the interest received by them. The Sed SUtes blundered into that trap, and within a year beg- gared a milhon of her citizens, and if we adhere to the blunder will wtL five millions more, and double the burden of every debtor and hXn beL™r in the W. If it be said the United States can not act Stone th answer ^conditions are such that she must grve notice that she w'ill act w'ThEngland if the latter consents; otherwise she will act al We* are the greatest debtor nation on earth. Hence it may be we 8 THE SILVER QUESTION. must start alone, if at all, and creditor nations will speedily join us for their own protection in reestablishing bimetallism. If necessary, and the United States does not start alone, gold monometallists will be so firmly intrenched behind the ramparts of wealth and power and the mass of the people be so helpless that bimetallism will be postponed a generation, if not forever. The plain citizen will still be encouraged with the pleasing delusion that the bare contemplation of the beauty and unchangeableness of a gold dollar beyond his reach is far preferable to the enjoyment of a silver dollar in his own pocket, and that the only honest dollar is the one that buys the largest quantity of his land, his labor, and the product of both. One thought more : How in the name of common sense .can we reason- ably hope, under our present system of monometallism, to protect our producers against the competition of those of China and Japan with- out building a tariff wall about our country as high as that which we induced those countries to take down in order to admit our goods to their market 1 ? See what a show we have made of ourselves under the pretense of protecting the producers of the United States. We insisted on getting into the Chinese and Japanese markets. We got there, but the gate that was opened to let us in remained open to let the Japanese and Chinese out. They came out, and are rapidly learning the art of manufacturing certain articles which they sell in our market at prices tliat defy com- petition, since they can manufacture at half the cost to us. That would be quite enough to make us anxious, but beyond that our capitalists, acting in concert with our creditors abroad, compel us to pay the Chinese and Japanese in gold, or its equivalent in demonetized silver. The result is that the Japs, selling their goods in our market, in matter of exchange alone get an advantage of 100 per cent. With the advantage in cost of labor and 100 per cent in exchange, what kind of a tariff would we require to protect our manufacturers? Thus, by the monetary system adopted by our capitalists cooperat- ing with our foreign creditors, we have practically closed the Japanese market to our people and opened our market to the Japanese, and now the great monoplies of our country that have been protected to the verge of toleration, while protesting against bimetallism, pray for a tariff that must be prohibitory as to other nations in order to shut out the Japanese. The striking feature of a tariff necessary to shut out the present and threatened Japanese competition will be a rate of duty so high as to be practically prohibitory as to other nations, and the consumers of the United States will be left to the tender mercies of the monopolies of our own country. As it is the Japs would injure a small part of the com- munity, and to prevent that injury to a few, Congress will be asked to secure to home monopolies the privilege of fleecing the whole population. The danger of Chinese and Japanese competition will trouble the manufacturers and producers of Europe as well as ourselves, and the remedy will be for the United States aud the nations of Europe to return to bimetallism and establish an equitable reciprocity in trade between themselves while warding off the destructive competition from China and Japan by an adequate protective tariff. Very respectively, .Benj. Btjtterworth. THE SILVER QUESTION. 9 Akron, Ohio, March 2, 1896. Dear Butter worth: In reply to and iu compliance with your num- erous requests, both written and verbal, that I should write something upon the silver question and upon the general financial policy of the Government, as of late pursued, I send you this letter, containing some facts, figures, comments, and conclusions, hastily thrown together for your perusal. You can neither discuss nor dispose of the silver question nor the money question by dumping a handful of silver upon one end of the balance beam of a pair of scales and a handful of gold upon the other end, and then point out that the gold end weighs so much and is worth so much and that the silver end weighs so much and is worth only so much. The silver question and the money question have a far wider reaching importance and determining influence upon the prosperity of our own, and of every other country, than any which can be determined upon the scales. They are inseparably connected with the great questions of debt and credit, and with the equally great and important question of taxation, and in dealing with and discussing them we must deal with and discuss not alone our Government as a unity and as a whole, but with the sev- eral branches which comprise it, viz, the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. All these several branches have separately, largely, and finally dealt with some phase and with nearly every phase of the questions of gold, silver, money, debt, credit, and taxation. Why is gold used as money? (1) It looks well; (2) it lasts well; (3) it is scarce. These are the only reasons why gold has always been used for jew- elry, ornaments, and money. The reasons why silver is and always has been used as money are exactly the same as those for which gold is and always has been used as money. Silver, however, is more abundant than gold, and lor ornaments and jewelry does not look quite so well. This difference in appearance and in abundance has, by the practical consent of the commercial nations of the world, been measured by a difference and by a ratio of about 15 or 16 of silver to 1 of gold. Upon this ratio of 16 to 1 the amount of gold and silver in the United States on the 1st day of January, 189.), differed only 1 cent per capita, they being, respectively, $9.04 of gold and $9.03 of silver for every inhabitant in the country; and what is still more startling and signifi- cant, that exactly this same per capita difference of gold and silver holds good and is applicable to every human being on the globe, the world's stock of gold being estimated at $4,080,800,000 and its stock of silver being estimated at $4,070,5CO,000. Counting the population of the world at 1,500,000,000, this would give to each inhabitant, it SuaHy divided among them all, $2.7-' of gold and $2.71 of silver. The aggregate amount* of these metals represented by these figures show th! refults of the efforts of all the ages, by every country and eveiy peoph , to accumulate as much as possible of these two precious metals When we think that some countries are gold producing and Sme are silver producing, and some both gold and silver producing; when we see the^et and actual results of thousands of years of effort over all the earth, upon the ratios already stated, to be identical with regard to the two' nfetals, we must conclude that their produe i™ is governed by some law of more universal operation than the proclama 10 THE SILVER QUESTION. tions or messages of Presidents or the enactments of Congresses or Parliaments. The aggregate amount of gold and silver at present in the world, as shown by the adding of the sums already stated, is $8,156,300,000. With this sum of money every other commodity, all the labor, and all the real property of the world must be measured. If one-half of this money be eliminated, then the purchasing power and the measuring power of values must be wholly vested in the other half. If one-half of the value and purchasing power be taken away from one-half of this stock of money, the purchasing power of the other half must be correspondingly increased. The less the amount of actual money, the greater will be its purchas- ing power and the more easily it will be controlled by a combination of a few individuals. Scarce and dear money makes every commodity which money purchases cheap and, to a large extent, unsalable at any price. The less bulky money is, such as gold, the more easily it is shifted from one center to another by combinations or individuals who seek to manipulate and control values. The more bulky it is, such as silver, the more difficult it is to transfer from one point to another and the less ability speculators .have to manipulate and control values with this metal. The very bulkiness of silver is, therefore, a certain check upon the violent fluctuations of values, and it is a queer fact that in coun- tries using only silver values are more stable than in countries using gold as a standard, the exceptions only being where hostile legislation is directed against silver itself. Values then, of course, become affected by a commodity which measures them becoming affected. In our own Congress the arguments urged against silver are that it is too bulky; thatthere is too much of it; thatthe commercial countries of Europe have, within the last twenty-five years, demonetized it and closed their mints to its free coinage; that by this action it has become a cheap money, and will drive the dear money (gold) out of the coun- try; and, last of all, the argument, which is only worthy of the dema- gogue, that it is produced in a part of our own country which is sparsely populated and, therefore, the liepresentatives of these States should, when Congress is dealing with these questions, be deprived of the voice and influence which the Constitution gives them in the councils of the nation. What matters it if all the gold produced in the nation were produced in one State, and in a small portion of one State, represented by only one maii in Congress. Would this have anything to do with the value of gold? What if all the silver produced in the country were produced in the same State and under exactly the same circumstances, would this have anything to do with the value of silver? In the markets of the world would the question ever be asked, "Over how much territory and in what State and country was this silver produced?" Such arguments are the lowest form of catering to the prejudices and passions of the unreasoning. Who are these European nations which have closed their mints to the coinage of silver? They are the great creditor nations of the world. Who are we who have made mad haste to join these European nations? We are the greatest debtor nation of the world. No other nation has so great a foreign debt. All other nations in the aggregate have not so great a foreign debt. Not in debts evidenced by our Government bonds, but in debts evidenced by every form of State, city, municipal, county, individual, and everv conceivable form nf ownnrai-a aor.nT.it.t7 ■ THE SILVER QUESTION. 11 We have nearly one-half of the world's mileage of railways and it is estimated that one-halt of these railway securities are held abroad. «. \^K 0Tm , 0f Ameri can financiering is now and has for more 1 an y yeaPS con »issibie and can exist, which, through the voice of one man, can say to every producer in the United States of every article of foo I and clothing, every article of raw mite- rial or manufactured, of building and structure, just what he shall pay tor delivering his product, either to the dealer or consumer, we have reached a degree of moral and commercial rottenness and a degree of monopolistic oppression fearful to contemplate. Fourth of July, postprandial, and orators of festive occasions are fond of quoting an illustrious name who said upon a memorable occasion that ours was a "Government of the people, for the people, and by the people." If the author of this statement were alive to-day he would need to change his description to read, "This is a Government of monopolies, for monopolies, and by monopolies." But, to return more directly to the question of silver and the repeal of the Sherman Act, we may ask, Has the owner and the tiller of the soil been benefited by this repeal? No. He finds that his honest dol- lar will not pay one cent more of his debts than the dollar of twenty years ago, but he finds that it will buy quite twice or thrice as much of his land or the produce of his land as the dollar of twenty years ago. Who has been benefited by this repeal! The foreign creditor, the money changers, and their allies and beneficiaries, and no one else. The gold monometallist would have us believe that gold is the one and only article of stationary and fixed value. They tell us that overproduction is the cause of all the products of the soil being so low. This is not true; but the lack of ability to purchase and to consume is the real cause of the lack of market for the producer. In the whole history of the human race upon the earth the world has never been able to get a single food crop ahead, and if the thermometer were to fall below the freezing point and to remain there for twelve months over all the earth's surface, and all the accumulated food were equally distributed among all the inhabitants of the world, every human beiDg would perish because there would not be sufficient food to feed man and animals until a second crop could be produced. With so narrow a margin of supplies always on hand, it is useless to talk about overproduction. The lack of opportunity to purchase, to pay for, and to consume is the question that presents itself to us for solution. Tariff legislation will furnish no solution and no remedy for this ill. Nor will a financial policy that shall strike down the valueof the world's stock of $4,000,000,000 of silver and raise the value of its stock of $4,000,000,000 of gold furnish us a solution of the trouble. It will only greatly aggravate the present misery. It will still further reduce the power of the producer and the wage earner to consume. The act repealing the Sherman Act was passed November 1, 189,5. From that date to March 1, 18!I6, is twenty-eight months. The Sherman Act required the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver per month If its operations had continued up to the present time there would have been purchased under its provisions 126,000,000 ounces of silver. During the twenty-eight months between November 1, 1893, and March 1, 1896, silver has averaged about 60 cents per ounce. It would then have required, under the provisions of this act, the issuance oi 14 THE SILVER QUESTION. .$75,600,000 of Treasury notes to have paid for this silver. During the lifetime of this act there were purchased 168,674,982 ounces of silver for which $155,931,002 of Treasury notes were issued in payment of it. This made this silver cost about 92 cents per ounce, but the closing of the mints in India in June 26, 1893, so greatly reduced the price of, sil- Ter that it has only averaged about 60 cents per ounce since that time. Now, what have been the net results of the repealing of this act? Instead of having increased the issue of Treasury notes to the extent of $75,600,000 and having purchased 126,000,000 ounces of silver, all of which we would still have on hand, we have issued and sold two hun- dred and sixty-two million five hundred thousand interest-bearing bonds to buy gold, all of which gold has gone away from us, and he would be a very poor prophet who could not see far enough ahead to predict that within a very few weeks we shall have less gold in the Treasury than we had on the 30th day of June, 1893, when President Cleveland issued his proclamation convening Congress for the sole pur- pose of repealing the Sherman Act, notwithstanding the fact that between that date and this two hundred and sixty-two and one-half millions of bonds have been sold. This is the operation of the policy of the "honest dollar." This is the operation of the policy of " sound finance." This is the operation of the policy of "keeping the cheap money from driving the dear money out of the country." The Treasury notes drew no interest. They had behind them all the silver which they purchased. The bonds do draw interest. They have nothing behind them as a collateral. They are a mortgage upon the soil of the producer, for the highest judicial tribunal in the land has declared that they shall not be a lien upon the income of the million- aire. All the gold which they have purchased has gone out from the Treasury as fast as it has gone into it. All of this gold has been used to pay every form of our corporate securities held abroad which have been thrown back upon our hands and to pay the interest and dividends upon enormous amounts of our railroad and other corporate securities held abroad. The mad haste to convene Congress for the repeal of the Sherman Act only four days after the act of the British Government closing the India mints, is in itself marvelously suggestive of an understanding, of cooperation, between our own Government and that of England. The act of the British Government was to double the debt of India to Engh.nd. The act of our own Government was to destroy the value of the silver-producing States. To destroy the value of the food-producing States. To destroy the value of the lands which produce the raw material for both food and clothiug. It was a declaration of war of the creditor agains' the debtor. It was a confiscation of the property of the creditor by the debtor without the cancellation of the obligation of the debtor. The aggregate result of the hostile legislation against silver of the -creditor nations of the world, aided by ourselves, the greatest debtor nation in the world, has been to measure the value of all the prop- erty on the earth and in the earth, on the seas and in the seas, by $4,000,000,000 of gold, or by $2.72 per head of each of the world's inhabitants. Was there ever so gigantic and so successful an attempt to put -values of every description, over the whole face of the earth, under a •combination sufficiently strong to control the world's supply of gold, THE SILVER QUESTION. 15 more than one-half of which is always locked up in government and other vaults and does not circulate at all. But again we are told that we can not better our condition without the cooperation of the other commercial nations of the world. Inasmuch as the principal of these commercial nations are the creditor nations and we the debtor nation, need we expect them soon to join us in a policy that will give us only one dollar of obligation to pay to them when we now owe them two dollars! Is it to be expected that they will join us in a policy that will lift ns from a state of debtor and borrower to one of ci editor and lender? Never. We must shape our financial policy for ourselves as we profess to shape our political policy for ourselves. We will always be a debt- ridden nation until we do this. We will always be under the yoke and bondage of an enormous foreign debt until we do this. With almost instant communication established with nearly all the habitable and inhabited parts of the world by means of the telegraph, with rapid transportation established with nearly all parts of the world by means of railroads and steamships, with the control of all these land and water lines of transportation concentrated in and under the control and management of a few individuals, it only needed the ability to fix the value and purchasing power of the money of the world, placed in the same hands which control the lines of transporta- tion, to enable them to fix the value of all the lands, all the products of the land, and all the labor of the world at figures which would give the half-fed, half-clad, half-boused, or the half -fed and altogether naked and unhoused producer — under such conditions of life and existence, for it is not living — the bare cost of production. Already such combines and monopolies have nearly all the transpor- tation lines of land and sea under their control, and it needs only that they have the additional power to fix and control the value and pur- chasing power of money to enable them to scale the tariff walls of tariff- protected countries or to ride through the open gates of free-trade countries with equal ease and facility. It is a most significant fact that it is the very parties who control, manipulate, wreck, or build up, as best may suit their interests, these great lines of transportation who are the loudest in crying out for an " honest dollar " and a single gold standard. " It is by this craft that they have their wealth." These men are all willing that the duped, confiding, ever-humbugged, cheated, and oppressed tiller of the soil shall have a " protective tariff" as a " panacea for all of his ills." ■,-,■, ~ ■. With the control of all the transportation of the world and all of the money of the world, tariff walls are no longer a barrier. The people are asking bread or the money to buy bread, but " they are given a stone " in the form of a protective tariff. The different parts of the world are now brought so close together by these means of rapid communication that we are compelled to deal with the interests of the world as we formerly dealt with the interests of a single State or, indeed, of a single county. Caesars, Alexanders, and Napoleons in finance of the present day far outrank the conquering commanders of these names in ancient days, and our modern generals of finance are little less dangerous to the liberties of the people than were the war generals of the past. The great army of toilers who raise our food and the raw materials for our clothing from the earth can not combine. They can form no 16 THE SILVER QUESTION. corporations or trusts. They can secure no legislation that will secure them a sufficient rainfall or prevent droughts or cyclones. They can secure no legislation that will maintain or enhance the price of their lands. When they have raised their crop it is for the transportation companies, the boards of trade, the various trusts which manipulate and control the price of their crops, and the money changers to say whether upon the ground where he has grown his crop the producer shall receive the cost of their production. The tariff laws furuish him no protection upon articles which we never import but always export, and, with the exception of China, he must compete in his own country, at his own home, with the free importation and the free competition of the cheapest laborer in the world. When he sends his products abroad he must sell them in the open market in competition with the labor and the products of the labor of the fellahin of Egypt, the coolies of China and India, and the serfs of Eussia. In the face of these conditions the lawmaking power of the land seeks to destroy one-half of the money of the world which meas- ures the value of all the products of the producer. The questions of money and debts are not new questions. Twenty- five centuries ago there lived a wise man in Greece whose name was Solon. When he assumed the control and management of the affairs of that country he found a condition of things existing that had very much in common with the condition of affairs now existing over a very wide extent of our own country. At each of the four corners of nearly every little farm in Greece he found a stone erected upon which was engraved the name of the mort- gagee and the amount of the mortgage which he held upon the land. Solon saw what at least a part of the trouble was. He dealt with the money question. He dealt with silver. He did not do as our modern Solons have done and are continuing to do. He did not depreciate or demonetize it. !Nb; he raised its value 40 per cent, and all the mort- gage-recording stones disappeared. He was a ruler "of the people" and for the people. Are there any left among us who have the conscience and the courage of ancient Solon? During the last fifteen months I have traveled through 37 States of this Union in order that, as far as possible, I might see for myself the exact condition of affairs. In all the small towns and hamlets , throughout the food producing and cotton-producing States, and throughout the silver-mining districts and upon most of the farms, I saw upon every hand the evidence of decay. Low prices for products and high-priced mortgages had sucked and were sucking the life out of the hovels and homes of the producer. Dilapidated houses and buildings, which had never known a paint brush, were alike common to hamlet, town, and country. They all told the story that their occupants could not afford a comfortable place of shelter. Only at the great money centers were thrift and comfort observable. It is a crime of no ordinary magnitude to make the lot of these peo- ple who supply us with our food harder; to still further shrink their assets and to still further increase their burden of debt. Yet this is exactly the yoke and burden that is being fastened upon them by every branch of this Government, by destroying the people's money, by hand- ing them over to the control of monopolies, by lifting the taxes from wealth and incomes and placing them upon poverty and mortgage- saddled homes and hovels; surely it is a new doctrine that poverty THE SILVER QUESTION. 