r BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME FROM THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND THE GIFT OF 1S91 Am^ai.2,- i.ri/..i.i2. Cornell University Library UF145 .H71 1890 Letters on artillery olin 1924 030 759 124 Cornell University Library The original of tliis book is in tlie Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://archive.org/details/cu31924030759124 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY By the same Author and Translator, uniform in size and binding, LETTERS ON INFANTRY. Crown 8vo. Cloth. 6s. Letters on Cavalry. with 3 folding Maps. Crown 8vo. Cloth. 6s. " The author of these two books Is not only the highest living authority on field artillery, but has commanded a mixed division, and has witnessed the fight- ing of all the three arms in the Danish, the Austro-Prussian, and the Franco- German Wars, Hence, though the Letters on Cavalry and Infantry do not carry so much weight as those on Artillerjj — reviewed by us a few months ago — they are entitled to respect as the production of a thoughtful, experienced, and practical soldier, who has enjoyed unusual opportunities for arriving at correct conclusions." — A thenaum. LONDON : EDWARD STANFORD, 26 & 27 Cockspur Street, S.W. LETTERS ON ARTILLERY PRINCE KRAFT ZU HOHENLOHE INGELFINGEN TRANSLATED BY MAJOR N. L. WALFORD, R.A. WITH SIX FOLDING PLATES SECOND EDITION LONDON: EDWARD STANFORD 26 & 27 CocKSPUR Street, Charing Cross, S.W. I 890 riC, r/ CORNELL^ UNIVERSITV^^ h^-i^^^^'^^Vr A- '^s-i'jz PREFACE The following translation of the Letters on Artillery was originally issued in the Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, and I desire to express my sincere thanks to the Committee of that Institution for their kind permission to publish them. The reception of the letters by the officers of the Royal Artillery has been so favourable, and so many inquiries have been made as to the possibility of the supply of copies to officers of the other arms, that I have felt myself justified in reprinting them. I have further to acknowledge, with my most grateful thanks, the extreme courtesy which I have received from the Author and from his Publishers, Messrs. Mittler of Berlin. N. L. W. Shoeburyness, September 1888. CONTENTS LETTER I THE USE MADE OF FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE WAR OF 1866 Introduction — Trautenau — Soor or Burkersdorf — Skalitz — Gitschin — Kdniggratz ....... Pages 1-28 LETTER II THE USE MADE OF FIELD ARTILLERY DURING THE WAR OF 1870 Weissenburg — Worth — Spicheren — Colombey- Nouilly — Vionville - Mars-la-Tour — Gravelotte - Saint - Privat — Beaumont — Sedan — Summary ........ 29-53 LETTER III THE FIRE-EFFECT OF THE ARTILLERY DURING THE WAR OF 1 866 Introduction of rifled guns — War of 1864 — War of 1866 — Personal experiences at Koniggratz — Summary of opinion on the action of artillery in 1866 — Austrian Artillery . . . 54-78 LETTER IV THE FIRE-EFFECT OF THE ARTILLERY DURING THE WAR OF 1870 Introduction — Experiences at Saint-Privat — Effect of artillery fire on infantry — Experiences at Sedan — At Vionville — At Gravelotte — Artillery before Orleans — Chilleurs-aux-Bois . . 79-108 CONTENTS LETTER V THE LOSSES OF THE ARTILLERY IN GUNS IN THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866, AND IN THAT OF 187O Practice of retiring, in 1866, to refit or when short of ammunition — ■ Abandoned in 1870 — Though expenditure of ammunition greater in latter war — Arguments — A disabled battery — Custom in 1870 — Le Bourget — Refitting guns in action — Artillery and Infantry — Summary . Pages 109-126 LETTER VI HOW IT WAS THAT THE ARTILLERY ALWAYS CAME UP AT THE RIGHT TIME Use of artillery in masses — Use of reserve artillery — No longer needed with rifled guns, owing to their longer range — Artillery marched in rear in 1866 — Corps artillery — Change of position in order of march — Artillery must be able to make long marches at a rapid pace — Details of marches in 1870 . 127-150 LETTER VII THE SPIRIT OF CASTE Isolation of the artillery— Old spirit of artillery— Relations to other arms— Growth of a new spirit— Anxiety of artillery in 1870 to aid— Avoidance of friction— Artillery cannot be independent- Artillery now an integral part of the army . 151-164 LETTER VIII HOW THE ARTILLERY LEARNT TO SHOOT Former practice of artillery— Character of targets— Nature of practice —Batteries not judged by their fire— Shooting for prizes— Intro- duction of rifled guns— School of Gunnery— Batteries of instruc- tion—Change in 1870- Moving targets— Result in action— Ex- amples from war . . . 165-190 CONTENTS ix LETTER IX ON THE RENEWAL OF AMMUNITION IN TIME OF WAR Length of train — Parts jDlayed in action — Accounts in 1813 of the expenditure of ammunition — And the disposition of the wagons — Orders for the renewal of ammunition — Wagons must remain with their batteries — Rules followed in 1870 — Position of wagons in action — Ammunition in the wagons to be first used — Wagons to stand on the same front as the guns — Marches of ammunition- columns — Filling up after an action — Filling up from the base — Expenditure of ammunition in 1870. . . Pages 191-223 LETTER X HOW THE ARTILLERY " SAVED " ITSELF DURING THE LAST WAR Disabled Ordnance — Guns sTiouId not retire to refit — Obsolete move- ments of artillery — Artillery when retiring to move first hundred paces at a walk — Exceptional duties discharged by artillery should not form a reason for additions to its training — Examples — Artil- lery never to retire when enemy is advancing against it — Artillery which refuses to retire cannot be driven back by infantry fire — Umpires — Examples . 224-246 LETTER XI GENERAL VON HINDERSIN The leader of reform — His birth — His character — His appearance — His mode of inspection — His readiness to welcome novelties — And to test them — 1S64 — His belief in the necessity for rifled guns — His eeforts — 1866 — Foundation of a School of Gunneiy — Enormous services rendered by him to the arm — Garrison Artil- lery—His death . . . 247-267 CONTENTS LETTER XII PRINCIPLES FOR THE FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY Sphere of effect of modern artillery — Long ranges render it less diffi- cult to come into action — Action of artillery now not merely preparatory but decisive — Artillery should be brought up by brigades — Artillery must march as far to the front as possible — Maxims for the future guidance of artillery — Lines of wagons — Ammunition-columns — Batteries without ammunition must stand their ground — Horse Artillery in combination with cavalry — Escorts for artillery Pages 268-297 LETTER XIII CONCERNING THE PROPOSAL "THAT ARTILLERY FIRE SHOULD NOT COMMENCE AT AN EARLIER MOMENT THAN SHORTLY BEFORE THE INFANTRY FIGHT ; BUT THAT IT SHOULD THEN AT ONCE BEGIN AT SUCH A RANGE THAT ITS EFFECT WILL BE ANNIHILATING." Losses in battle in the past and future — Examples — Artillery ranges of the future — Sequence of an offensive battle — Example from the field of Koniggratz — Uncertainty as to time required for decisive effect of artillery — Observation of lire very difficult in war Ex- periences at Sedan— Ranging a battery may take a long time Sequence of the artilleiy action of the attack . . 298-319 LETTER XIV SHOULD ARTILLERY AVOID IN FUTURE THE ZONE OF INFANTRY FIRE? Danger at long ranges of mistaking friends for foes— Examples— Guns under infantry fire— For their own safety gims cannot remain far m rear— Moral side of the question— Artillery of the defence- Position of foremost infantry with regard to the guns— Artillery must stand its ground— Artillery less inclined to move now than formerly— Owing to the necessity for finding the range-ArtiUerv in retreat • 320-337 CONTENTS xi LETTER XV ON SOME ARTILLERY QUESTIONS OF THE DAY 1. On reserve - artillery — System of reserves not applicable to artil- lery. 2. On finding the range from a position in rear — So many conditions must be fulfilled to make it useful that it is of little practical value — Manner in which it may sometimes be used. 3. On the use of salvoes by batteries — Quick fire is preferable — Method of ranging a brigade. 4. The occupation of a position in echelon — May be used as a tempor- ary expedient. 5. On diagonal fire — Every effort must be made to outflank enemy — But each battery must fire directly to its front. 6. On cover for limbers and guns^Rules as to use of limbers and wagons — Artificial cover. 7. On Horse Artillery — Reasons for existence. 8. On the abolition of corps artillery — Not advisable for many reasons — Better to increase the number of batteries in a corps. Pages 338-363 LETTER XVI ON THE DRILL REGULATIONS Should be simplified — Everything not used in war should be omitted — Column of route and advance in line only formations useful in war — Formation of lines of wagons — Practice of long movements at a quick pace — Movements in brigade not possible by word of command — Useful in peace for inspections — Notice of various parts of the Regulations — Notes on Appendices— Orders as to renewal of ammunition— The Grand Parade . . 364-384 CONTENTS LETTER XVII THE ANSWER OF THE CORRESPONDENT, GIVING A SUMMARY OF THE PRECEDING LETTERS The claims which we make on the artilleiy at the present day — The conduct of artillery in action — General rules — On the offensive — On the defensive — Horse Artillery in a cavalry action — Or- ganisation — The employment of the artilleiy by the leaders of troops ... . Pages 385-392 LETTER XVIII ANSWERS TO VARIOUS QUESTIONS 1. Opening fire at a range of 5500 yards. 2. Should the artillery be taken from the divisions ? 3. As to the temporary silence of the artillery of the defence. 4. Horse Artillery in a cavalry action. a. The authority over the artillery of generals commanding troops. i. Details of the formation of, and of the sequence of command in, a mass of artillery. L. The position for the main mass of the artillery of the attack — Artilleiy firing over the heads of infantry. d. How far is it advisable to " lay back " ? Explanation as to the position of wagons in action . . 393-420 Index . . . . 421 LIST OF PLANS I. Portion of the Battlefield of KoniggrXtz. II. Positions of the Corps Artillery of the Guard at IvONIGGRATZ. (SlIALL PLAN OF THE BATTLEFIELD.) III. Positions of the Corps Artillery of the 3D Corps at Vionville-Mars-la-Tour. (Small Plan of the Battle- field.) ' IV. Positions of the Artillery of the Guard and of the I2TH (Saxon) Corps at Saint-Privat. (Small Plan of the Battlefield of Gravelotte.) V. Positions of the Artillery of the Guard and of the I2TH (Saxon) Corps at Sedan. (Small Plan of the Battlefield.) VI. Positions of the Artillery of the 5th and of the iith Corps at Sedan. LETTER I THE USE MADE OF FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE WAR OF 1 866 You quietly, my dear friend, put to me a very grave question when you ask me : — " What is the reason that our artillery, which in the campaign of 1870- 7 1 did such excellent service, failed altogether four years before, in the war with Austria, to answer to the expectation excited by the effect which it pro- duced at Diippel in 1 864, and this although its materiel was with but few exceptions the same, while it was under the command of the very same men ? " This question has been briefly answered by drawing attention to the fact that the Prussian artil- lery, though nearly equal in number to that of the Austrians, had in each group of 1 6 batteries, only i o which were armed with rifled guns, while our adver- saries had condemned all their S.B. guns ; and, it was added, smooth-bore guns cannot compete with rifled guns. This answer is not exhaustive nor is it quite accurate, for the Austrian pieces of 1866 were rifled muzzle-loading guns which, on account of the com- plicated system of their rifling, of their difficult and LETTERS ON ARTILLERY slow service, of the uncertain bursts of their percussion shell, and of the doubtful effect of their shrapnel, were altogether inferior, as regards accuracy and effect of fire, to the rifled breech-loading Prussian pieces. If each side had been equally skilled as regards the employment of its artillery and the accuracy of its fire, lO Prussian guns might well have been expected to balance i6 Austrian, so superior were the former to the latter in point of construction. Therefore the 6 S.B. batteries which each Prussian army-corps possessed, over and above its lo rifled batteries, should be considered as con- stituting for us a surplus of artillery which should have turned the scale of the artillery combat in our favour. The rifled guns of the Austrians were, it is true, superior, as regards accuracy of fire, to the Prussian I 2-pr. S.B., but this superiority was not so great but that the latter might have been capable of holding their ground against them, above all if a sufficient number of them had been brought into action. At Schweinschadel the 3d battery of the Horse Artillery of the Guard held its ground, with its six 1 2-pr. S.B. guns, against 16 Austrian rifled guns; and many other S.B. batteries (for example the batteries under Schmelzer and Theiler at Koniggratz) took a glorious and active part in the general combat of artillery, and this sometimes even when they were isolated, in which case they boldly approached to within such a distance of the enemy as was necessary to attain the desired effect. If then, while searching for the solution of the problem, account be taken of the factor of materiel only, we shall be inclined to admit that, in the war of 1866, the Prussian INTRODUCTION artillery should have shown itself superior to that of the Austrians. The fact that this was not the case authorises your question — " What was the reason of this ? " It was long before I could bring myself to seek for the solu- tion of this question, for as soon as one sets to work to inquire why such and such a thing was not done when it might have been done, or why an undertaking has failed, or at least has not succeeded as well as one had a right to expect, it is found as a rule that somebody has committed a fault, and it is then neces- sary to declare, " It was this or that officer who was the cause of the failure." And this is true apart from the fact that the general public has a very natural tendency, when anything unpleasant happens, to seek for a scapegoat, as was well shown by the tragic fate of Bazaine. But the mere finding of a scapegoat proves nothing ; its only effect is to heap hatred and contempt on some individual, who is perhaps not so guilty as is believed, and who may possibly be altogether innocent. This is sufficient for the crowd, but no one gets any good from it. But the more I worked at the problem, the more certain I felt that there could be no question of making any one person responsible for the disap- pointment of our hopes, or of being compelled to accuse any individual in my altogether impartial endeavour to solve it. You yourself, by the manner in which you state your question, are evidently of the same opinion, since at the end you draw attention to the fact that the same officers commanded the artillery in 1870 as in 1866. It is true that a certain number of the colonels of 1866 commanded LETTERS ON ARTILLERY in 1870 the artillery of an army-corps ; some of the commandants who in 1866 led brigades,^ were in 1870 in command of regiments ; a proportion of the captains of batteries found themselves in charge of brigades, but many commandants and captains com- manded in 1870 the same force which they had led in 1866. On the other hand, the study of the causes in question has led me to examine some newly estab- lished principles of the employment and tactics of Field Artillery, so that I am compelled, in order to answer you, to enter fully upon the vast domain which this arm includes, since I shall find myself obliged to speak of the successive developments which led to the mode of proceeding that obtained in 1870. We shall draw truths from this study which will lose nothing of their value, even though the sphere of action of firearms be still further enlarged by new inventions. While seeking, then, a careful and well- reasoned answer to your question, we shall not only study the history of the past, but shall also arrive at conclusions with a practical value. Not having, therefore, in order to find an answer to your question, to accuse any person whatever, and believing that I 1 A Prussian Regiment of Artillery, at this time and during the war of 1S70, was made up of 4 " Abtheilungen. " I have ventured to translate this word as "Brigade." Three of these brigades consisted of 4 Field batteries each, while the fourth was composed of 3 batteries of Horse Artillery. To each of the two Divisions of which a Prussian army-corps was constituted a brigade of Field Artillery was apportioned, while the re- mainder, with the e.xception of such H.A. batteries as might be attached to the cavalry, formed that which in 1866 was called the "Reserve artillery," but in 1870 received the name of " Corps artillery " The batteries were commanded by captains, the brigades by com- mandants, and the regiment by a colonel. — N.L. W. INTRODUCTION can also lay down practical rules which may be useful in the future, I will gladly devote myself to this study. But you must be exceedingly patient. As the subject which I am about to treat is a very large one, I must devote to it more than one letter. It will, besides, take me some time to sub- divide it and set it in order ; you will therefore only receive my letters from time to time. You must allow me to again invite you to follow me over almost all the fields of battle of 1866, 1870, and 1 87 1. Even that will not be sufficient ; I shall find myself obhged to introduce you into the cabinet where, in time of peace, is carried out the elaboration of all that concerns the artillery, at the risk of wearying you with details which may interest you but little, since you do not belong to that arm. But this is necessary in order to give you an answer to your question. The data which my own past offers, if they do not embrace the whole subject, are at least very numerous. Not only have I, as an officer of that arm, followed very closely the action of the artillery in our last four campaigns, in 1864, 1866, 1870, and 1 87 1, but I have also been in close communica- tion with the men who had the principal part in all affairs which regard the arm, and I have been fre- quently desired to assist in the modifications which it has undergone. I cannot therefore excuse myself from owning, in what follows, the weaknesses and errors of which we gunners were guilty before 1866 ; and perhaps, my friend, you will be inclined to ironi- cally compare the cross-examination to which I shall subject myself to "The confession of a beautiful LETTERS ON ARTILLERY soul " out of Wilhelm Meister. But I shall not mind that, for the result at which I shall arrive will be very different ; Goethe's heroine improves and perfects herself only inwardly, while our improve- ments have declared themselves outwardly and visibly. You will admit to one who felt the matter bitterly, that there was widespread discontent in i 866 at the action of our Field Artillery. This discontent was founded upon facts so well known that each of us gunners was obliged, however clear was his own conscience, however sure he felt that he had himself done his duty as well as any officer of the other arms, to acknowledge it as well founded. The public in general for its part judged only by results, and it was our duty, as gunners, to find out the cause of the evil, and the ways and means to remedy it. The results obtained in the campaign of i 866 told most unfavourably against the artillery. If we study them by the light of the work of the General Staff, we shall see in 1866 our artillery, on almost every occasion, entered upon the scene far too late and with far too small a number of guns. In the course of all the engagements the infantry found itself exposed to the murderous fire of an artillery very superior in number to ours, and in order to reply and to defend itself had to have recourse to its own fire of musketry. Let us begin with the combat of Trautenau, fought on the 27th of June 1866. At the beginning of the engagement one battery, Trautenau. '* '^ ^™^' advanced through Trautenau in order to take up a position on the right TRAUTENAU bank of the Aupa ; it was reinforced by 2 guns from the detachment on the right ; but very soon, after a Uttle more than an hour, the 3 batteries of the advanced guard which had passed the river were brought back to the left bank, in order that they might from the northern heights cover the retreat, should that become necessary. After i P.M. Bohnke's battery came into action with the 44th and 45 th regiments of infantry to the south of the Aupa. Twenty-four hostile guns obliged it to retire. One hour and a half after Bohnke's advance, 2 batteries (12 guns), under Major Noak, engaged these 24 Austrian pieces on the south of Trautenau, and at least drew away from the infantry the murderous fire of this artillery. But Major Noak had to leave a battery in reserve at the western outlet of the village of Trautenau, for the reason that it had S.B. guns, which would not carry far enough. When at 3.30 P.M. the enemy, reinforced by fresh troops, advanced once more to the attack, the 2 batteries of Major Noak were, and continued to be, the only artillery which supported the infantry on the left bank, though there were near it (i) the 12-pr. battery which had been left at the western outlet of Trautenau, (ii) Bohnke's battery, and (iii) the 3 batteries posted to the north of Trautenau, which had been reinforced by 2 others taken from the reserve ; in all therefore 42 guns. Major Noak's 2 batteries likewise left their position between 4 and 5 P.M. From this moment the infantry carried on the fight without the assistance of any artillery, while the enemy increased his to 40 guns. We do not hear that our artillery came into action again until 8 P.M. ; LETTERS ON ARTILLERY this artillery, of the strength of 2 batteries, covered the retreat by firing on the outlet of Trautenau from a position to the north-west of Parschnitz, about 3 miles (English) therefore in rear of the position of Major Noak's batteries, of which we have spoken above. On the side of the Prussians, then, no more than 6 batteries and i division or 38 guns took an active part in the fight ; but never more than 2 batteries were in action at one time, namely, 8 guns at first, then 6 others, and at last 12 others. After that, during 3 hours, the infantry, though hard pressed by the enemy's infantry, remained without any assistance from the artillery, and it was not until the evening that 2 batteries came into action to cover the retreat. Can we then blame the infantry, who knew that g6 guns were present with the army-corps, if they asked with astonishment — "What has this mass of artillery of ours done during all this long day ? " The day after the fight at Trautenau the Guard soor or corps, as we know, defeated the loth Bnikersdorf, corps of the Austrian army, which had 28th June 1866. ^^^^ yictorious the day before. What part did our artillery play on that occasion, and of what assistance was it to the infantry ? At the commencement one battery of the reserve artillery of the Austrian corps fired on the head of the Prussian troops, and on our part was opposed by the ist 4-pr. battery. While the Austrian battery was reinforced by several others who came into line in succession we find on the Prussian side the ist"' 6-pr. battery 1 The Prussian guns were at this time classed (4-prs. or 6-prs.) by the weight of a spherical solid shot suited to their calibre. They thus throw a heavier shell than their names implied. — N.L. IV. BURKERSDORF coming into action in aid of tliat which was at first in position. The work of the Austrian staff tells us that, before the moment at which the infantry of the Prussian advanced guard carried out its attack against the clumps of trees to the east of Burkersdorf, the following batteries had been placed in position : the 9th, sth, 8th, loth, 3d, and 7th of the 3d corps, that is to say 6 batteries, and consequently 48 guns. This line of artillery was not reinforced during the course of the day. At another point of the field of battle, to the north of Neu-Rognitz, the battery of Mondel's brigade (ist of the 3d corps) took part in the action, in addition to the battery of Wimpffen's brigade, which stood to the south of Hohenbriick. Of the 9 batteries (72 guns) which the loth Austrian corps possessed, 8 (64 guns) were thus employed during the day, while 6 of these (48 guns) were in action from the first, in one and the same long line. The Prussian Guard corps, on the other hand, engaged at first only 2 batteries (12 guns) ; nor was this number increased, for though later on the 5th battery (12-pr.) took an active part in the fight, it merely relieved the ist 4-pr. battery. Of 78 guns belonging to this corps, 18 only took part in the action, for the Horse Artillery battery had been, that day, detached with the Heavy Cavalry Brigade of the Guard to the sth corps. Our brave infantry of the Guard conducted its advance on that day with inimitable valour and self- sacrifice, and, in spite of the murderous fire of the enemy's guns, carried through its attack and won a brilliant victory. But it would have been impossible LETTERS ON ARTILLERY to have blamed it, had it complained that it was not supported by the sister arm, and had it angrily asked, " Where were the 60 other guns ? " On the day of this engagement I had, very early in the morning, left the bivouac which had been assigned to me at Braunau with the reserve artillery of the Guard, and in accordance with orders which I had received, had marched by Politz and Hronow on Kosteletz, which had been given me as my point. I felt sure that we should find ourselves obliged to fight immediately after passing the frontier, had therefore hastened my march as much as possible, and arrived at Kosteletz with the head of my column at 10 A.M., having thus in a mountainous country marched 1 8 (English) miles in 6 hours. At Kosteletz I received an order to remain for the present in reserve with some other troops, for the reason that fighting was going on at Skalitz as well as at Soor, and it was as yet undecided where the reserve would be of most use. It was not until S P.M., when favourable news arrived of the fight at Skalitz, that I received authority to endeavour to rejoin my corps, and I then had to make a march of several miles, with the defile of Eipel at the end of it. After a troublesome march through this defile, which is 3 (English) miles in length, and which was rendered almost impassable by the ambulances carry- ing the wounded and by other carriages, I at length reached, long after dark, the open country between Ober-Raatsch and Staudenz where, in accordance with orders, I bivouacked. The last battery did not rest until after midnight. At the break of day (between 3 and 4 A.M.), NACHOD some routed Austrian troops broke into my bivouac, and the battalion which I had received as escort (the 2d of the 1st Regiment of the Guard) after a short fight overpowered thfem. During the early part of the morning this happened several times before I was able to join the corps and its staff, in order to obtain my orders. As a matter of fact I thought that I had made superhuman efforts to come to the assistance of my comrades who were fighting. I was therefore very disagreeably surprised when, on march- ing in the direction of Koniginhof, according to the order which I had received from the General com- manding the corps, to take my place in the column at Burkersdorf, I was accosted by my comrades of the infantry, who were all old friends of mine, with the words — " Here you are at last ! where in the world have you been ? We had to allow innumer- able guns of the enemy to overwhelm us with a hail of projectiles. We kept on looking to see if you were coming, but you did not come ! " At the moment these reproaches drove me to despair ; but when I now compare the figures which I have given above, which I have taken from the two official accounts, I am no longer astonished at them. During the action at Trautenau another unforeseen figlit took place at Nachod, the result of ifachod the meeting of the 5 th Prussian corps 27tiiJune with the 7th Austrian corps and the cavalry division of the Prince of Holstein. The Austrians had 12 batteries (96 guns). On the side of the Prussians General von Steinmetz had 1 5 batteries (90 guns) at his orders. At the beginning of the action 2 batteries were LETTERS ON ARTILLERY firing at each other. The Austrian battery (of Hertwek's Brigade) was obliged to retire, but it was soon reinforced by the battery of Jonak's Brigade, which two others afterwards joined, while on the Prussian side only one, the ist battery of 4-prs. joined that at first engaged (the 5 th 4-pr. battery), so that at this place 32 Austrian guns were engaged against 1 2 Prussian. About 1 1 o'clock the latter were increased to 18 by the arrival of a Horse Artillery battery. It would appear that, during the interval, the Austrian line of artillery had been increased to 40 guns by the arrival of the battery of Solm's Brigade, for when, at midday, the reserve artillery of the Austrian corps came into action, at Kleny, with 40 additional guns, it is mentioned that 80 Austrian guns had opened fire. On the part of the Prussians, other batteries came up in succession to the field of battle. But the line of artillery was not even then strengthened, for the 2 batteries which had commenced the action (the 1st and the sth 4-pr.) had been withdrawn, while the only Horse Artillery battery was destroyed as it unlimbered, and could not open fire. It was not until between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when the turning movement attempted by the Austrian cavalry and infantry against the Prussian right wing had failed (during which movement the second battery attached to an Austrian division seems to have come upon the scene, and to have brought the amount of their artillery up to 88 guns) not until this moment did the Prussian reserve artillery 4 batteries of rifled guns, make its appearance, and then the 2 batteries of the advanced guard, which SKALITZ 13 had been ordered again to the front, joined themselves to it. The fire of these 42 guns, and that of the 4th 1 2-pr. battery on the left flank, combined with that of the 1 8 guns already engaged, giving a total of 66 guns, seems to have decided the enemy to renounce all idea of renewing the attack. We see thus that in the action at Nachod up to 1 1 A.M. 1 2 Prussian guns were engaged with 3 2 Austrian; up to midday 18 Prussian against 32 Austrian ; from noon to half-past 4, 1 8 Prussian against 80 or 88 Austrian, and after 4.30, 66 Prussian guns against the Austrian artillery, which was gradu- ally reduced in number. We do not find that the Austrians mention their rocket battery, which does not appear to have taken any part in the action. On the Prussian side the 1st 6-pr. battery had during the day to retire, not being able to hold its ground, while Ohnesorge's battery was put out of action. I do not find the 3d and 4th 4-pr. batteries mentioned in the official account ; they may have been brought into action, but have been obliged to withdraw, on account of the superior fire of the enemy. We find then that on the Prussian side 4 batteries failed to co-operate in the action. On this occasion also our brave infantry contrived to conquer in spite of a hostile artillery superior to our own, a superiority which up to 4.30 P.M. amounted to double or treble our force. With regard to the action at Skalitz, which fol- lowed that of Nachod, we may make the g^autz same remark. 28tiiJime According to our official account the Austrian corps had 88 guns ; according to the H LETTERS ON ARTILLERY Austrian account, it had only 64 at its disposal against 102 Prussian guns. We may consider the Austrian figures as correct, but, as in these 64 guns are not included the 8 of Schindlocker's brigade, we must allow that the Austrians had really 72 pieces available. Of these 72 the 40 of the reserve artillery of the corps were in position from the first, and had commenced firing when a battery of General Lowen- felds's detachment began a useless cannonade, which ceased on either side as the range was too great. But when, at 10.45, General von Steinmetz resolved to make a serious attack, isolated batteries only came into action on the Prussian side, with very poor results, so that our infantry had to suffer from the entire fire of the enemy's overpowering artillery. Even " the batteries specially attached to the advanced guard had remained in rear." At noon 2 Prussian batteries came' into action against the 40 guns of the reserve artillery of the Austrian corps, but the latter brought up also the 3 batteries of its brigades ; it thus used the fire of 64 guns, in addition to those of Schindlocker's brigade, which fired from the other bank. It was not until 12.30 that the reserve artillery of the Sth Prussian corps reached the position of Kleny, from which since the early morning it had been distant no more than 2 (English) miles. In this position 9 Prussian rifled batteries were then massed, and they exercised a decisive influence on the artillery fight. Thus we find that on the Austrian side almost every battery was engaged from the commence- ment ; on the Prussian the principal mass of the artillery took no part in the action until after the GITSCHIN 15 infantry had been forced, during two whole hours, to undergo the very superior fire of the enemy's guns. I have no intention of wearying you by analysing, from a gunner's point of view, the part played by the artillery in every engagement fought during the war of I 866. I propose, before mentioning the great decisive battle of Koniggratz, to make observations on only one other of our armies, in order to see if these characteristics were everywhere present. For this reason I beg of you to kindly follow me to the battle of Gitschin. The 5th Division was accompanied by its 4 bat- teries. When its leading troops were re- Qitgchin ceived by the fire of the enemy's artillery, 29tii June one of its batteries was, about 4 P. M., sent to the front ; to this shortly afterwards a second was added. The enemy replied with 48 guns. About 4.30 the Prussian artillery was increased to 18 guns. This was the total strength brought into action during the entire course of the engagement, for the account does not say that the 4th 1 2-pr. battery was employed at all. On the side of the Austrians, on the other hand, another battery was soon unmasked, while from the heights to the south of Dieletz other batteries opened fire. According to this, it would appear that, up to 5 P.M. there were 80 guns in action against the 5th Prussian Division. But in addition the Saxon division of Stieglitz, and with it the reserve artillery of the Saxon corps, received the order to advance, and arrived at 6.30 P.M. Following the ordre de bataille, the 1st Austrian corps was composed of 5 brigades of infantry, of LETTERS ON ARTILLERY which each had its battery of artillery ; it had in addition a corps reserve of 7 batteries ; in rear of them was Edelsheim's cavalry division with 3 batteries. Of these 5 brigades one, that commanded by General Piret, was posted at Eisenstadt ; Poschacher's brigade was at Brada ; Leiningen's was in rear of the latter ; while Abele's and Ringelsheim's brigades took up a position at Prachow and Lochow. The batteries of these two last probably fired only on Werder's division. All the reserve artillery of the corps, the battery of Poschacher's brigade, 2 batteries of Edelsheim's cavalry division, and 2 guns of Leiningen's brigade, in all 82 guns, fired from the first on the Sth division. At a later period, between 5 and 6 P.M., the batteries of Appel's cavalry brigade and of Piret's infantry brigade joined the others ; there were thus, it would appear, 104 guns concentrated in action. According to the Austrian official account, 2 batteries of Saxon brigades also reinforced the line at about 6.30, while a little later a battery of the Saxon reserve joined the others. From that moment the guns, in number 122, formed a powerful line of artillery, against which, on the Prussian part, 18 guns only could be brought into action. Need we be astonished if, as we read of the battle in the Prussian official account, we come to the conclusion that the heroic infantry of the sth Division was stopped in its advance by the enemy's artillery alone. Still less need we wonder if the infantry felt that it had not been sufficiently supported by its own artillery. The situation was not altogether the same in the KONIGGRATZ 17 action which Werder's division fought on the same day in front of Gitschin. The Prussians had there 3 batteries (18 guns) in action against 2 Austrian batteries of Abele's and Ringelsheim's brigades. It is true that the Prussian ofificial account speaks of 3 Austrian batteries (" besides the battery already mentioned, which was posted to the west of the village, there were two others to the east of it "). But the Austrian ofificial account speaks of 2 batteries only, and the Prussian work appears to found its statement on the reports of the Prussian troops which were engaged, who perhaps may have mistaken 2 half- batteries firing from two different spots for 2 whole batteries. It is hard to see, following the ordres de bataille, where a third battery on this part of the field can have come from. Consequently we find that for once the number of guns on the two sides was about equal, namely, 1 8 Prussian against 1 6 Austrian. At the battle of Koniggratz the fight began by the advance of the different columns of ^ ^ Koniggratz, the Prussian ist army, and army of the sdJiay Elbe, towards the Bistritz, which was defended by the most advanced Austrian troops These columns were received with the fire of the enemy's artillery, to which they replied. According to the Prussian official account, the army of the Elbe brought a battery into action at Nechanitz against a Saxon battery. In the 1st army Herwarth's division brought up 3 batteries on the right of the main road to Koniggratz ; Horn's division, 3 others, on the left of the same road. Fransecky's division sent into action only 2 to the north of Benatek. C LETTERS ON ARTILLERY When, about 8 a.m., the advance was stopped for some time, in order to await the arrival of the remainder of the forces, there were 9 Prussian batteries in action, or 54 guns which, with the object of carrying out the preliminary action, were spread over the whole Prussian front, about 7 (English) miles in length. The enemy, according to the Prussian account, received our troops, as they advanced from Nechanitz, with the fire of one battery ; another battery fired upon us from the little wood of Sadowa, 4 batteries from Dohalitzka, and one from the forest of Skalka. At least 2 batteries in addition fired on us from the heights of Maslowed and Horenowes. Conse- quently at least one Saxon battery and 7 Austrian (62 guns) fired on the heads of the Prussian columns. Thus the official account speaks of the " numerous " artillery which so directed their fire. The Austrian official account, in contradiction to this, says that up to 9 a.m. there were in action, on the Austrian side, only the following batteries : The battery of Brandenstein's brigade on the right to the south of Maslowed ; in the centre the batteries of Appiano's and Prohaska's brigades of the 3d corps with the 2 batteries of Knebel's brigade of the 1 0th corps; which makes up, including the Saxon battery at Nechanitz, only 46 guns. It is added that up to this time, that is to say during an hour and a half, this small number of Austrian batteries had to hold Its own, not only against a nearly treble number of guns, but also against the advancing hostile infantry. However it may be, whether the Austrian artillery, at this time, had 46 or 62 guns KONIGGRATZ ig against the 54 Prussian pieces, it is clear that the number of guns employed on either side to commence the action was not large, considering the mass of artillery which was present with the two armies. Between 8 and 11 A.M. the battle began to work out. During this time neither side made much use of its artillery in the combat carried on by the army of the Elbe, as it possessed itself of the line from Lubno to Hradek ; the fighting was not yet particu- larly fierce. Far more serious was the struggle which the first army had ■ to undertake when it had gained the passages of the Bistritz. From 1 1 A.M. General Fransecky was obliged to throw all his eleven battalions into the contest for the possession of the forest of Swip, where they had to hold their ground against 40 Austrian battalions supported by 11 others in reserve. Fransecky's infantry was assisted by only 24 guns. The infantry and the artillery were covered by a hail of projectiles from 128 hostile guns. The Austrians had thus an artillery five times more numerous than ours, without counting the reserve of 24 guns.