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 Studies in naval history. 
 
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 STUDIES IN NATAL HISTORY 
 
BY THE SAME AUTHOR. 
 
 8vo. price 16s. 
 
 LETTERS AND DESPATCHES 
 
 or 
 
 HORATIO, VISCOUNT NELSON, K.B. 
 
 DUKE OF BRONTE, VICE-ADMIRAL OF THE WHITE SQUADRON. 
 SELECTED AND ARKANGED BY 
 
 JOHN KNOX LAUGHTON, M.A. 
 
 lecturer in Naval History at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. 
 
 ' Prof. Latjghton's book will, we trust, be added to every ship's library, 
 for every naval officer or man would be the better for studying this record 
 of the ceaseless forethought, constant application, undeviatdng attention to 
 duty, and thorough grasp of details, which are here shown to have been 
 the guiding principles of our greatest and most glorious admiral.' 
 
 Army ahd Navy Gazette. 
 
 London : LONGMANS, GKEEN, & CO. 
 
STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY 
 
 BIOGRAPBIGS 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN KNOX LAUGHTON, M.A. 
 
 PROFESSOR Off MODERN HISTORY AT KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON 
 LECTURER ON NAVAL HISTORY AT THE ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE, GREENWICH 
 
 LONDON 
 LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 
 
 1887 
 
 c 
 
 All rightt reteretd 
 
^. V 0^«o Cp\ 
 
 PRINTED BY. 
 
 SPOTTISWOODE AND 00, NEW-STEEET SQUAEE 
 
 LONDON 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 These Studies, now collected from the different maga- 
 zines in which they have first appeared, will not, I hope, 
 be considered as merely reclaimed waifs ; for the idea of 
 thus bringing them together in a more permanent form 
 has always been present to me, even whilst originally 
 writing them : and having carefully revised them by the 
 light of the most recent published information and of 
 our own Eecords, to which the Admiralty has been 
 pleased to permit me free access, I offer them, not only 
 as the relation of some stirring episodes in naval history, 
 but as, each in its own way, a contribution to the earnest 
 study of naval policy, strategy, or tactics. 
 
 I have only to add that the dates relating to Conti- 
 nental affairs are given throughout in New Style : those 
 which belong to English correspondence, English records, 
 or to purely English incidents are in Old Style ; though 
 occasionally I have given the double date. It is always 
 a troublesome point, and I can only hope that I have 
 minimised the customary confusion. 
 
 J. K. LAUGHTON. 
 
 1 July, 1887 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027751894 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER pAGB 
 
 I. Jean de Vienne : a Chapter from the Naval 
 
 History of the XIVth Century .... 1 
 
 r II. Colbert : the Birth of a Navy .... 30 
 
 III. Du Quesne : the French Navy in the XVIIth 
 
 Century 59 
 
 IV. Le Bailli de Suffren 94 
 
 V. Tegetthoff : Experiences of Steam and Armour 148 
 
 VI. Privateers and Privateering : I. Fortunatus 
 
 Wright 194 
 
 VII. Privateers and Privateering : II. George Walker 225 
 
 VIII. The French Privateers : I. Jean Bart . . 252 
 
 - IX. „ „ II. Du Guay Trouin . 287 
 
 X. „ „ III. Thurot . . .324 
 
 XI. Paul Jones, ' The Pirate ' 363 
 
 XII. The French Privateers : IV. Robert Surcouf . 412 
 
 Index 459 
 
STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 JEAN BE VIENNE. 
 
 A CHAPTEK FROM THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE 
 FOURTEENTH CENTURY. 1 
 
 Everyone knows that, according to the Act of Parlia- 
 ment, it is on the Navy that, ' under the good Provi- 
 dence of God, the wealth, safety, and strength of the 
 kingdom chiefly depend ; ' but there are probably few 
 who have realised the full meaning of that grave sentence. 
 Our fathers and grandfathers asserted our supremacy 
 at sea with such vigour, and bequeathed to us such a 
 transcendent prestige, that we are now apt to think of 
 these not only as our inheritance, but as our natural and 
 absolute right ; to forget that the one, as the other, was 
 of slow growth, has been often stoutly disputed, and at 
 times even well-nigh blotted out. Such times are now 
 of the distant past ; it is our duty to provide that they 
 remain so. But, as inculcating that duty, as enforcing 
 the necessity for that provision, it is well, from time to 
 time, to examine into our old history, and to retrace — 
 
 1 United Service Magazine, October 1880. 
 
2 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 however painfully — the sad lessons of disasters now very 
 imperfectly remembered. That we have suffered such 
 is matter of fact ; and even if we were disposed to forget 
 them, others are not ; for to them the memory — like the 
 glimmer of stars shining through the gloom — may serve 
 to brighten the past, or possibly to indicate the future. 
 It is the consciousness of this that leads me to recall the 
 life and career of Jean de Vienne, Admiral of France 
 during the latter quarter of the fourteenth century ; a 
 man of whom, it may be said, little is known in England 
 beyond the bare name. Even by contemporary chroni- 
 clers his personality has been lost sight of, and his deeds 
 have been attributed to others, misunderstood, slurred 
 over, or omitted altogether ; for, says Walsingham, with 
 surely a very false notion of the duties of a historian — 
 the record of all these untoward affairs is so shameful, 
 that we cloak in silence the things which we ought to 
 write about. 
 
 John of Vienne, 1 or, in the official language of his 
 time and country, Jehan de Vienne, Chevalier, Sire de 
 Kolans et Amiral de France, was born, probably at Dole, 
 in Burgundy, in 1341 ; the son of a family collaterally 
 related, in no very distant degree, to the reigning House 
 of Burgundy, and through it to that of France ; the 
 nephew of that elder John of Vienne with whom he is 
 often confused, who, in 1347, was Governor of Calais, 
 and whose name, as associated with our success, occupies 
 a more prominent place in our histories than that of his 
 more distinguished nephew. Of his childhood we have 
 no account, further than that he passed it at the castle 
 
 1 Jean de Vienne, Amiral de France, 1341-1396.' Par le Marquis 
 Terrier de Loray. Paris, 8vo, 1877. 
 
JEAN.DE vienne. 3 
 
 of Rolans, the ruins of which still stand, near Besancon, 
 in a commanding position on the river Doubs. At the 
 age of eighteen, on the death of his father, he succeeded 
 to his small estate, and would seem to have made his 
 first experience in arms against the free companies, 
 English in name, often under English leaders, which 
 drew together the armed scum of Western Europe, 
 and infested France and Burgundy after the Treaty of 
 Bretigny. In 1363 he is said to have had command of 
 a small party that, near Chambornay, on the Ognon, 
 crushed and well-nigh exterminated one of the most 
 formidable of these companies, and to have overthrown 
 in single combat, with knightly spear, their leader, 
 Guichard Monnot, presumably a Gascon. As a reward 
 for this service, he was invested by the King of France 
 with the lordship of the village of Villey, by accepting 
 which he became the liegeman of the king, to whom he 
 continued faithful during the rest of his life. In the 
 war which raged between the parties of France and 
 Navarre, rival claimants of the Duchy of Burgundy, and 
 virtually of the French crown, he served with distinction 
 under the Constable du Guesclin, whom he followed to 
 Normandy in 1364, though it is doubtful whether he 
 was still with him at Auray, or was then serving with 
 the Duke of Burgundy, as he assuredly was in the follow- 
 ing month and through the winter. 
 
 It was after his release from the captivity which befell 
 him at Auray, that Du Guesclin led an army of adven- 
 turers into Spain to support the cause of the bastard 
 Henry against his legitimate brother, the King of Castile, 
 a war in which — as is familiarly known — the Black 
 Prince afterwards interfered ; in which he — as everywhere 
 
 E 2 
 
4 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 else— achieved the most brilliant success, but in which 
 also, it would seem, he contracted that mysterious disease 
 which carried him off in the flower of his age. With this 
 war, however, we are not now concerned. John of Vienne 
 had no part in it, having embarked in a so-called crusade 
 which the Count of Savoy led to the East in support of 
 his cousin, the emperor John Palseologus, tben held 
 prisoner by the Bulgarians. 
 
 This crusade, the history of which is little known, may 
 perhaps more properly be called a chivalrous adventure. 
 A number of knights of different nations — Gascon, 
 Burgundian, French, German, Flemish — gathered to- 
 gether to support the cause of Christianity. Fourteen 
 of them, including John of Vienne, with the Count of 
 Savoy at their head, founded the Order of the Annuncia- 
 tion. They then took ship at Venice, and the force 
 having rendezvoused at Coron, went on to Gallipoli, at 
 that time in the hands of the Turks. This they carried 
 by assault. They then passed into the Black Sea ; 
 occupied Sizeboli and other places of less importance ; 
 took Missirri by storm followed by general pillage and 
 massacre, and invested Varna. The fortifications of 
 Varna were strong, and the christians were but ill- 
 provided to carry on a lengthened siege ; the season too 
 was late ; and the adventure might have ended badly,, 
 had not the courage of the Bulgarians failed them. 
 Negotiations were entered on, in which Jeanne de Vienne 
 and Guillaume de Granson represented the crusaders, 
 with such good effect, that their present claims were 
 acceded to, and the emperor sent back safely to Con- 
 stantinople. Thither the Western warriors went for the 
 winter, which would seem to have been spent in the usual 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 5 
 
 squabbles between Greek and Frank. In suing for 
 assistance, the emperor had pledged himself to bring 
 about the reunion of the Greek and Latin churches. 
 This promise he now withdrew, and warned the crusaders 
 to quit the town if they would avoid being massacred by 
 the turbulent populace. They accordingly crossed over 
 to Pera, waiting for the return of the good season. But 
 the Turks, meanwhile, advanced and laid siege to Size- 
 boli. The emperor's tone altered; he undertook to 
 repair to Eome ; to have the reunion of the churches 
 solemnly proclaimed there ; he bound himself by host- 
 ages ; he would agree to anything, if only they would 
 drive back the Turk. This was again happily done, and 
 the expedition returned home in the course of the summer 
 of 1367. 
 
 Two years later the emperor did, to some extent, 
 carry out his promises. He came to Eome; acknow- 
 ledged, ' in the presence of four cardinals, the supremacy 
 of the Pope and the double procession of the Holy Ghost,' ' 
 and paid public homage to Urban V in the church of St. 
 Peter. But all this was probably due as much to future 
 hopes as to past promises ; and the real business of his visit 
 to Italy would seem to have been to enlist some of the 
 free companies in his service, and especially their distin- 
 guished leader, John Hawkwood. In this, for whatever 
 reason, he was unsuccessf ul ; but we are scarcely doing 
 injustice to Hawkwood's memory if we suppose that he 
 insisted on some more tangible recompense than pro- 
 mises; and the empty state of the imperial purse is 
 proved by the fact that the emperor was detained at 
 
 1 Gibbon : chap. lxvi. 
 
6 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 Venice, virtually a prisoner for debt incurred on account 
 of the expenses of his journey. 
 
 With this adventure the earlier part of Jean de 
 Vienne's career may be said to close. He was still only 
 twenty-six years of age ; but since he was eighteen, he 
 had been engaged in almost constant service of one sort 
 or another ; and though we have no account of the suc- 
 cessive steps by which he rose to distinction, it appears 
 throughout that, by mere force of character, and inde- 
 pendent of the claim his birth might have given him, he 
 took at once a foremost position in the armies of France. 
 To have held responsible command, in a time of such 
 unceasing peril, under Philip the Bold and Bertrand du 
 Guesclin, was a training equivalent, and more than 
 equivalent, to the experience of a score of years. 
 
 It was in 1369 that the King of France, Charles V, 
 had resolved no longer to endure the disgrace and the issue 
 of the Treaty of Bretigny. He had prepared for the in- 
 evitable resumption of hostilities with England by an un- 
 scrupulous economy, 1 by a wise administration of his fin- 
 ances, by secret negotiations with the gentry of Guyenne, 
 themselves unwilling subjects of the English rule, and by 
 a close alliance with Henry, the reigning King of Castile, 
 whose personal inclinations were naturally adverse to the 
 supporters of his brother and rival. The immediate 
 cause of quarrel was the feeling that he was ready ; that 
 his great enemy, Edward III, was old and incapable ; 
 and that the terrible Black Prince was worn with sick- 
 ness. The war that ensued was primarily, and of ne- 
 cessity, one on shore. To speak of it, as such, is no 
 
 1 Amongst other instances of this may be counted the refusal to pay 
 his father's ransom. 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 7 
 
 part of my present plan ; in its general results the story 
 of it is familiar to every child amongst us ; and in its 
 military details, would be but the description of an 
 empire disintegrating itself from the natural want of 
 cohesion, rather than from the force of the enemy's 
 blows. How much this was accelerated by the physical 
 incapacity of the Black Prince, by the incompetence of 
 his deputies and successors, and by the prudence of the 
 French king, is all perfectly well known ; but there are 
 probably many who have not realised the decisive cha- 
 racter of the naval operations during the following ten 
 years, and how curiously, how fatally, the supremacy of 
 the sea was — for the time being — reversed. 
 
 From the beginning, Charles V would seem to have 
 appreciated the advantage which the command of the 
 narrow seas had given to England, ever since the battle 
 of Sluys, in 1340, and of ' Les Espagnols sur mer,' in 
 1350. He had wished to contest it, and had assembled 
 a large number of ships at Eouen and in the Lower 
 Seine. But the naval resources of the country proved 
 to be too weak, the war on shore too absorbing ; and the 
 expedition to England, projected in 1369, fell through. 
 But the alliance with Spain furnished means far beyond 
 the power of France. The King of Castile had at his 
 disposal ships of a size and strength unknown in other 
 countries, formidable opponents to the petty trading 
 vessels which constituted the greater part of the English 
 navy ; and though, these, when arrayed under the great 
 Edward and his greater son, had been able to defeat and 
 destroy the Spaniards off Winchelsea, in 1350, they were 
 at a vast disadvantage when barely equal in numbers 
 and under unskilled guidance. 
 
8 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 The first meeting was decisive. It was on June 23, 
 1372, that the young Earl of Pembroke came off Eochelle 
 with some forty vessels, armed, indeed, for war, but 
 laden also with stores and reinforcements for the army. 
 They were there met by the Spanish fleet, which had 
 been waiting for them, under the command of the Ad- 
 miral of Castile, Don Ambrosio Bocanegra. Although 
 the Spanish force was superior, both by the size of the 
 ships and then purely naval equipment, the English ad- 
 vanced at once to the attack, confident of victory, mind- 
 ful of their past glories, and persuaded that the Spaniards 
 were quite unable to withstand them. It took them but 
 a short time to find out their mistake, and the fight 
 became one not so much for victory as for life. The 
 English, though in disorder and without cohesion, fought 
 desperately; but their ships — so far as we can interpret the 
 details of the battle — were driven on shore before night- 
 fall, and were the next day burnt or captured ; whilst of 
 the men, those that were not killed were taken prisoners. 
 The consequences of this defeat were most serious. The 
 constable, taking advantage of the panic spread amongst 
 the English, advanced in force into Poitou, and captured, 
 almost on his march, Moncontour, Saint- Severe, Poitiers, 
 Eochelle and Thouars ; whilst the Duke of Lancaster, 
 hastily ordered to Guyenne with reinforcements, was 
 unable to sail by reason of continued bad weather, or 
 was perhaps unwilling to do so whilst the Spanish fleet 
 commanded the Bay of Biscay. 
 
 It has been suggested by some modern French writers l 
 
 1 M. Guerin among others : but this is only one and not the most as- 
 tounding of the many errors with which Guerin's Memoir (Les Marins 
 illustres, pp. 37-68) is crowded. 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 9 
 
 that Jean de Vienne commanded a French division in 
 the action off Eochelle ; but this is not warranted by any 
 evidence : there is no reason to suppose that even one 
 French ship was there present, and it is sufficiently well 
 established that, in the month of July, Jean de Vienne 
 was serving under Du Guesclin at the siege of Saint- 
 Severe. So far as history goes, he held his first com- 
 mand at sea in the spring of 1373. It was then that 
 the English fleet, under the Earl of Salisbury, had taken 
 up a position at the mouth of the Seine, to the hindrance 
 and stoppage of the coast and river navigation. To 
 oppose this, the Count de Narbonne, then Admiral of 
 France, having Jean de Vienne as his Vice-Admiral, 
 assembled a force of one hundred ships, before which* 
 Salisbury had to retire. He drew back to Saint-Malo, 
 whither he was followed by Narbonne ; and considering 
 himself unequal, passed on to Brest, where he remained 
 for some months, virtually blockaded by the French, 
 who kept possession of the Channel, and that with so 
 firm a grip that the expedition under the Duke of Lan- 
 caster, instead of landing in Guyenne, as had been in- 
 tended, was compelled to cross over at the Narrows, to 
 land at Calais, and to undertake that disastrous march 
 through France in the summer and autumn of 1373, ' the 
 result of which, more, perhaps, than any single episode 
 of the war, sealed the fate of the English provinces. 
 
 1 This account of Salisbury's expedition to Brest is very different 
 from that generally given, and adopted by Longman (Life and Times of 
 Edward III, ii. 221-5) and Nicolas (History of the Boyal Navy, ii. 150). 
 I would submit that the tests of its truth are the two faots that Lancaster 
 did land at Calais instead of Bordeaux, and that in July a general array 
 of all fencible men in the maritime counties was ordered, to prevent in- 
 vasion. 
 
10 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 Almost as soon as it was known that Lancaster had 
 landed, Jean de Vienne quitted the fleet, and had an im- 
 portant share in the military operations of that autumn ; 
 but afloat, the conclusion of the campaign of 1373 was 
 less favourable to the French than its beginning had 
 been. They lost the command of the Channel, several 
 of their ships were taken, and the rest were content to 
 seek for safety in their own harbours. The Viscount de 
 Narbonne was old and feeble, and as the departure from 
 the fleet of his second in command seemed to mark the 
 turning point in its success, Jean de Vienne was not un- 
 naturally appointed Admiral of France in his stead. In 
 this there was nothing exceptional : the office of admiral, 
 as that of constable, was at that time an active, not a 
 mere honorary or titular appointment ; and the greater 
 number of former admirals had held it for only a few 
 years. Jean de Vienne, appointed on December 27, 1373, 
 held it till his death. 
 
 The rights of the Admiral of France were then re- 
 latively more extensive, and the power greater, than 
 afterwards. He was the chief and ruler of the whole 
 shipping of the country, not only from an administra- 
 tive, but also from an executive, point of view ; at once 
 the minister of the navy and the commander-in-chief ; 
 and in each capacity nearly absolute and autocratic. 
 Without his leave, no merchant ship could sail on a 
 distant voyage, or on a cruise against the enemy : and 
 it was his duty to see that every ship, so cruising, was 
 suitably equipped, manned and armed. He could levy, 
 for the king's service, all the ships of every French 
 port. The jurisdiction of the admiralty courts included 
 all nautical matters, civil or criminal ; the judges were 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 11 
 
 appointed by the admiral, and their decisions given in 
 his name. As direct emolument, he received two-thirds 
 of all property found at sea, one-third of all thrown 
 up on the shore, a tenth of all prizes from the enemy, a 
 payment on the launch of every ship, and a yearly tax, 
 bearing some relation to her size; besides large per- 
 quisites arising from his charge of provisions and stores : 
 and as a personal honour, differing from and exceeding 
 anything ever granted in England, every ship wore the 
 admiral's banner. 1 
 
 With the exception of a few ships belonging to the 
 king, the naval force of France then consisted of 
 merchant ships levied by the admiral. This was also 
 the case in England, where, however, the special 
 charters of the Cinque Ports had in some measure pro- 
 vided a substitute for a standing navy. Charles V was 
 quick to see the disadvantage of the system, both to 
 commerce, which it annihilated, and to warlike efficiency, 
 which, in a fleet of small trading ships, hastily manned, 
 without experience or discipline, could scarcely be said 
 to exist. He had already endeavoured to increase the 
 number of royal ships, but it does not seem that any 
 real advance was made until after the appointment of 
 John of Vienne as admiral. It is difficult to say that 
 the energy then developed was all his ; but it is at least 
 permitted us to believe that it was very directly due to 
 
 1 ' Droits et Prominences de 1'Amiral de France,' in The Black 
 Book of the Admiralty, i. 443 et seq. The usage of wearing the 
 admiral's banner continued far into the sixteenth century; in the French 
 fleet of 1545 the ships wore the flag of Annebault, Gules, a cross vair. 
 Jean de Vienne's arms, which were, presumably, worn by the French 
 ships during the operations detailed in the following pages, were Gules, 
 an eagle displayed or. 
 
12 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 that man whose accession to office was the signal for 
 victorious enterprise, and whose conduct on different 
 occasions would show that he had himself a large share 
 of mechanical and constructive genius. The comhat off 
 Eochelle had established the superiority of ships built 
 and equipped for war ; the progress almost daily made 
 in the use of guns tended continually to make this 
 superiority greater ; and the naval efforts of France took 
 the direction of building ships distinctly as ships of war, 
 bigger and stronger than any that England could oppose 
 to them. A small dockyard and arsenal at Eouen, 1 
 dating back in its origin to the early days of Norman 
 rule, and now enlarged, was chosen as the cradle and 
 nursery of this infant navy ; and ships on the Spanish 
 model, of the then enormous size of 300 tons, were built 
 and launched under the personal orders of Aubert 
 Staucon, the master of the yard. 
 
 The construction of such a navy was, however, a 
 work of time, and during the years immediately following 
 his appointment as admiral, Jean de Vienne remained 
 on shore, rendering good service to France, and notably 
 in command of the siege of Saint- Sauveur, 2 a fortress 
 of great strength, from which the English, without too 
 strict a regard to the distinction between times of war 
 and peace, dominated the Cotentin and the whole of 
 Western Normandy. In consideration of payments, 
 something of the nature of black-mail, they refrained 
 from plundering or destroying in their immediate neigh- 
 
 1 'LeClos des Galees de Eouen sous Charles V ' (1364-1380), par 
 M. de Lafaye (Revue maritime et coloniale, 1877, vol. liv. p. 686). 
 
 2 The conduct of this siege is generally, but wrongfully, ascribed to 
 Du Guesclin, who was not in Normandy at the time. 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 13 
 
 bourhood ; but their maurading parties spread far and 
 ■wide; and, with or without their sanction, free com- 
 panies carried their evil fame to a still greater distance. 
 Complaint after complaint had been laid before the 
 king ; but the siege of a first-class fortress with no 
 sympathising inhabitants to render treacherous assist- 
 ance, was a serious affair; and the course of the war, 
 occupying the constable in Poitou, did not permit him 
 to undertake it. It was thus left untried, till, in the 
 summer of 1374, Jean de Vienne, being in Normandy, 
 and with no active employment, received orders ' to take 
 all necessary measures to reduce the place.' The means, 
 however, were not put at his disposal ; it was left for 
 him to devise or create them as he best could. 
 
 His first care was to isolate the garrison ; and by 
 fortified works on the Ouve, as well as by a sufficient 
 squadron at its mouth, he succeeded at once in closing 
 the direct water communication with England. But the 
 troops under his orders were raw levies, which were 
 laughed at or chased away by the hardened veterans of 
 the garrison, who scourged the country more severely 
 than ever, gathering in an enormous quantity of stores 
 and provisions. Little by little, however, the admiral 
 succeeded in forming his army, and in establishing it 
 in front of Saint-Sauveur. Then followed, with varying 
 fortune, those daily encounters which Froissart has 
 loved to describe. But the event of the siege was to 
 turn on the employment of the new artillery. By the 
 beginning of 1375 the French had several large guns in 
 position, throwing stones or masses of lead, which knocked 
 down the ramparts or crushed through the houses. The 
 effect of the cannonade, kept up, however slowly, by 
 
14 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOET. 
 
 night as well as by day, rendered the position of the 
 garrison difficult, and when the admiral, determined to 
 make it still more so, brought up two new cannons, of 
 the enormous weight of 2,000 lbs. to throw a shot of 
 100 lbs., with the unheard of charge of 5 lbs. of powder, 
 the result declared itself almost instantaneously. We 
 may believe that these guns were specially designed by 
 the admiral himself. The making of them was com- 
 menced on 21 March, and finished on 3 May ; they were 
 in position before Saint Sauveur on the 10th, and the 
 agreement to surrender, if not relieved within six weeks, 
 was signed on the 21st. 
 
 In signing this, the garrison had hoped to be relieved 
 by the Duke of Bretagne, who did, indeed, advance at 
 the head of 10,000 men. The French army prepared to 
 meet him, supported by thirty small guns which the 
 admiral had had newly constructed. These were of 
 copper, with strengthening rings of iron, and had a 
 wooden handle ; they threw a leaden ball of small weight, 
 and though actually swivels or wall-pieces, may be fairly 
 considered as amongst the earliest types of the more 
 modern musket. No engagement, however, took place ; 
 for on learning that a truce had been concluded between 
 the Kings of England and France, and being persuaded 
 by Lord Latimer, King Edward's lieutenant in Bretagne, 
 the duke drew back. But in spite of the truce it was 
 maintained by the French that the convention was 
 binding ; and as they held the eight hostages given by 
 the English, and were backed up by the two 100- 
 pounders, their reading of the convention was admitted, 
 and Saint- Sauveur was delivered up on 3 July. 
 
 In the following year the conduct of Lord Latimer 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 15 
 
 was the subject of a formal accusation ; he was im- 
 peached by parliament as ' unprofitable to the king and 
 the realm,' and as having — amongst more than * three- 
 score notable faults,' not now to our purpose — ' sold the 
 castle of St. Saviour's.' Of these crimes he was found 
 guilty, and by judicial sentence was deprived of his office 
 of chamberlain ; His goods were confiscated, and he was 
 ordered to be imprisoned during the king's pleasure, and 
 ' thenceforth to be holden as infamous.' l The sentence 
 was, however, revoked by the influence of the Duke of 
 Lancaster after the death of the Black Prince. 
 
 Meantime, and whilst the ships were building at 
 Eouen, the command afloat devolved on two foreigners, 
 the one, Eenier Grimaldi, a son or nephew of that elder 
 Grimaldi who honourably commanded the Genoese 
 contingent at the battle of Sluys ; the other, Evan, or 
 Owen — or, as he appears in the French chronicles, Yvain 
 de Galles — who claimed to be, by right of birth, a Prince 
 of Wales, robbed of his territory by the English. Evan 
 may or may not have been an impostor ; the question is 
 of little consequence, and there is no evidence to decide 
 it ; but he was undoubtedly a brave man and an enter- 
 prising corsair ; whether with the main fleet, or in com- 
 mand of detached squadrons, he, as well as Grimaldi, 
 proved himself an able partisan ; and the two, together 
 with a Spanish squadron, during the years 1374-5, well 
 nigh swept the English from the Channel, and wound 
 up the campaign by the wholesale capture of a rich fleet 
 of merchant ships returning from Bretagne on the faith 
 of the truce. 
 
 The English owners and merchants petitioned for 
 1 ' Contemporary Chronicle,' in Archceologia, vol. xxii. p. 225. 
 
16 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 vengeance, but in vain. The only answer they received 
 was that the king had done, and would continue to do, 
 his best to procure redress. He was, in point of fact, 
 powerless. The navy of England, which, thirty-five 
 years before, had sufficed to exterminate that of France ; 
 which, twenty-five years before had crushed that of 
 Spain, had now almost ceased to exist. The causes of 
 this were numerous ; but — bearing in mind that an 
 English fleet was composed mainly of merchant ships 
 levied for the king's service — they may be stated briefly 
 as, firstly: the frequency of these levies during the 
 thirty or forty years that the war had lasted, and the 
 custom of enforcing the levies, often, several months 
 before the ships were wanted, during which time they 
 were kept up at their owners' cost ; and secondly : the 
 granting to foreigners, in return for heavy loans or pay- 
 ments, such privileges and monopolies as virtually put 
 into their hands the whole export trade. By the action 
 of these, it had come about that the merchants were 
 impoverished, the seaport towns fallen into decay, their 
 walls in ruins, the shipping not kept up ; and the sailors, 
 unable to find employment, had taken to other means of 
 earning a livelihood. The evils were repeatedly stated 
 in detail, both in petition to parliament, and by parlia- 
 ment to the king ; but no remedy was applied, and for 
 many years their effects continued. 
 
 In France, the interval of truce had been carefully 
 utilised by the admiral. By the spring of 1377 he had, 
 actually afloat and ready for sea, thirty-five large ships, 
 built as men-of-war, armed with the newest guns, and 
 well equipped; besides smaller vessels, merchantmen, 
 which raised the total of his fleet to 120. These were 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 17 
 
 manned by about 15,000 men — sailors, men-at-arms, and 
 archers. The force in itself was sufficiently formidable, 
 and was still further increased by a Spanish contingent, 
 which, by the terms of the treaty, numbered at least 
 thirteen large ships. 
 
 The truce of two years ended on 24 June, 1377 ; and 
 the fleet, assembled at Harfleur, immediately put to sea, 
 under the command of the admiral in person, Grimaldi, 
 Jean de Eoye — a seaman of repute, the Sire de Torcy, 
 and many other nobles and knights. A few ships were 
 left to blockade the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, 
 and prevent their attempting any raid on the coast 
 of Normandy during the absence of the fleet, which at 
 once, in accordance with a prearranged plan, crossed 
 over to the coast of Sussex. On 29 June — eight days 
 only after the death of King Edward — Jean de Vienne 
 landed in the neighbourhood of Eye, the inhabitants of 
 which, trusting in the natural strength of their town, 
 and in a long immunity, had made but little preparation 
 to receive the enemy. The troops which opposed the 
 landing were driven back with great loss, and the town 
 itself was occupied the same afternoon. It was proposed 
 by the Sire de Torcy to keep possession of it as a 
 stronghold on English soil, a counterpoise to Calais ; but 
 the admiral, whether unwilling to weaken his force by 
 division, or judging that the place was not strong 
 enough, refused ; and notwithstanding the fierce anger 
 and abusive language of De Torcy — who would seem to 
 have had the more immediate command of the army or 
 landing-party* he set fire to the town. From Winchelsea 
 he was repelled with considerable loss, but at Eottingdean 
 he was more successful, although opposed by a strong 
 
18 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 force levied by the prior of Lewes. Having defeated 
 this, after a sharp encounter, he marched inland, took, 
 plundered, and burnt the town of Lewes and the neigh- 
 bouring villages, and withdrew slowly to the ships. 
 Folkestone was sacked and burned on 20 July, Ports- 
 mouth — already rising into note as a naval port — came 
 next, and further west Dartmouth and Plymouth were 
 reduced to ashes. It would seem that nowhere, after 
 the combat of Eottingdean, was any serious opposition 
 offered. In the West little preparation had been made, 
 for it was expected that the first force of the invasion 
 would fall — as it had fallen — on the coast of Sussex, and 
 would there — as it was not — be broken. 
 
 Laden with booty, the fleet returned to Harfleur by 
 the beginning of August ; and after refitting in haste, 
 sailed again, to assist in the siege of Calais, then under- 
 taken by the Duke of Burgundy. It was proposed on 
 the way to threaten the coast of England, so as to pre- 
 vent reinforcements being sent over to the besieged town ; 
 and the accident of weather turned the threat into a 
 reality. An easterly wind drove the fleet to the Isle of 
 Wight ; this was found to be practically undefended ; and 
 on 21 August the admiral effected a landing — apparently 
 near Yarmouth, which was immediately occupied ; the 
 island was ravaged, and a heavy contribution levied. 
 The invaders then made a demonstration against South- 
 ampton; and hastily re-embarking, landed at Poole, 
 which they burnt. On their way eastward, they sacked 
 and burnt Hastings, threatened Dover, and finally arrived 
 at Calais on 10 September. It was hoped that a more 
 decided success than had yet been obtained would win 
 back this town to France ; but the season was too far 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 19 
 
 advanced, and bad weather compelled the fleet to with- 
 draw to Harfleur. But the confidence of the English 
 was rudely shaken ; and up to the beginning of winter a 
 few active cruisers sufficed to blockade the coast, and by 
 preventing tbe fishing, to cause very real distress to the 
 inhabitants. 
 
 With the year 1378, the prospects of England in 
 Normandy seemed to brighten. The King of Navarre 
 had offered his daughter in marriage to Eichard II. and 
 with her, the several towns which he held in Normandy, 
 Cherbourg alone excepted. The proposed treaty came 
 at once to the knowledge of the King of France, who was 
 quick to anticipate it, by seizing on the possessions of 
 Navarre before they could be given up to the English. 
 The Duke of Burgundy and the constable conducted the 
 war by land ; by sea, the admiral occupied such places 
 as were near the coast, and guarded against the possi- 
 bility of any relief being sent from England. By the 
 end of April, Pont Audemer alone remained, a town care- 
 fully fortified, strongly garrisoned, and held to be of con- 
 siderable strategic importance by reason of its position 
 near the mouth of the Bylle, and threatening the navi- 
 gation of the lower Seine. The siege of this was en- 
 trusted to Jean de Vienne, whose success at Saint- 
 Sauveur had stamped his reputation ; and he proceeded 
 to reduce it by means of the same guns which at 
 Saint-Sauveur had proved so effective ; whilst Grimaldi, 
 with a sufficient force, guarded the approach by water. 
 An English fleet of some 120 ships, under the Earls 
 of Salisbury and Arundel, attempted to relieve it ; but 
 being unable to force Grimaldi's defences at the mouth 
 of the Bylle, wasted their energy in a vain attack on 
 
 c 2 
 
20 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 Honfleur. Left thus to itself, Pont Audemer surrendered 
 on 12 June; and its walls, like those of all the other 
 captured places, were razed, so that they might not, 
 in future years, afford shelter to the enemies of 
 France. 
 
 Cherbourg was now the only town in Normandy re- 
 maining to the King of Navarre. In his treaty with 
 England, he had specially reserved this to himself; but 
 alarmed by the rapid capture of his fortresses, and 
 threatened in Navarre itself by the de facto King of 
 Castile, he resolved to pledge Cherbourg to the English, 
 as the price of their support ; and it was accordingly 
 given over to Salisbury and Arundel on their way home, 
 after their unsuccessful attack on Harfleur. 
 
 The news reached Jean de Vienne whilst engaged in 
 the razing the fortifications of Pont Audemer. He sent 
 immediately to the Spanish squadron, of probably twelve 
 ships, then on the coast of Bretagne, to meet him off 
 Cherbourg, whither he himself went with such force as 
 he had with him, twenty-five of the king's ships and a 
 number of smaller vessels levied from the country. He 
 found the English fleet at sea, weakened, we must sup- 
 pose, by the garrison it had left at Cherbourg ; but in 
 number so superior to that of the French that it 
 did not hesitate to attack. Though fewer, however, the 
 French ships were superior in size, equipment and arma- 
 ment, and held their own with advantage until, as for- 
 tune determined it, the Spanish squadron arrived on the 
 scene of action. This decided the day. The account is 
 vague and confused to an extreme degree 1 ; but we are 
 led to conclude that a general rout followed, and that the 
 devoted courage of Sir Peter Courtenay — a son of the 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 21 
 
 Earl of Devon— in command of the rear-guard, alone 
 saved the fleet from utter destruction ; but Courtenay's 
 ships were overwhelmed, he himself and many with him 
 taken prisoners ; and the loss in killed and drowned was 
 very great. 
 