17 instead of wealth is the proper subject of taxation. Such, however is }S t ecislon of a ma J° rit y ° f ^e highest judicial tribunal of the land. All honor, however, to the minority of the court which spurned such flagrant injustice and sounded the note of warning against the terrible day of reckoning that is certain to follow such trampling upon the plainest dictates of rights. Money is to commerce what blood is to the body. Commerce and trade can not live and move without money. The body can not live and be healthy with one-half of its blood taken away. Production, trade, and commerce can not live, be healthy, and carried on with one-half of the money which moves it taken away or destroyed. This money may be the money of the world, but it must first of all be our own money. There is not in the history of this world any nation which ever grew rich or powerful, or had any permanently enduring prosperity, which employed or made some other nation its bankers. This is just what this nation has for thirty years been doing. And it has brought us to a state of affairs which may, in part, be summed up as follows: There are in the United States about 180,000 miles of railway. The entire system has an average stock and bonded liability of about $64,000 per mile, or an aggregate amount of $11,520,000,000. Prom the best information I have been able to get from those in best posi- tions to know, both in Europe and at home, one-half of all this vast sum, or $5,760,000,000, is held and owned in Europe. But this does not begin to represent our liabilities to Europe. We must add to it her ownership in our Government bonds, our State bonds, our city bonds, onr county bonds, our town bonds, and her interest in and owner- ship of our mines, breweries, flouring mills, steel mills, furnaces, every form of trusts and manufactories, until the aggregate of these invest- ments piles up the figures to a most dizzy height. Over and above the balances arising from our export and import trade with foreign countries, it is estimated that the great sums we expend in foreign travel, freights to foreign ships, and scores of other items not of record in the custom-houses, added to the interest and dividends upon the investments already enumerated, bring what have become practically fixed charges to Europe up to the enormous figures of $350,000,000 per annum. This is a sum greater than is earned and paid upon every bond and every share of stock on every mile of rail- way in the United States, and yet the Government is promising Europe gold for the whole of these liabilities, and is eagerly joining Europe in her effort to destroy silver. What interest has the Government in the securities of these private corporations that she should assume their payment or make such promises ? But does she assume their payment 1 Yes. How? It is in this way: Whenever the European holder of any portion of our securities wishes to dispose of them he sends them back to New York or to whatever money center he got them from, and they are sent to the stock exchange and sold. The purchaser's check is presented to the bank and greenbacks demanded, which are immediately pre- sented to the subtreasury and gold demanded and paid, which is then put in a keg and sent back by steamer to Europe. When the Govern- ment runs out of gold by this performance it makes another issue ot bonds to keep the stream going. If a banking house should be so fav- orably situated as to own houses both in London and New York one house could gather up the securities in Europe and send them to New York while the New York house could draw the gold from the Govern- a. Tine 235 2 18 THE SILVER QUESTION. ment Treasury, and thus keep the Government continually making new ssues of bonds. This would be a transaction profitable all around to the jankers, but one in which the Government would not have a dollar to show for all its issue of bonds. Is it not marvelous that anyone who is not the immediate beneficiary )f such transactions as are here described should be found committing ;he country to pay to Europe gold for all these securities, very few of ivhich she ever paid us any gold for ? Is it not still more marvelous :hat we, the debtor nation, should be joining the creditor nation in lestroying the value of our own assets and thus doubling the extent )f our liabilities! And it is little less wonderful that we should be told, >r that anyone should believe those who tell us, that a sufficient high ;ariff to provide for the current expenses of the Government would stop the outflow of gold, either to pay our foreign fixed charges or to pay for our returned securities, while we proclaim to all foreign coun- tries that they need not take silver, but that they can have gold for the isking. | |The best protective tariff that we can adopt is the free coinage of silver, with or without the cooperation of the commercial creditor lations of Europe; and the payment of all our purchases and all our iabilities to foreign creditors, as well as to our own citizens, in silver, md to sell all our products to other countries for silver. While doing this we should make the duties on our imports payable n gold. Not another dollar of the gold now in the Treasury should )e paid out for greenbacks or Treasury notes. This gold we should keep n the vaults of the Treasury until we had accumulated a sufficiently arge amount with which, together with having secured the trade of the diver -using countries, such as India, China, Japan, South America, tnd Mexico, we would be able to force bimetallism upon Europe. If, while hoarding the gold collected from duties upon imports, we veice compelled to sell bonds for the current expenses of the Govern- nent, that certainly would be a measure far preferable to the issuing md selling of them for the sole purpose of furnishing gold to Europe, as ill these thus far issued have been. The repealing of the Sherman Act was professedly for the purpose of >reventing our going to silver monometallism. The whole course of the Administration and of Congress, since the lonvening of the extra session under the President's proclamation of Tuly 30, 1893, has been to drive the country headlong to silver mono- uetallism, by gathering up all the gold in the country, through the issue ,nd sale of United States bonds, and then shipping all of this gold >ut of the country as fast as it can be collected together by the United itates Treasury. This policy is a robbery of the country and a preying upon its wealth .nd vitality in the interests of monopolies and combines unknown and mheard of in the history of any other country in the world. The very men most actively engaged in this policy of sapping and ucking the vitality out of the nation are the men crying the loudest ar " an honest dollar." While thus crying out for "an honest dollar," they are sending every old dollar out of the country without legislation, and destroying the alue of every silver dollar in the country by legislation. The confiding, unsuspecting, unknowing, taxpaying, rent-paying, aterest-paymg, food-producing tiller of the soil, who does not under- tand this game and is not a beneficiary of it, but who knows that he 3 suffering and does not know what ails him, is told by his political THE SILVER QUESTION. 19 leaders that they will cure his ills by a protective tariff. What criminal deception ! If Europe still refused to join us she would then put the same value upon all her investments in the United States that she had upon silver. In other words, if she depressed silver she would depress her own invest- ments here to exactly the same extent. In the meantime, by such action, we would be able to take away from her all her trade with the silver countries, while she would have to pay us gold for the import duties upon all the goods she sold to us. The articles which we are compelled to buy, such as tea, coffee, sugar, and the spices and fruits, come largely from silver-using countries. As soon as England accepted our silver on a par with gold, or at its coinage instead of its bullion value, silver would everywhere all over the world be at once lifted from its bullion value to its coinage value, and the problem of bimetallism among all the commercial nations would at once be solved and settled. All our mines and mints could then go on uninterruptedly and the whole vexed question of currency, national and international, would be settled and settled rightly. Our enormous foreign debt can now be used to give us a command- ing voice in the settlement. We can name the terms on which we will pay and the terms on which we will continue to buy. We are the only nation in the world which can, if compelled to do so, live wholly within ourselves, and live well at that. The habit of comparing the value of the various products of labor in any given State, which are to be consumed with the products of the precious metals which are not to be consumed, is both ignorant and misleading. As well might we compare the value of the bushel, quart, or gallon measures, or the yardstick or the scales with the value of the commodities which they weigh or measure. It is the office of the precious metals to measure the value of all other commodities and to be the money of ultimate payment of all liabilities not canceled by an exchange of commodities or credits. I earnestly hope that the parties in Congress who are in a position to control will submit to no further tariff legislation until Congress and the Executive shall restore to silver the rights of which they have robbed it, and give to our own citizens the right of as fair and honest treatment as we accord to foreign creditors. I most earnestly hope that the few Spartan heroes who have taken a stand for fair treatment for silver will stand firm until our Government occupies a better position than that of being a mere financial annex to London. , , , ,, „, The 168 674,982 ounces of fine silver purchased under the Sherman Act of 1890, and in payment of which $155,931,002 of Treasury notes were issued were sufficient to coin $218,084,438; $19,031,002 of this amount was coined into silver dollars and exchanged for an equal amount of the Treasurynotesissuedin paymentof this bullion. These notes s were canceled, leaving still outstanding of these Treasury notes $136,900,000. There have been some additional amounts of this bullion coined, making an aggregate amount to date of $41,500,000. This last amount deducted from the whole amount purchased under this act leaves in the Treasury bullion of the coinage value of $176,584,438. As these Treasury notes are now declared to be payable in gold, and are only so paid, the whole of this $176,584,438 is practically an unin- cumbered asset of the Treasury, and if the Government is t in l need of funds for current expenses, why is not this great amount of bullion 20 THE SILVER QUESTION. In the history of the world was any nation ever known to issue and sell interest-bearing bonds with nearly two hundred millions of bullion lying idle and unincumbered in its Treasury 1 ? Such a policy can not fitly be described as anything short of being criminal. It is an out- rage on a long-suffering, patriotic, and confiding people. We need no additional tariff for additional revenue while we have this large stock of silver bullion on hand, but if it is not so needed it should be coined and paid out in exchange for Government notes when they are presented for payment, and the gold collected on import duties should be kept in the Treasury. Europe could then join us in estab- lishing a bimetallism that means free coinage of silver, or she could take her pay from us in silver at the coinage value, just as she chose. What a mockery it is for any man, for any men, or for any party to be crying out for " the protection of a home market," for "the protection of American labor," fpr ''the protection of American manufactures," when they allow Europe to put any price she chooses upon our silver, and by so doing puts the value upon all our products, anil we join her in helping to destroy this value and to help her take all the gold out of the country and to pile up a great national debt. In conclusion, I may say that I have all my life been a Eepublican. I have never voted a Democratic ticket. I hold no public office and desire none, and have never for one moment in my life desired any office or been a candidate for one, but I am a citizen of this country and take an interest in its welfare, and as such I object to and protest against the government of this great country becoming the agent through which and by which great corporations, monopolies, combina- tions, and aggregations of wealth can control and manipulate all the products of labor, all the products of the tiller of the soil, all the prod- ucts of the delver in the mines, all the value of all the lands from which our food and clothing is grown, and upon which the producer has his home. Already all the great transportation lines upon the land and upon the seas are under the control of a few individuals. All the telegraph lines upon the land and under the seas are under the control of the same few individuals, and if the control and value of all the money in the world were to come, as it practically has come, also under the control of the same few individuals, who are the manipulators of finance, administrations, courts, Congress, and legislatures would in the last thirty years have gained a victory and a control over labor and all the products of labor such as in all the previous history of the world the sword never won. Very truly, yours, S. J. EiTCHlE. Hon. Benj. Btjttekwokth, Washington, J). G. 54th Congress, ) SENATE. ( Document 1st Session. \ ( No. 256. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. Mat 14, 1896. — Ordered to be printed. Mr. Vilas presented the following SPEECH OP HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE, BEFORE THE WORKINGMEN OF CHICAGO, APRIL 15, 1896. Mr. President and Gentlemen : I am here this evening in response to a communication received several months ago from a number of gen- tlemen connected with various labor organizations of this city, inviting me to address them and their fellow- workmen upon the currency and financial questions, which were then and are still agitating the minds of our people in all parts of the country. When that communication reached me, it was not in my power to designate a time when my official duties would permit me to come here, but I promised to hold the mat- ter under consideration and come whenever it might be possible to do so, and I now congratulate myself upon my good fortune in having at last found an opportunity to meet this great assemblage of laboring people and to discuss in their presence what I consider one of the most important economic questions that can possibly engage the attention of wage earners in this or any other country. Whether the general business of the people shall be transacted with good money or bad money, whether the wages of labor shall be paid in a sound and stable currency, with full purchasing power in the markets where they are exchanged for the necessaries of life, or in a depreciated and fluctuating currency, having no fixed value and therefore bearing no permanent relation to the current prices of commodities, are ques- tions which affect the comfort and happiness of every home and the peace and prosperity of every community. W;hile all are deeply inter- ested in the settlement of these questions, it is unfortunately the case that all will not be equally affected by an erroneous decision uponthem. The wealthy man, the man who has accumulated property or hoarded monev is always exempt from many of the most serious consequences of a financial or industrial disturbance. He has both means and credit, and wMe he may be subjected to much loss and inconvenience neither he noVhis family will be pinched by hunger or compelled to go without raiment or shelter. Itis the poor man and the ^* ^»™J°^ the man who has not been fortunate enough ^ accum nlate prop ert y or money, but who depends upon his wages or upon the Products ot his own labor for the means of supporting himself and his family, that alwavs feels the first and most disastrous effects of a business or indus- trKeSessfon, * „ matt er whether it results from a depreciated and fluctaatin?currency or from other causes. Such a man has nothing to Sose of bThls llbor, and nothing with which to support himself or 2 SPEECH OP HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. his family but his wages or the proceeds of his own labor, and any pol- icy that even temporarily suspends or obstructs tbe industrial progress of the country by diminishing the demand for the products of labor, or by impairing the capacity or disposition of capital to employ labor, must be injurious to his interestsand inflict more or less suffering upon all who are dependent upon him. Labor can not be hoarded; the idle day is gone forever; lost wages are never reimbursed; and therefore steady employment and good pay in good money are essential to the comfort and happiness of the American laborer and his wife and children, and he will be unfaithful to himself and to them if he does not insist upon the adoption and maintenance of such a policy as will most certainly preserve the value and stability of all our currency and promote the regular and profitable conduct of all our industrial enterprises. He can not prosper when the country is in distress, when its industries are prostrated, its commerce paralyzed, its credit broken down, or its social order disturbed; nor can he prosper when the fluctuations of the cur- rency are such that he can not certainly know the value of the dollar iu which his wages are paid, or estimate in advance the cost of the necessaries of life. THE FREE COINAGE PROPOSITION. Whether we shall Or shall not have a long period of financial, com- mercial, and industrial disturbance in this country, and whether labor shall be deprived of permanent employment or be partially employed and inadequately paid, are questions directly and necessarily involved in the demand now seriously made by many of our fellow citizens that the United States, without the cooperation of any other government in the world, and in opposition to the established policy of every other great civilized and commercial nation, shall authorize the free and unlimited coinage of full legal tender silver at the ratio of 16 to 1, not- withstanding the true market ratio between the two metals is about 31 to 1 ; or, in other words, that the United States alone shall declare by law that 16 ounces of silver are equal in value to 1 ounce of gold, when it is an indisputable fact everywhere recognized that iu all the markets of the world, in silver standard countries as well as in gold standard countries, 16 ounces of silver are worth only about one-half as much as 1 ounce of gold and will purchase only about one-half as much of the necessaries of life. The naked proposition is that the United States shall coin, at the public expense, for the exclusive benefit of the indi- viduals and corporations owning the bullion, all the silver that may be presented at the mints into dollars containing 371£ grains of pure silver, or 412J grains of standard silver, worth intrinsically about 51 or 52 cents, deliver the coins to the depositors of the bullion, and compel all the other people in the country to receive these coins at a valuation of 100 cents each in the payment of debts due them for property sold; for labor and service of all kinds; for pensions to soldiers and sailors and their widows and children; for losses sustained under policies issued by life and other insurance companies; for deposits in savings banks, trust companies, building associations, and other institutions ; for debts due to widows and orphans by guardians, executors, and administrators of decedents' estates, and other trustees ; for salaries of all civil, military, and naval officials, and the compensation of private soldiers and sea- men, and, in short, for every kind of obligation recognized by the laws of the land, except only in cases where the prudent capitalist has taken the precaution in advance to contract for payment of debts due to him SPEECH OP HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. 