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ARISTOTLE. 
 
WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR. 
 
 THE LIFE OF GOETHE. New Edition, partly rewritten. 1863. 
 
 STUDIES IN ANIMAL LIFE. With Coloured Frontispiece and other 
 Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 5s. 
 
 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF COMMON LIFE. With Illustrations. 2 vols. 
 1859. 
 
 SEASIDE STUDIES AT ILFRACOMBE, TENBY, SOLLY ISLES, 
 AND JERSEY. With Illustrations. Second Edition. 1860. 
 
 THE BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY -. from Thales 
 to the Present Day. Library Edition. 1857. 
 
ARISTOTLE: 
 
 A CHAPTER FROM 
 
 THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE, 
 
 INCLUDING* 
 
 ANALYSES OF AKISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC WEITINGS. 
 
 BT 
 
 GEORGE HENRY LEWES. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 SMITH, ELDEE AND CO., 65, COENHILL. 
 
 M.DCCC.LXIV. 
 
 [ The right of Translation is reserved, - ] 
 
A< HH^33 
 
Nam de famosis philosophus solus Aristoteles cum sua familia voeatus est 
 judieio omnium sapientum, quoniam ipse omnes partes philosophise digessit 
 secundum possibilitatem sui temporis, sed tamen ad finem sapiento non per- 
 venit. — Bogeb Bacon: Opus Majus, p. 4, Venet., 1750. 
 
 Noi siamo qui tra noi discorrendo familiarmente per investigar qualche 
 verita ; io non avro mai per male, che yoi mi palesiate i miei errori, e quando io 
 non avro conseguita la mente d'Aristotile, riprendetemi pur liberamente, che io 
 ve ne avrd buon grado. — Galileo Galilei : Dialoghi, XL, 128, Opere, 
 Milano, 1811. 
 
 Bur. — Volete che Platone sia un ignorante, Aristotile sia un asino, e quei 
 che l'hanno seguitati sieno insensati, stupidi, e fanatichi ? 
 
 Fra. — Figlio mio, non dico che questi sieno li pulledri, e quelli gli asini, 
 come voi volete ch'io dica ; ma come vi dissi da principio, li stimo eroi de la 
 terra, ma che non voglio credergli senza causa, ne ammetterli quelle proposi- 
 zione de le quali le contradittorie come possete aver compreso, se non siete a 
 fatto cieco e sordo, sono tanto espressamente vere. — Giobdano Bboto : De 
 I'infinito Universo, Op. Ital., II., 67, Leipzig, 1830. 
 
PE E F AC E, 
 
 The conception of evolution as the law of life, and conse- 
 quently as the law of Humanity, a conception which links the 
 Present indissolubly with the whole Past, and gives to the 
 study of history a new and deeper significance, is the creation 
 of our age. By a venial, yet fatal error, Catholicism separated 
 itself from the traditions of ancient thought ; with equal 
 exclusiveness, Protestantism opposed the great labours of the 
 Middle Ages ; and the philosophy of the 18th century in turn 
 rejected both, shouting the watchwords of Progress and 
 Enlightenment, as if these words were then heard for the first 
 time. All piety towards the Past was gone. 
 
 With clearer vision the leading minds of the 19th 
 century have attempted a reconciliation by accepting the 
 positive, and rejecting the negative tendencies of all schools. 
 History has consequently been studied with increasing 
 ardour, and with ever-widening aims. Nor is it only the 
 development of national life which History is summoned to 
 investigate. Everywhere questions of origin and develop- 
 ment have become paramount. The history of our globe, 
 and the development of animal life, are debated with a 
 fervour which would have been incomprehensible a century 
 
•yiii PREFACE. 
 
 ago. Even the anatomist is no longer contented to display 
 what the tissues are ; he must also trace their origin, and show 
 how they became what they are. 
 
 The origin and development of Science are questions of 
 high interest, and fortunately admit of being handled even by 
 those who would shrink from the gigantic difficulties of a 
 History of the Sciences. I have been for many years pre- 
 paring myself to attempt a sketch of the Embryology of Science, 
 so to speak, — an exposition of the great momenta in scientific 
 development ; and the present volume is the first portion of 
 such an exposition, which I publish separately because in itself 
 it forms a monograph, and because I may never live to com- 
 plete the larger scheme. 
 
 As a monograph it has not, I believe, been forestalled. 
 Numerous and exhaustive as are the works devoted to Aristotle's 
 moral and metaphysical writings, there is not one which 
 attempts to display, with any fulness, his scientific researches. 
 The only considerable treatise which touches on this ground,* 
 is strictly confined within the limits of Natural History. 
 
 Although Aristotle mainly represents the science of twenty 
 centuries, his scientific writings are almost unknown in England. 
 Casual citations, mostly at secondhand, and vague eulogies, 
 often betraying great misconception, are abundant ; but rare 
 indeed is the indication of any accurate appreciation extending 
 beyond two works, the De Animd, and the History of 
 Animals. The absence of translations is at once a cause and 
 a sign of this neglect. Of the 15 treatises analyzed in the 
 present volume, only the two just named have been translated, 
 
 * J. B. Meter: Aristoteles Thierlamde, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
 Zoologie, Physiologie, und alien Philosophic. Berlin, 1855. 
 
PREFACE. IX 
 
 and one of these appeared after my work was written.* Nor 
 would translations be of much help to the ordinary student, 
 unless illuminated by an ample commentary, such as would 
 place him at the requisite point of view for appreciating these 
 ancient monuments of scientific labour. I have endeavoured 
 to furnish such a point of view, as far as the limits and the 
 object of my work permitted. 
 
 Instead of following the usual plan of weaving together 
 various passages scattered through widely different works, which 
 thus presents a succinct, systematic, and often false outline 
 of the doctrines, I have analyzed the separate treatises, given 
 the doctrines precisely as Aristotle gave them (illuminating 
 them when necessary and possible from other sources), and 
 have never distorted them into modern formulae, nor eliminated 
 from them their essential or incidental absurdities. This latter 
 point is of some importance. Most expositions of Aristotle's 
 doctrines, when they have not been dictated by a spirit of viru- 
 lent detraction, or unsympathetic indifference, have carefully 
 suppressed all, or nearly all, the absurdities, and only retained 
 what seemed plausible and consistent. But in this procedure 
 their historical significance disappears. Writing as an his- 
 torian, not as a partisan, I have allowed the errors and the 
 crudities to take their rightful place beside the plausibilities 
 and truths ; thus preserving, as far as may be, the historical 
 colouring derived from the inherent weakness of early Science, 
 and the individual weakness of Aristotle. 
 
 * There is, indeed, a version of all Aristotle's works, by Thomas Taylor, in 
 10 vols. 4to. But there are two reasons for considering this as practically non- 
 existent: first, its rarity, only a very few copies having been printed ; secondly, 
 and chiefly, the translator's imperfect knowledge of science. I speak of the 
 work only from report ; but from what I have seen quoted, I believe the report 
 does him substantial justice. 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 That I have not been unmindful of what my predecessors in 
 all ages have done towards the elucidation of various points, 
 will be apparent from the notes, of which it_ is only needful to 
 say, that all citations made at secondhand have been scrupu- 
 lously acknowledged, and all references not thus acknowledged 
 may be accepted as the results of my own research. It is 
 eminently desirable that the growing practice of secondhand 
 citation should be discouraged ; since our native infirmity 
 renders us all sufficiently liable to error, without our taking on 
 ourselves the responsibility of other men's carelessness or 
 of their misrepresentations. 
 
 Headers who have but small interest in the details of 
 Biology, may perhaps object to my having sometimes — espe- 
 cially in the notes — wandered from the broad path, into the 
 windings and obscure alleys whither only a certain class will 
 care to follow. Let me plead in anticipation, that although 
 my own predilections have seduced me into adding details 
 for the sake of a class, I have not sacrificed any general 
 interest to such predilections, but merely given these details 
 in addition. 
 
 The first draught of this volume was completed in 
 February, 1862. The rewriting was finished in July, 1862 ; 
 but fresh researches, and many revisions, have retarded its 
 publication. 
 
 The Priory, 
 
 January, 1864. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I. The Life op Aristotle 1 
 
 II. The Dawn of Science 24 
 
 HE. Ancient Science 45 
 
 IV. The Metaphysical and Scientific Methods 65 
 
 V. Plato's Method 101 
 
 VI. Aeistotle's Method 108 
 
 VII. Aristotle's Physics, Meteorology, and Mechanics 122 
 
 VHI. Aristotle's Anatomy 154 
 
 IX. Aristotle's Physiology 171 
 
 X. General Principles of Biology.. 182 
 
 XI. ANTICIPATIOSL.PJ~MeBERN DISCOVERIES 197 
 
 XII. Life and Mind : Be AnimI 221 
 
 XIII. On the Senses 246 
 
 XIV. On Memory, Sleep, Dreams, and Longevity 256 
 
 XV. " The History of Animals " 269 
 
 XVI. "On the Pabts of Animals" 292 
 
 XVLL On Generation and Development 325 
 
 XVIII. Conclusion 376 
 
 Index 383 
 
ARISTOTLE. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 THE LIFE OP ARISTOTLE. 
 
 § 1. It is difficult to speak of Aristotle .without exaggera- 
 tion : he is felt to be so mighty, and is known to be so wrong. 
 History, surveying the whole scope of his pretensions, gazes 
 on him with wonder. Science, challenging these separate 
 pretensions, and testing their results, regards them with in- 
 difference ; an indifference easily exasperated into antagonism 
 by the clamorous urgency of unauthenticated praise. It is dif- 
 ficult to direct the opposing streams of criticism into the broad 
 equable current of a calm appreciation ; because the splendour 
 of his fame perpetuates the memory of his failure ; and to be 
 just we must appreciate both. His intellect was piercing and 
 comprehensive; his attainments surpassed those of every 
 known philosopher ; his influence has only been exceeded by 
 the great founders of Eeligions; nevertheless, if we now 
 estimate the product of his labours in the discovery of posi- 
 tive truths, it appears insignificant, when not erroneous. 
 None of the great germinal discoveries in science are due to 
 him, or to his disciples. His vast and active intellect gave 
 an impulse to philosophy, and for twenty centuries held the 
 
 1 
 
2 THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. [CHAP. I. 
 
 world in awe. Then came a change; the long-murmuring 
 spirit of rebellion grew strong enough to dethrone him. Ages 
 of servility had raised him to an unexampled eminence ; in 
 the tumult of revolution this pedestal became a pillory. 
 "When the Arabs kill a lion, their released terror vents itself 
 in insults on the harmless corpse : they kick, and spit upon, 
 and apostrophize in sarcasms the helpless image of their former 
 dread. It was thus with the great lion of Stagira. Men who 
 a few years before would have burned a presumptuous critic 
 for daring to think that the great teacher could be wrong, 
 were now laughing to scorn the method and conclusions of the 
 rejected sophist. 1 
 
 Our task is twofold : we shall constantly have to bear in 
 mind the relative (or historical) and the absolute (or scientific) 
 aspect which his achievements present ; never permitting our 
 natural and justifiable admiration for the effort, to disguise 
 our appreciation of its result ; nor, conversely, permitting our 
 contempt or disregard of the result, to mislead us into an 
 unjust depreciation of the effort. " It is the destiny and glory 
 
 1 The virulence with which some of the reformers attacked him is at times 
 amusing. A good example is Ramus : Scholarum Physicarum libri octo, 1565 
 (which I only know at second hand). Less virulent, but not less decided, is the 
 antagonism of Nizolids : De veris Principiis et vera Ratione Philosophandi 
 contra pseudo Philosophos, Parma, 1553. He complains indignantly of the 
 Greeks being followed, " perinde ac si essent oracula qusedam Delphica, aut 
 arcana divinitus revelata, qua? nullo pacto falsa esse possent," and he compares 
 Aristotle to the cuttlefish escaping in a cloud of ink — perhaps the earliest 
 example of this now threadbare comparison. Leibnitz thought this treatise 
 worth republishing, and wrote a preface to it ; see Tiraboschi : Storia della 
 Litteratura Italiana, 1812,, VH. 44, where he truly says that if Nizolius is 
 right in combating the Peripatetics, he is less happy in the attempt to replace 
 them. A more formidable antagonist is Telesio, whose work, De Natura 
 Iterumjuxta propria Principia libri novem, Naples, 1586, 1 shall have to quote 
 hereafter. Even more virulent is Patrizio (see Note 9). Giordano Bruno, 
 though relentless towards the peripatetics of his day, is more respectful to 
 Aristotle. The same must be said of Galileo and Descartes ; and notably 
 of Taurellus, in his attack on C^esalpinus, punningly entitled Alpes Casce, 
 hoc est A. Casalpini monstrosa et superba Dogmata discussa et excussa, Frank- 
 fort, 1650. No longer worthy of more than a passing glance is Basso : Phi- 
 losophies Naturalis adversus Aristotelem libri XII., Elzevir, 1649, though once 
 
CHAP. I.] THE LIFE OE ARISTOTLE. 3 
 
 of the anatomist of Stagira," says Isidore St. Hilaiee, 2 
 "to have had before him simply precursors and after him 
 only disciples." In yielding our most ample tribute, we 
 must be careful to make that tribute generously just : 
 we must hold the balance fairly, weighing the failures 
 with the successes. In an attempt so delicate, I cannot pre- 
 tend to have preserved the balance; but I can affirm that 
 it has been my constant aim; and I wish that I could be 
 certain of so expressing myself as to prevent readers from 
 misconstruing either the praise or the blame which will have 
 to be pronounced. The risk must be run; both praise and 
 blame must be expressed without reticence. Piety towards the 
 Past demands of us to be ready with our gratitude for all good 
 work ; and an equal piety towards the Present commands us 
 to beware of an exaggeration which would convert panegyric 
 of the departed into insults against the living. It is the glory 
 of Science to be constantly progressive. After the lapse of 
 a century, the greatest teacher, on reappearing among men, 
 would have to assume the attitude of a learner. His point of 
 view would no longer command the whole field of knowledge. 
 The very seed sown by himself would have sprung up into 
 a forest to obscure the view. But we who rejoice in the 
 grandeur of the forest must not forget by whom the seeds 
 were sown. His heritors, we are richer, but not greater than 
 he. " The similitude which many have fancied between the 
 superiority of the moderns to the ancients, and the elevation 
 of a dwarf on the back of a giant, is altogether false and 
 puerile. Neither were they giants nor are we dwarfs ; but all 
 of us men of the same standard, and we the taller of the two 
 
 highly prized. Campanella I have not read. Gassexdi is an uncompro- 
 mising adversary (see Note 18). If we except the two great luminous intellects 
 Galileo and Descartes, the inferiority of these adversaries to the man 
 they attack is so conspicuous that nothing but sympathy with their revolutionary 
 fervour can make them tolerable. 
 
 2 Isidobe Geoitboy St. Hilaire: Histoire Glnhak des Begnes Organiques, 
 Paris, 1854, 1. 19. 
 
 1-2 
 
4 THE LITE OE ARISTOTLE. [CHAP. I. 
 
 by adding their height to our own : provided always that we 
 do not yield to them in study, attention, vigilance and love of 
 truth, for if these qualities be wanting, so far from mounting 
 on the giant's shoulders, we throw away the advantage of our 
 own stature by remaining prostrate on the ground." 3 
 
 § 2. The ancient biographies of Aristotle have been 
 gathered by Buhle into the first volume of his valuable but 
 unfinished edition of the Opera Omnia. Meagre in detail, 
 and of suspicious authenticity, these are all that moderns 
 have to rely on for the facts of Aristotle's career. And as 
 I was aware, from previous experience, that the whole race 
 of compilers is far from trustworthy, and that little con- 
 fidence is to be placed in an ancient compiler (though to 
 moderns it generally seems as if anything written in Greek 
 must have a peculiar authenticity, even nonsense wearing an 
 august air in that language), it occurred to me that perhaps 
 the mere registration of the dates at which these several 
 biographies were compiled, might amply justify scepticism 
 as to their accuracy. All ancient writers, except, perhaps, 
 Thucydides, are uncritical in their reception of facts. ' Even 
 in our own critical age, as it is rashly called, we find it 
 extremely difficult to ascertain the truth respecting celebrated 
 persons ; so powerful is the mythical tendency, and so fungus- 
 like the rapidity with which lies are propagated. But the 
 ancients had not risen to the conception of what constitutes 
 evidence ; they were as credulous as children ; and accepted 
 almost any marvel which was narrated gravely. 
 
 What then are the dates, or thereabouts ? Aristotle was 
 born b.c. 384. Diogenes Laektius, whose narrative is the 
 fullest, the best, and the most generally followed, was born, at 
 the earliest, nearly six centuries later — i.e. a.d. 200 ; and it is 
 even supposed that he was as late as Constantino. The next 
 on our list is Ammonius (if the work be really his), who comes 
 
 8 This fine passage is quoted from Ludoviocs Vives by Dugald Stewaet. 
 
CHAP. I.] THE LIFE OP ARISTOTLE. 5 
 
 eight centuries after his hero, in a.d. 460; and that these 
 eight centuries have not been profitably employed in sifting 
 tradition, and bringing it nearer to accuracy, may be gathered 
 from a single detail noticed by Btjhle, 4 that Aristotle is made 
 a pupil of Socrates, who died just fifteen years before the 
 Stagirite was born. The nearest biographer, in point of time, 
 is Dionysius of Halicarnassus (b.c. 50), and this gives a gap 
 of three centuries ; moreover, one meagre page comprises all 
 he has to say. Hesychius was born a.d. 500 — nearly nine 
 centuries too late ; the date of Suidas is uncertain, but pro- 
 bably not earlier than the eleventh century of our era. 
 
 These writers contradict each other on separate points. 
 What means have we for deciding between them ? They 
 may have had contemporary documents as their authorities ; 
 but what guarantee have we for the accuracy of these docu- 
 ments ? It is but just three hundred years since Shakspbaeb 
 was born ; throughout this period he has been prized, and 
 written about ; compilers have done their worst upon this 
 subject ; yet what do we authentically know of his life ? above 
 all, what value do we attach to the earliest biography, that by 
 Eowb ? 
 
 If, therefore, modern scholars have pieced together the 
 various details traditionally preserved about Aristotle, we 
 
 4 " Quis enim Ammonium credat tain absurdum, ut Aristotelem per tres annos 
 Socratis, qui diu ante mortuus esset, discipulum, eundemque Alexandri in 
 itinere per Asiam usque ad Indos comitem fuisse, temere asseruerit ? " Buhle : 
 Arist. Opera, I., 51. It has been suggested that instead of Socrates we 
 should read the school of Socrates; but there was no such school. Mr. 
 Blakesley, by a plausible emendation, suggests Xenockates as the name 
 which by corruption has become Sockates. This, however, ill accords with 
 the statement of Ammonius ; nor have we any evidence that Xenocrates 
 taught till many years afterwards. During the revision of this chapter there 
 has fallen in my way a copy of the Greek text of Ammonius, from the Library 
 of St. Mark's at Venice, now first published by Dr. Robbe : Vita Aristotelis 
 ex codice Marciano Grace nunc primum edita, Lugd.-Batav., 1861, which gives 
 the same reading as the old Latin translation, previously our only guide. Here 
 is the passage: krUtv Si yevopevog eirra nal dixa, tov HvGoi Qtov , xpi\aavTOZ 
 avTif fAouoipuv irap' 'ASijvatoic, 0oir$ XuiKpam, xal avvijv tov, p-ixP l Tt\evTtjg 
 abrov xpovov okiyov ovra. 
 
6 THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. [CHAP. I. 
 
 may accept their narrative as the best which is now pro- 
 curable, though with no firm reliance on any side when 
 separate points are under discussion. I shall not, there- 
 fore, occupy the reader's time with discussions, where 
 decisive evidence is necessarily deficient ; but tell the story, 
 by using at my own discretion the narratives given in the 
 latest and most authoritative treatises, 5 leaving the unprofit- 
 able task of weighing imponderable evidence to those who 
 delight in such ingenuities. 
 
 § 3. Stagira — which, Boeckh says, should correctly be 
 written Stageiros — was a town in Northern Greece, on the 
 western coast of the Strymonic Gulf (now called the Gulf of 
 Contezza) just where the coast begins to take a southerly 
 bend. Its situation has been compared with the southern 
 part of the Bay of Naples. Immediately south, a promontory, 
 like the Punta della Campanella, and nearly in the same lati- 
 tude, runs out in an easterly direction, thus effectually screen- 
 ing the little town and its harbour, Capros, from the stormy 
 squalls of the iEgean. Stagira is said to resemble Sorrento, not 
 only in the general disposition of its coast lines, but also in 
 the terraced windings of its multitudinous orange and lemon 
 groves. 6 
 
 § 4. In this picturesque seaport, Aristotle was born, B.C. 384, 
 that is, exactly one century after the birth of Herodotus ; one 
 century before the foundation of the Alexandrian library, and 
 the execution of the Septuagint version of the Scriptures ; and 
 two centuries before the death of Philopcemen, " the last of 
 the Greeks," when the Achaean league dissolved before the 
 Boman power, and Greece merged her splendid existence in 
 the dependence of a Boman province. 
 
 6 Buhle, I, 80-104. Eittee : History of Philosophy, trans, by Morrison, 
 1839, III. Blakesley : Life of Aristotle, 1839. Stahr, art. Arist. in 
 Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography, 1844. Brandis : Aristoteles 
 seine Academischen Zeitgenossen und ndclisten Nachfolger, 1853. Zeller : Die 
 Philosophie der Griechen, 1 860, II. 
 
 6 Blakeslet : Op. eft., p. 12. 
 
CHAP. I.] THE LIFE 01? ARISTOTLE. 7 
 
 His father, Nicomachus, was a physician and an Ascle- 
 piad; but whether he had any better claim to the honour 
 of descent from iEsculapius than so many others who usurped 
 the title, 7 or simply belonged to the famous guild, cannot 
 now be determined. It is certain that he was a physician of 
 repute, attached to Amyntas II., the father of the Macedonian 
 Philip. The fact of his profession, coupled with the fact of 
 Stagira being on the sea-coast, may have been of moment in 
 determining his son's studies in the direction of physiology 
 and marine zoology. There is indeed a .passage in Galen, 
 often quoted, which affirms that among the Asclepiads chil- 
 dren were taught dissection, just as they were taught reading 
 and writing, thus becoming as familiar with anatomy as with 
 the alphabet. But this must be accepted with a large handful 
 of salt ; for, as we shall see presently, the Asclepiads, and 
 Aristotle himself, were very imperfectly acquainted with 
 anatomy. The statement, however, even in its exaggeration, 
 points to the important fact that anatomy was not neglected, 
 but formed one part of the boy's education ; and this isolated 
 fact sums up all we know of that education. 
 
 § 5. It is unknown how long he remained at Stagira before 
 accompanying his father to the court of Amyntas, at Pella, 
 where he learned to know and ingratiate himself with Philip, 
 who was hereafter to befriend him. Everything at this epoch 
 is conjecture, and conjecture may amuse, but cannot instruct. 
 
 § 6. At the age of seventeen he lost his father. This 
 is the next isolated fact which has been recorded, and it is 
 important. He thus became his own master, with the com- 
 mand of a large fortune ; a perilous condition to most youths 
 the temptation to squander his fortune in frivolous dissipation 
 must have been great, and could only be withstood by an 
 unusual seriousness of mind, or unusual felicity in his social 
 connections. So plausible is the supposition that a youth 
 
 7 See Hakless: De Medicis Veteribus " Aschpiades" dictis, a work only 
 known to me at second hand. 
 
8 THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. [CHAP. I. 
 
 thus circumstanced will be ruined, that idle gossip, which always 
 flits about a celebrated name, invented a story of his having 
 wasted his means, and having been reduced to sell drugs for 
 a subsistence ; a story which, however, found refutation even 
 among the ancients, and is wholly irreconcilable with the 
 known facts of his subsequent career. 
 
 He was young, ardent, ambitious, rich. Athens, the 
 glory of the world, though her political sun was setting, the 
 luminous centre of Philosophy and Art, beckoned to him, as 
 Rome and Florence beckon to the students of our day. Plato 
 taught there, and might admit him to the groves of the Academy. 
 To listen to this " old man eloquent," was a rare attraction, 
 and naturally it drew him to Athens. Arrived there, he 
 found that Plato was absent. Awaiting the great teacher's 
 return, he qualified himself for discipleship Joy three years 
 of arduous study. Had he squandered his wealth in dissipa- 
 tion, as the babblers reported, he could not have collected 
 the treasure of books which he is known to have bought; 
 for in those days it was almost as costly to create a library 
 of books as in our own to create a gallery of pictures. 8 
 To collect books and to read them are not always the same 
 thing. "With him they were one; and Plato, alluding to 
 the extraordinary passion he displayed, called him " the 
 reader." His writings show how diligently he had studied 
 all accessible literature ; and it is to his punctilious quotation 
 
 8 According to Gellius, he paid for the works of Speusippus alone three 
 Attic talents, that is about 700A of our money, a sum not to be spared out of 
 the profits of drug-selling unless by a merchant prince. In our own days 1,0007. 
 has been paid for a rare edition of an Italian poet ; but that was merely the 
 avidity of a collector's furor backed by the wealth of an English noble- 
 man. Curious details on the price of books in the Middle Ages may be read in 
 Muratori : Dissertazione sopra Vantichitd, Italiane, Diss. XLIII. Com- 
 pare also Heeken : Gesckichte der Classischen Litteratur im Mittelalter, 
 Werke, 1822, IV. In our days of cheap literature— cheap, because we have 
 cheap paper, and that because we wear linen instead of woollen clothes 
 —these details seem to render the darkness of the dark ages more in- 
 telligible. 
 
CHAP. I.] THE LIFE OE ARISTOTLE. 9 
 
 of his predecessors that we are greatly indebted for the 
 preservation of many fragments of ancient thought. So 
 little justice is there in Bacon's sarcasm, that like an 
 Eastern despot he strangled his rivals in order to reign 
 peaceably. 9 
 
 § 7. When Aristotle came to Athens the splendour of 
 her life was fast departing, and near at hand was the towering 
 greatness of Macedon, so soon to overshadow her on the 
 plains of Chseroneia. The sun was setting on the Age of 
 Pericles, and was rising on the Age of Alexander. For 
 sixty years Pericles had ceased to thunder from the 
 bema ; had ceased to communicate his agitating stimulus to 
 art and politics ; had ceased to adorn the beautiful city with 
 
 9 Aristotle's precepts, no less than his practice, answer this accusation. See 
 Metaph., II., 1, 995; De Colo, I., 10, 279 ; and De Anima, I., 1. Bacon 
 simply echoed Patkizio, whose enmity was virulent and avowed, and who de- 
 clares that one cause of this hatred was the abuse which Aristotle heaps on the 
 writers from whom his best ideas are stolen. Patkitii: Discussionum Peripa- 
 teticarum tomi quatuor, Bale, 1581, from which learned but untrustworthy work 
 some moderns have largely drawn. The first volume contains a life and a list of 
 the extant works, with an account of all the Peripatetics. In the third book there 
 is a valuable collection of the passages in which A. refers to his own writings ; 
 a collection subsequently used and expanded by Bitter, but without the 
 acknowledgment due in such a case. The second volume gives an exposition of 
 the points of agreement between the doctrines of A. and Plato, and the older 
 writers. In the third volume the points of difference are noted. In the preface 
 he complains of the insults to philosophers (p. 291-2), and sarcastically adds that 
 there is no mention of Hippocrates. (Some moderns, coupling this supposed 
 silence with the silence of Thucydides, have argued that Hippocrates lived 
 after Aristotle ; but the fact is that Hippocrates is mentioned, and in the 
 Politics there is a sketch of his views on climate.) In the fourth volume 
 Patkizio gives full expression to his antagonism. Giordano Bruno, in spite 
 of his own opposition to the peripatetic system, speaks with measureless con- 
 tempt of Patrizio as " un stereo di pedante Italiano che ha imbrattati tanti 
 quinterni con le sue discussione peripatetiche," and vows that he has not under- 
 stood th$ Stagirite, but only read and reread him " cucito, scucito e confeiito 
 con mill* altri greci autori amici e nemici di quello, et al fine fatta una grandis- 
 sima fatica non sola senza profitto alcuno, ma etiam con un grandissimo 
 sproposito." De la Causa Principio et Una {Opere ltd., Leipzig, 1830), I., 250. 
 Patrizio had many admirers and imitators; a notable one is Basso (see Note 1). 
 I have not had the courage to extend my wanderings further through this 
 rubbish of denunciation and criticism heaped up by the iconoclasts, 
 
10 THE LIFE OP ARISTOTLE. [CHAP. I. 
 
 his munificence and taste. Sophocles and Eueipides were 
 gone ; and the grand and pathetic drama they had unfolded 
 to applauding thousands, had fallen into the hands of 
 ChjEEemon, Cleophon, and Theodeotes (the last the friend 
 of Aristotle), whose efforts to make rhetoric supply the place 
 of poetry pointed unmistakably towards decline. Aristo- 
 phanes no longer laughed at the absurdities, and scourged 
 the corruptions of his time, in riotous and reckless farces, 
 which too often wilfully misrepresented persons and ideas 
 essentially wise and noble. No great prose writer except 
 Xenophon remained ; not one poet of eminence. 
 
 But if a sunset, it was still a glorious sunset, with some 
 splendour of the after-glow. Great memories swelled 
 ambitious minds. Powerful vibrations were still felt from 
 Salamis, Marathon, and Platsea. Isoobates upheld the 
 renown of Athenian eloquence ; and the greater Demosthenes 
 was preparing for his matchless displays. Peaxiteles was 
 at work upon statues, the very copies of which were 
 for centuries to be the despair of artists. Scopas, the' 
 sculptor of the immortal Niobe and the Venus of Milo, had 
 enchanted the Athenians with his Furies. Diogenes, with 
 drastic energy, despised the citizens from his tub. The 
 schools were crowded with listeners to many teachers. In 
 every direction there was intellectual activity and social 
 ferment. A young, keen intellect would find there abundant 
 stimulus. 
 
 § 8. As years ripened his intelligence, and free intercourse 
 with eminent men procured him the advantages and oppor- 
 tunity of display, Aristotle gradually won for himself a 
 foremost position. He came there a raw ambitious youth, not 
 only with the disadvantages of inexperience, but with those 
 disadvantages of accent and manner which, in the eyes of 
 supercilious Athenians — the Frenchmen of antiquity — made 
 him seem almost a barbarian. These, however, he soon 
 modified. One fact recorded of him — that he was some- 
 
CHAP. I.] THE LIFE OE ARISTOTLE. 11 
 
 what given to foppery in costume — implies an eager sensitive- 
 ness to approbation, which would have directed his attention 
 to anything provincial in his air. Keen, witty, logical, and 
 learned, he was a brilliant talker, and in that city of talkers 
 could hold his own with the best ; not even refraining from 
 controversy with his great master. Without pretending to 
 decide the much vexed question of his ingratitude towards 
 Plato, I must express my own disbelief in the accusation ; 
 although it is very credible, and by no means derogatory to 
 him, that, differing from his master in cast of mind, as well as 
 on certain fundamental points of philosophy, he should often, 
 during the seventeen years they were together, have been 
 seduced into warm, and sometimes irritating, discussion with 
 one whom, on the whole, he considered as the noblest of 
 thinkers. All opposition is apt to be construed as an offence ; 
 and if Aristotle's criticisms and allusions to Plato are not 
 always remarkable for their judicial calmness, they have never 
 any approach to irreverence. Often in antagonism — how could 
 this sincerely be avoided? — he is never in hostility to 
 Plato. Indeed, in the Ethics, he complains of the necessity 
 of attacking doctrines held by " dear friends," adding — 
 "It is our duty to slay our own flesh and blood where 
 the cause of Truth is at stake, especially as we are philo- 
 sophers; loving both, it is our sacred duty to give the 
 preference to Truth." It is a timidity unworthy of a noble 
 mind to shrink from intellectual opposition as an offence 
 against friendship, and to suppress convictions for fear of 
 misconstruction . 
 
 § 9. Aristotle remained twenty years at Athens. During 
 seventeen of these years, Plato was first his master, and then 
 his friend. His health was, like that of most ardent brain- 
 workers, delicate. He was short and slender in person ; he 
 had small eyes, and an affected lisp. Somewhat given to 
 sarcasm in conversation, he made, of course, many enemies. 
 On hearing that some one had vituperated him in his absence 
 
12 THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. [CHAP. I. 
 
 he humourously said, " If he pleases, he may heat me too — 
 in my absence." His heart was kind, as was manifest in 
 certain acts, and is expressed in this saying, " He who has 
 many friends has no friends," which profoundly touches 
 the very core of the subject, and may he paired off with this 
 other saying of his, " A friend is one soul in two bodies." 
 When asked how we should behave towards friends, he said, 
 " As we should wish them to behave towards us." 
 
 Advancing age and development, no less than the decidedly 
 scientific bias impressed upon his studies, necessarily caused 
 him to take up an independent position with respect to Plato, 
 who had little taste for physical science, and whose intellect 
 naturally withdrew from those very subjects to which his young 
 rival was, by nature and early bias, strongly determined. With- 
 out absolutely opening a rival school, Aristotle gradually 
 gathered round him a circle of admirers, and began, during 
 the last years of his Athenian residence, to give lectures. 10 
 
 § 10. Among the listeners was Heemias, the tyrant (or 
 ruler) of Atarneus, and to him, by invitation, Aristotle went, 
 on quitting Athens, after Plato's death. His companion on this 
 journey was Xenoceates, the best loved of Plato's disciples. 
 What was the object of their visit ? It has been conjectured 
 that Heemias invited them to frame a political constitution. 
 The scheme, if such it were, was frustrated by the assassina- 
 tion of Hermias, and the fall of Atarneus into Persian hands. 
 The two philosophers escaped to Mytilene, carrying with them 
 Pythias, the adopted daughter of their friend and patron ; and 
 Aristotle subsequently married her, out of compassion for her 
 defenceless position, and respect for the memory of his 
 murdered friend. Worthy of special reprobation, as indicating 
 the peculiar infelicity with which calumny often selects its 
 
 10 The story of his haying practised medicine at this time, which is founded 
 on his interest in that art, is refuted by his express statement in the work, 
 De Divinatione, I., 468, that in medicine he was only one of the laity, though 
 accustomed to philosophize upon it. 
 
CHAP. I.] THE LIFE OP ARISTOTLE. 13 
 
 points of attack, is the fact that his friendship for Heemias, 
 and generosity towards Pythias, furnished the cruel thought- 
 lessness of scandal with its bitterest accusations. Here 
 once more may be seen how in this life men are punished 
 for their virtues ; as a set-off, perhaps, to the rewards which 
 often crown their vices. So little reliance can be placed on 
 these ancient scandals, that some call Pythias the daughter, 
 and others the concubine, of Hebmias. It is, perhaps, a 
 slight objection to both these assertions that Heemias was 
 an eunuch. 
 
 § 11. To the memory of Hermias he raised a statue at 
 Delphi, with an inscription ; on which act was founded a 
 charge of impiety. Nor was the memory of Pythias, who 
 died after giving birth to a daughter, less honoured by the 
 grateful husband. In his will he enjoined that her bones 
 should be- laid beside his own. 
 
 § 12. He had not long been at Mytilene before he received 
 from Philip of Macedon the magnificent offer to undertake 
 the charge of the young Alexandee. From this it is evident 
 that his reputation, while at Athens, must have been consider- 
 able. To Macedon he went. His princely pupil was then 
 fourteen : young enough to receive a determining bias, old 
 enough to revere the intellectual force which impressed 
 that bias. The respectful love which men of fine intellect and 
 generous sympathies so gladly give to their first instructors is 
 well expressed in the saying of Alexandee, that he honoured 
 Aristotle no less than his own father ; for if to the one he 
 owed life, to the other he owed that which made life valuable. 
 
 That the tutor and pupil might promenade in the cool 
 shade during the hours of instruction, Philip caused a gym- 
 nasium to be built in a grove.; and even so late as the days of 
 Plutarch, the traveller might still see the shady walks 
 (7T£ptVarot) with their stone seats for resting-places. Aristotle 
 remained seven years in Macedon ; but only four of these 
 were given to the education of the prince,* who at eighteen 
 
14 THE LITE OE ARISTOTLE. [CHAP. I. 
 
 became Eegent. Thus while Demosthenes was thundering 
 against the ambition of Philip, who claimed for Macedon the 
 hegemony of Greece, Aristotle was stimulating and enlarging 
 the mind of Alexander, who was soon to carry the silver 
 shields of Macedon from Syria to Egypt, from Candahar to 
 the Indus, and from the Indus to the Persian Gulf. Popular 
 fiction makes the great teacher accompany the great conqueror 
 on this splendid expedition; and one regrets that this is a 
 fiction. There was, indeed, other work for Aristotle to do, 
 which the life of camps would hardly have advanced. Still 
 the expedition would have been a vast experience for him ; 
 and his observing mind could not have beheld that varied, 
 shifting panorama without great result. To have passed with 
 the conquering hosts to Tyre ; to have witnessed the foundation 
 of Alexandria ; to have lived through the agitations of the 
 day at Arbela, when the countless hosts of Darius were 
 assembled on the plain beneath the Koordish mountains, and 
 there were slaughtered like sheep ; to have witnessed the suc- 
 cessive subjection of Babylon and Susa, of Persepolis and 
 Ecbatana ; and finally to see the young Dionysus, maddened 
 with the insolence of success, cut off suddenly in his youth ; 
 these were grand experiences which one regrets to think were 
 lost to Aristotle. 
 
 § 13. Although, as I said, the relation between master 
 and pupil lasted only four years, the relation of friendly counsel 
 on the one side, and magnificent gratitude on the other con- 
 tinued. Had it not been for Alexander's princely aid, Aris- 
 totle's enormous collections could not have been made. The 
 aid is unexampled. It is said, but not on trustworthy 
 authority, that Alexander presented him with the sum of 
 eight hundred talents, which represents nearly two hundred 
 thousand pounds of our money. Few critical readers will 
 believe that ; and Schneider, in his edition of the Historia 
 Animalium, quotes with approbation the estimate of a prede- 
 cessor, who calculates that the whole revenue of Macedon 
 
CHAP. I.] THE LIFE OE AKISTOTLE. 15 
 
 would not have furnished such a sum. Still if we make 
 liberal deductions, and strike off two thirds of this sum, it 
 leaves a splendid surplus. The enormity of the exaggeration 
 points to an enormous sum. Add to this the statement of 
 Pliny, that Alexander gave orders to his hunters, game- 
 keepers, fishermen, and bird-catchers to furnish the philo- 
 sopher with all the material he might desire — an order which 
 at once placed several thousand men at his service. 11 But at 
 the same time remember it is Pliny who makes the state- 
 ment, and for untrustworthiness of statement he cannot 
 easily be surpassed ; so that even here an immense exaggera- 
 tion may be suspected ; and to sum up, remember that although 
 Aristotle must have had a large collection of materials before 
 he could have written his work on animals, Humboldt declares j 
 that there is no trace in that work of any acquaintance with < 
 animals first known through Alexander's expedition.-^ 
 
 § 14. After an absence of twelve years, B.pj_35i>, Aristotle 
 reappeared in Athens. He found the Academy already occu- 
 pied by his friend Xenoceates ; so that some other place had 
 to be sought where he might open a school. This he found at 
 the Lyceum, a gymnasium in the vicinity of the temple of 
 Apollo Lykeios, founded by Pisistratus, and embellished by 
 Pericles. It was the most splendid of the Athenian gymnasia, 
 consisting of a mass of edifices surrounded with gardens, 
 avenues, and a sacred grove. It had its spacious courts 
 with porticos, theatres for professors, covered promenades, 
 baths, an arena for wrestling matches, and a stadium for foot- 
 races. The walls were adorned with paintings ; the gardens 
 and walks were furnished with seats. But we must not sup- 
 pose, as many suppose, that this establishment was placed 
 
 11 Alexandre) Magno rege inflammato cupidine animalium naturas noscendi, 
 delegataque hac commentatione Aristoteli, summo in omni doctrina viro, 
 aliquot millia hominum intotius Asja? Grseciaeque tractu parere jussa, omnium 
 quos venatus, aucupia, piscatusque alebant ; quibusque vivaria, armenta, 
 alvearia, piscinae, aviaria in cura erant ; ne quid usquam genitum ignoraretur 
 ab eo."— Pliny : Hist. Nat., VHL, 16. 
 
16 THE LIFE OP ARISTOTLE. [OHAP. I. 
 
 under the direction of Aristotle, or that he had any voice in 
 its affairs. He simply received permission to teach in the 
 morning and evening at the peripatos, 12 a permission which 
 was the more acceptable because the shady walks offered 
 facilities to his accustomed habit of walking to and fro during 
 the delivery of lectures. The name of Peripatetics is commonly 
 supposed to have been given to his disciples on account of 
 this habit ; but as, according to the testimony of Theopheastus 
 and Ltcon, the lecture-place itself was named o irtpnrarog, 
 the locality probably gave ,the title to his school. This 
 suggestion is countenanced by the practice in other cases ; 
 for we find the schools designated by the places where they 
 were founded, unless when some peculiarity in doctrine gave 
 the title : thus the Academy, the Porch, the Garden, Megara, 
 and Cyrene, severally gave names to schools ; but never was a 
 name borrowed from some casual peculiarity in the mode of 
 lecturing. Moreover, Aristotle was by no means singular in 
 this practice of promenading while he taught. 
 
 § 15. For thirteen years he continued teaching, and 
 composing his immortal treatises ; powerfully impressing the 
 crowd of eager disciples, but probably regarded with angry 
 suspicion by the patriots, owing to his connection with 
 Auexandek. And now came the electric shock, shaking 
 Athens to her foundations, and agitating her with tumultuary 
 hopes : the Great Conqueror was no more ! At once, and 
 with exultant energy, the anti-Macedonian party took the 
 lead in public affairs. Aristotle necessarily was in peril ; 
 for although, in truth, his life had been blameless of political 
 intrigue, and no colourable accusation could be raised 
 against him on that score, if only because he was excluded 
 from political influence ; 13 yet as a foreigner, a philosopher, 
 and a friend of Macedon, he was trebly odious to the political 
 
 12 Maiteb: Hist, de I' (cole d'Alexandrie, Paris, 1840, 1., 30. 
 
 13 This political attitude is conspicuously set forth in Mr. Congebve's intro- 
 duction to his edition of the Politics, London, 1855. 
 
CHAP. I.J THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. 17 
 
 leaders ; and a pretext for accusation was raised on a ground 
 where such pretexts are always easily raised and are always 
 dangerous — irreligion. He was accused of blasphemy, and 
 of paying divine honours to mortals. And who were these 
 mortals he had honoured ? His friend and his wife. The 
 charge may seem frivolous ; but too well he knew the temper 
 of the multitude to hope that the absurdity of the charge 
 would be a guarantee for his safety. Mobs seldom reason, 
 rarely examine. The blameless life and lofty soul of Socrates 
 had been no defence against the charges of Mblittjs ; and 
 Aristotle quitted Athens, "not to give the Athenians a second 
 opportunity of committing a sacrilege against philosophy." 
 
 § 16. He retired to Chalcis in Eubcea.. There he wrote 
 an elaborate defence of his conduct, and exposed the calum- 
 nies circulated about him. But his health,, always delicate, 
 and severely tasked by unremitting study, rapidly gave way. 
 The Athenians, on his refusal to appear in answer to the 
 summons of the Areopagus, deprived him of citizenship, 
 and all the honours that had been conferred upon him. An 
 idle sentence of death was passed ; but nature had already 
 written that sentence in terms that were not idle. He died 
 in the sixty-third year of his age, B.C.. 322, only a few months 
 before the great orator, Demosthenes, also an exile. 
 
 § 17. His will, which maybe read in Diogenes Laeetius, 
 tells of his thoughtful kindness. His daughter Pythias, 
 his son Nicomachtjs, his adopted son Nicanoe, and his 
 concubine Herpyllis, are all duly provided for, and some 
 of his slaves are emancipated, others rewarded. 
 
 § 18. The purposes of this History render it unnecessary 
 to enter upon the vexed question of the authenticity of the 
 various writings which have passed under his name, had I 
 the scholarship which could justify such a digression. The 
 curious reader will easily find abundant material on this and 
 all cognate points. "We have here rather to consider the 
 nature of his ' achievements. The first thing which must 
 
 2 
 
18 THE LIFE OS ARISTOTLE. [CHAP. I. 
 
 strike every one is their encyclopedic extent, unrivalled in 
 the history of literature. In all branches of science then 
 cultivated he was proficient. He wrote on Politics, giving 
 the outlines of two hundred and fifty-five constitutions-; even 
 the little treatise on that subject, which is still extant, is 
 thought to be one of the very best works yet written, and 
 Dr. Aknold, who knew it by heart, declared that he found 
 it of daily service in its application to our own time. His 
 Ethics, Ehetoric, and Logic are still by many held to be 
 authoritative and unsurpassed. His Metaphysics would of 
 itself suffice to found a great renown. His fragments on 
 Poetics is perhaps the most valuable of all ancient critical 
 writings. And as if these were not titles enough, we must 
 now add the several scientific works which form the special 
 object of this volume; these embrace Physics, Astronomy, 
 Zoology, Comparative Anatomy, and Psychology. With 
 Sir W. Hamilton, we may say: "His seal is upon all the 
 sciences, and his speculations have mediately or immediately 
 determined those of all subsequent thinkers." Hegel, though 
 of a less fervid temperament, expresses himself with greater 
 emphasis : " He penetrated into the whole universe of things, 
 and subjected its scattered wealth to intelligence; and to 
 him the greater number of the philosophical sciences owe 
 their origin and distinction." 14 
 
 § 19. Such an intellectual phenomenon must always excite 
 astonishment. Let us form what opinion we may of his 
 philosophy, we cannot withhold our admiration of the vigour 
 and comprehensiveness of his mind. Nor is this his only 
 claim. Hq is admirable for the intense urgency of his mind in 
 seeking scientific explanations of phenomena, at a period when 
 such explanations were novelties ; and for the dominant induc- 
 tive tendency which led him on all subjects to collect the facts 
 before reasoning on them. The contrast he presents to Plato 
 
 14 Hegbl ; Vorhiiingen iiber die Gesch. der Philos., 18S8, II., 298. 
 
CHAP. I.] THE LIFE OE ARISTOTLE. 19 
 
 in this respect is as much to his advantage as the contrast 
 in respect of literary power is to his disadvantage. 15 Plato 
 was the most artistic of philosophers, and, among men of 
 great eminence, one of the worst of investigators; not, 
 assuredly, from deficient power, but from his disastrous miscon- 
 ception of Method. In spite of a certain loitering diffuseness 
 of style, and an oppressive circumstantiality in refuting 
 trivial considerations, no one before Plato, no one since, 
 has managed the extremely difficult art of dramatic debate 
 on philosophic topics with such commanding success; and 
 in consequence of this fascinating art, aided by the union 
 of dialectical subtlety with mystical yearnings, a subtlety 
 which seems to give a hope to mysticism, and a warrant to 
 transcendentalism, no one has exercised a more pernicious 
 influence on culture. The charm of the artist has immor- 
 talized the vices of the thinker. 16 
 
 With Aristotle the case is different. His Method although 
 imperfect, as we shall shortly see, was not utterly wrong, but 
 wrong only in one important particular ; in direction it was 
 wholly right. It was a Method which required development, 
 and was not like that of Plato, one upon which rational philo- 
 sophy was impossible. But as an artist, Aristotle is simply 
 
 15 The contrast is felicitously presented by Matjkice in the following passage: 
 " The student passing from the works of Plato to those of Aristotle is struck 
 first of all with the entire absence of that dramatic form and that dramatic 
 feeling with which he has become familiar. The living human beings with 
 whom he has conversed have -passed away. Prodicus, Protagoras, and Hippias, 
 are no longer lounging upon their couches amidst groups of admiring pupils ; 
 we have no walks along the walls of the city, no readings beside the Hissus, no 
 lively symposia giving occasion to high discourses about love, no Critias re- 
 calling the stories he had heard in the days of his youth, before he became a 
 tyrant, of ancient and glorious republics ; above all, no Socrates forming a 
 centre to those various groups. Some little sorrow for the loss of so many clear 
 and beautiful pictures will be felt, perhaps, by every one, but by far the greater 
 portion of readers will believe that they have ample compensation in the pre- 
 cision and philosophical dignity of the treatise for the richness and variety of 
 the dialogue." — Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, 1850, L, 162. 
 
 16 See Chap. V., "Plato's Method.'' 
 
 2—2 
 
20 THE LIFE OE AKISTOTLE. [CHAP. I. 
 
 without rank ; and as a writer, with submission be it said, he 
 is many degrees removed from excellence. This opinion will 
 probably excite surprise ; let it be, therefore, more circumstan- 
 tially explained. In works like the Politics, Poetics, Ethics, 
 and Ehetoric, — works which from their subject do not severely 
 task the writer's powers of composition, in the artful dis- 
 tribution of materials, — he is intelligible, and sometimes 
 epigrammatic, although without charm. But where more 
 severely tasked, and where he is called upon to marshal 
 numerous facts and ideas for effective presentation, so as to 
 shape arguments into culminating sequence, his composition 
 is rambling, scattered, and confused. There is little illus- 
 tration, and no side-lights of suggestion. The want of 
 artistic composition renders this absence of illustration a 
 serious defect. "When a writer's composition is good there 
 is less need of illustration, or (to use a favourite word with 
 the Florentine Platonists) collustration. But there are few 
 writers who understand this art; and Aristotle understood 
 it not at all. In studying his works, and especially in 
 attempting to reproduce their arguments, this defect has been 
 painfully forced upon my notice ; and when we read praises of 
 his style, supported by the great authority of Ciceeo, we must 
 admit the inference that he referred to works which are no longer 
 extant, and that moderns are awed by the majesty of Greek 
 type. Whatever may be the excellencies of Aristotle's dic- 
 tion (and these. few moderns can pretend to appreciate), the 
 defects of his composition are not matters of opinion, but of 
 demonstration. 
 
 § 20. It is not consistent with my design to follow the 
 course of Aristotelian influence through the commentaries of 
 Alexandee of Aphrodisias,' Porphyry, Iamblichus, Peoclus, 
 Themistius, Simplicius 01} Philoponus — which I only know 
 through extracts liberally given by scholars ; and this know- 
 ledge has excited in me thelliyeliest desire not to read more. 
 Nor can we follow the splendid train of the Benaissance in 
 
CHAP. I.] THE LIFE OE ARISTOTLE. 21 
 
 which figure Argyropyltjs, Gaza, Philelphus, George of Tre- 
 bizond, Politian, Hermolaus Barbarus, Latjrentitjs Valla 
 and Keuchlin, some of whom will be laid under contribution 
 as we proceed. The history of Aristotle is for many centuries 
 the history of learning. In the 17th century the tide com- 
 pletely turned. It is true that at the close of the 16th 
 Casaubon (1590) and at the opening of the 17th Du Val 
 (1619) published complete editions of the works, which, to 
 judge by the reprints, 17 must have been rapidly sold. But 
 these were the last efforts of expiring energy. The revolt 
 against Authority which characterized that century, was neces- 
 sarily directed against the thinker whose authority had been 
 most servilely accepted. 18 Nor can I find mention of a single 
 edition after that by Du Val. During the whole of the 
 18th century there was no edition of the complete works, 
 not even a reprint; and only an occasional edition of the 
 Poetics and Ethics. Btjhle's undertaking (1791-1800) was 
 thwarted by the burning of Moscow, in which all his collected 
 materials were destroyed. 
 
 § 21. A' reaction began at the close of the 18th which 
 has gained strength in the 19th century. Lessing called 
 attention to the Poetics by his own luminous comments. 
 Schneider by his edition of the History of Animals (1812) — 
 which, alas ! is even yet the only tolerable edition for the use 
 of naturalists, and is very defective — gave an impulse to the 
 
 17 Buhle, I, 229-30. 
 
 18 Hegel : Gesch. der Philos., II., 416. It is worthy of remark that in 1624 
 appeared the work o£ Gassendi : Exercitationum paradoxicarum adversus 
 Aristoteleos libri VII., in which, among other propositions, he maintains these 
 four : quod apud A. innumera deficiant — immensa superfluant — immensa 
 fallant — innumera contradicant. In the September of the same year the Par- 
 liament of Paris, which in the 13th century had declared some of A.'s works to 
 he heretical (See Roger Bacon's indignant protest, Opus Majus, Venet. 1750, 
 p. 10 ; compare also Jourdain : JRecherches sur les anciennes traductions 
 Latines d'Aristote, Paris, 1843), issued an edict that on pain of death no oppo- 
 sition against the approved doctrines of the ancients should publicly be taught. 
 The struggle had become a death struggle. 
 
22 THE LIFE OE ARISTOTLE. [CHAP. I. 
 
 study of the biological works. Fulleborn, Buhle, and 
 Tennemaxn, in their histories of philosophy, began to assign 
 him his legitimate position; but it was Hegel who first 
 spoke of him with enthusiasm and commanding authority. 19 
 From this time he began once more to be considered as the 
 profoundest of thinkers, whose works emphatically challenged 
 the attention of philosophers. Sir "W. Hamilton, in this 
 country, also lent his powerful aid in the revival, and Eos- 
 mini, in Italy, with more reserve, called attention to his 
 significance. 20 
 
 Meanwhile scholars have not been idle. Bkandis and 
 Bekker were commissioned by the Berlin Academy to pro- 
 duce a complete edition. For three years these patient 
 scholars courageously toiled over the manuscripts in Italy, 
 France, and England, and the result appeared in Bekker's 
 edition (Berlin, 1831-40, since reprinted at Oxford), and in 
 the work by Bbandis already cited (Note 5). A complete 
 edition was printed in 1832 by Tauchnitz in sixteen volumes, 
 and in 1843 by Weisse in one volume, neither of them highly 
 esteemed ; and in 1847 Didot began an excellent edition in 
 four volumes, edited by Bussemakee, still incomplete. 21 Of 
 separate treatises the editions have been too numerous to be 
 specified here. 
 
 § 22. Activity so energetic, after so long a period of 
 neglect, was naturally prompted and accompanied by a ten- 
 dency to over-estimate the works ; and the danger now is lest 
 the reaction go too far. Hegel and Sir W. Hamilton have 
 
 19 Lord Mokboddo in his Ancient Metaphysics ; Harris in bis Philosophical 
 Arrangements; and Thomas Taylor in various works, were enthusiastic 
 enough, but they spoke with no authority. 
 
 20 Eosmini : Aristotele esposto ed esaminato. " Poiche le questioni che 
 giaccino nella filosofia aristotelica sono vitali per 1' uman genere, e la grandezza 
 e l'importanza di queste restituira sempre ad Aristotele un gran peso d'autorita.'' 
 — p. 14 of the Milan edition, 1855. 
 
 21 This, and Buhle's, are the editions I hare used ; but for general conveni- 
 ence in reference I have given Bekker's pagination as nearly as possible 
 
CHAP. I.] THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE. 23 
 
 done their best to impress on fluctuating public opinion the 
 conviction that not only was Aristotle a thinker of vast 
 power, but of present worth : not only great in his own time, 
 but anticipating the truths of all time. Cuvier, Isidoee 
 St. Hilaire, De Blainville, and Johannes Muller, draw- 
 ing after them crowds of obedient disciples, have spoken of 
 his scientific works as if they were on a level with the science 
 of our day, claiming for him some of the most curious dis- 
 coveries of modern research. 
 
 Certes il ne meritait 
 Ni cet excSs d'honneur, ni cette indignite ; 
 
 and it will be the task of the following chapters to show that / 
 both the past neglect and the modern deification need revi- < 
 sion. One point only requires to be noticed at present. It is, 
 that among his modern eulogists will be found biologists, 
 politicians, and metaphysicians, but no astronomer, no physi- 
 cist, no chemist. In other words, in those sciences which have 
 advanced to the positive stage, and in which the rigour of 
 proof reduces Authority to its just position, his opinions are 
 altogether disregarded; whereas in those sciences in which, 
 from their complexity and immaturity, the influence of 
 Authority and the delusive promises of the Subjective Method 
 still gain acceptance, his dicta are cited as those of a puissant 
 investigator. 
 
( 24 ) 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. 
 
 § 23. In one sense, the dawn of Science is coeval with the 
 dawn of human intelligence. Introduced to this mysterious 
 universe naked and helpless, man is early forced to gain some 
 understanding of its relations to him. At first all is dim 
 sensation. To this succeeds a slowly organized classification 
 of elementary experiences. The great forces of Nature are 
 everywhere at work, everywhere manifesting themselves in 
 manifold and intermingling motions, which he must appreciate, 
 and intellectually disentangle, as far as they directly concern 
 him. This is simple knowledge. Science, which is a higher 
 sublimation of this knowledge, begins when the forces of 
 Nature are appreciated in their relations to each other; 
 and in its highest flights all personal relations are merged in 
 a grand disinterestedness. At first man stands before " the 
 roaring loom of Time," gazing in helpless perplexity at the 
 movements of the infinite shuttles, ignorant of the move- 
 ments which may be beneficent, and of those which may 
 be destructive to him. But he cannot remain thus. His 
 necessities soon change this attitude of wonder into an 
 attitude of inquiry. The objects which he sees are of 
 pressing importance ; he must observe them attentively that 
 he may adapt their powers to his purposes. The preservation 
 
CHAP. II.] THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. 25 
 
 of his daily existence depends on the accuracy with which he 
 observes, classifies, and infers the properties of objects — their 
 order of co-existence and succession. He has to find his 
 friends and his foes amid the multitude of forces which 
 surround him. None immediately announce their qualities ; 
 each has to be carefully watched and tested; the dearest 
 friend suddenly proving the direst foe under very trifling 
 changes of conditions. Then come intellectual needs ; 
 above all, the imperious desire for an explanation. The 
 spontaneous activity of his growing intellect urges him to 
 make out some scheme by which the various phenomena may 
 be bound together. He begins to link the known and acces- 
 sible on to the unknown and inaccessible ; he animates the 
 universe ; interprets all he sees by all he feels. 
 
 Thus Philosophy emerged from Knowledge. As civiliza 
 tion advanced, Knowledge became more extensive and precise, 
 Philosophy more ambitious in its sweep. Arts arose, which 
 preserved and extended the common fund of Knowledge, 
 transmitting it as a priceless heirloom. Those great 
 nations which duly cherished this heirloom, and increased 
 its store, magnified their existence, and became the glory of 
 our race. Those nations which neglected it, perished, or 
 continued barbarous — that is, comparatively helpless and 
 miserable. 
 
 § 24. Although in this sense Science may be said to be 
 coeval with man, the sense in which moderns employ the 
 word carries a more restricted meaning. To measure the 
 ground ; to measure the seasons and the length of days ; to 
 cure a disease or dress a wound ; to plough the soil and 
 garner the harvest ; to guide a fragile bark along a perilous 
 coast by the aid of the Pleiades, or " sailing stars;" to know 
 that fire burns, liquids evaporate, and metals fuse — these are 
 among the early experiences of the race, but they are not 
 Science. They are the preparatory materials — items of that 
 Common Knowledge which the energy of man, as he advances 
 
26 THE DAWN Or SCIENCE. [CHAP. II. 
 
 to maturity, developes into Science. 1 Science, as we now 
 understand the word, is of later birth. If its germinal origin 
 may be traced to the early period when Observation, Induc- 
 tion, and Deduction were first employed, its birth must be 
 referred to that comparatively recent period when the mind, — 
 rejecting the primitive tendency to seek in supernatural 
 agencies for an explanation of all external phenomena, — 
 endeavoured, by a systematic investigation of the phenomena 
 themselves to discover their invariable order and connection. 
 The separation of Science from Knowledge was effected step 
 by step as the Subjective Method was replaced by the 
 Objective Method : i. e., when in each inquiry the phenomena 
 of external nature ceased to be interpreted on premisses 
 suggested by the analogies of human nature. We shall 
 presently state more explicitly the character of these Methods 
 (§ 31) ; to . prepare the way for a thorough appreciation of 
 them, is the purpose of the ensuing paragraphs. 
 
 § 25. The history of human development shows that 
 there are three modes by which we conceive phenomena ; and 
 there are only three. The second being a transition from the 
 first to the third, we might, in strictness, admit of only two 
 distinct modes of conception. The first of these supposes that 
 the order and succession observed in phenomena, is due to the 
 influence of outlying agencies — powers which are super natural, 
 above the objects, not belonging to them. The second supposes 
 that the order of phenomena is due simply to properties 
 inherent in the objects themselves, which properties are 
 realities, and form part of the nature of the objects. 
 Obviously, things must either be conceived as, by nature, 
 passive or active; if passive, they can only be moved by 
 superior powers, independent of them ; if active, they possess 
 in themselves the conditions of their activity. Thus on one 
 
 1 To make clear the distinction between Science and Common Knowledge 
 would carry us too far ; it will be discussed in the Prolegomena to the History 
 of which the present volume forms a chapter. 
 
CHAP. II. J THE DAWN OE SCIENCE. 27 
 
 of two fundamental assumptions, respecting the activity of 
 objects, rests every possible explanation we can frame of the 
 mysteries around us. 
 
 § 26. The attitude of mind which is based on the first of 
 these assumptions is that which is common to all primitive 
 theories. It characterizes what Auguste Comte names the 
 Theological Stage in human development. On this assump- 
 tion, all phenomena not of the simplest and most familiar 
 kind are referred to the agency of invisible powers, spirits, 
 deities, or demons. To these powers, and not to any activity 
 inherent in the objects themselves, the changes in phenomena 
 are assigned. It is the will of some spirit which moves the 
 objects. As this idea of will originates in the analogies of 
 human volitions influencing human actions, the same caprici- 
 ousness and variability which characterize human actions are 
 supposed to characterize external phenomena. Much more 
 caprice would be attributed to the gods, because we do know 
 something of human motives — greed, anger, and love ; hut 
 we do not know why Zeus sends a storm in harvest-time, 
 or burns his own temple with lightning, or kills a pious man 
 by the side of a blasphemer. Variableness is predicated 
 of all successions of phenomena, save those of such frequent 
 occurrence, that expectation of their being found to vary is 
 finally extirpated. 
 
 § 27. In direct contrast to this is the scientific attitude, 
 based upon the second of the two assumptions just rehearsed. 
 It never could have obtained acceptance in the early stages 
 of our development. It implies a certain advance of culture 
 and great familiarity with the orderliness of Nature. Before 
 men could refer the changes they observed to the influence of 
 properties inherent in the objects, a strong conviction must 
 have arisen that the order of succession in phenomena was not 
 variable, but fixed. Invariableness would inevitably lead to 
 the conception of all changes being due to the relations 
 between the various properties of objects — first, by discrediting 
 
28 THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. [CHAP. II. 
 
 the interference of an external will, which is essentially 
 incalculable ; next, by disclosing that there was really no 
 need of anything but the recognized or recognizable pro- 
 perties of objects to account for all changes. 
 
 The conviction that objects are not by nature inert, passive, 
 acted on only by outlying, supernatural agencies, grew up 
 slowly with the slowly-growing perception of the essential 
 invariableness of phenomena whenever the conditions are the 
 same. In our day, reliance on the stability of created things 
 is unshakeable. The idea of variability is banished from ex- 
 ternal phenomena, and admitted only by one school with refer- 
 ence to internal phenomena. "Whenever a change does not take 
 place in accordance with our previsions, we never suppose the 
 failure to be owing to the caprice of Nature, or to some out- 
 lying power; we at once conclude the presence of some inter- 
 fering condition, some relation which we have overlooked. 
 
 Not only is the primitive conception of variability banished 
 for ever, but in its banishment is included that of externality. 
 Causation is now assumed to lie within, and not without, the 
 circle of phenomena. Science, withdrawing from all specula- 
 tion where it can find no adequate evidence, and where its 
 methods are inoperative, refrains from inquiry as to ultimate 
 causes, and says nothing respecting the mystery of creation ; 
 in dealing with created objects, and with natural phenomena, 
 it presupposes no variableness in their order of succession and 
 co-existence. Thus the clergyman who told the farmer that it 
 was useless to pray for rain till the wind changed, had embraced 
 the scientific view, and had learned to distrust appeals against 
 the order of Nature, because that was not a variable order. In 
 earlier days this man would have considered the direction of 
 the wind quite insignificant, and would have believed that 
 prayer was likely to determine a change in the weather by de- 
 termining a change in the will which regulated it. 
 
 To the mind of men in the primitive, theological stage, the 
 sun was a god driving a chariot of fire, the moon a goddess 
 
CHAP, n.] THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. 29 
 
 and a huntress. So difficult was it to escape these personifi- 
 cations that we find remnants of this Polytheism even in the 
 teaching of the Christian Church, which assigned to every 
 planet its tutelary angel. 2 The scientific mind replaces these 
 gods and angels by laws of nature, according to which the 
 planets move by forces similar, and under conditions similar 
 to those observed in all other moving bodies. It having been 
 discovered that the orbit of the planets is an ellipse, Newton 
 demonstrated on dynamical principles that a body could only 
 move in such an orbit in virtue of two forces, the variations of 
 which are in a reciprocal ratio with the vector — the one force 
 being centrifugal, the other centripetal. Thus the law of gravi- 
 tation dethroned the arbitrary agencies. Though in itself not 
 more intelligible than the action of the gods, this law has the 
 supreme advantage of linking astronomical and terrestrial 
 phenomena into general harmony, and admitting of a syste- 
 matic co-ordination of all observed facts. Besides this, it gets 
 rid of the presumed variability in the agency, and leads to the 
 careful study of the inevitable order ; instead of encouraging 
 attempts, by prayers, supplications, invocations, or the sacri- 
 fices of animal life, to persuade the inevitable order to alter its 
 course. 
 
 § 28. These two sharply opposed modes of conceiving 
 phenomena, one of which aims at penetrating the mysteries of 
 existence, and explaining the external order by knowledge of 
 the ultimate causes, the other of which aims only at detect- 
 ing the exact relations of co-existence and succession which 
 determine that order, without any hope of knowing the ulti- 
 mate causes : these two modes require some intermediate 
 transitional mode which will enable the mind to pass from the 
 one to the other. Such a transition is effected in the Meta- 
 physical stage, which agrees with the theological inasmuch as it 
 
 2 " Le Pere Schot, jesuite, a ecrit qu'en 1660 on voyait a. Rome la Basilique 
 des Sept Anges Gubernateurs des Planetes." — Savekibn : Hist, des Progres de 
 I'Esprit Humain, Paris, 1775, p. 222. 
 
80 THE DAWN OP SCIENCE. [CHAP. II. 
 
 also assumes a knowledge of the ultimate causes, and assumes 
 that these causes are in essence independent of the objects.' 
 But it differs from the theological in discarding the idea of 
 these agencies being variable ; by this it forms the passage to 
 a scientific conception. In the place of deities it assumes 
 abstract entities. Thus by gradual modifications the personal 
 agency becomes an impersonal agency, the deity an abstraction, 
 and this in turn becomes more and more material, as we see 
 in the succession of 1, Spirit; 2, Entity; and 3, Fluid or 
 Ether. 
 
 Although the entities which are assumed as the ultimate 
 causes of change are neither the objects themselves, nor 
 properties of the objects, they are assumed to be inseparable 
 from the objects and invariable in their agency. It is thus 
 they form an easy transition to the more purely objective 
 conception of laws. For example, the Veg'etal Soul, which 
 is supposed to be the cause of all the phenomena observed in 
 plants, is not a plant, nor a property of the plant, nor the 
 resultant of the plant's many properties ; it is an existence 
 sui generis, in virtue of which the plant is. At the same time 
 this Vegetal Soul is exclusively limited to the plant ; it has 
 no other form of existence ; it exists only under the con- 
 ditions of plant-life. And when the biologist patiently traces 
 out these conditions, the metaphysician willingly accepts 
 them, simply protesting against the supposition that the life 
 of the plant is due to nothing more than the mutual action 
 and reaction of the properties inherent in the molecules com- 
 posing the plant ; he asserts that, over and above these, there 
 is the Vegetal Soul, arranging the molecules and directing 
 their forces. 
 
 § 29. Such are the three modes of conceiving the course 
 
 3 " Le caractere fondamental des conceptions mfitaphysiques est d'envisager 
 les phSnomenes independamment des corps qui nous les mauifestent, d'attribuer 
 aux proprietfis de chaque substance uno existence distincte de la sienne." — 
 Comte: Cows de Philosophie Positive, 1835, II., 446. 
 
CHAP. II.] THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. 31 
 
 of nature which will everywhere be found curiously interwoven 
 amid the web of human history. Each has been predominant 
 at certain epochs. Each has had a potent influence on our 
 culture. But it is obvious that after the mind has passed 
 through its earlier stages of development, progress is seriously 
 impeded by theological and metaphysical explanations of natural 
 phenomena. Whether such explanations are now desirable in 
 any other department of inquiry, is a question which need not 
 here be agitated ; it is certain that they are obstacles to the 
 progress of science. The theological explanation is an 
 obstacle, because instead of stimulating the mind to a close 
 and reverent study of the truths revealed in Nature, it directs 
 the attention to whatever has been assumed respecting the 
 will and purpose of deities, supposed to be manifested in 
 phenomena. The metaphysical explanation is an obstacle, 
 because it withdraws attention from the close scrutiny of 
 facts,' and deludes the mind with unverified, unverifiable 
 assumptions. 4 
 
 When an epidemic fever wasted the Grecian camp, the 
 cause was at once assumed to be Apollo's wrath. Had not the 
 Deity been angered, the people would not have been punished. 
 What had angered him ? Surely it must have been the insult 
 offered to his priest ? Acting on this natural inference, the 
 Greeks bethought them how to appease this wrath. In the 
 Crimea our troops also suffered from fever ; we bethought 
 ourselves of the ventilation and drainage : an idea which to 
 the Greeks would have appeared not only inefficacious, but 
 impious. On the Palatine Hill, the Romans erected a Temple 
 to the Goddess of Fever. We build fever-hospitals, and 
 our form of prayer is a dose of quinine. 5 
 
 4 " Nous devons examiner la nature par tous les moyens que foumissent 
 l'observation et l'experience ; et non leur supposer des principes sur lesquels 
 l'esprit se repose et croit avoir tout fait lorsqu'il lui reste tout a, faire." — 
 VlCQ d'Aztk: Discours sur I'Anatomie. CEuvres, 1305, IV., 15. 
 
 s To a mind even moderately trained in the use of evidence and logical 
 connection, ancient superstitions are absolutely inconceivable. What, for 
 
32 THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. [CHAP. II. 
 
 So long as diseases were conceived to be the products of 
 supernatural agency, their cure was properly sought in invoca- 
 tions, sacrifices, prayers and charms, rather than in the study 
 of the organism, and an accurate acquaintance with the pro- 
 perties of objects. And although it is true that reliance on 
 supernatural appeals never wholly excluded reliance on all 
 natural means that were known, the quinine being administered 
 as well as the prayer, yet the mere fact that men conceived 
 the order of phenomena to depend upon a mutable will, was 
 an obstacle to the thorough and patient study of natural 
 means. No sooner was it understood that diseases were the 
 results inseparable from certain conditions of organic sub- 
 stances, and that under similar conditions the action of these 
 substances was invariable, than the mind recognized the 
 necessity of relinquishing a vain reliance on invocation, and 
 gave its severe attention to the study of objects, and the con- 
 ditions of health and disease. 
 
 § 30. The theological, metaphysical, and scientific ex- 
 planations have three different criteria, or guarantees. The 
 guarantee of the first is sacerdotal. A conclusion is held 
 to be certain, if it is conformable with the doctrines of which 
 the priesthood is the interpreter. Those doctrines, being 
 received as indisputable, form the standard of all truth. The 
 guarantee of the second is somewhat less absolute ; it admits 
 of question, because it is based on reason, not on faith ; 
 nevertheless, any conclusion which can be logically deduced 
 from general doctrines accepted by metaphysicians is held by 
 them to be demonstrated. To the theologian it is enough if 
 he can adduce a text. To the metaphysician it is enough 
 
 example, can we suspect to have been the grounds on which the Druids believed 
 that in any perilous juncture they could be guided Ivy the writhings of a dying 
 man ? They seized some innocent wretch, plunged a knife in his breast, " a ce 
 coup mortel ce miserable tombant a la renverse, on augurait de l'evenement a 
 veniv en observant les circonstnnces de sa chute, les convulsions de diffeientes 
 parties de son corps, et le rejaillissement de son sang." — Histoire LitUraire de 
 la France, by the Benedictines of St. Maur, 1733, 1., 28. 
 
CHAP. II.] THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. 33 
 
 if he can deduce his proposition from " clear and distinct 
 ideas." 
 
 The guarantee of science is in the verification of expe- 
 rience, direct or indirect (§ 64). It distrusts the validity 
 of a priori conclusions, or of any explanations drawn solely 
 from general ideas of Nature's order, unless those general 
 ideas have themselves been rigorously demonstrated to be 
 necessities of thought, or to represent the observed order, 
 (§ 63 a). What must be, or may be, has to give place to 
 what is. The general doctrines of Science are never, like 
 those of Theology and Metaphysics, conceived to be final. 
 However firmly fixed at present, they may be shaken to- 
 morrow by a new discovery. Moreover, in the general 
 doctrines of Science, while one portion is understood as 
 beyond dispute until the horizon of knowledge is enlarged, 
 another portion is admitted to be more or less hypothetical 
 and approximative. In every case Science welcomes scrutiny 
 and scepticism; its final guarantee is conformity with fact. 
 Its general doctrines have been slowly elaborated, verified 
 step by step, and therefore, to a considerable extent, they 
 represent the actual facts, and are not arbitrary assumptions 
 founded on slight analogies, or conclusions deduced from 
 unverified premisses. 6 
 
 The contrast between the metaphysical and scientific 
 guarantee is that the verification which both need is by the 
 one disregarded and by the other emphatically put forward. 
 While both the metaphysicist and the physicist draw conclu- 
 sions from their general doctrines, the one is contented with 
 logical symmetry, the other demands the confrontation with 
 fact. The ancient astronomers believed in the uniformity of 
 the celestial revolutions, and in the circularity of their orbit. 
 
 6 " Expliquer un phenomene se reduit toujours a faire voir que les faits qu'il 
 presente se suivent dans un ordre analogue a l'ordre de succession d'autres faits 
 qui sont plus familiers, et qui des lors semblent etre plus connus." — Babthez : 
 Nouveaux Element de la Science de I'Homme, Paris, 1816, 1., 8. 
 
 3 
 
84 THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. [CHAP. II. 
 
 On subjective grounds this belief is not only logical, but 
 irresistible. How, as M. Biot remarks, 7 could men imagine 
 these movements to be variable, which were seen to be 
 performed in perfect freedom, and in periods rigorously 
 constant, no obstacle being suspected? How could such 
 movements be accelerated or retarded, > being, as they were, 
 eternal, and due to neither impact nor resistance ? From this 
 assumption of uniformity, the circularity of the orbit was 
 a necessary conclusion. The logical chain was perfect. It 
 so completely fettered the mind as almost. to bar the way 
 against the admission of the truth. Kepleb had difficulty 
 in accepting his own discovery, when indubitable proofs 
 revealed that the orbit of Mars was not circular, and con- 
 sequently that its velocity was not uniform, but subject 
 to periodical variations. Thus nothing could be more 
 plausible, considered a priori, than the ancient theory; 
 nevertheless, no sooner were adequate means of Verification 
 applied to the theory than the whole fabric tumbled down 
 like a house of cards. 
 
 § 31. I have thus endeavoured to characterize the three 
 modes of speculative inquiry by which in all ages men have 
 explained the facts of nature ; these modes, as Auguste 
 Comxe profoundly saw, constitute the necessary evolu- 
 tion of speculative thought. To get rid of the equivoque 
 which lies in the phrases theological and metaphysical, we 
 may group all three under the Subjective and Objective 
 Methods, their tendencies being thus characterized : the 
 Subjective draws all explanations of external phenomena from 
 premisses directly suggested by consciousness ; it identifies 
 the external order with the internal order. Obviously, this 
 is the primitive method. When in the early days of our de- 
 velopment we find ourselves face to face with phenomena, the 
 order of which we do not understand, we satisfy the irresistible 
 impatience which demands an immediate explanation, by 
 7 Biot : Eludes sur VAstronomie Indienne et Chinoise, 1862, p. 58. 
 
CHAP. II.] THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. 35 
 
 assuming that the objects are moved as we are moved. We 
 feel that our own actions are determined by our volitions, 
 by the mysterious something within us; and we assign a 
 similar cause to the motions of external objects. Quite other- 
 wise is it with the Objective Method. This arises out of a 
 more extensive and precise knowledge of the objects, fami- 
 liarity with which gradually reveals something of their order 
 of co-existence and succession. As such knowledge accumu- 
 lates, it irresistibly pushes aside the interpretation which was 
 originally drawn from consciousness. It reveals the cosmical 
 order more and more as a system not measurable by the 
 analogies of human personality. Under the light of this 
 knowledge men cease to suppose anger behind the violence of 
 a storm, or prophecy in the gloom of an eclipse. The savage 
 who thinks the watch is alive, can only be made to relinquish 
 this subjective hypothesis by acquiring positive knowledge of the 
 properties of steel springs and the actions of a mechanism ; 
 but no sooner is this objective knowledge acquired than he 
 ceases to have recourse to the analogies of his own nature 
 for an explanation. 8 
 
 The Subjective Method claims direct knowledge of the 
 nature of things and the ultimate causes of all changes. The 
 Objective Method by looking at things, assuming the position 
 of simple spectator, renounces all hope of ever penetrating 
 the mysteries of existence, of ever knowing the intimate 
 essence of things, and only hopes to detect the invariable 
 order of co-existence and succession. The one claims a 
 knowledge of " noumena," the other a knowledge of the laws 
 of phenomena. 
 
 8 The influence of the Subjective Method is constantly traceable in com- 
 mercial and other enterprises rashly undertaken by men in the confidence that 
 facts will bend to their desires. A man sees great advantage to himself (/"events 
 take a certain direction ; and he believes that this direction will be taken 
 because he greatly desires it. The more objective mind sets aside its wishes 
 and tries to calculate the chances of the direction from a knowledge of the ex- 
 ternal conditions. 
 
 3—2 
 
86 THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. [CHAP. II. 
 
 § 31 a. It is evident, therefore, that since the Subjective 
 Method arises from our ignorance, and the Objective from 
 our positive knowledge, there can have been no period in 
 the history of our race in which either Method obtained 
 exclusive acceptance. Even the earliest and most ignorant 
 tribes must have so far familiarized themselves with certain 
 phenomena as to have explained them without reference to 
 the deities spontaneously invoked in less familiar cases. The 
 observed properties of the things themselves were deemed 
 sufficient for the immediate production of the changes, so 
 that by availing himself of these properties man was often 
 able to modify the course of phenomena according to his 
 needs. After learning that unless the wood were dry even his 
 fetish could not make it burn, he soon came to fix attention 
 on the dryness, and to cease invoking his fetish. On the 
 other hand, the most advanced European nations, although 
 they have frankly assumed the scientific attitude with re- 
 spect to most cosmical phenomena, still retain in their 
 systems a large admixture of theological and metaphysical 
 conceptions. 
 
 The rise of the Objective or Scientific Method is a late event 
 in the history of man, if we consider it not in isolated fragmen- 
 tary efforts, but as a systematic and conscious attitude of mind. 
 A late and glorious event, of which no trace is visible in the 
 early civilizations. The dawn of this new era in which Nature 
 was investigated without reference to supernatural agencies, but 
 solely with the view of deciphering her alphabet, and reading 
 her own sacred writing, is to be sought in Italy. It was the 
 Greeks, and especially the Italian Greeks who commenced this 
 revolution. In saying this I am not unmindful of the opinion, 
 held by many learned scholars, that the East was the cradle of 
 Science. It is not a subject that can be adequately discussed 
 here ; nor can I pretend to the erudition requisite for its dis- 
 cussion. But leaving the subject in worthier hands, there is 
 one general consideration which to my mind carries conviction. 
 
CHAP. II.] THE DAWN OP SCIENCE. 37 
 
 We have no evidence whatever that the Egyptians, Assyrians, 
 Persians, or Hindoos, conceived the true scientific Method ; 
 and there is positive evidence that they could not have had the 
 scientific knowledge often attributed to them, simply because 
 they had not the Instruments by which such knowledge is 
 attained. They had not the requisite Mathematics ; they had 
 not the Instruments. Unless facts are accurately known, laws 
 must remain obscure. But accuracy in the knowledge of facts, 
 that is to say, scientific accuracy, depends on instruments of 
 measurement and calculation. Science is pre-eminently quan- 
 titative, i. e., dependent on exact appreciations of quantities of 
 time, space, and force ; and hence its progress is intimately 
 connected with the perfection and application of Instruments 
 of measurement and calculation. Wanting these, the East 
 necessarily wanted scientific knowledge. 
 
 Not only am I compelled to follow those scholars who dis- 
 credit the claims of the East to any initiation of the era of 
 science, but I should also question the claim, more commonly 
 allowed, of the Egyptians as astronomers. That they made 
 numerous observations, and amassed some of the preparatory 
 material, is admissible, without involving any assent to their 
 scientific claim. It would be difficult to show that they had 
 mastered any of the initial conceptions. We read, indeed, of 
 priests, relieved from toil, devoting their leisure to study ; but 
 what was the nature of that study ? We hear of their careful 
 observations and their enormous annals, on which point 
 exaggeration is traditional : Hippakchus speaks of the 
 Assyrians having continuous records for 270,000 years ; 
 Diodoeus says the Chaldeans claim for their observations an 
 antiquity of myriads of years ; and " Maetianus Capella 
 adopts a statement that astronomy had been practised in secret 
 by the Egyptians for 40,000 years before it was divulged to 
 the rest of the world." 9 If this were true it would only the 
 
 9 Lewis : Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients, 1862, 
 p. 264. 
 
38 THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. [CHAP. II. 
 
 more decisively refute their pretensions ; since to have observed 
 the heavens for forty thousand years, and not discern a single 
 astronomical law, proves them to have been without the 
 rudiments of exact Science. Indeed, when we reflect that 
 they had not discovered one of the fundamental laws of 
 motion, and were unacquainted with trigonometry, it is obvious 
 that they were without exact knowledge, and without the 
 means of obtaining it. 10 
 
 The Egyptians made observations which were sufficiently 
 accurate for many of their needs, but not for science. And 
 no sooner do we pass from Astronomy to the other sciences 
 than discussion ceases. No one thinks of assigning the 
 origin of Dynamics, Optics, Acoustics, Anatomy, &c., 
 to the East. It is undoubtedly to the Greeks that we 
 must look for these ; as it is to them that we must look 
 for the systematic adoption of Method. The researches of 
 the Pythagoreans on the vibrations of bodies are the earliest 
 researches in Physics which were conceived in a scientific 
 spirit. 11 By the development of the mighty instrument of 
 calculation, and by their stedfast constancy in investigating 
 the causes of phenomena irrespective of theological bias, this 
 wonderful people began that intellectual movement which in 
 
 10 " A la reserve du gnomon, tous les instrumens astronomiquea sont des 
 inventions des Grecs. Nul autre people n'a produit aucune observation qui 
 meritat ce nom." — Delambre: Hist.de V Astronomic Ancienne, 1817, 1., p. 20. 
 Compare also Montucla : Histoire des Mathematiques, 1768 ; and Mbssen- 
 bhoeck : Cours de Physique ExpCrimentale, par Sigatjd de la Fond, Leyden, 
 1769, I., p. 28. On the astronomy of the Hindoos see Biot : Etudes sur 
 V Astronomie Indienne et Chinoise, 1862, p. 47, where it is proved that the Greeks 
 were the parents of Hindoo science. 
 
 11 " Pendant que les Etrusques torturaicnt et d6figuraient la Nature pour 
 faire coincider les phenom&ies qu'ils obscrvaient avec leurs idees mytholo- 
 giques, et que les Grecs tournaient leurs plus grands efforts vers les problSmes 
 metaphysiques qui surpassent les forces humaines, les habitans du Midi de 
 l'ltalie cultivjrent les sciences de l'observation, suivaient la methodo experi- 
 mentale, et contribuaient aux progres de la geometric et de l'arithmetique. Les 
 recherches des Pythagoriciens sur les vibrations des corps sont les plus anciennes 
 experiences de physique qui soient parvenues jusqu' a nous." — Libbi : Histoire 
 des Sciences Mathlmaiiques en Italic, Paris, 1888, 1., 28. 
 
CHAP. II.] THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. 39 
 
 modern times has achieved conquests more glorious than the 
 dreams of poets. 
 
 § 32. Observe the significance of the fact that the 
 Greeks gave us Mathematics. Of all sciences this is the one 
 which most rigorously typifies the true Method. In it there 
 is no place for the supernatural. It admits no outlying 
 agencies. It fixes the mind on relations, and only on relations. 
 By so doing it coerces the mind to maintain the strictly 
 scientific attitude, namely, the most watchful solicitude respect- 
 ing accuracy, both in data and conclusions. Much has been 
 written about the superior certainty of Mathematics ; but this 
 does not, I conceive, result from the simplicity of its symbols, 
 nor from the simplicity of the ideas involved; since it is 
 obvious that we may employ very simple symbols and very 
 clear ideas, yet arrive at very uncertain and very absurd con- 
 clusions. 12 The superior exactness and certainty of Mathe- 
 matics are due to the fact that no hypothesis is allowed 
 to stand for more than an hypothesis ; no deduction takes 
 its place as a datam until it has been demonstrated. 
 Whereas in all other sciences the mind has great difficulty in 
 restraining its impatience, and is thus induced to employ un- 
 verified data, and to rely on unverified deductions ; but when- 
 ever the data and the deductions have been rigorously verified, 
 the truths of Physics and Chemistry are as certain as those of 
 Mathematics. 
 
 There is a second important element in scientific 
 research for which we are indebted to the Greeks : the 
 systematic employment of Scepticism ; without which, indeed, 
 research would be vain, and a true Method impossible. The 
 Greeks, unwilling longer to acquiesce in traditional dogmas, 
 
 12 " Une propositiqn tout a fait absurde pent etre extr&nement precise, 
 comme si Ton disait que la somme des angles d'un triangle est egale a trois 
 angles droits ; et une proposition tres certaine peut ne comporter qu'une pre- 
 cision fort mediocre, comme lorsqu'on affirme que tout homme mourra." — 
 Comte: Cours de Philosophie Positive, 1830, 1., 103. 
 
40 THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. [CHAP. n . 
 
 early saw that if Observation and Reason were to be the 
 guides in investigation, these guides, being fallible, required 
 perpetual vigilance. "Men who desire to learn," said Abis- 
 totle, " must first learn to doubt ; for science is only the 
 solution of doubts : " l3 an aphorism, novel in those days, in 
 our own a truism. 
 
 That the Greeks imperfectly practised the scepticism 
 which they inculcated, will be seen by and by. In their 
 eagerness to explain phenomena they were far too ready to 
 accept observations which had not been controlled, and deduc- 
 tions which had not been verified. Nevertheless it is their 
 immortal glory to have recognized the necessity of proof; and 
 this recognition was itself consequent upon their ceasing to 
 interpret phenomena as the direct results of supernatural 
 agencies. Hippocbates, amid much that is preposterous in 
 the eyes of modern science, exhibits the new spirit which was 
 then guiding inquiry. Let us cite an example. Speaking of 
 a disease which was attributed to a god, he remarks, " For my 
 part I think this disease comes from a god just as others do ; 
 and that there are no diseases more divine or more human 
 than others. Each disease comes according to natural laws ; 
 none has any other origin." w 
 
 § 33. A fortunate union of temperament with culture 
 enabled this wonderful people to range through Nature in 
 pursuit of the true relations of things, without perplexing 
 themselves by fictions imagined respecting outlying agencies, 
 essentially mysterious. The mysteriousness was not denied ; 
 it was simply set aside, removed from the sphere of scientific 
 thought. The Greek had a free, independent spirit, adven- 
 turous, rebellious, curious ; and boldly doubting, sought a 
 
 13 Metaph., III., 1. Compare Phys., I., 2. l X u yap fi\oao(ptav i) irictyic. 
 
 14 Hipfocrates : De ASre, Aquis, et Locis. CV1I., Ed. Coray, Paris, 
 1800, I., 100. Iptol Si Kal airl<(j Sokiu Tama ra iraQta Oela tlvat, Kal t aXXa 
 irdvTa, Kal ovSiv ^rlpov iripov Qiionpov, oiSi avtiptumviimpov, a\\a iravra fata' 
 tKaarov Si tft" fyvoiv twv toiovtswv, KOt oiSiv &viv fyvaioQ yiyvtrat. 
 
CHAP. II. J THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. 41 
 
 solution of his doubts in his own way. He refused sub- 
 mission to established doctrines. He would accept neither 
 priest nor philosopher as his oracle. Without directly con- 
 tradicting the priest, he boldly erected his own Academy 
 beside the Temple. 
 
 Both their weakness and their strength aided the Greeks 
 in this new enterprise. For it was a weakness in them that 
 they had little sympathy with that sense of the Infinite 
 which characterizes some other eminent nations. This is 
 visible in their Art : an Art matchless in clearness and pro- 
 portion, in the beauty of arrested lines, and the repose of 
 symmetrical simplicity; but having none of those finer 
 issues which escape into the sublimity of Christian Art. 
 Greek Art is a lute, not an organ. 
 
 Abistotle is a striking illustration of this excellence and 
 this defect. He seems utterly destitute of any sense of the 
 Ineffable. There is no quality more noticeable in him than 
 his unhesitating confidence in the adequacy of the human 
 mind to comprehend the universe; a quality obviously con- 
 nected with the defect just mentioned. He never seems to be 
 visited by misgivings as to the compass of human faculty, 
 because his unhesitating mind is destitute of awe. He has 
 no abiding consciousness of the fact deeply impressed on 
 other minds, that the circle of the Knowable is extremely 
 limited ; and that beyond it lies a vast mystery, dimly recog- 
 nized as lying there, but also recognized as impenetrable. 
 Hence the existence of Evil is no perplexity to his soul ; it is 
 accepted as a simple fact. Instead of being troubled by it, 
 saddened by it, he quietly explains it as the consequence of 
 Nature not having correctly written her meaning. This 
 mystery which has darkened so many sensitive meditative 
 minds with anguish, he considered to be only bad orthography 
 (§107). 
 
 Although ready enough to recognize the fallibility of 
 men, he nowhere, that I remember, expresses a conviction of 
 
42 THE DAWN OE SCIENCE. [CHAP. II. 
 
 the inherent fallibility of reason. His contemporary, the 
 author of Ecclesiastes, passionately declared that all science 
 was vanity. Nor was this merely the dejected expression of 
 his own sense of miserable failure ; it was the serious conviction 
 of human infirmity. Not only had his efforts failed, all men 
 would fail, because the task was greater than human strength. 
 Such doubts never assailed the Greek. Great as his failure 
 was, he had little suspicion of it, and no suspicion of human 
 frailty. Where he knew that his insight fell short, he was 
 assured that the gaze of his successors would penetrate. For 
 the race, if not for himself, he had regal pretensions. 
 
 § 34. This royal confidence powerfully aided the develop- 
 ment of Science. It gave the stimulus to research, and made 
 inquiry adventurous. Yet it also exercised in one respect a 
 retarding influence. It prevented due circumspection. It 
 caused scepticism to stop half-way. It relied too securely on 
 logical deduction ; and accepted evidence without cross-exami- 
 nation. A little more distrust, a more modest hesitation, 
 might have prevented that precipitancy to which alone many 
 errors were due. 
 
 But if this confidence had its drawbacks, it had also its 
 incitements. It led to the laborious study of Nature, merely 
 with a view to knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and not 
 with a view to Eeligion, nor the interests of Commerce. 
 Science acquires her dignity, and her supreme power, from 
 her noble disinterestedness. Although her researches even in 
 the remotest regions are always finally beneficent among our 
 daily uses, although the abstract speculations of geometers de- 
 termine the satisfaction of our vulgar needs, it is not with this 
 view that researches are undertaken. Use is seoondary and 
 derivative; the primary objeot is elucidation of the Truth. 
 All Truth is beneficent ; but her seekers desire to behold the 
 serene splendour of her face, and not themselves to reap the 
 benefits which spring up on her track. 
 
 §85. This attitude was first assumed by the Greeks. Their 
 
CHAP. II.] THE DAWN OF SCIENCE. 43 
 
 philosophers were content to seek wisdom as the one great 
 object, without directly subordinating their search to Eeligion or 
 to Use. In doing so they incurred serious peril. They were 
 assailed by the ridicule and persecution which await all inno- 
 vators. Abistophanes only gives expression to public hatred 
 and to public scorn, in ridiculing and misrepresenting the 
 physical inquirers of his day — men said to occupy them- 
 selves in 
 
 Walking on air and contemplating the sun. 
 
 The attempt to explain Nature, without reference to the gods, 
 very generally drew on philosophers the accusation of impiety. 
 Nor was this prejudice confined to the vulgar and unthinking ; 
 it was shared and avowed by Sooeates. The repugnance 
 which, in early life, caused him to relinquish physical inquiries, 
 was, as we learn from Xenophon, repugnance at the idea of 
 excluding the constant agency of the gods, and the consequent 
 destruction of moral feelings connected with this agency. The 
 same thought has, in all ages, roused the bitter hostility of 
 theologians, against the scientific attitude, as one essentially 
 irreligious. 13 This hostility has gradually grown feebler, 
 and is now entirely restricted to narrow or imperfectly culti- 
 vated minds. The change has been effected partly by the 
 irresistible progress of Science with her triumphant demon- 
 strations, and partly by a deeper philosophy, which has 
 disclosed that Science can only destroy false explanations, 
 which it is for our welfare to have destroyed. No single truth 
 can be shaken by Science. If in her own path she detects 
 certain truths, these must necessarily be harmonious with all 
 other truths. We must learn to welcome all, and to prove all. 
 Even those bigoted minds which still regard with alarm 
 the steady advance of Science, must admit the fact of its 
 
 15 " Mos onmes Deum aut saltern Dei providentiam tollere putant, qui res et 
 miracula per cansas naturales explicant aut intelligere student." — Spinoza : 
 Traetatus Theolog.-Politicus, vi. Opera, III., 86. Ed. Bkuder, Leipzig, 1846. 
 
44 THE DAWN OE SCIENCE. [CHAP. II. 
 
 advance, the greatness of its victories, the triumph of its 
 Method, and the certainty of its continuing to extend its 
 empire. In minds of larger culture, or of less jealous narrow- 
 ness, there is a complete cessation of the old antagonism ; a 
 gradual approximation is being made between theology and 
 science, and a more candid recognition of their mutual claims 
 in regard to the grand religious and moral ideas which must 
 ever determine the movement of society. 
 
 § 36. The object of this chapter has been to show why 
 the Greeks are to be regarded as the originators of Science, 
 strictly so-called, and why this History takes note of no 
 earlier people. Other peoples amassed details of knowledge, 
 manifested intellectual activity, invented useful arts ; but it is 
 in the Greek writers that we must seek the inauguration of 
 the scientific epoch. It is in them that, for the first time, 
 appears the systematic effort to ascertain the relations of 
 things objectively, to detect the causes of all changes as in- 
 herent in the things themselves, and to reject all supernatural 
 or outlying agencies. 
 
 The Greeks began, but only began, this revolution. They 
 carried it but a little way. Their explanations were generally 
 inaccurate, owing to causes which will be set forth in the next 
 chapter ; and the eclipse which for several centuries darkened 
 the day that had thus brightly dawned, was owing chiefly 
 to the energetic revival of that very theological spirit from 
 which the illustrious Greeks had emancipated themselves. 
 
( 45 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE m. 
 
 ANCIENT SCIENCE. 
 
 § 37. Two thousand two hundred years have passed since 
 Aristotle began his scientific investigation of Nature, and 
 during two thousand of these years his writings were regarded 
 as the purest and most copious fount of knowledge. Then 
 came a revolution ; and during the two hundred years 
 which succeeded that revolution, almost everything we now 
 dignify by the name of scientific truth, saw the light. The 
 earlier discoveries were but as preludes to the great achieve- 
 ments of modern research; nor do those early discoveries 
 form more than an insignificant item in the mass of ancient 
 science. How can this failure of twenty centuries be accounted 
 for ? And why were the ancients so strikingly eclipsed by the 
 moderns ? 
 
 § 38. In subsequent pages of this History we shall have 
 to enumerate the causes which prolonged the infancy of 
 Science from the days of Aristotle and Archimedes to those 
 of Kepler and Galileo. At present we have to consider 
 how it was that the Greeks and Eomans, in spite of the 
 splendour of their genius, made such slight progress in the 
 discovery of physical laws. In Art, Literature, and Philosophy 
 they have legislated for the world. In Science, they are 
 without authority. Vainly have scholars struggled against 
 this verdict ; vainly have they striven to keep up a supersti- 
 
46 ANCIENT SCIENCE. [CHAP. III. 
 
 tious reverence for the profundity of ancient writings by 
 audacious announcements of " anticipations of modern dis- 
 coveries." 1 The candid student is quickly disabused ; he 
 learns that this profundity is indistinctness, the anticipa- 
 tion purely verbal. Interesting these ancient writings must 
 ever be : not as surpassing, or even approaching, the depth 
 and grandeur of some modern works ; not as anticipating the 
 results of modern labour ; but as brilliant points in the 
 dimness of the Past, by which the story of human develop- 
 ment may be deciphered; and as lessons, wherein may be 
 read the results of yielding to that natural impatience which 
 urges us to outstrip by guesses the tardy conclusions of 
 experience. The failure of ancient efforts thus assumes an 
 impressive interest, far exceeding the interest excited by a 
 discovery of accordance between the old thought and the new. 
 It suddenly lights up the study of ancient writings, rescuing 
 them from the dilettantism of scholarship, and placing them 
 among the serious archives of progress. 
 
 , § 39. There is tolerable unanimity as to the fact of the 
 ancient failure, but uncertainty and indistinctness as to its 
 cause. The failure is generally assigned to a complete dis- 
 
 1 See, for example, Ideler: He Meteorohgia veterum Gracorum et Roma- 
 norum, Berlin, 1832. He considers that Aristotle originated the undulatory 
 theory of light, because the generation of light by motion is compared with 
 the generation of sound 1 Schweigger maintains that in the ancient myths 
 were embodied the shattered and misunderstood fragments of a science which 
 existed in a remote antiquity. In the myth of the Dioscuri, for example, he 
 reads a perfect appreciation of the two electricities. Ueber die alteste Physik 
 und den Ursprung des Heidenthums aus einer misverstandenen JVaturweisheit, 
 1823. These views, of which Bacon gave a fanciful anticipation in his New 
 Atlantis, and Baillt a more elaborate sketch in his Lettres sur I'Origine des 
 Sciences, Paris, 1777, have been further developed by Karl Fischer : Beitraye 
 zur Urgeschichte der Physik, 1833. The notion is not more extravagant than 
 that of Democritus and Aristotle having anticipated modern physical dis- 
 coveries, which is not unfrequently put forward. See especially Dctens : 
 Origines des Dteouvertes attributes aux Modernes, 1796. The hardiest of recent 
 assertors of the profundity and accuracy of Aristotle's physics is M. Barthk- 
 lemt St. Hilaire, to whom the public is deeply indebted for several free and 
 vigorous translations. See the Introduction to his La Physique d'Aristote, 1862. 
 
CHAP. III.] ANCIENT SCIENCE. 47 
 
 regard of Observation and Experiment, together with a 
 "fondness for abstract reasoning." The amount of truth in 
 this charge depends upon the sense in which it is interpreted. 
 Taken absolutely it might be impugned by a defender of the 
 old philosophy on two different counts. He might reply that i 
 men may amass great wealth of observation, perform numer- 
 ous experiments, and carefully abstain from abstract reasoning 
 (if that be a merit), without reaching the explanation of a 
 simple physical law. He might affirm, and affirm truly, that 
 the ancients did observe, did perform experiments, and did 
 employ the Inductive Method, which indeed was systematically 
 proclaimed by Aristotle with a precision and an emphasis 
 unsurpassed by Bacon himself. 
 
 •§ 40. The cause commonly assigned, therefore, lends no 
 illumination. As a general statement, it is too vague in its 
 truth, and may be so erroneously interpreted as to pass from 
 a truism into a falsism. Let us seek something more precise. 
 A survey at once close and comprehensive detects the exist- 
 ence of two causes : a psychological and an historical cause. 
 The first lies in the nature of the Method pursued ; the 
 second lies in the condition of knowledge at the period. On 
 the Method pursued by the ancients, no satisfactory issues 
 could have been reached, even had it been backed by the 
 stored-up wealth of modern research : on such a Method 
 failure inevitably followed, precisely as it follows the efforts 
 of moderns whenever they employ it. Nor, on the other 
 hand, is it less certain that had the ancients clearly conceived 
 and rigidly adhered to that Method which alone issues in 
 fruitful results, their achievements, splendid in comparison 
 with what actually was achieved, would still necessarily have 
 been slight, because there was no stored-up material to form 
 the basis of extensive discovery. Science is a growth. The 
 future must issue from seeds sown in the past. The bare and 
 herbless granite must first be covered with mosses and lichens, 
 if from their decay is to be formed the nidus of a higher life. 
 
48 ANCIENT SCIENCE. [CHAP. in. 
 
 No magnificent vegetation springs up at once ; it emerges 
 gradually from the accumulated stores of former epochs. 
 From the small beginnings and successive growths of know- 
 ledge there emerges a more comprehensive and more complex 
 Science. The advance is not simply one of addition, but of 
 new development — a development rendered possible by the 
 addition ; just as the addition of a new tissue raises the 
 organism to a higher possibility of functional power. The 
 truth sought in one age as a goal becomes a starting-point 
 to the age which follows; the discovery which was the 
 passionate aim of one man, and conferred on him lasting 
 glory, becomes to his successors a mere instrument of new 
 research. 
 
 No one who reflects on the actual condition of any 
 science, will fail to notice the complicated connection of all 
 the sciences. The perfection of one demands illumination 
 from all. Not only are the movements of the stars in- 
 comprehensible before the laws of Mechanics are established, 
 but even a fact so simple as the transit of a star cannot 
 be ascertained until after it has been illuminated by optios, 
 barology, and thermology. The position of a star has to 
 be estimated with reference to the laws of aberration and 
 refraction of light, which in turn are affected by the laws 
 of atmospheric density, which again depend on laws of 
 ^temperature. The very telescope with which the star is 
 r observed is. itself the product of advanced science. 
 
 This connection of the sciences points to a simultaneous 
 growth, and a slow growth. Therefore in the early ages, 
 before a large mass of established truth had been accumulated, 
 before instruments had been invented, and when discoveries 
 which were to be the instruments of research were still unsus- 
 pected, it almost was impossible for any mind, however great, 
 to give a scientific explanation of any class of phenomena ; all 
 that could be done was to suggest some happy hypothesis, or to 
 work out some small point of special value. Some few minds 
 
CHAP. III.] ANCIENT SCIENCE. 49 
 
 were contented with this humble effort ; but the majority, 
 especially of philosophers, were too impatient ; and unable to 
 rest without some explanation, trusted confidently to the Sub- 
 jective Method, because the Objective Method could not then 
 have been constantly applied, so as to satisfy their intel- 
 lectual cravings. 
 
 § 41. Before we can explain the failure of the ancients 
 we must rightly appreciate the influence of two different 
 and concurrent causes, methodological and historical. Those 
 writers who, to my knowledge, have treated this subject ex 
 professo, have entirely overlooked the historical cause, confining 
 themselves to a specification of the defects in the ancient 
 Method. Nor does it seem to me that they have been successful 
 in very distinctly marking the sources of failure, even with 
 respect to Method. They have felt the defects rather than 
 assigned a philosophical explanation of them. An exception 
 must be made in favour of Dr. Whewell, who has brought 
 his views on the philosophy of science to elucidate this very 
 question ; with what success we will presently inquire. The 
 general mode of viewing the failure is typified in Pt.awatr's 
 celebrated Dissertation prefixed to the Encyclopedia Bri- 
 tannica, and we may content ourselves with a scrutiny of 
 its arguments. 
 
 § 42. After comparing ancient with modern physics, 
 Playfair thus delivers his verdict : " Extreme credulity 
 disgraced the speculations of men who, however ingenious, 
 were little acquainted with the laws of nature." Why were 
 they so ignorant? Because "unprovided with the great 
 criterion by which the evidence of testimony can alone be 
 examined. Though observations were sometimes made, 
 experiments were never instituted; and philosophers, who 
 were little attentive to the facts which spontaneously offered, 
 did not seek to increase their number by artificial combina- 
 tions." 
 
 Playtaib is inaccurate in saving that no experiments 
 
 4 
 
50 ANCIENT SCIENCE. [OHAP. in. 
 
 were instituted, and that observations were only occasional ; 
 but this historical error is insignificant beside the methodo- 
 logical error of assuming that the chief source of the ancient 
 failure was the absence of experiment. What is Experiment ? 
 what its function ? Its function obviously is to supplement 
 Observation, or rather to direct it, by making it definite, 
 precise, in cases where to the unassisted observer the facts 
 are indefinite and confused. Experiment, by varying the 
 circumstances which usually accompany the phenomena, 
 endeavours to disengage the conditions which are coincident 
 from the conditions which are causally related. Hence it 
 has been happily defined "une observation provoquee." 
 Instead of contenting itself with the ordinary course of pheno- 
 mena, it produces a definite disturbance of that course by 
 artificial means. Observation tells us in the gross that 
 atmospheric air which has been inspired by an animal, and 
 then expired, is more or less damaged for further respiration. 
 Experiment tells us definitely what have been the changes 
 undergone by the gaseous constituents of air. Observation 
 gives us the fact with great certainty, but without precision j 
 Experiment adds nothing to the certainty, but renders the 
 fact precise, and quantitatively appreciable. Although Experi- 
 ment is an instrument of immense importance, it is one 
 which derives all its value from the mind directing it. Used 
 at haphazard, its results are fortuitous. The example of 
 the alchemists should teach us how little it effects in incom- 
 petent hands ; that example discloses experimental investiga- 
 tions wandering into paths more eccentric, and arriving at 
 conclusions more preposterous than ever seduced an Aristotle 
 or an Abohimedes. Experiment is an art, and demands an 
 artist. 
 
 § 43. Moreover Playpaie's misconception may be answered 
 on other grounds. He would not deny that Astronomy, 
 Anatomy, Zoology, and Botany are sciences ; he would not 
 deny that the ancients failed to discover the laws of these 
 
CHAP. III.] ANCIENT SCIENCE. 51 
 
 sciences ; yet he: would be forced to admit that in these 
 sciences his " grand criterion," Experiment, has scarcely 
 any place, however humble. The astronomer cannot disturb 
 the ordinary course of the stars ; he must observe and calcu- 
 late. The anatomist and zoologist must likewise observe and 
 describe. These operations were performed by the ancients ; 
 yet they failed. Immense stores of observation were accu- 
 mulated, but they were of little, value. If it be said that 
 the Greeks may have observed and experimented, yet did 
 not observe correctly, nor experiment skilfully, the statement 
 is true, but unenlighiening.. Our inquiry is, ; Why was 
 this so ? 
 