 This was in the early days of July ; and for nearly 
 two months the French fleet continued in command of 
 the Channel, and keeping up an effective blockade of 
 Cherbourg, against which the constable was advancing 
 by land. To preserve Cherbourg to the English, a serious 
 effort had to be made ; and the Duke of Lancaster in 
 person, having collected a large force at Southampton, 
 sailed to its relief in the end of August. The number 
 of ships with Lancaster is not stated ; but the 12,000 
 soldiers, which they carried, would represent a fleet of 
 vast numerical strength. Such as it was, Jean de Vienne 
 felt unequal to oppose it, and retired into the Seine ; 
 and Lancaster, having thrown a sufficient garrison into 
 Cherbourg, passed down the coast and laid siege to 
 Saint-Malo. There the Admiral of France permitted him 
 to stay undisturbed, whilst he, with the Spanish ships, 
 crossing the Channel, ravaged the coast of Devon and 
 Cornwall, the resources of which had been drained to 
 supply the absent fleet ; burnt Fowey, then a leading 
 seaport, and returned, laden with booty. Saint-Malo 
 had, meantime, proved able to defend itself ; and when 
 winter approached, Lancaster went back to Southampton, 
 the only result of his great and costly expedition hav- 
 ing been the laying open the coast of England, so 
 that a small squadron of the enemy was able to harry 
 it with impunity, which is thus commented on by an 
 unknown chronicler : — ' Sicque, sub ducatu ducis nostri, 
 
22 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 hie illicque percutimur, ubique vero generaliter flagel- 
 lamur. Quia 
 
 Si bubo lapidi jactetur, vel lapis illi, 
 Ictus dampna gravis semper habebit avis.' 1 
 
 The next year, 1379, opened less unfavourably. Sir 
 Hugh Calverley had been recalled from his government 
 of Calais to take command of the western fleet ; Sir 
 Thomas Percy was admiral of the northern; and the 
 two together maintained the navigation of the Channel 
 with at least equal fortune. But the year closed with a 
 disaster equal in degree to any the fleet had ever sus- 
 tained, although different in character. Sir John 
 Arundel, the brother of the earl, had taken command of 
 an expedition to assist the Duke of Bretagne. With him 
 were Calverley, Percy, and a large number of knights 
 and gentlemen. They had scarcely sailed before a violent 
 gale sprang up, and drove them towards the coast of 
 Ireland, on which, by the ignorance and obstinacy of 
 Arundel, some twenty-six ships were lost with all hands, 
 Arundel himself among the number. The name of 
 Arundel during these years had not been of good omen 
 to the English arms ; nor indeed had it deserved to be, 
 if we are to judge of its owner's capabilities of organising 
 an army or of maintaining discipline, by the fact of Sir 
 John's having sacrilegiously and violently billeted his 
 men in a nunnery at Southampton, whilst waiting to 
 sail on this last voyage ; conduct repugnant alike to re- 
 ligion and humanity, and which, by the then Articles of 
 War, was punishable by death. 2 
 
 1 Chronicon AngKa, 1328-1388 ; Auctore Monacho quodam S. Albani 
 (Rolls Series, No. 64), p. 206. 
 
 2 Black Book of the Admiralty, vol. i. p. 24. 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 23 
 
 The loss of this fleet seems to have, for the time, 
 completed the ruin of the English navy. The seacoast, 
 practically undefended, was harried, almost at will, by 
 the Admiral of France and his active cruisers. At Kin- 
 sale, indeed, they were repulsed with some loss ; but on 
 the coast of England, from Yorkshire to Cornwall, no 
 point was secure from their attacks ; they sacked and 
 burnt Scarborough; they sailed up the Thames and 
 burnt Gravesend ; they captured Winchelsea after a stout 
 resistance ; Hastings and Portsmouth were destroyed for 
 a second time ; and nearer home, they captured and 
 held the islands of Jersey and Guernsey. 
 
 In England, the disgraceful conduct of the war, the 
 insolence of the invader, the loss of property and life, the 
 destruction of shipping, the ruin of trade, and the oppres- 
 sive taxation, all combined to give rise to great excite- 
 ment and irritation, which, among the better class, took 
 the form of petition and remonstrance, and among the 
 lower orders, culminated in popular and dangerous 
 insurrections. These, our historians have described and 
 discussed, without perhaps sufficiently marking the train 
 of events which ushered them in. The special outrage 
 which provoked John Tyler 1 at Dartford might have 
 passed as a private injury, or at most have caused a local 
 riot, had there not been a widespread and deep feeling 
 of dissatisfaction and indignation. That the lower orders, 
 more especially in the country, had many and very real 
 grievances, social, political and religious, is not to be dis- 
 puted ; but the immediately exciting cause of the revolt 
 seems to me to have been, not so much the levying of a 
 cruelly oppressive tax, as the fact, so plainly proved to 
 1 Stubbs's Constitutional History, ii. 456. 
 
24 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 the most ignorant, that the money was misspent. The 
 flames at Gravesend, in the autumn of 1380, were 
 characters that the unlettered peasants could quite well 
 read and understand ; and which they proceeded to 
 expound, in their own rude fashion, at Whitsuntide, 
 1381. 1 
 
 The exhaustion of England on the one side, the death 
 of the King of France and the minority of his successor 
 on the other, rendered a cessation of arms mutually 
 acceptable, and a truce, agreed on in the spring of 1381, 
 was nominally continued for six years, although war of a 
 veiled or irregular character was waged through almost 
 the whole time. Much of this was in Flanders, where 
 the French, as supporting the Duke of Burgundy, were 
 summoned to reduce the revolted Flemings under Philip 
 van Artevelde, backed up by the English. In this war 
 Jean de Vienne took a leading part, as became his post 
 of Admiral of France ; but that part was on shore, not at 
 sea, and in the main against the Flemings ; it may there- 
 fore be passed over with a bare mention. Afterwards, 
 on the renewal of hostilities between England and Scot- 
 land, the opportunity of carrying the war into the 
 enemy's country seemed to offer itself. This had always 
 been his favourite idea: to expel the English from 
 France by giving them work to do in England ; to make 
 them feel, in their own homes, the horrors of war. 
 ' What an indignity is it,' he had urged to the king, ' to 
 see everlastingly at our gates these English, who, after 
 all, are but few ; to nurture them in our bosom, and to 
 provide them with weapons to use against ourselves! 
 
 1 So considered, this revolt of the English villeins, may be faintly 
 compared with the French Jacquerie in 1358, or the. Commune in 1871. 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 25 
 
 Can we not, in our turn, go and destroy their homes, so 
 that in their distress they may leave us masters of 
 Guyenne, of Normandy, and of Flanders ? The Saxons 
 conquered England with but a handful of men, far from 
 their own country ; William the Bastard, with nothing 
 but his sword. Is it to be doubted that you — with a 
 kingdom full of men, of provisions and of money — would 
 surely attain the desired end ? ' Such arguments, when 
 addressed to Charles V, had fallen on stony ground ; 
 when addressed to his son, Charles VI, they took root, 
 and finally led to the admiral's expedition to Scotland 
 in 1385. 
 
 The story of that expedition is too well known to 
 need relating here ; but it may be necessary to remind 
 the reader that, such as it was, it was only a small part 
 of the plan which the admiral had devised. According 
 to this, in fact, it was merely a feint, to draw away 
 towards Scotland the available army of England, and 
 leave the country, void of defenders, to be invaded 
 without opposition. And notwithstanding the difficulties 
 which he met with in Scotland and in his intercourse 
 with the utterly unsympathetic Scotch, the result, so far 
 as he was concerned, was quite commensurate with his 
 expectations. King Eichard, his court and chivalry, 
 and an army of some 70,000 or 80,000 men, advanced 
 northwards as far as Aberdeen ; and, had the projected 
 invasion of England been made at that time the result 
 must have been most serious. As it was, the great fleet 
 of nearly 600 vessels assembled at Sluys could not be got 
 ready, and the project fell through. It was revived the 
 next year, but without the same chances in its favour. 
 John of Vienne had returned from Scotland, and the 
 
26 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 treatment he had received there was not such as to 
 encourage him to a repetition of his visit. Of the fleet, 
 too, many ships had been lost, many had been captured 
 whilst seeking winter quarters. It was then proposed — 
 apparently by John of Vienne, whose genius seems to 
 have favoured engineering workB, to construct a large 
 fortress of wood, which should be transported to England, 
 and there erected near the landing-place, as a place of 
 refuge for the invading army. Such a scheme did not 
 augur well for the invasion; it seemed to savour of 
 timidity, and, notwithstanding the invasion panic in the 
 summer of 1386, became ridiculous in the eyes of the 
 English when the seventy-two ships which were carrying 
 the ' ville de bois ' to Sluys were dispersed by a gale. 
 Two or three of them were driven up the Thames and 
 captured, and the pieces of the fort with which they 
 were laden were set up as a public show in the neigh- 
 bourhood of London. And so, waiting for their ' wooden 
 town ' and other equipments, the season passed away, 
 and it was again proposed to put off the invasion till 
 next year. But everyone felt that the opportunity had 
 passed. The money was spent, the men were wearied 
 and disgusted. The collection, too, of ships at Sluys 
 had left the English free to recover their losses, and 
 the cruisers from the English ports began again to be 
 active ; Dartmouth and Portsmouth had specially dis- 
 tinguished themselves, and private enterprise was doing 
 more than the king and his ministers could even promise. 
 I see no reason to doubt that this improvement in 
 the maritime affairs of the kingdom was due to the 
 abolition of some of the offensive privileges granted to 
 foreigners, and to the edict of 1381, ordering 'that none 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 27 
 
 of the king's liege people do from henceforth ship any 
 merchandise in going out or coming within the realm of 
 England in any port, but only in ships of the king's 
 liegeaunce,' ' under penalty of forfeiture. The improve- 
 ment, at any rate, is certain, and in the spring of 1387 
 the Earl of Arundel, appointed Admiral of the North 
 and West, was able to get together a numerous fleet, 
 with which he scoured the Channel, and seemed to 
 resume the supremacy which England had of late years 
 ceased to hold. It was in the course of this cruise that 
 he captured nearly the whole of a mixed French and 
 Burgundian fleet numbering 120 ships, laden with wine 
 and other rich merchandise ; a prize so great, and follow- 
 ing so many disasters, that it has been specially spoken 
 of as though a glorious victory. It was nothing of the 
 sort, and, even as it was, was not entirely a success ; for 
 on the homeward voyage, a part of the fleet commanded 
 by Sir Hugh Spenser was met on the coast of Normandy 
 by a number of French ships, and after a stubborn fight 
 was overpowered, taken, or destroyed. In concert with the 
 constable, Olivier de Clisson, Jean de Vienne had deter- 
 mined to attempt a smaller but more united expedition 
 against England, and for that purpose had assembled his 
 fleet at Harfleur. It may fairly be presumed that the 
 squadron which overwhelmed Spenser was a part of this, 
 and was acting under instructions from the admiral. 
 
 The expedition was on the point of sailing, with the 
 intention of landing near Dover and marching on 
 London, when it was suddenly stopped by the news that 
 Clisson had been taken prisoner by the Duke of Bre- 
 tagne. The admiral was anxious to go on, but under 
 1 5 Eiohard II. stat. i. cap. 3. Statutes at large, ii. 237. 
 
28 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 the circumstances the nobles and knights refused to 
 leave France. The army melted away, and when, after 
 a month, Clisson was set at liberty, it was too late to 
 begin again. But it by no means follows that even had 
 the expedition sailed it would have arrived at Dover or 
 the coast of England, for the English fleet was strong in 
 numbers and in spirit ; the men-at-arms were under 
 the especial command of Sir Henry Percy, better known 
 perhaps as Hotspur ; and every day the nation was re- 
 covering confidence in itself, so much so that the next 
 year, 1388, they kept the sea from May to November, 
 and cruising beyond the Channel, ravaged the enemy's 
 coast as far as Poitou. But this was about the end of 
 the war for the time being, for in 1389 a truce was 
 concluded, which lasted, however imperfectly, beyond 
 the end of the century. 
 
 Of the part which Jean de Vienne took in polities or 
 diplomacy during the closing years of his life I do not 
 propose to speak, and the crusading adventure to Bar- 
 bary in 1390, in which English and French fought side 
 by side, may be lightly passed over. It was in 1396 
 that the great man, enemy though he was, whose career 
 I have here hastily sketched, fought his last battle and 
 died honourably at Nicopolis on 28 September. Gibbon's 
 account of this battle is sufficiently incorrect. Neither 
 Jean de Yienne nor the Sire de Coucy can properly be 
 styled ' gay and thoughtless youths,' and the statement 
 that at ten o'clock in the forenoon they were ' heated 
 with wine ' is unwarranted. The fatal charge was due 
 solely to the youthful vivacity, impatience, and jealousy 
 of the constable, Philippe d'Eu, who ordered his own 
 immediate followers to advance. The two seniors hastily 
 
JEAN DE VIENNE. 29 
 
 consulted as to what they should do. ' Sire de Coucy,' 
 said the admiral, ' rashness must command when truth 
 and reason can no longer be heard, and since the Count 
 d'Eu is determined on fighting, it becomes our duty to 
 follow him.' It was thus that the little French army 
 plunged into the enemy's ranks, and at their head rode 
 Jean de Vienne, bearing on high the banner of Our Lady. 
 ' The battle,' says Gibbon, ' would not have been lost if 
 the French would have obeyed the prudence of the Hun- 
 garians, but it might have been gloriously won had the 
 Hungarians imitated the valour of the French.' This, 
 however, they did not attempt, and the French, over- 
 whelmed by numbers, were slain to a man, Jean de 
 Vienne amongst them, still clutching in his death grip 
 the sacred banner which he carried. 
 
 To an Englishman, even after the lapse of 500 years 
 it is not a pleasing task to recount the disasters of his 
 countrymen : but we can, none the less, honour the 
 memory of this great man, in the foremost rank of those 
 who won back— even though from our own princes — the 
 independence of France in the fourteenth century, and 
 who has stamped on the pages of our naval history a 
 bitter lesson which we should do well to lay to heart. 
 
30 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 COLBERT. 
 
 THE BIETH OF A NAVY. 1 
 
 The reign of Louis XIV, celebrated alike for the splen- 
 dour of its early, and for the gloom of its later years, 
 will always form a favourite chapter in French history ; 
 but whilst the brilliance of the French court, and the 
 warlike achievements of French soldiers, or of their 
 enemies, have been described in glowing terms by many 
 an enthusiastic writer ; whilst the poets, who shed such 
 grace over their own age, still live in their works as the 
 representatives of the literary genius of their nation — we, 
 in England at least, are too apt to ignore or slight 
 the memory of the statesmen who, by the development 
 which they gave to the resources of the country — by the 
 solidity which they gave to its power — were as much the 
 real authors of its greatness as the king, by his over- 
 reaching ambition, was of its subsequent weakness. Of 
 these men, first in point of time as well as of intellect, 
 was he whose name stands at the head of this page. 
 
 Jean Baptiste Colbert, the son of parents who, what- 
 ever may have been their ancestry, certainly occupied a 
 very humble position, was born at Eheims on 29 August, 
 1 St. PauVs Magazine, December, 1868. 
 
COLBEET. 31 
 
 1619. He received his early training in the office of a 
 banker in Lyons, from which, at the age of twenty-four, 
 he was introduced into the service of Le Tellier, Secretary 
 of State for War. 1 He rapidly acquired Le Tellier 's 
 confidence, acted as his agent in the conduct of delicate 
 business, and was thus brought to the notice of Mazarin, 
 who eventually, in 1651, appointed him to be his own 
 private secretary. With Mazarin's interests he seems to 
 have completely identified himself, and the cardinal when 
 dying, in 1661, formally bequeathed him to the king. 
 ' I owe you much, Sire,' he is reported to have said ; 
 ' but I partly repay you in leaving you Colbert.' The 
 recommendation was one to which Colbert was qualified 
 to give weight, and the malversations of Fouquet, the 
 Superintendent of Finance, afforded him the opportunity. 
 Between Fouquet and Colbert there had been a 
 friendship of long standing, but for the year before 
 Mazarin's death the intimacy had given place to stiffness 
 and suspicion. Whether from honest care for the public 
 weal, or from some more personal motive, Colbert had 
 laid before Mazarin an exposition of gross irregularities 
 in the accounts of the revenue, and Fouquet, not un- 
 naturally, believed that in doing so Colbert was actuated 
 by a desire to oust him from an office which he coveted 
 for himself. Mazarin, however, was unwilling to stir in 
 the matter, and for the time it was allowed to drop. 
 Colbert now revived it. He laid before the king such a 
 clear account of the malpractices of the Superintendent 
 of Finance that his disgrace followed within a few days. 
 
 1 Lettres, Instructions et Memowes de Colbert, public's d'apris Us 
 ordres de VEmpereur. . . . par Pierre Clement. 8 vols, royal 8vo. 
 1861-1882. 
 
32 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 The process which ruined Fouquet was the foundation- 
 stone of Colbert's fortune ; for the king resolved to be his 
 own minister, and struck with the ability which Colbert 
 had displayed in preparing the charges, appointed him to 
 the vacant office as Controller of Finance. The man's 
 tact, acquired in long training in subordinate positions, 
 and his aptitude for business, very shortly won him 
 the entire favour of the king, and during the ten years 
 which followed his first appointment, although nominally 
 holding only particular offices, he was, in reality, all but 
 absolute throughout the kingdom. 
 
 The time, however, was one of extreme difficulty, and 
 it was only by slow degrees that he was able to enter on 
 any great policy. His work at the beginning was neces- 
 sarily for the most part work of reform. His attention 
 was fully occupied with the struggle against the internal 
 confusion of the country, which had been brought to the 
 verge of bankruptcy by the unprincipled and licentious 
 administration of his predecessor, and which was now 
 scourged by a famine of almost unexampled severity, 
 caused in a great measure by the failure of the harvest 
 of 1661, but fearfully aggravated by a clause in the corn 
 laws passed the same year, which distinctly forbade the 
 formation of any company for the sale of grain, or the 
 accumulation of grain in any magazines. There was 
 thus no store in the country to meet the emergency. 
 Out of Josephus we know of nothing so terrible as the 
 description of the state of the French peasantry during 
 that spring of 1662. To say that they died in crowds 
 conveys no idea of their sufferings. They were found 
 dead in the fields, their mouths full of the grass with 
 which they had vainly tried to stay the cravings of 
 
COLBERT. 33 
 
 hunger. They were found dead in the church-porches, 
 their own hands and arms half-devoured ; dead in the 
 houses, destitute of all furniture and clothes ; dead in 
 the gutters, where they had been grovelling for carrion 
 and garbage. And many that lived were known to 
 have sustained life on food of a nature so loathsome 
 that at the very thought of it the blood runs cold with 
 horror. 
 
 Immediate and energetic measures on the part of the 
 government were necessary to relieve this fearful desti- 
 tution. Corn was bought up in foreign countries, and 
 from the stores thus acquired, and from Paris, sufficient 
 was thrown into the provinces to bring the price down 
 to a moderate level. At the same time large grants of 
 money were made, and reiterated appeals to private 
 charity called forth supplies which served to relieve the 
 most pressing wants. 
 
 But the disorder which existed amongst the finances 
 of the country,, though not so lethal as the famine, was 
 almost as important a consideration. It is difficult to 
 conceive anything worse than the state into which the 
 revenue had fallen. This was not only from the neglect 
 of crown property, but from the alienation of some of 
 the principal taxes ; the misappropriation of others ; 
 the wasteful expenditure of past years ; the fraud, pecu- 
 lation, and gross misconduct of the collectors, not in 
 isolated cases, but all over the country. The people 
 were ground down by a heavy, almost intolerable taxa- 
 tion ; and the public chest contained little or no money. 
 To remedy this, to restore order where -there seemed 
 nothing but impending ruin — work compared to which 
 the cleansing of the Augean stable might be considered 
 
34 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 the amusement of a summer afternoon — was the task 
 that Colbert was called upon to perform. 
 
 The state of the government securities was the first 
 point that demanded his attention ; they were in need of 
 a drastic treatment, and they got ( it. The direct taxes 
 of Paris were almost swallowed upl by charges secured on 
 irregular or illegal bonds. These were cancelled, not- 
 withstanding the excitement which such a step caused 
 amongst the many who had bought the stock in good 
 faith. Other loans which had been legally secured at a 
 high rate of interest, were paid off with money borrowed 
 on more equitable terms, thus effecting an annual saving 
 of eight millions of francs. Others, again, were bought 
 in, the holders being obliged to sell at the low price for 
 which they had purchased the stock, during a period of 
 excessive depreciation. Very large sums were further 
 raised by the Chamber of Justice, which compelled the 
 financial agents of the former administration to disgorge 
 a considerable portion of their ill-gotten wealth. This 
 court, appointed by the king specially to examine into 
 and adjudicate on the numerous charges brought against 
 these men, whilst sentencing many to corporal punish- 
 ment or death, imposed on most of them fines which ran 
 in some individual instances as high as six millions, and 
 amounted in the aggregate to upwards of 110 millions 
 of francs. When such sums could be recovered, after 
 several years of the unbounded extravagance and 
 splendour which rendered the name of financier almost 
 proverbial, we can form some estimate of the enormity 
 of the frauds which had been eating into the life of the 
 country. 
 
 The same cankerworm existed in every department 
 
COLBERT. 35 
 
 of the public service. Careless and corrupt administra- 
 tion, winking at or directly allowing rights illegally 
 usurped, had reduced the revenue derived from the 
 royal forests to 150,000 francs. Ten years later it 
 averaged upwards of a million. The pernicious practice 
 of selling at a high price almost every office under 
 government had in itself given rise to incalculable evil ; 
 and as the salaries had been irregularly or seldom paid, 
 those purchasers who had the power naturally enough 
 indemnified themselves for the loss. Patents of nobility, 
 which carried with them exemptions from many govern- 
 ment claims, had been lavishly granted during past 
 years, and the system of raising supplies by the sale of 
 such patents was openly recognised. It had thus come 
 to pass that the large body of the rich, on whom the 
 payment of taxes would have fallen but lightly, paid 
 nothing ; and that the money for the necessities of the 
 government had to be wrung out of the earnings of the 
 poor. Against this injustice a decisive blow was struck 
 by the edict of 1665, which revoked all letters of nobility 
 granted since 1634. At the same time several persons 
 were convicted of having usurped the privileges of 
 nobility without any authority whatever. These were 
 now punished and made liable to pay in the future. 
 The burden of the people was thus considerably relieved. 
 But the clamour against Colbert was very loud. Those 
 who were exposed, fined, and taxed, were men of wealth 
 and position, and their indignation was very great. This 
 sought a vent, not in a defence of their own inexcusable 
 conduct, of which they avoided all mention, but in a cry 
 that Colbert was undermining the constitution of the 
 country, lowering the royal prerogative, and putting the 
 
 D 2 
 
36 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 gentlemen on the same footing as the peasants. Colbert, 
 however, was too firmly seated in office to be influenced 
 or disturbed by the complaints of these would-be aristo- 
 crats ; he was upheld by the king, and carried on the 
 work of reform with energetic determination and un- 
 sparing severity. Highway robbery was put down, 
 rioters punished, public peace insisted on ; internal traffic 
 was encouraged ; local dues, so far as feelings of provin- 
 cial pride permitted, were equalised, and under the rule 
 of a government at once able and strong, the country 
 began quickly to emerge from the abyss of barbarism, 
 into which the last hundred years of anarchy, sedition 
 or rebellion, persecution, oppression, and civil war had 
 thrown it. 
 
 Integrity, economy, and order were, however, but 
 tributaries to the principal stream by which wealth was 
 to be poured into the country. Colbert was the son of a 
 shopkeeper, educated in early youth with a view to a 
 mercantile life ; and the bias which his mind thus re- 
 ceived affected his whole policy, and led him to consider 
 that the true prosperity of the nation was to be sought 
 in manufactures and commerce. On this principle he 
 determined that the capabilities of the kingdom should 
 be developed ; and he carried the determination through 
 with an ardour that neither failure could chill, nor the 
 fear of responsibility check. The labour which he de- 
 voted to each separate branch of industry was excessive. 
 As soon as a trade was introduced, or resolved on, it 
 received his fostering care, nor did he withdraw his 
 attention as long as it showed a spark of vitality. It 
 was thus that France became celebrated for her manu- 
 factures of lace, ribbon, and silk; but the means by 
 
COLBERT. 37 
 
 which he established and nurtured them were of a most 
 absolute, often of an illegal nature. When he learned 
 that the ribbon-makers of Chevreuse were in the habit 
 of wasting their time in dissipation, he promulgated an 
 order forbidding the publichouse-keepers of the town to 
 sell them anything either to eat or drink during working 
 hours. When he heard of a workman at Lyons who 
 had found out some improvement in cloth-printing, and 
 was on the point of taking it to Florence, he had him 
 imprisoned, in order to prevent his leaving the country. 
 And many similar instances might be given ; for one 
 of the distinguishing features in Colbert's character was 
 a fixedness of purpose that, when he had once made up 
 his mind as to what ought to be done, went straight at 
 the end proposed with a determination to bear down all 
 obstacles. And his ideas were for the most part con- 
 formable to the period in which he lived ; more enlarged 
 and clearer than those of ordinary men, but still subject 
 to the influences of the age, which centuries of tyranny 
 and misrule had prevented from receiving the more per- 
 suasive maxims of civilisation. Violent and extreme, 
 often illegal, punishments thus seemed to him the best, 
 as they were the quickest, means of attaining his end ; 
 and the men who were subjected to them, accustomed 
 to the oppression of the great and to the disorders of 
 rebellion and revolt, saw nothing strange in his arbitrary 
 method of carrying on the government. These influences, 
 acting on his industrial policy, caused him to believe 
 that a large and powerful country like France ought to 
 be almost entirely self-supporting ; that its manufactures, 
 its agriculture, its commerce ought to be sufficient to 
 provide for all the wants of both necessity and luxury, 
 
38 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 and that strict protection and constant government sur- 
 veillance were the best means of making them so. It 
 was contrary to the spirit of the age, ignorant alike of 
 the theory and practice of commerce, to suppose that 
 the wealth and prosperity of adjoining nations were 
 really sources from which wealth and prosperity ought 
 to flow towards his own country, and with the whole 
 weight of his influence and power he endeavoured to 
 make Prance indepejident of any import trade with the 
 rest of EuropeL^ft was thus that he devised the exorbi- 
 tant tariff of 1667, which, doubling, and in some cases 
 tripling the previously existing duties, amounted to a 
 partial or even total prohibition of both export and im- 
 port, The manufactures of the country, in their young 
 and undeveloped state, doubtless reaped a very decided 
 advantage from this prohibition. They could not pro- 
 duce enough to feel the clog of the export duties, whilst 
 those on imports gave them a sufficient sale within the 
 country. But agriculture suffered terribly ; for as corn 
 could not be exported at all except by permission from 
 government, and as this permission could never be 
 depended on, the farmers simplified their cares by not 
 growing more than would satisfy the demands of their 
 own neighbourhood. Thus the good land only was 
 cultivated, the inferior was neglected ; and on any failure, 
 or partial failure, of the harvest, there was an immediate 
 famine ; for as each province only sowed what would be 
 enough for its own consumption, when dearth occurred 
 in one the others had no excess out of which to relieve 
 the want. Very great suffering was therefore common ; 
 a scarcity of bread— not merely a certain rise in price, but 
 an absolute scarcity — occurring about once in every three 
 
COLBEKT. 39 
 
 years ; and on each occasion of this distress a fresh 
 attempt was made to prevent it in future by making still 
 stricter the laws against the export of grain. 
 
 And yet, whilst clogging with exorbitant duties the 
 commerce that was within his reach, he was still most 
 anxious to grasp at that which was beyond it. He 
 looked with great bitterness of feeling on the enormous 
 revenues which the Dutch drew from their East and West 
 India trade, from their trade in the Levant and the Baltic, 
 and from their Northern fisheries, whether of whale or 
 herring. He could not help seeing that it was this wide- 
 spread commerce which gave the Dutch an influence and 
 power in E urope wholly disproportionate to the size of their 
 country and the number of their population ; nor could 
 he avoid picturing to himself the magnificent future in 
 store for France when her commerce had taken the place 
 of that of Holland. To this end his labours were directed ; 
 and as companies, protected and assisted by the govern- 
 ment, were still believed to offer the best and surest 
 way of developing a new commerce, such companies were 
 formed with special privileges to trade, whether north, 
 south, west, or east. There was the Company of the 
 North, designed to divert the Baltic trade and the fisheries 
 to France ; the Company of the Pyrenees, which was to 
 bring timber, pitch, and tar from the mountain-slopes to 
 the sea-ports where they could be made available ; there 
 was the African Company to trade in negroes, palm-oil, 
 ivory, and gold-dust ; the West Indian Company, to share 
 in the valuable commerce of the Antilles and the Spanish 
 Main ; — above all, there was the East India Company, 
 which, it was fondly hoped, would draw to France the 
 produce that had successively enriched Venice, Portugal, 
 
40 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 and Holland. Three attempts to establish an East 
 India Company had already failed, when, in 1664, CoL 
 bert took the matter in hand, resolved to succeed if 
 trouble and expense could enable him to do so. But 
 the previous failures had made the commercial public 
 look coldly on the scheme, and much argument and per- 
 suasion were necessary to induce them to come forward 
 with their subscriptions. The mayors of the different 
 towns were invited to give both their money and influ- 
 ence ; the government officials were permitted to under- 
 stand that their personal interest might be forwarded 
 by a liberal contribution, the king himself subscribed 
 three millions out of the fifteen with which the company 
 was started, and it was agreed that these three millions 
 should not bear interest for the first ten years, and that 
 any losses the company might sustain should be charge- 
 able on them. The company was further gifted with 
 numerous privileges, exemptions from duties and tolls, 
 and the rights of sovereignty over the countries which 
 it might acquire from the natives, or conquer from the 
 enemy. It was thus fairly started in 1664 ; but neither 
 protection, nor privileges, nor the assistance of the govern- 
 ment could support it against the unfortunate selection 
 of the superior officers, and the apparent incapacity of 
 the French people for colonisation. During the first 
 eleven years of its existence there was an actual loss of 
 six millions and a half ; and though it lingered on for 
 upwards of a century, it never enjoyed more than the 
 most transient gleams of prosperity. 
 
 The fate of the other companies was still more de- 
 cisive. The Company of the West Indies became bank- 
 rupt for three and a half millions within ten years ; the 
 
COLBERT. 41 
 
 Company of the North collapsed on the breaking out of 
 the war with Holland in 1672 ; and that of the Pyrenees 
 ceased to exist about the same time. 
 
 The bad success which attended all these companies 
 was far from making Colbert view with equanimity the 
 continued stream of commerce which poured its riches 
 into the lap of Holland. It was this probably that caused 
 him to adhere so firmly to the toll of fifty sous per ton 
 levied on all foreign ships arriving in French ports — a 
 toll which pressed heavily on foreign merchants, more 
 particularly on the Dutch, and stirred up much ill-feeling 
 without producing to the revenue any direct advantage 
 worth speaking of, for it does not seem in any year to 
 have amounted to half a million of francs. But the toll 
 did undoubtedly at the time give a great stimulus to the 
 native ship-owners ; and though the Dutch remonstrated 
 against it, still, as they could only appeal to the faith of 
 ancient treaties, whilst Colbert was supported in his 
 resolve by the manifest advantage which it must bring 
 to French shipping, their remonstrance was unavailing. 
 The toll was continued, rankling in the minds of the 
 Dutch, whose material interests were again still more 
 severely injured by the tariff of 1667. This tariff pressed 
 heavily on the industries and commerce of both England 
 and Holland, and gave rise, in both countries, to the 
 most serious discontent. It did not, however, suit the 
 purpose of the English king to break with the crown 
 that paid his pension ; and the English people, with no 
 goodwill, were forced to submit to the new duties and 
 the loss which they imposed on them. With the Dutch 
 it was different. Their government did not hesitate to 
 express its dissatisfaction in very plain terms ; and Col- 
 
42 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 bert, backed by tbe army of France, was by no means 
 anxious to allay the angry feeling. War, if war should 
 arise, was as likely a way as any other to lessen the 
 power and drain the resources of Holland. The grasp- 
 ing ambition of the king seconded his views. After years 
 of tedious and querulous correspondence, war broke out 
 in 1672 ; and in a few months Holland, overrun by the 
 French troops, with its strong places in the hands of the 
 enemy, seemed on the brink of destruction. It was then 
 (8 July, 1672) that Colbert, hoping to accomplish his 
 long wished-for purpose, endeavoured to persuade the 
 king to adopt a series of measures which, if acted on, 
 would have annihilated the Dutch trade. His proposals, 
 which amounted to a demand for the cession of all their 
 East and West Indian settlements, and of their right of 
 trade in the Mediterranean, were, however, rejected by 
 the king as too moderate to be offered to a country 
 already completely subjugated. The result was — as is 
 well known — a continuance of the war, in which the 
 frenzy of despair lent an unexpected vigour to the Dutch 
 arms. The De Witts were massacred in a fit of popular 
 fury ; and the Prince of Orange, raised to the head of 
 affairs, so ably conducted them in the cabinet at home 
 and in the field abroad, that France lost her advantage 
 almost as quickly as she had gained it. For six years 
 this bitter war continued, and ended at last in the treaty 
 of Nimeguen, by which France — though gaining from 
 Germany and Spain some increase of her territory — lost 
 all the commercial advantages to the pursuit of which 
 Colbert had devoted his ministry and his life. The tariff 
 of 1667, one of the original causes of the war, was given 
 up ; the special privileges and excessive duties by which 
 
COLBERT. 43 
 
 he had sought to establish certain branches of commerce 
 and manufacture were abolished, and it was agreed 
 that reciprocal liberty of trade between the two countries 
 should not be prohibited, limited, or restrained. 
 
 In the conduct of this war on shore, Colbert, how- 
 ever, had no part beyond providing the money which it 
 devoured. At sea it was different. He had been actually 
 the head of the naval department since 1669, and vir- 
 tually so since 1665. It is in this capacity that his 
 career offers the greatest interest to us, as Englishmen ; 
 and doubly so when we find that, owing to his energetic 
 measures, France, a few years before entirely destitute 
 of any naval force, was able to send the Count d'Estrees 
 with a fleet of forty sail to witness the battle of Solebay 
 in May, 1672 ; and the Duke de Vivonne with upwards 
 of fifty ships to conduct the campaign of Sicily in 1676. 
 It is this sudden rise of the French navy, this extra- 
 ordinary development of the French maritime power — 
 which has been, with pardonable pride, compared to the 
 springing forth of Minerva from the head of Jupiter, 
 armed and ready for the combat — that must ever be 
 considered as the crowning point of Colbert's fame. 
 
 Bichelieu had indeed attempted to form a navy which 
 might be not quite unworthy of a great nation; and 
 succeeded in getting together a force respectable both in 
 numbers and efficiency ; but the troubles of the Fronde 
 with its accompanying civil wars quickly undid the work 
 of the great cardinal, and the neglect of Mazarin com- 
 pleted the destruction. A fleet cannot be kept up with- 
 out a large and continuous outlay of money, and the 
 disordered state of the finances during Mazarin's minis- 
 try did not admit of the requisite funds being supplied. 
 
44 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 Whilst Mazarin himself was appropriating fifty millions 
 out of the public money ; whilst Fouquet and the sub- 
 ordinate financiers were revelling in a display of luxury 
 and wealth which has seldom been approached, the sum 
 annually spent on the equipment of the king's ships fell 
 from the five millions, which Eichelieu had considered 
 necessary in 1647, to three hundred thousand francs, 
 which was all that Mazarin and his gang of attendant 
 harpies could allow. We cannot then feel surprised that 
 in 1662, Colbert found that the state possessed no more 
 than two or three ships of war in a seaworthy condition, 
 and that of the twenty galleys left by Eichelieu, six only, 
 miserably inefficient, remained ; the rest had rotted on 
 their slips, or sunk in the harbour of Toulon. With the 
 new ministry a new order of things was installed. Ee- 
 solved that the state should have a naval force both 
 numerous and efficient, Colbert commenced the work of 
 reformation at once. In 1662 he caused three millions 
 to be allotted for that purpose ; in succeeding years this 
 sum was doubled and trebled, and in 1671 — in ten years, 
 that is, from the time of his taking office — he had raised 
 this part of his budget to thirteen millions. That the 
 government was in a position to afford this large sum 
 was due entirely to the financial and administrative 
 reforms which Colbert had introduced. That it did 
 afford it was as entirely due to the influence of Colbert 
 as head of the navy. Nor under the direction of 
 such a man was it possible for the money to be mis- 
 applied ; every expense was strictly inquired into ; the 
 most severe economy was everywhere enjoined; and 
 however the public treasure might be squandered in 
 lavish profusion in. other departments which were beyond 
 
COLBERT. 45 
 
 Colbert's control, there is little doubt that in this, at 
 least, Prance got very good value for her money. 
 
 Large quantities of stores were purchased in Sweden ; 
 many ships, ready for sea, were bought from Holland, 
 then a friendly State, and many others were ordered to 
 be built. But Colbert was keenly alive to the necessity 
 of being independent of any foreign government. The 
 Dutch willingly lent him skilled workmen, whom he 
 brought from Holland to teach their trade to the raw 
 hands that he had to employ ; and they taught it them 
 well, so that in a few years the French shipbuilders 
 became celebrated both for the rapidity and excellence 
 of their work ; and down to the wars of the Eevolution, 
 French ships were considered as models of men-of-war. 
 
 Quickness in the building of a ship was a point on 
 which Colbert laid great stress. Experience has shown 
 that this was a mistake ; that the timbers, as they are 
 fixed in their places, require time to settle and become 
 firmly knit together. This was probably not known two 
 hundred years ago, or it would be difficult to explain the 
 importance which Colbert — who had a wonderful theo- 
 retical knowledge of even the details and technicalities 
 of the profession — attached to lessening the time in 
 which a ship could be built and equipped. In this, as 
 will generally be the case with anything to which an 
 earnest attention is paid, the success was almost in- 
 credible. Towards the latter part of his administration 
 a ship could be laid down, built, launched, rigged, and 
 got ready for sea in half a day. Wonderful as this 
 statement is, it rests on indisputable evidence. In July, 
 1679, a forty-gun frigate was actually built at Toulon 
 in seven hours ; and about the same date, a galley 
 
46 studies' in naval history. 
 
 carried the Marquis de Seignelay and a large official 
 party from Marseilles to the Chateau d'lf, within ten 
 hours and a half from the time that the shipwrights 
 commenced to build her. These, of course, were very 
 exceptional cases ; but they show what the ideal standard 
 of perfection was— a standard to which the different 
 controllers and superintendents were constantly urged 
 to approach as near as possible, on ordinary occasions. 
 When the head of the department showed himself always 
 energetic and watchful, when he was also at the head of 
 the finances of the kingdom, and could push forward his 
 projects with all the resources that money could buy, we 
 need not wonder at the results obtained. By the official 
 list of 1 January, 1677, the last year of the war with 
 Holland, the State possessed, exclusively of galleys, 
 199 ships of war of all sizes, actually afloat. Of these 
 sixty-eight were first, second, and third-rates, that is, 
 ships of not less than fifty guns, or 800 tons burden, 
 and several of them were much larger, as, for instance, 
 the Soleil Eoyal and the Eoyal Louis, each of 2,400 tons 
 burden and 120 guns. 
 