3 in gold or its equivalent. To say nothing of the gross partiality and manifest injustice of such a policy, its immediate effect would be to con- tract our currency to the extent of about $620,000,000 by stopping the use of gold as money and putting a premium upon the coins of that metal equal, or about equal, to the difference between the intrinsic value of the gold dollar and the intrinsic value of the silver dollar. Gold coins would at once become a commodity and would be bought and sold by speculators in the market just as they were during the war, when we had a depreciated paper currency. The value of the silver dollar would fluctuate from day to day, moving up and down with the rise and fall of the commercial price of the bullion contained in it, as the Mexican dollar does now, and the premium on the gold dollar would of course fluctuate to the same extent, thus affording an opportunity to bullion brokers and speculators to buy and sell it at a profit. It would cease to be used as money, because no man would pay his debt in gold dollars, or in paper redeemable in gold dollars, worth 100 cents, when the law permitted him to pay it in silver dollars, worth only 51 or 52 cents each. The sudden withdrawal of $620,000,000 from the volume of currency in the country would undoubtedly produce a financial and industrial disturb- ance far more disastrous to the interests of labor than has ever been experienced in our history, aud no man who has a particle of sympathy for workingmen and women and their dependent families can contem- plate the possibility of such a calamity without feeling that it is his duty, whether he occupies a public or a private station, to employ every honorable means at his command to avert it. While the sudden expulsion of $620,000,000 in gold from our stock of money would itself be sufficient to create a financial disturbance unpar- alleled in the history of this or any other couutry, the situation would be very greatly aggravated by the fact that the purchasing power of all the remainder of our currency would be suddenly reduced about one half ; we should have only about two-thirds as much currency as we have now, and at the same time it would be so depreciated in value that it would require about twice as much as we have now to transact the business of the country, provided there should be any business to transact. OUR EXPERIENCE WITH THE RATIO. The attempt to maintain what is called the double standard of value, that is, the attempt to keep the legal-tender coins of the two metals, gold and silver, in use as money at the same time, upon a ratio of value fixed by law, has repeatedly been made by kings and parliaments in every civilized country in the world, and it has failed again and again in every one of them ; and it requires no gift of prophecy to foresee that it must continue to fail so long as self-interest constitutes a controlling factor in the business affairs of men. Without trespassing upon your patience to review the monetary history of other countries in which this experiment has been made and failed, it may be advan- tageous to refer briefly to our own experience upon this subject. When it was determined to adopt a monetary system for the United States and establish a mint, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson two men who differed widely upon almost every public question, and whose names as founders and leaders of their respective parties will live as lone as our political literature is read, agreed that m determining what should be the coinage or legal ratio between gold and silver, the true relative commercial value of the two metals m the markets of the world must first be ascertained, and that this relative value when L SPEECH OF HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. iscertained should be incorporated into the statute as the basis of the >roposed system of coinage. Although they were party leaders they vere statesmen and patriots, and when they were called on to consider ihis great business question, affecting all the private affairs of their fellow- citizens, they gave it a thorough and impartial investigation lpon its merits, without regard to the effect their decision might have ipon their own political fortunes or upon the political fortunes of their bllowers. These great men were never disturbed for a moment by the Lelusionthat Congress could fix by statute the actual or relative values if gold and silver any more than it could fix by statute the actual or elative values of a pound of lead and a pound of iron. They knew hat gold and silver, like all other exchangeable things, are commodi- ties, and that their value will be fixed in the markets of the world. Dhey knew that it was entirely competent, in fact necessary, for Con- gress to declare the ratio upon which the two metals should be coined kt the mint, if they were to be coined at all, but they knew equally rell that if the ratio so declared did not correspond substantially with he ratio which the commercial world had established the coins of the wo metals could not be kept in use as money at the same time, and lonsequently, as I have already said, they determined to ascertain the lommercial ratio and to adopt it. They reached the conclusion that he true commercial ratio at that time was 15 to 1 — that is, that 15 imices of silver were equal in value to 1 ounce of gold — and accordingly he act of 1792, which was our first coinage law, authorized the coinage if the two metals at that ratio. GOLD DRIVEN OUT OF CIRCULATION. At the ratio thus established the silver dollar contained 371J grains if fine silver, and the gold dollar contained 24f grains of fine gold; tut it was soon discovered that a mistake had been made, and that 371J grains of fine silver were not in fact equal in value to 24f grains of Lne gold, and the consequence was that, although the difference between he value of a silver dollar and the value of a gold dollar was only /bout 1 cent and one- eighth of a cent, silver drove gold out of use ,nd out of the country, and from that time we had silver monometallism intil after the passage of the acts of 1834 and 1837. The fact that the ilver was put into the form of a coin and made legal tender the same ,s gold, and that both dollars were declared to be worth 100 cents each, [id not increase the value of the 371J grains of silver to any extent whatever. The people could not be deceived by mere words printed in , statute; they soon learned that the metal contained in the silver Lollar was not equal in value to the metal contained in the gold dollar, ,nd they paid silver to their creditors and hoarded the gold or sent it ut of the country. Even our new and full-weight silver coins would lot circulate or remain in the country, because Congress by various ,cts made certain foreign coins legal tender in the payment of debts, ,nd as they were generally so worn by abrasion as to be of less weight han the new domestic coins, they drove our dollars and half dollars, aid to a large extent our quarters and dimes also, out of use as money. )ur own coins were exported and used at their bullion value in making mrchases and paying debts abroad, and Mr. Jefferson himself, who had hen become President of the United States, issued an order on the 1st _ay of May, 1806, stopping the coinage of silver dollars at our mints. Jo more silver dollars were coined until 1836, thirty years afterwards, nd then only 1,000 of them were issued from the mints. SPEECH OF HON. JOHN G CARLISLE. 5 SILVER DRIVEN OUT OP CIRCULATION. trSf™ i aV i n I l6ft f*, 00 ™^, Congress, in 1834, during the Adminis- S Z or^t W Jac ^oa, determined to restore it to the circulation, ?? tJ> ? 5 t °, a , C «° + m ? 11 ^ that result > th e legal ratio was changed from JwtL ™E? ! 6 t0 l ; 1 n hat 1S ' the law was so amended as to provide that the gold eagle or $10 piece, should contain 232 grains of pure srold which made the dollar consist of 23^ grains, but by the act of 1837 it was changed to 23.22 grains, which now constitutes the dollar and unit ol value Ihis was a slight overvaluation of gold in the coinage, because 23.22 1 grains of fine gold were not in fact worth as much in the markets as 37L£ grains of fine silver. Although the difference in value was very small, it proved sufficient to change the whole character of our metallic currency, and under this ratio gold and silver exchanged places; silver went out of the country and gold came in, and from that time until after the passage of the act of 1878 we had practical gold monometallism, except during the period of the war, when we had no metallic money of any kind. When the great civil war began, we had no silver in circulation, except the subsidiary coins authorized by the act of 1853, but we had gold, and paper redeemable in gold, and it was not long before we had another practical illustration of the natural law that the inferior or less valuable legal-tender currency will expel the superior or more valuable legal-tender currency from circulation. Early in 1862 Congress most wisely, in my opinion, authorized the issue of legal-tender paper to circulate as money, and the usual and inevitable result followed. Gold ceased to be used as money, and the banks and the Treasury having suspended specie payments the country was flooded with depreciated currency worth at times less than 50 cents on the dollar. Later on, fractional paper currency was authorized by Con- gress, and the effect of this was to drive out of circulation even the light- weight subsidiary silver coins, and for many years not a single piece of metallic money of any kind was used by the people, except on the Pacific coast, where gold continued to circulate at its actual intrinsic value, without regard to the fictitious value which the acts of Congress attrib- uted to the legal-tender paper. I will endeavor to show you hereafter what effect this depreciated currency had upon the wages of labor and upon the prices of commodities which the laborers were compelled to purchase with their wages, my purpose at the present moment being simply to prove, by our own experience, that it is impossible to retain in circulation at the same time legal-tender gold and silver coins of the same denomination at any ratio which does not correspond with the actual commercial values of the two metals in the markets of the world, and that therefore the free and unlimited coinage of legal-tender sil- ver by the United States alone at the ratio of 16 to 1, when the true com- mercial ratio is about 31 to 1, would instantly contract the currency by the expulsion of all the gold now in the country. If the overvaluation of silver to the amount of a little over 1 per cent in the coinage law of 1792 expelled gold and established silver monometallism, and if the overvaluation of gold to the extent of less than 1 per cent in the acts of 1834 and 1837 expelled silver from circulation and established gold monometallism, is not the conclusion irresistible that the free and unlimited coinage of legal-tender silver at the present time, at an over- valuation of nearly 100 per cent, would at once place the country upon a monometallic silver basis? This question does not seem to me to be open to serious argument, and when it is proposed that the United 6 SPEECH OF HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. States shall, in defiance of our own experience during a period of eighty- nine years, authorize the free coinage of legal-tender silver at such a ratio it is the duty of the people, and especially the duty of the labor- ing people, to pause before it is too late and carefully consider whether they will determine to overthrow their existing monetary system and substitute in its place the depreciated silver monometallism of Asia and Mexico and the small States and Eepublics of Central and South America, with their low rates of wages and their high rates of exchange. Under the coinage act of 1792 we had silver but no gold, and under the acts of 1834 and 1837, with the free coinage of both metals, we had gold but no silver, except the token subsidiary coins after 1853, while now, with gold as the standard and the limited coinage of silver, we have both gold and silver as full legal- tender money in larger amounts than ever before in our history, and the coins of the two metals are kept equal in purchasing power by the credit and resources of the Government, notwithstanding the difference in their intrinsic value. SHALL WE USE BOTH METALS? We have now about $620,000,000 in gold and $413,000,000 in full legal-tender silver, besides $78,216,677 in subsidiary silver coins, which are legal tender in payments not exceeding $10, and the real question for the public to decide is whether they will continue to use the coins of both metals or adopt a monetary system which always has and always will drive one of them out of the country. I am not here, therefore, this evening to advocate the exclusive use of gold coin as money or to oppose a conservative and safe use of silver coin as money along with gold and at a parity with gold, but 1 am here to insist that we shall not abandon the present legal standard of value, expel all the gold from the country, and adopt silver monometallism, with free coinage of a nominal dollar worth intrinsically only 51 or 52 cents. I am here to insist that the mints of the United States, which were constructed and are maintained and operated at the expense of all the people, shall not be used for the exclusive benefit of the owners of silver bullion under a law giving them the right to have 51 or 52 cents' worth of their silver coined free of charge and stamped as a dollar, and compelling you and all others to receive it from them as a dollar. All the mints of the United States, operated to their full capacity and doing no other work, could not coin into standard silver dollars two-thirds of the annual production of sil- ver in our own country, but notwithstanding this, it is seriously pro- posed to offer free coinage to all the silver in the world at a legal valuation almost double its commercial value in the markets of the foreign countries where it is produced. The annual production of silver in the world is about $216,000,000 at our coining rate, and the annual capacity of our mints to coin standard silver dollars is only about $40,000,000. Last year we coined $43,933,475 in gold and $9,069,480 in silver ; so that if our mints were devoted exclusively to the free coin- age of standard silver dollars the addition to our stock of metallic money would be about $15,000,000 less every year than it is now, and it would not be good money after it was coined. More than fifteen years would elapse before we could at this rate coin enough depreciated silver dollars to supply the place of the good gold dollars expelled from the country, and in the meantime a complete revolution would have to be effected in our commercial relations with other nations, and in all our domestic business affairs, includingareadjustment of the wages of labor, the prices of commodities, the rates of municipal, State, and Federal SPEECH OF HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. 7 taxation, charges for transportation, and every other matter involving the use of money or credit. We should descend by a single step from the highest standard of value to silver monometallism, with a con- tracted and at the same time a depreciated currency, a financial exper- iment which has no precedent in the monetary history of the world. Fortunately, when changes have heretofore been made in the circula- tion by the substitution of the coins of one metal for the coins of the other, the difference in their value has been very small and the process of substitution has been gradual and created no great financial dis- turbance. Under the act of 1792 the difference in value between the coins at the legal ratio was only a little over 1 per cent, and yet, within less than one year after the enactment of that statute, Con- gress was compelled to reinforce our stock of money by making cer- tain foreign coins legal tender in the payment of debts; and on the same day of the passage of the act of 1834, which put the country on a gold basis by undervaluing silver about 1 per cent, Congress passed another statute making the gold coins of Great Britain, Portugal, Brazil, Prance, Mexico, and Colombia legal tender by weight in the payment of debts, thus providing, as far as possible, against a con- traction of the currency on account of the expulsion of silver from the circulation. During the war, when gold was leaving the country, legal-tender Treasury notes were rapidly issued, under the authority of Congress, to take its place, and, instead of a contraction of the currency, we had an expansion. After the war, when it was determined to change the character of our currency again by the resumption of specie pay- ments, the law was enacted four years in advance of the time when it was to take effect, in order that ample opportunity might be afforded to adjust the business of the people to the altered conditions. Now, however, all the conservative and prudential considerations that have usually controlled in the settlement of great financial questions seem to be utterly disregarded, and we are confronted by an orgauized and aggressive movement to destroy by a single blow the measure of value upon which all existing contracts are based, and thus subvert the very foundations of our monetary system, without allowing a single day to prepare for the change. In the general confusion and disorder result- ing from such a radical measure, what will be the condition of the American laborer"? Will he be benefited or injured by reducing the value of the money in which his wages are paid and at the same time increasing the prices of the commodities for which his wages are expended? DESTROYING THE VALUE OF WAGES. After struggling for more than a quarter of a century, through labor organizations and otherwise, to secure a rate of wages which would make the proceeds of a day's work equal to the cost of a day's subsist- ence for the workingman and his family, you are asked by the advocates of free coinage to join them in destroying one-half the purchasing power of the money in which you are paid and impose upon yourselves the task of doubling the nominal amount of your wages hereafter ; that is, to struggle for another quarter of a century, or perhaps longer to raise your wages in a depreciated currency to a point which will enable vou to purchase with them as much of the necessaries of life as you can purchase now; and if, after years of contention, privation, and industrial disorder, you should at last succeed in so adjusting wages that they would procure at the higher prices of commodities just what SPEECH OF HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. iey will procure now at the existing prices, what would you have ained by the change from the old to the new conditions'? Money jceived for wages, like money received on every other account, is aluable only to the extent that it can be exchanged for other com- wdities, and it is scarcely necessary to suggest that a dollar worth cents will not purchase as much in the markets as a dollar worth 00 cents. To call a dime a dollar would add nothing whatever to its ltrinsic value, or to its purchasing power; it would still buy only a ime's worth of goods. If these propositions are correct, it is clear hat when wages are paid in a depreciated currency the rates of wages mst be increased in proportion to the depreciation of the money and 1 proportion to the increase in the prices of other things, or the laborer all suffer a loss. Now, I affirm that it is the universal rule that the ates of wages do not increase in proportion to the depreciation in the alue of the money in which they are paid, and that when the currency 5 depreciated the rates of wages do not increase in proportion to the ncrease in the prices of the commodities the laborer is compelled to mrchase. If there has been a single exception to this rule in this or a any other country, my investigations have not enabled me to find it, nd I do not believe oue can be found. .MERICAN LABOR'S EXPERIENCE WITH A DEPRECIATED CURRENCY. It is not my purpose to weary you by the presentation of voluminous tatistics or by a tedious recital of facts, but the particular proposition low under consideration is of such great importance in the discussion if this subject that you must permit me to call your especial attention o the experience of the laboring people in our own country during the r ears immediately following the introduction of a depreciated paper :urrency in 1862, and also to the very low rates of wages which now irevail in countries having the silver standard of value, or the so-called Louble standard of value with coinage of silver at a legal ratio not cor- esponding with the commercial value of the metal, and in doing this '. will make no statement that can not be fully sustained by reliable svidence. On the 3d of March, 1893, a subcommittee of the Committee on Finance a the United States Senate made a report on the course of prices and rages in this country for a period of fifty-two years, embracing the >rices of almost every article of consumption in common use among he people and the rates of wages in almost every industry carried on Luring that time, and, in order that you may learn from this official md impartial investigation what effect a depreciated currency has on rages and prices, I will briefly state some of the most material facts and sonclusions embodied in that document. The subcommittee consisted if five Senators, representing both political parties and both sides of he currency question, and the investigation, which lasted nearly two rears, was most thoroughly and impartially made, with no purpose in dew except to ascertain and report the actual facts; and, so far as t relates to questions of fact, the report was unanimous. As stated leretofore, Congress, early in the year 1862, inaugurated the policy »f issuing legal- tender paper, gold was driven out of circulation, specie jayments were suspended, the currency began at once to depreciate, rad before the close of the year the paper dollar was worth less than r 6 cents in gold. From the time the depreciation began the prices of iommodities and the wages of labor were paid in paper currency, and ;he injurious effect upon the interests of the laboring man is clearly SPEECH OF HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. 