 § 44- As if imperfectly satisfied with his explanation, 
 Platfair next tries thev effect of rhetoric- " Experience in 
 those days was' a light which darted a few tremulous and 
 uncertain rays on some small portions of the field of science ; 
 but men had not acquired the power over that light which 
 now enables them to concentrate, iis : beams,, and to fix; them 
 steadily on whatever subject they wish to examine. This 
 power," he adds r as if he were speaking of something 
 definite, " is 1 what distinguishes modern physics, and is the 
 cause why later philosophers*, without being more ingenious 
 than their predecessors,, have been, infinitely more successful 
 in the study of nature." 
 
 Stripped of all metaphor thiff means that the ancients failed 
 because they did not bring the results of their research in 
 many directions to elucidate each special inquiry. But unless 
 those results had been truths, their concentration, would have 
 only been a complication^ of error. And our inquiry is, Why 
 were these results imperfect ? Why were the: separate sciences 
 so barren? To thisPLAVflAnt gives no answer. If, indeed, 
 we place ourselves at that elevation which brings twenty 
 centuries under our eye, from, which point, of view all details 
 are merged in a general mist, and only the broad failure 
 becomes visible?, we may say. with truth^. that deficient 
 
 4—2 
 
52 ANCIENT SCIENCE. [CHAP. in. 
 
 Observation was the origin of the failure. But such a truth 
 is barren of instruction. To make it fruitful we must rear it 
 in the soil of History ; we must trace the actual struggles of 
 Science, and learn there what were the causes of this imper- 
 fection. Had the Greeks observed truly, they must have 
 succeeded ; the fact of their failure proves that some radical 
 defect existed: a defect of completeness, or a defect of 
 Method. Can we discover that defect ? 
 
 § 45. It is the exceptional merit of Dr. Whewell to have 
 seen the necessity of a distinct answer to this question, and 
 to have proposed an answer which claims to be at once definite 
 and philosophical. It is given in the section on the " Cause 
 of the failure of the Greek Philosophy " in his History. 8 He 
 first points out the common error of supposing that this cause 
 lay in neglect of facts. The Greeks, he assures us, did not 
 disregard experience, did not spin their philosophy purely from 
 their own minds. " The disregard of experience is a phrase 
 which may be so interpreted as to express almost any defect 
 of philosophic method, since coincidence with experience is 
 requisite to all theory." He adds that Aristotle not only 
 insisted on experience as the foundation of science, but " also 
 stated in language much resembling the habitual phraseology 
 of modern schools that particular facts must be collected; 
 that from these, general principles must be obtained by in- 
 duction ; and that these principles, when of the most general 
 kind, are axioms " — an assertion we shall see amply justified 
 in our sixth chapter. 
 
 After referring to the large collection of facts, and the 
 ingenuity of their classification, to be found in Aristotle, he 
 remarks : " Since, as we have before said, two things are 
 requisite to science — Facts and Ideas ; and since, as we have 
 seen, Facts were not wanting, we are naturally led to ask, 
 were the ancients deficient in Ideas ? was there a want among 
 
 * Whewell : History of the Inductive Sciences, 3rd ed., 1857, 1, 54. 
 
CHAP. III.] ANCIENT SCIENCE. 53 
 
 them of mental activity, and logical connexion of thought?" 
 The answer is foreseen. Undue mental activity is the standing 
 reproach against them. 
 
 § 46. Having thus surveyed the elements of the question, 
 and having found that the defect sought could be neither 
 owing to absence of Pacts, as is commonly alleged, nor to 
 absence of Ideas, Dr. "Whewell concludes that " the defect 
 was that though they had in their possession Facts and 
 Ideas, the Ideas were not distinct and appropriate to the 
 Facts." 
 
 § 47. An obvious answer to this solution is that it merely 
 restates, in other words, the case of failure. In saying that 
 the Ideas were not distinct and appropriate to the Facts, he 
 simply says that the Facts were wrongly interpreted, not why 
 they were so. Answering this criticism, he affirms that his 
 explanation, over and above the case of failure, points out the 
 one special direction, out of several, in which the Greeks went 
 wrong. " They did not fail because they neglected to, observe 
 facts ; they did not fail because they had not ideas to reason 
 from ; but they failed because they had not the right ideas in 
 each case. And as long as they were wrong in this point, 
 no industry in collecting facts, or ingenuity in classing 
 them and reasoning about them, could lead them to solid 
 truth." 
 
 § 48. It is many years since this explanation was first 
 propounded, but I find myself still unable, after long medita- 
 tion, to see either the precision it claims, or accuracy 
 in the premisses from which it is deduced. I must venture 
 therefore to consider it under both aspects. With respect 
 to the first it should be observed that "distinct and appro- 
 priate Ideas " have a peculiar position in the author's philo- 
 sophy, which may be appreciated through the following 
 
 "The Greeks in their physical speculations fixed their 
 attention upon the wrong aspects and relations of phenomena ; 
 
54 ANCIENT SCIENCE. [CHAP. III. 
 
 and the aspects and relations in which the phenomena are to 
 be -viewed in order to arrive at scientific truths, may be ranged 
 under certain heads, which I have termed Ideas;: such as Space, 
 Time, Number, Cause, Likeness. In every case there is an Idea 
 to which the phenomenon may be referred so as to bring into 
 view the Laws by which they are governed ; this Idea, I term 
 the appropriate Idea in such a case ; and in order that the 
 reference of the phenomena to the Law may be clearly seen, 
 the Idea must be distinctly possessed. Thus the reason of 
 Aristotle's failure in his attempts at mechanical science is 
 that he did not refer the Facts to the appropriate Idea, 
 namely Force, the Cause of Motion, but to relations of 
 Space, and the like ; that is, he introduced geometrical instead 
 of mechanical Ideas." 
 
 § 49. That many special errors may be referred to such a 
 cause is admissible. A writer so conversant with science 
 and its history as Dr. Whewell, would not propound an 
 explanation which was destitute of confirmatory examples; 
 but he will admit that, unless the explanation be generally 
 applicable, it will not serve our purpose ; and it would be easy 
 to cite abundant examples of unequivocal failure which cannot 
 be referred to the indistinctness or inappropriateness of the 
 Ideas. When the orbit of the planets was held to be circular, 
 and their motion uniform, the appropriate and distinct Ideas 
 of Space and Time were not less . vividly present to the mind 
 of Aristotle, than they were to the mind of Kepleb, when he 
 held the orbit to be elliptical, and the motion variable. 
 Again, Aristotle's failure in Biology is not less conspicuous 
 than his failure in Mechanics ; yet the ideas of Final Cause, 
 Likeness, and Vitality, which are said to be the ideas appro- 
 priate to this science, were assuredly possessed by him with a 
 distinctness unsurpassed in modern times. In the course of 
 the ensuing pages many glaring errors of the Greeks will 
 have to be noticed ; and the reader will see how few of them 
 can be referred to the cause assigned by Dr. Whewell. 
 
CHAP, m.] ANCIENT SCIENCE. 55 
 
 § 50. Instead of conceiving that the Greeks failed to 
 detect the laws of equilibrium and motion because their Ideas 
 of pressure, resistance, momentum, &c, were indistinct, it 
 seems to me more consonant with History to conceive that 
 these Ideas were gradually evolved from the precise appreciation 
 of the Facts of equilibrium and motion. Thus, what Dr. 
 Whewell considers to be primary, fundamental, I hold to be 
 secondary and derivative. The appropriate Ideas said to 
 determine the progress of discovery are, I conceive, them- 
 selves perfected — brought into distinctness — during the 
 progress of discovery, and cannot properly be applied as 
 Instruments until some progress has been achieved. To use 
 the very illustration of our author — " The Idea of Likeness 
 could not be applied so as to give rise to a scientific classifica- 
 tion of plants till considerable progress was made in studying 
 the general relations of vegetable form and life." 3 However, 
 as this is a point in which our views on science are widely at 
 variance, I shall not further moot it here. 
 
 § 51. If it were admitted that the one determining cause of 
 the failure was the absence of distinctness and appropriateness 
 in the Ideas, a philosophic historian would still be called upon 
 to, explain this absence. The reason why the Greeks viewed 
 phenomena under wrong relations, and why the moderns 
 viewed them under right relations, would stand in need of 
 explanation. Thus Dr. Whewell's reply to the question, 
 Why did the Greeks fail ? is wanting in precision, to say the 
 very least ; and we may now proceed to consider the want 
 of accuracy in the premisses on which his conclusion is 
 founded. 
 
 § 52. He affirms that the Greeks were not wanting in 
 Facts, nor deficient in Ideas. The statement is delusively 
 equivocal. In strict language, neglect of facts was the cause 
 of failure ; and it is inaccurate to say that the Greeks were 
 
 * 
 
 3 History of Scientific Ideas, 1858, IL, 115. 
 
56 ANCIENT SCIENCE. [CHAP. III. 
 
 not strikingly deficient in them. Anatomy, for example, 
 is a science which consists in the accurate appreciation of 
 visible facts. It demands nothing but patience in dissection 
 and correctness in description. This science the Greeks 
 professed ; they expounded the facts of animal organization, 
 and their failure was extensive, minute, surprising. Can we 
 say there was not neglect of facts here ? 
 
 § 53. Although it may be justifiable to answer vague 
 allegations respecting the ancient contempt of observation, by 
 pointing out the large accumulation of facts from which the 
 Greeks drew their data, and by quoting their emphatic recog- 
 nition of the Inductive Method, it is equivocal to claim for 
 them such an appreciation of facts as warrants the assertion 
 that their failure did not arise from deficient observation. It 
 is true that they observed ; it is not true that they observed 
 adequately. It is true that they invoked experience; it is 
 not true that they invoked it sufficiently. They very im- 
 perfectly appreciated the nature of evidence ; they were careless 
 both as to the quantity and quality of the facts. 
 
 § 54. Nor is the assertion that they were fully possessed 
 with Ideas less equivocal. Undoubtedly, they exhibited 
 immense intellectual energy, but their Ideas were for the most 
 part inductions carelessly obtained from facts which had never 
 been verified ; consequently the ingenuity and activity of their 
 theories only exhibit mental energy, careless whether its 
 constructions rest on granite or on shifting sand. It will be 
 seen hereafter that they were not less regardless of Verification 
 in the region of ideas than in facts ; and therefore, although we 
 cannot say that they were deficient in facts or ideas, meaning by 
 deficiency entire absence, we must avow them to have been 
 deficient in both, meaning by it, insufficiency. This was not 
 due to want of power, but to want of Method. They 
 observed and reasoned, but observed badly, and reasoned 
 precipitately. 
 
 § 55. There are three modes of investigation : Obser- 
 
CHAP. HI.] ANCIENT SCIENCE. 57 
 
 vation, Induction, Deduction. To be fruitful, these must 
 all be rigorously subordinated to Verification. Before each 
 new step can be safely taken, the facts must be verified, the 
 induction verified, and the deduction verified. At any one of 
 these stages error may creep in ; unless these doors are securely 
 barred, no success is certain. Imperfectly observed facts, im- 
 perfect inductions and deductions, constantly betray men of 
 science in our own day ; and more constantly betrayed the 
 Greeks, because the Greeks were less alive to the dangers. 
 Our sole superiority consists in this : we have an ampler basis 
 of demonstrated and colligated truths, and a keener sense of 
 the sources of error. They were careless and credulous, 
 where we are circumspect and sceptical. They were confi- 
 dent and precipitate in induction ; and when an argument 
 was verbally consistent it had an excellent chance of being 
 accepted as an accurate representation of the order of 
 nature. 
 
 § 56. Abundant illustrations will present themselves in 
 the course of the following pages ; meanwhile let this example 
 suffice. The ancients maintained that the velocity of a falling 
 body is proportional to its weight. This is an opinion natu- 
 rally suggested by an unverified survey of the phenomena ; 
 and in those days no -one thought of verifying what was prima 
 facie plausible ; no one thought of ascertaining whether a 
 heavy body did fall more rapidly than a lighter body. The 
 fact was assumed on the faith of such experiences as the fall 
 of a stone and a feather. When Galileo denied the fact, he 
 was ridiculed by the Aristotelians. When he sought to bring 
 it within the range of Verification, by dropping bodies of 
 different weights from the leaning tower of Pisa, so powerful 
 was the old prejudice that it was unshaken even by the simul- 
 taneous sound of these bodies ringing on the pavement. 
 The Aristotelians, from having so long neglected Verification, 
 had come to disbelieve in its teaching. 
 
 § 57. To affirm that the Greeks wanted neither Facts nor 
 
58 AWCIENT SCIENCE. [CHAP. HI. 
 
 Ideas is therefore manifestly equivocal. Tor the purposes 
 of Science they wanted both ; that is, they wanted true facts 
 and true ideas. Such facts as they had, seldom sufficed for 
 their inductions, and their deductions were seldom confronted 
 with reality. In a word, they failed because they had not 
 a clear conception of the true Method, and wanted the aid of 
 the proper Instruments. The true Method came into use 
 only after the baffled ingenuity of many generations had dis- 
 closed the futility of every other, and partial success had 
 cheered men on the difficult but certain path. Each step on 
 that path made it easier for followers. The Greeks had no 
 predecessors. With the impatience of active intellects they 
 attempted to build before the accumulation of building materials 
 had furnished the means, and before Architecture had furnished 
 a Method. " The ancients," says Bacon, " proved themselves, 
 in everything that turns on wit and abstraction, wonderful 
 men. But as in former ages, when men sailed only by 
 observation of the stars, they could indeed coast along the 
 shores of the old continent, or cross a few of the Mediterranean 
 seas; but before the ocean could be traversed, and the new 
 world discovered, the use of the mariner's needle, as a more 
 faithful and certain guide, had to be found out." * Unhappily 
 the ancients were ill-content to creep along the coasts, and 
 slowly collect the wealth to be found there. They hoped to 
 traverse the great ocean without the guide of a compass. 
 That guide is Verification. 
 
 § 58. In the absence of this important principle, the inter- 
 pretation of nature can be but mere guesswork, sometimes right 
 and sometimes wrong, but without a standard of right or wrong. 
 The complexity of phenomena is that of a labyrinth, the 
 paths of which cross and recross each other ; one wrong turn 
 causes the wanderer infinite perplexity. Verification is the 
 Ariadne-thread by which the real issues may be found. Un- 
 
 4 Bacon: Works, by Spedmng and Ellis, 1858, IV., 18. 
 
CHAP. III.] ANCIENT SCIENCE. 59 
 
 happily, the process of Verification is slow, tedious, often 
 difficult and deceptive ; and we are by nature lazy and im- 
 patient, hating labour, eager to obtain. Hence credulity. 
 We accept facts without scrutiny, inductions without proof ; 
 and we yield to our disposition to believe that the order of 
 phenomena must correspond with our conceptions. 
 
 Verification, the alpha and omega of research, of which 
 Experiment is the potent handmaid, was so little understood 
 by the ancients, that it found neither employment in their 
 practice, nor recognition in their philosophy. I do not, of 
 course, mean that they never verified their facts or conclusions ; 
 only thus could they have acquired any accurate knowledge. 
 I mean that they rarely set about Verification with a distinct 
 consciousness that such a proeess was an indispensable part of 
 true investigation. The great Hippaechtjs and the illus- 
 trious Archimedes are individual examples of true scientific 
 inquiry, and their success was their reward. But few ancients 
 can be named beside these. Even in a science founded so 
 much on calculation as Astronomy we see a deplorable defi- 
 ciency of any due recognition of Verification. Thus when 
 Eeatosthenes conceived the felicitous idea of measuring an 
 arc of the meridian by the sun's distance from the zenith of 
 Alexandria on the solstitial day, conceiving that on the same 
 day the sun was exactly in the zenith of Syene, he never 
 thought of verifying his basis, never ascertained whether 
 Alexandria and Syene were, in fact, due north and south of 
 one another. Yet this is what no modern astronomer would 
 neglect. Had Eeatosthenes taken this preliminary trouble 
 he would have found that Syene is to the east of Alexandria, 
 and must have measured his arc by other points. In future 
 chapters we shall notice Aristotle framing theories, more or 
 less ingenious, upon premisses which a very moderate scrutiny 
 would have detected to be utterly erroneous ; and we may 
 compare this facile acquiescence in unverified facts with the 
 laborious solicitude of ft Hallee, sacrificing one hundred and 
 
60 ANCIENT SCIENCE. [CHAP, m. 
 
 ninety animals to establish the basis of his theory of Irri- 
 tability, 5 or with the patience of a Mullee, devoting two 
 years of almost daily observation to the generative organs of 
 reptiles and birds. 6 These great investigators knew the futility 
 of theorizing so long as facts remained unverified. They 
 knew the perpetuity of error and disputation when unchecked 
 by peremptory fact. 7 
 
 § 59. We have thus gradually disclosed the psychological 
 cause of the ancient failure. It was this defect of Method 
 which prevented successful research. The ancients flagrantly 
 disregarded the principle of Verification, both in the region 
 of facts and the region of ideas; neither recognizing its 
 necessity as a matter of teaching, nor employing it with 
 any rigour and system in practice. To this source every 
 one of their errors may be traced. Every error may be 
 shown to have arisen from reliance on unproved facts, pre- 
 cipitate inductions, or mere phrases reasoned from as if they 
 
 5 Haller : MSmoires sur la Nature sensible et irritable des parties du corps 
 animal, Lausanne, 1761, 1., 4. He complains of his contemporaries for not 
 taking due precautions. " Us ne font que peu, ou point, d' experiences, et ce 
 qui est plus dangereux encore, ils lour substituent des analogies auxquclles ils 
 donnent la meme force." In the preface to the 8th vol. of his Elementa Phy- 
 siologic, he finely says : " Lsetus exitum video immensi operis : qui ab annis 
 retro triginta et sex majorem partem vitae mese in id unum impendi. Numerosos 
 libros eo fine legi: animalia pene innumera incidi, et mortua et imprimis viva, ut 
 motus animales eorumque causas perciperem. . . . Longum id tempus non 
 suffecit tamen ut omnia ipse, et satis accurate, et satis repetito viderem ; fuerunt 
 quae nunquam, fuerunt qum nou satis itcrato viderim." This was the spirit 
 which made him one of the great legislators of science in his day. 
 
 6 Muixer : Bildungsgeschichte der Genitalien, 1830. Comp. also Vr/LPIAN 
 et Philipeaux : Hecherches ExpSrimentales sur la regeneration des nerfs in the 
 Memoires de la Societe de Biologie, Paris, 1859, I., 382, where, noticing the 
 small amount of facts they adduce after so many experiments, they add, " on 
 en trouvera les raisons dans le controle rigoreux auquel nous avons souniis nos 
 observations, parceque, nous defiant de nous memes, et soulevant apropos de chaque 
 fait des objections, nous n'acceptions comme reellement demonstratives que les 
 experiences qui ne pouvaient laisser place a aucun doute." No ancient would 
 have understood such scruples ; all moderns will applaud, if they have not the 
 patience to imitate them. 
 
 7 Por example, the disputes of physicians continued through oenturies re- 
 specting the share in diseases due to an acid state of the blood, before any one 
 had ascertained the fact of free acid existing in the blood at all. 
 
CHAP. III.] ANCIENT SCIENCE. 61 
 
 were demonstrated truths. And' to this source, likewise, 
 may all the errors of moderns be traced. 
 
 The last sentence seems to raise a doubt as to the 
 propriety of bringing against the ancients a charge to which 
 the moderns are confessedly open. But it is with steady 
 purpose that I identify the psychological cause in both cases. 
 The human mind has not changed. The cause of error is 
 everywhere the same. In modern times this cause must 
 be very active, since we see unequivocal evidence of its effects. 
 The superiority we have over the ancients arises from our 
 having learned in the study of science to distrust the facile pro- 
 cedure of the mind when left to its native impulses. We have 
 learned the art of investigation. Often failing in its applica- 
 tion, we, at any rate, recognize its methods. The ancients 
 imperfectly understood that art ; and since the art could 
 only have emerged gradually in the growth of Science, we 
 are brought to the second or historical cause of the ancient 
 failure. The psychological cause lies deep in human nature, 
 and is not less operative in our days than of old, whenever it 
 is disengaged from the influences of the historical cause ; that 
 is, whenever the mind acts free from the control of acquired 
 knowledge and acquired tendencies. A long training of the 
 mind in scientific investigation has induced a firm reliance 
 on scientific Method. This represses the spontaneous im- 
 patience and credulity natural to the untrained intellect. 
 We have acquired the habit of Verification in a long experience 
 of the dangers incurred by its neglect. We have learned 
 to view Metaphysics with such distrust as not unfrequently 
 to misconceive the value of abstract principles. 
 
 § 60. It thus appears that if we can explain the failure 
 of the ancients by their disregard of Verification, we have 
 still to explain why they disregarded so important a principle, 
 and why moderns have both recognized and employed it. 
 The explanation is simple and has already been sketched 
 (§ 40). Science is the attempt to interpret the phenomena 
 
62 ANCIENT SCIENCE. [CHAP, m. 
 
 of nature; and this interpretation borrows light from the 
 general illumination of discovery. But men cannot, or at 
 least, they will not, await the tardy results of discovery; 
 they will not sit down in avowed ignorance. Imagination 
 supplies the deficiencies of Observation. A theoretic arch 
 is thrown across the chasm, because men are unwilling to 
 wait till a solid bridge be constructed. The mind, as Bacon 
 says, " has a yearning which makes it dart forth to generali- 
 ties that it may have something to rest in ; and after a little 
 dalliance with experience becomes weary of it." The early 
 thinkers, by reason of the very splendour of their capacities, 
 were not less incompetent to follow the slow processes of 
 scientific investigation, than a tribe of martial savages to 
 adopt the strategy and discipline of modern armies. No 
 accumulated laws, no well-tried methods existed for their aid. 
 The elementary laws in each department were mostly unde- 
 tected. And with this poverty in material, with this absence 
 of acquired skill, and this native precipitancy of judgment"; 
 acting on the ambition to interpret nature, it is not wonder^ 
 ful if they chose the a priori road, neglecting the laborious 
 Inductive road which had not then been proved to lead to 
 great results. History tells how the theories established 
 in one generation become the starting-points of successors. 
 The laws, so difficult to discover, become, when discovered; 
 familiar facts ready for the tyro's use. Newton, with all 
 his genius, would not have detected the law of gravitation 
 had not Kepler and Galileo preceded him;, nor could 
 they have made their discoveries had not Greek mathemati- 
 cians supplied the means. It was by the bold and happy 
 identification of celestial with terrestrial physics that the 
 great thinkers of the seventeenth century made physical 
 Astronomy an exact science, making it a part of Mechanics, 
 explaining its' phenomena by those very Laws of Motion 
 which were proved to regulate the phenomena of terrestrial 
 bodies. 
 
CHAP. III.] ANCIENT SCIENCE. 63 
 
 The growth of discovery is slow, and man is naturally 
 impatient. Herein, as before hinted, lies the explanation 
 of the preference for the Subjective Method. Not until that 
 method had been tried by successive generations, and found 
 to lead to no discovery, was it relinquished for the more 
 modest and difficult method which experience proved to be 
 the true one. And this relinquishment was gradual. The. 
 great results obtained in the 17th century naturally fixed 
 attention on the method by which they were reached. From 
 that time to the present there has been an ever-increasing 
 extension of the method. And that this has been determined 
 by the accumulations of Knowledge is evident when we reflect 
 that the Subjective Method is co-extensive with our ignor- 
 ance. It is the tendency of all positive knowledge of objects 
 gradually to displace the subjective fictions by which the 
 blank of ignorance was at first filled up. Thus with the 
 growth of knowledge Metaphysics, which once reigned 
 supreme, has given place to Science in all but a few depart- 
 ments of inquiry. It will be the task of this History to set 
 forth the various stages of this progress and their causes. 
 For the present it is enough to note how the existence of 
 a mass of accurately-appreciated facts has determined the 
 general acceptance of that Method on which alone the mass 
 may be largely increased, and the true laws of phenomena 
 discovered. The amazing rapidity of scientific progress in 
 the last half century, compared with the slowness of its 
 progress in early times, is clearly due to the facilities afforded 
 by what may be called the historical conditions — the state 
 of knowledge out of which the progress issued. 
 
 To resume : The cause of the ancient failure was primarily 
 a defect of Method ; and the continuance of this cause, which 
 lies deep in human nature, was due to the imperfect con- 
 dition of Knowledge. At no time was the right Method 
 wholly disregarded, but the predominance of the false 
 Method kept it in a state of feeble subjection. As know- 
 
64 ANCIENT SCIENCE. [CHAP. HI, 
 
 ledge slowly advanced, this predominance slowly diminished ; 
 and at the present time the relative positions are changed; 
 the false Method is still employed, and in certain inquiries 
 preserves its supremacy; but the existence of a vast body 
 of scientific doctrine, and the rapidly increasing extension of 
 the scientific spirit, prove that the true Method is at length 
 predominant. 
 
( 65 ) 
 
 CHAPTEK IV. 
 
 THE METAPHYSICAL AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 
 
 § 61. The conclusion arrived at in the preceding chapter 
 requires that some specific account should be given of the two 
 rival Methods, Subjective and Objective, which for so many 
 centuries have struggled for mastery. I shall here confine 
 myself to the metaphysical phase of the Subjective Method. 
 Since the days of Bacon it has been a standing reproach 
 against the Greeks and the Schoolmen that they wasted fine 
 intellects in metaphysical disputes, prolonged the infancy of 
 philosophy by forsaking the plain paths of observation for 
 the wilderness of abstract speculation, and failed to make 
 any considerable advances towards true knowledge, because 
 they engaged in the hopeless endeavour to solve problems 
 insoluble by man. There is a sense in which this reproach is 
 just. There is also a sense in which it is profoundly unjust. 
 Those who perceive only the former, cannot understand why 
 those who perceive the latter should still persist in relying on 
 their bafiled pretensions, and should declare that the historical 
 fact of incessant failure is no convincing reason for ultimate 
 despair. •- — 
 
 The great battles of Humanity are never fought in vain. 
 Supposing it to be granted that energy and ingenuity have 
 been flung away upon problems essentially insoluble, the 
 
 5 
 
66 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 efforts of Metaphysics have not been without fruit. Apart 
 from the valuable experience gained respecting the nature of 
 the problems attacked, there has been the far greater gain 
 of clear insight into the true Method, which discloses what 
 problems are insoluble, and why they are so. For it is a 
 great, though frequent error, to suppose that all metaphysical 
 problems are beyond our power, and that many physical 
 problems are not so. The vanity of Metaphysics lies in its 
 Method, not in its aims. The same Method is no less 
 disastrous in Physics. How little force there is in the de- 
 clamations against that "fondness for abstract reasonings" 
 supposed to have led the ancients astray from the path of 
 observation, may be appreciated on remembering that the 
 Chaldeans observed the heavens for centuries without learning 
 more astronomy than would equip an old almanack-maker; 
 and that many modern astronomers, instead of confining them- 
 selves to observation, are exclusively occupied in calculation 
 and abstract reasoning, some of them being scarcely able to 
 recognize a star in the heavens. 
 
 § 62. The fundamental ideas of modern science are as 
 transcendental as any of the axioms in ancient philosophy. 
 Who will say that the Law of Causation, or the Laws of 
 Motion, although suggested by experience, and found to be con- 
 formable with it, do not transcend it? These are to ustu 
 ra <j>voiica. Take the formula : " Motion is necessarily rec- 
 tilinear and uniform." This is purely ideal. Our experience, 
 when closely examined, is never of uniform and rectilinear mo- 
 tions, but always of motions accelerated or retarded, and more 
 or less divergent. But the curve of a projectile is explained as 
 the resultant of the resistance of the ah-, and the attraction of 
 the earth acting upon a body which is conceived to be in uniform 
 and rectilinear motion ; and this conception itself is derived from 
 the law of inertia, in other words from the law of causation, that 
 no change (of velocity or direction) can take place without a 
 cause. Thus the uniformity of undisturbed rectilinear motion 
 
CHAP. IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 67 
 
 is an abstraction. But it is gained objectively — it is abstracted 
 from facts accurately observed, and is verified by undeviating 
 conformity with facts. In like manner the Law of Inertia is an 
 abstraction ; it so far transcends all experience as to seem in 
 flagrant contradiction to daily experience which shows us that 
 bodies in motion gradually cease to move, without any cause of 
 the cessation being apparent. The law asserts that a body in 
 motion will move for ever with undiminished velocity, unless 
 acted upon by some external cause. This assertion obviously 
 goes beyond the possibilities of experience. We know no body 
 that is not acted upon. The thing does not exist. Nevertheless 
 the law is irresistible. No sooner is it understood than it is 
 accepted without qualification. And the reason of this is that 
 it rigorously fulfils every condition of Verification. Considered 
 in its ideal aspect — (as a mere abstraction) — it is seen to be in 
 conformity with what may be termed the Ideal test, namely, 
 that its negative is unthinkable. I mean, of course, unthink- 
 able by us, not by the ancients, who held that bodies moved 
 and ceased to move from internal causes. Considered in its 
 phenomenal aspect — (as an expression of observed facts) — it 
 is seen to be in conformity with the Real test, namely, that by 
 experimentally diminishing all the known causes of resistance 
 to a body we proportionately diminish its retardation; from 
 whence we conclude that if all resistance were abolished all 
 retardation would disappear ; and thus we establish by experi- 
 ment a truth which transcends the limits of experience. 
 
 § 63. It is not a difference in \ the problems so much as 
 a difference in the Methods, which distinguishes ancient 
 from modern investigation. Compare the Physics of Abis- 
 totle with the Principia of Newton, and this becomes 
 immediately apparent. In the latter we find metaphysical 
 abstractions, but not the metaphysical Method. The formulas 
 are gained objectively, not subjectively : they are accurate 
 descriptions of the observed order in phenomena ; they are 
 moulded on realities ; they were abstracted from objects, and 
 
 5—2 
 
68 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 have been rigorously verified according to the Ideal and Real 
 tests. The formulas of Aeistotle are not more transcen- 
 dental, but they want the guarantee of Verification. On 
 confronting them with the accurately observed order of phe- 
 nomena we find them to be at variance with that order, or 
 unrelated to it. Formed upon incomplete or unverified data, 
 often upon slight analogies and verbal resemblances, they are 
 inaccurate as descriptions. When he deduces his theorems of 
 circular movement from the idea of the circle as the most 
 perfect form, he has neither the justification of conformity 
 with observed phenomena, nor of conformity with the ideal 
 criterion. The two ideas of perfection and motion are not 
 co-ordinates ; they admit of no equation. 
 
 If an a priori proposition conforms to the Ideal Test, that 
 is to say, if its negative is unthinkable, or absurd, we accept 
 it as subjectively true. When we say that under similar con- 
 ditions similar causes will be followed by similar effects, the 
 truth of the proposition is irresistible, although its absolute 
 conformity with fact can never be established, being, as it is, 
 a proposition respecting the future. Its negation being really 
 unthinkable, its positive truth is irresistible. On the other 
 hand, when Galileo supposed, with the ancients, that the velo- 
 city acquired by a falling body, at any point, must be propor- 
 tional to the space through which it had fallen ; this a priori 
 idea, though very distinct and plausible, did not withstand the 
 Ideal Test, since its negation was thinkable, and there was 
 the equally distinct idea of the velocity being proportional to 
 the time by which to oppose it. Then came the necessity for 
 Verification ; and the criterion in this case was obviously that 
 which we have named the Real Test. By this criterion he 
 learned that his first conception was erroneous, and, although 
 the conception which replaced it was not more intelligible, it 
 had the supreme advantage of being a more accurate descrip- 
 tion of the order of nature. 
 
 The Ideal Test was recognized by Abistotle and Des- 
 
CHAP. IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 69 
 
 cartes, when they advanced it as a principle of the logic 
 of Science, that on passing beyond the region of sense we are 
 to rely on what is possible. 1 In all verifiable cases we dare not 
 be confident that an explanation is true because its truth seems 
 possible. Our conceptions of possibility are too contingent to 
 form a secure ground of deduction. Thus, to Galileo, it 
 seemed possible that velocity must be proportional to space, 
 because, in so conceiving it, he had not distinctly visible to 
 his mind all the elements of the problem ; in other words, all 
 the possibilities. On the application of the Eeal Test he 
 found that the seeming possibility was a fiction. He might 
 have suspected this on the application of the Ideal Test, for 
 the negation of the proposition, "velocity is proportional to 
 space," is perfectly conceivable. Indeed, in such cases Possi- 
 bility requires to be submitted to the twofold verification, 
 and cannot therefore of itself furnish an ultimate test. 
 
 § 63 a. We are thus brought round to the simple rule 
 which Science inscribes on the pediment of her temple :— No 
 formula admissible unless verifiable; none admitted, except 
 as an hypothesis, until verified ; the Verification having two 
 different criteria : one, conformity with the positive laws of 
 thought; the other, conformity with the observed order of 
 phenomena. 
 
 This rule at once distinguishes the soluble from the insolu- 
 ble problems, by furnishing the tests to which they must con- 
 
 1 Meteor, I., vii., 343. " Concerning things which escape the perception 
 of our senses, we consider them to be sufficiently demonstrated when we have 
 shown them to be possible: irepi rdv dipavTwv ry aia&fiaa vo\uZ,ojiiv Uavuig 
 diroScdelxdai Kara rbv Xoyov, idv tig rb dvvarov dvaydyujfuv.'' Descaktes 
 refers to this as representing his own views : Principia Philosophies, Pars 
 quarta, § cciv. ; he adds the important qualification : " quod equidem verum 
 esse libentissime concedo, satisque a me prsestitum esse putabo, si tantum ea 
 quae scripsi talia sint ut omnibus naturae phenomenis accurate respondeant." 
 This is in accordance with Kant's excellent remark that, "Irrthiimer 
 entspringen nicht allein daher weil man gewisse Dinge nicht weiss, sondern 
 weil man sich zu urtheilen unternimmt ob man gleich nicht Alles weiss was 
 dazu erfordert wird." — Untersuchungen vher die Deutlichkeit der Grundsatze. 
 Werke, 1838, 1., 100. 
 
70 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 form. In transcendental questions the test is ideal. No 
 question within the sphere of natural phenomena is too vast 
 for human capacity, or too subtle for human ingenuity, if it 
 can be brought within the range of Verification, direct or in- 
 direct ; and all questions are insoluble so long as they remain 
 outside this range. A year ago (1860) it would have been as 
 idle to speculate respecting the metals which now exist in the 
 sun's atmosphere, as respecting the change of a luminiferous 
 vibration into a sensation of light — both questions were 
 hopelessly insoluble because both lay outside the sphere of 
 Verification. No sooner did the brilliant discoveries of 
 Kibchoff and Bunsen 2 disclose a means of Verification 
 (Spectrum analysis), than the question became strictly 
 scientific. In like manner, if ever the means of establishing 
 an equation between motion and sensation be detected, 
 we shall be able to recognize the sensation of light to 
 be the correlated form of the force previously existing as 
 vibrations of the luminiferous medium ; and we shall trace 
 the re-appearance of this force in the motion of muscular 
 contraction, just as in physics we see motion passing into 
 heat, and heat re-passing into motion, or into electricity. 
 
 § 68 b. That the ancients and the schoolmen spent them- 
 selves on insoluble problems, is true ; but it is not the capital 
 charge against them. Their grand mistake was the employ- 
 ment of a Method on which all problems were insoluble, and 
 
 2 " Nos connaissances positives par rapport aux astres sont necessairement 
 limitees a leurs phenomenes ggometriques et mccaniques, sans pouvoir nulle- 
 ment embrasser les autres recherches physiques, chimiques, physiologiques et 
 meme sociales que component les etres accessibles a. tous nos divers moyens 
 d'observation." — Comte : Cours de Philos. Positive, 1835, II., 9. Compare 
 also pp. 11, 13, This seemed justifiable at the time it was written, although 
 perhaps there was even then an unphilosophical absoluteness in asserting the 
 necessary limitation of knowledge, since Woixaston and Fraunhofer had 
 discovered the "lines " which form the basis of the new means of verification. 
 It is quite possible that we shall one day indirectly verify physical, chemical, 
 and even biological propositions concerning the planets, as we have already 
 verified their magnitudes, distances, orbits, and times of revolution. But until 
 the means of Verification are detected, such problems are insoluble. 
 
CHAP. IT.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 71 
 
 which rendered their explanations of ordinary phenomena as 
 fruitless as their speculations about noumena and efficient 
 causes. Instead, therefore, of indulging in declamations 
 against their verbal quibbles and pursuit of metaphysical 
 abstractions, we may inquire why verbal quibbles should so 
 long have deluded them, and why the pursuit of metaphysical 
 abstractions seemed to them the pursuit of noblest wisdom. 
 To ascertain this we must appreciate their Method, in contrast 
 with the Method of Science. 
 
 § 64. Science is that co-ordination of facts which describes 
 the order of co-existence and succession in phenomena. It 
 classifies facts, bringing the particular facts under general 
 heads, co-ordinating them into theories which have all the 
 exactitude compatible with our means. 
 
 § 64 a. What is the meaning of Fact ? Nothing seems 
 easier to define, until we try ; on trial, the task is perplexing 
 because of the ambiguities of language. In philosophical and 
 in vernacular usage, an antithesis is implied between Fact 
 and Idea (or Theory), which fades into vagueness on exami- 
 nation. Facts are commonly understood to relate exclusively 
 to sense — to the objective world — to phenomena existing 
 externally, and per se. Ideas, on the contrary, relate to con- 
 sciousness — to the conceptions we form of external things. 
 The sweetness of an apple is a fact when the quality on 
 which it depends is considered apart from our sensation ; an 
 idea when considered as a part of our experience. Facts 
 might thus be defined the order of phenomena ; Ideas, or 
 Theories, our conceptions of that order. In this sense there 
 can be no false facts, but only false ideas. 
 
 Could such distinctions be consistently maintained it might 
 be well. But they cannot. The psychologist knows how 
 shadowy and artificial are these pretended limits. His analy- 
 sis discloses that facts are indissolubly ideal — the appearances 
 of things to us, not the things per se, and that so far from 
 any fact being the unadulterated image of its object, the con- 
 
72 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 ditions of our consciousness are necessarily mingled with it. 
 Moreover his analysis shows in the simplest fact an inextricable 
 blending of inference with sensation. A fact may be defined as a 
 bundle of inferences tied together by one or more sensations. 
 Take a case so simple as the sight of an apple on the table. 
 All that is here directly certified by consciousness is the sen- 
 sation of a coloured surface ; with this are linked certain ideas 
 of roundness, firmness, sweetness, and fragrance, which were 
 once sensations, and are now recalled by this of colour, and 
 the whole group of actual and inferred sensations clusters 
 into the fact which is expressed in " there is an apple." Yet 
 any one of these inferences may be erroneous. The coloured 
 object may be the imitation of an apple in wood or stone ; the 
 inferences of roundness and solidity would then be correct, 
 those of sweetness and fragrance erroneous ; the statement of 
 fact would be false. Or the object seen may be another kind 
 of fruit, resembling an apple, yet in important particulars 
 differing from it. Or the object may not exist, and our per- 
 ception may be an hallucination. Thus a case seemingly so 
 simple may furnish us with the evidence that Facts express 
 our conception of the order in external things, and not the 
 unadulterated order itself. Should the accuracy of any par- 
 ticular fact happen to be of importance — and in Science all 
 facts are important — we must verify it, before accepting it. 
 How is it verified ? By submitting each of its constituent in- 
 ferences to the primordial test of Consciousness. The test 
 with regard to objects within range of sense is obviously the 
 reduction of inference to sensation. The test with regard to 
 axioms, or general principles transcending sense, is con- 
 formity with the laws of thought (§ 62) ; when we have thus 
 verified a fact we have attained the highest degree of certitude. 
 § 65. The mental vision by which in Perception we see 
 the unapparent details — i. e. by which sensations formerly 
 co-existing with the one now affecting us are reinstated under 
 the form of ideas, which represent the objects — is a process 
 
CHAP. IV. j AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 73 
 
 closely allied to Ratiocination, which also presents an ideal 
 series such as, if the objects were before us, would be a series 
 of sensations, or perceptions. A chain of reasoning is a chain 
 of inferences, which are ideal presentations of the details now 
 unapparent to sense. Could we realize all the links in this 
 chain, by placing the objects in their actual order as a visible 
 series, the chain of reasoning would be a succession of percep- 
 tions, and would cease to be called reasoning. The path of 
 the planets is seen by reason to be an ellipse ; it would be 
 perceived as a fact if we were in a proper position, and 
 endowed with the requisite instruments to enable us to follow 
 the planet in its course. Not having this advantage, we infer 
 the unapparent points in its course, from those which are 
 apparent. We see them mentally. In like manner, suppose 
 a human body is discovered under conditions which suggest 
 that it has been burned, but without sufficient indication of 
 the cause, i. e. the facts antecedent to the burning. Some 
 one suggests that these unapparent facts are those of Spon- 
 taneous Combustion. Our greater familiarity with the facts 
 of combustion in general, and with the facts of the animal 
 organism, enables us to see that this explanation is absurd; we 
 mentally range the supposed objects before us, and see that 
 such an order of co-existences and successions is in contradic- 
 tion to all experience ; we cannot see what the actual order 
 was, but see clearly that it was not that. 
 
 Correct reasoning is the ideal assemblage of objects in 
 their true relations of co-existence and succession. It is see- 
 ing with the mind's eye. Bad reasoning results from over- 
 looking either some of the objects, or their relations ; some 
 links are dropped, and the gap is filled up from another series. 
 Thus the traveller sees a highwayman, where there is truly no 
 more than a sign-post in the twilight ; and a philosopher, in 
 the twilight of knowledge, sees a pestilence foreshadowed by 
 an eclipse. 
 
 These considerations may elucidate the real meaning to be 
 
74 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 assigned to Facts, which are sometimes taken to express the 
 order of external things, and sometimes our conception of that 
 order —our description of it ; just as sound means hoth the 
 vibrations of the air, and our sensation of them. There is a 
 general tendency to use the word Fact for a final truth. 
 " This is a fact not a theory " means, " this is an indis- 
 putable truth, riot a disputable view of the truth." But if, as 
 we have seen, Facts are inextricably mingled with Inferences, 
 and if both Perception and Seasoning, are processes of mental 
 vision reinstating unapparent fatails, and liable to error in 
 the inferences, it is clear that the radical antithesis is not 
 between Fact and Theory, but between verified and unverified 
 Inferences. 
 
 § 66. The antithesis between Fact and Theory is un- 
 tenable, for the same statement may be either a fact or a 
 theory, without any change in its evidence. It is a fact that 
 the earth is globular. It is a fact that this globe is an 
 oblate spheroid. It is a fact that its orbit is elliptical. No 
 one doubts that these are facts, no one doubts that they are 
 theories. Shall we say that they were theories until they 
 were verified, when they became facts ? This will not 
 extricate us; since all facts require verification before they 
 are admitted as truths; up to that point they are not less 
 inferential than theories. 
 
 I see an apple now falling, and I see an apple which has 
 fallen. These are two facts which ordinary language will not 
 suffer us to call theories. Now consider two theories which 
 ordinary language suffers us to call facts : namely, that all 
 apples when unsupported will fall, and that the spaces fallen 
 through will be as the squares of the times. These are two 
 theories of extreme generality, which are far more indisputable 
 than the facts we have contrasted them with. They carry 
 such certainty that no mind having the requisite preparation 
 can for a moment hesitate in assenting to them. They are 
 inferences which are necessities. Whereas the inferences in- 
 
CHAP. IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 75 
 
 volved in the facts before named may very easily be erroneous. 
 The falling object may not be an apple ; the apple found at 
 the foot of the tree may not have fallen, but have been 
 plucked and placed there. Thus doubt is permissible ; and if 
 the facts carried any importance we should be bound to verify 
 the accuracy of our inferences. No doubt is permissible in 
 respect to the two theories, because the inferences on which 
 they rest have already been rigorously verified. They carry 
 none of those possibilities of error which we know may be 
 carried by individual experiences ; all such possibilities have 
 been eliminated in the establishment of the general truth. 
 Should any individual experience seem in contradiction with a 
 thoroughly verified theory, should a hundred individual experi- 
 ences contradict it, our confidence would suffer no disturbance ; 
 we should at once assign them to the interference of some 
 condition not included in the formula. That condition might be 
 wholly undiscoverable, but we should be certain that the laws 
 of nature were invariable; and our experience of disturbing 
 influences is sufficiently extensive to invoke them in every 
 apparent exception to a law. If it happened that two magnets 
 placed side by side impressed on a particle of iron a velocity 
 greater, or less, than the sum of the velocity due to each 
 magnet acting separately, and if this were to occur a thousand 
 times, we should not doubt the truth of the law that the 
 velocity is proportional to the force, but should attribute this 
 exception to some exceptional condition, such as the influence 
 of one magnet on the other. The reason is simple : the law has 
 been rigorously verified ; the absence of any exceptional condi- 
 tion has not been verified, whereas the presence of such a con- 
 dition is suggested by manifold experiences in analogous cases. 
 § 67. Failing thus to discover any valid antithesis between 
 Fact and Theory, we must look upon the ordinary distinction 
 as simply verbal. Shall we express it by the terms Descrip- 
 tion and Explanation, implying that a Fact describes the order 
 of phenomena, and a Theory interprets that order? For 
 
76 the Metaphysical [chap. iv. 
 
 many purposes this would suffice. Yet on examination we 
 shall find that an Explanation is only a fuller Description : 
 more details are introduced, greater precision is given, the 
 links in the chain which are unapparent to sense, are made 
 apparent to reason ; but the essential mystery is untouched ; 
 successions are enumerated, but causation escapes. Thus in 
 the description of falling bodies, greater fulness and precision 
 of detail are given when the unapparent links are added, and 
 the law of attraction is introduced as the explanation. In 
 like manner the description of an event, say the destruction 
 of a house by a fire, acquires greater fulness and precision of 
 detail when the apparent details are completed by some eye- 
 witness who saw the fire break out, and explains it by this 
 enumeration of details. In each case the objects are ranged 
 in their order, and are seen thus ; but in each case many 
 objects are not seen, many intermediate links are overlooked, 
 or are undiscoverable ; and the causal nexus is for ever undis- 
 coverable. Thus it is that explanations are descriptions, 
 and descriptions are explanations, facts are theories, and 
 theories facts. Science is the explanation of nature ; the 
 systematic co-ordination of the facts of co-existence and 
 succession. 
 
 § 68. It is beyond the purpose of this chapter to specify 
 the means by which facts and theories are verified. Enough 
 that whether they be simple or complex, particular or general 
 facts, they only amount to descriptions of the external order. 
 What is termed the explanation of a phenomenon by the 
 discovery of its cause, is simply the completion of its descrip- 
 tion by the disclosure of some intermediate details which 
 had escaped observation. The phenomenon is viewed under 
 new relations. It is classed. It is no longer isolated, but 
 linked on to known facts : as when the ascent of a flame, 
 and the descent of an apple are seen to be particulars of one 
 general fact. 
 
 We learn that chlorine is a gas having a strong " ten- 
 
CHAP. IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 77 
 
 dency" to unite with hydrogen; that is to say, we have 
 discovered this among its several relations. But the ten- 
 dency is only manifested in sunlight. The two gases may 
 he mingled together in darkness, and will not there unite 
 if they are left together. Admit a ray of light, and 
 the gases rush together with a loud explosion. So far we 
 can describe. If we desire to explain, we must seek the 
 intermediates ; we must bring the particular facts under some 
 general fact, and thereby detect the unapparent antecedent 
 named cause. Shall we seek this intermediate in a " repul- 
 sive force," which we assign to the darkness, and which 
 would forcibly separate the two gases ? On the Metaphysical 
 Method this would be legitimate, and metaphysicists might 
 accept the explanation. On the Scientific Method it would 
 at once be condemned, because it does not bring the unknown 
 into visible relation with the known, but into imaginary 
 relation with an imagined fact. Darkness is itself a negation, 
 and its repulsive force a fiction without basis. Let us turn 
 to Light, which is more or less known. Do we know any- 
 thing of it which enables us to class this effect on the two 
 gases under the same head as other effects ? We believe that 
 it is ethereal undulation of a specific velocity, and we may 
 infer that the transference of this velocity to the atoms of 
 the gases causes them to rush together. "We cannot produce 
 this combination by any other known velocity, consequently 
 we are not able rigorously, to assert that it is motion and no 
 other cause which effects the change ; but we have so many 
 evidences of chemical change produced by motion, i. e. by 
 heat and light and electricity, that it is difficult to assign 
 any other cause. Now let us suppose this proved. What 
 has been done ? The obvious order has received an addition 
 to its description by the recognition of an unapparent detail. 
 If our senses were sufficiently acute we might see the vibra- 
 tion of light transferred to the gaseous atoms, we might see 
 them quivering and rushing together; we might see them 
 
78 THE METAPHYSICAL [OHAP. IV. 
 
 liberated from the ethereal vibrations (heat), which had kept 
 them in a more expanded condition, and which now produce 
 the explosion. But that is all we should see; the mystery 
 of their new union, the nature of the forces, would be veiled 
 from us, and our explanation would still be no more than a 
 description of the order in phenomena. 
 
 § 68 a. To this illustration from science let one be added 
 from ordinary life. A man stumbles on the prostrate body- 
 of a girl. There is blood on the ground; a gash in her 
 throat ; a razor lies on the trampled mud. These appearances 
 suggest unapparent details. He sees that the girl has been 
 murdered ; recognizes the razor as belonging to her brutal 
 stepfatber; and at once explains the presence of the corpse 
 by inferring that the girl was murdered by her stepfather. 
 This description of the order of events, this mental vision 
 of unseen occurrences, may be correct. Another man looking 
 from a distant window may have seen the murder committed ; 
 seeing the facts which the other only inferred. But both 
 are describing an order of events in which there is large 
 inference, and both may be in error. The first witness 
 infers that the girl was murdered ; she may have committed 
 suicide. The second witness verifies the truth of the infer- 
 ence respecting the murder ; but the inference respecting 
 the identity of the stepfather needs confirmation. One relies 
 on the fact that the razor belongs to the stepfather, and that 
 this man has frequently maltreated the girl : but the razor 
 may be the property of another man, or may have been used 
 by another purposely to mislead suspicion. The eye-witness, 
 again, infers that the man seen from the window was the 
 stepfather, and no other : infers this from certain visual 
 sensations ; but the murderer may have resembled in general 
 aspect the stepfather. Suppose that the accused is able to 
 prove on unexceptionable evidence, that at the very hour 
 named, he was many miles away from the spot ; this would 
 at once set aside all the criminating evidence founded on the 
 
CHAP. IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 79 
 
 inferences of the eye-witness. By thus sifting the facts, 
 confronting inferences with the actual order of things, justice 
 and science arrive at their verdicts. 
 
 The digression we have just made discloses that whatever 
 may he the convenience of language, Fact and Theory, 
 Description and Explanation, admit of no essential separation. 
 The only vital antithesis is between verified and unverified 
 inferences. We are thus once again brought to the iteration 
 of the important principle that Verification is the alpha and 
 omega of philosophy ; and that it is by the vigilant solicitude 
 for Verification, and the comprehensive delicacy of the means 
 employed in it, that Science asserts her superiority over 
 Metaphysics. 
 
 § 69. The metaphysician and metaphysicist pretend to 
 co-ordinate facts with all the rigour of a physicist ; but they 
 admit facts which have not withstood the preliminary test, 
 and facts which are not amenable to that test. This disregard 
 and misapprehension of the test are due to overweening 
 confidence in the validity of reason. Ideas are accepted, 
 .unchallenged, as the correct representatives of the external 
 order. " There is one basis of science," says Descaktes, 
 " one test and rule of truth, namely, that whatever is clearly 
 and distinctly conceived is true." 3 A profound psychological 
 mistake. It is true only of formal logic, wherein the. mind 
 never quits the sphere of its first assumptions to pass out into 
 the sphere of real existences ; no sooner does the mind pass 
 from the internal order to the external order, than the 
 necessity of verifying the strict correspondence between the 
 two becomes absolute. The Ideal Test must be supplemented 
 
 3 " Hac igitur detecta veritate simul etiam invenit omnium scientiarum fanda- 
 mentum: ac etiam omnium aliarum veritatem, mensuram ac regulam ; scilicet, 
 quicquid tam clarS ac distinct^ percipitur quam istud verum est." He after- 
 wards qualifies this by adding " when the idea involves existence." Spinoza, 
 Implicitly in the Ethics, and explicitly in his letter to Oldenbukg, assumes the 
 iame criterion. Compare, also, his tract, De emendatione intellectus, § 108. 
 Indeed, it is the only ground on which Metaphysics can be justified. 
 
80 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 by the Real Test, to suit the new conditions of the problem. 
 "Reason is the Absolute," says Schilling, "and all the 
 objections against this proposition spring from our tendency 
 to regard things, not as they are in Reason, but as they 
 appear."* Again : " It is a fundamental belief that not only 
 do things exist independently of us, but that our Ideas so com- 
 pletely correspond with them that there is nothing in the things 
 which is not in our Ideas." Hegel, in the introduction to 
 his Logic, comes upon the question, " What is truth ? In 
 ordinary language we name the concordance of an object with 
 our conception of it, truth. In philosophical language, on the 
 contrary, truth is the concordance of the meaning with 
 itself (iibereinstimmung eines Inhalts mit sich selbst). And 
 this sense has also penetrated our vernacular, for we speak of 
 a true friend, meaning thereby one whose actions correspond 
 with the idea of friendship." 5 And he scornfully characterizes 
 Empiricism as seeking truth in Experience instead of in 
 Thought (statt in dem Gedanken selbst das Wahre zu suchen.) 6 
 It is on such principles that the modern German Philosophy 
 has reproduced the ambitious but inane attempts of Scholas- 
 ticism. Hegel's disciples avow that " since the Whole is 
 ideally in the Mind, the I has only to yield itself to its 
 I-hood, in order to see the Absolute in itself as there im- 
 mediately given." 7 The curious results of yielding to the 
 I-hood are familiar to all those who have toiled through 
 modern German philosophy. 
 
 Let us for one moment pause to consider how Hegel 
 applies this method to the elucidation of Matter and Spirit. 
 
 * Sohellino : Zeitschrift far speculative Physik, IX., Heft. II, 3, 
 
 s Hegel's Philosophie in wSrtlichen Ausziigen. Von Ekanz und Hillekt: 
 Berlin, 1843, p. 27. 
 
 'Hegel: Encyclopadie der philos. Wissenschaften, § 37, Heidelberg, 
 1830, p. 44. 
 
 'Ekanz und Hilleut: Op. cit. XII. The original must be added: 
 " Denn da im Geiste idealiter das Ganze ist, so hat sich das Ich nur seiner 
 Ichheit zu begeben, urn in sieh selbst das Absolute anzuschauen welches sich 
 unmittelbar darbietet." 
 
CHAP. IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 81 
 
 The substance or essence (substanp) of Matter, he says, is 
 Gravity ; that of Spirit is Freedom. But Matter is only 
 heavy inasmuch as it tends to a centre. It is composite ; 
 its very existence is external to itself — sie besteht ausser 
 einander. Thus the essence of matter consists in the search 
 for an unity which would be its destruction." 8 Now, supposing 
 we accepted these strange propositions, does not the inquirer 
 at once perceive that such subjective manipulations can be of 
 no assistance in the search for external relations ? 
 
 § 69 a. But the errors of a Descabtes or a Hegel, not 
 to mention the thousand broad and subtle intellects which 
 have pursued similar paths, are not to be disposed of by a 
 sentence. History reveals the completeness of the failure; 
 but Philosophy demands an exposition of its cause. I have 
 already indicated that cause in general terms, and will 
 endeavour to complete that indication. 
 
 First, let us consider the futility of deciding upon the 
 external order, by subjective scrutiny — of passing from formal 
 logic into the sphere of concrete objects — without being care- 
 ful to apply the Real Test. Oxygen and nitrogen are two 
 colourless gases ; abstract Logic assures us that out of two 
 negatives we cannot educe a positive ; out of two colourless 
 gases, therefore, Logic tells us that we can get no colour by 
 their union. But what is the fact ? We pass from the sub- 
 ject to the object ; we bring the two gases into union ; and the 
 nitrous acid which results has a deep orange colour. The 
 application of the Eeal Test, the verification of our deduction 
 by the confrontation with reality, discloses an imperfection in 
 that deduction, which, subjectively, could not have been sus- 
 pected. And if, in so simple a case, the objective facts are 
 not in accordance with the subjective deduction, how much 
 more urgent is the demand for Verification in highly complex 
 
 8 Hegel: Philos. der Geschichte, 1849, p. 22. Comp. also Encyclop. der 
 philos. Wissen., § 262. 
 
 6 
 
82 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 cases, physiological or psychological, not to mention the 
 favourite themes of Metaphysics ? 
 
 And yet it is obvious that the truths of formal logic are 
 unimpeachable. But they lose their guarantee in passing 
 beyond their sphere. The laws of Kational Mechanics are 
 none the less certain, because in Practical Mechanics the 
 effects of friction and the inevitable imperfection of materials 
 cause us to modify our calculations. But the results of apply- 
 ing the laws of Bational Mechanics without due consideration 
 for the disturbing causes would be disastrous. It is the same 
 in speculation. No sooner do we pass beyond the region of 
 abstractions, than we must at every step assure ourselves of 
 the truth of our inferences by the confirmation of reality. 
 This necessity metaphysicians have overlooked. Logical 
 dependence was the sole test they sought. A conclusion was 
 pronounced valid if it could be shown to be " involved in the 
 idea " which was formed of the facts ; but how that idea itself 
 had been formed, or how far it was verifiable, was disregarded. 
 The uniform velocity of the planets was involved in the idea 
 of their circular orbit, which again was involved in the idea of 
 the circle as the most perfect form. The variable velocity of 
 the planets is equally involved in the idea of their orbit being 
 elliptical ; but this idea was not gained by deduction from 
 the idea of perfection ; it was gained by an abstraction from the 
 observed order of phenomena : it was a verifiable and verified 
 inference. The one conclusion was purely metaphysical, the 
 other purely scientific. 9 
 
 § 70. Unless we adopt the Platonic conception of Ideas, 
 and suppose that our d priori notions are independent of 
 
 9 Roger Bacon is worth quoting here : " Duo enim sunt modi cognoscendi, 
 scilicet per argumentum et experimentum. Argumentum concludit et facit 
 nos concludere qussstionem, sed non certificat neque removet dubitationem, ut 
 quiescat animus in intuitu veritatis, nisi earn inveniat via experientia? • " and 
 comparing the man who argues about the properties of fire with the man who 
 tests them, he adds, " sed assumpta experientia combustionis certificatur ani- 
 mus et quiescit in/ulgore veritatis." — Opus Majus, Venet., 1750 p. 336 
 
CHAP. IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 83 
 
 experience, it is obvious thai the Metaphysical Method violates 
 the first principles of research. If experience is the basis of 
 even abstract knowledge— the abstract notions being elicited 
 from concrete facts— experience will be the test of all know- 
 ledge. This is not the place to re-open the discussion respect- 
 ing the origin of knowledge. Those who hold that the mind 
 is furnished with ideas derived from a source independent of 
 experience, and not therefore amenable to it, must neverthe- 
 less confine themselves strictly within the sphere of such 
 ideas, and not include in it the facts only given by experience. 
 Descabtes, who started from universal doubt, refusing to 
 admit anything but what was demonstrably true, very soon 
 wandered into error, because his criterion of truth was simply 
 subjective ; whereas another criterion was no less indispensa- 
 ble directly he passed from the region of ideas to the region of 
 facts. Thus, in assigning the pineal gland as the seat of the 
 soul, he says, " The reason which persuades me that the soul 
 can have no other seat is that I consider all the other parts of 
 the brain are double, and that thought is single ; and one can 
 easily conceive that the images are collected in this gland by 
 means of the animal spirits." 10 What he can easily conceive, 
 he at once unsuspectingly accepts to be the truth ; any con- 
 firmation of this view by the application of the Eeal Test he 
 deems superfluous. Here, as throughout, he falls into the 
 common mistake of metaphysicians. Kant truly says " it is 
 the fate of human reason in speculation to build as rapidly as 
 possible, and only when the edifice is completed to examine 
 the solidity of its foundations." 11 And the source of such 
 carelessness he finds in this, that knowledge often consisting 
 in the analysis of our conceptions, we are led to pay exclusive 
 attention to them, rather than to their prigin. 
 
 § 71. That the vital distinction between Metaphysics and 
 
 10 Descartes: Traite des Passions, art. 32. (Euvres, ed. Simon: Paris, 
 1844, p. 519. 
 
 11 Kant : Kritik. Einleitung, § III., p. 9. 
 
 6 — 2 
 
84 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 Science is less the nature of their problems than the nature 
 of their Method, which finally determines what problems are 
 soluble and how they can be solved, may be shown from two 
 sides. Many of the fundamental principles of Science are, 
 as we have already seen, principles which transcend experience, 
 although rigorously conformable with it. They are necessary 
 truths, in the sense that the mind having once understood 
 the terms of their enunciation cannot conceive the proposi- 
 tions otherwise ; they conform to the Ideal Test, and cannot 
 be made matters of direct observation. The law of causation, 
 and the law of inertia, are not measurable and demonstrable in 
 the same way as the law of refraction is measurable and 
 demonstrable. No physicist ever thought of proving the 
 former by experiment ; no physicist would accept the latter 
 unless it had been experimentally verified. Hence Kant has 
 proposed to form a separate science, physica pura or rationalis, 
 of those propositions which usually form the introduction to 
 Physics. 12 
 
 But the reason which most imperatively forces us to regard 
 Method as the primary and cardinal distinction, I take to be 
 this : a theory may be transferred from Metaphysics to 
 Science, or from Science to Metaphysics, simply by the 
 addition or the withdrawal of its verifiable element. Thus 
 the law of universal attraction becomes pure Metaphysics if 
 we withdraw from it the verifiable specification of its mode of 
 operation. Withdraw the formula " inversely as the square 
 of the distance and directly as the mass," and Attraction is 
 left standing a mere " occult quality." Indeed the Cartesians 
 reproached it with being such an occult quality, and stigmatized 
 it as a revival of Aristoteliauism. On the other hand, add this 
 verifiable formula to the " inherent virtue " of the old meta- 
 physicists, and the result is a strictly scientific proposition. 
 
 12 Kaht : Kritik. Einleitung, and compare also his very remarkable treatise 
 Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft. Werke. V., where these 
 propositions are elucidated. 
 
CHAP. IV.J AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 85 
 
 § 72. And how is this transference from Metaphysics to 
 Science effected ? Obviously by the precision of our descrip- 
 tion, the intercalation of facts in their proper order, facts 
 which previously had been unsuspected, or had not been seen 
 in that order. It is a common mistake to suppose that Science 
 deals solely with facts, and Metaphysics with ideas. Both 
 deal largely with both.' The difference lies in the authenticity 
 of the Method by which the facts are collected, and co- 
 ordinated. There is abundance of well authenticated facts 
 which nevertheless form no Science because their co-ordination 
 has not been effected ; they are bricks awaiting the architect. 
 It is certain, for example, that the cervical vertebra of all 
 mammals (with two or three exceptions) are seven in number ; 
 the long-necked giraffe has the same number as the short- 
 necked hog, or mole. The same uniformity, however, is not 
 found in other vertebrae. The giraffe has 14 dorsal and 
 20 caudal vertebras ; the mole has 13 dorsal and 10 caudal. 
 Indeed, the varieties are no less striking in the other portions 
 of the spinal column, than the uniformity is in the neck; 
 and these varieties suffice to refute the suggestion which 
 has been propounded respecting the mystic influence of 
 the number seven ; a suggestion not only metaphysical in its 
 principle, but faulty in its disregard of the fact that in some 
 mammals the cervical vertebras are not seven in number, in the 
 sloth, for example, they are nine. Although we are at present 
 without a reason, without an explanation, we carefully preserve 
 the facts ; they are not science yet ; they may become science 
 by co-ordination with other facts. If we attempt to co-ordinate 
 them, we class them first under the general fact of Type. 
 All the mammals are related : probably by kinship, remote 
 ancestry ; certainly by those organic resemblances which con- 
 stitute Type. Passing to more special considerations, and 
 asking why the cervical vertebras have varied so little from the 
 ancestral type, and why the dorsal, lumbar, and caudal have 
 varied so much, we are led to seek the conditions of variation ; 
 
86 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 when these have been ascertained, we may be able to co- 
 ordinate them, and then we shall have a scientific explanation 
 why mammals have seven cervical vertebrae, neither more nor 
 less. The metaphysician instead of waiting for such facts 
 proceeds to solve the difficulty by invoking the influence of 
 Number, or perhaps of Final Causes, 
 
 § 72 a. The spontaneous tendency to invoke a Final Cause 
 in explanation of every difficulty is characteristic of meta- 
 physical, philosophy. It arises from a general tendency 
 towards the impersonation of abstractions which is visible 
 throughout History. We animate Nature with intentions 
 like our own. We derive our ideas of Cause, and Force, 
 from our own experience of effort ; and the changes we 
 observe are interpreted as similar in origin to the changes we 
 effect. This leads to the Fetichism of savages and children ; 
 to the Polytheism of more advanced intelligence ; and, by 
 a gradual refinement in abstraction, to the Metaphysics and 
 Transcendental Physics of later days. We first impersonate 
 the causes as Deities ; we next eliminate more and more of 
 the personal elements, leaving only abstract Entities ; we 
 finally reduce these Entities to Forces, as the general expres- 
 sion of Properties or Eelations ; e. g., the Force of gravity is 
 only the abstract expression of the fundamental relation which 
 matter universally manifests. All matter is heavy ; all masses 
 attract other masses ; this property is as universal and funda- 
 mental as that of impenetrability ; we abstract it as gravita- 
 tion or attraction (§ 74 c). In this gradation the Will first 
 disappears ; next the independent Existence ; leaving finally, 
 an abstract expression of observed order. In the final stage 
 we recognize that what was assumed to be an independent 
 something, regulating phenomena, moulding them according 
 to its nature, is only an impersonation of the order in pheno- 
 mena, the statement in abstract terms of the very facts them- 
 selves. Thus, observing the facts of organic growth and 
 development, physiologists have attributed them to the agency 
 
CHAP. IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 87 
 
 of a Plastic Force (vis formativa, Bildungstrieh), which 
 moulds the heterogeneous materials into definite shapes. If, 
 however, we seriously consider what this Plastic Force can be, 
 apart from the phenomena, we are quickly led to perceive that 
 it is only a name assigned to the observed order, a generalized 
 expression of the facts, which has been personified, according 
 to a well-known tendency. 
 
 § 72 b. Of this kind is the impersonation of a Vital Prin- 
 ciple, which has played so conspicuous a part in speculation, 
 and which has been endowed with many imaginary attributes, 
 among them that of controlling chemical agency. What 
 is it, in a last analysis ? All the visible facts of life are 
 generalized in an abstract expression ; this abstract expression 
 is personified ; this personification is endowed with attributes ; 
 and we then believe firmly that over and above the facts 
 observed there is an independent Principle regulating these 
 facts, calling them into existence, and impressing on them a 
 definite direction ; in other words, besides the organism 
 and its functions, the organs and their acts, we believe 
 in the existence of a mysterious something, an Entity 
 inhabiting the organism, fashioning its organs, and direct- 
 ing its acts. Did we not know that the mechanism of a 
 watch was arranged by man, and that its activities depended 
 on the properties of matter, placed in certain relations 
 of interdependence, we should believe in the existence of a 
 Watch-principle, fashioning springs, wheels, and escapements, 
 and regulating their activities. But knowing the fact, we 
 recognize the purely ideal existence of such a Principle ; and 
 in like manner we can conceive that what we imagine to be a 
 Vital Principle, anterior and independent in the organism, is 
 really nothing but our generalized expression, abstracted from 
 the mutually-dependent facts. 
 
 § 72 c. It is the same with all the other numerous imper- 
 sonations of abstract ideas. They are collected from the 
 observed order, and interpreted according to the analogies of 
 
88 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 our personality ; then the facts from which they were abstracted 
 are gradually dropped out of sight, until only the abstraction 
 remains. When this has been done, we have great difficulty 
 in not believing that they exist independently of the facts — 
 that our subjective separation corresponds with an objective 
 separation — and we therefore make them the starting-points of 
 investigation without reference to the facts. This is the basis 
 of Metaphysics. 
 
 § 73. Having thus endeavoured to understand the nature 
 of Metaphysics, and the reason why it necessarily formed the 
 first explanations of philosophy, we may now glance at the 
 influence of Language in abetting the spontaneous tendency. 
 " All the first attempts to comprehend nature led to the 
 introduction of abstract conceptions, often vague, indeed, but 
 not therefore unmeaning, such as motion and velocity, force 
 and pressure, impetus and momentum (jootttj). And the next 
 step in philosophizing necessarily was to endeavour to make 
 these vague abstractions more clear and fixed, so that the 
 logical faculty should be able to employ them securely and 
 coherently. But there were two ways of making this attempt ; 
 the one by examining the words only and the thoughts which 
 they call up ; the other by attending to the facts and things 
 which bring these abstract terms into use. The latter, the 
 method of real inquiry, was the way to success; but the 
 Greeks followed the former, the verbal or notional course, 
 and failed." 13 Not the Greeks alone, but all metaphysicians, 
 metaphysicists, and metaphysiologists, have followed this 
 course, and consistently followed it, when they have once 
 adopted the belief that the order in ideas necessarily repre- 
 sents the order in external things. The pivot of Science is 
 precisely the Verification of this assumed correspondence. 
 
 Moreover, aiding and abetting this tendency in the mind 
 to accept ideas as exact representations of things, there is the 
 tendency to assume that distinct names represent distinct 
 13 Whewell : History of the Inductive Sciences, 1857, I., 27. 
 
CHAP. IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 89 
 
 facts, so that to analyse the meaning of words is held 
 equivalent to analysis of the things represented. Psychology 
 has made a great advance when it has learned to question 
 these primitive assumptions, an advance which was scarcely 
 suspected in ancient philosophy. The theory of Language 
 was little understood, and nations familiar with no language 
 but their own could hardly have been on their guard 
 against verbal fallacies. When Aristotle commences an 
 investigation he is careful to enumerate what other men have 
 said on the subject, and the meanings which are attached to 
 certain words. In this he is imitated by most moderns, but 
 with a difference : while they display even greater servility to 
 the mere opinion of authoritative writers, they own no servility 
 to the current meanings of words ; if they are careful in 
 defining their expressions, it is in order to be understood; 
 whereas Aristotle defined them in order to expound the facts 
 they resumed. " The propensity to seek for principles in the 
 common usages of language," says Dr. Whewell, " may be 
 discovered at a very early period. Thus we have an example 
 of it in the saying of Thales, when he was asked, What is 
 the greatest thing ? He replied Place ; for all things are in 
 the world, and the world is in it. In Aristotle we have the 
 consummation of this mode of speculation. The usual point 
 from which he starts is that we say thus or thus, in common 
 language. Thus, when he has to discuss the question whether 
 there be in any part of the universe a Void, or space in which 
 there is nothing, he first inquires in how many senses we say 
 that one thing is in another. He enumerates many of these : 
 we say the part is in the whole, as the finger is in the hand ; 
 again, we say the species is in the genus, as man is included 
 in animal ; again, the government of Greece is in the king ; 
 and various other senses are described, but of all these the 
 most proper is when we say a thing is in a vessel, and 
 generally, in place." 14 
 
 14 Op. cit., p. 29. 
 
90 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 § 74. The Method which has led to success in every 
 department of inquiry, and a success proportional to the 
 rigour of its employment, does not, as many suppose, lead us 
 to rely solely or mainly on ohservation, to the neglect of ideas, 
 but to rely solely on those facts and ideas which have with- 
 stood the tests of Verification, and have received their " Hall 
 mark " from the Goldsmith's Company (§ 62). This Method 
 at once eliminates many of the objects of metaphysical research, 
 rejecting them because not verifiable. The primary requisi- 
 tion of Science is that, apart from the hypothesis which 
 colligates the facts, and is understood to be only an hypothesis 
 (§ 74 a), every detail in its Descriptions (Explanations) shall 
 have been confronted with the observed order in things. It 
 thereby renounces, as beyond its scope, all inquiry into 
 noumena, or essences, confining itself to phenomena and 
 their order of co-existence and succession. Metaphysics, 
 believing that what we think necessarily corresponds with 
 what Nature is, endeavours, by analysis of the ideas of 
 existence and cause, to gain a clear understanding of them. 
 Its Method demands only the one criterion of logical depen- 
 dence ; and so long as it keeps within transcendental limits, 
 this criterion is the only possible one. In passing from 
 formal logic to physical inquiry, a new set of conditions is 
 entered upon, and the test of conformity with fact becomes 
 imperative. 
 
 Owing to the impatience excited by metaphysical preten- 
 sions, there has of late years arisen a desire to banish the word 
 " cause " from inductive philosophy ; but the word is useful, 
 and it cannot be banished. All that can be done is to mark 
 out clearly the meaning assigned to it in science, namely, that 
 of unconditional antecedence. The metaphysical conception of 
 a cause, the producer of effect, needs limitation. "We can 
 know nothing of the final nexus. When we say that heat 
 produces expansion, we simply express the observed facts, that 
 one heated body brought near a colder body begins to con- 
 
CHAP, IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 
 
 91 
 
 tract, and the colder simultaneously begins to expand; 
 nothing new has been produced ; a mutual change in the 
 condition of the two bodies has resulted in the transference 
 of so much motion (heat, expansion) from one body to 
 another. 
 
 Hence, rigorously speaking, we must limit even the con- 
 ception of necessary sequence, which is held to express all 
 that is known of causation. There is no following of effects 
 from causes ; but, as Sir John Herschel more truly says, 
 the causes and effects are simultaneous. If a bar of antimony 
 and bismuth, in contact, be heated, a current of electricity is 
 said to be produced ; yet if a fine wire be introduced between 
 the extremities, the wire becomes heated, and no electricity is 
 manifested. Is the heat a cause of electricity in the metals, 
 and this electricity a cause of heat in the wire ? Which is 
 cause, and which effect ? Both or neither. Again : bring a 
 magnet within a certain distance of a needle and the needle 
 rushes towards it. Here the magnet is said to produce motion 
 by its attraction, which is the cause — antecedent — of the effect. 
 Our minds demand such artifices : we abstract one detail 
 from a complex description, that is, we abstract the attrac- 
 tion and view it by itself, considering it as the cause or 
 antecedent of the motion which succeeds it in our conception ; 
 and similarly we abstract the motion, viewing it by itself, 
 and consider it as the effect, or consequent of the attraction. 
 But however indispensable, such language is merely an artifice. 
 No separation actually exists. There is not first attraction, 
 and subsequently motion ; the two are simultaneous. In like 
 manner, we say the earth's attraction causes the weight of the 
 apple ; but the weight is the attraction : they are two aspects 
 of one unknown reality. 
 
 § 74 a. Although admitting the utility of the word Cause, 
 thus explained, Science disclaims all attempts to penetrate 
 the secrets of causation. It seeks only the phenomenal and 
 relative. It recognizes the constant presence of the Un- 
 
92 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 knowable, as something real though inaccessible ; but while 
 admitting the mystery it makes no effort to transcend the 
 already vast limits of the Knowable. So readily does it 
 restrict itself within the relative and phenomenal that it 
 accepts hypotheses which are themselves unverifiable and 
 which even seem absurd if in any way they facilitate the 
 more accurate co-ordination of facts. This is a paradox ; but 
 it is significant. The first person who grasped its significance 
 I believe to be Copernicus. In the preface to his immortal 
 work he says of the heliocentric hypothesis, " It is by no means 
 necessary that hypotheses should be true, nor even seem true, 
 it is enough if they reconcile calculation with observation." 15 
 The hypotheses of geometry are manifestly of this kind ; no 
 one believes in the existence or possibility of a line without 
 breadth. The hypotheses of atoms, and of an attractive force 
 inherent in molecules, are beyond all reach of proof. They 
 are metaphysical ideas, and find a place in Science simply 
 because they facilitate calculations and the exposition of facts. 
 The metaphysical Method would employ them as bases for the 
 deduction of facts, would argue from them as if their nature 
 were known and their truth indisputable. But Science, which 
 concerns itself only with facts and their observed order, in its 
 indifference to the undiscoverable nexus binding the facts into 
 this order, allows any hypothesis respecting that nexus, pro- 
 vided some convenience of colligation or exposition belongs to 
 it. Nay it even adopts contradictory hypotheses when they 
 suit convenience. For example, we adopt the hypothesis 
 that the gravity of bodies above the superficies of the earth is 
 inversely as the squares of their distances from the earth's 
 centre. It is because this hypothesis reconciles calculation 
 
 15 Copernicus : De Revolutionibus Orbium cvelestium. " Neque enim necesse 
 est eas hypotheses esse veras, imo ne verisimile quidem, sed sufficit hoc unum, 
 si calculum obsei'vationibus congruentem cxhibeant." I do not remember where 
 I found this striking passage. To a similar effect, though less explicit, 
 Descabtbs : Principia, pars IV., § 1 and 204. 
 
CHAP. IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 93 
 
 with observation that we accept it, knowing all the while that 
 the absolute relation may possibly be different. But in the 
 theorem of falling bodies we adopt a contradictory hypothesis, 
 that is, we assume the action of gravity to be the same at all 
 distances ; because the heights to which bodies can be carried 
 above the surface of the earth are so trifling compared with 
 the length of the earth's semi-diameter, as to be disregarded 
 in our calculation. If we never had occasion to pass beyond ter- 
 restrial phenomena this theorem would perfectly satisfy all our 
 needs ; yet we know that it is false ; but it has the relative 
 truth demanded for our purposes; and we have no better 
 assurance of the truth of universal attraction. So indifferent 
 is Science to the absolute truth of ideas ; so anxious about 
 their relative truth ! The reverse is the case with Meta- 
 physics. It cannot be indifferent to absolute truth; if its 
 ideas are false, all deductions drawn from them are vitiated. 
 See the contrast in an example : whether comets be said to 
 make their appearance in consequence of the anger of a deity, 
 or in consequence of the law of gravitation, the explanation 
 in either case rests on the assumption of an ultimate cause 
 acting in the manner described; but in the one case the 
 truth of the assumption is all important, in the other it is 
 indifferent. Unless the anger of a deity be actually in opera- 
 tion, the first explanation is wholly irrelevant and must lead 
 to irrelevant conclusions; but the second explanation pre- 
 serves all its value provided that the path of the comet be 
 observed to be precisely the curve which accords with the 
 assumption of a gravitating force. Let this curve be verified, 
 according to the known law, and we are supremely indifferent 
 respecting the truth or error of our ideas as to the force of 
 which the law is known. How clearly Newton saw this 
 appears in the following declaration : "What I call attraction 
 may be performed by impulse, or by some other means un- 
 known to me. I use that word here to signify only in general 
 my force by which bodies tend towards one another, whatever 
 
94 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 be the cause." In truth the cause is in itself unknowable, 
 and it is solely the law of its action with which Science is 
 concerned. Given the law — i.e. the verifiable statement of 
 the observed order — and the cause is known in all the fulness 
 possible or desirable for human needs. Suppose that an angel 
 were discovered in the centre of the sun drawing the planets ; 
 this discovery would at once displace our hypothesis of 
 attractive force inherent in the molecules of matter; but 
 it would make no alteration in our formula of the law; 
 the drawing would still take place with an inverse quadratic 
 power, and all our calculations would remain unshaken. A 
 new band would tie our facts together, but the facts would 
 present an unchanged order. 
 
 § 74 b. One other aspect of causation, rarely appreciated, 
 remains to be noticed. While it is important to understand 
 that causes — in the metaphysical sense — cannot be known, 
 and that all inquiry into their ultimate nature is waste of 
 ingenuity, not less important is it to understand that our 
 limitations in this direction are no greater than those placed 
 by our necessary ignorance of matter, and of all noumena. 
 All knowledge is phenomenal. Apart from the phenomena, 
 we know no more of Matter than we know of Force. But 
 phenomena we know ; and we are also said to know their 
 laws, when we have rigorously ascertained the exact order 
 of their co-existence and sequence. Observing falling bodies 
 with the requisite precision, we find that the space fallen 
 through is invariably proportional to the square of the time. 
 This is a law ; and other laws are known as accurately as the 
 properties of the bodies themselves. But we are not content 
 with these laws ; we desire to know the cause. What is it 
 which forces bodies to fall, and to fall in this order? We 
 name it the force of gravity ; but the name brings no exten- 
 sion of knowledge. In itself the cause remains unknown; 
 but we already know it in its positive characters, or modes 
 of action, as fully as we can know Matter. Both Force and 
 
CHAP. IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 95 
 
 Matter are abstractions. They stand on similar ground : 
 as essences equally inaccessible, as phenomena equally acces- 
 sible. 
 
 Considered solely in reference to falling bodies, the general 
 fact (law), that they fall through spaces proportional to the 
 squares of the times, gains no additional illumination from 
 an ascription of the cause, since all we know of this cause is 
 the law of its action. But although the cause, named gravity, 
 is merely an abstraction, yet it enables us to class under the 
 same head, to interpret by the same laws, many phenomena 
 besides those of falling bodies. By this force we explain the 
 figure of our globe and its flattened poles, the orbit of the 
 moon, the movements of all planetary masses, the precession 
 of the equinoxes, and the ebb and flow of the tides. Thus, 
 although causes, or forces, are abstractions, the great and 
 obvious advantage to philosophy of such abstractions needs 
 not be emphasized. Their danger lies in our tendency to 
 forget that they are introduced into our calculations solely 
 as unknown agents acting through known laws ; a forgetful- 
 ness which leads us to postulate more of them than has been 
 disclosed through the laws. If once anything is assumed 
 of Force, which has not already been verified in fact, we incur 
 the same danger as when we assume properties in a substance 
 which have never been recognized in it. 
 
 An immense gain to philosophy, and the dissipation of 
 an incalculable amount of vague theorizing, must result when 
 men have firmly fixed in their minds the true conception of 
 Force as a mere abstraction which only has reality for us 
 through its demonstrated Laws. People will cease to talk 
 glibly of nerve-force, vital-force, &c, in explanation of 
 phenomena not yet reduced to law ; they will understand 
 that only such effects as can be deduced from the known 
 laws may be predicated of the unknown forces. Without 
 being called upon to give up the advantages of having 
 such abstractions as that of Force, they will escape the 
 
96 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 danger of metaphysical reliance on such generalized expres- 
 sions. 
 
 Thus once again the principle of Verification shows itself 
 as our firmest guide and our best consolation. Knowledge 
 may be limited to phenomena, causes may be hidden from 
 us, as all ultimate existence is hidden, for the ground of 
 existence must transcend knowledge so long as Being and 
 Knowing are not one ; but within the sphere of positive 
 knowledge a sufficient basis may be laid, resting on three 
 separate stages : 1st, the observation of phenomena (facts) ; 
 2nd, the observation of their order of co-existence and suc- 
 cession (laws) ; 3rd, the determination of the abstract forces 
 from which the order results as a calculable consequent 
 (causes). 
 
 § 74 c. In the foregoing section no notice has been taken 
 of the great question mooted in philosophy respecting the 
 existence of Force as an Entity independent of Matter ; for 
 in truth whether we believe in two distinct existences (Force 
 an Ens, and Matter an Ens), or believe that Force is only 
 the abstract expression for the dynamical relations of Matter 
 (§72 a), in either case the principles are equally valid; 
 since the realist must admit that Force can only be in- 
 vestigated in its positive characters, or laws ; and the 
 nominalist holds that beyond these laws there is nothing 
 to investigate. In each case the limitation to phenomena 
 imperatively calls for Verification and condemns Meta- 
 physics. 
 
 § 75. Metaphysics is the co-ordination of unverified facts. 
 Science is the co-ordination of verified facts. That confirma- 
 tion which the one sees in Logic, the other sees in Observa- 
 tion. The metaphysical tendency is the spontaneous tendency ; 
 the scientific caution is an acquired caution. Hence not 
 only is the metaphysical tendency active in all the early 
 epochs of speculation, both of the race and the individual, 
 but is with great difficulty repressed even in the highly-trained 
 
CHAP. IV.] AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 97 
 
 intellect of an advanced period. It may be traced in the 
 speculations of philosophers whom we should never think 
 of classing among metaphysicians. Lamarck abounds in 
 illustrations. For instance, he argues that a Polype cannot 
 have Sensibility, because that "would be contrary to the 
 laws of organization, and to the plan which Nature is obliged 
 to follow in all her works." l6 No ancient speculator was 
 ever more adventurous; to deduce a fact from the idea of 
 "a plan which nature is obliged to follow," in lieu of ascer- 
 taining what the fact is, what plan she does follow, is pure 
 metaphysics. Elsewhere he explains the variety in organisms 
 as due to two causes : one of these is the metaphysical pouvoir 
 propre de la vie, which tends incessantly to form complex 
 organisms, and to perfect them ; the other is the modifying 
 influence of external circumstances. 17 
 
 Nay, even Newton, the exalted type of the scientific 
 intellect, occasionally yields to the metaphysical tendency, 
 as may be seen in his account of the Vis Inertia, or in the 
 following query at the close of the Optics : 1B " It seems 
 probable to me that God in the beginning formed matter in 
 solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles, of such 
 size and figures, and with such properties and in such 
 proportions to space, as most conduced to the end for which 
 He formed them; and that the primitive particles being 
 solids are incomparably harder than any porous bodies com- 
 pounded of them, even so very hard as never to wear or break 
 in pieces : no ordinary power being able to divide what God 
 made one in the first creation." It is noticeable how Newton, 
 with his usual caution, advances this as what to him seems 
 probable ; an ancient would have advanced it as a fact beyond 
 dispute. Yet why probable ? "What proof can there be, 
 except such metaphysical proof as is to be found in the easiest 
 
 16 Lamarck : Histoire des Animaux sans Vertebres, Paris, 1835, 1., 105. 
 
 "Ibid., I., 114. 
 
 18 Newton : Works, ed. Hoksley, 1782, IV., 260. 
 
98 THE METAPHYSICAL [CHAP. IV. 
 
 mode of conceiving an order of things wholly removed from 
 any possible knowledge ? 
 
 Newton's query is, however, simply an hypothesis, and is 
 made to prove nothing. This cannot he said of many 
 hypotheses now current, especially those in what Berzelius 
 sarcastically calls the " physiology of probabilities." No one 
 who scrutinizes the science of our day can fail to perceive how 
 ready men still are to accept phrases for explanations, and 
 guesses for facts. Long before these pages are yellow with 
 age, men will have learned to look upon much that is now 
 taught in the schools respecting the oxidation of the tissues, 
 and the like, with a pity akin to that which is bestowed on the 
 physiology of Aristotle or Van Helmont. It will then be 
 noted that this explanation — the oxidation of tissues — was 
 presented without the guarantee of a single direct observation, 
 that it was based on inferences, none of which were verified, 
 and that it was a phrase used to cloak our ignorance, much as 
 the " nervous fluid " was used a few years ago. 19 
 
 § 76. Let it be noted, on the other hand, that many objec- 
 tions are raised against ideas and expressions, which though 
 metaphysical are perfectly justifiable. For example, Laplace 
 in stating the first law of motion says that a body at rest does 
 not contain within itself any reason for moving in one direc- 
 tion rather than in another. 20 This seems to Auguste Comte 
 a metaphysical, and therefore vicious, conception, 21 the prin- 
 ciple of " sufficient reason " being odious to him. How, he 
 asks, could we be assured that " there was no reason " for the 
 deviation ? what can we know of it except from experience ? In 
 this criticism, it seems to me that his antagonism against 
 
 10 Cuvier said he could not believe in the existence of a fluid which no one 
 had demonstrated j instead of acknowledging the propriety of this caution, 
 Lamarck scornfully retorted that, on similar grounds, physicists would be forced 
 to abandon the magnetic fluid (Hist, des Animaux sans Vertebres, I., 189). Not 
 long afterwards they did abandon it. 
 
 10 Laplace: Exposition du Systeme du Monde, 6th ed., 1836, 1., 275. 
 
 21 Comte: Cours de Philosophie Positive, 1830, 1., 557. 
 
CHAP. IV. 1 AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. 99 
 
 metaphysics has led him too far. If we replace the word 
 "reason" by the word "condition," the formula will run 
 thus, " a body remains at rest, because there is no condition 
 present which would cause it to move ; " and such a formula 
 is every way unexceptionable. If we are asked how we can 
 be assured of this, we reply, The axiom of general causation, 
 founded on universal experience, assures us that no change 
 can take place unless the conditions of change be present. 
 I cannot agree in the assertion that "all these pretended 
 explanations resolve themselves into nothing but repeating 
 in abstract terms the very fact itself, and saying that bodies 
 have a natural tendency to move in a right line, which was 
 precisely the proposition to be proved." What is here called 
 the fact itself is never a matter of experience; there are 
 no motions in a straight line absolutely perceived by us ; the 
 "natural tendency" is an abstraction, an idea, guaranteed 
 by observation and calculation (§ 62), but deduced a priori 
 from the law of causation. The " principle of sufficient 
 reason " fulfils all the requisites of the a priori method. 
 It conforms to the Ideal Test, namely, that its negation 
 is inconceivable, or absurd. Whereas the principle of "per- 
 fection" by which Aeistotle infers that all movements are 
 naturally circular — a principle by Comte placed on a level 
 with that of the " sufficient reason " — does not conform 
 to this test. We can as readily conceive its negation as its 
 affirmation; in other words, the laws of thought, which 
 represent universal experience, do not force' us to conceive 
 undisturbed motion as circular, but they do force us to con- 
 ceive it as uniform and rectilinear. 
 
 I have thus endeavoured to make clear the characteristics 
 and defects of the Metaphysical Method in contrast with the 
 characteristics of the Scientific Method, and shall have frequent 
 opportunities. in the course of this History of invoking and 
 illustrating what may be called the supreme law of all research 
 —the principle of Verification. No one familiar T^h History 
 
 7^2 
 
100 THE TWO METHODS. [CHAP. IV. 
 
 will consider that too much importance is here assigned to 
 Method ; few will consider that its true characteristics have 
 hitherto been adequately expounded even by those who have 
 specially treated of it. The principles of Inductive and 
 Syllogistic Logic have indeed been amply expounded ; but the 
 supreme law (with its two criteria, Ideal and Real), has been 
 taken for granted, rather than articulately expressed, and has 
 very often been wholly overlooked. Hence the iterated in- 
 sistance on it in these pages, "car les hommes ont encore 
 plus besoin de m^thode que de doctrine, d'^ducation que 
 destruction." 22 
 
 22 Comte : Cours de Pkilosophie Positive, 1835, II., 225. 
 
( 101 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE V. 
 
 PLATO'S METHOD. 
 
 § 77. Having chosen Aristotle as the representative of 
 Ancient Science, it is unnecessary for me to expound the doc- 
 trines of his various precursors ; yet on many accounts it is 
 desirable to sketch the outlines of the Method adopted by his 
 great master and rival Plato, indicating how far it was meta- 
 physical, and how far scientific j not only that we may thereby 
 gain clearer insight into the condition of ancient thought, 
 but also that we may be more just to the Stagirite, by esti- 
 mating the kind of science which satisfied the mind of his 
 illustrious teacher. 
 
 The name of Plato is still surrounded witn the respect 
 due to a great genius and a great renown. It is true that this 
 respect often degenerates into servility, because here, as else- 
 where, the admiration of the few becomes the exaggeration of 
 the many, and genuine enthusiasm is echoed in loud lip- 
 homage. But no amount of exaggeration, or of insincerity, 
 ought to make us unjust to the noble faculties which inspired 
 these excesses. I do not myself pretend to share the sym- 
 pathy and admiration for Plato's philosophy, which has un- 
 doubtedly been felt in all ages by many wise and beautiful 
 souls. He had great qualities, and has greatly influenced 
 men; but our admiration for his dramatic power, dialectical 
 
102 PLATO'S METHOD. [CHAP. V. 
 
 skill, and moral elevation ought not to blind us to the defects 
 of his teaching, and above all to the disastrous tendency of 
 his method. A general estimate of Plato is not within the 
 scope and purpose of this History ; and in the present chapter 
 we have to consider him solely with reference to Science ; an 
 aspect, it must be confessed, in which he is seen to great 
 disadvantage. 
 
 § 78. In the Phcedo he has sketched the history of his 
 studies. He tells us how in youth he was eager to learn all 
 about the causes of things, but found to his disappointment 
 that his efforts left him no wiser. One day he heard a person 
 reading from a book of Anaxagoeas, in which it was declared 
 that " Mind was the cause and orderer of all things." This 
 filled him with delight. He at once accepted its truth. 
 " And I considered with myself that Mind orders all things 
 and disposes each as it will be best for it. If any one, then, 
 desire to discover the cause of any phenomenon, how it is 
 produced, and how it perishes, he must ascertain in what way 
 it is best for it to exist or act. From this it follows that a 
 man should consider only what is most excellent and best." 
 With such a clue to the mysteries of nature Anaxagoeas, he 
 thought, could enlighten him not only as to whether the earth 
 were flat or globular, but also as to the cause of its being so, 
 showing that it is better for it to be what it is ; and, " if he 
 should say it is in the centre, he would explain why it is better 
 in the centre." To his great disappointment, he found 
 Anaxagohas adducing simple physical reasons, instead of the 
 teleological reasons which he had expected. Such a teacher 
 could no longer allure him. A new course opened. Wearied 
 with contemplating things as they are, he bethought him that 
 men in studying an eclipse of the sun look at its image 
 reflected in the water, lest they should become blind by gazing 
 directly at the sun. " It seemed to me, therefore, that I 
 ought to have recourse to reasons, and in them to contemplate 
 the truth of things. Thus always adducing the reason which 
 
CBfAP. V.] PLATO'S METHOD. 103 
 
 I judge to be strongest, I pronouce that to be true which 
 appears to me to accord with it ; those which .do not accord 
 with it I deny to be true." 1 
 
 In this frank avowal of the Subjective Method he takes 
 no precautions and offers no guarantee for the solidity of the 
 grounds upon which he judges one reason to be stronger than 
 another. Between the caprices of imagination and the rigours 
 of demonstration he offers no criterion. And the disastrous 
 consequences of this oversight are visible in every page of the 
 Timmus, where the idea of a Best, to which Nature is made 
 to conform, leads him into extravagances such as would be 
 incredible unless their origin were known. 
 
 § 79. Above the world of fleeting phenomena, he conceived 
 a world of permanent existences. These were Ideas. With 
 these, and these only, was Science properly concerned. The 
 visible phenomena are diagrams for the convenience of reason. 
 The great value of Science consists in its withdrawal of the 
 soul from the contemplation of phenomena, and its insistance 
 on the contemplation of pure essences. " If geometry com- 
 pels the soul to contemplate real existence it does concern us ; 
 but if it only forces the changeful and perishing upon our 
 notice it does not concern us. . . . Science is pursued 
 solely for the sake of knowledge." 2 
 
 He ridicules the notion of Astronomy, as practised by 
 astronomers, being capable of making the soul look upwards ; 
 and says it positively makes the soul look downwards. " I 
 
 1 Plato : Phtsedo, p. 90, ed. Bekker, Berlin, 1817: 'i$o%e St) poi XPV VCCI tl S 
 t6vq \6yovg Kuratpvyovra Iv ikuvoiq gkottuv tSjv ovtidv tt)v akifiuav .... 
 Kai vTrodtjiivos kicaoTOTE Aoyov '6v av Kpivui i^piniuvkaraTOV clvai, a fdv av pot 
 SoKy Toi>T<$ %vitfojviiv TiQrifii a>£ AXrjdrj ovtcl . . . & S'dv /it), a>g oiiK a\r)9fj. 
 He overlooks the fact so felicitously expressed by Bacon that the mind 
 may be an unequal mirror to the rays of things—" instar speculi inasijualis ad 
 radios rerum, qui suam naturam naturae rerum immiseet, eamque distorquet et 
 inficit." 
 
 2 Plato : Republic. Translated by Davies and Vaughan, Cambridge, 
 1852. One of the rare translations from the Greek which may be used with 
 confidence. 
 
104 PLATO'S METHOD. [CHAP. V. 
 
 cannot conceive that any science makes the soul look upwards 
 unless it has to do with the real and invisible. It makes no 
 difference whether a person stares stupidly at the sky, or looks 
 with half-shut eyes upon the ground ; so long as he is trying 
 to study any sensible object I deny that he can be said to have 
 learned anything, because no object of sense admits of scientific 
 treatment. Since this fretted sky is still a part of the visible 
 world we are bound to regard it, though the most beautiful of 
 visible things, as far inferior, nevertheless, to those true 
 revolutions which real velocity and real slowness, existing in 
 true number and in all true forms, accomplish relatively to 
 each other, carrying with them all that they contain : which 
 are verily apprehended by reason and thought, but not by 
 sight. Therefore we must employ that fretted sky as a pattern 
 or plan to forward the study which aims at those higher 
 objects." 
 
 Further on, he says, " Whenever a person strives by the 
 help of Dialectics to start in pursuit of every reality by a 
 simple process of reason independent of all sensuous informa- 
 tion, never flinching until by an act of pure intelligence he 
 has grasped the real nature of good, he arrives at the very end 
 of the intellectual world." There is more of the same kind 
 in this 7th book of the Republic, but no more need be cited 
 here. 
 
 § 80. Let us now glance at a few of the results to which 
 this Method led him. We open the Timceus, and learn that 
 the Universe was generated as an animal, with a soul, because 
 that was best. 3 Whatever is generated must necessarily have 
 body, and be visible no less than tangible. Nothing can be 
 visible without Fire, nothing tangible without a Solid, nothing 
 solid without Earth. Thus the first step in creation was the 
 production of two elements. But it is impossible for two 
 things to cohere without the intervention of a third. A bond 
 
 1 Plato : Timaus, ed. Bek., p. 27. 
 
CHAP. V.] PLATO'S METHOD. 105 
 
 is necessary, and of all bonds the most beautiful is that which 
 as nearly as possible unites into one both itself and the things 
 bound. 4 Had the substance of the universe been a superficies 
 without depth, one medium or bond would have sufficed ; but 
 as it was a solid, and solids are never one only, but always 
 joined by two bonds, therefore the Creator placed Water and 
 Air between Fire and Earth. These are the Four Elements, 
 and the reason has been given why they are only four. 
 
 The elements are fashioned into a perfect sphere, because 
 the sphere is the most perfect of figures, and most resembles 
 itself. Although this universe was made an animal, it was 
 made becoming and congruous ; hence it had neither eyes nor 
 ears, there being nothing external for it to see and hear ; no 
 lungs, for it needed not respiration ; no digestive organs ; no 
 secretory organs ; no feet, for its motion is peculiar, namely, 
 circular, and circular motion requires no feet, since it is not 
 progression. 
 
 § 81. The mathematicians having discovered the five 
 regular solids, Plato naturally made great use of them in 
 his cosmology. Four of them were represented by the four 
 elements — the Earth was a Cube, Fire a Tetrahedron, Water 
 an Octahedron, and Air an Icosahedron. This left the fifth, 
 the Dodecahedron, without a representative, accordingly it 
 was assigned to the universe as a whole. 
 
 The Creator, having thus shaped the visible universe, 
 and distributed souls over the earth, the moon, and other 
 unnamed places, — and having commissioned the younger gods 
 (dii minores) to construct man, — retired to his repose. 
 
 It is needless to add that Plato never thinks of offering 
 any better reason for these propositions than that they are by 
 him judged sufficient. If one of his hearers had asked him 
 why water might not be a cube, and air an octahedron — or 
 
 4 deapGiv 8k KaMtoroc 8$ av avrov Kal to. ZvpSoifteva on fuxkurra iv 
 icovg. 
 
106 PLATO'S METHOD. [CHAP. V. 
 
 what proof there was of either being one or the other — he 
 would have replied : " It is thus I conceive it. This is best." 
 
 § 82. Let us proceed. The universe, we learn, has a 
 soul which moves in perpetual circles. Man also has a soul 
 which is but a portion thereof, consequently it also moves in 
 circles. To make the resemblance more complete, man's soul 
 is also enclosed in a spherical body — namely the head. But 
 the gods foresaw that this head, being spherical, would roll 
 down the hills and could not ascend steep places ; to prevent 
 this, a body with limbs was added, that it might be a loco- 
 motive for the head. And as the foreparts are more honour- 
 able and regal than the hind parts, the gods made man's 
 locomotion chiefly progressive. 
 
 § 83. As may be anticipated, the anatomical and physio- 
 logical conclusions to which such a Method leads are not in 
 strict agreement with inductive science. Thus we find the 
 liver described 3 as " compact and smooth, shining and sweet, 
 though somewhat bitter ; and the reason is that the thoughts 
 falling on it from the intellect, as on a mirror, might terrify 
 it by employing a bitterness akin to its nature ; and threaten- 
 ingly mingle this bitterness with the whole liver, so as to give 
 it the black colour of bile; or, when images of a different 
 kind are reflected, sweetening its bitterness, and giving peace 
 to that part of the soul which lies near the liver, giving it rest 
 at night, with the power of divination in dreams. Although 
 the liver was constructed for divination, it is only during life 
 that its predictions are clear ; after death its oracles become 
 obscure, for it becomes blind." 
 
 Even more surprising is the description of the intestines. 
 They are, he says, on the left side for the purpose of acting 
 like a sponge to keep the surface of the liver bright and clear, 
 and capable of reflecting the images of the soul. 
 
 § 84. In a modern such ideas would not appear profound. 
 
 ' Op. cit., p. 100. 
 
CHAP. V.] ; PLATO'S METHOD. 107 
 
 I have not cited them for % the poor pleasure of holding up a 
 great name in the light of ridicule ; but to show how even a great 
 intellect may unsuspectingly wander into absurdities, when it 
 quits the "firm though laborious path of inductive inquiry. 
 " The dove cleaving the thin air," to use the happy illustra- 
 tion of Kant, " and feeling its resistance, might suppose that 
 in airless space her movements would be more rapid. Pre- 
 cisely in this way Plato thought that by abandoning the 
 sensuous world, because of the limits it placed to his under- 
 standing, he might more successfully venture into the void 
 space of pure intellect." 6 It is not in Science only that Plato 
 is misled by his Method. The same confidence in deduction 
 from unverified premisses vitiates his teaching in every other 
 department of inquiry, moral and political; but in Science 
 his errors are more patent, because his statements admit of 
 a readier, and less equivocal, confrontation with fact. 
 
 6 Kant : Kritih. Einleitung, § III., 1790, p. 8. 
 
( 108 ) 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. 
 
 § 85. The contrast between the Master and the Pupil is no- 
 where more emphatic than in Method. Aristotle may he truly 
 styled the father of the Inductive Philosophy, since he first 
 announced its leading principles ; and announced them with a 
 completeness and precision not surpassed by Bacon himself. 
 There is, indeed, a radical defect in his conception of 
 Method, but it is a defect not less visible in the Novum 
 Organwm, and is common to all the systematic expositions 
 of Method that have yet been published. This defect is the 
 absence of the due recognition of Verification. All writers 
 implicitly recognize Verification as the inseparable attendant 
 of Observation, Induction, and Deduction ; but they do not 
 explicitly, and emphatically, assign to it the primary import- 
 ance it should have ; they do not trace in its neglect the cause 
 of every failure. Overlooking this defect, men have expressed 
 surprise at the unquestionable fact that Aeistotle and Bacon 
 failed egregiously in scientific research, in spite of their i 
 conception of scientific Method; and this failure has some-' 
 times been made a ground for denying the value claimed for! 
 Method. But the seeming contradiction disappears on close 
 examination. The failure is then traced to a radical imperfec- 
 tion in the Method. A discrepancy is disclosed between the 
 principles which Aristotle and Bacon implicitly taught, and 
 the principles they actually employed. 
 
CJ5AP. VI.] ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. 109 
 
 § 86. We will first inquire what those principles were. 
 In direct opposition to Plato, who, denying the validity of 
 the senses, made intuitions the ground of all true knowledge, 
 Aristotle sought his basis in sensuous perception. Antici- 
 pating Bacon, he affirmed that it was wiser to dissect the 
 "complex phenomena of sense than to resolve them into 
 abstractions — "melius est naturam secare quam abstrahere." * 
 His reliance was on Experience and Induction : the one 
 furnishing the particular facts, from which the other found 
 a pathway to general facts— or laws. 2 "Without sensation 
 thought is impossible. 3 Plato held that the deceptions of 
 sense justified scepticism of all sense-knowledge (airarris 
 jUEffTj) fi Bia rwv ofi/j,a.TO)v aKsxpig). Aristotle, more correctly, 
 taught that error did not arise from the senses being false 
 media, but from the wrong interpretations we put on their 
 testimony. Manifold deceptions may thence arise ; but each 
 sense speaks truly so far as it speaks at all. 4 It is from sense 
 we gain the knowledge of particulars. It is from Induction 
 we gain the knowledge of universals. Agreeing with Plato 
 that Science is only concerned with universals, he affirmed 
 that these could only be reached through Experience. 
 
 § 87. This is the corner-stone of the experience-philo- 
 sophy or " Empiricism," so often urged as a reproach against 
 Aristotle. 5 Hegel boldly denies the charge. Science regards 
 the accusation as an eulogy. Unhappily, even by Aristotle, 
 experience was too frequently neglected and too carelessly in- 
 terrogated. The vigilance of scientific scepticism was wanting. 
 Yet at times he seems thoroughly impressed with the necessity 
 
 1 Bacon: Nov. Org., 41. 
 
 8 kirayiayri Srj r) d.irb twv KaQkicaara kiri ra Kadokov ItpoSog. Topic, L, 10. 
 See also Anal. Post. I., 31 ; Hist. Animal. I., 6. 
 
 3 ovSk vou 6 vovq ra Ikto£ pr) per ala8r]iTeo)Q ovra. Be Sensu, VL, 445 ; 
 Be Anima, III., 8, 432. 
 
 4 Be Anima, III., 3; Metaph., TV., 5; and elsewhere. 
 
 s Even so late as Schleieemaokeb, who urges it in his History of 
 Philosophy. 
 