 To man the ships when built was a point of no less 
 importance than the mere building. In former ages, the 
 plan of manning a fleet, when one was got together, was 
 extremely simple. The ports throughout the kingdom 
 were closed, and a press-gang laid violent hands on 
 every available man, who was forthwith sent on board. 
 The pressed men were by a legal fiction supposed to be 
 seamen ; but knowing as we do the traditions of the ' 
 press in our own country fifty years ago, we can have 
 little difficulty in understanding that in France more 
 than two hundred years since, an able-bodied man, 
 
COLBEET. 47 
 
 whatever might be his trade, would find it far from easy 
 to persuade his captors that he was not a seaman ; and 
 that, seaman or not, when once pressed, he had to serve. 
 This system Colbert attempted to abolish. He did, in 
 fact, abolish it in name, and substituted a strict enrol- 
 ment of sailors in all the provinces of the seaboard. The 
 maritime population was thus divided into three classes, 
 one of which was called out for service every year. Of 
 this year they actually served six months, and if no 
 longer wanted, received half-pay for the other six. In 
 the two years which intervened before their turn came 
 round again, they were free to serve in merchant ships, 
 or employ themselves as they liked. The system, how- 
 ever, did not fully answer the expectations which the 
 minister had formed ; the men were suspicious, and 
 evaded the enrolment; a promise half-made, that those 
 who were enrolled should be exempt from taxation, was 
 never fulfilled; the half-pay, though distinctly agreed 
 on, could not be paid when the war which began in 
 1672 was calling for all the money the kingdom could 
 raise; but above all, the new system, by doing away 
 with many opportunities for jobbing, militated so directly 
 against the personal interests of several officers in high 
 position, that it became to a great extent a dead letter. 
 And the necessities of the state itself practically abro- 
 gated the law ; for whenever war broke out, the class of 
 the year was insufficient, so that all the classes were 
 called on, in addition to which the ports were closed, 
 and the press again instituted. The men thus found 
 themselves in a worse position than ever. Obliged as 
 they were by the law to serve when it was their turn, 
 and seized on by the press when it was not, it is not to 
 
48 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 be wondered at that they had recourse to all possible 
 subterfuges and evasions to escape the enrolment. The 
 fleets, however, were manned, and in the course of time 
 many out of the different crews doubtless became more 
 reconciled to the service, and settled down into regular 
 men-of-war's men. These formed a future nucleus ; and 
 the system of enrolment by classes, modified considerably 
 according to the requirements of the state, or as expe- 
 rience suggested improvements, remained in force for a 
 full century after Colbert's death, and may fairly be con- 
 sidered as the basis of the system which exists at the 
 present day. 
 
 As supplemental to the sailors of the fleet, of whom 
 he was unable to find a sufficient number, Colbert 
 formed in 1669 two regiments of infantry, of 3,000 men 
 each, to serve in detachments on board the ships, in a 
 manner precisely similar to our own marines. These, 
 there can be little doubt, would have been a valuable 
 adjunct to the crews, had not the jealousy of Louvois, 
 who insisted on having the appointment of the officers, 
 rendered the plan abortive. The officers so appointed, 
 receiving their commissions from, and dependent for 
 promotion on, the Secretary of State for War, had little 
 care to win the good opinion of the Secretary for the 
 Navy, or of the naval officers under whom they served. 
 Being put on the same footing, with regard to pay and 
 promotion, as the officers of the line regiments, instead 
 of enjoying the peculiar advantages and privileges which 
 Colbert had offered in the first instance, they conceived 
 a distaste for the service afloat, which enhanced their 
 insubordinate disposition, and led to such constant diffi- 
 culties and quarrels, that in 1671, only two years after 
 
COLBERT. 49 
 
 they were raised, they were turned over to the regular 
 army, and soldiers for the service afloat were entered as 
 each ship was put in commission. 
 
 The difficulty of finding officers for the ships was 
 scarcely less than that of finding men. A few there 
 were, indeed, who had served in the time of Eichelieu, 
 or had since learnt the profession on board the Maltese 
 cruisers. These, however, were far from sufficient in 
 number, so that officers of the army were transferred, in 
 a wholesale manner, to the sister service, and gradually 
 attained a certain amount of nautical skill under the 
 instruction of the merchant skippers who were, at the 
 time, the real sailing-masters of the ships. But it was 
 far from Colbert's idea tbat this state of things should 
 continue. He resolved that the officers of the several 
 ships should be such in reality as well as in name ; and 
 being convinced of the advantage of early training, he 
 instituted a body of cadets which remained in existence 
 till the Eevolwtion. These cadets, under the title of 
 ' Gardes de la Marine," were all gentlemen by birth, and 
 served on board as volunteers until they received their 
 promotion to the rank of ensign. They were, in fact, 
 on very much the same footing as midshipmen in our 
 own navy, and performed the same duties, but their 
 advancement as a rule was speedy, for the necessities of 
 the country required officers. These, as they grew up 
 to be men, having been carefully instructed in their 
 profession, theoretically and practically, formed a very 
 valuable class ; though the pride of birth, in many in- 
 stances, led them into difficulties with others who, by 
 long or daring service, had won their promotion from an 
 inferior rank of life. For of these there was a consider- 
 
 B 
 
50 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 able number — a number, too, which increased rapidly 
 when war, putting a check on the rising commerce, con- 
 verted the bold skipper of many a fishing or coasting 
 boat into a dashing privateer, and in time into the com- 
 mander of his majesty's ships and squadrons. Such 
 men were, in the succeeding age, Jean Bart and Du 
 Guay-Trouin, whose exploits, although for the most 
 part performed with but small force, read more like the 
 romantic tales of the Knights of the Bound Table, than 
 the sober history of the seventeenth or eighteenth cen- 
 tury. The almost equally celebrated colleague of these, 
 De Forbin, was, on the other hand, a cadet of the 
 aristocratic guards, and served as such in the expedition 
 to Messina in 1675. De Langeron also was a cadet a 
 few years senior, and having stepped over the inter- 
 mediate grades, served as a captain in the same expe- 
 dition. Tourville, who commanded the French fleets in 
 the battles of Beachy Head and La Hogue, commenced 
 his career on board a Maltese galley, and quitting the 
 active service of the order in a fit of pique, won at an 
 early age considerable renown by a series of enterprises 
 in the Levant, which were then counted as honourable, 
 but which in a time of stricter morality would have 
 conducted him to the gallows. It was not till 1667 that 
 he entered the service of the French king. Chateau- 
 Benault also was a knight of St. John. Du Quesne, 
 whose conduct on the coast of Sicily rendered his name 
 dear to France, a skilful officer, but of a most perverse 
 and quarrelsome disposition, was one of the old school, 
 his commission as captain dating back as far as 1626. 
 Count d'Estrees, who for some years held the chief 
 command over the French fleets of the West, was a 
 
COLBERT. 51 
 
 landsman until his appointment as Vice-Admiral of 
 France in 1669 ; as also was the Marquis de Villette till 
 he was forty years old. These are some of the men 
 who occupied a distinguished position in the navy of 
 Louis XIV, and it is not a little interesting to notice 
 the different points from which they started. A similar 
 diversity was then general throughout all ranks. But 
 as the navy became more and more a settled institution, 
 as the ships' companies were more regularly raised by 
 enrolment, the officers were also more commonly, and 
 latterly almost entirely, entered as cadets of the guard 
 and trained to the discipline of the service from their 
 youth. 1 Officers not gentlemen by birth were rare 
 during the second half of the eighteenth century ; and it 
 was this exclusiveness which, on the breaking out of the 
 Eevolution, turned the popular rage against them in a 
 manner so fatal both to themselves and to the French 
 navy. 
 
 In the time of which we are speaking, however, when 
 there were no precedents to guide their conduct, when 
 passions were more unrestrained, when public morality 
 was a thing little understood, there was considerable 
 difficulty in binding the different elements together so 
 that they might act in unison. The executive officers 
 were inclined to treat the civil officers with disdain ; the 
 sailors looked down on the landsmen ; the aristocratic 
 cadets scorned the company of their more humbly-de- 
 
 1 D'Estaing, whose career, ashore or afloat, does not reflect much 
 honour on either his name or his country, was one of the very few 
 who, in the end of last century, held high naval command with- 
 out having worked their way through the subordinate grades. He 
 was thrust into the navy, with the rank of lieutenant-general, in 
 1763. 
 
 E 2 
 
52 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 scended messmates ; quarrels were never-ending ; duels 
 were frequent ; insubordination was by no means rare ; 
 tbe captains, and even the admirals, set but a bad 
 example to the lieutenants and ensigns ; the enmity 
 between D'Estrees and Du Quesne was notorious, and 
 although the latter was palpably in the wrong, though 
 his conduct as an inferior officer towards his superior 
 was contrary to all the rules of military service, still the 
 need which the kingdom had of officers possessing ability 
 and experience was so great, that Colbert could do 
 nothing more than persuade, entreat, or threaten. With 
 the juniors he took a more decided tone. In their cases, 
 threats were generally followed by punishment which 
 might in some instances be counted unduly harsh, did 
 we lose sight of the extreme danger which the navy 
 ran of being utterly disorganised by the existing unruly 
 spirit. 
 
 The dishonesty of the commissaries presented another 
 serious difficulty. Embezzlement of money and fraudu- 
 lently making away with stores ' were crimes painfully 
 common ; and the temptation to the captains, who acted 
 also as the pursers of their ships, to enrich themselves 
 by serving out provisions in short allowance and of 
 inferior quality was not often resisted. These were 
 taxes on the energy of the minister against which few 
 besides Colbert could have made adequate resistance ; 
 but his iron will sustained him, and he did in the course 
 of time succeed in getting together a body of officers, 
 who could, under heavy pressure, live together without 
 
 1 These were vices of the age, not peculiar to France or the French 
 navy, but much too frequently manifested on board our own ships, or in 
 high places on shore. 
 
COLBERT. 53 
 
 brawling, and, under constant surveillance, could take 
 charge of stores without stealing ; but whilst these were 
 being selected, the number of those who were dismissed, 
 disgraced, or imprisoned was very large. 
 
 The mere numerical strength to which the exertions 
 of Colbert raised the French navy was alone sufficient to 
 give it prestige in the eyes of Europe. It was not till 
 the year 1676 that it had any opportunity of endeavour- 
 ing to win that prestige by force of arms. The skill of 
 the officers and crews must, however, have been still far 
 below the standard to which natural aptitude and long 
 experience had raised the Dutch, especially while under 
 the command of an admiral like De Euyter. In the 
 battle of Alicudi, on 8 January, notwithstanding their 
 superiority in number, size, and in the equipment of 
 their ships, which were fresh from Toulon with complete 
 crews — notwithstanding their superiority in number and 
 weight of guns, the French were not able to gain even 
 the semblance of an advantage over their hardy enemy. 
 On 22 April, off Agosta, De Euyter, with ten ships — 
 separated from the rest of his fleet by a division of the 
 most incapable of allies — held at bay and virtually beat 
 back the whole French fleet, a splendid achievement, 
 dearly paid for by the wound which proved mortal after 
 seven days. And whatever we may think of the arro- 
 gance or imbecility of the Spanish government, or of 
 the weakness of the Spanish navy, it is still evident 
 that the careful administration of Colbert, whilst able to 
 build and equip ships in a manner equal to those of any 
 country in Europe, was not able to improvise, in a 
 similar way, a race of men who could be compared with 
 the sailors of Holland. 
 
54 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 The detailed accounts of these battles were, however, 
 by no means generally known through the kingdom of 
 France. The government of Louis XIV was perfectly 
 well skilled in the art of spreading favourable news ; and 
 Colbert in particular held it as a point of duty to speak 
 highly of the achievements of the navy. In 1672, after 
 the battle of Solebay, he had repeatedly expressed his 
 indignation at the modest way in which the Count 
 D'Estrees had spoken of the French share in the action, 
 and had given positive orders that all reports meant for 
 the public eye should be made as favourable as possible. 
 If this was the case after the battle of Solebay, when 
 whatever accounts tended to the glory of the French 
 navy must have contained a very large proportion of 
 fiction, it was much more so in 1676, when two actions 
 had been fought, against De Euyter, without defeat; 
 and when — at Palermo, on 2 June — one very decided 
 success had been gained. This, indeed, was so complete 
 a victory that the French minister had very solid 
 grounds for congratulating the navy and the country on 
 the splendid achievement. The other two battles got 
 mixed up with it, in the popular mind ; and the general 
 impression throughout the kingdom was that the fleet 
 under Du Quesne had completely defeated the Dutch 
 with De Euyter at their head. The death of De Euyter 
 lent a colour to this view ; and the imagined victory over 
 De Euyter has been spoken of in glowing language by 
 writers whose researches into the history of the time 
 ought to have cleared away all confusion. 
 
 The three battles, however, deservedly won a mar- 
 quisate for Du Quesne ; the veteran's grumblings were 
 forgotten in the splendour of his victory; and even 
 
COLBERT. 55 
 
 Colbert, laying aside his usual coldness, wrote to express 
 his joy and satisfaction at the result of the campaign. 
 We can indeed easily understand that his satisfaction 
 must have been very great. The successes on the coast 
 of Sicily were the proof to the public of the success of 
 his endeavour to form a navy — the proof to himself, 
 perhaps, that his navy was capable of real service, and 
 not merely one that might look well in the roadstead, or 
 appear formidable on paper. To us, acquainted with 
 the difficulties against which he had to contend, the 
 figures which represent its strength are a conclusive 
 proof of the talent and energy which he had employed. 
 We have already given the number of ships of all classes 
 actually afloat during the last year of the Dutch war 
 as 199. To officer these, there were, on the official 
 list, 86 captains, 116 lieutenants, and 136 ensigns ; 
 admirals, commanders of different grades, and officers 
 holding exceptional posts, brought the number up to 416. 
 After the peace the numerical strength of the navy was 
 not much increased during Colbert's life, though his zeal 
 for its efficiency does not seem to have suffered any 
 diminution ; and on his death in 1683, his son, the 
 Marquis de Seignelay, succeeded to the administration 
 of a force which, in respect to equipment and organisa- 
 tion, was far superior to that maintained by any other 
 power in the world. 
 
 If it were on the foundation of this alone that the 
 claims of Colbert's memory to the gratitude of Prance 
 were based, he would even then be deservedly celebrated 
 as one of the most distinguished of her sons. When to 
 that, the principal and grandest labour of his life, we 
 join the consideration of the numerous other tasks which 
 
56 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 he accomplished, of the permanent advantages which 
 accrued from his ministry ; when we consider the enor- 
 mous stimulus which he gave to manufactures and com- 
 merce; the way in which he opened out the internal 
 resources of the kingdom by the construction of roads 
 and canals, and in an especial degree by the construction 
 of the canal of Languedoc, which had been the dream of 
 so many former reigns, we are driven to the conclusion 
 that not only in Prance but in the civilised world, he 
 takes a high place among those who have worked for the 
 benefit of their country. 
 
 And yet he died hated by the people, and all but 
 disgraced by the king. There is reason to believe 
 that jealousy of Louvois and chagrin at the coldness of 
 the king aggravated and rendered fatal an illness which 
 was brought on, in the first instance, by the severe toil 
 to which he had subjected himself, without necessary 
 repose. This toil was indeed excessive. During many 
 years he worked in his office regularly for sixteen hours 
 a day, and the results testify that the time was not 
 lightly employed. It was not the mere force of genius 
 which enabled him to accomplish such mighty tasks. 
 The labour which they cost him is manifest on every 
 page of his voluminous writings ; and whilst our opinion 
 of his natural gifts is at the highest, we cannot but 
 acknowledge that the gift which, of all others, conduced 
 the most to his success, was his wonderful industry and 
 determination. 
 
 In his comparative loss of the favour of the vain and 
 versatile king, there is perhaps nothing strange, but we 
 might be surprised at the bad odour in which his name 
 was held by the people. This may in part be attributed 
 
COLBERT. 57 
 
 to the stern and cold manner which was natural to him, 
 and caused him to be spoken of as the ' man of marble.' 
 Many anecdotes are told of him which well illustrate his 
 claim to the title ; amongst others, this : Madame Cor- 
 nuel, who was celebrated in society for her wit and lively 
 disposition, had one day attempted to persuade him to 
 grant her some favour. Colbert listened to all she had to 
 say without making any answer, till at last, piqued by his 
 silence, the lady exclaimed, ' Monseigneur, faites moi au 
 moins signe que vous m'entendez.' In part also it may 
 be attributed to the bold and unsparing way in which he 
 trampled on private interests, or suppressed class privi- 
 leges. I have spoken already of the hostile feeling he 
 excited by his arbitrary manipulation of the funds, and 
 by doing away with special exemptions from taxation ; 
 but other instances were not unfrequent where he had 
 steadily pursued what he conceived to be the path of 
 duty, without too much regard to the prejudices of those 
 for whom he legislated. The enemies whom he thus 
 stirred up were men for the most part of good position 
 or of provincial authority ; and of the dirt which they 
 so freely flung on his reputation, some doubtless ad- 
 hered. 
 
 But, above all, it was notorious that, being a man of 
 humble origin, he had provided splendidly for all his 
 relations, and had amassed a very large fortune. It is 
 impossible to think that the ten millions to which this 
 amounted were not acquired in a strictly legal manner, 
 more especially as he made no secret of the amount ; 
 but the people could not help looking with suspicion on 
 a minister who, during twenty-two years of great finan- 
 cial distress— for the Dutch war pressed heavily on the 
 
58 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 taxpayer — had managed, with but a small nominal 
 salary, to accumulate such a sum. The libels and savage 
 epigrams which appeared after his death, when the terror 
 inspired by his resolute conduct no longer restrained the 
 scribblers of the day, were almost countless. Gross and 
 frantic as most of them are, they still, with scarcely 
 an exception, cling to his dishonesty as the assailable 
 point in his character. The following verse of one of 
 them embodies the general spirit, with a certain sparkle 
 of wit to relieve the uncommonly plain-speaking which 
 runs through the rest of the ode : — 
 
 Enfin Colbert n'est plus, et o'est vous faire entendre 
 Que la France est reduite au plus bas de son sort ; 
 
 Car s'il restoit encore quelque chose a lui prendre, „ 
 Le voleur ne seroit pas mort. 
 
 We do not, as we have said, attach much importance 
 to these charges. It is scarcely credible that a man of 
 Colbert's acumen would have laid himself open to such, 
 from a legal point of view ; but the ten millions remain, 
 a fatal proof that, whatever the law might think of his 
 conduct, he could not say on his death-bed, with our 
 English admiral, Sir George Eooke, 'I do not leave 
 much, but what I leave was honestly gotten. It never 
 cost a sailor a tear, or the nation a farthing.' 
 
59 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 DU QUESNE. 
 
 THE FRENCH NAVY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. 1 
 
 The origin and early organisation of the navies of France 
 and England have been so different, that a student of 
 naval history has his attention naturally turned to the 
 consideration of them, in his endeavours to understand 
 the permanent differences between the two services — 
 differences which have especially shown themselves in 
 the relative standard of practical skill and of theoreti- 
 cal knowledge. With us, the navy in earlier ages was 
 simply the militia of our sea-coasts, a force composed 
 of ships which on ordinary occasions were traders or 
 pirates, and, when need was, assembled from their 
 several ports, subject to the orders of the king or his 
 admirals : this, as it gradually developed into a govern- 
 ment institution, long retained the essentially popular 
 character of its origin, possessing a remarkable degree 
 of elasticity in time of rare defeat or more frequent 
 maladministration. With the French it was on a very 
 different footing; it rested entirely on the whim or 
 ambition of the government, and its strength ebbed or 
 
 1 Fraser's Magazine, November, 1874. 
 
60 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 flowed according to the imbecility or vigour of the 
 administration. It was not till after many and extreme 
 fluctuations that, towards the end of the seventeenth 
 century, it settled into something like its present form. 
 
 Of this period of change and development, I have 
 already spoken in the last chapter. But the importance 
 of the subject seems to warrant my recurring to it in 
 connection with the life of the Marquis Du Quesne ' whose 
 career occupies a prominent position in the early history 
 of the existing French navy. A captain under Eichelieu 
 and Mazarin, when captains were few ; an admiral 
 under Colbert, when ships were many, Du Quesne was 
 for more than fifty years mixed up with every naval 
 event of any importance. One of the few seamen whom 
 France could then boast amongst her officers, the 
 embodiment and mouthpiece of naval tradition, of ' the 
 manners and customs used at sea,' conservative to an 
 extreme, yet withal intensely anti-aristocratic, the story 
 of his life does in reality possess a singular interest, 
 whether we consider it from a personal or from a scien- 
 tific, point of view. 
 
 Abraham Du Quesne was born at Dieppe in 1610. 
 His father, a shipmaster and shipowner in a small way, 
 was a self-made man, the son of a Huguenot tailor at 
 
 1 Abraham Du Quesne et la Marine de son Temps, par A. Jal, Ancien 
 Eistoriographe et Archiviste de la Marine. Paris : 1873. Other important 
 works, bearing on the naval history of the time are -.—Lettres &c. de 
 Colbert (Clement), see ante, p. 31; Memowes du Marquis de Villette 
 (Monmerque) ; Lettres dc. de Vivonne, et de Valbelle (as quoted in 
 Histoire de la Marine, par Sue) ; La Vie de Michel de Ruyter, par 
 Gerard Brandt ; Annates des Provinces XJnies, par Basnage. There is a 
 portrait of Duquesne at Greenwich, in the Painted Hall, to which it was 
 presented by Louis-Philippe ; but its genuineness is, nevertheless, rather 
 doubtful. 
 
DU QUESNE. 61 
 
 Blangy, whose connection with one or other of the noble 
 Norman families of the same name must be regarded 
 as altogether apocryphal. Of his boyhood we have ab- 
 solutely no information ; and though he, in some way, 
 learned to read and write fairly, he was probably occu- 
 pied, from a very early age, on board the small coasters 
 which his father commanded. In 1627 he was serving 
 as his father's chief officer, in a small privateer of 70 
 tons ; and, from the evidence given at a trial regarding 
 one of their prizes, it appears that both father and son 
 held commissions as ' captains in the service of the 
 king.' That his commission, dated in 1626, gave him 
 seniority as a captain, is a point on which Du Quesne 
 insisted throughout his whole career ; but as given to a 
 boy of sixteen, who could, in fact, be nothing more than 
 his father's apprentice, and who does not seem to have 
 ever served in a king's ship, it can only be considered as 
 a species of enrolment, about which we have no certain 
 information. The father's commission dated from 1625, 
 but neither father nor son appears to have had, at that 
 time, any further connection with the public service ; on 
 the contrary, we find the father in 1628 still cruising on 
 his own account, and combining something like piracy 
 with his legitimate trade. Being at St. Malo, he fell in 
 with the skippers of two barques bound for Bouen, 
 and having struck up a sort of intimacy, undertook to 
 convoy them as far as the mouth of the Seine. When 
 they arrived off Honfleur he changed his tone, and by 
 a display of force, compelled them to accompany him 
 to Dieppe, where, at his instance, the officers of the 
 Admiralty condemned them for illegally trading from 
 one province to another. An appeal to the court of 
 
62 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 Eouen reversed this judgment, condemned Du Quesne 
 to pay all the expenses, and fined the Dieppe officers who 
 had perverted justice to the advantage of their townsman. 
 It does not appear that young Du Quesne was engaged 
 in this discreditable affair ; but it nevertheless gives us 
 a very clear insight into his early training, and the 
 influences under which he grew to manhood. 
 
 After a few years more of trading and piracy the 
 father disappears ; nothing certain is known of his fate, 
 but there is reason to believe that he was captured by 
 some Spanish cruisers from Dunkirk, and died there of 
 his wounds about the year 1635. At this time the son 
 appears to have cast in his lot with the service of the 
 king, and to have become in reality, as before in name, 
 an officer of the king's navy. He was appointed to the 
 Neptune, a vessel of 200 tons burden, carrying eight small 
 guns, and joined the fleet which assembled at Belle Isle 
 in June 1636, under the command of the Count d'Har- 
 court and M. de Sourdis, Archbishop of Bordeaux. This 
 fleet consisted of forty-two ships rated as men-of-war, 
 all belonging to the crown, of which the largest, the 
 flag-ship, Saint-Louis, was of 1,000 tons burden and 46 
 guns ; and was collected with the view of its joining such 
 ships as could be got together at Toulon, and retaking 
 the Lerins Islands, which the Spaniards had seized on 
 during the past year, and fortified, with the evident 
 intention of making them a base for operations against 
 the neighbouring coast of Provence. 
 
 With thirteen transports in company, and carrying 
 14,000 soldiers, the fleet weighed from Belle Isle on 23 
 June, and reached Toulon on 29 July, having lost many 
 men by sickness : a fact not to be wondered at when we 
 
DU QUESNE. 63 
 
 consider the crowded state of these small and filthy ships 
 during the hot season in the Mediterranean. 
 
 It might be supposed that, after fitting out an expe- 
 dition of this magnitude for a special purpose, measures 
 would have been taken to carry out that purpose as 
 speedily as possible, the more so as delay could only 
 serve to enable the Spaniards to complete their defences. 
 It was not so, however. Marshal de Vitry, the governor 
 of Provence, to whom the military command of the expedi- 
 tion was to be entrusted, could not think of embarking 
 under the naval command of Count d'Harcourt, who was 
 not, in fact, a seaman, although by his commission 
 ' lieutenant-general in command of the fleet.' Vitry 
 would not acknowledge this commission as giving any 
 authority over the expedition ; Harcourt, on the other 
 hand, asserted his right ; Sourdis supported him ; and 
 months passed away in fierce and idle squabbles over the 
 council-table, in one of which Vitry went the length of 
 striking Sourdis with his cane. The Archbishop — though 
 permitted by his orders to act as a leader of the expedi- 
 tion and to fight the Spaniards — felt unable to wreak 
 his vengeance on Vitry personally ; he complained to 
 Kichelieu, who wrote, imploring them to agree ; but no 
 attention was paid to this letter, and Vitry and Harcourt 
 arranged to settle their quarrel at the point of the sword. 
 A positive order from the king put a stop to the proposed 
 duel ; it could not, however, put a stop to the ill-feeling 
 which existed and continued to exist, so that months 
 passed away and nothing was done. Vitry was supported 
 by strong family interest, and it was not till the follow- 
 ing March that Kichelieu ventured to recall him from his 
 government. Freed from his obstructive presence, Har- 
 
64 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 court and Sourdis carried on their operations with vigour; 
 Sainte Marguerite, the principal of the islands, held out 
 for six weeks ; when it surrendered, the others followed 
 its example ; and M. de Sourdis having, as general, taken 
 a leading part in the capture, now, as priest, chanted the 
 Te Deum for the victory. Marshal de Vitry was on this 
 permitted to return to his post ; but as he immediately 
 resumed his quarrel with the two successful generals, he 
 was first seriously admonished by the king and shortly 
 afterwards arrested ; he was sent to the Bastile, and 
 stayed there for more than five years, not being released 
 till after Eichelieu's death in December 1642. 
 
 Considered as a military operation, the reduction of 
 Sainte Marguerite was a very trifling affair, but it derives 
 interest from the illustration it offers of the curious state 
 of discipline and divided command which then prevailed, 
 and which was not apparently considered reprehensible 
 in itself, but only in so far as it hindered the public 
 service. It was here too that Du Quesne, as captain of 
 the Neptune, got his first insight into the realities of war 
 as distinguished from privateering ; and might, had he 
 been so minded, have carried away useful lessons as to 
 the necessity of unanimity and concord. He seems to 
 have been impressed rather the other way, and to have 
 learned that disagreement was the rule of the service. 
 
 In the two following years he commanded successively 
 the Saint- Jean, of 300 tons, and the Maquedo, a Spanish 
 prize, of 600, and was engaged under Sourdis in the 
 naval operations carried on on the north coast of Spain 
 in conjunction with the army under Conde. The active 
 share of the navy in these operations was, however, 
 considerably reduced by the crushing defeat which the 
 
DU QUESNE. 65 
 
 Spanish fleet sustained from the Dutch off the South 
 Foreland in September 1639 ; and the next year the 
 Archbishop, being appointed to the command of the 
 Mediterranean fleet, took Du Quesne with him to Toulon. 
 
 At this time the material force of the French navy 
 consisted of 52 ships of all sizes actually in commission, 
 most of which were very small. There was, however, one, 
 the Couronne, which merits a particular notice as being 
 the largest ship then afloat. She is described as being 
 of 2,000 tons burden ; as measuring in length 200 feet 
 over all, in extreme breadth 46 feet, and as having a 
 height from poop to keel of 75 feet. She had a comple- 
 ment of 600 men, including two chaplains, and carried 
 72 guns. The statement of her armament is noteworthy, 
 for we find in it the germ of a principle in which foreign 
 ships have, till lately, differed widely from our own. To 
 the builders of the Couronne may, perhaps, be assigned 
 the discovery that a comparatively small number of guns 
 with roomy quarters is more advantageous than a much 
 greater number so crowded together that there is not 
 sufficient room to work them ; the truth of this we were 
 slow to realise ; and for nearly 200 years French ships 
 were, as a rule, heavier and larger than ours of the same 
 rate. Besides the Couronne, there was one ship of 1,000 
 tons, one of 700, two of 600, and ten of 500 tons ; below 
 that they diminished rapidly, and several were of less 
 than 100 tons. 
 
 Mere numbers, however, are rarely to be depended 
 on ; and this force, comparatively respectable on paper, 
 must be valued in accordance with a memoir sent in by 
 the Marquis de Breze, a nephew of the cardinal, who 
 succeeded Sourdis in command of the Ocean fleet. ' Ten 
 
66 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 of the ships,' he writes, ' are good for nothing ; and next 
 year it will be necessary to condemn as many more, for 
 they are very old and strained. Even the flag-ship (the 
 Saint-Louis of 1,000 tons) is more than twenty years 
 old. The building-slips of Indret have (in the three 
 years since they were established) turned out only two 
 large ships and three frigates.' He concludes by re- 
 commending that the foreign ministers should find out 
 whether the Dutch or Swedes would be willing to sell 
 some of their ships, of which they had more than they 
 wanted. 
 
 It must fairly be supposed that of the twenty ships 
 Breze here condemns, a fair proportion were of the larger 
 class ; so that the estimated force of the French navy 
 was, in reality, insignificant, not only in comparison with 
 the state navy of England, but of Holland, Sweden, or 
 Denmark. I dwell on this because later writers have 
 been much in the habit of speaking of the age of Eichelieu 
 as having been a flourishing time for the navy ; an idea 
 which is far from correct, though worse times were await- 
 ing it. 
 
 In 1640 Catalonia revolted from Spain, and applied 
 to Eichelieu for assistance. Sourdis was directed to co- 
 operate with the insurgents; but want of stores and 
 equipment prevented his leaving Toulon till late in the 
 following spring, when he established the blockade of 
 Tarragona, then besieged by the French troops in concert 
 with the Catalans. His force, however, was insufficient 
 to resist the strenuous efforts made by the Spaniards, 
 and after several smart encounters in July and August 
 he was fairly beaten off the coast. Tarragona was re- 
 victualled ; and the archbishop, already in disgrace for 
 
DU QUESNE. 67 
 
 his long delay at Toulon — a delay caused by want of 
 stores — was summarily removed from the command for 
 his want of success, although his failure was clearly due 
 to the numerical inferiority of his fleet. It gives an 
 idea of the very unformed state of discipline to find that 
 several of the captains, officers on active service, wrote a 
 semi-public letter expressing their regret at and strong 
 disapproval of this step by the government ; and that 
 this letter is signed, amongst many others, by the 
 Chevalier de Cange, who succeeded to the command of 
 the fleet, and by Du Quesne, who was appointed to the 
 command of an independent squadron. 
 
 Up to this time our information concerning Du Quesne 
 is very limited. That at the age of thirty-two he, a man 
 of no family interest, was appointed to such a command 
 affords a fair presumption that, during these six or seven 
 years of actual service, he had distinguished himself 
 by energy, zeal, and intelligence ; and he seems to have 
 enjoyed the confidence and favour of Sourdis, himself, 
 undoubtedly, an able man. It is, however, quite certain 
 that he had a forward, pushing temper, which would 
 never permit him to lose anything for want of asserting 
 his own claims, and which led him to insist on what he 
 conceived to be his rights in the most pertinacious 
 manner. A singular instance of this occurred almost 
 immediately after his appointment to this command, 
 and shows some at least of the peculiar difficulties which 
 stood in the way of the early organisation of the French 
 navy. 
 
 Being at anchor with his squadron in the Gulf of 
 Eosas, he was joined by a squadron of galleys commanded 
 by M. de Baumes. Du Quesne, as the senior captain, 
 
68 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 took command, and gave De Baumes orders not to weigh 
 without permission. De Baumes urged that whilst Du 
 Quesne's seniority would undoubtedly give him the com- 
 mand if the two squadrons were carrying on any opera- 
 tion in concert, it did not give him any authority over 
 the squadron of galleys meeting him in a casual manner 
 and cruising independently ; at the same time offering to 
 follow him if he wished to undertake anything against 
 the enemy. Now, according to modern ideas, De Baumes 
 was quite wrong ; under any circumstances the junior is 
 bound to obey the senior, and that not as a matter of 
 agreement, but of duty. At that time, however, the laws 
 of precedence were by no means settled ; the galleys and 
 the ships were, to a very great extent, distinct services, 
 and the right of an officer of the one to exercise command 
 over an officer of the other, without express commission, 
 was commonly enough disputed. The question, then, 
 between Du Quesne and M. De Baumes was one that 
 should properly have been referred to a higher authority, 
 and the more so as it involved no point of immediate 
 importance. This Du Quesne would not see ; he repeated 
 his order in a violent and overbearing manner, ' more 
 suitable to a drunkard brawling in a pothouse than to the 
 general of an army ' (this is De Baumes's way of describ- 
 ing it) ; and when, in the course of the night, the galleys 
 got under way, he fired into them without further 
 ceremony. ' Our officers,' wrote De Baumes to Marshal 
 de Breze, the French viceroy and commander-in-chief in 
 Catalonia, ' were much astonished and enraged, as they 
 saw themselves murdered by cannon shot in the very 
 port, not knowing to what to attribute this insolence. I 
 beseech you to teach M. Du Quesne that, if he has no 
 
DU QUESNE. 69 
 
 respect for the commander of this squadron, he must at 
 least have some for the king's galleys.' Marshal de 
 Breze does not seem to have taken any action in conse- 
 quence of this letter ; he probably advised De Baumes to 
 keep out of Du Quesne's way, or Du Quesne to be more 
 moderate ; but certainly nothing was done to render such 
 an occurrence impossible for the future ; the jealousies 
 between ships and galleys continued, and died out only 
 when the service of the galleys itself came to an end. 
 
 That this should be so was perhaps natural; the 
 officers of the ships were, to some extent, seamen ; those 
 of the galleys were, for the most part, soldiers ; in ap- 
 pointing to the command of a ship, good service and ex- 
 perience were occasionally, though by no means generally, 
 counted for something ; the command of a galley was a 
 mere matter of purchase ; the galleys considered them- 
 selves socially superior to the ships : the ships considered 
 the galleys ignorant and pretentious know-nothings. Dif- 
 ferences between the two were thus of frequent occurrence, 
 even after and notwithstanding the edict of 1677, which 
 ordained that squadrons of ships and galleys, accidentally 
 meeting, should continue independent of each other, 
 but that when ships and galleys formed a combined ex- 
 pedition, the officers of the galleys ranked as junior to 
 the ships' officers of the same grade; a distinction of 
 ' with but after ' which, as affecting relative rank, has 
 often, in our own service, given rise to much private ill- 
 feeling. 
 
 During the summer of 1642 and the following year 
 Du Quesne, still in the Maquedo, continued cruising on 
 the Catalan coast ; but the service, principally blockading, 
 has no special interest. Naval affairs were poorly sup- 
 
70 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 ported after the death of Eichelieu ; and Du Quesne 
 being left in 1644 without employment, applied for 
 service under the Swedish flag. His offer was accepted ; 
 he commanded the Swedish ship Kegina in the battle off 
 Eibe on 16 May, and his conduct obtained for him pro- 
 motion to the rank of admiral-major, or, as we should 
 say, rear-admiral. He continued in the Swedish service 
 for about three years, and returned to France in charge 
 of four ships which Mazarin had bought from the 
 Swedish government. 
 