3 shown in the report referred to. In 1862 the wages of labor, paid in depreciated paper, were less than 3 per cent higher in paper than when paid in gold, but the prices of the 223 articles used by the laborers and other people in the maintenance of their families were nearly 18 per cent higher than they were when paid in gold ; in 1863 the wages of labor, paid in depreciated paper worth about 69 cents on the dollar, were 10J per cent higher than when paid in gold, but the prices of the articles the laborer had to buy with his wages were nearly 49 per cent higher; in 1864 the wages of labor paid in depreciated paper dollars worth 49 cents each had advanced 25£ per cent, but the prices of the necessaries of life had advanced 90 J per cent ; in 1865 wages paid in paper currency worth 63 cents on the dollar had advanced 43 per cent above the rates previously paid in gold, or its equivalent, but the prices of commodities had advanced nearly 117 per cent — that is to say, had more than doubled; and in 1866 wages paid in a currency worth 71 cents on the dollar had advanced a fraction more than 52 per cent from the previous rates in gold, or its equivalent, but the prices of commodities had advanced 90 per cent. The rise in the rates of wages never corresponded with the rise in the prices of other thiugs until the year 1869, four years after the close of the war, when the value of our currency was 71 cents on the dollar, and it was quite certain that no further depreciation would occur. In 1860 this country was on a gold basis and had been on that basis for many years, under the operation of the acts of 1834 and 1837. Wages were then paid in gold, or its equivalent, and by reducing the wages paid in a depreciated currency to a gold basis, and comparing them with the rates paid in gold in 18U0, we shall have another demonstra- tion of the injurious effects of cheap money on the interests ot the laborer. On this basis the laborer received 76 cents and 2 mills m 1803, instead of the gold dollar he received in I860; in 1864 he received 80 cents and 8 mills instead of a gold dollar, and in 1865 he received 66 cents and 2 mills instead of a gold dollar. In other words, the wages oHabor, measured by gold, as they were in 1860, when ,^ da sound currency, had fallen about 24 per cent in 1863, more than 19 per cent inl864 and nearly 44 per cent in 1865, when we had a depredated cur- acy 'aud, gentlemen, the force of this illustration is greatly aug- mented by th! facts that these reductions in the rates of wages occurred Satinie when several thousand laborers had been withdrawn from the field c? competition, when the Government was engaged m the prose- cution ofTfreat war and was expending money lavishly for all kinds oFsuppnesir the Army and. Navy, and when the pn» s of aH the products of labor had largely increased. Suiely if ^there evei can oe wages fell so rapidly or so low. AN IMPRESSIVE WARNING PROM CHILE. „ „e fi 10 T?PTinhlic of Chile furnishes another The recent experience of the K e P<™ °* >T f deprec iated impressive warning ^XX?SS3l double stand- currency. That country had fm a }°, n j>;? me p ,^ d * d silver at the ratio Xtt&tfi &JZ^?&%£S£Sj£&*~ of silver, 10 SPEECH OF HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. the coins of that metal went out of circulation and gold constituted the medium of exchange and actual standard of value until about the begin- ning of the year 1876; but as soon as the commercial value of silver fell below the ratio of 16.39 to 1 as compared with gold, all the gold went out of circulation and the country had silver monometallism. In 3875, before this change took place, the peso, or dollar, of Chile, was worth about 88£ cents in our money, but in 1885, ten years after gold went out and silver came in, the peso was worth less than 53 cents in our money. Silver continued to depreciate, and, besides, large amounts of paper cur- rency were issued by the Government and the banks, and in 1895, twenty years after the change from the gold basis to the silver basis, the peso was worth only about 34^ cents in our money. Let us see, now, what effect this cheap money, or in other words this system of silver monometal- lism which you are asked to adopt here, had upon the wages of labor in that country. Our minister at Santiago has very recently made an official investigation and report upon this subject, which has not yet been published, from which it appears that in the northern part of Chile, where labor has always been in greater demand than elsewhere, on account of the great nitrate fields located in that section of the country, very little change took place even in the nominal rates of wages, notwithstanding the great fall in the value of the currency; that is, laborers continued to receive in depreciated money about the same amount they received before in good money. In 1875, when the peso was worth 88J cents, a mechanic, a boiler maker, a blacksmith, a carpenter, a fireman, and an ordinary laborer received together for a day's work 18J pesos, or $16.37 in our money; in 1885 the same persons received for the same work 20f pesos, but owing to the depreciation of the currency this was equal to only $10.93 in our money ; and in 1895, twenty years after the country had descended to a silver basis, the same laborers received for the same work 25.95 pesos, but the value of the peso was less than 35 cents, and consequently their wages amounted to only $8.34 in our money, or just about one-half what they had received twenty years before. In the central part of the country the result was substantially the same, though not quite so injurious to the laborer. In 1875 a day's wages for five men — a mason, a carpenter, a gas fitter, a painter, and an ordinary laborer — amounted altogether to $6.45 in our money, but in 1885 the wages of the same men were $5.53, and in 1895, $4.99. In the southern part of the Eepublic there was some increase in the nominal amount of wages paid between 1876 and 1889, on account of the fact that a line of railway was then being constructed through that region by foreign capital, but since the latter date the general average rate of wages has remained substantially the same, although paid in a constantly depreciating currency. Our minister to Chile, after a very careful examination of the entire situation in that country, says : " It may be taken for granted that in Chile, as in all other countries which have had a like financial experience, the consequences of cheap money have weighed most heavily upon the classes that are least able to support the burden." The evils of silver monometallism and a depre- ciated currency finally became intolerable in that country, and, although it produces considerable silver and very little gold, it has recently changed its policy and adopted the gold standard of value. In nearly every country in the world having the gold standard of value the wages of labor have increased materially during the last twenty-five years, and, at the same time, the purchasing power of the money in which wages are paid has increased also, while in the countries having the silver standard of value wages have been actually reduced by the depreciation SPEECH OP HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. 11 of the currency to such an extent that the laborer is in a much worse condition than he was at the beginning of that period. Japan, by far the most progressive and prosperous country in the Bast, coins both gold and silver at the ratio of 16.18 to 1, a ratio which greatly over- values silver, and, as the Government does not maintain the parity of the two metals, the currency is on a depreciated silver basis. Wages are paid in silver, of course, because the laboring men and women always get the cheapest money in circulation, and they generally pay the highest prices for the articles they buy, for the reason that their purchases are usually made in small quantities at a time. The Japa- nese silver yen is worth a little less than 50 cents in our money, and when the wages of labor, paid in this depreciated coin, are reduced to our standard of value they appear so insignificant that it is difficult to understand how the people who receive the miserable pittance can live and maintain their families. The average daily earnings of a bricklayer amount to 33 cents; blacksmiths, carpenters, and cabinetmakers receive 30 cents; compositors in printing offices, 29 cents; pressmen, 26 cents ; roofers, 29 cents; stonecutters, 36 cents; ordinary tailors, 28 cents; weavers, 15 cents; and in all the long list of occupations and wages no laborer, however skilled, can be found who receives more than 49 cents per day, except porcelain artists in the great city of Yokohama, who get 72 cents. Factory laborers even in that city, where most of the great industries are carried on by American or European capitalists, receive 21 cents per day, and in other parts of the country they receive less. FREE SILVER IN MEXICO — SOME RESULTS. Our neighboring Eepublic of Mexico, with a constitutional govern- ment very similar to our own, with an area of 767,000 square miles and a population of only about 12,000,000, with almost marvelous natural resources awaiting development, and offering a most inviting field for the investment of capital and the employment of labor, has the silver standard of value, gold not being in use, and if cheap money is a bless- ing to the labcing man, he ought to be prosperous and happy in that country. The Mexican dollar contains 377.17 grains of pure silver, or nearly 6 grains more than is contained in our dollar, and yet, not being sustaiued by a monetary system which keeps it at a parity with gold, it is worth only about 53 cents in our money. Wages are paid in sil- ver and are very low in comparison with the wages paid m this country for the same services, in many instances not being half as much while the prices of commodities generally are much higher than they _are here. The prices of imported articles especially are exorbitantly high in Mex- ico? because they have to be paid for abroad in gold, and the deprecia- tion of their money is so great that it requires nearly two dollars in silver to uav one inToll Although our own silver dollar contains less fine sUve/than the Mexican dollar, one of ours is nearly equal ^ exchange- Xle value to two of theirs, because here the coinage is limited and the Government Sea the coin's on its own account and has pledged its . feith Md credit to keep them as good as gold, a pledge that has been faith- Sv Tept up tothis time, notwithstanding the complaints and denun L2 SPEECH OP HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. whatever in the coins, and it would be grossly unjust to require the jovernment to keep theni equal in exchangeable value to gold. The lollars, as rapidly as coined, would be delivered to the owners of the aullion free of charge, and the Government would have no legal or noral right to tax all the people of the country in order to procure ^old with which to redeem, these private coins. The value of our dollar irould, therefore, be no greater than the intrinsic or commercial value )f the silver contained in it, and its purchasing power in the markets would be diminished about one-half; but the wages of labor would remain, for a long time, at least, substantially at the present rates, or if ;hey should be nominally increased on account of the depreciation of ;he currency, experience in the past shows that^they would not increase u proportion to the increase in the prices of commodities. Rises in the ?ates of wages take place very slowly, while the prices of commodities nove rapidly, at some periods changing several times in the course of i single day, and these movements are always more frequent and more larmful when the currency is in an unsettled condition. A MOVEMENT TO REDUCE WAGES. Tou have doubtless observed recently what appears to be quite a formidable demonstration in favor of the free coinage of silver by cer- ;ain large manufacturing interests in the eastern part of the country, ipon the ground that if we continue to maintain our present standard )f value the silver standard countries, especially India, China, and Tapan, will soon be able to undersell them in the markets of the world. Reduced to its simplest form, the proposition of these gentlemen is that ;he manufacturers of certain kinds of goods in this country can not sontinue to pay their laborers high wages in gold, or its equivalent, and jompete successfully in the markets abroad with the manufacturers of similar goods in silver-standard countries, who pay their laborers low yages in depreciated silver and, therefore, they insist that a monetary system shall be adopted here which will give them the advantage of pay- ng for their labor in depreciated silver. The theory is that with free :oinage of legal-tender silver, the wages of labor in this country would je paid in silver dollars worth about half as much as gold dollars, but ;he products of labor, which would belong to the employer, would be sold for gold in the markets abroad, and that the gold thus obtained iould be exchanged for silver at about the rate of one dollar in gold for two dollars in silver; and thus the process would go on, the anployer getting gold of full value, and the laborer getting depreci- ited silver, which, in the opinion of these gentlemen, would be a most lappy solution of this question. If the interests of labor are to be left sntirely out of consideration, and if it were not reasonably certain that i sudden revolution in our monetary system would at once arrest the )rogress of all our industries, and produce almost universal bank- ruptcy, this scheme to make the employer very rich, and the laborer very )oor might be worthy of serious consideration; but the American aborer has a right to demand pay for his work in as good money as the smployer receives for his products in any part of the world, and when le surrenders this right he is doomed to the same fate that has already >vertaken his brothers in the silver- standard countries. It is but sim- )le justice to say, in this connection, that the great body of employers, u vast majority of the men who have embarked their capital in indus- trial enterprises and are relying for success upon their skill and energy n the prosecution of their business, do not want the present standard. SPEECH OF HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. 13 of value overthrown, because they know that the establishment of sil- ver monometallism would be ruinous to them and to all who are depend- ent upon them for employment, or for the supply of commodities at reasonable prices. AMERICAN LABOR IS A LARGE CREDITOR — THE DEBTS DUE IT. If the solution of this question affected only the character and amount and purchasing power of the future earnings of the American laborer, it would still be a subject of the gravest importance to him ; but its impor- tance is greatly increased by the fact that the safety and value of a very considerable part of his past earnings are also involved. The thrifty and provident workingman, anticipating a time when he .may be disabled or deprived of employment, has endeavored to save something out of his earnings, in order to provide for the comfort of his wife and children in the future, and has laid it away at home, or deposited it in a bank or building association, or invested it in a life-insurance policy, or loaned it to some friend in whom he has confidence. He is not a debtor, but a creditor, and the corporations and individuals having the custody of his earnings are indebted to him, and ought to pay what they owe him in just as good money as he put into their hands. According to the latest reports, the savings banks in your own State hold $24,357,400 on deposit for 83,802 people, or an average of $257 for each depositor, and in the whole country they hold $1,810,597,000 for 4,875,519 people, or an average of $371 for each depositor. State banks, trust companies, and private banks hold $1,340,888,000 for about 1,500,000 people, and national banks hold $1,701,653,521 for 1,929,340 depositors, of whom 1,724,000 have less than $1,000 to their credit. Besides these institutions, there are 6,000 building and loan associations in the United States, having about 1,800,000 share- holders, male and female, who have paid dues in good money, amount- ing to more than $500,000,000. There are nearly 700 of these associa- tions in the State of Illinois alone, and in these institutions many laborers— men, women, and even children— have deposited every dollar they could spare, often denying themselves some of the comforts of life, in order to lay up something for a time of need. More than 2,000,000 of our people have taken out life-insurance poli- cies which are now in force, amounting to $4,202,857,323, and have paid the premiums on them year after year m good money, while the mutual benefit and assessment and cooperative and fraternal companies and associations have 3,500,000 members who have contributed a large Dart of their earnings to the funds held to reimburse losses sustained bv sickness or death. The obligations of these companies and associa- Ss to their members amount to $5,184,670,936; and the xndustnal romnanies in the United States have a membership of 6,919,598, with Sance amounting to $810,650,678 in addition to all the foregoing, and it is constantly increasing. How many laboring men and women Save taken out policies or otherwise contributed from their earnings to Ere themselves against loss by accident while engaged in the pros- ecution of ft St work: cannot be accurately ascertained, but the number ^T^hLk^USfcomSnies, building associations, and other similar • A SSteTeoK the United States to-day $5,353,138,521 mstitutions owe the peop e ^ timeg eF thw IZ ^?»KWaU&tional banks in the country; while the life- Ssurance po ties held by the people in the various kinds of corpora- .4 SPEECH OP HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. ions and associations and in force to-day amount to $10,203,804,357, a arger sum than has been actually invested in all our railroads, and ibout fifteen times larger than the capital of all the national banks. n view of these facts, which can not be successfully disputed, I submit hat you ought seriously to consider all the consequences to yourselves tnd your fellow- citizens before you agree to the free and unlimited ioinage of legal tender silver at a ratio of 16 to 1, in order that these jreat corporations and associations may have the privilege of discharg- ng their debts to the people by paying 51 or 52 cents on the dollar, for hat is exactly what it means. It is a low estimate to say that each >ne of the depositors in savings and other banks and in building associ- itions, and each holder of a life-insurance policy and member of a nutual benefit and assessment association has dependent upon him or ler an average of at least two other persons, and, if so, a majority of all mr people are directly or indirectly creditors of these corporations and issociations and are interested in the preservation of a standard of 7alue which will insure the payment of their claims in as good money is they parted with when they made their loans or deposits or paid iheir assessments or premiums. Every dollar the people put into these janks and trust companies and other institutions, and every dollar they >aid for insurance was worth 100 cents and would procure 100 cents' worth of coulmodities in the market when they earned it and when ;hey invested it, and they have an unquestionable right to demand ;hat it shall be refunded to them in dollars worth 100 cents everywhere. The adoption of any policy that would deprive them of this right would lot only inflict an enormous loss upon them, but would so seriously mpair their faith in the fidelity and utility of such institutions that ittempts to accumulate and save surplus earnings would be abandoned, )r at least greatly discouraged, for a long time to come. FREE COINAGE WOULD SCALE OR DESTROY THE DEBT. But if free and unlimited coinage of legal-tender silver at the ratio )f 16 to 1 is established in this country, a very large part of the money leposited in these various kinds of savings institutions will not even be repaid in depreciated silver, but will be wholly lost, because such a reck- less monetary system would precipitate a financial panic, which veryfew, :f any, of the depositories could survive. I doubt that there is a single financial institution in the country that could sustain the pressure that should be immediately made upon it by its depositors and other cred- tors, when it became apparent that our standard of value was to be lowered and our currency depreciated by free coinage. Payment of all jur obligations held abroad would be demanded in gold at once ; every investment of foreign capital in this country would be instantly with- Irawn ; every man who owed a debt at home or abroad would be called upon to pay it. All depositors in banks and other institutions would svant to withdraw their money at the same time; no loans could be negotiated and no credit would be given, because no man would lend money or sell property on time when he knew with absolute certainty bhat he would be paid in a depreciated currency. Creditors would not wait for the actual passage of a free-coinage law, but as soon as such a measure had received the approval of the people at an election they would demand their money, and if not paid they would enforce its col- lection by judicial proceedings and the forced sale of property. It is useless for you and me or anybody else to say that depositors in banks and other creditors ought not to pursue this course when a crisis comes, SPEECH OF HON. JOHN G. CARLISLE. 