110 ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. [CHAP. VI. 
 
 of securing his basis before attempting to build. " Let us first 
 understand the facts, and then we may seek for their causes." 6 
 There are many passages in which he distinctly disapproves 
 of the fatal tendency to eke out deficiencies of observation by 
 mere guesses, and to rely on those guesses as on observations. 
 Of such passages four may here be given : — 
 
 I. Speaking of the parthenogenesis of bees, he says, 
 " There are not facts enough to warrant a conclusion, and 
 more dependence must be placed on facts than on reasonings, 
 which must agree with facts." r »#^ 
 
 II. Speaking of Hybridity, after noticing*- the opinions of 
 his predecessors, and even suggesting an a priori argument 
 himself, he says, "But such a proof is far too abstract and 
 empty (/c6V(>e). For reasons not drawn from the inherent 
 principles of things (rdiv oikeiojv ap-^uiv) are empty, and only 
 seem to explain them, just as only those are geometrical proofs 
 which are deduced from geometrical principles ; so also in all 
 other sciences. The empty argument seems potent, but is 
 powerless." 8 
 
 III. Speaking of those who held a certain astronomical view, 
 he says, they did so because their thoughts were not directed to 
 the phenomena and the discovery of the causes, but they 
 endeavoured to make the phenomena correspond with their 
 opinions. 9 And still more strongly in this passage : " These 
 philosophers, treating of phenomena, say things which by no 
 means correspond with the phenomena, the cause of this being 
 that they have not rightly conceived first principles, but reduce 
 everything to certain prescribed notions (irpog rivag $o£o.q 
 dipi(T / u£i>ae) , and they persist in these in spite of all contra- 
 diction, as if they were in possession of true principles, as if 
 these ought not rather to be educed from the phenomena." 10 
 
 6 De Part, I., 1, 639. 
 
 7 De Gener. Animal, III., 10, 760. 8 Ibid., II., 8, 748. 
 
 9 De Casio, II., 13, 293. Compare also ibid., p. 294. 
 
 10 Ibid., IH.,1, 306. 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. HI 
 
 IV. " The reason why men do not sufficiently attend to 
 the facts is their want of experience. Hence those accustomed 
 to physical inquiries are more competent to lay down the 
 principles which have an extensive application; whereas 
 others who have been accustomed to many assumptions 
 without the confrontation of reality, easily lay down principles, 
 because they take few things into consideration. It is easy to 
 distinguish those who argue from facts and those who argue 
 from notions." u 
 
 § 88. Instea^gf distrusting knowledge derived through 
 the senses, and-^lacing unhesitating reliance on knowledge 
 derived from intuitions, he declared that ideas are nothing 
 but the products of reason. Eeason separates, by abstraction, 
 the particular objects from their general relations, i. e. those 
 relations which these objects have in common. Anticipating 
 modern Psychology, he taught, confusedly indeed, and not 
 always consistently, that intelligence is a late development. 
 The understanding is built up from sensuous materials. 
 Each particular sensation gives rise to a sensuous state, and 
 the permanence of this state is Memory. From memory arise, 
 first, distinctions ; and finally, after many repetitions, experi- 
 ence ; from experience a pathway leads to Science, that path- 
 way being Induction. Plato taught that all knowledge was 
 reminiscence — a revival of pre-existent Ideas. From any one 
 Idea we can arrive at all others, owing to the logical connexion 
 existing between them. In direct contradiction to this, 
 Aristotle maintained that complete knowledge could only 
 arise out of complete experience ; and he significantly points 
 out the danger of the Platonic Method, which neglects facts, 
 and rashly concludes a general proposition from a few par- 
 ticulars. 12 
 
 § 89. In indicating the way we are to arrive at general 
 
 11 De Gen. et Corr., I., 2, 316. Compare also De Partibus, IV., 5, 679. 
 
 12 De Gen. et Corr., I., 2. 
 
112 ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. [CHAP. VI. 
 
 truths, he expresses himself with a precision unsurpassed by 
 moderns. " We must not," he says, " accept a general 
 principle from logic only, but must prove its application to 
 each fact, for it is in facts that we must seek general prin- 
 ciples, and these must always accord with the facts." 13 Nor, 
 while thus insisting on Observation, was he wholly without a 
 perception of the value of that aid to inquiry, which is usually 
 supposed to be a modern invention, I mean Experiment. He 
 did not, indeed, see its importance as moderns have seen it ; 
 for, not rightly apprehending the necessity of Verification, he 
 failed to apprehend the true purpose of Experiment, which is 
 simply a means of verifying the accuracy of data, and conclu- 
 sions hypothetical or theoretical. But he refers to it, and 
 even to vivisection, often enough to mislead a modem wor- 
 shipper into the belief that this great instrument of scientific 
 research was distinctly recognized by him. Here are a few of 
 the passages I have noticed. 14 
 
 He refers to the experiment of tying or removing the 
 right testis of the male, previous to congress, in disproof of 
 the hypothesis that the sexes are derived from the right and 
 left testes. 15 He refers to the experiment of removing the eyes 
 from young birds, to show that these organs are capable of 
 being reproduced, a capability not observed in adult birds. 16 
 Although he places the seat of motive power in the heart, 
 yet he refers to the experiment of removing the heart from 
 tortoises, after which they still continue for some time to 
 move ; 17 and to prove that the nutritive soul is contained in 
 the centre, he refers to the insects whose heads and limbs 
 
 13 De Animal, motione, I., 698. Aci Sh tovto /u) povov 7-<£ \6yip Ka86\ov 
 \afSitv, dXKa Kal iirl t&v KaOsKaara Kal tSiv aiaBrjrwv, Si dVtp Kal roie 
 kcc96\ov faroi/iev \6yovg, Kal k<p' Stv itpappSTTtiv oto/xtBa iciv avrovg. 
 
 14 M. Bakthelemy St. Hilaire has pointed oat several others in the intro- 
 duction to his work La MUiorohgie d'Aristote, Paris, 1863. 
 
 16 De Gener. Animal., IV, I. 
 '« Ibid., IV., 6. 
 
 17 Be Reap., XVII., 479. 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. 113 
 
 may be removed without destroying their vitality. The fact is 
 incorrectly stated. The separated head will live almost as long 
 as the body ; and I have often found the hinder part of a triton 
 live and move for hours after its separation from the body. 18 
 
 § 90. Since then, it appears that Aristotle very distinctly 
 recognized the cardinal principles of the Baconian philosophy, 
 why, it will be asked, has the world credited Bacon with a 
 great reform in the very attacks he made on Aristotle ? 
 The answer is simple. Bacon did not attack the Method 
 which Aristotle taught ; indeed, he was very imperfectly 
 acquainted with it. He attacked the Method which the 
 followers of Aristotle practised. 
 
 The further question may be raised, Why these followers 
 practised a Method so unlike the one their master taught? 
 Because, unhappily, Aristotle himself had set them the ' 
 example. He did so from the two causes already explained 
 in our third chapter : 1° the initial weakness in his Method, 
 namely, the insufficient part assigned to Verification, and 
 2° the inevitable immaturity of all scientific ideas at such an 
 era ; these made him depart from his own precepts, and led 
 him a deluded captive through the labyrinth of metaphysical 
 conjecture. It is to these causes that Bacon's failure must 
 also be ascribed ; for grandly as he traces the various streams 
 of error to their.sources, he is himself borne along by these 
 very streams, wheneverhe quits the position of a critic, and 
 attempts to investigate the order of nature for himself. 
 
 § 91. Aristotle's failure was inevitable. We have seen 
 that, even on the supposition of his having mastered the true 
 Scientific Method, he could not continuously have applied it 
 in an epoch when the elementary laws had still to be 
 discovered. The native impatience of the human mind disdains 
 that fortitude of resignation which is implied in rejecting 
 
 18 Stilling narrates that a frog lived, hopped about, and defended itself, for 
 an hour after removal of its heart, and the whole of its viscera. Untersuchungen 
 tiber die Functionen des Huckenmarks, 1842, p. 38. 
 
 8 
 
114 ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. [CHAP. VI. 
 
 all but verified facts and verified conclusions, at an epoch -when 
 the means of verification are little understood. 
 
 In future chapters we shall see how little Aristotle 
 recognized the absolute importance of Verification ; how 
 little he troubled himself to ascertain the accuracy of the 
 facts he so laboriously collected ; how little he discriminated 
 between perfect and imperfect inductions ; how little he 
 perceived the lurking fallacy of analogical reasoning; in a 
 word, how little he understood the nature of proof. This 
 is what was meant by saying that his Method was imperfect 
 at its base. In the Prolegomena, I shall explain the immense 
 importance which must be assigned to Hypothesis ; and that, 
 so far from the true philosoph er -being called upon.torenounce 
 hypothe ses, he is called upon to be incessantly in venting 
 them, line wouldenKrge the boundaries of our .horizon ; 
 but .he must distinctly understand that, until rigorouslj, 
 verified, _an hypothesis is only a guess, which m ay be , a, 
 jjubjime imth^or jmay be an' abjiir,^ "error. Hypothesis, like 
 everything else, must be proved7"l>rneld as a mere thread, 
 which for convenience sake may tie the facts together until 
 a better be discovered. It must never form a basis of deduc- 
 tion. This Aristotle did not distinctly understand, although 
 he is said to have invented the theory of proof. Let us see 
 what that theory was. 
 
 § 92. Science is the co-ordination of facts (§ 64), the 
 reduction of particular facts to general facts. " As this can 
 only take place through an induction of universals from 
 particulars, proof must first lie in the correctness of the 
 induction; and when these universals have been attained, 
 and a deduction is made from them to some new particulars, 
 proof lies in the correctness of this deduction. There is, 
 however, an initial difficulty : all knowledge rests upon ante- 
 cedent knowledge. We see this in induction and in demon- 
 stration; the one arriving at a conclusion from particulars 
 already known ; the other starting from a conclusion already 
 
CHAP. VI.j ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. 115 
 
 known." Plato evades this difficulty by referring all know- 
 ledge to reminiscence. This explanation Aristotle rejects. 
 He affirms that demonstration rests upon universals which 
 are in their nature better known 19 (or, let us say, more cer- 
 tainly apprehended) ; whereas induction rests on particulars, 
 which are better known to us. The basis of Science is 
 therefore an Inductive Syllogism. 
 
 It is necessary to appreciate clearly this distinction between 
 knowledge of universals and knowledge of particulars. He 
 affirms that, although sensation is the origin of all knowledge, 
 the first ideas awakened in the soul consist of general ideas. 
 Thus a man seeing a body at a distance has at first only 
 the general idea of substance ; on approaching nearer, and 
 observing that it moves spontaneously, he has the less general 
 idea of an animal. On approaching still nearer, he recognizes 
 the kind of animal, by recognizing many of the particulars 
 which distinguish it as kind ; and he thus gains a particular 
 idea, in lieu of his first general idea. In this way the mind 
 advances from the universal to the particular. The infant 
 at first calls every man papa, and every woman mamma; 
 afterwards it learns to discriminate individuals. 
 
 The fallacy here is patent. It confounds an indefinite 
 with a generalized conception. It is a fallacy which leavens 
 ancient speculation. 
 
 § 93. Since proof rests on universals, perception, which 
 is concerned only with particulars, can give no science. 
 Nay, if we could perceive that a triangle has the sum of its 
 angles equal to two right angles, we should still be forced to 
 seek for a proof of it (IforoujUEv av airoSti^iv), otherwise we 
 should have no knowledge of it. 
 
 19 This very important distinction in his philosophy was completely misun- 
 derstood by the schoolmen, who, as Mr. Ellis pointed out, were misled by- the 
 ambiguity of the Greek dative, notius naturd, to suppose that notius natura was 
 meant, as if Aristotle contrasted Nature's knowledge with our own. Bacon 
 fell into this error : Works by Ellis and Spedding, 1857, 1., 137. The same 
 mistake is made by Roger Bacon : Opus Majus, Venet., 1750, p. 46. 
 
 8—2 
 
116 ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. [CHAP. VI. 
 
 If the question be asked why we must seek this proof 
 of what has already been perceived, Aristotle answers : 
 "Because only particulars can be perceived, and science is 
 of universals." In another work (for hitherto I have been 
 drawing from the Analytics), he judiciously remarks that it 
 is absurd to seek for a proof of that which is clearly known, 
 and for which all the conditions of a correct perception are 
 present. 20 But even the universal must be obtained through 
 induction from perceptions. He says that if we were in the 
 moon, and the earth, coming between us and the sun, deprived 
 us of light, we should have no knowledge of the cause of 
 darkness ; we should see that the moon was dark, but not 
 why it was dark. It is true that, from frequent observation, 
 we might find out the cause by detecting the universal ; since 
 out of numerous particulars the universal becomes evident 
 (e/c yap tHiv KaOsKaara irXtiovwv to tcaOoXov StjXov). But, he 
 adds, the universal has the preference, because it makes evident 
 the cause. We do not understand a phenomenon until we 
 can demonstrate its cause by a syllogism, showing that it 
 necessarily follows from some general principle. Hence syllo- 
 gism is the true scientific instrument ; and as the syllogism 
 proceeds from the general to the particular, it must be better 
 known in its nature than the particulars it has to prove. 
 
 There is no need to enter more minutely here into 
 Aristotle's Logic. The reader may find it analysed with great 
 care by Biese, 21 and more briefly in most histories of philo- 
 sophy. The foregoing paragraphs contain all that is essential 
 as regards Method. 
 
 § 94. It is clear that this conception of proof is one which 
 inevitably tends to make investigation metaphysical and 
 a priori. In spite of his recognition of the importance of 
 observation and induction, he conceived universals as better 
 
 20 Phys., VIII., 3. Compare Metaph., IV., 4. 
 
 21 Biese : Die Phihsophie des Aristoteles in ihren inneren Zusammenhange, 
 Berlin, 1835-42. 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. 117 
 
 , r 
 
 known than particulars. It was therefore inevitahle that he 
 should practically rely on universals to the neglect of par- 
 ticulars, care more about syllogisms than observations ; and 
 whenever the universals (general ideas) happened to be true, 
 the reliance was secure. Unfortunately these universals were 
 very often false, still oftener irrelevant ; and as no criterion of 
 their truth or relevancy was furnished by the syllogism, the 
 reliance proved disastrous. By his theory of proof he placed 
 the Ideal Test above the Real Test : this is metaphysical. 
 Hence in his writings we see little of the patient circum- 
 spection of Verification ; we see only the impatient facility of 
 Deduction from assumptions which have not been confronted 
 with reality. 
 
 § 95. It was this which led him and all the ancients to 
 waste so much effort in the pursuit of causes. Science was 
 supposed to be the knowledge of causes; not the knowledge 
 of laws, or the order of succession and co-existence, but of 
 causes which were knowable'entities. 
 
 He recognized four different kinds : the formal, or sub- 
 stantial; the material ; the motor, or efficient ; and the final. 
 A word of explanation on each of these may be of service. 
 
 I. The formal cause, or essence, known under the scholastic 
 titles of " quiddity " and " substantial form," is what may be 
 called the raison d'etre of a thing. Although form cannot be 
 disjoined from substance in fact, it can in thought, — and that 
 was enough for the ancients. We still preserve the idea in 
 such phrases as, the essence of good government consists in 
 reconciling order with progress ; or, the essence of a circle 
 consists in the equi-distance of every point in the periphery 
 from the centre. 22 The substantial form, in short, is that 
 
 a " En contemplant les choses nous voyons qu'elles sont differentes entr'elles, 
 et que chacune a quelque chose de particulier qui la distingue des autres : c'est 
 ce qu'on appelle Pessenee d'une chose, qu'on definit ce qui fait qu'une chose est 
 ce qu'elle est." — S'Gkavesande : Intro, a la Philosophic, Leyden, 1737, p. 5. 
 This is strictly Aristotelian, and explains the phrase by which Aristotle defines 
 the formal cause:— ») ovaia icai rb n rp>' tlvai. The phrase is not gramma- 
 
118 ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. [CHAP. VI. 
 
 which makes a thing to be what it is. N.B.— The distinction 
 between the essence of a thing and the essence of our concep- 
 tion of a thing had not then been admitted into philosophy. 
 
 II. The material cause— causa materialis—v «Xj? kqi to 
 Woicetfuvov — is the matter itself, conceived apart from its form. 
 Under all the varieties of things we recognize something which 
 exists as the subject of these varieties ; for example, the sub- 
 stance of the soul is something distinct from its phenomena. 
 
 III. The motor cause — efficient cause — h apyj\ tx\q 
 Kivi'iatwg — which plays so great a part in scholasticism, is a 
 conception necessarily added to the two first-named causes, 
 since these alone will not explain movement or change. But 
 inasmuch as change is incessant, there must be some principle 
 of change. Nature is not self-moved ; we must, therefore, 
 assume a Prime Mover, himself immoveable. 
 
 But even thus we fail to account for the phenomena of this 
 changing universe. What is it which determines each par- 
 ticular movement to be that and not another ? What is it 
 which causes the harmony, regularity and beauty of the world ? 
 Obviously a fourth cause : — ■ 
 
 IV. The final cause — to o5 ivaca Kai rayadov. This 
 gives to every movement an aim, and a benevolent aim. The 
 good of each and the good of all is the final cause of every 
 change. 23 
 
 tically explicable. See Trendelenberg's edition of the De Anima, 1833, 
 pp. 192-471 ; or Zeller: Pliilosophie der Griechen, 1860,11., 147. 
 
 23 " Finis vero est, quo res tendit. Finium alii praeoptati, alii consequentes. 
 Prseoptati ejus generis sunt, ut valitudo qua? medicamentis et deambulatione 
 comparatur. Consequentes vero ejus generis sunt, ut medicatio et deambulatio: 
 primum enim valetudinem, doinde ea quse valitudini faeiunt quserimus." — 
 Hermolaos Barbarus : Compendium scientice naturalis ex Aristotele, 1547, 
 Lib. I., p. 6. I cannot quote from this once renowned and now forgotten 
 scholar, without remarking that, although he occupies a prominent place in the 
 correspondence of scholars during the latter part of the 15th century, and was 
 thought by Erasmbs to be a " divine man," whose name could never die, he 
 has so completely passed out of sight that most Encyclopaedias and Biographical 
 Dictionaries do not. even mention him. The notices in Tirabosohi: Storia 
 delta Litt. ItaL, 1807, VI. ; in HeerenT Gesehichte der classischen Litteratur 
 
CHAP. VI.] AKISTOTLE'S METHOD. 119 
 
 § 96. It is apparent, on the most casual inspection, that 
 no one of these causes can be verifiable ; no one of them is 
 susceptible of any stronger guarantee than that of a certain 
 logical concordance in the assumptions we make respecting 
 them ; but inasmuch as they pass beyond the sphere of ideas, 
 and claim to represent external realities, the Eeal Test is indis- 
 pensable; yet it cannot be applied. Such conceptions are, 
 therefore, utterly unscientific. Nevertheless the slow evolu- 
 tion of Science has not altogether disengaged itself from their 
 trammels. Even in the present day there are not wanting 
 men of eminence who firmly uphold the validity of final 
 causes, and believe teleological argument to be an instrument 
 of research. This is owing to the lingering influence of the 
 Subjective Method, and is seldom met with in astronomy, 
 physics, or chemistry. The Objective Method teaches that it 
 is idle to assign a final cause, unless we believe that we have, 
 or can have, authoritative knowledge of what actually were the 
 Creator's intentions ; and such knowledge Science modestly 
 disclaims. It endeavours to co-ordinate facts ; assumptions 
 respecting the intentions of the Creator are not verifiable ; if 
 we accept them as we accept other transcendental conceptions, 
 they can only be an unknown quantity in our calculation. The 
 futility of the teleological argument may be seen in this, that 
 until we have discovered the law of succession, until the facts 
 are co-ordinated, the assumption of a final cause brings with 
 it no illumination ; and when the law has been discovered, the 
 addition of the final cause brings no increase of knowledge. 
 
 § 97. By the imperfection of his Method, no less than by 
 the condition of culture at the time, Aristotle was, therefore, 
 practically a metaphysician, assuming, without misgiving, the 
 
 im Mittelalter, II. (Werhe, 1821-8, V.); and in Corniani : / secoli della Litt. 
 Itoi., 1818, III., are all obviously at second hand, drawn probably from that 
 marvellous torso of Italian erudition, Mazzuchelli: Gli scrittori cT Italia, 1758, 
 vol. II., parte I., 256. A good account of him is given in Johnson : Life of 
 Linacre, 1835. Scaligek speaks of him as " incomparabilis doctrinae, divinas 
 probitatis." — Contra Cardanum, 1557, Exerc. clvii. 
 
120 ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. [CHAP. VI. 
 
 validity of all principles that were clear and logically consistent, 
 no matter if they were merely verbal propositions, wholly 
 without correspondence in fact. He argued from these prin- 
 ciples, and only scrutinized the logical dependence of his 
 deduction, instead of scrutinizing the principles themselves, 
 and the verification of his conclusions. Thus, from the 
 assumption that the circle is the most perfect form, he 
 deduced the conclusion that the motion of the planets must 
 be circular. From the assumption that the centre is the 
 " noblest place," he deduced the conclusion that the heart, 
 being central, must be the seat of the noblest faculty — the 
 soul. And in this path his disciples unhesitatingly followed. 
 Although History is bound to record the disastrous results 
 which issued from the imperfect conception and imperfect 
 practice of the Objective Method, not less is it bound to 
 testify to the greatness of the revolution which that Method 
 inaugurated. Aristotle's claim to our veneration is that he 
 produced an organon of science. It was a gigantic creation ; 
 and for centuries was regarded as the perfect organon. This 
 book it was which opened the subject, and which for centuries 
 was thought to have closed it. We, instructed by a fuller 
 wisdom, may point out its deficiencies, and perceive how they 
 hampered as much as they aided true investigation. The errors 
 and excesses of his followers threw strong light on his defects. 
 But we must not suffer these defects to obscure the real 
 greatness of his achievement. His noblest title is that of 
 Father of the Inductive Method. He first made men aware 
 of the paramount importance of Fact, and taught them to 
 seek explanations of phenomena on the Objective Method. 
 
 His followers were fascinated by his defects. Hence the 
 revival of Science was accompanied by the most energetic 
 protests against Aristotelianism, as being the despotic 
 obstacle to all true research; and Eogeb Bacon expressed 
 a feeling which afterwards moved many minds, when he 
 said that if he had the power he would burn all the works 
 
CHAP. VI.] ARISTOTLE'S METHOD. 121 
 
 of the Stagirite, since the study of them was not simply loss 
 of time' but multiplication of ignorance. 24 
 
 24 Si haberem potestatem supra libros Aristotelis, ego facerem omnes 
 cremari ; quia non est nisi temporis amissio studere in illis, et causa erroris, et 
 multiplicatio ignorantise. — Roger Bacon: Opus Majus, Jebb's preface, p. v. 
 Yet in spite of this outbreak every page is studded with citations from Aristotle, 
 of whom he everywhere speaks in the highest admiration. 
 
 After writing this note I found Jourdain in his erudite work, Recherches sur 
 les anciennes traductions latiiies d'Aristote, 1843, p. 386, giving a rational explana- 
 tion of Roger Bacon's words: " En s'exprimant ainsi, il ne voulait sans doute 
 pasparler des ouvrages dAristote ainsi que Jebb parait le croire, mais simplement 
 des versions latines sur lesquelles la fonle des etudiants s'exercait." The virulent 
 style in which Bacon speaks of these translations renders this explanation highly 
 probable. And indeed on referring again to Jebb's preface I think this was his 
 interpretation also, although Roger Bacon's latest biographer, Charles : 
 Roger Bacon, sa vie, ses ouvrages, et ses doctrines, d'apres des textes ine"dits, 
 1861, p. 103, and Milman: History of Latin Christianity, 1855, VI., 477, have 
 understood the passage as I have given it in the text. 
 
122 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 CHAPTEE VII. 
 
 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 
 
 § 98. Although modern Science includes ideas not less 
 transcendental than those included in ancient Science, and 
 employs the a priori or deductive Method with almost equal 
 confidence, the resemblance is only superficial. If similar 
 ideas are invoked they are ideas reached by a different route, 
 having a different guarantee, and occupying a different position 
 in the system of thought. In modern science they are the 
 highest generalities of accurate, quantitative research. Often 
 transcending the limits of actual experience, they are always 
 founded on experience, and are strictly conformable with all 
 we know or can think. As abstract expressions of the 
 observed order of nature they are liable at any moment to 
 be displaced in favour of expressions more accurate. They 
 serve as guides and starting-points in research. They are not 
 believed in as absolute existences. In ancient science they 
 were held to be absolute existences, which it was the primary 
 object of research to find, and which, when disclosed to the 
 imagination, required no confrontation with reality. The 
 ancients studied phenomena to discover the realities under- 
 lying phenomena ; the moderns study phenomena to detect 
 the order of their co-existences and successions. 
 
 § 99. It is deeply significant of the importance of Method 
 that, although Aristotle and his followers were in the main 
 metaphysical in their researches, they failed in their attempts 
 to establish the transcendental ideas of Physics, not less 
 
CHAP. VII.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 123 
 
 signally than in their attempts to discover special laws. The 
 reason is that their Method was subjective; whereas even 
 the laws of transcendental physics are discoverable solely 
 by the objective Method. It is also noticeable that, although 
 the ancients had formed the conception of the Indestructibility 
 of Matter, they failed to take the step which now seems so 
 easy, the Indestructibility of Force. Ex nihilo nihil fit was 
 an axiom applied only to Matter. While no one thought 
 that new matter could be produced, every one believed that 
 force could be produced where no force pre-existed. The 
 idea had not arisen that each manifestation of force was a 
 devolutidn from some other already in existence. 
 
 The conception of the Indestructibility of Force — with its 
 consequence "the Correlation of Forces" (or, more accurately, 
 the correlations of Force), is modern. It is now so obvious 
 that no physicist disputes it, whatever may be his views 
 of the nature of Force — whether he believes it to be 
 an Entity, or a Kelation (§ 72 a). There is indeed some 
 difficulty in keeping this conception steadily before the mind, 
 and this arises from the two conditions under which Force is 
 apprehended, conditions which are antagonistic to Sense, 
 though transcendentally identical. These are the statical 
 and dynamical conditions — i.e., Force as tension, and Force 
 as vis viva. According to sensuous perception, these are 
 antagonistic, and mutually exclusive; and correspond with 
 the two fundamental conditions of matter, namely, Eest and 
 Motion. According to transcendental ideas, they are iden- 
 tical: as tension disappears, vis viva reappears; and what 
 seems lost as vis viva is found to be restored in tension. 
 Tension is not the less force because of its equilibrium; 
 matter is not the less active because it is at rest. 
 
 What is called the passive, or static, condition of bodies is 
 a pure abstraction, a fiction framed for our convenience, a 
 necessary fiction, but directly at variance with what is disclosed 
 by objective inquiry. The idea of absolute inertness— inac- 
 
124 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 tivity — is a figment; it is correlative with the idea of all 
 activity being due to some outlying agency, some existence 
 apart from, and controlling bodies. It arose from the 
 metaphysical view of Nature which interpreted subjective 
 distinctions as objective realities, and thus separated Motion 
 from the Moving Body, because such abstractions were 
 possible in thought, and convenient in speech. The abstrac- 
 tion became personified as an independent Force (§ 72 a). In 
 Mechanics we also make this abstraction, and conceive bodies 
 as passive; nor is there any impropriety in doing so, for 
 Mechanics deal only with abstractions. Elsewhere we recognize 
 the fiction, and we conceive Motion not as a thing, but as a 
 relation: "a change of situation in reference to bodies con- 
 ceived as at rest," 1 though the bodies are known not to be at 
 rest. Thus in a moving ship, only those bodies are said to 
 move which change their position in the ship. But this ship, 
 thus conceived to be at rest, is moving through the sea ; the 
 sea moves with the earth round its axis ; the earth moves 
 round the sun ; the sun moves through space. Thus we pass 
 on in our analysis, till finally we arrive at fixed points, from 
 which absolute motion may be considered. "We imagine 
 space without limit, motionless, penetrable by matter. It is 
 to the parts of this imaginary space that we refer the positions 
 of bodies, and conceive those bodies to be in motion when 
 they correspond with successive portions of this space. This 
 is the ultimate effort of abstraction. All we know of motion 
 is change of position ; such changes are necessarily relative ; 
 absolute motion is therefore unknown ; and consequently Best 
 must be equally unknown. 
 
 § 100. To cite another example : — The transcendental idea 
 of uniformity in Nature, which is so completely interwoven 
 
 1 Laplace : Exposition du Si/slhne du Monde, I., 269. On the relativity of 
 our conceptions of Motion and Rest, compare Kant : Neuer Lehrbegriff der 
 Sewegung und Mute, Werke, 1839, V., 279. Compare also his Anfangsgriinde 
 der Naturwissenchaft, erstes Hauptstiick, V., 320. 
 
CHAP. VII.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 125 
 
 with modern speculations, was by no means clearly conceived 
 by Aristotle. We shall presently find him maintaining that 
 action and reaction are not always equal. We shall find him 
 satisfied with the conclusion, based on extremely superficial ob- 
 servation, that some male animals have teats, others not ; that 
 lions have only one cervical vertebra, although dogs, in all other 
 respects so similar in structure, have several. Hebschel 
 has noticed how the Stagirite. obstructed the progress of 
 astronomy by not identifying celestial with terrestrial me- 
 chanics, but laying down the principle that celestial motions 
 were regulated by peculiar laws, thus placing them entirely 
 without the pale of experimental research, while at the same 
 time the progress of mechanics was impeded by the assump- 
 tion of natural and unnatural motions. 2 
 
 The remark is just, and yet, although a clear conception of 
 the principle of uniformity would have prevented such an , 
 error, we must not forget that the principle itself was really 
 disclosed by vast experiences of uniformity ; that is to say, the ^ 
 idea was obtained inductively. In our day the principle is so < 
 familiar that we imagine it must have been an easy step to 
 generalize from terrestrial to celestial mechanics. Yet neither 
 Kepler, the bold, nor Galileo, the far-seeing, had the 
 courage to make such a generalization. Kepler assumed 
 that there was some distinct force operating in planetary 
 motions ; and it was for the same purpose that Descartes 
 invented his vortices. Even Newton, as will be seen hereafter, 
 was very timid in extending terrestrial to celestial laws ; and 
 Auguste Comte goes so far as to consider the extension 
 of gravitation beyond our solar system to be very rash, 
 unless understood to be simply a conjecture founded on 
 analogy. 3 This seems to me ultra-scepticism. It is true that 
 we have at present no proof that gravitation extends beyond 
 our own system ; but neither have we the shadow of an indi- 
 
 2 Hekschel : Discourse on Natural Philosophy, 1830 (294). 
 
 3 Comte :, Corns de Philos. Positive, 1835, III., 254. 
 
126 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 cation to the contrary, and gravity is so indissolubly bound up 
 with our conception of matter that we cannot think of the 
 stars being material without at the same time thinking of 
 them in relations of gravity. Direct proof to the contrary 
 would, of course, rectify this belief, but until that is fur- 
 nished, the idea of matter without gravity is unthinkable. 
 
 § 101. He who is ignorant of Motion, says Aristotle, is 
 necessarily ignorant of all natural things. Much as he has 
 written about Motion, it is very significant that he should not 
 have contributed the smallest item even to what we now call 
 the metaphysics of the subject. 4 Not only was he entirely in 
 the dark respecting the Laws, he was completely wrong in his 
 conception of the nature of Motion. He thought it was 
 a something superadded ; an " energy" which was opposed to 
 that of Best. He thought that every body in motion naturally 
 tends to rest. We have learned to identify the two ; we have 
 learned that Rest is not a mere privation, not a mere negation, 
 but one aspect of the positive energy of Force {tension, not vis 
 viva) ; for we have learned that Eest is only Equilibrium, and 
 that is the action of equal and opposing forces, i. e., tension. 
 
 The ancients all conceived Rest as something essentially 
 different from Motion, different in nature, not simply in quan- 
 titative amount. They believed the earth to be at rest ; we no 
 longer believe this of the sun. We have measured the velocity of 
 the earth which seems to be at rest, and have learned to regard 
 motion simply as a change of relation. 
 
 In justice to Aristotle, however, we should remember that 
 these ideas are of late development. Even Mtjssenbeoek 
 could only conceive Motion and Rest as two attributes or pro- 
 perties of bodies. He thought that Motion was by no means 
 
 4 In writing this I was little prepared to find a modern contradictor ; yet 
 M. Baeth&emt St. Hilaikb asserts that he knows no work in the whole 
 range of philosophy wherein the theory of motion has been treated " avec plus 
 d'etendue ni plus de solidite."— La Physique d'Aristote, 1862, 1., p. Ixiv. His 
 idolatry leads hhn to make many such surprising assertions. 
 
CHAP. VII.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 127 
 
 necessary to bodies, since a body might rest eternally in the 
 place once given it by the Creator. 5 
 
 § 102. Aristotle has been compared with Newton on the 
 ground that both make a theory of motion the basis of Physics. 
 But the comparison is unjust ; the reaction it provokes against 
 Aristotle leads to a misconception of his real greatness by the 
 application of a false standard. While it is true that both 
 deliver a theory of motion, it is certain that Aristotle had 
 mastered none of the elements out of which a true theory could 
 be constructed, whereas Newton had not only mastered the 
 elements, but also the laws, which constitute a theory as mag- 
 nificent in reach as it is fruitful in result. 
 
 § 103. The physical writings of Aristotle still extant are 
 the eight books of Physics, the four books On the Heavens, 
 the two books on Generation and Corruption, with the 
 Meteorology, and the Mechanical Problems. The contents of 
 these works very slightly correspond with their titles, according 
 to modern conceptions. The sciences which we class under 
 the heads of Physics and Astronomy are in no sense repre- 
 sented in them. There is no attempt to sketch the laws of 
 Statics, Dynamics, Optics, Acoustics, Thermotics, or Elec- 
 tricity. There is nothing beyond metaphysical disquisitions 
 suggested by certain physical phenomena ; wearisome disputes 
 about motion, space, infinity, and the like ; verbal distinc- 
 tions, loose analogies, unhesitating assumptions, inexpressibly 
 fatiguing and unfruitful. They have furnished matter for 
 centuries of idle speculation, but few beams of steady light 
 to aid the groping endeavours of science. We cannot say 
 that on every point he is altogether wrong ; on some points he 
 was assuredly right ; but these are few, isolated, without bear- 
 
 s Mussenbroek : Cours de Physique Exptr. et Mathematique, 1769, 1., 71. 
 His predecessor Rohatot had a clearer view, and defined Motion as " the suc- 
 cessive application of a body to the different parts of those bodies which are 
 immediately about it." Rest, therefore, became " the continual application of 
 that body to the same parts of those bodies which are about it and immediately 
 touch it." — System of Natural Philos., by Clarke, 1735, 1., 39. 
 
128 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 ing on the rest of his speculations, and without influence on 
 research. I shall therefore analyse these works much more 
 rapidly and briefly than the works on Biology. 
 
 I. — The Work on Physics. 6 
 
 § 104. In Book I., after briefly laying down the rules of 
 Method, he examines the opinions of his predecessors. This 
 has an historical interest, but science nowadays is some- 
 what indifferent to criticisms on Being, or the various 
 meanings which may be attached to the word. Nor will any 
 but metaphysicians trouble themselves with the celebrated 
 principle of Contraries, once so fruitful in disputation. He 
 says truly enough (Chap. II.) that the early speculators erred 
 because insufficient experience led them into a wrong path ; 
 but his own conception of the right path turns out not a whit 
 less misleading. 
 
 There are, he says, three principles : Matter, Form, and 
 Privation. In every phenomenon we can distinguish the sub- 
 stance and its form ; but as the form can only be one of two 
 Contraries, and as only one of these two can exist at each 
 moment, we are forced to admit the existence of a third prin- 
 ciple — Privation — to account for the contrary which is absent. 
 Thus a man must be either a musician or a non-musician ; he 
 cannot be both at the same time ; and that which prevents 
 his being one of these is the privation of the form. 7 
 
 Another conclusion reached, after some difficulty, is that 
 Motion really exists. 
 
 6 Pranti, has added a German translation and useful notes to his edition of 
 the text. Leipzig, 1854. And during the revision of these sheets there has 
 appeared a French version by Barthelemy St. Hilaire : La Physique 
 d'Aristote, Paris, 1862, in two volumes, with a long preface and a paraphrase. 
 The version seems excellent. 
 
 ' " "Voila, cette theorie fameuse de la matiere et de la forme si souvent 
 reprochee a Aristote, et que l'on critique™ sans doute plus d'une fois encore. 
 Pour moi, je la trouve simple et vraie." — Barthelemy St. Hilaire, I., 
 p. xxviii. 
 
CHAP. VII.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 129 
 
 § 105. In Book II. he presents his definition of Nature. 
 After some confused and vacillating explanation, he arrives at 
 the conclusion that Nature is the principle of Motion and Best. 
 Those things are called natural which are self-moved. He 
 then enters upon .the four causes, which we have already 
 expounded (§ 95). These comprise Nature : for everything 
 has substance, everything has form, everything has motion, 
 everything has an end or aim. 
 
 § 106. In the eighth chapter of this Book there is a dis- 
 cussion on final causes, which is too interesting to be passed 
 over. He first argues against those who hold Chance to be a 
 cause of phenomena. " What, it has been said, is to prevent 
 nature from acting without an aim, and without any refer- 
 ence to the Best (fir\ 'ivaca tov iroiuv juryS' on (5s\riov) ? Why 
 should not Zeus rain from necessity (e$ avayfoje), and not to 
 make the corn grow? Since the vapour, rising upwards, 
 must become cold, and vapour chilled is water, which would 
 descend as rain ; and, because this has happened, the corn has 
 grown. Again, if the corn in a granary is ruined by the rain, 
 we cannot say that the final cause of the rain was the ruin of 
 the corn, but that this ruin was accidental (tovto ovfifiefinicEv). 
 What, then, prevents the organs of animals from being 
 formed in a similar way ? The teeth are produced necessarily ; 
 those in front are sharp and capable of tearing the food ; those 
 behind are broad, and capable of grinding it. They are not 
 there for these ends, but these ends simply coincide with their 
 existence (av/nireaeiv). And so of all other organs. Thus, those 
 things which happen to be constituted as if they were made 
 for an express purpose persist, and are preserved because the 
 conditions permit ; but those of, which this is not the case 
 have perished, or will perish." 8 
 
 Having thus stated the argument with great impartiality, 
 
 8 oirov fihi ovv Uiravra avvifiri tioirtg «av d ivaca tov iyiviro, Tama fiiv 
 la&Bri diro tov ccvto/jAtov avaravra lmrti$eiw£' oca Si fir) ovnig diriiXcro icai 
 diraXKvrat. 
 
 9 
 
130 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. Til. 
 
 he proceeds to answer it as follows : — " That this should be 
 the case is impossible, and for this reason : these things, 
 and all things naturally generated, are always, or mostly, 
 so generated. On the contrary, this is never seen in 
 spontaneous or accidental cases. Thus, it does not seem 
 to be accidental, or coincidental, when much rain falls 
 in winter; but it does' seem so when it occurs in the dog- 
 days. Nor is it accidental when great heat occurs during 
 the dog-days; but it is so during winter. If, therefore, 
 such occur, either as an accident or with a view to some 
 purpose, and if it is impossible to say the phenomena are 
 accidental, it is clear they must occur with some end in 
 view. But since all things are thus in nature — as even 
 those admit who speak of these things — there must neces- 
 sarily be a final cause of these things which in nature exist, 
 or are produced." 
 
 Considering the reputation of Aristotle as a logician, this 
 is, perhaps, one of the feeblest arguments ever put forth on 
 this subject, which has elicited many. 9 Had he confined him- 
 self to the proposition first announced, namely, that constant 
 uniformity of adaptation to an end implies a design, whereas 
 accidental adaptations are only occasional, there would have 
 been some force in the argument ; but his illustrations betray 
 the confusion of his ideas. 
 
 § 107. He goes on to specify the obvious illustrations 
 used by the advocates of final causes, in the acts of animals, 
 and in the structure of plants, concluding that " there must 
 be some cause for everything which exists, or is produced." 
 But Nature is to be considered under two aspects — Matter and 
 Form. Now form being an end, and all the rest being 
 arranged with reference to it, we may call the form the final 
 
 9 Opinions differ. M. Bakth^lemy St. Hilatke, always ready with his 
 enthusiasm, thinks this argument " une magnifique apologie de la nature." 
 Aristotle himself, on one occasion, sees through the absurdity of always seek- 
 ing final causes (§ 401). 
 
CHAP. VII.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 131 
 
 cause. Error is, however, possible both in Nature and in 
 Art. A grammarian may be betrayed into an error of spelling, 
 a physician into administering a wrong potion. Similar errors 
 may exist in Nature. Monstrosities are Nature's faults in 
 orthography. 
 
 § 108. In Book III. we have his celebrated definition of 
 Motion as the passage from potential existence to actual exist- 
 ence. " Motion is the energy of what exists in power, so far 
 as existing. It is the act of a moveable which belongs to its 
 power of moving." 
 
 Before studying motion it is necessary to come to a clear 
 understanding of Infinity, since motion is continuity, and as 
 such infinitely divisible ; therefore the Infinite must first be 
 studied. Then again as Motion implies both Space and Time, 
 these also must be studied. What Aristotle has to say on 
 these transcendental questions the curious reader must find 
 out for himself; it would occupy too much space, and too 
 unprofitably, to reproduce it here. I will rather call attention 
 to the long persistence of the metaphysical fallacy which kept 
 up discussions on such subjects as the existence of space 
 as anything more than a relation. The fallacy (§ 69) is, that 
 whenever man can form clear ideas, not in themselves con- 
 tradictory, these ideas must of necessity represent truths of 
 nature. 10 Hence when we conceive body, we conceive it as 
 existing in something, which contains it (i. e. body as filling 
 space), we are led to believe that this all-container must itself 
 have an objective existence. The idea will not withstand 
 criticism. An equal necessity can be shown for something to 
 contain the container. As we cannot pursue this reduction 
 ad infinitum, we must stop somewhere ; why not, therefore, 
 
 10 " Jusqu' a present nous n'avons traite que de l'idee du vuide ; il faut main- 
 tenant que nous fassions voir qu'il n'est pas impossible qu'il existe dans le 
 monde un vuide etendu ; ce qu'on peut demontrer facilement d'apres l'idee que 
 chacun peut se former du vuide; car en peut supposer que tout ce qui se concoit 
 clairement etqui n'emporte aueune contradiction avec soi, existe.' ' — Mussenbkoek : 
 Cours de Physique, I., 82. 
 
 9—2 
 
132 AEISTOTLE'S physics, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 stop at Substance, of which we know something, rather than, 
 go on to Space, of which we know nothing ? 
 
 The argument of J. Beenouilli, cited by Mussenbeoek 
 with approval, is a specimen of metaphysical trifling quite 
 worthy of Aristotle. " Before the creation of the world there 
 was nothing existing, except God. If this universal vacuity 
 was not repugnant to Creative "Wisdom, we cannot suppose it 
 repugnant to his Wisdom if there are now many vacant spaces 
 between existing bodies." Out of similar " suppositions " 
 and "clear ideas," metaphysicians have built many systems ; 
 systems, but no science. 
 
 § 109. Instead of wearying the reader with discussions 
 about Space, let me detach from Aristotle's fourth book the 
 theory of projectiles, interesting in itself, and also because it 
 gives us the first glimpse of a conception of Inertia. 
 
 He argues that in vacuo, Motion is impossible. In a void 
 there can be no difference of place ; and motion implies differ- 
 ence of place. He then adds that projectiles continue moving 
 after the original motor ceases to be in contact with them, 
 " either, as some say, by reaction (Si avriirtpiaTaaiv), or by 
 the motion of the moved air, which is more rapid than that 
 of the natural tendency of the body to its proper place." 11 
 
 " In vacuo, on the contrary, there will be nothing of the 
 kind, no body can have motion there unless it be carried and 
 supported as in a chariot." How the chariot is to be moved 
 in vacuo, he does not explain ; yet he started from the position 
 that no motion was possible in vacuo. " Moreover," he adds, 
 "no one can say why in vacuo a body once set in motion 
 should ever stop ; since why rather here than there ? Con- 
 sequently it must either remain in necessary rest, or — 
 if in motion — in endless motion, unless some stronger 
 interferes." 
 
 " Compare also lib. VIII., chap. X., 267, where the same explanation is 
 given. Galileo's masterly refutation of this may be seen in his Dicdoghi, 
 Giornata Seconda (Opera, Milan, 1811, XI., 344). 
 
CHAP. VII.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 133 
 
 § 110. On many accounts this is an interesting passage. 
 He had by no means overlooked the fact of the resistance of 
 air, since he compares it with the resistance of water. Yet 
 the air is made to keep up rather than destroy the motion of a 
 projectile. He had, also, as we see, got a glimpse of Inertia— 
 at least, as regards bodies in vacuo. But it never occurred to 
 him to connect the two ideas, and make inertia keep up the 
 continuity of motion, and resistance of the air destroy the 
 motion. 12 He was forced to seek for some continuous external 
 motor to account for continuous motion; "the pulses of the 
 moved air " was the first cause which presented itself, and was 
 accepted at once. Whereas had he (and succeeding philoso- ; 
 phers) steadily conceived the so-called Law of Inertia— that is ' 
 to say, the transcendental Law of Causation, that every change 
 demands a cause,— he would have perceived that continuous 
 motion was motion unchanged — would have perceived that no - 
 external cause was needed for such continuity, but was only '> 
 needed to arrest, deflect, accelerate, in a word change the 
 motion. The pulses of air might thus have been conceived 
 as retarding the motion, deflecting it, or* accelerating it — 
 and by Verification he would have ascertained which of these 
 conceptions was correct. But in no sense could the pulses of 
 air have been conceived as causing the simple continuance of 
 motion, since continuance implied that there was nothing to 
 cause change. 
 
 \ 111. The succeeding Books (V. — VIII.) are mainly 
 devoted to Motion. It is divided into absolute, partial, and 
 accidental motions — phrases much cherished by scholasticism, 
 which fed on phrases as the fabled chamaeleon fed on air. By 
 accidental motion is not meant motion occurring without a 
 known cause, but motion which has reference to the "acci- 
 dent" or attribute of a thing. Thus when we say "a musician 
 walks " we speak of an accidental motion ; since it is not the 
 
 a As Des Cabtes did. See his Principia Philos., pars II., c. xxxviii. 
 
134 ABISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 musician which walks, but the man in whom being a musician 
 is the "accident." 
 
 Partial motion is when we say of a sick man that he 
 is cured. In truth this motion of cure concerns only his 
 diseased organ, and not the whole man himself. 
 
 Absolute motion is that in which the object moves entirely, 
 as when we say "a man walks" because his whole body 
 changes its place. 
 
 In the theory of motion five elements are involved : the 
 motor, the moved, the direction of movement, the starting- 
 point, and the goal. It is from the last that motion receives 
 its special designation. Thus the corruption of a body is 
 its movement towards non-existence, although it must neces- 
 sarily start from existence. In like manner the movement of 
 generation is a movement towards existence, though starting 
 from non-existence. 
 
 § 112. A little of this kind of philosophy will doubtless 
 suffice for all readers. They can easily imagine how fertile 
 such principles must have been in verbal disputation, how 
 sterile in any other result. Yet this is the system which has 
 been compared with Newton's ! 
 
 There are three Categories of Motion laid down : — 
 1. Quantity; 2. Quality; 3. Place. On these he rings the 
 changes. When a body increases or diminishes, there is the 
 " motion of quantity." When the body changes its quality 
 without changing its quantity — as in becoming hot or 
 cold — there is "the motion of quality." When a body 
 merely changes its place, there is locomotion, or the " motion 
 of place." 13 
 
 § 113. Motion in space, from an external motor, is of four 
 
 12 Hekmolaus Barbarus thus compendiously Btates it: " Motus autem est 
 ejus rei, quae movetur, fluens atque inchoata perfectio. Qusecunque ver6 
 moventur, aut spatium percurrunt (ut ea qute loco mutantur), aut quantitatem 
 transferuiit (ut ea qua? auctantur minuunturque), aut qualitatem (ut ea quae 
 calefiunt fiigefiuntque), aut aliquid hujuscemodi nanciscuntur." — Compendium 
 Scientia Naturalis ex Aristotele, 1547, Lib. I., p. 8. 
 
CHAP. VII.] METEOKOLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 135 
 
 kinds : — Traction, Impulsion, Translation, and Rotation. To 
 these all changes may be referred. Thus Compulsion (eV&wc) 
 is an Impulsion (oxnc) in which the motor accompanies the 
 body which it moves ; and Repulsion (avwaic) is an Impul- 
 sion which does not accompany the moved body. Projection 
 is the impress of a more violent movement than the body 
 would naturally have, and lasts until this "natural motion" 
 regains the upperhand. Expansion is repulsion, Contraction 
 is traction. 
 
 This analysis may be carried further ; we may reduce both 
 translation and rotation under the heads of traction and 
 impulsion. Thus the body may be accidentally moved, or be 
 in some body which is moved, or be on that body ; that which 
 carries may itself be carried, either because it is drawn, or 
 pushed, or rolled. Rotation is obviously constituted by traction 
 and impulsion. 
 
 § 114. There are two great classes of movements — 1st, 
 the natural; and 2nd, the violent, or unnatural. These 
 belong to all bodies. Fire ascends, and a stone descends, 
 by natural movement. A stone may be made to ascend, but 
 this is owing to violence ; some external motor causes it to 
 ascend ; by its natural movement the stone would never rise, 
 but always fall. For a similar reason fire may be made to 
 descend ; but left to its natural movement it will only ascend. 
 
 § 115. Translation being the first of movements, and 
 being reducible to circular, linear, and mixed, the question 
 arises : Which of these is the most perfect ? which represents 
 the infinite, continuous, uniform motion of the First Mover ? 
 Not the mixed, since that is a combination of the two others. 
 Not the linear, since a straight line is necessarily finite, and 
 if a body were to move eternally along it, there must be 
 a return, which would produce contrary movements, and 
 moments of repose, which would be solutions of continuity. 
 The circular therefore alone remains : in the circle there is no 
 solution of continuity : the motion may be eternal in it. 
 
136 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 This demonstration of circular movement as the most 
 perfect, played a conspicuous part in peripatetic philosophy. 
 Yet the reader sees at once how entirely it is removed from 
 , reality, how purely verbal its basis, how utterly unscientific. 
 The same may be said of all the ideas expounded in the 
 Physics ; and we need bestow no more time upon them. 
 
 II. — The work on the Heavens. 1 * 
 § 116. The title of this work, De Goelo, was not given by 
 its author. It raises in the modern reader an expectation 
 which will not be fulfilled of finding in it astronomical views. 
 Its subject-matter is very much that of the Physics; indeed, 
 the two works may be considered as parts of one treatise. 
 
 § 117. In Book I. substance is treated as a continuity of 
 three dimensions, divisible on all sides. Bodies are deter- 
 mined by motion; but every motion is either straight or 
 circular, or else a compound of the two. Circular motion is 
 movement round a centre ; straight motion is either upwards 
 or downwards. That is named upwards which goes from the 
 centre ; that is named downwards which goes to the centre. 
 
 The qualities of bodies which correspond to these forms 
 of Up and Down are Levity and Gravity. These are not 
 relative but absolute ; they belong to the bodies themselves. 
 In .a subsequent passage (Book IV.) Aristotle objects to the 
 early philosophers that they conceived these contraries of Up 
 and Down as simple relations, without determining what 
 Levity and Gravity were in themselves. He maintains that 
 Earth by nature tends downwards, and has absolute gravity ; 
 Fire, on the contrary, tends upwards, and has absolute levity. 
 The former underlies the firm and solid; the latter rises 
 above, and swims over the elements. Those bodies which 
 move in circles can be neither heavy nor light, since they 
 
 14 Pbantl has given an edition of this also, with a German translation, fol- 
 lowed by the little treatise On Generation and Corruption. Leipzig, 1857. 
 
CHAP. VII.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 137 
 
 cannot be moved from or to a centre, either by natural, or 
 unnatural motions. 
 
 § 117 a. The profound difference between such ideas and 
 the ideas of modern science must be obvious. Instead of 
 trying to ascertain the law of gravitation, that is to say, its 
 proportional relations, a verbal definition of the nature of 
 gravitation is given, without any guarantee for the accuracy 
 of the definition. No illumination can issue from such a 
 source, nor from the subsequent demonstration that an infinite 
 body is impossible, consequently there can be no infinite 
 gravity, no infinite levity. 
 
 § 118. We have learned that the weight of bodies is not 
 an absolute quality inherent in the particles, but the relation 
 existing between the particles and the centre of the earth, 
 a relation which varies with the variation of the distance. 
 But this conception could not have been formed until it had 
 been disclosed in the phenomena of celestial mechanics. It 
 was otherwise with the conception of positive levity The 
 ordinary phenomena of terrestrial physics might have disclosed 
 to Aristotle the error of supposing bodies to have positive 
 levity. Epictjkus clearly saw through the fallacy of imagining 
 that Fire ascended in virtue of its levity. " No body," says 
 Lucretius, 15 " can by its own force tend upwards ; flame 
 descends when left to its own nature, as we see in lightning, 
 falling stars, and the descending beams of the sun which 
 reach the earth." 
 
 § 119. In Book II. there is much profitless discussion 
 of the Contraries in Space, Eight and Left, and the like. 
 It is to be observed that he regards these not as relative, 
 but as positive ; thus in Book IV. he distinctly says that Up 
 and Down, Eight and Left, are fixed by nature, and are not 
 
 15 Luchetius : II., v., 184, seq. " Nullani rem posse sua vi corpoream sur- 
 snm ferri, sursumque meare." The idea of a positive Levity continued to reign 
 so long that even in 1755 we find Dr. Samuel Clarke elaborately refuting it. 
 See notes to Rohault's System of Natural Philosophy, I., 99. 
 
138 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 simply relations to us : ov ftovov 7r s ooc ij/iae. After this dis- 
 cussion he advances the proposition that whatever exists 
 exists for its own end. The energy of God is immortality : 
 this is eternal life. The Godlike must consequently have 
 eternal motion, and as the Heaven is Godlike it must contain 
 bodies eternally moving in circles. Why are not all bodies 
 of this nature ? Because it is necessary, when a body moves 
 in a circle, that there should be a fixed and motionless centre ; 
 such a centre is the earth. By a similar course of argument, 
 it is proved that there must be a contrary to this earth; 
 namely fire. But the positive is prior to the privative, and 
 heat is prior to cold. Now, Kest and Gravity are said to 
 be privations of Motion and Levity. The apparent contra- 
 diction in thus making fire prior to earth is reconciled by 
 Peantl somewhat more Germanico. He sees in it a deep 
 ontological meaning, that out of the co-existence of two 
 contraries a deeper metaphysical priority for one of the two 
 may be- evolved, and precisely for this of fire. 16 
 
 Leaving this dainty morsel to the palates of metaphysi- 
 cians, we may consider the important detail that when 
 Aristotle speaks of Best and Cold as privations, he is not to 
 be understood as meaning negations. In his system priva- 
 tives are positives (§ 104). Hence the solid earth is conceived 
 as privative in respect of fire ; gravity is privative in respect 
 of levity. 
 
 § 120. " The necessary form of the Heaven," he says, 
 " is a circle; for this form is the most suitable to its substance, 
 and is the first in nature : tovto yap oi/ceiorarov te ry ovoia. 
 Kai Ty <j>vaei Trpurov." Substance can be known, then ? Yes, 
 but you must not ask how the knowledge is acquired. He pro- 
 ceeds to demonstrate his proposition at length ; but we need 
 not follow. The stars attract us. " It is most rational to con- 
 ceive the stars as constituted of that substance in which they 
 
 16 See Phantl : ad locum, p. 298. 
 
CHAP. VII.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 139 
 
 have their orbit." Why ? The answer is intensely signifi- 
 cant. " Because we have said already that there was some- 
 thing which by its very nature was moved in a circle : £7m§77 
 ifafxiv ti e'tvai b kvkAoj <j>ipiaOai irtyvictv." Should any doubt 
 arise respecting the high rationality of such a conclusion, the 
 doubt will be silenced by the axiom that " everything neces- 
 sarily arises from that in which it is." Thus as the stars 
 move in circles they must be formed out of circles. 
 
 § 121. The dynamical theory of heat, which in our day 
 has received something approaching to a demonstration, and 
 has led to the questionable hypothesis that the heat of the 
 sun is produced and constantly renewed by the shock of 
 planetary masses against it, gives a curious interest to the 
 following passage, which an uncritical admirer might regard 
 as an anticipation. " The heat and light of the stars are 
 evolved from the friction of their bodies against the air ; for 
 motion naturally produces heat, even in wood and stones ; 
 and still more must this be the case with bodies which are 
 nearer to fire ; and air is nearer to fire, as may be concluded 
 from the heat of arrows which become so heated that some- 
 times their lead is melted; and when they are heated the 
 air surrounding them must be heated also. Motion through 
 the air generates heat. Of the Upper bodies, each is moved 
 in its own circle, so that it does not become hot, but the air 
 surrounding it is made hot, and there hottest where the sun 
 is. We must conclude, therefore, that the stars are neither 
 made of fire nor moved in fire." 
 
 § 122. Anything like a connected view ofJiis astronomical 
 opinions must be deferred until we come to the early history 
 of astronomy ; here we may content ourselves with one more 
 characteristic detail, namely, his proof of the stars being 
 spherical. " They are by nature incapable of being self- 
 moved; and as nature never does anything irrational or 
 purposeless (ov&v a'Aoywe ovSs parr/v), it follows that 
 to the body incapable of self-movement she would give the 
 
140 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. Til. 
 
 form which is the least moveable; now the sphere is the 
 least moveable, since it has no instruments by which to 
 move : Sia to firi§iv e\uv opyavov irpog rr)v Kivrjaiv. 
 
 § 123. In Book III. he gives expression to the famous 
 conception of four elements. He defines an element to be 
 that which exists potentially, or actually, in bodies, and 
 cannot be resolved into any other elements. Fire and earth 
 are potentially in flesh and wood ; otherwise they could never 
 come out of flesh and wood. But in fire there is neither 
 actual nor potential flesh or wood ; otherwise we should see 
 them produced out of it. 
 
 Peantl thinks it is a striking illustration of the Grecian 
 tendency to neglect facts for ideas that not one among these 
 early speculators ever attempted to ascertain what earth and 
 fire really are. The reproach is scarcely just, for it is difficult 
 to conceive how such an attempt could have been made at 
 that period. The energetic protests against the a priori 
 Method which escape from Aristotle in this very book, 
 warrant us in saying that he would have escaped from it 
 had the other Method been open with any prospect of result. 
 He accepted the idea of the elements because it was plausible. 
 There was no suspicion of its accuracy, no known means of 
 verifying it. 
 
 Although only four elements are enumerated here, and 
 generally also elsewhere, yet a fifth is often named, the Ether, 
 and a great part assigned to it in his speculations. Critics, 
 however, are far from agreement respecting it. Hitter, Henri 
 Martin and Meyer, for example, maintain the Ether to be a 
 distinct element. Biese, Humboldt, and Zeller argue that 
 it wants the cardinal character of an element, the principle 
 of contraries. It is neither heavy, nor light ; neither hot nor 
 cold ; therefore it has no linear, but only circular movement, 
 and is destitute of up and down. One cannot but see that 
 Aristotle's language must be very vacillating or obscure when 
 there can be two opinions on such a point. I think that 
 
CHAP. 711.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 141 
 
 although his language is lax, his meaning is consistently 
 preserved. There are some unequivocal passages in which 
 Ether is included generally among the elements, though it is 
 always marked off from the other four, as standing by itself; 
 the four elements are commonly spoken of because they are 
 the four mundane principles; from them all bodies on our 
 earth and in our atmosphere are derived ; whereas the Ether 
 begins where our world ends, and fills the whole of the supra- 
 mundane space. This view is clearly expressed in the apochry- 
 phal treatise De Mimdo, v < which may be cited as collateral 
 evidence, showing how Aristotle was understood by the 
 Alexandrians : " Ether is the substance of the heavens and the 
 stars ; so named not because it is of fire, but because of its 
 eternal circular movement. It is an element differing from 
 the four others, not to be confounded with them, because 
 divine." There is, therefore, good reason why the principle 
 of contraries which characterizes the other four should be 
 absent from this element. 
 
 § 124. In Book IV. he returns to Gravity and Levity, 
 which are conceived to be at once absolute and relative. 
 " Heavy and light we call that which by nature has the power 
 of being moved ; for the two energies there is no name unless 
 it be velocity. Some things are called absolutely heavy, or 
 absolutely light ; others only relatively so. Of those which 
 have weight we say some are lighter than others — as wood is 
 lighter than brass." 
 
 After objecting to the earlier philosophers for having 
 only considered heavy and light bodies, without inquiring 
 into the nature of Gravity and Levity, he proceeds to 
 define Gravity as absolute in all bodies which tend towards 
 the centre ; and Levity as absolute in all bodies which 
 
 17 De Mundo, II., ed. Bussemaker, p. 628. ovpavov Se /cat auTpiav ovaiav 
 fiXv aiOipa KaXovptv, oi% &Q tiviq Sid rb irvpiiiSr) ovaav aWeaBai . . . d\\d Sid 
 To del 9etv Kvic\o$opovii£V7]V, gtqxuqv ovaav erepov rttiv rtTraptav, aKqparov 
 re Kal 9&ov, Compare also HE., p. 629, mvrt St] OTOx&a Tama, k.tX. 
 
142 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 tend from the centre. " It is absurd to suppose that there is 
 nothing in the celestial region which corresponds to Upper 
 and Under." He contends against the notion that bodies are 
 light in proportion to the amount of empty space which they 
 contain. Those who reason thus forget, he says, that there 
 must also be less substance, otherwise a large mass of gold 
 would be lighter than a small quantity of fire, since it would 
 contain more empty space. 
 
 § 125. In the Physics he argues that place is something 
 positive. He here argues that everything has its appointed 
 place, to which it constantly tends : the light bodies belong to 
 the Upper, the heavy bodies to the Lower. " To ask why 
 fire moves upwards and earth downwards, is as if one were to 
 ask why the curable passes into health, and not into white- 
 ness." 
 
 § 126. He inquires into the reason why bodies have 
 different weights under different conditions. In the air a 
 talent of wood is heavier than a mina of lead; but in the 
 water it is lighter than the lead. The reason is : all things, 
 except fire, have weight ; and all things, except earth, have 
 lightness. Consequently earth, and that which contains most 
 earth, must necessarily have weight anywhere; water also 
 must have weight everywhere except in the earth; air also 
 must have weight everywhere except in water and earth. In 
 other words, everything, except fire, in its own place has 
 weight. That even air has weight is proved by the fact that a 
 bladder filled with air is heavier than the same bladder empty. 
 Hence when a body contains more air than water and earth, it 
 is lighter in water than another, but heavier in air ; since 
 it will swim on the surface of the water, but not on the surface 
 of the air. Water will sink below everything but earth, and air 
 will rise above everything but fire. Thus we see that the four 
 elements have their four places : fire at the top, earth at the 
 bottom ; between the two air and water. 
 
 § 127. He declares that the shape of bodies is not the 
 
CHAP. VH.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 143 
 
 cause of their moving up and down ; but only the cause of 
 the greater velocity with which they move. He raises the 
 question why flat pieces of brass or lead swim on the surface 
 of water, whereas smaller pieces, if round, long, or pointed, 
 sink ; and other substances, as dust, float in air ? 
 
 The reader here recognizes the problem solved by Galileo 
 in a masterly manner, both by reasoning and experiment. 
 The solution of Aristotle is, as usual, little more than a 
 restatement of the problem in different words. He begins by 
 saying that every continuity is more or less divisible, and that 
 every body has a more or less penetrating power over it. The 
 easily limited is easily divided; air is more so than water, 
 water more so than earth. And the smaller a body is, the 
 more easily is it divided. The body which has a flat shape 
 remains at the top of the water, because it has a larger quan- 
 tity of water under it, and this larger quantity is less easily 
 penetrated ; but a body of contrary shape sinks because there 
 is a less quantity of water under it to be penetrated. 
 
 These are all the topics needful to be noticed in this work 
 until we come to consider his astronomical theories. The 
 two books on " Generation and Corruption " may be passed 
 over ; for they are in his most wearisome style of verbal dis- 
 putation, and contain no scientific views not expressed else- 
 where. 
 
 TTT. — The Work on Meteorology. 18 
 
 § 128. This is in many respects one of his most interesting 
 treatises. It has a more directly scientific attitude, and is 
 guided by a more consistently inductive method than either 
 of the works just noticed. No one will be surprised to hear 
 that it very imperfectly corresponds with what in our days 
 is understood by a treatise on Meteorology; nor must we 
 
 » A translation of this work has just appeared by M. Baethelemt St. 
 Hilaike: La Mtteorologie d'Aristote, Paris, 1863. 
 
144 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 object to its including questions of astronomy, geology, and 
 chemistry ; for at that period the boundaries of the several 
 sciences were not carefully marked. Even at the present 
 time Meteorology, rich in details, is eminently imperfect, 
 aided though it is by instruments of precision, and a vast 
 body of scientific truths which would lend their collustration, 
 were fundamental principles established. In Aristotle, there- 
 fore, we can still less expect to find material of value. His 
 observations and theories wear somewhat the aspect of the 
 observations and theories to be found in the works of the 
 early alchemists, as compared with modern chemistry. But 
 although the absolute value of the treatise is insignificant 
 its historical value is considerable, and on this point, there- 
 fore, the reader's attention may chiefly be fixed. 
 
 The work shows what could and what could not be 
 effected by Observation, when unassisted by Instruments. 
 Aristotle, equally with moderns, makes Heat the chief agent 
 in meteorologic changes. But this is general, qualitative 
 knowledge, and Science demands quantitative knowledge. 
 Wholly destitute of a measure of heat he could establish no 
 quantitative bases for his reasonings. In like manner he was 
 without a Barometer which could measure the weight of the 
 atmosphere at different times and in different places. He 
 knew that the atmosphere had weight, but was unable to 
 measure that weight. He further wanted an Anemometer 
 by which to measure the velocity of atmospheric currents, 
 and a Hygrometer by which to measure the quantities of 
 vapour. Nor had he any knowledge of Electricity, which 
 also plays a considerable part in , meteorologic phenomena. 
 Thus, deprived of all those puissant means of investigation 
 which could make observation precise, we see in his work 
 an example of the genuine commencement of Science, when 
 man is face to face with complex phenomena, the order of which 
 he intensely desires to discover, and finds himself reduced to 
 qualitative observation and to reasoning. Now the remark- 
 
CHAP. Til.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 145 
 
 able point in Aristotle's treatise is that, standing as he does 
 in the condition of the early pioneers, he does not adopt that , 
 primitive theological mode of explanation which we have) 
 seen (§ 31) to be generally characteristic of such a condition,! 
 but on the contrary, adopts a strictly scientific method,! 
 rejecting all theological explanations, and endeavouring toj 
 range the phenomena in their natural order. He examines 
 the facts and co-ordinates them to the best of his ability. 
 
 § 128 a. Books I. to III. discuss a variety of questions. 
 First the elements are enumerated. These are five; the 
 Ether, which fills supramundane space (§ 123) and is endowed 
 with circular movement, is only alluded to ; the four others 
 are fire, air, water, earth, which compose all mundane bodies. 
 He then gives theoretic explanations of shooting stars, comets, 
 the milky way (which he regards as an exhalation from the 
 earth suspended in the air ; although Demooeitxjs had already 
 asserted it to be a cluster of stars), clouds, fogs, dew, hoar-frost, 
 rain, snow, hail, winds, the formation of rivers, the reciprocal 
 changes of sea and land, the saltness of the sea, the nature 
 of winds, and the influence of sun and stars on them, earth- 
 quakes (which are compressed winds), thunder and lightning, 
 the rainbow, and meteors. 
 
 On these multiform topics his theories, as may be 
 imagined, are mostly wide of the mark, but they often 
 display remarkable sagacity, and bear the stamp of an earnest 
 investigating mind. The large accumulation of facts is very 
 noticeable ; but rather, I think, on account of the attitude 
 of mind which impelled him to make such an accumulation, 
 and to insist with so much emphasis on the value of facts, 
 than, as M. Babthelemy St. Hilaiee would have us believe, 
 because the facts themselves display any noticeable sagacity. 
 M. St. Hilaire is at great pains, in his commentary, to 
 point out every occasion on which his hero is correct or 
 approaches correctness in facts ; but a little reflection reveals 
 that in the majority of such cases the facts are such as lie 
 
 10 
 
146 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 open to universal observation, implying no merit therefore 
 in the observer, while in no case have they quantitative pre- 
 cision. It is for its method, rather than for its results, that 
 this treatise is remarkable. I shall, therefore, content myself 
 with this general indication. 
 
 § 128 b. Book IV. is more in the nature of a chemical 
 treatise, dealing with the elements and their active and passive 
 principles. The hot and the cold are the active, the moist 
 and the dry are the passive principles. This is clear from 
 their definitions, for we call the hot and the cold active 
 because that which coagulates bodies is certainly an active 
 principle; the moist and the dry are passive because they 
 are limited with ease or with difficulty, according' to the 
 modifications impressed upon them. The hot unites the 
 homogeneous and separates the heterogeneous ; as may be 
 seen in the fusion of metals. The cold unites the heteroge- 
 neous ; as we see in ice, which is the union of the heterogeneous 
 materials of water. The moist has no natural limit, but 
 readily accepts a limit; the dry, on the contrary, has a 
 natural limit. 
 
 From these two active and two passive principles are 
 derived the four unions corresponding with the elements. 
 Thus, Fire is warm and dry ; Air is warm and moist ; Water 
 is cold and moist ; Earth is cold and dry. Each element 
 has its appointed place. Fire and Earth are the two extremes ; 
 they are purer and less mixed than the two intermediates, 
 Air and Water. In the gradual development of these elements, 
 there is an ascent from the imperfect to the more perfect. 
 In Water there is Earth ; in Air there is Water ; in Fire 
 there is Air. 
 
 It is needless to follow him in his explanation of the 
 liquefaction and coagulation of bodies, the fusion of metals, 
 the phenomena of putrefaction and digestion, and the tempera- 
 ture of bodies ; although his ideas on these subjects reigned 
 almost without dispute for many centuries. We shall here- 
 
CHAP. Til.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 147 
 
 after find more fitting occasions for the display of such ideas. 
 At present we must pass on to the Mechanical problems. 
 
 IV. — The Mechanical Problems. 
 
 § 129. Although it is certain, from his numerous references, 
 that Aristotle wrote a work called Problems, scholars dispute 
 how far the work which now passes under that title is 
 genuine, and how many of the problems, thus collected 
 together, were really written by him. On this dispute I 
 cannot venture to offer an opinion. Nor does the question of 
 authenticity acquire any importance for us, since the work 
 certainly represents peripatetic views, and has always been 
 accepted as Aristotelian. 
 
 Most of these problems relate to medical and physiological 
 subjects. Those which relate to Music have been learnedly 
 expounded by Chabanon ; 19 those which are usually called 
 " mechanical " have been expounded by Poselg-er, 20 who 
 maintains that they are not correctly styled " mechanical," 
 being strictly dialectical. It is certain that Aristotle declares 
 it to be his intention to solve aporia, i. e. difficulties ; but if 
 this was his intention, and if his solution of these was always 
 dialectical, as Poseloer maintains, we may be permitted a 
 doubt whether this be not as great a deviation from scientific 
 procedure as the attempt, with which Whewell reproaches 
 him, to solve mechanical problems geometrically. On this 
 point we may remark that Aristotle could not, had he wished 
 it, have furnished strictly mechanical answers, since mechani- 
 cal science was not then in existence. It is to Archimedes 
 we owe the foundation of Statics ; to Galileo the foundation 
 of Dynamics. Aristotle could only solve the difficulties he 
 raised with such means as were ready to his hand ; and this 
 he did. The whole collection affords interesting proof of his 
 
 19 In the Mimoires de I'Acadimie des Inscriptions, 1793, XL VI. 
 
 20 In the Abhandlungen der mathematischen Klasse der Academie der Wis- 
 sencha/ten zu Berlin, 1829. 
 
 10—2 
 
148 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 immense curiosity, his ardent desire to interrogate nature, and 
 the misdirected ingenuity with which he answered his own 
 questions. 
 
 § 130. Although he had no systematic knowledge of 
 mechanical laws, he had gained certain glimpses which now 
 seem surprising. The principle of "virtual velocities " was 
 certainly known to him. This has been denied ; but Galileo 
 himself says that he found it in Aristotle, and doubtless 
 alludes to the following passage: — "The same force will 
 raise a greater weight in proportion as the force is applied at 
 a longer distance from the fulcrum, because it then describes 
 a larger circle ; and a weight which is farthest removed from 
 the centre is made to move through the greatest space." 
 
 § 131. He also gained a glimpse of the parallelogram of 
 forces. Poselgek thinks his statement of it superior in 
 elegance and precision to that given by Kant. Yet in spite of 
 this, I must still think that Aristotle only gained a glimpse of 
 the law, as he did of the principle of " virtual velocities," 
 since he failed to see its far-reaching importance, and made 
 little or no use of it. In his hands it never became the 
 instrument which it has proved in modern hands ; but 
 was neglected for dialectical distinctions and physical hypo- 
 theses. 
 
 Montucla speaks with supreme contempt of Aristotle's 
 mathematical insight. 21 I cannot presume to offer an opinion 
 on such a point, but I observe that Montucla is apt to speak 
 contemptuously on very slight grounds. Other authorities are 
 more laudatory. 22 An unbiassed opinion is rare, the servility 
 towards great reputations making men eager to interpret the 
 slightest indications as evidences of mastery. This much, at 
 least, is certain, that Aristotle made no advances in mathe- 
 
 21 Montucla : Histoire des Mathitnatiqv.es, Paris, 1758, 1., 204. 
 
 22 Libki : Histoire des Sciences Matheniatiqnes en Italic, Paris, 1838, L, 99, 
 notices, as a fact of the highest interest, and one which has escaped notice, that 
 Aristotle employed " des lettres de Palphahet pour designer les quantites 
 indeterminees." 
 
CHAP. VII.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 149 
 
 matics, and, while he frequently employed mathematical 
 illustrations, he did not apparently devote to the science the 
 attention devoted to other sciences. 
 
 § 132. Of these Mechanical Problems now under notice, 
 Montucla says that they gained a great reputation in those 
 ages, when, to ensure applause, it was enough for the Stagirite 
 to have spoken ; but that this applause will not be bestowed by 
 moderns, who must consider the majority of the answers as 
 entirely false, while the first and principal solution is "tout a 
 fait ridicule." 23 Let us consider this. The problem being 
 how a lever, or balance, of unequal arms, could hold in 
 equilibrium unequal weights or forces. " Aristotle seeks it 
 in the marvellous properties of the circle, of which he makes 
 a puerile enumeration, after which he says it is not surprising 
 that a figure so fertile in marvels should produce one in the 
 equilibrium of equal powers." This criticism has been fre- 
 quently repeated. It is scarcely just. Aristotle mentions, 
 indeed, the wonderful properties of the circle; but not to 
 draw therefrom his mechanical solution so much as to justify 
 the dialectical nature of the problem. 
 
 "Those things," he says, "are wonderful which occur 
 according to nature, but of which the cause is hidden ; and 
 those also which are effected by art contrary to nature. When 
 anything is effected contrary to nature it presents a difficulty 
 which requires art (Sia to yakvKov diroplav 7raptx El Ka ' 6£lTal 
 te^vjic) ; and the art which resolves such difficulties we call 
 Mechanics. Of this kind are the means by which great 
 weights are moved by small weights, and all other mechanical 
 problems. These are not quite the same as physical problems ; 
 nor very different from them, but pertain to both. Mathe- 
 matics treat of the formal, Physics of the material. The 
 lever presents difficulties of this kind. For it seems absurd 
 (otottov) that a great weight should be moved by a force 
 
 23 Montucla, I., 205. 
 
150 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 which is itself added to a great weight. We can easily, with 
 a lever, mere a weight which we could not move without one. 
 Of all these cases, the circle contains the principle and the 
 cause, and very naturally, since there is no absurdity in some- 
 thing wonderful being derived from something more wonderful. 
 A combination of opposites is the most wonderful of all, and 
 such a combination is the circle. It is constituted by a 
 stationary point and a moving line, which are contraries in 
 nature, and hence it is not surprising if contraries result." 
 
 In this proem he is obviously treating solely of the dialec- 
 tical nature of the problem. He does not pretend to explain 
 the mechanical effect from the wonderfulness of the circle ; 
 that is explained by the properties of the lever, with which he 
 was not unacquainted, although it is true that he " perplexed 
 himself with loose and inappropriate notions respecting natural 
 and unnatural movements." 2 * He says, " A body at the end 
 of a lever has a natural motion in the direction of the tangent, 
 and an unnatural motion in the direction of the radius. The 
 reason why a force acting at a greater distance from the 
 fulcrum moves a weight more easily, is because it describes a 
 larger circle." 
 
 § 133. It would needlessly occupy great space to go 
 through these problems seriatim; many of them consist 
 simply of questions which he does not attempt to answer. 
 A sample or two must suffice. 
 
 In the XXth he moots the question, subsequently dis- 
 cussed by Bokelli, Mebsenne, Leibnitz, Bebnouilli, Mac- 
 laubin and others, touching the difference between pressure 
 and percussion. "Why," he asks, "when we place an axe 
 upon wood, and on the axe place a heavy weight, is the wood 
 but slightly indented ; whereas if we raise the axe, without the 
 weight, and strike upon the wood, the wood is split, although 
 the falling weight is much less than the resting and pressing 
 
 w Whewell : History of the Inductive Sciences, 1857, 1., 61. 
 
CHAP. VII.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 151 
 
 weight ? Perhaps because everything acts by motion (# S16V1 
 iravra ry kivjjo-ei Epya&rai) ; and a weight already in motion 
 takes the motion of another more powerfully than a weight at 
 rest? Hence in this case the resting weight acts with no 
 motion ; but when moved, its motion is increased with that of 
 the striker." The mind which has once grasped the con- 
 ception of the measure of force being as the mass multiplied 
 by the velocity finds no difficulty in understanding why the 
 effect of the axe at rest is so much less than that of the axe 
 in motion. But in Aristotle's day this conception was un- 
 suspected; and he could only detect the general fact that 
 velocity increased the effect. 
 
 § 134. In the XXXHnd he asks : " Why a body in 
 motion is more easily moved than the same body at rest — 
 a rolling carriage being more easily moved than when it first 
 begins to move ? Is it because it is more difficult to move a 
 weight in a contrary direction ? For some part of the moving 
 power must be lost, even though it be swifter, and the impulse 
 in one direction will be slackened by reaction ; this also will 
 be the case when the body is at rest ; for that which is at rest 
 resists. When a body is in motion, and receives a new 
 impulse in its own direction, it is as if the force and velocity 
 of the moving body had been increased by so much." 
 
 It is evident here that he had not fully understood the law 
 of inertia, since he supposes it is only a body at rest which 
 resists; but he was so near the conception of the law of 
 accelerated motion, that we are the more surprised to find him 
 not detecting the old error of supposing the velocity of falling 
 bodies to be proportional to the spaces. 25 
 
 § 135. In the XXXIIIrd he asks : " Why does a pro- 
 jectile finally come to rest? Is it because the projecting 
 
 25 We shall hare to consider this hereafter. Meanwhile the reader may look 
 up Galileo's masterly refutation. Dialoghi, Giornata Seconda. Opere, Milan, 
 1811, XL, p. 478. 
 
152 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS, [CHAP. VII. 
 
 power ceases; or because of the reaction; or because the 
 weight of the body overcomes the projecting force ? Or is it 
 absurd to ask such a question, the principle being absent 
 
 / » / \ ' / \ Oil 
 
 \aq>£VTa tts\v a^yy\v) C 
 
 § 135. In the XXXIVth he asks : " Why when a body is 
 not self-moved does it continue moving, when the motor 
 neither follows it, nor acts from a distance ? Is it not mani- 
 fest that the first impulse acts upon another body, and this 
 again upon another, and ceases only when this transference 
 can go no further ? " The law of inertia is here entirely dis- 
 regarded ; a proof that Aristotle had no steady conception of 
 the law. 
 
 § 136. One more, and we conclude. "Why cannot we 
 throw a very large nor a very small body, but it is necessary 
 there should be a proportion between the mass and the pro- 
 jecting force ? Is it because of the necessary reaction against 
 the impelling force ? For that which, owing to its magnitude, 
 does not yield, or, owing to its feebleness, does not resist, 
 cannot be impelled. That which is greater than the im- 
 pelling force does not move — that which is much less, has 
 no resistance." 
 
 § 137. From this summary of Aristotle's Physics it is 
 abundantly manifest that in spite of his acuteness, and his 
 intense desire for knowledge, he had not mastered the initial 
 conceptions of the science. Not simply deficient in the indis- 
 pensable requisites of quantitative co-ordinated facts which 
 distinguish Science from Common Knowledge, we find him 
 deficient even in the transcendental postulates of Science. 
 Disputes, but no illumination, could proceed from such pos- 
 tulates as the Contraries, Natural and Unnatural Motions, 
 Up and Down, Heavy and Light. These hampered while they 
 flattered the intellect; preventing the labour of real investi- 
 gation, by the belief that subjective distinctions represented 
 objective facts. Of what avail was it to learn that besides the 
 four elements, Matter has also its contraries — the hot and the 
 
CHAP. VII.] METEOROLOGY, AND MECHANICS. 153 
 
 cold, the moist and the dry — these being the principles of 
 generation ? 
 
 § 138. Such speculations are condemned to the sterile 
 fecundity of disputation, and carry with them no possible 
 enlightenment. I do not say that Aristotle's efforts were 
 in vain. Far from it. The world is the richer for his genius, 
 the wiser from his failures. But he came at a time when the 
 continuous enployment of the Objective Method was next to 
 impossible. He ploughed the unbroken soil, in which others 
 hereafter were to plant the seeds. 
 
 The conclusion forced upon us, therefore, is that the 
 neglect into which his physical speculations have fallen is 
 entirely justified. The present has absolutely nothing to learn 
 from them, except the historical lesson to be gained from the 
 spectacle of a gigantic mind struggling along a hopeless path./ 
 
 Must we say the same of his biological speculations ? Let 
 the following chapters furnish a reply. 
 
( 154 ) 
 
 CHAPTEK VIII. 
 
 ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. 
 
 § 139. The eulogies la-risked on Aristotle, as a biologist, even 
 by men wbose own special knowledge might have made them 
 the severest critics, remind us rather of the tone adopted in 
 the Middle Ages, than of the more circumspect and critical 
 language of our own age. "In Aristotle," says Cuvibe, 1 
 "everything amazes, everything is prodigious, everything is 
 colossal. He lived but sixty-two years, and he was able 
 to make thousands of observations of extreme delicacy, the 
 accuracy of which the most rigorous criticism has never been 
 able to impeach." This rhetorical exaggeration is painfully 
 insincere; no one better than Cuvier could have known the 
 worthlessness of Aristotle's observation on all points which 
 were not open to the common eye; but that servility, too 
 common among Frenchmen, which makes them eager to do 
 homage to every established reputation, made Cuvier forget 
 his own knowledge, and bow his head before the blinding 
 splendour of a great renown. 
 
 Little less rhetorical is De Blainville, who, though noto- 
 rious for his love of contradiction, dared not whisper a word 
 against "le grand Stagirite." "It is the Natural Sciences," 
 he says, 2 " which owe the most to Aristotle. His plan was 
 
 1 CuviEit : Histoire des Sciences Naturelles, 1841, 1., 132. 
 8 De Blainville et Maupied : Histoire des Sciences de I' Organisation, 
 1847, 1., 212. 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. 155 
 
 vast and luminous ; he laid the bases of science which will 
 never perish." 
 
 Isidobe Geottroy St. HilaireI speaking from less 
 acquaintance with Aristotle's writings, is splendid in eulogy. 3 
 "He is in every branch of knowledge like a master who 
 cultivated that one only. He reaches, he extends the limits 
 of all the sciences, and penetrates to their very depths." 
 
 Our own countrymen have been somewhat soberer, although 
 even they have written very surprising eulogies ; one of the most 
 amusing being that of the worthy naturalist, Macgillivray, 
 who discovers that Aristotle not only collected a mass of 
 facts, but " elicited from them general principles, the accuracy 
 of many of which might surprise us, if we did not reflect 
 that in this department, at least, he followed the true method 
 by which the physical sciences have in our own times received 
 so vast an augmentation." 4 
 
 I have indicated the tone by these examples, partly to 
 justify what might otherwise seem a needless severity in 
 pointing out the deficiences of this wonderful man ; and 
 partly also to justify the large space devoted to his biological 
 writings. The summary treatment which sufficed in the 
 case of the Physics would, in the case of Biology, have carried 
 no conviction. The reader was prepared to find the Physics 
 altogether valueless, but he is told that in the department 
 
 3 Isidore St. Hilaire: Histoire Ginirale des liegnes Organiques, 1854, 1., 
 18 seq. 
 
 4 Macgiluvray : Lives of Eminent Zoologists, Edinburgh, 1834, p. 32. 
 Herschel has lent his powerful countenance to the applause of Aristotle's 
 accuracy of observation : Discourse on Natural Philosophy (101). Grant 
 also : Lectures on Comparative Anatomy, in Lancet, October, 1833, p. 90. We 
 shall hereafter see with what justice. Counter-statements may occasionally be 
 met with. Btjonafede cites the example of Burnet, who drew up a list of 
 Aristotle's " puerilities " :— " Stati sano' disse 'O Stagirita : tu per me sarai 
 sempre un cattivo astronome, un teologo peggiore, un pessimo fisiologo." — 
 Delia Storia e della Indole di ogni Filosofia, II., 289 (ed. of Italian Classics, 
 Milan, 1837). And Nizolius, after quoting the assertion of Averrhoes, that 
 in 1500 years no error had been detected in the Stagirite, replies " non multo 
 pauciora vel falsa vel inutilia vel etiam ridicula ab eodem scripts reperiri." — 
 De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi, Parma, 1553, p. 6. 
 
156 ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. [CHAP. VIII. 
 
 of Natural History, Aristotle made important discoveries, 
 anticipated some of the brilliant results of modern research, 
 and laid the " eternal bases " of the Science. Nothing but a 
 detailed examination would suffice to elicit the truth on such 
 points ; and I shrink the less from entering upon these 
 details, because many of them would necessarily find a place 
 somewhere in this History, and this is as good a place 
 as any. 
 
 § 140. Biology has two grand divisions, statical and 
 dynamical : in common language," Anatomy and Physiology. 
 We have only to reflect how knowledge of the laws of 
 life is necessarily dependent on accurate acquaintance with 
 the structure of living beings, in a word, how Physiology is 
 nothing but " animated Anatomy," as Hallee felicitously 
 called it, to perceive the importance of commencing an examin- 
 ation of Aristotle's biological writings, with a view of his 
 knowledge of structure. 
 
 § 141. The extent of his survey is amazing, embracing 
 the whole animal kingdom, from sea anemones to man. But 
 of the accuracy of his knowledge, I am compelled, after long 
 and minute study, to form a very different estimate from 
 what is current among critics and historians. 5 Reading his 
 works by the light of modern discovery, we are apt to credit 
 him with all that his words suggest to us ; we come, indeed, 
 upon numerous inaccuracies, and on many statements which 
 imply gross carelessness ; but whenever his language does not 
 palpably betray him, modern readers insensibly fill out his 
 hints with details from their fuller store. On a superficial 
 examination, therefore, he will seem to have given tolerable 
 descriptions ; especially if approached with that disposition 
 to discover marvels which unconsciously determines us in 
 
 6 E. g.: — " Les travaux d'Aristote ont fait cesser en grande partie l'ignorance 
 profonde oil l'on gtait sur la structure animale." — Lacth: Histoire tie I'Ana- 
 tomie, Strasbourg, 1815, 1., 61. Yet he proceeds in detail to show that Aristotle 
 really knew very little. 
 
CHAP. Till.] ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. 157 
 
 our study of ancient writers. But a more unbiassed and 
 impartial criticism will disclose that he has given no single 
 anatomical description of the least value. All that he knew 
 may have been known, and probably was known, without 
 dissection. The casual revelations of the slaughter-house 
 and battle-field, together with the intimations gathered from 
 auguries and embalmments, probably furnished his knowledge 
 of man and the larger animals. I do not assert that he never 
 opened an animal ; on the contrary, it seems highly probable 
 that he had opened many* But I am persuaded that he 
 never dissected one in the careful systematic style necessary 
 for more than a general acquaintance with the positions of 
 the chief organs. He never followed the course of a vessel 
 or a nerve ; never laid bare the origin and insertion of a 
 muscle ; never discriminated the component parts of organs ; 
 never made clear to himself the connection of organs into 
 systems. 
 
 § 142. In illustration of what was meant by reading his 
 works in the light of modern discovery, let us take the idea 
 of the homologies of the skeleton, which he is said to have 
 originated in a comparison of the fore and hind limbs. The 
 analogy. was certainly noticed by him. But it is too obvious 
 to have escaped attention. To make it fruitful, to demon- 
 strate that what seemed to be an analogy, really was a 
 homology, and expressed an identity of composition in the 
 two limbs, it was necessary that this vague idea should 
 be carried into the comparison of bone with bone, muscle 
 with muscle, nerve with nerve, vessel with vessel. Aris- 
 totle as may be supposed never attempted anything like 
 this;; nor did any one attempt it, till Vicq d'Azye; and 
 since then, Homology has become an important branch of 
 anatomical research. 6 When we now read Aristotle's vague 
 
 6 Vicq d'Azyr : Mimoires sur les rapports entre les usages et la structure 
 des quatre extr&miUs dans I'homme et dans les quadruples, in his (Euvres, 
 1805, IV., 315. Compare Owen ; On the Homologies of the Vertebrate 
 
158 ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. [CHAP. Till. 
 
 and meagre account, we read into it all that moderns have 
 taught us. 
 
 But if, disengaging the mind from such sources of mis- 
 conception, we inquire what he really did know, we find it 
 amounts to nothing beyond the result of casual and careless 
 inspection. It would be unfair to compare his observation 
 with that of the patient Swammerdamm, or that of Lyonet, 
 who accurately describes the four thousand and forty-one 
 muscles of the caterpillar ; 7 but it is strictly just to compare 
 his observation with that of Galen, whose anatomical know- 
 ledge, imperfect as it was, rested upon careful dissection. 
 On such a comparison, his inferiority is not simply inferiority 
 in degree, it is inferiority in kind. 
 
 § 143. Aristotle knew nothing of the muscles, not even 
 of their existence. He knew very little indeed of two or 
 three nerves, and absolutely nothing of the nervous system. 
 He did not distinguish between arteries and veins. 8 Thus the 
 three most important parts of the organism, animal, psychical, 
 and vegetal, were wholly hidden from him. Naturally, the 
 less obvious parts were not better known. According to 
 Lauth, he described Well the structure of men and animals, 
 whenever he could observe the entire body, or the body 
 
 Skeleton, 1848; where, however, the homologies are merely shown in the hony 
 structure, without reference to the soft parts; and an elaborate memoir by Ger- 
 vais: Comparaison des membres chez les verUbris, in the Annales des Sciences 
 Naturelles, 1853, p. 21. Since then M. Martins has published a curious and 
 striking memoir in the Memoires de I' Acad, de Montpellier, 1857, III., endeavour- 
 ing to prove that the humerus is identical with the femur, but twisted 180 deg. 
 on its axis, whereas the femur is straight. " Ainsi les systemes musculaires, 
 arteriels et nerveux du bras et de l'avant bras confirment l'idee d'une torsion de 
 l'humerus, car tous sont disposes comme ils le seraient sur un femur dont les 
 condyles auraient execute un mouvement de rotation de 180 deg., la t6te restant 
 immobile fixee dans la cavite cotylo'ide." — Archives Gintrales de Medecine, 
 Oct., 1858, p. 481. 
 
 7 Lyonet : Traite" anatomique de la chenille qui ronge le bois de saule, La 
 Haye, 1760, p. 584. 
 
 8 He refuted the old error of the head being the origin of the bloodvessels, 
 and rightly assigned the heart as the origin. Thielmann: Veterum opinion, 
 de angiol. atque sang, motu, 1832, p. 28. He also first distinguished the aorta 
 from the vena cava, but went no further. 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. 159 
 
 opened by incisions ; but he was without the art of isolating 
 the organs, and he erred in describing them, because to know 
 them properly, we must begin by dissecting them. 9 It is 
 further noticeable that many of his statements are wholly 
 without foundation, in fact, sometimes even without the super- 
 ficial appearance of it ; and as they could not have originated 
 in misinterpretation of observed appearances, they were pro- 
 bably assumed merely to suit his views. 
 
 § 144. After this, it seems idle to consider the oft-mooted 
 question whether he dissected the human body. If the 
 answer should be affirmative, it would be still more damaging 
 to his reputation, since it would render many of his errors 
 unpardonable. But a close scrutiny of the evidence forces a 
 negative answer ; and, as opinions seem to be still divided on 
 the subject, 10 we may here examine the evidence. 
 
 § 145. It is now generally accepted as beyond dispute that 
 
 9 Conhingitts, who denies that Aristotle dissected man, declares he was 
 most expert in the dissection of animals : " ut animalium omnem rem nemo 
 etiam illo vel fusius vel etiam accuratius prosequutus sit." — Intro, in artem 
 Medicam, 1687, p. 147. Casteixi declares Plato and Aristotle to have been 
 supreme anatomists: " praestantissimos anatomicos fuisse." — De optima Medico, 
 1637, p. 36. It is needless to cite others ; even glaring errors were either de- 
 fended because Aristotle had put them forth, or, if refuted, were refuted 
 
 tenderly. 
 
 B perche" egli e Aristotele, besogna 
 Credergli, ancorche dica la menzogna, 
 
 is a couplet quoted by Redi.— Esperienze intorno alia generazione degl' insetti, 
 in the Florentine ed. of his Opuscoli, 1858, p. 191. 
 
 10 As early as 1687, Conringius pronounced decidedly against it. " Aris- 
 toteli, quamvis in hrutorum sectionibus peritissimus f uerit, humani tamen cor- 
 poris insignem adeo notitiam non habuit, si sane partes internas et in ipso 
 corpore delitescentes spectes."— Op. cit, p. 153. On the other hand, Barchusen: 
 De Medicines origine et progressu, 1723, after citing two or three examples, 
 says: " Hsec et similia abunde probant Anatomen quoque in hominibus sevo 
 Aristotelis institutam, et non Herophilum, quern Tertullianus false appellat 
 dicterio lanium, qui sexcentos exsecuit," p. 127. Haller, as cited by Harles, 
 is of the same opinion, which Harles : Geschichte der Hirn-und Nervenlehre im 
 Alterthume, 1801, p. 56, also adopts. Sprengel: Geschichte der Arzneihunde, 
 1821, 1, 456, is dubious, but inclined to the affirmative. Antonio Cocchi is 
 emphatic in the negative, but advances no evidence.— Discorso intorno VAna- 
 tomia. Opere,Milan,1824,I.,29. Portal: Histoiredel'anatomieetdelachirurgie, 
 1770, says, " II y a toute apparence qu'il n'a jamais disseque des hommes," I., 41. 
 
160 ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. [CHAP. VIII. 
 
 his predecessor, Hippocbates, never dissected the human 
 body, and the grounds of this opinion are, first, the known 
 feelings of the Greeks respecting the sacredness of the dead ; 
 and secondly, the ignorance of human anatomy exhibited in 
 his works. 11 These are also the grounds for a similar opinion 
 in the case of Aristotle. 
 
 I. — The Feeling of the Greeks. 
 § 146. The laws were very stringent respecting immediate 
 burial. In Athens the Demarch who allowed a corpse to 
 remain a single day unburied was subject to a fine of 1,000 
 drachmas ; and victorious generals had been condemned to 
 death because they neglected to bury the slain. The whole 
 of that tragic masterpiece, the Antigone, turns upon the 
 sacredness of the dead, and the necessity, higher than 
 imperial commands, of immediate burial. The popular feel- 
 ing against dissection remains energetic even in our own 
 day ; and in future chapters of our History we shall see the 
 struggles of Science against this horror at the very idea of a 
 human body being violated by the scalpel. With the Greeks 
 this feeling was intensified by their belief that the released 
 soul wandered sadly on the shores of Styx during the whole 
 period that the body remained unburied. It is exceedingly 
 doubtful that Aristotle would have braved such feelings merely 
 for the sake of more accurate knowledge of details ; doubtful 
 because his was not a fierce rebellious spirit rising against the 
 prejudices of his age ; doubtful because the Asclepiads drew 
 
 11 See Conrinqius: Op. cit., p. 152. Barchuskn: Op. cit., p. 126, consi- 
 ders the point doubtful. Hallee has a little paper in his Opuscula Anatomica, 
 Gottingen, 1751, p. 133, entitled, " Quod hunrana corpora secuerit Hippocrates," 
 in which he argues that Hippocrates dissected man and not monkeys, because 
 monkeys were rare and costly in price, and are nowhere mentioned by him. Yet 
 in his oration, " de Amoenitate Anatomes," in the same volume, p. 330, he 
 says — " Audaciores Grasci et ingenio ad inquirendam yeritatem excitato, ante 
 tempora Ptolemcei Philadelphi, aut nunquam aut rarissime hominum corpora 
 adtigerunt." See the whole ^question satisfactorily argued by Gbunkb: 
 Analecta ad antiquitates medicos, 1774, p. 98, seq. 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. 161 
 
 their knowledge of anatomy from animals, and were contented 
 with it ; 1£ and doubtful because he, who nowhere shows any 
 pressing anxiety about the accuracy of the facts he collects, but 
 is quite willing to accept those ready to his hand, would have 
 wanted the powerful fascination which alone can .suppress the 
 shuddering repulsion that keeps men from the dissecting-room. 
 § 147. The fascination must be strong, for the disgust is 
 powerful. Our senses are affected by the sickening scent of a 
 corrupting body, by the painful sight of bloodstained instru- 
 ments, and the scattered shreds of a dismembered corpse. 
 There is also a deeper moral disgust, peculiarly affecting to 
 imaginative minds. The spectacle of death is always accom- 
 panied by a certain awe. At the bedside, or on the battlefield, 
 no gazer remains unmoved : pity, and a sense of community 
 in death, steal over every mind when unshaken by violent 
 emotions. How much more painful the dissecting-room, where 
 the corpse is untended by affection, and unpitied by strangers ! 
 none of the sanctity of death surrounds it; none of the 
 tenderness of love watches over it ; none of the ceremonials of 
 respect defend it. There it lies, naked, and alien alike from 
 affection and respect, flung upon a table in oblivious disregard 
 of its having once been the temple of a human life. It is no 
 longer that temple ; it is not even a corpse ; it has become a 
 subject. 
 
 12 While in Rome I read, in Emil Beaun's Handbook of the Ruins and 
 Museums of Home, 1856, p. 21], a reference to two anatomical figures in the 
 Vatican sculpture gallery, which afforded " a practical contradiction to the 
 widely diffused opinion that the ancients did not found their knowledge of 
 anatomy on the study of the human body." This sent me to the Vatican with 
 some curiosity. As usual, Bbaun was speaking in utter ignorance. The 
 figures show no science. The skeleton of the thorax is extremely rude ; the 
 ribs are all anchylosed. The viscera, exhibited in 1 the second figure, seem to 
 have been modelled from memory, and the memory ill-instructed; the heart is 
 egg-shaped, its position vertical, the apex attached to the diaphragm ; there is 
 no aorta; no bronchi; the lungs arise immediately from the larynx; there is no 
 pleura; and, in short, the whole representation is contemptible. If Bbaun is 
 right in his conjecture that these figures, " unique of their kind, were probably 
 originally in some temple of JEsculapius," it says little for the Asclepiads. 
 
 11 
 
162 ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. [CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Yet all these sources of repulsion have been, and daily are, 
 overcome. Men sit patiently for many hours, inhaling the 
 nauseous odours, exploring with their scalpel the winding 
 intricacies of vein and nerve, steadfast, patient, victorious. 
 They have suppressed the suggestions of the scene by firmly 
 fixing their minds on the object of their task. It is not 
 because their sensibilities have become obtuse, but because 
 their power of abstraction has overcome the solicitations of 
 suggestion. They have not become hardened; they have 
 simply learned to concentrate their thoughts upon a definite 
 pursuit. Were it not for this we might wonder that men did 
 not consent to remain for ever unenlightened on the marvels 
 of their organization, rather than acquire the knowledge by so 
 repulsive a route. 13 But the passion for knowledge '« im- 
 perious. It urges men to surmount all obstacles, to brave the 
 prejudices of others after suppressing their own — to brave 
 human laws, to rob the grave in the dead of night, and pursue 
 their study in secrecy and peril. This passion furnishes the 
 power of abstraction ; and hence it is that anatomy has been 
 pursued by poets, theologians, and even women. Goethe, 
 for example, a nature of the keenest sensibility, who could not 
 bear to look upon Schilleb dead, even he was an anatomist. 
 Haller, one of the great anatomists, was early and late a poet 
 of some mark. Bossuet was not repelled from the study ; 
 he wrote an anatomical tractate. Anna Manzolina made 
 those wax preparations of every part of the body which 
 became the pride of Bologna ; and for these she had herself 
 
 13 " Sans doute il repugne a, l'homme de voir d'aussi prSs son neant, il fttit 
 ce triste spectacle, et il consent a s'ignorer lui memo, plutot que de s'affliger a 
 la vue de tant de miseres." — Vicq d'Aztr: CEuvres, IV., 229. " Natura 
 mortis horrorem nobis impressit, et contnbernio cadaverum nihil tristius est." 
 Haller: De amcenitate anatomes. Opuscula, 1751, p. 327. " To converse 
 with dead and putrid carcases were, one would think, a shocking and odious 
 employment, yet some anatomists dote upon it: and I must own its usefulness 
 has greatly enamoured me with dissection." — Boyle: Ore the Usefulness of Phi- 
 losophy. Works, by Shaw. 1738. 1., 5. 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. 163 
 
 held the scalpel, "con virile e forte animo, e con incredibile 
 costanza." w 
 
 § 148. But Aristotle, wanting the imperious desire, was 
 little likely to have overcome this repulsion, and still less likely 
 to have braved the prejudices of his contemporaries for an object 
 of which he did not rightly estimate the value. It is true that 
 human dissection was practised in Alexandria some centuries 
 later, under the Ptolemies, and the idea is not, therefore, wholly 
 inadmissible that Aristotle may have privately dissected. 15 
 Not wholly inadmissible, yet wholly without evidence. All 
 the evidence runs counter to it. Hippocrates did not, nor 
 did Galen, four hundred and fifty years afterwards ; l6 yet 
 both Hippocrates and Galen had incomparably more need of 
 such knowledge for their purposes than Aristotle had for his. 
 Although Aristotle never once intimates that he had dissected 
 man, and, as we shall see, his mistakes exclude such a suppo- 
 sition, there is one casual sentence which I have met with 
 that might bear this construction : — in the De Partibus 
 (I. 5, 645), defending the study against those who despised 
 it, he says : — " "We cannot, without great reluctance, behold 
 the parts of which man is composed, such as blood, flesh, 
 bones, vessels, and the like ; but we must regard them as the 
 
 "Medici: Compendio Storico detta Scuola Anatomica di Bologna, 1857, 
 p. 357. 
 
 15 Sprbngel suggests that he may have done so in Chalcis. — Gesch. der 
 Arzneikunde, 1821, 1., 456. 
 
 16 This also has been a disputed point ; but I consider it conclusively settled by 
 the testimony of Galen's editor and translator, Dakemberg, who says that he has 
 repeated every one of Galen's dissections, which has convinced him that only 
 animals were employed. " Galien repete sans cesse qu'il decrit particulierement 
 le singe comme etant l'animal le plus voisin de l'homme; son seul tort c'est 
 d'avoir presque toujours conclu du singe a l'homme/" — CEuvres de Galien, 
 Paris, 1854, I., xiv. The resistance of scholars against this truth, when first 
 published by Vesalitjs, is singularly like the resistance of theologians to the 
 revelations of Astronomy and Geology. The Galenists first denied the truth of 
 what Vesalius affirmed ; when public demonstrations rendered this denial 
 ridiculous, they fled for refuge to two explanations — 1st, that the text of Galen 
 was corrupt ; 2nd, that the human organism had become different since 
 Galen's days. 
 
 11—2 
 
164 ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. [CHAP. VIM, 
 
 architect regards the wood, stones, lime, &c, with which he 
 builds." This would furnish a strong presumption were it 
 not contrary to all the other evidence. As it is, I leave it 
 without attempting to weaken it by another interpretation. 
 
 II. — Special Ignorance. 
 
 § 149. We have his own confession that the internal 
 anatomy of man is the least known, and must therefore be 
 studied in animals. 17 Although this does not imply that 
 nothing was directly known of the internal parts, it very 
 clearly implies that such knowledge was not to be gained 
 through dissection. And the nature of the mistakes he has 
 made points in the same direction. 
 
 Some of these errors may indeed admit of a favourable 
 interpretation; for example, he describes the lungs of man 
 as not double, like those of oviparous animals, but single 
 (liovo^vri) like the heart ; 18 yet elsewhere he says the lungs 
 are always double, though least so in man. 19 Again when he 
 describes the uterus as double, the error is manifest. It is 
 double in the embryo ; double in many animals, such as the 
 hare or rabbit; but even in monkeys there is only a trace, 
 which reveals the original separation into two equal halves. 
 In the human female this trace has disappeared. If Aristotle 
 had ever seen an uterus, how came he to make so obvious 
 a blunder ? Two explanations are admissible : — 1°, either 
 he means the two ovaries (which are always by him undis- 
 tinguished from the uterus), to represent this twofold nature ; 
 or 2°, the uterus which came under his observation may have 
 been one of the rare specimens of abnormal duplicity ; from 
 this he may have concluded that normally the uterus was 
 
 17 Hist. An., I., 13, 494. dyvoiara yap Ian jiaKiara rd t&v dvBpuirmv, Hurt 
 fiei irpig ra tuiv aWuiv Zimov dvdyovrag ckottCiv. 
 
 18 Be Parlibus, III., 7, 669. 
 
 19 Hist. An., I.;,13, 495. 
 
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. 165 
 
 double. I think, however, it is more probable that he had 
 never seen one at all ; and that his statement is simply an 
 a priori conclusion. He thought the uterus was the analogue 
 of the testes, and these being double, the uterus must also be 
 double. 20 
 
 § 150. Some other statements do not admit such pal- 
 liation. What are we to think of the assertion that the heart 
 lies higher than the lungs, above them, avuripio rov 7t\ev- 
 fiovoc, where the trachea bifurcates? 21 Could he ever have 
 seen the human kidney, which he describes as lobed like that 
 of an ox ? ^ It is no answer to say that the kidneys are lobed 
 in the foetus ; 23 since all trace of the lobular form disappears 
 about the fifth month, and he is not likely to have examined a 
 foetus younger than this; moreover, he distinctly states it of 
 the adult, not the foetus. 
 
 § 150 a. His description of the spleen is inaccurate, 
 though not so glaringly inaccurate as that of the kidney. 
 Ves alius notices the error of attributing only eight ribs 
 to man, as a proof that he was not speaking from direct 
 inspection. 2 * 
 
 § 150 b. He speaks of the heart having only three 
 chambers; whereupon Lauth remarks that he only judged 
 of its structure from the external aspect : M an error, since 
 he mentions its septa and its tendons. Those who maintain 
 
 a Be Gen. An., I., 3, 716. 
 
 21 Hist. An., I., 14, 495. Be Part, III., 6, 669. 
 
 22 Be Part., in., 9. 671, 
 
 23 " Je l'ai vu quelquefois forme de huit, plus souvent de six, ou de quatre 
 petits reins de chaque cote."— Serkes: Precis d'Anatomie transcendante, 1824, 
 p. 101. It is amusing to find Barchhsen apparently citing this very case of 
 the kidney as a proof of Aristotle having dissected man. — De Medicines Origine, 
 1723, p. 127, note. 
 