 The supreme command of the French navy was at 
 this period vested in a ( Grand Master of Navigation,' a 
 title which Eichelieu himself had held, and which was, 
 at his death, conferred on his nephew, the Marquis de 
 Breze. Breze was killed in action with the Spaniards 
 off Orbitello in 1647 ; after which the queen, Anne of 
 Austria, took the office on herself as ' Grand Mistress,' 
 and continued to hold it till 1650, when it was conferred 
 on the Duke de Vendome, a natural son of Henry IV. 
 During this time but little attention was paid to the 
 navy ; the internal troubles distracted the government, 
 and Mazarin was notoriously averse to a liberal expendi- 
 ture. Under Eichelieu the annual estimate for the navy 
 had been from three to five millions of francs, and this 
 sum, as we have seen, was barely sufficient to meet the 
 requirements of the small fleet. It now fell lower and 
 lower, till at last 300,000 francs was all the government 
 thought fit to devote to the maintenance of the navy. 
 It may well be supposed that these 300,000 francs might 
 better have been devoted to some other service, as they 
 were clearly inadequate to maintain a navy ; of course, 
 then, the navy was not maintained, and the few ships 
 
DU QUESNE. 71 
 
 whose names stood on the official lists rotted away and 
 became utterly unserviceable. 
 
 But the decay of the navy was not to be attributed 
 solely to the neglect and parsimony of the government. 
 Although too cautious to commit himself to any active 
 support of the failing cause of royalty in England, 
 Mazarin had favoured it so far as to permit privateers 
 to be fitted out. It is difficult to understand what gain 
 he or the royalist party expected to derive from this 
 step ; the actual result was that the parliament issued 
 orders for reprisals ; and thus, without any declaration 
 of war, and whilst nominal peace continued to exist 
 between the two countries, English and French ships 
 fought whenever they met, with, as might be expected, 
 advantage in the long run to the most numerous. 
 Blake's alleged encounter with four vessels in the Straits, 
 in December 1650, may have been one of these skir- 
 mishes ; another is pithily described by Whitelocke 
 under date 22 August, 1650 — ' Letters of some Fights at 
 Sea between the Parliament's Frigates and some French 
 Men-of-war, who were soundly beaten.' This, we may 
 conclude, was the fight which is reported by the French 
 to have taken place near Jersey, in which a squadron of 
 five ships under Du Quesne, bound for Bordeaux, was 
 rather roughly handled. This desultory war ended in 
 September 1652, in the seizure by Blake of the French 
 fleet which had been sent to the relief of Dunkirk, then 
 besieged by the Spaniards : seven ships were sent into 
 Dover, and those that escaped were so damaged as to be 
 valueless. 
 
 It is not too much to say that from that time the 
 French navy was altogether unable to undertake any 
 
72 STUDIES m NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 operation ; it gradually dwindled away ; and when 
 Mazarin died, in 1661, had practically ceased to exist. 
 According to the inquest instituted by Colbert, it con- 
 sisted of seven ships ' good for nothing but to be broken 
 up,' five ships which might possibly be made seaworthy, 
 and some four or five which might be reckoned as ser- 
 viceable. The country, then, was destitute of ships, of 
 sailors, of officers, and of money ; for the civil wars and 
 the shameless peculation of every servant of the governr 
 ment had reduced it to the verge of bankruptcy. 
 
 During all this time there had been no employment 
 for Du Quesne. He had endeavoured, but without 
 success, to re-enter the Swedish service, and had passed 
 the years from 1650 in domestic retirement. In 1661 
 he was appointed to the command of a squadron fitting 
 out at Brest, but nearly a year slipped away in dilatory 
 preparation and in grumbling about the want of stores. 
 With great difficulty a fleet of some ten ships of all rates 
 was at last assembled at Toulon, its object being an 
 expedition against the piratical states of Barbary ; but 
 neither ships nor officers seem to have been fit for service. 
 
 I have already spoken of the ships ; the officers were 
 almost worse. Du Quesne was an old and competent 
 sailor, but obstinate, jealous, and insubordinate in the 
 extreme. The command was entrusted to M. de Nuchezes, 
 a commander of the Order of St. John, with whom was 
 associated the Duke de Beaufort, the old leader of the 
 Fronde, and now Admiral of France and Grand Master 
 of Navigation, in succession to his father, the Duke de 
 Vendome. Between these two there arose a bitterness 
 and ill-feeling which rendered vain any hope of effective 
 action. Nuchezes wrote against Beaufort, Beaufort wrote 
 
DU QUESNE. 73 
 
 against Nuchezes; the officers declared themselves for 
 one side or the other, and duels were never-ending. The 
 fleet cruised for a short time, and having exhausted its 
 provisions, but attempted nothing, returned to Toulon. 
 It is impossible to conceive a department of the public 
 service in a worse condition — officers brawling, eager only 
 for their own advantage, disobedient, and utterly in- 
 capable ; ships rotting at anchor or wrecking themselves 
 on the nearest rock as soon as they got under way ; har- 
 bours choked with foul and worn-out hulks ; commissaries 
 dishonest, and the exchequer empty. Such was the state 
 of the navy in the early days of Colbert's administration. 
 
 The reformation worked under Colbert in the course 
 of a few years was astonishing: the harbours were 
 cleared; the ships were numerous and in good order; 
 the naval estimates were liberal, and were honestly 
 administered. The great difficulty lay in procuring sea- 
 men and officers ; even that was got over ; and though^, 
 it would be too much to say that the crews or their 
 officers were sailors in the true sense of the word, there 
 was amongst them a sufficient sprinkling of the craft to 
 permit the work to be performed creditably. To a war- 
 like people the mere fighting comes by nature. That 
 the French officers of that time should fight was a matter 
 of course, but it was not easy to persuade them to fight 
 only according to order — to fight the proper enemy at 
 the proper time, and to fight no one else. 
 
 Of all offenders against strict discipline, Du Quesne, 
 from his high position, was one of the worst ; he was 
 not, perhaps, quarrelsome in the ordinary sense ; he 
 was not a duellist, but he was excessively cantankerous. 
 On every occasion we find him at variance with his 
 
74 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 superiors; his experience as a seaman, his knowledge, 
 his ability, rendered his services indispensable, a fact of 
 which he was fully aware, and of which he took every 
 advantage. ' A man irritable (epineux) and difficult to 
 persuade ; ' ' an able man, but very fond of his own 
 opinion ; ' ' difficult to control ' — these are a few ex- 
 pressions, taken almost at random from the letters of 
 the intendant at Toulon to Colbert. 
 
 The fleet continued under the command of M. de 
 Nuchezes and the Duke de Beaufort, and as these two 
 set the example of quarrelling, it was not to be expected 
 that it could be in good order. Nuchezes wrote begging 
 that he might be relieved ; his health would furnish an 
 excuse. ' I am useless here,' he says, ' and, frankly, I 
 would rather herd cows than command a disorderly and 
 ill-disciplined army.' Beaufort, indeed, seems to have 
 been a man altogether unfit for high command. His 
 birth and rank gave him a certain authority, and he 
 had a handsome person, a noble presence, and a hearty, 
 friendly manner which told well with the men ; but he 
 was ignorant, obstinate, opinionated, and yet easily led 
 — an apparent contradiction which is not unfrequently 
 met with. He had in his youth gone through the usual 
 course of instruction, yet, of all the officers in the fleet, 
 he was probably the worst educated. Du Quesne's 
 advantages had been few, but compared with Beaufort, 
 Du Quesne was a literary genius ; Du Quesne could, 
 at least, write decently and with some appearance of 
 grammar ; Beaufort's attempts at writing, spelling, 1 arid 
 grammar were alike outrageous, and in one of his let- 
 ters to Colbert he attributes his shortcomings in these 
 1 For one delicious specimen of his letters, see Jal, i. 270. 
 
DU QUESNE. 75 
 
 respects to the rolling of the ship. The evil of com- 
 petitive examinations is, now-a-days, a fertile subject 
 for declamation, and we hear much about the many able 
 men whom, it is assumed, they would have excluded ; it 
 is satisfactory to think that they would also exclude a 
 man such as the Duke de Beaufort. He was Grand 
 Master of Navigation, he was Admiral of France, he 
 commanded a French fleet for about eight years during 
 an exciting and anxious time of reform and progress ; 
 but wherever he was concerned nothing prospered. 
 The expedition against Gigeri (Djidjelli) in 1664, suc- 
 cessful at first, eventuated in a miserable failure ; in 
 1666 the fleet was to have joined the Dutch previous to 
 the battle off the North Foreland on 11 June (N.S.) ; he 
 received the news of the battle at Lisbon, and took no 
 part whatever in the war ; finally, in 1669, he lost his 
 life in the vain attempt to relieve Candia ; and without 
 saying that the blame of these and other smaller failures 
 rests entirely with him, his uniform want of success 
 affords, nevertheless, a fair presumption of his incapa- 
 bility. 
 
 During this time, however, the French navy was 
 rapidly becoming more worthy of a great Power. By 
 the purchase of ships and stores, and by the hiring 
 workmen from Holland and Sweden, a numerically 
 respectable fleet was got together as early as 1666. 
 This, as I have just said, was, according to treaty, to 
 have taken part with the Dutch in the war against 
 England, but it did not arrive in the Channel till the 
 middle of September, after a delay which gave rise to 
 the idea that there was a secret understanding between 
 Louis and Charles. It is more probable that it was due 
 
76 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 to a determination of the French king not to risk his 
 newly formed fleet : and the marriage of Mademoiselle 
 d'Aumale ' to the King of Portugal afforded a convenient 
 pretext. The young queen could only sail in summer, 
 for she suffered horribly from sea-sickness, and the 
 whole French fleet was necessary for a safe escort. As 
 a matter of fact, the squadron under Du Quesne, which 
 took her to Lisbon, arrived on 1 August, three days 
 after the fleet under Beaufort had sailed ; the two had 
 no communication with each other, and their actual 
 movements seem to have been quite independent. 
 
 During all these years Du Quesne's share in the 
 work was in no way prominent. He had no family 
 interest ; his captious temper did not make many friends ; 
 and though his ability and experience were respected, 
 his zeal and enterprise were considered doubtful. He 
 is constantly reported as fond of staying in harbour, 
 slow in refitting, exorbitant in his demands, overbearing, 
 petulant, and insubordinate. At the same time it must 
 be remembered that he was the oldest officer in the 
 service, and almost the only seaman ; that he thus 
 looked with the contempt traditional to the old sailor on 
 all landsmen who ventured to have an opinion on naval 
 affairs, and waged war equally on port-intendants and 
 soldiers turned admirals, whom he doubtless, in his 
 secret mind, classed indiscriminately as land-lubbers.. 
 
 The work of the French navy was, however, at this 
 time, work of progress, not of war, and the credit of the 
 results belongs solely to Colbert. Beaufort was simply 
 
 1 Louise Francoise Elisabeth de Savoie, duchesse de Nemours et 
 d'Aumale, daughter of the due de Nemours and of Isabelle de Venddmei 
 sister of the due de Beaufort. 
 
DU QUESNE. 77 
 
 a stumbling-block in his way, Du Quesne a source of 
 much anxiety ; and these were the only officers of rank 
 he had to depend on. Tourville, whose name was pre- 
 eminent some twenty years afterwards, was of a later 
 generation ; he entered the French service as a captain 
 in 1667, having previously, as a knight of St. John, 
 distinguished himself in wild cruising against the Turks 
 in the Levant. D'Estrees was altogether a landsman, 
 and having the rank of lieutenant-general in the army 
 on shore, came afloat in 1668, with the understanding 
 that he was shortly to be advanced to a high rank in 
 the navy. After a semi-diplomatic or political voyage to 
 the West Indies, he was made Vice-Admiral of France, 
 and commanded in chief the fleet which nominally acted 
 with the English at the battle of Solebay on 7 June 
 (28 May), 1672. 
 
 The appointment of D'Estrees as vice-admiral gave 
 great offence to Du Quesne ; he had possibly nourished a 
 secret idea that the rank might be conferred on himself, 
 or it may simply have been that he was determinedly 
 antagonistic to every officer put over his head. The 
 high value put on his technical knowledge preserved him 
 to the service, but it may be doubted whether his abrupt 
 dismissal would not have been more advantageous to it. 
 As it was, he was the ruin of all attempts to enforce dis- 
 cipline, for the squabbles between him and the vice- 
 admiral were as notorious as disgraceful. And yet these 
 two were the commanders of the squadron which joined 
 the English for the summer campaign of 1672. 
 
 The battle of Solebay was the first in which the new 
 navy of France took part, and its action in it has been 
 the subject of much adverse criticism, the value of which 
 
?8 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 can only be decided by an examination into some of the 
 circumstances of the fight. 
 
 It is well known that the allied fleet was anchored in 
 Solebay, or, as it is now more commonly called, Southwold 
 Bay, 1 on the coast of Suffolk, in line parallel to the shore 
 — that is, nearly north and south — with the wind at 
 about E.N.E.; and, remaining in that position, in defi- 
 ance of all nautical rule, and notwithstanding the warning 
 counsel of the Earl of Sandwich, was taken at a dis- 
 advantage by the Dutch. The French division, which 
 formed the van of the fleet, was anchored to the south ; 
 and, in the natural order, the fleet, on weighing, would 
 have stood towards the south, on the port tack, as had 
 probably been agreed on the day before. The Dutch, 
 however, came in unexpectedly from the north-east ; and 
 had the allies stood out on the port tack — that is, towards 
 the south-east — according to the original intention, it is 
 evident that they would have crossed the line on which 
 the Dutch were advancing ; they would, in fact, have 
 presented their flank to the enemy, as Blake had done 
 off Portland in 1653, or as, many years afterwards, in 
 1805, Villeneuve did off Cape Trafalgar. The wind, too, 
 after a short lull, veered to the south of east, thus offer- 
 ing more sea-room to the north ; and the English, without 
 hesitation, adopted the only course open to them of es- 
 caping from the unfavourable position in which they 
 had allowed themselves to be caught. They hastily and 
 confusedly stood out towards the north-east, on the 
 
 1 This bay was a favourite anchorage of our fleets all through the 
 Dutch wars. The contour of the land has apparently changed a good 
 deal, and Southwold Bay now presents a nearly straight line of coast 
 running north and south. 
 
DU QUESNE. 79 
 
 starboard tack ; the rear division, commanded by the 
 Earl of Sandwich, thus becoming the van and leading 
 into action. Now, whether D'Estrees did not understand 
 the Duke of York's signal, whether he was unwilling to 
 form the rear division of the fleet, or whether, as was 
 commonly said, he had private orders to keep his squadron 
 out of danger, cannot now be certainly known ; what he 
 did was to come to the wind on the port tack, in the 
 natural order, and to stand towards the south or south- 
 east, thereby at once separating and continuing to sepa- 
 rate from the rest of the fleet. It is beyond dispute that, 
 in so doing, D'Estrees committed a gross tactical error, 
 the result of which was that the Dutch, leaving a small 
 squadron under Bankert to occupy the French, fell in 
 force on the English. All our histories tell the rest ; the 
 fight was maintained with pertinacious courage on both 
 sides till nightfall, and neither English nor Dutch could 
 strictly claim the victory, though each considered that 
 it inclined in their favour. On one point only were they 
 agreed : the French had treacherously kept out of the 
 fight. 
 
 We have no evidence which will permit us to say 
 what secret orders D'Estrees may have had ; one, at 
 least, has recently come to light — an order from Colbert 
 to make his report as favourable as possible ; but the 
 minister's anxiety to encourage the rising navy, his 
 dread lest a too accurate statement might dispirit it, 
 is a ready excuse for some exaggeration, which, being 
 published, has crept into the current French histories. 
 Whether time may produce any other secret order, such 
 as has been spoken of, must be doubted ; nor, indeed, is 
 it necessary to suppose that such ever existed. When we 
 
80 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 consider the very rude system of signalling at that day ; 
 that D'Estrees had very little experience at sea, and ab- 
 solutely none of naval war ; that he was on bad terms 
 with Du Quesne, the second in command, who would 
 delight in seeing him make a blunder ; that Du Quesne 
 led the van of the French squadron, and with his captious 
 temper and bitter hatred of the English might probably 
 enough refuse to sail in their wake; that the Dutch 
 attack had the nature of a surprise, and the fleet had to 
 get under way so hurriedly that some of the ships cut 
 their cables ; that there was thus no time for explana- 
 tion ; — taking, I say, all these things into consideration, 
 it would seem strange indeed had no mistake occurred. 
 Supposing D'Estrees impressed with one idea that his 
 division was the van, the movements of the English 
 might easily be beyond his comprehension till he found 
 himself hopelessly separated from them. I do not, of 
 course, say that this is the true explanation of the prob- 
 lem, but it seems at least a plausible one, which is more 
 than can be said in support of the received story which 
 attributes a meaningless piece of treachery to an able if 
 rather unscrupulous government. 
 
 As a matter of fact, however, Du Quesne's conduct 
 on this occasion was very severely judged by the French 
 themselves. The vice-admiral distinctly accused him of 
 keeping out of the fight, and of edging away from the 
 enemy. This led to a violent quarrel ; the matter was 
 referred to the court; and without pronouncing any 
 judgment on the case, it was so evident that D'Estrees 
 and Du Quesne could not advantageously serve together, 
 that Du Quesne was superseded. It is difficult now to 
 say what amount of truth there was in the charge. We 
 
DU QUESNE. 81 
 
 can readily believe that Du Quesne was not very zealous 
 in a fight which, if won, tended so directly to the advan- 
 tage of the English, whom he detested, and of D'Estrees 
 whom he hated. But on the other hand, it is far from 
 improbable that D'Estrees was quite ready to sacrifice 
 Du Quesne, a personal enemy, to preserve his own credit ; 
 and he certainly did not win golden opinions when, the 
 next year, free from Du Quesne's influence, with the 
 same allies and against the same enemies, he had every 
 opportunity of doing so. With all his faults Du Quesne 
 was a gallant man and an able seaman ; D'Estrees was 
 an incapable commander, and probably could not tell 
 whether a ship was close to the wind or not. His family 
 interest gained for him the high position and supported 
 Vn'm in it, leaving first Du Quesne, and afterwards 
 Martel, his successor, to bear the weight of the popular 
 indignation and of the Court's displeasure. 1 
 
 Du Quesne's stay on shore was not long. In January 
 1674 he was appointed second in command of a squadron 
 fitting out for service in the Mediterranean. After long 
 delay this squadron, consisting of nine ships, and com- 
 manded by the Count de Vivonne, sailed for Messina on 
 1 February, 1675, to assist the revolted townsmen against 
 
 1 M. Jal and others have maintained that the evidence of M. de Feu- 
 quieres, a midshipman of Du Quesne's own ship, the Terrible, as given 
 in a private letter to his father, is conclusive in Du Quesne's favour 
 (Lettres inidites des Feuqmires, par Etienne Gallois, ii. 47, 53). They 
 have not noticed that a midshipman of the Terrible was necessarily a 
 violent partisan, and that on a technical point the evidence of a sea-sick 
 boy has no great value. After all, so far as the conduct of the French 
 in the battle is concerned, the question is not, Did the Terrible keep 
 close to the wind or not ? but, Why did the whole French division stand 
 away on the port tack ? My own conclusion is that it was simply a 
 blunder on the part of D'Estrees. 
 
 G 
 
82 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 the Spaniards, in conjunction with a smaller squadron 
 of six ships which, under the Chevalier de Valhelle, had 
 sailed a month earlier. On 11 February, off Stromboli, 
 they met the Spanish fleet of twenty-nine ships and 
 fourteen galleys, a force numerically strong, but of very 
 inferior quality. Valbelle's squadron came out to the 
 support of their friends, and the Spaniards, notwith-r 
 standing their numbers, would not await the conjoint 
 attack. Suffering the loss of one ship, they crowded all 
 sail and fled to the northward ; while the French, with 
 the large convoy of victuallers, passed into Messina. 
 
 I do not propose to. enter on any detailed account of 
 the operations at Messina during this war, which is 
 a matter of every-day history. My object is merely to 
 trace the influence which the campaign had on the 
 development of the French navy, and on the career of 
 Du Quesne, whom we find now, for the first time, in 
 command of a fleet ; for the Count de Vivonne, as vice- 
 roy, contented himself with the general direction of 
 affairs. 
 
 The local trade of Messina being entirely stopped by 
 the Spaniards, the town was dependent for sustenance 
 on the provisions brought by the French. Valbelle first, 
 and then Vivonne, had given temporary relief, but the 
 expedition was grudgingly supported, and neither the 
 troops required for maintaining the position nor the 
 provisions needed for the town were forthcoming. Great 
 exertions were thus necessary, not so much to extend the 
 French influence as to hold the bare town. Very strong 
 letters on this subject were written by the viceroy, but 
 Du Quesne, who had been sent back to France to convoy 
 the reinforcements, returned in the end of May with only 
 
DU QUESNE. 83 
 
 3,000 men ; he was afterwards despatched on a cruise 
 along the north coast of Africa, to arrange about the 
 transport of cattle and corn for the starving population ; 
 and then again to Toulon, which place he left in the 
 middle of December, with a fleet of twenty ships of war 
 and six fire-ships, his flag flying on board the Saint- 
 Esprit, and having under his orders, amongst others, 
 the Marquis de Preuilly, the Marquis de Villette, the 
 Chevalier de Valbelle, and the Chevalier de Tourville, 
 names dear to France and renowned in naval history. 
 
 It was with this fleet that, on 7 January, 1676, near 
 Stromboli, he met the Dutch squadron of eighteen ships, 
 which had been sent into the Mediterranean to the assist- 
 ance of the Spaniards. De Euyter, who had been ap- 
 pointed to the command, at the special request of the 
 King of Spain, had vainly protested against being sent 
 out with a force so small; the Dutch authorities had 
 formed an idea that the French navy was merely 
 nominal, and certainly not superior in quality to the 
 Spanish ; they judged, therefore, that the Spanish 
 contingent would raise the allied fleet to a decisive 
 superiority. De Euyter thus found himself in presence 
 of the enemy with a force so inferior in strength as 
 to make it unadvisable for him to attack. His object 
 was to prevent, if possible, the relief of Messina ; and, 
 with a southerly wind, he manoeuvred between the 
 French fleet and their port, barring their passage, and 
 ready to seize on any advantage that might offer. The 
 French, on the other hand, being superior both in the 
 number and the size of their ships, were anxious to 
 defeat the covering fleet and to break the blockade. 
 During the night the wind shifted to the west or north- 
 
 o 2 
 
84 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 west, and Du Quesne having thus the advantage, ran 
 down towards the enemy. The Dutch, formed in line 
 towards the south-west, received them firmly ; the French 
 van, under M. de Preuilly, suffered a good deal ; but the 
 fight extending along the whole length of the two lines, 
 continued at close quarters throughout the day, the 
 French losing two of their fire-ships in futile attempts 
 to burn the Dutch to leeward. Towards evening it fell 
 calm, and the fleets drifted apart, the damage sustained 
 on each side being nearly equal. The next day the 
 French were joined by a squadron of ten ships from 
 Messina ; this gave them a decided superiority, for the 
 detachment of six Spanish ships which joined the Dutch 
 strengthened them in appearance only, and De Euyter 
 could not venture on an attack, which Du Quesne, on 
 his part, did not press. The Dutch drew back towards 
 Melazzo, hoping to be able to cut off the rear division of 
 the French as they passed through the Straits ; and Du 
 Quesne, fearing this, after some days" manoeuvring stood 
 away to the westward. The Dutch, being in much need 
 of repairs, went to Palermo to refit ; and the French, 
 passing round the south of Sicily, got into Messina. 
 
 It seems the invariable rule that an indecisive action 
 is claimed as a victory by both sides ; and this formed 
 no exception. The Dutch had perhaps fair grounds for 
 doing so, for they prevented the French from entering 
 Messina as they intended ; with very inferior force they 
 kept them at bay for more than a week, and obliged them 
 to make a detour, which still longer delayed the relief of 
 the town ; they did not arrive in Messina till the 22nd. 
 But the French accounts, deliberately and purposely 
 falsified at the time, have passed into history ; and we 
 
DU QUESNE. 85 
 
 frequently read, in a few words, that the Dutch gave 
 way, and that the French passed through to Messina 
 without hindrance. Du Quesne's merit must he limited 
 to his having, with a force numerically large, of new and 
 heavy ships, but with inexperienced officers and men, 
 fought a gallant action against a fleet weaker indeed in 
 ships and numbers, but well manned, and commanded 
 by the most able and experienced seaman of the day. 
 To have met De Euyter without suffering a crushing 
 defeat was, for the French, almost equivalent to a 
 victory ; it gave them a confidence in themselves and in 
 their admiral which paved the way to future success. It 
 was not, however, till towards the middle of April that 
 they could muster resolution to endeavour to break 
 the blockade which the combined Dutch- Spanish fleet 
 had established. The mere fact that they endured this 
 blockade for more than two months is strong evidence in 
 contradiction of their claim to victory on 8 January ; 
 and it was not till De Euyter threatened their position 
 at Agosta, that they felt it necessary to take active 
 measures against him. 
 
 The two fleets met on 22 April, almost under the 
 shadow of Etna, their line extending towards the east ; 
 and De Euyter, having the advantage of a southerly 
 wind, ran down with the van division and attacked the 
 French van with great vigour. Against thirty French 
 ships the allied fleet mustered seventeen Dutch and 
 ten Spanish. Unfortunately the Spanish admiral, Don 
 Francisco de la Cerda, who was the nominal commander- 
 in-chief, insisted on stationing himself with the Spanish 
 division in the centre of the line, a position to which his 
 rank and the numbers of his squadron gave him an 
 
86 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 apparent right. The Dutch were thus divided ; and as 
 the Spaniards still kept to the wind when De Kuyter 
 ran down against the enemy, the line was broken, and 
 Haan, who commanded the rear division, was kept out 
 of the fight. The whole brunt of the attack thus fell 
 on De Euyter, who ought to have been overpowered. 
 The French were, however, slow to realise the utter 
 worthlessness of the Spaniards, who, keeping at a 
 respectful distance, fired a few occasional shots; and 
 De Euyter, having driven back several ships of the French 
 van, came next into contact with the centre, which, 
 under the immediate command of Du Quesne himself, 
 stood on to take their place. 1 Haan had, by this time, 
 managed to get into action; and obtaining a slight 
 advantage over the French rear, their whole line edged 
 away to leeward. Night separated the combatants ; the 
 French were lost in the darkness, and De Euyter, 
 apprehending bad weather, which, in the shattered 
 condition of several of his ships, would have been 
 dangerous, did not care to follow too far. The next 
 morning broke in rain and mist; the French were 
 nowhere to be seen ; it was conjectured that they had 
 retired to Messina; and the allied fleet went into 
 
 1 The manoeuvres at this time have been very differently described. 
 Jal (ii. 218), following the despatch of M. de Vivonne, and to some ex- 
 tent also that of Du Quesne, seems to think that De Euyter, with his 
 squadron, made a stern board and so came abreast of the French centre. 
 Brandt (689), on the other hand, says that Du Quesne ' seeing that the 
 Spanish admiral held his wind, crowded sail to join his van and support 
 it against De Euyter.' So also Basnage (ii. 681). I have little doubt 
 this was what really happened ; and that in doing it, Du Quesne in- 
 vented a manoeuvre which the French repeated several times in the next 
 century. 
 
DU QUESNE. 87 
 
 Syracuse, the Spanish galleys taking in tow the more 
 disabled of the Dutch ships. 1 
 
 The weather continued broken for several days, but 
 on the 29th the French, who had with great difficulty 
 kept at sea, appeared off Syracuse. The allies were not 
 in a mood to fight. No one amongst them doubted that 
 they had won a clear if not decisive victory on the 22nd ; 
 but their joy was now turned to sorrow. A wound in 
 the leg, which De Euyter had received in the battle, not 
 considered dangerous at the time, proved fatal in a very 
 few days : mortification set in, and the admiral died on 
 the 29th, the last and greatest of the Dutch heroes of 
 the English wars, a victim to the parsimony of his govern- 
 ment and the miserable inefficiency of the Spaniards. 
 The sting of the allied fleet was drawn, for the Dutch 
 admiral, Haan, who succeeded to the command, was 
 not a man to win distinction under circumstances even 
 less disadvantageous than those in which he was now 
 placed. 
 
 The account which I have given of this battle of 
 Agosta is very different from that which it suited the 
 the French government to publish. We know that they 
 gave systematic orders that the official reports were to 
 be made as favourable as possible ; and the story put 
 forth on this occasion was that the allies had been 
 completely defeated, had been chased into Syracuse, and 
 blockaded there. The death of De Euyter gave a plausible 
 colouring to this story, which the Dutch accounts, De 
 Euyter's letter to the States, and Haan's letters to the 
 
 1 The pictures and plana in Recueil de Combats et d' Expeditions 
 Maritimes, d'apres les dessins de N. Ozanne, give a clear and, on the 
 whole, very fair idea of this and Du Quesne's later battles. 
 
88 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 King of Spain, contradict in every detail, and which is 
 altogether at variance with the accusations freely made 
 in letters from Du Quesne to Colbert, and in the pri- 
 vate correspondence or memoirs of different officers. 1 
 According to these, several ships, and even the Saint- 
 E sprit herself, did not keep as closely as possible to the 
 wind ; in other words, they gave way before the enemy. 
 When, therefore, we find the Dutch accounts, public 
 and private, agreeing in the main with the non-official 
 letters of the French, and when we know that the French 
 official report was prepared to order, there is little 
 difficulty in deciding which is most worthy of credit ; 
 and it is after a close comparison of many conflicting 
 statements that I have framed the description of this 
 celebrated battle. 
 
 The death of De Euyter was, however, a terrible 
 blow to the allies, and one from which they could not 
 recover ; they made no effort to resume the blockade of 
 Messina, and shortly afterwards went round to Palermo. 
 Here, whilst refitting, they were caught by the French 
 under Vivonne himself, who had embarked with the 
 Chevalier de Tourville on board the Sceptre. The idea 
 that Tourville was the real author of the plan of the 
 attack which followed seems well founded. Vivonne was 
 not a man of energy or experience ; Tourville, on the 
 contrary, was a sailor from his youth, and had already 
 won a distinct reputation for enterprise and ability ; in 
 a Bmall boat he reconnoitred the position of the enemy, 
 anchored in a crescent along the coast in front of the 
 town ; and at a council of war held on board the Sceptre 
 after his return it was decided that the Marquis de 
 1 Basnage, ii. 683 ; Jal, ii. 220-229. 
 
DU QUESNE. 89 
 
 Preuilly with a squadron of nine ships should, if the 
 wind held as it then was, at north-east, lead in against 
 the eastern division, the main body of the fleet support- 
 ing him by attacking the rest. The general outline of 
 the battle fought on this plan on the following day, June 2, 
 bears a striking resemblance to that of the battle of the 
 Nile, and the result was very similar. Preuilly's squad- 
 ron stood in so close 'that they let go their anchors on 
 the anchor-buoys of the enemy, and at these close 
 quarters opened an overwhelming fire. The Spanish 
 vice-admiral set the example of cutting his cable and 
 letting bis ship drift on shore ; the others soon followed 
 his example. The French fire-ships, driven by the 
 north-east wind, were let loose among them, and flames 
 and confusion spread in all directions. The ship of the 
 Dutch rear-admiral was blown up ; the Spanish flag- 
 ship shared the same fate ; Haan, the Dutch admiral, 
 was killed ; three Dutch and five Spanish ships were 
 burnt or blown up ; the destruction ceased only when 
 the French had expended their store of fire-ships, the 
 Spanish and Dutch taking refuge behind the mole, or 
 running themselves aground, out of reach of the enemy's 
 guns. Naval history records few victories more com- 
 plete ; and in the opinion of the French government a 
 great part of the credit reflected on Du Quesne, who was 
 second in command, whilst it was known that Vivonne 
 was not a seaman. Du Quesne, however, does not seem 
 to have taken much part, and certainly not a leading 
 part, in the action ; the brunt of the fighting fell on 
 Preuilly's squadron ; and, as I have already said, the 
 ingenious tactics adopted were almost universally 
 attributed to Tourville. It was even said that Du Quesne 
 
90' STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 had not shown any particular forwardness in the fight ; 
 but he was a man with few friends and many bitter 
 enemies, who lost no opportunity of speaking ill of him. 
 
 With this severe blow to the allies the active opera- 
 tions of the fleet on the coast of Sicily may be said to 
 have ended ; for the Dutch squadron was shortly after- 
 wards recalled, and the Spaniards were unable to show 
 themselves at sea. The French ships were employed 
 principally in carrying troops or stores from Toulon, till, 
 in March 1678, the French government decided to eva- 
 cuate Messina ; peace was concluded with Spain,and the- 
 revolted Sicilians were left unprotected and exposed to 
 the vengeance of their enemies. 
 
 The reconstruction of the French navy may be con- 
 sidered to have been by this time accomplished. Its 
 organisation and discipline' were still imperfect; gross 
 irregularities were still frequent in the dockyards ; but 
 the system was fairly inaugurated ; the ships were real, 
 new, large, and heavily armed ; the officers were be- 
 coming more and more habituated to the sea ; and men 
 were gradually being enrolled for the service of the 
 crown. In the further development of the young navy 
 Du Quesne had an important share, and he seems to 
 have been actively employed for some years in examin- 
 ing into and putting a stop to abuses, or in suggesting 
 remedies. One instance of his work will suffice. 
 
 A squadron of four ships, commanded by Tourville, 
 going round from Toulon to Brest, was caught in a gale 
 of wind in the Bay of Biscay. Two of them foundered 
 at sea, with great loss of life. Du Quesne was ordered 
 to inquire into the matter ; he reported that the masts 
 had been badly stayed, and the hulls weak ; that they 
 
DU QUESNE. 91 
 
 were contract-built, and that the work had been scamped. 
 As the result of this report the intendant and master- 
 shipwrights at Toulon, where the ships had fitted out, were 
 put in prison. The intendant had friends, and his im- 
 prisonment was not long ; the others, though mere sub- 
 ordinates, seem to have had a severe lesson. 
 
 In this formation of a new navy there is one point 
 worthy of a special notice ; when the ships were em- 
 ployed as troopers, the sickness and mortality were 
 excessive. This tells unmistakably that no advance 
 whatever had been made in cleanliness. The filthy 
 habits on board were not so much the result of con- 
 servatism as of ignorance ; and it was not till nearly a 
 hundred years later that the importance of cleanliness 
 and ventilation on board ship was fully understood. In 
 the seventeenth century but little attention was paid to 
 purification ; the lining of the ship was a convenient re- 
 ceptacle for filth of all sorts ; and the state of the bilges 
 can be more easily imagined than described. 
 
 In 1681 Du Quesne was sent with a small squadron 
 into the Levant, to repress the Tripoli corsairs, who had 
 been preying on the rising French commerce ; and in 
 1682-83, with a more powerful fleet, against Algiers. 
 These expeditions, which resulted in the liberation of 
 great numbers of Christian slaves, are, from a naval 
 point of view, chiefly remarkable for the first employ- 
 ment of mortar vessels, which were designed by Eenau, 
 a young engineer then coming into notice. 
 
 In 1684 Du Quesne superintended, rather than com- 
 manded, the bombardment of Genoa, and with the close 
 of the year his service came to an end. He died suddenly 
 a few years later, being found dead in his bed on the 
 
92 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 morning of 2 February, 1688, sixty-two years after the 
 date of his commission as captain. He had been pro- 
 moted to the rank- of commodore {chef d'escadre) in 
 1647, on his return from Sweden ; and in after-years he 
 claimed seniority as lieutenant-general — corresponding 
 to the modern rank of vice-admiral — from 1650; the 
 claim was allowed, though he does not seem to have had 
 any distinct commission. His naval rank never reached 
 higher ; his adherence to the reformed religion was used 
 as a pretext for not promoting him ; but as it did not 
 hinder the government from rewarding his services with 
 the title of marquis in 1681, and with liberal gifts of 
 money and land, it is at least probable that they con- 
 sidered it unadvisable to give the highest service rank 
 to a man of his captious and obstinate temper, or to give 
 a place of exceptional distinction to a man of low birth. 
 