-' The well-known reports from General Fransecky's 1 Indeed, when I count the Austrian batteries, I find that they had 136 guns, for, in addition to the 96 which had opened fire from this place at 9.30, the following batteries came into action, viz., the battery of Thorn's brigade, the 5th 4-pr. battery of the corps reserve, the 2 batteries of the cavalry divisions and the rocket battery of the reserve : in all 5 batteries or 40 guns. Perhaps the rocket battery has not been counted on account of the inefficiency of its fire. According to the ordre de bataille each of the two Austrian corps, which were fighting at this point, had 10 batteries or 80 guns. Consequently if only 128 guns were in action and 24 in reserve, one battery of 8 guns must have been detached. But in fact all this has only a relative importance. LETTERS ON ARTILLERY infantry of the terrible effects of the fire of the enemy's artillery were indeed only too well founded. In the centre, the three most advanced divisions of the 1st army seized, between 8 and li A.M., the passages of the Bistritz opposite to which they stood, and secured their conqilest by occupying localities which lay immediately beyond these passages, namely, Mokrowous, Dohalitzka, Ober - Dohalitz, Unter - Dohalitz, and the Forest of Hola. On receiving an order to discontinue the advance, they had to content themselves for the moment with maintaining their hold on these points, and thus stood on the defensive. In this position they found themselves overwhelmed by the fire of a mass of artillery which crowned the edge of the heights running from Lipa to Stresetitz ; of this mass the Saxon brigade Heydenreich, posted on the heights between Stresetitz and Tresowitz, formed the left wing. It is probable that at this point there were 1 24 Austrian guns, for the Prussian official account says that in the whole line from Horenowes by Lipa to Stresetitz there were not less than 250 guns; and adds that 128 of these were firing on the forest of Swip.^ Jr. .^! r' ?T"'%'^ '^"''"^" °*^='^1 =^<==°'^°'. " is impossible to f d and the Tolf ' *' ''^'^^^' °^ ^""^ ^° ^^«°° ^' *is point. The latter on^efA'^'P'r"""" P?''"^ *"-^' *^ ^°'-^^' ™ 'he right, the latterie^ ft ,n^'>,'° '°^ '° *' "'''" * ^'"''^"' *e 3d corps had 11 the ,T il ■ ^'"P". '°- ^^^'^"'^ ('°* corps) employed also the 3d Dwision (4 batteries) of the reserve artillery of the army which rhe™thDwtol?t: rV "P?"''^'' ^'= -n^nlt^n wasSvet S would thus amount to 26 batteries o 208 ^^Tr'^'^v ^^ 1°^' ™ust deduct a certain number cflu:! ^X&t^ntt 'b^ttloTh KONIGGRATZ Against this mass of artillery, on the side of the Prussians, up to 1 1 A.M., were brought into action the following : 3 batteries to the south of the forest of Skalka and 2 batteries which Werder's division threw across the Bistritz, while at this time the reserve artillery of the 2d corps were preparing to cross that river. There were thus at the most 30 pieces answering to the enemy's fire ; for which reason the Prussian official account says : " However, these batteries did not succeed in diverting from the forest and attracting to themselves the excessively violent fire of the very numerous artillery of the enemy !" On this point, therefore, also the infantry (the 2d and 8th Divisions), who were engaged, were the mark of a truly infernal fire from the enemy's artillery, and felt themselves left in the lurch by the sister arm. After 1 1 A.M. (I follow the chronological order adopted by the Prussian ofificial account in describ- ing these events) the 2d Prussian army came on the scene. In order to meet it the Austrian right wing had to be thrown back, facing to the north, and 40 Austrian pieces were posted on the height of Horenowes in order to cover this movement. The Austrian official account says that these were Nos. I, 5, 7, 9, and 10 batteries of the 2d corps. Against them one after the other, up to noon, were brought into action the batteries of the i st Division corps at Soor. It is also doubtful — and the Austrian official account makes no distinct statement with regard to this — at what hour tlie mass of the artillery attained its greatest strength. At any rate the number of 120 guns, mentioned by the Prussian official account as having opened a simultaneous fire at this point, is the least which can be admitted. LETTERS ON ARTILLERY of the Guard corps, which fired from the ground lying between Zelkowitz and Wrehownetz, and those of the I ith Division firing from the height which lies to the north-west of Racitz ; the total of the whole was 48 guns. A little later, about 12.30, this number was increased to 90 by the arrival of 5 batteries of the reserve artillery of the Guard and of 2 batteries of the 1 2th Division, who for some little time also fired on the height of Horenowes. This is the only artillery fight during the whole of the battle of Koniggratz in which it can be shown that the Prussian artillery had a numerical superiority. It lasted a very short time ; the Austrian artillery soon fell back. We Prussian gunners thought at the moment that it retired before the superior effect of our fire, but it appears by the Austrian official account that it obeyed a categorical order from high authority to occupy the line from Chlum to Nedelist and the redoubts which lay in front of that line. During this time the Prussian infantry continued without intermission to advance. The corps of the Austrian right wing fell back, the 2d in the direc- tion of Lochenitz on the Elbe, while the 4th occupied the line from Chlum to Nedelist. There the batteries of the Austrian 4th corps, which had retired, were in position ; they were reinforced by the batteries of the 2d corps, as well as by two divisions (48 guns) of the reserve artillery of the army, and amounted, according to the Prussian official account, to 1 3 bat- teries, that is to say to more than 100 guns. I tried at the time to count these guns, and counted 120, including the artillery which was firing on our flank from the low ground. According to the KONIGGRATZ 23 Austrian official account there were posted at this point the following batteries, viz., the 1st, 8th, 4th, 1 0th, 9th, 7th, nth, and 5th batteries of the loth corps, and Hofifbauer's 8 batteries, in all consequently 128 guns, without counting the batteries of the Aus- trian 2d corps or of the Tour-and-Taxis .cavalry division, which took us in flank for a moment from the low ground through which the Elbe runs ; with- out counting also Groben's battery which, the instant that it commenced its attack against our infantry, was destroyed at the southern extremity of Chlum. At 2 P.M. the great line of artillery completed its movement into position. After having opened for a short space of time an ineffective fire from the height of Horenowes, 4 batteries of the reserve artillery of the Guard placed themselves, at 2.30 P.M., on the crest of the heights which run from Maslowed to Nedelist ; on their right and left came up also 3 batteries of the ist Division of the Guard. There were thus 42 Prussian guns against 128 Austrian, for the S.B. battery of the ist Division of the Guard had remained in rear at the exit from Maslowed in order to direct its fire from there against Cistowes, while the batteries of the 6th corps and the 4th H.A. battery of the Guard were advancing against the 2d Austrian corps, which was posted in the low ground through which the Elbe flows. Thanks to the impetuosity and the rapidity with which our infantry rushed to the front, the numerical superiority of the enemy's artillery could not, for want of time, produce at this phase of the struggle such a tremendous effect as it did at other points and at other moments in the course of the battle. It 24 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY was no doubt on account of the very high corn, and of the smoke produced by the rapid fire which it kept up on our batteries, that the Austrian artillery were not able to follow with the requisite attention the advance of our foremost lines of skirmishers. It was thpse lines which, suddenly and at almost point blank range, overwhelmed the enemy's guns with a rapid fire and captured 68 guns of this long artillery line (the ist Division of the Guard took 55 and the 2d battalion of the 50th regiment 13 guns). The others succeeded in escaping. I can still see clearly every detail of the moment. We had scarcely fired two rounds, firing very slowly to pick up the range, in reply to the rapid fire of the enemy, which made a deafening noise, when we saw some of his limber- boxes explode, and at once upon this the whole line of the Austrian artillery ceased firing and disappeared. We cheered at our success, and only learnt later on —I own much to our annoyance — that these explo- sions were principally due to the explosive bullets of the infantry. At the commencement of this period of the battle Fransecky's division had been obliged to hold its ground against a force of the enemy whose numeri- cal preponderance was enormous. During the course of the action it continued to be crushed under the superior effect of the enemy's artillery, whose fire did not begm to diminish until after noon. It was nof until between i and 2 p.m. that it was perceived that the attacks of the enemy were losing their vigour; he fierce fight continued, and only at 2.30 P.M. was the division freed from its most dangerous position. In the centre, during this time, the ist army had KONIGGRATZ 25 felt more and more the superiority of the Austrian artillery. A great number of Prussian batteries had indeed come into action on the other side of the Bistritz ; to the left (north) of the high road there was not room for more than 48 guns, but on the right (south-west) of the road and the forest of Sadowa, where there was more available space, lo Prussian batteries were coming into line. But these batteries came up one by one, and several of them had to retire to repair damages, while others had expended all their ammunition, and were unable to find their ammunition column. At no time then at this point did the Prussian artillery attain to more than half of the effective strength of the Austrian, which besides occupied a very much more advanta- geous position. The Austrian artillery appears during the whole of this time to have possessed the complete number of guns of which I have spoken above as being present at 1 1 A.M., for the Prussian official account says that its force amounted to 200 guns. The same work mentions in what an awkward posi- tion our infantry thus found itself placed. It was only natural that it should consider itself abandoned by its artillery. During this time, on that part of the field of battle where the army of the Elbe was engaged with the Saxon troops, up to 11 a.m. nothing had happened but a cannonade which had but little result, on account of the long range at which 24 Prussian guns were engaged with 34 Saxon. At 12.30 the line of Prussian artillery was reinforced to a strength of 1 1 batteries or 66 guns. About 3 P.M. these Prussian guns were advanced to the east 26 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY of Ichlitz and also to near the forest of Popowitz, from which points, as the range was not so great, their fire was very effective, and these batteries, as also some S.B. batteries (Schmelzer and Theiler), took an energetic part in the infantry fight. But the Saxon artillery did the same, and it is impossible to say that there was on one side or the other any real superiority in the matter of artillery, with regard either to the number of guns or to the efficiency of fire. But 9 Prussian batteries, of which 5 were of the reserve artillery, were doing nothing at Nechanitz. In the phase of the battle which followed, our infantry, and especially that of the ist Division of the Guard, was once more ove]:whelmed by the fire of a superior artillery. This was at the moment when the Austrian reserves (ist and 6th corps) were set in motion against the above division. The latter found itself assisted in its fight, on the part of the artillery, by only the 4 batteries of the artillery reserve which were posted on the crest of the heights to the south of Chlum, and by the 5 th 4-pr. battery (30 guns). The Austrians prepared their counter-attack by bringing into action a very large mass of artillery. I counted at the time 120 guns (15 batteries) which converged their fire on us, being posted on the arc of a circle from Langenhof as far as Wsestar and Sweti and even farther up to Rosnitz. The Austrian official account speaks only, it is true, of the battery of Appiano's brigade, of 4 batteries of the ist Division of the reserve artillery of the army, of the reserve artillery of the 6th corps, and of the batteries of Rosen zweig's and Waldstat- KONIGGRA TZ 27 ten's brigades ; a total of 1 2 batteries or 96 guns which at this point opened fire on us. But the ist Division of the Guard in its advance had attacked the 1st Austrian corps, and we may thus be per- mitted to suppose that this corps was also firing on us with some part of its artillery ; I believe that I counted right. In any case the enemy's artillery was more than three times superior in number to ours, and this was to a great extent the reason that the I st Division of the infantry of the Guard had to abandon Rosberitz. After the Prussian infantry had won the victory, and the Austrian army had found itself unable to retrieve the battle by means of bold cavalry charges, some few brigades of artillery did, it is true, support the infantry who moved in pursuit of the enemy ; for instance Scherbening's 6 batteries at the foot of the hill of Chlum, 7 others between Stresetitz and Langenhof, and 9 batteries of the 6th corps on the hill of Wsestar and Sweti. But when, on the Austrian side, a number of batteries had been established on the line Stosser, Freihofen, and Ziegelschlag to Plotitz, these batteries, with the assistance of the cavalry which covered them, put an end to the pursuit for that evening, and the Prussian batteries, which took up their position at Charbusitz, Rosnitz, and Briza, could not reduce the Austrian line to silence. I will not weary you more to-day by quoting other historical examples from the war of 1866. Those which I have mentioned amply suffice to show that the account of what occurred proves the truth of the statement that the artillery, in this war, did 28 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY not come up to that which we thought we had a right to expect, and that it never arrived at the point of action in sufficient numbers. For during one phase only of the war, the moment when the 2d army ap- peared on the scene at the battle of Koniggratz, was it superior in number to the enemy's artillery, while the latter, on all other occasions, managed to bring into action twice or three times, even four times, as many guns as we, although the total number of guns of the Austrians was no greater than that of the Prussians. Other facts also have been proved : for example, that our artillery did not shoot so well as we had reason to anticipate, judging by the results obtained on the practice-ranges and by its success against the redoubts of Diippel ; again the renewal of expended ammunition was carried out on no regular plan, so that many batteries, owing to the want of ammuni- tion, were not in a condition to injure the enemy ; and batteries also constantly went out of action, either on account of the enemy's infantry fire, or in order to refit, when they would have done better to have remained in their position. But all this I propose to enter upon with you at another time. LETTER II THE USE MADE OF FIELD ARTILLERY DURING THE WAR OF 1870 In the campaign of 1870, the Prussian artillery found itself, at the beginning of the war, in a much better position than was the enemy's artillery, as re- garded the question of matdriel ; since all the Prussian guns were rifled, and were, besides, constructed in conformity with our technical progress, and with the most recent inventions. The French guns, on the other hand, were still the old bronze S.B. guns, which had been altered on Lahitte's system. This altera- tion was a sort of half measure, out of which they had made a system, and to which they held because the guns had done good work in the war of 1859. Their fire was very far inferior to that of the Austrian guns in 1866. Moreover, the leaders of the Prussian army knew in 1870 how to bring up their artillery everywhere, at the exact moment, and in sufficient numbers. To the historical examples which I have borrowed from the war of 1866, you might be tempted to oppose this argument : in this campaign we fought offensive battles only, the defender could thus more easily than the assailant bring into action a consider- 30 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY able mass of artillery, since the latter had gradually to change his order of march into the order of battle. But this argument has an apparent value only ; Nachod and Trautenau were chance encounters, in which both adversaries had to similarly change their formations, while at Koniggratz the 2d army, for its part, was able as soon as it came on the scene to deploy a mass of artillery superior to that of the enemy. How was it then that the other armies could not do the same ? Good generals ought to know how, even when they take the offensive, to put into position at the desired moment the necessary mass of artillery. In 1870, we fought hardly any but offensive battles, and the leaders of the army knew perfectly how to satisfy this condition. I shall study only the battles which were fought up to the 1st of September, for the later engagements, being between seasoned and well trained armies and newly raised and inexperienced troops, cannot serve as a basis for establishing the rules which should be observed in actions between armies of an equal value. I shall once more follow the official account of weisaeabnrg, ^^^ General Staff in its chronological order, ■ August and I shall therefore begin by the action 4tli 1870. at Weissenburg. I read that the French had not the least idea of the advancing movement of the hostile troops until Bauer's Bavarian battery opened fire on Weissenburg at almost the same moment as the light infantry of the loth battalion. Later on this battery was reinforced by Wurm's battery. When this reinforcement had come up (at 8.30 A.M.) the preparation of the infantry fight w; commenced. Both batteries were exposed to the fi s was WEISSENBURG 31 of the enemy's infantry. In a similar manner the advanced guard of the 5 th corps opened the action by the fire of 2 batteries, which were reinforced by 2 batteries of the 1 1 th corps. But very soon the 5 th corps advanced its corps artillery also at a trot ; these, before 1 1 A.M., took up a position with 30 guns to the south of Windhof. At the last 66 guns sup- ported the decisive attack. During this attack the artillery fired at the closest possible range while blowing in the gates of Weissenburg after the infantry had found itself unable to break them down ; again it went under a most deadly fire from the enemy's infantry, for the purpose of bombarding the Chiteau of Geissberg, after the efforts of the infantry to take it by assault without waiting for the guns had completely failed. It appears that Haupt's and Kipping's batteries were used for this service, with the addition of the 3d heavy battery and the 2d brigade of Field Artillery, which stood on the hill crowned with poplars ; there were thus 42 guns in a half circle round the chiteau. It is not easy to make out from the official account if all these had opened their fire when the defenders surrendered. We may add, finally, that after the action the artillery took part also in the pursuit. It was natural that in this action, considering the enormous superiority of the Germans, they should employ more artillery than the French. But the fact that, though this superiority was equally marked as regards the infantry, 66 guns came into action against 18 in the preparation for the attack is characteristic, when we compare the use made of the artillery in the war of 1 866. 