 24 Vebalius: Opera Omnia, ed. Boebhaave and Albinus, 1725, p. 76. 
 Sonnenbubg: ZoologUch-Kritische Bemerhungen zu Aristot. Thiergeschichte, 
 Bonn, 1857, p. 5, adopts the convenient hypothesis of a corrupt text in this 
 case, although he knows that the error was repeated by Punt. 
 
 85 Lauth: Histoire de VAnatomie, 1815, 1., 62. There is an amusing note 
 on this point in the commentary of Blazius to Wesslikg's Syntagma Ana- 
 tomicum, Amsterdam, 1666, p. 150. 
 
166 AKISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. [CHAP. VIII. 
 
 that he must have practised human dissection, refer to his 
 mention of the heart not being vertically placed, but inclin- 
 ing a little to the left (§ 398). But we learn from Galen 
 that this was the vulgar opinion, derived, as he says, from 
 the fact that the beating of the heart is felt under the left 
 breast. 26 
 
 § 150 c. But perhaps the climax of inaccuracy is to be 
 found in what he says of the brain, namely that it is bloodless, 
 and that it does not extend to the back part of the skull, 
 "which is quite empty" — assertions several times repeated. 
 Without insisting on the fact that more blood goes to the brain 
 than to almost any other organ 27 (which Aristotle had no means 
 of knowing), it is enough to say that casual inspection of an 
 uncooked brain reveals the presence of abundant blood, even 
 the white matter being studded with red spots. 28 But in the 
 cooked brain (or in the brain of fish) no such appearance 
 presents itself; whence we conclude that he had never seen 
 the human brain, since he could not have seen it cooked, and 
 in the fresh state its blood is apparent. 29 As to the surprising 
 and unintelligible assertion that there is no brain in the back 
 part of the skull, if it does not prove, as Poetal remarks, 
 
 26 Galen : De usu Partium, lib. VI., ch. 2, p. 415, ed. Kuhn, 1822. This 
 opinion he considers to be erroneous, a clear proof that he had not dissected the 
 human body. It should be noted that Galen conceived the heart as having only 
 two chamhers, the ventricles; the auricles were regarded merely as accessories. 
 See Dakembekg: (Euvresde Galien, I., 400. 
 
 27 One-fifth of the whole amount, according to the estimate of Hallee : 
 Elementa Physiotogia, Lausanne, 1762, IV., 141 ; and one-third, according to 
 Malpighi: De Cerebro, p. 6 in Opera Omina, 1686. 
 
 88 " Dum cerebri portiones abscindis, ait, ex Plempio, Moebius, p. 592, 
 adverte guttulas et punctula sanguinis, in cerebri substantia, et disce Aristo- 
 telem non vera docerc dum scribit cerebrum nihil venarum in se continere." — 
 Blazius : in comment. Wessling Syntagma, p. 214. In his anxiety to defend 
 the Stagirite from so gross an error, Blazius adds: " Ast qua ratione proba- 
 bunt arterias non seque sanguinem hunc exhibere in dissecto tali cerebro quam 
 venas." 
 
 29 " Donde si raccoglie che Aristotele non anatomizzd mai alcun cadavere 
 umano, e che la sua notomia e la sua erudizione nella storia degli animali fu 
 molto sotto il mediocre."— Buonafede: Delia Istoria e della indole di ogni 
 filosofia, Milan, 1837, II., 209. 
 
CHAP. Till.] ARISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. 167 
 
 that he had never opened a skull; 50 it proves that he observed 
 carelessly. 
 
 § 150 d. Examples of this glaring kind have been chosen, 
 because mistakes which casual inspection would have prevented 
 are more illustrative than any enumeration of errors on obscurer 
 points. They prove that Aristotle could never have dissected a 
 human subject, perhaps had never seen one laid open ; or else 
 they prove that his inspection was careless, his memory trea- 
 cherous, and his anatomical knowledge extremely superficial. 
 
 § 151. Nevertheless he is said to have made discoveries, 
 and we even read that he first discovered the nerves. The 
 learned Haeles, in his valuable contributions to the history of 
 ancient neurology, 31 has satisfactorily shown that no anatomist 
 before Aristotle had the slightest knowledge of the nerves ; no 
 one seems to have suspected the existence of such organs. 
 Every one of the passages which later writers (Galen in- 
 cluded) have cited, prove on close inspection that the words 
 vtvpov and to. vtvpa refer to tendons, ligaments, aponeuroses, 
 or even muscles, and never mean nerves. 
 
 This misleading use of the word was continued long after 
 it had come to be applied to the structures now designated as 
 nerves. Galen did not escape the confusion, and his suc- 
 cessors forgot altogether the original use of the term. 32 It 
 
 30 Portal : Histoire d'Anat. et de la Chirurgie, 1770, 1., 42. Scaliger attempts 
 to palliate this by saying, " tametsi multa medulla est in quibusdam, caput iis 
 magnum adeo,ut inanis esse cavitas Tideatur;" but Sohnenburg, in citing this 
 passage in his Zoologish-Kritische Bemerhungen zu Aristoteles Thiergeschichte, 
 Bonn, 1857, p. 9, truly says that Aristotle expressly declares it to be and not to 
 seem empty. Moreover, in point of fact, it does not seem empty. Sonnen- 
 bdrg's defence is that by the back part of the head Aristotle meant the 
 neck. It is possible that by Iviov neck was meant ; but this does not render 
 the passage less inaccurate. The neck is not more empty than the skull. 
 
 31 Harles: Versuch einer Geschichte der Hirn-und-Nervenlehre, 1801, 20-54. 
 
 32 Vesalius notices the mistake: Opera, 1725, p. 13; and Kohler: 
 Aristoteles de Molluscis cephakpodibus, 1820, p. 4, remarks that even in our 
 own time tendons and nerves have been mistaken for each other, alluding to the 
 tendinous filaments which surround the sesophagus of the Holothuriae, and 
 which Spix and others have supposed to be nerves; the real nervous system 
 discovered by Moller lies above these. 
 
168 AEISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. [CHAP. VIII. 
 
 still exists in the common language of metaphor. "We speak 
 of a nervous arm, nervous courage, and a man of nerve, an 
 unnerved condition, "hardy as the Nemsean lion's nerve." 
 
 § 152. In commencing our inquiry therefore we must 
 begin by distinctly recognizing the fact that when Aristotle 
 uses the word vtvpov he does not mean nerve ; 33 otherwise we 
 shall fall into the error of Galen, frequently repeated by suc- 
 cessors, of attributing to Aristotle the very gross absurdity of 
 deriving all the nerves from the heart. 34 If therefore it be 
 true, as affirmed, that he is the first anatomist by whom the 
 nerves were mentioned, by what name are we to recognize 
 them ? By that of iropoi or ducts (tubes, canals), this term 
 being employed by him to designate the optic, olfactory, and 
 auditory nerves. Galen is in error when he attributes this 
 to Eudemus and Heeophilus. 35 
 
 The word is noticeable ; but let not the reader jump to the 
 conclusion that it indicates any knowledge on Aristotle's part 
 of the tubular structure of nerves, first described by Leetj- 
 wenhoee, and made familiar to all Europe by Eheenbeeg. 36 
 
 33 See this point conclusively settled in Philippson: SXjj dv9pwirivti, Berlin, 
 1831, p. 12; in Harles: Op. cit, 65; and in Sprengel, I, 456. There are, 
 indeed, a few passages where the word vtvpov correctly indicates a nerve; 
 but it is evident that in these he mistook the real nature of the part indicated. 
 
 34 An absurdity which CiESALPmcs undertook to defend: Peripateticarum 
 gucestienum, Venice, 1571, lib. V., ch. 3, p. 106, scornfully noticed by Tatjrel- 
 lus in his attack on Ca3salpinus : Alpes Ccesa, 1650, p. 864. Sommering set 
 up the defence that Aristotle wished to indicate " cor mediante cerebro nervorum 
 principium esse:" De basi encepkali, 1778, p. 8. Galileo tells a story of 
 having been present when a Venetian anatomist demonstrated that the origin of 
 the nerves was in the brain and not the heart, and then demanded of an Aris- 
 totelian what he had to say; whereupon the philosopher, after a pause, replied, 
 " Voi mi avete fatto veder questa cosa talmente aperta, e sensata, che quando il 
 testo d'Aristotele non fusse in contrario, che apcrtamente dice i nervi nascer dal 
 cuore, bisognerebbe per forza confessarla per vera." — Opere, Milan, 1811, 
 XL, 265. 
 
 35 De libris propriis, chap. HI., cited by Darekberg. 
 
 36 Leetiwenhoek: Select Works, II., 303. Ehrenberg: BeobacHung einer 
 bisher unbekannten Structur des Seelenorgans in the Abhandhngen der Akad. 
 der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1834, p. 665. Li this memoir Aristotle is credited 
 with the discovery of three cerebral nerves; but no mention is made of his 
 having called them tubes. 
 
CHAP. Vin.] AEISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. 169 
 
 On the contrary, he probably observed the readiness with 
 which the semifluid contents can be pressed out of the tough 
 neurilemma, and hence concluded that the nerves were ducts. 37 
 The tubular structure, of which moderns speak, is that of 
 the seemingly solid fibres which compose the nerves; and 
 this is visible only under the microscope. 
 
 § 153. Although it is certain that Aristotle first called 
 attention to the existence of the nerves which have their origin 
 at the base of the brain, it is very far from certain that he 
 had any suspicion of their being special structures, differing 
 from all other ducts ; and it is indisputable that he never 
 classified them with the other nerves. I am therefore dis- 
 posed to accept the view of Philippson, that iropoi never 
 meant organs tantamount to " nerves," but simply brain- 
 ducts, in nowise discriminated from other ducts, except by 
 their position. 38 "We find the word duct used for the channel 
 of any fluid except blood ; it even designates the ureter and 
 the intestine. But I have sought in vain for any intimation 
 that these brain-ducts were special structures. If, therefore, 
 on the one hand, 7ropoe is a word of very general signification, 
 and, on the other, no special signification is assigned to it 
 when used' to designate the optic and olfactory nerves, how 
 can we credit Aristotle with the discovery of these nerves ? 
 He described the course of these ducts, not accurately indeed, 
 
 37 The idea of the optic nerves being tubes, or ducts, was accepted by 
 Aticenna and Roger Bacon. I am not aware at what period it was relin- 
 quished. Vesalius declares that he can establish no difference between nerves 
 founded on their being hollow, since he had never yet seen one that was so. 
 — Opera, ed. Boerhaave and Albinus, p. 361. In spite of this the opinion con- 
 tinued, and even in Wessling's Syntagma, 1666, the optic nerve is said to be 
 more porous than any other, p. 220. Comp. Fabkicius ab Aquapendente : 
 Opera Omnia, 1738, 1., 193. Willis : Opera Omnia, Geneva, 1676, 1., Ill, 
 has no mention of ducts. 
 
 38 Philippson: vXn dvBpwmvri, p. 15-21. Trendelenbekg also says: 
 " Medici iropovg nervos esse volunt . . . sed ab Aristotele tarn angustis 
 terminis circumscripti non sunt. Ductus enim sunt, ut quicunque est finis, con- 
 junctionem et quasi partium commercium adjuverit." — Notes to his ed. of the 
 Be Anima, 1833, p. 162. Comp. ibid., p. 396. 
 
170 AEISTOTLE'S ANATOMY. [CHAP. Vin. 
 
 but sufficiently to establish his claim to this discovery ; but he 
 never suspected the part they played in vision and smelling. 
 He thought the optic duct nourished the eye. 39 This settles 
 the question. In like manner, although he describes the 
 olfactory and auditory nerves, there is overwhelming proof 
 that he did not suppose them to be connected with smelling 
 and hearing. 40 
 
 We conclude, then, that although he knew something of 
 the anatomical distribution of three of the nerves, he knew 
 absolutely nothing of the nervous system ; and as he likewise 
 knew very little of the viscera, and of the muscular system 
 nothing, 41 it is clear that his anatomical knowledge was too 
 slight and inaccurate to serve as the basis of sound physiology. 
 
 39 De Gen. An., II., 6; Phimppson : Op. cit., 18; Harles: Op. cit., 113. 
 Roger Bacon says, " nemis tamen iste in quo est hasc via humoris vitrei se 
 diffundit." — Opus Mujus, p. 203. 
 
 40 Harles confesses this. Comp. also Phimppson, p. 19. 
 
 41 Fabricius ab Aqtjapendehte was one of the first to make this evident. 
 — Opera Anaiomica, p. 383, 
 
( 171 ) 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSIOLOGY. 
 
 § 154. To explain the phenomena of Life, without having 
 previously mastered the facts of anatomy, is as hopeless as to 
 attempt an explanation of the action of a watch, in ignorance 
 of springs, escapements, and wheels, merely from seeing it 
 wound up, and hearing it tick. Nothing hut vague unassured 
 guesses can he formed. Of this kind is the physiology of 
 Aristotle. All the complex phenomena which are still hut 
 imperfectly explained, even now that anatomy is accurately and 
 extensively studied, aided by the minute researches of chemists 
 and physicists, were by him interpreted from superficial obser- 
 vation and a priori theories. Observation was necessarily 
 incomplete ; the broad gaps left, instead of being filled up by 
 patient research, were bridged over by considerations of Final 
 Causes, or by analogies often fanciful, never verified. Here, 
 as elsewhere, we find him wholly wanting in the vigilance 
 required for testing the accuracy of the data from which he 
 reasoned ; and very often employing great ingenuity in 
 attempting to explain a fact which did not exist. We shall 
 meet with many examples ; but the following is amusing no 
 less than instructive. 
 
 § 155. " If a woman, suffering from scarlet fever," he 
 says, " look at herself in a mirror, the surface of the mirror 
 
 1 
 
172 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSIOLOGY. [CHAP. IX. 
 
 will become suffused with a kind of bloody mist; 1 and this 
 mist, if the mirror be quite new, cannot be rubbed off without 
 difficulty." This was doubtless one of the old woman's tales 
 current in his day. He never thought of ascertaining the 
 truth of the statement, but proceeded to explain it, which he 
 does in various ways. "The cause," he says, "is that the 
 eye not only receives the impressions from without, but reacts 
 upon external objects, setting them in motion. The eye is 
 full of blood-vessels, and during the fever, the blood being in 
 commotion and inflammation, the eye, though we cannot detect 
 it, is agitated and feverish ; the air is moved by this, and 
 conveys the motion to the surface of the mirror. The polished 
 surface of the mirror is very sensitive to all motions, and 
 hence they become visible upon it." 
 
 § 156. Having gained this glimpse into his mode of inter- 
 pretation, let us briefly review his opinions on the chief vital 
 phenomena. 
 
 The obvious facts of the conversion of food into blood, and 
 of blood into the substance of the body, were early known. 
 But neither the anatomical nor the chemical knowledge neces- 
 sary to our approximate theory of Digestion were familiar to 
 him; consequently, he did not even suspect the order of 
 changes which are impressed Upon food in the mouth, the 
 stomach, and the intestines ; still less did he know the in- 
 fluence of the liver, spleen, and lungs, in the final elaboration 
 of the food. He thought that the food passed into the 
 stomach, and was there cooked by the animal heat. He 
 understood that food must become liquid before it is assimi- 
 lable, since blood is its final product. Food is made liquid 
 
 1 yivtrai ri ImwoKije tov ivoirrpov olov ve^tXij «l/iar(Mijc. — De Insomniis, II., 
 459. In the original the occasion is not scarlet fever ; the variation, however, leaves 
 the argument unaffected. The idea is repeated, and, as usual, exaggerated by 
 Pliny/: " Acrescunt superventu musta, sterilescunt tactas fruges, moriuutnr 
 insita, exuruntur hortorum germina, et fructus arborum quibus insedere, deci- 
 dunt." — Hist. Nat, VII., 13. Even the more sceptical Roger Bacon accepts 
 the notion.— Opus Majus, Vcnet., 1750, p. 65. 
 
CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE'S PHYSIOLOGY. 173 
 
 in the stomach and intestines, and this liquid steams up 
 through the small vessels of the mesentery, which lead to the 
 larger vessels, and thence to the heart : there it ceases to be 
 ichor, and becomes blood. Nature acts like an economist, 
 giving the best parts of the food to the noblest parts of the 
 body ; as the freemen eat the prime portions, the slaves eat 
 the inferior portions, and the rest is thrown to the dogs, so 
 the nobler organs — flesh and the senses — receive the sweetest, 
 and the baser organs— bones, hair, &c— receive the bitterest 
 parts. He suspected that the liver and spleen played 
 some part in digestion, but what part he never distinctly 
 stated. 
 
 From the heart the veins carry the cooked blood to every 
 part of the body. The veins become smaller and smaller, 
 until they are too small for the passage of the blood ; through 
 these, therefore, it can find no egress, only the excretion of 
 moisture (rijc vypag iKfiaSoe) which we call sweat (icSpwTa), 
 and this especially when the body is warmed and the veins 
 open wider (§ 476). 
 
 This latter statement reads very like the modern idea 
 of the blood parting with certain of its principles which 
 ooze through the walls of the capillaries ; but such was not 
 really his meaning. He knew nothing of the blood gushing 
 through these capillaries and returning to the heart. He 
 imagined that the vessels terminated in the flesh, and there 
 the blood became flesh. Nor is this idea quite banished yet. 
 Many physiologists imagine — or speak as if they imagined — 
 that the organs are formed by the blood ; whereas embryology 
 discloses that many organs exist before the blood has appeared. 
 Instead of saying that the organs are formed by the blood, 
 we ought to say they are nourished by it. They draw' their 
 material from the organic plasma ; and blood, when once it 
 has appeared, is carried byjj this plasma. It is equally true 
 to reverse the proposition, and say the organs form the 
 blood, since blood is affected by two different influences, 
 
174 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSIOLOGY. [CHAP. IX. 
 
 one impressed by nutritive material, and one by the organs 
 through which it passes. 
 
 § 157. Although the vascular system was altogether mis- 
 conceived by him, yet the manifest importance of the blood 
 leads us to expect to find all his theories having an intimate 
 dependence on the heart, which he regarded as the centre 
 of Life, Sensation, Motion, and Heat. It is the great 
 cooking apparatus. 2 The blood, in being cooked, causes an 
 expansion, or steaming, which makes the heart expand, and 
 with it the chest expands. Into the space thus formed 
 the cold air rushes, and by its coldness contracts the chest, 
 which again contracts the heart. These alternate expansions 
 and contractions cause the pulsation of the heart and blood- 
 vessels. The blood is always formed in the heart, never 
 returns there, but is converted into flesh, fat, bones, &c. 
 
 As the great source of Heat, the heart must also be the 
 great source of Motion, for heat is motive. Moreover, it is 
 full of tendons, and it is the tendons which move the limbs. 
 
 That Aristotle should have made the heart the origin of 
 the tendons (vevpa) is a striking example of theoretical 
 anatomy in flagrant contradiction with even casual inspection. 
 
 § 158. On Kespiration he has written a separate treatise. 
 In it he complains that his predecessors left unasked the 
 question why animals breathe, or else answered it from very 
 insufficient observation. He notices the common error of 
 supposing that all animals respire — an error, by the way, 
 
 2 " The diastole, or dilatation, is made by the blood boyling or swelling by 
 the spirits within it : and so Aristotele's opinion concerning the pulsation of 
 the heart (namely, that it is made by a kinde of ebullition,) is in some sort true. 
 For as in milk set upon fire, and in beere, we see dayly a fermentation, working, 
 or intumescence; so is it in the pulse of the heart, in which the blood, as by a 
 kinde of fermentation working up is distended, and then ebbs or falls down 
 againe." — Harvey: Anatomical JExercitations concerning the Generation of 
 Living Creatures, 1653, LI., p. 276. By Swammerdamm this idea of the heart 
 as a great cooking centre was retained unhesitatingly. He thought the blood 
 which returned to the heart was that which had not been competent to nourish 
 the body, and returned to be re-cooked — urn aufs neue gekocht zu werden.— 
 Bibel der Natur., 1752, p. 54 (written a century earlier). 
 
CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE'S PHYSIOLOGY. 175 
 
 from which few moderns are free — an error which arises from 
 the latitude given to the word " Eespiration," used not to 
 designate the act of breathing — an act compounded of two 
 distinct yet dependent processes, inspiration and expiration — 
 but to designate the ultimate fact of an exchange of gases 
 taking place between the blood and the atmosphere. It is 
 superfluous to say that this was unknown to Aristotle ; the 
 existence of gases was unsuspected. But had he known it, 
 he would have been justified in protesting against the con- 
 fusion of this general property possessed by all living tissues, 
 of exchanging carbonic acid for oxygen, with the special 
 function of respiration possessed only by a respiratory appa- 
 ratus of organs. It is only by an abusive laxity of language 
 that we apply one term to acts so markedly distinct as : — 
 l.^The inspiration and expiration of air, in animals with 
 lungs. 2. The muscular movements which wash the gills with 
 water, in some animals with branchiae. 3. The simple bathing 
 of the whole surfaces with air or water in all other animals. 
 
 It is true that in all three, the ultimate fact is the aeration 
 of the nutritive fluid ; the exchange of carbonic acid for 
 oxygen. But this community of end does not efface the 
 differences in the functions by which it is attained. Aristotle 
 knew that there was a community of end, which he thought 
 was a cooling process ; and difficult as it is to. draw absolute 
 lines of demarcation he was on the whole justified in assert- 
 ing that Eespiration belonged only to animals with lungs. 
 "If fish breathe," he says, "they must expire the air at 
 the same moment that they draw in the water — which is 
 absurd." He thought that no air entered the fish's body : 
 an error, but his proof was not contemptible. If you place 
 an animal under water, he says, bubbles of air will rise. 
 Now, as none rise from fish, it is evident that they contain 
 no air. The existence of air in the water, and the passage 
 of the oxygen from that air into the blood, were unknown 
 to him. Galen, who knew that the water contained air, also 
 
176 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSIOLOGY. [CHAP. IX. 
 
 knew that the gills supplied the place of lungs ; the little 
 holes, which he supposed them to have, admitted the passage 
 of air, though excluding the water. 3 
 
 If we regard Aristotle's theory of respiration historically, 
 it is admirable. Indeed, no important improvement was made 
 on it until the discovery of the circulation changed the whole 
 aspect of the problem, which the discovery of the gases was 
 still further to modify.* 
 
 § 158 a. He thought that the fact of fish dying when 
 removed from the water into the air was a proof that they 
 did not breathe, since they gape like suffocated animals. 
 Diogenes explained this as due to the fact that fish out of 
 water receive too much air, whereas in the water they have 
 no more than is needful. This Aristotle calls a foolish 
 explanation, and adds, that were it true, we should observe 
 it of terrestrial animals ; but who ever saw an animal suffo- 
 cated because it had too much air? 5 Men fall into such 
 
 3 Galen : De Usu Partium, VI., 9, 443, ed. Kuhn. 
 
 4 Up to the time of Harvey the theory remained undisturbed, as may be 
 seen in Fabrictus ab Aquapbndente: De liespiratione et ejus instrumentis, 
 Opera, 1738, p. 161. The absurd criticisms of Severinus: Antiperipatias de 
 respiratione piscium diatriba, 1661, shows the immense superiority of the 
 Stagirite. In spite of Galen and Kondelet (who had shown that fish breathe 
 the air in the water), we find Cardan, the most learned physician of his age, 
 declaring most positively that fish do not breathe air. — De varietate rerum, 
 Lugduni, 1580, lib. VII., cap. xxxvii., p. 289. (The elaborate and interesting 
 work by Morley: The Life of Cardan, 1854, presents a curious picture of the 
 literary life at that period.) • 
 
 5 The reason why fish die out of water is still awaiting an answer. 
 I instituted numerous experiments which disproved the explanation pro- 
 pounded by Flourens, namely, that the weight of the leaflets composing the 
 gills differs but slightly from that of water, so that the least movement suffices 
 to float them, by which their surfaces are thoroughly bathed with water. In 
 the air , the difference between the weight of the leaflets and that of the air 
 causes the gills to collapse j thus, instead of the leaflets floating free in the air, 
 they are pressed together, and thus an insufficient amount of blood gets aerated; 
 Annates des Sciences Naturelles, 1830, p. 5. This, however, is only one cause. 
 When I kept the leaflets separated, and their whole surfaces exposed to the air, 
 the fish died almost as rapidly as before; but when I suffered the gills to 
 collapse, and prevented the rapid evaporation from the whole surface of their 
 bodies, the fish lived three times longer than similar fish unprotected. Dr. 
 
CHAP. IX.] ARISTOTLE'S PHYSIOLOGY. 177 
 
 errors, he says, because they disregard internal structure, 
 and do not ask what is nature's aim in all she does. 
 
 § 159. Having argued that Life cannot exist without a 
 certain amount of warmth which is necessary for digestion, 
 and that the seat of this source must be the centre, or heart, 
 he remarks that when heat is intense it consumes itself; there- 
 fore for its preservation a certain cooling opposition is indis- 
 pensable. Eespiration is the cooling process. Air is best 
 adapted for it, because its lightness enables it to penetrate 
 where water could not find an entrance. 6 This is his teleo- 
 logical explanation ; nor is the anatomical explanation much 
 more satisfactory. The air rushes in when the chest expands, 
 but how the air gets from the lungs, which he compares to 
 bellows, into the heart is far from clear. He says that this 
 mechanism is described in another work. I can find no de- 
 scription in the works extant. In one place he says the wind- 
 pipe goes to the heart ; yet elsewhere he rightly says it 
 bifurcates on its entrance into the lungs. 
 
 § 160. He has also written a special treatise on Animal 
 Movements. But when we consider that he was ignorant of 
 nerves and muscles, it is apparent that all his explanations 
 must have wanted a basis. 7 Accordingly in all that he has 
 
 McDonnell, in his valuable paper on the Habits and Anatomy of the Lepi- 
 dosiren (" Journal of the Royal Dublin Society," 1 860), mentions that his Lepi- 
 dosiren managed to lire for seventy-five days out of water, because the slough 
 it secreted prevented the evaporation from the surface of its body. It has lungs, 
 however. Eels live a long while out of water, because their bodies are covered 
 with a mucus which retards evaporation. 
 
 6 Oomp. Galen: De usu Partium, VI., 2; and Telesius : De natura 
 rerum, Naples, 1586, lib. VI., p. 238. 
 
 7 Eabeicius ab Aquapendente has argued this point decisively. — De rnus- 
 culi aetione, p. 400. Meyek: Aristoteles Thierkunde, 1855, says Eabrictcts is 
 in error when he attributes to Aristotle the hypothesis of the pneuma moving 
 the bones through the arteries. Yet see §161. It was distinctly the opinion of 
 Telesius: De natura rerum, V., 197. Roulin has given an instructive sketch 
 of the successive hypotheses, in his Recherch.es tMoriques et expfrimentales sur 
 le me'canisme des mouvements in Majendie's Journal de Physiologic, 1821, 1, 209. 
 Long after muscular contractility was discovered, the belief in animal spirits, as 
 necessary to excite that contractility, remained till it was replaced by the 
 
 12 
 
178 aeistotle's PHYSIOLOGY. [CHAP. IX. 
 
 written on this subject there is no attempt at an explanation 
 of the mechanism of motion, nothing is said which was not 
 Common Knowledge. There is metaphysical and psycho- 
 logical argument, but no anatomy, no physiology. He says 
 the animal never moves but for some end, its motives being 
 intelligence and instinct ; it is always some good which is 
 sought. Appetite says : drink is necessary ; sense or reason 
 says : this is drinkable ; and we drink. It is with us abso- 
 lutely as with automata, which move by a very slight move- 
 ment of their springs which act on other springs. The organs 
 by which animals move are the tendons and bones; these 
 represent the springs and wood of the automata. There is, 
 however, this difference : In the automata the parts are in- 
 capable of internal modification, and their action is fatal ; but 
 the parts of animals are capable of great modification ; the 
 same part may become larger or smaller, and its form may 
 change, under the influence of heat and cold, or some internal 
 cause. Imagination or thought may modify them. The idea 
 of cold or heat, of pleasure or pain, is thus almost the same as 
 the reality : we tremble at the very thought of certain objects. 
 
 § 161. All motion has its origin in the soul, and the agent 
 which is intermediate between soul and body is the pneuma, 
 or spirit, which is placed in the heart. He says that he has 
 elsewhere explained his views on the pneuma ; unhappily none 
 of the extant works throw much light on it. He says, how- 
 ever, that it is by nature peculiarly fitted to cause movement. 8 
 
 § 162. To the vast and important class of phenomena 
 grouped under the sensorial functions, his attention had 
 naturally been much directed ; but here again the anatomical 
 basis was wanting. He had not mastered the initial discovery 
 
 " nervous fluid," which was replaced by " nervous force," or— as I have pro- 
 posed to call it — neurility. Tblbshts was fully aware of the marvel of heavy 
 limbs being moved by so slight a spirit, tantidus spiritus ; but threw the marvel 
 upon Infinite Wisdom. — Op. cit., p. 197. 
 8 Comp. Mbtek in preceding note. 
 
chap, ix.] ,aristotle's physiology. 179 
 
 that the nervous system formed the sensorial mechanism. 
 Departing from the route which Hippocrates had at least 
 opened, though not with much success, in assigning to the 
 brain the faculty of sensation, Aristotle, on purely a priori 
 grounds, placed the seat of sensation in the heart because it 
 was in the centre of the body. He thought it was only 
 because the chief organs of sense are in the head that some 
 philosophers supposed the brain to be the seat of sensation. 
 One argument against such a supposition is that the brain 
 itself is insensible. 9 The heart is in the noblest position, the 
 centre, and must, therefore, have the noblest function ; and 
 its relation to the nutritive soul proves it to be the organ of 
 sensation. 10 
 
 § 163. Having on these grounds assigned this function to 
 the heart, it is noticeable that he never attempts to demon- 
 strate the connection between the heart and the organs of 
 sense, or the phenomena of sensation. It is true that he says 
 " all the senses pass through ducts, iropoi, to the heart ; " 
 but he does not show this. The senses -of Touch and Taste 
 he asserts to be visibly in connection with the heart: a 
 puzzling assertion which admits, I think, of this theoretical 
 vindication — Touch is the universal sense, possessed even by 
 animals which possess no other ; it is consequently directly 
 connected with the Vital Principle, of which the heart is the 
 centre. Taste is the sense next in universality, and for a 
 like reason it must have a direct connection with the heart, 
 which he styles the Acropolis of the body. 
 
 9 This is insisted on by GaiSALPiNUS: Peripateticarum Qucestionum, 1571, 
 lib. V., quaest. 3 and 6. That the brain is the seat of sensation, he says, would 
 be said by none, " nisi is qui crasse haec contempletur,'' p. 107. We shall here- 
 after consider this difficulty (§ 385). 
 
 10 Roger Bacon reconciles the two opinions respecting the seat of the soul, 
 by saying that the sensitive soul has two instruments: one, the heart, being 
 radical and fontal; the other, the brain, being that which is first affected by the 
 Visible Species, and which first distinguishes the operation of the senses. He 
 quotes Avicenna to a similar effect. — Opus Majus, p. 196. 
 
 12—2 
 
180 ARISTOTLE'S PHYSIOLOGY. [CHAP. IX. 
 
 We may also notice that although he argues against the 
 brain as the seat of sensation because it is insensible, he 
 never undertakes to show that the heart is more sensible. 
 The truth is that the a priori argument derived from the 
 nobleness of a centre was the argument which coerced his 
 conviction. 
 
 § 164. Since he overlooked the real functions of the brain, 
 we may ask what functions he assigned to it. The answer 
 will probably raise a smile : he declared it was a moderator : 
 its coolness, " for it is the coldest part of the body," serves to 
 temper the great heat of the heart-region. Hence it has no 
 blood sent to it ; only to the enveloping membranes is a small 
 quantity sent, in order to temper its coolness. Hence also 
 bloodless animals have no brains, since their moderate heat 
 requires no cooling. Galen justly criticises this notion of 
 the brain serving to cool the heart ; and he also expresses his 
 surprise at Aristotle's opinion that the brain is cold. 11 
 
 It is interesting to consider how the idea was arrived at. 12 
 Clearly it was not through direct observation, since he had no 
 means of measuring temperature in living animals, and if he 
 judged simply by the touch, the dead brain would not be colder 
 than the liver or kidney. If not arrived at through direct 
 observation, it must have been from a priori considerations ; 
 thus, believing the brain to be bloodless, he concluded it was 
 cold. (§ 384.) 
 
 § 165. From this survey of the chief vital phenomena we 
 discern that Aristotle's physiology was entirely the physiology 
 of conjecture ; it was without one single solid stone to serve 
 as a foundation for future discovery. In the presence of such 
 a result, we ask with surprise, how it comes to pass that 
 biologists of renown can have affirmed that Aristotle laid the 
 
 11 Galen: Deusu Partium, VIII., 3. 
 
 12 See John Davy: Researches Physiological and Anatomical, 1839, 1., 157, 
 for some attempts to estimate the temperature of the brain; hut as the ex- 
 periments were performed on animals recently killed and decapitated, the 
 results are only approximative. 
 
CHAP. IX.] aeistotle's PHYSIOLOGY. 181 
 
 eternal bases of their science, and that his writings are still 
 authoritative to discerning minds. Surely the bases of 
 Biology are to be sought in Anatomy and Physiology ? Yet 
 these were entirely unknown to him. 
 
 Although I have met the affirmation of enthusiastic 
 eulogists by a confrontation with fact, which may seem to 
 press somewhat hardly against Aristotle, the wish to be per- 
 fectly equitable makes me help to restore the balance by point- 
 ing out the philosophical generalities which he enunciated, 
 and which arrest the attention of modern students. This will 
 occupy the next chapter. 
 
( 182 O 
 
 CHAPTEK X. 
 
 GENEBAL PRINCIPLES OP BIOLOGY. 
 
 § 166. That which first led me to study Aristotle's scientific 
 writings was the thrill of surprise on meeting with certain 
 passages seeming to prove that he had arrived at general prin- 
 ciples which modern biologists estimate among the most pre- 
 cious results of philosophic speculation. This surprise, and the 
 admiration consequent upon it, were heightened on my learn- 
 ing that not only had he at one bound reached the summits of 
 speculation, but had also actually anticipated some of the 
 startling discoveries of our times. Thus both in speculation 
 and observation he had shown himself a master and a fore- 
 runner. 
 
 This was my experience ; and it is reasonable to presume 
 that it is not unallied to the experience of those eminent 
 investigators who have spoken of Aristotle in terms of extra- 
 vagant eulogy. In the next chapter we shall have to consider 
 in how far moderns really have been anticipated by the obser- 
 vations of Aristotle. For the present we confine ourselves to 
 the philosophical generalities. 
 
 § 167. There is no disputing the fact that several modern 
 speculative views are to be found very clearly expressed in his 
 writings. But it may reasonably be doubted whether these 
 always had the same significance to him as they have to us ; 
 
CHAP. X.] GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. 183 
 
 and the ground of this doubt is chiefly that he did not make 
 the same application of them, nor did he insist upon then- 
 importance as luminous guides. An example has already been 
 given (§ 142) in the supposed perception of homologies. 
 Another may be seen in the so-called " law of economy " J 
 which declares that Nature everywhere gives to one part what 
 she takes from another. This law, which Geoffkoy St. 
 Hilaibe fancied was his, own discovery, 2 and which he entitled 
 la hi dm balancement des organes, is very questionable, and 
 would require a vast amount of detailed proof. Aristotle's 
 applications are few and not successful. Thus, he says, Nature 
 cannot give the Bear a tail, because she has used up the earthy 
 material in covering his body with hair ; and although there 
 are other hairy animals with tails, yet the law of economy 
 still prevails, since these animals with tails are without 
 flesh on their legs. He overlooks the large amount of 
 bone which coats the cartilaginous plates, when he Bays 
 " the cartilaginous fish are without bones, because the thick- 
 ness of their skins has exhausted all the available earthy 
 matter." 
 
 § 168. Another consideration is to be held in view. In 
 the History of Science, as in the growth of an individual 
 mind, it sometimes happens that the earlier speculations are 
 nearer the truth than those which succeed them ; accordingly 
 we find certain old ideas which had been discarded as erro- 
 neous are reinstated by completer knowledge. On many points 
 we find ourselves, after long wanderings, returned to the 
 ancient starting-place, resuming the forsaken position ; but if 
 we occupy this position anew, it is with very different arma- 
 ments, and we are in no danger of being dislodged by the 
 
 1 De Partibus, L, 9, 655. 
 
 2 First vaguely expressed in his Phibsophie Anatomigue, 1818, p. 456. It 
 had, however, been explicitly stated by Goethe in 1807. See his work: Zur 
 Morphobgie. It was afterwards well stated by Bichat: Recherches sur la 
 Vie et la Mart, 1829, p. 218. 
 
184 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. [CHAP. X. 
 
 first assailant. The early thinkers sometimes had a correct 
 general -view simply because they had not sufficient knowledge 
 of details to obscure the view, or to open another. With 
 fuller knowledge arose many difficulties; in trying to find a 
 pathway through these, the seekers wandered from the old 
 road. We are warranted therefore in questioning the pro- 
 fundity of an ancient speculation, unless it can be shown to 
 have been formed from ample details, and to have been applied 
 extensively to the explanation of particulars. 3 
 
 To give an example : I was formerly much struck with 
 the clear insight Aristotle displayed in avoiding the confusion 
 introduced by later biologists, who make plants essentially 
 distinct from animals, and make an essential distinction 
 between Life and Mind. But although he placed himself at 
 the loftier point of view which recognizes the identity of 
 Plant and Animal, the identity of Life and Mind, I am now 
 of opinion that he did so by a very simple induction such as a 
 superficial view of the general phenomena would first suggest, 
 but which would have been blurred by more detailed know- 
 ledge. He identified plants and animals, but, as we shall see 
 (§ 179), on grounds such as no modern would accept. In like 
 manner he pronounced the sponge to be an animal; and 
 moderns declare this judgment to have been correct. He has 
 not told us what were his grounds ; but we may reasonably 
 ask, whether, had he known so much of sponges as Okbn and 
 Btjemeistee, he would have maintained, against them, that 
 sponges were animals? Had he known the grounds upon 
 which psychologists still, for the most part, found an essential 
 distinction between Life and Mind, which they hold to be 
 
 3 D'Alembeet expresses a similar opinion: " La philosophic moderne s'est 
 rapprochee snr plusienrs points de ce qu'on a pense dans le premier age de la 
 philosophie, pareequ'il semble que la premiere impression de la nature est de 
 nous donner des idees justes que 1'on abandonne bientot par incertitude ou par 
 amour de la nouveaute et auxquelles enfin on est force de revemr." — Sur le 
 Systeme du Monde. CEuvres, 1805, XIV., 79. 
 
CHAP. x.J GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. 185 
 
 two not one, would he have maintained their identity ? These 
 questions cannot be positively answered ; his wonderful saga- 
 city might have pierced the fallacies which have misled more 
 instructed minds ; but on the whole, highly as I estimate his 
 sagacity, it seems to me most probable that he would not 
 have held his views at a later epoch in History, and with an 
 ampler knowledge of the details. 
 
 § 169. It is not because ancient ideas happen sometimes 
 to agree in expression with our completer knowledge, that we 
 are to assume, as a matter of course, that the ancients really 
 held the opinions we hold. Among their many speculations 
 manifestly erroneous, some few are found to be in seeming 
 conformity with the latest results of research. Are we to 
 assume in the ancients a power of divination rendering 
 research superfluous ? or shall we not rather suppose that two 
 or three of their conjectures turn out right by accident, not 
 insight ? and even when these opinions were inductions from 
 the facts, are we not justified in suspecting that they were due 
 to the simple conception being unobscured by a multiplicity of 
 details ? It may seem ungenerous, by raising these doubts, to 
 deprive the ancients of their credit ; but impartial criticism is 
 forced to raise such questions ; since otherwise we shall have 
 to accept the dangerous paradox that truths of science may be 
 divined spontaneously, and need not therefore be laboriously 
 sought ; and that the ancients were by some peculiar privilege 
 dispensed from the necessity of accurate knowledge. To state 
 such an opinion is to refute it. Nevertheless the uncritical 
 attitude with which men in general approach ancient authors 
 constantly betrays them into a more or less explicit acceptance 
 of such an opinion. When Galen happens casually to de- 
 scribe flame as ignited air, and says that the rose-tree burns 
 because it contains much of this air, a modern historian reads 
 in these vague phrases a wonderful anticipation of chemical 
 discovery. "Ne dirait-on pas que, par une sorte d 'intuition 
 spontanee, Galien pressentit la decouverte des gaz incan- 
 
186 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. [CHAP. X. 
 
 descents, tels que l'hydrogene, l'hydrogene bi-carbone, l'oxyde 
 de carbone, &c. ?" 4 
 
 § 170. One of the great difficulties in interpreting ancient 
 opinions is to guard against the tendency of reading our 
 fulness of knowledge in their vague expressions. We often 
 find in ancient works the precious metal we have ourselves 
 brought with us; as the Alchemist often unconsciously put 
 into his crucible the gold which he afterwards discovered 
 there with surprised delight. Mueatoei 5 mentions that in a 
 very ancient astronomical manuscript there is the figure of 
 a man gazing at the stars through a long tube; a similar 
 representation was noticed by Mabillon in another manu- 
 script ; and Porta in his work on " Natural Magic " (1549) 
 says that at Alexandria a telescope was used to descry ships 
 at a distance. From these facts Mubatobi remarks that it 
 would naturally be concluded that the telescope was known to 
 the ancients; but he adds that Marville, Vegetio, and 
 Fabbizio, correctly explain the mistake, namely, that these 
 tubes were without glasses, and were used to assist vision by 
 shutting out other objects. A modern, seeing the tube, infers 
 the existence of a telescope ; imagination supplies the lenses. 6 
 
 § 171. Unless we are rigorous in our examination, we 
 shall constantly fall into the error of attributing knowledge to the 
 ancients which they could not have possessed. Thus Aristotle 
 has been credited with the discovery of the vertebral theory. 
 Lauth, who considers the theory absurd, says — " ce qui doit sur- 
 prendre davantage, c'est son idee sur les os, qu'il croit provenir de 
 la colonne vertebrale, idee r6produite dans les derniers temps." 7 
 
 4 Hoefer: Histoire de la Chimie, Paris, 1842, I., 173. There is much more 
 of the same unhistorical appreciation in this work. 
 
 6 Muratori: Dissertazioni sopra le Antichita Italiane, ed. 1790, XLIV., 
 p. 374. 
 
 6 There is a passage in Roger Bacon describing what might be effected 
 with lenses, which has led many to suppose that he had discovered the telescope; 
 but in a subsequent chapter of this History we shall see that, in truth, he knew 
 nothing whatever about the telescope. 
 
 7 Lauth: Histoire de I'Anatomie, p. 61. Comp. p. 73. 
 
CHAP. X.] GENERAL PRINCIPLES OP BIOLOGY. 187 
 
 Now, the fact simply is that Aristotle described all the bones as 
 connected with the vertebral column. His words are — " The 
 bones, in animals, are all dependent upon one, and are con- 
 nected together like the veins ; nor is any one to be found 
 isolated. The origin of all the bones is the spinal column." 8 
 A modern reading this may read into it the vertebral theory ; 
 but Aristotle had no such conception in his mind ; his object, 
 moreover, was descriptive, not transcendental, anatomy. 
 
 § 172. In the course of our analyses we shall meet with 
 various examples of such seeming anticipation ; and also 
 meet with genuine inductions, really remarkable. Of the 
 latter may at once be mentioned his clear perception of the 
 i important morphological law, that the greater luxuriance of the 
 plant is at the expense of its seed ; hence the more the growth 
 is stunted the more seed will be produced. He has made 
 such frequent use of this principle, and always with such 
 insight, that we cannot question his having thoroughly 
 mastered it. 
 
 § 173. He had also meditated on the progressive com- 
 plexity of life, and in some respects he is superior to many 
 illustrious moderns who have taught various forms of the 
 doctrine of a chain of created beings ; in other words, of a 
 series passing, by insensible gradations, from the simplest to 
 the most complex. 
 
 Perhaps the wildest of these was put forth by Bobinet, 9 
 who supposed minerals to develope into plants, and plants 
 into animals. The scheme of Bonnet io is less extravagant. 
 He admits that there is no transition between the mineral and 
 the plant ; admits that Nature seems to take leaps. From the 
 
 8 to. tfhara roig Zqiotg a<j> kvbg iravra ovvriprniikva iarl xai trvvexv dWi/Xoig 
 &amp al (fKkjieg- avro Si Kaff avrb ovSkv kanv barovv. 'AfX'l & V P«X'£ ^ aTlv * v 
 iraai roTg Ixovaiv bora. — Hist. An., III., 7, 516. 
 
 9 Robinet: De la Nature, Amsterdam, 1766. I gave an analysis of this 
 rare work in Frazer's Magazine, Nov., 1857. 
 
 10 Bonnet: Considerations sur les Corps organises, 1768. 
 
188 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. [CHAP. X. 
 
 plant, however, the chain is unbroken up to man. Buffon 
 maintains the existence of a series of insensible gradations, 
 conceiving that the whole living universe presents itself as one 
 family, 11 an opinion also adopted by Heedee. 12 Teevibanus 
 makes a separate kingdom of the cryptogamic plants and the 
 zoophytes, intermediate between the two kingdoms, vegetal 
 and animal ; and Letjckabt 13 thinks the sponges may, per- 
 haps, form such an intermediate kingdom. Meckel w holds 
 that all existing organisms may be modifications, by insensible 
 gradations, of one primitive type: a view recently made 
 popular by the " Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," 
 and placed on a scientific footing by Daewin. 15 Noticing the 
 obvious objection that no such gradations are discoverable, but, 
 on the contrary, that very great gaps occur at all parts of this 
 pretended series, Lamaeck remarks that the animal scale only 
 presents its degrees in the principal masses, and not in the 
 species, nor even in the genera, 16 and therefore he rejects the 
 idea of a connected chain. He holds that it is only at their 
 common starting-point that the two grand divisions of organic 
 life, vegetal and animal, are related by the simplicity of their 
 structure. Not only does he deny the " chain of creation," but 
 he holds that even animals do not form a chain ; they simply 
 exhibit a progressive complexity of organization. 17 In the same 
 spirit Geoffkoy St. Hilaiee pronounces the "chain" to 
 be a 'chimera, and substitutes for it his doctrine of "Unity 
 of Composition." Sebees, reproducing the arguments of 
 Meckel, says that the " missing links " in the chain 
 may all be discovered if we seek them in the life of the 
 embryo. On comparing animals arrived at their complete 
 
 11 Quoted by Isidore St. Hilaire: Essais de Zoologie Genirale, 1841, p. 78. 
 
 12 Ibid. 
 
 13 Leuckart: Observations Zoologicce, p. 13. 
 
 14 Meckel: Traiti d'Anat. Comparee, Pans, 1828, 1., 83. 
 16 Darwin: Origin of Species, 1860. 
 
 16 Lamarck: Ph.ilosoph.ie Zoologique, 2nd ed., 1830, 1., 107. 
 
 17 Lamaeck: Hist, des Animaux sans Vertebres, 2nd ed., 1835, 1., 51, 110. 
 
CHAP. X.] GENERAL PRINCIPLES OP BIOLOGY. 189 
 
 development, we find many and wide differences between them ; 
 but if we compared them during their successive stages of 
 evolution, we should see that these differences were preceded 
 by resemblances, 18 that, in fact, comparative anatomy is an 
 arrested embryology, and embryology is a transitory compara- 
 tive anatomy. Auguste Comte proposed to fill up the miss- 
 ing links by the imaginative and arbitrary creation of new 
 forms. 
 
 § 174. It would be tedious to enumerate all the shapes 
 this general conception of a connected chain has assumed ; 
 always, I think, upon arbitrary and unsatisfactory grounds. 
 The simplest observation concurs with the profoundest, that 
 organic beings are not linked together in a chain nor in a 
 series ; and, although it may flatter our propensity to arrange 
 Nature according to our own notions of symmetry and sim- 
 plicity, the attempt is perpetually frustrated on descending 
 from the lofty region of speculation into that of concrete 
 reality. Nor do the laws of development, in proving that all 
 animal forms may have been developed, by successive modifi- 
 cations, from one original, justify the notion of a series. The 
 image of a tree much better represents the facts than that of a 
 chain. An ideal series of Locomotives might be constructed, 
 from the first rude cart or barrow up to the railway carriage 
 and steamboat, which would have quite as much objective 
 reality as the animal series. 
 
 § 175. Aristotle's conception was that of an ascending 
 complexity in vital phenomena from plants to man ; and this 
 we may now see in detail. 
 
 Instead of the three kingdoms — mineral, vegetal, and 
 
 18 Sekbes: Precis d'Anat. transcendante, 1842, p. 135. The progress of 
 embryology has discredited this striking and plausible generalization, by confirm- 
 ing the views so luminously set forth by Von Baeh: Zur Entwickelungs- 
 geschichte, 1808, p. 199, and Nova Acta, 1826, that the vertebrate type is at the 
 very first constructed differently from that of the invertebrate; and that not 
 only do the analogous organs appear in different successions, but are formed on 
 different plans. See the elaborate memoir by Lekebouixet : Becherches d'Em- 
 bryologie comparie in the Annates des Sciences Naturelles, 1863, XX., 7. 
 
190 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. [CHAP. X. 
 
 animal — which moderns have borrowed from the alchemists, 19 
 he made the more philosophical division of 1° the Inorganic, 
 ra axpv^a, and 2° the Organic, ra ifi\fw^a. The dis- 
 tinction between living and non-living beings is broad and 
 palpable ; it is obviously of quite another kind from the dis- 
 tinction between plants and animals. 20 But although the line 
 of demarcation is broadly marked, yet Nature passes by 
 ascending steps from one to the other ; from the inanimate 
 she passes to animals, through beings which are not indeed to 
 be called animals, yet are so like them that the two are only 
 separated by slight intervals. 21 
 
 § 176. The first step is that of Plants ; which, compared 
 with minerals, may be called animated, but compared with 
 animals seem inanimate. Plants have Life ; "for that which 
 nourishes itself, grows, and decays, we call living." An 
 animated body must have a soul, since the soul is the essence 
 and reality of an animated body. It is the first entelechie, 
 the reality by which the body becomes active. (§ 215.) 
 
 § 177. The first stage of the soul's activity is that which 
 all living beings have in common, namely, Nutrition, or 
 Vegetal Life, as it has been called since Bichat. 22 Plants 
 have organs; but as these are limited to the one function of 
 
 19 A fact first noticed by Isidore St. Hilaire: Hist. desSegnes Organiques, 
 1856, II., 6. A fourth kingdom, the atmospheric, was proposed by Mtjssen- 
 broek: Cours de Physique, 1769, 1., 11. 
 
 80 " J'ai depuis longtemps trouve plus convenable d'employer une autre 
 division primaire, parcequ'elle est propre a faire mieux connoitre en general 
 tous les etres qui en sont l'objet. Ainsi je distingue toutes les productions 
 naturelles comprises dans les trois regnes, en deux branches principales— 1 en 
 corps organises, vivansj 2° en corps bruts et sans vie."— Lamarck: Philosophic 
 Zoobgique, 1831, 1., 92. He fancied he was establishing an important inno- 
 vation, yet his illustrious countryman, Vicq d'Azyr, had already suggested 
 the very same division, (Euvres, TV., 18-230. And Aristotle had preceded 
 them by three-and-twenty centuries. 
 
 sl r, yap fvaiQ utrafSaivu avvix&e avb tS>v fyv X wv ti'c to. ?fia Sia. tSiv 
 Z&vrwv ptv o*k ovtuv 8k Z,6o>v oiirwe iian SokcIv '^d/iwav /uicpbv diafipuv 
 Qaripov Baripov r<f aiviyyvQ dXKrjKois. — De Partibus, TV. 5, 481. 
 
 82 Vegetatio also by the mediaeval writers. See Axbe'rtus Magnus, or 
 Hermolaus Barbartts. 
 
CHAP. X.] GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. 191 
 
 Nutrition, they are designated simply as Upper and Under. 
 They have no Right and Left, these being in relation to loco- 
 motion; nor Before and Behind, these being in relation to 
 sensation. The upper and under parts are not the same as in 
 animals; for plants take in nourishment by the roots, and 
 these, therefore, are the upper, representing the mouth of an 
 animal. The roots shoot up from the seed, and may be com- 
 pared to umbilical veins, since through them the plant is 
 nourished from the earth, as the embryo is nourished from the 
 uterus. The stem shoots perpendicularly and carries nourish- 
 ment to the fruit and the seed. The leaves protect the fruit, 
 and are permeated with veins, which persist after the leaf is 
 dead. Fruit and seed are one. The pericarp surrounds the 
 seed, which is a kind of secretion from the nutriment ; for the 
 plant has no excretions, because its food is digested in the 
 earth ; and in lieu of excretions it forms fruit and seed. 
 Plants, being fixed in the soil, have no occasion for the use of 
 various and dissimilar parts : a few simple organs suffice for 
 their simple functions. Nor are they ruled, like animals, by 
 one central Vital Principle, since they live after division, 
 and are reproduced by grafting. 23 But although Plants 
 have a Vital Principle analogous to that of animals, it is 
 not central, and cannot receive sensitive impressions, 24 conse- 
 quently it cannot move. Therefore the first stage of mere 
 nutritive activity is all that the soul developes into in the 
 plant. 
 
 23 Grafting, however, can no longer be made a mark of distinction for plants, 
 since it has been successfully effected on animals. Baronio transplanted the 
 spur of one cock to the comb of another, with complete success. Tiedmann: 
 Physiologie de V Homme. Paris, 1831, I., 163. Hunter repeated the experiment 
 with equal success; and recently M. Olliee has transplanted pieces of bone to 
 various parts of the organism. Annates des Sciences Naturelles, 1858, p. 378. 
 Comp. Brown Seqtjabd's: Journal de Physiologic, 1859, pp. 1-169. and 1860, 
 p. 88. It was Duhamel who first proved that the growth of bone took place 
 from the periosteum. See his eloge by Vicq D' Aztr: CEuvres, I., 150. 
 
 24 See De Part., II., 10; Hist. An., II., 17; De Somno, 2; De Resp., 8; 
 De Motione Animal, 9, on the heart as the centre of sensation and thought. 
 
192 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. [CHAP. X. 
 
 § 178. Although his views are not clear on the point, 
 he seems to have had his attention arrested by the morpho- 
 logical tendency of plants to develope their organs at the 
 periphery, and of animals to develope theirs at the centre. 
 He, also, as before noticed, mastered the relation between 
 growth and reproduction. The annual plants, he says, use 
 up all their nutritive material to form seeds, as in the cereals. 
 He also notices how the forms of plants are determined by 
 the soil, and that they thrive better from rain than from 
 water poured on them. 25 
 
 § 179. The second step Nature takes is from plants to 
 Plant-animals, Zoophytes. " There are many marine crea- 
 tures," he says, "which leave the observer in doubt as to 
 whether they are plants or animals, for they grow on the 
 rocks, and many die if detached." "With the exceptions of 
 the Sponges and Sea-anemones, Aristotle was unfortunate 
 in the examples he selected. The Polypes he held to be 
 plants ; and he placed several animals having no characteristic 
 of plants in the intermediate class of Zoophytes. For instance, 
 he names the Pinna and the Solen ; but the first does not 
 die, as he says, when detached from the rock ; and the second 
 is not attached to the rock, but burrows in the sand like a 
 mole. Possibly he may designate other animals than those 
 now recognized under these names ; yet it is certain that he 
 is referring to some kind of shell-fish, since he says : " The 
 whole class of testaceous animals seem to be plants, in com- 
 parison with animals which can move themselves." Nor is 
 want of locomotion the only sign ; he refers also to their want 
 of the organs of sense. " Some of them have flesh, such 
 are Ascidians and Acalephse ; but the Sponge is exactly like 
 a plant." 
 
 § 180. It is interesting to know on what grounds he 
 
 25 Eor fuller details respecting Plants, see Wimmek : Phytologia Arist. 
 fragmenta, 1838; or Biese: Die Philos. des Aristoteles, 1842, II. The book 
 De Plantis is universally acknowledgfijLto be spurious. 
 
CHAP. X.J GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. 193 
 
 decided the nature of the sponges to be animal. For many- 
 years eminent naturalists were divided on this point. Bauhin, 
 Eay, Tournefort, Forskal, Tozzetti, Spallanzani, Blu- 
 menbach, Sprengel, Oken, and Burmeister, held them 
 to be plants ; Belon, Peysonnel, Trembley, Ellis, 
 Solander, Linnjbus, Lamarck, Cuvier, and De Blainville, 
 held them to be animals. The latter opinion is now almost 
 universal. But what is the proof? Mainly the fact that 
 the glairy substance of the sponge is composed of sarcodic 
 particles, each having an expansile motion similar to that 
 of the Amoeba ; this, and the presence of cilia lining their 
 canals, are the principal marks of animal nature ; 26 but 
 neither of these could have been known to Aristotle, since 
 they are visible only under the microscope. 
 
 The only reason adduced by him is that sponges have 
 sensation. " The proof of this," he says, " is their retracting 
 when they perceive any attempt to tear them from the rock. 
 They also retract when the waves dash violently. There are 
 some people — for example, the people of Torona — who dispute 
 this." Such a passage leads us to doubt whether he did 
 not confound the Polypes with Sponges. No such retraction 
 has been observed in the latter. The old Italian naturalist, 
 Imperato, 27 however, describes the sponges accurately enough, 
 and yet he also speaks of their powers of voluntary retraction, 
 which he asserts resides solely in the mucus; but he may 
 be merely repeating the statements of Aristotle and Pliny. 
 
 § 181. The third step taken by Nature is the development 
 of Animals, which arises from an increased activity of the 
 Vital Principle, resulting in sensibility ; and with sensibility, 
 desire ; and with desire, locomotion. This new soul is 
 
 86 Dujabdin: Histoire Naturelle des Infusoires, 1841, p. 305. Bkonk: Die 
 Klassen und Ordnungen des Thier-Reichs, 1859, 1., 9. 
 
 27 Impbbato: Dell' Historia Naturale, libri XXVII., Naples, 1599, p. 727. 
 " La consiatenza di quali 6 simile a corpo di lano compatta, fistuloso, yestito, c 
 sparao per tutto di muccagine membranosa . . . nella muccagine e pro- 
 priamente il senso, e la vita, con la virtu di poter ritirarsi in se steasa." 
 
 13 
 
194 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. [CHAP. X. 
 
 only a more energetic and more complex form of the original 
 Life. The much debated question respecting a line of 
 demarcation between Plant and Animal had not arisen in 
 those days. It is not settled in our own. Where one school 
 sees only a higher differentiation, the other sees the avatar 
 of a new principle of Life. By the latter, the animal is held 
 to be an organism having another kind of Vital Principle, 
 essentially distinct from that of the plant. Now in so far 
 as a marked difference exists between plants and animals in 
 their organisms and functions, we need a special term to 
 indicate this difference ; and thus may call the one vegetal 
 life, and the other animal life, without danger, and with 
 positive advantage. But the same is true of all other differen- 
 tiations: we need to distinguish infancy from puberty, and 
 puberty from old age. "We do not, however, suppose that 
 these three differentiations of one organism are owing to three 
 different principles. We distinguish sensibility from thought ; 
 but few psychologists now suppose that sensibility belongs 
 to one vital principle, and thought to another. We call them 
 two manifestations of one Life. In like manner we should 
 regard Vegetal and Animal Life as differentiated organic 
 energies, the one a higher development of the other, dependent 
 on a more complex organism. 28 Hence we ought to feel no 
 surprise if, in the earlier forms of each, the two are indis- 
 tinguishable ; and if no boundary line can be drawn between 
 the plant-world and the animal-world. Hence, also, we 
 ought to expect to find — what we do find — that plants some- 
 times exhibit the manifestations which are thought to be 
 
 29 Compare Gegenbauer : Grundziige der vergleichenden Anatomie, 1859, 
 p. 9. Aristotle's views are thus briefly expressed by Hermolaus Barbarus: 
 Compendium Scient. Nat, 1547, lib. V., p. 43.—" In plantis quidem sola est 
 vegetatio ; in iis vero quao sensu raoventur, et vegetatio et sensio cernitur : at 
 homini, et vegetatio et sensus et intellectio est attributa. Quoniam vero inesse 
 non est verisimile tria genera animarum ei, qui est ratione insignitus, putan- 
 dum est imam, atque earn quidem rationale™, in homine reliquarum tencre 
 potestatem." 
 
CHAP. X.] GENERAL PRINCIPLES OP BIOLOGY. 195 
 
 exclusively animal; I mean locomotion and obscure traces 
 of sensibility; while, on the other hand, some animals lead 
 an almost vegetal existence, being wholly destitute of locomo- 
 tion, and having but the faintest traces of sensibility. 
 
 § 182. Aristotle makes man the head of the animal 
 creation. To him belongs the godlike nature. He is pre- 
 eminent by thought and volition. But although all are 
 dwarf-like and incomplete in comparison with man, he is 
 only the highest point of one continuous ascent. He is the 
 wisest and most thoughtful of animals, but other animals 
 are also endowed with thought. The difference is, that 
 animals only know particular truths, they never generalize,, 
 never form abstractions. 
 
 In this Aristotle anticipated Linnaeus and the majority 
 of modern naturalists. Yet there have not been wanting 
 attempts, even in our own day, to separate man from the 
 animal kingdom, and to give him a kingdom to himself as 
 broadly distinguished from the animal, as the animal is 
 distinguished from the vegetal, and the vegetal from the 
 mineral. 29 Still more frequent and more justifiable have 
 been the efforts to found a distinction on intellectual supe- 
 riority; man being classed as rational, and animals as 
 irrational ; 30 a classification which is forced to invoke the 
 
 ^Isidoeb St. Hilaibe: Hist, des Regnes Organiques, vol. I, where pre- 
 vious attempts are enumerated. See also Quatrefages: L'uniU de I'espece 
 
 humaine, 1861. 
 
 30 " Rationale nullum est prater hominem."— Chaeleton: Exercitationes 
 de different, et nominibus animalium, Oxon, 1671, p. 1. He derives our word 
 Man from the Anglo-Saxon mtenan, to think; " cui felicissime alludit Grsec. 
 pAvoc, animus, a quo et Latin, mens deflexum videtur." This is like Plato's 
 derivation of Mpuiiroc, from the faculty of observing what is seen; animals 
 only see, they do not observe.— Cra^aa, ed. Bekk., Berlin, 1817, p. 37. _ Max 
 Muller finds the origin of our word man in the Sanskrit mann, a derivative 
 root,- meaning to think. "From this we have the Sanskrit mann, originally 
 thinker, then man. In Gothic we find both man and mannisks, the modern 
 German mann smimensch."— Lectures on the Science of Language, 1862, p. 385. 
 Pateizio denied all distinctions between rational and irrational, because, accord- 
 ing to him, the whole world was rational, having a soul. "Nobis vero dis- 
 
 13 — 2 
 
196 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OP BIOLOGY. [CHAP. X. 
 
 bold hypothesis of Descartes, that brutes are mere machines, 
 and have no thought or volition ; since in the absence of such 
 an hypothesis, there is the awkward fact that animals reason, 
 and reason in the same way as man, if not so much or 
 so well. 
 
 Such is the scheme of an ascending complexity of Life 
 conceived by Aristotle. We shall better appreciate it when his 
 views on Life and Mind have been expounded; but before 
 this can be done, we have to consider a question of some 
 interest, already alluded to, namely, in how far he is to be 
 credited with having anticipated certain modern discoveries. 
 
 tinctio hseo animi rationalis et irrationalis minime probata. Nullum enim 
 animum sua natura irrationalem esse existimamus." — Nova de Universis Philo- 
 sophic/, libris quinquaginta comprehensa, Venet., 1593. Panarchia, XX.II. (There 
 are really sixty-nine books, instead of fifty, as named in the title.) 
 
197 
 
 CHAPTEE XI. 
 
 ANTICIPATION OF MODEKN DISCOVERIES. 
 
 § 183. One of the first remarks which escapes from almost 
 every zoologist of our day, when Aristotle is named, turns on 
 the surprising anticipations of modern discoveries said to be 
 found in his writings. The piercing intellect which could 
 thus foresee results of modern research at a time when 
 Science was wholly without the means and appliances of 
 modern research, is pronounced something marvellous. Mar- 
 vellous, indeed, the fact would be ; unhappily for the lovers of 
 the marvellous and the eulogists of the past, the fact is a mis- 
 conception. Let me confess that for a long while I shared 
 the belief, and echoed the eulogy. With a view to this History, 
 I carefully collected all the instances of anticipation, intending 
 with them to make a great display in honour of the old Greek. 
 But on submitting them to that rigorous scrutiny which the 
 impartiality of History demands, they turned out to be no 
 marvels at all. The most striking examples may now be cited 
 and examined. 
 
 I. — The Hectocotyhis of the Argonaut. 
 § 184. Our first instance is the one most frequently cited. 
 The history of the discovery has been sketched by Vebany 
 and Vogt, from whose pages it may here be repeated. The 
 
198 ANTICIPATION OF [CHAP. XI. 
 
 Hectocotylus was first described, in 1825, by Delle Chiaje, 1 
 as a parasite upon the beautiful Argonaut, and the more 
 familiar Octopus. This idea of its being a parasite was the 
 most obvipus suggestion, when its origin was unknown ; and 
 as a parasite Cuviee described it, from a specimen furnished 
 by Laueillabd, who had detected five of them on the bodies 
 of the Octopus at Nice : three in the funnel of one female, 
 and one on the arm of a male ; in the latter case it had almost 
 destroyed and replaced the arm, so " that at first sight it 
 might have been mistaken for the arm itself." 2 This was 
 coming very near the discovery. As a parasite, however, it 
 continued to be classed, until Costa, a Neapolitan naturalist, 
 made a bold but premature guess at its nature : he said it was 
 simply the cephalopod's spermatophore. 3 Seven years later, 
 Dujabdin made a nearer approach to the truth. He confessed 
 himself unable to decide upon its nature, but was quite posi- 
 tive that it was not a parasitic worm. " One might call it," 
 he said, 4 " an arm torn from some other cephalopod." The 
 presence of a long white thread suggested that this might be a 
 bundle of spermatozoa ; and that the Hectocotylus might be a 
 portion of the cephalopod, detached from its body, and sub- 
 servient in some way to fecundation. 
 
 Meanwhile ELolliker investigated several specimens of 
 Hectocotyli, and the result of his investigation was " that 
 these supposed worms are nothing but the stunted males 
 of the cephalopoda on which they are found." 5 These 
 views were adopted, with slight modification, by Von Siebold, 
 in his work on Comparative Anatomy. But the peculiar 
 marvel of the Hectocotylus was simultaneously discovered by 
 
 1 Delle Chiaje: Memorie sulla Storia eNotomia degli animali senza Ver- 
 tebre del regno di Napoli, 1823-9. 
 
 2 Cuviee : Annales des Sciences NatureUes, 1829. 
 
 3 Costa: Annales des Sciences Nat, 1841. 
 
 4 Dujardin: Histoire Naturelle des Helminth.es, 1848. 
 
 "Kollikek: Annals of Nat. History, 1845; and Bericht von der KSnig- 
 lichen Zootomischen Anstalt zu Wurtzburg, 1849. 
 
CHAP. XI.] MODERN DISCOVERIES. 199 
 
 H. Muller, Verany, and Vogt, who found that this animal 
 was neither a worm, nor a parasite, neither a spermatophore, 
 nor a stunted male, but simply the modified arm of the male 
 cephalopod, an arm which developes within it the generative 
 organs, and on detaching itself from the body, fastens itself 
 by suckers to the body of the female, and impregnates her. 
 Thus the Hectocotylus is not an independent animal, although 
 capable of a brief independent existence ; it is not an animal, 
 in spite of its circulation, and its power of locomotion ; it is 
 a detached organ, an organophore ! 
 
 § 185. This discovery excited great astonishment; and 
 before the thrill at such a surprising phenomenon had sub- 
 sided, another thrill was given by Von Siebold's announce- 
 ment that Aristotle had anticipated it : "he appears to have 
 been acquainted with the natural history and internal struc- 
 ture of the cephalopoda, to an extent which even now must 
 be astonishing. From the following passages Vebant and 
 Muller will learn with amazement that Aristotle may fairly 
 contest with them the priority of their discovery." 6 Von 
 Siebold then quotes, from Schneider's Latin version, the 
 following passages, which I will translate from the original as 
 strictly as possible : — 
 
 Hist. Animal, lib. iv. c. 1. — " The Polypus uses its arms 
 as feet and as hands ; for with the two which are above the 
 mouth it introduces its food. The extreme arm, which is dis- 
 tinguished by its sharp and bifid end and the whiteness of its 
 back, is used in sexual congress." 
 
 Ibid. lib. v. c. 5. — " Some say that the male has a kind of 
 generative apparatus in the arm which carries the largest 
 suckers ; this extends as a tendinous substance into the 
 middle of the arm, and is thrust into the nose (i. e. funnel) of 
 the female." 
 
 6 Siebold und Kollikeb : Zeitschrift fur Wissenschaftliche Zoologie, 
 1852. The papers of Siebold, Mullek, Vebant, and Vogt were translated 
 by Huxley in the Scientific Memoirs, 1853. 
 
200 ANTICIPATION OP [CHAP. XI. 
 
 Ibid. c. 10. — " The male is distinguished from the female 
 by a longer head, and the white bodj in his arm, which the 
 fishermen call his genitals." 
 
 § 186. Whoever remembers not only that so eminent an 
 investigator as Von Siebold could see in these passages 
 Aristotle's claim to a knowledge of the Hectocotylus, but that 
 the claim has been admitted all over Europe without a murmur 
 of doubt, must feel the necessity which exists of revising our 
 first impressions. On reading Von Siebold's announcement I 
 shared his enthusiasm, and was blinded by it. Instead of being 
 on guard against the tendency of facile acquiescence in the glory 
 of an ancient, I followed the lead, and read into these passages 
 a meaning Aristotle never conceived. But when I came to 
 prepare this chapter, and to scrutinize the evidence, it very 
 soon became apparent that Aristotle knew absolutely nothing 
 more than the idle conjecture of fishermen. 
 
 § 187. Let us first hear all that he says in the passage of 
 which Von Siebold only quotes a portion. " The Polypi, in 
 congress, hang mouth to mouth, with their arms interlaced. 
 One of the Polypi rests on the ground with that part which is 
 called its head, and extends its arms ; the other then arrives, 
 and entwines its arms with the arms of the former, so that 
 they mutually fix each other by their suckers. Some say 
 that the male has a kind of generative apparatus in the arm 
 which carries the largest suckers ; this extends as a tendinous 
 substance into the middle of the arm, and is thrust into the 
 nose (i. e. funnel) of the female. The Sepia and Loligo, on 
 the contrary, swim together mouth to mouth, and arms 
 entwined." 
 
 To this let us add a passage from the work on Genera- 
 tion. 7 " The cephalopoda embrace each other in the region 
 of the mouth by grasping and supporting each other with their 
 arms. This mode of congress is caused by the fact that Nature 
 
 7 De Gen. An., I., 15, 720. 
 
CHAP. XI.] MODERN DISCOVERIES. 201 
 
 has so bent the part whence the secretion issues, that it lies 
 close to the' mouth." 
 
 "Whoever attentively considers these passages will see that 
 Aristotle knew nothing of the Hectocotylus ; not even of its 
 existence; much less of its being the arm of the male, 
 detached, and living parasitically in the mantle-cavity of 
 the female. This, which is the peculiar marvel, was totally 
 unsuspected by him. Had he gained even a glimpse of it, he 
 would assuredly have mentioned it, especially in the work on 
 " Generation," where all known peculiarities are so carefully 
 registered. His account obviously repeats what he had heard 
 from fishermen ; it is true that by a lucky guess they assigned 
 a generative function to the " tendinous substance " in the 
 arm ; but it was only a guess ; and the loose ground on which 
 it rested may easily be imagined. 
 
 § 188. Although there is no evidence to warrant the idea 
 that Aristotle did know anything of the Hectocotylus, there is 
 nothing in the nature of the discovery which he might not 
 have known, had his attention been rightly directed. It 
 is otherwise with the second example on our list. 
 
 II. — The Parthenogenesis of Bees. 
 
 This could never have been known until certain delicate 
 anatomical and physiological researches had furnished an 
 assured basis ; accordingly we must a priori reject the idea of 
 Aristotle's having known it. In an interesting essay on the 
 subject, Axjbbet and Wimmer 8 have cited in extenso all the 
 passages in which he explains his views ; and these passages 
 at first convey the impression that he really knew the chief 
 phenomena; but on a closer scrutiny we find that it is we 
 who read into them our own knowledge. 
 
 § 189. Let us glance at the present state of opinion on 
 
 8 In Siebold und Kollikek's Zeitschrift fur Wissenschafiliche Zoohgie, 
 1858. 
 
202 ANTICIPATION OF [CHAP. XI. 
 
 this subject. The ultimate fact in the Generation of plants 
 and of animals seemed attained when it was discovered that 
 impregnation essentially consists in the union of a spermcell 
 with a germcell. This splendid generalization still continues 
 to be the true expression of the widest classes of phenomena. 
 But it is not absolute. There are many indisputable facts 
 pointing to an important variation in the law ; a variation 
 felicitously named Parthenogenesis, 9 and successfully traced as 
 a frequent mode of reproduction in Polypes, Entomostraca, 
 Bees, Moths, and Aphides. It has also been asserted, by 
 distinguished botanists, as a mode of reproduction in plants ; 
 but the latest investigations throw such doubt on all the 
 specified cases, that for the present we must hold a verdict of 
 " not proven," 10 No such doubt is permissible respecting the 
 fact in animal generation. In all those named above, we have 
 the most rigorous evidence that unfertilized ova have pro- 
 duced perfect progeny, which in turn were fertile, either as 
 virgins, or coupled with males. I speak with the more confi- 
 dence because I have patiently investigated the question, 
 tested the evidence, and added some contribution of new obser- 
 vations. 11 But the single observation about to be cited from 
 Bonnet, suffices to prove that such a phenomenon does occur. 
 § 190. The Aphis, a winged insect familiar with our rose- 
 trees and other plants, and vulgarly called the plant-louse, 
 deposits its eggs at the close of summer, in the axils of the 
 leaves of plants. These eggs are hatched in the following 
 spring. The insect which issues is, however, wingless and 
 sexless. Although sexless, and although isolated from 
 every other individual of its kind, this insect brings forth 
 other sexless insects; and brings them forth alive, not 
 
 9 Owen, in his work On Parthenogenesis ; or the successive production of 
 procreating individuals from a single ovum, 1849. 
 
 10 Cueeet: Report on Vegetable Parthenogenesis, in the Natural History 
 Review, Oct., 1861. 
 
 11 For fuller detail, see Seaside Studies, 2nd ed., I860, pp. 296, seq. 
 
CHAP. XI.J MODERN DISCOVERIES. 203 
 
 simply as eggs. Bonnet « separated one as soon as it was 
 hatched, reared it in the strictest seclusion, watching it daily, 
 almost hourly, with the patient tenacity of genius. He has 
 recorded his anxieties, his tremulous agitation lest its death 
 should frustrate all his hopes ; and his joy, (after seeing his 
 captive four times shed its skin and thus reach its normal 
 development,) to observe that this absolute virginity did not in 
 the least interfere with fertility. On the eleventh day this 
 secluded Aphis produced a live Aphis, which was instantly 
 secluded in like manner ; another succeeded, then another. 
 Every twenty-four hours the brood was increased by three, 
 four, and even ten fresh comers ; so that at the end of twenty- 
 one days this virgin insect had given birth to ninety-five 
 living insects ! Nor does the marvel end here : each of these 
 virgin products will in turn produce virgin progeny ; and this 
 goes on for several successive generations. 
 
 § 191. This is enough to prove the fact ; how can we 
 explain it? Is it the decided contradiction to the general 
 law of reproduction that it appears to be? On what does 
 the law of the union between spermcell and germcell itself 
 repose ? 
 
 Some speculative biologists have likened this union to the 
 union of an acid with a base which gives a new product differing 
 from either. But the comparison is untenable. One striking 
 result of modern Histology is that germcell and spermcell, 
 ovum and spermatozoon, are identical, and in the earlier 
 phases of their development they are indistinguishable. , It is 
 only in their subsequent stages that they differ. 13 If there- 
 fore Histology on the one hand proves the identity of germcell 
 
 12 Bonnet: Traitt d' Insectologie, 1745, 1., 26, seq. 
 
 13 Charles Robin : Comptes JRendus de VAcademie des Sciences, 1848, 
 p. 427. In this memoir it is shown that in the male organs, both of animals 
 and plants, an ovule is formed identical with the ovule formed in females. Its 
 vitellus spontaneously subdivides into the embryonal cells, each of which be- 
 comes a spermatozoon, or a pollen grain. 
 
204 ANTICIPATION OF [CHAP. XI. 
 
 and spermcell ; observation on the other proves that animals, 
 normal in structure and functions, are sometimes developed 
 from germcells alone : the unfertilized egg developes into an 
 animal identical with that developed from the fertilized egg. 
 The influence of fertilization — the union of spermcell with 
 germcell — cannot therefore be like the union of an acid with 
 a base, to form a salt. No alkali developes spontaneously into 
 a salt ; without the acid, the alkali is powerless to assume any 
 of the saline forms. But the germcell does develope into an 
 embryo, without the aid of a spermcell; and even in those 
 cases where the union with a spermcell is indispensable for the 
 full development of an embryo, the germcell alone spontane- 
 ously passes through the same early phases of development 
 as it would pass through if fertilized. 
 
 § 192. The germcell of a reptile, bird, or mammal, is 
 unable to continue this development without the aid of a 
 spermcell. But in Polypes, Entomostraca, Bees, Aphides, . 
 and Moths, the development may continue. One may accept 
 therefore the general fact that every ovum has within itself a 
 power of development, unaided by a spermatozoon. In the 
 more complex organisms this unaided development falls very 
 far short of an embryo ; but it travels some distance on that 
 road ; and when, as in insects, the goal is not very distant, it 
 may be reached alone. I have compared the spermatozoa to 
 the extra pair of horses put to the carriage when a steep hill 
 has to be crossed. Two horses bring the carriage to the foot 
 of the hill, and by precisely the same route as four horses 
 would have taken; but here, at the foot of the hill, other 
 horses are indispensable. 
 
 Newport's investigations in the artificial impregnation of 
 the ova of amphibia, led him to believe that although impreg- 
 nation commences at the instant of contact between sperma- 
 tozoon and ovum, yet a certain duration of contact is requisite 
 for the completion of development ; and although subsequent 
 researches have modified this conclusion by proving that it is 
 
CHAP. XI.] MODERN DISCOVERIES. 205 
 
 not contact alone, but the entrance of the spermatozoon into 
 the ovum, which determines fecundation, the result is the 
 same. An exceedingly minute quantity .of spermatozoa 
 suffices; but development takes place much more slowly 
 than when the quantity is abundant ; and below a certain 
 minimum the impregnation is only partial, the yelk is 
 imperfectly segmented. 14 
 
 § 193. So much on the general question. Let us now 
 see how it stands with the Bees. The fact of Partheno- 
 genesis in Bees has been placed beyond cavil by the researches 
 of Dziebzon and Von Siebold. 15 It is a fact which is 
 guaranteed by anatomical data, no less than by careful obser- 
 vation, rigidly controlled and verified. 
 
 Anatomical investigation has discovered that the Queen- 
 bee is a perfect female ; the Worker an imperfect female ; and 
 the Drone a perfect male. In the first and last, the generative 
 organs are complete ; in the second they are present, but in 
 so undeveloped a condition as to forbid congress. One of 
 these organs in the female is curious : it is a spermatic 
 receptacle (receptaculwm seminis) l6 which is filled with sper- 
 matozoa during congress, and retains them during the greater 
 part of the Queen's life ; only those ova which are fertilized 
 by the spermatozoa develope into Queens and Workers; the 
 unfertilized ova become Drones. 
 
 It has further been ascertained that the Queen only 
 becomes impregnated during her wedding flight. If her flight 
 be prevented, by the removal of her wings, or any other 
 means, she is forced to remain a virgin ; nevertheless in this 
 state she deposits eggs, and these eggs become bees, no less 
 
 14 " Manifesta igitur est sententia proposita: marem formam solum tribuere: 
 fcBminam autem universam materiem, formam verd usque ad aliquid." — Gesal- 
 pinus: Quastionum Peripateticarum, 1571, p. 102. 
 
 15 Von Siebold: On true Parthenogenesis in Bees and Moths, trans, by 
 W. S. Dallas, London, 1857. 
 
 16 Von Siebold has since discovered a similar organ in Tritons and Sala- 
 manders. — Zeitsehrift fur Wissen. Zool., 1858. It is found also in snails, 
 Trematoda, and many insects. 
 
206 ANTICIPATION OF [CHAP. XI. 
 
 than if they had been fertilized. In like manner the virgin 
 Workers lay eggs, when the Hive is deprived of its Queen. 
 But there is this peculiarity common to the eggs under both 
 these conditions : they only become Drones, never Workers, 
 nor Queens. 17 
 
 § 194. The anatomical data which thus form the basis of 
 the theory of Parthenogenesis in Bees were not, and could 
 not have been, known to Aristotle ; nor were the experimental 
 proofs by which it is verified suggested to him. All he knew 
 on the subject was derived from the loose observation of bee- 
 keepers. If some of his sentences now read like a lucky 
 anticipation of the truth, we have only to compare them with 
 other sentences, to see that the agreement is delusive. He 
 was wholly in the dark respecting the sexual differences. He 
 thinks it improbable that the Queen should be a female, and 
 the Drone a male, because the Queen has a sting, " and 
 Nature never bestows a defensive weapon on females : " an 
 argument as unfortunate in its teleology as it is inaccurate in 
 its data. On the other hand he holds it to be improbable 
 that the workers should be males, and the drones females; 
 because the workers take care of the young, " and this the 
 male never does." Again the data are wrong : some males 
 take upon themselves the entire charge of the young ; and the 
 male pipefish (syngnathus) even hatches the eggs. 
 
 But the conclusive proof that he knew nothing of Parthe- 
 nogenesis as an exceptional process, is that he insists on the 
 fact of no impregnation ever taking place among bees — since, he 
 says, it has never been witnessed, and must have been witnessed 
 had it been in the order of nature. He thought that all 
 generation in bees resulted from a mingling of the male and 
 
 17 Let no sarcastic conclusion bo precipitately drawn from this fact of the 
 male bee proceeding from unfertilized eggs. In one kind of Moth {Psyche), it 
 is the female which proceeds from the unfertilized egg. In the silkworm moth 
 the virgin progeny are both male and female. 
 
CHAP. XI.] MODERN DISCOVERIES. 207 
 
 female principles. There was no act of congress. They were 
 self-generated, by a sort of hermaphroditism such as was 
 observed in fish. 
 
 § 195. We are thus led to the third case on our list : — 
 
 III. — Hermaphroditism in Fish. 
 
 Here, again, we have a delicate anatomical problem, such 
 as Aristotle had no means of solving. 
 
 Many plants are dioecious, and many of the lower animals 
 (as snails) are double-sexed, i. e. capable either of self- 
 impregnation, or of mutual impregnation. This Hermaphro- 
 ditism is confined to the invertebrata, with the single known 
 exception of certain species of Perch. V Had the term dioecious 
 been carried over from the vegetable to the animal kingdom, 
 there might have been an avoidance of the confusion which 
 now exists, because the term, Hermaphroditism, includes 
 two widely different groups of phenomena : 1st, the normal 
 organization of a complete generative apparatus of both sexes 
 in the same individual ; 2nd, the abnormal organization, in 
 which arrest or excess of development in one or more parts 
 of the generative apparatus presents some of the appearance, 
 though not the reality, of two sexes. 18 I venture to propose 
 the terms dichogamism for the bisexual class, and hermaphro- 
 ditism for the abnormal class. 
 
 § 196. It must be borne in mind that the organs of both 
 sexes are formed on the same plan, and are, in their earlier 
 stages, absolutely indistinguishable from one another. There 
 is at first neither male nor female; but both these forms 
 branch from a common root, and never even in their ultimate 
 development lose the discoverable traces of their common 
 type. It is not strictly accurate to say that at first all 
 
 18 See this subject folly treated in Mukder: Bildungsgeschichte der Geni- 
 talien, 1830, p. 121. Isidore St. Hilaire: Histoires des Anomalies de V 'Orga- 
 nisation, 1836, II., 30, 174. Meckel : TraiU d'Anatomie comparie, Paris, 
 1828, 1., 298. 
 
208 ANTICIPATION OF [CHAP. XI. 
 
 organisms are female, and then gradually develope into 
 the male ; 19 but it is true that the earlier stages of 
 the male have a resemblance to the later stages of the 
 female. 20 • 
 
 Hermaphroditism is consequently wholly unlike the 
 normal dichogamic type of structure. It arises from an 
 arrest, or excess of development in one organ of the genera- 
 tive apparatus ; and considering that the organs in male and 
 female are both formed on the same plan, we can easily 
 understand how an arrest, or excess, will produce in the 
 male a resemblance to the female, in the female a resemblance 
 to the male. But this resemblance only affects the form, 
 it does not affect the function. The Hermaphrodite is 
 always of one sex, and, in spite of deceptive appearances, 
 we never find such an organism producing both spermato- 
 zoa and ova, but only one of these. When both sexes are 
 united in one individual, we have dichogamism, properly so 
 
 19 " II n'y a primitivement ni male ni femelle ; a un second temps en appa- 
 rence il n'y a que des femelles; puis les organes d'apparence femelle se trans- 
 forment en organes males. Toutes les femelles a une certaine epoque de leur 
 formation ont l'air d'etre hermaphrodites." — Sekres : Pricis de I'Anatomie 
 transcendante, 1842, p. 104. 
 
 20 " Embryo primus a formatione et inchoataa vitas momentis peculiari sexu 
 donatus non est, sed genitalium utriusque sexus rudimentis instructus est, et a 
 yirium physicarum, quae vitam et partium organicarum evolutionem mode- 
 rantur, quantitate et directione dependet, an mas an vero ftsmina prodeat." — 
 Ackekmakn: Infantis Androgyni historia, quoted by M&llbh : Bildungs- 
 geschichte der Genitalien, where ample and accurate details on this delicate 
 and important point may be found. See also Rathkb: Abhandhmgen 
 zur Bildungs und JSntwickelungsgeschichte der Menschen und Thiere, 1832, 1., 
 45-92; Kollikek : Entwickelungsgeschichte des Menschen, 1861, p. 448; or 
 Longet: TraiU de Physiologie, 1850, II., p. 208. Quite recently Eottoet has 
 proved that the erectile apparatus of man, often, but erroneously, called erectile 
 tissue, has its anatomical and functional analogue in the woman. Memoire sur 
 les organes erectiles de la Femme, in Bkown Sequahd's Journal de Physiol., 
 1858, pp. 47, 320, 479. One of the most curious of the morphological identi- 
 fications is that of the vesicula prostatica in the male with the uterus and vagina 
 of the female. See Leuckakt: Vesicula prostatica, in the Cyclopaedia of Anat. 
 and Physiol. The disputes on this point may be settled, I think, by Geoffroy 
 St. Hilaire's luminous guide, the principe des connexions, which best deter- 
 mines homologies. 
 
CHAP. XI.] MODERN DISCOVERIES. 
 
 209 
 
 called, 21 i. e. the bisexual structure, as in dioecious plants, 
 in which the characteristic developments of both sexes are 
 found, and both spermcells and germcells are produced. The 
 simplest form of this bisexual condition in animals I found to 
 exist occasionally in Sea-anemones and some Polypes, namely, 
 the normal production of germcells and spermcells in one 
 and the same spot. The next step is in the differentiation 
 of one special organ for the production of germcells, and of 
 another organ for spermcells. 
 
 § 197. Of the two kinds of Hermaphroditism, commonly 
 confounded, but in the preceding paragraphs markedly dis- 
 tinguished, the first has been detected in all classes of 
 animals ; as, indeed, may be anticipated from the fact of 
 its being a defect of development. The second, common 
 enough in Kadiata and Mollusca, has never yet been detected 
 in Insects, Arachnida, or — with the single exception of the 
 Perch — in Vertebrata. That this single exception should 
 have been known to Aristotle may well excite surprise. We 
 are, however, prepared to receive the announcement with 
 some scepticism, and are disposed to believe that he was 
 merely repeating the hearsay of fishermen, or that he was 
 advancing some crude hypotheses to explain an ill-observed 
 fact. A brief history of the discovery will best display 
 this. 
 
 § 198. Eondblet, in 1654, after citing Aristotle's remark 
 that the perch (serranus) is capable of self-reproduction, and that 
 no males had been found, suggests that perhaps the perch is 
 at once both male and female ; but he does not throw much 
 
 21 The generative apparatus has three pairs of organs : external, median, and 
 internal. These three pairs are nourished by three pairs of arteries: the external 
 iliac, the hypogastric, and the spermatic. Any one pair, or one of each pair, 
 may be arrested or accelerated in development, and thus produce abnormal 
 hermaphroditism. Cases haye been known of lateral hermaphroditism, in 
 which the organs of each side hare been differently developed.— Isidore St. 
 Hilaiee, Op. cit, vol. II. Comp. also Muller: Bildungsgeschichte, p. 130. 
 
 14 
 
210 ANTICIPATION OP f [CHAP. XI. 
 
 emphasis on this suggestion, which was only a lucky guess. 28 
 Chaeleton, in 1667, mentions it as an exception to the whole 
 class of fishes, that in this genus, there is no distinction of 
 sex. He does not suspect them to be bisexual, but asexual. 83 
 Cavolini described both the ovaries and testes present in the 
 same individual; 8 * but described them so imperfectly that 
 Eudolphi declared he had mistaken the ovaries, in an im- 
 perfect state of development, for testes ; 8S and Meckel con- 
 firming this, adds that he himself never found any but females. 
 Valenciennes espoused the opinion of Cavolini, which was 
 also adopted at first by Cuviee, who afterwards in the second 
 edition of his Reg&e Animal, came to doubt its accuracy. 
 Duvernot pronounced decidedly against it. 26 
 
 "With such an array of authorities against the idea, it is 
 difficult to suppose that Aristotle, if he happened to be right 
 where they were wrong, could have had very solid grounds for 
 his opinion. They knew of the opinion, examined its evidence, 
 and rejected it. That they were wrong, has been satisfactorily 
 settled by the researches of Dufoss^ ; 2r but this result in no 
 way vindicates Aristotle's opinion. Dufoss6 examined 368 
 specimens of serranus scriba, s. cabrilla and s. hepatus ; and 
 both by anatomical inspection, and direct observation, dis- 
 covered them to be normally bisexual. He not only recog- 
 nized spermatozoa and ova, but observed the fish depositing 
 their ova, and at the same time casting their milt. 
 
 22 Kondeletii: De Piscis marinis. Lib. IV., p. 185: "Verumdehac re 
 nihil statuo, sed liberum cuique judicium relinquo." Quoted by Dueosse' in 
 the Memoire presently to be cited. 
 
 23 Charleton : Exercit. de Differentibus et Nominibus Animalium, 1677. 
 Pisce, p. 14. 
 
 81 Cavolini: Memoria sulfa generazione deipesci, 1787, p. 91. 
 
 25 Meckel: Traite d'Anat. comp. Paris, 1828. I., 300. 
 
 28 Duvernot et Cdviek: Lecons d'Anat. camp., 1846. I., p. 193. Refer- 
 ences 24 and 26 are from Dufosse's Memoire. 
 
 27 Dufosse: Annates des Sciences Nat, 1856, p. 295, where the organs are 
 described and figured in minute detail. 
 
OHAP. XI.] MODERN DISCOVERIES. 211 
 
 Instead of this anatomical evidence, which Aristotle could 
 not have had, and this evidence of observation, which he 
 might have had, but had not, it is clear that he was relying 
 upon fishermen's report as to there being only females ; 28 and 
 this he makes the evidence for his assumption that they are 
 self-impregnating, like the bees. 
 
 § 199. This third example has thus turned out no more 
 favourable to the idea of his having anticipated modern dis- 
 coveries, than its two predecessors. Let us consider a fourth. 
 
 IV. — Placental Fish. 
 
 The three preceding examples might a priori have been 
 dismissed as obvious cases of the facility with which modern 
 opinions may be read into ancient texts. They all three 
 depend upon minute and accurate anatomical knowledge, and 
 could not possibly have been correctly known, so long as the 
 anatomical basis was unknown. Were it true, therefore, that 
 Aristotle had rightly guessed, we could not accept the guess 
 as an anticipation, nor glorify his sagacity ; since a guess in 
 science has only value when it is founded on some positive 
 facts which it endeavours to explain, or when it leads to 
 some specific research. A guess is scientific when it is a 
 genuine hypothesis — a finger-post on the laborious route 
 of inquiry, not a phrase which is accepted for an ex- 
 planation. 
 
 § 200. In the cases now to be examined we shall find 
 Aristotle at more advantage. He is recording simple facts of 
 observation ; and as these demand neither preliminary know- 
 ledge, nor difficult inquiry, we may readily admit that he has 
 seen and noted what subsequent naturalists had no oppor- 
 tunity of seeing, or had overlooked. 
 
 § 201. The first of these is the existence of placental 
 fishes. To a modern biologist the announcement is startling ; 
 
 88 See § 473, where it appears that he did not even believe these statements. 
 
 14-2 
 
212 ANTICIPATION OP [CHAP. XI. 
 
 and when he learns that the announcement is strictly true, 
 and that Aristotle was perfectly aware of the fact, his surprise 
 is apt to express itself in exaggerated admiration. But all 
 readers who are imperfectly acquainted with embryology, 
 will understand from their own experience the state of 
 Aristotle's mind. They will see nothing startling in the 
 announcement, because they will not have present to their 
 minds the systematic knowledge which it seems to contradict. 
 Surprise starts from a background of knowledge, or fixed 
 belief. Nothing is surprising to ignorance, because the 
 mind in that state has no preconceptions to be contradicted. 
 To the ancients it could be but small matter of surprise 
 when told that animals were generated spontaneously, or 
 that mice became impregnated by licking salt. Before these 
 things could be surprising, a certain amount of know- 
 ledge respecting the laws of generation must have been 
 systematized. Had Aristotle really known the facts of Par- 
 thenogenesis and Metagenesis, which so much astonish us, 
 they would probably have excited no wonderment in his 
 mind, because they would have * disturbed no deeply-rooted 
 convictions. Before surprise at a phenomenon can be felt, we 
 must have learned to rely on an uniformity which seems con- 
 tradicted by it. A chemist would feel a painful difficulty in 
 believing that an acid had become converted into a salt without 
 the presence of a base. An ordinary man would feel no 
 difficulty at all in it ; he would believe it as easily as the 
 reverse. In like manner, a biologist hears with surprise 
 that in ^he same genus of fishes there are species which 
 bring forth their young alive, like other viviparous fishes 
 and reptiles, and also species which bring forth their young 
 like mammalia, with a placenta — hears it with so much 
 surprise as to demand rigorous proof of the fact; whereas 
 Aristotle hears and records the fact without any surprise 
 at all. 
 
 § 201 a. The fact is of considerable interest, and, as no 
 
CHAP. XI.J MODEKN DISCOVEEIES. 213 
 
 mention of it occurs in the English text-books that have 
 fallen in my way, we may pause a moment to examine it. 
 
 Animals are classed as oviparous and viviparous. The obvi- 
 ous differences implied in bringing forth young alive, or bringing 
 forth eggs which develope into young, require corresponding 
 differences in terms ; but to the speculative biologist, oviparity 
 and viviparity are identical processes ; identical, observe, not the 
 same. Since De Geaaf ^ commenced, and Von Baer 30 com- 
 pleted the discovery of the mammalian egg, and since it has 
 been known that this egg is developed into an embryo under 
 conditions identical with those of all other animals, passing 
 through precisely analogous phases of differentiation, the con- 
 clusion has been irresistible that all animals are oviparous ; 
 and, inasmuch as the eggs, when deposited, are all alive, it 
 follows that all animals are viviparous. 31 
 
 § 202. We still speak of the metamorphoses of insects 
 and batrachians, as if such changes were peculiar to insects 
 and batrachians ; whereas we know that all animals, man 
 included, undergo successive metamorphoses quite as remark- 
 able ; but they undergo them while within the egg, or within 
 the parent body. A striking illustration of this is seen in 
 the two kinds of salamander. In one — the aquatic — the 
 young is born a tadpole ; in the other, the land salamander, 
 (Salamandra atra), it is born a perfect animal. We observe 
 the tadpole swimming in the pond, where it gradually loses 
 
 29 De Ghaaf : De Mulierum organis Generationum, p. 80, ] 58. Opera, 
 Lugd., 1678. 
 
 30 Von Baeb: Epistola de ovi mammalium et hominis genesi, 1827. I know 
 this only through the translation published by Breschet : Repertoire general 
 d'Anat. et de Physiol. Pathologique, Paris, 1829, to which is also added Von 
 Babe's commentary of 1828. 
 
 31 As indeed was clearly seen by Harvey : " All animals are in some sort 
 produced out of an egge; for the foetus of viviparous creatures is produced after 
 the same manner and order out of a pre-existent conception, as the chicken is 
 formed and constituted out of an egge . . . For an egge is an exposed 
 conception, from which a chicken is produced, but a conception is an egge which 
 is retained within until the foetus have attained its just bulk." — Exercitations 
 concerning the Generation of living Creatures, 1653, p. 391. 
 
214 ANTICIPATION OP [OHAP. XI. 
 
 its gills and acquires its four limbs by successive metamor- 
 phoses. But precisely these metamorphoses are undergone 
 by the other salamander within the body of its mother. I 
 have removed them from the mother's body when in this 
 tadpole condition, placed them in water, and observed them 
 swim about, indistinguishable from the ordinary aquatic tad- 
 pole. Again : the white ant passes through all its metamor- 
 phoses while in the egg ; other insects pass through the 
 stages of grub and pupa before reaching that stage of develop- 
 ment reached by the white ant on emerging from the egg. 
 
 It is needless to insist on the differences observable between 
 these two forms of reproduction, since underneath the differ- 
 ences which adapt the young of the one species to an aquatic, 
 and the young of the other to a terrestrial existence, there 
 persists the physiological identity. Whether all the stages 
 of development be passed through within the parent or in the 
 water, there is no difference whatever in the successive stages 
 themselves, nor in their final issue — a consideration, by the 
 way, which shows how untenable is the plausible generalization 
 that the longer the period in which the embryo remains within 
 its parent's body, the more complex will be its organization. 
 The dog is as complex as the camel, yet the dog requires 
 only nine weeks', and the camel twelve months' gestation. 
 The aquatic salamander is as complex as the terrestrial, yet 
 all its development, from the very moment of fertilization 
 of the ova, takes place outside the parent's body ; while that 
 of the terrestrial salamander takes place inside the parent's 
 body. 
 
 § 203. There are several varieties in the conditions under 
 which the impregnated egg will develope : — 
 
 1st. It may be left to the agency of oxygen, and the very 
 slight amount of heat in the water. 
 
 2nd. It may be left to the agency of oxygen and greater 
 amount of heat in the air. In each of these two cases an 
 exchange of gases takes place, passing through the shell. 
 
CHAP. XI.] MODERN DISCOVERIES. 215 
 
 If the shell be varnished, or if the exchange of gases be 
 hindered, no development takes place. 32 
 
 3rd. It may be hatched under the protection of the parent's 
 body ; outside, as under the breast of the bird, or in the pouch 
 of the male pipefish ; inside, as in the viviparous infusoria, 
 molluscs, fishes, reptiles, and mammals. 33 
 
 § 204. But under all these varieties the process is iden- 
 tical, the successive changes are uniform. The egg, once 
 impregnated, is an independent living being ; its connection 
 with the parent is indirect, and (with the strange exception of 
 the Salpce) only approaches distinctness in the higher animals, 
 called placental animals. In one sense the mother feeds the 
 offspring in all animals : in some she simply furnishes the 
 yelk of the egg, which will be used up in the development of 
 the embryo; in others, as in molluscs and batraehians, the eggs 
 are embedded in a mass of transparent mucus which serves the 
 young as food; 3 * in others the egg is nourished within the 
 parent's body ; but not by any more direct means. The egg is 
 free and unattached in the oviduct, or uterus, and while there 
 it receives nourishment in some unexplained way. 35 
 
 32 Daheste: Memoire sur V influence qu'exerce sur le developpement dupoulet 
 V application partielle d'un vernissur la coquiUe deVcmf. — Annates des Sc. Nat., 
 1855, IV., 119. 
 
 33 " Besides, as a chicken is hatched out of an eggrf by the fostering heat of 
 the sitting hen, or some other adscititious hospitable patronage, so also the fetus 
 is produced out of the conception in the eggf by the soft and most natural 
 warmth of the parent." — Harvey: Exercit. concerning Generation, p. 393. 
 
 34 Physiologists little suspect the power possessed by the embryo of assimi- 
 lating material, however minute may be the quantities present. Eor example, 
 I placed three tadpoles immediately on their emerging from the egg into about 
 two ounces of filtered water, with no visible substance, animal or vegetable. 
 The water was never changed, nor was any food added; nevertheless, the tad- 
 poles lived rather more than a month, lost their gills, and increased to about 
 four times their original size 1 
 
 K Unexplained, but indubitable. The embryo notoriously increases in utero. 
 The chick, on emerging from the shell, weighs less than the original egg, de- 
 ducting the shell. According to Geoffhoy St. Hilaike the loss is as much 
 as one-sixth; see his M&moire, cited by his son: Vie, travaux et doctrine de 
 Geoffroy St. Hilaire, 1847, p. 457. This loss is explicable : during the whole 
 period of incubation the chick has received nothing but heat (imponderable) 
 
216 ANTICIPATION OF [CHAP. XI. 
 
 Owen has shown how in the kangaroo, and other impla- 
 cental mammalia, the embryo is nourished. But as we 
 arrive at the placental mammalia we seem to come upon 
 a totally different arrangement, namely, a direct communi- 
 cation between the embryo and parent. This placenta (or 
 " afterbirth ") seems actually to unite the two ; yet although 
 there is, so to speak, physiological union, there is no 
 anatomical union ; and this physiological union only differs 
 in degree from that which is seen in the implacental vivipara. 
 In point of fact, the placenta 3fi is a contrivance whereby the 
 bloodvessels of the uterus lie side by side with the bloodvessels 
 of the chorion ; that is to say, one portion of the maternal 
 bloodvessels is brought into contact with a portion of the 
 embryo's bloodvessels ; and at this point of contact the two 
 vessels exchange gases and liquids by osmosis through their 
 walls ; so that the placenta forms an organ of nutrition and 
 respiration for the embryo. It is by this channel that the 
 mother may communicate diseases to her child. Indeed, 
 whatever affects her blood, must affect its blood. Nevertheless, 
 in spite of this seeming union, the embryo is truly inde- 
 pendent ; it is fed from the maternal blood, as a few months 
 later it will be fed by the maternal milk. But embryo or 
 infant, it is equally independent. 
 
 and oxygen ; whereas it has given off a large amount of water by evaporation, 
 and of lithic acid, &c., by secretion. Now compare this loss in ovo with the 
 gain in utero : according to Dr. John Davy, the average weight of the torpedo's 
 egg is 182 grains, the weight of the torpedo developed from it inside the parent 
 is 479 grains. Davy: Anatomical and Physiological Observations, 1839, 1., 65; 
 yet there is no vascular connection between mother and offspring. Compare 
 chap. XV., note 11. 
 
 36 On certain delicate points in the structure of the placenta the student may 
 consult Charles Robin: Mtmoire sur quelques points d' Anatomic et Physiologic 
 de la muqueuse utirine, in Brown Sequard's Journal de la Physiologie, 1858, 
 I., 47. and Farre: Uterus and its Appendages, in the Cyclopaedia of Anatomy 
 and Physiology. Compare also Von Baer : Untersuchungen iiber die Gefiiss- 
 bindung zwischen Mutter und Frucht in den Saugethieren, 1828 ; and Sharpey 
 in Italy's translation of MUller's Physiology; also the memoir cited in 
 note 37. 
 
CHAP. XI.] MODERN DISCOVERIES. 217 
 
 § 205. I have been somewhat more minute than was 
 absolutely necessary to explain the particular point now in 
 hand; but all these details will be needed in future pages, 
 and therefore I have not hesitated to give them in this place 
 as the most convenient. 
 
 The survey we have taken of the main differences in the 
 animal kingdom respecting the connection of the embryo with 
 the mother, showing as it does that except in the Salpa only 
 in the highest organisms does the connection approach direct- 
 ness, and that in all other organisms there is no semblance 
 of connection, will explain the surprise and interest felt in 
 Muller's rediscovery of the fact announced by Aristotle — 
 that one of the cartilaginous fishes (Mustelus) resembled the 
 mammalia in possessing a placenta, though not exactly of 
 the mammalian structure ; 37 the more so, since it was known 
 that other viviparous species had no trace of it. 
 
 " Although Stenon had seen something of the kind," says 
 Mulleb, " and Cuviek, mentions a fact which must recall a 
 passage to the memory of every student of Aristotle, yet the 
 fish named by Aristotle has hitherto remained totally un- 
 known, and none of the fishes hitherto examined presented 
 the phenomenon noticed by him ; so that this statement of 
 the great philosopher, like so many other remarkable facts of 
 natural history observed by him, has remained unexplained." 
 
 § 206. Zoologists might learn from this a lesson. Al- 
 though many of the statements to be found in Aristotle are 
 notoriously inaccurate, yet in all those cases not proved to be 
 wrong, it would be prudent to assume the possibility of their 
 being right. They should by no means be accepted ; but they 
 might serve as finger-posts. Kesearch should be made to 
 verify or to refute them. 
 
 As an example let us cite his assertion that the cuttlefish 
 
 37 See MOllek's elaborate memoir, Veber der glatten Hai des Aristotdes, 
 in the Berlin Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1840, p. 187. 
 
218 ANTICIPATION OF [CHAP. XI. 
 
 embryo has its head united with the vitellus, which hangs from 
 its mouth. This singular statement turns out to be nearly 
 accurate, as was proved by the researches of Kolliker. 38 
 
 § 207. Again he says that a fish called Physeis makes a 
 nest like a bird; a statement which Cuviee tells us was 
 always doubted until an Italian naturalist, Olivi, had occasion 
 to verify it. 39 
 
 § 208. Eespecting the vision of the Mole some con- 
 fusion prevails. " Until our own days," says Cuviee, 40 
 (alluding of course to the researches of Geoffeoy St. 
 Hilaiee, 41 ) "it was always denied that the mole had eyes, 
 in spite of Aristotle's assertion ; but quite recently his obser- 
 vation has been verified." 
 