 The great length of time over which his service ex- 
 tended, and the excessive changes through which the 
 country, the government, and, still more, the navy 
 passed, have given to his name a celebrity, and still give 
 to the study of his career an- interest, far beyond his 
 personal merits. That he was a man of energy and de- 
 termination is not to be doubted; but these qualities 
 were principally exhibited against his superiors or col- 
 leagues. It is not a little curious to notice that in every 
 action in which he held important command, and espe- 
 cially at Solebay, he was accused of being backward in 
 fight ; that he was everywhere accused of unnecessary 
 delay in fitting out, of making difficulties, of preferring 
 his own interests to the good of the service, of greediness 
 and selfishness. His own letters prove that, at least, 
 some of these were not idle charges. The only excuse 
 
DU QUESNE. 93 
 
 we can find for him is that in an age and a society in 
 which eager selfishness was universal, and family connec- 
 tions of the basest kind were unblushingly turned to ad- 
 vantage, he alone had no one to urge his claims ; he had 
 no unchaste interest about the court ; he had to take his 
 own part in the broad daylight of official correspondence. 
 He was perhaps not more greedy than his neighbours, 
 though he was so in a more direct and public manner. 
 Beyond this we cannot go. That he was an able officer 
 must be admitted, but that he was a great commander 
 is contrary to evidence ; that he was the conqueror of 
 De Euyter is contrary to fact. 
 
94 STUDIES m NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 LE BAILLI DE SUFFBEN. 1 
 
 On the two sides of the Channel there has often heen 
 held a very different estimate of the conduct of naval 
 commanders, whether English or French ; and in few 
 cases has this difference been more clearly shown than in 
 that of the Bailiff de Suffren, boasted of in France, as one 
 of the greatest heroes that has in any time adorned any 
 navy ; known in England — if known at all — merely as the 
 commander of a squadron in the East Indies, who fought 
 a series of unimportant actions, with no decisive results, 
 in support of a cause that was ultimately lost. And 
 yet Suffren was no ordinary man ; notwithstanding the 
 exaggeration of the French estimate — an exaggeration 
 which almost unconsciously excites a spirit of opposition 
 and of unbelief ; notwithstanding the want of result to 
 his labours ; the want of that success by which, in Eng- 
 land, we prefer to judge of performance, he was a com- 
 mander of rare skill and energy ; rich in resources, of 
 unflinching courage, and of untiring perseverance. I 
 conceive, therefore, that we shall derive both interest 
 and advantage from a critical examination of De Suffren's 
 career ; unsurpassingly brilliant as are the achievements 
 
 1 United Service Magazine, May and June, 1867. 
 
SUFFREN. 95 
 
 of so many of our own naval heroes, our good fame can 
 never suffer by a due award to the noblest and bravest 
 of our enemies. 
 
 Pierre Andre de Suffren Saint-Tropes, 1 a younger 
 son of a noble family of Provence, was born on 17 July, 
 1729. At the age of fourteen, he was admitted into the 
 navy of France, as a preparation for his entering, at 
 a later period, into the Order of St. John ; and his 
 first service, as a cadet, was on board the Solide, a 
 64-gun ship, one of the allied fleet which, under Admirals 
 de Court and Navarro, fought the indecisive action 
 with the English, off Toulon, on 22 February, 1744. 
 Though the brunt of the battle fell on the Spaniards, 
 some of the French ships, and amongst others, the Solide, 
 were actually engaged, and Suffren, still a mere boy, 
 made acquaintance with the cruel realities of war. In 
 the following year, on board the Pauline, he was present 
 in the disastrous affair off Martinique, when Vice-Admiral 
 Townsend captured, or drove ashore, a great part of the 
 valuable convoy which, under the command of Com- 
 modore Macnamara, was intended to victual the French 
 West-Indian settlements ; and the year after, 1746, in 
 the Trident, took part in the attempt made to recapture 
 Cape Breton. The anxiety consequent on the failure of 
 the expedition carried off the Duke d'Enville, the com- 
 
 1 The principal authorities for the life of Suffren are : Histoire du 
 BailU du Suffren, par Ch. Cunat ; Histoire de la Campagne de I'Inde 
 par VEscadre Frangaise sous les ordres de M. le BailU de Suffren, par 
 le Citoyen Trublet (M. Trublet de la Villejegu), eapitaine de Vaisseau ; 
 Essai Hstorigue sur la Vie et les Campagnes du BailU de Suffren, par 
 M. Hennequin ; and best, though latest, Histoire de la Marine Frangaise 
 pendant la Guerre de V Independance Amiricaine, par E. Chevalier, 
 eapitaine de vaisseau. 
 
96 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 mander-in-chief, and so preyed on the mind of the cap- 
 tain of the Trident, M. d'Estourmel, on whom, after the 
 death of the duke, the command devolved, as to drive him 
 io commit suicide. Storm by sea, inclement weather on 
 land, improper exposure and small-pox proved themselves 
 more fatal than any hostile effort. Such numbers of 
 men, sailors as well as soldiers, perished, that a hasty 
 retreat to the ships became absolutely necessary ; and of 
 those ships, weakened by their losses, many were cap- 
 tured, almost without resistance, on their way across 
 the Atlantic. 
 
 The next year, 1747, Suffren was serving in the 
 advanced rank of ensign, on board the Monarque, of 74 
 guns, when that ship, with five others (the Trident 
 amongst the number), was captured by Bear- Admiral 
 Hawke, in the Bay of Biscay, on 25 October. He did 
 not remain long a prisoner, being exchanged in the 
 course of a few months ; but the losses that France had 
 sustained during the war had reduced her navy to com- 
 parative inaction ; the young ensign was unable to obtain 
 employment, and after the peace, which was signed on 
 7 October, 1748, he went to Malta, to fulfil the wishes 
 of his family, by joining the Order. For six years he 
 remained amongst the Knights Hospitallers, serving 
 .actively on board their ships in the perpetual war which 
 they waged against the Turk; and we may perhaps 
 fairly attribute a certain unscrupulousness of character 
 to the fact of his having been engaged for so long a 
 period, at the turning-point of his life, from the age of 
 nineteen to twenty-five, in this sort of semi-piratical, 
 adventure. 
 
 On his return to France, Suffren was appointed to 
 
SUFFKEN. 97 
 
 the Dauphin Eoyal, of 70 guns, one of the fleet sent out 
 to North America, under M. Dubois de la Motte, in the 
 spring of 1755. Admiral Boscawen, in command of a 
 powerful fleet, left England about the same time, and off 
 Louisbourg seized on two ships of De la Motte's squadron 
 — the Alcide and Lys — separated from the rest in a fog. 
 The Dauphin Eoyal was nearly sharing the same fate, 
 but escaped into Louisbourg, from whence — being unable 
 to rejoin the admiral — she returned to Brest. 
 
 Though the two countries, in an unrecognised and 
 privateering sort of way, continued to prey on each 
 other's shipping, it was nearly a year after this before 
 there was a formal declaration of war. At that time 
 Suffren was a lieutenant of the Orphee, 64 ; and in her 
 was engaged in the notorious action off Minorca on 
 20 May, 1756. Early in the next year he was appointed 
 to the Ocean, 80, carrying the flag of M. de la Clue {chef 
 d'escadre) and was serving in that ship when she, together 
 with a great part of the Toulon fleet, was blockaded hi 
 Cartagena by Admiral Osborn. During that time he 
 had the pain of seeing his former ship, the Orphee, as 
 well as the Foudroyant, and the rest of the squadron 
 under the Marquis Du Quesne, 1 captured by the English 
 in their attempt to break the blockade, on 28 February, 
 1758. De la Clue, who appears to have been wanting 
 in that daring energy which is one of the first qualities 
 in a naval commander, was content to witness their 
 capture without making an effort to save them from 
 their fate ; although a junction with Du Quesne would 
 have raised his force to a numerical equality with that 
 
 1 Du Quesne-Menneville, son of Du Quesne-Monnier, the nephew of 
 Abraham Du Quesne, the first Marquis. 
 
 H 
 
98 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 of the blockaders. The capture of these ships and the 
 lateness of the season, rendered it unnecessary or un- 
 advisable for the English to remain any longer off 
 Cartagena, and whilst Osborn withdrew to Gibraltar, 
 De la Clue got back to Toulon. 
 
 The next year, 1759, was singularly fatal to the 
 French arms afloat. Immense preparations were made 
 for landing on the coast of England ; a large fleet was 
 collected at Brest, under the Marquis de Conflans, to 
 cover the expedition; and that not being considered 
 sufficient, De la Clue, with the Mediterranean fleet, was 
 ordered round from Toulon. But Boscawen, with a 
 powerful force, appeared before that port, and De la Clue 
 did not consider himself justified in trying the chances 
 of battle. In vain did the English admiral try to tempt 
 or to goad him into coming out; De la Clue firmly 
 adhered to his resolve to stay in, until want of water and 
 provisions compelled Boscawen to break up the blockade 
 and retire to Gibraltar. Whilst he was there, the French 
 having come out from Toulon, attempted to pass the 
 Straits. Boscawen, however, by a judicious distribution 
 of his frigates, had sufficient intelligence of their move- 
 ments ; he met them in the narrow waters, off Cape de 
 S. Maria, where, on 18 August, they sustained a signal 
 defeat. De la Clue, although possessing a fair share of 
 personal courage, seems to have been entirely unfitted 
 for the command of an important fleet. On the day of 
 battle, things directed themselves ; several of the French 
 ships were out of the way altogether, and, as far as ren- 
 dering assistance went, might as well have remained 
 at Toulon. Of the ships of the squadron that did en- 
 gage, almost all were captured ; the Ocean ran ashore 
 
SUFFREN. 99 
 
 near Lagos, and M. de la Clue, who had been mortally 
 wounded in the action, was landed ; the ship, however , 
 was taken possession of, and burnt by the English ; and 
 M. de Suffren, for the second time, became a prisoner 
 of war. 
 
 A few months later, the Brest fleet under M. de 
 Conflans experienced a fate similar to that of the Toulon 
 squadron. It was destroyed by Sir Edward Hawke, in 
 Quiberon Bay, on 20 November. As this fleet was larger 
 than the other, so was its defeat more severe ; but the 
 combined result of the two actions was to leave France, 
 for the time, powerless in European waters. Suffren 
 returned home after a short captivity, but remained 
 unemployed till the peace in 1763, when he was ordered 
 in command of a small vessel, the Cameleon, to cruise in 
 the Mediterranean for the protection of trade. In her, 
 and afterwards in the Singe, he continued for four 
 years employed more or less actively in restraining the 
 Morocco pirates ; and was present at the bombardment of 
 Sallee in June, 1765, and in the severe repulse which 
 the French squadron subsequently met with at Larrache. 
 In 1767 he was promoted to the rank of commander 
 (capitaine de fregate), and after a few months, during 
 which he served as flag-captain on board the Union 
 frigate, in an embassy to the court of Morocco, he went 
 once more to Malta. For four years longer he remained 
 in the service of the Order — in which he acquired the 
 distinction of commander — and appears to have been 
 engaged in active cruising during a large proportion of 
 that time. Being made a captain (capitaine de vaisseau,) 
 in 1772, he returned to France, and commanded suc- 
 cessively the frigates Mignonne and Alcmene in a series 
 
 H 2 
 
100 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 of experimental cruises. In the early part of 1777 he 
 was appointed to the Fantasque, 64 ; which, on the de- 
 claration of war in March, 1778, was one of twelve ships 
 sent to America under the orders of Count d'Estaing. 
 
 In company with the fleet, or on specially detached 
 service, the Fantasque remained on that station for 
 nearly two years ; was present when Howe's position at 
 Sandy Hook was judged unassailable, July 1778 ; took 
 part in the abortive attack on Barrington at St. Lucia, 
 15 December 1778; and was the leading ship in the 
 battle of Grenada on 6 July 1779. The battle, like so 
 many others in the last century, was indecisive, and, as 
 usual in such cases, each has claimed a victory that 
 cannot rightly be assigned to either. Both fleets sus- 
 tained a good deal of damage, and the French drew off, 
 but retained the prize for which they were fighting. 
 Suffren, in his official letter, speaks of his loss in men, 
 and of the damage done to his ship and rigging as 
 serious, though less so than the honourable post he had 
 filled might lead one to apprehend: the number of 
 killed and wounded on board the Fantasque was re- 
 turned as sixty-two. 
 
 Suffren went back to France in the end of 1779, when 
 he appears to have been well received by the government. 
 In the following March he was given a pension of 1,500 
 livres, as a mark — so runs the order — of the king's satis- 
 faction at the zeal and activity he had displayed in the 
 course of his service, and in particular whilst command- 
 ing the Fantasque, in the fleet of the Count d'Estaing ; as 
 well as at the bravery and talent which he had given 
 proofs of in various battles, and especially in the battle of 
 Grenada. Consequent on this, he was appointed in April 
 
SUFFREN. 101 
 
 of the same year to the Zele, 1 and sailed from Brest 
 to join the allied fleet then blockading Gibraltar, and 
 cruising off Cadiz. 
 
 It was shortly after his arrival that they fell in with 
 a large and valuable English convoy, which — for the 
 East and West Indies together — numbered no less than 
 sixty-three ships. This convoy was nominally under the 
 order and protection of Captain Moutray, in the Eamil- 
 lies (with the frigates Thetis and Southampton), who 
 made out the Franco- Spanish fleet about midnight of 
 8 August. He immediately, by general signal, directed 
 the convoy to alter course to the westward, at the same 
 time altering course himself. Unfortunately, the 
 merchant ships did not attend to the commodore's 
 orders ; they continued their southerly course, which 
 carried them, by daybreak, almost, into the middle of the 
 enemy. They were thus taken possession of with only 
 two exceptions, — ships that were coppered, and had kept 
 with the Ramillies. The actual loss to England was 
 enormous, and was rendered greater by the circumstances 
 under which it happened ; for in consequence of such 
 a heavy blow inflicted on their opponents, the court of 
 Spain abruptly broke off negotiations for a separate 
 peace ; whilst, at the same time, our establishments 
 abroad, both naval and military, were deprived of the 
 stores which were being sent out, and of which they 
 stood in great need. Captain Moutray was dismissed 
 his ship, by sentence of court-martial, 13 February 1781 ; 
 but the following year, under the new administration, 
 
 1 The same ship which, under another captain, was such an important 
 factor in the manoeuvres of the French fleet prior to the battle of 
 Dominica, on 12 April, 1782. 
 
102 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 he was appointed to the command of another ship, the 
 Edgar ; and a year or two later, to be commissioner of 
 the navy at Antigua. 1 
 
 A squadron of seven line-of-battle ships, under M. de 
 Suffren, chased the Eamillies and her frigates for some 
 time ; but finding themselves completely outsailed, they 
 returned to pick up the straggling merchant-men. It 
 was afterwards — and in consequence of this — that Suffren 
 addressed a strong paper to the minister of the navy, on 
 the importance of coppering the bottoms of ships of war. 
 In this paper he pointed out that, as the English had al- 
 ready coppered several of their ships, and were engaged in 
 coppering others as fast as possible, it must be considered 
 not merely advantageous, but absolutely necessary, for 
 the French to do the same ; otherwise the enemy would 
 always have the option of battle, or of retreat ; would 
 be able to keep the sea longer, and, even with inferior 
 forces, to prey on the French commerce. He then pro- 
 ceeded, in illustration of his views, to give instances where 
 ships had been manifestly at a disadvantage through not 
 being coppered ; he entered into the minute details of how 
 and where a sufficient supply of copper was to be obtained ; 
 and concluded with again strongly urging the necessity 
 of coppering their own ships, and of inducing their allies 
 to copper theirs. The recommendations of M. de Suffren 
 were too sensible to be strictly followed ; and indeed, 
 notwithstanding his argument founded on the number of 
 ships in our service, already coppered, such ships were 
 
 1 Whilst commissioner at Antigua, a curious question arose as to his 
 right to fly a broad pennant and, whilst on half-pay, do the duties of 
 senior officer. See my select Letters and Despatches of Lord Nelson, 
 p. 29-31. 
 
SUFFEEN. 103 
 
 then, and for some time after, exceptions to the general 
 rule. The first ship in the English navy which was 
 coppered was the Dolphin frigate, in 1764, when she was 
 being fitted for her voyage round the world, under Com- 
 modore Byron ; the next was, I believe, the Alarm, a 
 32-gun frigate, which was commissioned for the Mediter- 
 ranean, 1769, by Captain John Jervis. The adoption of 
 the new sheathing was however very slow, and years 
 passed away before it became at all common. Till then, 
 ships' bottoms were smeared over with some composition 
 of tallow or wax, which, of course, offered little or no 
 obstacle to the various plants and animals which infest 
 the sea; and even this slight protection was rubbed 
 off in a few weeks by the action of the waves, or by 
 the friction, as the vessel was forced through the water. 
 
 Early in the following year the French fleet returned 
 to Brest ; the Zele was put out of commission, and 
 Suffren appointed to the Heros, a new ship of 74 guns, 
 as senior officer in command of a squadron of five ships 
 of the line about to proceed to the East Indies ; with an 
 order to take acting rank as commodore (chef d'escadre) 
 when past the Cape of Good Hope. 
 
 We thus arrive at the turning point in Suffren's 
 history. After a career of extraordinary activity and 
 incident, — after thirty-eight years of almost uninterrupted 
 sea service, whether in the French navy or in the Maltese 
 cruisers, he was now appointed to a command in which 
 he would be able to reduce to practice the rules which 
 the hard chances of war had taught him. He had had, 
 indeed, unexampled opportunities of studying the higher 
 part of his profession. Engaged in almost every naval 
 action that had been fought since the time of his child- 
 
104 STUDIES W NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 hood ; twice a prisoner in the hands of the enemy ; for 
 nearly five years captain of a ship forming part of an 
 experimental squadron ; — it is difficult to imagine a series 
 of lessons more adapted to qualify a courageous and de- 
 termined man, a zealous and intelligent officer, for in- 
 dependent command. Such a man, such an officer, so 
 schooled was Suffren, when at the age of fifty-two he was 
 appointed to the command of the East Indian squadron. 
 
 At this time, the English government was fitting out 
 an expedition against the Dutch settlements at the 
 Cape of Good Hope ; and to defend that colony was the 
 primary object of the French. Suffren accordingly left 
 Brest on 22 March 1781, The English had left a few 
 days before ', the squadron, consisting of four ships of 
 the line, three frigates, and a very large number of 
 transports, store-ships, &c, sailed from Spithead on 
 13 March, under the command of Commodore George 
 Johnstone, a man of no professional reputation, who by 
 loud talk, and virulent criticism of Lord Howe in the 
 House of Commons, had induced the public to form a 
 high opinion of his bravery and skill. Seldom has a 
 greater mistake been made, Johnstone proved himself 
 to be utterly unfit for such a position ; and through his 
 carelessness, ignorance, and incapacity, the objects of the 
 expedition were entirely frustrated. 
 
 The aim of M. de Suffren.was to get to the Cape as 
 soon as possible; but one of his ships, the Artesien, 
 which had been destined in the first instance for the ' 
 West Indies, and had been ordered to the Cape at the 
 last moment, found it necessary to water at the Cape 
 Verd Islands. To avoid a separation which might be 
 dangerous, as well as to take advantage of the chance of 
 
SUFFREN. ] 05 
 
 refreshing his ships' companies, which were sickly, 
 Suffren with the whole squadron accompanied the 
 Artesien to Port Praya, in St. Jago, and arrived there 
 on 16 April. He found the bay occupied by the English 
 fleet, which Johnstone — although perfectly aware that a 
 French squadron was being sent out to oppose him — had 
 anchored in the most confused and promiscuous order ; 
 the transports outside and all round the ships of war, 
 whose fire they thus in a great measure masked. The 
 French commodore at once noticed the error of the 
 English ; and further conjecturing (as was the fact) that 
 they would probably be busy watering, and that their 
 boats and many of their men would be on shore, he re- 
 solved to attack immediately, and stood into the bay. 
 A more scrupulous man might have respected the 
 neutrality of the Portuguese harbour ; a less audacious 
 one might have shrunk from thrusting his squadron in 
 amongst a fleet that, in guns and men, far outnumbered 
 his own ; but scrupulousness and timidity were equally 
 strangers to the character of Suffren ; and the blunders 
 of Commodore Johnstone had so crippled the strength of 
 his fleet that, had the French ships followed into the 
 attack with as much determination as their commander 
 led, it would have been in very great danger. But 
 whilst the Heros and the Annibal anchored in the midst 
 of the English ships of war, and closely engaged the 
 Hero and the Monmouth, the others — whether from 
 timidity, from misapprehension, or from want of skill 
 and seamanship, allowed themselves to drift about the 
 bay, firing random broadsides into some of the merchant 
 ships, till they were carried by the tide down to leeward, 
 and were unable to take any effective part in the fight.. 
 
106 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 Left thus to themselves, exposed to the fire of all the 
 English ships — men-of-war or armed transports — which 
 could bring a gun to bear, the Heros and the Annibal 
 were very roughly treated. The Annibal was completely 
 dismasted; had seventy killed — her captain, M. de 
 Tremigon, amongst the number — and a hundred and 
 thirty wounded. The Heros also suffered severely; 
 though her masts were still standing, they were much 
 damaged, and most of the shrouds were shot away ; she 
 had thirty-four killed and fifty-six wounded ; and Suffren, 
 under the circumstances, felt compelled to retreat. That 
 he was permitted to do so, speaks volumes as to the 
 incapacity of the English commodore. The two French 
 ships cut their cables and drifted out to sea ; the Annibal, 
 commanded by her first lieutenant, M. de Galles, setting 
 some small sail on the stump of the foremast, until taken 
 in tow by the Sphinx. More than three hours after- 
 wards, the English ships got under way and stood out, 
 apparently in pursuit of the retreating enemy. But 
 Commodore Johnstone was a man of talk, not of action. 
 After wasting the afternoon in waiting for the Isis, which 
 had been partially dismasted by a passing broadside from 
 one of the French ships, he discovered towards evening, 
 that he had given no rendezvous to the convoy, and 
 that it would be imprudent to let himself be carried too 
 far to leeward of Port Praya ; he accordingly hauled to 
 the wind and stood back into the bay. 
 
 Suffren not having been able to crush (as he had 
 hoped) the English before their arrival at the Cape, 
 resolved to hurry on to anticipate them there. With 
 the Annibal, now jury-rigged, j<p tow, the squadron 
 arrived in Simon's Bay on 21 June, exactly a month. 
 
SUFFEEN. 1 07 
 
 before the English appeared off Cape Town. Johnstone's 
 dilatory conduct had saved the colony. The squadron was 
 not able to attempt anything against the combined French 
 and Dutch forces ; the troops were not even landed ; and 
 the seizure of a few merchant ships in Saldanha Bay was 
 the only result of this costly expedition. Commodore 
 Johnstone, fortunately for the country, was never em- 
 ployed again. He attempted to turn the indignation of 
 the government on to Captain Sutton, of the Isis, who 
 was tried by court martial, but was honourably acquitted. 
 Captain Sutton, in return, brought a civil action against 
 the commodore, for maliciously accusing him of an offence 
 of which he was innocent. He obtained a verdict assign- 
 ing him 5,000Z. damages ; but years passed away hi 
 appeals or counter-appeals to different courts ; Captain 
 Johnstone died in 1787, and the fine was never paid. 
 
 The conduct of the French commodore in this action 
 has often been severely commented on. He has been 
 accused of rashness, of foolhardiness, of ignorance even, 
 in taking his squadron into a position such that nothing 
 but favouring fortune, added to the incapacity of his 
 enemy, could have saved him from destruction. Such a 
 charge seems to me inadmissible. The first object of the 
 French was to protect the Cape ; to do that, Suffren had 
 been carrying on under a press of sail, in order, if pos- 
 sible, to pass the enemy who had left ten days before 
 him. By what he could only consider as a piece of luck, 
 he found that enemy, to whom haste ought to have been 
 as much a consideration as to himself, wasting precious 
 time in a neutral port. He had outrun him in the pas- 
 sage to St. Jago, but he could not certainly calculate on 
 being able also to outrun him in the further passage to 
 
108 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 the Cape. The confused manner in which the English 
 fleet was anchored, tempted to an attack. The character 
 of the English commodore had probably not escaped the 
 acute intelligence of a man like Suffren : as a talker in 
 the House of Commons, Johnstone had brought himself 
 prominently before the naval world, and Suffren, who 
 had been in the fleet opposed to Lord Howe in North 
 . America, and more particularly off Ehode Island on 10 
 August, 1778, was able to estimate at their proper value 
 the noisy and vituperative absurdities by which his present 
 antagonist had worked his way to public notice. And in- 
 dependently of all other reasoning, the result of Suffren's 
 bold measure fully justified its adoption. It was not as 
 successful as it might have been; but it attained the 
 principal aim of the French as completely as if it had 
 towered beyond their wildest and most visionary hopes. 
 It so delayed the sailing of the English fleet, or — to 
 speak more correctly — it gave such an excuse for so 
 delaying it, that instead of a close race to the Cape, the 
 French and Dutch had ample time to make all possible 
 preparations. The attack in Praya Bay, although re- 
 pulsed with considerable loss, was the salvation of Cape 
 Colony ; and it is not for us to scrutinise too closely the 
 steps by which such a result was obtained, when our own 
 naval records so teem with instances where some of our 
 most justly distinguished commanders have set their 
 reputation and the safety of their fleet on a chance, 
 compared to which the hazard of a die might be con- 
 sidered security. 
 
 The first object of his mission having been thus 
 accomplished, Suffren, leaving behind him troops and 
 $ tores to render the Dutch settlements more secure for 
 
SUFFREN. 109 
 
 the future, hoisted his broad pennant ' and went on with 
 his squadron to the Isle of France. He anchored at Port 
 Louis on 25 October of the same year, 1781. 
 
 The war which was raging in Europe had early ex- 
 tended itself to the Indian seas ; and the French having 
 formed a close alliance with our inveterate enemy, Hyder 
 Aly, hoped, apparently, to regain a portion at least of 
 the Oriental influence which they had lost some five and 
 twenty years before. But their naval commanders in 
 that part of the world were not equal to the task. M. de 
 Tronjoli, having received a serious check from Commodore 
 Vernon, retired to the Mauritius, and the English took 
 possession of Pondicherry, the last important settlement 
 of France on the Indian coa.st. In the beginning of 1781 
 M. d'Orves, who had succeeded M. de Tronjoli in the 
 command, brought a strong squadron into Indian waters, 
 but only to retire without venturing on any undertaking 
 that could in any way benefit the common cause of 
 France and of Hyder Aly. In vain did this latter offer 
 supplies of provisions or water for the ships ; in vain did 
 he offer to retake Pondicherry and to establish there a 
 naval magazine : M. d'Orves could not be tempted to 
 pursue a vigorous course ; and — refusing even to land 
 any of his men to serve with the native army — he re- 
 turned to the Isle of France. He arrived there on 1 
 April, and there he remained till the end of the year. 
 
 Suffren, however, gave a new life to the French coun- 
 sels. Although his squadron had many defects after so 
 
 1 This, as was said above, was only local rank. On receiving his 
 account of the fight in Port Praya, the king ordered a commission as 
 chef d'escadre to be sent out to him ; but it did not reach him till the 
 end of February, 1783. 
 
110 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 long a voyage, and the fight in Praya Bay — the Annibal, 
 for instance, being only jury-rigged — and notwithstanding 
 the meagre resources of the small colony, such was the 
 commodore's own energy, and the energy which he knew 
 how to instil into those with whom he came in contact, 
 that in less than a month he was ready for sea ; and M. 
 d'Orves, yielding to the impulse of a will stronger than 
 his own, though nominally subservient to it, at last 
 made the signal to weigh. Accordingly the fleet— which, 
 with Suffren's squadron, amounted to no less than eleven 
 ships of the line, besides six frigates and corvettes (three 
 of each) — left Port Louis on 17 December, and proceeded 
 towards the coast of India, capturing on their way, near 
 Point de Galle, on 21 January, the English 50-gun ship 
 Hannibal, which, with three others, had been detached 
 by Commodore Johnstone to join Sir Edward Hughes, 
 the English commander-in-chief in Indian waters. The 
 other three ships, the Hero, Monmouth, and Isis, were 
 more fortunate ; they passed safely up the coast, and 
 joined the main body of the fleet at Madras. 
 
 M. d'Orves, whose health had been failing for some 
 time past, died on 9 February, leaving the command to 
 Suffren. With a resolution to which the fleet had long 
 been a stranger, he at once made his way to Madras, 
 where Sir Edward Hughes, with a very inferior force, 
 was known to be lying. The English, however, were 
 joined by the three new arrivals in time to prepare them 
 to meet their formidable enemy ; and when Suffren came 
 in sight of Madras, instead of finding, as he expected, 
 only a few ships which must fall an easy prey, he found 
 a squadron of respectable force, though still inferior to 
 his own, and posted so strongly under ,the batteries on 
 
SUFFKEN. 111 
 
 the shore, that he shrank from the designed attack. He 
 accordingly anchored at some little distance from the 
 English, and made the signal for all the captains to come 
 on board. He explained to them his reasons for thinking 
 an attack unadvisable ; and as the Benior captains agreed 
 with him that it would be better to continue the voyage, 
 the thing was considered as settled ; when, to the astonish- 
 ment and annoyance of his elders, M. de Salvert, com- 
 manding the Fine, a 36-gun frigate, opposed this decision 
 on the grounds that their departure would have the appear- 
 ance of timidity, and would increase in the minds of the 
 natives the unfavourable impression which the conduct 
 of the fleet in the former year had created ; and besides, 
 that there was room to pass in shore of the two southern- 
 most ships of the enemy, which were out of reach of the 
 forts, and might be attacked with advantage. 1 
 
 The only effect of M. de Salvert's opinion thus given 
 was to raise a feeling of ill-will against him among the 
 senior officers of the fleet ; and they seem even to have 
 hinted that it was easy for him to offer bold counsels, in- 
 asmuch as, being in a frigate, he could not be called on 
 to carry them into force. On 20 June in the following 
 year, De Salvert, then in a ship of the line, had an op- 
 portunity of showing the falsehood of such aspersions on 
 his courage; but, notwithstanding his gallant conduct 
 
 1 Trublet, p. 37. M. Chevalier thinks this story more than doubtful, 
 lstly, because it is not mentioned in the journal of the major de 
 Vescadre ; 2ndly and chiefly, because he considers it highly improbable 
 that a young officer of M. de Salvert's rank and position — he was a 
 lieutenant de vaisseau — would have ventured on an opinion contrary to 
 that of the commander-in-chief, the hero of Port Praya. The major 
 might very well pass over a proposal to which no weight attached ; and 
 it is exactly the supposed impudence of it which rendered it worthy of 
 M. Trublet's notice. 
 
112 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 and death, French writers, taking their tone from the 
 hostile feeling of the fleet, have perpetuated the calumny. 
 De Salvert was a brave and spirited man ; and, as far 
 as we can judge from his actions, there is no reason to 
 believe that he would not gladly have shared in any 
 attempt to carry his counsel into execution. The com- 
 modore, however, thought it impracticable, and the fleet 
 continued on its way. 
 
 In the month of February, a northerly wind blows 
 pretty steadily in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal ; 
 and on this account, Suffren having in the first place 
 stood out to sea, had made the land to the north, that is, 
 to windward of Madras ; he had then dropped down the 
 coast, and now continued his course southward. As 
 soon as he was well to sea, Sir Edward Hughes also 
 weighed. His doing so caused great surprise among the 
 French, as they could not conceive it possible that with 
 nine ships he would come out to attack them with 
 twelve ; and it is most probable that he had not any such 
 positive intention, but that he wished rather to take, 
 destroy, or scatter their convoy, and perhaps also to pre- 
 vent or obstruct their landing the troops which they had 
 on board. 1 The French, however, were incredulous ; and 
 thinking that the English were merely shifting berth, 
 took little or no notice of them, till the next morning 
 Suffren awoke from his dream of security to find that Sir 
 
 1 Cunat, whom Chevalier follows, thinks that Hughes's object waB to 
 slip down the coast in order to cover Trincomalee, which he supposed 
 might be Suffren's aim. Hughes himself merely says : ' At four in the 
 afternoon the enemy weighed and stood to the southward; when I 
 immediately weighed and stood after them.' I feel therefore at liberty 
 to suppose that what he actually did first was what he primarily hoped 
 to do. 
 
SUFFREN. 113 
 
 Edward had, during the night, slipped past him, in 
 shore, and was now spreading destruction among the 
 convoy, which, as a precautionary measure, he had posted 
 to leeward of his fleet. He immediately hastened to the 
 rescue, hut before he could arrive at the spot, the English 
 had seized on six merchantmen ; one of which, the Law- 
 riston, a transport carrying three hundred soldiers, and 
 laden with artillery, ammunition, and military stores, 
 was a very valuable prize. The sight of the French fleet 
 under press of sail compelled Sir Edward to call off his 
 own ships from the chase, and to form line of battle ; but 
 darkness closing in prevented any encounter that night. 
 The next day, 17 February, the wind, though irregu- 
 lar and squally, being still from the north-east, gave the 
 French an advantage which Suffren at once endea- 
 voured to avail himself of. Sir Edward, on the other 
 hand, manoeuvred throughout a great part of the day, in 
 order, if possible, to weather on the French line ; but the 
 squalls and slight shifts of wind continually prevented 
 him ; and in one of these squalls, about four o'clock in 
 the afternoon, Suffren was able to engage the rear division 
 of our fleet, which was formed in a somewhat irregular 
 line toward the south-east. The squall lasted but for a 
 short time, and was followed by a nearly perfect calm, 
 during which the principal part of the French fleet was 
 clustered round the five sternmost ships of the English. 
 The four ships in the English van could not tack to come 
 into the fight ; the ships of the French rear kept aloof 
 from the combat ; and in this way a partial, but very 
 severe struggle took place. The brunt of it fell on the 
 Exeter, a small 64, carrying the broad pennant of Com- 
 modore King. After suffering severely from the broad- 
 
114 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 .sides of all the French ships that joined in the battle, 
 she was, later on, closely engaged by the Brillant and 
 Flamand, ships of equal force ; and the French at one 
 time believed that she was on the point of yielding to 
 the odds brought against her. Commodore King took a 
 different view of his position. When the two 64's were 
 bearing down with the evident intention of bringing her 
 to close action, the master asked what was to be done. 
 ' There is nothing to be done,' said the commodore, as 
 with his handkerchief he wiped away the brains of the 
 flag-captain, Eeynolds, which a cannon-ball had just 
 dashed into his face — ' there is nothing to be done but 
 fight her till she sinks.' 
 
 After two hours of this unequal combat, that is about 
 six o'clock, a lucky squall from the south-east materially 
 changed the position of affairs. The four ships of the 
 English van were able to come to the assistance of their 
 comrades; and Suffren, seeing this new enemy approach- 
 ing, drew his ships out of the fire, in order to reform his 
 line and receive the attack. The Exeter, however, was 
 so disabled, as also was the Superb, Sir Edward Hughes's 
 flag- ship, which had, next to the Exeter, been the prin- 
 cipal aim of the enemy, that the admiral did not feel 
 able to renew the battle, and a slight distant interchange 
 of shots was all that followed the pause. The two fleets 
 separated during the night, and both had suffered too 
 much to permit them at that time to look for each other. 
 The English accordingly went to Trincomalee, and the 
 French to Pondicherry, which had been, a short time 
 before, occupied by the native troops. 
 
 In this battle, fought off Sadras, the loss of men in 
 the two fleets was singularly equal. The. English had 
 
SUFFREN. 115 
 
 thirty-two killed, eighty-three wounded ; the French loss 
 is stated as thirty killed and a hundred wounded, but it 
 almost seems as if these were given as round numbers. 
 There was probably also but little difference in the damage 
 done to mast or hull ; but it was, perhaps, more equally 
 divided among the French ships than among our own, 
 two or three of which, and in an especial degree, the 
 Exeter, suffered very severely. 
 
 The discontent of Suffren with the result was notori- 
 ous. He had fought well; he had made a most judicious 
 use of the advantage which the wind gave him, and which 
 the calm that followed his attack had preserved for him ; 
 four English ships, unable to tack, could not get near 
 the scene of action ; and the rear division — that is the 
 five ships astern of the centre — opposed to twelve of the 
 enemy, ought to have been overwhelmed. They might 
 have been, had all the twelve fought with the same de- 
 termination as the Heros, the Flamand, or the Brillant. 
 But several of the others, and particularly the Artesien 
 and the Annibal, took little or no share in the battle, 
 and as far as being of any use went, were merely lookers 
 on, notwithstanding the signal, flying the whole time, 
 for them to come within pistol shot of the enemy. 
 
 The battle off Sadras, however, indecisive as it was, 
 and notwithstanding the capture of some of their convoy, 
 gave the French a definite advantage in the field of 
 Indian politics. They had fought what, at least, seemed 
 to be a gallant action with the English, till then all- 
 powerful at sea, and had not been beaten. Of Suffren 
 there could no longer be any doubt ; he had entered 
 heartily into the cause, and Hyder Aly at once showed a 
 favourable disposition to form a closer alliance. During 
 
 I 2 
 
116 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 the commodore's stay at Porto Novo, whither he had 
 proceeded from Pondicherry, he succeeded in making an 
 agreement, by the terms of which a French agent (M. 
 Piveron de Morlat) was to reside at Hyder's court, and 
 the French troops, acting independently under their own 
 officers, with a considerable native force, cavalry as well 
 as infantry, attached to them, were taken into Hyder's 
 pay. 
 