32 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY Two days later the battle of Worth was fought. The official account tells us that originally 6th August the General-in-Chief and his staff had not ^*™' intended to fight on the 6th of August. The battle was the consequence of a reconnaissance, and the sound of the guns of the different corps decided them to go reciprocally to each other's aid. From this it resulted that partial and isolated move- ments were first made, and were after a certain time abandoned. The tendency to employ artillery early in the action was again characteristic of the battle. The first reconnaissance even, before the infantry had fired a single shot, was commenced by Gaspari's battery ; and when the noise of this cannonade decided General von Bothmer to advance, he also began with artillery fire. The sound of firing, which resulted from Bothmer's reconnaissance, led General von Kirchbach, not only to continue the reconnais- sance which his advanced guard had been making (but which had been stopped), but also to direct a serious attack against the enemy's position. He deployed his artillery from the first, and brought at once into action every gun that was present with the corps ; he formed in combination with the 24 guns of the iith corps (which at this moment had also opened fire from near Gunstadt) a continuous line of fire from Gorsdorf to Gunstadt. At this point then, after 9.30 A.M., 108 guns were in action, and this not only before the infantry had carried out its first attack, but even before it had changed from the order of march to the order of battle. The deploy- ment took place under the protection of these 108 guns. After observing the manner in which the WORTH 33 artillery of the 5 th corps was thus used, we involun- tarily think of their gradual employment at Nachod. The official account speaks strongly of the enormous effect produced by this artillery. In the iith corps also, the 21st Division, which led the march, sent all its artillery (24 guns) to the front to Gunstadt, to join the leading battalion, and thus made it possible for it to assist that of the 5 th corps. At a little after i P.M. this line of artillery was reinforced by 3 batteries of the ist Bavarian corps, at Gorsdorf, batteries which the 1st Division of that corps had also sent forward ; at this moment nearly 200 guns-^including the remainder of the artillery of the 1 1 th corps — were ready to reinforce the front of the 5 th corps. And this took place immediately after the preparatory phase of the action, for up to this ^ time the only infantry of the 2d Bavarian corps engaged was the 4th Division (which was in wooded ground, and could not bring all its artillery into action), the 20th brigade with part of the 19th of the 5 th corps, and the brigade of the advanced guard of the iith corps. But as soon as the 5 th corps had pushed forward its celebrated frontal attacks, against the vineyards on the other side of Worth, sufficiently far to render a space avail- able for artillery, we find that batteries hurried up from our side to reinforce the line of skirmishers. The Iith corps also, while its advanced -guard brigade (the 41st) was engaged with the enemy, had begun by bringing 12 batteries into action before employ- ing the infantry of the main body, who during this time changed from order of march to order of battle. Only two of its batteries were not engaged D 34 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY from the beginning, and these were retained in rear, not because it was desired to form a reserve, but simply because there was not enough room to place them also in position. Then the infantry of this corps seized the Nieder- wald. When the infantry found itself prevented by the enemy's fire from continuing its advance from the northern edge of this forest, the artillery was pushed out to the front. Eight batteries came into action in the very thickest of the infantry fire and supported the attack which was directed against Elsasshausen, just as later on they assisted the infantry to repUlse the counter-attacks of the enemy ; on this occasion they many times fired case in place of shell. Between 3 and 4 P.M., 1 3 batteries had already been- hauled up the scarped heights on the other side of the Sauerbach, and prepared the way for the attack on FroschwiUer with the fire of nearly 80 guns at a very short range. At this point single batteries advanced in front of the line of skirmishers attacking the village. The ist Bavarian corps, which had this day to fight principally in woods, could employ very little artillery except the first 4 batteries, which advanced beyond Gorsdorf During the pursuit, in the evening, the artillery still supported the other arms at all points. It is impossible to avoid noticing the contrast between the manner in which the artillery was used at Worth, and that in which it was employed at the battle of Skalitz. On the same day on which the battle of Worth spicheren, ^^'^ fought took place also that of Spich- ''"'itTT"'* ^""^"^ ^"^^^ ^^**'® ^S^^" ^^^ "°* designed beforehand, and might be described as the SPICHEREN 35 result of an accidental encounter. Nevertheless the artillery, in superior number, opened the action. A little before noon the battery of the advanced guard of the 4th Division was engaged, and shortly after- wards, at noon, 4 batteries (24 guns) opened fire. They took up their position fairly near the enemy's artillery and in a half-circle, and thus compelled the French battery, which stood on the northern extremity of the Rothe-berg, to retire to a position in rear, and so prevented it from firing on the low ground by which the infantry was to advance. An hour later the Prussian batteries advanced to within reach of infantry fire from the enemy on the Galgenberg, in order to facilitate the advance of their own infantry on the Rothe-berg. They obliged the enemy's artillery, which had established itself there, to continue its retrograde movement, while at a later hour the advanced -guard battery compelled the artillery of the enemy, which was firing on the foot of the Rothe-berg, to fall back in rear of Stiring- Wendel. The divisions which arrived after General von Francois had taken the Rothe-berg also sent their artillery to the front. Thus the i6th Division, after 3 P.M., pushed forward 2 batteries under the escort of a regiment of cavalry, while before this, a little after 2 p.m., the 5th Division had sent I battery forward. At this time 6 batteries of the 1st army and i of the 2d were keeping up a fire superior to that of the enemy ; they drove back his artillery and shook his infantry. While, from 4 to 6 P.M., the two infantries fought fiercely with alter- nate success, the batteries were in full play, and over and over again aided our infantry to repulse the very 36 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY energetic counter-attacks which that of the French made, with the object of regaining from the Prussians the advantages which they had won. Eventually two other batteries of the 5 th Division even climbed the Rothe-berg by a very steep mountain road, which had been considered as absolutely impracticable for artillery ; they came into action in the midst of the very hot fire of the enemy's infantry, and forced those of the enemy's troops who still held the height to continue their retreat ; and this although they them- selves lost one half of their men. Though the result obtained by them cannot be considered as absolutely decisive, nevertheless the possession of the Rothe-berg was assured to us from that moment The final decision of the action could only be brought about by the capture of the hill of Forbach and the taking of Stiring-Wendel. This was com- menced by sending the artillery to the front to prepare the attack. At 6.30 P.M. as many guns as could find place there (36) were brought into action on the hill of Foist ; 2 batteries had to remain in rear as there was not sufficient room for them. From the top of this hill the 36 guns fired vigorously not only on the above-named points, but also in part, during the last moments of the action, even farther in advance up to the hill of the Golden-Bremm, until darkness put an end to the contest. Eleven batteries in all {66 guns) had been employed in this battle. Not one battery, of all those which were able to reach the field of battle, remained inactive, and though the troops arrived for the most part by small fractions, as the railway brought them, it was yet found possible to obtain the action, one, complete COLOMBEY-NOUILLY 37 and entire, which is produced by a mass of artillery. Thus the 4th light battery of the ist corps, which arrived by rail on the iield of battle, directly from Konigsberg in Prussia, at once took part in the fight. And now, my dear friend, compare all this with the use which was made of the artillery in the action at Trautenau, the 27th June 1866, which fight also was the consequence of an accidental meeting. Like the battle of Worth, that of Colombey- Nouilly had not been contemplated before- Colombey- hand. It was the consequence, as was Nouiuy, the former, of a reconnaissance made by ^**''j^mo^''^* an advanced guard, to whose assistance the nearest troops afterwards hurried. This advanced guard commenced its reconnaissance, as that of the 5 th corps at Worth had done, by the fire of artillery, and very soon engaged its 2 batteries. The ad- vanced guards of the 1st and of the 2d Divisions of infantry hastened up to its aid, and sent forward at a trot, far in advance of the infantry, all the avail- able guns under an escort of cavalry. Shortly after General von der Goltz had ex- changed his first shots with the enemy, that is, a little after 4.30 P.M., 30 pieces had already opened fire, though no engagement had been expected. At 6 P.M. the number of batteries in the artillery line was increased to 10 by those of the main body of the 13th and ist Divisions, which also had advanced at a trot in front of their infantry. A short time afterwards, also at the trot, the whole of the batteries of the 1st corps arrived in one group on the field of battle ; they had been in bivouac, and were pushed 38 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY rapidly to the front, some with an escort of cavalry, others with none. Shortly after 7 P.M. they formed a formidable line of 90 guns, of which 24 (of the 1st brigade) crossed the Colombey stream, and even un- limbered in the line of skirmishers. Including the 7 batteries of the 7th corps, from that moment 132 guns took part in the action, and continued their fire until darkness came on. They assisted powerfully to repulse the energetic attacks which the enemy directed against the front and right flank. Like the batteries of the 7th, 1st, and 2d Divisions, the artillery of the 1 8 th Division and that of Luderitz's cavalry brigade, coming from the south, preceded their own troops to the field of battle, in order to prepare the attack, while the infantry followed and deployed. The battle of Vionville-Mars-la-Tour was also vioaviue ''^'^'^^^ ^" improvised than a premeditated Mars-ia-Tour, battle, though, on the 1 6th of August, ^^* wo.^'* ^ collision with the enemy was expected. The battle again began by a reconnais- sance, and this reconnaissance was prepared by the fire of a mass of Horse Artillery of no less than 30 guns ; for the effect produced by the artillery of the Sth cavalry Division, which had 4 batteries, was soon increased by that which, to the south, was caused by the battery of the 6th cavalry Division. After the fire of this artillery had thrown the enemy's bivouacs, particularly those of the cavalry, into the desired confusion, the French infantry, thanks to its immensely superior numbers, drove back the cavalry on the advancing infantry (10 A.M.) The head of the Sth and 6th Divisions appeared on the field of VION VILLE -MARS- LA- TOUR 39 battle advancing from Gorze and Tronville. While they were preparing to make head against the enemy, who were gaining ground, and while in part they found themselves committed to a most serious struggle with him (as was the case with the troops of the 5 th Division), all the batteries of which the corps could dispose advanced at the trot in two lines of march ; at TO A.M. the 4 batteries of the 6th Division arrived, at 10.30 the 2 batteries of Horse Artillery of the corps artillery ; about an hour later the brigade of Field Artillery of the corps artillery came up ; while the 5 th Division sent all its batteries, to the number of four, to which in addition the battery of Lyncker's detachment of the loth corps joined itself. Between 1 1 and 1 2 o'clock a most powerful line of artillery crowned the heights from Tronville as far as the wood of Vionville. It included then 21 batteries or 126 guns, namely, 4 batteries of the 5th cavalry Division, i of the 6th cavalry Division, 4 batteries of the 5 th, and 4 of the 6th Divisions of infantry, i battery of Lyncker's detachment. Major Lenz's 2 Horse Artillery batteries, and 4 batteries of the 2d brigade of the Field Artillery of the corps artillery, and finally, since 9.30 A.M., the battery of Lehmann's detachment. Some of these batteries had, up to the moment of the arrival of their own infantry, to defend themselves against the masses of the enemy's infantry without the assistance of any other arm. Before all this mass of artillery had as yet commenced to fire, the 6th Division of infantry had taken Vionville (at 11.30 A.M.) It then (at noon) captured Flavigny, being on this occasion supported by a fraction of the 40 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY 5th Division. The hne of artillery of which we have spoken above was, about 3 o'clock, reinforced by 4 batteries of the 20th Division, which brought its strength up to 150 guns ; from that moment until the end of the battle it did not cease firing. I need not, doubtless, enter with you into the details, nor tell you how the centre of this line gained ground by advancing and holding its position along the road which runs from Gorze to Flavigny, nor how its left wing, posted at the high road, stopped short a very dangerous turning movement which the enemy attempted, nor how at length, in the evening, the right wing advanced with the two other arms, when they all assumed the offensive, and occupied the plateau marked ^ 989, the possession of which had been disputed with so much obstinacy. It will be sufficient for my purpose to show that this fact proves decidedly that complete darkness alone im- posed silence on this mass of artillery. When, about 2.30 P.M., the 20th Division of the loth corps arrived at Chambley, in proximity to the field of battle, the first thing that it did was to send the whole of the artillery which was present with it, that is to say, 8 batteries, to the assistance of the 3d corps; of these, 4, as I have already said, supported the centre, while 4 prolonged the left wing to the north of Tronville, in order to oppose the turning movement by which they were threatened in that direction. A part of this artillery had left its infantry at Saint-Julien and advanced at a trot. It arrived just in time to support the left wing, which suffered seriously until the moment (3.30 P.M.) when ' On the plan of the battle.— j^Z. W. GRAVELOTTE- SAINT- PRIVAT 41 the head of the 20th Division came up. Thus the loth corps brought all its available artillery into action before the infantry took part in the struggle (except such detachments as had been already placed at the disposition of the 3d corps) ; for half of the 19th Division, with the two last batteries, were not yet present. It was with the half of this division that these last batteries also took part in the unsuc- cessful attack directed against the plateau of Bruville. They afterwards prolonged the line of artillery at the high road. As regards the artillery of the Guard, the 1st battery of Horse Artillery, which came up with the brigade of dragoons, was on the spot, and neglected no opportunity of participating in the struggle. It was this battery which in some degree prepared the way for the great cavalry fight which took place on the left flank. Finally three batteries of the 8th corps took part in the action between 3 and 4 P.M. Every gun therefore, to the number of 210, which could possibly reach the field of battle, assisted in the contest, and during several hours in the course of the afternoon they all fired simultaneously. In the decisive battle of Gravelotte-Saint-Privat the artillery came upon the scene at every oraveiotte-st.- point in still larger masses. This gigan- PrfTat, lath . f , , ^ ^ f' , August 1870. tic contest was begun by the nre of the artillery of the 9th corps. That corps commenced by bringing into action the artillery of the 1 8 th Division and the corps artillery. By noon 54 guns were present at this point in advance of their infantry, and allowed themselves to be carried by their zeal so far to the front under a most effective 42 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry, that one battery was destroyed by the hostile missiles, while the others, after having fired for two hours, were no longer in a condition to continue the struggle. About an hour after these 54 guns, the five Hessian batteries of the other division came into line on the left of the Bois de la Cusse, and on their arrival this line of artillery amounted to 84 guns. This total was increased to 90 by the arrival of the Horse Artillery battery of the Hessian cavalry brigade, which posted itself to the east of Verneville. Almost at the same time the 4 batteries of the ist Division of the Guard and the Guard corps artillery took up their position on the left of the Hessian batteries and prolonged the line up to Saint-Ail. From after I P.M. there were therefore at this point 138 guns which had opened fire before the infantry masses had been engaged. During this time the 7th corps supported the 9th in its struggle by bringing up its artillery, which after i P.M. opened fire with 7 batteries. At the same time 1 1 batteries of the 8th corps posted themselves on their left and commenced firing, so that the battle was begun by the fire of 108 guns which stood before the front of the 1st army at Gravelotte. A very instructive episode, and one very interest- ing as regards the part played by the artillery, was the capture by assault, during the cannonade which then followed, of Sainte - Marie -aux- Chines ; this took place at 3 p.m. Thirteen Saxon batteries and 1 guns of the Guard corps artillery, a total of 88 guns, were drawn up in a half circle around this village and opened fire on it, and our brave infantry, attack- GRAVELOTTE- SAINT- PRIVAT 43 ing with the greatest dash, passed without a check through the whole village, and seized at once the opposite edge. The artillery of the 1 2th corps came up also to prolong the mass of artillery in the direction of Saint-Privat, while the artillery of the 2d Guard Division did the same, by pushing three batteries into the line of battle at Saint-Ail and a fourth at the centre in front of Amanvillers. If we study the plan in the official account, which gives the state of the battle at 5 P.M., we find the German artillery acting in three great groups : the mass on the right wing at Gravelotte, directed against the position of Point-du-Jour, was composed of 27 batteries ; that of the centre, in action against Aman- villers, had 13, and that of the left wing, firing on Saint-Privat, 30 batteries. But S of these batteries had been already brought to the front at Gravelotte, and were engaged in the middle of the infantry fight. Only such batteries had been left in reserve as could