 Geoffeoy St. Hilaiee begins his memoir by asserting 
 that Aristotle and all the Greek philosophers thought the mole 
 was blind ; for what purpose should it have eyes with which it 
 could not see ? 
 
 Both these illustrious men somewhat misrepresent the 
 real position of Aristotle. Galen, Aldoveandtjs, and Soaligeb 
 maintained that the mole had eyes and could see; but 
 Aristotle's assertion is that the mole has eyes yet cannot 
 see. "All the red-blooded viviparous animals," he says, 
 " have all the senses, though in some cases one is imperfect, 
 as in the mole, which cannot see, for externally it has no 
 visible eyes. But if we remove the thick skin of the head, 
 we find on the spot where the eye is wont to be, an eye, 
 imperfect indeed, but nevertheless possessing all the essential 
 
 38 Vogt: Zoologische Briefe, 1851, I., 381; Gegenbauer: Grundzuge der 
 Vergleiehenden Anatomie, 1859. 
 
 39 Cuviee: Hist des Sciences Nat, 1841, 1., 157. The nest-building fishes, 
 namely, the Stickleback, the Goramy, and the Hassar, have since been care- 
 fully studied. 
 
 « Ibid., I., 159. 
 
 41 Geoferoy St. Hilaire : Histoire NatureUe des Mammiferes, 1834, 
 Lecon XVI.. in which there is an extremely interesting account of the structure 
 and habits of the mole. 
 
CHAP. XI.] MODERN DISCOVERIES. 219 
 
 parts of an eye. "We detect the pupil and the cornea, only 
 they are smaller than usual." 42 
 
 Two questions are raised, Has the mole eyes ? and Is the 
 mole mentioned by Aristotle the talpa known to us ? On the 
 first point we may reply with Sir Thomas Browne : " That the 
 moles have eyes in their head is manifested unto any that 
 want them not in their own ; and are discoverable not only in 
 the old ones, but, as we have observed, in young and naked 
 conceptions taken out of the belly of the dam." 43 Geoffrov 
 St. Hilaiee not only proved that the mole had perfect eyes, 
 but proved also that it had perfect vision. 
 
 With regard to the second point, Lamarck 44 mentions 
 that a traveller had discovered in Syria a species of mole 
 which perfectly corresponds with Aristotle's description, and 
 hence he concludes that this was the species to which the 
 Stagirite referred, and not our common European mole. 
 Cdvter's editors also remark that in Greece there does exist 
 a little subterraneous animal, called the rat-mole, which is 
 totally incapable of vision. 43 
 
 § 209. Cxivier's desire to glorify Aristotle has led him 
 into error, in attributing to him the discovery, "which has 
 only been verified in our own day," that molluscs have a 
 brain. This is trebly unfortunate. The word (/uaXa/cia), 
 which is here translated molluscs, was not used by Aristotle 
 to designate any wider group than the cephalopoda; he did 
 not suppose the pinna, solen, oyster, cockle, mussel, &c, 
 to possess a brain : he expressly states that no " bloodless " 
 
 48 Hist. An., IV, 8. 
 
 43 Browne: Vulgar Errors, ed. Wilkins, 1852, I., 312. 
 
 44 Lamarck: Philosophie Zoologique, I., 241. 
 
 45 According to an Italian naturalist, quoted by Sonnenbtjrg (Lawi : 
 Memorie sopra le Talpa, Pisa, 1822), the Italian mole has its eyes covered, as 
 described by Aristotle, there being only a microscopic opening visible between 
 the lids. To the same effect the old Neapolitan, Imperato, says of the mole : 
 " Vive sotterra, senza occhi manifesti, ma oscuramente formati sotto la pelle.' 
 — DeW Historia Natural*, Libri XXVII., Naples, 1599, p. 776. 
 
220 ANTICIPATION OE MODERN DISCOVERIES. [CHAP. XI. 
 
 animal has a brain. The " brain " of the cuttlefish and cala- 
 mary is almost as obvious as that of a rabbit ; so that no dis- 
 covery was anticipated in naming the brain of these animals. 
 Secondly, the discovery of the brain in the less highly- 
 organized molluscs was not "one of our own day;" it is as 
 old as Swammerdamm. 46 Thirdly, the masses which Aristotle 
 and Cuvier call the "brain" are by modern anatomists recog- 
 nized as only cephalic ganglia, and cannot be considered as 
 homologous with cerebrum and cerebellum. 
 
 § 210. Although I have not exhausted the list of cases in 
 which Aristotle is said to have anticipated moderns, but must 
 leave the others to fall in as they occur in the analyses of the 
 works, those already cited will suffice to give a more definite 
 and accurate opinion respecting the claims so frequently urged 
 by the too facile enthusiasm of his eulogists. That opinion 
 may be thus briefly expressed: — Aristotle had certain facts 
 brought under his notice which were not known to his succes- 
 sors ; but in no single instance, and under no legitimate 
 extension of the term, can he be said to have made a 
 discovery. 
 
 § 211. I have indicated the reasons why he could not 
 have made a discovery, when it involved a precise appreciation 
 of delicate or complex phenomena; but in cases where the 
 phenomena are not too remote or too complex for the unas- 
 sisted senses, where the intellect is chiefly tasked, he is no 
 longer under the same disadvantage as when having to deal 
 with data discoverable only through the arduous research of 
 ages. Here the mighty intellect displays itself. Here the 
 mind, which could not avoid falling into absurdities when 
 theorizing about heat without the aid of a thermometer, and 
 about Physics without knowledge of the laws of motion, 
 rises into admirable eminence when treating of the higher 
 generalities of Life and Mind. 
 
 46 Swammerdamm: Bibel der Natur, Tab. IV., fig. 6, Tab. VI., fig. 1. See 
 also Halleb: Elements Physiologies, Lausanne, 1762, IV., 2. 
 
( 221 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE XII. 
 LIFE AND MIND : DE ANIMA. 
 
 § 212. Among the various works of Aristotle, the treatise 
 De Animd holds eminent rank. The extreme interest of its pro- 
 blems and the profundity of its views, render it the most valuable 
 and valued of ancient attempts to bring the facts of life and mind 
 into scientific order. A really good edition is still much needed j 1 
 but it must come from a physiologist. I do not mean by this to 
 intimate that the work is not a treatise on psychology; but 
 nemo psychologus nisi physiologus (to quote Johannes Mtjl- 
 ler), and the saying is peculiarly apposite respecting a treatise 
 which is occupied with the Soul as the Vital Principle. 
 
 § 213. The word ^v^rj is untranslatable in modern lan- 
 
 1 For scholars little is left to be desired by the valuable edition of Tkende- 
 lenbueg (Jena, 1833), with its voluminous commentary. But for men of 
 science another kind of work is needed. (Since this note was written A. Tok- 
 stkik has published a new recension of the .text from newly discovered MS., 
 Berlin, 1862. It is addressed solely to scholars. I have consulted it during 
 the revision of this chapter.) Of translations there are several; one in English 
 by Dr. Charles Colliek (Aristotle on the Vital Principle, Cambridge, 1855), 
 has been laid under contribution in these pages, though I have frequently de- 
 parted from it when a more rigid accuracy seemed indispensable. M. Babthe- 
 lemt St. Hilaike has given one in French, of which report speaks highly. 
 There are two or three in German. There is also a curious Tuscan paraphrase 
 by Segni: U trattato sopra i libri dell'Anima d'Aristotele, Florence, 1583. Of 
 the numerous commentaries on this treatise, published at the revival of Learn- 
 ing, I have consulted only the elaborate and tiresome work, Nifhi: Expositio 
 subtilissirna necnon et collectanea commentariaque in tres libros Aristotelis de 
 Anima, Venice, 1559. This is one of the fourteen folios which Agostino Mfo 
 published on Aristotle; and although valuable and curious as an index of the 
 philosophy of that time, is fully entitled to the cobwebs which now cover it. 
 
222 LIFE AND MIND : DE ANIMA. [CHAP. XII. 
 
 guages. It is commonly rendered by Anima, or its equiva- 
 lents, Ame, Seele, Soul. This has caused a general 
 misconception of the profounder meanings conveyed in 
 Aristotle's treatise. Since the days of Descartes there has 
 been a broad distinction between Life -and Mind, for which 
 two separate essences or principles were required; and this 
 distinction having permeated every modern language, we are 
 at a loss for a single word which will express the union of the 
 two, as it was conceived by Aristotle and all the early 
 thinkers. The word ijvyr\ represents Soul as both Life and 
 Mind — anima and animus. Yet if we translate the title of 
 Aristotle's treatise, " On the Soul," it will be as misleading in 
 its suggestions as the translation, " On the Vital Principle." 
 Both phrases are narrower in their meaning than the Greek ; 
 the one excludes the physiological, the other the psychological 
 meaning. Sir Alex. Grant justly remarks that the word 
 means more and less than our word soul ; " more, as having 
 on one side, at all events, a directly physical connection ; less, 
 as not in itself implying any religious association. "We can- 
 not translate ^pv\^ ' v ^ a ^ principle,' because, though it is this, 
 it is a great deal besides ; nor, ' mind,' because this would leave 
 out as much at the one end as the former translation did at 
 the other." 2 Yet on many accounts " Vital Principle " is 
 better than " Soul," and represents more accurately the 
 meaning of 4* V X*1 (which literally means breath, " the breath 
 of life," as anima also means breath, avs/xoc;) , s more accu- 
 
 * Grant: The Ethics of Aristotle, 1858, p. 236. 
 
 3 " This anima meant originally blowing or breathing, like spirit from 
 spirare, and was derived from a root, an, to blow, which gives us anila, wind, 
 in Sanskrit, and anemos in Greek. Ohost, the German geist, is based on the 
 same conception. It is connected with gust, with yeast, and even with the hiss- 
 ing and boiling geysers of Iceland."— Mai MCllbe: Lectures on the Science 
 of Language, 1862, p. 382. " Quod Graxi veteres unico ipvxvc nomine signi- 
 rlcarunt," says Patrizio, " id duplici Animi et Animse expressere Latini. In 
 etymis eorum, erravere utrique. Illi quod i\nixh v a verbo ij/vxaZ<i>, refrigere, 
 deduxere. Contrario ab ejus opere signiflcatu. Quoniam nullibi sit animus, 
 imxfi, quin ibi calor quoque existat. Isti quod a voce Grseca foi^oe., qui ventus 
 
CHAP, xn.] LIFE AND MIND : DE ANIMA. 223 
 
 rately, because Aristotle's view is not that of Stahl, and the 
 celebrated Montpellier school of " animists," which conceives 
 the Mind to be the animating principle, bestowing on the 
 body all activity, determining all vital functions, and thus 
 including under its supremacy all physical and physiological 
 phenomena. Instead of conceiving Life as one of the mani- 
 festations of Mind, Aristotle taught the precise obverse, 
 namely, that Mind is only the highest development of Life.* 
 He always exhibits Life as the general form of organic activity ; 
 Mind as only one of the special forms, developed in later 
 stages, but wholly absent from the earlier. "Plants," he 
 says, "have no sensation. By this the animal is separated 
 from that which is not animal. Numerically, therefore, it 
 (the soul) is one and the same part ; but in its mode of being 
 it is many and different." 5 
 
 est, parva admodum detorsione animum et animam derivavere. Contraria 
 maxime a vera re sententia. Nihil enim minus, quam ventus, animus est et 
 anima. Error hie uterque a respiratione venit. Nam ea qua? confesso ani- 
 mam habent, animantia sunt et animalia. Hsec vero respirant. Bespiratio fit 
 veato, ventus internum refrigerat calorem. A vento animus, a refrigeratione 
 yjwxfi sunt efformata."— Fkancisci Patritii : Nova de universis philos., libri 
 L V., comprehensa, "Venice, 1593: Pampsychia, I., p. 49. Stahl, in his dis- 
 sertation, De mechanismi et organismi diversitate (Theoria Medico, Vera, ed. 
 Choulant, Leipzig, 1831, 1., 45), tries to prove that -tyvxh is. a corruption of 
 Qvakxn, quasi tx {ov T0 fyvav. This is somewhat in the manner of Aristotle's 
 derivation of alBrtp from del and Bet: De cash, I., 3, 271. Plato also de- 
 rives it from Qvoexbt aa * ne driver and sustainer of nature: ij Qvmv 6xtl Kai 
 £X«, foakxw iirovofiaZtiv i\ian 8k Kai ipvxv v KOfnptvojievov \syuv. — Cratylus, 
 ed. Bekk. Berlin, 1817, p. 38. But he had previously given the common deri- 
 vation from respiration. 
 
 4 To my knowledge no writer has seen this radical distinction between the 
 two views, owing, doubtless, to their verbal similarity. The Montpellier editors 
 of Stahl persist in asserting that Stahl and Aristotle teach precisely the same 
 doctrine (CEuvres de Stahl, 1860, III., p. lxi. and cxxxix.) M. Blondin says, 
 " Stahl n'a jamais dit que c'est l'ame pensante, c'est a dire en fonction d'intel- 
 
 ■ ligence, qui execute les fonctions vitales et organiques," which is true; but that 
 Stahl attributed all the vital and organic functions to the soul as soul, and 
 taught that this immaterial principle was pre-eminently intelligent, seems to me 
 clear from his treatises, De mechanismi et organismi diversitate, and De diffe- 
 rentia \6yov et Xoyur/iov. 
 
 5 De juventute, I., 467: ipiBftif \&v ovv dvaymlov tv tlvai Kai rb aiirb 
 tovto rb fwpiov, Ttji S'tlvai jrXfifei Kai 'irepa. 
 
224 LITE AND MIND : DE ANIMA. [OHAP. XII. 
 
 § 214. There are one or two passages which raise a doubt 
 as to whether Aristotle had made this point clear to himself 
 in the sense in which it is held by the most advanced psycho- 
 logists ; indeed, it is evident that he had but imperfectly 
 appreciated the necessary correlation between an ascending 
 complesity_jpf . organization,, and an ascending complexity in 
 vjiaLghgao^nena, since he had not clearly and steadily mas- 
 tered the fundamental relation between organ and function. 
 Nevertheless, if he sometimes stopped midway, if he wavered 
 in his conception of the relation between organ and function, 
 the majority of moderns, even physiologists, have not been 
 less wavering, and he stands at the point of view now gene- 
 rally occupied by the most advanced thinkers. 6 
 
 6 " We have already pointed out the impossibility of drawing any exact 
 limit between the vital and the spiritual facts of our nature. . . . We have 
 first presented to us a being manifesting vital properties only ; next to this we 
 see the nerve force appearing in the double phenomena of sensation and motion ; 
 and then, lastly, out of these we see consciousness and intelligence gradually 
 evolved." — Moreia: An Introduction to Mental Philosophy, on the Inductive 
 Method, 1861, p. 28. This return to the Aristotelian point of view is quite 
 recent. Less than thirty years ago Schroeder van der Kolk mentioned 
 with pain that some new writers " were not ashamed " to announce that Soul 
 and Vital Principle were words of equivalent meaning; and the object of his 
 Dissertation iiber den Unterscheid zwischen todten Naturhraften, Lebenskraften 
 und Seele, Bonn, 1836, is to disprove such an hypothesis. He maintains the 
 existence of a specific nerve-force, which forms the bond of union between 
 soul and body. It is a curious point in the history of speculation that the 
 doctrine of Aristotle, which was regarded for many centuries as the orthodox 
 Christian doctrine, and was declared such by the (Ecumenical Councils, 
 should, since Descartes, have been regarded as dangerous to religion, so 
 that its modern revival has been generally stigmatized. Descartes limited 
 the functions of the Soul to thought alone; and having thus limited the mean- 
 ing of the word, another word was employed to indicate Life; See Bouiller: 
 Du principe Vital et de I'dme pensante, 1862; and Blondin: Du vitalisme 
 animique, in the 3rd vol. of the (Euvres de Stahl traduites et commenUes, 1860. 
 A similar change in doctrine is noticeable in the views of the early Church 
 respecting the soul. " Je pourrais multiplier it l'infini les citations," says 
 Guizot, " toutes prouveraient que la materialite de l'ame etaitdans les premiers 
 siecles, une opinion, non seulement admise, mais dominante." — Histoire de la 
 Civilisation en France, Lecon VI., Bruxelles, 1839, n., 199. See the collection 
 of passages from the Fathers, asserting that only God is incorporeal, in Abe- 
 lard : Sic et Non, ed. Henke et Lindenkohl, Marburg, 1851, pp. 105 seq. 
 At the end of the 4th century the doctrine of immaterialism began to assume 
 
CHAP. xn.J LIFE AND MIND: DE ANIMA. 225 
 
 In the following analysis, the phrases " Vital Principle" 
 and " Soul " will be used alternately, but always as desig- 
 nating Life, of which Mind is the highest manifestation. 
 
 § 215. Book I., Chap. I. — The inquiry opens with a 
 question as to the nature of the Vital Principle : whether it is 
 a something — an essence — or simply quantity or quality, or 
 some one of the other categories ; also, whether it is in itself 
 a, potentiality (w iv Svvafiti ovtojv) or a reality (tvrt\sjiia) . 
 The reader is probably familiar with the Aristotelian distinc- 
 tion, which subsequently played so great a part in Scholas- 
 ticism, between potential existence and actual existence; at 
 any rate, he must have heard often enough of the entelechie 
 or reality (completeness) of a thing, to understand that it was 
 no idle inquiry to ascertain at the outset whether the soul was, 
 or was not, such an entelechie. " We have to consider also 
 whether the Soul is divisible or without parts ; and whether 
 every Vital Principle is, or is not, the same in kind ; and if 
 not, whether the difference is generic or specific." He warns 
 the inquirer against the dangers of studying man exclusively ; 
 and insists on the study of animals being included. 
 
 He settles that there is only one Vital Principle. " It is 
 difficult to say whether we should study the parts before their 
 functions, as the mind before thought, and sensibility before 
 sensations. If expedient to commence with functions, it may 
 be questioned whether it would not be better to study their 
 opposites first, i. e. the object of perception before that which 
 perceives, and thought before that which thinks. Now the 
 
 this view ; Clatoian Mammertus (in the 5th century) exhausted all the 
 capital arguments by which Descartes was thought to have established it irre- 
 fragably. In the analysis of his treatise, De natura animce, given by the learned 
 Benedictines of St. Maur, we read, " II fait voir que l'ame n'est jamais sans 
 penser, et que la pensee n'est point differente de l'ame; qu'elle est toute volonte 
 et toute pensee; que penser, vouloir et aimer est sa substance. Qu'il ,n'y a 
 point de corps sans longueur, largeur, et profondeur; que l'ame n'a point ces 
 dimensions, et que par consequent elle est incorporelle." — Histoire litt&raire de 
 la France, V. Steele, II., 447, Paris, 1735. 
 
 15 
 
226 LIFE AND MIND: DE ANIMA. [CHAP. XII. 
 
 knowledge of anything in itself seems to be useful towards 
 a right conception of the causes of the accidents (attri- 
 butes — ffujuj36/3rjKora) in substances ; but the knowledge of 
 accidents contributes largely towards knowing what the thing 
 essentially is ; for whenever we are able, from the appearance 
 of any substance, to recount the whole, or the greater number 
 of its accidents, we are then best prepared to say what its 
 essential existence is." T By essential existence, ovo'ia, is not 
 meant noumenon, in the modern sense, but the reality of a 
 thing as known to us. (See § 95 for an explanation of ovaia.) 
 "The essential existence is the proper beginning for every 
 demonstration, so that all those definitions which do not make 
 known, or make it easy to conjecture what may be the acci- 
 dents of any substances are to be regarded as profitless 
 subtleties." 
 
 § 216. Whether all the affections of the soul (to iraQr) rrjc' 
 -tyvyjio) are also affections of the body is not clear ; if there is 
 any exception to be made, it must be in favour of thought, 
 that appearing to be most peculiar to the Vital Principle; 
 " but whether thought be imagination of some kind, or never 
 unaccompanied by imagination, still we must admit that it 
 cannot exist without the body. If, therefore, there is any one 
 affection, or function, which is peculiar to the Vital Principle, 
 we should admit that it might be isolated from the body ; but 
 if no one belongs to it exclusively, then we say that it cannot be 
 separate." Here, as elsewhere, he maintains that thought is 
 separable from the body in our abstraction, but not in fact ; 
 the separation is subjective not objective, similar to the sepa- 
 ration of whiteness from white bodies. 
 
 § 217. It is for the physiologist (^wctikoc), he says, to 
 
 7 To a similar effect Goethe in the Preface to the Farbenlehre : — " Denn 
 eigentlich unternehmen wir umsonst, das Wesen eines Dinges auszudriicken. 
 Wirkungen wei'den wir gewahr, und eine vollstandige Geschichte dieser Wir- 
 kungen umfasste wohl allenfalls das Wesen jenes Dinges." — Werke, 1840, 
 XXXVH. 
 
CHAP. XII.] LIFE AND MIND: DE ANIMA. 227 
 
 study the soul. The Dialectician and the Physiologist would 
 differ in their explanations ; the latter would explain " anger 
 as an ebullition of blood, or excess of heat about the heart ; 
 the former would declare it to be a desire for retaliation, or 
 some such motive." The reader will probably be of opinion 
 that the dialectician seems here to have the best of it. 
 
 § 218. Chap. II. is wholly devoted to a review of the 
 opinions expressed by the early thinkers. 
 
 § 219. Chap. III. examines the Principle of Motion, and 
 whether the Soul be self-moved, or moved externally. If 
 moved, it can only be moved by sensations. After glancing at 
 some other opinions, he concludes thus : — " The same incon- 
 gruity, which occurs in most of the theories about the Vital 
 Principle, is met with here, namely, that the writers join this 
 Principle to a body, and place it in a body without having 
 first settled for what purpose the body is to receive it, or how 
 it is fitted to this office. This, however, must be settled, 
 since it is through such a connection that one acts and the 
 other is acted on; and these are relations which cannot be 
 attributed to chance. There are writers who content them- 
 selves with saying what the soul is, without determining 
 anything about the body, its recipient, as if any kind of soul 
 might clothe itself with any kind of body. But everything, 
 on the contrary, seems to have its own particular species and 
 form (riSog Kai fiopfriv). We might as well maintain that 
 the architect could work with musical instruments; for, as 
 each art must employ its own instrument, so each soul its 
 own body." 
 
 § 220. Chaps. IV. and V. are devoted to the examination 
 of more theories. At the close occurs this important passage : 
 " Since the faculties of knowing, feeling, thinking, desiring, 
 willing, and the appetites in general, as also locomotion, 
 growth, maturity, and decay, are properties of the soul, we 
 may inquire whether each of these properties is given by the 
 soul as a whole, or are different offices assigned to different 
 
 15—2 
 
228 LIFE AND MIND: DE ANIMA. [CHAP. XII. 
 
 parts ? Is Life in one part, in more than one, or in all the 
 parts ? or is there some other cause of Life besides the soul ? 
 Some say the Vital Principle is divisible — one part thinking, 
 another part desiring ; but, if this be so, what holds the parts 
 together? Not the body, certainly, for the Vital Principle 
 appears to hold it together, since, from the moment of its 
 departure, the body expires and decays. 8 If there be some- 
 thing which makes it one, that something is, in the strictest 
 
 sense, the Vital Principle With respect to the 
 
 parts of this Principle, it is difficult to determine what is the 
 office assigned to each in the body, for, if it is the whole which 
 sustains the body, then we must conclude that each part sus- 
 tains one part of the body. But this is very like an impossi- 
 bility, for it is difficult even to conjecture what part the 
 intellect could connect with other parts, and how it could do 
 so. 9 Thus plants, when divided, are seen to live, and so are 
 certain insects, as if still possessing the same Vital Principle, 
 considered specifically, though not the same numerically. 10 
 Each of the divided parts has sensation and locomotion for a 
 time ; and there is no room for surprise at their not continuing 
 to manifest these properties, seeing that the organs necessary 
 for the preservation of nature are absent. 11 Nevertheless, in 
 each divided part coexist all the parts of the Vital Principle." 
 Here he contradicts what he has said elsewhere respecting the 
 absence of the vital centre from the separated head (§ 89). 
 
 8 Compare Stahl: Theoria Medica vera de Vita et Sanitate, p. 229. " Hajc 
 ipsa conservatio rei tarn corruptibilis, ne ipso acta corrumpatur, est propria illud 
 quod sub usitato vitce vocabulo intelligi debet." 
 
 9 irotov yap jiipwv, f) itHq 6 vovg avvk^si. 
 
 10 Hfu aiiTrjv %x ovTa ^"X't" r V e ^ Et > « Ka ' t"i dpiB/iif. 
 
 11 This acute remark solves many difficulties. Aristotle's view, both of lift 
 and mind, is adopted by MtJllee: Elements of Physiology, 1843, II., 1334. 
 For examples of " divided vitality," see Physiology of Common Life, II., 
 225, 421. The old writers puzzled themselves incessantly over this difficulty. 
 See, for example, Basso: PhihsophicE Naturalis adversus Aristotelem, Amster- 
 dam, 1649, p. 260; or Tacrbllub: Contra Ceesalpinum, 1650, p. 850; neither 
 of them comparable to Aristotle. 
 
CHAP, xu.j LIFE AND MIND: DE ANIMA. 229 
 
 Probably he was thinking only of Plants, for he continues— 
 "and those parts are specifically the same with each other 
 and with the whole— with each other as being inseparable, and 
 with the whole as being inseparable. The vitality of plants is 
 due to a kind of Soul, common both to animals and plants ; 
 and this may be separated from — i.e. exist without — the 
 sentient principle; but without it no sentient principle can 
 exist." 12 
 
 § 221. Book II., Chap. I. — The preliminary arguments 
 of the first book clear the way for a definition of Life. 
 Numerous as have been the attempts to frame such a defi- 
 nition, that of Aristotle holds rank with the best. One 
 great source of confusion has been the radical error of 
 conceiving Life to be an Entity, apart from, and only 
 inhabiting the organism (§ 72 b); just as the several 
 Forces were for centuries conceived to be independent of 
 matter, instead of being regarded as matter in dynamic 
 conditions. To escape from such a confusion, and to have 
 seen thus early the positive solution of the difficulty, implies 
 immense intellectual force. A glance at some modern 
 definitions will enable us the better to appreciate Aristotle's. 
 
 Kant defines Life " an internal principle of action ; " and 
 an organism, " that in which every part is at once means and 
 end." Yet Fermentation, which no one calls Life, is such an 
 internal principle. 
 
 Trevtranus defines it — " The constant uniformity of 
 phenomena under diversity of external influences," which may 
 
 " In the preface to Descartes: TraiU de I'Homme, Paris, 1729, written by 
 Schuyl, there is this remarkable passage, which contains samples of the meta- 
 physical and scientific modes of viewing phenomena: " C'est par une impru- 
 dence presque semblable et par nne prodigalite aussi inconsideree, que, centre 
 I'intention du crfateur, le Peripatetisme attribue aux plantes une ame vivante ; 
 qu'il ne fait pas simplement consister dans la disposition et le mouvement de leurs 
 parties, en quoi consists toute la cause de la vigUation ; mais que l'ignorance ou 
 il est de sa veritable cause, lui fait considerer, selon son caprice, comme un 
 esprit ou une substance entiSrement differente de la mati&re ou du corps de la 
 plante." 
 
230 LIFE AND MIND: DE ANIMA. fcHAP. XII. 
 
 be said with equal truth of a watch, since, if some external 
 influences disturb the mechanism of a watch, external influ- 
 ences will not less disturb an organism. 
 
 Bichat's famous definition : " Life is the sum of the 
 functions by which death is resisted," is only another form of 
 the one already quoted from Stahl (Note 8), and is every way 
 objectionable ; for on the one hand it is a paraphrase of the 
 truism that " life is the means by which we live ; " and on 
 the other hand it declares that there is a fatal antagonism in 
 external agencies ; whereas we know that such agencies are 
 necessary co-efficients, Life being inconceivable without a 
 medium. 
 
 Dug^s defines Life "the special activity of organized 
 beings." 
 
 Becxard says : " Life is the sum of the phenomena 
 proper to organized beings. It consists essentially in this, 
 that organized beings are all during a certain time the centres 
 to which foreign substances penetrate and are appropriated, 
 and from which others issue." 
 
 De Blainville's definition, adopted by Comte and Chaeles 
 Kobin, runs thus : — " Life is the twofold internal movement 
 of composition and decomposition at once general and con- 
 tinuous." But this only embraces the phenomena of vegetal 
 life, and even there is too restricted. 
 
 Herbert Spencer says, "Life is the definite combina- 
 tion of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and suc- 
 cessive, in correspondence with external co-existences and 
 sequences." 
 
 In a former work, after citing these definitions, I proposed 
 the following : — " Life is the dynamical condition of the 
 organism." The advantage of such a formula is that it 
 embraces every form of life, from that of the simple cell to 
 that of the most complex mammal. It further expresses 
 every variation in the intensity or the complexity of vital 
 phenomena, according to the activity or complexity of the 
 
CHAP. XII.] LIFE AND MIND: BE ANIMA. 231 
 
 organism ; and their dependence on external and internal 
 agencies. 13 
 
 § 222. By conceiving Life simply as the function of the 
 organism, we do not rob it of its solemn mystery. It is still 
 the dark Dynamis which must ever remain impenetrable ; but 
 a similar mystery hangs over the course of the planets, the 
 ebb and flow of the tides, the vehement impulses and repul- 
 sions of chemical elements ; yet, as in these we have detected 
 order, and gained some glimpse of law, so in the manifold 
 phenomena of Life, we may likewise discern order and law if 
 we study them aright. 
 
 That Aristotle conceived Life thus, may be read in the 
 following sentences: — "Among natural bodies some have, 
 and some have not, life ; and by life we mean the faculties of 
 self-nourishment, self-growth, and self-decay. Thus every 
 natural body partaking of life may be regarded as an essen- 
 tial existence (ovaia) ; but then it is an existence only in 
 combination (ueavvOtrri). And since the organism is such a 
 combination, being possessed of life, it cannot be the Vital 
 Principle. Therefore it follows that the Vital Principle must 
 be an essence, as being the form of a natural body holding 
 life in potentiality ; but essence is a reality (entelechie). The 
 Vital Principle is the original reality of a natural body 
 endowed with potential life; this, however, is to be under- 
 stood only of a body which may be organized. Thus the parts 
 even of plants are organs, but they are organs that are alto- 
 gether simple, as the leaf which is the covering of the 
 pericarp, the pericarp of the fruit. If then there be any 
 general formula for every kind of Vital Principle, it is — the 
 primary reality of an organism.'" u 
 
 13 Kant : Kritik. der Urtheilshraft ( Werke IV., 260) ; Tbeviranus : 
 Biohgie; Bichat: Beckerches eur la Vie et la Mort; Duges: Physiologie 
 Comparfe, I., 3; Beclard: Anatomie Genirale; Comte : Cours de Philos. 
 Positive, III., 295; Herbert Spencer: Principles of Psyclwlogy, 1855, p. 354. 
 Compare Physiology of Common Life, 1860, II., 426. 
 
 14 ivre\ex aa V itguni mb/taTog <pvoiicov bpyavitcoii. 
 
232 LIFE AND MIND: DE ANIMA. [CHAP. XII. 
 
 " It is, therefore," lie adds, " as idle to ask whether the 
 Vital Principle and body are one, as whether the wax and the 
 impress on it are one ; or whether the matter formative of any 
 object, and the object formed, are one ; for one and being have 
 many significations, but they are correctly designated by the 
 word reality (entelechie). Thus if an eye were an animal, 
 vision would be its Vital Principle ; for vision, abstractedly con- ^ 
 sidered, is the essence of the eye ; but the eye is the body of 
 vision, and if vision be wanting, then, save in name, it is 
 an eye no longer." 
 
 This admirable illustration, profoundly misconceived by 
 Telesio, 16 not only shows that Aristotle conceived Life as the 
 function of the organism, but also points to the answer he 
 would have made had the common objection been urged, that 
 the organism remains entire even after the departure of the 
 breath of life. It does not remain entire, he would have 
 replied ; the conditions of its activity are removed ; it is an 
 organism only in name. 16 He fell into none of the confusions 
 of subsequent philosophers. The animal body, without its 
 soul, was, he said, no longer an animal body ; for an animal 
 is body and soul, as an eye is pupil and vision. 17 
 
 § 223. Chap. II. carries this conception further, showing 
 that not only has the whole organism its life — or sum of 
 functions — but that each separate organ has its life, or 
 function. One simple form of vitality suffices for simple 
 organisms, as plants ; more complex forms being demanded 
 by more highly organized beings, such as animals. 
 
 " The term living has many significations, but if only one 
 
 15 In his argument against the soul being the form of the body: Telesics: 
 De Natura Serum, 1586, V., 184. He might have been saved from this "mis- 
 conception had he attended to what Niphtjs had said on this point in his 
 ■Expositio subtilissma, Venice, 1559, p. 245. 
 
 16 jiaXXov yip Srj\ov iSn 6 vtxpbg avSpwirog ojiuivvjiujq. — Meteor., IV., 
 12,3,88. 
 
 17 " Ita enim ex hisce duabns partibus homo constat, ut neqne animus sit 
 homo, nee item corpus, sed tertium quiddam quod et animo constet et corpore." 
 — Philelphus: Epist. familiarum libri XXXVII., Venet., 1502, p. 253, verso. 
 
CHAP. XII.] LIFE AND MIND: BE ANIMA. 233 
 
 of its forms be manifested (i. e. mind, sensibility, locomotion, 
 and rest, as well as nutrition, growth, and decay) we say tbe 
 object is living. And, therefore, all plants are alike, for they 
 have within them a principle by which they acquire growth, 
 and undergo decay in opposite directions. It is possible for 
 nutrition to exist independently of the other functions ; but 
 the others cannot exist in the absence of nutrition. This is 
 manifest in plants, since no other form of life has been-given 
 them. Life is thus first manifested by this function. But 
 animal life is characterized by sensibility; for we say that 
 creatures endowed with sensibility are not simply living, but 
 are animals, even though incapable of moving. Touch is the 
 first form of sensibility manifested by animals ; just as nutri- 
 tion may be independent of all other functions, so may Touch 
 exist independently of all other sensibilities. L'ife, or Soul, 
 may therefore be defined as the principle of nutrition, sensa- 
 tion, intellection, and locomotion." 
 
 § 224. In the next paragraph occurs one of those passages 
 which render, it difficult to come to a decision respecting his 
 views on the immortality of the soul, or rather of the thinking 
 principle; a question hotly debated in the 15th and 16th 
 centuries, by friends and foes desirous of defending, or of 
 incriminating his orthodoxy. 18 Having alluded to the fact 
 that insects, when divided, manifest life and sensation— and 
 "if sensation, then also imagination and desire"— in each 
 divided half, he adds : " Kespecting mind, and the theoretic 
 faculty, nothing as yet is evident; but it seems to be another 
 kind of soul, and is alone capable of separation, as the ever- 
 lasting from the perishable." « Thus it is manifest from 
 
 18 His views are briefly but lucidly stated by Phimxphus: Op. cit, p. 48. 
 Comp. Niphcs: Expositio subtilissima, p. 642. 
 
 » ripi Si tov vov koI rrjg fcwpqnirijff Sw&pmQ oilh ™ favcpov, a\\ tourc 
 4»v*C Tfroc i"pov Aval, Kai rcvro ^vov Mfemu x»V«f*« ""^Zll* 
 d\sZ L /eaprok The mortality of all three souls was d.stmctly »™* d 
 by Galbk Li one of the brief treatises translated by Dakembekg, he says, 
 « n y a trois especes d'ames; ces trois ames habitent l'une dans le foie, 
 
234 LIFE AND MIND: DE AJYIMA. [CHAP. XII. 
 
 what has been said that the other parts of the soul are not 
 distinct from the body, although, considered abstractedly, they 
 are different from it: for the mode of being in a sentient 
 creature must differ from that in a cogitative creature, since 
 feeling differs from thinking. (See § 466.) 
 
 § 225. Chap III. treats of the simpler manifestations of 
 Life, especially Touch and Taste, the latter being a kind of 
 Touch. It is to be observed that, in giving animals sensation, 
 he also adds appetite, passion, and volition, remarking that it 
 is uncertain whether those which have simply Touch have 
 imagination also. 
 
 § 226. Chap. IV. is on Life as a cause and origin of the 
 living body. " Cause and origin have several significations, 
 for the Vital Principle is equally a cause according to any one 
 of the three defined modes of causation ; 1, as that whence 
 motion proceeds ; 2, as that for which motion is produced ; 
 3, as the essence of living bodies." 
 
 His grounds for considering' it a final cause are these : — 
 As the mind acts for an end, so does Nature, and that end is 
 her aim ; and such an aim has the Vital Principle by its 
 nature in living bodies. Thus all plants and animals' are its 
 instruments, and are what they are for its purposes. The 
 term final cause has two meanings : it implies that for which 
 and that by which any result is obtained; and the Vital 
 Principle is a final cause, being that from whence locomotion 
 is derived, although this is a function that does not belong to 
 all animals. 
 
 § 227. Nutrition he defines " a contrary acted upon by a 
 contrary; but this does not mean any kind of contrary; it 
 refers only to such as can generate from, and give growth to, 
 one another." He here perceives a difficulty, namely, the 
 axiom that like is increased by like ; he eludes it by saying 
 
 l'autre dans le coeur, la troisi&mc dans l'encephale. Si done la partie rationelle 
 de l'ame est une espece d'ame, cette espece sera mortelle, car elle est elle-mgme 
 un certain temperament de l'encephale." — CEuvres de Galien, 1854, I., 52-5. 
 
CHAP. XII.] LIFE AND MIND: DE ANIMA. 235 
 
 that food, inasmuch as it is undigested, is a contrary nourish- 
 ing a contrary ; but when it is digested it is a like increasing 
 a like. 
 
 There are three things : something to be nourished, some- 
 thing by which it is nourished, and something which is 
 nourishment. That by which it is nourished is the primal 
 soul 20 — the first Vital Principle — which is capable of gener- 
 ating another like itself. 
 
 § 228. Chaps. V. and VI. pass to the consideration of 
 Sensibility. Having defined sensation "the result of a 
 motion, and an impression," he starts this difficulty : — "Why 
 is there no sensation from the senses themselves ? That is to 
 say, why, in the absence of external objects, do not the senses 
 give sensation, since fire and earth and the other elements are 
 present in them, and it is from these that sensation is derived ? 
 
 The answer runs thus : — Because the sensibility is not in 
 a state of actuality, but only of potentiality ; 21 and, therefore, 
 it is with it as with a combustible body, which alone, without 
 something on fire, does not burn ; for, otherwise, it might set 
 fire to itself, and could stand in need of no actual fire. 
 
 § 229. He then indicates the distinction between primary 
 and secondary qualities ; each of the special senses perceives 
 a special quality, as sight, colour, hearing, sound, &c. ; but, 
 besides these, there are qualities more generally perceived, 
 belonging not to one sense alone, but to all in common — such 
 are motion, form, number, magnitude. 
 
 § 230. Chaps. VII.-IX. treat of Sight, Hearing, and 
 Taste (topics which we shall have to consider more fully here- 
 after) ; but why these, which are subsequent in development, 
 should be spoken of earlier than Touch, is by no means clear. 
 A logical arrangement would have reversed this order. 
 
 w rb \iiv rpkipov larlv r) irpbirt) ij/vxfl. 
 
 81 It will not escape the reader that this answer is only a restatement of the 
 difficulty in other words; but it has more the appearance of an answer than 
 that given by Hermolaus Barbakus: Compendium Scient. Nat. ex Aristotele, 
 1547, V., de Animd, p. 51. 
 
236 LIFE AND MIND: BE ANIMA. [CHAP. XII. 
 
 § 231. Chap. X. is on Touch, the first and most important 
 of the senses. " It is difficult to specify the organ per- 
 cipient of tangible qualities, whether or not it is the flesh, 
 and that which is analogous to flesh in other creatures; yet 
 flesh is only a medium, and the essential organ, ffpwrov 
 ataOtirripiov, must be something different and internal. . . . 
 Is, then, this sentient organ within the flesh, or is it the 
 flesh itself which is immediately perceptive ? No indication 
 can be obtained from the fact of sensation being simultaneous 
 with tangible impression, for were any one to extend a mem- 
 brane over his flesh, the part would be equally sensible when 
 touched, and sensible at the moment of contact ; and yet, 
 clearly, the sentient organ cannot be in that membrane. . . . 
 "When the sentient organ itself is touched, no sensation can 
 there or then be produced, any more than a white object can 
 be seen when placed immediately over the surface of the eye ; 
 and thus it is evident that the part perceptive of tangible im- 
 pressions must be internal." Although not stated here, we 
 know that by this internal part, which is perceptive, he 
 means the heart, the central seat of all sensibility. 
 
 § 232. Chap. XII. is on Perception. "It must be 
 admitted that each sense is receptive of the sensible forms of 
 things (ideas, images) without their matter, as wax takes the 
 impress from a seal-ring without the iron or gold of which the 
 ring is made." 
 
 Why, then, do plants not feel, seeing that they have a 
 psychical organ (nopiov n ^v^ikov), and are impressible by 
 tangible objects ? The reason is that they want the central 
 faculty {(u&OTtiTa), which alone would admit of their being 
 impressed by sensible forms without the matter. Constituted 
 as they are (§ 177), they receive the matter along with 
 the forms. 
 
 § 233. Book III., Chap. I., continues the discussion of 
 Sensibility. We have, he says, but five senses. Touch 
 makes us aware of whatever is tangible; all other qualities 
 
CHAP. XII.] LIFE AND MIND: DE ANIMA. 237 
 
 are perceived, not through touch, but through the media air 
 and water. The sentient organs are constituted of these two 
 simple bodies : the pupil is composed of water, the organ of 
 hearing is composed of air, and the organ of smell is of one or 
 the other. Tire forms no part of any organ ; or rather it is an 
 element common to all, since there is nothing sentient 
 without heat. 
 
 We are furnished with several senses, instead of one, in 
 order that the common properties of bodies — motion, magni- 
 tude, number — may the less readily escape notice. If vision 
 were our only sense, then all other qualities except colour 
 would escape notice, seeming to be identical with it. But as 
 common properties are manifested by different bodies, it is 
 evident that they must also be different. 
 
 § 234. Chap. II. — "Vision must be by sight, or by some 
 other sense ; but if by some other sense, then it will be per- 
 ceptive of sight and colour, the subject of sight, and thus 
 there will be two senses for one office, or the sight itself will 
 be the percipient. But if to perceive by sight is seeing, and 
 if that which is seen is colour, or something having colour, 
 then if any sense is to see, that which sees must first have 
 colour. 22 It is thus manifest that perception by sight is not a 
 single perception* for when we cannot see, it is still by sight 
 that we judge both of darkness and light, -although not in the 
 same manner." 
 
 This, as may be imagined, has been an enticing passage 
 to commentators, and is full of pitfalls both of equivoque 
 and psychological subtlety. Much of the obscurity of psycho- 
 logical questions arises from the tendency, almost irresistible, 
 to refer all perceptions to the organs of sense, instead of to 
 that consciousness which is affected by the organs of sense in 
 their action : e. g. perceptions are referred to the retina rather 
 
 22 War nicht das Auge sonnenhaft, 
 Wie konnten wir das Licht erblicken ? 
 
 Gothe. 
 
238 LIFE AND MIND: BE ANIMA. [CHAP. xn. 
 
 than to the optic centre. Hence, also, the confusion of ob- 
 jective with subjective, as when we speak of a colour which 
 is unseen, of a sound which is unheard. 
 
 § 235. " If motion, production, and impression, are in the 
 product, it follows that sound and hearing, in an active state, 
 must pre-exist potentially in hearing; for the action of the 
 motor exists naturally in that which is acted on. It is, there- 
 fore, not necessary that the motor itself should be in motion. 
 The action of a sonorous body is sound, or sounding; that of 
 the auditory sense is hearing ; for hearing is double, as sound 
 is double. The same applies to other senses and perceptions. 
 Since production and impression are not in that which acts, 
 but in that which is impressed, so the action of the object of 
 perception, and the sensibility are in the sentient organ. But 
 while for some senses the two states have been distinguished 
 by separate names — such as sound and hearing — there are 
 others for which one or the other state is without a name. 
 Thus, the action of vision is called sight, but the action of 
 colour is unnamed ; the action of the gustatory sense is called 
 taste, while that of savour is without a name. Since the 
 action of the object and the sentient organ is one and the 
 same, though different in mode of acting, it follows that hear- 
 ing and sound in this sense must be lost together, or together 
 preserved. But this does not hold of such relations in 
 potentiality. The earlier writers expressed themselves ill, in 
 saying there could be neither black nor white without sight, 
 nor savours without taste. And yet they were partly right ; 
 for as senses and sentient impressions have a twofold accepta- 
 tion, according to their potentiality or activity, so what was 
 advanced by these writers may be true of one state, and not 
 true of the other. But they reasoned about things considered 
 as isolated which do not in truth admit of being isolated." 
 
 § 236. " Each sense is perceptive of its own objects, is 
 innate in its own organ, as an organ, to discriminate qualities 
 — Sight judging of black and white, Taste of bitter and 
 
,CHAP. XII.] LIFE AND MIND: DE ANIMA. 239 
 
 sweet. But how do we perceive that qualities differ? Evi- 
 dently by some sense, because the impressions are sentient ; 
 and the flesh cannot be that final sentient, zoyarov aiaOrirripiov , 
 since to judge of qualities it must of necessity first touch 
 bodies." 
 
 His meaning here is by no means clear. He says empha- 
 tically that we have only five senses ; that each sense can only 
 discriminate its own objects ; that that which perceives white 
 to be different from sweet cannot be the sense of Taste nor the 
 sense of Sight, yet it must be a sense, because the impression " 
 is sentient ; finally he says that the sense cannot be Touch, 
 because to judge of qualities, that sense must first touch 
 bodies — by which he probably means that white and sweet not 
 being tangible, cannot be perceived by Touch. 
 
 What, then, is this judicial sense ? He has nowhere told 
 us. He enters upon discussions as to whether the judging 
 faculty is divisible or indivisible, and this numerically or 
 locally ; but what it is, or where it is, he has not explained in 
 this treatise. Elsewhere we gather that he means the com- 
 mon sensorium, which is in the front centre (heart) of each 
 animal. 23 
 
 § 237. Chap. III. " The soul being characterized gene- 
 rally by the faculties, locomotion and thought, judgment and 
 sensibility, it would seem that thought and reflection are 
 considered to be forms of sensation. All writers assume 
 that thinking, like feeling, is corporeal, and that Like is com- 
 prehended by Like. But they should have noted the liability 
 of the senses to produce error. It is manifest that feeling is 
 not the same as reflection ; the one belonging to all creatures, 
 the other only to a few. Neither is the judging faculty, which 
 discerns right from wrong, to be confounded with sensation ; 
 for sensation being derived from particulars is always true, 
 
 23 1v n koivov aiaevnipiov.—De Juventute, I., 467. Compare also De 
 Somno, II., 454. 
 
240 LIFE AND MIND: DE ANIMA. [OHAP. XII. 
 
 and belongs to all animals; but error lies in judgment, and 
 none are liable to error save those which have reason." 
 
 § 238. Imagination is then treated. He says it is neither 
 sensation nor judgment, yet it is never called up without 
 sensation. It is the faculty by which an image of some kind 
 is called up within us, and is to be ranked with those faculties, 
 such as sensation, opinion, and knowledge, by which we form 
 judgments. 
 
 § 239. Chap. IV. has peculiar interest, being devoted to 
 the voue, or intellect, " that part of the Soul by which it both 
 knows and reflects." 
 
 " If thinking be similar to sensation," he says, " then 
 may it be some kind of impression by the object of thought, 
 or some other analogous agency. But that which thinks must 
 then be passive, awaQlq, receptive of the Forms of objects, 
 and identical with the objects in potentiality, though not so in 
 actuality. In a word, the Intellect must be related to objects of 
 thought, as sensibility is to objects of perception. Thus, the 
 so-called Intellect of the Vital Principle (and by Intellect I 
 mean that which judges and compares) has in actuality no 
 existence prior to the act of intelligence. 2 * It is very impro- 
 bable, therefore, that the mind should have been commingled 
 with the body ; for if this were so, it would be a quality of some 
 kind, as hot or cold ; or it would have some kind of organ such 
 as there is for sensation ; but there is none such." 
 
 § 240. " It is well said that the Soul is the place of Forms 
 {roTroQ eiSdiv) ; but this is not to be understood of the whole 
 soul, only of the cogitative part; and of Forms, not in 
 actuality, but in potentiality." 
 
 24 ovdlv lanv ivtpytiq, tuiv qvtw> irpiv voiiv. This, if I understand it 
 aright, means that the mind has no substantive existence, but exists only in 
 act, as a function. The passage is very obscure. Trendelenburg, who has 
 a long note on the parenthesis, which does not require one, is silent on the only 
 real difficulty. Torstrik says, " intellectus non est actu idea antequam 
 cogitet (oiiB ianv avrov fiaiQ o&Se/iia A.W i) avrn) 8n $vvaT&v=oi>8kv toriv 
 ivcpydq, tS>v ovtuiv irpiv voilv), ed. De Animd, p. 198. 
 
CHAP. XH.J LIFE AND MIND : BE ANIMA. 241 
 
 § 241. He argues that the reflective faculty is not the 
 sensitive faculty in a state of repose. " The mind judges of 
 flesh and ideal flesh, either by some different faculty, or by 
 being itself differently affected. It is by sensibility that we 
 judge of hot and cold and other properties of flesh ; but it is 
 either by some distinct faculty— or as a curved line is to a 
 straight line — that we judge of ideal flesh." 
 
 § 242. Chap. V.— The soul is creative. It is essentially 
 an energizing influence. Knowledge in activity is identical 
 with the object ; but in potentiality, it pre-exists in the indi- 
 vidual. "Yet rigorously speaking that cannot be said to 
 pre-exist which sometimes is, and sometimes is not, reflected 
 on. But that alone, whatever it be, which is separate from 
 everything else, is deathless and eternal. "We have no memory 
 of it because it is passionless (airaOis) ; and the impressible 
 mind is perishable, and without it there can be no reflection." 
 
 § 243. Chap. VI. briefly reiterates the argument that 
 the senses are free from error, which arises solely from the 
 judgment. 
 
 § 244. Chap. VII. — The opening sentence may be read 
 as a vague anticipation of the modern hypothesis, that 
 knowledge, or rather the aptitude for acquiring knowledge, 
 becomes developed in the race, and is thus transmitted from 
 parent to child, so that the offspring of European parents is 
 capable of acquiring a higher degree of intellectual develop- 
 ment than the offspring of Australian parents reared under 
 similar conditions. 
 
 Hume's doctrine 25 that the mind is simply the suc- 
 cession of impressions is thus formularized at the close of 
 the chapter : " The mind in the act of thinking is the things 
 thought of." £6 
 
 § 245. Chap. VIII. is a repetition of former arguments. 
 
 25 Hoteb: Treatise on Human Nature, Works, 1826, 1, 269. 
 28 '6\<i>£ dk 6 vovg iariv b Kar kv'epyuav tu irpdyfiara voSiv. 
 
 16 
 
242 LIFE AND MIND : DE ANIMA. [CHAP. XH. 
 
 § 246. Chaps. IX. and X. are devoted to the locomotive 
 powers considered as parts of the Vital Principle. The 
 nutritive and generative functions which belong to all living 
 beings originate the motions concerned in the processes of 
 growth and decay. These are motions, but how does loco- 
 motion originate ? 
 
 Not by the nutritive faculty, since animal progression has 
 always some cause in imagination or appetite ; and no being 
 moves except when urged by desire or fear, unless there be 
 some external impulse. Besides, if nutrition were the cause 
 of locomotion, plants would move. 
 
 Not by the sentient faculty, since there are many sentient 
 beings which are stationary throughout life. 
 
 Not by the rational faculty, or mind, as we call it ; for the 
 theoretic faculty never thinks upon what is to be done, or 
 suggests what should be pursued and avoided; but pro- 
 gression is always an act of pursuit or of flight. Nor does 
 the rational faculty even when reflecting on flight or pursuit 
 at once bid the animal move, since it often dwells upon some- 
 thing terrible or agreeable without suggesting alarm, although 
 the heart may be agitated. Moreover, although the mind may 
 bid, and reason suggest, that something should be fled from 
 or pursued, the animal does not necessarily move, but acts 
 like an intemperate man, according to the dictates of passion. 
 
 Finally, it is not appetite that causes progression, since 
 the temperate, even while desiring and yearning after something, 
 do not act in order to secure it, but follow their understanding. 
 
 § 247. Having thus excluded Nutrition, Sensation, Eeason, 
 and Appetite as incapable singly of causing locomotion, he 
 proceeds to show that the motor principles are Appetite and 
 Eeason; an apparent contradiction, but when read by the 
 light of a previous passage (§ 160), seen to mean that Eeason 
 and Appetite must act in combination to produce locomotion. 
 "It is mind as a logical' and practical power," he adds, "and 
 which differs from the theoretic mind in its aim. Every 
 
CHAP. XH.J LIFE AND MIND : DE ANIMA. 243 
 
 appetite has an aim ; the appetite which is the principle of 
 the practical mind has always an object in view, and this 
 object is the principle of action. Thus appetite and practical 
 reason may be regarded as the two motors." 
 
 § 248. Chap. XI. raises the question whether those 
 inferior animals which have only the sense of Touch can 
 have motion and imagination. They appear sentient of plea- 
 sure and pain, and hence must feel desire; but how can 
 imagination be present ? Even as their motions are indeter- 
 minate, so also may imagination exist in them indetermi- 
 nately. 87 The sentient imagination belongs to other animals ; 
 the voluntary imagination only to such as are rational : for 
 whether this, or that, shall be done is a matter of reasoning ; 
 and as the individual is to pursue the better of two courses, 
 he must be guided by a rule of some kind which enables him 
 out of many images to select one. 
 
 § 249. Chap. XII. reiterates the statement of an ascend- 
 ing complexity of organisms. It is necessary that every living 
 being should have the nutritive soul, but it is not necessary 
 that every living being should be sentient. All animals must 
 be sentient, if Nature does nothing in vain; since without 
 sensibility a progressive animal would perish, being unable to 
 select its nutriment. Creatures which are stationary obtain 
 their nourishment on the spot. But it is impossible that a 
 progressive animal which has been generated should possess a 
 Vital Principle and a judging faculty, and not be sentient. 
 
 Touch and Taste are the primary and indispensable senses. 
 The other senses are given only to the higher animals ; for if 
 these are to preserve their existence, they must not only be 
 sensible of objects touching them, but also at a distance. 
 
 57 This is analogous to the hypothesis of many zoologists, that nerve tissue 
 may exist in a diffused state in all those animals which manifest sensibility, yet 
 seem to be destitute of nerves. Both opinions arise from loose conceptions of 
 Psychology and Anatomy. An imagination without images, and a nerve tissue 
 without definite structure, are not more acceptable than liquid crystals. 
 
 16—2 
 
244 LIFE AND MIND : BE ANIMA. [CHAP. XH. 
 
 § 250. Chap. XIII. — This final chapter argues that the 
 animal body cannot be homogeneous, i. e. made up of one 
 element only. The sentient organs may be composed of all 
 the elements except earth, for these organs all receive impres- 
 sions through media (§ 238). But Touch is made sensible 
 by contact with bodies, and hence its name. Other organs 
 likewise perceive by contact, but it is through media — through 
 something foreign to themselves — whereas Touch perceives 
 directly. So that an animal body cannot be constituted of 
 any of the other elements exclusively, nor can it be formed of 
 earth alone ; for Touch is the medium of tangible impres- 
 sions, and its organ is perceptive not only of the distinctions 
 which pertain to earth, but also of hot and cold, and all other 
 tangible qualities. Hence it is that we have no sensation in 
 bones, hair, and analogous parts, because they are formed of 
 earth ; and plants, for the same reason, being formed of earth, 
 have no sensation. 
 
 § 251. "While Touch is necessary for continued existence, 
 some animals have other senses, not simply for existence, but 
 for enjoyment. They have Vision, in order that living in air 
 or water, in a transparent medium, they may see. They have 
 Taste, that by discerning what is grateful or nauseous in food 
 they may desire and obtain, or avoid it. They have Hearing, 
 that others may signify something to them; and a Tongue 
 that they may signify something to others. 
 
 § 252. If now we review the contents of the treatise just 
 analysed, we shall note first how very slightly it touches on 
 those faculties which are more prominently indicated by the 
 modern word Soul, and how it enlarges on physiological, 
 rather than psychological questions. Secondly, we shall note 
 here, as in almost every one of his scientific works, the want 
 of masterly and logical arrangement of subject, and the want 
 of the elementary requisites of good composition. There is 
 no progression, no culmination. One chapter might be trans- 
 posed in the place of another, one paragraph might precede 
 
CHAP. Xn.] LIFE AND MIND : DE ANIMA. 245 
 
 its predecessor without affecting the symmetry, or rather the 
 asymmetry of the work. "Were this not equally observable in 
 other works, we might not unreasonably lay the blame at the 
 door of the earlier editors and copyists ; but such an argument 
 is untenable in the presence of compositions so uniformly 
 defective. Thirdly, we suspect, what detailed examination 
 proves to be the fact, 28 that the work was the great text-book 
 of Psychology until modern times, the additions made by 
 Aristotle's successors up to the 17th century being unimpor- 
 tant. Fourthly, we shall note the profundity of many of its 
 views, and their singular accordance with much that is taught 
 in the best writings of our own times. 
 
 48 Fbies: Handbuch der paychischen Anthropologic, 1820, 1., 59. 
 
( 246 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE XIII. 
 
 ON THE SENSES. 
 
 § 253. Aristotle has written much about the senses in 
 several works. The treatise De sensu, in the Parva Natv/ralia, 
 is perhaps the hest source we can consult ; and it may, there- 
 fore, be analysed briefly here. 
 
 § 254. The early philosophers sought in the four elements, 
 earth, air, fire, and water, for the several bodies constituting 
 the senses. As there are five senses, and only four elements 
 were generally recognized, a fifth element was imagined. What 
 that element is, Aristotle does not say ; elsewhere we learn 
 it is the Ether. 
 
 I. — Vision, 
 
 § 255. Every one, he says, believes Vision to be of fire ; 
 the reason is that men misconceive the phenomenon of sparks 
 dancing before the eyes when rubbed, especially in the dark. 
 But if we cannot deny that we feel and see that which we see, 
 it necessarily follows that the eye sees itself. Now, why have 
 we this sensation only when the eye is rubbed ? 
 
 The explanation offered is that smooth bodies shine natu- 
 rally in the dark, though without producing light ; now the 
 pupil of the eye is smooth ; and when the eye is rubbed it 
 seems as if that which was one became two. The rapid 
 motion makes the eye which is seen and that which sees 
 appear different. The phenomenon is not producible unless 
 
CHAP. XIII.] ON THE SENSES. 247 
 
 the eye be rubbed . quickly, and in darkness (I suppose he 
 means by darkness the eye being closed, otherwise the quali- 
 fication is erroneous), smooth bodies shine no less than certain 
 fish heads, and the ink of the cuttlefish. When the eye is 
 rubbed slowly, the sensation is not such as to make us think 
 that what sees and what is seen are one and the same, so that 
 the eye may see itself as in a mirror. 
 
 § 256. This, it must be confessed, is not a fortunate 
 attempt at explanation. Newton, in one of his celebrated 
 queries added to the Optics, first clearly stated that the sparks 
 which arise when the eye is rubbed " arise from such motions 
 excited in the bottom of the eye by the pressure and motion 
 of the finger, as at other times are excited there by light for 
 causing vision." But it was Johannes Mullee, stimulated 
 by the Farbenlehre of Goethe, who placed beyond a doubt 
 the fact that each special nerve of sense responds only in one 
 special manner, no matter how various may be the stimuli, so 
 that whatever excites the optic nerve excites a luminous 
 sensation ; whatever excites the auditory or gustatory nerves, 
 excites sonorous and sapid sensations; and the pressure 
 on the skin-nerve which excites pain excites in the optic 
 nerve not pain, but a luminous sensation. 
 
 § 257. Aristotle, knowing nothing of the properties of the 
 optic nerve, could not, of course, give an explanation of the 
 phenomenon. But his explanation is better than that of 
 Empedocles and Plato, who held " the eye to be of fire." 
 He asks, apropos of this, " If vision is produced when light 
 passes from the eye, as from a lantern, why can we not see in 
 the darkness ? To pretend that light is extinguished by the 
 darkness, on quitting the eye, is absurd." 
 
 § 258. He thinks Democeitus " right in asserting that the 
 vision is ' of water,' but wrong in asserting it to be an image 
 (appearance, iiKpaaiq), for the image is produced because the 
 eye is a smooth surface, and vision is not in it, but in the 
 seeing faculty. The affection is a refraction, iivatcXaais yap 
 
248 ON THE SENSES. ["CHAP. Xni. 
 
 to naBoc. But in those days the theory of images and re- 
 fraction was not understood. Moreover, it is absurd not to 
 have asked why the eye alone can see, and not other bodies." 
 
 § 259. "It is correct to say that vision is of water; not 
 because it is of water, but because it is diaphanous, and this 
 quality is common to air. Water;' however, retains and re- 
 ceives it better than air, and that is why the pupil and the 
 eye are of water. The soul is assuredly not at the surface of 
 the eye, but within ; hence the eye must be translucent and 
 capable of receiving light. Thus men in battle wounded near 
 the temple, so that the optic channels (nerves, iropoi) are 
 divided, have felt darkness come on as if a lamp had been 
 extinguished ; for indeed the diaphanous and the pupil form a 
 sort of lamp." 
 
 § 260. " Thus it is evident we must assign an element to 
 each sense, and say that the part of the eye which sees is of 
 water, that which hears is of air, and that which smells is of 
 fire. Touch is earthy. Taste is a kind of Touch. The eye 
 is a part of the brain ; and the brain is the moistest and 
 coldest part of the body. Touch and Taste are connected with 
 the heart, which is the hottest part of the body." 
 
 § 261. We have next an exposition of Colour. He defines 
 Light " the colour of the diaphanous per accidens," or, as he 
 expresses it in the De Animd, " colour is a movement of the 
 diaphanous," which may be interpreted into an anticipation of 
 the modern undulatory theory, the diaphanous standing for 
 the elastic ether, and the movement being its undulations. 
 
 *' When there is an igneous body (irup&j&e «) in the 
 diaphanous, we have light ; when none, we have darkness. 1 
 That which we call the diaphanous does not belong exclusively 
 
 ' Telesio held Light to be visible heat — lux caloris species est— which is 
 tinged by the colours of the objects through which it passes.— DejRerum Natara, 
 1586, VII, 292-3. This is a much more superficial view than that of Aristotle; 
 and the same may be said of most of his deviations from the doctrines of the 
 
CHAP. XIII.J ON THE SENSES. 249 
 
 to water, air, and other bodies which are translucent. It is 
 some common nature and force, which not existing separately 
 exists in these bodies and in others, in some more and in 
 some less." 2 
 
 What that force was supposed to be I cannot discover from 
 the writings now extant phe seems to have considered it suffi- 
 ciently described by its name. 
 
 § 262. " As all bodies have necessarily a limit, so also has 
 the diaphanous, and this limit is colour, which is either the 
 limit of bodies or at their limit ; and hence the Pythagoreans 
 call colour ' the surface.'" 
 
 " Colour being the limit of the diaphanous in a limited 
 body, it is possible that that which produces light in the air 
 will also be in the diaphanous in limited bodies, or will not be 
 there ; and thus, as in the air there may be light or darkness, 
 so in bodies there may be white and black. The white and 
 black may be placed side by side, so that both may be invisible 
 separately, on account of their minuteness, yet, nevertheless, 
 the result of the two will be visible. But this result can be 
 neither black nor white ; but as it must have some colour the 
 colour will be a compound of the two. That is how different 
 colours arise. Many colours are also produced by the combi- 
 nation of the parts : thus three may be arranged with two, or 
 four, and other combinations. Those colours which depend 
 on proportional numbers are harmonious, such as purple and 
 scarlet." 3 
 
 II. — Taste and Smell. 
 
 § 263. " These have great similarity, though produced in 
 different organs. The nature of flavours is more evident than 
 
 2 aWa rig l(Tn Koivq tpveig ical Siva/iig, ») %ti>pu;r?i fikv oiitc tanv, iv rovroig S" 
 iori Kal roig aXKoig Oib/iaoiv Iwirapxti, roig phi fiaKKov roig S" rjrrov. 
 
 3 For an elaborate exposition of the views held by the ancients on the sub- 
 ject of colour, see Prantl: Aristoteles iiber die Farben, erlautert durch eine 
 iibersicht der Farbenlehre der Alten, Munich, 1849. But perhaps the most intel- 
 ligible account is that given by Goethe: Geschichte der Farbenlehre. Werke, 
 XXXIX. 
 
250 ON THE SENSES. [CHAP. XIII. 
 
 that of odours, because our sense of smell is less keen than 
 it is in other animals ; on the other hand, we have Touch 
 more sensitive than any other animal, and Taste is a kind of 
 Touch. 
 
 § 264. " Although water is insipid by nature, it is neces- 
 sary that water should contain all flavours which escape our 
 perception on account of their feebleness ; or that it should 
 contain a matter which is the germ of all flavours ; or finally, 
 that water having no difference of flavour in it, the cause is 
 heat. Thus the flavour of fruit is developed by heat. All 
 the flavours to be found in fruits are to be found also in the 
 earth. At least the ancients thought that water varied with 
 the soils through which it passed, which is evident from salt 
 waters, as salt is also a kind of earth. 4 Thus water filtered 
 through cinders contracts a bitter taste, and so of the rest. 
 "We may hence see why plants have their various flavours ; for 
 moisture, like everything else, is modified by its opposite, and 
 dryness is the opposite of moisture. Thus moisture is 
 modified by fire, for fire is by nature dry. Thus when some- 
 thing sapid is dissolved in water, the water becomes sapid ; 
 and in the same way nature acts upon the dry element, and 
 the earthy element : it filters the moisture through the dry 
 and earthy, setting it in motion by heat, and giving it all the 
 necessary qualities. This modification of moisture is flavour." 
 
 § 265. " As various colours arise from the combinations of 
 black and white, so various flavours arise from the combina- 
 tions of sweet and bitter ; and these combinations may be 
 proportional or indefinite. Those which are agreeable depend 
 on numerical proportion. The kinds of flavour resemble those 
 of colour : both are seven in number." 
 
 § 266. " Odours are perceptible in air and water ; they are 
 transmitted by the diaphanous which is common both to air 
 
 s 
 
 4 Who were these ancients ? The commentators declare that Metrodorus 
 and Anaxagoras are alluded to. Perhaps so; yet the opinion may be found 
 very distinctly expressed by Hippocrates: JDe Aire, Locis et Aquis. 
 
CHAP. XIII.] ON THE SENSES. 251 
 
 and water. That water alone suffices is proved by the fact 
 that fish have the sense of smell. Odour is dry flavour con- 
 veyed by the moisture in air and water. All sapid bodies are 
 odorous." 
 
 III. — Hearing. 
 
 § 267. Either Aristotle forgot to include Hearing in this 
 treatise, or else the chapter has been lost. But his views are 
 expressed in the Be Animd (II., 8), from which we may 
 borrow them in a compressed form. 
 
 § 268. " Sound is both potential and actual ; for we say 
 that some bodies, such as sponge, wool, &c, are without sound, 
 and others, as brass, wood, hard and smooth bodies, have 
 sound, because able to make sound actual by the action of the 
 medium between the object and the ear. Actual sound is the 
 result of something in relation to something, and in some- 
 thing ; for its cause is percussion. But with only one body 
 there can be no percussion ; so that the sonorous object sounds 
 by its relation to another. Without movement there can be 
 no percussion, and sound is not produced by the percussion of 
 every substance; and hollow bodies create, by reflex, many 
 percussions after the first, owing to the medium within them 
 having been set in motion, and being unable to escape. Sound 
 is audible in air, and less distinctly in water. 4 But neither 
 air nor water can be the cause of sound, since there must be a 
 percussion of solid bodies against each other and against the 
 air." 
 
 § 269. "A vacuum is justly called the lord of hearing 
 (Kvpiov tov clkovuv), for the air appears to be a vacuum, and 
 when moving continuously creates hearing. But being very 
 diffluent, it gives out no sound, unless when that which is 
 
 5 An ereor which observation might have guarded against; since very simple 
 experience shows water to be a better conductor of sound than air. The velocity 
 with which sound traverses water has been calculated as four times its velocity 
 through air. 
 
252 ON THE SENSES. [CHAP. XIII. 
 
 percussed is smooth: in this case the air becomes uniform 
 over its surface, for the surface of a smooth body is one. 
 Every sonorous body sets in motion the air which is, by 
 continuity, one with the organ of hearing ; and sound being 
 in the air, the air without the organ sets in motion the air 
 within. An animal, therefore, does not hear in every part, 
 for every part does not contain air. The air itself, owing to 
 its diffluence, is without sound; but when confined, its motion 
 produces sound. The air within the ear is so immured as to 
 be incapable of escape ; 6 and this, in order that the sense 
 may perceive accurately all variations of its movement. And 
 thus we are enabled to hear in water ; for the water cannot 
 gain access to the congenital air, or pass through the con- 
 volutions of the ear. The ear is constantly giving out sound, 
 as a horn does ; for the air within it is continually moving in 
 some peculiar manner. Hence we speak of hearing by a 
 vacuum and something resonant, because we hear by the 
 part which contains the air confined within it." 
 
 IV. — Sensation in general. 
 
 § 270. Having passed the Senses in review, he then 
 touches on certain general questions relative to sensation. 
 And first of its divisibility ad infinitum. 
 
 If bodies are infinitely divisible, are the impressions they 
 make on us equally so ? This question Aristotle answers with 
 
 6 The translation in the text came spontaneously from my pen, because I was 
 not aware that the language of Aristotle had puzzled the commentators. (See 
 Trendelenburg, p. 386, for an example.) The sense is so plain that I cannot 
 even now comprehend how it has been missed. Aristotle says the air in the ear 
 is immoveable or unmoved, 6.kIvi)toq ; immobilis is Bussemaker's translation, 
 immoveable is Collier's. Yet inasmuch as the movement of this air is men- 
 tioned immediately afterwards, the verbal contradiction is glaring; yet it is only 
 verbal. If we suppose that aKivijroc has reference to the air which iv roic Siaw 
 lyKaTtfueoSS/iriTat (is immured within the ears), the meaning is obvious enough. 
 A man is said to be immoveable from his studio or bureau without any imputa- 
 tion on his power of movement; but commentators, boggling at small contra- 
 dictions, and passing by great ones without remark, would point out that a man 
 cannot be immoveable if he move at all. 
 
CHAP. XIII.] ON THE SENSES. 253 
 
 manifest superiority over Sir William Hamilton, who, pro- 
 bably from an unsuspected reminiscence, has used the very 
 same illustrations to justify his own doctrine of " latent con- 
 sciousness." That our consciousness may arise out of un- 
 conscious modifications is evident, according to Hamilton, in 
 the fact of a minimum visible, which is the smallest surface 
 that can be seen : " It is plain that if we divide this minimum 
 visible into two parts, neither half can by itself be an object of 
 vision or visual consciousness. They are, severally and apart, 
 to consciousness as zero. But it is evident that each part 
 must have produced in us a certain modification, real though 
 unperceived, for as the perceived whole is nothing but the 
 union of unperceived halves, so the perception is only the sum 
 of the two modifications, each of which severally eludes our 
 consciousness." T 
 
 § 271. The fallacy of this argument may be disclosed in a 
 counter illustration : the stick which at a distance of three 
 feet just touches us, and produces the sensation of contact, 
 will no longer produce that sensation if broken in half, and 
 held towards us at a distance of three feet : it will not 
 affect our consciousness at all : the two halves thus pointed 
 towards us do not produce modifications in our conscious- 
 ness the sum of which is perceived when the whole touches 
 us. Hamilton's mistake lies in the vague conception of a 
 minimum visible, which being the extreme point of visual 
 consciousness, anything beyond that extreme must necessarily 
 pass altogether beyond the sphere of consciousness. It 
 does not become latent; for consciousness it becomes non- 
 existent. The difference in degree has amounted to a differ- 
 ence in kind. 
 
 § 272. Aristotle justly says that the sensible qualities are 
 named such because they produce sensation. " All magnitude 
 
 7 Hamilton: Lectures on Metaphysics, 1859, I., 350. It is strange that 
 neither the erudite Hamilton, nor his erudite editors, should have mentioned 
 Aristotle in this place. 
 
254 ON THE SENSES. [CHAP. XIII. 
 
 is necessarily sensible, otherwise it would not be magnitude. 
 Were it otherwise there would be bodies which had no colour, 
 no weight, nor any other quality, and which consequently 
 would not be perceptible to us, since it is by such qualities 
 that we have perception. But the sensible is composed of 
 sensible qualities, and assuredly not of mathematical defini- 
 tions. 8 How do we form any judgment of sensible things? 
 By the intellect ? But the ideas are only possible when based 
 on sensations. The solution of these questions makes mani- 
 fest why the kinds of colour, taste, &c, are limited, or finite. 
 It is because in all things which have extremes there must 
 also be intermediate points of limitation ; now contraries are 
 extremes, and in all sensible impressions there are contraries, 
 as white and black in colour, sweet and bitter in taste. A 
 body, that is continuous therefore may be infinitely divided 
 into unequal parts, but its divisibility into equal parts is finite. 
 That which is not continuous as a whole has its parts (species) 
 finitely divisible. Since we call the sensible qualities species, 
 and they are always continuous, we must distinguish between 
 the actual and potential ; and hence we do not see the millionth 
 part when we see the million, nor do we hear the quarter-tone 
 when we hear the melody ; the interval is imperceptible and 
 is lost in other sounds. It is the same with the infinitely 
 little in other sensibles : they are potentially visible, but not 
 actually visible when isolated. 9 Thus the line of one foot is 
 potentially in the line of two feet; but exists actually only 
 when alone. The infinitely small qualities are lost in sur- 
 rounding bodies, as drops of perfume poured into the sea. 
 This infinitely little which transcends sensation is neither 
 
 " irav elvat piytQos a"ta6r]T0V &Svvarov ydp \ivicbv fiiv bpav nil iroabv Sk' il 
 y&p p,r) oi)rw£, kvU%oiT hv dvat n aSipM. /iridkv ix ov XP&na, /u/iW /3apo£, im$ 
 (SiXXo n toiovtov ir&Qof liar oif ala9t]Tbv 8\wf • ravra y&p t& aia9r)T&. T6 
 <xp' aiadr]Thv hrai avyKtl/ievov oi« ££ alaBr\rS>v. 'AW' StvayKaloV oi ydp Sr) ik 
 ye tSiv fmSrijiaTiKSiv. VI., 445. 
 
 9 cvi'dfitt ydp opard, ivtpyaq $ oi, '6rav %upiady. 
 
CHAP. XIII.] ON THE SENSES. 255 
 
 sensible in itself nor by itself, for it is only sensible potentially 
 in the larger quantity." 
 
 I have preserved the Aristotelian phraseology, but the reader 
 •will find little difficulty in disengaging the meaning, and -will 
 perceive how this distinction of the potentially and actually 
 visible agrees with and yet rises superior to Hamilton's idea 
 of our being unconsciously modified by that which never 
 reaches the consciousness, so that two zeros may make an 
 unit. 
 
 § 273. In the concluding chapter, he enters upon the 
 question whether we can have two different sensations in the 
 same instant of time ; a question of some psychological 
 interest. He answers it in the negative. 
 
 § 274. In reviewing Aristotle's opinions on the Senses, it 
 is requisite to bear in mind that he was wholly without the 
 anatomical and physiological, no less than the physical and 
 chemical knowledge, which could have given an assured basis 
 to his speculations. It is a subject which, even in our own 
 day after so much laborious inquiry, is only beginning to be 
 understood ; and the psychologist will have many years yet to 
 wait, before science furnishes him with the data he requires. 
 
256 ON MEMORY, SLEEP, DREAMS, [CHAP. XIV. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 ON MEMORY, SLEEP, DREAMS, AND LONGEVITY. 
 
 § 275. Among the Parva Naturalia, there are four treatises 
 which must be briefly analysed here : — 
 
 I. — Memory and Recollection. 
 
 This treatise, which Sir W. Hamilton in his Notes on 
 Eeid has illustrated (obscured, some may think) with his 
 usual prodigality of erudition, is held by admirers to be both 
 exhaustive and profound. Let the reader judge. 
 
 § 276. "What is memory ? what is recollection ? To 
 what part of the soul do they belong ? They do not always 
 accompany each other : sluggish minds have the best memo- 
 ries ; the quickest minds, those which are readiest at learning, 
 have the strongest recollection. 
 
 § 277. Memory being always of things absent, the ques- 
 tion arises : How can the mind perceive that which is absent ? 
 All that is actually present is the affection, tradoq, of the 
 soul. This is the explanation : the original sensation left a 
 trace behind it, an impression, such as the seal leaves upon 
 wax ; and it is the perception of this impression which consti- 
 tutes memory. But as this is a description of perception 
 itself, and as memory is something different, we must add 
 thereto the idea of Time. The impressions, or we may say 
 
CHAP. XIV.J AND LONGEVITY. 257 
 
 the pictures painted on the mind, and retained there to be 
 presented again in memory, require a certain physical con- 
 dition in the sensorium, suitable to the impression. If the 
 sensation be too violent, or if the mind be in a state of 
 agitation, no more impression is made than would be made on 
 running water ; and if the sensorium be too hard, as in old 
 age, no impression is made. That is why the young and the 
 old have no memory. Those also who are very vivacious, and 
 those who are very slow, have little memory : the brains of 
 the former are too moist, iiyporcpoi; the latter too hard, 
 ff/eXjjporEpoi ; so that in the one case an image will not remain, 
 in the other the image cannot be impressed. 
 
 § 278. The problem is thus stated : How is it that, in 
 memory, we think of the absent object, and do not think of 
 the image which is really present ? But the answer given is 
 purely verbal. An animal painted in a picture, he says, is 
 both an animal and a copy, and while being that one and the 
 same, it is nevertheless two things at once. The animal and 
 the copy are not identical, and we may think of the picture 
 either as an animal or as a representation. This also is true 
 of the image within us ; and the idea which the mind contem- 
 plates is something in itself, although it is also the image of 
 something else. 
 
 § 279. He then passes to Eecollection, which is a distinct 
 faculty, according to him. It is in this place that he gives 
 expression to the glimpse he had attained of the law of 
 association of ideas, over which Hamilton has blown such 
 emphatic trumpets. My only remark is that here, as in so 
 many other cases, modern knowledge supplies the telescope 
 with its lenses. Had Aristotle really conceived the law as a 
 law, he would have applied it to the explanation of psycho- 
 logical questions, in the way moderns have applied it. The 
 fact that he did not attempt this, suffices to show how 
 imperfect was his appreciation of the law. 
 
 17 
 
'258 ON MEMORY, SLEEP, DREAMS, [CHAP. XIV. 
 
 II.— Sleep. 
 
 § 280. This is a problem which even yet is so far from a 
 solution, that the very conditions on which sleep depends are 
 under dispute. The majority of physiologists assume that 
 sleep is caused by a temporary congestion of the blood-vessels 
 in the brain, the pressure of this congestion suspending the 
 activity of the brain. 1 "Were this fact established, we should 
 still have to inquire into the cause of the congestion ; but is 
 it established ? Although I have myself in a former work 
 argued as if the fact were certain, I am forced now to confess 
 that further inquiry has not only shown me that there is 
 absolutely no good evidence for such an opinion ; but has also 
 shown me that all the phenomena may be even better explained 
 on the assumption of an anaemic condition. A considerable 
 withdrawal of the circulation from the brain would better 
 account for the general inactivity of the brain during sleep ; 
 for the partial activity of dreams ; and for the rapidity with 
 which the whole activity is restored by a rush of blood, under 
 any stimulus. Congestion implies relaxation of the vessels ; 
 the instantaneous recovery of mental energy when a sleeper is 
 awakened by the alarm of fire, or the like, would scarcely be 
 compatible with such a relaxed condition. 
 
 § 281. Whichever view may be the correct one, we are at 
 present condemned to conjecture, since we are without the 
 means of verifying either hypothesis. Until some method 
 shall be disclosed of accurately determining the condition of 
 the cerebral circulation during sleep, we cannot know what are 
 the conditions of the phenomenon. 
 
 § 282. Aristotle, as may be supposed, had no suspicion of 
 the brain being the important agent in sleep. He asserted 
 simply that -Sleep and Waking are two functions of the animal 
 economy, and are recognized by similar signs : when a man 
 
 1 In the very latest work on the subject this opinion is assumed as if it were 
 beyond cavil. See Maury: Le Sommeil etks Reves, Paris, 1861. 
 
CHAP. XIV.] AND LONGEVITY. 
 
 259 
 
 manifests sensibility we say he is awake; when he manifests 
 none, we say he is asleep. " Hence we conclude that it is 
 the sentient principle which sleeps and wakes. Now sensi- 
 bility belongs neither to the soul nor the body, but to the 
 union of the two. Only animals sleep, because they only are 
 sensitive ; and there is no animal which always sleeps, none 
 which always wakes. Since every organ becomes fatigued after 
 a certain exercise, the fatigued eyes no longer see, the wearied 
 hand no longer grasps." 
 
 § 283. Although he maintains deductively that every 
 animal must sleep, he does not pretend that observation in 
 every case warrants the conclusion. " Sleep has been ob- 
 served, he says, in all terrestrial and aquatic animals ; in all 
 fish and cephalopoda; and in all those which have eyes. 
 Those which have hard eyes, like insects, sleep but little ; and 
 hence the doubt has arisen whether they sleep at all. The 
 testacea have not been directly observed ; but on this point we 
 must be guided by probabilities." 
 
 § 284. The modern naturalist will be tempted to ask what 
 kind of observations suggest that fish, cephalopoda, and insects 
 ever sleep ? It is evident that they take repose ; but repose 
 is not the same as sleep. Are they shut out from all percep- 
 tion of external objects, as is the case in the sleep of higher 
 animals? We are completely in the dark. (§ 345.) 
 
 § 285. After a survey of sleep in the animal kingdom, 
 Aristotle concludes the chapter with the assertion still unhesi- 
 tatingly repeated in our text-books, that Nutrition is most 
 active during Sleep ; and that the waste- of the day is then 
 repaired. I have endeavoured to show e that this opinion is 
 not only unsupported by any plausible evidence, but is in 
 flagrant contradiction with known facts and the physiological 
 inferences they suggest. Were it true, the longest sleepers 
 should be the strongest animals, since their repair of waste 
 
 2 Physiology of Common Life, II., 358. 
 
 17—2 
 
260 ON MEMORY, SLEEP, DREAMS, [CHAP. XIV. 
 
 would be the most effectual. "Were it true, many dreadful 
 cases of slow atrophy might be cured by opiates. "Were it 
 true, the sleepless maniacs, and men who sleep but little, 
 would show a rapid destruction of their substance. To admit 
 that muscular and nervous tissue require intervals of repose, 
 is not equivalent to admitting that their nutrition is only, or 
 even mainly, effected during Sleep. 
 
 § 286. The cause of Sleep is thus expounded "by Aristotle. 
 There are four causes of everything (§ 95). The final cause 
 of Sleep is the health of animals ; but the aim which Nature 
 has in view is not Sleep, it is "Waking, since the aim of all 
 animals is constituted by feeling and thinking, because these 
 are the Best, and Nature always works for the Best. 
 
 § 287. This subjective explanation will probably satisfy 
 few readers. Let us, therefore, hear his physiological 
 explanation. 
 
 When the food enters the organs allotted to its reception, 
 an evaporation, avaOv/uaaig, takes place into the veins; 
 there it is transformed into blood, and carried to the heart. 
 That which evaporates must ascend to a certain height, and 
 then descend, turning back like the tides of Euripus. Now, 
 the warmth in every animal is borne upwards ; having reached 
 the uppermost parts, it turns back again and descends. 
 Hence Sleep chiefly comes on after a meal, for then there is 
 much and thick moisture which ascends, and this standing 
 still oppresses the head, and creates sleepiness ; no sooner 
 does it descend and in its descent drive away the warmth, 
 than sleep arrives, and the animal drops off. This is proved 
 by the effects of narcotics, for all these produce a heaviness of 
 the head ; and those who are sleeping are in a similar con- 
 dition, unable to raise their eyelids or their heads. And it is 
 especially after meals that such a condition supervenes, because 
 of the great evaporation from the food. 
 
 § 288. Moreover, Sleep follows fatigue, for fatigue is a dis- 
 solves ffvvTijriKov ; and that which is dissolved acts like undi- 
 
CHAP. XIV.] AND LONGEVITY. 261 
 
 gested food, if it be not cold. Certain diseases produce the 
 same effect, especially those which arise from excess of warmth 
 and moisture, as, for example, Fever and Lethargy. 
 
 § 289. The reader will have noticed what a supreme dis- 
 regard of everything like evidence, or even logical connection, 
 is displayed in this explanation ; yet Aristotle had no suspicion 
 of its wanting either. He applies it to the elucidation of 
 several phenomena, as if it were an established truth. Thus 
 he says, " The reason why young children sleep much is 
 because all their food is carried upwards," and, as this latter 
 position may require some proof, he adds, " the proof is seen 
 in the fact that in infancy the upper parts are larger compared 
 with the lower parts, and because it is in the upper that the 
 growth is most active." 
 
 § 290. More is made of this excess in the upper parts. 
 It is the cause why infants, until they are about five months 
 old, are unable to turn their heads round ; " it is with them as 
 with drunken men — an immense quantity of moisture is 
 carried upwards." 
 
 § 291. Nay, this also serves to explain Epilepsy. " Sleep 
 is said to be very like Epilepsy; hence this disease often 
 begins in sleep, and its crises never occur in a waking state," 
 a statement which will not receive the assent of pathologists. 
 Epilepsy is produced " when a quantity of moisture has 
 ascended, and in its descent swells the veins, which thus com- 
 press the windpipe," an explanation which will also be rejected 
 by pathologists. 3 
 
 § 292. We further learn that those who have large heads 
 and small veins are great sleepers; whereas those who have 
 large veins sleep little ; the former because the narrowness of 
 their veins prevents the descending moisture from descending 
 freely, and the greatness of their heads occasions a powerful 
 
 3 It is almost unnecessary to inform any reader that Epilepsy is now known 
 to be a disease of a nervous centre. Consult Schroder van derKolk: Bau 
 und "Functionen der Medulla Spinalis und Oblongata, 1860, and the writings of 
 Broww Sequaed. 
 
262 ON MEMORY, SLEEP, DKEAMS, [OHAP. XIV. 
 
 evaporation ; whereas in the latter, who have large veins, the 
 descent is easy and rapid, unless there be some other cause of 
 obstruction. Bilious people sleep little, because their interior 
 is always cold, and consequently there is but small evaporation 
 going on in them ; and for a similar reason they are large 
 eaters and have hard flesh, their body being ill adapted to 
 absorb. The bile, being cold by nature, makes the nutritive 
 and secretive organs also cold. 
 
 § 293. My purpose will be greatly misunderstood if these 
 absurdities are supposed to be dragged forward in triumphant 
 hostility to the great name of Aristotle. Admirers have 
 carefully ignored such things, and thereby deprived the 
 general public of the lesson to be learned from seeing how an 
 intellect so vast and so stored with various knowledge, could, 
 nevertheless, allow itself to be the dupe of phrases, without 
 ever raising one question as to the validity of the facts on 
 which these phrases were formed. Seriously contemplated, 
 there is something pathetic in the fatal facility with which the 
 human mind at all periods has accepted a phrase as a revela- 
 tion, never pausing to see whether the facts truly are what they 
 are assumed to be, but satisfied if the phrase seems to explain 
 the difficulty. 
 
 § 294. Some difficulties, indeed, he attempted to remove. 
 They are thus stated : — 
 
 " Sleep appears, from what has been said, to be an inward 
 concentration of warmth, and a reaction, or counter action. 4 
 Hence in the sleeper there is much movement ; hence, also, 
 he becomes weaker and colder, and, on account of the cold, his 
 eyelids droop. The upper and outward parts of the body 
 are cold, the lower and inner parts are warm ; for example, 
 the feet and viscera. But, perhaps, some may be sur- 
 prised that Sleep should follow meals, that wine should be 
 a narcotic, and that other heating things should produce 
 
 * 6 inrvos larl aivolds ri£ row dcp/tov Aata Kai dvmrcpiarams $voua\. 
 
CHAP. Xiy.] AND LONGEVITY. 263 
 
 Sleep. It seems incomprehensible that Sleep should be a 
 growing cold, and yet warmth be the cause of Sleep. Shall 
 we say that when the stomach is empty it is warm, and when 
 full it is made cold by movement, in the same way that the 
 passages of the head and other places are made cold when the 
 evaporation is carried there ? Or shall we say that, as those 
 who drink suddenly a warm liquid are seized with shivering, 
 so here also the heat ascending, the cold which arises from 
 concentration makes the body cold, and drives away the 
 natural warmth ? The same effect may arise from a quantity 
 of food being taken, which acts like wood thrown on fire. 
 Thus Sleep comes on when the heavy evaporation is carried by 
 warmth to the head, and, unable to ascend higher, is forced to 
 descend. Hence also men lie down when the heat which kept 
 them erect is withdrawn; for man alone, of all animals, 
 has an erect position, 5 and the descent of the vapour on 
 the heart takes away all sensibility, and afterwards imagina- 
 tion." 6 
 
 § 295. We now perceive the part assigned by Aristotle 
 to the brain in the production of Sleep. Its part was that 
 of a cooler of the evaporations from food. It is the coldest 
 organ in the body (§ 164). "As the moisture, evaporated by 
 the sun's heat, on reaching the upper air is chilled by the 
 cold there, and falls back again in rain, so does the vapour 
 of food, on reaching the cold brain, become condensed, and 
 falls back again in mucus (hence the pituitary fluxion seems 
 to come from the head), but that portion which is nutritive 
 and not noxious descends and tempers the heat of the body. 7 
 Not only is the brain cold, but the smallness of its veins 
 
 6 Compare § 391 a. 
 
 6 %anpov Si favraaiav, which Bussemakee renders " deinde vero ima- 
 ginationes subgerit," an interpretation warranted by A.'s theory of dreams. 
 
 7 This notion of fluxions from the brain plays an important part in the 
 history of Medicine. See Hippocrates: Be Aere, Locis et Aquis; and com- 
 pare it with Van Helmont's amusing and energetic protest: Catarrhi delira- 
 menta, in his Opera Omnia, 1655, p. 271. 
 
264 ON MEMORY, SLEEP, DREAMS, [QHAP. XIV. 
 
 prevents the vapour from easily penetrating ; and thus, in 
 spite of the great heat, it becomes cooled by the brain." 
 
 § 296. " When the food is entirely cooked, and the heat 
 being gathered into a small space, overcomes the cold, and 
 when the thick blood has been separated from the thin, we 
 awake. The blood which is in the head is thinnest, that 
 which is in the lower parts is the thickest and most turbid ; 
 and it is because after meals the blood is the least separated 
 that Sleep lasts until the thinner blood goes upwards and the 
 thicker downward. No sooner is this effected, than the 
 animal, freed from the weight of food, awakes." 
 
 § 297. Large space has been given to this treatise on 
 Sleep, because it illustrates the thoroughly vicious method 
 Aristotle pursued. We may also perceive in it a great want 
 of logical connection, even with its own premisses. 
 
 III. — Dreams. 
 
 § 298. This little treatise stands in favourable contrast 
 to its predecessors. Herein we see how the mere fact that 
 the writer is no longer called upon to expound processes 
 discoverable only by laborious investigation, leaves his mind 
 disengaged from the trammels in which it moved so clumsily, 
 and allows it full,' play. By this it is not meant that Dreams 
 are not also dependent upon physiological laws ; but that they 
 are to be elucidated by psychological observation, and for this 
 Aristotle was as well equipped as any modern, except that he 
 had a smaller range of recorded facts to draw from. If, 
 therefore, his treatise still seems remarkable, we must attri- 
 bute it either to his sagacity, which thus early detected the 
 real elements of the problem, or else to the circumstance 
 that being ourselves without a true solution, we are unable 
 to see wherein his errors lie. 
 
 § 299. He begins by inquiring to what part of the soul 
 dreams address themselves. It cannot be the sensible part, 
 since Sleep consists in insensibility. Nor can it be the 
 
CHAP. XIV.] AND LONGEVITY. 265 
 
 understanding. We hear and see in dreams, but not as when 
 awake. A dream is a land of image. Imagination has been 
 defined (in the treatise De Animd) as the motion produced 
 by our sensibility in act. Sensible things produce sensations, 
 and the motions thus produced continue after the exciting 
 cause has vanished. Thus on going into a dark place, we 
 are at first unable to see because the motions produced by the 
 sun have not yet subsided. If we look steadily at a coloured 
 object the sensation remains when the eyes are carried to 
 other objects. To this must be added the fact of hallucination. 
 We are constantly liable to deceptions of the senses when in 
 the tumult of passion. During fever the patient sees animals 
 in the lines on the wall of his room. 
 
 § 300. These motions, which in the tumult of sensations 
 are unperceived, because overpowered by the stronger move- 
 ments, as a small fire is by a large fire, are perceived in the 
 calmness of sleep. The inactivity of each special sense brings 
 all these motions, which during the day are unperceived, 
 to the origin of sensation (i. e. the sensitive centre : sort 
 tx\v a.pyj\v ttjc aiadrjaiue) , and in the calmness become 
 sensible. Like the ripples and circles caused by eddies, the 
 sensations have their after movements ; sometimes these 
 ripples and circles are repeated in the same forms ; at others 
 they are broken and distorted by the obstacles they encounter. 
 Young children do not dream; nor do adults dream soon 
 after meals, 8 because then the movement caused by the 
 ascending heat is great, and an image can then no more be 
 formed than in troubled water; or if an image be formed 
 it will be distorted and unlike the object. But when the 
 water is calm the images are clear. 
 
 § 301. Thus, in Sleep, images are formed ; the after- 
 motions of sensations, when the disturbance is great, are 
 
 8 Kant: Anthropologic, Werke, 1838, VII., 30, maintains that we never sleep 
 without dreaming; for, he argues, to cease to dream would be to cease to live. 
 Yet he would hardly have maintained that we dream during syncope. 
 
266 ON MEMORY, SLEEP, DREAMS. [CHAP. XIV. 
 
 either destroyed or distorted, and our dreams are terrible, 
 monstrous. It is the same with men drunk or in a fever. 
 But when the separation of the blood has taken place, the 
 after-motions are perceived, and then we see and hear. It is 
 owing to these after-motions that we often, when awake, 
 seem to see and hear sights and sounds not really existing. 
 
 § 302. Dreams are the images, or after-motions of sensa- 
 tion. But it is not every image presenting itself during sleep 
 which is to be called a dream ; for if, when asleep, we hear 
 a noise, feel a touch, or perceive a light, there being actually 
 present the objects which excite these sensations, we cannot 
 consider these to be dreams. 
 
 § 303. Such is the theory of Dreams propounded by 
 Aristotle. If we disengage it from the peculiar physiology 
 in which it is enveloped, it will appear not unworthy a place 
 beside modern theories, of which there are so many. And 
 we may further remark that the theory seems to have been 
 entirely his own, since he does not allude to the opinions of 
 any predecessor. 
 
 IV. — Longevity. 
 
 § 304. The treatise De Longitudine et Brevitate Vita has 
 several points of interest illustrative of his physiological views. 
 After noticing the varieties in the longevity of animals he 
 undertakes to explain the cause. We must assume, he says, 
 that an animal is naturally moist and warm, and that Life 
 depends on these conditions ; whereas old age is dry and cold, 
 and so is Death, since so it manifests itself. The material 
 of the body being thus compounded of moisture and warmth, 
 dryness and cold, it is obvious that in growing old we dry up. 
 It is necessary, therefore, that the moisture should not easily 
 dry up. Hence fat bodies are preserved from decay because 
 they are of air, and air acts like fire in relation to other things. 9 
 Now fire does not become putrid. 
 
 The logic of this last sentence is strangely arbitrary. If 
 
CHAP. XIV.] AND LONGEVITY. 267 
 
 fire does not become putrid, its power of drying moisture 
 is too familiar to have been overlooked. 
 
 § 305. Moreover the moisture must not be too small in 
 quantity. Hence we see why the larger plants and animals 
 live longer ; they have more moisture. But this is not the 
 sole reason. There are two causes operative : the quantity 
 and the quality. The moisture must not only be considerable, 
 it must also be warm ; so that it may neither congeal nor dry 
 up easily. This explains why man is longer lived than much 
 larger animals. Those animals which have less moisture will 
 be long-lived if the quality of their moisture makes up for its 
 deficient quantity. There are some whose fat and warmth 
 makes it difficult to become dry and cold. 
 
 § 306. Here the reader makes acquaintance with that 
 radical moisture which played so conspicuous a part in old 
 medical theories, and to which Walter Scott humourously 
 alludes. The modern may, if he please, read into it an anti- 
 cipation of the importance of water to the organism, of which 
 it constitutes more than two-thirds by weight ; and in the 
 accompanying warmth, he may also detect the agent of all 
 organic activity. But the ancient ideas of moisture and 
 warmth were founded on very different data from ours ; and few 
 things would have astonished Aristotle more than hearing that 
 water formed an integral constituent of solid bone, nay, even 
 of the hardest of organic substances, such as the enamel of the 
 teeth; and that animal heat was mainly produced by the 
 action of that very air which, he thought, cooled the body. 
 
 § 307. Another cause of Longevity is moderation in 
 secretion; for all secretion destroys the animal, either by 
 causing disease, or by its own action. The action of a secre- 
 tion is adverse and destructive both of the whole organism 
 and its parts. This is the reason why salacious animals 
 quickly grow old ; why the mule lives longer than its parents ; 
 why females live longer than males ; and why male sparrows 
 are short-lived. 
 
268 MEMORY, SLEEP, DREAMS, LONGEVITY. [CHAP. XIV. 
 
 § 308. Fatigue also shortens life. Why? "Because 
 fatigue produces dryness, and old age is dry. Males ought 
 by nature to be longer-lived than females, since they have 
 more warmth. 10 Animals live longer in warm than in cold 
 climates for the same reason that the larger live longer than 
 the smaller ; and it is those which are by nature cold which 
 in warm countries grow to a great size : serpents and lizards 
 in warm countries become enormous. Warmth and moisture 
 are the causes of growth and life. But as the moisture in 
 animals becomes more fluid in cold countries it more easily 
 congeals. Hence in cold countries we find animals without 
 blood, or with very little; or if we find any, they are very 
 small and die young. Cold takes away their power of growth. 
 
 § 309. " When plants and animals take no nourishment 
 they perish : they then consume their own substance (o-uvi-rj/cEi 
 ■yap aura eavra). For as a flame destroys a smaller flame by 
 consuming its food, so animal warmth which is the primary 
 digester destroys the substance in which it is." Here again a 
 willing admirer may read an anticipation of modern physio- 
 logy, which has no better explanation to give. 
 
 § 310. Plants are the longest lived of all beings because 
 they are less watery and less easily congealed; they are fat 
 and viscid, and therefore, although dry and earthy, they do not 
 easily lose their moisture. 
 
 § 311. From the knowledge gained in the preceding 
 chapters respecting Aristotle's physiological and psychological 
 theories, we are now in a proper condition to examine the 
 three great treatises on the " History of Animals," the " Parts 
 of Animals," and " Generation and Development," which will 
 conclude our survey. 
 
 10 Modern investigations show that tho average of life is slightly in favour of 
 women; and that their temperature also is slightly superior to that of men. 
 
( 269 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE XV. 
 
 "THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." 1 
 
 § 312. "I cannot read this work," says Ctjviek, "without 
 being ravished with astonishment. Indeed it is impossible to 
 conceive how a single man was able to collect and compare the 
 multitude of particular facts implied in the numerous general 
 rules and aphorisms contained in this work, and of which his 
 predecessors never had anj idea." z 
 
 By the time we have reached the end of the chapter it 
 will probably be seen that this astonishment was very easily 
 excited by the prestige of a great name, and that there is no 
 
 1 The best edition of the Historia Animalium is by Schneider, 4 vols., 
 Leipzig, 1811. That by J. C. Scaliger, Tolosse, 1619, with the notes of 
 Maussacus, is of interest to scholars only. There is a German translation by 
 Strack, Frankfort, 1816, which is tolerably accurate ; and a well-known 
 French translation by Camus, Paris, 1783, with the text, and a volume of notes, 
 which, although no longer representing the zoology of our day, has'interesting 
 matter. I can find no Italian or Spanish version. The Spanish work of Diego 
 de Funes mentioned by Buhle (Opera,!., 269), is not a translation at all, but 
 a compilation. (See note 13, chap, xvi.) 
 
 During the revision of these pages there have appeared, 1st, a proposal for 
 a new translation into English; and 2nd, the execution of such a proposal. The 
 first is by the Rev. Mr. Houghton, in the Natural History Review, April, 1862, 
 with the first book as a specimen, and decisive proofe of the utter untrust- 
 worthiness of Taylor's version. The execution is by Mr. Ceesswell : 
 Aristotle's History of Animals, in ten books, 1862 (Bonn's Classical Library). 
 
 2 Cuvier: Histoire des Sciences Nat., 1841, 1., 146. Inasmuch as the works 
 of A.'s predecessors have all perished, it is rather perilous to assert their abso- 
 lute deficiency in rules and aphorisms. 
 
270 " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XV. 
 
 impossibility at all in conceiving how a single man achieved 
 what Aristotle actually did achieve — which is, however, wholly 
 different from what Cuvier supposes him to have achieved. 
 
 "The History of Animals," he continues, "is not pro- 
 perly a zoology, that is to say a series of descriptions of 
 various animals ; it is rather a sort of philosophic anatomy, 
 in which the author treats of the generalities of organization 
 presented by various animals, in which he explains their 
 differences and resemblances, founded on a comparison of 
 their organs, and in which he lays the bases of grand classifi- 
 cations irreproachable in accuracy." 
 
 § 313. There is a difficulty, we know, in speaking of 
 Aristotle without exaggeration; but the language of Cuvier 
 passes all bounds permissible to sincere enthusiasm ; the 
 more so because of the authority attached to his own eminent 
 name. Others speak with a like exaggeration, but not with a 
 like authority. I am very far from any desire to understate 
 the claims of Aristotle ; but it is my purpose to control the 
 reckless assertions of critics who would severely scrutinize 
 the claims of contemporaries, while they lavishly exaggerate 
 the merits of the ancients. 3 
 
 3 See Buxton: Histoire Naturelle, I., p. 62. De Blainvtixe : Histoire 
 des Sciences de V Organisation, 1847, I. Cahus : Traiti d'Anatomie Com- 
 pare, Paris, 1833, Introd. Isidore Geoffroy St. Hilaire : Histoire 
 Generate des JRegnes organiques, 1854, I. Bubmeister : Manual of 
 Entomology, by Shuckhard, 1856, p. 597. Spix : Geschichte und Beur- 
 theilung aller Systeme in der Zoologie, 1811, p. 18. Swainson: Discourse 
 on the Study of Natural History, p. 6 (quoted by Houghton), says, " Had this 
 extraordinary man left us no other memorial of his talents than his researches 
 in Zoology, he would still be looked upon as one of the greatest philosophers of 
 ancient Greece, even in its brightest and highest age." This may be accepted; 
 but Macgillivray passes from Greece to modem times when he says that 
 Aristotle was not only acquainted with numerous species, " he described them 
 also according to a comprehensive and luminous method, which perhaps none of 
 his successors have approached ! " — Lives of Eminent Zoologists, 1834, p. 55. 
 The simple fact being that he has not described a single species, nor even 
 attempted it. Of the same accuracy is the assertion that he has treated com- 
 parative anatomy with genius, " and best deserves to be taken as a model. The 
 principal divisions which are still adopted by naturalists in the animal kingdom 
 are those of Aristotle, and he proposed some which have been resumed after 
 
CHAP. XV.] " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." 271 
 
 Looked at historically, that is to say with reference to the 
 works which for centuries succeeded it, the "History of 
 Animals" is a stupendous effort; but looked at absolutely, 
 that is to say in relation to the Science of which it treats, 
 it is an ill-digested, ill-compiled mass of details, mostly of 
 small value, with an occasional gleam of something better. 
 There is, strictly speaking, no science in it at all. There is 
 not even a system which might look like science. There is 
 not one good description. It is not an anatomical treatise ; 
 it is not a descriptive zoology; it is not a philosophy of 
 zoology; it is a collection of remarks about animals, their 
 structure, resemblances, differences, and habits. As a collec- 
 tion it is immense. But it is at the best only a collection of 
 details, without a trace of organization ; and the details them- 
 selves are rarely valuable, often inaccurate. 
 
 § 314. Aware of the paradoxical aspect which such a 
 judgment must present to the mind of every reader unpre- 
 pared by a previous acquaintance with the "History of Animals," 
 I shall bestow some pains to justify it in the following 
 analysis. 4 
 
 And first let me endeavour to correct the very misleading 
 remark of Ctjvier respecting the immense variety of parti- 
 culars implied in its general aphorisms. Are they really 
 generalized conclusions, drawn from an exhaustive survey of 
 particulars ? When Aristotle asserts that no terrestrial animal 
 is fixed to the ground, that all winged insects which have 
 their stings at the fore part of the body are two-winged, 
 whereas those which have the sting at the posterior part of 
 the body are four-winged — the generalizations may imply 
 either extensive observation, or rashness in drawing conclu- 
 
 having been unjustly rejected." A similar strain of exaggeration may be read 
 in Sonnenbtjrg : Zoologische-Kritische Bemerhungen zu Aristoteks Thier- 
 Gesehichte, Bonn, 1857, p. 6. It is not thought enough to glorify Aristotle 
 unless moderns are dwarfed beside him. 
 
 4 The appearance of the English translation will enable eyery reader to 
 control this analysis. 
 
272 " THE HISTOET OH' ANIMALS." [CHAP. XV. 
 
 sions. Cuvier assumes the former. He says they " sup- 
 posent un examen presque universel de toutes les especes." 
 Now, from my acquaintance with Aristotle's mode of pro- 
 cedure in general, and his facility in leaping to absolute con- 
 clusions on the slenderest warrant, I am extremely doubtful 
 on the point of his having carefully examined many, much 
 less all insects before he concluded as to the relation borne 
 by the stings to the number of wings ; not only is it unlike 
 him to have pursued this laborious plan, but it is improbable 
 from the very absoluteness with which he states the relation. 
 If we reflect that the fact is wholly without illumination from 
 physiology, and that no rational suggestion has yet been 
 offered why the diptera should not carry their offensive 
 weapon behind, we shall conclude it to have been simple 
 rashness in Aristotle to have done more than notice it as a 
 coincidence in all the insects observed by him. 
 
 § 315. Cuvier has instanced four generalizations to prove 
 the immense acquaintance Aristotle must have had with 
 particulars. I will quote four others (forty might be found), 
 all taken from the first book, which exemplify plainly enough 
 how easily large and careful induction could be dispensed 
 with. 
 