 Having landed the troops, and refitted the ships as 
 far as his resources permitted him, Suffren quitted Porto 
 Novo on 23 March ; on the 25th off Tranquebar he was 
 joined by the frigate Bellone, and by the Chaser, an 18- 
 gun corvette, which she had captured off Madras ; from 
 these he learned the movements of Sir Edward Hughes, 
 who after having refitted at Trincomalee had returned to 
 Madras, and had taken from there a considerable number 
 of soldiers which he was now carrying to Trincomalee as 
 a garrison for the forts. De Suffren at once resolved to 
 go to the southward : but owing to the baffling wind that 
 then prevailed, he did not come abreast of Ceylon till 
 8 April. On the 9th, at daybreak, the English fleet was 
 discovered; but as it was to windward, and as Sir Edward 
 wished in the first place to land the troops and stores at 
 Trincomalee, M. de Suffren was unable to bring him to 
 action till the 12th. By that time the two fleets were 
 very close to the shore ; and though only a few leagues 
 from his port, Sir Edward, by keeping away towards it 
 had got to leeward of the French, so that it was no longer 
 possible for him to avoid the battle. The circumstances 
 were far from favourable. Having taken it for granted 
 that the French would be unwilling to force him to fight, 
 he now found himself jammed on a dangerous lee shore, 
 
SUFFREN. 117 
 
 with a superior fleet outside, able to choose its own mode 
 of attack. He was, however, a brave man and a good 
 seaman ; although his judgment as an admiral may at 
 times have been at fault, he seems never to have felt 
 any hesitation about meeting his adversary ; and on the 
 present occasion, though for the sake of the garrison 
 of Trincomalee, he had wished to avoid an immediate 
 action, he met it cheerfully when it was forced upon him. 
 Within the last few days two ships, the Sultan and Mag- 
 nanime, newly come from England had joined him ; and 
 though these, after the long voyage, were foul and sickly, 
 a very large proportion of their crews being down with 
 scurvy, they still, in a measure, did away with the marked 
 inferiority of his numbers. His line now consisted of 
 eleven ships, which he formed on the starboard tack, to- 
 wards the north, and waited for the enemy, who came up 
 with the wind astern, and commenced the battle about 
 two o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 De Suffren's qualities as a tactician were of the first 
 order, and in that age of nautical pedantry, he appears 
 as one of the earliest who endeavoured to apply sound 
 principles to the conduct of battles at sea. As in armies 
 so in fleets, that one is effectively the most numerous 
 that can bring the greatest number into action at a 
 given point ; and it is not a little curious that, on the 
 very same day, in different hemispheres, this, as a new 
 system of naval tactics, was inaugurated by the admirals 
 of two different nations ; for it was on this same 12 April 
 1782, that Sir George Eodney, in the West Indies, gained 
 a decisive victory by means of a manoeuvre which, though 
 widely different in detail, was essentially similar to that 
 which M. de Suffren put in practice in the East; the 
 
118 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 concentrating, that is, the attack on a part of the 
 enemy's fleet, instead of dispersing it along the whole. 
 Bound by the formulae of the 'Fighting Instructions,' 
 none of our admirals had ventured to apply it ; and 
 since the days of Du Guay-Trouin, no Frenchman in 
 command of a squadron had thought of attacking. In 
 the West Indies, the accident of a varying wind gave 
 Eodney the opportunity of putting in practice the idea 
 which he had attempted to develop on 17 April 1780 ; 
 and we have already seen how, in the East Indies, on 17 
 February 1782, fortune had pointed out to Suffren the 
 way to attain tactical advantage. He was now, on 12 
 April, ready to avail himself of the favourable circum- 
 stances. The French fleet had an actual numerical 
 superiority ; Suffren had learnt how to make that supe- 
 riority still greater. 
 
 The wind was from about north-east, and the English 
 fleet was close hauled on the starboard tack ; but the 
 four rearmost ships— Magnanime, Isis, Hero, and Wor- 
 cester — were somewhat astern and to leeward of their 
 station. The French commander therefore, directing 
 his four leading ships to engage the van and hold it in 
 check, threw himself, with the rest of his force, on the 
 English centre. The onset was tremendous. Suffren 
 himself in the Heros, backed up by the Orient, another 
 74, engaged the Superb, the English flag-ship, at close 
 range ; afterwards, leaving the Superb to other ships as 
 they came up, passed on to the Monmouth, the ship 
 ahead, and turned her heavy metal against the little 
 sixty-four. But the Monmouth, worthy of her ancient 
 fame, and of the day when, twenty years before, her name- 
 sake had, singlehanded, captured the Foudroyant of 84 
 
SUFFREN. 1 1 9 
 
 guns, heroically resisted the still greater odds now against 
 her. She, however, suffered terribly, and being reduced 
 almost to a wreck, and unmanageable, shot up into the 
 wind, and was thus thrown into a very prominent posi- 
 tion between the two lines. At this critical juncture Sir 
 Edward endeavoured to bring the Superb in between her 
 and the French flag-ship ; but the Orient and Brillant 
 interposing, obliged him to pass to leeward, leaving the 
 Monmouth still exposed to the fire of the whole French 
 line. Other ships came up ; and the battle raged furi- 
 ously round the little Monmouth. The Heros lost her 
 fore topmast, and received such other serious damage 
 that Suffren went on board the Ajax, where he hoisted 
 his flag. The Orient's mizen-topmast was shot away, her 
 mainmast badly wounded, and her mainsail in flames. 
 On the other hand, the Monmouth had nothing but the 
 foremast standing ; the Superb was on fire below, and in 
 both these ships the loss of men was very great. The 
 Superb had 59 killed, and 96 wounded ; the Monmouth 
 45 killed and 102 wounded. Such loss in the two ships 
 of the English centre shows with what vigour the French 
 attack had been pushed against that particular portion 
 of the line. On the van, they had made no impression ; 
 and in the rear, whilst the English ships were to leeward, 
 the French held their wind and took but little part in 
 the action. 
 
 About four o'clock, Sir Edward Hughes made the 
 signal to wear, principally, it would seem, because the 
 fleet was getting into shoal water ; partly, perhaps, with 
 a wish to bring what remained of . his line to windward 
 of the Monmouth. The French line endeavoured to 
 follow his example, but in the confusion which the evo- 
 
120 STUDIES IN JTAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 lution threw them into, Captain Hawker of the Hero 
 took the Monmouth in tow, and placed her in compara- 
 tive safety to leeward. The fight continued some time 
 longer, though with slackened fury; and about half- 
 past five, when a violent squall, with heavy rain, came 
 down on the two fleets, the firing ceased as if by mutual 
 consent. 
 
 Both fleets anchored for the night, but in a very pro- 
 miscuous manner ; so mixed indeed were they, that M. 
 de Suffren's flag-lieutenant having been sent a message, 
 went, by mistake, on his way back, on board the Superb, 
 and was detained as a prisoner. About the same time, 
 the Fine was sent to tow the disabled Heros off shore, 
 but in the darkness, and in the strength of the storm 
 which was then raging, in attempting to do so, she fell 
 foul of the Isis, whose bowsprit passed between her mizen 
 shrouds, the anchor at the same time hooking one of her 
 quarter ports. This caused great confusion in both ; 
 neither one nor the other seems to have thought of any- 
 thing but getting loose, and before they had time to 
 recover their coolness and judgment, a fresh gust of the 
 storm separated the two ships. 
 
 In this second engagement, which has been called by 
 the French the battle of Providien, from the small island 
 of that name off which the fleets anchored, the loss on 
 both sides, as well as the damage sustained, was very 
 nearly equal. In men, the English had 137 killed, 430 
 wounded, and a very large proportion of these on board 
 the two ships Superb and Monmouth. The French loss 
 is given by M. Chevalier as also 137 killed, 357 wounded, 
 but much more equally distributed. And the morning 
 showed how much the ships had suffered. All that the 
 
SUFFREN. ' 121 
 
 respective commanders could do was to alter the position 
 of some of them, so as to bring them into better order. 
 Suffren, then on board the Ajax, a ship which had been 
 but slightly engaged, is indeed said to have expressed 
 a wish to fire on the Isis, which was anchored within 
 range ; but, on its being pointed out to him that this 
 could not lead to any definite result, he gave up the 
 half-formed intention. The story, as told, is very vague 
 and very doubtful. After seven days, however, having 
 refitted as far as possible, he did offer battle, which was 
 not accepted. Sir Edward, anxious to land the stores 
 and troops at Trincomalee, did not consider it prudent 
 further to risk them in the chances of a sea fight, except 
 on his own ground, where an advantageous position 
 might compensate for inferiority of force ; he accordingly 
 remained secure in his anchorage, and the French, un- 
 willing to attack him in it, after a parade of their strength, 
 sailed for Batacalo. 
 
 During the stay of the two fleets off Providien, the 
 admirals entered into a correspondence relative to a 
 mutual exchange of prisoners. Sir Edward refused to 
 consent to it ; either, because, as he alleged, he did not 
 conceive that he had authority to make any such arrange- 
 ment, or because, as the French insist, he wished to 
 burden the enemy with their maintenance. Suffren, 
 however, was not a man to be burdened in this way. Of 
 resolute will and unflinching determination, when he 
 found that he could not exchange his prisoners, he handed 
 them all over to his ally, Hyder Aly. This was clearly 
 contrary to the custom of civilised war ; for whatever 
 the French may pretend, Hyder Aly was in reality a 
 barbarian, and his treatment of his prisoners was such 
 
122 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 as might have been expected from his savage nature. At 
 the same time, we must remember that Suffren's resources 
 were extremely limited ; and the providing for a large 
 number of useless mouths was a severe tax on his slender 
 stores. The measure which he adopted was politic ; was, 
 perhaps, under the circumstances, excusable ; but the 
 very fact of having to excuse it, is a sufficient proof that 
 it was not altogether justifiable. 
 
 Suffren was undoubtedly a hard man ; but in this 
 lies a great part of his merit : a man of a softer and 
 more genial nature, even with equal talents, would have 
 been overwhelmed in the course of the campaign ; for it 
 was not merely in battle, and under the flag of England, 
 that he found enemies. Detested by the senior officers 
 of the fleet, who rendered him an unwilling obedience ; 
 destitute of all supplies, of all stores, — for the loss of the- 
 Lawriston was severely felt — he yet, purely by his own 
 unaided energy, was able to keep the fleet in working 
 order, and to make it, almost against its will, fight with 
 something like his own courage and resolution. 
 
 The state of things. was indeed very bad. It is thus 
 described by M. Trublet, a zealous and experienced 
 officer, at that time first-lieutenant of the Flamand : — 
 
 ' Scurvy was making frightful ravages in the fleet.: 1,500 
 men suffering from it were landed ; the medicines on board 
 the ships had all been used : the capture of the hospital ship 
 had deprived us of all further supply. The country (round. 
 Batacalo) was unhealthy ; and though there was plenty of fish 
 and game ; though we obtained, through the Dutch governor, 
 a few wretched bullocks, it was impossible to get either fruifr 
 or vegetables, things which are the most powerful, if not the 
 only remedy against the disease. In addition to this, the 
 damage sustained by many of our ships, rendering it necessary. 
 
SUFFKEN. 123 
 
 for them to be docked ; our supply of rope exhausted ; the 
 provisions running short; the crews, sadly diminished in 
 number, overworked ; the certainty of more battles, in which 
 we could not promise ourselves any advantage more decisive 
 than in those which we had fought ; — all these were considera- 
 tions that threw a dark cloud over our future prospects, and 
 gave rise to the most embarrassing reflections.' 
 
 It is no wonder, then, that under these circumstances 
 the fleet was not prepared to sail from Batacalo till 
 3 June. 
 
 On the 5th, Suffren anchored at Tranquebar, where 
 he found some store ships which had been sent by the 
 Dutch from Batavia. He continued there for several 
 days, during which his cruisers were busy at sea, and 
 captured several merchantmen, laden some with rice, 
 some with military stores, but all extremely valuable in 
 the existing want of supplies. From there he moved 
 down to Cuddalore, which had been lately occrpied by 
 the French troops ; and sending the flag captain, M. de 
 Moissac, to the camp of Hyder Aly, concerted measures 
 with him for the recapture of Negapatam, a settlement 
 formerly Dutch, which the English had seized on at the 
 first outbreak of the war. In accordance with the scheme 
 then arranged, he took 1,500 soldiers on board the 
 ships, and left Cuddalore on 3 July. He had received in- 
 telligence that the English fleet, now come north from 
 Trincomalee, had anchored before Negapatam ; and he 
 left his port, in the full intention of bringing it to 
 action, if necessary, in order to land his troops and to 
 carry on the siege. In this purpose he never wavered, 
 and, when according to his information, he found the 
 English at Negapatam, he at once made the signal to, 
 
124 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 prepare to anchor with a spring on the cable. In stand- 
 ing in, however, a sudden squall struck the fleet and 
 partially dismasted the Ajax ; in the delay that this 
 occasioned, Sir Edward Hughes weighed and stood out 
 to meet them ; but M. de Suffren, wishing to give the 
 Ajax time to repair the damage, avoided immediate 
 action, which Sir Edward on his part, did not press. 
 The wind was blowing from the west, and a too eager 
 pursuit of the French might have enabled them to pass 
 to windward of him, and to land troops sufficient to 
 overwhelm the settlement before he could recover his 
 position. This landing it was Sir Edward's object to 
 prevent ; and he did prevent it by resolutely keeping his 
 fleet interposed between the French ships and the shore. 
 In this state of things, night closed in. Daylight on the 
 following morning showed little or no change ; the fleets 
 were formed in line-of-battle, and about ten o'clock, both 
 being then on the starboard tack, with the wind from 
 south-west, Sir Edward commenced the action, signalling 
 each ship to engage the one abreast, in accordance with 
 Article XIX of the ' Fighting Instructions.' 
 
 In many battles at sea during the century the inef- 
 fectiveness of this mode of attack had been clearly 
 proved. A Bhip of the line was in those days so strongly 
 built ; her timbers were of such extreme thickness ; the 
 guns brought against her were, in comparison, so feeble, 
 that she could stand very severe pounding in the hull, 
 with but little loss : and by the time that any single 
 antagonist could reduce her to the point of striking, that 
 antagonist was herself so disabled as to be unable to 
 take advantage of her success. There were, no doubt, 
 some exceptions to this rule ; but they were very rare, 
 
SUFFEEN. 125 
 
 and, for the most part at least, capable of being explained 
 away. It was the same when ships were pitted one 
 against one, in line of battle, even when the whole line 
 succeeded in getting into action, which was rarely the 
 case. In the late fight off Providien, M. de Suffren had 
 suggested a different method of engaging, which from 
 the danger it occasioned to at least one ship of the English 
 centre, might have persuaded his enemy of its merit. 
 But Sir Edward, though brave, and skilled in his pro- 
 fession after the manner of the old school, was neither 
 by temper nor by genius fitted to receive new ideas ; he, 
 therefore, with all the advantage of the wind, wasted his 
 strength in a dispersed attack on the whole fleet, accord- 
 ing to the practice of the former age ; and the result was 
 indecisive, as it always had been when such tactics were 
 followed. 
 
 The firing, was, however, kept up with great spirit on 
 both sides, and both fleets suffered severely ; so much so 
 that when, about half-past twelve, the wind suddenly 
 shifted to the south-east, and the respective ships, first 
 taken aback, were brought round in a confused manner 
 with their heads to the westward, neither one nor the 
 other was anxious to recommence an engagement which 
 did not seem likely to attain any further end : the 
 English took up their former position off Negapatam ; 
 and the French, having been unable to effect their pur- 
 posed landing, returned the next day to Cuddalore. 
 
 It was during the confusion consequent on the sudden 
 shift of wind in this battle, that the Severe, a French 64, 
 came for a few minutes into very close action with the 
 Sultan, and struck her flag. The Severe had not sus- 
 tained any great loss either in men or rigging ; she was 
 
"126 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 perfectly able to continue the fight ; and no explanation 
 of the circumstance can be offered but that given by M. 
 Trublet, whose account presents such a remarkable phase 
 of human nature, and is so singularly opposed to all our 
 ideas of professional pride, and of the courage which 
 springs from education, that we should have been tempted 
 to reject it as impossible, were it not amply confirmed by 
 official testimony, 1 as well as being the deliberate testi- 
 mony of one actually present, and whose bias might be 
 supposed to tend rather the opposite way. His account 
 is this : — 
 
 ' The conduct of M. de Cillart, whilst in command of the 
 Bellone, had given rise to grave doubts of his courage ; but in 
 this campaign, his weakness had hitherto been kept a secret 
 on board his own ship ; for as he had been prudent enough to 
 leave the management of her, on important occasions, to his 
 officers, the ship had on the whole done well. In the present 
 instance, however, the two officers on whom he depended had 
 been carried below wounded. Left to himself, this weak- 
 minded man lost his head, in the heat of the action, to such 
 an extent that, without reflecting on the shame and disgrace 
 which he heaped on himself and which he threw on his 
 country, in presence of the whole French fleet,, he made up 
 his mind to surrender himself to the enemy : he ordered the 
 flag to be struck. Two auxiliary, officers (bluesl, 2 to whom he 
 gave the order, refused to execute it ; but some others of the 
 crew to whom he repeated it, were cowardly enough to obey : 
 the captain meanwhile demanding quarter by the most un- 
 mistakeable gestures. When this was made known below, 
 one of the officers, a M. Dieu, rushed up on deck, and after 
 vainly endeavouring to make the captain ashamed of his 
 cowardice, he declared to him that he and the other officers 
 would not share in his disgrace ; that they considered the flag 
 
 1 Trublet, p. 113 ; Chevalier, p. 422. 2 See post, p. 256. 
 
SUFFREN. 127 
 
 in such hands a mere trumpery rag, that they would not 
 surrender to the enemy, and that they were going to continue 
 the action. Accordingly, the fire which had ceased for some 
 minutes was reopened with increased vigour. It was unfor- 
 tunately at this moment that the Sultan, which had hove to, 
 lowered a boat in order to take possession of the Severe ; she 
 thus sustained considerable loss, and was compelled to fill and 
 stand on. It was noticed at the time by the several ships of 
 the fleet that the Severe's ensign was not flying ; but it was 
 supposed that the halliards had been shot away, and that 
 they were too busy on board to repair the damage. It was 
 not till after the fleet anchored at Cuddalore, that the dis- 
 graceful truth became known.' 
 
 There were, however, several other captains in the 
 fleet whose misconduct deservedly called down on them 
 M. de Suffren's displeasure. Three of these were sent 
 home ; but even this severe step was not sufficient to 
 quell the spirit of insubordination which had manifested 
 itself ; it checked it indeed for a time, but only that it 
 might break out again in a more resolute and dangerous 
 manner. 
 
 Notwithstanding the great difficulties which Suffren 
 had to contend with, he worked most energetically at 
 Cuddalore to get the fleet ready for sea. In the long 
 campaign, and in three hard-fought battles, the ships had 
 sustained damages which it was impossible thoroughly 
 to repair without large stores and the conveniences of a 
 dockyard. These were not to be had. The voice of dis- 
 content was loud in the fleet, pressing for an immediate 
 return to the Isle of France. Eather than abandon 
 the coast, said Suffren, I will sink the ships in the very 
 roadstead of Madras. He determined that the ships 
 should be repaired, and he carried that determination 
 
128 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 into effect by the mere force of his will. The requisite 
 timber was obtained on shore, often by pulling down 
 houses and converting the beams. For other purposes, 
 other makeshifts were adopted ; and on 1 August the 
 fleet sailed for Batacalo, where the commodore expected 
 to find some reinforcements and stores lately arrived 
 from Europe. 
 
 It was at Batacalo, whilst waiting for these to come 
 on from Point de Galle, that, on 19 August, he received 
 a complimentary letter from the Grand Master of Malta, 
 conferring on him the dignity, and enclosing the insignia 
 of Bailiff, or Grand Cross of the Order. This is the^ 
 more noteworthy, as notwithstanding the honours that 
 were afterwards lavished on him by the King of France, 
 it is by this title of Bailiff that his name is, in France, 
 almost invariably distinguished. 
 
 Sir Edward Hughes was meanwhile refitting at 
 Madras, and such was his carelessness as to intelligence, 
 that he did not learn positively, till the 16th, that the 
 French had left Cuddalore. The frigate Coventry, which 
 met the Bellone off Batacalo on the 12th, and engaged 
 her in a running fight until close in with the fleet, 
 brought him the first news. The governor of Madras 
 had, indeed, sent him word, some days before, of their 
 having gone to the southward, and had pressed him to 
 sail, in order to prevent any operations against Negapatam 
 or Trincomalee ; but he had chosen to doubt the infor- 
 mation, and had answered that he was in no way re- 
 sponsible to the governor for the management of the 
 fleet. Alarmed, too late, for the safety of Trincomalee, 
 Sir Edward now hurried his preparations, and sailed 
 from Madras on the 20th. Baffling winds made his 
 
SUFFREN. 129 
 
 passage unusually long, and he did not arrive off Trin- 
 comalee till 2 September. The place had surrendered 
 to the French two days before. 
 
 Acting with characteristic energy, Suffren, after 
 being joined by the reinforcements at Batacalo on 
 21 August, appeared off Trincomalee on the 25th ; on 
 the 26th landed the troops which had just joined him, 
 as well as others specially embarked at Cuddalore and 
 Batacalo, and a considerable part of the ship's com- 
 panies ; pushed the works vigorously on the 27th and 
 28th ; opened fire on the 29th ; on the 30th summoned the 
 *' '* • agreed hurriedly to all the demands of the governor, 
 
 "Cspc;~ tty Macdowal, relative to the honours of war ; 
 
 and took" possession on the 31st. Two days after, when 
 the English fleet was signalled in the offing, he was at 
 liberty to re-embark his men, and prepare to meet his 
 old enemy at sea. 
 
 Sir Edward Hughes did not discover the loss he had 
 sustained till the next morning, when, as he was within 
 five or six miles of the shore, Suffren hoisted the French 
 flag. The surprise was so great that he recoiled, as it 
 were, from the unexpected contact, and stood out to sea. 
 Suffren followed, resolved, apparently, to complete his 
 conquest by a victory over the English fleet, for his 
 superiority in force had been made greater than ever, by 
 the addition of two ships and large numbers of men. 
 But the captains of his fleet were opposed to the idea. 
 They had fought often enough, they said ; they could 
 not conquer the enemy, whose resources were inex- 
 haustible, and whose strength in the end would be over- 
 whelming ; the whole fleet ought to return to the Isle of 
 France ; and if the fleet did not go, they themselves would 
 
 K 
 
130; STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 demand permission to retire. It is difficult to under- 
 stand how a man of Suffren's harsh disposition and 
 unyielding temper could tolerate such language from his 
 subordinates. Some of them were, as captains, senior 
 to himself, and this may have occasioned a delicacy in his 
 behaviour towards them, which he would not otherwise 
 have felt necessary. It is possible, too, that family con- 
 nections, or court interest, may have prevented him from 
 exercising the severe justice which the laws of strict 
 discipline demanded, or he may have found a dearth of 
 officers qualified to fill the places which would become 
 vacant ; but whatever may have been the cause of his 
 leniency, he was content to expostulate. 
 
 It was then under such unfavourable circumstances 
 — with the higher officers of the fleet in a state bordering 
 on open mutiny— that Suffren sailed out to attack the 
 English. He had, however, the advantage of the wind 
 from south-west, which gave him again an opportunity 
 of essaying his new tactics. The English line was formed 
 on the starboard tack, heading about south-east, and the 
 French admiral made a general signal to engage its rear. 
 He had fifteen ships against the English twelve, and 
 his idea was to throw the whole of this superiority, at 
 close range, on the sternmost ships, leaving, at most, 
 an equal force to hold the van in check. But the ill-will 
 of some of the captains, and the lubberly, unseamanlike 
 conduct of others, completely frustrated his plan. His 
 signals were not obeyed ; his line of battle was never 
 formed ; the ships engaged in an independent and isolated 
 manner — some within pistol shot, where they sustained 
 ■considerable damage, as the flag-ship, the Illustre and 
 the Ajax ; some almost out of range, where they suffered 
 
SUFFRES. 131 
 
 little or no loss, as the Aimibal, the Severe, the Orient, 
 and the Sphinx ; others more or less closely, but without 
 that hearty and zealous co-operation so necessary to 
 ensure success. In this irregular way the battle con- 
 tinued for about three hours, when the wind shifted tc 
 east-south-east. This brought the English fleet more on 
 an equality as regarded position ; but it was too inferior 
 in numbers, the enemy had too many ships quite fresh to 
 permit it to become the assailant. Three French ships, 
 which had borne the brunt of the battle, had suffered 
 severely; in men, their loss was 64 killed and 178 
 wounded, out of a total of 82 and 255 ; the Heros had 
 lost her mainmast ; the Illustre, her mizenmast and 
 maintopmast ; but twelve ships still remained practically 
 untouched, to put a good face on the backward movement 
 which the Bailiff was compelled to make. The firing 
 ceased at dark ; the English unable to press their enemy, 
 the French unwilling to do anything but get back into 
 Trincomalee. This, however, they effected with difficulty. 
 Although but a short distance from their port, they were 
 dead to leeward of it, and to beat up with their crippled 
 ships was a work of time. They did not arrive off the 
 harbour till the evening of the 6th, when, owing to the 
 ignorance and inexperience of the officer of the watch, 
 the Orient, carried by the currents which prevail at that 
 season, grounded heavily on the reef that stretches 
 out from Foul Point. She was an old ship, launched 
 at L'Orient in 1756, and was so damaged that she 
 could not be got off. Jler masts, however, might have 
 served for the disabled ships ; but the most impor- 
 tant, the mainmast, destined for the Heros, was, by the 
 unskilfulness of the officer in charge, broken short 
 
132 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 off at the level of the upper deck, and rendered quite 
 useless. 
 
 Suffren felt deeply the cowardly and traitorous dis- 
 affection of the captains under him in this action. He 
 felt that through it he had missed what would have 
 been the crowning glory of his campaign ; that with the 
 superior force, and the advantage of position, he had had 
 a chance of breaking the power of the English, a chance 
 of — as he wrote a few months later — destroying Sir 
 Edward Hughes, and remaining master of India. We, 
 of course, looking from a different point of view, may 
 hold a different opinion ; we may think that he had no 
 better chance of annihilating the British fleet on 3 Sep- 
 tember than he had on the previous occasions, when with 
 a more united force he vainly attempted it ; but we can 
 nevertheless understand the bitter disappointment he 
 experienced at not being allowed to try, when circum- 
 stances were externally so favourable to him. 
 
 It was, therefore, impossible that things could re- 
 main unchanged. Four captains were sent to the Isle of 
 France ; among the number was M. de Tromelin, of the 
 Annibal, the senior captain in the fleet, and as such, the 
 leader of the cabal against the commander-in-chief. The 
 vacancies were filled up from the frigates and' corvettes, 
 to which in turn some of the subordinate officers were 
 promoted. Amongst these we find a name afterwards 
 well known in naval history, that of M. Villaret de 
 Joyeuse, who some years later commanded the Eepublican 
 fleet in the battle off Ushant. 
 
 In refitting and reorganising the fleet, the month of 
 September passed away. It was 1 October before the 
 French left Trincomalee, and the season was then so 
 
SUFFRES. ] 33 
 
 broken that it was advisable to seek winter quarters. 
 During the northerly monsoon the east coast of India is 
 so exposed that Suffren had some time before resolved 
 to go to Sumatra ; he accordingly now carried this resolve 
 into execution, visiting on his way the several stations 
 on the Coromandel coast. At Cuddalore, the Bizarre, a 
 64-gun ship, was run ashore by the carelessness and in- 
 capacity of her captain, M. de Trehouret, one of the late 
 promotions. M. de Trehouret was afterwards placed on 
 the retired list, as a punishment for his fault ; but the 
 ship was irrecoverably lost, and even her spars, and such 
 of her stores as could be saved, being put on board a 
 Dutch transport, were, with her, captured by the Medea 
 a few months later. The fleet left the coast on 15 October, 
 and on 1 November arrived at Achen, in Sumatra, where 
 it remained during the bad season. The English fleet 
 left Madras on the same day, forced to sea by a hurricane 
 that swept over the roadstead, and caused most terrible 
 destruction. A great number of country ships, laden 
 with provisions, went down at anchor, and the direct 
 consequence of the loss was a famine which carried off 
 thousands of the inhabitants. And the fleet also suffered 
 very seriously. The Superb and Exeter were completely 
 dismasted, and for some hours were rolling about, the 
 mere sport of the waves, and in momentary danger of 
 foundering. The admiral moved for the time to the 
 Sultan, and the two ships finally made Bombay, jury- 
 rigged. It was the middle of December before all the 
 fleet had reached that port. They were here reinforced 
 by a squadron of five ships of the line, under Commodore 
 Sir Bichard Bickerton, in the Gibraltar, 1 a fine 80-gun 
 
 1 Formerly the Phoenix, flag-ship of Don Juan de -Langara, and was 
 
134 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 ship, which had been taken from the Spaniards two years 
 before, and this addition raised them to a number greater 
 than that of the French under the Bailiff de Suffren ; 
 the more so, by reason of the loss of the two ships, 
 Orient and Bizarre. Accordingly, Sir Edward felt in a 
 position to act more vigorously, and with ships repaired 
 and men refreshed, put to sea on 20 March, 1783. 
 
 The French fleet had enjoyed no such good fortune 
 during the whiter. It had remained at Achen for a 
 couple of months, where it had indeed been able some- 
 what to recruit the health of the men, as well as to refit 
 the ships to a certain extent, limited by the very scanty 
 allowance of stores ; but the impatience of the Bailiff 
 was too great to permit him to stay there longer than 
 was absolutely necessary. He left Achen on 20 December, 
 and did not arrive at Cuddalore till the beginning of 
 February, having spent nearly two months in a desultory 
 cruise in the Bay of Bengal, and in a few abortive 
 attempts on some of the scattered English stations. He 
 was recalled to the coast of Coromandel by a rumour of 
 the death of Hyder Aly. The intelligence was doubtful, 
 but it was of too great importance for him not imme- 
 diately to inquire into it ; for if Hyder 's son did not hold 
 the same views as to the war, did not entertain the same 
 friendly disposition towards the French as his father had 
 done, things might go hard with their forces, by sea as 
 well as by land. On his arrival at Cuddalore, he was 
 reassured. The news was correct ; Hyder Aly had died 
 on 7 December ; but the son, Tippoo Sahib, had inherited 
 the policy and the martial spirit of the father. He 
 
 captured by Sir Gsorge Rodney off Cape St. Vincent, on the night of 
 10 January, 1780. 
 
SUFFEEN. 135 
 
 readily renewed the agreement with the French, and 
 furnished them with a supply of the requisite provisions ; 
 so that Suffren, satisfied on the score of the native alli- 
 ance, sailed in a few days for Trincomalee, where he 
 received the news of his confirmation in the rank of chef 
 d'escadre, and was joined, on 10 March, by a large rein- 
 forcement fresh from Europe and the Isle of France. 
 Three ships of the line, a frigate, and a liberal supply of 
 stores qualified the fleet for the approaching campaign ; 
 whilst a considerable number of soldiers (2,500), formed 
 a force that when- joined to the troops already in the 
 South of India, and co-operating with the native army, 
 would be very formidable. Fortunately, however, the 
 command of this force had been given to M. de Bussy, 
 an officer who had fought his way to fame and wealth 
 more than twenty years before, as a contemporary and 
 rival of Lally, but who was now old, luxurious, and un- 
 enterprising ; more fortunately, because on the death of 
 Sir Eyre Coote, on 26 April, the command of the English 
 army devolved on Major-General Stuart, a man who — 
 whatever his talent — showed himself more eager to up- 
 hold his personal claims, as against the civil power in 
 the Presidency, than to wage a single-hearted war for the 
 good of the country. Against such, a bolder leader than 
 De Bussy might have achieved some fatal success. 
 
 The French troops were landed about 20 March, at 
 Porto Novo; Suffren, with part of the fleet escorting 
 them there, and covering the disembarkation. As Sir 
 Edward Hughes was daily expected to return to the east 
 coast, he was anxious to get back to Trincomalee, and 
 reunite his forces ; but the absence of the flying squadron 
 delayed him, and it was 7 April before he. could leave 
 
136 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 Porto Novo. He was only just in time. As he entered- 
 the Bay of Trincomalee, the English fleet was seen pass- 
 ing at some distance to seaward. 
 
 Left to himself, to his own want of energy, and the 
 ineptitude of dissolute favourites, De Bussy frittered 
 away his time and resources. Having resolved not to 
 undertake any active operations against the English 
 army, he took up a strong position at Cuddalore ; in 
 front of which General Stuart, after many delays, arrived 
 on 7 June. The English fleet had meantime possession 
 of the coast* Many of the French ships were in such a 
 wretched state — some of them needing the pumps con- 
 stantly going, in order to be kept afloat — that it was not 
 possible to leave Trincomalee without a thorough repair. 
 De Suffren, feeling how much his presence was called 
 for, pushed on the work with the energy of despair ; but 
 under any circumstances, even far more favourable than 
 those which attended him, heaving down several line- 
 of-battle ships requires time, and De Bussy's messages, 
 pressing him to come to the northward, could not be 
 obeyed. Sir Edward Hughes was thus able to enforce 
 a rigid blockade of the coast without opposition ; and 
 though he was a good deal distressed for want of water, 
 he had sufficient strength to permit of his keeping an 
 adequate squadron cruising off Cuddalore, and from that 
 as far south as Porto Novo : so that when General Stuart 
 closed the land communications, the French troops were 
 exposed to all the deprivations of a siege. 
 
 The strength of the English fleet was, however, to a 
 great extent^ a hollow show ; for such virulent scurvy 
 raged throughout, that the ships were scarcely more than 
 half-manned. In the beginning of June, upwards of a 
 
SUFFREN. 137 
 
 thousand men were sent to hospital at Madras, and not- 
 withstanding this, a few days later, the sick lists of the 
 different ships mounted, on the average, to about a hun- 
 dred. The efficiency of the fleet was thus much impaired, 
 but it still continued at sea. On 24 May it was off Trin- 
 comalee, and perhaps meditated an attack on the ships 
 in the outer anchorage ; but on closer observation Sir 
 Edward judged that they were posted too strongly to per- 
 mit such an attempt to be made. He therefore stood to 
 the southward, hoping to pick up some French store- 
 ships, supposed to be in the neighbourhood ; but returned 
 in a few days, and resumed his former cruising ground 
 between Cuddalore and Porto Novo. 
 
 It was at this time that Suffren wrote to M. de 
 Souillac, governor of the Isle of France, the following 
 letter, which gives a tolerably clear idea of his view of 
 his position : — 
 
 ' I cannot make out what Sir Edward Hughes's plan is. 
 Does he expect reinforcements ; is he looking out for those 
 which we expect ; or is he waiting till I go to the relief of 
 Cuddalore to attack Trincomalee, which he would capture 
 easily, as I am obliged to take away five hundred of the 
 garrison in order that my ships maybe — I cannot say manned, 
 but capable of going at all ? Persuaded then that with fifteen 
 ships, of which eight only are coppered, I cannot attack seven- 
 teen which are all coppered, and stronger than mine, which have 
 the advantage of the wind, and, owing to their superior sailing, 
 can keep it ; persuaded also that they have left their eighteenth 
 ship, with some frigates, blockading Cuddalore, I have sent 
 two transports laden with provisions and stores, in convoy of 
 the Fendant, Cl^opatre and Coventry. I believe that this is 
 the surest way to relieve Cuddalore, without at the same time 
 risking Trincomalee, on which our existence in Indian waters 
 depends.' 
 
138 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 On 11 June the French left Trincomalee. Although 
 still believing himself inferior in force to the English, 
 ignorant as he was of the fearful sickness which was 
 making such havoc amongst our crews, Suffren neverthe- 
 less felt that an energetic effort must be made to relieve 
 Cuddalore, or rather the French army, whose very being, 
 as such, depended on the safety of the fort, now hard 
 pressed. On the 13th, a series of vigorous attacks, 
 obstinately resisted by the garrison, ended in its being 
 driven within the walls. The next day the French fleet 
 appeared in the offing. 
 