15 or is apprehended, for they always Lave pursued it, and always will, unless human nature itself should be changed. THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS. Less than three years ago you saw our financial, commercial, and industrial affairs violently disturbed by the fear that the Government would not be able to maintain gold payments, and that our currency would descend to a silver basis. You saw the operations of industry interrupted, banks failing, great commercial houses unable to meet their obligations, credit seriously impaired, mills and factories closed and thousands of laborers thrown out of employment, and a state of panic and business disorder prevailing in every part of the country. If a mere doubt as to the kind of money we intended to use produced these distressing results, what think you would be the probable consequences of a deliberate determination upon the part of our people to adopt silver monometallism as a permanent system? The imagination can scarcely conceive the deplorable state of society that would immediately follow the announcement of such a policy, and I will not attempt to describe it. It can not be possible that in the closing years of the nineteenth century and in this great and free Republic the people themselves will imitate the bad examples set by the corrupt potentates of Europe, who have made their names forever odious in history by debasing the money of their subjects and robbing the industrious poor of the just rewards of their labor. The greatest crime, short of absolute political enslave- ment, that could be committed against the workingmau in this country would be to confiscate his labor for the benefit of the employer by destroying the value of the money in which his wages are paid. But, gentlemen, this irreparable wrong can never be perpetrated under our system of' government unless the laboring man himself assists in forging his own chains. And, now, gentlemen, having submitted as briefly and as plainly as the nature of the subject would permit some of the reasons why I think your interests demand the maintenance of a sound and stable currency, I thank you most sincerely for your kind and patient attention, and will detain you no longer. 54th Congress, > SENATE. (Document _ Wto*»»- i j No . 306 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. June 6, 1896.— Ordered to be printed. Mr. Lodge presented the folio-wing PAPER BY L. G. POWERS, RELATIVE TO GOLD AND THE WORLD'S WHEAT FARMERS. GOLD AND THE WORLD'S WHEAT FARMERS. Much of the recent discussion of the silver question in its relation to the world's wheat farmers reminds a thoughtful person of the play of Hamlet with Hamlet left out. That discussion seeks to show the effect of the silver legislation of 1871 and 1873 upon the wheat farmers, not by presenting the relative prices received now and twenty-five years ago by those farmers in the great centers of wheat production, but by giving the statistics for great centers of consumption or distri- bution, such as London, New York, or Chicago. Is it not time in this discussion to take the farmer into consideration, the prices realized by hiju^Jiis present and past resources, his debts and debt-paying ability ne^Qfefprndrty years ago % As exhibiting the relative prices for wheat for the past thirty-five years in one of those great wheat producing centers the writer here presents a table, compiled from the returns of the United States Agri- cultural Department, giving the statistics since 1862 for the four States of Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas, and Nebraska. Those States in 1895 pro- duced three times as much wheat as Great Britain ; as much as Italy or Germany; as much as Australia and Argentina; one-half as much as British India, and nearly one-third as much as Eussia in Europe. The table gives the total number of bushels and the total value in cur- rency for all the wheat raised in the given States from 1862 to 1895, inclusive, by four-year periods. The figures for a few special years and groups of years are also given separately. There are also given the average values per bushel in gold and currency for each of the periods and years shown in the table. 2 GOLD AND THE WORLD'S WHEAT FARMERS. The bushels of wheat raised, the total value in currency, and Ihe average currency and gold values per bushel of the same, on the farms of the wheat crops of Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas, and Nebraska, from 186$ to 1895, inclusive. [Including estimates for Minnesota for 1866 for which no Government figures are given.] Production. Total value. Average value per bu'euel in cents. Years. Four States. Iowa (gold). Minne- sota (gold). Kansas , JS" - (gold? Currency. Gold. Bushels. 84, 586, 105 151,910,000 224, 824, 000 319, 073, 206 398,, te53, 768 954,474,400 385, 019, 000 454, 776, 783 ] 16, 945, 533 2, 590, 261, 795 $90, 090, 213 133,601,410 181, 438, 420 235, 870, 585 §43,117, !28 279,'868, 988 272, 634, 185 269,6)3,498 51, 366, 841 106.5 88 80.7 73.9 71.4 66.4 72.6 68.5 86.1 61.6 70.8 59.3 43.9 72 66.2 70.8 68.1 86.2 65 71.8 67.6 46 69 65.3 73.1 72.9 92.2 64.2 73.4 62. 1 44 96.4 82 88.6 69 80.5 59.8 69.4 55.5 45 84.1 1867 1870 55.5 1871 1874 66 1875 1878 50.6 1879 1882 79.3 54.4 65.2 55.6 '40 1862-1865 1,857,601,268 71.7 69.4 71.3 71.8 65.9 61.2 1865 27, 481, 876 46, 300, 000 62, 313, 478 164, 799, 000 17, 030, 010 26. 152, 000 58, 703, 007 126, 902, 730 62 56.5 84.2 77 28.8 41.0 61.1 61.6 46.3 38.3 62.6 58.7 23.8 27.3 56.5 63.1 80 57.6 84.2 7'J.8 69.6 1869 37.6 1862 1865 71.1 1868-1871 59.2 Turning to the table we first note this fact : The four States, when their crop statistics 'are combined into regular four-year periods, show a Wonderful uniformity of farm values in gold from 1862 to 1894. They probably exhibit as great a stability of such values as can be found for any agricultural staple in history, for an equal territory and for the same length of time. In this period of thirty-four years there were great temporary variations, due to crop failures or crop abundance in the United States or in other parts of the world. Thus, a wheat failure in many parts of the United States in 1866 and corresponding failures in Europe in 1867, 1881, and in other years, greatly raised the priced for those years and for the four-year periods in which they occurred. Low price years are fouud in these four States in everv four- year period from 1862 to 1894, with the exception of the period 1879 to 1882. These high and low price years occur in all the eight periods shown in the table before 1894, with the exception of one, and thus give rise to the general uniformitv of prices already noted, with a special rise for the years 1879 to 1882. In the four-year period, 1891 to 1894, there was one year of high, two of low, and one of medium prices, and yet it will be noted that its average is but 1.8 cents a bushel less than for the four-year period 1862 to 1865, and 2.3 cents less than that of 1868 to 1871, and 1883 to 1886. The prices for 1895 were low, as shown in the table, as were those for 1893 and 1894. These low years should not frighten anyoue, as they have occurred at different times in these States in the" past thirty-five years, notably in 1865 and 1869. One high-priced year, if it occur, as it doubtless will in the next three years, will bring tip the level of the four -year period, 1895 to 1898, to the general level which prevailed in 1862 to 1865, 1868 to 1871, 1883 to 1886, or 1891 to 1894. The figures for 1891 to 1894 show that on the average the farmers of central Kansas and Nebraska and of western Iowa and northwestern Minnesota received in those years as much gold for their wheat as did the farmers of southeastern Minnesota and eastern Iowa in the war times. The farmers have gained, thus, all the benefits that have accrued from cultivating cheaper though more distant lands, and also those GOLD AND THE WORLD'S WHEAT FARMERS. 3. which have followed the introduction of improved farming machinery, lne amount of this gain from cheaper lands can, for Kansas and Nebraska, be approximately determined in the following manner: Wheat, at the prices which prevailed in the four States in the latter period, 1891 to 1894, can be combined in the proportions by bushels Which are indicated by the crops in bushels raised in the same States, in the earlier years. 1862 to 1866. ( 'ombining in these proportions, the average from 1S91 to 1894 is found to be 65.4 cents a bushel. This is 6,1 cents above the average of 59.3 cents shown iu the table. The shifting of wheat fields in the two States of Kansas and Nebraska thus reduces the general average from the four States by that amount. An equal reduction is caused by a corresponding shifting in the States qf Iowa and Minnesota. In the sections of those two States in which was raised the bulk of the wheat included in the table for 1862 to 1865 there was, therefore, an actual advance in the average gold value of wheat from that period to 1891 to, 1894 of at least 10 cents a bushel. The wheat farmers of those sections gained, therefore, that amount, together with all the benefits following the introduction of improved farming machinery. The apparent decline of 1.8 cents a bushel shown in the table results from the increase of wheat production upon the lands which in 1862 produced little or no wheat, and which then or now were more distant from market, and hence commanded low average prices. The same conclusion may be reached in another way. It is by com- paring the average price in these four States in the exceptionally low year, 1895, which was lower than in 1893 or 1894, with the correspond- ing figures for 1865 and 1869. In those earlier years Kansas and Nebraska did not raise enough wheat for home consumption. The little wheat which their farmers raised commanded a good price, which was the price in Iowa or Missouri plus the cost of shipping it west to those States. The average for the four States was, in 1869, 41.6 cents, and in 1865, 28.8 cents gold. The first is substantially the average for the four States in 1895. In the latter year the farmers of these States had, as compared with their predecessors in 1869, the benefit of their location on cheap lands, and also the benefit of all improvements in machinery. This exactly corresponds with the deduction from the figures by four-year periods. The gain shown when comparing the figures of 1865 and 18,95 is still more marked. 'Tlere is no trace of any appreciation in the purchasing power of gold in terms of wheat. In contrast, if we are to assume with the free-silver advocates that all price variations are caused by variations in the supply of gold and silver, there is a positive depreciation in the value of gold That depreciation is equivalent to the gain of 10 cents a bushel realized in average price by the farmers of eastern Iowa and south- eastern Minnesota, and the gain realized by reason of improved machin- ery for cultivating and harvesting wheat. This latter alone is a gam of not less than 50 per cent. This is a positive gain to the wheat farm- ers of the four States named, much greater than the decline in wheat prices for the farmers of Great Britain. The farmers of these States m 1895 raised over 116,000,000 bushels of wheat, while those of Great Britain only raised 3,8,000,000, Shall we not give three times as much weight to this gain in the profit of wheat raising shown by the farmers Tthese four States as to the corresponding loss to the British farmer fith a totTcrop ^reduction of about one-third that of those for these States « The writer believes we should. This'change in these four States in the cost of producing wheat and 4 GOLD AND THE WORLD'S WHEAT FARMERS. iu the prices realized from its sale added to the average farmer's abil-, ity to accumulate money. It increased the average value of farm lands. It is accompanied by increasing wealth and increasing debt-paying power among the farmers of these very States. Of these States only two, Iowa and M innesota, as late as 1869, raised wheat enough to sup- ply home demands. Only those two States, then, can be considered in this connection in making a comparison concerning the resources and the debt paying power of the Western farmers now and thirty-five years ago. These two States lie side by side and have much in com- mon. What is true of one. is doubtless true of the other in general terms, with only a small possible variation. Let us turn to the figures for Minnesota. In the three years 1869 to 1871, in eight typical counties investigated in that State by the State bureau of labor, it was found that on an average 1.5 per cent of the taxable land was sold annually by mort- gage foreclosure. In the three years 1891 to 1893 there was only 0.62 thus sold, and in 1893, a year of low prices, the average was only 0.48, or less than one third as much as in the three-year period just before the legislation of 1873. But the foregoing figures do not tell the whole story of improved farm finance in Minnesota. We must compare the ratios of mortgages made and mortgages foreclosed now aud thirty years ago. In 1865, the first of the years of low prices, there were in these eight Minnesota counties mortgage foreclosures equal to 38.9 per cent in amount of the mortgages placed on record four years before. In 1869 this percentage of foreclosure was 34.!t per cent. The corre- sponding percentage in 1893 was only 7.1 per cent. The foreclosures in some portions of the Red River Valley wheat region are very numerous at the present time, but only about one-fourth of what was the ratio of such foreclosure in southern Minnesota in 1865 and 1869. An analysis of the census returns tor Minnesota shows that the aver- age farmer in that State, between 1880 and 1890, was able to add to his net resources a sum not far from $200 annually. This was over two times his proportionate share of the increment of the nation's resources for those years. The analysis of the census returns of Iowa gives about the same results for that State. Wheat farming, then, in these States is not crashing the farmers. To be sure, those farmers are find- ing better returns from diversified crops than from single-crop wheat raising. The addition to farm resources noted is doubtless due, in large part, to an adoption of such diversified methods of agriculture, but eveu the exclusive wheat farmer of the West is gaining more than his average share of the addition to our national wealth. In the period from 1878 to 1883 the immigrant could, in Minnesota, buy land from' the railroad companies, and with one good crop of wheat could pay for the land and for raising the wheat. The present prices do not give such returns, but they assure a profit that lifts the wheat raiser above his predecessor thirty years ago iu these same States. Mention has already been made of the fact that Kansas and Nebraska in the earlier years covered by the table did not raise enough wheat to supply their home demand. This fact is reflected in the high average price per bushel for the little wheat they raised during the war time. The price realized in Kansas was as high as in Ohio and was the St. Louis price plus the cost of transporting flour west to the homes in Kansas. When the farmers of these two States ceased to be wheat importers and became wheat exporters, the average farm price took a great tumble, as is shown in the table. Similar changes in the prices of wheat and other agricultural staples can be found in the history of GOLD AND THE WORLD'S WHEAT FARMERS. 5 every State in tbe great Mississippi Valley. The averages for the sev eral States reflect the eff< ct of the new processes of milling introduced in the seventies. Before that introduction winter wheat commanded 20 cents a bushel more than spring wheat. After that introduction the two became practically equal in value, with a slight advantage to spring wheat. This can be noted in the fact that from 1871 to 1874 the aver- age price in Kansas was 15.5 cents a bushel higher than in Iowa, while in the four years 1879 to 1882 it was 11.9 cents lower. In the foregoing table and analysis are given the facts demonstrating that in this center of wheat production in America there has been no real permanent fall in wheat prices in the spring-wheat States in thirty- four years. The farmers in those States have profited and not lost by changes in the world's wheat culture, traffic, and prices. But there are many great centers of wheat culture on the globe. It is well to inquire what effect these modern-world changes in the culture and traffic of wheat have had upon them. Bussia is one of those other great wheat- producing sections. In 1893 there was harvested in Europe 376,885,000 bushels of wheat, or nearly three times what these four States produced. The Industries of Bussia, a work prepared by the various depart- ments of the Russian Government, and translated by the United States consul-general to Bussia, Hon. John Martin Crawford, furnishes a vast mass ot information with reference to the subject, all official. That portion of this work relating to wheat and agriculture are all by the minister of agriculture. The work does not give the prices of wheat consecutively for a series of years, for any given section, such as these four American States. In the chapter which discusses the prices of land we learn that in the (Jhernomorsk governments, covering the wheat raising section of the Black Sea region, farm land has been rising in value continuously since 1860. In the sixties tbe average value of a dessiatine of land (2.6997 acres) was 33 rubles. In the seventies this had risen to 55 rubles; in 1883 to 85 rubles, and in 1889 to 90 rubles. These figures are in paper rubles, which have been at a discount, the ratio between gold and paper changing and increasing with the years. The gold ruble in 1871 to 1S75 was worth, on an average, 1.19 paper rubles. In 1886 to 1890 it was worth 1.6 of paper. After allowing for this change in the relative value of gold and paper we see that laud must have fully doubled in gold value in the years covered by the table for American wheat prices. The increase in Bussia in land values has been most where wheat was raised for export, and least where other grains were raised for home consumption. Wheat raising has not, therefore, with its varying prices had an evil effect in Bussia upon its producers It has, as we have found by other tests, for these Ameri- can States improved tbe lot of the wheat farmers in thirty-five years fully 50 per cent. No trace here, in Bussiau or in American wheat- growing sections, of the appreciation of gold and the consequent ruin of the wheat raiser by reason of the silver legislation of 1871 and 1873. The advocates of the free coinage of silver have, from time to time, presented figures showing an increased profit in wheat raising in India. That increased profit they have credited to the fact that India has been all these years a silver-standard nation. But no evidence has been produced showing for India as great an advance id value of wheat land such increasing ability to meet mortgage debt, such accumulation of farm resources, and such other gains as are found in these four American States. Each and all countries agree in the fact that there has been on the average an increasing profit in wheat raising with the GOLD AND THE WORLD'S WHEAT FARMERS. assage of the last thirty years in the great centers of such production, >ut not in the centers of wheat consumption. This study of wheat prices would not be complete without some ref- rence to the effect of transportation from such centers of production s Russia, India, and these four American States to such countries as England and to the older sections of the American nation — -in other rords, to the centers of consumption. The figures and data already resented show the effect of changes iu methods of production upon he producers of the bulk of the world's wheat. Let us note how changes a transportation charges affect the price for the balance. In the fol- iwing table is presented, in parallel columns, from the various groups f years employed in the other table the average pake for wheat in the sur States, the price realized by the farmers in New York State as an verage, and the prices of American wheat in London. In translating English prices into American, the English quarter is assumed to be qual to 8 American bushels, and the pound sterling to $4.80 : 1 comparison shotoing the effect of changes in th,e cost of transporting wheat r upon the price of that grain on the farms of New York and in the markets of London, England, when those prices are contrasted with the average of those of Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas, and Nebraslca. Years. Average gold price per bushel. Difference between four States and — London. Four States. New York. London. New York. 362-1866 Cents. 71.4 66.4 72.6 68.5 86.1 61.6 70.8 59.3 Cents. 130.3 138.6 134.1 110.5 125.2 92.4 95.3 83.5 Cents. Cents. 58.9 72.2 61.5 42 39.1 30.8 24.5 24.2 Cents. 367-1870 '.. 