 1. The lion has no cervical vertebrae, but a single bone 
 in its neck. 
 
 2. Long-lived persons have one or two lines which extend 
 through the whole hand ; short-lived persons have two lines, 
 and these do not extend through the whole hand. 
 
 3. Man has, in proportion to his size, the largest and the 
 moistest brain. 3 
 
 4. The forehead is large in stupid men ; small in lively 
 
 5 Neither statement is correct. The relative size of the brain is much greater 
 in birds, rodents, monkeys. The notion of a greater moisture in the human brain 
 (several times repeated by him) may have arisen from one seen in a state of 
 decomposition; or was perhaps purely a hypothetical assumption. Elsewhere, 
 he speaks of the brain as one of the fluids (iyptiv), adding that of fluids it 
 is the driest or most consistent {aixH-ipirarov).— De Partibus, II., 7. 
 
CHAP. XV. j " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." 278 
 
 men ; broad in men predisposed to insanity (karariKot.) ; and 
 round in high-spirited men. 
 
 § 316. We are not justified, therefore, in assuming that 
 Aristotle was acquainted with all, or most, of .the particulars 
 which may be implied in his generalizations ; since we see 
 that he is quite ready to frame generalizations in the absence 
 of anything like an inductive warrant. 
 
 § 317. Are we justified in interpreting some of his generali : 
 zations as profound attempts at classification? This is a more 
 delicate inquiry. There are probably few who do not believe 
 that among his claims to eminence as a biologist, must be 
 named the first outline of a scientific Classification ; and were 
 this idea correct, his rank would indeed be very high, for 
 Classification is one of the latest results of scientific research. 
 I may say at once that it is only by bringing together certain 
 general statements, and disregarding the whole context, that 
 a plausible scheme can be drawn up from his works ; and so 
 far from his having laid " the eternal bases " upon which 
 moderns have erected their classification, it does not appear 
 that he had ever attempted a special arrangement of the 
 various groups of animals. 
 
 The reader must not reproach me with inconsiderate 
 antagonism. Polemical discussion is forced on me by the 
 reckless and misleading assertions of respected historians 
 and critics. Except Db. Whewell and Agassiz I know 
 of no one who treats this topic of Classification with any 
 apparent solicitude to state the simple truth. Ehetorical 
 exaggeration is supported by an arbitrary selection of phrases, 
 and an omission of all the passages which contradict or 
 qualify them. 
 
 " Aristotle," says Ctjvier, 6 " divides animals into two 
 grand classes : those which have blood, and those which have 
 
 6 To the same effect Deixe Chiaje : Istituzioni di Anatomia e fisologia 
 comparata, 1 832, 1., p. xxxv. ; and indeed almost every writer who mentions the 
 classification. 
 
 18 
 
274 " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XV. 
 
 no blood ; in other words, he divides, as we do, animals 
 with red blood from animals with white blood." On turning 
 to the original, do we find any such systematic division as 
 this ? By no means. "We find the distinction noted, but 
 it comes in quite casually at the close of a chapter, having 
 no relation to what has gone before, none to what comes 
 after it. True, it is frequently referred to in subsequent 
 chapters ; but only as to a general remark, a sort of popular 
 distinction, useful for its brevity. It is nowhere used as a 
 principle of classification, but simply as a generality. The 
 succeeding chapter opens with a remark of equal generality, 
 which is not less frequently referred to, namely, " some 
 animals are viviparous, some oviparous, and others vermi- 
 parous. The viviparous include man, the horse, the seal, 
 and all animals which have hair ; also among aquatic animals 
 the cetacea, such as the dolphin and cartilaginous fishes." 
 
 The next chapter opens with another remark of the same 
 kind : " Animals have either feet or no feet ; the former 
 have either two feet — as man, and no other animal, except 
 the bird ; or four feet — as the lizard or dog ; or many feet — 
 as the centipede, or bee." From this he passes on to the 
 fins of fish, and the feathers of birds. 
 
 § 318. Occasional reference is made to each of these < 
 three distinctions ; but no one distinction is used as a prin- 
 ciple of classification. The reason why no attempt was made 
 is to be read in the treatise on the " Parts of Animals." 
 He there argues at length against the idea of forming a 
 classification upon a " principle of negation ; " and not only 
 does he argue thus, but specially mentions this very case of 
 bloodless animals as being of all others " the most difficult, 
 nay impossible." 7 
 
 7 irdvTbiv Sk KakeirotTiiTov ij SiSivarov its ret dvaifia. I., 3, 9. Titze read 8 
 Avrucdprnia, " contraries," instead of «'c t& avaifxa. But this lection, which has 
 no other authority, really makes very little difference in the meaning, since 
 under the general term of contraries must be included the special distinction of 
 animals with and without blood. 
 
CHAP. XV.] " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." 275 
 
 § 819. Even were not his views thus explicitly stated, we 
 might gather from his practice that he never thought the 
 division of animals, according to their blood or no blood, 
 was a principle of classification ; rather should we seek one, 
 if at all, in the division of viviparous, oviparous, and vermi- 
 parous; for he did not know the extent to which Nature 
 overleaps such boundaries, presenting us with viviparous 
 amphibia, viviparous snails, viviparous insects, viviparous 
 worms, and viviparous infusoria. 8 But it is evident that he 
 had no idea of making generative distinctions the grounds of 
 a classification. 
 
 § 320. Eeturning to the distinction of animals into san- 
 guineous and exsanguineous, we may observe that it does not 
 quite represent the " animaux a sang rouge, et a sang blanc," 
 for by exsanguineous Aristotle meant without blood, and not 
 blood of a different colour. He held that the lower animals, 
 i. e., reptiles and our invertebrata, had a fluid which was not 
 blood, but analogous to it. 9 
 
 8 Although he knew that some of the cartilaginous fishes are viviparous, he 
 too precipitately generalized the fact. The genera Raia and Scyllium are 
 oviparous: Lacepede: Histoire naturette des Poissons 1798. Aristotle ex- 
 cepted the Lophius piscatorius ; but he erred in supposing it to be a carti- 
 laginous fish. The viviparous osseous fishes, Blennius and Anableps, he could 
 not have known ; the former being found only in the German Ocean, and the 
 latter in the waters of Surinam. See Rathke : Abhandlungen zur Bildungs 
 und Entwickelungsgeschichte des Menschen und der Thieve. 1853, H., Erste 
 Abhand. 
 
 9 De Partibus, I., 5, 15. Compare also Kohler : Aristoteles de MoUuscis 
 cephalopodibus, Rigs, 1820, p. 2. Delle Chiaje makes it a reproach that 
 Aristotle " reputd senza sangue que' viventi che ne sono a dovizia proveduti, ed 
 in taluni di essi h questo rosso, di che lo stesso gran Linneo non si awide." 
 Istituzioni di Anat. e fisiologia comparata, 1832, 1., xxxvii. Swammebdamm 
 first pointed out that many of the earth worms had red blood; and he adds that 
 the blood of the snail is a viscid reddish fluid.— Bibel der Natur, Leipzig, 
 1752, p. 54. Cutier himself was forced to admit the "vers a, sang rouge." 
 Since then the blood of several annelids has been found to be green, pale 
 yellow, and red; while that of some Tunicata and the Sipuncula is red, orange 
 yellow, yellow, violet, blue. See Seaside Studies, 1st ed., 1858, p. 66; 2nd ed., 
 1860, p. 70 ; and compare Rouget : Comptes rendus de la SociM de Biologie, 
 1859, p. 172 ; also in Brown Sequard : Journal de la Physiohgk, 1859, 
 H, 660. 
 
 18—2 
 
276 " THE HISTORY OF ANIMAXS." [CHAP. XV. 
 
 § 321. Another distinction he names is that of winged 
 and wingless : the winged animals have feathers, like birds, 
 or membraneous wings, like insects, or wings of skin, like 
 bats. The first and last have blood ; the second are bloodless. 
 
 § 322. The principal classes which have blood enumerated 
 by him are birds (not reptiles : these he held to be bloodless), 
 fish, and cetacea. " There is also another class, covered with 
 a shell, vulgarly called shellfish ; and an anonymous class, the 
 soft-shelled (malacostraca), which comprises crabs, carcini, 
 astaci ; and another of mollusca (cephalopoda) ; and another 
 of insects. The common character of the four last-named 
 classes is to have no blood, and to have more than four feet 
 when they have feet at all. There are no large classes besides 
 these, for there are many forms which are not included under 
 any common form ; but either stand alone, without difference 
 between them, as Man ; or, if there are any different species 
 they have not been named." 
 
 " All wingless quadrup.eds have blood. Of these some are 
 viviparous, some oviparous. Most of the oviparousjdiave hair ; 
 the oviparous have scales. . . . Not all animals which 
 are viviparous have hair, since some fish bring forth their 
 young alive ; but all hairy animals are viviparous. In the 
 class of viviparous quadrupeds there are many genera («§»)), 
 but anonymous ; hence we are forced to name them severally, 
 as man, lion, stag, horse, dog. On the other hand, there is a 
 class which is made out of animals having manes — such as 
 the horse, the ass, the oreus (Mule), the ginnus (Hinny), the 
 innus (also a Mule), and the so-called hemionus (Half ass) of 
 Syria, which is called a mule from its resemblance only, for it 
 is really a distinct genus, which breeds with its own kind." 
 
 § 323. He expressly tells us that this sketch is only an 
 outline, or foretaste ; but there is no intimation that he re- 
 garded it as inaccurate ; nor is there an intimation that he 
 attempted to make any other classification than what naturally 
 presented itself in the obvious differences of structure, habits, 
 
CHAP. XV.] « THE HISTOKY OF ANIMALS." 277 
 
 and habitat. All men had spontaneously grouped animals as 
 fourfooted, winged, aquatic, terrestrial, oviparous, &c. ; nor 
 has Aristotle attempted any more systematic grouping. In- 
 deed, it is to mistake the whole course of scientific develop- 
 ment to suppose that Classification can precede the labours 
 which it can only succeed : its principles must be eliminated 
 from the extensive research of comparative anatomy. From 
 the days of Aristotle to those of Linn^tjs there was no im- 
 portant step taken towards such an elimination, and this was 
 mainly owing to the backward state of comparative anatomy. 
 For what is the aim of a classification ? It is to group 
 animals in such a manner that each class and genus shall in- 
 dicate the degree of complexity attained by the organism, -and 
 thus the external form betray the internal structure. 
 
 § 324. No such scheme ever entered the head of Aristotle. 
 He only wished to mark out the obviously distinctive cha- 
 racters by which the common eye could recognize each class 
 or genus. Historians have drawn up a scheme from his 
 remarks, and presented it as his classification. But, naturally 
 enough, they cannot agree among themselves as to the details. 
 Meyee, 10 after mentioning the various schemes which have 
 been drawn up, from Pliny to Ehrenberg, points out the 
 violent contradictions visible in these attempts, and that these 
 writers are not agreed as to Aristotle's method, main divisions, 
 and subdivisions. Nay, more : not only do these doctors 
 differ respecting the nature of the disease, but there are some 
 who doubt whether there is any disease at all : they are not 
 unanimous as to whether Aristotle had or had not a system. 
 Furlanus is angry at such a doubt, and cannot conceive how 
 any one should fail to detect the system. Artedi and Eeau- 
 mur are equally puzzled to detect one. Buefon and Cuvier 
 see the system plainly enough. Agassiz declares that 
 " Aristotle cannot be said to have proposed any regular 
 
 10 Metee; Aristoteles Thierkunde, Berlin, 1855, p. 64. 
 
278 " THE HISTOKY OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XV. 
 
 classification. He speaks constantly of more or less extensive 
 groups under a common appellation, evidently considering 
 them as natural divisions ; but he nowhere expresses a con- 
 viction that these groups may be arranged methodically so as 
 to exhibit the natural affinities of animals." n 
 
 The fact of such dissidences, on a point which ought not 
 to admit of two opinions, is decisive. There can be no classi- 
 fication where students mistake both the leading principles 
 and particular applications. Zoologists may read a classifica- 
 tion in Aristotle's pages ; but they do violence to the plain 
 meaning of the text ; they disregard context, and piece toge- 
 ther from far and wide detached observations never meant to 
 be connected with each other. Whbwell aptly remarks that 
 the construction of a classification " consists in the selection 
 of certain parts as those which shall peculiarly determine the 
 place of each species in our arrangement. It is clear, there- 
 fore, that such an enumeration of differences as we have 
 described, supposing it complete, contains the materials of all 
 possible classifications. But we can with no more propriety 
 say that the author of such an enumeration of differences is 
 the author of any classification which can be made by means 
 of them, than we can say that a man who writes down the 
 whole alphabet writes down the solution of a given riddle or 
 the answer to a particular question." 18 We may add that 
 Albebtus Magnus, Gesner, and the other followers of 
 Aristotle, saw no system in their master's work ; and why 
 should we ? 
 
 § 325. Having cleared away some of the obstructing mists 
 of prejudice, we may now look at " The History of Animals" 
 with more impartiality. 
 
 11 Agassiz : Essay on Classification, London, 1859, p. 802. Compare also 
 J. C. ScAiiGEE in his commentary on the Hist. Animal., 1619, Lib. I., c. vii., 
 p. 53, from which it is evident that he found no system of classification in the 
 work. 
 
 12 Whewell : History of the Inductive Sciences, 1857, III., 289. 
 
CHAP. XV.] " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." 279 
 
 The abruptness with which it opens is so contrary to the 
 practice of Aristotle, that there can be no reasonable doubt of 
 the original introduction having been lost or transposed. 
 Patrizio thought that the whole treatise was a continuation of 
 the De Partibus; 13 but this idea will not withstand close 
 scrutiny ; the De Partibus manifestly succeeds the " History 
 of Animals" (§ 357). 
 
 The ingenious suggestion of Titze " seems at first sight 
 to remove the difficulty. He thinks the first book of the 
 De Partibus has been transposed from the " History of 
 Animals," to which indeed it forms a very good introduction. 
 To this Fbanzids, in his edition of the De Partibus, has 
 given his assent. Yet on a due consideration, it seems to me 
 that the difficulty is only shifted ; the one work gains an in- 
 troduction which the other loses. A commencement of the 
 De Partibus at the second book will be not less abrupt than 
 the present commencement of the " History of Animals ; " 
 moreover, there is a passage distinctly referring to the " His- 
 tory of Animals " in this first book (§ 357). 15 
 
 § 326. Book I. opens, without a word of preamble, by a 
 division of the organism into similar and dissimilar parts, 
 which may be regarded as the first dawn of a conception of 
 philosophic anatomy, such as Fallopia more distinctly con- 
 ceived, and Bichat made the foundation of modern histology. 
 Since Bichat, the organism has always been understood as 
 composed of elementary tissues, which combine to form organs, 
 and these organs combine to form systems. It is, therefore, 
 
 13 Patritii : Discussionum Peripateticarum tomi quatuor, Bale, 1581, I., 
 c. ix., p. 118. 
 
 14 Titze : 'AfnaroreXovg \6yog o irtpi Qvoeiug rrjg £o>iKrjg /mXhtto fuBoSueog, 
 Prag., 1819. 
 
 15 Neither Ritter nor Beandis makes any mention of Titze's proposal ; 
 whence we may conclude that they thought little of it. It is, however, adopted 
 by Sundebaix: Die Thierarten des Aristoteles, Stockholm, 1863 ; a valuable 
 and candid exposition of the subject, which came into my hands too late for 
 more than this passing recommendation. 
 
280 " THE HISTORY OP ANIMALS." [CHAP. XV. 
 
 difficult without equivoque to use Aristotle's language ; but if 
 by similar parts, partes similares, 16 we understand those which 
 are general, and by dissimilar parts, those which are indi- 
 vidual, his meaning will be plain. 
 
 § 327. " The parts of animal bodies," is the opening 
 sentence, " are either simple, that is, admit of being divided 
 into similar parts — as, for example, muscle into muscles ; 1T or 
 they are composed of dissimilar parts — such as the hand, 
 which can no more be divided into several hands than the 
 face into several faces. Some of these parts are also called 
 limbs, those namely which, while they form wholes, are com- 
 posed of many parts, such as the head, the foot, the hand, 
 the arm, and the thorax. All these compound parts are 
 formed of simple parts — as the hand from flesh, sinews, and 
 bones." 
 
 § 328. In some animals all the parts are the same, in 
 others they differ. In those which are of the" same class, the 
 parts only differ in excess or defect. But some animals do 
 not agree thus. They have parts which from their resem- 
 blance may be called analogous. " Thus a bone is the 
 analogue of a fish bone, a nail of a claw, a hand of a crab's 
 nipper, a feather of a fish's scale, for it is plain that what the 
 feather is to the bird, that is the scale to the fish." 
 
 Here we see another germ of modern science, the thdorie 
 des analogues, which, especially since Goethe, and Geoffeoy 
 St. Hilaike, has given so much precision to transcendental 
 anatomy, when coupled with the theory of homologies. 
 
 § 329. After dividing the simple parts into those which 
 are moist, and those which are dry, he proceeds to enumerate 
 
 w . Aristotle was the first to use the term b/iow/upi'). Compare Phiufpson : 
 ii\)j dvQpwirivr], p. 4. 
 
 17 olov adpiceg elg adpKag. He did not know muscle as we understand it ; 
 yet I cannot otherwise intelligibly render the phrase. Strack says, " Fleisch und 
 Fleisch/atfe™; " but this conveys the erroneous impression that A. knew the 
 fibrous structure of muscles. (Cresswell is boldly literal, " flesh, into pieces 
 of flesh.") 
 
CHAP. XV.] " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." 281 
 
 the various grounds of distinction among animals. This is 
 done rapidly and in outline, details being left for future 
 occasions. He then proceeds to examine the constituent 
 parts of animals ; and first of man, because of all animals 
 man is the best known. By this he means the external parts 
 of man are the most familiar ; and after a very dry and some- 
 what trivial enumeration of these familiar parts, he says that 
 the internal parts being unknown, we must compare them 
 with the parts of animals most resembling man. 18 
 
 § 330. He commences his exposition of the internal 
 organs with meagre and inaccurate notices of the brain, 
 lungs, heart, kidneys, liver, &c. Even Cuvier is forced to 
 admit that on these topics "his ideas have not the same 
 exactitude ; " but tries to save his character by adding, — 
 " One sees that on certain points of d.etail he is a better observer 
 than the majority of his successors." Now this is certainly 
 untrue of Galen, whose knowledge of anatomy was incom- 
 parably more accurate than Aristotle's ; nor, with the single 
 exception of the questionable mention of the Eustachian tube, 
 is there one point upon which Aristotle can be said to have 
 observed what his successors overlooked. 
 
 § 331. Book II. — Having in the first book described the 
 external and internal parts of man, he now proceeds to 
 describe those of animals. Here, as throughout, we have to 
 note the singular prodigality of detail which is displayed : 
 almost every line contains a fact, and often a generality em- 
 bracing a wide range of facts. There may be, and indeed 
 there is, considerable inaccuracy in his statements, but we see 
 the mighty energies of dawning Science in this gathering 
 together of facts which Philosophy was but too prone to 
 ignore. Had he only been half as solicitous about the quality, 
 
 18 So carelessly is Aristotle spoken of even by historians of science that we 
 find Spix declaring " A. makes man the standard both for internal and external 
 structure, and executes his descriptions in a masterly style."— Geschichte und 
 Beurtheilung alter Systeme in der Zoologie, p. 18. 
 
282 " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XV. 
 
 as he showed himself about the quantity of his facts, the 
 work would perhaps have delighted his contemporaries less, 
 but it would have been an instructor for all time. To cite a 
 third of the examples of careless observation and rash 
 generalization would be to inflict a needless weariness on the 
 reader ; yet as the accuracy of Aristotle's observation is not 
 unfrequently vaunted, a specimen or two, taken at random, 
 must be given. 
 
 § 332. I. " The male has more teeth than the female in 
 man, 19 sheep, goats, and swine. In other animals the obser- 
 vation is imperfect." 
 
 II. " Fish have no external organs of Sense, not even the 
 passages of hearing and smelling." 
 
 III. " The heart of the ox is peculiar ; for there is a kind 
 of ox, though not every kind, which has a bone in its heart ; 
 and in the heart of the horse there is also a bone." (§ 389.) 
 
 IV. " Some animals have a gall-bladder attached to the 
 liver, others none. The Achainian deer seems to have one on 
 its tail ; that which is called the gall-bladder in this animal 
 resembles it in colour, but is not liquid, and is more like the 
 spleen in structure." 
 
 § 333. Naturalists have been interested to find the men- 
 tion of a ruminating fish in this book. Here is the passage : 
 " Fish have one simple stomach, but it differs in form ; in some 
 it is like an intestine, as in the scarus, and this is the only 
 fish which seems to ruminate." 
 
 The statement is repeated twice. 20 We note that the fact 
 is unaccompanied by any expression of surprise (compare 
 § 201), and also unaccompanied by anything like evidence. 
 If true, the fact must be one difficult of observation, since 
 
 10 It may be supposed that a fact so easily verified as the normal number of 
 teeth in woman could hardly have been misstated unless on the warrant of some 
 superficial evidence ; and ae some women never cut their wisdom teeth — a fact 
 also noticed in certain men — an example of this kind may have famished 
 Aristotle with his conclusion. 
 
 80 In Book VHI., c. xiv., p. 675, and in De Part. HI., 14. 
 
CHAP. XT.] " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." 283 
 
 fish will not exhibit their ruminating propensities out of the 
 water ; and in the water, it could hardly have been watched. 
 Is it true ? 21 
 
 § 334. Book III. continues the enumeration of the inter- 
 nal organs. It casually reveals the fact that there were illus- 
 trated books in those days ; since references are made to a 
 diagram in which the letters a, b, c, d, indicate the parts 
 spoken of in the text, just as in a modern work. 
 
 The descriptions of veins, sinews, muscles, hair and flesh 
 need not be cited here ; but the chapter on the blood is too 
 interesting to be passed over. First be it noted that the 
 blood is said to be, in common with the brain and spinal 
 marrow, without sensation. What does this mean ? Probably 
 he wishes to guard against the false conclusion that blood 
 may be sensitive, because flesh is the medium of sensation, 
 and blood is transformed into fat, marrow, and flesh. Or 
 it may be that he is simply protesting against Plato, who 
 held that opinion. 
 
 § 335. " The taste of blood in a healthy condition is sweet, 
 and its colour red ; but when of inferior quality, or damaged 
 by sickness, it is black." The sweetness of the blood is 
 probably a metaphorical expression. The blackness was 
 observed in blood drawn from the veins, and, as it was only 
 drawn in cases of sickness, the coincidence stood for cause. 
 
 § 336. " Inside the body blood has a certain warmth and 
 fluidity : but outside it coagulates, except in deer and animals 
 resembling them. The blood of other animals coagulates, 
 unless the fibres are removed : eav firj e^aipiOwmv al ivsq." 
 
 21 Milne Edwakds states it without misgiving in his Lefons sur la Physio- 
 logie et t'Anat, comparte, 1861, VI., 290, referring to Owen's Lectures on the 
 Vertebrata, as his authority. In a private note Prof. Owen informs me that 
 the Scans named by Aristotle has not been identifie*, but that " the carp by a 
 rotatory motion of the gullet brings the vegetable food-contents of the stomach 
 successively within the sphere of the action of the strong pharyngeal grinding 
 teeth, whence the pulp is returned to the stomach fitted for passing the 
 pylorus." 
 
284 " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XV. 
 
 This is a remarkable passage. Although the blood of deer 
 is really no less coagulable than that of other quadrupeds, there 
 is some probability in a genuine observation having originated 
 the error ; since modern physiologists affirm that in the blood 
 of a hunted animal the fibrine disappears, or is so much 
 lessened, as to prevent coagulation. Now, it is possible that 
 Aristotle's observation was made on the blood of a hunted 
 deer. 
 
 Even more noteworthy is the mention of fibrine or fibres, 
 al ivfc, as the cause of coagulation. One might, without an 
 over-anxiety to read modern discoveries into ancient texts, 
 regard this as an anticipation of Malpighi's discovery of 
 fibrine being the coagulable material; 22 an anticipation also 
 of the further discovery by Boeelli that this fibrine is liquid 
 while in the blood-vessels, and only coagulates on exposure to 
 the air; 23 since it might be argued that Aristotle knew the 
 fibrine to be liquid in the blood ; otherwise, when specifying 
 the fluidity of the blood, he would have excepted its fibres. 
 Yet such an argument would be very questionable. He was 
 only repeating the notion shared by Plato respecting the 
 existence of fibres in the blood ; and we have but to open the 
 Timceus to see how far that notion was from the truth. Plato 
 thought the fibres actually existed as fibres in the blood, and 
 that by their aid its motions were effected ! 
 
 § 337. Aristotle seems to have made, or collected, some 
 observations on the comparative rapidity of coagulation, for he 
 states that the blood of oxen coagulates more rapidly than 
 that of any other animal. I am not aware whether this is 
 exact; but experiment has proved that the blood of oxen 
 sheep and dogs coagulates faster than that of man. 
 
 § 338. " Fat animals have purer blood, but in small 
 quantity. Man has. the purest and thinnest ; oxen and asses 
 
 22 Malpighi : De Polyp., p. 125, in Opera Omnia, Loud., 1686. 
 
 23 Borelli : Be Motu Animalium, liome, 1681, II., prop, cxxxii., p. 265. 
 
CHAP. XV.J « THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." 285 
 
 the thickest and blackest." These imaginary facts are suc- 
 ceeded by the following a priori statement, deduced from the 
 axiom that the upper must be the nobler part: — "In the 
 lower parts of the body the blood becomes thicker and blacker 
 than in the upper parts." Of equal value is the assertion that 
 the blood of woman is thicker and blacker than that of man. 
 
 § 339. The book concludes with remarks on milk and its 
 coagulation, from which may be cited the mention of the 
 occasional appearance of milk in the male. He speaks of a 
 male goat at Lemnos which yielded enough milk for cheeses to 
 be made from it, and whose male descendants inherited the 
 peculiarity. Nor is this the fable it was long held to be. 
 Bukdach 2 * cites several well-attested cases of males yielding 
 milk. Humboldt saw aman in A merica who suckled _his ' 
 child for five months, during the lHnessafhis wife; and 
 Isidore ""GIiopfroy SrTTlSATET^aT*foTsome years, in the 
 Jardin des Plantes, a male goat with largely developed udders 
 yielding milk. 
 
 V- § 340. Book IV. — The first seven chapters of this book 
 are devoted to the anatomy of invertebrata, and are not only 
 rich in details, but approach more nearly to the demands of a 
 systematic treatise than any other portion of the work. The 
 cephalopoda are first described, and with a minuteness which 
 could only come from familiarity with their forms. That he 
 gathered much of his information from fishermen is obvious : 
 yet it will be remarked how singularly free his statements are 
 from the absurdities which commonly distort the narratives of 
 fishermen. Not only does he withhold credence from their 
 marvellous stories, which is in itself remarkable, when we 
 consider how credulous were his contemporaries and suc- 
 cessors, and how uncritical he himself often is respecting 
 facts and explanations; but in another place he distinctly 
 intimates the reason of fishermen's ignorance, — " that these 
 
 84 Bukdach : Traitt de Physiohgie, Paris, 1839, IV., 382. 
 
286 " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XV. 
 
 people never make direct observations for the sake of 
 knowledge." s5 
 
 § 341. Every naturalist recognizes at once, by unmistake- 
 able though indefinable indications, the portions of a work 
 which are compiled without direct knowledge ; and will see in 
 Aristotle's treatment of the cephalopoda traces of that personal 
 knowledge which he, perhaps, first gained in the pleasant 
 idleness of boyhood. 26 Yet although he was doubtless familiar 
 with them from his early years, as with many other forms of 
 marine life in his book, there are no traces of the naturalist's 
 enjoyment. It has no out-of-doorness. We never feel the 
 sea-breeze blowing; we never hear the delicious ripple of 
 the waves against the advancing keel ; we never hear the 
 creaking whirr of the net being hawled on board. From 
 anything to be gathered from this book, we might conclude 
 that the author had only toiled amidst the dust of libraries and 
 museums, like the veriest professor of an inland university. 2T 
 
 § 342. He next describes the Crustacea, and then the 
 Testacea ; in both displaying more anatomical knowledge than 
 is shown in the descriptions of the vertebrata. A brief 
 
 25 oiOtlg y&p avriav oiiBiv rrjpet rotavrov tov yv&vai %dpiv. — He Gen. 
 Animal., HI., 5, 756. His rejection of the fables reported by writers such as 
 Ctesias shows even more discrimination ; for as Pliny truly says, though his 
 own excessive credulity renders the phrase rather ludicrous in his mouth, 
 " mirum est quo procedat Graca credulitas ! Nullum tam impudens men- 
 dacium est, ut teste careat." VHI., 22. Compared with this writer, or with 
 Pliny, Aristotle is a model of sober sagacity ; compared with the naturalists of 
 this century, he is somewhat easy in credulity. 
 
 26 Koiiler : Aristoteles de Moll use is cephalopodibus, Riga, 1820, has col- 
 lected all the passages in which A. speaks of the cephalopoda in his three 
 principal treatises. See a still more exhaustive notice in the essay by At/bert: 
 Die Cephalopoden den Aristoteles in the Zeitschrift fur Wissenschafiliche 
 Zoohgie, 1862, XII., 372. 
 
 27 Yet a genuine naturalist could say of it : " It is less intended as a 
 summary of his general views respecting their organization and habits, than 
 as a popular exordium calculated to engage the attention of the reader and 
 excite him to the study of Nature." — Macgillivray: Lives of the Zoologists, 
 1834, p. 62 ; and Sonnenburg has the courage to assert that its "natural and 
 simple style " gives it a charm which is wanting to most modern works. — 
 Zoohgische-hritische Bemerkungen, p. 6. 
 
CHAP. XV.] " THE HISTOKY OF ANIMALS." 287 
 
 description of the structure of Insects completes his survey. 
 No classes are proposed for worms, polypes, medusas, &c, the 
 reason for which he has given elsewhere. " No groups have 
 been made because there is no one form which embraces 
 many forms." 
 
 § 343. Chap. VIII. passes to the enumeration of the 
 organs of Sense, in invertebrata. I will only pause to notice 
 one detail. "With regard to sight and hearing in the 
 Testacea," he says, " nothing is very clear. The solen seems 
 to fly when any noise is made, and on feeling the approach of 
 the iron rod which is used to capture it ; and the pecten, when 
 a finger approaches, opens and shuts as if it saw." He here 
 contents himself with recording the observed facts, which seem 
 to imply the existence of senses. He did not know that the 
 pecten has eyes, studding its mantle like jewels ; but, what- 
 ever vision the pecten may possess, it does not open and shut 
 at the approach of a finger. 
 
 § 344. Chap. IX. is devoted to the voices of animals, 
 distinguishing between Voice and Sound, and Speech, which 
 is different from both. Voice is only produced by the pharynx ; 
 therefore, no animal without lungs has a voice. The rigorous 
 exactness of this distinction is seen when he comes to treat of 
 ,the so-called voice of fishes. " Fish are mute, for they have 
 no lungs, no windpipe, no pharynx. Some of them emit 
 sounds and squeaks, which are hence said to have a voice. 
 But some of these produce the sound by the friction of their 
 gills which are spinous ; others produce the sound internally, 
 near the stomach. And all have an organ of breathing (air- 
 bladder ?) which causes a sound when pressed and moved. 
 Some cartilaginous fishes also seem to whistle, but they cannot 
 properly be said to have a voice, only to utter a sound." 28 
 
 88 Johannes MUiaer in his Archiv fur Anat. und Physiohgie, 1857, 
 p. 249, has given an elaborate survey of existing knowledge on the voices of the 
 fish with valuable additions of his own. Dufosse has also treated the subject 
 in a Memoire addressed to the Academic des Sciences, Feb., 1858. 
 
288 " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XV. 
 
 § 345. Chap. X. treats of Sleep. In a former paragraph 
 (§ 284) we drew attention to the distinction between Sleep 
 and Repose; and the remark must be repeated apropos of 
 this chapter, in which the various indications of animal sleep 
 are brought together. Aristotle thinks it by no means clear 
 that oviparous animals dream, but is certain that they sleep. 
 
 § 346. Chap. XI. enumerates the distinctions of sex ; but 
 this subject is more fully treated elsewhere. 
 
 § 347. Book V. commences the enumeration of the chief 
 particulars concerning Generation. Chapters I. to XIV. 
 specify the various modes of congress, the breeding periods, 
 and periods of puberty. Out of the mass of details here 
 collected, true, false, and trivial, we shall only cite one ; and 
 this not as a specimen of the rest, but as an example of the 
 unreasoning credulity which propagates vulgar errors, and from 
 which, as we have seen, even Aristotle was by no means free. 
 The hen-partridge, he says, is impregnated if the wind blows 
 from the male ; nay, at certain periods, it is frequently enough 
 for them only to hear his voice as he flies over them and they 
 become impregnated by his breath. 
 
 § 348. Chap. XIV. suddenly quits the subject of Genera- 
 tion and without any transition passes to a description of the 
 structure and habits of Sponges ; a defect in composition 
 which might justify a suspicion of this being an interpolation, 
 did not the whole work exhibit extreme laxity in the arrange- 
 ment of its materials. 
 
 § 349. Chap. XV. to the end of the book continues the 
 subject of Generation. 
 
 § 350. Book VI. is a continuation of the same subject, 
 the first nine chapters being devoted to Birds ; the next eight 
 chapters to Fish; and the remainder to viviparous animals 
 with feet. As we shall hereafter have to consider his views 
 on generation more in detail, we need not pause over these 
 chapters, except to notice the spontaneous generation of eels 
 from mud. 
 
CHAP. XV.] « THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." 289 
 
 " Eels are not reproduced from sexual congress, nor are 
 they oviparous. Dissection reveals neither sperm nor eggs, nor 
 the generative organs. And this is the only animal possessing 
 Hood which does not arise from congress or from eggs. That 
 this is so, however, is evident, since after rain they appear in 
 ponds which have heen dried up. But they are never produced 
 in dry places, nor in ponds always full : they are nourished 
 by rain-water. They originate in the bowels of the earth." 
 
 § 351. Book VII. is only a fragment, and is devoted to 
 a continuation of the subject of the two former books, but 
 restricted to man. For the reason already mentioned (§ 350), 
 we pass it over with the simple remark that in it may be found 
 many of the notions current in medical literature up to the 
 eighteenth century. 
 
 § 352. Book VIII. opens with a description, already 
 quoted (§ 175-179), of the ascending complexity in the 
 scale of organic life, and then passes on to a variety of details 
 respecting animals. First of the different localities they 
 inhabit ; then of their food ; then of their migrations ; then 
 of their hybernation and their various relations to tempera- 
 ture. It next treats of the diseases to which they are subject. 
 Here, as may be expected, there are many absurd notions, 
 some so contradicted by ordinary experience that it is difficult 
 to understand how a man of his amazing sagacity could have 
 given them credence. For example, mentioning the madness 
 of dogs, he says that all animals bitten by rabid dogs become 
 rabid, except man. Again, " horses ranging the meadows 
 suffer from no disease except gout, which destroys their 
 hoofs ; one sign of this disease is the appearance of a hollow 
 wrinkle beneath the nose." Domesticated horses suffer from 
 various diseases. The Elephant is only troubled with two 
 diseases, flatulence and diarrhoea. 29 Mice die if they drink 
 during summer. 
 
 59 Repeated by Pliny, Hist. Nat, VIII., 10. 
 
 19 
 
290 " THE HISTOBY OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XV. 
 
 § 853. Book IX. is on the habits and instincts of animals. 
 The details are frequently very interesting, and on the whole 
 tolerably accurate; but they are merely collected as details, 
 without any attempt at systematic arrangement, so that the 
 book is a quarry rather than a composition. It shows Aris- 
 totle's love of facts for their own sake ; but it shows little 
 of the philosophic power with which naturalists have so 
 gratuitously credited him. Like most boys, and many men 
 who call themselves naturalists, he was eager enough in 
 collecting facts and anecdotes ; but there is no more illumi- 
 nation of such facts by biological principles, no more 
 attempt so to co-ordinate them as to evolve general principles, 
 than in the labour of species-mongers who pass their lives in 
 registering the spots on a butterfly's wing, the curves of a 
 shell, or the markings of Diatomacese. Spix has had the 
 courage to avow this : " Aristotle was so far from giving a 
 form to his wealth of details that he was content to publish a 
 chaos of observations and opinions as materials for some 
 future architect.. His ' History of Animals ' thus resembles 
 a great market where each one may choose what he wants." 30 
 Only he must not want accuracy. 
 
 § 354. From the foregoing analysis the reader will be 
 able to judge how far Ctjviee's opinion is acceptable, and with 
 what justification this work can be pronounced "one of the 
 greatest monuments which the genius of man has raised to 
 Natural Science." 31 That it is a marvellous work, consider- 
 ing the period at which it was produced, and the multiform 
 productions of its author, every one must admit. But this is 
 not admitting its claim to be regarded as a great monument 
 of Science. It is no more a monument than a brick-kiln 
 is an architectural achievement. There are plenty of facts, 
 some valuable, some trivial, many false. There is no colliga- 
 
 30 Spix: Geschichte und Beurtheilung aller Systeme in der Zoologie, 1811, 
 p. 22. 
 
 31 Cuvier : Op. cit., I., 166. 
 
CHAP. XV.] " THE HISTORY OF ANIMALS." 291 
 
 tion of these facts — none of the general principles which could 
 bind them into a serviceable system, and form a work of 
 science. In his day it was a great thing for an eminent 
 thinker to bestow so much care upon the collection of facts ; 
 but this could only be a preparation for future science ; 32 and 
 one luminous principle is worth a thousand unconnected facts, 
 for it contains within it the seeds of a thousand discoveries. 
 
 § 355. There is not a single principle established by 
 Aristotle in this work which would lead the student to new 
 discoveries, or enable him to illuminate the old. He could 
 not, knowing this work by heart, class a single new animal, 
 even provisionally, nor explain a single biological pheno- 
 menon. And the best answer to its eulogists is History, 
 which teaches that no zoological science was even begun until 
 many centuries afterwards. Had Aristotle really laid the 
 " eternal bases," had he placed in the hands of men a new 
 instrument of research, Zoology would have advanced as 
 Astronomy advanced from Hippaeohus to Ptolemy. 
 
 § 356. Once more let me remind the reader that these 
 objections are not directed against Aristotle, but against his 
 careless panegyrists. They would be preposterous if urged 
 against the great thinker in the early days of science. One 
 might as well insult Greek civilization by a triumphant enume- 
 ration of its deficiencies, and point to its want of a post-office 
 or a free press. But the language of panegyrists is as sweep- 
 ing as it is exaggerated. The real historical greatness of 
 Aristotle does not suffice them ; they insist on our accepting 
 him as an authority. 
 
 » "In so complex a science as that which relates to living beings," says 
 EmiH, "accurate and diligent empirical observation, though the best of 
 things as far as it goes, will not take us very far , and the mere accumulation 
 of facts without generalization and classification is as great an error in el- 
 lectually, as hygienically would be the attempt to strengthen by accumulating 
 nourishment without due attention to the print* vi^tte ™f » ^ 
 being chiefly giddiness and confusion in the head.»-0» the Cell-Theory m the 
 British and Foreign Medical Review, Oct., 1853, p. 291. 
 
 iy— — 2 
 
( 292 ) 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." 1 
 
 § 357. The position of this treatise immediately after the 
 one just analyzed is clearly indicated in Aristotle's programme 
 of study. " First, we must understand the phenomena of 
 animals ; then assign their causes ; and finally, speak of their 
 generation." The " History of Animals " undertakes the 
 first ; the De Partibus undertakes the second ; and the treatise 
 to be analyzed in the next chapter undertakes the third. 
 
 The work now before us has been comparatively little 
 studied. Editors have neglected it ; translators have avoided 
 it ; students generally have found it uninteresting. And indeed 
 it wants the abundance of detail, and the more attractive sub- 
 ject of the " History of Animals ; " it is, moreover, very difli- 
 cult to understand. Yet as an attempt to explain the causes 
 of biological phenomena, it deserves close attention. 
 
 § 358. Book I., Chap. I., opens with the question whe- 
 ther "it is necessary to treat of each individual separately, or 
 to treat of that which is common to them all. For there 
 are many things alike in different animals, such as sleep, 
 respiration, growth, decay, and death. Of these we can say 
 
 1 The best edition of the De Partibus is that by Eranzhjs, with a translation 
 and excellent notes, Leipzig, 1853. I cannot find any English, Italian, Spanish 
 or French versions. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] " ON THE PARTS OP ANIMALS." 293 
 
 nothing clear or certain as yet. But it is evident that by 
 separate treatment the same things must frequently be re- 
 peated. . . . It is otherwise with those things which are 
 included under one name, but which have nevertheless dif- 
 ferences of kind, such as Locomotion, which may be flying, 
 creeping, swimming, or walking. Hence we must first settle 
 whether our inquiry is to begin with that which is common to 
 the whole class, and then proceed to the particulars, or at once 
 commence with each animal by itself." 
 
 There being several causes, for example, the moving cause 
 and the final cause, we must settle which of these naturally 
 comes first. The final cause must evidently be treated first, 
 for it is the reason, \6yog, and reason is the beginning of 
 every product of art and nature. 
 
 § 359. Here follow metaphysical distinctions respecting 
 necessity, form, and cause, from which the following is all 
 that need here be quoted : " We must say since man is to be, 
 therefore he has such and such parts, for without these he 
 cannot be. Since he is such a being, he must of necessity 
 have such an origin, and in such a manner : therefore this 
 part and then that part- is originated." 
 
 § 360. In his teleology will be noticed an opinion directly 
 the reverse of the one now generally current. In modern 
 science, final causes, long since almost banished from astronomy 
 and physics, find refuge mainly in biology ; whereas Aristotle 
 thought that the order and regularity of astronomical pheno- 
 mena more decidedly implied the action of a final cause than 
 the irregular and capricious phenomena of the organic world. 
 
 § 361. Without very explicitly stating his views, Aristotle 
 gives us to understand that he held a similar opinion to that 
 of moderns respecting Species, as real existences, or Types. 
 " It is evident," he says, " that there must be something 
 which we call nature, o Sq «u KaXoi/iev tfimv." The word 
 f&nc, however, had to the Greek mind different suggestions 
 from that which the word Nature has to us, and resembled 
 
294 " ON THE PARTS OP ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 rather the natura naturans of Spinoza. The passage just 
 given is thus elucidated : " For it is not any thing that issues 
 from a seed, but a particular body from each particular seed, 
 and every seed from its own particular body. The seed is 
 therefore the beginning and the plastic material of that which 
 is formed out of it. But prior to it is the Being, of which it 
 is the seed ; for the seed is the genesis, and the final cause is 
 the existence." 2 
 
 § 362. Chaps. II. and III. treat of classification, or of 
 such rude attempts as were then in vogue. His criticism of 
 dichotomy is obviously directed against Plato. As before 
 noticed (§ 318), he considers the attempt to classify by dividing 
 genera according to two characters, partly difficult and partly 
 impossible. Dichotomy, he says, would scatter allied animals 
 — some birds, for example, would be placed in one division, 
 and others in another. The strongest objection, however, is 
 that the dichotomist must erect Negation into a principle: 
 " but there can be no distinctions under a negation ; for it is 
 impossible that there should be species of nothing ; there can 
 be no species of wingless or footless as of winged and footed 
 animals." It is difficult to draw such distinctions even in 
 animals which present species, as, for example, in the division 
 of winged and wingless, since one and the same animal may 
 be both, as in the case of the ant, the glow-worm, and some 
 others. 
 
 There can be little doubt that Aristotle has here pointed 
 out the scientific error of all classifications founded on nega- 
 tives ; and that his criticism reaches even the familiar division 
 established by Lamarck, and now universally accepted, of 
 vertebrata and invertebrata. The vertebrata form a natural 
 division, characterized by an obvious peculiarity ; but to lump 
 together all other animals, no matter how manifestly different, 
 merely on the negative character of their having no vertebral 
 
 * ykviaiQ utv yelp tI> airepfia, oiaia U ri t'bXoq. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] « ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." 295 
 
 column, is— except as a provisional expedient— eminently 
 unphilosophie. 3 
 
 § 363. But although dissatisfied with the systematic 
 attempts of predecessors, Aristotle does not offer one of his 
 own. He follows the common method of grouping together 
 all animals which have several obvious characters, rather than 
 grouping them by any single character. " This is the way 
 the vulgar have grouped birds and fishes." 
 
 " No part of an animal arises without matter (SAjj) ; nor 
 can it exist as matter alone ; since there is no animal, nor 
 part of an animal which is simply body (avjia.) Moreover, 
 it is necessary to distinguish between what is essential, and 
 
 what is accidental Also, we must classify according 
 
 to opposites; for opposites imply differences, as black and 
 white, straight and crooked." 
 
 § 364. Chap. IV. — He here says that some surprise may 
 be felt at men not having classed aquatic and winged animals 
 together, since they have several characters in common. But 
 there is a good reason for it. All kinds which differ only in 
 degree have been united under one genus ; those which only 
 resemble each other by analysis have been separated. Birds, 
 for example, are distinguished among each other by some 
 preponderance, one having the wings shorter, another longer ; 
 but fish are distinguished from birds, because their resem- 
 blance is only one of analogy : the one having scales, the 
 
 3 On the principles of classification compare Lettckabt : Uber die Morpho- 
 logie und die Verwandtschaftsverhaltnisse der wirbellosen Thiere, 1848, p. 7. 
 Meckel: Traite" d'Anat. Comp., Paris, 1828, I., p. 90. Victor Carus: 
 Systeme du thierischen Morphologie, 1853. Van deb Hooven : Handbook of 
 Zoology, trans, by Clark, 1856. De Blainville : De I' Organisation des 
 Animaux, 1832, I. Bronn : Die Klassen und Ordnungen des Thierreichs, 
 1859, I. Agassiz : Essay on Classification, London, 1859. Von Baer : 
 uber Entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere. Erste Theil, 1828, p. 89, 90, and the 
 whole of the 5th scholion ; also his essay in the Nova Acta Physico-Medica, 
 1826, translated by Huxley in the Scientific Memoirs, Lond., 1853, 1., p. 176. 
 Isidore Geofproy St. Hilaire : Hist. Nat. des Regnes Organiques, 1854, I. 
 It is unnecessary to name works which will spontaneously present themselves to 
 the reader's mind. 
 
296 " ON THE PARTS OP ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 other feathers. But to carry this out through all animals is 
 not easy ; for many animals have the same analogies." 
 
 We see here a dim perception of the Natural Method ; but, 
 as Schleidbn 4 justly remarks, it is only such a perception as 
 lies in the common knowledge of all peoples, and which neces- 
 sarily precedes the Artificial Method. To credit Aristotle 
 with any profound insight into the superiority of the Natural 
 over the Artificial Method, is to misconceive the whole course 
 of historical development. He had no tolerable example of 
 the Artificial Method before him. He had not even arrived at 
 the conception of Class, Order, Family, Genus, and Species. 
 His groups were all roughly marked out by certain obvious 
 characters. 
 
 § 365. Chap. V. contains an earnest defence of the study 
 of Biology : a defence not wholly superfluous even in our own 
 days, when protests against a "trivial curiosity respecting flies 
 and tadpoles " may occasionally be heard issuing from grave men 
 too facile in contempt of what they do not understand. " Even 
 in objects unattractive to the vulgar eye, Nature offers inex- 
 pressible delights to the philosophic mind capable of studying 
 her causes. For it would indeed be strange and foolish if we, 
 who take delight in such objects when we see them repre- 
 sented in art, should not be even more attracted by Nature 
 herself. Nor must we indulge in childish repulsions ; for in 
 all natural objects there lies marvellousness ; and if any one/ 
 despises the contemplation of inferior animals, he must 
 despise himself." \ 
 
 § 366. Book H., Chap. I. — He now proceeds to explain 
 what is known of the parts of animals. Referring to the 
 History of Animals, in which has been explained " out of 
 what, and of how many parts they are composed," he has now 
 to inquire into the causes why each part is what it is. Our 
 threefold study of structure, chemical, histological, and ana- 
 
 4 Schleidbn : Grundzilge der wissenschaftlichen Botanih, 1861, p. 7. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] " ON THE PARTS OP ANIMALS." 297 
 
 tomical, may be found indicated in the opening of this book. 
 There are three kinds of composition, he says ; the first is 
 that of the elements— fire, earth, air, and water ; the second is 
 that of similar parts— bones, flesh, &c. ; the third is that of 
 dissimilar parts— face, hands, &c. This, although the order 
 of our study, is not the order of nature, which indeed is the 
 reverse. For that which is last formed in the animal, is the 
 first in its essence or being ; just as a house does not exist for 
 the sake of the bricks and mortar, but prior to them. In respect 
 of Time, substance and its formation are prior to the formed 
 animal ; but in respect of Eeason {i.e. according to our con- 
 ceptions) the essence and the form are prior. It is evident 
 that the conception of house-building includes the conception 
 of a house ; but the conception of a house does not include 
 that of house-building. Thus we see that the elements are for 
 the sake of the similar parts ; and the similar parts are for 
 the sake of the dissimilar. 
 
 § 367. Some parts of the animal are functional, and 
 others are sensitive. The functional parts are all composed of 
 the dissimilar parts : the sensitive of the similar. 
 
 The reason he alleges is characteristic. Sensation must 
 arise in the similar parts because every sensation is of one 
 kind. No philosopher has ventured to assert that the hand, 
 face, or any other dissimilar part was fire, earth, air, or water ; 
 but they have assigned the various sensations to air and fire. 
 
 § 368. " Although sensation has its seat in the similar 
 parts, yet it is natural that Touch should be in a simple, 
 though not altogether simple, part ; for it has several kinds, 
 such as Warmth and Cold, Dryness and Moisture; and the 
 part which is sensitive to these — the flesh and its analogue in 
 animals without flesh — is the most corporeal of sensitive 
 structures. 5 . . . As it is impossible for an animal to 
 
 o<o/ia.T<iidioTa.T6v Ian rStv a'usdr\Tripibiv. A statement repeated in chap, vm., 
 p. 654. 
 
298 " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." [OHAP. XVI. 
 
 exist without sensation, it necessarily follows that all animals 
 must have some simple parts, because it is in these that they 
 have sensation ; and their functions are performed by dis- 
 similar parts." 
 
 § 369. Chap. II. is on the partes similares. They are of 
 two classes — 1. moist and fluid, such as flesh, fat, suet (ortap), 
 marrow, lymph, blood, bile, milk; 2. hard and solid, as 
 vessels, sinews, bones, and cartilage. 6 
 
 § 370. Distinctions arise according to the relative goodness 
 of these parts ; blood, for example, being sometimes warmer, 
 sometimes colder, sometimes thicker, sometimes thinner, not 
 only in different animals, but also in different parts of the 
 same animal. The blood in the upper parts is distinguished 
 from that in the lower, on the a priori ground of the upper 
 being the nobler part. " Thick and warm blood is better 
 adapted for plastic purposes; thin and cold blood better for 
 sensation and thought. 7 Hence bees and other animals are 
 more intelligent, <j>povi[*u>Tepa, than many animals with red 
 blood ; and of the red-blooded those are the most intelligent 
 which have the thinnest and the coldest blood. The best of 
 all are those which have warm, pure, and thin blood ; they 
 are distinguished by fortitude, avBpda, and intelligence. 
 Hence the upper and lower parts, the right and left sides, the 
 male and female, manifest their differences." 
 
 § 371. In those days philosophers were fond of discussing 
 relative heat and cold. He notices their discussions respect- 
 ing the temperature of animals, some asserting the aquatic 
 animals to be warmest, because they have to compensate, 
 eiraviaovv, by their own heat, the cold of r the medium in 
 
 6 aicavBa must obviously be here rendered by cartilage, though elsewhere it 
 means fishbone and porcupine quills. Of course his ideas on the nature of bone 
 wanted the precision now attained. 
 
 7 Whatever the modem reader may think of this hypothesis, he should know 
 that it was applauded by Habvbt : Exercitations on Oeneration, 1653, p. 282, 
 Exer. LH. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] « ON THE PARTS OP ANIMALS." 299 
 
 which they live; an opinion very near the truth, though 
 founded on insufficient data. Aristotle remarks that these 
 disputes are due to the fact that warmth is a phrase used to 
 express very different meanings ; and it is necessary to settle 
 first in what sense a thing can properly he. called hot or cold. 
 I quote his argument to show the inevitable weakness which 
 arose from the absence of an objective standard, such as a 
 thermometer, whereby heat could be measured with an 
 accuracy impossible to any measurement by sensation. 
 
 § 372. He first asks whether heat is simple or multiple. 
 "It is necessary to ascertain how the heat manifests itself, 
 for in one sense that body will be called warmest which 
 most warms another body touching it ; in another sense, 
 that which creates the most sensation when touched, especially 
 if accompanied with pairj. This, however, often seems 
 erroneous, for sometimes individual disposition is the cause of 
 the pain. Further, that body is hottest which is most capable 
 of melting the fusible, and burning the combustible. Again, 
 when there are two sizes of the same substance, the larger is 
 the warmer. We also say that the body which cools slowly, 
 and warms quickly, is hotter by nature than that which is 
 
 slowly warmed Boiling water heats more than 
 
 flame, but flame burns the combustible, and melts the fusible, 
 which water cannot do. Moreover, boiling water is warmer 
 than a small fire, but water cools more, and more quickly than 
 fire ; for fire never becomes cold ; water always does. Again, 
 water, in relation to feeling, is warmer, indeed, than oil, but 
 it cools and becomes solid more speedily. Blood is warmer to 
 the touch than water and oil, but becomes solid more rapidly. 
 Further, stories and iron, and such like, are slower in warming 
 than water, hut they burn more when warmed. Besides, 
 some warm bodies have warmth of their own added to what 
 they get from others ; but there is a great difference whether 
 a body is warm in one way or the other, for the one may be 
 accidental, as if we were to say a musician is warmer than 
 
300 " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI, 
 
 another man, because one in a fever happened to he a musi- 
 cian. But of two bodies, one warm by nature, the other warm 
 by accident, the former will cool more slowly, but the latter 
 will often seem hotter to the feeling ; the former will burn 
 better ; for example, flame burns more than boiling water, but 
 boiling water is hotter to the touch, although its heat is acci- 
 dental. Hence it is clear that we cannot easily decide which 
 of two bodies is the warmer, one being warmer in this sense, 
 the other in that." 
 
 § 373. He has repeated these statements elsewhere. 8 
 They curiously illustrate the nature of ancient science. They 
 show the hopelessness of attempting to measure physical 
 forces by subjective standards. That this is the source of 
 their weakness, and not deficient sagacity, may be seen in the 
 following passage from Bacon, who was equally without an 
 instrument to measure heat: "Fire burneth wood, making 
 it first luminous, then black and brittle, and lastly, broken 
 and incinerate ; scalding water doth none of these. The 
 cause is — for that by fire the spirit of the body is first refined, 
 and then emitted : whereof the refining or attenuation causeth 
 light ; and the emission, first, the fragility, and after, the dis- 
 solution into ashes. Neither doth any other body enter; but 
 in water, the spirit of the body is not refined so much ; and 
 besides, water entereth, which doth increase the spirit, and in 
 a degree extinguish it ; therefore, we see that hot water will 
 quench fire." 9 
 
 § 374. Had the ancients possessed an instrument capable 
 of measuring temperature, they would have learned, as easily 
 as we learn, the immense difference between that of boiling 
 water and flame, and the various degrees of heat which 
 various flames contain. Before science had explained the 
 phenomenon, the fact that a finger can be passed through 
 
 8 Problemata XXIII. 
 
 9 Bacon : Sylvia Sylvarum, VII. Works by Spedding and Ellis, 1857, 
 , II., 552. 
 
CHAP, xvij " ON THE PARTS OP ANIMALS." 301 
 
 flame and scarcely feel the heat, whereas through boiling 
 water it cannot pass without pain, naturally suggested that 
 boiling water must be hotter than flame. The paradox 
 disappears when we learn that before the skin of the finger 
 can be attacked by the flame, its moisture must first be 
 evaporated ; this moisture, which serves as a temporary shield, 
 while the finger passes rapidly through the flame, cannot^ 
 of course, protect the skin in water. 
 
 § 375. The invention of the thermometer, or objective 
 standard of heat, rendered a science of Thermotics possible ; 
 but great as is its superiority over any subjective standard, 
 the superiority of quantitative over qualitative knowledge 
 . being thereby attained, it is itself too gross for the needs of 
 modern science; and the more delicate susceptibility of the 
 thermo-electric pile has revealed facts of the highest import- " 
 ance which would have been as far beyond the reach of the 
 thermometer as the facts revealed by the thermometer were 
 beyond the reach of any appreciation by sensation. 
 
 § 376. Chap. III. — Aristotle having explained his views 
 on heat, applies them to Digestion, which he held to be, as the 
 Greek word implies, a kind of cooking. Heat, and heat alone, 
 is the agent by which food is made fluid and metamorphosed 
 into assimilable material. 10 Plants take up, by their roots, the 
 food prepared for them by the earth ; the earth is their stomach, 
 and its warmth cooks their food. 11 Blood is perfected food. 
 The conclusion drawn from this is not, however, easy to follow. 
 He says, that because it is perfect food, blood gives no sen- 
 sation when touched ; in this resembling every other secretion 
 and excretion. Nor is blood the same as flesh ; for flesh when 
 touched gives sensation. Nor is blood directly connected with 
 flesh ; nor does it form an integral part of it ; but is contained 
 in the heart and veins, as in a vessel. 
 
 10 leal TOVTtav fi mipig yiverca xal i) /j£ra/3oX>) Sid rrjs rov Oip/xov Swd/iiuig. 
 " ry yap yy sal ry iv airy 9epii6rrin xpv Tai wffTfp soikia. 
 
302 " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 § 377. Chap. IV. is also devoted to the blood, repeating 
 what is said in the History of Animals respecting its fibrine 
 coagulation and the dependence of intelligence on its thinness 
 and purity. He adds that those animals which have watery 
 blood are the most timorous, " for fear makes cold." This 
 is rather confused reasoning. A man under terror feels cold ; 
 the action of the heart being checked, the blood quits the 
 surface. But how does terror affect the blood? By con- 
 gealing its water, says Aristotle. Granting the accuracy of 
 this assertion, it will only explain how terror might make 
 an animal cold ; it will not explain why watery blood should 
 predispose the animal to terror. Out of such hypothetical 
 assumptions Logic might deduce the cause of the coldness 
 which follows terror ; but Logic will at any rate protest 
 against putting the effect for the cause, as Aristotle does 
 in this case. 
 
 § 378. Besides becoming cold, animals in terror are 
 motionless, discharge excretions, and some of them change 
 colour. It is noticeable that this is said only of the bloodless 
 animals, and from a subsequent passage of this work (IV., 5,) 
 it is evident that he refers to the discharge of ink and the 
 change of colour in the cephalopoda. We are not, however, 
 to suppose that by this he had overlooked the obvious facts 
 exhibited by animals with blood ; but that he called attention 
 to the less familiar facts exhibited by the cuttlefish and its 
 fellows. 12 
 
 § 379. In contrast to the watery-blooded animals he places 
 
 12 In attributing the change of colour in the cuttlefish to a mental emotion, 
 Aristotle is more excusable than many modern naturalists who have fallen into 
 the same error; e.g., D'Okbignt : Mollusques vivants et fossiles, 1855, p. 113. 
 In Seaside Studies, 2nd ed., I860, p. 100, I showed that the phenomenon was 
 not directly dependent on the mental condition of the animal, but was mani- 
 fested by a strip of skin from the body of a dead animal ; which also dis- 
 proves the suggestion of Delle Chiaje, that it may be connected with respira- 
 tion. Descrizione e notomia degli animali invertebrati delta Sicilia Citeriore, 
 Naples, 1841, I., 15. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] " ON THE PARTS OF AKIMALS." 303 
 
 those whose blood contains more fibrine, and is consequently 
 more earthy. These are of a more earthy character, more 
 passionate, more easily angered. 13 " For anger makes warm, 
 and that which is solid when warmed becomes hotter than 
 that which is fluid; and as fibrine is solid and earthy, so 
 anger occasions fomentations in the blood. Hence bulls and 
 boars are so wrathful and easily driven wild with rage, their 
 blood being exceedingly rich in fibrine." If this is somewhat 
 wildly hypothetical, it is far less so than Van Helmont's 
 explanation of the poisonous quality of bull-beef. 14 
 
 § 380. Chap. V. is on Fat and Suet. Both are made 
 of the blood, which has not been devoted to the formation of 
 flesh. " This is evident from their shining ; for the shining 
 of a fluid is the product of fire and air. 15 Hence no bloodless 
 animal has fat nor suet." We must not be surprised at his 
 not knowing that the bloodless animals produced fat; the 
 means of detecting it were then too imperfect. 
 
 § 381. Fat in certain proportion, he says, is useful, but 
 in excess injurious. Why? "If the whole body were of 
 fat or suet, it would perish, because an animal is that which 
 has sensation. Now flesh and its analogue are sensitive ; 
 
 13 In the words of the Spanish compiler, Diego de Funes t Mendoca : 
 " Los animales que tienen la sangre fibrosa y llena de cosas gruessas, estos 
 tienen naturaleza mas terrena, son mas animosos, y ayrados, 7 ansi mismo 
 furibundos." — Historia General de Aves y Animales de Aristoteles traduzida de 
 Latin en Romance. Valentia, 1551, p. 280. It is the title of this work which 
 misled Btjhle into the supposition that Mendoca was one of Aristotle's trans- 
 lators. The book is a compilation of absurdities from all ancient sources ready 
 to hand ; and is interesting as » specimen of Natural History in the 16th 
 century. 
 
 14 " Do you desire to be informed why the blood of a Bull is poisonous, but 
 that of an Oxe, though brother to the Bull, is safe and harmlesse? The reason 
 thus : the Bull at the time of slaughter is full of secret reluctancy and vin- 
 dictive murmurs, and firmly impresseth upon his own blood a character and 
 potent signature of revenge. A Bull dyes with a higher flame of revenge 
 above him than any other animal."— Ternary of Paradoxes, translated by 
 Charleton, 1650, p. 67. 
 
 15 Srjkol Si to \11rapbv airHv tiSv yap iypvv rb \tirapbv koivov depog mi 
 mpoQ iaTiv. 
 
804 " ON THE PAKTS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 but, as I said before, blood is not ; consequently fat and 
 suet are /not sensitive." He further notices why excess of 
 fat causes sterility in females : the blood which would have 
 formed progeny being used up for fat. 
 
 § 382. Chap. VI. is on Marrow, also a product of 
 Blood, and not as some think (alluding to Plato), a product 
 of the spermatic fluid. In some animals marrow is fatty, 
 in others suety. The important ganglionic mass forming 
 the Spinal Chord, is considered by him, as it is by the vulgar 
 of our day, to be the Spinal Marrow, bearing the same relation 
 to the vertebrae that marrow bears to the hollow bones ; but 
 he distinguishes it from every other marrow as being less 
 fatty or suety. 
 
 In this chapter there is nothing more to be noticed, unless 
 it be one more example of rash generalization from imperfect 
 observation, namely, the statement that some animals — among 
 them the lion — have no marrow. 
 
 § 383. Chap. VII. treats of the Brain, by many then 
 held to be also marrow and the origin of the spinal marrow ; 
 but this appears absurd to Aristotle, " for the Brain is the 
 coldest part of the body, the Marrow is by nature warm, 
 as is evident by its shining and its fat." This contrast of 
 cold and warmtb, is the reason why brain and spinal marrow 
 are in connection, Nature being careful to compensate for 
 excess in one direction by excess in another; and the cold 
 brain is therefore fitly placed in juxtaposition with the warm 
 marrow. 
 
 § 384. " That the spinal marrow is warm is evident in 
 many ways." He has already mentioned its shining, which 
 implies the presence of fire. " The coldness of the brain 
 appears when we touch it ; it is also the most bloodless of 
 moist parts." (§ 164.) 
 
 § 385. Modern readers, accustomed from boyhood to hear 
 the brain spoken of as the seat of sensation, will feel some 
 surprise on meeting with a passage directly contravening that 
 
CHAP. XVI.] " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." 305 
 
 opinion, as the following: — "It is evident from simple inspec- 
 tion that the brain is in no direct connection with the sensi- 
 tive parts ; still more evident in the fact that when touched it 
 yields no sensation." The first clause is a deduction from 
 the theory of flesh being the medium of sensation. The 
 second clause indicates an important fact — the insensibility of 
 the cerebrum — which in our own day has caused surprise, and 
 some absurd speculation. 16 The difficulty admits of easy 
 explanation. When observation proves that the brain is 
 insensible to direct stimulus — that it may be pinched, cut, 
 torn, or galvanized without producing any evidence of sensa- 
 sation in ,the animal operated on — the conclusion is that the 
 brain is not a transmitter of stimuli, as a nerve is ; the brain 
 is sensitive, and only when the stimulated nerve acts upon it 
 is its sensibility excited. To imagine that Sensibility could 
 be excited in the brain by the same means as Neurility is 
 excited in the nerve (i.e. by simple external stimulus) is to 
 overlook the important distinction between nerve-action and 
 ganglionic action — or, as I have proposed to name them, 
 Neurility and Sensibility. 17 
 
 In the days of Aristotle there was no suspicion of any 
 such distinction as that of excitor and excited ; and finding 
 the brain insensible, when touched, he was justified in denying 
 it to be the seat of sensibility. 
 
 § 386. But although the psychical office of the brain is 
 thus denied by Aristotle, he gives it, as we have seen (§ 164) 
 
 16 Harles: Versuch einer Gesch. der Him und Nervenlehre im Alterthume, 
 1801, p. 80, apparently unaware of this fact, thinks that Aristotle invented it to 
 suit his theory. Compare Gesalpincs : Peripateticarum Qucest, 1 571, lib. V., 
 quasst. 3 and 6 ; and his antagonist Tattrellus : Alpes Casce, 1650, p. 926. 
 The insensibility of the cerebrum is discussed by Halleb: Elementa Physio- 
 logic, Lausanne, 1762, IV., 312 seq., where numerous observations and expe- 
 riments are recorded. All the best modem works contain ample evidence on 
 the point. 
 
 17 Reports of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1859, 
 and Physiology of Common Life, 1860, II., 14-24. 
 
 20 
 
806 " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 a physiological office — that of moderating the exoeasive heat 
 of the blood. 
 
 " Man has the largest brain in relation to his body, and 
 larger than woman ; for he has the warmest thorax, which is 
 most abundantly supplied with blood. Hence, also, man 
 alone has an erect position, because heat in gaining strength 
 works an increase from the centre, according to the direction 
 of its path." 18 
 
 § 387. He also treats, in this chapter, of the sutures of 
 the skull; and in doing so, illustrates the fanciful deduction 
 and careless observation which characterize ancient science. 
 " Their office, he says, is to permit the escape of vapours from 
 the brain." I know not how long this explanation found 
 credit, but it was still flourishing in the time of Galen. 19 
 
 " The number of sutures, he says, is greatest in man ; 
 greater in man than in woman." The observation is in every 
 way unfortunate. Among mammalia, the number is precisely 
 the same ; in fish and amphibia it is much greater than in 
 man ; and if the skulls of old women, from their more rapid 
 ossification, do occasionally present fewer apparent sutures, 
 a very little circumspection would suffice to discover that 
 there is really no difference in the number possessed by each 
 sex. 
 
 § 388. Chap. VIII. treats of Flesh, the most important 
 of the partes similares. It is the seat of sensibility; the 
 mark of animality, " since we define an animal, that which 
 has sensation." This is a much higher attribute than that 
 
 19 r) yap tov Beppov t/waii; lvia%vovaa iroiii rffv avZr/atv airb rov fifoov Kari. 
 rrjv airrjg fopav. This obscure passage is thus rendered by Bussemaker: 
 " Caloris enim natura invalescens incrementum de medio agit secundum sui 
 itineris directionem." It may be thus paraphrased: " The direction of heat is 
 upwards, and it will, therefore, determine growth upwards, thereby giving man 
 his erect position." Though why animals do not more gradually approach this 
 erect position is not stated, unless it be implied in the fact that they have too 
 little warmth to be compared with man. 
 
 19 Galen: De usu Partium, IX.,I., 688. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] " ON THE PARTS OP ANIMALS." 307 
 
 assigned by Plato, who said flesh was made in order that it 
 might be a preservative against the cold of winter, and the 
 heat of summer ; besides being a shield against blows. 
 
 § 388 a. " The primary sensibility is that of Touch, and 
 its organs are the respective parts. Other sensibilities were 
 not necessary; they might have been left uncreated; but 
 Touch was necessary, for it is, if not the only corporeal sensa- 
 tion, at least the most corporeal, o-wptrw&c." (§ 368.) 
 
 § 389. All other parts, such as bones, sinews, skin, 
 vessels, hair, and nails, are present only as servitors to 
 sensation, e. g. bones being for the protection of the soft 
 parts. 
 
 § 390. Chap. X. developes this idea of the subordina- 
 tion of parts to the Flesh ; or as moderns would say, the 
 subordination of parts to the animal organism. Aristotle 
 distinguishes bone from fish-bone and cartilage. He holds 
 cartilage to be a mixture of the earthy substance of bone 
 with soft marrow ; whereas in bones the two are separate, 
 the marrow lying inside. He could not know that cartilage 
 contains fat. But he might have avoided the error of 
 asserting that bone and cartilage are alike in not being 
 regenerated when broken or cut. Bone happens to be one of 
 the most easily regenerated of tissues ; and hence the observed 
 rapidity with which even large broken bones are mended, or 
 removed pieces replaced. Cartilage, on the contrary, never 
 regenerates, but is replaced by another structure. "When 
 fractured, as sometimes happens with the rib cartilages, there 
 is no reunion by cartilaginous matter, but the broken surfaces 
 become connected by fibrous tissue." M 
 
 20 Shakpbt: in Quain's Anatomy, 1856, 1., c. vii. The physiological reason 
 of this difference I take to he this : bones grow, and consequently are regene- 
 rated from the periosteum, or enveloping membrane ; and hence by transplant- 
 ing a portion of this membrane to another body, or another part, new bone will 
 grow from it (see note 21 to Chap. X.) But cartilages do not grow from a 
 perichondrium. 
 
 20—2 
 
308 "ON THE PAKTS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 § 391. Chap. X. — " All animals have two indispensable 
 parts : those which take in food, and those which get rid of the 
 waste. Plants have no excretory organs, for they take their 
 food ready digested from the earth, and give in return seed 
 and fruit. . . . Plants, inasmuch as they are fixed to the 
 ground, do not need much variety in their organs. But those 
 creatures which have sensation as well as life possess a more 
 varied structure, and some more varied than others, when 
 Nature thinks not only of life but of good life. Such is the 
 case with man. For he is the only living creature known to 
 us who has a portion of the divine in him ; or, at any rate, he 
 has more of it than any other creature. On this account, and 
 because his external forms are best known, we must speak of 
 him first : for his parts are disposed according to Nature ; 
 since his upper part is directed upwards to the supreme of 
 all." 21 
 
 § 391 a. It is curious to find men in all ages laying so 
 much stress on a very unimportant peculiarity, and making 
 man's supremacy to consist in a power of gazing upwards, 
 which is shared by every goose that waddles across his path. 
 
 L'homme eleve un front noble et regarde les cienx, 
 
 says Louis Racine, in imitation of Ovid's well-known lines : 
 
 Pronaque cum spectent animalia csetera terrain, 
 Os homini sublime dedit, coelumque tuerl 
 Jussit. 
 
 Galen justly ridicules this notion ; it is, he says, refuted by 
 the fact that there are fish which always have their eyes 
 directed towards the heavens, and that man can only direct 
 his eyes upwards by bending back his head. 22 As to the erect 
 position, no one till Isidobe Geoffboy St. Hilaire thought 
 of the familiar fact that many birds, such as the penguins, 
 
 21 thdvq yap ml tcl fyvaei fiopta Kara tyvtnv ?x« Toir<f povcp, iced to tovtov 
 dvtt) 7rpo£ t6 tov '6\ov &x u avta. 
 
 22 Galen: De usu Partium, HI., 3. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] " ON THE PARTS OP ANIMALS." 309 
 
 have the vertical attitude, and some mammals— such as the 
 gerboa and kangaroo— approach it very closely. 23 If the atti- 
 tude of man is more perfectly erect, this is but a question of 
 degree, not worth making a cardinal distinction. 24 Better 
 than all such trifling marks of superiority is the grand charac- 
 teristic expressed in Lamartine's verse — 
 
 L'homme est un dieu tombe qui se souvient des cieux. 
 § 392. The remaining chapters of this book are not, as 
 might be expected from the passage previously quoted, devoted 
 to the various organs of Nutrition and Excretion, but to an 
 enumeration of the various parts of the head. The style is 
 rambling, one remark suggesting another without any attempt 
 at order. I will specify but one : " Man is of all animals the 
 one having the greatest abundance of hair on the head ; this 
 is necessary, because of the humidity of the brain and the 
 sutures of the skull ; for growth must be greatest where there 
 is most warmth and humidity." 25 One cannot but remark 
 the want of logic in this facile physiology, which, after 
 assuming that warmth and moisture determine excess, makes 
 
 23 St. Hilaibe: Histoiredes Begnes Organiques, 1856, II., 191. 
 
 24 Lord Monboddo maintained that the erect position is acquired, like 
 speech, and acquired with difficulty. Origin and Progress of Language, 2nd 
 edit., I., 186. In his Ancient Metaphysics, 1779, III., 74, he adds this corro- 
 borative story, which he professes to hare received from a Swedish gentleman, 
 a pupil of Linnaeus, who told the story in his class: "There was a human 
 creature caught in the woods of Saxony, in the time of Frederick Augustus of 
 Poland. He was running wild upon all fours with the bears, and like them fed 
 chiefly upon honey. The greatest difficulty in taming him was to make him 
 walk upright; for which they hung weights to his shoulders to counteract that 
 propensity which he had to fall prone. After he was civilized, had learned to 
 speak, and had lived several years with men, he still retained his bearish love 
 for honey, and inclination to rob the bees." Monboddo adds that he " holds it 
 to be a vulgar error that walking upright is an essential quality of human 
 nature ;" and this opinion is also maintained by Mosoati: Delle corporee dif- 
 ferenze essenziali che passono fra la struttura de' bruti e la umana, Milan, 1770, 
 cited by Isidore St. Hilaire. 
 
 85 Compare Galen: De urn Partium, XL, 14. This old notion of the brain 
 nourishing the hair is not yet quite extinct among the vulgar. I was told of a 
 country haircutter, whose theory was that " The brain, sir, percolates through 
 the skull, and nourishes the roots of the 'airs : that's what it's for, sir." 
 
810 " ON THE PAETS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 no attempt to show why the excess should be that of hair 
 rather than anything else. 
 
 § 393. Book III., Chaps. I., II., and III., continue the 
 enumeration of the parts of the head and neck, namely, 
 teeth, mouth, horns, oesophagus, and trachea. The larynx is 
 confounded with the pharynx ; the trachea he calls aprripia, 
 windpipe, and is described as going to the lungs and the 
 heart. 
 
 § 394. Chap. IV. describes the viscera, airXay^va, which 
 were parts tolerably familiar through the practice of augury. 
 The bloodless animals are said to have none ; but this is no 
 doubt to be understood in the same sense as when they are 
 said to have no blood. At any rate, he describes the ana- 
 logues of heart and liver in the Cephalopoda. He objects to 
 the statement of Democeitus, that the viscera are present but 
 invisible on account of their smallness ; for, he justly adds, 
 the viscera are quite visible in the embryo of the vertebrate 
 animals. He says the heart of the chick is visible on the 
 third day, as a mere point; which indicates an amount of 
 embryological investigation such as few moderns would antici- 
 pate. In the little treatise De Juventute (HI., 468), he also 
 mentions that the heart is the first organ developed : " This is 
 certain from the facts observed by ourselves in the develop- 
 ment of animals." 26 Modern research has discovered that the 
 heart is not the first organ to make its appearance : the priority 
 is claimed by the nervous axis. The heart appears later even 
 than many bloodvessels. 27 
 
 § 395. The viscera are formed out of the blood, and there- 
 
 M Compare also De Gen. Animal., II., 1, 734. 
 
 37 Malpighi: De formatione pulli in ovo, p. 5 {Opera, 1686), doubts which 
 is the first to appear, heart or vessels. C. F. Wolff, in his masterly Theorie 
 der Generation, 1764, p. 168, first rightly observed the order of genesis. See 
 Koixiker: Entwiehehtngsgeschichte des Menschen undder ksheren Thiere, 1861, 
 pp. 83, 87, 88, 90, for the latest views. The heart is first a solid string of cells; 
 then a cylinder ; then this becomes twisted into the form of an Sj and then the 
 cavities are formed. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] « ON THE PARTS OP ANIMALS." 311 
 
 fore are only found in sanguineous animals, which necessarily 
 have a heart ; for it is clear that, having blood, which is a 
 fluid, they must have a vessel to contain it, and hence also 
 Nature has created veins ; and for these veins the origin must 
 necessarily be one, since one, whenever possible, is better than 
 many. The heart is the origin of the veins : this is seen in 
 the fact that they spring from it, and do not go through it ; 
 also they resemble it in structure. The heart has the chief 
 position, namely, that of the centre, but more upwards than 
 downwards, and rather in front than behind : for Nature is 
 accustomed to seat the noblest in the noblest place, unless any 
 stronger reason prevails : ov /xrj ti k<d\vu fitlZov." 
 
 § 395 a. He says, " those who assert that the origin of 
 the veins is in the head do not rightly consider the case." 
 Why ? Because Anatomy says otherwise ? No such objection 
 occurs to him. He prefers the logical objection that " they 
 thus make the origin manifold and separate, and moreover in a 
 cold place, whereas the heart region is warm." Thus could 
 even so earnest an advocate of the inductive method allow him- 
 self to arrange the facts of nature deductively. 
 
 § 396. " It is manifest that the emotions of pleasure and 
 pain, and all other feelings, have their origin in the heart and 
 return to it. And there is logical ground for this : for the 
 origin must be one, when possible. And of all places the 
 centre is that which is most natural (eii^viaraTog), for the 
 centre is one, and is related to all in an equal or nearly equal 
 manner. Further, it is clear that neither the blood nor the 
 bloodless parts can have feeling, therefore that which first has 
 blood, as in a vessel, must necessarily be the origin. This," 
 he characteristically adds, " not only appears evident, accord- 
 ing to our ideas, but also according to sense; for in the 
 embryo the heart appears in motion before all other parts, as 
 if it were a living animal, and as if it were the beginning of 
 all animals which have blood." 
 
 Here he strangely couples together metaphysics and em- 
 
812 " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 bryology. Although it is not quite correct to make the heart 
 the origin or starting-point of animal development — although 
 the early stages of development are not dependent on the 
 blood, which, indeed, is somewhat late in making its appear- 
 ance — although the heart begins to pulsate even before the 
 blood appears — still the notion of the heart as the punctwm 
 saliens is strictly scientific, warranted by what was then good 
 evidence. It is, however, a notion awkwardly yoked with that 
 of the heart being the origin of sensation because it is one, 
 because it is the origin of the animal, and because the animal 
 is animal only in virtue of sensation. 
 
 § 397. " The Liver is also found in all sanguineous 
 animals, yet no one can suppose it to be the origin of the 
 body, or of the blood." The reason is noticeable. "For 
 its position is by no means one worthy of an origin." 2B And 
 as if this were not enough, he adds : "It has also an equipoise 
 in the spleen in all the most perfect animals." 
 
 § 398. The heart lies in the centre, and in front, not only 
 because these are the noblest positions, but also because the 
 breast is least protected by flesh against cold, and the warmth . 
 of the heart keeps it warm. In other animals the heart 
 occupies the exact centre ; but in man it leans a little towards 
 the left side to compensate the greater coolness of that side : 
 "for of all living creatures man has the coldest left side." 
 This amazing statement, obviously one of his teleologies! 
 fancies to account for the inclination of the heart, illustrates 
 the deductive method of dealing with facts ; he never could 
 have instituted the most casual inquiry into the comparative 
 temperature of the left side, but assumed the fact needed by 
 his theory. A little further on he says, that the right cavity 
 of the heart has warmer blood than the left cavity; this is 
 correct ; 29 but he is right by accident : he had no better reason 
 
 28 Ktlrai yda oiiSa/iue "P^C dp%ouSrj Biaiv. 
 
 59 See Claude Bebnakd: Lemons sur les propriety Physiol, des Liquiies 
 de I'Organisme, 1859, I., 56. Davy thought that he had proved the left 
 
CHAP, XVI.] " ON THE PAETS OP ANIMALS." 313 
 
 for the statement than his metaphysical notion of the right 
 side being nobler, therefore warmer, than the left. 
 
 § 399. Another example of rash theorizing from very 
 imperfect observation meets us here. It is a fact that nor- 
 mally in turtles, and exceptionally in elephants, horses, and 
 oxen, there is an ossification of the septum of the heart. 
 Aristotle saw, or heard of, one of these " bones " in the hearts 
 of a horse and an ox, and forthwith generalized the observa- 
 tion thus : " The heart is destitute of bones except in horses 
 and in a species of ox; these, however, in consequence of 
 their size, have something bony as a support, just as we find 
 throughout the whole body." His Spanish follower Funes t 
 Mendoca improves on this by saying that the bone acts like 
 a stick to support the weight of the heart, which is very 
 great. 30 
 
 § 399 a. " The difference in size and consistence of the 
 heart determines differences in character. The unfeeling have 
 hard hearts ; the sympathetic have soft hearts. Animals with 
 large hearts are timorous ; with small hearts courageous." 
 
 " Of all parts the heart least withstands disease." The 
 reason alleged is that if the heart, which is the origin of the 
 body, be diseased, there is no other part from which help can 
 
 Tentricle to be warmer than the right: Researches Physiol, and Anatomical, 
 1839, 1., 149. But there was a source of fallacy in his experiments which he 
 completely overlooked, namely, that the left ventricle having much thicker 
 walls than the right, cools less rapidly when the chest is opened to admit the 
 thermometer. 
 
 30 " Tiene muy gran coracon, tanto que dice Aristoteles que tiene un huesso 
 en el, que le serve como de baculo para sustentarle per la grandezza que tiene." 
 —Diego Fuses t Mendoca : Historia general de Aves y Animales de Aris- 
 toteles traduzida de Latin en Romance, Valentia, 1521, p. 330. Galen states 
 the normal existence of the bone as a fact, and agrees with Aristotle as to the 
 cause, though he adds, " it is more correct to say that Nature has everywhere 
 attached the ends of ligaments to a cartilage or to a cartilaginous bone; and she 
 could not, therefore, neglect the ligaments of the heart nor the tissue of the 
 arteries."— De usu Partium, VI, 20. Punt, of course, repeats the statement 
 without misgiving. I believe Vesalius first accurately explained the excep- 
 tional fact, as owing simply to an induration of the septa, and not to the presence 
 of a true bone. — Opera Omnia, ed. Boekkaave and Albinus, 1725, p. 512. 
 
314 " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 come. By way of guarantee for this a priori view, he notices 
 that in animals which had been sacrificed no diseased hearts 
 had been observed, whereas all other viscera had been found 
 diseased. 
 
 § 399 b. Chap. V. passes to the veins and arteries, which 
 are, of course, not properly discriminated. The course of the 
 bloodvessels through the body is aptly compared with the 
 irrigation of a garden. " Since every part of the body is made 
 from the blood, it is necessary that blood should be conveyed 
 to every part " (which, however, is not the case). " The veins 
 pass from larger to smaller, till they become too small for the 
 passage of the blood ; through these therefore the blood can 
 find no egress, but only the excretion of moisture which we 
 call sweat, tSpwra; and this especially when the body is 
 warmed and the veins open wider." (See § 155.) 
 
 § 399 c. Chap. VI. treats of the Lungs, which are given to 
 all terrestrial animals to cool their bodies. It is necessary 
 these bodies should be cooled, because they are warm, and 
 warmth demands an equipoise. Animals with blood require 
 that this cooling process should be effected from without, 
 because they are so warm; whereas animals without blood 
 are enabled to cool themselves by their natural breath or 
 spirit, tw av/j.(j>vTii) -rrvivfiari, — whatever that may be. 
 
 It is an error, he says, to suppose the lungs cause the 
 beating of the heart; "for man, alone, presents this pheno- 
 menon of heart-beating, because he, alone, is moved by hope 
 and expectation of what is coming." One would fancy, from 
 this passage, that Aristotle had never held a bird in his hand. 
 "Moreover," he adds, "it is in man the farthest removed 
 from, and lies higher than the lungs, so that they can in no 
 way cause the beating." 
 
 § 399 d. Chap. VII. is on the single and double organs. 
 Bichat tried to establish a generalization which has been 
 much admired, namely, that all the organs of Animal life are 
 double and symmetrical, while all the organs of Vegetal 
 
CHAP. XVI.] "ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." 315 
 
 life are single and asymmetrical. 31 Unhappily the facts do 
 not fit. In the commencement almost every organ is double 
 and symmetrical ; and only in the later stages of development 
 do the differences appear. 32 Even in the matured organism 
 we find many striking exceptions to Bichat's generalization. 
 Thus the parotid, sublingual, and mammary glands, the 
 lungs, the kidneys, ovaries and testes, are all vegetal organs, 
 and all generally double. 33 Aud if the heart and uterus are 
 classed as single organs, then must the brain and spinal cord 
 be classed thus. While in birds the liver is double and 
 symmetrical. 
 
 § 399 e. Bichat's generalization is in the spirit of Aris- 
 totle, yet Aristotle avoided it. He merely noticed that some 
 of the viscera are single, others double. Among the single 
 organs he names the heart and the lungs, though it is far 
 from clear how he came to consider the lungs single, since the 
 reason of any organ being double is because the body has two 
 halves, each requiring its own organ, and hence the brain has 
 
 31 Bichat: Becherches sur la Vie et la Mori. 
 
 32 " Le fait primitif de tons les organismes est lenr dualite. Tous sans 
 exception (?) sont doubles a leur apparition, tous sont pairs : on trouve a 
 droite du jeune embryon la repetition exactement de ce qui est a gauche ; les 
 organismes impairs qui vient plus tard sur la ligne mediane forme des arcs 
 boutants ou des clefs de la voute, ne deviennent tels que par la fusion de la 
 dualite primitive qui les constituait des leur debut." — Seeres: Br&cis d'Anat. 
 transcendante, 1842, p. 238. This statement is somewhat too absolute. The 
 intestine is at no period double, and the heart is single from the first. See 
 Note 27. 
 
 33 Not always, nor in all animals. The lung is single in many serpents, and 
 the ovary is single in almost all birds. Both ovaries are present, it is true, in 
 the embryo bird, but very soon after its exit from the egg the right ovary finally 
 disappears. The date varies. Muller says that on the ninth day of hatch- 
 ing the diminution begins in all but birds of prey; in these latter the diminution 
 is not visible until about the end of the hatching.— Bildungsgeschichte der 
 Genitatien, 1830, p. 30. Yet I once found the right ovary not quite disappeared 
 in a chick just ready to escape from the shell. In the viviparous Blenny 
 Kaxhke says there is but one ovary. The same is true of the Perch; and I 
 believe of some other fishes. On the imperfect symmetry in animal organs, see 
 Meckel: iiber die aeitliche Asymmetrie im thierischen Korper in his Anat. Phy- 
 siologische Beobachtungen, Halle, 1822. Compare also his Traiti d'Anat. 
 Compare, Paris, 1828, 1., 20. 
 
316 " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 a tendency ()3oiX£rai) to become double ; and the heart has its 
 two chambers. The Liver and Spleen puzzle him, but he is 
 disposed to regard them as balancing each other. 
 
 § 399/. Chaps. VIII. and IX. treat of the gall-bladder 
 and kidneys. As in the other chapters, there is abundance of 
 detail, true, false, and fanciful ; but nothing needful to be 
 extracted here. 
 
 § 399 g. Chap. X. is on the diaphragm. It divides the 
 heart and lungs from the stomach in order that the heat of 
 the sensitive soul may be protected, and not easily endangered 
 by the exhalations from the food, and by adventitious warmth. 
 Nature has thus separated the Upper from the Under, for the 
 Upper is the end and the best ; the Under is created for it. 
 That the diaphragm acts as a protection against the warmth 
 is evident, for when it attracts the warm secretions, thought 
 and feeling are immediately confused ; and hence it is called 
 phrenes, as if it participated in thinking. But it has really 
 no part in thinking, yet, being near the organs which are 
 active in thinking, it certainly operates a change in 
 consciousness. 
 
 § 399 h. Although Aristotle here departs from the idea of 
 the phren as the seat of the mind, 34 he makes the diaphragm 
 play its part in consciousness : " and when warmed it quickly 
 makes itself felt, as we see in laughter, for those who are 
 tickled laugh quickly because the movement quickly reaches 
 this place." Man is the only animal that is ticklish, because 
 of the fineness of his skin, and because he is the only animal 
 that laughs, " and tickling is laughter from a motion of this 
 kind of the parts about the armpit " 35 — a physiological expla- 
 nation rather puzzling to understand. 
 
 The remainder of this Book is occupied with notices of 
 
 34 The various opinions formerly held respecting the diaphragm are cited by 
 Hallee: Opuscula Anatomica, 1751, p. 19. 
 
 35 & Sk ytip yaKuriiie yeXwj hrl Sid xivrjaeiits roiainjj rov /toplov tov wepi 
 
OHAP. XVI.] " ON THE PAliTS OP ANIMALS." 317 
 
 different forms of viscera, and a minute account of the 
 intestines. 
 
 § 399 i. Book IV., Chap. I., opens with remarks on the 
 viscera of the Apoda. When he says that none of these, 
 except the tortoise, possess a bladder, he is wrong anatomi- 
 cally ; but he is wrong Aristotelically when he assigns the 
 reason, namely that these animals drinking little because they 
 are without blood, their moisure is converted into scales, as 
 that of birds is into feathers. 
 
 § 399 k. He separates the vipers from other serpents on the 
 ground of their being viviparous, " or rather," he says, " they 
 are at first ovo-viviparous, iporoKrioavTa." Had he known 
 that all the viviparous snakes are poisonous, and the oviparous 
 harmless, it is probable that he would have suggested some 
 strange metaphysical cause for it. 
 
 § 400. Chap. II. treats of bile and the gall-bladder. As 
 we see in our word " choleric," the bile was thought formerly 
 to be intimately connected with anger and other emotions. 
 Brutus tells Cassius that he must "digest the choler of his 
 spleen," as if that were the final clearance of bad tempers. 
 Aristotle will not admit that the bile has anything whatever to 
 . do with feeling, for he remarks some animals have no gall- 
 bladder — such are the horse, the ass, the mule, the deer, the 
 camel, and the seal. Because the word used by him, joXrj 
 means both bile and gall-bladder, it is difficult to correctly 
 seize his meaning ; however, except the seal, all the animals 
 named by him are without a gall-bladder, though not, of 
 course, without bile. He adds this strange assertion: — "In 
 the same species some appear to have the gall-bladder, and 
 others not to have it, as the mice. To this class also belongs 
 man. Some men have manifestly a gall-bladder attached to 
 the liver, others not." Does not this look very like the sort 
 of information he might have derived from the embalmers ? 
 It is difficult to suppose that any anatomist could have been 
 so careless. 
 
318 " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 § 401. After disputing the opinion expressed by Anaxa- 
 goras, that bile is the cause of acute diseases, he adds that 
 the bile is an excretion, and serves no end. " It is true that 
 nature sometimes uses excretions to some good end, but we 
 must not on that account seek a final cause in all things, but, 
 inasmuch as certain things have certain properties, there will 
 necessarily follow from these many effects." s6 This import- 
 ant passage should be a set-off against the many formal 
 declarations of teleology to be met with in his writings. It 
 shows that he had a glimmering of the philosophic conception, 
 and that, like the modern advocates of teleology, he was only 
 disposed to employ final causes where proximate causes were 
 hidden from him. 
 
 §402. Chaps. III., IV., and V.— After describing the 
 omentum and mesentery he passes on to the viscera of 
 molluscs and insects, or to such analogues as may be found 
 in them, for these animals not having blood cannot hate the 
 viscera which are formed from blood. They have no vessels, 
 no bladder, no breathing organs. But it is necessary that 
 they should' have the analogue of a heart, "for the sensitive 
 part of the soul, and the cause of life, has in all animals 
 a definite seat." This seat must be the centre. 
 
 Among the noticeable details of this chapter is the classi- 
 fication of sea-anemones and ascidians as intermediate between 
 plants and animals. 
 
 §403. Chaps. VI. and VII.— He then treats of the 
 external forms of molluscs and insects; and says that the 
 former are inactive, which is the reason why they have not 
 many limbs. It is doubtful whether he really meant to put 
 the effect for the cause in this way, since the continuation 
 of the passage, though confused, seems to indicate the contrary. 
 " The more limbs an animal has, the more active it must be, 
 
 36 oil iikv Sul tovto SeX ZflTiiv ir&vra ivtica Hvo£ clXKa nvStv o"vtidv toiovtw 
 8rfj)o 1J ivdyicris av/iPaivei Sia ravra 7roWd. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] « ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." 319 
 
 because of their functions ; for more organs are required by 
 those which have more functions." 
 
 § 404. In the many discussions raised respecting the uni- 
 formity of composition in the animal organization, much stress 
 has been laid on the fact that in the invertebrata the relative 
 position of the nervous system is the reverse of that in the 
 vertebrata. The dorsal surface of the one corresponds with 
 the ventral surface of the other. Cuvier and his followers 
 point to this as a proof that the plan is not uniform. 
 Geoffroy St. Hilaire and his followers declare that it only 
 proves the mollusc to be a vertebrate animal reversed. Aris- 
 totle sees in it only an adaptation to modes of life ; all testa- 
 ceous animals have the head downwards, like plants. " The 
 reason is because they take the food from below, as plants 
 do with their roots. They have, therefore, the peculiarity 
 that with them the Upper is Under." 
 
 § 405. Chap. X. — After describing the organs of the 
 Crustacea (in Chap. VIII.), and of the Cephalopoda (in 
 Chap. IX.), he returns to the viviparous sanguineous 
 animals. 
 
 Man is discriminated from all other mammals by the 
 possession of hands and arms. Not that monkeys are here 
 overlooked ; they are always spoken of by Aristotle and Galen. 
 as quadrupeds, or, as they have been termed since Tyson 
 and Buffon, quadrumana. 37 
 
 37 " L'homme est le seul qui soit bimane et bipede. . . le Lamantin n'est 
 que bimane . . le singe est quadrumane." — Buffon : Nomenclature des 
 Singes, cited by Isidore St. Hilaike. But as Huxley : Man's Place in 
 Nature, 1863, p. 90, points out, the word quadrumanous was first employed 
 by Tyson in 1699 : moreover, as Huxley elsewhere remarks, " Before we 
 accept the diagnosis that man has two hands and two feet, while apes have 
 four hands, we must ask to have the difference between hands and feet clearly 
 defined; and this is by no means so easy as it appears." I am not aware that 
 any one has defined it. If the name follow the function, then it is certain that 
 apes grasp even more than they walk, and so far seem to be fourhanded ; but 
 the grasping function of the human foot has only fallen into disuse, and when 
 uncramped by the use of shoes, as in savages and sailors, the toes are " very 
 moveable, very flexible, and capable of prehension by opposition not only of 
 
820 " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 § 406. " Man alone of all living beings is erect, because 
 of bis godlike nature and his godlike essence. The function 
 of a godlike nature is knowing and thinking ; but this would 
 be difficult if the upper part of the body were large, for weight 
 makes thought and common sensibility slow." 
 
 This explanation, which is teleological, may be compared 
 with the physical explanation formerly given (§ 386). 
 
 § 407. "Animals are four-footed because their souls are 
 not powerful enough to carry the weight of their bodies in 
 an erect position. Therefore all animals in relation to man 
 are dwarfs, for dwarfs are those which have the upper parts 
 large and the organs of progression small." By the upper 
 parts he means the trunk of the body, or thorax, as he calls 
 it. "In man there is a proper proportion between the trunk 
 and the limbs ; but when newly-born, the trunk is large and 
 the limbs small. Hence infants crawl and cannot walk ; at 
 first they cannot even crawl, nor move alone, for all infants 
 are dwarfs. On the contrary, among quadrupeds the under 
 part is at first the larger ; but as they develope, the upper 
 part becomes the larger. Hence colts are little — if at all — 
 shorter than horses, and when they are young they can touch 
 their heads with their hind feet, which they cannot do as 
 adults." Birds and fishes are likewise dwarfs. " Hence all 
 animals are less intelligent, afpovsartpa, than man. And 
 among men, children and dwarfs are less intelligent than 
 the adult and the well-grown. The reason is, as before 
 
 the toes to the sole, hut of the great toe to the second," as witness the boatmen 
 of China, the weavers of Senegal, and the Brazilian horsemen, who put their 
 feet to the same purposes as those for which we employ our hands; not to 
 mention Miss Biffin and the painter Ducornet. If, on the contrary, the name 
 follows the anatomical structure, then it is clear that " the arrangement of the 
 bones and muscles of the terminal segment of the hind limb in every ape 
 whatsoever is, in all essential respects; similar to that which obtains in the foot 
 of man and other mammals, and is totally different from the hand of man and 
 terminal segment of the forelimb of other mammals. In fact, there is no four- 
 handed mammal in existence." — Natural History Review, January, 1862, p. 6. 
 On the counter side compare Vicq d'Azyk: (Euvres, 1805, IV., p. 149-50. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." 321 
 
 stated, because the physical principle is very difficult to move, 
 and is corporeal. 38 
 
 § 408. Another deduction from man's erect position is, 
 that he cannot use his anterior limbs as legs and feet, but 
 only as arms and hands. Galen thinks this is because man 
 has no need of the velocity to be attained by four legs ; but 
 was meant by nature to tame horses, aided by his intelligence 
 and his hands. 39 Elsewhere, 40 Galen highly applauds 
 Aristotle for having, in this very place, refuted the opinion 
 of Anaxagokas, who preceded Helvetius, in deriving the 
 intellectual superiority of man from the possession of hands. 
 Aristotle thinks it far more logical to say that man possesses 
 hands because he is the most intelligent of animals. " The 
 hand is an instrument. Nature, like a rational being, always 
 bestows instruments on those who can use them. For it is 
 better to give a flute to a flute-player, than to make a flute- 
 player of one who possesses a flute ; since the inferior ought 
 to be given to the greater and nobler, and not the nobler and 
 greater to the inferior. If, therefore, it is better so, and as 
 Nature always acts for the best, when possible, evidently man 
 has hands because he is the most intelligent ; and is not the 
 most intelligent because he has hands." The reader will not 
 fail to appreciate how entirely the solution of a deeply 
 interesting problem is frustrated by this seeming explanation. 
 
 § 409. A little further on we meet with this amusing 
 explanation of the statement (which is erroneous), that the 
 lioness has only two teats. " The reason is, not because the 
 lioness brings forth few young, for she often brings forth more 
 than two, but because she has little milk ; and she has little 
 milk, because her food is converted into her own substance ; 
 and she does not eat much because she is carnivorous." 41 
 
 38 TroWifi &) dvadvriToe fori, ko\ owpaTwdrig. 
 
 39 Galen: De usu Partium, III., 1. 40 Ibid., I., 3. 
 
 41 This is improved on by Diego Funes t Mendoca, who says, " No tiene la 
 Leone mas que dos tetas, con que cria sus hijos, y tan poca leche en ellos, que 
 siempre los trae muertos de hambre."— Historia General de Aves y Animates, 
 
 21 
 
322 " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 § 410. Nor is the reason alleged for the position of the 
 elephant's teats between the forelegs less amusing. " The 
 reason why she has but two, is because she only brings forth 
 a single young one ; and she has them between the forelegs 
 because she has cloven feet, and no animal with cloven feet 
 has the teats under the groin ; finally, she has them between 
 the forelegs because it is there that most milk is found." 48 
 
 He further observes that man has nipples, but that some 
 male animals have them, and others are without them. Not 
 content with this carelessness as to facts, he adds that those 
 males which have nipples resemble their mothers. 
 
 § 411. The anatomist will read with surprise that man is 
 the only animal which has flesh on its legs ; but the cause 
 will, perhaps, surprise him more. " There is but one cause, 
 and that is the erect position. In order that the Upper part 
 should be light and easily carried, Nature has taken away the 
 substantial from the Upper, and placed it in the Lower : 
 hence she has made the buttocks, thighs, and calves fleshy. 
 At the same time she made the buttocks for repose (sitting) ; 
 since quadrupeds can stand without fatigue, man needs a 
 seat." 
 
 Man has no tail, like other quadrupeds, because the forma- 
 tion of his buttocks uses up all the available material. Nor 
 does the existence of tailless apes disturb this argument. The 
 ape has neither tail nor buttocks, because he is intermediate 
 between man and quadruped : he has no tail, because he is 
 biped ; no buttocks, because he is quadruped. 
 
 § 412. The treatise we are now considering is devoted to 
 an exposition of causes, and represents the physiology of 
 Aristotle. On this account I have selected typical examples, 
 
 1521, p. 256 j and gravely he copies from Pliny the following: " Conoce si la 
 leone le hahecho adulterio con solo el olor; annque ella se suele huyr, 6 lavarse 
 en algun rio, si le ha cometido." The idea of a lioness, ashamed of her adultery, 
 bathing herself in the stream to escape detection, is very droll. 
 w Compare Gausn: De urn Partium, VII,, 21. 
 
CHAP. XVI.] " ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS." 323 
 
 both of insight and error, which might convey a just idea of 
 his method and its results. Perhaps some readers may have 
 felt that this has been done too minutely ; but although fewer 
 examples would have displayed the method, I believe that a 
 less exhaustive analysis would have failed to rectify the false 
 and exaggerated estimate of Aristotle's scientific eminence. 
 Throughout these page3 I have had to contend against the 
 very natural prejudice in favour of a mighty fame. Half a 
 dozen examples, no matter how absurd, would not have shaken 
 the prejudice, because the reader would have supposed that, 
 in spite of these, the works contained enough to justify their 
 reputation. 
 
 In conclusion, we may, observe that, far as this treatise 
 " On the Parts of Animals " may be from the modern standard, 
 it is of great interest in the History of Science, not only for 
 the material it furnishes, but also as one of the earliest 
 attempts to found Biology on Comparative Anatomy. Although 
 for centuries animals were studied rather as curiosities than 
 as furnishing scientific data, and, until quite recently, Zootomy 
 formed no recognized branch of biological research, Aristotle, 
 we see, had early comprehended its true position, and sought 
 for the laws of life in all organic beings. He would recognize 
 the moderns as his inheritors, and would hear with satisfac- 
 tion that " to Zootomy we owe almost all the important 
 discoveries in Anatomy and Physiology." 43 Those grave 
 physicians who sneered at John Hunter's " wasting his time 
 over flies and frogs," might have known that it was in the 
 study of animal organization that Harvey discovered the cir- 
 culation; and that Aselli, Pecquet, Eudbeck, and Bar- 
 tholinus enlarged this discovery by detecting the lymphatics, 
 and their transport of the chyle into the veins; and that 
 
 43 Tiedemann: Physiologie de Vhomme, Paris, 1831, 1., 41. Compare also 
 Stlvhts (Leboe): Opera Omnia, 1679, p. 875. Halleb: Elementa Physw 
 kgiee, Lausanne, 1757, 1., 3. Delle Chiaje: Istituzioni di Anatomia « Fuw- 
 loqia comparata, 1832, 1., p. xiu. 
 
 21— 2 
 
324 " ON THE PAETS OF ANIMALS." [CHAP. XVI. 
 
 Malpighi and Leeuwenhoek completed the great discovery by 
 that of the capillaries. It was thus that Hoffmann, Wirsung, 
 Stenon, and Wharton, discovered the excretory ducts of the 
 pancreas and salivary glands. It was thus De Graaf dis- 
 covered the function of the ovaries. It was thus Harvey, Mal- 
 pighi, and Wolff, laid the foundations of Embryology. It was 
 thus that almost all our knowledge of the nervous system was 
 attained. It was thus that almost all we know of the chemical 
 changes going on during respiration and digestion was gained. 
 To Aristotle such information would have seemed like the 
 realization of his dreams ; and that he should thus early have 
 perceived the importance of comparative anatomy, is one more 
 of the many evidences of his prodigious scientific insight. 
 
 But, and the remark is important in its bearing on 
 Method, although Aristotle fully saw how wide and fertile 
 was the field of investigation, and how completely it was 
 identified with the study of human life, he failed to discover 
 a single physiological process or a single anatomical fact, not 
 patent to the vulgar eye. 
 
( 325 ) 
 
 CHAPTEK XVII. 
 
 ON GENERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 §413. The treatise "On the Generation of Animals," 1 ia 
 the last we shall have to analyze. It is an extraordinary 
 production. No ancient, and few modern works, equal it 
 in comprehensiveness of detail and profound speculative 
 insight. We there find some of the obscurest problems of 
 Biology treated with a mastery which, when we consider the 
 condition of science at that day, is truly astounding. That 
 there are many errors, many deficiences, and not a little care- 
 lessness in the admission of facts, may be readily imagined ; 
 nevertheless, at times the work is frequently on a level with, 
 and occasionally even rises above, the speculations of many ad- 
 vanced embryologists. At least so it appears to me ; and the 
 reader knows how little I am disposed to discover in ancient 
 texts the fuller meanings of modern science, and how anxiously 
 I strive to represent what Aristotle actually thought. It is 
 difficult to disengage ancient texts from the suggestions of 
 modern thought ; but I should not be candid were I to con- 
 ceal the impression which the study of this work left on my 
 mind, that the labours of the last two centuries from Harvey 
 to Kolliker have furnished the anatomical data to confirm 
 many of the views of this prescient genius. Indeed, I know no 
 
 1 A valuable edition, with a German version and notes, has recently been 
 published by Aueeet and Wimmek, Leipzig, I860. I can find no other version 
 except the imperfect one of Gaza. 
 
326 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 better eulogy to pass on Aristotle than to compare his work 
 with the " Exercitations concerning Generation " of our 
 immortal Hakvey. The founder of modern physiology was 
 a man of keen insight, of patient research, of eminently 
 scientific mind. His work is superior to that of Aristotle in 
 some few anatomical details; but it is so inferior to it in 
 philosophy, that at the present day it is much more anti- 
 quated, much less accordant-with our views. 
 
 But in expressing my admiration of Aristotle's treatise, 
 I am naturally solicitous not to exaggerate, nor to convey a 
 wrong impression of the kind of excellence discoverable in it. 
 In this chapter, therefore, as in its predecessors, the errors 
 and deficiences will be carefully indicated. That the errors are 
 not more numerous is marvellous, when we reflect on the 
 enormous difficulty of embryological research, and the defi- 
 ciency, in Aristotle's day, of those means of observation which 
 have assisted moderns. 
 