find no room in the Gravelotte position. In the centre, on the other hand, the line of artillery had been reinforced by borrowing guns from the 3d corps, which formed a reserve. Seventy batteries, or 420 guns, had thus commenced firing before the masses of infantry were sent forward to the decisive attack. The available masses of artillery might have been employed as powerfully and successfully against the village of Saint-Privat as they had already been against Sainte-Marie-aux-Chenes, if they had been informed that the attack was intended. When suddenly the masses of infantry, as they advanced to the assault, masked the fire of their own batteries, and attacked the as yet uninjured village but were unable to con- 44 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY tinue their advance, the batteries hastened forward into the infantry fire, and so overwhelmed the place with shells that its capture became possible. Wherever the infantry passed to the decisive assault, the artillery, as at Gravelotte, advanced absolutely into the line of skirmishers and supported the sister arm, fighting with it shoulder to shoulder ; it did this at the farm of Champenois and on the ground which lies immediately in front of Aman- villers, and again on the right of Saint-Privat on the hill which had just been captured. At this point it repulsed the numerous counter-attacks of the enemy's reserves, and assisted the effect produced by the fire of the infantry on the village, which stood like a fortress on its hill. When at length this village had been carried, which was towards the evening, all the artillery which was within reach crowned the chain of heights of which we had taken possession. On the left of Saint-Privat the whole of the batteries of the 1 2th corps (96 guns) took up a position. On the right of Saint-Privat I collected 14 batteries of the Guard, besides which all those who could reach the heights came up at once. Colonel Stumpff reported himself to me and announced that he had brought up 6 batteries, and as night fell Colonel von der Becke led up to me also 4 batteries of the corps artillery of the loth corps, which was held in reserve. By these successive arrivals the total of my force was so increased that at last I had 24 batteries under my command. This total implied nearly 140 guns; for some batteries were not at their full strength, since in the previous artillery fight some guns had been put out of action. BEAUMONT 45 and it had not yet been possible to refit them. On this height, ,as night fell, there was thus a continuous Hne of artillery, divided only by the village of Saint- Privat, Wfhich comprised 230 guns ; these swept the ground in the direction of the Bois de Jaumont and the Bois de Feves so completely that the enemy renounced any attempt to recapture the height from us. The deafening noise of this cannonade lasted until it was altogether dark, and the battle was brought to a close. Does not the recapitulation which we have just made of the employment of masses of artillery at Gravelotte-Saint-Privat, superficial as it is, recall to remembrance the small number of guns which we brought into action at any one spot at the battle of Koniggratz ? Does it not render it unnecessary for us to continue our comparison between the two ? In no offensive battle could the difficulties which the direction of the lines of march always -' Beaumont, entails upon the deployment of large 30th August masses of artillery, on the part of the "^^ "' assailant, be of a more embarrassing character than in the battle of Beaumont. The columns of the 4th corps were painfully dragging themselves through the forest on two very narrow and very bad roads. Only seven battalions and a half had reached that edge of the forest which it was desired to occupy, the rest were still in the woods. And yet 48 guns were on the spot to commence the action. Shortly after, when the regiment of Saxon light infantry had driven the enemy's advanced guard, who were de- fending the defile, from the little wood which stands near the farm of Beaulieu, the i 2th corps opened its 46 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY cannonade with 6 batteries, or 30 guns. But very soon both corps hastened to push to the front all the remainder of their artillery, and between i and 2 P.M. the 14 batteries of the 4th corps, in one line, had opened fire, while almost at the same moment the whole of the artillery of the 1 2th corps did the same. The latter, deducting the battery of Horse Artillery which was attached to the cavalry division, had 1 5 batteries. But this Horse Artillery battery also took part in the action from the opposite bank of the Meuse. Thus the fight had hardly continued for an hour before 1 80 guns were actively employed. Towards the end of the battle the 4th corps, which was ordered to pursue the enemy, had 12 batteries or 72 guns still in action, their fire being directed towards Mouzon ; this can be seen by looking at the plan of the battle. The catastrophe of Sedan commenced very early Sedan ^" ^^ morning, at 4 A.M., when the let September Bavarians made their way into Bazeilles. So long as a thick fog, during twilight, rendered it impossible to see even the ground in close proximity, there could naturally be no question of the employment of artillery. This state of things lasted until 6 A.M. In spite of this some effort was made to use the artillery. General von der Tann ordered his reserve artillery to open a very slow fire from the left bank of the Meuse ; this produced absolutely no effect. At 6 A.M. a Saxon battery came into line to the east of La Moncelle ; a little later Hutten's Bavarian battery drew up beside it, and the 6th battery of the 3d brigade took up its position to the left of it. Two guns in addition SEDAN 47 made their way with the infantry into the interior of the village of Bazeilles ; they took their share of the street fighting, in the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy, until almost all their men were killed or wounded. But it was not until 7 A.M. that the morning fog dispersed altogether, so that it was possible to use artillery. The first disposition that the General commanding the 1 2th corps made, on receiving the news of the struggle at Bazeilles, was to order the corps artillery to advance at a trot. This artillery was still on the march to the south of Douzy. One hour and a half after the order had been given, it opened fire from the east of the Givonne valley, which is nearly one German (4.5 English) mile from Douzy. During the interval all the batteries of the 24th Division had commenced firing, and at 8.30 A.M. a line of 12 batteries (72 guns) had been deployed at this point ; this line, from the moment that it was formed, suffered considerable loss from the enemy's infantry fire, but nevertheless maintained its position. Half an hour later this line of artillery was increased to 16 batteries or 96 guns. At that moment also the artillery of the Guard prolonged the line of artillery towards the north. The heart of every gunner throbbed with joy when he found that all our leaders had but one desire, to bring up their artillery. General von Pape had accompanied the light infantry and Fusiliers of the Guard when they drove the few skirmishers of the enemy whom they found there from Villers-Cernay and the adjoining forest. From the other side of the wood he saw the French grand artillery line, 48 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY which was firing on the I2th corps from the opposite side of the low ground of Givonne. " Bring me two guns," he cried to me when I met him, " so that I may take that line in flank ! " — " You shall have not only two, but ninety," I could proudly answer, for already the batteries were coming up at a trot, by the order of the General commanding the Guard corps. At 8.45 A.M. the artillery of the 1st Division of the Guard opened fire in front of the wood through a clearing we found there, and a quarter of an hour later it was reinforced on its right (to the north of the wood) by the Field Brigade of the corps artillery, and on its left by the brigade of the 2d Division of the Guard. At the commencement there was not sufficient room for the 3 Horse Artillery batteries ; but eventually the artillery of the 2d Division of the Guard took ground to the left, so that these batteries also were able to come up into line and take part in the action. Thus the artillery of the Guard commenced the struggle at this point (before the infantry were seriously engaged) with 72 guns, which were very soon increased to 90. While the German artillery saw their superiority over the enemy, in this part of the field of battle, in- creasing every moment, while the brave Bavarians were little by little possessing themselves of Bazeilles, while Givonne was being taken by the advanced guard of the Guard corps, and the infantry of the 1 2th corps were carrying the posts which stood on the stream between Givonne and the village of Bazeilles, the advanced guards of the 5th and nth corps showed themselves, shortly after 10 A.M., in rear of the French army. But these two corps had SEDAN 49 to pass the narrow defile of Saint-Albert before they could act against the enemy. They at once brought their artillery into action. As soon as the first battalions of the advanced guard of the i ith corps had occupied Saint-Menges and the hill situated to the east of it, 3 batteries took up their position there and opened fire. General von Gersdorff at once pushed forward the corps artillery. By 10 A.M. 7 other batteries were in position beside the 3 former on the crest of this hill, and at 1 1 A.M. the 4 remaining batteries of the I Ith corps came up to reinforce this line of artillery. Thus all the 84 guns of the iith corps had been pushed to the front, and formed an enormous single battery, at a time when so small a fraction of the infantry had passed the defile that it would have been difficult for it to protect this line of artillery. During this time the General commanding the Sth corps had been studying the situation from the hill where stands the farm of Champ de la Grange. He gave the order that all the available artillery should advance, without any regard to their organisa- tion by commands, to the support of the artillery line of the iith corps. After having occupied some intermediate positions, a mass of i O batteries advanced, part by way of Fleigneux, and part round the north of that place, and at 1 1 A.M. came into position front- ing Illy ; its left wing was to be covered by the cavalry. The left wing of this mass of artillery, which numbered 24 batteries or 144 guns, already combined its fire with that of the artillery of the Guard, and from that time the circle of guns which was forming around the French army continued to E 50 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY close in, to be shortly after still more contracted, for at this moment the corps artillery of the 4th corps and that of the 2d Bavarian corps forbade all issue to the enemy by the south of Sedan. The manner in which the artillery of the 5th and nth corps was used gives most clear practical proof that it is quite possible, even when on the offensive, to open the action with the fire of masses of artillery, even though only one line is available by which to approach the enemy. I fear I should try your patience too hardly if I entered into too many details, and showed how the masses of artillery of which we have just spoken were still more augmented, and how those batteries only for which there was absolutely no space available were left in reserve. It must be sufficient for me to say that all the generals, and particularly those who commanded the artillery, were filled with the idea that as much artillery as was available should be employed as soon as possible, and that none should be kept in reserve. I need not either insist upon this point, that, everywhere, the artillery pushed to the front quite close to the enemy, even into the line of skirmishers, and that it dared to advance beyond ■ defiles, as soon as the infantry found itself sufficiently strong to make decisive assaults, in order to assist them in their close attack. I need not either speak here of the heroic struggles which the infantry sus- tained, on the one hand again.st the enemy's cavalry and infantry, who fought fiercely to disengage them- selves, on the other in the attack of the various posts which had to be carried, for we have now to occupy ourselves only with the use made of the artillery. SEDAN SI It will be sufficient to study, with reference to their effective strength, the different masses of artillery which prepared the way for the decisive attack. We find on the south of Sedan, at Frenois, a battery of 1 1 4 guns, belonging to the Wurtemberg division and the 2d Bavarian corps ; this was bombarding Sedan. Next came a group of 6 batteries or 36 guns, belonging to the corps artillery of the 4th corps ; this was posted near Pont-Maugy, and had fired, but at very long range, on the ground to the north of Bazeilles. To the east 24 batteries or 144 guns, belonging to the 1st Bavarian corps, the 4th corps, and the 12 th corps, had crossed the Givonne valley and had fired on Balan, Fond de Givonne, and the old entrenched camp of Sedan. Eighteen bat- teries belonging to these three corps could not find room to come into action, and impatiently awaited the time when they might be of service. (I remember very well how I annoyed the leader of a brigade of the 1 2th corps. He arrived to reinforce the position which I had taken up farther to the north, and I was obliged to tell him that I had no more room even for one gun. He received it almost as a personal insult.) Farther to the north 90 guns of the Guard corps had opened fire on the Bois de la Garenne. To the north-west the formidable line of artillery of the 5 th and i ith corps amounted to 26 batteries or 156 guns ; these swept with their fire the Bois de la Garenne and the ground to the north-east in front of that wood. There were thus five prin- cipal groups which, with their 540 guns, fired at the same time at the same target ; and these con- stituted four-fifths of the artillery present with the 52 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY different corps which were able to take part in the battle of Sedan. I will not speak of the use which was made of the artillery in the battle of Noisseville, since this was a defensive battle, and since the employment of masses of artillery is very much more easy in a defensive action than in an offensive operation. This battle, again, cannot furnish us with any materials for our comparison of the actions of 1866 with those of 1870, since in the former year we fought only on the offensive. It seems to me also that we have collected a sufficient number of data for our subject. Let us summarise the observations which we have made on the comparative manner of employing the artillery in the two campaigns : — 1. In 1866 great unwillingness was shown to employ much artillery to prepare the action. In 1870, intentionally and from the first, as much artillery as possible was brought into action. 2. In 1 866 it was assumed as a principle that, even at the moment when the fight was at its height, either a reserve of artillery should be kept, as well as one of infantry and cavalry, or a fresh reserve of artillery should be formed.^ Thus half of the great mass of artillery of the army reserve of the ist army did not fire a single shot at Koniggratz ; it remained near Dub in absolute inaction. In 1870 a totally opposite principle obtained, namely, that a reserve of artillery was useless. Even the name " Reserve Artillery " was abolished and replaced (except in the Bavarian corps) by that of " Corps Artillery." 1 In the case, we may presume, where the original reserve artillery had been perforce engaged. — N.L.W. SUMMARY S3 3. In 1 866, as was natural when it was deter- mined to keep a reserve, the artillery marched as near as possible to the tail of the column ; there were some occasions when it was some days' march in rear of the corps (for example, the artillery of the Guard at the time of the entrance into Bohemia). In 1870, it was held as a principle that the artillery should be as far to the front in the column of march as was compatible with its due escort by the other arms. We even find corps sending all their artillery far ahead into the middle of the battle (for example, the Guard and the 3d corps at Saint-Privat, the 5th, nth, and 12th corps at Sedan). 4. Finally we find, in i'866, that masses of artil- lery moved during their marches for the most part at a very slow pace, but finished by galloping at the moment when they moved into position and were about to unlimber. On the other hand, in 1870 great masses of artillery marched distances of many German miles without ceasing to trot, and thus arrived at their position with a gain of several hours. This was the case with the corps artillery of the 3d corps at Vionville, with that of the Guard at Saint- Privat, with that of the 4th corps, the Guard, the nth and the 12th corps at Sedan. LETTER III THE FIRE EFFECT OF THE ARTILLERY DURING THE WAR OF 1 866 " Cease to quote historical examples," you say, '' and tell me the cause of all this." I will answer you, but not yet. I shall do that' later. I must first obtain more materials for my answer, and prove by facts the statement with which I ended my last letter. Have therefore a little patience while I do this. I said there that in 1 866 our artillery did not hit its mark so often as we had a right to expect, judging from the results obtained on the practice- ground, and the success gained at the redoubts of Dlippel. In order to prove this statement I must go back a little into history. In the sixth decade of our present century our artillery tried to realise an idea which had hitherto been condemned as unpractical and ludicrous by all authorities of the arm ; this was to construct rifled guns. The trials which were made succeeded, and gave truly astonishing results as regards accuracy and the effect of fire, which with the fact that shells could be made to burst on impact and with the results of the experiments in breaching which took place at Schweidnitz in the autumn of 1857, decided INTRODUCTION OF RIFLED GUNS 55 our Government to introduce rifled guns of six, twelve, and twenty-four pounds for siege and fortress artillery. During the year 1858 the construction of a really practical rifled field gun was studied with German thoroughness, and a great deal of time was thus lost. Again every novelty has many opponents. Justifi- able doubts as to whether so complicated a machine as was our rifled gun of those days could ever be of practical use, considering the rough treatment to which guns are exposed during a campaign, strength- ened that opposition which the force of habit always presents to anything which is new. Our committee of artillery experiments endeav- oured to conquer all doubts, whether justifiable or unjustifiable, by means of inventions, proposals, and trials. In the meantime the French artillery heard something of the results of the breaching trials which took place at Schweidnitz. Napoleon during the year 1858 saw that contest approaching, which in 1859 brought on the war with Austria, and ordered his artillery to be armed with rifled guns without delay. But nothing new can be worked out in a day, nor can the artillery materiel for a large army be suddenly improvised. Time pressed. So the French artillery rifled their S.B. bronze guns, and thus arose the bastard system which continued to 1870, and which was called the " Lahitte system." Though this transformation was hardly completed when the war of 1859 broke out, though the French gunners were unskilled in the management of their guns, the French artillery obtained with them so considerable an advantage over the Austrians as regarded range, that all artilleries and all Govern- S6 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY ments took an immense interest in it. Our own Government demanded that its artillery should not be inferior to that of France. At this moment our committee of artillery experiments had completed their trials