 Sir Edward Hughes, in consequence of the arrival of 
 the enemy, moved up off Cuddalore, while the French 
 anchored some miles to the southward. Suffren had, 
 however, resolved to relieve the place, if possible, at all 
 hazards. He accordingly weighed on the 17th, and stood 
 boldly in, as if to attack the English in their anchorage. 
 Sir Edward went out to meet him, forming line of battle 
 in expectation of immediate action ; but the Bailiff's first 
 object was to establish a free communication with the 
 besieged town, and to accomplish this end he manoeuvred 
 during the whole day. By the evening he had passed, 
 with his whole fleet, inside the English, and was able to 
 anchor close in shore. This gave him the wished-for 
 opportunity of filling up his ships' companies with men 
 from the garrison ; he borrowed no less than 1,200, half 
 of whom were Europeans, and at once distributed them 
 through the fleet ; the crews were thus raised rather 
 above their complement ; whilst those of the English, 
 reduced by sickness and death, were far below it. The 
 next day, he weighed again, and having the advantage 
 of the wind, was eager to engage; but Sir 'Edward, 
 
STJFFREN. 139 
 
 manoeuvring for the weather gage, refused the proffered 
 battle. 
 
 During the whole of the 18th and 19th, the English 
 admiral vainly endeavoured to recover the advantage 
 which he had allowed to be taken from him. On the 
 ,20th the relative position of the two fleets was but little 
 altered ; but Sir Edward, weary of manoeuvring, and 
 perhaps somewhat out of temper at the idea that he had 
 been outwitted, made up his mind to fight. He accord- 
 ingly hove to, in line of battle, on the port tack, the wind 
 being almost due west, and received the onset of the 
 enemy, who opened fire a little after four o'clock. 
 
 The action continued from that time till dark ; but 
 without the energy of spirit which had distinguished 
 former actions between the same admirals. Owing to a 
 recent order from France, issued consequently on the 
 capture of Count de Grasse, in the Ville de Paris, the 
 year before, Suffren hoisted his flag in the Cleopatre, 
 and took no personal share in the battle ; and, whether 
 mistrusting his unskilled and motley crews, composed to 
 a very large extent of soldiers, Sepoys, Lascars, Cinga- 
 lese, and negroes, or from some other cause which we 
 cannot now guess at, he did not attempt to repeat his 
 former tactics. This is the more curious as, before sail- 
 ing from Trincomalee, he had, for the first time, reduced 
 his attack to a system, and had given out an order of 
 battle, according to which his five 74-gun ships were to 
 form the rear of the line and were to double on the rear of 
 the enemy, whilst the rest of the fleet, in very open order, 
 were to stretch along and occupy the English line. 1 As 
 matter of fact, however, the whole French fleet extended 
 1 M. Chevalier says (p. 465) : ' This order of battle had been signalled 
 
140 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 along and to windward of the English ; which, on its 
 side, was too weak from the late enormous loss of men 
 by sickness, to do more than maintain its ground till 
 night closed in. 
 
 This. put an end to the combat. The loss in killed 
 was almost exactly equal ; that of the English was 103, 
 of the French 102 ; but Sir Edward, by withdrawing to 
 Madras, thus raising the blockade of Cuddalore, must un- 
 doubtedly be considered as having admitted the inferiority 
 of his force. 
 
 General Stuart might thus have found himself in a 
 position of groat danger had his opponent possessed more 
 force of character ; but while Suffren was endeavour- 
 ing to stimulate M. de Bussy into taking the offensive, 
 news arrived, 29 June, of the cessation of hostilities, and 
 the war terminated without either of the opposing forces 
 having been able to gain over the other any advantage 
 that could be considered at all decisive. 
 
 The account, necessarily somewhat detailed, which I 
 have given of the campaign extending over a year and a 
 half, and of the battles fought by the fleets, will put the 
 relative merits of the two commanders and of the forces 
 under them, in a clearer light than any mere expression 
 of opinion. By this account we are led to the conclusion 
 that in state policy, or in naval tactics, Suffren was 
 alike the superior genius. Distinguished above his ad- 
 versary by energy of character, by a burning zeal which 
 considered little done so long as anything remained to 
 be done ; a man of infinite resource, of perfect self-con- 
 fidence, and yet knowing how to conciliate the civil and 
 
 on 14 and 15 June : on the 20th, the circumstances probably did not 
 permit the application of this method of attack.' 
 
SUKFREN. 141 
 
 military authorities, even whilst he differed from them 
 in opinion — it might well be asked how it happened that 
 his campaign was not more successful, and that his 
 labours were so fruitless. The cause of this is clear. Su- 
 perior to Sir Edward Hughes in most of the qualifications 
 of a naval commander, he was not so in the one great 
 essential ; Sir Edward, though opinionated, perverse, 
 with but little idea of tactics and less of policy, was still 
 at all times ready for battle ; he did not know much 
 about manoeuvring a fleet, but he could handle his indi- 
 vidual ship to admiration ; he had not much judgment 
 as to the proper time or place to fight, but when he did 
 fight, he did so with a courage that was proof against all 
 odds. In this he was splendidly seconded by the captains 
 under him. According to all rule, the Exeter off Sadras, 
 or the Monmouth off Providien, ought to have struck ; 
 but they did not strike ; nor does the idea of striking ap- 
 pear to have suggested itself to either Commodore King or 
 Captain Alms as even a possibility. Theoretically they 
 were beaten ; as a matter of fact, and in a matter-of-fact 
 way, they kept their flag flying till the end of the battle. 
 There was no attempt at theatrical display. They did not, 
 as M. de Suffren is said to have done when his masts went 
 by the board in the battle of 3 September, stamp on the 
 deck in a transport of rage, or cry, in a tone of exalta- 
 tion, ' Bring flags, bring all the flags on board ! hang 
 them all round the ship ! ' but they took the heaviest 
 pounding that the enemy could give, with the under-! 
 standing, probably, that it was part of the day's work. 
 
 With the French it was very different. Notwith- 
 standing the brilliant example which their courageous 
 admiral set them, the captains of the fleej; were, with few 
 
142 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 exceptions, resolute in hanging back in the hour of 
 danger. We by no means specially refer to the very 
 extraordinary case, already related, of the captain of the 
 Severe, in the battle of Negapatam ; the conduct of M. 
 de Cillart is beyond the pale of criticism ; but a want of 
 energy, a lukewarmness, a slackness in action — which 
 may have been spite and jealousy, but which savours 
 strongly of cowardice — was the rule amongst the superior 
 officers of the fleet. The Ajax, on the evening of 5 July, 
 lost her main and mizen topmasts in a squall ; though 
 in presence of the enemy, though a battle the next day 
 might almost certainly be counted on, nothing was done 
 on board to repair the damage ; the Ajax the next morn- 
 ing was in the same disabled state as on the previous 
 evening, and her captain, M. Bouvet, had the unblush- 
 ing assurance to make a signal for permission to part 
 company. The permission was refused ; but the Ajax 
 lay to leeward of the fleet, and took no share in the 
 action. That Bouvet was a very old man and in bad 
 health is all that his friends seem able to allege in his 
 behalf. On 12 April, the Vengeur and Artesien persis- 
 tently disobeyed the signal, several times repeated, to 
 close on the enemy. The same two ships rendered them- 
 selves conspicuous on 6 July, by a similar disobedience 
 of signals, and their captains, De For bin and De Maur- 
 ville, were in consequence sent to the Isle of France, 
 under arrest; family interest, it would appear, saved 
 them from further punishment. M. de Tromelin, com-, 
 manding the Annibal, the senior captain in the fleet, 
 was notoriously the soul of a party against Buffren ; and 
 the disgraceful and unsailorlike conduct of several of the 
 other captains in the battle of 3 September was principally 
 
SUFFREN. 143' 
 
 due to his machinations ; but the insubordinate jealousy 
 of their senior by no means absolves the others. In 
 all this there is one circumstance especially remark- 
 able : it is that none of these mutineers was visited with 
 the penalties of martial law. In the history of our own 
 navy, we find a very close parallel in the West Indian 
 campaign of Vice- Admiral Benbow in 1702. I am by no 
 means sure that, morally, a large part of the blame does 
 not rest on Benbow, 1 whilst Suffren seems to be clear ; 
 but of the captains implicated in that scandalous affair 
 off Santa Marta, two suffered capital punishment ; one 
 escaped the same only by an earlier death ; and a fourth 
 was dismissed the service, and imprisoned during the 
 Queen's pleasure. Of the many in M. de Suffren's fleet who 
 were guilty of cowardice, disaffection, and disobedience, 
 only one — De Cillart — was cashiered. 
 
 Such painful considerations, however, tend to raise 
 the French admiral's credit to a higher pitch. When we 
 reflect that men of all creeds, and of all nationalities, 
 freemen or slaves, often in want of provisions, of medi- 
 cines and of military stores, formed the crews of ships 
 many of which were so rotten that they could only be 
 kept afloat by continual pumping ; that such crews were 
 commanded by cowardly and mutinous captains, and 
 officered by inexperienced or ignorant lieutenants, we 
 cease to wonder how it was that, with a force numerically 
 so imposing, so little was accomplished ; we begin rather 
 to admire the genius of the man who, under such diffi- 
 culties, cbuld accomplish so much. What he did accom- 
 plish was this : by his bold and daring behaviour he won 
 on the natives to continue against us the war which 
 1 See Dictionary of National Biography, s.a. Benbow, John, iv. 210. 
 
144 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 they had been on the point of abandoning ; he conciliated 
 Hyder Aly in a personal interview to such an extent that 
 that wily old barbarian lent himself heart and soul to 
 the furtherance of the admiral's plans and of the French 
 interest, as indissolubly wrapped up with his own ; he 
 captured Trincomalee by a skilful combination of craft, 
 strategy, and force ; and he fought an action in defence 
 of his capture, which, under all disadvantages, put it out 
 of the enemy's power to undertake any operations against 
 his new possession. He relieved Cuddalore from a 
 blockade which must, if continued, have caused the ruin 
 of the army ; and in doing so placed the French general 
 in a position to carry on an offensive war. 
 
 This much he did ; but we cannot assent to the 
 exaggerated statements of French writers that he gained 
 great naval victories. Gaining a naval victory does 
 not consist in allowing an inferior force to stand firmly 
 at bay till nightfall, and at the close of the action to take 
 up an impregnable position ; but this was the case in the 
 battle of Providien. Gaining a naval victory does not 
 consist in allowing an inferior force to cut off convoy, to 
 capture a transport and the hospital ship, under the 
 very eyes of the fleet, and to carry off the prizes after an 
 action fought to retake them ; but this was the case 
 in the battle of Sadras : nor in being driven from the 
 manifest purpose of landing troops and prosecuting en- 
 terprises on shore, as happened at Negapatam. Such 
 actions, well fought as they undoubtedly were — at least, 
 on the part of the commander-in-chief — were not victories 
 in any sense of the word, and to style them such, far 
 from increasing, tends to lessen the glory of the admiral ; 
 for to speak of these, or of the battles of Providien, of 
 
SUFFREN. 145 
 
 Trincomalee, or Cuddalore as victories, carries with it, 
 to our ears, an appearance of unfitness that borders on 
 the absurd— to our ears, accustomed to the name of 
 victory as belonging to such battles as La Hogue, Vigo, 
 Quiberon Bay, or Dominica, not to carry the glorious 
 roll-call into the wars of the Eevolution. 
 
 The court of France, however, formed a much higher 
 estimate of the services of the Bailiff de Suffren. He 
 had already, in March 1783, on the news of his first 
 three battles, been raised to the rank of lieutenant-general, 
 though — during the war, at least — he remained ignorant 
 of his promotion. 1 On his arrival at Toulon on 26 March, 
 1784, he hastened to Paris, where he received the 
 greatest possible consideration from Louis XVI. The 
 Queen herself presented him to the Dauphin, as one of 
 the best servants of the King. ' Learn my son,' she said, 
 • to pronounce properly the names of the heroes, the 
 defenders of their country.' 2 He was, shortly afterwards 
 — although there was no vacancy — created Vice- Admiral 
 of Prance, and an extraordinary chapter of the order of 
 Saint-Esprit was held, that he might be enrolled among 
 its knights. He was the hero of the day, cheered by the 
 crowd whenever he appeared in public, and everywhere 
 received with the highest honour and distinction. 
 
 1 It is worth calling attention to this, as illustrating what is said 
 in Chapter VIII, on the subject of French naval rank in the last century. 
 M. de Suffren, whilst commanding a fleet of from twelve to fifteen sail 
 of the line, was, during the greater part of the time, so far as he knew, 
 merely a captain having local rank, and through the whole campaign 
 wore only a broad pennant. His enemy, Sir Edward Hughes, holding a 
 corresponding command, was a vice-admiral. 
 
 2 It maybe interesting to note that the Provencal and accepted pronun- 
 ciation of the name is as if written Suffrein ; which may perhaps account 
 for the persistency with which, in this country, it has been misspelt. 
 
 L 
 
146 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 He did not live long to enjoy his popularity and rank. 
 A very few years after, during a cloud on the political 
 horizon of Europe, he was appointed to the command of 
 a fleet ordered, as a measure of precaution, to be fitted 
 out at Brest, and was on the point of leaving Paris, when 
 he suddenly died, on 8 December, 1788. About his 
 death there is some mystery. He had been in his usual 
 health, and had been working with his accustomed energy 
 in forwarding the equipment of the fleet. His sudden 
 death was, at the time, attributed to a fit of apoplexy, 
 and his extreme corpulence would suggest that there was 
 nothing improbable in such a story. Various French 
 writers, however, consider that there is satisfactory 
 evidence that he was killed in a duel, provoked by the 
 Prince de Mirepoix, on account of his having, whilst in 
 the East Indies, put two of the prince's nephews under 
 arrest and turned them out of the service. The witness 
 whose testimony is adduced was a servant of Suffren at the 
 time, and his story, related by M. Cunat as weU as by M. 
 Jal in minute detail, is plausible enough. It is, however, 
 quite uncorroborated ; and the sudden death of distin- 
 guished men has so often led to a variety of contradictory 
 reports — as though the world strove to separate, even in 
 the manner of dying, the hero from the common herd — 
 that we should be careful how, even on such a point, to 
 which little importance attaches, we yield a too ready 
 belief to what may have been merely the monomaniacal 
 idea of a very old man. 
 
 But whatever was the cause of his death — whether 
 apoplexy or the sword — the loss to France was equally 
 severe. Had he lived, the next few years might have 
 been very different for his country. A man of keen fore- 
 
SUFFREN. . 147 
 
 sight and unclouded judgment, he might have obtained 
 the adoption of measures of sound policy and necessary 
 concession. A man of undoubted probity, his word 
 might have been accepted by a populace that put no 
 faith in the promises of the court, or in the pledges of 
 the king. A man of unscrupulous determination, his 
 prompt and vigorous action might have quelled in its 
 very cradle the young rebellion, which weak and timo- 
 rous opposition fostered to such a gigantic and terrible 
 growth. 
 
 And, though the estimate I have formed of his cha- 
 racter is in some respects less high than that which has 
 been formed by his own countrymen, I yield a ready 
 assent to the opinion that — cool and daring in action, 
 crafty in policy, of ready wit, and of singular genius as a 
 tactician, with much practical skill, added to a vast fund 
 of theoretical knowledge — the Bailiff de Suffren was one 
 of the most dangerous enemies that the English fleets 
 have ever met, and, without exception, the most illus- 
 trious officer that has ever held command in the French 
 navy. 
 
 L 2 
 
148 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 TEGETTHOFF. 
 
 EXPERIENCES OF STEAM AND ARMOUK. 
 
 Theeb is a certain tendency in the minds of those who 
 are most earnest in the cause of naval education to 
 confuse the means with the end, and to imagine that all 
 that is wanted is a competent knowledge of such sciences 
 as mathematics, physics, geography, astronomy, naviga- 
 tion even, or pilotage, gunnery or naval architecture. 
 In reality, and so far as the duties of a naval officer are 
 concerned, all these are but branches, however important, 
 each in its different degree, of that one science, the art 
 of war, which it is the business of his life to practise. 
 Prom this point of view, the raison d'etre of a ship of 
 war is her power of fighting ; that of her captain is the 
 skill to use that power. The captain of a ship of war is 
 therefore called on to possess not merely the skill of the 
 navigator, of the seaman, of the engineer, of the gunner, 
 or nowadays of the electrician, but of all together, 
 directed by the knowledge of how and when to use each 
 to the best advantage so as to attain the desired end. 
 As a matter of first necessity, young officers are specially 
 
 1 Fraser's Magazine, June, 1878. 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 1 49 
 
 instructed in the details of those several branches, a 
 knowledge of each of which must be joined together in 
 the perfect commander ; but it is not by that detailed 
 instruction alone that they become fitted for the duties 
 which promotion will lay on them. Where the official 
 instruction ends, the higher education really begins. 
 From that time it is the man's own experience, and 
 reading, and thought, and judgment, which must fit him 
 for the requirements of higher rank. 
 
 It is a trite proverb that experience teaches even 
 fools. But needful personal experience is not always to be 
 had, or the cost of its lessons may be ruinous. The wise 
 man will learn from the experience of others : and just 
 as a naval officer learns navigation from the theories 
 and practice of centuries, embodied in his Inman or his 
 Eaper ; or as he learns seamanship from the traditions 
 of old, whether handed down by word of mouth or 
 recorded by Darcy Lever, or Boyd, or Nares ; so also 
 will he learn the art of commanding ships or fleets from 
 the history of his great predecessors, of what they have 
 done, and how they have done it. But this is a higher 
 and graver study than all that has gone before. Certain 
 fixed rules can be laid down for observing the sun or 
 for regulating the chronometers. The different points of 
 seamanship are learned and understood by the average 
 boatswain as well as by his commanding officer. A 
 given battery will send an electric current through a 
 known resistance. Steam at a given pressure will drive 
 the ship at a known speed ; and the measures necessary 
 for obtaining that pressure and that speed are acquired 
 by hundreds. But the science of war is not one of 
 mere rule and precedent, for changing conditions change 
 
150 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 almost every detail, and that too in a manner which it is 
 often impossible to foresee. 
 
 The commanding officer who hopes to win, not 
 merely to tumble into distinction, must therefore be 
 prepared beforehand for every eventuality. The know- 
 ledge of what has happened already will not only teach 
 him by precedent ; so far as that is possible, it is easy. 
 and within the compass of everyday abilities : it will also 
 suggest to him things that have never yet been done ; 
 things in the planning of which he may rise to the 
 height of genius, in the executing of which he may rise 
 to the height of grandeur. And it is in this way that 
 the exact story of difficulties overcome, of brave defence 
 or brilliant achievement, interesting in itself as a story 
 of gallantry or heroism, becomes, to the naval officer, a 
 study of real and technical importance. 
 
 As a contribution to such a study I am going to 
 relate the story of the battle of Lissa, a battle of our 
 own time, the only battle between armoured squadrons ; 
 a battle which Captain Colomb ' has aptly described as 
 ' beyond all bounds the most important naval occurrence 
 since Trafalgar,' and yet a battle of which — in this country 
 at least — little or nothing is accurately known. There 
 is scarcely an incident in it that is not every day mis- 
 represented, and even the name of the victorious admiral 
 is almost invariably misspelt. 2 This is not very satis- 
 factory : to us, as a nation supposed to be the nursery 
 
 1 Journal of the United Service Institution, vol. xi. p. 104. 
 
 2 The misspellings show considerable ingenuity. Starting with the 
 data that its consonants are t, g, f , and a doubtful h, these have been 
 arranged by ones or twos, in almost every possible combination. 
 Tegethoff, Tegetofi, Teggetoff, Teghetoff, are only some of the many 
 ways that have come under my notice. 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 151 
 
 and the storehouse of naval science and naval tradition, 
 it is not very creditable. 
 
 Wilhelm, the son of Lieutenant-Colonel Karl von 
 Tegetthoff, was born at Marburg in Styria on 23 Decem- 
 ber, 1827. We are, as yet, told nothing of his childhood, 
 except that he spent some of it in the Gymnasium at 
 Marburg ; but at the age of thirteen he was sent to the 
 College for Naval Cadets at Venice. There he stayed for 
 five years : he was nearly eighteen when he made his 
 first experience of sea-service. On 23 July, 1845, he 
 was appointed to the Montecuccoli brig, and after- 
 wards to the corvette Adria, on board which ships, 
 whilst cruising in the Adriatic and Archipelago, he 
 learned the more practical part of his duties. On 27 
 January, 1848, he was made an ensign of the second 
 class, and was raised to the first class three months 
 later, on 18 April. 
 
 The Austrian navy was at this period a service of 
 extremely small importance, either from a national or 
 political point of view. It was feeble ; it was neglected 
 by the government, and every kreuzer spent on it was 
 grudged. In the interior of the country it was scarcely 
 known that there was a navy at all. The officers were, 
 almost to a man, natives of the Italian provinces ; the 
 few Germans amongst them— sons of government officials 
 civil or military, whose rank and position gave them 
 an opportunity of pushing forward their relations in a 
 service where competition was not keen — had either to 
 assimilate themselves to their Italian comrades, or to 
 lead a life of solitude or seclusion. In Venice the fleet 
 was openly spoken of as belonging to the Italian nation, 
 and ' Young Italy ' counted many of its warmest sup- 
 
152 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 porters on board the Austrian ships of war. The two 
 Bandieras, chiefs of the rising of 1844, who had been 
 shot at Cosenza, were naval officers, a lieutenant and 
 an ensign, and the sons of a naval officer, an admiral. 
 Of the seven who were executed with them one other, 
 Moro, was also an officer of the navy. They had tam- 
 pered, on a large scale, with the fidelity of the seamen, 
 and they had all but made themselves masters of the 
 Bellona frigate. These were things of public notoriety, 
 and those Austrians who knew that a navy did exist, 
 connected their idea of it principally with the memory of 
 convicted traitors ; an idea which afterwards seemed to 
 be justified by the fact that when the war of 1848 broke 
 out, and Venice threw off the Austrian yoke, most of the 
 naval officers flung in their lot with the revolutionary 
 cause. In doing so, however, they failed to secure the 
 ships. These were still held by the Austrians, but were 
 for the time useless, as the few officers that remained 
 were insufficient in number, and the Sardinian fleet, 
 mistress of the Adriatic, prevented all attempts at re- 
 organisation. It was not till the Sardinians, after their 
 defeat at Novara (23 March, 1849), and the pressure 
 thus brought on Piedmont by land, were compelled to 
 withdraw their ships, that the Austrian navy could show 
 signs of life, and was able with the few ships they could 
 fit out, to close the blockade of Venice, which finally sur- 
 rendered on 22 August, 1849. 
 
 During the early part of this period of enforced in- 
 activity, Tegetthoff was an ensign on board, one after the 
 other, the brig Montecuccoli, the brig Triest, and the 
 frigate Bellona, where, at best, he was but perfecting 
 himself in habits of discipline, and in the knowledge of 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 153 
 
 the internal economy of ships of war. He was afterwards 
 aide-de-camp of Field-Marshal Martini, the then head of 
 the navy, and went with him in his embassy to Naples ; 
 but returned in time to take his share of the blockading 
 on board his old ship Adria. After the peace he served 
 on board the steamer Maria Anna in the Levant, and 
 was present in the Peiraeus during the English blockade 
 of that port on account of the Don Pacifico affair, now 
 almost forgotten, or remembered only by Sir George 
 Dasent's clever skit. 1 He was promoted on 4 June, 
 1851, to the rank of lieutenant of the second class, and 
 on 4 November, 1852, to the first class, in which grade 
 he served again on board the Montecuccoli and the 
 corvette Carolina, and in 1854 was appointed to com- 
 mand the schooner Elisabeth, from which shortly after- 
 wards he was transferred to the steamer Taurus. 
 
 These rapid changes speak of the disorganised and 
 unsettled condition in which the Austrian navy was at 
 the time. The ships were there, though in bad state, 
 but the officers were very few, and seem to have been 
 transferred from one to the other, either at the caprice 
 of the authorities, or in accordance with the necessities 
 of the dockyard. In command of the Taurus, however, 
 Tegetthoff remained for some time, employed, during 
 the Crimean war, in a sort of police duty in the Sulina 
 mouth of the Danube. This duty was neither pleasant 
 nor easy, and Tegetthoff not only gained credit by the 
 way in which he performed it, but was brought to the 
 favourable notice of the Archduke Maximilian. 
 
 After the general break-up in 1848, and the dis- 
 appearance of the overwhelming Italian element, the 
 1 Jest and Earnest, vol. ii. p. 110. 
 
154 STUDIES IN NAVAi HISTORY. 
 
 navy seems to have become suddenly popular. Many 
 officers from North Germany and Denmark were induced 
 to take service under the Austrian flag. The command- 
 in-chief was given to a Dane, Admiral Dahlerup, who is 
 described as having some difficulty in accommodating 
 himself to the very mixed materials put at his disposal — 
 Old Austrian, North German, and Danish officers, mer- 
 chant skippers, Germans, Slaves, Dalmatians, and 
 Illyrians : to fuse them into one homogeneous whole was 
 no easy task. 
 
 Numbers of cadets, too, came in, members of the 
 best Austrian families, and among them, setting the 
 example, the emperor's brother, the Archduke Ferdinand 
 Maximilian. After a short service in the subordinate 
 ranks, the archduke was appointed, in 1854, rear- 
 admiral and head of the navy. He was then only 
 twenty-two : but his zeal compensated, to some extent, 
 for his want of experience ; and for the next ten years 
 he devoted himself to the good of the service over which 
 he really presided. Under his fostering care an excellent 
 dockyard and arsenal were constructed and fortified at 
 ■ Pola. Many ships were built, amongst them a line-of- 
 battle ship and three large frigates. One of these, the 
 Novara, was sent on a combined scientific and training 
 expedition, a voyage round the world ; and in 1857, also 
 in the interests of navigation and the development of 
 Austrian commerce, Tegetthoff was despatched, in com- 
 pany with the distinguished ornithologist, Dr. Heuglin, 
 on a semi-official journey in Egypt and Arabia; the 
 object being to collect local information which might 
 throw new light on the project of cutting a canal through 
 the Isthmus of Suez, with a possible view to take an 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 155 
 
 early advantage of the canal, if it should be completed, 
 and, amongst other things, to select a point suitable for 
 a coaling station. 
 
 The two travelled up the Nile to Thebes, from there, 
 by caravan, to Kosseir, on the Eed Sea, and thence 
 southwards, examining both coasts as they went. Near 
 Bender Gam, in Somali Land, they were attacked by 
 the natives, taken prisoners, and detained until their 
 ransom was duly paid. Dr. Heuglin, who had been 
 severely wounded, crossed over to Aden and returned to 
 Cairo, whilst Tegetthoff pursued his investigations by 
 himself. In an open boat, and against the north-easterly 
 monsoon of the Gulf of Aden, he crossed over to 
 Makallah, coasted along to Eas Fartak, and crossed 
 again to Socotra. After exploring this island, he went 
 back to Aden, and so to Egypt and to Europe. 
 
 Whilst at Aden he received his promotion to the rank 
 of captain of the third class ; and after serving on shore 
 at Trieste for a few months, he was, in the autumn of 
 1858, appointed to the command of the screw coryette 
 Erzherzog Friedrich, and sent to the coast of Morocco 
 to inquire after the crew of a merchant ship wrecked 
 there, who were said to have been carried as slaves into 
 the interior. What with the Spanish war, the wanton 
 attacks of some French ships, and the threatening 
 neighbourhood of an English squadron, the whole coast 
 was in a very disturbed state, and any Europeans — Aus- 
 trians or others — thrown helpless on shore, would cer- 
 tainly be condemned to slavery, if not to death. The 
 Erzherzog Friedrich had examined the whole coast of 
 Morocco east of the Straits without obtaining any 
 tidings of the castaways. Before going west she put into 
 
156 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 Gibraltar for letters, and received orders to return at once 
 to the Adriatic. War with France and Italy was imminent, 
 and the safety of the ship, as well as the defence of the 
 home ports, rendered her immediate recall necessary. 
 
 In the Adriatic, however, nothing was done. The 
 French fleet, in overpowering force, swept the sea, but 
 was not at first strong enough to attack Venice. After- 
 wards, when a number of floating batteries and ships 
 of the line had been brought round, Louis Napoleon 
 judged it opportune to send an autograph note to Franz 
 Joseph ; and on the basis of this, peace was shortly 
 afterwards concluded. During this time the Austrian 
 fleet was altogether unequal to any offensive measures, 
 though such were indeed proposed. Admiral Jurien de 
 la Graviere, who commanded the ships which instituted 
 the blockade, tells us that — 
 
 The officers of the Austrian squadron were full of ardour ; 
 they were, even then, the same brave officers who afterwards 
 triumphed at Lissa. ' They asked to be led out. They felt 
 humiliated by the blockade : they would endeavour to raise 
 it. But the archduke would not venture his fleet. If it 
 should be lost, Austria would never sanction its being 
 replaced. He chose rather to follow the example set by the 
 defenders of Sebastopol, and applied himself to prevent our 
 approaching the town. The line-of-battle ship Kaiser, which 
 had been lately launched at Pola, was anchored in mid- 
 channel ; and instead of completing her equipment, arrange- 
 ments were made to sink her at once, if necessary, so as to 
 close the only passage available for ships having even a 
 moderate draught of water. 1 
 
 We are told that amongst those anxious to make a 
 dash against the French squadron Tegetthoff was con- 
 
 1 La Marine d'Aujourd'hui, p. 158. 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 157 
 
 spicuous ; and it seems not improbable that a man of 
 courage and resource, such as he afterwards proved him- 
 self to be, might have cut off some of the small cruisers 
 or store ships in the Adriatic, and have made an un- 
 expected diversion by an attack on the coast of France. 
 But the attempt was not permitted ; and till the close of 
 the war the Erzherzog Friedrich remained as inactive 
 as the other ships. 
 
 After the peace Tegetthoff was appointed aide-de- 
 camp to the archduke, and in this capacity accompanied 
 him to Brazil on board the steamer Kaiserin Elisabeth. 
 The account of this voyage has been written at great 
 length by the archduke himself. Apart from the cir- 
 cumstance of its being the journal of a prince and em- 
 peror — round whose name such a halo of romance has 
 circled — it is a very commonplace record of travel, and 
 has here no special interest beyond describing to us how 
 
 the archduke and his aide-de-camp T were ducked 
 
 on crossing the Line, and reminding us of the bond of 
 union between Tegetthoff and the head of the Austrian 
 navy. Of the two, Tegetthoff was five years the senior ; 
 he was altogether the stronger intellect, and there seems 
 reason to believe that the relation between them was that 
 of friend to friend rather than of commander to admiral, 
 or of lordling to prince. It is certain that there was a 
 close intimacy, and the archduke was able to advance 
 his friend's interests at the same time that he advanced 
 those of the service. 
 
 On their return from Brazil, Tegetthoff was, on 
 24 April, 1860, made a captain of the second class, and 
 in this rank he commanded the frigate Badetzky in 
 the Levant until the autumn of 1861, when she was put 
 
158 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 out of commission. On 3 November following he was 
 advanced to the first class, and appointed to the command 
 of the Novara, the 50-gun frigate which had just come 
 home from her voyage round the world. He was then, 
 notwithstanding his want of seniority, sent into the 
 Levant as commodore, and was present in Greek waters, 
 in Phalerum Bay or the Peirseus, for a great part of 
 1862-3, during the Eevolution and the accession of King 
 George. Afterwards, as the Novara was found to be 
 in want of extensive repairs, he was turned over to the 
 Schwarzenberg, a frigate of the same size, and in her, 
 in company with the Eadetzky, of 31 guns, was, at the 
 end of 1863, at Port Said, inspecting the works of the 
 canal, on which, in fact, he is said to have written a clear 
 and valuable report. He was still there when he received 
 orders to go immediately to the North Sea, where the 
 naval power of Denmark threatened to baulk some of 
 the military plans of the Germanic spoilers. 
 
 With the Schwarzenberg, Eadetzky, and a gun- 
 vessel, the Seehund, Tegetthoff immediately went round 
 to Brest, where he was joined by three Prussian gun- 
 boats, the Blitz, Basilisk, and Adler. These were put ' 
 under his orders, and with the squadron so formed he 
 left for a cruise against the Danes, who were, it was said, 
 blockading the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. It 
 was about noon on 9 May, 1864, that, within sight of 
 Heligoland, he met the Danish squadron under Commo- 
 dore Suenson. The Seehund was not in company, 
 and the three Prussian gunboats were paltry little things, 
 so that his effective force consisted of simply : 
 
 Schwarzenberg . . . 400 h.p. 48 guns 
 Eadetzky . . . . 300 „ 31 „ 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 159 
 
 As against the Danish force : 
 
 "&■ 
 
 Niels Juel . . . .300 h.p. 42 guns 
 JyUand . . . . 400 ,, 44 „ 
 
 Heimdal . . . . 350 „ 16 „ 
 
 The Austrians were clearly overmatched ; and the 
 Danes, both in prestige and efficiency, were not an enemy 
 to whom one would willingly give odds. Nevertheless, 
 Tegetthoff did not hesitate a moment. He was steering 
 towards the north, Suenson towards the south ; and the 
 two, advancing straight against each other, came within 
 range about a quarter before two o'clock. 
 
 The action which followed was the first, and with 
 the exception of that, a few months later, between the 
 Kearsarge and Alabama, remains the only one fought 
 between wooden ships under steam and armed with 
 heavy shell guns ; but on neither side does any excep- 
 tional use seem to have been made of the steam-power ; 
 and the damage and loss inflicted by the shells were no 
 greater than were in many cases, during the old French 
 war, inflicted by much smaller cold shot. The hostile 
 frigates, on each side in close order, one astern of the 
 other, passed in opposite directions, interchanging their 
 starboard broadsides. The Danes then turned to star- 
 board, trying to cut off the Prussian gunboats, which 
 were a long way astern ; and to prevent this the Austrians 
 also turned to starboard, countermarching their line. 
 But in this they were a little late, and the Schwarzen- 
 berg, as she advanced towards the south, received a 
 raking broadside from the Niels Juel. They did, how- 
 ever, prevent any attack on the gunboats, and the two 
 squadrons ran in parallel lines at a distance of about 
 500 yards apart, and heading at first towards the south- 
 
160 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 west, the Schwarzenberg and the Niels Juel, the 
 Eadetzky and the Jylland, supported by the Heim- 
 dal, keeping up a brisk fire on each other. About three 
 a shell from the Niels Juel lodged in the bunt of the 
 Schwarzenberg's foresail and burst there, setting it on 
 fire. This rapidly spread, and the fore topmast was 
 enveloped in flames. The fire of the Niels Juel pre- 
 vented all attempts at extinguishing them, and the ship 
 had to be kept right before the wind, which was easterly. 
 A little after four they were within the territorial waters 
 of Heligoland, and the action ended. 
 
 The question has often been mooted whether an 
 action, begun outside, may not be finished within neutral 
 waters. Bynkershoek laid down the rule that it may ; 
 some of Stowell's decisions seem to sanction it ; and, 
 apart from the arguments of lawyers, there are cases on 
 record in which English commanders have taken the 
 same view — notably, that of 19 August, 1759, when 
 Boscawen captured or burnt De la Clue's ships in Lagos 
 Bay. It is quite possible that Commodore Suenson, who 
 had the Austrians distinctly in his grip, might have fol- 
 lowed the precedent, and given risen to international 
 disputes and certain ill-feeling ; but the presence of the 
 English frigate Aurora, under the command of Sir Leo- 
 pold McClintock, prevented any such complication. The 
 Austrians anchored, and shortly afterwards the Schwar- 
 zenberg's foremast went over the side, but the fire was 
 not completely extinguished till ten o'clock at night. 
 The Danes, meanwhile, after lying-to for some time, 
 repairing damages, had gone forth. They had suffered 
 heavily, and were in no condition to keep up a blockade 
 of Heligoland, so that the Austrians, getting under way, 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 161 
 
 crossed over, unhindered, to Cuxhaven, where they 
 anchored early the next morning. 
 
 Independent of the damage done to the ships — and 
 the Schwarzenberg was certainly incapable of any pro- 
 longed defence — the loss in men stands thus : Danes, 14 
 killed, 54 wounded. Austrians, 36 killed, 52 badly 
 wounded, and a great many slightly ; of which total quite 
 six-sevenths fell on the Schwarzenberg. But the blockade 
 was raised : the Austrians had met the Danes with a 
 weaker force, and had not been crushed. The convenient 
 neighbourhood of neutral water was not put too pro- 
 minently forward, and the Germans claimed an effective 
 victory, as, in fact, it strategically was, for the Danish 
 operations on the coast were perforce ended. The Aus- 
 trian emperor acknowledged Tegetthoffs telegraphic 
 message by one promoting him to the rank of rear- 
 admiral, and conferring on him the Order of the Iron 
 Crown, with a war decoration. Undoubtedly Tegetthoff 
 deserved well of the allied sovereigns. He had fought a 
 superior enemy, superior both in force and in prestige. 
 He had fought boldly, and though beaten, was still so 
 far successful that the Danish navy had no further in- 
 fluence on the war. 
 
 Tegetthoff was now employed for a few months in the 
 War Office at Vienna, and in 1865 was again in command 
 of a small squadron in the Mediterranean. With this, 
 in the beginning of 1866, he was recalled to Pola, to 
 take part in the war with Italy, which was finally declared 
 on 20 June. 
 