 § 414. As an introduction it may be useful to give a brief 
 summary of the various forms of Generation and Develop- 
 ment recognized by modern embryologists. The more so, 
 because we have no philosophical treatise which rigorously 
 sets them forth; and some confusion is noticeable in the 
 common subdivisions of the subject, especially as regards three 
 very distinct groups of phenomena relating to the origination, 
 the development, and the gestation of the embryo. These 
 groups not being well defined, the student is frequently 
 perplexed, because questions of origin are confounded with 
 questions of history. It is clear, for example, that the con- 
 ditions which determine the origin of a new being — the union 
 of a germcell with a spermcell — are of another order from 
 the conditions which determine the subsequent development 
 of that being ; and these, again, are different from the con- 
 ditions of gestation and incubation, whether the development 
 goes on within the parent organism, or outside it. Let us 
 severally examine these three groups. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 327 
 
 I. — Origination. 
 
 § 415. This is genesis. If we exclude the form of Spon- 
 taneous Generation, as not properly coming within the circle 
 of established truths, 2 all the phenomena of genesis range 
 under two rubrics, which may be entitled Monogenesis, when 
 the origin is from one cell, or one parent ; and Digenesis, 3 
 when the origin is from two cells, or two parents. 
 
 § 416. Monogenesis may occur under three forms : — 1. by 
 spontaneous fission; 2. by external gemmation— budding ; 
 8. by internal gemmation — parthenogenesis. 
 
 1st. Spontaneous fission — also, but inaccurately, by a con- 
 fusion of the ideas of origin and birth, called fissiparity — is a 
 well-known phenomenon in the vegetal and animal kingdoms. 
 A single cell divides into two cells ; these two again divide 
 into four, and so on indefinitely. The cells may either cohere 
 and form a filament, or they may separate into many inde- 
 pendent individuals. Not only will the single cell spontane- 
 ously divide, but, among the lower animals, a similar division 
 of the whole organism is observed. Thus a Vorticella becomes, 
 by longitudinal division, two distinct animals on one stem. 
 
 2nd. External gemmation — also, but inaccurately, called 
 gemmiparity — is well known as the production of buds in 
 plants, and is also observed in certain animals, such, for 
 example, as the Polype. In the origination of the young 
 Hydra from the substance of the parent body without any 
 sexual agency whatever,* there is nothing distinguishable from 
 ordinary processes of growth, except that, instead of forming 
 an increase of the parental substance, it forms a new Hydra, 
 which finally separates from the parent. The young Hydra 
 is a bud like a plant-bud. 
 
 2 On this point see Blackwood's Magazine, February, 1861. 
 
 3 Bukdach: Traitt! de Physiologic, Paris, 1837, 1., 47, 83. Van Beneden: 
 Minwire sur les Vers Intestinaux, Paris, 1858, p. 296. 
 
 4 Repeated examination has assured me of the accuracy of what Huxley 
 has stated on this point in his important memoir On the Agamic Reproduction 
 and Morphology of the Aphis, in the Zinncean Transactions, XXII., 217. 
 
828 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 3rd. Internal Gemmation, or Parthenogenesis, has been 
 already explained (§ 189-190), and need not, therefore, be 
 further dwelt on here. 
 
 § 417. Digenesis may occur under two forms : — 1. Con- 
 jugation; and 2. Fertilization. 
 
 1st. Conjugation is a phenomenon well known to botanists ; 
 two cells, apparently similar in all respects, having, perhaps, 
 become two by spontaneous fission, unite their contents, and 
 originate a new cell. 
 
 2nd. Fertilization is the union of two dissimilar cells, 
 called spermcell and germcell, or spermatozoon and ovum. 
 This is the normal mode of genesis in the majority of plants 
 and animals ; the exclusive mode in all the animals of a com- 
 plex organization (see § 191-2.) It is a matter of indifference 
 where these dissimilar cells are produced, whether in the same 
 organ, or in organs morphologically different; whether they 
 are produced in one and the same plant or animal, or in plants 
 and animals of different sexes ; the cardinal fact is simply the 
 union of the two dissimilar cells, the fertilization of the germ- 
 cell by the spermcell. This is fundamental ; everything else 
 is accessory. 
 
 II. — Development. 
 
 § 418. Here begins the history of the new being. The 
 genesis having been effected, histogenesis (or formation of 
 tissues) commences. In the case of the vegetal seed, a long 
 period may elapse before this development begins. The seed 
 may lie, as in Egyptian tombs for thousands of years, ferti- 
 lized, yet undeveloped, because the necessary conditions of 
 histogenesis are absent. In animals also there is often a lapse 
 of time. In the deer for example, the impregnated ovum lies 
 four months and a half in the uterus before development com- 
 
 5 1 am indebted for this curious fact to Proiessor Bischoff, the embryo- 
 logist. 
 
CHAP. XTII.J AND DEVELOPMENT. 329 
 
 The various laws of histogenesis may be ranged under 
 these two heads : — 
 
 1st. Differentiation, in which the primitive homogeneous 
 germinal membrane becomes more and more heterogeneous, 
 through successive differentiations, both of composition and 
 form, giving rise to tissues, the tissues forming organs, and 
 the organs grouping themselves into systems. 
 
 2nd. Assimilation and Disintegration, a continuous pro- 
 cess, coincident with differentiation, by which the several 
 elementary structures are nourished. 
 
 III. — Incubation. 
 
 § 419. Our third group relates entirely to the habitat of 
 the impregnated ovum. It has obviously nothing to do with 
 the genesis of the new being, and is only an accessory condition 
 of its early history. There are two forms of Incubation : — 
 
 1st. Oviparity. The female having produced an egg, this 
 is developed either entirely outside her organism,— or mainly 
 outside, and partly inside, — or almost entirely inside. It is 
 developed entirely outside in the majority of fishes and 
 batrachians. 6 It is developed mainly outside, but partly 
 inside, in some infusoria, polypes, some fishes, and all birds. 
 It is developed almost entirely inside in what are called the 
 ovo-viviparous and viviparous animals, and thus insensibly 
 passes into — 
 
 2nd. Viviparity, in which the chief metamorphoses have 
 
 6 The Ephemeron (dayfly) must be franked with these, according to 
 Swammekdamm. He describes the deposit of the eggs in the water, and their 
 subsequent fertilization by the male. — Die Bibel der Natur, 1725, p. 100. So 
 accurate an observer is not lightly to be contradicted, and the fact, as he states 
 it, may be true for one species. Reaumbr, however, feels great hesitation, 
 and says that his own observations do not confirm Swammerdamm: — Memoires 
 four servir a I'histoire des Insectes, Paris, 1762, VI., 500. Burmeister: 
 Manual of Entomology, London, 1836, takes no notice of it. Be the fact as it 
 may, even if congress does occur, the impregnated egg can only remain a few 
 minutes before it is deposited. 
 
880 ON GENEEATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 taken place while the embryo is within the parent's body, so 
 that, at the time of birth, it is said to be capable of indepen- 
 dent existence. 
 
 "We have seen already (§ 201 a., 202-3-4) that, strictly 
 speaking, no distinction exists between oviparity and vivi- 
 parity as regards organic processes, though the terms are 
 convenient for ordinary purposes ; and to what is there said, 
 may be added the illustrative parallel between the development 
 of the viviparous Blenny and the oviparous Fowl, which, as 
 Kathke has shown, 7 presents only this difference : that after 
 the changes have advanced to a certain stage in the hen's egg, 
 a shell is formed and the egg is extruded, to be hatched 
 externally, whereas the Blenny's egg is hatched internally. 
 
 § 420. If now we turn to Aristotle, and ask how much he 
 knew of the forms of Eeproduction just sketched, we shall 
 find that, except Spontaneous Fission, they were all more or 
 less familiar to him. The evidence upon which he believed 
 in Monogenesis was indeed very imperfect ; still we find him 
 positively recognizing it; and we shall see in the course of 
 our analysis how lucky were many of his anticipations on 
 other points. 
 
 § 421. Book I., Chap. I. — The work opens with the 
 declaration that it is a sequel to the treatise on the " Parts of 
 Animals," and will concern itself with the parts devoted to 
 Generation, also, with the causes of Generation. 
 
 " In all animals having distinct sexes, offspring issue from 
 the union of the sexes. But this distinction of sex is not 
 universal, though few exceptions occur among the sanguineous 
 animals (by the exceptions, he means certain fishes). Of 
 ex-sanguineous animals, some have distinct sexes, which 
 reproduce their kind ; others reproduce, but not their kind : 
 such are those which do not issue from parents, but from 
 putrefaction and excrement." He reckons in this class insects 
 
 7 RATHKJfy: Abhandlungen zur Bildungs-und-Entwickelungsgeschichte des 
 Menschen und der Thiere, Leipzig, 1833, II., p. 9. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 331 
 
 and all those animals which, like the oyster and mussel, remain 
 fixed to one spot. These have no more distinction of sex 
 than the plants they resemble. Plants are partly developed 
 from seeds, and partly from putrefaction, by spontaneous 
 generation. 
 
 § 422. Chap. II. — Of plants he promises to speak in a 
 separate work (no longer extant), and, therefore, only speaks 
 of animals here. And first he desires us to understand the 
 masculine and feminine principles : the masculine principle 
 being the origin of all motion and generation ; the feminine 
 principle being the origin of the material generated. 8 The 
 proof is furnished by observation as to the origin of the sperm. 
 It is because these principles are secreted from the male, and 
 in the female, that they are masculine and feminine, " for we 
 name masculine that which engenders in another; and 
 feminine, that which engenders in itself. On this account we 
 regard the earth as a mother, and the heaven, or sun, as the 
 genitor and father." 
 
 After more of such not very luciferous metaphysics, he 
 briefly touches on the sexual differences in male and female, 
 and notices the great disturbance in the organism occasioned 
 by any modification of the sexual organs, which he regards as 
 a proof that the Masculine and Feminine are veritable prin- 
 ciples — i.e. vital causes. 
 
 § 423. Chap. III. briefly describes these organs. As may 
 be expected, his anatomical knowledge was very imperfect. He 
 entirely misses the correct analogy of the uterus, which he 
 makes the analogue of the testes. Yet inasmuch as he never 
 discriminates between the uterus and the ovaries, but always 
 employs the same word to designate both, a defence might 
 be set up for him, were he not on other points so vague and 
 inaccurate. It is only in Mammalia that a true uterus is 
 present, and modern research has discovered that the uterus 
 
 » t& pkv dppiv dig TrJQ Kivi)<nug mi Hjg yevhewg l%ov rqv a^v, jb Si 9rj\v 
 dig ttKijg. 
 
332 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 is a modification of the oviduct. The serial development is as 
 follows : 
 
 In the simplest animals there is no permanent organ 
 answering to the ovary; but the ova are developed in a tem- 
 porary organ, a mere fold of membrane. 9 
 
 Higher in the scale, we find a permanent organ, — ovary, — 
 but no oviduct. The ripe ova burst through the membrane, 
 and fall into the general cavity of the body, where they are fer- 
 tilized ; or else they pass out into the external medium. 10 
 
 Still higher, we meet with an oviduct into which the ripe 
 ova pass, and are thence extruded, or are sometimes developed 
 there as in an uterus. 11 
 
 In mammals, the development of the ova begins in the 
 fallopian tube, which is the upper part of the oviduct, and 
 finishes in the uterus, which is the lower part. 
 
 § 424. That Aristotle should not have discriminated 
 between the uterus and ovaries, is little remarkable, for the 
 function of the ovaries was never rightly understood until 
 Stenon 12 recognized them as the analogues of the organs 
 which in the ovipara produced eggs, and, therefore, he named 
 them ovaries. The name was adopted by Regnieb de Geaaf 
 in 1672, in his chapter de testibiis mulieribus sive ovariis. 13 
 
 9 In Sea Anemones ; or any part of the body except the arms in Fresh- 
 water Polypes. 
 
 10 This may be seen in certain fishes without oviducts. Vogt et Pappen- 
 heim : Mecherches sur I'anat. comp. des organes de la generation, chez les animaux 
 verUbris, in the Annates des Sciences Naturelles, 1859, p. 357. 
 
 11 In the viviparous Blenny the ovary itself is the organ wherein the 
 embryo is developed.— Katiike : Op. cit., p. 8. The fluid Kathke found in the 
 ovary of the impregnated Blenny doubtless serves to feed the embryo. Com- 
 pare Chap, ix., note 34. Fabeicius ab Acquapendente : De formatione 
 pulli, and Hakvey speak of the hen's ovary as an uterus. 
 
 12 Stenon: Element. Myologice specimen, 1669, p. 145. 
 
 13 De Gbaap: De Mulierum Organis, Chap, xii.; towards the close he re- 
 marks, " Hinc potius 'mulierum ovaria quam testes appellanda veniunt: siqui- 
 dem nullam similitudinem turn forma turn contento cum virilibus testibus 
 proprie dictis obtinent." The early anatomists held with Hippocrates that 
 the female, as well as the male, furnished sperm ; they considered the ovaries to 
 be testes. It is as testes that the ovaries are described by Vesalius: Opera 
 Omnia, ed. 1725, p. 459 ; by Failoppius: Observationes Anatomica (printed 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 333 
 
 § 425. Chap IV. — Aristotle's anatomical knowledge was 
 imperfect; this imperfection stimulated his readiness to 
 explain phenomena by final causes. In noticing certain dif- 
 ferences in the male organs, he undertakes to explain the 
 purpose of the testes. " Everything in nature occurs either 
 from necessity, or for the best. Now it is manifest that testes 
 are not necessary, since there are animals (fish and serpents) 
 which have none. They have only canals — vasa deferential 
 What, then, is the end attained by the testes ? The chief 
 object of the organism in most animals, as in plants, is that of 
 producing seed and fruit. And just as animals with straight 
 intestines are the most voracious, so animals which have no 
 testes, but only canals, are the most procreant. But those 
 animals which are more moderate in desire, have long winding 
 
 in the ed. of Vesalius, J3. 750), and by all anatomists till Stenon. In an epitome 
 of Vesalius by Fontantts (Amsterdam, 1 642), they are rudely figured and named 
 as testes; and the question " generatne foemina semen ?" is answered ".Gene- 
 rat; sed modicum," p. 32. Aristotle always denies the existence of sperm in 
 the female; and is thus superior to his predecessors and successors. Tatjrei-ltjs, 
 in his attack on Gssahpinits, controverts this, asserting that anatomy proves 
 women to have testes, and- observation detects their sperm: Alpes Ccesce, 1650, 
 p. 819. Ealloppius says: " Omnes anatomici uno ore asserant in testibus 
 fteminarum semen fieri, et quod semine referri reperiantur, quod ego nunquam 
 videre potui, quamvis non levem operam, ut hoe cognoscerem, adhibuerim. Vidi 
 quidem in ipsis quasdam veluti vesicas aqua, vel humore aqueo, alias luteo, 
 alias vero limpido turgentes. Sed nunquam semen vidi, nisi in vasis ipsis sper- 
 matids, vel delatoriis vocatis," p. 750. See the reply of Vesalius, p. 820. The 
 " vesicles " mentioned by Ealloppius were by De Graae thought to be ova 
 {Epistola ad Lncam Schacht, p. 72, and De Muliervm Orqanis, pp. 80, 158) ; 
 and although Von Baer proved that these vesicles contained the ova, and were 
 not the ova themselves, still we must see in this observation a firm basis of 
 fact. Dominic de Marchettis : Anatomia, 1656, p. 70, describes the 
 ovaries as testes, without misgiving. To the same effect Wessling, in his 
 Syntagma Anatomicum, chap, vii., ed. Blasius, Amst, 1666, p. 98, and their 
 product as "semen analogice." Everardus: Novus exortus hominis et ani- 
 malium, Medioburgi, 1662, p. 26, thinks that they secrete a sperm, but one not 
 perfectly cooked. Harvey denies that the ovaries are testes, and denies that 
 the female has any " preparing, leading, and ejaculatory vessels," or that she 
 produces any sperm— Exercitations concerning Generation, 1653, p. 399, 
 Exerc LXV He regards the function of the ovaries as "intended to secure the 
 divarications of the veins, and retain a moisture in them whereby to keep the 
 parts glib " (p. 406). Thus did these illustrious men grope in the dark. 
 14 This error was refuted by De Graae: Op. cit, p. 23. 
 
334 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 intestines, and spermatic canals, in order that the nutritive 
 and procreative instincts should not be too rapidly gratified. 
 It is for this the testes are given : they retard the movement 
 of the sperm." 13 
 
 § 426. Chaps. V., VI., and VII., continue the subject of 
 the male organs, with some remarks on the modes of con- 
 gress. Chap. VIII. is on the uterus (including the ovaries), 
 which is variously constituted in different classes. " Thus in 
 Man and the Quadrupeds it is situated in the groin ; the 
 viviparous cartilaginous fishes, on the contrary, have it under 
 the diaphragm. The other viviparous animals have it below ; 
 birds and oviparous quadrupeds above. All these variations 
 have their reasons. Some, as the fish, lay imperfect eggs, 
 which are perfected and developed outside the organism ; the 
 reason being that fish are very fertile, and if they had to 
 develope perfect eggs, it could only be in small numbers. But 
 they produce so many, that one-half of the ovary of the smaller 
 fish seems to be nothing but one egg. Birds and oviparous 
 quadrupeds, however, lay perfect eggs, which must have a 
 hard shell for protection; but they are soft-shelled during 
 their growth. This hard shell is produced by warmth, which 
 evaporates the moisture from the earthy matter ; and the 
 place where this occurs must, therefore, be warm. Hence 
 they are developed in the region of the diaphragm where the 
 food is cooked. " 
 
 § 427. Chap. IX. — There are also differences among the 
 vivipara. Some produce their young within themselves, as 
 man, horse, dog, and all hairy animals; and among the 
 aquatic animals the dolphin, the whale, and other cetaceaB. 
 
 § 428. Chap. X. — Cartilaginous fish and vipers not only 
 produce living young, but first produce eggs, and indeed per- 
 fect eggs, from which the embryos are developed. For from 
 
 16 This idea is not even original with him ; it is borrowed from Plato's 
 Timaus, and, though I cannot now recover the passage, I believe it is repeated 
 in Galen. 
 
IS 
 
 CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 335 
 
 perfect eggs embryos are developed, not from the imperfect. 
 The reason why these animals do not deposit their eggs 
 because they are by nature cold, and not, as some assert, 
 warm. 
 
 § 429. Chap. XL— They produce soft-shelled eggs, because 
 they have so little warmth that the external surface of the egg 
 cannot be dried; and because they produce soft eggs they 
 never deposit them, lest the eggs should perish. No sooner 
 is the embryo developed than it descends to the region of the 
 groin. 
 
 Having shown the reasons for the variations in position, 
 he adds, " It is impossible for the young embryo to be pro- 
 duced under the diaphragm, since it must have weight and 
 movement, and this could not be tolerated so near the centre 
 of life." Why it could not be tolerated he does not explain. 
 " Moreover, birth would be rendered difficult, on account of 
 the length of the route ; as we see in women, who have diffi- 
 cult parturition if they yawn during the time, or if by any 
 movement they draw the womb upwards." 
 
 § 430. The modern reader will be puzzled, perhaps, by 
 this mention of the womb moving upwards, especially during 
 the act of yawning. It is an ancient notion, which was made 
 to explain the choking sensation felt during the hysterical 
 attack — globus hystericus. " Even the empty womb," says 
 Aristotle, " produces strangulation when it moves upwards." 
 Plato, as usual, is even more audaciously fanciful. He says 
 the womb is an animal fervently desirous of producing chil- 
 dren, and when this desire is thwarted beyond a certain time, 
 the womb, growing indignant, wanders about the body, 16 
 stopping the breathing passages, throwing women into the 
 greatest trouble, and causing' many diseases. 
 
 § 431. Having thus accounted for the observed differences 
 Aristotle proceeds, Chaps. XIII. and XIV., to inquire why the 
 
 ! Plato: Timaus, ed. Bek., p. 140. irKaviifisvov iravry Kara rb a&pa. 
 
1 
 
 836 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 uterus lies inside, and the testes sometimes outside, sometimes 
 inside ; with other questions of a similar nature. In Chap. XV. 
 he touches on the congress of the cephalopoda ; the passage 
 has already been quoted (§ 187). There is also this remark- 
 able sentence : " The female has an organ which must be 
 regarded as an ovary, for it contains that which at first is an 
 undifferentiated egg," and which becomes by differentiation 
 many eggs." 17 
 
 § 432. Chap. XVI. — Some insects have congress, and re- 
 produce insects of the same kind and name as themselves, 
 such as the grasshopper, cricket, spider, wasp, and ant ; 
 others, again, have congress, but produce worms, and their 
 origin is to be sought in putrefying liquids and substances.: 
 such are flies and fleas. Others, again, have no parents, nor 
 do they have congress ; such as the ephemera, tipula, and the 
 like. Among insects which have congress the females are 
 generally larger than the males ; because the larger body can 
 better contain the weight of^the impregnated eggs. 18 
 
 § 433. Chap. XVII. — After a lengthy, yet not minute, 
 description of the organs, he now proceeds to consider the 
 sperm. " Inasmuch as some animals indubitably have it, but 
 with regard to others — insects and cephalopoda — it is uncertain 
 whether they have it or not, the first inquiry must be why the 
 exception exists, if it exist ; and then whether females have or 
 have not sperm, or something analogous?" This is an 
 important inquiry. Before expounding his views, it may not 
 be superfluous briefly to sum up the results of modern 
 research, in order that we may appreciate the absolute, no less 
 than the historical interest of his remarks. 
 
 § 434. In the lower animals the spermcells and germ- 
 
 17 ifbv yap iff%ei rb piv irp&TVV dSiopiarov, iirura Siaxplvojitvov ylverai 
 7ro\\a. 
 
 18 This ia correct. The termite ant begins to swell immediately after con- 
 gress, so that by the time she is ready to lay her eggs her abdomen has grown 
 to 1,500 times the size of her body. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 337 
 
 cells, out of which the embryo is originated, are developed in 
 precisely the same parts of the organism. Somewhat higher 
 in the scale, these cells are developed in similar, but not the 
 same, organs. Still higher in the scale they are developed in 
 organs so very dissimilar in structure, aspect, position, that it 
 is only by the minute morphological studies of recent times 
 that the conviction of their identity has been confirmed. In 
 this last stage the organs are named testes and ovaries. 
 
 § 435. -The identity of structure carries with it identity of 
 function. If the testis is the male ovary, it will comport itself 
 in all essential respects as an ovary. This has not been 
 sufficiently borne in mind ; otherwise we should have 
 seen physiologists recognizing Semination as a distinct func- 
 tion, corresponding with that of Ovulation; instead of 
 vaguely classing it under the head of secretion. Thus the 
 function of the testis is the production of spermcells — Semi- 
 nation. The function of the ovary is identical, it is the 
 production of germcells — Ovulation. These functions belong 
 to the organs, and are prior to, and independent of, any act of 
 congress. Spermcells and germcells are developed, not only 
 prior to any act of congress, but even in animals which from 
 their birth have been kept, isolated from all sexual stimulus. 
 Nay, in the ovary of an embryo may be seen the germcells 
 which would become ova at a later period. 19 The spermatozoa 
 cannot indeed be thus early recognized in the male ; but the 
 spermcells which will hereafter become spermatozoa are 
 present. 
 
 Ovulation is a spontaneous process. Every one knows, 
 what indeed was known to the ancients, that the hen lays eggs 
 spontaneously, without congress. These eggs do not, it is 
 
 19 This may be easily seen under the microscope in a thin section from the 
 ovary of a new-born kitten, previously hardened in alcohol. The ova are 
 densely crowded at the periphery. Indeed, the ovary itself, at first, seems 
 nothing but a mass of the original germinal cells. In the virgin Aphis an 
 embryo may be found, and in this embryo there are ova ! See Huxley On the 
 Agamic reproduction of the Aphis. 
 
 22 
 
338 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 true, develope into chicks ; but the eggs of virgin-bees and 
 virgin-moths develope into insects capable of reproducing their 
 kind (§§ 189—193). In mammals, during the rutting period, 
 and in women, during the catamenial period, eggs are matured, 
 and made ready for impregnation. These eggs are spon- 
 taneously developed, and if not impregnated by congress, 
 they are either extruded from the ovary by the bursting of the 
 Graafian vesicle, or they wither and are reabsorbed. There is 
 considerable uncertainty among embryologists respecting these 
 alternatives, although both seem to me consonant with known 
 facts. One school maintains I 'ovulation spontanJe, as it is 
 termed by M. Pouchet ; declaring it to be an invariable law 
 that ova are spontaneously developed and discharged quite 
 irrespective of congress. The other school maintains I'ovu- 
 lation excise, as it may be termed ; asserting that the stimulus 
 of congress is necessary to secure the perfect maturation and 
 discharge of ova, which would otherwise be reabsorbed. 20 
 I believe that the true case is this : Ovulation, or formation of 
 ova, is always spontaneous, being the simple function of 
 the healthy ovary; but the ovipont, or discharge of ova, 
 though generally spontaneous, especially in mammals, some- 
 times requires the stimulus of congress, to prevent the ova 
 from being reabsorbed. Bltjmenbach compares the bursting 
 of the Graafian vesicle, in which the ovum is contained, to the 
 spontaneous bursting of an abscess. Guided by this analogy, 
 we may suppose that when the vesicle does not burst, it 
 is reabsorbed like an abscess which disappears without 
 rupture. The excitement may be • a very efficient agent in the 
 rupture. 
 
 § 436. Let us compare Ovulation with Semination, and 
 we shall see the probability of what has just been said. 
 Semination is indubitably spontaneous ; but the discharge, 
 
 w The evidence on both sides is well summed up in Dr. Arthur Fakre's 
 admirable monograph, The Uterus and its Appendages, p. 568, in the Supple- 
 ment to the Cyclopaedia of Anat. and Physiology. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 339 
 
 although it may, and does, occur spontaneously, usually 
 requires the stimulus of congress. When there is no stimulus, 
 the spermatozoa, though formed, are not discharged, but are 
 reabsorbed. We seem justified in asserting, therefore, that 
 Ovulation and Semination are both spontaneous— the simple 
 functions of the ovaries and testes ; but that the Ovipont and 
 Seminipont depend on other causes ; and require a stimulus, 
 which is sometimes effected by mere periodic congestion, at 
 other times requires the more energetic excitation of con- 
 gress. 
 
 § 437. Having thus made clear to ourselves that both 
 male and female spontaneously prepare the spermcells and 
 germcells, the union of which forms the origin of an embryo, 
 let us return to Aristotle. He knew nothing 'of the important 
 fact that the mammalian female producedgejms, although the 
 eggs of insects, fish, reptiles, and birds ought, we are apt to 
 suppose, to have suggested the idea. It is, however, a modern 
 idea, and we must not look for it in his work. 
 
 In examining the origin of sperm, he asks whether it is 
 derived from the whole body, or only from a part. There are 
 four grounds upon which it may be argued that it is derived 
 from the whole body. 1st. The force of the voluptuous 
 sensation ; for the sensation is stronger in proportion to its 
 fulness, and will be fuller if it arise from all parts than 
 if only from one. 2nd. Maimed children issue from maimed 
 parents ; and if sperm is derived from all parts that part 
 which is wanting in the parents, will necessarily be wanting in 
 the offspring. 3rd. The resemblance of offspring to their 
 parents in the whole body, and in the particular organs ; 
 which shows that each part furnishes its quota. 4th. It is 
 logical to conclude that if the whole arises from a First 
 Principle, each part must have its First Principle ; and hence 
 if there is a sperm for the whole, there must likewise be 
 a particular sperm for each part. Children are observed to 
 resemble their parents not only in congenital peculiarities, but 
 
 22—2 
 
340 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 also in those which are subsequently acquired. They inherit 
 even the scars of their parents. 
 
 § 438. Chap. XVIII. — He now proceeds to refute these 
 reasons : If closely examined they will prove the very opposite 
 conclusion. Eesemblance can be no proof that the sperm 
 comes from the whole body, for resemblance extends tdVoice, 
 nails, hair, and movements, from all which nothing can be 
 derived. 21 
 
 His next objection is more plausible, though erroneous in 
 its assumption. " Children also resemble their ancestors 
 from whom they can derive nothing. The resemblance is 
 propagated through many generations ; as may be noted in 
 the case of the woman in Elis who had a daughter by an 
 Ethiopian, and this daughter although not black produced a 
 black son. 22 The same is seen in plants. It is evident that 
 seed does not arise from all the parts of a plant, since many 
 parts are absent, others can be cut off, and others grow sub- 
 sequently. Nor can seed come from the pericarp, yet this 
 always has the same form." 
 
 § 439. " "We must ask those who hold this opinion : Does 
 the sperm come from the partes similares — e. g., flesh, bone, 
 and sinew; or from the partes dissimilares — e.g., face and 
 hands ? If from the former, we observe nevertheless that the 
 resemblance is in the latter. And if the resemblance in these 
 parts does not arise from the sperm being derived from all 
 parts, there is no reason against the supposition that the 
 resemblance in the dissimilar parts arises from some other 
 cause. If we suppose it only arises from the dissimilar parts, 
 we thereby admit that it does not arise from all. It would be 
 more correct to suppose that the similar parts being the first, 
 
 21 irpwTov fikv oJiv '6n ovBkv arjfutov ij fyjoidnjf tov innitai avrb iravrbQ, 
 '6n xal fmvijv Kai owxas «<*' rpixas 8/ioioi yiyvovTai ml rtp> Kivr\aw, df' Siv 
 ohdiv aVepx* rai. 
 
 22 " Cette histoire est une fable prise au serieux par AriBtote." — Coste, cited 
 by At/bert and Wimmee, who justly remark that analogous well-authenticated 
 examples exist. <, £, $j\ «JMf«-\ ; 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 341 
 
 and those from which the dissimilar parts are formed, it is from 
 them the sperm comes, and that the resemblance in face and 
 hands must have been preceded by resemblance in flesh and 
 nails. If we suppose the sperm to come from both similar 
 and* dissimilar parts, what will be the mode of generation ? 
 For the dissimilar are formed out of the similar, and if the 
 sperm came from the former, it would be the same as if it 
 came from the latter and their union. It is as with names. 
 If anything is derived from the whole name, it must be 
 derived from every syllable, and if from every syllable then 
 from the letters and their union. If therefore flesh and bone 
 are composed of fire, and the like, we must go back to the 
 elements. For how is it possible that sperm should arise 
 from union? and yet without it there could be no resemblance. 
 But if some subsequent cause produces this union, it will be 
 the cause of the resemblance, and not anything derived from 
 the whole." 
 
 § 440. This argument is an illustration of the helplessness 
 of the mind when trying to force a pathway through the 
 marsh of metaphysics. Whatever may be the fallacy of the 
 reasons he refutes, they bear at least some direct relation to 
 the facts, as then understood ; whereas his own argument is 
 logical quibbling, withdrawing attention altogether away from 
 the phenomena. In continuing his objections he advances 
 an argument which was much used in after times when the 
 great battle of Epigenesis (§ 457) was fought. " If," he says, 
 "the parts pre-exist in the sperm, how can they live separate ? 
 if united, then they already form a miniature animal. And 
 how about the generative organs ? since those organs which 
 come from the male are unlike those which come from the 
 female. Moreover, if the sperm is derived from all parts of 
 both parents, the issue will be two animals, since it will have 
 each part of each parent. And wherefore should not the 
 female generate from herself alone, if the sperm is derived 
 from all parts, and she has the proper receptacle ? " 
 
342 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 Growth presents another difficulty. He agrees with Anax- 
 agoeas that " flesh becomes added to flesh by means of food; 
 but those who maintain that sperm comes from the whole 
 body have to explain how increase of size can be effected by 
 that which is different if the addition itself remain un- 
 changed? And if the addition has the power of change, 
 why not at once assume that the sperm has this power, and 
 can become flesh and blood without being originally alike? 
 For growth is not to be explained by mixture. For on this 
 idea the sperm would contain each separate part in its purest 
 state, but we see that it becomes subsequently flesh and blood 
 and every other part. And the idea of one portion of the 
 sperm being sinew and another portion bone is beyond our 
 conception." 
 
 "Another difficulty is this: many animals are not pro- 
 duced by animals of the same kind, nor even by animals of 
 different kind — e.g., flies and fleas; from these worms are 
 produced. It is clear that in these cases the offspring cannot 
 arise from sperm derived from all parts; for they ought to 
 resemble their parents if resemblance is a proof that the 
 sperm comes from the whole body." 
 
 § 441. He then considers the other arguments. The 
 reason why maimed parents produce maimed children is the 
 same as that which in other respects causes the resemblance ; 
 and he adds that many perfectly-formed children are born 
 to maimed parents ; also that many children are unlike their 
 parents. Finally, the female has no sperm ; this is proof 
 that sperm does not come from the whole body. 
 
 § 442. After thus viewing this question from so many 
 sides he proceeds to define sperm thus : " Sperm is in its 
 nature an origin, or Principle, out of which arise all things 
 which are naturally formed. 53 There are many ways in which 
 
 23 /3ov\trat St tolovtov ttjv fimv ilvai r6 mripfia 1% oi t& Kardt tyiaiv 
 ovvWTdjitva yivtrai irpurov, oil r<f 1% imiivvv n tlvai rb iroiovv ; which 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 343 
 
 one thing may arise from another, as one after the other— e.g., 
 day from night, the man from the boy. Another example is when 
 a statue is produced from brass, a bed from wood, and wherever 
 a whole is formed from pre-existing material. A third is when 
 from a contrary a contrary is developed— e.g., a cultivated from 
 an uncultivated man, a sickly from a healthy man. A fourth is 
 that which Epichaemus calls 'by climax' — e.g., when from 
 calumny and abuse a quarrel arises. From all these the 
 principle of action has an origin, a-pxn. This principle lies 
 toithin, as when calumny is a part of the whole disturbance ; 
 or without, as the arts of the artists, or the light of a house 
 on fire. It is clear that the sperm must belong to one of 
 these categories : either it is the material or the principle of 
 action." Is the reader enlightened ? 
 
 § 443. The sperm is a Principle of motion ; the cause of 
 organic development in the material furnished by the female. 
 Aristotle cannot always be clearly understood, because just 
 as moderns call both the impregnated and unimpregnated 
 egg an ovum, he has a similar ambiguity in speaking of the 
 sperm sometimes as synonymous with the fertilized seed, and 
 at others as the fertilizing agent. He here defines the yovrj, 
 or seminal fluid, as that which in animals of different sexes 
 contains the principle of generation ; airepfia, sperm, as that 
 which contains the principles of both parents (i. e., the 
 impregnated ovum). 
 
 § 444. Sperm is shown to be a secretion. " All secretions 
 must be either from available or unavailable nutritive elements. 
 It is clear that sperm is not useless, but is a portion of the 
 material available for nutrition." This important position 
 enables him to indicate that relation between growth and 
 reproduction already noticed (§172). "Instead of saying 
 that sperm comes from all parts of the body, we should say 
 
 Bussbmakek renders: Tale autem sua natura semen esse requint, ut ex 
 eo (tanquam) primo oriantar ea quas secundum naturam constituuntur, non ita 
 ut exstet aliqua res quae ex eo aliquid fecit. 
 
344 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 that it goes to them. It is not the nutrient fluid, hut that 
 which is left over, secreted ; like the colour on a painter's 
 palette which has not been employed in the picture. Hence 
 the larger animals have fewer young than the smaller animals, 
 for by them the consumption of nutrient material will be 
 larger, and the secretion less. Another point to be noticed 
 is, that the nutrient fluid is universally distributed through 
 the body, but each secretion has its separate organ." This 
 is a very remarkable passage. " Sperm," he continues, " is 
 absent during infancy, old age, and severe illness. In illness, 
 on account of weakness ; in old age, because the food can no 
 longer be sufficiently cooked ; in infancy, because the rapidity 
 of growth uses up all available material. For in man, the 
 body seems in its fifth year to have reached half the size it 
 will subsequently attain." 
 
 " There are great differences in the quantity of sperm 
 produced by various animals. Some, indeed, produce none 
 at all, and this not from weakness, but the very opposite, 
 since that which should become sperm is devoted to the whole 
 body ; thus in men who are unusually developed, with much 
 flesh and fat, the secretion of sperm is trifling, and they are 
 less salacious ; so, also, vines, which from excess of food are 
 over-luxuriant in growth, run to leaf rather than to fruit, just 
 as over-fed goats are feeble in generation. Hence the object 
 of pruning the vines ; the unpruned vines are named goat 
 vines." 24 
 
 In these passages are indicated with great clearness the 
 relation between growth and reproduction, which still remains 
 the limit of our knowledge. 
 
 § 445. Chap. XIX. Begins the inquiry whether the 
 female also furnishes sperm, or something else. It was for 
 centuries a vexed question. 25 Aristotle was correct in denying 
 
 24 The play of words on rpayog, goat, and rpayav, luxuriance, is untrans- 
 lateable. 
 
 25 See Note 13. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 345 
 
 the existence of sperm; and as it was impossible, without 
 a microscope, to have recognized the mammalian egg, the 
 view he adopted was the most philosophical one open to him. 
 The peculiarity of the catamenia in women and the rut in 
 animals, and their, obviously intimate connection with repro- 
 duction, suggested that the analogue of the sperm was to be 
 found in the catamenia. In one place he actually speaks of 
 it as the spermatic material of females. 26 
 
 § 446. What is the true relation between the catamenia and 
 the spermatic fluid, according to moderns ? Not that the cata- 
 menia furnishes the plastic material out of which the embryo 
 is formed by the spermatic agency, as Aristotle conceived, and 
 as his successors have for centuries repeated ; but that it is 
 simply a phenomenon which accompanies spontaneous ovula- 
 tion. Eigorously speaking, the two processes are independent. 
 Ovulation and the ovipont may occur without any of the cata- 
 menial phenomena. They always occur thus in the majority 
 of animals, and sometimes even in women. On the other 
 hand, the uterine discharge not unfrequently occurs in women 
 without any ovulation ; under circumstances, indeed, which 
 seem to exclude the possibility of ovulation, as in the cases of 
 young children and very old women. 27 
 
 That, normally, the phenomena are in the female in- 
 timately allied is indubitable. The relation is as follows : the 
 egg ripens in the ovary. This ripening process acts as a stimulus 
 to the organ and its surrounding tissues, which stimulus is 
 irradiated even to the uterus, on account of the energetic sym- 
 pathy established between ovary and uterus by their vascular and 
 nervous connections; hence an increased turgescence of the 
 blood-vessels which form what Eouget calls the corpora caver- 
 nosa of the uterus; 28 and hence the s anguineous discharge. 
 
 26 lv tiS 9i)\u rfiv VKnv ti)j» ampnanKr)v, III., 1, 750. 
 
 * See Gubleb: Des Epistaxis UUrines simulant Us regies, m Memoires de 
 la Societe de Bioloyie, 1863, IV., 149. „„.„„.„ 
 
 » Rouget: Sur Us Organes Erectile* de la Femme, in Brown Sequaed s 
 Journal de la Physiol, 1858, 1., 749 j and Gtoler: Op. cit., p. 160. 
 
346 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 § 447. Aristotle could not have .known this. He, there- 
 fore, concluded from the observed phenomena that the cata- 
 menia was the analogue of the spermatic fluid, yovfi. "And 
 it is thus intelligible why children resemble their parents, 
 since that which makes all the parts of the body, resembles 
 that which is left over as secretion : thus the hand, or the 
 face, or the whole animal pre-exists in the sperm though in 
 an undifferentiated state, aBiopiaTb)g ; and what each of 
 these is in actuality, tvcpyela, such is the sperm in 
 potentiality, Bwa/iu • either according to its substance, 
 or according to some power which it has within it. 29 For 
 it is not yet evident whether the substance of the sperm 
 is the cause of generation, or has within it a motor and 
 generative principle." 
 
 Especial attention is requested to this passage, which, 
 with several others, shows how profound a glance he had 
 directed into the obscure question, afterwards so hotly debated 
 between the advocates of Epigenesis and Pre-existence (§ 457). 
 
 § 448. He held, and not without considerable superficial 
 evidence, that the formation of fat is at the expense of sperm 
 in males, and its analogue in females ; and he explained the 
 great fertility of the invertebrata on the ground of their 
 forming no fat — which, though wrong, is ingenious. 
 
 That the female had no sperm is proved, he thinks, by 
 the fact of conception in the absence of sensation, and vice 
 versa, in sensation without conception. 30 
 
 § 449. Chap. XX. Having proved that the material of 
 the embryo is furnished by the female, and this material is 
 
 29 Thus I render the ambiguous passage : »/ Kara rbv Zyicov rbv iavrov, 
 ij exn nva dvva/uv Iv iavrif. Atjbekt and Wimmer propose to read i%ov for 
 'ix a > but this does not remove the difficulty which lies in the word oynw. 
 We can hardly suppose that Aristotle maintained that the sperm had within it 
 the bulk of the embryo. 
 
 30 Compare Eveeaedtjs: Novus exortus hominis et animalium, 1662, p. 31 j 
 De Geaae: De virorum organis, p. 27; Bakchuskn: De Medicince oriyine et 
 prugressu, 1723, p. 44. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 347 
 
 a secretion contained in the catamenial fluid, he refutes the 
 notion that the fluid secreted by the female is seminal. 
 He holds the uncomplimentary opinion that woman is an 
 undeveloped man. " She is female by her weakness, since 
 the coldness of her nature will not suffer her food to be cooked 
 into sperm." 31 
 
 § 450. " In those living beings which are without the 
 distinctions of sex, the sperm is a kind of conception (icvy/ia, 
 a fertilized seed). I call the first mixture of the masculine 
 and feminine principles, a conception. Hence from one sperm, 
 one body is generated ; as one stalk of wheat from one seed, 
 and one animal from one egg : twins are from two eggs. 
 But in those beings which have distinct sexes, many can be 
 generated from one sperm." The mistake here arises from 
 his not being aware of the immense multitude of spermatozoa 
 contained in the sperm, and from his considering the sperm 
 as one. 
 
 §451. He believes that. the males give the form and 
 principle of motion to "the embryo ; the female giving nothing 
 but the plastic material. 33 As in the coagulation of milk, the 
 milk is the substance, but the rennet is that which contains 
 the cause, so that which is furnished by the female is 
 divided, differentiated (jiepilofxivov), by that which comes 
 from the male. 33 The chapter closes with this reflection : 
 
 31 On this Regnier de Gkaajt: De virorum organis, p. 2, remarks, " Nee 
 minori contumelia Aristoteles fceminam marem imperfectum appellat : vel ut 
 loquuntur barbari Philosophi animal occasionatum." Taukellus calls the idea 
 blasphemous.-^* Ccesce, 1650, p. 814. Comp. also Scamger contra Car- 
 danum, p. 188, verso. But it was long maintained by very grave philosophers. 
 
 » The argument of C^esalpinus is that if the male and female both fur- 
 nished material the one would interfere with the other, or there would be two 
 offspring in lieu of one.- Quastiones Peripatetics:, lib. V, p. 97 D. -But wny 
 should they not be blended? He never thinks of this alternative. Taurellus 
 laughs at him, but advances no solid argument. •„„„„, 
 
 - An idea frequently reproduced. See Regkier be Graae: ^orurn 
 
 oraanis p 57: and Haller: Elementa Physiologic*, Bern. 1761 VIU. 54. 
 
 n^demtim'es it has assumed this modified and not less absurd form: "La 
 
 generation tient a ce que la liqueur femelle est oxidee pax to sperme et reduite 
 
348 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 " That the female furnishes no seminal fluid, but that she 
 nevertheless furnishes something, and this something is 
 derived from the catamenial fluid in vertebrata, and from its 
 analogue in invertebrata, is evident from what has already 
 been said. It is also clear from abstract considerations. 
 Since, of necessity, that which generates, and that out of 
 which it generates, must pre-exist; and if these are united 
 in one, they must be different in kind ; and when separated, 
 the substance and the nature of the efficient and recipient 
 must be diverse. If, therefore, the masculine is that which 
 moves and forms, and the feminine is that which is moved 
 and formed, it is clear that the female will not add seminal 
 fluid, but simply material ; which is indeed the fact, for the 
 nature of the catamenia is that of a primary material." 
 
 § 452. Chap. XXI. It has already been noted that the 
 accurate data upon which modern embryology bases the 
 conclusion that both parents furnish material and form, were 
 not accessible to Aristotle. His view best accords with the facts 
 then known, and far surpasses that of the majority of his 
 successors. He held the male influence to be qualitative, 
 not quantitative ; 3 * and he adduces this ingenious argument : 
 " When a hen is heavy with ' wind-eggs,' if she be treaded 
 before the eggs have so far developed as that the yolk has 
 received its white, she will lay perfect eggs, and not ' wind- 
 eggs.' And if she be treaded by another cock while the egg 
 is still yellow, the whole brood of chicks will resemble this 
 cock. Hence, those who wish to rear fine broods bring the 
 hen to be treaded by two different birds, for they do not 
 suppose the sperm mixes with the eggs, nor that it comes 
 from all parts of the body, otherwise the chicks would be 
 double. But the sperm gives a specific force to the egg; 
 
 en un caillot." — Ackermann, as quoted by Burdach. Still more recently the 
 great embryologist Bischoff has reproduced it under the form of a catalytic 
 action similar to that observable in fermentation. 
 
 34 ovk itg t& Troaov ovjifSaXk6ii.tvov toXq Sjfoic row dppsvog d\X lig rb irolov. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 349 
 
 and this is increased by the new sperm, which is warmed and 
 cooked, for the egg receives nourishment as long as it is 
 growing. It is the same with fish. No sooner has the 
 female laid her eggs, than the male casts his milt on them, 
 and those eggs which are reached by the milt are fertilized, 
 the others not." 
 
 There is nothing in the two remaining chapters which 
 requires special mention here. . 
 
 §453. Book II. Chap. I. — The individual is mortal 
 because individual. The species is eternal, because it repro- 
 duces the individual. And the Masculine and Feminine exist 
 only for this reproduction. But inasmuch as the first moving 
 cause which determines species is higher and better than the 
 substance determined, so it is better that the higher should be 
 separated from the lower ; on this account, when possible, the 
 masculine is kept distinct from the feminine, for the masculine 
 is the principle of motion, and is higher and more god-like, 
 whereas the feminine represents only the substance. 
 
 § 454. After tbis teleological argument he surveys the 
 various forms of reproduction. One division of animals, he 
 says, brings forth young alive, and resembling their parents ; 
 another division brings forth young without limbs, and differ- 
 ing from their parents. Of this latter division the sanguineous 
 bring forth eggs ; the exsanguineous, worms. 
 
 In rendering ffKa>A»)£ by worm, I follow the translators 
 and commentators; and the vague notions which then pre- 
 vailed, respecting worms, may justify the interpretation ; but 
 it is by no means certain that Aristotle meant what would now 
 be understood by that term ; and perhaps the word scolex 
 would be less misleading. He thus explains himself: " Egg 
 and scolex are in this distinguished : in an egg the embryo 
 arises from one part, all the rest serving it as food ; in the 
 scolex, on the contrary, the embryo is developed from the 
 
 whole." 
 
 § 455. " Of viviparous animals some generate their young 
 
350 ON GENERATION [OHAP. XVIL 
 
 immediately within themselves — as man, horse, dolphin. 
 Others are ovo-viviparous, first generating eggs, which develope 
 into embryos within the parent — as the cartilaginous fishes." 
 Although this distinction has been destroyed by the discovery 
 that the embryo of the vivipara is at first an egg, the nomen- 
 clature has been retained by many writers even to our own 
 day. "Among the ovipara, some lay perfect eggs, which 
 never increase after they are laid — such as birds and reptiles ; 
 others, as fishes, Crustacea, and cephalopoda* lay imperfect 
 eggs, which increase after they are laid." The increase here 
 alluded to is supposed by Atjbekt and Wimmbe to be the' 
 swelling from imbibition of water ; there is no other increase ; 
 the eggs of fish and Crustacea are as perfect as those of birds 
 and reptiles. 
 
 After noticing several other points of distinction, he 
 touches on the protections of eggs : " fish, which have scales, 
 and Crustacea, which are earthy, lay eggs with hard shells ; 
 but the cephalopoda, which have slimy bodies, lay eggs 
 imbedded in slimy matter." 
 
 § 456. " Insects all bring forth scolices (worms) ; for they 
 are all exsanguineous, and hence scoliparous." It is strange 
 that he should not have known the eggs of insects. " Nature 
 has admirably arranged generation in a series. The most 
 perfect and the warmest animals bring forth their young per- 
 fectly formed, not indeed in size, for all grow after birth ; and 
 they generate directly within themselves. The less perfect do 
 not generate their young directly within themselves, for they 
 first produce eggs ; but the young are born alive. Others, 
 again, do not produce perfect young, but perfect eggs. Those, 
 again, which are of a colder nature produce imperfect eggs. 
 Finally, the coldest of all do not produce eggs, but scolices, 
 which in time become similar to eggs; for the so-called 
 chrysalis of the insect has the power (Swa/uv) of an egg, from 
 which in the third metamorphosis an animal is produced." 
 
 § 457. He now proceeds to sketch rapidly, yet fir mly , his 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 351 
 
 doctrine of Epigenesis, which he has variously illustrated. 
 Every one acquainted with the history of science is familiar 
 with the long and fierce disputes which have surrounded the 
 question, Does the embryo pre-exist in the germ? but as 
 even men otherwise well-informed are quite unacquainted 
 with Aristotle's views on this point, and suppose the doctrine 
 of Epigenesis to date from Harvey and Caspar Friedrich 
 Wolff, it may be useful here to set down the hypotheses 
 advocated by the various schools, before expounding Aristotle's. 
 Blumenbach states that Drelinoourt " collected no less 
 than two hundred and sixty-two groundless hypotheses con- 
 cerning generation advanced by his predecessors ; and nothing 
 is more certain than that Drelincourt's own theory formed the 
 two hundred and sixty-third." 3S All these theories may be 
 ranged under two classes : — 
 
 A. Those which relate to the action of the parents. This 
 class may be further subdivided into : 
 
 1. The Spermatist theory — which makes the male parent 
 the sole progenitor. 
 
 2. The Ovist theory — which makes the female parent the 
 sole progenitor. 
 
 3. The Syngenetic theory — which makes both parents 
 equally progenitors. 
 
 B. Those which relate to the changes in the egg. This 
 second class may be further subdivided into : 
 
 4. The theory of Evolution, which makes the embryo pre- 
 existent in the germ, and only rendered visible by the unfold- 
 ing and expansion of its organs. 
 
 5. The theory of Epigenesis, which makes the embryo 
 arise by a series of successive differentiations from a simple 
 homogeneous mass into a complex heterogeneous organism. 
 
 §458. The spermatist theory is of immense antiquity. 
 In the Hindoo code Man is considered as the seed, and 
 
 *> Quoted by Allen Thompson: Art. Generation, in the Cyclopcedia of 
 Anat. and Physiol. 
 
852 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 Woman as the soil; by their co-operation the new being is 
 produced. 36 In the Ewmenides of .ZEschyltjs there is the same 
 idea. Apollo declares that the mother is not a genitrix, but 
 merely the rearer of the young germ. Life is generated by 
 the father. 
 
 oi/K tan fifirrip 17 KeKktipivov t'ckvov 
 roKiis, rpo^Ac dk Kvparog veoavopoV 
 
 TlKTlt & 6 QphlffKtoP. v. 615. 
 
 Most of the ancient philosophers held this view; and no 
 sooner had Leetjwenhoek discovered the spermatozoa 3r 
 than it seemed as if a positive basis had been gained for this 
 hypothesis. The spermatozoon is a microscopic, transparent, 
 oval particle, with a long and delicate thread-like tail. It 
 wriggles forward with amazing vivacity, and is in no respect 
 distinguishable from an animalcule. What wonder, then, 
 that the oval part was pronounced to be a head, and the thread 
 a tail? Imagination saw, and an occasional draughtsman 
 actually figured, the lineaments of a man in this microscopic 
 particle. 38 And as these spermatozoa are only found in repro- 
 ductive males, and always in them, the hypothesis of the 
 spermatists seemed to have acquired a demonstration. 
 
 § 459. The ovists, however, were not without their rival 
 
 36 Manava-Dharmasastra, lib. IX., St. 33, quoted by Lucas: TraiU philos. 
 de I'MrediU, Paris, 1850, II., 67. 
 
 37 On the claims of Hartsoeker to priority, see the note in Bostook's 
 erudite System of Physiology, 3rd ed., 1836, p. 642. Compare also Vallisnebi: 
 Historie von der Erzeugung der Menschen und Thiere, aus dem Italidnischen von 
 C. P. Beegek, 1739, p. 7. 
 
 ' 8 " L'imagination avait alors un vaste champ ouvert devant elle. Les uns 
 crurent voir dans les animalcules spermatiques des embryons corporalises, qui 
 n'avaient plus besoin que de croitre. Gautier les figura ayant des figures 
 d'hommes. Suivant Andry, chacun d'eux va trouver l'ovaire, se glisse dans un 
 ceuf, ferme la porte derriere lui avec sa queue, et se developpe ; si plusieurs 
 veulcnt entrer a, la fois dans un meme ceuf, ils se fttchent, se battent ensemble, 
 et se brisent ou se luxent les membres, ce qui donnent lieu aux monstmosites." 
 — Bukdach: Traits de Physiologic, Paris, 1838, II., 287. In the German 
 version of Vallisneki: Erzeugung der Menschen und Thiere, the figures drawn 
 by Andky are reproduced. Nothing more preposterous in the way of mal- 
 observation (if it were not a pure invention) can be named. 
 
CHAP. XVII.J AND DEVELOPMENT. 353 
 
 discovery. Stenon and De Gbaaf had detected the mamma- 
 lian ovum, or rather the Graafian vesicle, which they mistook 
 for the ovum, but which Von Baeb proved to contain it 
 Tins important discovery seemed to the ovists to prove that 
 the female furnished the germ, and the male furnished only 
 the exciting influence. Malpighi, Vallisneei, Halleb, 
 Spallanzani, Beaumub, and Bonnet lent this hypothesis their 
 powerful supports They held that the embryo pre-existed 
 m the germ, and that its evolution was excited by the 
 influence of the sperm. 
 
 § 460. The theory of Syngenesis, which considers the 
 embryo to be the product of both male and female, is as old 
 as Empedocles, though it had no better basis than the 
 observed resemblance between the offspring and both parents. 
 Modern research has furnished a scientific basis, by show- 
 ing that, while in the higher animals both ova and 
 spermatozoa are equally indispensable, they are themselves 
 only modifications of one and the same anatomical ele- 
 ment (§ 191). 
 
 § 461. Let us now glance at the theories of the second 
 class. The first of these, or the theory of Evolution, assumes 
 that the embryo pre-exists in the germ, and is only called into 
 visible existence by the agencies of generation and develop- 
 ment. Not only so, but the germs themselves were all 
 contained in the original germ ; the first generation contained 
 all successive generations. This is the emboitement theory of 
 Swammeedamm, Malebeanche, Vallisneei, Beaumub, and 
 Bonnet, which was accepted by the great Halleb, and was 
 not rejected even by Cuviee. Some one wittily observes that 
 " l'hypothese de l'emboitement rend necessaire 1'emboitement 
 d'un infini d'hypotheses ;" and it has the vice of being meta- 
 physiological ; yet of course it has many plausible arguments 
 
 39 Ldcas: Op. cit, declares that De Blainville also adopted it in his 
 Cours de Physiohgie ; but no exact reference is given, and I can find nothing in 
 the Lecture to bear out Lucas's statement. 
 
 23 
 
354 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 ill its favour, otherwise it would never have been maintained 
 by the judicious Halleb. 40 
 
 § 462. In the present day no one believes in the pre- 
 existence of germs, or the evolution of the embryo. The 
 doctrine of Epigenesis triumphs along the whole line. Since 
 Wolff showed how the primitive amorphous germ became an 
 organism through successive modifications, each modification 
 being the cause of others — part being added to part, not 
 simply in the way of addition, but each being the product 
 of some predecessor, and the cause of some successor 41 — the 
 researches of hundreds of patient embryologists have made 
 Epigenesis the only acceptable hypothesis. The argument of 
 the evolutionists, that all the organs are formed at once, and 
 not successively, 42 seems admissible when supported by the 
 assertion that the extreme smallness and transparency of these 
 organs prevent their being visible ; but both assertions fall 
 before microscopic investigation, which shows that the impreg- 
 nated germ passes through several successive visible stages 
 wholly irreconcileable with this notion of a pre-existent in- 
 visible organism. The germinal membrane, composed of three 
 layers, is seen to form itself into two cylinders, the two 
 outer layers curving upwards, the innermost layer curving 
 downwards, and from each of these cylinders issue the 
 rudimentary forms of the several organs. 
 
 § 463. It will probably surprise the reader to hear that 
 Aristotle very distinctly announced the docrine of Epigenesis, 
 
 40 Haller: Elementa Physiologies, VIII., 143-51. Compare also Vallis- 
 neki: Von der Erzeugung, 1739, pp. 140, 442, 461 ; or Reaumur: Mimoires 
 pour servir a I'histoire des Insectes, 1734, I., 343, seq. 
 
 41 There are few works of deeper insight or more patient research than 
 C. F. Wolff's Theorie von der Generation, in zwo Abhandlungen erkliirt und 
 bewiesen, Berlin, 1764, and I shall not easily forget the excitement with which 
 I hurried through the Berlin streets in a storm to secure a copy at an old 
 secondhand bookshop. In it may be found the origin of Goethe's Metamor- 
 phoses of Plants, as well as the leading ideas since expounded with such 
 mastery by Von Baer and his followers. 
 
 42 Haixer, p. 148. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 855 
 
 a doctrine commonly attributed to Harvey. Wolff is wrong 
 m stating that Aristotle "affirmed, but did not defend 
 Epigenesis, simply because no one had thought of denying 
 it." * 3 It had been denied, and a counter theory proposed 
 which Aristotle refuted. "Either," he says, "the parts 
 arise together and at once, or one after the other. That they 
 do not arise at once is evident to sense ; for we see that some 
 parts are present, and others absent; and it is certain that 
 these latter are not invisible simply because of their smallness, 
 for although the lungs are larger than the heart, yet in 
 development they are later. Since one part is earlier, and 
 another later, it becomes a question whether the one forms the 
 other, the latter being dependent on the former, or the one 
 simply arises after the other. The heart does not form the 
 liver, and this again the other parts ; but the one part arises 
 after the other, as the man comes after the boy, but not from 
 the boy. The reason is this: In everything produced by 
 Nature or by Art, the actual arises from the potential; and so 
 must here the species and form exist in the earlier — for 
 example, the liver must exist in the heart. 44. And this view 
 is otherwise deceptive. For it is impossible that from the 
 first a part of the plant, or animal, should exist ready formed 
 in the sperm — whether capable or incapable of forming other 
 parts — if all arise from the spermatic fluid. For if such a 
 part be in the sperm, it must have been made by that which 
 made the sperm. Now sperm must be the first ; and this is 
 the work of generation. Hence it is impossible that a part 
 should pre-exist. Therefore the plastic power (to ttoiovv) 
 has no organ within it, nor without it. Yet one or the other 
 is necessary. Let us try to reconcile this contradiction." 
 
 43 Wolff, p. 60. 
 
 44 'on iiri tov IvriKixeicj, ovrog to SvvdfiEi 'iv yivirai iv roig fvau f) rsxvy 
 yivo/ikvots, Store Seoi &v to ildoe Kal rijv fiop</>$v iv Ueivy elvai olov iv ry 
 KapSiq. rb tov ijiraTos : The reader must bear in mind the distinctions of 
 entelechie and dynamis, and of species and form. 
 
 23—2 
 
356 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 To reconcile these views lie adduces the comparison of the 
 movements of an automaton in which one wheel, on being set 
 in action, determines the movement in other parts. The 
 sperm is this primary motor ; and has the power of communi- 
 cating movement long after its original impulse has ceased. 
 No organ is the cause of development. The cause is that 
 which first originated the movement. Hence one organ 
 arises after another, and not all at once. 
 
 § 464. As the analysis proceeds, we shall still further 
 learn how firmly the doctrine of Epigenesis was grasped 
 by him ; for the present it is enough to have indicated his 
 view. 
 
 Chap. II. is devoted to the physical nature of sperm,, 
 which is described as a kind of foam, or mixture of water and 
 air. " The ancients seem to have known this, to judge from 
 the name of the goddess Aphrodite." 45 The air (Trvexifia). 
 here referred to, can hardly be understood as atmospheric air. 
 It plays a considerable part in the speculations of the ancient 
 and the Eenaissance writers ; but I have never been able to 
 make out what was precisely meant by it. In theories of 
 generation, it is the av/ra rising from the sperm, which, 
 until the discovery of Spermatozoa, 46 was almost universally 
 held to be the agent in fertilization. 
 
 § 465. Chap. III. touches on other points connected 
 with sperm. Especially worthy of note is the statement that 
 sperm and seed are as the living animal and plant which will 
 issue from them. "It is clear that they have the Vegetal 
 Soul (nutritive principle), and in their further development 
 they must acquire the Sensitive Soul, which constitutes them 
 animals." 
 
 45 ii0p6? in Greek means " foam." 
 
 46 And even for many years afDerwai - ds. Thus, Haller: Elementa Phys. 
 VIII., 154 ; and still later Schneegass maintained that " il se degage du 
 melange de sperme et de mucus uterin une aura seminalis, qui monte le long 
 des oviductes, et qui d'aprSs Ktjhlemann penetre a travers lea membranes de 
 l'ovaire." — Bubdach: TraiU de Phys.,\l., 195. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 357 
 
 Not only is Aristotle an upholder of the doctrine of 
 Epigenesis, hut he is also to he ranked among the most philo- 
 sophical teachers who have held the doctrine so luminously 
 expounded by Von Baer, that the general and specific 
 characters of the embryo are successively acquired, so that the 
 mammalian embryo is first an animal, then a vertebrate, then 
 a mammal, and finally, a particular kind of mammal. This 
 doctrine is thus aphoristically expressed by Aristotle : " Not 
 at once is the animal a man or horse ; for the end is last 
 attained ; and the specific form is the end of each develop- 
 ment. Hence it is an important question when, how, and 
 whence comes the Intellect in those animals which possess it. 
 We must evidently assume that the sperm and the unsepa- 
 rated conception (ovum) must possess the Vegetal Soul (rriu 
 dptwTiicrjv Tpw%fjv) at least potentially ; though not in reality, 
 until the separated conception (foetus) takes up nourishment, 
 and thus fulfils the work of such a soul. At first it seems as 
 if the embryo lived the life of a plant ; it is only at a subse- 
 quent period that we can speak of a sensitive and intelligent 
 soul. These, however, must necessarily pre-exist potentially 
 before they exist in reality. Now either they must not have 
 been actually present, and must have come in all together ; or 
 they were all present ; or else some were present, and others 
 not ; and they must have come in with the germ, and not 
 with the sperm ; or reached the germ from the sperm. If in 
 the sperm, they must have entered at once from without, or 
 none did so ; unless some did, and others did not. But it is 
 impossible that they should have been actually present, since 
 all the corporeal functions naturally require the presence of 
 their respective organs, 4 ? e. g. there can be no walking without 
 legs. For the same reason they cannot come from without. 
 
 « I depart here somewhat from the literal rendering, in order to make this 
 remarkable passage intelligible. The illustration o walkmg sufficiently 
 Justified iy interpretation: Ln> yap h™ a^v v ^pyna a^ar^, *,W 
 Sn ravrag aviv aiiftaroe dSvvarov virapx" v - 
 
358 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 Nor can they enter alone — being inseparable from their 
 organs ; nor in a body, for the sperm is a secretion from the 
 metamorphosed food. Only the Intellect enters from without. 
 It alone is godlike. Its actuality has nothing in common 
 with corporeal actuality." 
 
 § 466. This is the most decisive passage I have been able 
 to find respecting the immortality of the soul (§ 224). It is 
 the more explicit because it is made to express the distinction 
 between the Intellect as a godlike and incorporeal principle, 
 and the Nutritive and Sensitive principles which are obviously 
 dependent on matter. 48 
 
 § 467. " The vital principles seem to belong to another 
 body, which is of a more honourable nature than the so-called 
 elements. And just as these principles differ in rank amongst 
 each other, so also are they different in the nature of their 
 common body. In all sperm there is the so-called heat, which 
 effects generation. This heat, however, is not fire, but a 
 breath (irvtvfia) contained in the foamy nature of the 
 sperm ; and in this pneuma there is a nature analogous to 
 that of the elements of the stars. Hence fire generates no 
 living thing. But the warmth of the sun, on the contrary, 
 has this power." 
 
 § 468. Woman is undeveloped man. She furnishes the 
 analogue of the sperm minus its vital principles. The proof 
 of this is seen in the "wind-eggs" of the hen, which have 
 ' the plastic substance, but which, wanting the formative prin- 
 ciple of the sperm, never become living beings. In the Third 
 Book (c. 7, p. 757) he explains this more clearly. The wind- 
 eggs, he says, never become perfect chicks, because they want 
 the sensitive soul ; they have the nutritive soul, since that 
 belongs to all females, and all living beings. And a wind- 
 egg may therefore be regarded as a perfect vegetal seed, but as 
 
 49 It was thus Roger Bacon understood it. " Intellectus agens est pars 
 animas, sed est substantia intellectiva alia et separata per essentiam ab intellectu 
 possibili."— Opus Majus, Venet., 1750, p. 20. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 359 
 
 an imperfect animal seed. The influence of the male is neces- 
 sary for a perfect animal. 
 
 § 469. Chap. IV. is devoted to the catamenia. The 
 intimate dependence of Lactation on this process is noticed; 
 also the formation of the foetal membranes from the corporeal 
 elements of the fluid, after the evaporation of its moisture. 
 
 " No sooner is the conception (ro K v W a) formed, than it 
 grows like the seed of plants in the earth. For even in the 
 seed there is a self-contained principle of development, and 
 from it arise stem and roots, through which it takes up 
 nourishment. In the same way all the parts of an animal are 
 potentially contained in the conception, and a principle of 
 development. The heart is the first differentiated reality. 
 For there must be an origin out of which all the rest will 
 arise." 
 
 § 470. He then passes to another problem. A concep- 
 tion is potentially an animal, although an imperfect animal. 
 It must have food ; but whence is the food derived ? As the 
 plant derives food from the earth, the fetus derives food from 
 the uterus. " Hence Nature has from the first sent two veins 
 from the heart which, dividing into several smaller vessels, 
 forms the umbilical cord (o 6/i(j>a\og), and this goes to the 
 uterus. This cord is a vein, in some animals several veins, 
 enveloped in a membrane for its protection. These veins ramify 
 like roots over the uterus, and through them the foetus receives 
 nourishment. It is on this account that the foetus remains 
 in the uterus, and not, as Democbitus thinks, in order that 
 each part may be formed like the mother. This is evident in 
 oviparous animals which develope their parts in the egg, away 
 from the mother." 
 
 Although inaccurate in its details, this passage expresses in 
 a general way the true relation of the fetus to the mother. 
 He then considers this question : " If blood be nourishment, 
 and the heart first arises in order to contain it, and if food 
 comes from without, whence the first nourishment ? Or is it 
 
360 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 not correct to say that all nourishment comes from without, 
 but that just as in the seed of plants there is a milky fluid, so 
 in the foetus there is a surplus of material from which it will 
 receive nourishment?" 
 
 § 471. " The differentiation of organs does not, as some 
 think, take place by the attraction of like for like ; but the 
 child resembles its mother because her secretion is potentially 
 of the same nature as her whole body, and hence contains the 
 possibility, though not the reality, of all her organs." 
 
 This is further explained by the fact of the mother 
 furnishing not only the plastic material but the nutritive 
 principle, or vegetal soul. In plants there is no separation 
 of sexes ; but in those animals' which have separated sexes 
 the female cannot of herself produce offspring. 
 
 § 472. Chap. V. — " Yet it may be asked : If the female 
 possesses a soul, and if her secretion furnishes the material, 
 why is the male influence indispensable ? The reason this : The 
 animal has a Sensitive Soul, and this is wanting to the plant." 
 
 Aristotle admits the power of vegetal reproduction in 
 females, but denies them that of animal reproduction. It is 
 true that unfertilized ova live, but what is their life ? Not the 
 life of animals, otherwise they would become animals ; yet a 
 life higher than that of inorganic substances, as we see by 
 their decay. They possess only the lowest form of life — that 
 which is common to plants and animals, i. e. the nutritive 
 soul. This cannot form an animal organ. 
 
 § 473. " If there is, indeed, a class of animals which, 
 although feminine have no males, it is possible that such may 
 produce young by themselves. But this is not yet credibly 
 ascertained : even in fishes it is dubious. Of the so-called 
 Erythrinnes no male has yet been found, but many females 
 full of conceptions. But on this point we have no decisive 
 experience. There are, however, fishes which are neither 
 male nor female, such as the eel, and a species of Icestris 
 (supposed to be the mullet)." 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 361 
 
 Aristotle thought that eels were generated spontaneously 
 in the mud. In those days spontaneous generation was 
 received without difficulty by all minds. 4 9 But how the sexes 
 of mullets came to be overlooked is not clear. 
 
 " Whenever the male exists the female is incompetent to 
 generate alone; otherwise the male would be useless, and 
 nature does nothing in vain. Hence in animals the male 
 perfects generation, giving the sensitive soul." 
 
 § 474. Since the organs are already potentially existing in 
 the germ it is only necessary for the sperm to give the first 
 impulse, and straightway all the organs begin to range them- 
 selves in due succession. 50 The heart is the first to appear. 
 It is the origin and centre of development. That it is so is 
 seen not only by direct inspection, but also in the fact that it 
 is the last to die; since it is a law that that which appears 
 last disappears first. 
 
 Modern research, as I have already stated, discredits the 
 idea of the heart as primum saliens. The heart is not the first 
 organ which appears, nor is it the last which dies, ultimum 
 moriens. That it lives and beats for some time after the death 
 of the animal, in amphibia for some hours, is quite true ; 
 but other organs also survive the organism. Hair grows, 
 glands secrete, and the stomach will digest many hours after 
 the heart has ceased to beat. 51 
 
 § 475. Chap. VI. sketches the phenomena of develop- 
 
 49 Even so late as the 17th century we find Julius Cssar Scaliger main- 
 taining that mice were generated from corruption. — Exercitationes contra Car- 
 danum, Paris, 1657, p. 81. 
 
 60 " Solum semen masculum dormientem embiyonis vitam excitat." — 
 Haller: Elementa Phys., VIII., p. 154. The whole of this 31st section 
 might be taken as a translation of Aristotle, with the understanding that what 
 the Greek regards as potential pre-existence, the Swiss regards as actual pre- 
 existence. 
 
 51 Twenty-four hours, in certain fishes, according to Charles Kobin : 
 Comptes Rendus de la SociiU de Biologie, 1853, V., 134. I found the hinder 
 extremities of a Triton living, and capable of motion, three hours after the 
 heart had ceased to beat. But the phenomenon is very variable, and sometimes 
 the heart survives the extremities. 
 
362 ON GENEEATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 ment. Although in many points inaccurate, and in some 
 purely fanciful, it shows that Aristotle had studied develop- 
 ment, not indeed with the patience and caution necessary in 
 an inquiry so delicate, but with quite as much as he thought 
 fit to bestow on any other inquiry. He notices that the upper 
 half of the body is first developed, the lower half being smaller 
 and less distinct. The fact is so ; 52 but the reason assigned 
 is erroneous. The heart, he considers, as the origin of all 
 development, the lower part being only for the sake of the 
 upper. 
 
 § 476. " The genesis of the partes similares takes place 
 through cooling and warmth ; ^the coagulation and solidifica- 
 tion of some being determined by cold, and of others by 
 warmth. The nutritive fluid filters through the veins and 
 the canals of each part, like water in unglazed earthen 
 vessels (ufio'ig Kspafiioig) , and becomes flesh, or its analogue, 
 coagulating in cooling ; and hence it becomes dissolved by fire." 
 
 Although we should greatly err if we interpreted this 
 language into an expression of the modern idea of the plastic 
 elements oozing through the walls of the bloodvessels (§ 156), 
 we cannot but remark how much nearer the truth Aristotle 
 was than other physiologists, until the discovery of the 
 capillaries by Malpighi made it impossible to accept the 
 notion of the blood being poured on the tissues. 
 
 " That portion of the filtered fluid which is earthy, and 
 has little warmth and moisture, becomes, during the cooling 
 process, which evaporates the moisture, hard and earthy: 
 such as nails, hair, hoofs, &c. Hence these become softened 
 by fire, but not melted ; others by liquids : for example, the 
 shells of eggs. But under the influence of internal warmth, 
 which dries up their moisture, sinews and bones arise; and 
 hence they are not soluble by fire, for they are baked as in 
 an oven by the genetic warmth." This warmth is contained 
 
 52 Compare KOllikbe: Entwickelungsgeschichte, 1861, p, 50. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 363 
 
 in the sperm, and possesses the motor and creative power 
 necessary for each part. Whenever this is in excess or 
 deficiency, it occasions a deformity in the embryo. 
 
 § 477. " The skin is formed by the drying of the flesh, 
 as we see a skin formed on the surface of cooked meat. But 
 it is not the fact of its being the surface which causes this ; 
 the reason is because the viscid material (to yXlcrxpov) 
 cannot evaporate, and remains at the top. In other cases this 
 viscid material is dry, and thus forms the hard and soft shells 
 of bloodless animals ; whereas, in sanguineous animals, it has 
 a more fatty nature, and hence we see only those which are 
 not very earthy have fat under their skin— a proof that the 
 skin arises from a similar material." 
 
 § 478. The order of differentiation is noticed. In the 
 course of this the parts are at first sketched in outline, and 
 subsequently assume their colour, softness, hardness, &c, 
 "just as the painter first draws an animal in outline, and 
 then fills up the picture with colour." 
 
 § 479. Chap. VII. begins with a description of the 
 placenta, and then passes to the question why Hybrids are 
 usually not fertile. In Chap. VIII., after examining the 
 opinions of his predecessors on this point, and even suggesting 
 an a priori argument in their favour, he makes this remark- 
 able observation : " But such a proof is far too abstract and 
 empty. For reasons not drawn from the inherent principle 
 of things are empty and only seem to explain them. Just as 
 those only are geometrical proofs which are deduced from 
 geometrical principles, so also in all other sciences. The 
 empty argument seems potent, but is powerless." 
 
 He clenches his refutation of all the abstract arguments 
 against the possible fertility of Hybrids by this pithy statement : 
 " The fact is that many Hybrids are fertile." Yet his own 
 explanation of the common infertility is not a whit more 
 acceptable than the explanations he rejects. 
 
 § 480. Book HI.— The first seven chapters of this book 
 
364 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 are devoted to an enumeration of the differences in the forma- 
 tion and development of eggs. Full of repetitions and' destitute 
 of any attempt at systematic arrangement, these chapters, 
 like so many others in his scientific writings, resemble the 
 unorganized contents of a note-book rather than parts of a 
 treatise. One or two passages of interest have already been 
 previously quoted in these pages. 
 
 § 481. Chap. VIII. — Having mentioned that the cephalo- 
 poda are of distinct sexes, he refers to the opinion that all 
 fishes are females, adding : " It is, however, too much to 
 believe that cephalopoda are of distinct sexes, and fishes not ; 
 and the opinion is only an evidence of insufficient observation." 
 At the close of the chapter he almost anticipates the modern 
 discovery that the embryo of the cuttlefish, instead of having 
 the yolk on its under surface, has it attached to the head ; 
 in fact, the embryo seems to swallow the yolk. 
 
 § 482. Chap. IX. is on the generation of insects, which 
 he describes as being partly sexual, partly spontaneous. 
 Chap. X. is on the generation of bees, already noticed (§ 194). 
 Chap. XI. treats of molluscs, and gives a fuller, exposition 
 of his views on Spontaneous Generation than can be found 
 elsewhere. To the mind of almost every biologist of our 
 day, the idea of Spontaneous Generation appears excessively 
 improbable, and certainly not proven, even with respect to the 
 simplest plants and animalcules ; and with respect to worms, 
 insects, or molluscs, it is universally rejected. 53 At present 
 the massive weight of evidence is against the hypothesis. 
 The chief argument in its favour rests on the difficulty of 
 always proving the presence of germs; and this is enforced 
 by the facility with which some minds believe that whatever 
 is conceivable must be true. 
 
 53 The doctrine of spontaneous generation has been revived by Pouchet : 
 Hiterogfnie ; ou traiti de la Generation spontanie bas6 sur des nouvelles expe- 
 riences, Paris, 1859. See the Comptes Eendus of the Academy for the years 
 1859-63. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 365 
 
 In Aristotle's day there was no difficulty whatever in 
 believing that insects, molluscs, and eels were spontaneously 
 originated in putrefying matters. Animals suddenly appeared 
 in places where there had previously been no trace of their 
 parents. To the ancients this was sufficient proof of spon- 
 taneous generation. Aristotle said that all plants and animals 
 which arise spontaneously, do so in putrefying substances to 
 which water has been added, " It is not from putrefaction, as 
 such, but from coction, that the new being arises : the putrid 
 substance is only a secretion from that which is cooked. 
 Animals and plants arise in the earth, and in moisture, 
 because water is present in earth, and in water there is air 
 (pneuma), and in all air there is animal heat; so that in 
 a certain sense all things have life (soul, ^v-^rj). Hence 
 bodies are quickly formed when enclosed in a small space, and 
 they are so enclosed when by means of heat the fluid substance 
 is formed into a kind of foam-vesicle. 54 The differences of 
 nobler and ignobler species depend on that vital principle 
 which is enclosed ; and hence we must seek the cause both in 
 what is enclosed, and where it is enclosed. In sea-water 
 there is much earthy matter, and hence from the sea, 
 testaceous animals are produced ; the earthy matter being 
 hardened on their surface, for it is not to be melted by 
 heat ; and internally the living body is enclosed. Only a few 
 species have been observed in congress; and it is uncertain 
 whether generation was the result or not in these cases. We 
 must inquire what here represents the material principle of 
 other animals. Among females, it is a secretion which 
 receives from the male its moving principle, and potentially 
 
 54 E/i7repiXaiJ.I3dvtTai Si zeal yiverca Oipficuvofiivuiv tSv aiajiarixav iypuiv 
 olav dfpiaSric iro/i<p6\v%. Atjbert and Wimmek read in this curious passage a 
 prefiguration of the modern cell-theory; but the resemblance is slight and 
 purely verbal. A much closer resemblance is noticeable in Oken's notion that 
 the transition from the inorganic to the organic is the change into a vesicle.— 
 Programm iiber das Universum; cited by Letdig: Lehrbuch der Histologic, 
 1857, p. 5. 
 
866 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVH. 
 
 contains the whole animal. But what is there to represent 
 this here, and what represents the masculine principle ? We 
 must consider that, even in animals which generate, the heat 
 prepares the secretion from the cooked food, and this is the 
 origin of the germ. So also in plants, except that with them, 
 as with some animals, the aid of the masculine principle 
 is not needed, because it is contained, mingled in their sub- 
 stance ; whereas in the majority, the secretion needs this aid. 
 The food of some is water and earth ; of others, substances 
 prepared from these, That which is prepared from food by 
 animal heat, is by the summer heat prepared from sea-water 
 and earth, and is mixed and cooked. And that part of the 
 vital principle which is contained in the air (pneuma), or is 
 separated from it, forms the foetus, and gives it movement." 
 
 If much cannot be said for this hypothesis, it at least 
 satisfied Aristole and his successors. Eels were originated, he 
 thought, out of the casts of the earth-worms. That testacea 
 originate spontaneously, is proved he thinks by the fact of their 
 sudden appearance on the keels of ships and other places. Nor 
 is the spontaneous origin of mankind altogether incredible to 
 him. " If this ever took place," he adds, " as many affirm, we 
 must assume that it was either from a scolex, or from an egg. 
 Since of necessity the original germ must have contained 
 within it the requisite food (and such a germ is the scolex), 
 or it must have procured the food elsewhere, and this either 
 from a parent, or from a part of the germ. If, therefore, it is 
 impossible that food should flow from the earth, as it does 
 from the uterus to the foetus, then must the food have come 
 from a portion of the germ ; and such we call an egg." And 
 as eggs are produced only by parents, it is clear that the origin 
 of our race, on this hypothesis, must have been a scolex. 
 
 § 483. Book IV. Chap. I. — It is an old question, Why 
 one child is masculine, and another feminine ? and as the 
 desire for male offspring is often intense, people have naturally 
 lent a greedy ear to any philosopher who pretended to inform 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 367 
 
 them how males could be obtained. Anaxagoras taught 
 that the distinction is original, and exists in the sperm 
 itself; the masculine coming from the right, the feminine 
 from the left. Empedocles thought that the distinction was 
 due to the coldness or warmth of the womb. Democrittjs, 
 who is generally nearer the mark than any other old philo- 
 sopher, thought that the distinction arose entirely from the 
 preponderance of one of the two secretions, the offspring being 
 a male when the sperm predominated, and a female when tbe 
 germ predominated. Aristotle refutes Empedocles and Anax- 
 agoras by reference to facts. The existence of twins of 
 different sexes in the same uterus disproves the idea of the 
 relative temperature of the uterus being the determining 
 cause ; and the existence of both sexes, after the removal of 
 one testis, disproves the idea of the right and left sides baving 
 their special sexes. 55 As these absurd hypotheses were repro- 
 duced many centuries later, 56 it is interesting to observe how 
 thoroughly Aristotle recognized their absurdity. His comment 
 is in the spirit of Bacon : " Prophesying from their opinions 
 what will be the fact, and anticipating, in lieu of observing, 
 what the fact is." 5r But having dismissed these hypotheses, 
 he admits that " there is some ground for the belief that sex is 
 determined by the warmth of the respective sides, 58 since the 
 
 55 It is by reference to similar facts that De Graaf refutes this notion. See 
 his De Virorum Organis, p. 6, in Opera Omnia, 1678. 
 
 * See Haixek: Elementa Physiologies, VIII., 79. Batjhin, in his work De 
 Hermaphroditorum Monstrorwmque Natura, Oppenheimii, 1614, not only advo- 
 cates this view, but says with great gravity, as if he had opened pregnant dogs 
 and sows, " Si preegnantem canem vel suem aperueris, in dextro latere mares, 
 in sinistra vera foeminas reperies ; ideo qui masculam prolem expetunt mulieres 
 in latus dextrum cubare jubent," p. 60. a . > 
 
 « fiavnvSiievoi t6 (W^^^vov Ik tS>v hk6tiov, koX wpoXafi/SavovTec wf 
 
 *sffir :i iitTwioS; ^. * h — by ^ 
 
 among the three modes of procuring male offspring, though he reverses the 
 sMes ordering the mother to lie on her left side, because it is the stronger, and 
 ml; a e formed in the stronger. He declares that he has prescribed this 
 me hod to patients with great success.-^ subtilUate rerun, lib. XII., Lugdum. 
 S, P- 441- Scax-igeb has nothing to object here, so we must presume he 
 accepts the argument as valid. 
 
368 ON GENERATION [OHAP. XVII. 
 
 right side is indeed warmer than the left (which it is not) ; but, 
 such hypotheses do not touch the real difficulty ; for that we 
 must look into first causes." 
 
 § 484. His own hypothesis is this : " The masculine and 
 feminine are distinguished by a certain power, and a certain 
 impotence. That is masculine which has the power of cooking, 
 condensing, and secreting sperm containing the formative 
 principle ; and I do not call that a principle which becomes an 
 individual from the material, but that which is the first moving 
 cause, either in itself, or in another; the feminine, on the 
 other hand, is that which receives, but is incapable of con- 
 densing and secreting sperm. If the cooking depends on heat, 
 the male must necessarily be warmer than the female." After 
 enlarging on this notion of heat, he adds, " Male and female 
 are contraries, and have different generative organs, which 
 have different functions. Moreover, according to our views, 
 everything arises from contraries ; and when there is loss or 
 failure (v <j>9opa) in the one contrary, that which cannot 
 properly be fashioned naturally turns into, the opposite. On 
 these grounds it is easy to explain the sexes. Whenever the 
 formative principle fails to gain the upper hand, and, from 
 deficient warmth, fails properly to cook the material, and so 
 fashion it into its own shape, then will this material necessarily 
 pass over into the contrary ; and the contrary of the masculine 
 is the feminine. And since their difference consists in their 
 functions, and these in their organs, the first change will be in 
 the organs. Now when one important and dominant organ 
 (ecoc juopiov emicaipov) is changed, then there is a change 
 in the whole form of the organism." 
 
 The reader will observe how luminously the idea of 
 Epigenesis is expressed in the last sentence ; and lest 
 there should be any doubt as to his meaning, he adds, 
 " This is manifest in castrated animals, which, being de- 
 prived of a single organ, lose their sexual appearance, so 
 as in many respects to resemble the female. The cause 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 369 
 
 is that certain organs are origins of development, and if 
 one of these be altered, much that is connected with it 
 must likewise change. When, therefore, the masculine is 
 denned to be a kind of principle and cause, and is only mascu- 
 line in as far as it possesses these which are wanting to the 
 feminine— and when such power and such impotence are 
 determined by the capability and incapability of cooking the 
 final nourishment, called blood in the sanguineous, and 
 its analogue in the ex-sanguineous ; and when the origin of 
 the blood is in the central organ, the source of animal heat, 
 then it is necessary that a heart, or its analogue, should 
 be formed, and that the embryo should be male or 
 female." 
 
 § 485. Whatever may be thought of this hypothesis, which 
 becomes somewhat confused towards the close of the exposi- 
 tion, when we remember that he did not, and could not know 
 that every embryo was at first asexual, passing from this 
 indeterminate condition into determinate organs by successive 
 morphological changes, we shall acknowledge that his answer 
 is quite as good as that of any of his successors, and better 
 than most. What determines the special changes remains ', 
 to this day a profound mystery ; all we know is that sex is not \ 
 primitive, pre-existent, but — as was shown in Knight's experi- 
 ments on Plants — is determined by unknown conditions of 
 temperature and nutrition. 59 
 
 § 486. Chap. II. — Connecting his hypothesis with the 
 statistics of birth, as known to him, he finds further proof in 
 the fact that more females are born during the youth and old 
 age of the parents than during their prime : in the young the 
 animal heat has not acquired maturity, in the old it is begin- 
 ning to disappear. He also thinks that fruitful animals produce 
 more females than males. That more males are generated 
 
 59 See an interesting essay by Ploss: Uber die Geschlechtsverhaltnisse der 
 Kinderbedingenden Ursachen, Berlin, 1858, and compare Pagenstechek: fiber 
 das Oesetz der Erzeugung der Geschlecter. Aus dem Pranzbsischen von M. 
 Thukt. Leipzig, 1864. 
 
 24 
 
370 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 during the prevalence of the north winds, may be explained 
 on the ground of the secretions being then smaller in quantity, 
 and more easily cooked; a similar cause operates in the 
 appearance of the catamenia, chiefly at the last quarter of the 
 moon, for this part of the month is colder and moister, owing 
 to the disappearance of the moon. He quotes, without dis- 
 approval, the saying of shepherds, that males or females are 
 produced according as the sheep have congress during a north 
 or south wind ; not only so, but it is an important condition 
 whether the animals in congress look towards the north or the 
 south, " so trifling a circumstance being influential in genera- 
 tion by determining heat or cold." 
 
 The chapter contains other passages which raise a smile. 
 Variations of sex are attributed to the nature of the soil and 
 the water, which with the atmosphere, influence the food. 
 " Hence hard and cold waters occasion the sterility of women, 
 and partly determine the generation of females." To this day 
 the Egyptians attribute the fecundity of their women to the 
 waters of the Nile ; and Hippocrates, 60 who thought that 
 water issuing from hard rocks must necessarily be hard, 
 mentions hard and cold waters among the causes of sterility. 
 
 § 487. Chap. III. treats of the hereditary transmission of 
 qualities from parent to offspring. 61 It has long been a ques- 
 tion whether all the qualities, physical and moral, are trans- 
 mitted, and whether one parent transmits one group, and the 
 other another, or both transmit all. Even Haller and 
 Bonnet, who thought the embryo pre-existed in the germ, 
 could not deny that Hybrids partook of the characteristics of 
 both parents. Holding the sperm to be merely the nutriment 
 
 60 Hippocrates: De Ae're, Locis, et Aquis, XX., 19. Compare Batjhin : 
 De Hermaphroditorum Natura, 1614, p. 59. 
 
 61 The literature of this important subject will be found in Burdach: 
 TraiU de Physiologie, II. ; and Lucas : Traits' de VHiridiU naturelle, 1847; see 
 also Girotj de Buzareingues: TraiU de la Generation, 1828 ; Orton : 
 Lectures on Breeding, 1859. 
 
CHAP. XVII. AND DEVELOPMENT. 371 
 
 and excitor of the germ, they thought that the form of the 
 embryo would vary with the quality and quantity of the sperm. 
 It was thus they explained the fact of the mule having the ears 
 and voice of the ass. The germ from which the mule pro- 
 ceeds is the germ of a horse ; but the sperm of the ass 
 containing more particles destined for the nutrition of the ears 
 and vocal membranes, the mule resembles in these the ass. 
 
 § 488. Those who held the doctrine of Epigenisis varied in 
 their interpretations of parental influence. Some thought that 
 the male gave the animal organs, the female only the vegetal 
 organs. The superficial resemblance of the spermatozoon to 
 the early form of the cerebro-spinal axis, 62 and the fact of the 
 spermatozoon being endowed with movement, naturally sug- 
 gested the idea of the nervous and muscular systems being due 
 to the male, whence it was further inferred that the digestive 
 and glandular systems came from the female. This idea has 
 been favourably received by physiologists and cattle-breeders. 
 I have elsewhere endeavoured to show how irreconcileable it 
 is with the facts, 63 and may here briefly state an a •priori 
 argument which entirely disproves it. That the whole sum of 
 the contribution to the formation of the embryo is limited on 
 the part of the male to the spermatozoa, and on the part of 
 the female to the ovum, is decisively proved in the generation of 
 amphibia and fish, since in that generation, which takes place 
 in the water, outside the parent, there is nothing but these two 
 elements present. Now, we have already seen that sperma- 
 tozoa and ova are identical (§ 191) ; and when to this it is 
 added that in some animals ova alone suffice to form a perfect 
 offspring (§ 192), there can remain no doubt that the contribu- 
 tion of the mother is not limited to any one system or group 
 of organs, but embraces the whole organism. Unless, there- 
 
 82 " Si le zoosperme n'est pas im systeme cerebro-spinal, et le vitellus un 
 syst&me digestif, ils possMent en eux les elemens necessaires au developpement 
 ulteriearde ces bases essentieiles de l'animalite."— Laixemand: Annates des 
 Sciences Naturelles, 1841, p. 281. 
 
 63 Physiology of Common Life, IX, 392. 
 
 24—2 
 
872 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 fore, we return to the old hypothesis of the ovists, and regard 
 the contribution of the male simply in the light of a stimulus 
 to the germ (an hypothesis abundantly refuted by the facts of 
 cross-breeding, in which the obvious characteristics of the male 
 are transmitted), we have no alternative but to declare that 
 both parents furnish their quota to every part of the offspring. 
 
 § 489. Having thus glanced at modern hypotheses, let us 
 consider the view taken by Aristotle. In the generation of 
 man he says the progenitor is not simply a man, but a special 
 individual such as Socrates or Koriskos. The individual and 
 special have always predominance. Koriskos is man, as well 
 as animal, but his speciality is as man rather than as animal. 
 The individual predominates in generation because individuality 
 constitutes the essence. But, inasmuch as when the formative 
 principle fails to fashion the material, the contrary must be 
 produced, so when Koriskos is a parent, if his influence qua 
 man be feeble, his child will be a female, resembling him, his 
 influence qua man having passed into its contrary ; and if this 
 influence is still feebler, the child will be a female resembling 
 its mother. If the influence qua individual be feeble, the 
 child will resemble its grandfather. But, whatever variation 
 take place, the child always exhibits human characteristics. 
 
 The cause of all these variations is the check received by 
 the Motor impulse from the Material moved. Action pro- 
 duces reaction. The edge of a tool is blunted by the material 
 which it cuts; the heating body is cooled by that which it 
 warms; "and sometimes the reaction is greater than the 
 action ; the warming body becomes cold, and the cold body 
 warm, and hence the effect is lost or weakened." 
 
 § 490. In extreme cases, the formative principle is so far 
 checked that the child ceases to resemble human beings, and 
 resembles an animal — in which case it is called a monster. 
 Here the material is not fashioned into special forms, but 
 the general remains Qxevei to Ka96\ov), and this is animal. 
 " Thus, it is said that children are bom with the heads of 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 373 
 
 sheep or cakes, and other parts resembling those of animals; 
 for example, a calf with a child's head, or a sheep with the 
 head of an ox. All such phenomena are due to the cause 
 before-named ; but we must not understand such statements 
 literally; none of these monstrosities really are animals, but 
 only resemble them. The same sort of resemblance may be 
 seen in perfectly-formed healthy men. A Physiognomist once 
 showed how all faces could be reduced to two or three animal 
 types. But how impossible it is for one animal to have the 
 parts of another is evident from the differences in the periods 
 of gestation of men, sheep, dogs, and oxen. Each can only 
 be formed in its own definite period." 
 
 This passage displays remarkable sagacity, and might have 
 enlightened many o*f his successors. The belief in a race of 
 men having the heads of dogs was easy to Lord Monboddo, 
 who confesses that such men have not been seen by any modern 
 traveller, but they are spoken of by so many ancient authors, 
 that he can hardly doubt of their having once existed. 64 
 Aristotle not only marks what is true from what is false in 
 the popular belief, but refers to distinct physiological grounds, 
 namely, that the child requires nine months, and the dog only 
 nine weeks for its development. Whence he probably con- 
 cluded that so great a difference in the development of the two 
 would prevent any such organic union, as vulgar superstition 
 accepted. 
 
 § 491. He does not mention "mothers' marks," as we are 
 reminded by Hallee. 65 We cannot say whether this omission 
 was intentional ; but he is hardly to be credited with having 
 seen through the popular fallacy which attributes the marks 
 
 64 Monboddo: Ancient Metaphysics, 1779, HI., 263. He also believed in 
 tbe existence of a nation of one-legged men; and although he owns that 
 StKabo rejects this as a fable, he reminds us that " a spirit of incredulity was 
 begun as early as the days of Strabo," p. 251. He would hare found support 
 in his credulity in Bauhin: De Hermaphroditorum Natura. 
 
 65 Haiaee: Elementa Phys., VHL, 142. 
 
374 ON GENERATION [CHAP. XVII. 
 
 on the child to the imagination of the mother, an absurdity 
 that has found energetic defenders even in our own day. 
 
 § 492. He treats of monsters par exces, in which six 
 fingers, six toes, two heads, &c, are formed; and acutely 
 remarks that although these phenomena are contrary to the 
 ordinary course of nature they are not unnatural. Modern 
 science has established on irrefragable grounds that defor- 
 mities and monstrosities follow precisely the same laws of 
 development as are followed in perfect embryos. 66 
 
 § 493. Chap. V. is on superfcetation. 
 
 § 494. Chap. VI. treats of the condition in which the 
 young of various animals are born, whether blind or not, and 
 how far capable of maintaining independent existence; with 
 several other matters not specially calling for notice here. 
 
 § 495. Chap. VII. is on extra uterine gestation, and on 
 the so-called mola. But it is too exclusively technical for 
 this place. Chaps. VIII., IX., and X., are devoted to milk, 
 and to the periods of gestation. He supposes that the 
 period of gestation is in relation to longevity. 
 
 § 496. The Final Book is occupied with discussions as to 
 the cause of the variation in the colour of eyes and hair, the 
 abundance of hah-, the sleep of the embryo, sight and hearing, 
 voice and the teeth. But interesting as some of these are, 
 there is nothing which induces us to expand this chapter 
 already too long. 
 
 § 497. We close our analysis of this work with the re- 
 
 66 Geoffroy St. Hilaire: Philosophic Anatomique, 1830, vol. II.; Serres: 
 Hecherches tPanatomie transcendante et pathologique, 1832 ; Isidore St. 
 Hilaire: Histoire des Anomalies de V Organisation, 1832. In the last-named 
 work the literature of this extensive subject is copiously given. The treatise by 
 Bauhin: De Hermaphroditorum Monstrorumque partuum Natura, libri duo, 
 Oppenheimii, 1614, is an exhaustive and very amusing collection of the ancient 
 and mediaeval opinions and fancies on this subject. I have already cited it more 
 than once, but the following is too characteristic of what our credulous fore- 
 fathers accepted as evidence to be passed over: — " Triginta sex filios vivos uno 
 partu peperit Margarita Comitis Virboslai uxor, Cracoviensi agro. An. 1270, 
 20 Jan. Cromero et Guagnimio testibus." — P. 74. 
 
CHAP. XVII.] AND DEVELOPMENT. 375 
 
 iteration of our conviction that it is his masterpiece in 
 science. To those who open it prepared only by knowledge 
 derived from modern writers it will necessarily appear at times 
 jejune and not a little absurd ; but to those who are familiar 
 with the writers of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
 centuries, it will appear in its true greatness ; and those who 
 have familiarized themselves with the results and speculations 
 of the most advanced embryologists will, I think, be surprised 
 and delighted to find how often Aristotle seems at the highest 
 level of speculation. 
 
( 876 ) 
 
 CHAPTER XVIH. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 On reviewing the general impression of Aristotle's aims and 
 achievements which the foregoing pages have endeavoured to 
 convey, we first note the contradiction they present to the 
 popular conception of his claims as a great observer, and a 
 great legislator, in science. The uncritical enthusiasm of 
 eulogists has been challenged; the unreflecting iteration of 
 hyperbolical praises has been confronted with analyses of his 
 works ; and yet, in spite of the rigour of our scrutiny, there 
 has been no stint of admiration where admiration seemed 
 deserved. The inquiry has resulted in a verdict which con- 
 siderably modifies, yet scarcely lessens, our idea of his 
 greatness. 
 
 We have seen that the title of a great observer cannot 
 fairly be awarded to him. Far from meriting this rank, he 
 is not entitled to any place, great or small, among men 
 specially distinguished as observers, in the scientific sense of 
 the term : since not only did he fail to enrich Science with the 
 valuable and accurate details which serve as the solid supports 
 of speculation, he failed also to appreciate the primary con- 
 ditions of successful observation. He collected many facts, 
 he never scrutinized them. 
 
 So long as we consider him in his historical position, no 
 serious blame can fairly be attributed to him for failing to 
 appreciate the importance of Verification, and the means by 
 
CHAP. XVIII.] CONCLUSION. 377 
 
 which it may be sought ; for in his day these were appreciated 
 by no one ; they could only gain adequate recognition during 
 the slow evolution of scientific experience. 
 
 If, however, it would be unjust to blame him for an imper- 
 fection which was universal in his day, it would be eminently 
 unphilosophical in an historian to overlook the imperfection. 
 To overlook it would be to miss the great lesson of History, 
 which teaches us that even the power of Observation is a late 
 development in the mental evolution of our race, and not, as it 
 may at first sight appear, the easy and spontaneous exercise 
 of human faculties. There is as wide a distinction between the 
 untutored observation practised by the early pioneers of science, 
 and the cultivated caution of modern observers, as between 
 the rude polity of savage tribes and the complex civilization 
 of advanced nations. The ancient rarely attempted to analyze 
 complex phenomena into their several elements, rarely sus- 
 pected even that they were complex ; and such analysis as was 
 attempted was always executed without the aid of instru- 
 ments of precision, consequently was inevitably imperfect and 
 approximative. Unaided by instruments, and unaware of 
 their indispensable value, the ancient philosopher was thrown 
 upon his sagacity in guessing ; and it is no wonder that he 
 constantly duped himself and his hearers by mistaking mental 
 distinctions and verbal analogies, for Nature's differences and 
 resemblances. The modern, on the contrary, trained in the dis- 
 cipline of severer methods, and taught by those very methods 
 to distrust whatever has not been rigorously demonstrated, is 
 for ever seeking greater accuracy in his analyses, and greater 
 delicacy of precision in the instruments by which analyses are 
 to be made. Instead of relying on a supine credulity, he is 
 tormented by a vigilant scepticism. Far from trusting to the 
 uncontrolled observation of facts such as sufficed in early times, 
 he has learned to distrust the accuracy of his senses, and to 
 question closely the accuracy of his instruments. He has 
 even learned the necessity of establishing what is called the 
 
378 CONCLUSION. [CHAP. XVIII. 
 
 personal equation, by which the delicate variations of sensitive 
 organisms may be reduced to an average. Thus although 
 the beats of a pendulum may seem accurate standards for the 
 observation of a phenomenon in time, they admit of an in- 
 accuracy which it is important to correct, since it has been 
 found that no two persons agree precisely as to the moment of 
 observation — one being always a trifle in advance of the other. 
 Bessel found himself in the habit of noting phenomena in 
 advance of his assistant, Argelander, by as much as l s- 22 ; 
 and Mr. Sheepshanks found himself 45-hundredths of a 
 second behind M. Quetelet, and 35-hundredths before Mr. 
 Henry. In astronomy such variations would lead to enormous 
 inaccuracies ; consequently, as a preliminary to observation, a 
 personal equation has always to be established between the 
 observers. 
 
 The Art of Observation is a late development. Science 
 depends greatly on this Art for its progress ; and yet the Art 
 itself is only to be evolved during the slow advances of Science : 
 the two go hand in hand : they act and react. In the early 
 stages of scientific growth even an intellect so great as Aristotle's 
 could not place itself at the point of view which is now taken 
 by the humblest investigators. If his successors have become 
 more cautious it is because they have been trained in a severer 
 discipline — a discipline which it is his immortal glory to have 
 inspired, by that scientific impulse which, as we have seen, he 
 impressed on philosophy. 
 
 Another popular exaggeration has been treated in the fore- 
 going pages : his claim to the anticipation of modern dis- 
 coveries has been refuted. Where intellectual force alone was 
 involved, there Aristotle appeared a giant. But no single 
 mind can do the work of Humanity ; no one man can antici- 
 pate the labours of ages. Newton, in Alexandria, could not 
 have done the work of Keplee; nor, in Syracuse, would 
 Galileo have surpassed Akohimedes. How idle to expect 
 that Aristotle in the fourth century before Christ should have 
 
CHAP. XVIII.] CONCLUSION. 379 
 
 made discoveries which were only possible nineteen centuries 
 after Christ; only then possible because until then science 
 was without the requisite data, and without the requisite 
 instruments by which the data could be ascertained. 
 
 It is, therefore, unphilosophic exaggeration destructive 
 of the whole significance of History to say that Aristotle 
 " laid the bases " of any physical science. He laid no bases 
 at all. He was not a legislator. Neither by his conceptions, 
 nor by his methods, were any sciences finally rescued from 
 Common Knowledge, and constituted, as Astronomy was 
 constituted by Hipparchus, or Statics by Archimedes, or 
 Dynamics by Galileo. The coincidences of some of his 
 conceptions with those of modern philosophers have been 
 exhibited in various parts of this volume, coincidences some- 
 times due to a profound sagacity, oftener due to our tendency 
 to read into ancient texts the thoughts of modern thinkers. 
 Instead of regarding him as a legislator, we must confess 
 that, great as his indirect influence has been, his direct 
 influence on the physical sciences is inappreciable. Could 
 we eliminate the indirect influence exercised by his mind over 
 the minds of succeeding generations, we might begin the 
 history of every science without once naming him. 
 
 But, fortunately, we cannot estimate that influence. It 
 has been immense, and his fame is justifiably colossal. None 
 can pretend to appreciate the extent of that influence, mingled 
 as it is with so many concurrent streams ; but no one with a 
 knowledge of History, and a sense of historical significance, 
 will deny that the influence has been potent. In many pas- 
 sages of this volume criticism wears somewhat the appearance 
 of polemics ; an attitude to be regretted, but not to be avoided. 
 I entered upon my task full of enthusiasm for the greatness 
 of Aristotle, though with the determination to express in all 
 sincerity whatever convictions might grow out of careful study. 
 The critical attitude, proper to an historian who refuses to 
 become a partisan, may, in my case, have been made some- 
 
380 CONCLUSION. [CHAP. XVIII. 
 
 what rigid by the reckless eulogies of many writers whom I 
 had to consult during my labours, and perhaps also by the 
 inevitable swing of reaction in my own mind on discovering 
 that I had been misled by excessive and misplaced praises ; 
 but in concluding my work I should be guilty of an injustice 
 on the other side, if I did not endeavour to express my sense 
 of Aristotle's intellectual supremacy. 
 
 After every deduction has been made, the instinctive and 
 popular appreciation of his greatness will be ratified by a large 
 philosophy. Among the great heroes of Humanity, his 
 position must ever remain conspicuous. He claims pre- 
 cedence over hundreds who, under more fortunate conditions, 
 have enriched science with priceless details. He rises superior 
 to most of those who' have illuminated science with great 
 conceptions. And this superiority is claimed not only in 
 virtue of his many achievements, but also in virtue of his 
 native force. His comprehensive glance embraced the whole 
 field of research ; and if some other philosophers, ancient and 
 modern, have taken as wide a survey, none have like him 
 first opened the pathways they surveyed. But he might have 
 had even greater comprehensiveness, and yet not have justified 
 the glory which for centuries has surrounded his name. He 
 had a greatness above this versatility. He had that kind of 
 intellectual Force not easily defined, and mainly to be 
 estimated through its vast results — the Force which creates 
 epochs in the evolution of human progress. This power, 
 which founds Keligions and Philosophies,, by changing the 
 whole order of men's conceptions, is not to be measured 
 by any of the standards we apply to discoveries developed from 
 previous discoveries. It is to be measured rather by its 
 results, immediate and remote. The creation of a Method 
 is incomparably greater than the most brilliant application 
 of that Method. And it is not because Aristotle himself 
 made great discoveries, but because he deeply and extensively 
 influenced the minds of discoverers, that his name is illustrious. 
 
CHAP. XVIII.] CONCLUSION. 381 
 
 "We, who have grown up under the influence of the revolu- 
 tion which he began, are in no condition adequately to appre- 
 ciate his work. Just as we cannot thoroughly understand why 
 he was so careless with respect to accuracy in observation, 
 just as we cannot appreciate the obstacles which in his day 
 opposed the employment of vigilant scepticism and constant 
 verification, so also are we at a loss to estimate what was the 
 supreme difficulty of initiating the Scientific Method. To us 
 it may seem little that he should steadily have renounced 
 theological interpretations of natural phenomena, and that he 
 should have attached primary significance to Fact as the basis 
 of speculation. It may seem as if no alternative had been 
 open to him. Thus we may be insensible to the value of his 
 conception of Method, and of his gigantic efforts to apply 
 it in all directions ; and this insensibility will make us aware 
 only of his deficiencies. 
 
 Instructed by History, we learn that in the resolute with- 
 drawal of all explanations from theological interpretations, 
 in the predominance assigned to Fact, and in the insistance 
 on graduated Induction, there were the fruitful germs of as 
 wreat a revolution as any which has hitherto modified the 
 development of mankind. 
 