with reference to a 6-pr. field gun ; the new gun satisfied the high military authorities who were present, and consequently before the war between France and Austria had come to an end, orders had been given to construct, as a beginning, 300 rifled 6-pr. field guns. The results obtained from these guns were indeed astonishing to any one who had until then seen only S.B. guns fired. Up to that time when firing at 1000 paces the result had been so doubtful that our gunners acted on the proverb which says : " The first shot is for the devil, the second for God, and only the third for the King,'' that is to say, that at the range of 1 000 paces only one-third of the shot hit the target then in use, which was 6 feet high and SO paces wide. Moreover the greatest range was only from 1 800 to 2000 paces. At greater distances there was no danger from S.B. field guns. Now suddenly a gun was seen, which could hit the target at a still greater range, and of which the shell burst on striking the mark with such destructive effect, that it seemed doubtful whether any enemy could stand against such a missile. There was, however, some hesitation in replacing all the old S.B. guns by the new rifled pieces. We had not yet succeeded in making a good shrapnel with a time fuse for rifled guns, while the case-shot of the rifled guns was not so effective as that of the S.B. pieces. Great importance was attached to the WAR OF 1864 57 fire of shrapnel and case with regard to close fighting, in which it was not considered that there would be sufficient time to lay so carefully as is necessary in order to get the full effect of the rifled gun. It was considered ample then for the moment to give three rifled batteries, or one -quarter of the Field Artillery, to each army-corps, whilst for siege and fortress artillery as many guns were provided as the funds allowed. A lighter field gun, the 4-pr., was invented, and one battery was armed with it on trial. The change in the armament was at this point when the war with Denmark broke out at the beginning of 1864. No conclusive experience was obtained with Field Artillery in this campaign. Such engagements as we fought in the open field were of a secondary importance. On some rare occasions only did I see our guns fire a few shots in the open. The enemy immediately abandoned his position. This was the case at Satrup on the loth of February and at Fredericia on the 8th of March. Our experience with our siege guns was more instructive. The effect of our rifled siege guns sur- prised not only the enemy but also ourselves. At ranges at which the enemy considered themselves absolutely safe from our shell, our 2 4-pr. guns threw their shell beyond the great Wenning-Bund, destroying block-houses by their explosion, dismounting the guns on the ramparts which they enfiladed, and causing, on the first day of the bombardment, such annoyance and such a panic, that had we considered such a result as possible, we should have held our troops in readiness to take advantage at once of this first terror. We should perhaps have met with less 58 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY resistance on this first day than we eventually did at the time of the assault. At least the prisoners told us that on the opening day of the bombardment the redoubts i to 6 were deserted by the whole of their garrisons. We could not see this on account of the heavy snowstorm which was raging. Later on the defenders became accustomed to our shell, and learnt how to shelter themselves in some degree by throwing up epaulm'ents of earth. When the guns which were captured in the Diippel redoubts had been brought back in triumph to Berlin, the state of complete ruin to which they had been reduced by our shell excited general admiration for the effect of our new inven- tion. It was naturally believed that in the open also everything must give way to it under penalty of an- nihilation. These sanguine hopes imposed silence on some doubts, which might otherwise have been excited by certain experiences, particularly with regard to the difficulty of hitting with a rifled gun a target which was in rapid motion. This was especially the case when firing on ships. When in the month of February at Fenno we tried to prevent a vessel from passing the Little Belt, it went back, it is true, but we did not hit it. At the time of the assault on Diippel an enormous quantity of iron and lead was lavished on the celebrated ironclad Rolf Krake before we succeeded in getting the few hits on the monster in consequence of which she abandoned the action. Shortly after the storming of Diippel the greatest zeal was displayed in the construction of more rifled field guns, especially of 4-prs., and when the war of 1866 broke out we had four 6-pr. and six 4-pr. rifled WAS OF 1866 59 batteries in each army-corps, while only 6 batteries remained armed with the old S.B. guns. Many men of experience still believed that we could not alto- gether do without S.B. guns for close fighting, on account of their superior fire with case and shrapnel, and were confirmed in this opinion by the action of the only Power which had renewed its materiel during a great war. For the Federal Government of the United States of America had found itself obliged to three times renew almost the whole of its artillery materiel, and on the last occasion had considered it necessary to have at least a quarter of short S.B. 12-pr. guns, against three-quarters of rifled pieces. This was the same proportion as that in which our artillery was armed in 1866. In 1866 then we entered upon the campaign absolutely certain that nothing could resist our artillery. We knew, indeed, that the Austrian muzzle- loading gun, though it was rifled and was constructed with a little more care and exactness than the French gun on the Lahitte system, shot very much worse than our B.L. guns. We expected therefore to see the other arms, infantry as well as cavalry, scatter asunder and disperse like chaff as soon as our shell fell and burst in the midst of them. I had not the good fortune to participate in the first engagements fought by the 2d army, at Nachod, Skalitz, Schweinschadel, Trautenau, and Soor. The reports of those batteries of my regiment which were attached to troops, and which took part in three of these actions, spoke only of one thing — the triple or even quadruple numerical superiority of the enemy's 6o LETTERS ON ARTILLERY artillery. At Schweinschadel the 3d Horse Artillery battery, armed with 6 S.B. guns, approached to within 1 000 paces of 1 6 Austrian guns ; it fired shrapnel at them and did not seem to have a very high opinion of the fire of the enemy, who was at last driven back. At Koniginhof I was present at the extreme end of the action, and I was witness of a cannonade opened at so long a range that I regretted to see such a waste of costly ammunition ; indeed the firing was very soon stopped. I likewise cared very little for a rapid fire which four of the enemy's batteries opened upon me and the officers who were with me when, towards evening, I rode to Koniginhof to make a reconnaissance with a view to forcing the passage of the Elbe, an opera- tion which was spoken of for the morrow, but which did not take place. I had consequently no personal experience as to the value of our new field guns during the period which preceded the battle of Koniggratz. But I was still full of the confidence with which our experiences in time of peace had in- spired us. Nothing at least had as yet happened to diminish it. Confidence in one's self and a feeling of the certainty of victory are the essential conditions of great suc- cesses. But they must be based on realities, and unless this is the case there is a considerable danger that a check, at the decisive moment, may transform this confidence into an opposite feeling. Though I met with no such bitter experience as this, yet the results in the battle of Koniggratz did not altogether come up to the expectations which I had cherished, with regard to the effect of the guns under my com- PERSONAL EXPERIENCES IN iS66 6i mand. At that period the colonel of a regiment of Field Artillery very often found a considerable number of his g6 guns detached, by superior orders, from his command ; thus I had only one brigade (the 2d) still left to me ; this consisted of 4 batteries, that is of 24 guns, all rifled. Very soon the order arrived for me to advance ; we went off gaily at a quick trot over hill and valley, from Rettendorf by KSniginhof, Chotieborek, and Jericek, up to the front line of the advanced guard of our corps. I ordered the batteries to take up a position to the south of Jericek, against the enemy's artillery, which was posted on the hill of Horenowes ; this was ci'owned with a clump of trees which has now a name in history. The enemy's guns had already fired shell at me as I was passing the Trotinka at Jericek, but these shell, falling at a high angle, buried -themselves deeply in the ground, and burst here and there, throwing the earth about, but far from doing us any harm, they only put us into a good humour. The first trial shots gave the range as 4000 paces ; we were then much too far from the enemy, and I advanced my guns nearer to him, up to the undulation which lies near to Horenowes, to the north of that place. The range was then 1900 paces ; we therefore engaged the enemy. In my first letter I have already said that his line of artillery consisted of 40 guns ; I added that on my right and left other batteries also fired on it, and that altogether 90 guns were firing on the target. During this artillery fight we saw coming out of Horenowes by the road which leads to the hill where the trees stand (therefore at a shorter range than that on which the Austrian artillery stood), a battery of the enemy 62 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY which trotted up the hill from right to left, in column of route. It would be impossible to find a better target. All my batteries began to fire at this column. The shell fell in front or in rear, but not one hit the enemy. The battery escaped without losing a single man or horse, and disappeared behind the hill. I felt as angry as a hunter who has missed a royal stag. Shortly afterwards I was a little consoled, for my shells broke up a hostile battalion which, coming from Horenowes, was slowly climbing the slope. A squadron of dragoons charged the enemy and carried off a crowd of prisoners. The Austrian artillery, after having kept up the fight for a short time, ceased firing and disappeared behind the hill. We gladly flattered ourselves that we had driven them off. During this time the main body of the 1st Division of the infantry of the Guard had formed line after passing the Trotinka, and advanced in this order against the hill with the clump of trees, while the advanced guard was engaged in the village with the rearmost troops of the enemy. As soon as the advancing infantry masked my batteries, I ceased firing, and stood ready with loaded guns to repulse any possible counter-attack ; I myself accompanied the infantry, as they advanced, in order to be able to select, as soon as the hill was captured, a new position for my artillery. While I was thus moving forward with the infantry, a battery of the enemy gave me most evident proof that the Austrian artillery had been by no means annihilated. It surprised us by firing from our left front eight shells, one quickly after the other, which all fell in the same spot, exactly where the battalion with which I was riding happened EXPERIENCES AT KONIGGRATZ 63 to be marching at the moment. Three shells burst in front of the battalion, three in the midst of the ranks and two in rear, immediately in the middle of the dead and wounded who were writhing one on the other. But the battalion was not broken up. I heard the word of command : " Leading file, advance from the right ! March ! Right, left, right, left," and the battalion continued its march as if nothing could stop it. (I think it was a battalion of the 3d regiment of the Guard, for I remember that I rode a little way with Captain von Lobenthal.) It was evident then that the shells of rifled guns, when they burst, did not produce so demoralising an effect as I had believed ; at least, they did not produce that effect on good infantry. After having opened for a very short time a rapid fire from the crest of the hill on the last remnants of the enemy's infantry, our own seized the hill with the clump of trees ; I then sent, by the adjutant of the regiment, an order to my batteries to come up to me at once, in order to secure to us the possession of the height. While awaiting their arrival I looked about me. I saw the enemy disappearing in the direction of Nedelist, and wished to convince myself how far the wreck of the enemy's artillery would bear witness to the annihilating effect of our guns. I found — nothing. Not one gun with broken wheels, not an atom of any limber -box torn to pieces by its explosion, not a horse with shattered limbs, absolutely nothing marked the place where the enemy's artillery had stood. This was certainly rather discouraging. But when at a later date I read the Austrian official account, and saw there that the hill of Horenowes had been 64 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY evacuated solely because Benedek had several times given the order to do so — for he had had no inten- tion of extending- his right wing so far — when at last I was really obliged to own that the enemy's artillery had by no means retired on account of the effect produced by our fire, then I was sad indeed. But on the 3d of July I had not much time, on that hill, to give way to any feelings. The infantry of the 1st Division of the Guard pressed back the yield- ing enemy. Some of the enemy's shells whistling through the air fell among us from the outskirts of Chlum, and my batteries unlimbered on the hill with the clump of trees and replied. The range was enormous. I therefore ordered them to economise their ammunition, and to fire only just enough to draw off the enemy's fire from our advancing infantry. After this I galloped along the steep crest of the hill of Maslowed in order to find for my batteries a position nearer to the enemy, so that their fire might be more effective than it had been up to the present. I met General von Colomier in the most advanced line of the infantry skirmishers, who were pressing on, and he agreed with me that it was useless to fire at so long a range. As the northern slope of the hill near Maslowed was very steep, I was afraid that our guns would run down it when they recoiled ; I therefore chose a position half way between Maslowed and Nedelist, on the ridge which runs from one to the other. I ordered the adjutant of the regiment to bring the batteries there, while I went directly to the spot to select their posts. During the interval the enemy's artillery, whose strength I had previously judged at one or two EXPERIENCES AT KONIGGRATZ 65 batteries, had increased so much that the crest of the height which runs from Chlum to Nedelist, and which bounded our view, appeared as if crowned with a continuous row of guns. There was at this spot a road which was planted with small trees ; I went towards it ; I saw behind me the leading battery (the 4-pr.) descending the hill of Horenowes, where stood the famous clump of trees ; the slope was so steep that it was obliged to come down at a walk. I looked at the enemy. He fired a shot. The projectile fell in the cornfield about lOO paces short of me. A second shell followed, which went about as far over me. A third shell struck the ground quite close to me and buried itself in the earth, which was softened by the rain. Then followed a mournful silence, like that which, before a heavy storm, precedes the first flashes of lightning. I thought that I could guess the design of the enemy. He had recognised me as the officer who was seek- ing for the best position for the coming artillery ; he then found his range on me, and was only waiting, before commencing to fire, for the arrival of the battery which had disappeared from his view behind the hill on which I stood. I then went back to the battery, in the low ground, and gave the captain the following order : — As soon as he came to the top of the hill and the enemy opened fire on him, he was to advance as quickly as possible, without taking any notice of the fire, and was to unlimber at the spot where I should halt. I went back to my former post, and watched the enemy with the greatest attention. Hardly had the leaders of the battery appeared over the crest than the whole horizon in F 66 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY my front was covered with blue clouds, and a rapid fire kept up by more than lOO guns commenced with such a noise and such whistlings of shell that it seemed as if hell was let loose. But at the same moment I spurred my horse and advanced at a gallop about 300 paces towards the enemy. The battery followed me as fast as the greasy and broken ground would permit. The enemy's projectiles all passed together whistling over our heads, and fell in rear of us in the road. The enemy could not have been able to see, on account of the thick smoke produced by his fire, that we had passed under his shells, for he went on firing without changing his elevation ; a thick hail of projectiles continued to fall on the road while we, very quietly, fired our trial shots, and found the range to be 1350 paces. The battery had only one casualty while passing under the hostile missiles : one man was wounded. When once it had taken up its position it suffered no loss at all. I had at least the consolation of knowing that the enemy, with his new pattern guns, had also not yet learnt how to make good practice.