371 1874 176.3 149.2 149.6 113.5 106.1 93 375 1878 379 1882 381-1886 387-1890 390 1894 In the earlier years the Western farmer, on the average, realized only bout one-half of the price obtained by the New York farmer, and only .bout one-third of what his wheat sold for in Great Britain. In those lays the Western farmers complained bitterly about the middleman, ,nd no wonder. Iowa was the greatest producer of wheat of either of hese States, and it led in the antimonopoly movement of the early sev- nties. That movement and the organization of the early grangers Lad as its main object the elimination of the middleman, who consumed wo bushels of wheat in taking one from Iowa to Liverpool. The old lifference between Western and Eastern wheat has vanished. The largin between the price realized by the New York farmer and that btained on an average by those of these four Western States, in 1867 o 1870, was 72.2 cents; in 1891 to 1894 it was only 24.2 cents, or about ne-third of its early proportions. Twenty cents of this decreased dif- jrence is doubtless due to changed methods of milling, already referred o, affecting the relative price of the winter wheat of New York and he spring wheat of the West. The balance is due to the decreased ost of transportation which has come with the passing years. The able shows the decreased difference between London and the West, but ot for the whole period. By the table the average Western gold farm irice was, in 1871 tp 1874, $1,037 less than the selling price of American rheat in London. In 1891 to 1894 this difference averaged only 33.7 ents, or less than one-third as much. GOLD AND THE WORLD'S WHEAT FARMERS. 7 The first table presented shows that the farmers of these Western states, especially those raising spring wheat, have been able to secure lor their own benefit all the added profits due to improved methods of farming and all that comes from the cultivation of cheap lands more distant from the great centers of the world's market. This is a relative gain of over 50 per cent. It is an enormous gain. The Western farmer has not gained any share in the decreased cost of transporting his wheat to New York or England. All that has passed to the consumer of his wheat. But the Western farmer has gained, in addition to what has already been set down to his benefit, the decreased cost of shipping and traiiicking in all the articles that he purchases. As a purchaser of farming implements and staples of food not raised by himself, and all articles of clothing and all furniture and household adornments, he reaps his share of the benefits of the eliminations of the middleman, as the purchaser of his wheat in London reaps a corresponding benefit in his purchase of the products of the Western farmer. In the case of the wheat raised in these four States and in that raised in Eussia and India we find no trace of price variations due to chang- ing money supply. We do see, in the price for which the wheat raised in these three nations is sold iu England and on the Atlantic seaboard, a price variation due clearly to changed cost of transportation, inten- sified by the effect of Minneapolis milling inventions upon the relative prices of winter and spring wheat. The wheat farmers of these four States and those in Eussia and India have been gaining in their rela- tive average ability to pay off their mortgage debts. The prices of their lands have been increasing. The resources of these farmers have been increasing far beyond those of any other set of toilers that their several countries had witnessed-before 1870. If the legislation of 1873 has contributed in giving this decreased mortgage foreclosure, this increased value to lands, the growing resources of those farmers; if it has assisted in maintaining the general stability of wheat prices which we have found in these four States for thirty- four years; if it has main- tained that stability of prices while the farmer has increased his ability to produce wheat by 50 per cent, we can well call for more of such legislation. The passing years and their laws and changes have not brought an appreciation in the value of gold. They have rather been accompanied by a large list of results, which in all past ages have been accounted the proof of the opposite movement in the relative value of the pre- cious metals. Nothing can be found in the annals of European his- tory accompanying the flood of American silver in the seventeenth century, which so increased the saving and debt-paying power of the average farmer as has been realized since 1862 by the average spring- wheat farmer in these four American States, and also by the wheat raiser of Eussia and India. This is what we have left after eliminating the effect of changed cost of production and transportation upon the Western wheat farms. If it shows a change in the value of the world's precious metals, does it not prove a marked depreciation m the exchange value of sold in terms of wheat, and not the opposite, as has been so lone and loudly asserted by the advocates of the free coinage of silver? L. G. Powers. 54th CONGRESS, V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. ( Document 1st Session. J \ jsf . 362. PURCHASE OP MINOR COINAGE BLANKS. LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, TRANSMITTING A reply to the House resolution of March 11, 1896, asking for information relating to the purchase of minor coinage blanks by the superintendent of the mint at Philadelphia, together with accompanying papers. April 23, 1896. — Referred to the Committee on Coinage, Weights, and Measures, and ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, Office of the Secretary, Washington, B. C, April 22, 1896. Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following resolution adopted by the House of Representatives March 11, 1896 : Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby requested to furnish the House of Representatives, at the earliest date practicable, with a detailed statement of the price per pound and quantity of blanks for nickels and pennies supplied to and purchased by the superintendent of the mint in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, since April eighteen hundred and ninety, and whether, since that time, section thirty-seven hundred and fifty-eight of the Revised Statutes has been complied with m BesoheT That he is hereby authorized and directed to furnish a detailed compar- ison of the contract prices of said blanks with the market quotations for similar material during the entire period. In reply I have the honor to transmit herewith a statement, marked Exhibit A,' showing the quantity and cost of copper-nickel 5 and bronze 1 cent blanks delivered each month from April 1, 1890 to March 11, 1896, on contracts made by the superintendent of the mint of the _ U nited States at Philadelphia, Pa., and approved by the Director of the Mint October 15, 1889, March 21, 1890, January 20, 1891 and February4 1893. Tne quantity and cost of 'bronze 1-cent blank s delivered was 1 563 575.162 pounds, at 19.94 cents per pound, cost $303,00d.^59, and ^luantityof 5-ce'nt nickel blanks, 678,177 881 pounds 0q f j *hich 676 677 881 pounds, at 31.94 cents per pound, cost $221,5o0.81 the rema/ning 1$00 pounds, at 40 cents per ponnd $600, a small balance received on account of contract of October 15, 1889. 2 PURCHASE OP MINOR COINAGE BLANKS. ft Section 3528, Eevised Statutes, provides : For the purchase of the metal for the minor coinage authorized l>y this title, a sum not exceeding fifty thousand dollars in lawful money of the United States shall be transferred by the Secretary of the Treasury to the credit of the superintendent of the mint at Philadelphia, at which establishment only, until otherwise provided by law, such coinage shall be carried on. The superintendent, with the approval of the Director of the Mint as to price, terms, and quantity, shall purchase the metal required for such coinage by public advertisement and the lowest and best bid shall be accepted, the fineness of the metals to be determined on mint assay. Under date of September 11, 1889, the superintendent of the mint at Philadelphia was authorized to advertise in certain newspapers pub- lished in New York and Philadelphia, inviting proposals for furnishing 50,000 pounds, more or less, of 5-cent copper-nickel blanks and 100,000 pounds, more or less, of bronze 1-cent blanks. The following proposals were received and opened in the presence of the bidders October 1, 1889, at 12 o'clock noon: Bidder. Russell & Co Rowland A. Kobbins Benedict & Burnbain Manufacturing Co Scovill Manufacturing Co Merchant & Co B. H. Cramp & Co 1-centr; blanks (per " pound). Upon investigation as to the responsibility of the bidders, the super- intendent of the mint reported that the lowest bidders, Messrs. B. H. Cramp & Co., frankly admitted that if the contract were awarded them they would be obliged to have the work done by other parties, and that the next lowest bidders were dealers in metals and had no facilities for doing the work, and recommended that all bids be declined and new proposals be invited by public advertisement. The superin- tendent was directed October 15, 1889, to accept the bid of Messrs. Merchant & Co., the next lowest bidders, provided they would com- mence delivery of the blanks within ten days, which they agreed to do, and gave bond in the sum of $10,000 for the faithful performance of the contract. Messrs. Merchant & Co. delivered on this contract 98,500 pounds of 5-cent nickel blanks, at 40 cents per pound, and 100,000 pounds of bronze 1-cent blanks, at 26 cents per pound. The superintendent of the mint at Philadelphia was authorized, February 26, 1890, to advertise in certain newspapers published in New York and Philadelphia, for proposals to furnish 100,000 pounds, more or less, of 5-cent nickel blanks, and 200,000 pounds, more or less, of bronze 1-cent blanks. The proposals received and opened in the presence of the bidders, at 12 o'clock noon, March 18, 1890, were as follows : Bidder. Rowland A. Robbins J. Friedenstein Scovill Manufacturing Co , John P. Lovejoy Co Benedict & Burnham Manufacturing Co Merchant & Co 5-cent blanks (per pound) Cents, 481 45J 31. 94 45.73 41.38 1-cent blanks (per pound) . Cents. 27| 19. 94 25.73 25.77 2-i£ PURCHASE OF MINOR COINAGE BLANKS. 3 The bid of the Scovill Manufacturing Company was accepted, and under date of March 20, 1890, the Director of the Mint authorized a contract to be made with that company for 200,000 pounds of 5-cent nickel blanks, or so much thereof as the Government might require, at the price of 31.94 cents per pound; and 500,000 pounds of bronze 1-cent blanks, or so much thereof as the Government might require, at the price of 19.94 cents per pound. A copy of the letter of the Director of the Mint and contract is transmitted herewith, marked Exhibit B. Under date of January 15, 1891, the Director of the Mint author- ized and directed the superintendent of the mint at Philadelphia to make a new contract with the Scovill Manufacturing Company in terms similar to the contract dated March 21, 1890, for the reason that he con- sidered the terms very favorable to the Government. A copy of the letter of the Director of the Mint and the contract made in accordance therewith are transmitted herewith (Exhibit C). From April 1, 1890, to February 29, 1892, the Scovill Manufacturing. Company delivered to the mint at Philadelphia, under the contracts of March 21, 1890, and January 20, 1891, the following minor coin blanks: The superintendent of the mint, under date of April 25, 1892, was instructed to notify the Scovill Manufacturing Company that the con- tract of January 20, 1891, would be considered as having expired and no more blanks would be received on the same. No delivery of blanks was made between March 1 and August 1, 1892. The stock of nickel blanks having been exhausted, the superintendent of the mint at Philadelphia was authorized by the Director, under date of Julv 21, 1892, " to accept 10,000 pounds, or thereabouts, of nickel blanks from the company having the contract to furnish such blanks, at the contract price." These blanks were delivered m August, 1892. Under date of July 26, 1892, the superintendent of the mint was aeain authorized to advertise in certain newspapers inviting proposals for famishing 200,000 pounds, more or less, of 5-cent nickel blanks and 500 000 nounds, more or less, of 1-cent bronze blanks. The following bids were received and opened in the presence of the bidders at 12.30 p. m., August 15, 1892: Bidder. 5-cent blanks (per pound). 1-cent blanks (per pound) . Cents. 39.25 38.94 39| Cents. 28.20 28| 4 PURCHASE OF MINOR COINAGE BLANKS. nickel from 60 to 55 cents per pound, and copper from 14J to llf cents per pound. The Scovill Manufacturing Company finally agreed to deliver blanks at the old rate of 31.94 cents per pound for 5-cent nickel blanks, and 19.94 cents per pound for bronze 1-cent blanks. It appears from the statement transmitted, that up to September 1, 1892, the Scovill Manufacturing Company had delivered on their con- tract of March 21, 1890, and January 20, 1891 (each contract calling for the delivery of 200,000 pounds of nickel blanks and 500,000 pounds of 1-cent blanks), 350,247.881 pounds of nickel blanks and 772,805.162 pounds of 1-cent blanks, leaving about 50,000 pounds of the former and 227,000 of the latter due on the contracts. From August, 1892, to January, 1893, inclusive, the Scovill Manufac- turing Company delivered to the superintendent of the mint at Philadelphia, 111,000 pounds of 5-cent nickel blanks, and 110,000 pounds of 1-cent blanks. From the records of the Department it appears that on January 24, 1893, the Director of the Mint decided to renew the con- tract with the Scovill Manufacturing Company, and a new contract calling for the delivery of 200,000 pounds, more or less, of 5-cent nickel blanks, and 500,000 pounds, more or less, of bronze 1-cent blanks, was executed and approved by the Director of the Mint, February 4, 1893. A copy of this contract is transmitted herewith, marked Exhibit D. While it might have been to the advantage of the Government (which, however, is not certain) if the Director of the Mint had adver- tised for proposals before renewing the contract with the Scovill Manu- facturing Company, there is no doubt that, with the experience had with the proposals for such blanks received in August, 1892, in authoriz- ing and approving the contract of February 4, 1893, he acted, as he believed, for the best interests of the Government. By the second section of the resolution I am directed " to furnish a detailed comparison of the contract price of said blanks with the market quotation for similar material during the entire period." In reply I have the honor to respectfully submit the following exhibit of the price of the metals at the dates the contracts enumerated were made, of which the 5-cent nickel and bronze 1-cent blanks are composed : Date of contract. Metals. Nickel. Lake ingot copper. October 15, 1889 March 21. 1890... January 20, 1891 February 4, 1893 Gents. 62 60 60 55 Cents, i4 15 12J Gents. 20.80 20.39 20 20.20 Gents. 5.10 5.87 5.55 1.33 At these prices the cost of the metal in a pound of 5-cent nickel blanks, 25 per cent nickel and 75 per cent copper, and in a pound of bronze 1-cent blanks, 95 per cent copper, 3 per cent tin, and 2 per cent zinc, would be as follows : Date. 5-cent nickel blanks. 1-cent bronze blanks. October 15, 1889. March 21, 1890.. January 20, 1891. February 4, 1893 Cents. 24. 125 25. 6875 26.25 22. 84375 Cents. 11. 651 14. 2666 14. 9670 12. 20535 PURCHASE OF MINOR COINAGE BLANKS. 5 At the cost of the metals as above stated, based upon the market quotations for the same when the contracts were made, there would be a margin left to cover the expenses of manufacture, transportation, etc., including manufacturer's profits under the respective contracts, as follows : iJate. 5-cent nickel blanks : October 15, 1889.. March 21, 1890 . . . January 20, 1891 February 4, 1893 . 1-cent bronze blanks October 15, 1889.. March 21,1890... January 20, 1891 . February 4,1893. Contract Cost of price (per metal (per pound). pound) . Genu. Cents. 40 24.125 31.94 25. 6875 31.94 26.25 31.94 22. 84375 26 11. 6510 19.94 14. 2666 19.94 14. 9670 19.94 12. 20535 Margin to cover ex- penses of manufac. ture (per pound). 15. 875 6. 2525 5.69 14. 349 5. 673* 4.973 7. 73465 The material approximating more closely in composition than any- other the 5-cent nickel and 1-cent bronze blanks that the Department has any knowledge of, are the 20 per cent German silver circles for the nickel blanks and bronze circles for the bronze 1-cent blanks. The net prices for these circles, from J to 2 inches in diameter, as fixed by the Brass Manufacturers' Association, since the 15th of January, 1894, have been — For 20 per cent German silver circles : Centa. From January 15, 1894, to June 11, 1894 47 From June 11, 1894, to March 11,1896 36.45 For bronze circles : From January 15, 1894, to September 24,1894 18 From September 24, 1894, to May 22, 1895 18.81 From May 22, 1895, to August 1, 1895 19.80 From August 1, 1895, to J anuary 1, 1896 ^1-bO Since January 1, 1896 19 - 60 The above are the net prices fixed for plain circles, and does not include annealing, cleaning, or milling. In addition to the blanks purchased for the minor coinage, an ex- change was made with the Scovill Manufacturing Company of the metal resulting from the melting of uncurrent minor coins, transferred to the mint for recoinage, for new blanks, pound for pound, the said company being allowed for reworking such metal at the rate of 8 cents per pound for the bronze blanks and 10 cents per pound for the 5-cent nickel blanks, which was paid from the appropriations for contingent expenses of the mint at Philadelphia. _ A copy of the statement furnished by the superintendent of the mint at Philadelphia showing the amount of old metal exchanged for new blanks from July 1, 1890, to December 31, 1895, is transmitted here- with, marked Exhibit B. r .. n , I]f Respectfully, yours, J- »• ° AR ™ W Hon. Thomas B. Eeed, Speaker of the House of Representatives. PURCHASE OP MINOR COINAGE BLANKS. Exhibit A. tatement, by months, showing amount and cost of 1-eent bronze and nickel 5- purchased from April 1, 1890, to March 11, 1896, and from whom purchased United States at Philadelphia). blanks of the Bronze 1-cent blanks. Avoirdupois pounds. 36, 000 29, 551. 162 5,000 10, 000 37, 000 45,000 114, 000 54, 500 23, 500 20, 500 2,500 Cost. 5,000 22, 500 43, COO 21, 000 15, 000 9,000 78, 500 137, 500 7,000 56, 754 10, 000 19, 000 -51,500 29, 500 40, 000 32, 000 25, 000 20, 000 37, 000 20, 400 25, 500 40, 000 38, 000 28, 870 18, 500 23, 500 49, 000 42, 486 1,500 20, 014 ?7, 178. 40 5, 892. 50 997.00 1, 994. 00 7, 377. 80 8, 973. 00 22, 731. 601 Nick el 5-cent blanks. Avoir- dupois pounds. 1,500 500 27. 034. 881 10, 000 7,500 15, 500 20, 500 000 10 867. 301 47, 000 4, 685. 90 4, 087. 70 498. 50 997. 00 4, 486. 50 8, 574. 20 4, 187. 40 2, 991. 00 1,794.60 15, 652. 90 27, 417. 50 1, 395. P0 11, 316. 75 1, 994. 00 3, 788. 60 10, 269. 10 5, 882. 30 7, 976. 00 6, 380. 80 4, 985. 00 3, 988. 00 7, 377. 80 4, 067. 76 5, 084. 70 7, 976. 00 7, 577. 20 5, 756. 68 3, 688. 90 4, 685. 90 9, 770. 60 8,471.71 299. 10 3, 990. 79 9,000 17, 000 42, 000 21, 000 6,500 20, 924 26, 500 25, 500 25, 789 10, 000 3,000 22, 000 25, 000 37,000 14,000 14, 500 12, 500 23, 500 4,000 18, 000 27, 000 20, 500 20. 930 3,000 17, 000 28, 500 2,000 Cost. Avoirdupois pounds, $600. 00 159. 70 634. 94 194. 00 395. 50 950. 70 547. 70 874. 601 011.80, I 874. 60 429. 80 56, 15, 17, 52, 65, 123, 101, ,500 ,500 586. 043 000 500 500 500 0U0 500 2, 395. 50 13,414.80 0, 707. 40 2, 076. 10 6, 683. 13 8, 464. 10 8. 144. 70 8, 237. 00 32, 500 37, 50(1 2,500 3, 194. 00 958. 20 7, 026. 80 7, 985. 00 11, 817. 80 4, 471. 60 4,631.30 3, 992. 50 7, 505. 90 1, 277. 60 5, 749. 20 8, 623. 80 6, 547. 70 6, 685. 04 958. 20 6, 429. 80 9, 102. 90 638. 80 12, 500 22, 500 85. 000 42, 000 15, 000 15, 500 99, 424 164, 000 32, 500 82, 543 10, 000 3,000 32, 000 44. 000 88i 500 43. 500 54, 500 32, 000 25,000 32, 500 60, 500 24,400 43, 500 '67,000 58, 500 49, 800 23, 500 26, 500 66, 000 70, 986 3,500 20, 014 Cost. From whom purchased. $600. 00 7, 338. 10 14, 527. 44 4,191.00 4, 389. 50 12, 328. 50 15, 520. 70 25, 606. 20 25, 879. 10 7, 560. 50 ; 517. 498. 881. 9, 540. 50 19, 553. 75 3, 194. 00 958. 20 9. 020. 80 11, 773. 60 22, 086. 90 353. 90 607. 30 380. 80 985. 00 980. 50 883. 70 5, 345. 36 833. 90 599. 80 124.90 441.72 5, 644. 10 15, 200. 40 17, 574. 61 937. 90 3, 990. 79 Merchant & Co. Scovill Manufactur- ing Co. Do.' Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. No purchases. Scovill Manufactur- ing Co. Do! Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. No purchases. Do. Do. Do. Do. Scovill Manufaetar- ing Co. Do.' Do. Do. Do. Ho. Do. Do. Do. Do. No purchases. Scovill Manufactur- ing Co. Do! Do. Do. No purchases. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Scovill Manufactur- ing Co. Do! Do. Do. Do. No purchases. PURCHASE OF MINOR COINAGE BLANKS. 7 Statement, by months, showing amount and cost of 1-cent bronze and nickel 5-cent blanks purchased from April 1, 1S90, to March 11, 1896, etc.— Continued. Bronze 1-cent blanks. Nickel 5-cent blanks. Total. Date. Avoirdupois pounds. Cost. Avoir- dupois pounds. Cost. Avoirdupois pounds. Cost. Prom whom purchased. 1895. 73, 500 1,500 8,000 63, 500 28,500 14, 000 23, 000 7,000 $14, 655. 90 299. 10 1, 595. 20 12,661.90 5, 682. 90 2, 791. 60 4, 586. 20 1. 395. 80 73, 500 1,500 8,000 63, 500 48, 500 24,500 23, 000 7,000 $14, 655. 90 299. 10 1, 595. 20 12,661.90 12, 070. 90 6, 145. 30 4, 586. 20 1, 395. 80 Srovill Manufacturing Co. Oct Do. Do. 1896. Jan Feb 20, 000 10, 500 $6, 388. 00 3, 353. 70 Do. Do. Do. Do. Total . . 1, 563, 575. 162 311, 776. 89 678, 177. 881 216, 730. 912, 241, 753. 043 1 1 528, 507. 80 The price paid per pound for the bronze 1-cent blanks was 19.94 cents, and for the nickel 5-cent blanks 31.94 cents, with the exception of nickel blanks purchased from Merchant & Co. in April, 1890, which were at the rate of 40 cents per pound. Herman Kretz. Exhibit B. Proposals received and contract made for minor coin blanks, March W, 1890. Mint of the United States at Philadelphia, Superintendent's Office, March 18, 1890. Sir- I have the honor to state that upon opening the proposals for nickel and bronze blanks received up to 12 m. this day they were found to be as scheduled below, to wit: No. of bid. Name and address of bidder. Eowland & Bobbins, 141 Chambers street, New York - — ■ - - ----- - J. Triedenstein, 83 Maiden Lane, Iiew York.. The Scovill Manufacturing Co., Waterbury, John F. "Lovejoy Co., 102 Chambers street, New York - ;--;■-: K " " Benedict & Burnbam Manufacturing Co., Waterbury, Conn ■■.-■■■ Merchant & Co., Philadelphia, Pa 5-cent blanks. Quantity. Pounds. 100, 000 100, 000 100, 000 100, 000 100, 000 100, 000 Price per pound. Cents. 48.25 45.75 31.94 45.73 41.38 38 1-cent blanks. Quantity. Pounds. 200, 000 200, 000 200, 000 200, 000 200, 000 200, 000 Price per pound. Cents. 