 The force of Aristotle's intellect, acting through the 
 germinating power of his Method, gave him despotic power 
 over succeeding generations, and sharpened in the hands of 
 his antagonists the very weapons with which they assailed 
 him. The despotism was in many respects disastrous, as all 
 despotisms must be. His defects became more influential than 
 other men's excellences. His guesses were more attended 
 to than his sober precepts. And yet it was surely not 
 altogether his fault that his Organon became an instrument 
 of repression rather than of research, and that his practice 
 was more readily followed than his precepts? However he 
 may have been impelled to systematize on imperfect bases 
 and to reason where he should have- observed, it is not too 
 
382 CONCLUSION. [CHAP. XVIII. 
 
 much to say that had he reappeared among later generations 
 he would have been the first to repudiate the servility of his 
 followers, the first to point out the inanity of Scholasticism. 
 His mighty and eminently inquiring intellect would have been 
 the first to welcome and to extend the new discoveries. He 
 would have sided with Galileo and Bacon against the 
 Aristotelians. 
 
( 383 ) 
 
 INDEX, 
 
 Abelaed, his Sic et Non cited, p. 224 
 Absolute (the), idea of Hegel's disci- 
 ples on, 80 
 Abstractions, tendency towards the im- 
 personation of, 86; Whewell on the 
 employment of, 88 
 Ackermann, on male and female or- 
 ganisms, 208; on female sperm, 347 
 Acoustics, their origin due to the 
 
 Greeks, 39 
 JEschylus, the Eumenides cited, 352 
 After-birth. See Placenta 
 Agassiz, on Aristotle's classification, 
 
 277. Cited, 295 
 Albertus Magnus, cited, 190, 278 
 Alexander the Great, a pupil of Aris- 
 totle, 13 ; his reverence for his 
 teacher, ib.; becomes Regent, 14; his 
 magnificent patronage of Aristotle, 
 ib.; Pliny's account of, 15; effect of 
 his death in Athens, 16 
 Alexandria, human dissection practised 
 
 in under the Ptolemies, 163 
 Ammonius, his Life of Aristotle dis- 
 credited by Buhle, 5 
 Anatomy, its origin due to the Greeks, 
 39; failure of the Greeks in, 56; 
 Aristotle's anatomy valueless, 157; 
 whence he derived his knowledge of, 
 157, 158; Emil Braun's reference to 
 the anatomical figures in the Vatican, 
 161; whence the Asclepiads derived 
 their knowledge of, ib,; Boyle on the 
 usefulness of, 162; absurdities of the 
 Galenists, 163; A.'s confession as to 
 the internal anatomy of man, 164; 
 proofs of A.'s never having dissected 
 the human body, 164, 165, 167; 
 comparative anatomy an arrested 
 embryology, 189; want of classifica- 
 tion owing to the backward state of 
 anatomy, 277; first dawn of philo- 
 
 sophic anatomy, 279; account of the 
 anatomy of the invertebrata, 285 
 
 Anatomists (ancient), their error re- 
 specting the Uterus, 332 
 
 Anaxagoras, his influence on Plato, 102 ; 
 his opinion that bile is the cause of 
 acute diseases, 318; his reason for the 
 intellectual superiority of man, 321; 
 on the origin of the sexes, 342, 367 
 
 Ancients, failure of their efforts in 
 science, 47, 49, 60, 63; Playfair's ver- 
 dict on their failure, 49, 51 ; their 
 large collection of scientific facts, 
 52; their mental activity, 53; Dr. 
 Whewell's conclusions as to their 
 failure, ib.; their inferiority to the 
 moderns, 57 ; their opinion as to 
 the velocity of a falling body, ib. ; 
 their impatience in the investigation 
 of science, 58; quotation from Bacon, 
 ib.; source of their errors, 60; their 
 chief mistake, 70; employed a Method 
 on which all problems were insoluble, 
 71; their ignorance of anatomy, 161 
 
 Andry, his figures of the spermatazoon, 
 352 
 
 Animal Movements, Aristotle's expla- 
 nation of, 177, 178. See Motion 
 
 Animals, identified with plants, 184 ; 
 their resemblance in the embryonic 
 stage, 189 ; their development the 
 third step in natural gradation, 193; 
 hermaphroditism of, 207; conclusion 
 that all animals are oviparous, 213 ; 
 their metamorphoses instanced in the 
 salamander, ib.; alleged existence of 
 the Nerve tissue in inferior animals, 
 243; Aristotle's division of, 273, 274, 
 275; Delle Chiaje on A.'s classifica- 
 tion, 275 ; sanguineous and exsan- 
 guineous, 276; A.'s want of system- 
 atic grouping, 277; design of A.'s 
 
884 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 classification, ib. ; Agassiz cited, ib. ; 
 Sunderall's work on A.'s knowledge 
 of animals, 279 ; analysis of A.'s 
 Hist. Animal., ib.; A.'s "partes simi- 
 lares," 279, 280, 298 ; analogy of parts 
 in animals, 280 ; A.'s standard of 
 animal structure, 281; account of the 
 intestines of animals, 281, 282, 283; 
 of the blood, 283, 284 ; mention of 
 the appearance of milk in the male, 
 285; on the voice of animals, 287; 
 their habits and instincts, 290; object 
 of the De Partibus, 292; A. on then- 
 composition, 297; on animal tempe- 
 rature, 298, 299 ; cause of animal 
 terror, 302; on watery-blooded ani- 
 mals, ib. ; earthy-blooded animals, 
 303 ; Aristotle on animal fat, ib. ; the 
 direction of heat, 306; use of the 
 flesh, 307 ; Man not the only animal 
 with the erect attitude, 309 ; but he is 
 the only one that is ticklish, 316 ; the 
 quadrumanous animals of Tyson and 
 Buffon, 319; Man a quadrumanous 
 animal, 320; why he is the most 
 intelligent, ib.; why the lioness has 
 only two teats, 321; Eunes de Men- 
 doga's improvement on this last theory 
 of A.'s, ib. ; the generation of ovi- 
 parous animals, 350 
 " Animists," the Montpellier school of, 
 
 223 
 Anna Manzolina. See Manzolina 
 Antigone (the), chiefly relates to the 
 
 sacredness of the dead, 160 
 Aphis, its parthenogenesis, 202, 203 
 Aquapendente. See Fabricius. 
 Archimedes, an example of true scien- 
 tific inquiry, 59 ; the founder of 
 Statics, 147, 379 
 Aristotle, life of, p. 1 ; his intellect and 
 attainments, ib.; insignificant result 
 of his labours, ib. ; revolt against his 
 authority, 2, 21 ; attacked by the 
 scientific reformers, 2; inferiority of 
 his adversaries, 3; his biographies 
 collected by Buhle, 4, 5 ; their con- 
 tradictions, ib.; scant and untrust- 
 worthy materials for a life of, 4 ; his 
 birth, 4, 6 ; his father, 7; called 
 the "reader" by Plato, 8; attracted 
 to Athens, ib. ; his occupations there, 
 ib. ; Bacon's sarcasm, 9 ; he wins for 
 himself a position at Athens, 10; his 
 foppery in costume, 11; his alleged 
 ingratitude to Plato, ib. ; taught by 
 Plato for seventeen years, ib.; his 
 person and character, 11, 12; instance 
 of his humour, 12; opens a school of 
 philosophy, 1 2, 15 ; his work De Divi- 
 natione cited, 12; alleged object of 
 
 his visit to Hermias, ib. ; marries 
 Pythias, adopted daughter of Her- 
 mias, ib. ; story of his practising me- 
 dicine at Athens, ib. ; goes to Mace- 
 don, 13; fiction of his accompanying 
 Alexander to Asia, 14; his return to 
 Athens, 15; opens the Lyceum as a 
 school, ib.; regarded with suspicion 
 in Athens, 16; accused of irreligion, 
 17; quits Athens, ib. ; authenticity of 
 his writings, ib.; their encyclopaedic 
 character, 17, 18; his modem eulo- 
 gists, 1 8 , 23 ; contrasted with Plato, 1 9 ; 
 without rank as an artist and writer, 
 20; his commentators, ib. ; his errors 
 pointed out by Gassendi, 21 ; his 
 works declared heretical by Parlia- 
 ment of Paris, ib.; his legitimate 
 position assigned by Eiilleborn, Buhle, 
 and Tennemann, 22; considered the 
 profoundest of thinkers, ib.; various 
 editions of his works, ib. ; his 
 true place in science, 23 ; his 
 remarks on scepticism in sci- 
 ence, 40; he illustrates the excel- 
 lence and defects of the Greeks, 41 ; 
 his explanation of the mysteries 
 of nature, ib.; compared with the 
 writer of Ecclesiastes, 42; his con- 
 fidence in science, ib.; his study of 
 nature for the sake of knowledge, ib. ; 
 alleged to have anticipated modern 
 discoveries, 46 ; his failure in Biology, 
 how far referable to the neglect of 
 Ideas, 54; Dr. Whewell on the cause 
 of his failure in Mechanical Science, 
 ib. ; his carelessness in scientific in- 
 vestigation, 59; his Physics compared 
 with Newton's Principia, 67, 68; his 
 formulas want the guarantee of Obser- 
 vation, 68; on the demonstration of 
 things beyond the senses, 69 ; A. 
 recognized the Ideal Test, ib. ; his 
 claim to the first outline of classifica- 
 tion, 84; his deference to other men's 
 opinions, 89; he defined words in 
 order to expound facts, ib.; his de- 
 fective conception of Method, 108; 
 the father of Inductive Philosophy, 
 ib. ; his contrast to Plato, ib. ; cause 
 of his failure in scientific research, 
 ib. ; his reliance on sensuous per- 
 ception, 109 ; his method compared 
 with Plato's, ib. ; on Experience and 
 Induction, ib.; on the impossibility of 
 thought without sensation, ib. ; his 
 Empiricism urged as a reproach, ib.; 
 on the parthenogenesis of bees, 110; 
 on hybridity, ib.; on Experience as 
 the true guide in science, 110, 111; 
 his anticipation of modern Psycho- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 885 
 
 logy, 111 ; on the necessity of Obser- 
 vation, 110, 111, 112; A. points out 
 the danger of the Platonic Method, 
 1 1 1 j his perception of the value of 
 experiment, 112, 113; anticipates the 
 cardinal principles of Bacon's philo- 
 sophy, 113; his neglect of his own 
 method, ib.; places the Ideal above 
 the Real Test, 117; his efforts wasted 
 in pursuit of causes, ib.; his four 
 causes unverifiable, 119 ; practically a 
 metaphysician, ib. ; his chief claim 
 to our veneration, 120; his followers 
 fascinated by his defects, ib.; Roger 
 Bacon's desire to burn A.'s works, 
 121 ; his Physics, Meteorology and 
 Mechanics, 122 ; his obstruction of 
 Astronomical Science noticed by 
 Herschel, 125; ignorant of the laws 
 and nature of Motion, 126 ; com- 
 pared with Newton, 127; his extant 
 writings on physics, ib. ; his defi- 
 nition of Nature, 129; his celebrated 
 definition of Motion, 131; his theory 
 of projectiles, 132, 133 ; fallacy 
 respecting continuous motion, 133; 
 his analysis of Motion, 134, 135; his 
 work on the Heavens, 136; on the 
 relations of space and gravitation, 
 136, 137; his idea of the form of the 
 Heavens, 138; on the substance of 
 the Stars, 138, 139 ; his theory of 
 Heat and Light, 139; definition of an 
 Element, 140; his protests against the 
 a priori Method, ib. ; ether as an 
 Element, 141 ; on Gravity and 
 Eevity, ib. ; on Ether as the substance 
 of the Heavens, ib. ; his work on Meteo- 
 rology, 143; his explanation of the 
 Milky Way, 145; on the chemistry of 
 the Elements, 146; his Problems, 147; 
 made no advance in Mathematical 
 Science, 149; on Pressure and Per- 
 cussion, 150; his disregard of the law 
 of Inertia, 152; deficient in the trans- 
 cendental postulates of Science, ib ; 
 his efforts not in vain, 153; but the 
 neglect of his physical speculations 
 justified, ib.; his Anatomy, 154; 
 Cuvier's exaggerated eulogy of Aris- 
 totle, ib.; his servile eulogists, 154, 
 155; De Blainville's admiration for, 
 ib.; amazing extent of his biological 
 survey, 156; Lauth's eulogy ; of his 
 anatomical labours, ib. ; A.'s ana- 
 tomy valueless, 157; whence he de- 
 rived his knowledge of Anatomy, ib.; 
 assigns the Heart as the origin of the 
 Blood-vessels, 158; his ignorance of 
 the Muscles, ib.; his ignorance of the 
 Nervous-system, ib.; and of the three 
 
 most important parts of the organism, 
 ib.; A. did not dissect the human 
 body, 159 ; on the parts of the human 
 body, 163, 164; his description of the 
 Lungs, ib.; of the Uterus, ib.; his 
 error regarding the position of the 
 Heart, 165; in reference to the spleen, 
 ib.; Blazius' anxiety to defend A., 
 166; Buonfede on A.'s ignorance of 
 the Human Brain, ib. ; Galen on A.'s 
 ignorance of Human Anatomy, ib.; 
 A.'s erroneous description of the 
 Brain, ib. ; alleged to have first dis- 
 covered the nerves, 167; Scaliger's 
 palliation of Aristotle, ih.; credited 
 with discovery of Cerebral nerves, 
 168 ; his alleged discovery of the 
 nerves discussed, 168, 169 ; knew 
 nothing of the nervous system, 170; 
 his Physiology, 171 ; he was igno- 
 rant of the phenomena of diges- 
 tion, 172, 173; his ideas on respira- 
 tion, 174, 175, 176; on the respiration 
 of fish, 175, 176; his explanations of 
 animal movements baseless, 177, 178; 
 places the seat of sensation in the 
 Heart, 179; on the senses of Touch 
 and Taste, ib. ; fallacy of his having 
 laid the ' eternal bases ' of Biology, 180, 
 181; his alleged anticipation of mo- 
 dern discoveries, 183, 187; recognizes 
 the identity of Plant and Animal, 
 184; credited with the discovery of 
 the Vertebral Theory, 186; his dis- 
 covery that plants are nourished at 
 expense of their seed, 187; his idea 
 of an ascending complexity in "Vital 
 phenomena, 189; on Natural grada- 
 tion, 190; his Organic and Inorganic 
 kingdoms, ib. ; on the Heart as the 
 centre of sensation and thought, 191 ; 
 on the different developments of 
 plants and animals, 192; classes the 
 Testaceous animals as plants, ib. ; 
 his reason for classing Sponges as 
 animals, 193 ; his views of Plants and 
 Animals stated by Hermolaus Bar- 
 baras, 194; makes Man the head of 
 Animal creation, 195 ; anticipates 
 Einna3us, ib.; the Hectocotylus in- 
 stanced, 199, 200 ; ignorant of the 
 parthenogenesis of bees, 206 ; his 
 remark on the Perch, 209; Aristotle 
 proved by Dufosse to be right where 
 moderns are wrong, 210 ; his reli- 
 ance on hearsay, 211 ; aware of 
 the existence of Placental fishes, 212; 
 his assertion respecting the Cuttlefish 
 verified by Kolliker, 218; his state- 
 ment regarding the nest-building fish 
 verified by Olivi, ib. ; on the vision of 
 
 25 
 
336 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 the Mole, 218; made no discovery in 
 Science, 220; his treatise De Anima, 
 221; ^vyfi imtranslateable, 221, 222; 
 on Life and Mind, 223 ; his doc- 
 trine on the Soul declared orthodox, 
 224; on Sensation as the characteristic 
 of the Soul, ib. ; on the nature of the 
 Vital Principle, 225, 226 ; his concep- 
 tion of the mystery of Life, 231 ; his 
 views on the immortality of the Soul, 
 233 ; on sensibility, sight, hearing, 
 &c, 235, 238 ; on Imagination, 240; 
 his chapter on Intellect, ib. ; on 
 the Eeflective faculty, 241; hypo- 
 thesis of the development of know- 
 ledge, ib.; his views of Locomotion, 
 242, 243 ; denies that the animal 
 body is homogeneous, 244; on the 
 sense of Touch, ib. ; his analysis of 
 the Senses, 246 to 255; his definition 
 of Light, 248; of Taste and Smell, 
 249; his explanation of Colour, ib. ; 
 on the divisibility of Sensation, 253, 
 254 ; his explanation of Memory, 
 256 ; his treatises on Memory, Sleep, 
 Dreams and Longevity, ib. ; his ab- 
 surd theories on sleep, 258, 260, 261, 
 262, 263, 264; his treatise on Dreams, 
 264; his History of Animals, 269; 
 Cuvier's description of the Hist. 
 Animal., 270; erroneous conclusions, 
 271, 272; Cuvier on A.'s classifica- 
 tion of animals, 273, 274; Aristotle 
 distinguishes Animals into sangui- 
 neous and exsanguineous, 275 ; on 
 bloodless animals, 276; his sketch of 
 those which have blood, ib. ; disputes 
 as to his system of classification, 277; 
 doubts as to whether he had a system, 
 ib. ; no classification in the Hist. 
 Animal., 278; Sunderall's work on 
 A.'s classification of Animals, 279; 
 analysis of Hist. Animal., ib.; his 
 division of the organism into similar 
 and dissimilar parts, 279,280; on the 
 parts of animal bodies and their 
 analogy, 280 ; A.'s knowledge of 
 Anatomy less accurate than Galen's, 
 281; instances of A.'s carelessness 
 and rash generalization, 282; on the 
 blood of animals, 283; his account of 
 the anatomy of the Invertebrata, 285 ; 
 his mention of the appearance of 
 milk in Males, ib. ; on the Crustacea, 
 286; on sight and hearing in the 
 Testacea, 287 ; his assertion in refer- 
 ence to Hydrophobia, 289; on gout 
 in Horses, ib.; his defence of the 
 study of Biology, 296; on the com- 
 position of animals, 297; on animal 
 fat, 303; on the composition of the 
 
 brain, 304; on the composition of 
 animal Marrow, ib.; cause of his 
 belief in the insensibility of the Brain, 
 305 ; on the organs of Men and 
 Plants, 308 ; his account of the Heart 
 and Liver, 311, 312 — examples of his 
 rash -theorizing, 311, 312, 313; his 
 remarks on single and double organs, 
 3 1 5 ; his description of the Diaphragm, 
 316 ; his reason for the position of the 
 Elephant's teats, 322; why man has 
 flesh oh his legs, ib. ; asserts that man 
 is tailless, ib. ; work on generation 
 and development, 325 ; compared with 
 Harvey's work on Generation, 326; 
 on sexual differences, 331; denies the 
 existence of sperm in females, 333, 
 345 ; on the testes,333,334 ; his opinion 
 that woman is but undeveloped man, 
 347; his doctrine of Epigenesis, 351, 
 355, 368, 369 ; on development of the 
 Embryo, 357, 358, 359 ; on the power 
 of reproduction in females, 360; his 
 opinion that eels are generated spon- 
 taneously, 361; on the phenomena of 
 development, 362 ; on the fertility of 
 Hybrids, 363 ; supposed prefigura- 
 tion of the Cell Theory, 365 ; origin 
 of the sexes, 367, 368, 369; on here- 
 ditary transmission of qualities, 370, 
 371 ; his omission of " mother's 
 marks," 374; his true rank in Science, 
 376; his claim to have anticipated 
 modern discoveries, 378, 379 ; his 
 immense influence, 379, 380, 381 ; 
 one of the great heroes of Humanity, 
 380; he would have been an anti- 
 Aristotelian, 382 
 
 Arnold, Dr., his eulogy of Aristotle's 
 Politics, 18 
 
 Artedi, cited, 277 
 
 Art, Greek, defects of, 41 
 
 Asclepiads (the), imperfectly acquainted 
 with Anatomy, 7;. whence their ana- 
 tomical knowledge derived, 161 
 
 Association of Ideas, A.'s glimpse of the 
 law of, 257 
 
 Assyrians, exaggerated antiquity of their 
 records, 37 
 
 Astronomers (ancient), their belief in 
 the uniformity of celestial revolutions, 
 33; Biot's remark thereon, 34 
 
 Astronomy (Egyptian), Martianus Ca- 
 pella on the antiquity of 37; slight 
 acquaintance of the Chaldseans with, 
 66; Plato's depreciation of, 104; 
 Aristotle's ideas of, 139 
 
 Athens, Aristotle attracted to, 8; his 
 occupations at, ib; declining glories 
 of, 9, 10 
 
 Atoms, hypothesis of, beyond proof, 92 
 
INDEX. 
 
 387 
 
 Attraction, stigmatized by the Carte- 
 sians as an occult quality, 84; the law 
 of denuded of Metaphysics, ib. ; again 
 restored to science, ib. ; Newton on, 
 93 ; its cause unknowable, 94 ; science 
 concerned only with the law of Attrac- 
 tion, ib. 
 
 Auguries, the Druids' method of, 32 
 
 Avefrhoes, on the infallibility of the 
 Stagirite, 155 
 
 Avicenna, cited, 169; quoted by Roger 
 Bacon on the seat of the Soul, 179 
 
 Bacon, Lord, his sarcasm respecting 
 Aristotle's quotations, 9 ; on the want 
 of scientific instruments among the 
 ancients, 58; on the psychological 
 cause of error in science, 62 ; on the 
 inequality of mind as a mirror of 
 things submitted to it, 103; cause of 
 his own failure in scientific research, 
 108, 113; his Novum Organon, cited, 
 109; not opposed to Aristotle, but to 
 A.'s followers, 113; the cardinal prin- 
 ciples of his philosophy anticipated 
 by Aristotle, ib. ; his Sylvia Syl- 
 varum cited, 300; on the action of 
 fire, ib. Cited, 41, 367 
 
 Bacon,Roger, cited, 21, 115, 169, 172; on 
 Verification, 82 ; Jebb's preface to the 
 Opus Majus cited, 121 ; his desire to 
 burn Aristotle's works, ib.; on the optic 
 nerve, 170; on the seat of the Soul, 
 179; his alleged discovery of the 
 telescope, 186; on the Intellect, 358 
 
 Baer. See Von Baer 
 
 Bailly, his letters on the origin of the 
 sciences, cited 46 
 
 Barbaras, Hermolaus. See Hermolaus 
 
 Barchusen, asserts that Aristotle dis- 
 sected the Human Body, 159, 165; his 
 opinion adopted by Haller and Harles, 
 159. Cited, 160, 346 
 
 Baronio, his successful grafting of parts 
 of animals, 191 
 
 Barthelemy St. Hilaire. See St. Hilaire 
 
 Barthez, on Verification, 33 
 
 Basso, his attack upon Aristotle', 2; an 
 admirer of Patrizio, 9. Cited, 228 
 
 Bauhin, on the origin of the sexes, 367. 
 Cited, 370, 373, 374 
 
 Beclard, his definition of Life, 230. 
 Cited 231 
 
 Bees, Aristotle on the Parthenogenesis 
 of, 110, 206. See Parthenogenesis 
 
 Benedictines of St. Maur, their Literary 
 History of France cited, 32; on the 
 soothsaying of the Druids, ib. Cited, 
 225 
 
 Bernard, Claude, cited, 312 
 
 Bernouilli, J., his metaphysical trifling, 
 
 Biphat, on the "law of economy," 183; 
 his famous definition of Life, 230; 
 made Aristotle's division of the orga- 
 nism the foundation of modern his- 
 tology, 279; on the distinction between 
 animal and vegetable organs, 314, 
 315. Cited 190, 231 
 
 Biese, his analysis of Aristotle's scien- 
 tific logic, 116. Cited, 140, 192 
 
 Bile, Aristotle's account of, 317, 318 
 
 Biology, Aristotle's failure in, how far 
 referable to neglect of Ideas, 54; its 
 two grand divisions, 156; amazing 
 extent of A.'s survey, ib. ; fallacy of 
 Aristotle's having laid the eternal 
 basis of, 180, 181; general principles 
 of, 182; instance of A.'s alleged anti- 
 cipation of modern speculations, 183 ; 
 Aristotle's defence of the study of, 
 296; its obscurest problems treated in 
 the De Generatione, 325 
 
 Biot, his work on Indian and Chinese 
 Astronomy quoted, 34, 38 
 
 Bischoff, Professor, cited, 328, 348 
 
 Blakesley, his suggestion that Aristotle 
 was a pupil of Xenocrates, 5. Cited, 6 
 
 Blazius, on the quantity of blood going 
 to the brain, 166 
 
 Blondin, his Vitalisme Animique cited, 
 224 
 
 Blood (the), Aristotle's account of, 283, 
 284; the fibrine of, discovered by 
 Borelli, ib. ; the distinctions of, 298; 
 A. on the influence of different kinds 
 of, 302 
 
 Bloodvessels, Aristotle's account of, 314 
 
 Blumenbach, cited, 338, 351 
 
 Bodies, their passive and static con- 
 dition, 123; Aristotle's ideas on their 
 weight and lightness, 141, 142, 143 
 
 Bone, reason for the growth of, 307 
 
 Bonnet, his scheme of the origin of 
 species, 187; proves the partheno- 
 genesis of the aphis, 203. Cited, 353 
 371 
 
 Books, illustrated, in the time of Aris- 
 totle, 283 
 
 Borelli, his discovery in reference to the 
 fibrine of blood, 284 ' 
 
 Bossuet, an anatomist, 162 
 
 Bostock, his System of Physiology cited, 
 352 
 
 Bouiller, cited, 224 
 
 Boyle, on the usefulness of anatomy, 1 62 
 
 Brain, quantity of blood going to, 166; 
 Blazius cited, ib. ; Buonfede on Aris- 
 totle's ignorance of, ib. ; A.'s erroneous 
 description of, ib. ; the seat of sensa- 
 tion 179; functions ascribed to it by 
 
 25—2 
 
888 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Aristotle, 180; A.'b notion of the 
 brain criticised by Galen, ib. ; Davy's 
 attempts to estimate its temperature, 
 ib. ; Cuvier's error on the brain of 
 Molluscs, 219, 220; part assigned to 
 it in production of sleep, 263 ; Aris- 
 totle's erroneous conclusion on the 
 size and moisture of man's brain, 
 272, 306 ; its origin and composition, 
 304; A.'s belief that it is devoid of 
 sensation, 305, and moderates the heat 
 of the blood, 306 
 
 Brain-ducts. -See Nerves 
 
 Brandis, cited, 6, 279 
 
 Brann, Emil, his reference to the ana- 
 tomical figures in the Vatican, 161 
 
 Bronn, cited, 193, 295 
 
 Brown Sequard cited, 191, 208, 216, 
 261, 275, 345 
 
 Browne, Sir Thos., on the vision of the 
 Mole, 219 
 
 Bruno, Giordano, cited, 2; his contempt 
 for Patrizio, 9 
 
 Buffon, on the living universe as one 
 family, 188. Cited, 270, 277, 319 
 
 Buhle, collects the ancient biographies 
 of Aristotle, 4; discredits that by 
 Ammonius, 5; his error regarding 
 Punes y Mendoca, 303. Cited, 6, 21, 22 
 
 Bunsen, in reference to'spectrum analy- 
 sis, cited, 70 . , , 
 
 Buonfede cites Burnet's list of Aristotle s 
 puerilities, 155; on A.'s ignorance of 
 the brain, 166 
 
 Burdach, on milk in males, 285; on the 
 spermatozoon, 352. Cited, 327, 348, 
 
 356,371 „„ , * 
 
 Bnrmeister, cited, 184; his Manual of 
 
 Entomology cited, 270, 329 
 Bumet, his list of Aristotle's puerilities 
 
 cited by Buonfede, 155 
 Bussemaker, edits Aristotle's works, 22; 
 
 his rendering of an obscure passage 
 
 in Aristotle, 306. Cited, 263, 343 
 Buzareingues, Girou de, cited, 371 
 
 Cjesalpinus, his erroneous defence of 
 Aristotle, 168; on the brain as the 
 seat of sensation, 179; on generation, 
 205,347. Cited, 305 
 
 Camus, his French translation of the 
 Hist. Animal, 269 
 
 Cardan, on the respiration of fish, 176; 
 on the generation of male offspring, 
 367 
 
 Cartesians, stigmatize Attraction as an 
 occult quality, 84 
 
 Cartilage, reason why it never regene- 
 rates, 307 
 
 Carus, Victor, cited, 270, 295 
 
 Casaubon, his edition of Aristotle's 
 
 works, 21 
 Castelli, declares Plato and Aristotle 
 
 perfect anatomists, 159 
 Catamenia, modern ideas on, 345 ; Aris- 
 totle on, ib. 
 Caterpillar, its 4,041 muscles, 158 
 1 Causation, law of, transcends experience, 
 66; how demonstrable, 84; in itself 
 L_ unknowable, 91, 92, 93 
 Cause, desire to banish it from Induc- 
 tive Philosophy, 90; its meaning in 
 science, ib. ; life regarded by Aristotle 
 as a final cause, 234 
 Causes, no following of effects from, 91 ; 
 causes and effects are simultaneous, ib. ; 
 Aristotle's efforts wasted in pursuit of, 
 117; the four kinds of causes, 117, 
 118; A.'s discussion on final causes, 
 129, 130 
 Cavolini, cited, 210 
 Cell Theory, Aristotle's alleged pre- 
 
 figuration of, 365 
 Cephalopoda, Von Siebold on Aristotle's 
 
 acquaintance with, 199 
 Chabanon, his Mimoires de PAcadernie 
 
 des Inscriptions cited, 147 
 Chaldseans, exaggerated antiquity of 
 their astronomical observations, 37; 
 their slight knowledge of astronomy, 
 66 
 Charles' Life of Roger Bacon cited, 121 
 Charleton, cited, 195, 210, 303 
 Chemistry of the Elements, Aristotle 
 
 on, 146 
 Children, their resemblance to their 
 
 parents, 372, 373 
 Circulation of the Blood, important 
 
 results of the discovery, 176 
 Classification, Aristotle's claim to first 
 outline of, 273; one of the latest 
 results of scientific research, ib. ; 
 Cuvier on Aristotle's classification, 
 273, 274 ; Meyer on the various 
 schemes of, 277; general ignorance 
 of A.'s attempts at, ib.; its mode 
 of elimination and aim, ib. ; Whewell 
 on the construction of a classification, 
 278; Agassiz on Aristotle's grouping, 
 ib.; Aristotle on, 294; but offers no 
 classification of his own, 295; his 
 dim perception of the natural me- 
 thod, 296 
 Claude Bernard, cited, 312 
 Claudian Mammertus, on the immate- 
 
 rialism of the Soul, 225 
 Cocchi, Antonio, denies that Aristotle 
 
 dissected the Human Body, 159 
 Collier, Dr. Charles, his translation of 
 
 the be Animd, 221 
 Colour, Prantl cited, 249 ; Goethe 
 
INDEX. 
 
 389 
 
 cited, 249; Aristotle's explanation 
 of, ib. 
 
 Comparative Anatomy, the want of 
 classification owing to the backward 
 state of, 277 
 
 Comte, Auguste, on metaphysical con- 
 ception of phenomena, 30; on mathe- 
 matical precision, 39; on our limited 
 physical knowledge of the planets, 
 70 ; his commentary on Laplace's 
 theory of Motion, 98; led too far by 
 his antagonism to Metaphysics, 99; 
 on the necessity of Method and Edu- 
 cation, 100; on the extension of 
 gravitation beyond, the solar system, 
 125; his proposition to fill up missing 
 links in nature, 189. Cited, 34 
 
 Congreve, his edition of Aristotle's 
 Politics cited, 16 
 
 Conringius, denies that Aristotle dis- 
 sected Man, 159, 160 
 
 Contraries, principle of, 128 
 
 Copernicus, on hypotheses, 92 
 
 Corniani, his work on Italian Literature 
 cited, 119 
 
 Cosmology, Plato's, 105 
 
 Costa, guesses at the nature of the 
 Hectocotylus, 198 
 
 Coste, on Aristotle's story of the woman 
 of Elis, 340 
 
 Cresswell, his translation of the Hist. 
 Animal., 269. Cited, 280 
 
 Crustacea. See Invertebrata 
 
 Currey, his Meport on Vegetable Parthe- 
 nogenesis cited, 202 
 
 Cuttlefish, Aristotle's assertion regard- 
 ing, 218; cause of its change of 
 colour, 302 
 
 Cuvier, on the existence of the " nervous 
 fluid," 98; his eulogy of Aristotle, 
 154 ; describes the Hectocotylus, 
 198; his error regarding the brain 
 of Molluscs, 219 ; his statement 
 about Aristotle's predecessors, 269 ; 
 his enthusiasm for Aristotle's Hist. 
 Animal, 269, 270, 271,272; on A.'s 
 classification, 273, 274; his admission 
 of the " vers a sang rouge," 275; on 
 A.'s knowledge of anatomy, 281. 
 Cited, 23, 154, 210, 218, 290, 319, 353 
 
 D'Alembeet, on the truth in ancient 
 
 ideas, 184 
 ■Daremberg, on Galen's ignorance of the 
 
 anatomy of the human body, 163 
 Dareste, cited, 215 
 Darwin, cited, 188 
 Davies and Vaughan's translation of 
 
 Plato's Eepublic cited, 103 
 Davy, Dr. J., his Physiological and 
 
 Anatomical, Researches cited, 180, 
 
 216; his fallacious experiments on 
 
 the Liver, 313 
 D'Azyr, Vicq. See Vicq D'Azyr 
 Dead, feeling of the Greeks respecting 
 
 the, 160 i- s 
 
 De Anima (the), Trendelenberg's edition 
 cited, 118; its great eminence, 221- 
 editions of, ib. ; translations, ib!; 
 Max Miiller on the meaning and 
 equivalents of anima, 222; analysis 
 of, 225; enlarges more on physical 
 than psychological questions, 244; its 
 want of logical arrangement, ib.; pro- 
 fundity of many of its views, 245; its 
 value as a scientific work, 290, 291 
 Cited, 265 
 De Animal. Motione (the), cited, 112 
 De Blainville, his eulogy of Aristotle, 
 154; his definition of Life adopted by 
 Comte and Charles Robin, 230 
 Cited, 23, 154, 270, 295, 353 
 De Cmlo (the), cited, 110; analysis of, 
 
 136; Prantl's edition of, ib. 
 Deduction, one of the modes of scientific 
 
 investigation, 57 
 De Generatione (the), cited, 110, 112, 
 310; its vast scope, 325 ; Aubert and 
 Wimmer's edition of, ib. ; analysis of, 
 330 to 376; pronounced the master- 
 piece of ancient science, 375 
 De Graaf, commenced the discovery of 
 the Mammalian ovum, 213; on the 
 Uterus, 332; on Aristotle's opinion 
 that woman is undeveloped man, 347. 
 Cited, 332, 333, 346, 347, 353, 367 
 De Juventute, Aristotle's, cited, 239 
 Delambre, Hist, of Astronomy cited, 38 
 Delle Chiaje, cited, 198, 273, 323; on 
 Aristotle's division of animals, 275; 
 on the change of colour in the cuttle- 
 fish, 302 
 Democritus, on Vision, 247 ; on the ori- 
 gin of the sexes, 367. Cited, 145, 359 
 De Partibus (the), cited, 110, 163, 274, 
 282 ; a continuation of the Hist. 
 Animal., 279; analysis of, 292; its 
 object, ib.; its distinction of partes 
 similares, 298; represents Aristotle's 
 physiology, 322; its great interest in 
 the history of science, 323 
 Descartes, his reliance on the Possible, 
 69 ; recognizes the Ideal Test, ib. ; on 
 the rule of Truth, 79; his errors, 81, 
 83; on the habitat of the Soul, S3; 
 his neglect of the Real Test, ib. ; his 
 Principia cited, 92, 133; his hypo- 
 thesis that brutes are mere machines, 
 196; on the functions of the Soul, 224 
 De Sensu (the), analysis of, 246. See 
 Senses 
 
390 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 De Somno, Aristotle's, cited, 239 
 
 Development, Aristotle on the phe- 
 nomena of, 362. See Generation, 
 Parthenogenesis, Organism, Embry- 
 ology- 
 
 Diaphragm, Aristotle's description of, 
 316; its part in consciousness, ib. 
 
 Dichogamism. See Generation, Parthe- 
 nogenesis, Hermaphroditism 
 
 Dichotomy, Aristotle's criticism of, 294 
 
 Diego de Eunes y Mendoca. See Eunes 
 y Mendoca 
 
 Differentiation of plants and animals, 
 stated, 194 
 
 Digenesis, forms of, 328. See Generation 
 
 Digestion, Aristotle ignorant of the 
 phenomena of, 172, 173; A. on the 
 influence of heat in, 301 
 
 Diodorus, on the antiquity of Chaldsean 
 astronomical observations, 37 
 
 Diogenes Laertius, ' the biographer of 
 Aristotle, 4, 17 
 
 Diogenes, on the respiration of Eish, 176. 
 
 Dionysius of Halicamassus,a biographer 
 of Aristotle, 5 
 
 Dissection, evidences against Aristotle 
 having dissected the human body, 
 159; Greek popular feeling against, 
 160; struggles of Science for, ib.; the 
 disgust and fascination for, 161, 162; 
 illustrious anatomists, ib.; Boyle on 
 the usefulness of, 162; practised in 
 Alexandria under the Ptolemies, 163; 
 absurdities of the Galemsts,i6.; proofs 
 of A.'s never having dissected the 
 human body, 164, 165, 166, 167 
 
 Dominic de Marchettis, on the ovaries 
 of females, 333 
 
 D'Orbigny, cited, 302 
 
 Dreams, analysis of Aristotle's treatise 
 on, 264, 265, 266; the images, or 
 after-motions, of sensation, 266 
 
 Drelincourt, cited, 351 
 
 Druids, their method of predicting 
 events, 32 
 
 Dufossfi, proves Aristotle to be right 
 where Moderns are wrong, 210. Cited, 
 287 
 
 Duges,his definition of Life, 230. Cited, 
 231 
 
 Duhamel, on the growth of bone, 
 191 ; his eloge by Vicq d'Azyr, 
 quoted, ib. 
 
 Dujardinj his Natural History of Infu- 
 soria cited, 193; on the Hectocotylus, 
 198 
 
 Dutens, his Origin of Discoveries as- 
 signed to the Moderns cited, 46 
 
 Du Val, his edition of Aristotle's works, 
 21 
 
 Duvemoy, cited, 210 
 
 Dynamics, their origin to be sought 
 "among the Greeks, 38; founded by 
 Galileo, 147 
 
 Dzierzon, his researches on the par- 
 thenogenesis of bees, 205 
 
 Ecclksiasticus, comparison of, with 
 Aristotle, 42 
 
 Eels, Aristotle's opinion that they are 
 generated spontaneously, 361 
 
 Egyptians, their scientific claims dis- 
 credited, 37 ; their observations and 
 annals, ib. ; without the rudiments of 
 science, 38; their idea of female fe- 
 cundity, 370 
 
 Ehrenberg, on the structure of the 
 nerves, 168 
 
 Elements (the Eour), Plato on the co- 
 hesion of, 105; Aristotle's definition 
 of an Element, 140; the fifth element, 
 ib. ; A. on the chemistry of, 146 
 
 Elephant assigned only two diseases by 
 Aristotle and Pliny, 289 
 
 Elis, story of the woman of, 340 
 
 Ellis and Spedding, their edition of 
 Bacon's works cited, 115 
 
 Embryo, the " missing links " to be 
 sought in the life of, 188 ; its assimilat- 
 ing power, 215; increases in utero, ib. 
 
 Embryology, how far equivalent to com- 
 parative anatomy, 189; identity of 
 the spermcell and genncell, .203 ; 
 identity of the male and female 
 organisms, 208 ; summary of the 
 modern science of, 327; origination, 
 ib. ; development, 328 ; incubation, 
 329 ; its modern forms known to 
 Aristotle, 330; A. on the origin of 
 the sperm, 339, 340 ; on the growth 
 of the embryo, 342 ; his diagnosis of 
 the sperm, 342, 343, 344 ; the form 
 and principle of the embryo derived 
 from the male, 347; hypotheses con- 
 cerning, 351; A. on the development 
 of the embryo, 357, 358 359. See 
 Generation, Organism 
 
 Emil Braun. See Braun 
 
 Empedocles, held " the eye to be of 
 fire," 247 ; on the origin of male and 
 female, 367 
 
 Empiricism, Hegel on, 80 ; urged as 
 the reproach of Aristotle, 109 
 
 Epicharmus, cited, 343 
 
 Epicurus, cited, 137 
 
 Epigenesis, theory of, 351; its triumph, 
 354; idea of grasped by Aristotle, 
 369. See Generation 
 
 Epilepsy, compared by Aristotle to 
 sleep, 261; disease of a nervous 
 centre, ib. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 391 
 
 Equilibrium, the action of equal oppos- 
 ing forces, 126 
 Erasmus, his opinion of Hermolaus 
 
 Barbaras, 118 
 Eratosthenes, an instance of the neglect 
 of Verification among the Greeks, 59 
 Ether a fifth element, 140 
 Ethics (A.'s), quotation from, 11 
 Eulogists, Aristotle's, 18, 23, 154, 155 
 Eumenides of ^Eschylus cited, 352 
 Everardus, on female sperm, 333. Cited, 
 
 346 \ 
 
 Evolution. See Generation 
 Experiment, what, it is, 49; distin- 
 guished from Observation, 50 ; in- 
 stances of Aristotle's perception of, 
 112,113. See Empiricism 
 
 Eabricius ab Aqtjapendente, cited, 
 
 169, 170, 176, 177, 332 
 Eact (Scientific), definition of, 71; its 
 implied antithesis to Idea or Theory, 
 71, 74, 75 ; the real distinction, 75, 
 76, 77, 78; its indissoluble connection 
 with Idea, 72 ; its verification, ib. ; 
 real meaning to be assigned to, 73 ; 
 tendency to use it as a final truth, 74 
 Ealloppia cited, 279, 332; on the exists 
 
 ence of sperm in females, 333 
 Earre, Dr. A., his article on the Uterus 
 
 and its Appendages cited, 216, 338 
 Ectichism, cause of, 86 
 Einal cause, tendency to invoke, a cha- 
 racteristic of Metaphysics, 86 
 Eischer, Karl, cited, 46 
 Eish, Cardan on the respiration of, 176; 
 why they die out of water, ib. ; the 
 perch said to be self-reproductive, 
 209, 210; Aristotle's ruminating fish, 
 282; Milne Edwards and Professor 
 Owen on the ruminating fish, 283 
 Elesh, Aristotle on the properties of, 
 307 ; subordination of its parts, ib. ; 
 cartilage, ib. 
 Elourens, his explanation of the respira- 
 tion of fish disproved, 176 
 Eorce, advantage of the true conception 
 of, 95; its existence as an entity, 96; 
 methods of its investigation, ib.; the 
 conception of its indestructibility 
 modern, 123 ; the conditions under 
 which it is apprehended, ib. ; correla- 
 tion of forces, ib. 
 Eour Elements, Plato on the cohesion 
 of, 105 ; Aristotle's definition of an 
 element, 140 ; the fifth element, ib. ; 
 A. on the chemistry of the elements, 
 146 
 Erantzius, cited on Aristotle's Hist. 
 
 Animal, 279 ; his edition of the Be 
 
 Partibus, 292 
 Praunhofer, cited, 70 
 Pries, his work on Anthropology cited, 
 
 Funes y Mendoca, cited, 269 ; on 
 fibrous-blooded animals, 303 ; on the 
 ossification of the heart, 313 ; follows 
 Aristotle's opinion that the lioness 
 has but two teats, 321 
 
 Eurlanus cited, 277 
 
 Galen, affirms that the Asclepiads were 
 taught dissection, 7 ; his anatomical 
 knowledge said to rest upon careful 
 dissection, 158; he did not dissect 
 the human body, 163 ; Daremberg, 
 his editor and translator cited, ib.; on 
 A.'s ignorance of human anatomy, 
 166; his conception of the Heart, ib.; 
 his confusion regarding the nervous 
 system, 167, 168; on the respiration 
 of fish, 176; his De Usu Partium 
 cited, 177; criticizes Aristotle's theory 
 of the brain* 180 ; alleged to have 
 discovered the incandescent gases, 
 185, 186 ; maintained the mortality 
 of the Soul, 233, 234; on the three 
 species of souls, 233; his knowledge 
 of anatomy more accurate than 
 Aristotle's, 281 ; on the' sutures of 
 the skull, 306 ; mentions fish having 
 the os sublime of Ovid, 308; on the 
 existence of bone in the heart, 313. 
 Cited, 176, 321, 322, 334 
 
 Galenists, their absurdities, 163 
 
 Galileo, ridiculed by the Aristotelians, 
 57; his experiments on the velocity 
 of falling bodies, ib. ; his a priori 
 idea as to the velocity of a falling 
 body, 68 ; hesitates to identify celes- 
 tial and terrestrial mechanics, 125; 
 his refutation of Aristotle's theory of 
 projectiles, 132; the founder of Dy- 
 namics, 147; finds the principle of 
 " virtual velocities" in Aristotle, 
 148 ; his Dialoyhi cited, 151 ; his 
 story about the origin of the nerves, 
 168. Cited, 2, 143 
 
 Gassendi, an adversary of Aristotle, 3 ; 
 on the errors of A., 21 
 
 Gautier, his figures of the spermatozoa, 
 352 
 
 Gaza, his imperfect version of the De 
 Generatione, 325 
 
 Gegenbauer, cited, 194 
 
 Gellius, cited, 8 
 
 Generation, normal and abnormal, 207 ; 
 male and female organisms, 207, 208 ; 
 
392 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 hermaphroditism, 208 ; conditions of 
 development of the impregnated 
 ovum, 214, 215; loss of weight of the 
 egg during development, 215, 216; 
 A. on various modes of generation, 
 288, 289; summary of modem know- 
 ledge of, 327; origination, ib.; deve- 
 lopment, 328 ; incubation, 329 ; Aris- 
 totle on the origin of the sperm, 339, 
 340; and on the growth of the 
 embryo, 342 ; various hypotheses 
 concerning generation, 351 ; Hindoo 
 theory pfj 352 ; discovery of the 
 mammalian ovum, 353 ; theory of 
 syngenesis, ib. ; of evolution, ib. ; 
 on the physical nature of sperm, 
 356 ; the aura seminalis, ib. ; A. on 
 the development of the embryo, 
 357, 358, 359; on the generation of 
 fish, insects, and bees, 364 ; impro- 
 ' bability of spontaneous generation, 
 364, 365 ; origin of male and female, 
 367 ; influence of each of the parents, 
 372. See Embryology, Organism 
 Genesis, Plato's idea of, as expressed 
 
 in the Timcsus, 104 
 Geoffroy St. Hilaire. See St. Hilaire, 
 
 Geoffroy 
 Germcell, production of, 337 
 Gesner, cited, 278 
 Giordano Bruno. See Bruno 
 Girou de Buzareingues, cited, 371 
 Gland, pineal, the seat of the Soul, 83 
 Goethe, an anatomist, 162 ; his work on 
 Morphology cited, 183 ; his Farben- 
 lehre cited, 247. Cited, 226, 237, 249, 
 280 
 Graafian Vesicle, cause of its bursting, 
 338 ; Blumenbach, cited, ib. ; mistaken 
 for the ovum, 353 
 Grafting, animal, successfully practised, 
 
 191 
 Grant, Sir Alex., on the meaning of 
 
 in>XV, 222 
 Grant's Lectures on Comparative Ana- 
 tomy cited, 155 
 Gravitation, law of, discovered by New- 
 ton, 29 ; Comte on its extension be- 
 yond the solar system, 125 
 Gravity, an abstraction, 95; its expla- 
 natory use, ib. ; Aristotle's idea of, 
 141, 142, 143 
 Greeks, the inventors of astronomical 
 instruments, 38; their scientific dis- 
 coveries, 39; their adoption of scien- 
 tific scepticism, 39, 40 ; Aristotle an 
 illustration of their excellence and 
 defects, 41 ; their desire of knowledge 
 for its own sake, 43; the originators 
 of science, 44; their slow progress in 
 discovery, 45; Whewell on the cause 
 
 of their failure in philosophy, 52, 88 ; 
 their want of ideas examined, 55 ; 
 neglect of facts, not of ideas, the 
 cause of their scientific failure, ib.; 
 their imperfect appreciation of the 
 nature of evidence, 56; their recog- 
 nition of the Inductive Method, ib. ; 
 deficient both in facts and ideas, 58 ; 
 their want of method and instru- 
 ments, ib. ; quotation from Bacon, ib. ; 
 their impatience in investigation, ib.; 
 Whewell on their failure in science, 
 88 ; their superstitions respecting 
 unburied bodies, 160; their stringent 
 laws as to burial, ib. ; their horror of 
 dissection, ib.; Pliny on their menda- 
 city, 286. 
 
 Greek art, defects of, 41 
 
 Gruner's Analecta ad Antiquitates Me- 
 dicas cited, 1 60 
 
 Gubler, cited, 345 
 
 Guizot, on the materiality of the soul, 
 224 
 
 Halleb, cited, 159, 220, 323, 347, 353, 
 354, 356, 361, 367, 371, 374; his pati- 
 ent labours in Verification, 60; on the 
 want of patient investigation in his 
 contemporaries, ib. ; an instance of 
 his great labours, ib. ; his definition of 
 Physiology, 156 ; maintained that 
 Hippocrates dissected the Human 
 Body, 160; on man's natural repug- 
 nance to dissection, 162 ; his estimate 
 of the quantity of blood going to the 
 brain, 166; on the insensibility of the 
 ' Cerebrum, 305; his Opuscula Ana- 
 
 tomica cited, 316 
 Hamilton, Sir W., his eulogy on Aris- 
 totle, 18, 22; on " divisible sensa- 
 tion," 253; his notes on A. 's treatise 
 on Memory and Kecollection, 256. 
 Cited, 257 
 Harles, cited, 159, 167, 170 
 Harless, on the Asclepiads, cited, 7. 
 Harris, his Philosophical Arrangements, 
 
 cited, 22 
 Hartsoeker, his claim to priority in the 
 
 discovery of the Spermatozoa, 352 
 Harvey, on the pulsation of the Heart, 
 174; asserts that all animals are ovi- 
 parous, 213; on generation, 215 ; 
 studies which led him to the discovery 
 of the circulation of the blood, 323; 
 compared with Aristotle, 326 ; denies 
 the existence of female sperm, 333. 
 Cited, 298, 305, 332, 355 
 Heart, assumed by Aristotle to be the 
 seat of the Soul, 120; Aristotle's error 
 in reference to the position of, 165 ; 
 
INDEX. 
 
 393 
 
 Galen's conception of, 166; regarded 
 as the great source of Motion, 174; 
 assumed by A. to be the origin of the 
 tendons, ib.; dependence of Aristotle's 
 theories on, ib. ; Harvey on the pulsa- 
 tion of, i'6. ; the seat of sensation, 179; 
 A.'s opinion that it is the first organ 
 developed, 310; genesis of, ib.; the 
 origin of the veins and of emotion, 
 311; Aristotle on the ossification of 
 the septum, 313; the heart the origin 
 of character, ib. ; its inability to with- 
 stand disease, 313, 314; the origin of 
 development, 361 
 
 Heat, Aristotle's theory of, 139; his 
 inquiries respecting animal heat, 299; 
 the direction of animal heat, 306 
 
 Heaven, analysis of Aristotle's work De 
 Ccelo, 136; the form of, 138 
 
 Hectocotylus of the Argonaut, 197, 198; 
 described by Cuvier, 198; its peculiar 
 wonder, 198, 199; the discovery sup- 
 posed to be anticipated by Aristotle, 
 • ib.; A.'s passages on, 199, 200; his 
 ignorance of the Hectocotylus, 200, 
 201; Von Siebold's error, 201 
 
 Heeren, his account of Classic Literature 
 in the Middle Ages, cited, 8, 118 
 
 Hegel, his admiration for Aristotle, 18, 
 22 ; his disciples' idea of the Absolute, 
 80; his Introduction to Logic, cited, 
 ib. ; on the meaning of Truth, ib. ; on 
 Empiricism, ib.; his elucidation of 
 Matter and Spirit, 81; his errors, ib.; 
 denies the charge of Empiricism 
 against Aristotle, 109. Cited, 21 
 
 Helvetius, his reason for the intellectual 
 superiority of Man, 321 
 
 Herder, adopts Buffon's idea of the 
 living universe as one family, 188 
 
 Hereditaiy transmission of qualities, 
 370, 371 
 
 Hermaphroditism, in fish, 207 ; explana- 
 tion of, 208; hermaphrodites always 
 of one sex, ib. ; Serres cited on, ib. 
 
 Hermias, King of Atarneus, a disciple 
 of Aristotle, 12; invites A. to his 
 court, ib.; A. raises a statue to, 13 
 
 Hermolaus Barbaras, on the " final 
 cause," 118; Erasmus' opinion of him, 
 ib. ; Scaliger's opinion of him, 119; 
 on Locomotion, 134 ; on Aristotle's 
 views of Plants and Animals, 194. 
 Cited, 190, 235 
 
 Herpyllis, Aristotle's concubine, 17 
 
 Herschel, cited on causes and effects, 91 ; 
 notices the obstruction of Aristotle to 
 astronomical science, 125 
 
 Hesychius, a biographer of Aristotle, 5 
 
 Hindoo theory of generation, 352 
 
 Hipparchus, on the records of the Assy- 
 
 rians, 37; an example of scientific 
 inquiry, 59 
 
 Hippocrates, an example of scientific in- 
 quiry, 40; never dissected the Human 
 Body, 160, 163. Cited, 179, 250, 
 263, 332, 370 
 
 Histogenesis, laws of, 329 
 
 Histology, Modern, foundation of, 279 
 
 Historians of Science, their carelessness, 
 281 
 
 History of Animals (Aristotle's), various 
 editions of, 21, 269; proposal and 
 specimen of a new translation, 269; 
 new translation by Mr. Cresswell, ib. ; 
 Cuvier's enthusiasm for, 269, 270 ; ana- 
 lysis of , 27 1, 279 ; criticisms on Cuvier's 
 remarks concerning its generalizations, 
 271; no system of classification con- 
 tained in, 278 ; Titze's ingenious sug- 
 gestion concerning, 279; supposed to 
 be a continuation of the De Partibus, 
 ib.; its abrupt commencement, ib.; 
 the introduction supposed to be lost, 
 ib. ; examples of its careless generali- 
 zation, 282 
 
 Hofer, on Galen's extraction of the in- 
 candescent gases, 185, 186 
 
 Homologies of the skeleton, Aristotle's 
 idea of, 157 
 
 Houghton, his proposal of a new trans- 
 lation of the Hist. Animal., 269 
 
 Humboldt, cited, 140; mentions the 
 case of a man suckling a child, 285 
 
 Hume, his treatise on Human Nature, 
 cited, 241; his doctrine on the 
 Mind, ib. 
 
 Hunter, his animal grafting, 191. 
 
 Huxley, on the value of scientific gene- 
 ralization and classification, 291; on 
 the difference between Hands and 
 Peet in Man, 319. Cited, 327, 337 
 
 Hybridity, Aristotle on, 110 
 
 Hybrids, Aristotle on the fertility of, 
 363 
 
 Hydrophobia, A.'s assertion in respect 
 to, 289 
 
 Hypothesis, scientific importance of, 114 
 
 Idea, a priori, of Galileo, powerless to 
 stand the Ideal Test, 68; the indis- 
 soluble connection of Idea (Theory) 
 with Fact, 72, 74, 75; the. real dis- 
 tinction, 75, 76, 77, 78 
 
 Ideas, their reference to natural pheno- 
 mena, 54; Aristotle's neglect of Ideas 
 the cause of his scientific failure, ib. ; 
 the Platonic conception of, 83; the 
 tendency to accept them as represen- 
 tations of things, 88; science careful 
 
394 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 of their relative truth, 93; Plato's 
 world of permanent existences, 103 
 
 Ideal Test of Inertia, conformable with 
 Real Test, 67 
 
 Ideal Test, when subjectively true, 68 ; 
 recognized by Aristotle and Des- 
 cartes, 69 ; must be supplemented by 
 the Real Test, 80 ; placed above the 
 Real Test by Aristotle, 117. 
 
 Ideler, on Greek and Roman Meteo- 
 rology, cited, 46 
 
 Imagination, Aristotle on its existence 
 in inferior Animals, 243; definition 
 of, 265 
 
 Immortality of the Soul, Aristotle on, 358 
 
 Imperato (the old Italian Naturalist), his 
 description of Sponges, 193; on the 
 vision of the Mole, 219 
 
 Impregnation, the union of a spermcell 
 with a germcell, 202 ; Newport cited 
 on artificial impregnation, 204 
 
 Incubation, the two forms of, 329 ; ovi- 
 parity and viviparity, ib. 
 
 Induction, one of the modes of scientific 
 investigation, 57 
 
 Inductive Method, accurately proclaimed 
 by Aristotle, 47 ; Aristotle the father 
 of Inductive philosophy, 108 
 
 Inductive Syllogism, the basis of science, 
 115 
 
 Inertia, law of, an abstraction, 67 ; Ideal 
 Test of, ib. ; law of, how demonstrable, 
 84; absolute Iner. a figment, 124; 
 instance of Aristotle's disregard of the 
 law of, 152 
 
 Inorganic: the gradation from the inor- 
 ganic to the organic kingdom, 190; 
 plants, the first step in the scale, ib. 
 
 Insects, metamorphoses of, 214; Aris- 
 totle on their external form, 318, 319; 
 on their mode of generation, 336. 
 See Parthenogenesis 
 
 Instruments, scientific, Greek want of, 58 
 
 Intellect, Aristotle's chapter on, 240 
 
 Intestines, Plato's description of, 106 
 
 Invertebrata, Aristotle's account of the 
 anatomy of, 285, 286; their organs of 
 sense, 287 
 
 Isidore St. Hilaire. See St. Hilaire 
 
 Jebe, his Preface to Roger Bacon's 
 
 Opus Majus cited, 121 
 Johnson, his Life of Linacre cited, 119 
 Jourdain, his work on the ancient inter- 
 pretations of Aristotle, cited, 21; his 
 explanation of Roger Bacon's desire 
 to burn Aristotle's works, 121 
 
 Kant, cited, 69, 231 ; on scientific specu- 
 lation, 83; his proposal to form an 
 introductory science to Physics, 84; 
 
 on Plato's Method, 107; on the rela- 
 tivity of Motion and Rest, 124; his 
 definition of Life and Organism, 229; 
 on dreamless sleep, 265 
 
 Kepler, his "doubts as to his own dis- 
 covery respecting the orbit of Mars, 
 34; hesitates to identify celestial and 
 terrestrial mechanics, 125 
 
 Kidneys (the), Serres' observation re- 
 garding, 165 
 
 Kirchoff cited on spectrum analysis, 70 
 
 Kohler, on the confusion of nerves and 
 tendons, 167. Cited, 275, 286 
 
 Kolk, Schroder van der, cited, 224, 261 
 
 Kblliker, his investigation of the Hecto- 
 cotylus, 198; his views adopted by Von 
 Siebold, ib. ; on Aristotle's assertion 
 regarding the Cuttlefish, 218. Cited, 
 208, 310, 362 
 
 Kuhlemann cited by Schneegass, 356 
 
 Lacepede, his Histoire Naturelle des 
 Poissonx cited, 275 
 
 Lallemand, on self-contained elements 
 of development in Spermatozoon, 371 
 
 Lamarck, cited as an instance of the 
 metaphysical tendency, 97 ; on the 
 sensibility of the Polype, ib. ; on the 
 causes of the variety of organisms, 
 ib. ; his retort against Cuvier regard- 
 ing the nervous fluid, 98; on the 
 degrees of the animal scale, 188 ; on 
 the relations of organic life, ib. ; 
 denies the " chain of creation," ib. ; 
 on the organic and inorganic king- 
 doms, 193; his Philosophie Zoohgique 
 cited, 2 1 9 ; his division of animals into 
 vertebrata and invertebrata, 294 
 
 Lamartine, his noble description of man, 
 309 
 
 Language, its influence in philosophy, 
 88, 89 ; its theory little understood, 
 89; modems own no servility to, 89; 
 Whewell on Aristotle's subservience 
 to language, ib. 
 
 Laplace, on the law of Motion, 98, 124 
 
 Laurillard, furnishes a specimen of Hec- 
 tocotylus described by Cuvier, 198 
 
 Lauth, his eulogy of Aristotle's ana- 
 tomical labours, 156 ; his inconsis- 
 tency, ib. ; cited, 158 ; on A.'s error 
 regarding the Heart, 165; on A.'s 
 claim to the discovery of the vertebral 
 theory, 186 
 
 Lawi, his Memorie sopra le Talpa 
 cited, 219 
 
 Lerebouillet, his work on comparative 
 Embryology cited, 189 
 
 Lessing, on Aristotle's Poetics, 21 
 
 Leuckart, thinks Sponges intermediate 
 
INDEX. 
 
 395 
 
 between the vegetal and animal 
 kingdoms, 188. Cited, 208, 295 
 
 Leuwenhoek, first described the tubular 
 structure of the nerves, 168. Cited, 352 
 
 Levity, Aristotle's idea of, 141,142, 143. 
 See Bodies 
 
 Lewis, Historical survey of Astronomy 
 of the Ancients cited, 37 
 
 Leydig, cited, 365 
 
 Libri, on the successful scientific studies 
 of the Italians, 38; his History of 
 Mathematics cited, 148 
 
 Life, various definitions of, 229; the 
 impenetrable dynamis, 231 ; poten- 
 tial and real, id.; regarded by Aris- 
 totle as a final cause, 234; causes of 
 prolonged life, 266, 267, 268 
 
 Light, Aristotle's theory of, 139; his 
 definition of, 248 
 
 Linnteus, his views regarding man anti- 
 cipated by Aristotle, 195 
 
 Liver, Plato's description of, 106; Aris- 
 totle on the properties of, 149, 150, 
 312 ; -Davy's fallacious experiments 
 on, 313 
 
 Locomotion, A.'s views of, 242, 243 
 
 Logic, its danger, 81 ; Aristotle's scien- 
 tific, 115, 116, 117 
 
 Longet, cited, 208 
 
 Longevity, Aristotle's treatise on, 266 ; 
 his explanation of the causes of, 266, 
 267, 268 
 
 Lucas, cited, 352, 353 
 
 Lucretius, on the tendency of bodies in 
 space, 137 
 
 Ludovicus Vives, on the comparison be- 
 tween the moderns and the ancients, 4 
 
 Lungs, Aristotle's description and theory 
 of, 164, 314 
 
 Lyceum, opened as a school by Aris- 
 totle, 1 5 ; description of, ib. 
 
 Lyonet, his anatomical work cited, 158; 
 his patient observation, ib. 
 
 Mabillon, refers to the figure of the 
 telescope in ancient MS., 186 
 
 Macgillivray, his amusing eulogy of 
 Aristotle, 155; his exaggerated esti- 
 mate of A., 270; on Aristotle as a 
 naturalist, 286 
 
 Magnetic Fluid, Lamarck's retort 
 against Cuvier respecting, 98 
 
 Majendie, his Journal de Physiologie 
 cited, 177 
 
 Malebranche, cited, 353 
 
 Malpighi, his estimate of the quantity 
 of blood going to the brain, 166; 
 alleged anticipation of his discovery 
 respecting the fibrine of the blood, 
 
 284 ; discovers the capillaries, 362. 
 Cited, 310, 353, 362 
 
 Mammals, varieties of vertebrae in, 85 
 
 Mammertus, Claudian. See Claudian 
 
 Man, compared by Plato to the universe, 
 106; Aristotle's confession as to man's 
 internal anatomy, 164; derivation of 
 the word man, 195; modern attempts 
 to separate him from the animal 
 kingdom, ib.; the stress laid on his 
 erect posture, 308, 309 ; Lord Mon- 
 boddo's man, who preferred going on 
 all fours, 309 ; Lamartine's noble 
 description of man, ib. ; the only ani- 
 mal that is ticklish, 316; A.'s diag- 
 nosis of man, 319; a quadrumanous 
 animal, 319, 320 ; A.'s inferences 
 from man's erect attitude, 320, 321 ; 
 A.'s reasons why he of all animals 
 has flesh on his legs, 322 ; asserts 
 that man is tailless, ib. ; his sponta- 
 neous origin not incredible to Aris- 
 totle, 366 
 
 Manava-Dharmasastra cited, 352 
 
 Manzolina, Anna, her wax preparations 
 the pride of Bologna, 162 
 
 Mars, Kepler's doubts respecting the 
 orbit of, 34 
 
 Martianus Capella, on the antiquity of 
 Egyptian astronomy, 37 
 
 Martin, Henri, cited, 14 
 
 Martins, his Memoires de I'Acad. de 
 Monpellier cited, 158; on the identity 
 of the Humerus with the Pemur, ib. 
 
 Mathematics, their Greek origin, 39 ; 
 the most rigorous type of the true 
 method, ib. 
 
 Matter, his History of the Alexandrian 
 School cited, 16 
 
 Matter, Newton on the formation of, 97 
 
 Matter and Spirit, Hegel's elucidation 
 of, 81 
 
 Maurice, his felicitous contrast of Plato 
 and Aristotle, 19 
 
 Maury, his Le Sommeil et les Reoes 
 cited, 258 
 
 Max Miiller. See Miiller 
 
 MazzucheUi, his Italian Writers cited, 
 119 
 
 McDonnell, cited, 177 
 
 Mechanics, Rational compared with 
 Practical, 82; Aristotle's work on, 
 122; A.'s distinction between celes- 
 tial and terrestrial mechanics, 125; 
 Kepler and Galileo's hesitancy, ib. 
 
 Meckel, on the gradation of organisms, 
 188; his views adopted in theVestiges 
 of Creation, 188. Cited, 207, 210, 
 295, 315 
 
 Medici, his work on the Anatomical 
 School of Bologna cited, 163 
 
396 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Memory, Aristotle's explanation of, 
 256 ; analysis of A.'s work on Memory 
 and Recollection, ib. ; Sir W. Hamil- 
 ton's notes on Reid, ib. 
 
 Metamorphoses ot Animals, instanced 
 in the Salamander, 213 ; whence 
 Goethe deduced his theory of the 
 metamorphoses of Plants, 354 
 
 Metaphysical conception of Nature, 
 Mind impeded by, 31 
 
 Metaphysicians, overlook the Real Test, 
 82 
 
 Metaphysics, its efforts not without 
 fruit, 66; its vanity lies in Method, 
 ib.-, as distinguished from Science, 
 84, 93; basis of, 87, 88; demands 
 only the test of logical dependence, 
 90; its tendency active in the early 
 stages of culture, 96; Aristotle a 
 metaphysician, 119 
 
 Meteorology, Aristotle's work on, 
 122 — 147 ; its design and scope, 
 143, 144, 145; its failure for want 
 of instruments, ib. ; analysis of, 
 145 
 
 Method, the Subjective and Objective 
 compared, 35 ; origin of the Subjec- 
 tive, 36 ; systematic adoption of 
 Method due to the Greeks, 38 ; 
 Mathematics the most rigorous type 
 of the true Method, 39 ; the (rue 
 Method impossible without scepticism, 
 ib. ; the Inductive accurately pro- 
 claimed by Aristotle, 47 ; the ancient 
 Method powerless to lead to satis- 
 factory results, ib.; Greek want of 
 Method, 58; preference for the Sub- 
 jective explained, 63 ; its gradual 
 relinquishment, ib. ; the scientific 
 failure of the ancients referable to 
 false Method, 64 ; account of the 
 Subjective and Objective Methods, 
 65; error of the Subjective tested, 
 81; Method the distinction between 
 Science and Metaphysics, 84; Plato's 
 Method examined, 101 ; his frank 
 avowal of the Subjective, 103; Kant's 
 happy illustration of Plato's Method, 
 107; Aristotle's defective conception 
 of, 108; impossibility of applying 
 true Method in A.'s time, 113; Aris- 
 totle's scientific Logic, 115, 116, 117; 
 A. protests against the a priori 
 Method, 140 
 
 Meyer, cited, 140; on the error of Fabri- 
 cius, 177; on the various schemes of 
 classification, 277 
 
 Milky Way, Aristotle's explanation of, 
 145; theory of Democritus, ib. 
 
 Milman, his Hist, of Latin Christianity, 
 cited, 121 
 
 Milne Edwards, on Aristotle's ruminat- 
 ing fish, 283 
 
 Mind, Plato refers the causes of all 
 things to, 102 ; only the highest 
 development of Life, 223 
 
 Moderns, supposed anticipation of their 
 discoveries by the ancients, 46, 197; 
 their superiority to the ancients in 
 the investigation of facts, 57; psycho- 
 logical cause of their errors, 61; own 
 no servility to current meanings of 
 words, 89; some of their speculative 
 views anticipated by Aristotle, 183; 
 their uncritical attitude toward ancient 
 authors, 185, 186 
 
 Moisture, assigned by Aristotle as a 
 cause of longevity, 267 ; ancient ideas 
 of, ib. 
 
 Mole (the), Aristotle on the vision of, 
 218; fierce debate of naturalists, 218, 
 219; an Italian Mole corresponding 
 with Aristotle's description, 219 ; 
 proved to have perfect vision by 
 Geoffroy St. Hilaire, ib.; the Syrian 
 Mole mentioned by Lamarck, ib. 
 
 Molluscs, Aristotle on their external 
 form, 318, 319 
 
 Monboddo, Lord, cited, 22 ; mentions a 
 man who preferred going on all fours, 
 309; maintains Man's <« sublime to 
 be merely artificial, ib. ; his belief in 
 monsters and one-legged men, 373, 374 
 
 Monogenesis, various forms of, 327 
 
 Monsters, Aristotle's and Monboddo's 
 opinions on, 373, 374. 
 
 Montucla, his History of Mathematics, 
 cited, 38 ; his contempt for Aristotle's 
 mathematical insight, 148; on A.'s 
 mechanical Problems, 149 
 
 Morell, on the Vital and Spiritual Forces 
 of our Nature, 224 
 
 Morley's Life of Cardan, cited, 176 
 
 Moscati, cited, 309 
 
 Mothers' marks, Aristotle's omission of, 
 374 
 
 Motion, its laws transcend experience, 
 66; formula of, 66, 99; our expe- 
 rience of, ib. ; Laplace on the law of, 
 98; Comte on Laplace's theory, ib.; 
 analysis of Motion, 124, 133, 134, 135, 
 136; Aristotle ignorant of the laws 
 and nature of, 126 ; the ancient 
 conception of, ib.; Mussenbroek and 
 Rohault's conception of Motion and 
 Rest, 126, 127; Aristotle's celebrated 
 definition of, 131 ; fallacy respecting 
 continuous Motion, 133; its three 
 divisions, 133, 134; Hermolaus Bar- 
 baras on the " motion of place," 134; 
 A. on accelerated motion, 151; the 
 Heart regarded as the source of, 174; 
 
INDEX. 
 
 397 
 
 theoiy of animal movements, 178; 
 origin of all motion, ib. ; Aristotle on 
 the principle of, 227; Motion consi- 
 dered as part of the Vital Principle,242 
 
 Miiller, Johannes, his patient labours 
 in Verification, 60; his discovery of 
 Nervous System in Holothuriaa, 167; 
 on Aristotle's announcement of a 
 Placental fish, 217; adopts A.'s view 
 of Life and Mind, 228 ; on the action 
 of special nerves of sense, 247 ; on the 
 voices of fish, 287. Cited, 23, 207, 
 208, 221, 315 
 
 Miiller, Max, on the origin of the word 
 man, 195; on the meaning and equi- 
 valents of anima, 222 
 
 Muratori, his Dissertation on Italian 
 Antiquities, cited, 8 ; on a drawing of 
 the telescope in an ancient MS., 186 
 
 Muscles, Aristotle's ignorance of the, 
 158 
 
 Muscular contractility, theories of, 177, 
 178 
 
 Mussenbroek, his Experimental Physics 
 cited, 38; his conception of Motion 
 and Rest, 126; on the idea of Space, 
 131 ; proposes a fourth kingdom, 190 
 
 Mythology (Ancient), its alleged em- 
 bodiment of a lost Science, 46 
 
 Natuke, idea of uniformity not con- 
 ceived by Aristotle, 125; A.'s defini- 
 tion of, 129; the principle of Motion 
 and Rest, ib. ; her ascending steps 
 from non-living to living beings, 190 
 
 Natural gradation: the first step Plants, 
 190; the second step Plant-animals, 
 192; the third step animals, 193 
 
 Natural History. See Anatomy, Biology 
 
 Nerves, Aristotle said to have dis- 
 covered them, 157, 168; his slight 
 acquiantance with, 158 ; what- are 
 their Greek equivalents, 168 ; their 
 tubular structure first described by 
 Leuwenhoek, ib. ; made familiar to 
 Europe by Ehrenberg, ib.; Galileo's 
 story on their origin, ib.; defenders 
 of Aristotle's theory of the nerves, ib. ; 
 A.'s alleged discovery discussed, 168, 
 169; A. also credited with discovery 
 of the cerebral nerves, 169; the optic 
 nerves believed by Aricenna and 
 Roger Bacon to be tubes or ducts, 
 169, 170 . 
 
 Nerve-tissue, its alleged existence in 
 inferior animals, 243 
 
 Nervous system, Aristotle's ignorance 
 of, 158; Galen's confusion respecting, 
 167, 168 
 
 NeSpow, meaning attached by Aristotle 
 
 to, 167, 168 
 Newport, on artificial impregnation, 204 
 Newton, Sir I., discovers the law of 
 gravitation, 29; his Principia com- 
 pared with Aristotle's Physics, 67, 
 68; on Attraction, 93; N.'s metaphy- 
 sical tendency, 97; on the formation, 
 of Matter, ib. ; his hesitation in iden- 
 tifying celestial and terrestrial Me- 
 chanics, 125 
 Nicanor, Aristotle's adopted son, 17 
 Nicomachus, the father of Aristotle, 7; 
 physician to Amyntas II., ib. ; his 
 death, ib. 
 Nicomachus, Aristotle's son, 17 
 Nifo's work on Aristotle cited, 221 ; his 
 
 Expositio Subtilissima cited, 233 
 Nile, the cause of female fecundity, 370 
 Nizolius, his indignation against the 
 blind worship of the Greeks, 2 ; com- 
 pares Aristotle to the cuttle-fish, ib. 
 Novum Organum, its defective concep- 
 tion of Method, 108 
 Nutrition, the first stage of the Soul's 
 activity, 190; Aristotle's definition of, 
 234; alleged by A. to be most active 
 during sleep, 259 
 
 Objective Method, replaces the Sub- 
 jective in science, 26; contrasted with 
 the Subjective, 35 ; arises from positive 
 knowledge, 36 ; its origin, a late event 
 in the history of man, ib. ; due chiefly 
 to the Italian Greeks, ib. ; no evidence 
 of it in the East, 37 ; its use impos- 
 sible without instruments, ib. ; its 
 teaching on the "final cause," 119; 
 its use in Physics, 123. See Subjec- 
 tive Method, Ideal and Real Test 
 
 Observation, compared with Experiment, 
 50; one of the modes of scientific 
 investigation, 57; Aristotle on the 
 necessity of, 110, 111, 112; use of the 
 personal equation, 378; late develop- 
 ment of the art of, ib. 
 
 Oken, cited, 184, 365 
 
 Olivi, verifies Aristotle's statement re- 
 garding the nest-building fish, 218 
 
 Oilier, M., his successful grafting of 
 pieces of bone, 191 
 
 Optics, their origin due to the Greeks, 39 
 
 Organic, the gradation between the 
 organic and inorganic kingdoms, 
 190 
 
 Organism, Lamarck on the causes of the 
 varieties of, 97; its three most impor- 
 tant parts unknown to Aristotle, 158; 
 the differentiation of plants and 
 
898 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 animals stated, 194; male and female 
 organisms, 207, 208; Kant's definition 
 of an organism, 229 ; theory of ascend- 
 ing complexity, 243; Aristotle's divi- 
 sion into similar and dissimilar parts, 
 279, 280; Bichat on the distinction 
 between animal and vegetable organs, 
 314, 315; single and double organs, 
 315; A. on the sexual organs, 332; 
 various authorities cited as to the 
 ovaries, 332, 333; A. on the testes, 
 333, 334; the uterus, 334; A. on the 
 origin of the sperm, 339, 340. See 
 Generation, Embryology 
 
 Origin of Species, Kobinet's wild scheme 
 of, 187; Bonnet's scheme, ib. 
 
 Orton, his Lectures on Breeding, cited, 
 371 
 
 Ovaries, opinions of various physiolo- 
 gists on, 332, 333; their functions, 
 338 
 
 Ovid, his description of man's sublime 
 gaze applicable to certain fishes, 308 
 
 Oviparity. See Incubation 
 
 Oviparous Animals, Aristotle on, 350 
 
 Ovulation, processes of, 337, 338; spon- 
 taneous ovulation, 338 ; compared 
 with semination, 339 
 
 Owen, Professor, cited, 157; his work 
 on Parthenogenesis, cited, 202 ; on the 
 nourishment of the embryo, 216; on 
 Aristotle's ruminating fish, 283 
 
 " Oxidation of tissues," a phrase used 
 to cloak ignorance, 98 
 
 Pagenstecher, cited, 369 
 
 Parallelogram of forces, Aristotle's ex- 
 position of, 148; superior to that of 
 Kant, ib. 
 
 Parents, their mutual influence upon 
 their children, 371, 372 
 
 Paiis, Parliament of, declares Aristotle's 
 works heretical, 21; edict as to the 
 doctrine of the ancients, ib. 
 
 Parthenogenesis, Aristotle on that of 
 bees, 110; one of his anticipations of 
 modern science, 201 ; present state of 
 opinion on, 202; of the Aphis, 202, 
 203; the means of, discussed, 204; 
 fact of that of bees placed beyond 
 doubt, 205; researches of Dzierzon 
 and Von Siebold, ib. ; guaranteed by 
 anatomical investigation, ib. ; the ana- 
 tomical data unknown to Aristotle, 
 206 
 
 " Parts of Animals." See Be Partibus 
 
 Patrizio, his enmity to Aristotle echoed 
 by Bacon, 9; contents of his Peri- 
 patetic Discussions, ib. ; Giordano 
 Bruno's contempt for him, ib.; he 
 
 denied all distinction between Ra- 
 tional and Irrational, 195, 1 96 ; on the 
 Greek and Latin equivalents for Soul, 
 222, 223. Cited, 279 
 
 Perch, Aristotle's remarks on the, 209 ; 
 said by Eondelet to be both male and 
 female, ib. ; an exception to the whole 
 class of fishes, 210; dispute as to its 
 self-reproduction, ib.; the Perch bi- 
 sexual, ib. See Fish 
 
 Peripatetics, origin of the name, 16 
 
 Personal equation, value of, 378 
 
 Phaedo, Plato's, cited, 102 
 
 Phenomena, three modes of conceiving, 
 26,27,30; invariability of , 28 ; Comte 
 on the metaphysical conception of, 
 30; Vicq d'Azyr, on the Objective 
 interpretation of, 31 j Greek and 
 Modern interpretation of, ib.; con- 
 ceived to be dependent on a mutable 
 will, 32 ; criteria of their three modes 
 of interpretation, ib. ; contrast between 
 the metaphysical and scientific gua- 
 rantee of, 33 ; modes of interpreting, 
 34; Aristotle's idea of an ascending 
 complexity of Vital Phenomena, 189. 
 See Method 
 
 Philelphus, on the connection of Mind 
 and Body, 232. Cited, 233 
 
 Philip of Macedon entrusts Aristotle with 
 tutorship of Alexander, 13; builds a 
 gymnasium, ib. 
 
 Philippson, cited, 169, 170, 280 
 
 Philosophic Anatomy, first dawn of, 
 279 
 
 Philosophy, Greek, Whewell on the 
 cause of its failure, 52, 88; Aristotle, 
 the father of Inductive, 108; Prantl's 
 reproach against ancient philosophy, 
 140 
 
 Physics, Kant's proposal to form an 
 introductory science to, 84; Aristotlc"s 
 failure to establish a transcendental 
 idea of, 122; use of Objective Method 
 in, 123; his extant writings on, 127; 
 analysis of A.'s treatise on, 128; Bar- 
 thelemy St. Hilaire's version of A.'s 
 Physics, ib. 
 
 Physiology, Aristotle's anatomical 
 knowledge insufficient for, 170, 171; 
 A.'s neglect of Verification, 171, 172; 
 A.'s physiology entirely one of con- 
 jecture, 180; studies which led to the 
 great discoveries in, 323, 324, 325 
 
 Pineal Gland, the seat of the Soul, 83 
 
 Placenta, its use, 216 
 
 Placental Pish, Aristotle aware of their 
 existence, 212; Miiller on Aristotle's 
 announcement of, 217 
 
 Planets, Comte on our limited physical 
 and chemical knowledge of, 70 
 
INDEX. 
 
 399 
 
 Plants, Aristotle's identification of, with 
 animals, 184; his perception of an 
 important morphological law, 187; 
 Treviranus makes a separate kingdom 
 of the Cryptogamic plants and Zoo- 
 phytes, 188; they have life, 190, 191; 
 their designation, 191; grafting no 
 mark of distinction, ib. ; plant-animals 
 the second step in natural gradation, 
 192; Schuyl on Vegetable Life, 229; 
 vitality of plants due to a Soul, ib. 
 
 Plato, Aristotle's alleged ingratitude to, 
 11; A.'s teacher for 17 years, ib.; 
 contrasted with A., 19; P.'s pernici- 
 ous influence, ib. ; his noble faculties, 
 101; his Method, how far scientific 
 and how far philosophic, ib.; his 
 philosophy in reference to science, 
 102; his studies, ib.; he refers the 
 causes of all things to Mind, ib.; the 
 influence of Anaxagoras on him, ib. 
 the method of eliminating scientific 
 truth, 102, 103; his intensely Sub- 
 jective method, 102, 103, 104; on 
 genesis, ib. ; his idea of Science, 103; 
 his frank avowal of the Subjective 
 method, ib. ; causes of the scientific 
 extravagances in the Timcpus, ib. ; his 
 depreciation of Astronomy, 104; on 
 the cohesion of the Pour Elements, 
 105; his use of the five solids, ib. ; 
 his anatomical and physiological con- 
 clusions, 106; his description of the 
 Liver, ib. ; of the Intestines, ib. ; his 
 own reason for his conclusions, ib. ; 
 Kant's happy illustration of his 
 Method, 107; his whole teaching 
 vitiated, ib. ; contrast to Aristotle, 
 108; his method compared with A.'s, 
 109; taught that all knowledge was 
 reminiscence, 111; his evidence of 
 the true scientific method, 115; his 
 derivation of aV0pw7roc, 195 ; on 
 the derivation of fvxv, 223 ; held 
 "the eye to be of fire," 247; on 
 the use of the Plesh, 307; on the 
 Uterus, 335 
 
 Platonic Method, Kant on the, 107 ; dan- 
 ger of, pointed out by Aristotle, 111 
 
 Playfair, on the Physical science of the 
 ancients, 49; inaccurate as to their 
 scientific failure, 51 
 
 Pliny, on Alexander's assistance to 
 Aristotle, 15; on the phenomena of 
 scarlet fever, 172; on Greek men- 
 dacity, 286; repeats A.'s statement 
 respecting the induration of the 
 Heart, 313. Cited, 289 
 
 Ploss, cited, 370 
 
 Polypes, Lamarck denies the sensibility 
 of, 97; held by Aristotle to be plants, 
 
 192; doubt as to whether A. con- 
 founded them with Sponges, 193; 
 their bisexual structure, 209 
 
 Polytheism, remnants of, in the Christian 
 Church, 29 
 
 Ildpoi, what Aristotle meant by, 169 
 
 Portal denies that Aristotle dissected 
 the Human Body, 159; on A.'s ana- 
 tomical carelessness, 167 
 
 Poselger, his exposition of Aristotle's 
 Problems, 147. Cited, 148 
 
 Pouchet, cited, 338, 364 
 
 Prantl, his edition of Aristotle's Physics, 
 cited, 128; of the De Ccelo, 136; on the 
 priority of fire to earth, 138; his 
 reproach against ancient philosophers, 
 140. Cited, 249 
 
 Precision, instance of Aristotle's scien- 
 tific, 112 
 
 Primal Soul, see Vital Principle 
 
 Problems, Aristotle's work on, 147; ex- 
 pounded by Chabanon and Poselger, 
 ib.; Montucla's comment on, 149; 
 examples from, 150, 151, 152. Cited, 
 300 
 
 Projectiles, Aristotle's theory on, 132, 
 133; on the cessation of motion, 
 152 
 
 Psychology, modern, Aristotle's antici- 
 pation of, 111; reason for much of its 
 obscurity, 237 
 
 Pythagoreans, their researchesin physical 
 science, 38; their constancy in investi- 
 gating causes of phenomena, ib. ; the 
 pioneers of modem science, ib. 
 
 Pythias, Aristotle's wife, 12; his love 
 for, 13 
 
 Pythias, daughter of Aristotle, 17 
 
 Quatrefages, his Unity of the Human 
 
 Species cited, 195 
 Quiddity, one of the four Causes, 117. 
 
 See Causes, Causation 
 
 Ramus, cited, 2 
 
 Rathke, cited, 208, 275, 315; on the 
 difference between oviparity and vivi- 
 parity, 330 ; his observations on the 
 Blenny, 332 
 
 Real Test, the criterion of Verification, 
 68 ; must supplement the Ideal Test, 
 80; necessity of, 82 
 
 Reason, Schellihg on the absolutism 
 of, 80 
 
 Reaumur, cited, 277, 353, 354; his obser- 
 vations on the Ephemeron, 329 
 
 Recollection, considered by Aristotle as 
 distinct from Memory, 257 
 
400 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Eedi, his couplet on the worship of 
 Aristotle, 159 
 
 Reproduction, Aristotle on the power of, 
 in females, 360. See Generation, 
 Parthenogenesis 
 
 Reptiles, held by Aristotle to be blood- 
 less, 276 
 
 Republic, Plato's, cited, 103 
 
 Respiration, Aristotle's ideas on, 174, 
 175, 176; the respiration offish, 175, 
 176 ; A. on the process of, 177 
 
 Rest. See Motion 
 
 Ritter, cited, 6, 9. 140, 279 
 
 Robbe, Dr., his edition of Ammonius, 5 
 
 Robin, C, on embryology, 203 ; on the 
 placenta, 216. Cited, 361 
 
 Robinet, his wild scheme on the origin 
 of species, 187 
 
 Roger Bacon. See Bacon 
 
 Rohault, his definition of Motion, 127 
 
 Rondelet, on the male and female cha- 
 racter of the Perch, 209 ; his work De 
 Piscis Marinis quoted by Dufosse, 210 
 
 Rosmini, on the real weight of Aris- 
 totle's authority, 22 ; his estimate of 
 A.'s philosophy, ib. 
 
 Rouget, cited, 208, 275, 345 
 
 Roulin, cited, 177 
 
 Rudolphi, cited, 210 
 
 Ruminating Pish, Aristotle's, 282 ; 
 Milne Edwards's reference to, 283; 
 Professor Owen's note on, ib. 
 
 Salamander, an instance of the meta- 
 morphoses of animals, 213 
 
 Saverien, quotes Pere Schot respecting 
 the Planet Angels, 29 
 
 Scaliger, J. C, his opinion of Herma- 
 laus Barbaras, 119; his palliation of 
 Aristotle, 167 ; his edition of the 
 Hist. Animal, 269; finds no classifi- 
 cation in it, 278 ; maintained that 
 mice are generated from corruption, 
 361. Cited, 347, 367 
 
 Scarlet fever, Pliny on the phenomena 
 of, 172 
 
 Scepticism, the chief element in true 
 Method, 39 ; due to the Greeks, ib. ; 
 Aristotle on, 40; imperfectly prac- 
 tised by the Greeks, ib. 
 
 Schelling, on the absolutism of Reason, 
 80 
 
 Schleiermacher, cited, 109 
 
 Schleiden, cited, 296 
 
 Schneegass, on the aura seminalis, 356 
 
 Schneider, on Alexander's assistance to 
 Aristotle, 15; his edition of the Hist. 
 Animal, 21, 269 ; his Latin version 
 cited, 199 
 
 Schoolmen (the), their grand mistake, 
 
 70; employed a method on which all 
 problems were insoluble, 71 
 Schroder van der Kolk, on the union 
 between Soul and Body, 224. Cited, 
 261 
 Schuckhard, cited, 270 
 Schuyl, on Vegetable Life, 229 
 Schweigger, his fanciful explanation of 
 
 ancient myths, 46 
 Scientific scepticism, its Greek origin, 39 
 Aristotle on, 40; imperfectly prac- 
 tised by the Greeks, ib. See Scep- 
 ticism 
 Science, dawn of, 24; its gradual deve- 
 lopment, 24, 25 ; distinguished from 
 " common knowledge," 26 ; the cri- 
 terion or guarantee of, 33; its sup- 
 posed origin in the East, 36 ; pre- 
 eminently quantitative, 37; Pytha- 
 gorean researches in, 38, 39 ; its 
 dignity springs from disinterested- 
 ness, 42; cause of the hostility of 
 theologians to, 43; Greeks the origi- 
 nators of, 44; cause of its eclipse in 
 Europe, ib. ; prolonged infancy of, 
 45; failure of the ancients in, 46 ; 
 their failure owing to disregard of 
 Observation and Experiment, 47 ; 
 Playfair's verdict on the failure of the 
 ancients, 49; Playfair inaccurate, 51 ; 
 causes of the failure of the Greeks 
 examined, 55; neglect of facts, not 
 ideas, the cause of Greek failure, ib. 
 three modes of investigation, 57 
 Greek want of instruments, 58 
 source of the errors of the ancients 
 60, 61; the law of progress in, 62 
 transcendental ideas of modern, 66 
 ancient and modern distinguished, 67 
 the absolute rule of, 69 ; the two cri- 
 teria of Verification, ib. ; definition 
 of, 71 ; as distinguished from Meta- 
 physics, 84, 93, 96 ; Kant's proposal to 
 form an introductory science to Phy- 
 sics, 84 ; Whewell on the failure of 
 the Greeks, 88 ; the successful 
 method, 90 ; the primary requisition 
 of science, ib. ; meaning of the word 
 " cause," ib.; disclaims attempts to 
 penetrate secrets of causation, 91 ; 
 seeks only the phenomenal and rela- 
 tive, ib.; its range and limits, 92; 
 Copernicus cited, ib. ; three stages of 
 positive knowledge in, 96 ; continuous 
 abandonment of unverified theories, 
 98; Plato's idea of, 103 ; Experi- 
 ence the true guide in, 111; danger 
 of the Platonic Method, ib. ; impossi- 
 bility of applying the true Method in 
 Aristotle's lime, 113; based on Induc- 
 tive Syllogism, 115; fallacy of ancient 
 
INDEX. 
 
 401 
 
 speculations, 115; Aristotle's scientific 
 logic, 115, 116, 117; his four scientific 
 causes, 117, 118; struggles against the 
 popular horror of dissection, 160; con- 
 formity of ancient ideas with modern 
 research, 185; curious illustration of 
 ancient science, 300 ; summary of 
 modern embryological science, 327 ; 
 ancient and modem contrasted, 377 ; 
 precision of modern, 378 ; personal 
 equation, ib. 
 
 Sea Anemones, their bisexual struc- 
 ture, 209; Aristotle's classification of, 
 318 
 
 Secretion, moderation in, a cause of 
 longevity, 267 
 
 Segni, his Tuscan paraphrase of the De 
 Animd, 221 
 
 Sensation, Aristotle on, 235, 238, 239, 
 252, 297; the judging faculty, 239; 
 divided sensation, 252 ; the distinctions 
 of, 297 
 
 Senses, Touch and Taste the primary, 
 243; other senses, 244, 246, 249, 251; 
 Aristotle's treatise on, 246 ; A.'s 
 analysis of Vision, ib.; of Taste and 
 Smell, 249; of Hearing, 251 
 
 Sensibility, Aristotle's views on, 235, 
 236, 237 
 
 Serres, on the kidneys, 165; on the 
 means of discovering the missing links 
 in the chain of creation, 188; his 
 Pricis d'Anat. transcendante cited, 
 189; on the embryology of male and 
 female organisms, 208 ; on the duality 
 of organs, 315. Cited, 374 
 
 Severinus, cited, 176 
 
 Sexes, Aristotle on the differences of, 
 331; authorities cited on origin of, 
 367; Aristotle's hypotheses on, 368, 
 369, 370 
 
 S'Gravesande, on the differences of 
 things, 117 
 
 Sharpey, cited, 216 
 
 Siebold. See Von Siebold 
 
 Skeleton, Aristotle's ideas of the homo- 
 logies of, 157 
 
 Skin, Aristotle on the formation of the, 
 363 
 
 Sleep, Aristotle's treatise on, 258; his 
 survey of, 258, 259; he asserts it to 
 be the most active time of nutrition, 
 259 ; cause and natural aim of Sleep, 
 260; A.'s physiological explanation 
 of, 260, 261, 262 ; compared to 
 Epilepsy, 261; Kant on dreamless 
 sleep, 265 
 
 Socrates, Aristotle alleged to have been 
 a disciple of his, 5; cause of his re- 
 pugnance to physical inquiries, 43 
 
 Solids, Plato's use of the five, 105 
 
 Sbmmering, his defence of Aristotle 
 respecting the seat of the Nerves, 168 
 
 Sonnenburg, on Aristotle's assertion as 
 to the emptiness of the back part of 
 the skull, 167. Cited, 219, 271 
 
 Soul, Descartes on the seat of, 83; 
 Plato compares Man's soul to that of 
 the universe, 106; Aristotle places its 
 seat in the Heart, 120; first stage of 
 its activity, 190; not equivalent to 
 the tyvxv of Aristotle, 222; sensation 
 the characteristic of, 224; doctrines 
 on, ib.-, Claudian Mammertus on the 
 immaterialism of, 225 ; A. on the 
 divisibility of, ib.; on the study of, 
 226, 227; Galen on the three kinds of, 
 233, 234; Aristotle's views on the 
 immortality of, 233,358; the "place 
 of forms," 240 
 
 Space, useless discussions on the idea 
 of, 131; Aristotle's profitless discus- 
 sion on contraries in, 137, 138 
 
 Spallanzani, cited, 353 
 
 Species, Bonnet's and Robinet's schemes 
 on the origin of, 187; Aristotle's 
 views on, 293 
 
 Spectrum analysis, discloses metals in 
 Sun's atmosphere, 70 
 
 Spencer, Herbert, his definition of Life, 
 230. Cited, 231 
 
 Sperm, whether derived from the whole 
 body or only a part, 339, 340, 341; 
 Aristotle's diagnosis of, 342, 343, 
 344; its physical nature, 356 
 
 Spermatozoon, description of, 352 ; 
 figured by Andry and Gautier, ib. ; 
 Lallemand on its self-contained ele- 
 ments of development, 371 
 
 Sperm-cells, production of, 337 
 
 Speusippus, Aristotle pays 700/. for the 
 works of, 8 
 
 Spinoza, on the hostility of theologians 
 to physical science, 43. Cited, 79, 
 294 
 
 Spirit and Matter, Hegel's elucidation of, 
 81 
 
 Spix, cited, 167, 270; on Aristotle's 
 standard of animal structure, 281; on 
 A.'s wealth of facts, 290 
 
 Spleen, Aristotle's description of inaccu- 
 rate, 165 
 
 Sponges, pronounced by Aristotle to be 
 animals, 184, 193; Imperato's descrip- 
 tion of, 193; A.'s opinion adopted by 
 the Moderns, ib. 
 
 Spontaneous Generation. See Genera- 
 tion 
 
 Spontaneous fission. See Monogenesis 
 
 Sprengel, cited, 159, 168; suggests that 
 Aristotle may have dissected the 
 human body, 163 
 
 26 
 
402 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Stagira, the birthplace of Aristotle, 6j 
 
 its situation, ib. 
 Stagirite. See Aristotle 
 Stalil , on the functions of the Soul, 223; 
 said to teach the same doctrine as 
 Aristotle, ib. ; on the Vital Principle, 
 228 
 Stahr, his article on Aristotle in the 
 Dictionary of Greek and Roman 
 Philosophy cited, 6 
 Stars, Aristotle's theory of their sub- 
 stance, 138, 139, 140 
 Statics, founded by Archimedes, 147, 
 
 379 
 Stenon, cited, 332, 333, 353 
 St. Hilaire, Barthelemy, his assertion of 
 the accuracy ,of Aristotle's Physics, 
 46 ; his Introduction cited, ib. ; on A.'s 
 theory of Motion, 126; his version of 
 the Physics, 128 ; his idolatry of A., 
 130; his translation of Aristotle's 
 Meteorology, 143; his version of the 
 VeAnimd, 221. Cited, 112, 145 
 St. Hilaire, Geoffrey, cited, 183, 208, 
 218, 280, 319, 374; pronounces the 
 chain of creation a chimsera, 188; his 
 docjarine of the " unity of composi- 
 tion," ib.; on the development of the 
 impregnated ovum, 215 
 St. Hilaire, isi'dore, his eulogy on Aris- 
 totle, 155;- quotes Buffon on the 
 theory of gradation, 188; on herma- 
 phroditism, 209; his wonderful goat, 
 285*. Cited, 3, 23, 183, 190, 195, 207, 
 208, 270, 295, 309, 374 
 Stilling, cited, 113 
 
 St. Maur Benedictines, their Literary 
 
 History of France cited, 32 ; their 
 
 account of the auguries of the Druids, 
 
 ib. ; on the essence of the Soul, 225 
 
 Strack's translation of the Hist. Animal., 
 
 269. Cited, 280 
 Subjective Method of interpreting Na- 
 ture, 26, 34, 35; its influence, 35; 
 contrasted with the Objective Method, 
 ib.; arises from ignorance, 36, 63; 
 relied on by the ancients, 49; its 
 gradual relinquishment, 63 ; explana- 
 tion of the preference for, ib. ; the meta- 
 physical phase of, 65; account of the 
 Subjective and Objective Methods, 
 ib. ; error of Subjective Method tested, 
 81; Plato's frank avowal of, 103; its 
 inability to measure physical forces, 
 300. See Objective Method, Ideal 
 and Real Test 
 Sunderall, his Die Thierarten desAris- 
 toteles, cited, 279 ...... 
 
 Sun's atmosphere, metals disolosedm, 
 
 by spectrin analyses, 70 
 Swainson, on Aristotle's greatness, 270 
 
 Swammerdamm, his patient observa- 
 tions, 158 ; on the Heart as the great 
 " cooking centre," 174; on the Ephe- 
 meron, 329. Cited, 220, 275, 353 
 
 Syllogism, Inductive, the basis of 
 science, 115 
 
 Sylvius (Leboe), cited, 323 
 
 Syngenesis, ancient theory of, 353. See 
 Generation 
 
 Syrian Mole. See Mole. 
 
 Taste, Aristotle on the sense of, 179. 
 See. Senses 
 
 Tauchnitz, edition of A.'s works, 22 
 
 Taurellus, his attack on Csesalpinus 
 cited, 2, 168, 228, 305, 333, 347 
 
 Telesius, cited, 2, 178; his Be Naturd 
 Rerum, 177 ; his misconception of 
 Aristotle's illustration of the Vital 
 Principle, 232 ; held light to be visible 
 heat, 248 
 
 Telescope, the, alleged to have been 
 known to the ancients, 186 ; but 
 theirs was a tube without a lens, ib. ; 
 supposed discovery of, by Roger 
 Bacon, ib. 
 
 Tension, identical with vis viva, 123 
 
 Terror, its effect on animals, 302; its 
 cause, ib. 
 
 Testacea, Aristotle on sight and hear- 
 ing of, 287 
 
 Test (Ideal), placed above the Real by 
 Aristotle, 68, 69; when subjectively 
 true, ib. ; must be supplemented by 
 the Real Test, 80. See Real Test 
 
 Testes. See Organism, Generation, 
 Embryology 
 
 Thales, cited by Whewell, 89 
 
 Thielmann, cited, 158 
 
 Theology : progress impeded by the theo- 
 logical conception of Nature, 31; its 
 hostility to physical science, 43 ; 
 its gradual approximation to science, 
 44 ., . 
 
 Theory (or Idea), its implied antithesis 
 to Fact, 71, 74, 75 ; the real distinc- 
 tion, 75, 76, 77, 78; may be trans- 
 ferred from Metaphysics to Science, 
 84; or from Science to Metaphysics, 
 84, 85 " 
 
 Thermoties, value of the science of, 301 
 
 Thompson, Allen, cited, 351 
 
 Tiedemann, cited, 323 . 
 
 Tiraboschi, his History of Italian Lite- 
 rature, cited, 2, 118 
 
 Titze, his ingenious suggestion concern- 
 ing the Hist. Animal., 279 
 Timceus, Plato's, cause of the scientific 
 extravagances in, 103; idea of the 
 genesis, 104. Cited, 334, 335 
 
INDEX. 
 
 403 
 
 Torpedo: weight of its eggs and of the 
 developed young, 216 
 
 Torstrik, A., his recension of the De 
 Anima, 221 j on the Intellect, 240 
 
 Touch, Aristotle on the sense of, 179. 
 See Senses 
 
 Trendelenberg, his edition of the De 
 Anima cited, 118; on Aristotle's 
 meaning of jropoi, 169. Cited, 240 
 252 
 
 Treriranus, makes a separate kingdom 
 of the Cryptogamic plants and Zoo- 
 phytes, 1 88 ; his definition of Life, 221 
 Cited, 231 
 
 Truth, Hegel on the meaning of, 80; 
 Descartes' erroneous criterion of, 83 
 
 Tyson, cited, 319 
 
 UNpoRMiTT in Nature. See Nature. 
 
 Universals, importance attached to by 
 Aristotle, 116, 117 
 
 Universe, Plato's idea of the creation 
 of, 105, 106 
 
 Uterus, Aristotle's description of, 164, 
 165, 215, 334, 335, 336 ; error of 
 the ancient anatomists respecting, 
 332, 333; Plato's description of, 335 
 
 "Valenciennes, cited, 210 
 
 Vallisneri, cited, 352, 353, 354 
 
 Van Beneden, his M&moire sur les Vers 
 Intestinaux cited, 327 
 
 Vander Hooven's Handbook on Zoology 
 cited, 295 
 
 VanHelmont, cited, 263; on the " poi- 
 sonous quality of bull-beef," 303 
 
 Vatican, the ancient anatomical figures 
 in, 161 
 
 Vegetal Soul, an existence sui generis, 
 
 . 30; Schuyl on vegetal Life, 229 
 
 Verany, cited, 197 
 
 Verification, the guarantee of Science, 
 33 ; the ruling principle of investiga- 
 tion, 57, 58; its process slow and diffi- 
 cult, 59 ; want of appreciation of 
 amongst the Greeks, ib.; instance of 
 Eratosthenes, ib.; A. 's carelessness of 
 verification, 59, 171, 172 ; Haller's 
 patient labours in, 60; instance of 
 Miiller, ib.; the criteria of verifica- 
 tion, 68, 69 ; its immense applica- 
 bility, 70; insolubility of all questions 
 beyond it, ib. ; instance of metals in 
 the sun's atmosphere, ib. ; future 
 verification of propositions now in- 
 soluble, ib. ; urgent demand for, 81 ; 
 the principle of verification our best 
 guide in Science, 96; the slow appre- 
 ciation of, 377, 378 
 
 Vertebrae, vaiieties of in different ani- 
 mals, 85 
 Vertebral Theory, Aristotle's claim to, 
 
 186, 187 
 Vesalius, cited, 163, 167, 169, 332, 333; 
 notices Aristotle's error in attributing 
 eight ribs to Man, 165; first discovers 
 the nature of the bone of the heart. 
 313 
 Vestiges of the Natural History of 
 Creation, views of Meckel adopted 
 in, 188 
 Vicq d'Azyr, on the objective interpre- 
 tation of Nature, 31 ; on our natural 
 horror at dissection, 162. Cited, 157, 
 190, 191, 320 
 Virboslai, Margaret, Countess, her ex- 
 traordinary parturition, 374 
 Virtual velocities, the principle of known 
 
 to Aristotle, 148 
 Viscera, Aristotle's diagnosis' of, 310 ; 
 the opinion of Democritus objected 
 to by A., ib.; remarks on the viscera 
 of the Apoda, 317; of molluscs and 
 insects, 318 
 Vision, Aristotle on, 237, 246, 247 ; 
 Newton on the sparks of the eye, 247 
 Vital Phenomena, Aristotle's idea of 
 an ascending complexity in, 189. See 
 Nature, Phenomena 
 Vital Principle, impersonation of, 87 ; 
 results of its increased activity, 193 ; 
 of plants and animals, 194; the nearest 
 translation of Aristotle's i>vxn, 222 ; 
 the nature of, 225, 226, 227, 228 ; 
 " divided vitality," 228; Aristotle's 
 conception of, 231, 232, 233; regarded 
 by A. as a final cause, 234; the intel- 
 lect of, 240 
 Viviparity. See Incubation 
 Vogt, cited, 197, 218 
 Vogt and Pappenheim, cited, 332 
 Von Baer, on the difference between the 
 Vertebrate and Invertebrate types, 
 189 ; completed the discovery of the 
 Mammalian egg, 213. Cited, 216, 295, 
 333, 353, 354, 357 
 Von Siebold, on Aristotle's acquaint- 
 ance with the Cephalopoda, 199; his 
 researches on the parthenogenesis of 
 bees, 205 
 Vulpian and Philipeaux, on the import- 
 ance of Verification, 60 
 
 Warmth and Moisture, essential to 
 
 growth and Life, 268 
 
 Wessling, his Syntagma cited, 169, 333 
 
 Whewell, Dr., cited, 49, 150; on the 
 
 failure of Greek Philosophy, 52; his 
 
 History of the Inductive Sciences 
 
404 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 cited, 52 ; his conclusion as to the 
 failure of ancient science, 53, 88 ; 
 this conclusion examined, 53, 54 ; his 
 History of Scientific Ideas cited, 55; 
 on the first attempts to comprehend 
 Nature, 88 ; on the employment of 
 abstractions, ib.; on the propensity 
 to seek for principles in the usages 
 of language, 89 ; on Aristotle's sub- 
 servience to language, ib. ; his re- 
 proach against Aristotle, 147; on the 
 constitution of a classification, 278 
 
 Willis, his Opera Omnia cited, 169 
 
 Wimmer, cited, 142, 340, 346 
 
 "Wolff, C. F., cited, 310, 354, 355 
 
 Wollaston, cited, 70 
 
 Xbnocratbs, accompanies Aristotle on 
 his visit to Hermias, 12; teaches in 
 the Academy, 15 
 
 Xenophon, on the repugnance of 
 Socrates to physical inquiries, 43 
 
 ZELLER,-his Philosophy of the Greeks 
 cited, 6, 118; on Ether as an element, 
 140 
 
 Zoology. See Animals, Plants, Gene- 
 ration, Biology 
 
 Zoophytes, plant-animals the second 
 step in natural gradation, 192; ex- 
 amples selected by Aristotle, ib. See 
 Plants. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 London : Printed by Smith, Eldee and Co., Little Green Arbour Court, Old Bailey, E. C.