^ The other 1 The trick which had just succeeded, and which consisted in passing rapidly under the enemy's fire, had been already practised by Strotha at the battle of Leipzig, when he was called upon to relieve a Russian battery which had been put out of action. Having arrived at the spot where the ruins of this batteiy lay, he gave the command to gallop, and advanced 300 paces nearer to the enemy. When I noticed at Koniggratz the silence of the enormous battery of the enemy, the recollection of Strotha's manoeuvre passed like a flash of lightning through my mind, and I imitated it. He had many years before related the stoiy to my comrades and myself, when we were quite young officers, at a discussion on technical matters at which we were present. I mention this fact merely to show how much good may result if the elder officers will take the trouble to relate to their juniors such events as have been of importance in their lives. EXPERIENCES AT KONIGGRATZ 67 batteries of the brigade also passed to the right and left of the first (Mutius's battery), with very small loss, over the crest of the height which was bombarded by the enemy, and they, with some batteries of the 1st Division of the Guard, posted themselves on the same line with it. I have already told you, in my first letter, that we had hardly fired one or two rounds after having picked up the range when we saw that some limber- boxes were exploding in the enemy's line and that it was falling into disorder. We attributed this, as I told you, to the effect of our fire, but, to our great disappointment, we afterwards learnt that our skirmishers, advancing in very high corn, had approached to within 200 or 300 paces of the enemy's artillery, who could not see them on account of the thick smoke caused by his fire. They had cartridges with explosive bullets, of which at that time the use had not been forbidden, and these bullets produced a most destructive effect on the limber-boxes and the waggons. I afterwards heard that on this occasion one of the officers commanding the skirmishers (it was, I think. Lieutenant Chorus) had set quietly to work to fire a couple of trial shots at a white horse ; when he saw the animal fall he gave the order to take the elevation at 250 paces, to open a rapid fire in order to knock over as many gunners and horses as possible, and then to rush in on the battery with a cheer. As a matter of fact the projectiles from our line of artillery may very probably have hit some gunners and horses, but it is very difficult to make sure of this after the event, or to judge how many 68 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY men and animals fell. But the reports furnished by the infantry establish as an assured fact that the whole of the enemy's line of artillery continued to fire without a moment's interruption until the infantry opened their rapid fire. Consequently, we gunners, in this position also, obtained a very small number of hits, and our fire had only one effect, which was certainly essential, that of drawing upon ourselves the attention and the fire of the formidable line of the enemy's artillery, and of thus averting it altogether from the infantry. In this manner the latter was placed in a position, while suffering only relatively small loss, to reduce all this mass of artillery to silence, and to take half the guns. After having been many times stopped by the enemy's infantry and cavalry, who threw themselves from the right on my rear, front, and flank, I reached the last position which I was to occupy during this battle. It was to the south of Chlum on a hill, whence I could support the battalions of the ist Division of the Guard, which had pushed to the front. I certainly had before me there a target which it would have been impossible to miss, whether my guns had been rifled or not. Two Austrian corps were drawn up on the plain, at the very foot of the hill ; their lines were admirably dressed, and their white uniforms showed up plainly against the green of the cornfields waving in the wind. They were massed with their front towards Sadowa, and consequently showed me their right flank. These battalions, squadrons, and masses of artillery, concen- trated in good order in their formation on parade, looked from above like the squares on a chess-board. EXPERIENCES AT KONIGGRATZ Their masses filled the vast breadth of the valley as far as the heights of Problus, and their right flank was about 900 paces from the place where I stood with my guns. Their fire at once struck the enemy with surprise, terror, and confusion. An infantry officer (Major Erckert), who is a friend of mine, was at that moment stretched on the ground in front of Rosberitz. He was wounded, absolutely motionless, and believed to be dead. He has told me that the Austrian battalions, who were passing over his body as they advanced to the attack of Rosberitz, stopped short in their rush at the first shot fired from the hill of Chlum ; they were seized with fear, and seemed held fast to the spot by a magic force. I myself can also certify to the slaughter which our shells caused in the crowded ranks of the enemy. Each projectile which fell among them burst and mowed large gaps in these compact masses of men, who tried to escape to the right and left. But in vain I encouraged the zeal of my gunners, in vain I cried to them to hurl their projectiles into these masses of troops with redoubled rapidity, in order to cause yet more disaster ; the enemy did not take to flight, as in my heart I had expected. It is true that the ranks opened out, and that the men sought for cover everywhere where the ditches along the roads or the undulations of the ground offered them any protection, but at the last the mass formed front towards us and commenced the attack. The first attack, executed by the cavalry, came to grief in a hollow road which lay at the foot of the hill, from which some companies of our infantry received the Austrian squadrons with a destructive fire from their 70 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY needle-guns. At this very moment I have my doubts whether the fire of our artillery, so little trained as it was then, would alone have sufficed, without the aid of the infantry,, to compel the cavalry which charged us to wheel about. Upon this we saw in the low ground, at every point, hostile batteries unlimber, as soon as they could find space to deploy ; they opened fire on us with the greatest possible rapidity and violence. They once more formed a line of more than lOO guns. But this time they were drawn up in a half-circle around us, and the fire of their left wing was particularly severe ; splinters of shell bounded throughout the length of the line of our batteries. We now suffered very much more serious losses. Whole teams went down at a blow ; some guns lost the whole of their de- tachments. It was once more a stroke of luck for us that the enemy's gunners had not very much skill in the use of their new weapons. Most of the Austrian batteries, as far as we could make out, seemed to choose the church tower of Chlum as their target, for shell after shell fell into it ; it began to totter, and the tiles and splinters of masonry flew all around. But we were drawn up about 200 paces in front of the tower, and the projectiles which hit it did us no harm at all. All the same, the hell which the enemy made for us was hot enough. We had, as they say, put our hands into a wasp's nest. This state of things may have lasted about an hour when the attacks of the enemy's masses ended by driving back our infantry. Our seven companies which were posted at Rosberitz had to give up that village. They were disordered EXPERIENCES AT KONIGGRATZ and most of their leaders had fallen. They drew back therefore before the 17 battalions of the 6th corps which threw themselves upon them. These masses, it is true, yet hesitated for a few moments before the fire of the guns and that of the needle- guns. But with the fire of my artillery alone I could not stop them ; the results which I had obtained up to that time showed me this clearly, and I therefore followed the general movement and drew my guns back to the nearest height, that which runs with the gentle slope from the northern part of Chlum towards Nedelist. The enemy followed us, but found them- selves taken in flank, both to the right and left, by our 6th and ist corps, who annihilated them. This was the last action in which I took part during the war. At the battle of Koniggratz, when I had refitted my batteries and filled up with ammunition, at the moment when 1 was about to advance on to the heights at Rosnitz in order to take part in the pursuit of the enemy, I received orders to join the reserve in rear of the infantry of the Guard. During the battle I had every possible reason to feel satisfied with the manner in which my batteries had behaved. They had shown very great courage, and everything had been carried out exactly as it was ordered. Not a man had flinched. But we had not, by very much, succeeded in shooting as well as we had a right to expect. This was because my men had not sufficiently learnt how to shoot, and I was obliged to acknowledge to myself that I also was not sufficiently instructed. From this came the feeling of constraint and trouble which I found in me, and I was curious to know how the other 72 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY regiments of our army stood in this respect. This was what I found. On every occasion when an officer has told me frankly and confidentially what he thought, he has owned to this same feeling of constraint, and has confessed that he was not pleased with himself My friend Scherbening, who was under my orders at Sedan, and fell there also before my eyes, acknowledged to me privately that this was the case with himself, and yet he had at Konig- gratz fought his four batteries with the greatest hardihood in the position in front of the defile at Sadowa, and at Blumenau, the last engagement of the war, had particularly distinguished himself I could further name to you some large bodies of artillery, whose 4-prs., in the course of the long cannonade, gradually threw shorter and shorter distances, and at last were 300 or 400 paces short of the target. This fact was attributed to the fouling caused by the powder in the bore, whilst in reality it arose from the tangent scales of the 4-pr. slipping down a little each time the gun was fired, and from no one taking care to set them again. The 4-prs. indeed had tangent scales of a different pattern to that of the 6-prs. ; with the latter the tangent scale was taken out before the gun was fired, and the recoil could not therefore make it slip down. I could also name to you some large bodies of artillery whose shells were blind, simply because, in the projectiles furnished at the renewal of their ammunition from the columns, they had forgotten, as was afterwards discovered, to insert any percussion arrangement; it is difficult to see how the shells could have been expected to burst. But I will not WAR OF 1866 73 name them to you, as I should not like to set in the pillory, as it were, so long after the event, men of recognised merit, and this for a really very pardon- able fault. I say that this fault is pardonable, because we had not then acquired the necessary familiarity with the handling of the new armament, or, to put it better, we had not yet learnt how to shoot. I have not a shadow of a doubt, for my own part, but that all the regiments were exactly in the same condition as ourselves ; where indeed, during the whole of the war of 1 866, have we succeeded in hitting a target which was worth the trouble of hitting ? At the commencement of the battle of Nachod a Prussian battery obliged the Austrian battery of Hertwek's brigade to retire ; during the battle of Soor an Austrian battery left one disabled gun behind it when it retired ; during the fight at Schweinschadel the 3d Horse Artillery battery of the Guard had obliged, as it says in its report, two Austrian batteries to abandon their position. But this was all, absolutely all. In the great battle of Koniggratz we captured nearly 200 guns ; not one in the whole number, as far as I know, had been injured by fire. At Nachod and at Skalitz the enemy, it is true, retired when our reserve artillery made its appearance at the end of the engagement. But even now it is by no means certain whether, at Nachod, it was this advance of the reserve artillery which decided the enemy to retire, or whether he had not already resolved to abandon the field of battle, owing to the failure of all his attacks. As 74 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY regards the fight at Skalitz, it is actually proved in history that the Austrian corps had orders to hold on till two o'clock only, and that its retreat was carried out without any reference to the appearance of the reserve artillery of the 5 th corps. Nowhere, during the whole course of the campaign of 1866, did our artillery play a decisive part with regard to the other arms of the enemy's army. No considerable mass of infantry, no grand corps of cavalry, was destroyed by it ; against no object of attack, neither village nor position, did it open its fire in the preparation for the attack in such a manner as to render certain the success of the assault. And the reason that it did not do this was that, as I have shown in my former letter, it advanced in strength too far inferior to that of the enemy. Besides, six of every sixteen batteries were armed with S.B. guns, and a large proportion of the S.B. batteries did not fire a shot, owing to the long ranges at which the two artilleries engaged. As far as I know, that half of the grand reserve artillery of the 1st army which was armed with S.B. guns did not succeed in firing a single shot, and only a very few S.B. batteries had the good fortune to gain imperishable glory by push- ing on to within short range of an enemy whose fire was more effective, as did Buddenbrock's battery at Schweinschadel, and Schmelzer's and Theiler's bat- teries at Koniggratz. After the campaign of 1866 we all, as I have already said, felt that we had not shot sufficiently well. Nevertheless our consciences were easy, and we could say that we had done our duty, for we had fought wherever we had been ordered to fight, had ARTILLERY IN 1866 75 held strictly to the drill-books, and had shot as we had been taught to shoot at the practice grounds. If, in spite of all this, the results which we had obtained were not such as the army had the right to expect from the assistance of its artillery, then the fault must have been in the orders which we had received, in the recognised system of drill, or in the instruction in shooting which had been imparted to us. But when later on some things were written, between the lines of which we could read that there was an idea that the artillery had not done its duty, we were filled with a feeling of most just indigna- tion. But this indignation was considerably dimin- ished when, still later, we learnt from historical works on the campaign how much the other arms had suffered from the superiority of the enemy's artillery. From that moment every officer of the Prussian artillery sought, as the object of his con- stant meditation, to discover by what means our artillery might be placed in a position to furnish a more effective fire. Even some meddling persons occupied themselves with this question, and the best proof that public opinion was excited against our artillery is given by the fact that a book, such as that which appeared under the pseudonym Arkolay, was able to attract public attention, even though it proposed, as the only means of saving the honour of the artillery, to give up rifled guns and to return to smooth-bores. The effect produced by the Austrian artillery in the war of 1866 has been frequently compared with that obtained by the Prussian artillery in the same war. For my part I have never been able to see 76 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY that they shot better than we. But they used their artillery in very much larger masses ; and when the projectiles of masses of artillery, which often num- bered more than lOO guns in one line, sweep all the ground in front of that line the troops which are exposed to the fire must suffer from it, thanks per- haps to some good shots, but also perhaps to some bad ones. But when I, as I mentioned above, could come into action with at first only 6 guns against more than loo guns, at a range of from 1300 to 1400 paces, and that with the loss of only one man wounded, the enemy cannot have shot well. Our infantry, in most of its reports, has spoken of the violent shell fire through which during this war it had to advance. But did this infantry find that a single one of its attacks was repulsed by the fire of the enemy's artillery alone ? No ! Then the enemy's artillery also did not get a sufficient number of hits, for it ought to be possible to demand from an artil- lery which shoots sufficiently well that the enemy shall not be able to approach it by a frontal attack when once it has opened its fire. I venture to de- clare here that, as a general rule, during the campaign of 1866 the artillery of both sides shot badly. I do not mean to say but that some batteries were exceptions to this rule. For example, I know from information which is beyond doubt that Heyden- reich's Saxon battery which, at the battle of Konig- gratz, held its position, with such stubbornness and so gloriously, on the hill to the south-east of Tresowitz, hit with shell after shell. It fired very slowly, and never at long ranges, but every one of its shells hit the mark and caused us some loss. AUSTRIAN ARTILLERY 77 This was the case with Leonhardi's battery also. At Blumenau, the Austrian artillery knocked a Prussian battery to pieces ; on the other hand, Scher- bening's four batteries produced an excellent effect in the same engagement. A great noise has also been made about the heroism with which the Austrian artillery sacrificed itself during the war to save the other arms. With respect to all the many guns which were lost, the reports of the victorious infantry declare that they in general captured only such guns as had lost their teams by fire ; the others succeeded in escaping. Most of them tried to escape, and those which were surprised had simply missed the right moment for retiring, either because they had not estimated the range and the effect of our needle-gun at its true value, or because they had not seen our infantry at all, attacking them as it did, according to the situa- tion, either by advancing against the front through very high corn, or by turning their flank. Thus then the Austrian guns which, during the campaign of 1866, fell into the hands of the enemy did not all intentionally sacrifice themselves with a full know- ledge of what they were doing, as was the case with Groben's Austrian battery in front of the southern outlet of Chlum, and with the valiant gunners in the positions of Lipa, who continued their fire until they fell dead beneath their guns. Most of them tried to escape, and if many did not succeed, they did not, owing to their desire to fly, exhaust the full effect of their guns, by waiting until the enemy had come up to their very muzzles. I maintain then what I have said : " We gunners. 78 LE TTERS ON AR TILLER Y on one side and the other, did not make a sufficient number of hits in the war of 1866." What, on the other hand, were the results of the fire during the war of 1870? Allow me to enter into that with you in another letter. To-day I am tired of writing, and you are probably equally tired of reading. LETTER IV THE FIRE-EFFECT OF THE ARTILLERY DURING THE WAR OF 1870 If I should wish to show, in comparison with the very unsatisfactory results of the fire of our artillery during the campaign of 1866, that it obtained far better in 1870, and were to give reasons for this improvement, I should be obliged to go through the official account battle by battle. But even this would not suffice, since I could not exactly show from it what portion of the effect was on each occasion to be ascribed to the artillery. I will not weary you by taking you again over all the fields of battle, but will only bring forward certain facts, and will relate some personal observations of my own together with some communications which I have received from friends. This will be sufficient to establish all data. It is not astonishing that at Weissenburg the Ger- man artillery should have exercised a decisive influence on the course of the action, since it was possessed of a considerable numerical superiority. I have related in my second letter how this artillery, posted in the foremost line of skirmishers, compelled the defenders of the Chateau of Geissberg to capitu- late, and also how at Worth it prepared the assault 8o LETTERS ON ARTILLERY on Elsasshausen. At Spicheren it began by making the enemy's artillery abandon their post on the Rothe-berg ; it next repulsed the frequent counter- attacks of the enemy on its position on the heights of Foist ; and finally secured the possession of the Rothe-berg, for we did not consider that point as having been definitely occupied by us until Stumpff's and Voss's batteries had established themselves on it, and had repulsed several of the enemy's efforts to retake it. At Vionville our artillery commenced by harassing all the enemy's camps ; it then maintained the fight in the centre until the infantry of the two divisions of the 3d corps had arrived in sufficient number ; on this occasion, unassisted by the other arms, it had to defend itself against the enemy's infantry ; later on it contributed, in conjunction with the infantry, to repulse the repeated counter-attacks of the enemy. Finally it pushed forward with the infantry when it was already dark, and assisted the latter to make certain of the victory, which had been so hard to win. At Beaumont it is less easy to dis- tinguish the effect produced by the very numerous German artillery from that caused by the infantry. Need I speak again of Saint-Privat-Gravelotte and of Sedan, those two battles which, during a great part of the time that they lasted, were battles of artillery ? It will be sufficient for me to recall that the assault on Sainte-Marie-aux-Chenes was prepared by the fire of 88 guns, in such a manner that our infantry was able, with one rush and without a stop, to push its way to the opposite edge of the village to that at which it had entered ; at Saint-Privat the attack made no progress until the artillery advanced EXPERIENCES AT SAINT-PRIVAT 8i in a mass to the line of