28.25 27.75 19.94 25.73 25.77 24.50 I Mo.. tho bia>, .nmlerol in order of tleir ™»1|4 "J "JKfJ "?„'£„'" tract will be awarded to that party, with your approval. Very respectfully, Q c BosBysH ELL, Superintendent. Hon. E. O. Leech, Director of the Mint, Washington, V. o. Treasury Department, Bureau of the Mint 1REA8URT ih^a JVash \ ngtoni D C-; Mareh zo, 1890. Sir : Acknowledging the receipt «^™^^^^£X& the warding the proposals for nickel and bronze "■£"» ^"^ 94 oent8 per pound for bid of the Scovill Manufacturing Company, at the rate 01 ax.vt ceu v v 8 PURCHASE OF MINOK COINAGE BLANKS. 5-oent blanks be accepted, is approved, and you are authorized to enter into a con- tract with the Scovill Manufacturing Company to furnish 200,000 pounds of 5-cent nickel blanks, or so much thereof as the Government may require, at the price of 31.94 cents per pound, and 500,000 pounds of 1-cent blanks, or so much thereof as the Government may require, at the price of 19.94 cents per pound. The proposals are herewith returned. Very respectfully, E. O. Leech, Director. Superintendent United States Mint, Philadelphia, Pa. Agreement made this twenty-first day of March, A. D. 1890, between the United States of America, acting herein by Oliver C. Bosbyshell, superintendent of the mint of the United States at Philadelphia, of the one part, and The Scovill Manu- facturing Company, of Waterbury, Connecticut, of the other part. Whereas the said The Scovill Manufacturing Company, in answer to a public advertisement, submitted a proposal to said superintendent, under date of March 15th, 1890, to supply said mint with one hundred thousand (100,000) pounds, more or less, of five-cent copper-nickel blanks, at the rate of thirty-one ninety-four one- hundredths (31.94) cents per pound, and further proposed to accept further orders from said superintendent for said blanks up to the total amount of two hundred thousand (200,000) pounds at the same price, viz, 31.94 cents per pound, as by ref- erence to said advertisement and proposal will fully appear, which proposal has been accepted by said superintendent and approved by the Director of the Mint. Now, therefore, this agreement witnesseth that the said The Scovill Manufactur- ing Company are to furnish and deliver the required blanks at the mint aforesaid, in such quantities as may be required from time to time by the superintendent of the mint, to the amount of not less than one hundred thousand (100,000) pounds, and not more than two hundred thousand (200,000) pounds, being for all requirements of the mint for blanks of this denomination until the said 200,000 lbs. shall have been delivered, the blanks to be of proper size and form, and be composed of three-fourths copper and one-fourth nickel, and no piece shall deviate more than three (3) grains from the standard weight, viz, seventy-seven and sixteen-hundredths (77.16) grains, prescribed by law ; the blanks to be properly annealed, cleaned, and milled, and to be of the proper ductility ; the stated fineness and proportion of the metals to be determined on the mint assay, and all blanks not suitable for coinage to be rejected. Payments to be made weekly, if required, for all blanks delivered and accepted under this contract, at the rate of 31.94 cents per pound. Witness the hands and seals of the parties to this contract the day and year first above written. O. C. Bosbyshell, [seal.] Superintendent of the Mint. Scovill Mankg. Co., [seal.] By C. P. Goss, Treasurer. Witnesses preseut : F. M. Nichols. O. B. Jones. F. J. Gross. T. R. Hyde, Jr. Approved : E. O. Leech, Director of the Mint. Agreement made this twenty-first day of March, A. D., 1890, between the United States of America, acting herein by Oliver C. Bosbyshell, superintendent of the mint of the United States at Philadelphia, of the one part, and The Scovill Man- ufacturing Company, of Waterbury, Connecticut, of the other part. Whereas the said The Scovill Manufacturing Company, in answer to a public advertisement, submitted a proposal to said superintendent, under date of March 15th, 1890, to supply said mint with two hundred thousand (200,000) pounds, more or less of one-cent blanks, at the rate of nineteen and ninety-four hundredths (19.94) cents per pound, and also proposed to accept further orders for said blanks at the same rate per pound to the total amount of five hundred thousand (500,000) pounds if called for, as by reference to said advertisement and proposal will appear; which proposal has been accepted by said superintendent, and approved bv the Director of the Mint. PURCHASE OF MINOR COINAGE BLANKS. 9 Now, therefore, this agreement witnesseth that the said The Scovill Manufactur- ing Company are to furnish and deliver the above-specified blanks at the mint aforesaid, in such quantities as may be required from time to time by the superin- tendent of the mint, to the amount of not less than two hundred thousand (200,000) pounds, and not more than five hundred thousand (500,000) pounds, being for all the requirements of the mint for blanks of this denomination until the said 500,000 pounds shall have been delivered, the blanks to be of proper size and form, and to be composed of ninety-five per centum of copper, three per centum of tin, and two per centum of zinc, and shall not deviate more than two (2) grains from the standard weight prescribed by law, viz: Forty-eight (48) grains; the blanks to be of proper and satisfactory ductility; the fineness and proportion of the metals composing them to be determined on the mint assay; and all blanks not suitable for coinage to be rejected. Payments at the rate of nineteen and ninety-four hundredths (19.94) cents per pound to be made weekly, if required, for all blanks delivered and accepted under this contract. Witness the hands and seals of the parties to this contract, the day and year first above written. O. C. BOSBYSHBLL, [SEAL.] Su2>t. of the Mint. Scovill Manfg. Co., [seal.] By C P. Goss, Treasurer. Witnesses : F. M. Nichols, O. B. Jones, F. J. Gross, T. R. Hyi>e, Jr. Approved : E. O. Leech, Director of the Mint. Exhibit C. Contract made for minor-coin blanks, January SO, 1891— Letter of Director of the Mint authorizing same. Treasury Department, Bureau of the Mint, Washington, D. C, January IS, 1891. Sib: After a careful consideration of the advertisement and contract with the Scovill Manufacturing Company, for supplying nickel and bronze blank s, I . h* e con.e to the conclusioS that it would be lawful to enter into a new cont r ac t withtt s company, under the old advertisement; anil, as I consider the oontiaet. » fftvo rable one for the Government, you are authorized and directed to -prepare and enter into ward them to Washington for my approval. Very respectfully, E Q LbbcH; Director. The Superintendent Unitei> States Mint, Philadelphia, ra. 15th, 1890, to supply said mint «^^,S& ninety-four hun- less, of rive-cent copper-nickel W^^.^^^Jt Accept further orders from dreaths (31.94) cents per pound, and fa ther P r0 P°^ Q ° t f £ w0 hun dred thousand said superintendent for said blanks up to the to **1 » m "™ * ° d a8 by reference to (200,000) pounds at the same P'^"^^ omta ^er po nn ^ ^ by said advertisement and proposal will fully appear, ?»£■">>.* sa d superintendent and approved by the Director of the 1 M«t Maliafactur . Now, therefore, this agreement ^eweto that the ™£ i^) f and above alluded ing Company have renewed their proposal of March loin, j.oo , 10 PURCHASE OF MINOR COINAGE BLANKS. to, to furnish the said mint with five-cent copper Dickel blanks, in quantity and at the rate per pound as above recited, which renewed proposal has been accepted by said superintendent and approved by the Director of the Mint, and the contract made pursuant to the proposal of the said The Scovill Manufacturing Company March 15th, 1890, is hereby extended, and the said Scovill Manufacturing Company are (after completing the delivery of the 200,000 lbs. called for in the contract of March 21, 1890) to furnish and deliver the required blanks at the mint aforesaid, in such quantities as may be required from time to time by the superintendent of the mint, to the amount of not less than one hundred thousand (100,000) pounds and not more than two hundred thousand (200,000) pounds, being for all requirements of the mint for blanks of this denomination, until the said 200,000 lbs. shall have been delivered, the blanks to be of proper size and form and be composed of three- fourths copper and one-fourth nickel, and no piece shall deviate more than three (3) grains from the standard weight, viz, seventy-seven and sixteen-hundredths (77.16) grains, prescribed by law, the blanks to be"properly annealed, cleaned, and milled, and to oe of the proper ductility; the stated fineness and proportion of the metals to be determined on the mint assay; and all blanks not suitable for coinage to be rejected. Payments to be made weekly if required for all blanks delivered and accepted nnder this contract at the rate of 31.94 cents per pound. Witness the hands and seals of the parties to this contract, the day and year first above written. Q. C. Bosbysheix, Supt. of the Mint. Scovili. Manfg. Co., [seal.] C P. Goes, Treas. Witness present : O. B. Jones, Jno. T. Potts. (The words " after completing the delivery of the 200,000 lbs. called for in the con- tract of March 21, 1890," interlined in the 9th line, 2nd page, before signing.) Agreement made this twentieth day of January, A. D. 1891, between the United States of America, acting herein by Oliver C. Bosbyshell, superintendent of the mint of the United States at Philadelphia, of the one part, and The Scovill Man- ufacturing Company, of Waterbury, Connecticut, of the other part. Whereas the said The Scovill Manufacturing Company in answer to » public advertisement, submitted a proposal to said superintendent under date of March 15th, 1890, to supply said mint with two hundred thousand (200,000) pounds, more or less, of one-cent blanks, at the rate of nineteen and ninety-four hundredths (19.94) cents per pound, and also proposed to accept further orders for said blanks at the same rate per pound to the total amount of five hundred thousand (500,000) pounds, if called for, as by reference to said advertisement and proposal will fully appear, which proposal was accepted by said superintendent and approved by the" Director of the Mint. Now, therefore, this agreement witnesseth that the said The Scovill Manufactur ing Company have renewed their proposal of March loth, 1890, and above alluded to, to furnish the said mint with one-cent blanks, in quantity and at the rate per pound as above recited, which renewed proposal has been accepted by said superin- tendent and approved by the Director of the Mint, and the contract made pursuant to the proposal of the said Scovill Manufacturing Company, March 15, 1890, is hereby extended, and the said Scovill Manufacturing Company are (after complet- ingthe delivery of the 500,000 lbs. called for in the contract of March 21, 1890) to furnish and deliver the above-specified blanks at the mint aforesaid, in such quan- tities as may be required from time to time by the superintendent of the mint, to the amount of not less than two hundred thousand (200,000) pounds, and not more than five hundred thousand (500,000) pounds, being for all the requirements of the mint for blanks of this denomination until the said 500,000 lbs. shall have been delivered, the blanks to be of proper size and form, and to be composed of ninety- five per centum of copper, three per centum of tin, and two per centum of zinc, and shall not deviate more than two (2) grains from the standard, weight prescribed by law, viz, forty-eight (48) grains ; the blanks to be properly annealed, cleaned, and milled, and to be of proper and satisfactory ductility; the fineness and proportion of the metals composing them to be determined on the mint assay; and all blanks not suitable for coinage to be rejected. Payments at the rate of nineteen and ninety-four hundredths (19.94) cents per pound, to be made weekly, if required, for all blanks delivered and accepted under PURCHASE OF MINOR COINAGE BLANKS. 11 Wit ness the hands and seals of the partieB to this contract the day and year first above written. O. C. BOSBYSHELL, Supt. of the Mint. Scovill Manfg. Co., [seal.] Witnesses present: C. P. Goss, Treasurer. O. B. Jones. Jno. T. Potts. (The words " after completing the delivery of the 500,000 lbs. called for in the contract of March 21, 1890," and the words " properly annealed, cleaned, and milled, and to be," in the 24th line of 2nd page, interlined before signing.) Know all men by these presents that we, The Scovill Manufacturing Company, of Waterbury, Connecticut, acting herein by C. P. Goss, treasurer thereof, as princi- pal, and Joseph Wharton, of the city of Philadelphia and State of Pennsylvania, as surety, are held and firmly bouDd unto the United States of America, in the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) lawful money of the United States, to be paid to the United States of America, to which payment, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, and administrators, firmly by these presents, sealed with our own seals, and dated this twenty-first day of March, anno Domini one thousand eight hundred aDd ninety. Whereas the said The Scovill Manufacturing Company, by two contracts with the United States aforesaid, acting therein by Oliver C. Bosbyshell, superintendent of the mint of the United States at Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, bearing even date herewith, have stipulated and agreed to supply the said mint with five- cent copper-nickel blanks to the amount of not less than one hundred thousand (100,000) pounds, nor more than two hundred thousand (200,000) pounds, at the rate of thirty-one and ninety-four one-hundredths cents per pound (31.94), and also bronze one-cent blanks to the amount of not less than two hundred thousand (200,000) pounds nor more than five hundred thousand (500,000) pounds, at the rate of nineteen and ninety-four one-hundredths cents per pound (19.94), upon the terms and conditions specified in said contracts, as by reference thereto will fully appear. Now, therefore, the condition of the obligation is such that if the said The Scovill Manufacturing Company shall and do faithfully execute said contracts and fnlfill all the requirements thereof as therein stated, then this obligation to be void and ot none effect, otherwise to be and remain in full force and virtue. Scovill Manfg. Co., [seal,] By C. P. Goss, Treasr. Joseph Wharton. Sealed and delivered in the presence of us— F. J. Gross. T. R. Hyde, Jr. M. H. Cobb. Approved : E. O. Leech, Director. And now to wit, January 20th, 1891, the contract with The Scovill Manufacturing Company7forthe kthful performance of which ^TT^ZfZZ'ICeT^ entered into by the said company, acting herein i by C. P. Goss, treasurer t "ereot, m Sealed and delivered in the presence of us— O. B. Jones. Jno. T. Potts. Approved : By C. P. Goss, Treas. Joseph Wharton. 12 PURCHASE OF MINOR COINAGE BLANKS. Exhibit E. The Mint of the United States at Philadelphia, Superintendent's Office, January S3, 189S. Sir: Complying with your verbal request during your recent visit at this mint, I nave the honor to submit copies of a contract for minor-coin blanks with Scovill Manufacturing Company, of Waterbury, and trust it may prove satisfactory. I will thank you to indicate any points wherein it may seem to require amendation. Very respectfully, O. C. Bosbyshell, Superintendent. Hon. E. O. Leech, Director of the Mint, Washington. D. C. Treasury Department, Bureau of the Mint, Washington, D. C, January 24, 1893. Sir : I return herewith the form of contract which you drew up for the continu- ance of the present arrangement with the Scovill Manufacturing Company for the delivery of five-cent and one-cent blanks. You will notice that I have corrected one copy as it will be approved by this Bureau and canceled the other. You are authorized to execute a contract with the Scovill Manufacturing Com- pany in accordance with the corrected form herewith sent. The form, as corrected, fully covers the case and there can be no objection to it upon the part of the firm or upon the part of anybody. Very respectfully, E. 0. Leech, Director. The Superintendent United States Mint, Philadelphia, P The Mint op the United States at Philadelphia, Superintendent's Office, February 6, 1893. Sir: I have the honor to forward herewith contracts with Scovill Manufacturing Company for nickel and bronze coin blanks, duly signed aijd attested. I also send the amended copy returned to this office by you, according to your request. Vory respectfully, O. C. Bosbyshell, Superintendent. Hon. Edward 0. Leech, Director of the Mint, Washington, D. C. Whereas under contracts made upon due advertisement for proposals and dated March 21st, 1890, the United States of America purchased from the Scovill Manu- facturing Company, of Waterbury, Connecticut, certain copper-nickel coin blanks and certain bronze coin blanks for the use of the m int of the United States in the manufacture of five-cent coins and one-cent coins; which contracts, having been found advantageous to the United States, have been extended from time to time ; and Whereas the said contracting parties are now willing to contract with each other for further purchase and delivery of such blanks for the use of the mint of the United States at Philadelphia : Now, therefore, this agreement, made this fourth day of February, 1893, between the United States of America, acting herein by Oliver C. Bosbyshell, superintendent of the mint at Philadelphia, of the one part, and the Scovill Manufacturing Com- pany, of Waterbury, Connecticut, of the other part, witnesseth : That the United States will purchase from the said Scovill Manufacturing Com- pany for the use of its mint, and the said Scovill Manufacturing Company will sell to the United States two hundred thousand (200,000) pounds, more or less, of copper- nickel coin blanks at the rate of thirty-one ninety-four one-hundred ths (31.94) cents per pound, as may be needed for coinage purposes ; the blanks to be of proper size and form, and to be composed of three- fourths copper and one-fourth nickel; and no piece shall deviate more than three (3) grains from the standard weight, viz, seventy-seven and sixteen hundredths (77.16) grains troy, as prescribed by law; the blanks to be properly annealed, milled, and cleaned, and to be of the proper ductility ; the stated fineness and proportions of the metals to be determined on the mint assay, and all blanks not suitable for coinage to be rejected. PURCHASE OP MINOR COINAGE BLANKS. 13 ^.nd this agreement further witnesseth, that the United States will purchase from 3 said Scovill Manufacturing Company for the use of the mint, and the Scovill Man- ictnring Company will sell to the United States five hundred thousand (500,000) unds, more or less, of bronze coin blanks as may be needed for coinage purposes, the rate of nineteen ninety four hundredths (19.94) cents per pound, the blanks be of the proper size and form, and to be composed of ninety- five per centum of pper, three per centum of tin, and two per centum of zinc, and shall not deviate >re than two (2) grains from the standard weight as prescribed by law, viz, forty- ;ht (48) grains, Troy; the blanks to be of the proper ductility, to be annealed, lied, cleaned, and the fineness and proportions of the metals composing them to determined on the mint assay ; all blanks not suitable for coinage to be rejected. Payments at the rates aforementioned, respectively, for such coin blanks, to be ide weekly if required, and the deliveries of the same to be made from time to ne, as required by the superintendent of the mint, free from freight charges at e mint at Philadelphia and in such quantities as the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, c Document J ftSesnon. j } Xo.m. BONDS AND CURRENCY OP THE UNITED STATES. LETTEB FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, TRANSMITTING An acJcnoicledgment of the receipt of the House resolution of February 17, 1896, and making reply to the inquiries contained therein in regardto the bonds and currency of the United States. Jdjsje 5, 1896. — Referred to the Committee on Ways and Means and ordered to be printed. Treasury Department, Office op the Secretary, Washington, D. C, June 3, 1896. Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge House resolution dated Feb- ruary 17, 1896, as follows : Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury he requested to inform the House — First. What was the aggregate amount of bonds issued and sold under the resump- tion act of 1875, and also what was the aggregate sum realized therefrom, specifying the character of coin received, between the passage of said act and March 1, 1893 ; and also the aggregate amount of bonds offered and sold under such act and the aggregate sum realized therefrom between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896, giv- ing amount, rate, character of bond, and sum realized for each issue ; and also what was the amount of gold in the Treasury reserve for redemption of United States legal-tender notes January 1, 1879, and what was the amount of gold reserved for such purpose March 1, 1893, and also the amount reserved on January 1, 1896. Second. What was the aggregate amount of United States legal-tender notes redeemed by the Treasury between January 1, 1879, when the resumption of specie payments took effect, and March 1, 1893; and what was the aggregate amount redeemed between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896, specifying separately the amount of greenbacks, so called, and the amount of Treasury notes thus redeemed, and not including the Treasury notes redeemed and canceled as provided by the act of July 14, 1890, and also specifying the kind of coin, whether gold or silver, used in such redemption. Third. What was the amount of greenbacks, so called, less currency certificates, held by national banking associations, and what was the amount of Treasury notes in the Treasury March 1, 1893, and also January 1, 1896; also what was the amount of United States legal- tender notes and currency certificates held in their reserve by national banking associations at each of such dates, or at the time nearest to such date for which the Treasury has official returns. Fourth. What was the amount of United States legal-tender notes on deposit in the Treasury March 1, 1893, and also January 1, 1896, as the 5 per cent fund for the redemption of the notes of national banking associations. Z BONDS AND CUEEENCY OF THE UNITED STATES. Fifth. What disposition was made of such of the United States legal-tender notes as were redeemed from January 1, 1879, to March 1, 1893, and did not remain as cash in the Treasury at the latter date; and also what disposition was made of such of the United States legal-tender notes as were redeemed between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896, and did not remain as cash in the Treasury at the latter date. Sixth. What was the surplus or the deficiency of revenue, as the case may have been, each fiscal year or part of year from July 1, 1879, to March 1, 1893, and from March 1, 1893, to July 1, 1895, and for the first half of the fiscal year ended January 1, 1896 ; what disposition was made of the surplus in each fiscal year, and also from what source or sources the requisite means were obtained to pay so much of the cur- rent expense of carrying on the Government, pensions, and interest on the public debt as was in excess of the revenue in any such fiscal year or part of fiscal year. Seventh. What was the amount paid on account of the reduction of the principal ' of the interest-bearing public debt, including premium on bonds redeemed each fiscal year and part of fiscal year from July 1, 1879, to March 1, 1893; how much of such amount was derived, from surplus revenue, and how much from the fund for redemp- tion of notes of national banking associations in liquidation or reducing circulation, etc., which was covered into the Treasury by the act of July 14, 1890; and also how much the interest-bearing debt was increased between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896. Eighth. What was the amount of legal-tender notes held in the Treasury as the deposit of national banking associations in liquidation or reducing or retiring their circulation for the redemption of their outstanding circulating notes, January 1, 1879, March 1, 1885, March 1, 1889, and also July U, 1890; when this fund was cov- ered into the Treasury what was the amount of such notes of national banking associations redeemed from the fund between January 1, 1879, and March 1, 1885, and between March 1, 1885, and March 1, 1889, and also between March 1, 1889, and July 14, 1890 ; also what was the amount of legal-tender notes paid into the Treasury by national banking associations in liquidation or reducing or retiring their circula- tion between July 14, 1890, and March 1, 1893, and between March 1, 1893, and Jan- uary 1, 1896 ; and also what was the amount of notes of such banks redeemed by the Treasury during each of these periods. In reply I transmit herewith eight statements, duly numbered, which contain the answers to the eight questions put in the resolution. The answer to question three does not comply exactly with the require- ments of the resolution, because the reports of national banks, from which the information was derived, do not show the " amount of green- backs less currency certificates" in their possession. The preparation of Statements 6 and 7 involved a large amount of preliminary work. All the information called for in the corresponding questions is contained in the books of the Department, but it is in a form adapted to the regular reports of the Secretary, and the task of recasting it to meet the requirements of the resolution has been very great. Respectfully yours, J. G. Carlisle, Secretary. The Speaker of the House of Representatives. ANSWER TO QUESTION 1. Bonds sold under the resumption aet prior to March 1, 1893. Character. Amount. Amount realized. 43, per cent 1891 . i per cent 1907 .. Total $65, 000, 000 30, 500, 000 $65, 500, 000 30, 500, 000 95, 500, 000 96, 000, 000 These bonds were sold for gold coin or its equivalent. BONDS AND CURRENCY OF THE UNITED STATES. Bonds sold between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896. Character. Amount. Rate. Amount realized. $50, 000, 000 50, 000, 000 62, 315, 400 117.223 to 200 117. 077 104. 49462+ $58, 633, 295. 71 58, 538, 500. 00 65, 116, 244. 62 162, 315, 400 182, 288, 040. 33 These bonds were sold for gold coin or gold certificates. ANSWER TO LAST PART OF QUESTION 3. All the bonds issued under the resumption act of January 14, 1875, were' payable, principal and interest, in coin of the standard value of July 14, 1870. Net gold in the United States Treasury. January 1, 1879 $114 ' 1 ??'^?2 Marchl,1893 m -£$>lll January 1, 1896 63,262,268 ANSWER TO QUESTION 2. The aggregate amount of United States notes and Treasury notes redeemed in gold coin between January 1, 1879, and March 1, 1893, was as follows : United States notes ^'foo'^Q Treasury notes si > ldB ' 47d Total 99,634,378 The aggregate amount so redeemed between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896, was: United States notes $2 ?q' n=I' mo Treasury notes 4d, U54, oijd Total 324,155,725 The amount of United States notes and Treasury notes redeemed in standard silver dollars prior to March 1, 1893, can not be stated, there being no complete available record. The amount so redeemed between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896, no u including the Treasury notes redeemed and canceled as provided by the act of .July 14, 1890, was as follows : tt •* j c* * +„ D $2,490,337 United States notes *y 14 g' 67 j Treasury, notes ' ' Total 3 > 640 ' 012 ANSWER TO QUESTION 3. Statement of the gold and silver certificates legal-tender notes and V™tfSftf™^ cotes of deposit for legal-tender notes held by national banks on March 6,1893, and DeterZberlS,1895, as shcnvn by their reports of condition to the Comptroller of the Currency. Gold Treasury certificates. Silver Treasury certificates . UnfSdStetL^tificateV of deposrffor ^tender notes J Mar. 6, 1893. $69, 198, 790 21, 695, 114 90, 935, 774 14, 675, 000 Dec. 13, 1895. $20, 936, 030 25, 878, 323 99, 209, 423 31, 440, 000 Treasury notes in Treasury- $5| 42 0, 240 March 1,1893 " 22,044,511 January 1, 1890 2 BONDS AND CURRENCY OF THE UNITED STATES. Fifth. What disposition was made of such of the United States legal-tender notes as were redeemed from January 1, 1879, to March 1, 1893, and did not remain as cash in the Treasury at the latter date; and also what disposition was made of such of the United States legal-tender notes as were redeemed between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896, and did not remain as cash in the Treasury at the latter date. Sixth. What was the surplus or the deficiency of revenue, as the case may have been, each fiscal year or part of year from July 1, 1879, to March 1, 1893, and from March 1, 1893, to July 1, 1895, and for the first half of the fiscal year ended January 1, 1896 ; what disposition was made of the surplus in each fiscal year, and also from what source or sources the requisite means were obtained to pay so much of the cur- rent expense of carrying on the Government, pensions, and interest on the public debt as was in excess of the revenue in any such fiscal year or part of fiscal year. Seventh. What was the amount paid on account of the reduction of the principal ' of the interest-bearing public debt, including premium on bonds redeemed each fiscal year and part of fiscal year from July 1, 1879, to March 1, 1893 ; how much of such amount was derived from surplus revenue, and how much from the fund for redemp- tion of notes of national banting associations in liquidation or reducing circulation, etc., which was covered into the Treasury by the act of July 14, 1890; and also how much the interest-bearing debt was increased between March 1, 1893, and January 1 1896 'Eighth. What was the amount of legal-tender notes held in the Treasury as the deposit of national banking associations in liquidation or reducing or retiring their circulation for the redemption of their outstanding circulating notes, January 1, 1879, March 1, 1885, March 1, 1889, and also July 14, 1890; when this fund was cov- ered into the Treasury what was the amount of such notes of national banking associations redeemed* from the fund between January 1, 1879, and March 1, 1885, and between March 1, 1885, and March 1, 1889, and also between March 1, 1889, and July 14, 1890; also what was the amount of legal-tender notes paid into the Treasury by national banking associations in liquidation or reducing or retiring their circula- tion between July 14, 1890, and March 1, 1893, and between March 1, 1893, and Jan- uary 1, 1896; and also what was the amount of notes of such banks redeemed by the Treasury during each of these periods. In reply I transmit herewith eight statements, duly numbered, which contain the answers to the eight questions put in the resolution. The answer to question three does not comply exactly with the require- ments of the resolution, because the reports of national banks, from which the information was derived, do not show the " amount of green- backs less currency certificates" in their possession. The preparation of Statements 6 and 7 involved a large amount of preliminary work. All the information called for in the corresponding questions is contained in the books of the Department, but it is in a form adapted to the regular reports of the Secretary, and the task of recasting it to meet the requirements of the resolution has been very great. Kespectfully yours, J. G. Carlisle, Secretary. The Speaker of the House of Eepresentatives. AFSWEK TO QUESTION' 1. Bonds sold under the resumption act prior to March 1, 189S. Character. Amount. Amount realized. •ij per cent 1891 . i per cent 1907 . . Total $65, 000, 000 30, 500, 000 $65, 500, 000 30, 500, 000 95, 500, 000 96, 000, 000 These bonds were sold for gold coin or its equivalent. BONDS AND CURRENCY OP THE UNITED STATES. Bonds sold between Maroh 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896. Charaoter. Amount. Bate. Amount realized. 5 per cent 1904 . Total $50, 000, 000 50, 000, 000 62, 315, 400 117.223 to 200 117.077 104. 49462+ $58, 633, 295. 71 58, 538, 500. 00 65, 116, 244. 62 162, 315, 400 182, 288, 040. 33 These bonds were sold for gold coin or gold certificates. ANSWER TO LAST PART OF QUESTION 3. Ji^.££i ™^- 8 I 88 " 16 ? ? nde ? the re 8»mption act of January 14, 1875, were' payable, principal and interest, in coin of the standard value of July 14, 1870. Net gold in the United States Treasury. ^ Vsof 9 $114,193,360 March 1,1893 103 284 219 January 1, 1896 63 262 268 ANSWER TO QUESTION 2. The aggregate amount of United States notes and Treasury notes redeemed in gold coin between January 1, 1879, and March 1, 1893, was as follows : United States notes $65,495,905 Treasury notes 34,138,473 Total 99,634,378 The aggregate amount so redeemed between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896, was: United States notes $281,101,132 Treasury notes 43,054,593 Total 324,155,725 The amount of United States notes and Treasury notes redeemed in standard silver dollars prior to March 1, 1893, can not be stated, there being no complete available record. The amount so redeemed between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896, not including the Treasury notes redeemed and canceled as provided by the act of July 14, 1890, was as follows : United States notes $2, 490, 337 Treasury, notes 1, 149, 675 Total 3,640,012 ANSWER TO QUESTION 3. Statement of the gold and silver certificates, legal-tender notes, and United States certifi- cates of deposit for legal-tender notes held by national banks on March 6, 1893, and December 13, 1895, as shoion by their reports of condition to the Comptroller of the t Currency. Mar. 6, 1893. Dec. 13, 1895. Gold Treasury certificates Silver Treasury certificates Legal-tender notes United States certificates of deposit for legal-tender notes. $69, 198, 790 21, 695, 114 90, 935, 774 14, 675, 000 $20, 936, 030 25, 878, 323 99, 209, 423 31, 440, 000 Treasury notes in Treasury- March 1,1893 $5,420,240 January 1, 1890 22,044,511 4 BONDS AND CURRENCY OP THE UNITED STATES. ANSWER TO QUESTION 4. The amount of the 5 per cent fund for the redemption of the notes of national hanking associations on March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896, was as follows : March 1, 1893 $6,119,026.84 January 1, 1896 , 7,835,379.38 ANSWER TO QUESTION 5. The United States legal-tender notes which were redeemed from January 1, 1879, to March 1, 1893, and did not remain as cash in the Treasury at the latter date were paid out in the current disbursements, as were also those which were redeemed from March 1, 1893, to January 1, 1896, and did not remain as cash in the Treasury at the latter date, with the exception of the Treasury notes redeemed in standard silver dollars after July, 1893, which were canceled and retired. ANSWER TO QUESTION 6. Periods. Revenues, ex- clusive of postal. Expenditures, exolusive of postal, princi- pal of debt, and premium. Surplus rev- enues. Remarks. July 1, 1879, to July 1, 1880. . . July 1, 1880, to July 1, 1881. . . July 1, 1881, to July 1, 1882. . July 1, 1882, to July 1, 1883. July 1, 1883, to July 1, 1884. July 1, 1884, to July 1, 1885. . . July 1, 1885, to July 1, 1886. July 1, 1886, to July 1, 1887. $333, 526, 610. 98 $264, 847, 637. : $68, 678, 973. 62 360, 782, 292. 57 403, 525, 250. 28 398, 287, 581. 95 348, 519, 869. 92 323, 690, 706. 38 336, 439, 727. 06 371, 403, 277. 66 259. 651, 638. 81 257, 981, 439. 57 265, 408, 137. 54 244, 126, 244. 33 260, 226, 935. 11 242, 483, 138. 50 267, 932, 179. 97 101, 130, 653. 76 145, 543, 810. 71 132, 879, 444. 41 104, 393, 625. 59 63, 463, 771. 27 93, 956, 588. 56 103, 471, 097. 6 The surplus for 1880, -with $141,485,744.21 taken from the accumulated cash balance, making $210,164,717.83, was ap- plied to the redemption of $207,369,397.41 princi- pal of debt, and the pay- ment of $2, 795,320.42 pre- mium on bonds pur- chased. The surplus for 1881 was applied to the redemp- tion of $85,432,381.05prin- cipal of debt and to the payment of $1,061,248.78 premium on bonds pur- chased, the remainder, $14,637,023.93, being add- ed to the cash balance. The surplus for 1882, with $20,736,144.84 taken from the cash balance, making $166,279,955.55, was ap- plied to the redemption of the debt. The surplus for 1883, with $1,178,462.55 taken from the cash balance, making $134,057,906.96, was ap- plied to the redemption of the debt. The surplus for 1884 was applied to the redemp- tion of $99,861, 684.50 prin- cipal of the debt, the remainder, $4,531,941.09, being added to the cash balance. The surplus for 1885 was applied to the redemp- tion of $45,984,485.43 prin- cipal of the debt, the re- mainder. $17,479,285.84, being added to the cash balance. The surplus for 1886 was applied to the redemp- tion of $44,543, 993.36 prin- cipal of the debt, the re- mainder, $49,412,595.20, being added to the cash balance. The surplus for 1887, with $24,447,370.46 taken from the cash balance, making $127,918,468.15, was ap- plied to the redemption of the debt. BONDS AND CURRENCY OF THE UNITED STATES. ANSWER TO QUESTION 6— Continued. Periods. Revenues, ex- clusive of postal. Expenditures, exclusive of postal, princi- pal of debt, and premium. Surplus rev- enues. Remarks. July 1, 1887, to July 1, 1888. July 1, 1888, to July 1, 1889. $379, 266, 074. 76 $259, 653, 958. 67 387, 050, 058. 84 281, 996, 615. 60 $119,612,116.09 105, 053, 443. 24 July 1, 1889, to July 1, 1890. 403, 080, 982. 63 297, 736, 486. 60 105, 344, 496. ( July 1, 1890, to July 1, 1891. July 1, 1891, to July 1, 1892. July 1, 1892, to March 1, 1893 March 1, 1893, to July 1, 1893. July 1,1893, to July 1,1894. 392, 612, 447. 31 354, 937, 784, 24 260, 231, 442. 20 125, 588, 186. 58 297, 722, 019. 25 355, 372, 684. 74 345, 023, 330. 58 259, 425, 404. 34 124, 052, 550. 15 367, 525, 279. 83 37, 239, 762. 57 9, 914, 453. 66 806, 037. 86 1,535,636.43 '69, 803, 260. 58 The surplus for 1888 was applied to the redemp- tion of $74, 81 3,563.05 prin- cipal of the debt and to the payment of $8,270,- 842.46 premium on bonds purchased, the remain- der, $36,527,710.58, being added to the cash balance. The surplus for 1889, with $33,503,357.76 taken from the cash balance, mak- ing $138,556,801, was ap- plied to the redemption of $121,264,438.35 princi- pal of the debt and to the payment of $17,292, 362.65 premium on bonds pur- chased. The surplus for 1890, with $19,601,877.53 taken from the cash balance, making $124,946,373.56, was ap- plied to the redemption of $104,642,149.50 princi- pal of the debt and to the payment of $20,304,224.06 premium on bonds pur- oil £186(1 The surplus for 1891, with $34,132,372.16 taken from the cash balance, and $40,018,392.25 from the national-bank fund,mak- $111,390,526.98, was ap- plied to the redemption of $100,989,306.37 princi- pal of the debt and to the payment of $10,401,220.61 premium on bonds pur- . chased. The surplus for 1892, with $27,673 266.32 taken from the cash balance, making $37,587,719.98, was ap- plied to the redemption of $24,332 836.98 princi- pal of the debt and to the redemption of $13,254,- 883 national-bank notes in excess of deposits. The surplus from July 1, 1892, to March 1, 1893, with $4,131,050.14 taken from the cash balance, making $4,937,088, was applied to the redemp- tion of $445,640 principal of the debt and to the redemption of $4,491,448 national-bank notes in excess of deposits. The surplus from March 1, ' 3893, to July 1, 1893, with $314,350.07 taken from the cash balance, mak- ing $1,849,986.50, was ap- plied to the redemption of $241,363, principal of the debt, and to the re- demption of $1,608,623.50 national-bank notes in excess of deposits. Of the deficiency in reve- nues for 1894, $58,391,- 098.51 was supplied from the general funds in the Treasury, which had BONDS AND CURRENCY OF THE UNITED STATES. ANSWER TO QUESTION 6— Continued. Periods. July 1, 1894, to July 1, 1895. $313, 390, 075. 11 July 1, 1895, to January 1, 1896| Revenues, ex- clusive of $356, 195, 298. 29 169, 271, 792. 36 Expenditures, exclusive of postal, princi- pal of debt, and premium. $*42,805,223.18 182, 806, 251. 21 Surplus rev- enues. *13,534,468.85 Remarks. been increased by notes redeemed in gold pro- cured by the sale of bonds, said notes becom- ing a part of the general fund and being required by law to be reissued, and $5,708,247.75 from national bank fund. The deftciencyin revenues for 1895 was supplied from the general funds in the Treasury, which had been increased by notes redeemed in gold procured by the sale of bonds, said notes becom- ing a part of the general fund aud being required by law to be reissued. The deficiency in revenues for the first six months of 1896 was supplied from the general funds in the Treasury, which had been increased by notes redeemed in gold procured by the sale of bonds, said notes becom- ing a part of the general fund, and being required by law to be reissued. * Deficiency in revenues. ANSWER TO QUESTION 7. Reduction of principal of interest-bear- ing debt. Premiumpaid on bonds purchased. Total princi- pal and premium. Remarks. July 1, 1879, to July 1, 1880. . . . July 1, 1880, to July 1, 1881. . . . July 1,1881, July 1, 1882, July 1,1883, July 1,1884, July 1,1885, July 1,1886, July 1,1887, July 1,1888, July 1,1889, July 1,1890, to July 1, 1882 to July 1,1883 to July 1,1884 to July 1,1885 to July 1,1886 to July 1,1887 to July 1,1888 to July 1,1889 to July 1,1890 to July 1,1891 $207, 117, 185. 00 85, 322, 940. 00 July 1, 1891, to July 1, 1892. . . July 1, 1892, to March 1, 1893. March 1, 1893, to July 1, 1893. July 1, 1893, to July 1, 1894. . . July 1, 1894, to July 1, 1895 . . . July 1, 1895, to January 1, 1896 166, 220, 410. 134, 010, 640. 99, 840, 510. 45, 968, 110. 44, 533, 400. 127, 911, 030. 74, 788, 920. 121, 253, 120. 104, 636, 560. 100, 985, 090. 24, 328, 620. 00 445, 640. 238, 405. * 49, 761, 970. * 78, 673, 520. * 30, 489, 820. $2, 795, 320. 42 1, 061, 248. 78 $209, 912, 505. 42 8, 270, 842. 46 17, 292, 362. 65 20, 304, 224. 06 10, 401, 220. 61 86, 384, 188. 78 166, 220, 410. 134, 010, 640. 99, 840, 510. 45, 968, 110. 44, 533, 400. 127, 911, 030. 83, 059, 762. 138, 545, 482. 124,940,784. Ill, 386, 310. 24, 328, 620. 00 445, 640. 238, 405. $104, 072, 410 paid from pro- ceeds of 4 per cent bonds issued, and the remain- der, $105,840, 095.42,from accumulations of sur- plus revenues. Paid from accumulations of surplus revenues. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. Do. $40,018,392.25 paid from national bank redemp- tion fund, and the re- mainder, $71,367,918.36, from accumulations of surplus revenues. Paid from accumulations of surplus revenues. Do. Do. * Increase of debt. BONDS AND CURRENCY OF THE UNITED STATES. 7 ANSWER TO QUESTION 8. . The amount of the fund in the Treasury as the deposit of national hanking asso- ciations in liquidation, or reducing or retiring their circulation for the redemption 01 their outstanding circulating notes, January 1, 1879, March 1, 1885, March 1, 1889, and July 14, 1890, was as follows : January 1, 1879 $10,425,034.75 March 1,1885 40,387 666.10 March 1,1889 82,577 250.25 July 14, 1890 54^ 961)811.75 The amount of such notes of national banking associations redeemed from the fund between January 1, 1879, and March 1, 1885, and between March 1, 1885, and March 1, 1889, and also between March 1, 1889, and July 14, 1890, was as follows : Between January 1, 1879, and March 1, 1885 $111, 578, 734. 40 Between March 1, 1885, and March 1, 1889 156, 463, 966. 85 Between March 1, 1889, and July 14, 1890 49, 465, 525. 50 The amount of lawful money paid into the Treasury by national banking associa- tions in liquidation, or reducing or retiring their circulation, between July 14, 1890, and March 1, 1893, and between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896, was : Between July 14, 1890, and March 1, 1893 $14,498, 563.50 Between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896 31, 982, 599. 00 The amount of notes of such banks redeemed by the Treasury during each of these periods was: Between July 14, 1890, and March 1,1893 $47,188,314.00 Between March 1, 1893, and January 1, 1896 31, 594, 925. 75 3& »g