skirmishers, and bombarded the place. As for the battle of Sedan it will suffice to throw a glance on the two plans which are attached to the official account, in order to see that the French army was enclosed in a circle of artillery. If the question be asked, "What did the projectiles of the artillery hit ?" a sufficient answer maybe found in the information given by General Douay, that in the 7th corps alone 40 wagons blew up during the battle. For in this war the international convention had resulted in the disappearance of explosive bullets from the infantry ammunition, and thus the explo- sion of the wagons, mentioned above, can only have been caused by missiles thrown by the artillery. i But these data are too general for me to consider them as sufficient ground for a proposition, which I intend to take as my point of departure for further deductions. I shall therefore beg your permission to relate some facts of which my friends and I have been eye-witnesses. At the battle of Saint-Privat, when the Guard corps advanced in line of battalion columns from Doncourt towards the village of Saint-Privat, it was received by the shells of those of the batteries of the enemy which had been pushed forward to meet us, from the crest of the heights which run from Saint- Privat to Amanvillers. The four batteries of the 1st Division of the Guard opened their fire against them in succession, that is to say, one after the other, with intervals as short as the deployment of the batteries from column would permit. Immediately afterwards they were reinforced by the corps artillery, and as each of these batteries, according to the orders G 82 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY given to them, posted itself 200 paces nearer to the enemy than the battery on its flank which had already begun to fire, our fire becoming more and more intense and accurate (since its efficacy increased in proportion as the batteries approached nearer to those of the enemy) very soon obliged the latter to retire to their principal position on the heights. We continued the artillery fight against this position at the very long range of 2500 to 2800 paces, since the General commanding the Guard corps did not wish us to go in to a distance at which we might have produced a decisive effect ; for he had received orders to wait at first until the turning movement and the flank attack, which were to be carried out by our left wing, should have produced their full result. Thus from a little after 2 P.M. until a little after 5 P.M. we continued the artillery fight in a position of which the left flank, as a whole (for there were some modifications in detail), stood a few hundred paces in front of Saint-Ail, while the right flank touched that of the Hessian artillery, which was posted at the Bois de la Cusse. The result of this artillery fight was that the enemy, at the end of only an hour, ceased to fire, and disappeared behind the hill of Saint-Privat, which bounded the view in our front. On this occasion the fire of our infantry did not annoy the enemy's artillery, nor did the latter break off the action on account of orders from superior authority, dictated by the general tactical situation. If the enemy's guns were reduced to silence, we have the right to attribute this result to the effect of our fire, and this result was obtained by us, though the enemy was equal to us in number, EXPERIENCES AT SAINT- PRIVAT 83 and superior with respect to the very favourable position which he occupied. After this first hour had passed, I kept up an extremely slow fire ; I obeyed the orders which I had received from the General commanding the Guard corps, to lengthen out the action and economise my ammunition. In the interval the attack on Sainte-Marie-aux-Ch6nes was prepared ; ten guns of my left wing, as I have several times mentioned, took part in this action, by changing front to the left in front of Saint-Ail ; so that, as they opened fire on Sainte-Marie, they pre- sented their right flank to the enemy's main position at Saint-Privat ; but his fire was so kept down that he gained no advantage by this circumstance. When one knows one's self superior, one can attempt the incredible. We could not dare to nurse the illusion that we had annihilated the great line of artillery of the enemy, of which I estimated the strength at 60 guns, by our fire, which was delivered up a slope, at a range of from 2000 to 3000 paces. But his com- plete silence and the retrograde movements which he could be seen making from Roncourt to Saint- Privat proved that he felt the superiority of our fire. When, however, between 5 and 6 P.M., the infantry of the Guard came out from under cover, and moved against Saint-Privat, the enemy's infantry and artil- lery recovered their activity all along the height, which proves that they had only sheltered themselves from our superior fire in order to reopen the fight at the decisive moment. Our infantry, rushing boldly to the attack, very soon masked our batteries, which had again opened a violent fire on the enemy LETTERS ON ARTILLERY who were now visible, and I ordered the corps artil- lery (under Scherbening) and that of the 1st Division (under Rychelberg) to accompany the infantry. The right wing of this line of artillery (4 batteries of the I st Division, and 2 batteries of the corps artillery of the Guard) galloped straight forward and reached at the same time as the skirmishers the nearest edge of the heights between Saint-Privat and Amanvillers, at the very moment when the enemy's skirmishers were giving way before our own. The left wing of the line (3 batteries of the corps artillery, and the batteries of the 2d Division of the Guard, to which, later, two other Horse Artillery batteries joined them- selves) reinforced the firing line of the infantry, which was now firing from the open ground against the walls of the village. Farther to the left the batteries did the same, but I shall make no further mention of them, as they were not under my com- mand. I did not myself see the effect produced by the batteries of my left wing, as I was with the right, and had ordered Colonel Scherbening to lead the other. But some French officers, who were taken prisoners, told us afterwards that this effect was so murderous that, if the infantry attack had taken place half an hour later, we should have found no defenders in the village. I was then with the right wing, and I advanced with the 2d heavy battery, commanded by Prittwitz. It was the first which was ready to start after having limbered up ; this operation, by the way, takes much longer in a real engagement than at peace manoeuvres : there are shells to pack away, horses which have been shot to unharness, or some little repair to be EXPERIENCES AT SAINT-PRIVAT 85 done to the gun. On this occasion the captain commanding the battery had made up his mind to advance before he received my order, and was thus ready sooner than the others. The battery galloped up the slope of the hill and joined the skirmishers as they moved to the. assault ; only three guns at first reached the top, the three others having lost horses as they advanced. At the spot where the battery came up, the crest of the hill is so wide that it almost amounts to a plateau. The enemy's skir- mishers were flying before ours. But at a distance of from 300 to 500 paces in front of us masses of the enemy, in quarter -columns, were advancing to dispute the crest of the height with our skirmishers. You can scarcely imagine the effect which the first shot of Prittwitz's produced on these masses. In an instant they became motionless as if they had re- ceived a violent electric shock. But when shell after shell began to burst in the middle of them, when our line of artillery was reinfoi'ced by my other batteries as they arrived in turn at a gallop, and by the three guns of the first battery, which succeeded in rejoining us, the columns at once took to flight. Then my 30 guns set to work to find the range by firing trial shots at different points, while on our left the fight was raging around Saint-Privat. The possession of our height was of the greatest importance. From it, to our right we could enfilade Amanvillers, for we could see its steeple above a slight undulation of the ground. To our front we were sending shell as far as the quarries of Amanvillers, near the Bois de Feves, and it was possible for us to reach, at a point near the Inn of Marengo, the end of the main road 86 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY from Metz to Saint-Privat, by which the reinforce- ments which the enemy might send from the former to the latter place must pass. But at the moment there were 'very few of our infantry on this height. The principal masses were engaged in the fight and the attacks directed against the village. Only the six companies which the General commanding the Guard corps had sent me during the cannonade to serve as our escort, were available for the attack on the height to the right of the village. But these companies had been cruelly decimated ; the battalion commander who led them lay on the ground severely wounded. The captain who had succeeded him, though his head was bleeding from a wound, managed to rally 20 or 30 men round the colours. Other small detachments were collected at different points, and were divided between the batteries, so that they might be ready to open a rapid fire at point-blank range should the enemy push towards us. When all these arrangements had been made, I placed myself behind the captain of the 4th heavy battery (Seeger), because this officer was the quickest at finding the range by his trial shots. As he gave me the ranges, I sent them to the other batteries by my orderly officers. We had not long to wait for the first movement which the enemy's infantry was to make in our direction. It advanced in quarter -column from Amanvillers, and attacked us energetically. When the head of the column became visible over the hill, our trial shots reached it at a range of 1900 paces, and my 30 guns opened a rapid fire. The enemy's infantry was enveloped in the thick smoke which the EXPERIENCES AT SAINT- PRIVAT 87 shells made as they burst. But after a very short time we saw the red trousers of the masses which were approaching us appear through the cloud. I stopped the fire. A trial shot was fired at 1700 paces range ; this was to show us the point up to which we should let them advance before reopening the rapid fire ; we did the same for the ranges of 1500, 1300, 1 100, and 900 paces. In spite of the horrible devastation which the shells caused in their ranks, these brave troops continued to advance. But at 900 paces the effect of our fire was too deadly for them ; they turned short round and fled ; we hurled shells after them as long as we could see them. Here was an infantry attack which was repulsed purely and simply by the fire of artillery. A few years later I had the opportunity of talking with an aide-de-camp of General de Ladmirault, the very man who had carried the order to make this counter- attack, and who had been present during its execu- tion. Two regiments of infantry had been despatched on this duty. The French officer said to me, " It was impossible to succeed. You have no idea what it is to have to advance under the fire of your artillery." These infantry attacks were repeated. They continued to come from the same direction. Alto- gether three were made, but the two last were not carried out with the same energy as the first. They were stopped at about i 5 00 paces in front of our line. A mass of cavalry also appeared, before the infantry attacks, with the object of trying to disen- gage the defenders of Saint-Privat from their position. The head of the mass showed itself near the farm of Marengo on the high road from Metz to Saint-Privat ; LETTERS ON ARTILLERY it halted while the column deployed. As soon as we had found the range with the help of a few trial shots, we opened a rapid fire, and our shells, falling among the crowded ranks of the cavalry, broke up the mass, and it disappeared in the same direction from which it had come. At length our infantry made their way into Saint-Privat, and the remainder of the batteries of the artillery of the Guard hastened up also, and posted themselves on the height to the right of the village. The enemy, on his part, deployed a grand line of artillery in front of us, in the low ground along the edge of the forest near the quarries of Amanvillers. We found no difficulty in silencing this artillery (it was that of the Imperial Guard), for we knew our range ; we were superior in number (the batteries of the loth corps and of the Hessian Divi- sion had reinforced our line), and we had the better position. When night came the enemy's artillery had disappeared. Allow me to tell you also what was the result of our fire at the battle of Sedan. I have already related in my second letter, how the artillery of the 1st Division of the infantry of the Guard had, at the moment when the Guard corps began to appear, passed through the Bois de Villers-Cernay by a forest road, in order to open fire from the other side of the wood. When we had reached the edge a powerful line of artillery (field guns and mitrailleuses) presented itself to our view at a range from which its fire was very effective. Most of these guns were covered by earthen parapets, and they were hurling death and destruction on the Saxons, who were already engaged from a position which lay close to EXPERIENCES AT SEDAN the right edge of the Givonne valley, and of which the left wing was extended in a nearly northerly direction beyond the farm of Haybes ; we had thus the opportunity of attacking this line energetically in flank. This was specially carried out by the three batteries which stood at the end of the wood-road, close to the edge of the forest. Three batteries only had found room at this spot, the fourth was posted on their left rear. They obtained the most brilliant result ; proof of this was furnished by the consider- able number of disabled guns and mitrailleuses which our infantry, when they advanced, found in the em- placements. It is impossible to decide how much was due to our fire, and how much to that of the artillery of the 1 2 th corps, which stood in front of us (it is well known that when shooting, every one says that he hit the hare), but this much is certain, that the guns were disabled by artillery fire. At first, it is true, the three batteries of the i st Division of the Guard had no easy work, for when they appeared the enemy fired at them ; he tried, on his part, to take them in flank, by firing obliquely from the northern end of the Bois de la Garenne, near where the Calvary of Illy stands. I suppose that this was the artillery of the French cavalry, which was held in reserve at that point. On our side we at once placed the Field Brigade of the corps artillery in position against the French batteries ; this was posted to the north of the Bois de Villers-Cernay. Although at this point also the batteries pushed on as far as possible to the front, the edge of the hill, which is very steep at this place, obliged them to come into action at a considerable distance from their target. go LETTERS ON ARTILLERY The great distance and many other circumstances rendered it difficult to observe the effect of the fire, so that it was some little time before we could be sure of its efficacy. But when once we were sure of it the enemy's artillery disappeared, and our shells very much annoyed the masses of cavalry, which at last retired towards the north. During this time the enemy had endeavoured to bring his artillery into action at a closer range against the batteries of the I st Division of the Guard, whose position had become particularly troublesome to him. A battery horsed entirely with grays trotted up from the Fond de Givonne to Givonne itself, and tried to take up its position between that village and the Bois de la Garenne. As soon as it appeared on the hill the three batteries mentioned above opened fire on it. It fell to pieces, as it were, and its ruins remained where they fell. It did not fire a single shot. A second and a third battery met with the same fate. In a French pamphlet which appeared shortly after the war, I read the following : — " The Emperor himself tried to post three batteries at the exit from the low ground of the Givonne. They were demolished without having fired a shot." It is possible that the episodes mentioned in the book entitled Sedan, by General de Wimpffen, Paris 1 87 1 (page 193, 13th line from the top, and page 34 1) 7th line), have reference to the same phase of the action. At any rate, the hour mentioned was that at which the batteries appeared which were crushed by our fire ; consequently I may have had the honour of having the Emperor in person in front of me. During this time the 2d Division of the Guard EXPERIENCES AT SEDAN 91 attacked the flank of those of the enemy's troops whose counter-attack seriously annoyed the 12th corps. (It may now have been about 10 A.M.) In this operation they were assisted by the whole of the four batteries of the Division. It is impossible to decide how much of the result obtained was due to the infantry and how much to the artillery. But the losses which the latter suffered by the fire of the chassepots proved that it advanced well into the middle of the fight. Captain von Roon and Ensign Tesdorpf were killed, and Lieutenant Baron von Tauchnitz had both legs hit by a chassepot bullet, which passed through them. On the right wing, to the north of the Bois de Villers-Cernay, the corps artillery directed its fire during the morning (after the enemy's artillery and cavalry had been driven from the ground near the "Calvary of Illy"), some- times on one point, sometimes on another, against such of the enemy as still showed themselves. At one time a battery appeared here, at another a body of troops showed itself there, and on these it opened fire. The longer the target remained in one position, the more certain and the more effective was the fire. At one moment something was seen moving to the right, in the forest of the Ardennes. By the help of field-glasses, this was made out to be some cavalry marching in two ranks towards the north, and passing through a clearing in the forest on the hill. The batteries endeavoured to find the range. With eleva- tion for a little more than 4000 paces we appeared to hit. I considered that the range was too great for the fire to have any effect, and I was about to order it to cease, when an evident disturbance in the 92 LETTERS ON ARTILLERY ranks of the enemy proved that our projectiles had reached him. We continued then to fire slowly at this moving target as long as it remained visible. I suppose that this was the same French cavalry which was at first posted at Illy, and which must have turned to the west towards Corbion, moving on an arc of a circle by forest paths, in order to take part in the charges which were directed against the 5 th and the nth corps. On the following day Lieutenant von Kaas, while doing duty as aide-de-camp, passed by this point, and found on a narrow crest which ran between very steep ravines, an entire French battery which had been abandoned there. The team of the leading gun had been blown to pieces by our shells, and the other guns could not pass it ; thus the whole battery fell into our hands, a trophy of the accuracy of our fire. These visible results increased the confidence of our men in their guns and in the regulation of the fire. They became more and more careful to obey all words of command, and to make the corrections ordered, while the tangent -scale was set with yet greater accuracy and the guns laid with greater exactness, so that their effect became more and more irresistible. The Guard corps had up to this time been ordered to remain on the defensive, with its right flank on the Belgian frontier, and thus to prevent the enemy from breaking out towards the east. When the suc- cesses obtained by the left wing of the army of the Meuse permitted it at length to assume the offensive, in order to extend a hand to the left wing of the 3d army, which was making visible progress, so that the EXPERIENCES AT SEDAN