 This new war found the Austrian navy in a very un- 
 prepared condition. The popular idea seems to have 
 been that the late alliance with Prussia had inaugurated 
 
162 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 a reign of peace ; that there were to be no more wars ; 
 and though, as a measure of precaution, an army might 
 be necessary, to spend money on a fleet was downright 
 waste, and, in the impoverished state of the treasury, a 
 thing not to be thought of. Accordingly, the ships which 
 were unfinished when the Archduke Maximilian went to 
 Mexico, were unfinished still ; and what ships there were 
 had been permitted to lie by, waiting till it was convenient 
 to repair them. But though Maximilian was no longer 
 there to direct the work or to push it forward, when the 
 necessity occurred the navy still enjoyed the benefit of 
 his rule. He had insisted that the navy should be a 
 national force, that the ships and their engines, as well 
 as their men, should be Austrian. The arsenal at Pola 
 was a reality ; and the ships, though unfinished, were 
 in their own hands, to be got ready as soon as possible. 
 The one point in which they had trusted to foreign re- 
 sources was the only one that utterly failed them. But 
 it was an important one. A number of heavy guns which 
 had been ordered from Krupp's works were stopped by 
 the Prussians, and the want could not now be adequately 
 supplied. 
 
 The spirit of the service was, however, excellent. 
 Tegetthoff, with the few ships ready for sea, took up his 
 station at Fasana ; and whilst the men — raw recruits 
 most of them — were drilled almost incessantly, the 
 admiral inspired the commanding officers, and through 
 them the seamen, with courage and confidence. Other 
 ships were fitted out, hastily, imperfectly, but still equal 
 to the emergency. The two large ships, armoured 
 frigates of the first class, were pusbed forward ; their 
 spars were not ready, but they were jury-rigged, and sent 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 163 
 
 to Fasana. These were ships which, though somewhat 
 smaller, may, in horse-power and armour, be compared 
 to our Eoyal Oak; wooden ships, with 4|-inch plating, 
 of 800 horse-power, of 5,130 tons displacement, and, 
 failing the Krupp guns, armed with 16 smooth-bore 
 48-pounders. On board one of these, the Brzherzog 
 Ferdinand Maximilian — which was shortly called Fer- 
 dinand Max, or, affectionately, Max — Tegetthoff hoisted 
 his flag. Presently came the Kaiser, a 90-gun ship, 
 similar to those two-deckers which, only three years 
 before, had formed the bulk of our Mediterranean fleet. 
 Then came the Novara, which had narrowly escaped 
 burning at the hands of an incendiary, but which had 
 been repaired as quickly and as well as circumstances 
 permitted ; then also the Don Juan de Austria, meant 
 for an armour-plated ship, but ironclad only at the water 
 line and the after part ; forward, the want of the plates 
 was supplied by wooden planking. By the end of June 
 the admiral had with him, under his immediate orders, 
 the whole of the available force of the Austrian navy : 
 seven (so-called) ironclad frigates, the 90-gun ship, two 
 50-gun frigates, four smaller, and a number of gun- 
 vessels, gunboats, and fast steamers, including one of 
 the Austrian Lloyd's boats. But everything was in the 
 rough — the ships, as I have just said, very much so ; 
 the masts and rigging, the fittings and the guns, such as 
 could be got most readily and most quickly. ' Only send 
 them,' wrote Tegetthoff—' send them as they are ; I'll 
 find some use for them.' 
 
 The men were almost all newly raised ; their gun- 
 drill went on all day and every day ; they were exercised 
 more especially in firing concentrated broadsides — that 
 
 M 2 
 
164 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 is, in laying the guns by marks on the ships' decks, so 
 as all to converge to a focus, and firing them as one, at 
 the word. 
 
 Above all, the several captains were fully in the 
 admiral's confidence. Promoted as he had been, for 
 actual service without reference to seniority, Tegetthoff 
 was probably junior to many of those under his command. 
 Possibly he felt this might be a difficulty in his way. It 
 does not appear to have been so ; the hopes, and fears, 
 and plans, and strategy, and tactics of the campaign be- 
 fore them seem to have been discussed in friendly con- 
 clave, of which Tegetthoff was the president and the soul. 
 He imbued them with his fiery spirit. The wooden ships 
 might be roughly armoured with ranges of chain-cable 
 fastened on abreast of the boilers : it would give the 
 stokers some sense of protection. The guns were weak : 
 they must be supplemented by the ships themselves : if 
 a 48-pound shot would not pierce the enemy's plates, a 
 5,000-ton ship might. Hence the determination to use 
 the ships freely as rams. To fire by concentrated broad- 
 sides and to ram — these were the elements of the tactics, 
 the details of which were discussed in all their probable 
 bearings. When the day came that saw them face to 
 face with the enemy, every captain knew the admiral's 
 intention as well as the admiral himself did; every 
 officer knew what had to be done, and every man had 
 some idea of it, and above all knew that he had to 
 fight, 
 
 The Italian navy was on a widely different footing 
 from the Austrian. From the birth of the kingdom, six 
 years before, the fixed idea of the Italians had been 'to 
 have a navy. They aimed at being a great naval power ;. 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 165 
 
 and, by liberal expenditure, had got together a number 
 of ships that could compare even with the fleets of 
 England or France. They were able to collect at An- 
 cona a force of twelve armour-plated ships, besides a 
 large number of powerful wooden frigates and. smaller 
 craft. 
 
 Of their armoured ships, most had been built abroad ; 
 the' two largest, the Be d'ltalia and the Be di Porto- 
 gallo, in America. These were wooden ships of 5,700 
 tons displacement ; they were armoured with 5^-inch 
 plates, had engines of 800 horse-power, and could steam 
 from 12 to 13 knots.. Some controversy arose after* 
 wards as to whether their construction was as good as it 
 was believed to be ; they were said to be unsound, built 
 of green wood, and incurably foul from the filth that had 
 been thrown down the lining, and so built into them. 
 Whether this was the case or not, it is difficult to deter- 
 mine ; but there is reason to believe that their scantling 
 was too weak — a fault which proved fatal to the Be 
 Italia. Their armament consisted of two 300-pounder 
 Armstrong guns, ten smooth-bore 10-inch guns, and 
 twenty-four rifle guns throwing shot of 90 pounds. If 
 we remember what our own navy was in 1866, we shall 
 see that the Bellerophon was the only ship we had 
 then afloat which, as an effective man-of-war, could be 
 said to be decidedly superior to these. Our ships of the 
 Prince Consort class, though a little bigger, had thin- 
 ner armour, and had no rifled guns ; no more had the 
 Achilles, whose extreme length would have made her 
 compare unfavourably, as a tactical engine, with either 
 of these two Italians. 
 
 Two others, the Terribile and the Formidabile, had 
 
166 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 been built in France; these were iron ships of 2,700 
 tons, with 4^-inch plates over 14 inches of backing — 
 they had ram bows,, then still a novelty, and were said 
 to have a speed of 12 knots. Of the others I will only 
 mention in detail the Affondatore, a turret ship, built 
 in England ; she was of 4,000 tons and 700 horse-power; 
 she had a spur 30 feet long, and though she had only 
 two guns they were 300-pounder Armstrongs. Besides 
 these there were five others of about 4,000 tons, and two 
 smaller of 2,000 tons, the Palestro and Varese, which 
 were only partially plated, their bows and -sterns being 
 left unarmoured. These ships were all armed with rifled 
 guns, principally of cast-iron with strengthening coils, 
 which threw 90-pound shot. In mere material force 
 the Italian fleet was at least double the Austrian ; but 
 the government, whilst spending freely on their new 
 ships and guns, had neglected to ensure the quality of 
 their officers and the discipline of their seamen. 
 
 The officers were young, without knowledge or ex- 
 perience, without the discipline or even the social train- 
 ing which teaches men so thrown together to live in 
 mutual amity ; there was a lamentable want of barmony 
 between those of the same grade, and of deference from 
 inferiors to superiors. This was nothing new ; it had 
 always been so in the Sardinian navy, and was aggra- 
 vated by the coalition with the Neapolitan. It was so 
 universal that the writer from whom I quote concludes 
 that it is the necessary condition of naval life : ' Every- 
 body,' he says, ' knows that this poisonous plant takes 
 root and flourishes amongst other seafaring people ; 
 and it seems that the compulsory and continual living 
 together renders it difficult to avoid the clashing of in- 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 1 67 
 
 dividual characters, and makes their differences more 
 acrimonious.' ' 
 
 The command in chief of this fleet was entrusted to 
 Persano, the one admiral of the Italian navy; under 
 him were Albini, vice-admiral, and Vacca, rear-admiral. 
 Vacca was a Neapolitan ; Albini, a native of Sardinia. 
 Carlo Pellion di Persano, of noble family, was born at 
 Vercelli, in Piedmont, in 1806. At the age of eighteen 
 he entered the Sardinian navy, and having passed 
 through the regular grades of the service, was made a 
 captain in 1*841. He then commanded the Eridano brig 
 for a three years' commission in the Pacific ; and, 
 during the Adriatic campaign of 1848-9, had had com- 
 mand of the brig Daino, in which he is said to have 
 distinguished himself. In 1851 he was in command of 
 the Governolo, which carried to London the Pied- 
 montese contribution to that first International Exhibi- 
 tion. Afterwards, in 1859, he had command of the 
 Carlo Alberto, a 50-gun frigate ; and having served in 
 her through the operations of that year, was, in October, 
 raised to the rank of rear-admiral. He then had charge 
 of the squadron which, in the early summer of 1860, was 
 co-operating with Garibaldi on the coast of Sicily ; after 
 which he conducted the naval attack on Ancona, and 
 received the surrender of Lamoriciere on board the flag- 
 ship, the Maria Adelaide, on 80 September. For this 
 service he was made a vice-admiral ; Albini, the second 
 in command, being at the same time made a rear- 
 admiral. In 1862 Persano was a member of the Eatazzi 
 cabinet, as minister for the navy, and, on its break up 
 
 1 La Guerra in Italia nel 1866. L'Eseroito, la Flotta e i Volontarj 
 Italiani. Studio militare (Milan, 1867), p. 344. 
 
168 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 in the end of the year, before he retired from office* 
 promoted himself to the rank of admiral. 
 
 This is a short outline of Persano's service claims to 
 distinction. He was generally esteemed as a man of 
 good family and of amiable temper ; he had married an 
 English lady, and being thus connected with English 
 society, was looked on as partly an Englishman, or at 
 least was supposed to have caught, as if by infection, the 
 good qualities of the typical English naval officer. When 
 the war broke out in 1866, he was considered the man of 
 the day, and great things were expected from him. He 
 proved, however, wanting in almost every gift which 
 raises an officer to the height of an emergency. At 
 Taranto, where he took the command on 16 May, he 
 found that a great deal was still wanting to make the- 
 fleet fit for active service ; the equipment was imperfect, 
 the men were newly raised, the senior and commissioned 
 officers were inefficient, and of petty officers there was a 
 great scarcity. Such defects were, of course, very real, 
 but Tegetthoff, at Fasana, was struggling manfully 
 against the same ; at Taranto or at Ancona Persano 
 does not seem to have realised that it was his duty to do 
 this. ' Send me what you have,' wrote Tegetthoff to the 
 minister for the navy, ' I will do something with it.' 
 Persano's tone was rather, ' If you don't send me what 
 I ask for, I can do nothing.' And, meantime, he did 
 nothing. The drills were slack, discipline uncared for, 
 and the equipment left very much to itself. 
 
 Any competent witness who had been able to study 
 the condition, the preparation, above all the temper of 
 the two fleets, as they lay in their respective roadsteads, 
 would have had no doubt as to the result of a hostile 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 169 
 
 meeting between them. Though the material superiority 
 lay so entirely with the Italians, he would have remarked 
 that a large proportion of the Austrian seamen were Dal- 
 matians, the descendants of the Uscocchi and other mari- 
 time tribes of the Gulf of Quarnero, the best and sturdiest 
 seamen that the Mediterranean has ever seen, the men 
 who had for centuries upheld the supremacy of Venice in 
 the Adriatic, or who, on their own account, had questioned 
 the rule alike of Venetian, Turk, or Spaniard ; he would 
 have remarked the personal difference of the admirals, 
 and its effect on the courage and temper of their sub- 
 ordinates ; and, finally, he would have remembered that 
 at St. Vincent, the Nile, or Trafalgar, an English fleet 
 had conquered against nominal odds as great as, or even 
 greater than, those which now told in favour of the 
 Italians. 
 
 But to the general public, or even to the government 
 of Italy, nothing of this was known. It was known that 
 the Austrian ships were paltry ; it was, perhaps, supposed 
 that they were worse than they really were. It was 
 known that 300 millions of lire (12,000,000L) had been 
 spent on the Italian fleet within the last five years, and 
 it was taken for granted that good value had been got 
 for the money, as indeed it had. But beyond this public 
 knowledge did not go ; and neither the government nor 
 the people doubted for a moment that Persano was master 
 of the situation. ' The Adriatic,' wrote Depretis, the 
 minister for the navy, ' is an Italian sea, and the Austrian 
 flag must disappear from it. Do as you think best, but 
 this end must be attained.' In every cafe in Venice, in 
 Milan, throughout the north of Italy, this end was spoken 
 of as certain. Young Italy was as ready to discuss naval 
 
J 70 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 as political affairs, and knew as little about one as about 
 the other. 
 
 As soon as war was declared, on 20 June, Tegetthoff 
 had despatched the Stadium, the Austrian Lloyd's 
 steamer, to find out exactly where the Italian fleet was, 
 and what its force. The Stadium reported, on the 
 23rd, that as far south as Bari it was not to be seen. 
 The admiral jumped to the conclusion that it would be 
 coming round from Taranto, probably in scattered order, 
 possibly in small detachments, and at once resolved to 
 go with what force he had and look for it. With six 
 ironclads, the Schwarzenberg, and four gun-vessels, he 
 left Fasana on 24 June ; at daybreak of the 27th he was 
 off Ancona. The main body of the Italian fleet had 
 arrived there two days before. They mustered eleven 
 ironclads, four large frigates, and sundry smaller vessels, 
 a force certainly more than double that of the Austrians. 
 But they were coaling in a promiscuous and disorderly 
 manner. The Be d'ltalia's coal had caught fire in the 
 bunkers ; the Be di Portogallo had got water in her 
 cylinders ; almost every ship had some defect due to 
 carelessness, stupidity, or ignorance, and none was ready 
 to go out and attack the enemy. When at last some of 
 them did get under way, they pottered about, performing 
 silly or pedantic evolutions in the entrance of the harbour, 
 while Tegetthoff, having seen all that he wanted to see, 
 and having encouraged his men by the sight of a timid 
 or disorganised enemy, went quietly back to Fasana. 
 Some rumours, much to Persano's discredit, were not 
 slow to arise, but they do not seem to have then taken 
 any definite form. The minister urged him to do some- 
 thing — anything you will, provided you cause the Austrian 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 171 
 
 flag to disappear from the Adriatic. Persano replied, 
 making difficulties : the Austrians would not meet him ; 
 Pola was impregnable ; his Bhips were not properly 
 equipped ; his men were undisciplined ; his officers were 
 incompetent. 
 
 The Count Carlo di Persano and the Honourable 
 John Byng, few men have been more unlike each other. 
 Persano was gentle, amiable, social, and personally brave ; 
 Byng was a small-minded martinet, haughty and re- 
 served. But Persano's correspondence has a curious 
 resemblance to Byng's : it shows the same querulous in- 
 capacity, the same desire to have things done by others, 
 the same unwillingness to do anything for himself. 
 Byng's letters have long been before the world : if I 
 quote one or two disjointed sentences it is only byway of 
 emphasis : — 
 
 I am firmly of opinion . . . that the throwing men into 
 the castle will only . . . add to the numbers that must fall 
 into the enemy's hands, for the garrison, in time, will be 
 obliged to surrender. 
 
 I am afraid all communication will be cut off between 
 us ; ... for if the enemy have erected batteries ... it will 
 render it impossible for our boats to have a passage. 
 
 Many of the ships that came out with me are foul. I fear 
 from the inconvenience we shall meet here there will be great 
 difficulty in keeping the ships clean, as there is but one wharf 
 for them to prepare and careen at. 
 
 And now for Persano : — 
 
 It is my dnty to submit to your Excellency that the ships 
 which join the fleet from day to day are incompletely manned, 
 especially in regard to their petty officers ; and — which is of 
 more consequence — are without trained gunners, who are 
 now more than ever necessary, on account of the greater 
 
172 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 number of rifled guns, which require long and careful drill. 
 And this when hostilities are every moment expected to begin ! 
 
 This awakens very serious thoughts. 
 
 The fleet is not ready for war. 
 
 It will take at least a month to bring it to a tolerable 
 pitch. 
 
 Help me, I earnestly entreat you. 
 
 Finally, on 8 July, Persano was induced to put to 
 sea. He went for a five days' cruise, but kept carefully 
 out of sight of land. It had been rumoured that the 
 fleet was to range the Istrian coast, and confront Tegett- 
 hoff at Fasana or Pola. It did nothing of the kind ; it 
 stood to the south-east, and in mid-channel sailed back- 
 wards and forwards in open order, the ships keeping 
 1,000 yards apart from each other, and exercising none 
 of the manoeuvres of battle. They were better hidden, 
 it was said, in the middle of the Adriatic than were the 
 Austrians at Pola. Boggio, a member of the Chamber 
 of Deputies, had embarked on board the Be d'ltalia, as 
 Persano's guest, and seems to have understood that 
 he was to pay for his entertainment by indiscriminate 
 praise. ' How cowardly are these Austrians ! ' he said, 
 'they will not give us a chance; they fly before us.' 
 But the Marquis Paolucci, Albini's flag-captain, to whom 
 the remark was addressed, replied : ' It is not the 
 Austrians who should be called cowardly, it is we who 
 have been hnmiliated,' and Albini had previously per- 
 mitted himself to say in Paolucci's hearing, ' This is not 
 the way to make war ! We have lost an opportunity 
 which may never return.' 
 
 The feeling against Persano was general, and he was 
 urged to go out. 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 173 
 
 ' Would you tell the people,' wrote Depretis, ' the people 
 who are vain enough to believe our sailors the best in the 
 world, that after spending three hundred millions, we have 
 done nothing better than get together a squadron which dare 
 not meet the Austrian ? Why, they'd stone us ! As if the 
 mere name of the Austrian navy has not always been a sub- 
 ject of ridicule. If Tegetthoff declines to meet us, we will 
 effect a landing somewhere on the coast ; at Lissa, for 
 instance. Lissa, by its central position, would ensure us the 
 sovereignty of the Adriatic ; let us take Lissa. 
 
 There seems to have been no positive order to attack 
 Lissa, only to do something ; but Lissa had been sug- 
 gested, and Persano had not sufficient force of character 
 or originality of judgment to disapprove of it, or to sug- 
 gest any distinct alternative. He would have preferred 
 remaining at Ancona, brilliant in a gold coat trimmed 
 with blue cloth, but that he was not allowed to do. And 
 so, on the afternoon of 16 July, in a state of hurry and 
 flurry, he put to sea, having neither detailed charts, nor 
 plans, nor information as to the defences of Lissa ; with- 
 out even the soldiers that had been offered him as a force 
 for landing. 
 
 But why Lissa ? In England, Lissa, if known at all, 
 was known only as the head-quarters of our Adriatic 
 cruisers in the old French war, and as giving a name 
 to the brilliant little action (12 March, 1811) in which 
 Captain Hoste, with his squadron of three frigates and a 
 corvette, not only defeated the Franco-Venetian squadron 
 of six frigates, a brig, and four small craft, a force more 
 than double his own, but drove the French commodore's 
 ship irrecoverably on shore, captured two others, and 
 compelled a third, which afterwards escaped, to strike 
 her flag. 
 
174 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 Lissa is an island, or rather a mass of hill and 
 mountain, eleven miles long from east to west, and six 
 hroad from north to south, rising in some of its peaks to 
 a height of nearly 2,000 feet. Its principal productions, 
 according to the gazetteer, are wine, oil, almonds, and 
 figs ; bees, sheep, and goats are reared in great numbers 
 by its inhabitants ; and near its coasts are rich sardine 
 fisheries. But neither figs nor sardines formed its value 
 in Italian eyes. The English had fortified the principal 
 harbour, the Bay of San Giorgio, and on its recurring 
 to the Austrians the fortifications had been preserved and 
 added to. In time of war it evidently might, from its 
 position and security, become a place of the utmost im- 
 portance. Besides San Giorgo, in the north-east corner 
 of the island, there are two minor harbours, Comisa at 
 the extreme west, and Manego at the south-east corner,' 
 the fortifications of which, though small, were situated 
 on high ground, so as to be secure against any mere 
 naval attack : they might very well have been left to 
 surrender when the forts of San Giorgio had been 
 carried. 
 
 Persano, however, thought differently. The fleet 
 arrived in the neighbourhood of the island on the night 
 of the 17th ; by dawn of the 18th it was off San Giorgio.' 
 Albini with the wooden ships was to attack Manego; 
 Vacca with three of the ironclads was to shell Comisa ; 
 Persano with the main body was to operate against San 
 Giorgio. By eleven o'clock, fire was opened on Comisa. 
 It was quite futile. The forts were perched on the hills 
 at heights of 500 feet, which to Vacca seemed more than 
 twice as much. After an hour or two he gave up the 
 attempt, and joined Albini off Manego. The forts there 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 175 
 
 were judged to be even higher than at Comisa, and 
 as the big Dahlgren gun which one of the frigates 
 carried on her forecastle could not reach up to them, 
 no other shots were fired. Towards evening, the two 
 divisions went round and rejoined the admiral off San 
 Giorgio. 
 
 There the action had been lively. The forts at the 
 entrance of the harbour had been blown up by shells 
 bursting in their magazines ; and the main fort, Madonna, 
 which raked the harbour, had been silenced several 
 times ; but the Austrians stuck manfully to their guns, 
 and each time renewed their defence. The Re d'ltalia 
 alone fired 1,300 shot. Boggio enjoyed his holiday on the 
 poop, and wrote the next day to his friend Depretis : ' The 
 noise was infernal. Your humble correspondent remained 
 on the poop from eleven o'clock to half-past six, exposed 
 to a storm of shell.' After which he was good enough 
 to send a certificate of the admiral's conduct. ' Persano 
 is most unjustly accused ; he deserves the perfect con- 
 fidence of the government and the country. The heavy 
 responsibility may have rendered him unduly careful ; 
 but now that the time of action has arrived, what a dif- 
 ference is there between him and others ! ' Nevertheless, 
 when evening closed in, no decisive advantage had been 
 gained, nor did it seem probable that, without troops, 
 any could be gained. And time was scant ; for the 
 obvious precaution of cutting the telegraph wire had not 
 been adopted till the fleet had been seen and reported 
 from the island to Pola — not indeed till the engagement 
 had actually commenced, and the record of a return 
 message from Tegetthoff had been found : ' Hold out till 
 the fleet can come to you.' 
 
1?6 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 The following day the Affondatore and two wooden- 
 frigates joined from Ancona, bringing a strong detach- 
 ment of Boldiers. This put Persano in a position to 
 land 2,200 men, and he determined to persevere. The 
 Terribile and Varese were again sent to occupy the 
 attention of Comisa. The Formidabile and Affonda- 
 tore were to go into the harbour and engage Fort 
 Madonna : Vacca in the Principe di Carignano was to 
 support them. For this, Vacca found there was no 
 room. The Formidabile, leading in, took up a position 
 in front of the fort ; the Affondatore was held in play 
 by some flanking works which did her no more damage 
 than she did them ; but the Formidabile had a hot 
 time, and after an hour she had had enough of it, and 
 drew off. She had three or four men killed and about 
 sixty wounded ; her rigging, boats, bulwarks and every- 
 thing not covered by the armour were cut to pieces, her 
 funnel shot away, and six of her port-lids ; l and though 
 neither shot nor shell had penetrated her armour, a 
 shell bursting on the sill of one of the ports had killed 
 two and wounded ten men at the gun, and filled the 
 battery with such a dense smoke that the guns' crews 
 were nearly stifled. The attack for that day had failed ; 
 the only result of it had been to get the Formidabile 
 knocked to bits. It was resolved, therefore, to try on 
 the morrow what the landing party could do. And this 
 resolution Persano stuck to, notwithstanding Tegetthoff's 
 intercepted telegram : ' Hold out till the fleet can come 
 to you.' He seems to have been positively unable to 
 entertain or to weigh two ideas ; the one, to capture San 
 
 1 The port-lids are trie solid shutters that close the ports ; the idea 
 conveyed in the term would seem to be analogous to that in eye-lids. 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 177 
 
 Giorgio, had filled his mind ; the other, the probable 
 advent of Tegetthoff, could find no place. 
 
 Accordingly, the next morning preparations were 
 made for landing. The Terribile and Varese were 
 to renew the attempt on Comisa. Albini, from the 
 wooden ships, was to land the troops and small-arm 
 men. The ironclads were to engage the forts. No 
 intimation was given to the captains of the ships, nor 
 even to the vice and rear admirals, that the enemy's 
 fleet might be expected. Vacca alone had heard of the 
 telegram ; and that only by reason of the accident of 
 his having had direct communication with the flagship. 
 "When, about eight o'clock in the morning (20 July, 1866), 
 the Esploratore, a despatch vessel, came in from her 
 look-out station, with the signal flying, ' Enemy in 
 sight,' it was to the whole fleet as startling as a thunder 
 clap. Albini, with his division, had the boats out and 
 full of military stores, waiting for the signal to land. 
 The signal was, instead, to hold on, and a few minutes 
 later, 'Enemy in sight — prepare for action.' It was the 
 first intimation he had that there was a near chance 
 of the enemy's fleet coming. Neither on the previous 
 evening, nor at any other time, had there been any con- 
 sultation, or any explanation of the admiral's wishes or 
 intentions. The order had indeed been given that, as 
 Albini had been placed by the minister in more im- 
 mediate command of the wooden or reserve squadron, 
 Vacca was to command the van or right wing, and 
 Eibotty, the captain of the Ee di Portogallo, to com- 
 mand the rear or left wing, according as the fleet was 
 in line ahead or abreast. But nothing more. Vacca's 
 words, as afterwards given in evidence before the court,, 
 
 N 
 
178 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 are : ' No council was called, nor was the plan of battle 
 discussed, as the regulations direct. I was unable to 
 form any idea of what the commander-in-chief meant 
 to do.' 
 
 To interpret the thought of another man is difficult. 
 In this case I do not believe that there was a thought to 
 interpret. Persano had formed no plan. He had either 
 not permitted himself to think of the possibility of Tegett- 
 hoff's approach, or he had trusted to that inborn genius 
 which I often hear spoken of. When the hour of trial 
 came, the admiral was more utterly unprepared than any 
 of his subordinates. Tegetthoff was advancing from about 
 north-west. The Italian ironclad squadron, or so much 
 of it as was available, was hastily formed in line abreast, 
 and steered towards him. But the Terribile and 
 Varese were at the other end of the island, some ten 
 or twelve miles off, and the Formidabile was so shat- 
 tered that she made the signal for permission to part 
 company, and lay to, repairing damages. Her captain, 
 Saint-Bon — who had joined only just as she left Ancona, 
 and did not know his officers even by name — afterwards 
 deposed that her ports were so low, so near the water, 
 that it was impossible for him to prepare for action in 
 such a swell as was then on ; so many of his port-lids 
 had been shot away that he must have been swamped. 
 He hoped to have rejoined the fleet within a few hours, 
 but, contrary to all expectation, the fight was over before 
 he was ready. 
 
 After standing towards the enemy for a short half- 
 hour, some hazy recollection of last century's wars 
 seems to have flitted across Persano' s mind : he made 
 the signal to form line of battle towards the north-east, 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 179 
 
 that is, nearly at right angles to the course on which the 
 Austrians were advancing. He expected — or at least 
 said so afterwards — that Albini, with the wooden fri- 
 gates, would form a second line on his starboard, or 
 right-hand side, leaving the picking up of the boats and 
 soldiers to the small craft. But Albini had no orders, 
 and, failing these, fell back on a sort of general under- 
 standing that wooden ships were not needlessly to engage 
 ironclads. He accordingly stayed well to the rear, and, 
 as far as the fight which followed was concerned, might 
 as well — or better — have been at Ancona. 
 
 And meantime Tegetthoff was advancing at full 
 speed ; his seven ironclad ships, in a double oblique line 
 in front, the Erzherzog Ferdinand Maximilian leading, 
 the salient point of this wedge of war. • Behind, at a 
 distance of 1,000 yards, were the seven wooden ships, in 
 a similar formation, the Kaiser leading in the wake of 
 the Ferdinand Max, the 50-gun frigates Novara and 
 Schwarzenberg covering the right and left wings ; and 
 another 1,000 yards farther astern were the gun-vessels, 
 also in double echelon ; behind all, the despatch vessels 
 and miscellaneous small craft. But Tegetthoff 's plans 
 had been arranged long beforehand, and as he advanced 
 the only signals he had to make were : ' Clear for action ' 
 — ' Close up '— ' Full speed ; ' and lastly, at lOh. 35m., 
 ' Ironclads are to rush against the enemy and sink 
 him.' ' 
 
 The charge of the Austrian squadron must be de- 
 scribed as brilliant ; it was made in good order and with 
 
 1 The wording of this signal, which may be considered as Tegetthoff 's 
 tactical legacy, was, ' Panzerschiffe den Feind anrennen und zum sinken 
 bringen.' 
 
 N 2 
 
180 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 an admirable unanimity and steadiness ; but the speed 
 of it has, nevertheless, been very incorrectly stated. It 
 seems quite certain that none of the ships in the Austrian 
 fleet could steam at a rate exceeding ten knots, if so 
 much. I believe that the speed of the charge was not 
 more than eight knots ; but probably enough it seemed 
 more, and especially to the thunderstruck Italians. 
 
 And now, as the crash was imminent, Persano carried 
 out the idea of changing his ship. His flag was flying 
 at the main of the Be d'ltalia. He signalled the 
 Affondatore to close. The Be d'ltalia was stopped for 
 quite ten minutes, and the admiral with his personal 
 staff, but leaving behind his guest and adulator, Boggio, 
 went on board the turret-ship. The two or three ships 
 immediately astern, -which, owing to the unexpected 
 stoppage of the Be d'ltalia, had probably ranged up 
 abreast of her, saw what was going on, but no one else 
 did. The van had held on its course, and, at a distance 
 of nearly a mile, only saw that a boat passed ; and since 
 the ships were all dressed with flags, an ensign at every 
 masthead and everywhere else where an ensign could 
 be hoisted, the admiral's flag — which differs but little 
 from an ensign — could not be distinguished. In their 
 subsequent examination, Vacca and Albini stated posi- 
 tively that they had no idea that any such change 
 had been made ; they both looked to the Be d'ltalia for 
 signals and saw none. The Affondatore' s masts were 
 mere sticks, quite unsuitable for signalling ; and in the 
 crowd of flags, any signals she made were little likely 
 to attract notice, and did not attract it. If signals 
 were made, no one saw them, and the battle fought 
 itself. 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 181 
 
 About a quarter of an hour after the Ee d'ltalia 
 had resumed her way, the front line of the Austrians — 
 the ironclads — in a compact mass passed through the 
 Italian line, or rather through the gap which the Ee 
 d'ltalia had opened. As they approached, Vacca opened 
 fire at a distance stated by the Austrians as 1,000 or 
 1,200 yards, but which the Italians call 200 ; the dis- 
 crepancy may perhaps be reconciled by supposing that 
 some straggling shots were fired at long range, but none 
 by Vacca's orders until the ships were close to. It is 
 at least agreed that the Austrians did not fire till they 
 were within 200 yards. Then they did ; and in the 
 cloud of smoke in which their own fire enveloped them, 
 passed harmlessly through the gap. Captain Colomb 
 suggests that the Ee d'ltalia may have eased to let 
 them so pass through ; but there is no evidence of this, 
 and the gap was already there, owing to the previous 
 stoppage. 
 
 As the Austrians advanced, Vacca, with the three 
 leading ships, bore to the left and enfiladed their line ; 
 then, also, the line of wooden frigates, and, circling 
 round, came into the rear of all, with the intention of 
 destroying some, at least, of the small craft in the third 
 division. But Commodore Petz in the Kaiser, and 
 with the wooden ships, was meanwhile edging away 
 towards the south, to attack the wooden division of the 
 Italian fleet. On his part, Eibotty had turned to the 
 left, and was steering with his three ships — the Varese 
 had just rejoined — to interpose between Petz and Tegett- 
 hoff, so as to let Albini have the undisturbed enjoyment 
 of his share of the fray ; but Albini made no move to 
 take advantage of this, and Petz, seeing the Ee di Por- 
 
182 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 togallo and the other two ships heading towards him, 
 turned to meet them. 
 
 On the way he encountered the Affondatore; the 
 two ships were running right against each other, bows 
 on ; a collision seemed unavoidable, but the Affonda- 
 tore turned off and passed away. The Kaiser then 
 engaged the Ee di Portogallo, firing concentrated broad- 
 sides. Between two such ships, the Kaiser, an old- 
 fashioned line-of-battle ship, and the Ee di Portogallo, 
 an ironclad of 5,700 tons, carrying amongst her thirty- 
 six guns, all rifled, two 300-pounder Armstrongs, the 
 word combat ought to be inapplicable. That the Kaiser 
 ever came out of it, speaks, more positively than any 
 detailed evidence, of the inefficiency of the Italians. 
 What happened was this. The Kaiser, finding that her 
 guns produced no impression on the ironclad's sides, 
 resolved to ram her and did so. The shock carried 
 away her own stem and bowsprit ; her figure-head re- 
 mained on the Ee di Portogallo's quarter-deck ; her 
 foremast also went, sweeping away the funnel in its fall ; 
 flames and smoke smothered the upper deck, and the 
 ship, grinding alongside the ironclad, received her broad- 
 side at this very close range. That she was not de- 
 stroyed seems almost to confirm the report, that the 
 Italian gunners in their flurry fired blank cartridges. 
 
 Still firing, the Kaiser passed on, and on her way 
 was again met by the Affondatore. This ship was 
 fitted specially as a ram. She had a spur thirty feet 
 long — a touch would have been fatal. She was coming 
 straight on. Her quarry was before her, nearly square ; 
 a slight turn towards the left would have made its 
 destruction certain. Her commander gave the order for 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 183 
 
 the men to throw themselves flat on their faces, 'Pancia 
 a terra ! ' when to his surprise, to the surprise of every- 
 body who could see, her helm was put hard over, and 
 she turned away to the right, receiving at a very close 
 range the Kaiser's concentrated broadside on her thinly 
 armoured deck. The true reason of the Affondatore's 
 conduct will for ever remain doubtful. It is certain 
 that the order to turn to the right was given, and 
 given with repeated emphasis, by Persano himself ; but 
 whether his doing so was a simple, well-meaning error 
 of judgment, whether he was afraid of the effect of the 
 shock on the exaggerated spur, or whether his humanity 
 revolted from the idea of putting nine hundred Austrians 
 into the water, cannot possibly be decided. 
 
 But the Kaiser, closely followed by the Novara 
 and the others, passed through the rear of the Italian 
 line, interchanging a heavy fire with the ships of that 
 division— the Be di Portogallo, Maria Pia, and Varese. 
 The loss fell almost entirely on the Kaiser and Novara. 
 The Kaiser, in addition to the loss of her masts and fun- 
 nel, had 24 men killed, and 75, amongst whom was the 
 commodore, wounded. The Novara had 7, including her 
 captain, killed, and 20 wounded. The rest of the division 
 had in all but 3 killed and 9 wounded. But the Kaiser 
 was disabled ; her engineer reported that he could not 
 keep up steam ; and she made her way with difficulty, 
 though unopposed, into St. Giorgio. 
 
 The crisis of the fight was, however, farther north, 
 amongst the ironclads. The three leading ships, forming 
 Vacca's division, had encircled the rear of the Austrian 
 small craft, but too slowly to enclose them or even to 
 do them any harm. The three sternmost ships under 
 
184 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 Eibotty, as well as the Affondatore, were engaged with 
 the Kaiser and her consorts ; and the three in the 
 centre — the Be d'ltalia, Palestro, and San Martino — 
 were opposed to the concentrated force of the seven 
 Austrian ironclads. The result of Persano's want of 
 forethought, or of his trust in the inspiration of the 
 moment, was, that with a fleet of twelve ironclad ships 
 against seven, the actual condition of the fight was that 
 three were opposed to the seven, and were beaten by them, 
 
 This is the one great tactical lesson which the action 
 seems to me to convey. Captain Colomb has spoken of 
 the result of the first charge of the Austrian ironclads 
 as the dividing of the Italian line. In this I am com- 
 pelled to differ from him. The Italian line was divided 
 before the charge quite as much as after ; and no part of 
 it was really cut off by the mere passing through a very 
 wide gap. The resulting break was, in fact, rather in 
 the Austrian fleet, whose wooden division was exposed to 
 a concentrated attack from Vacca, Eibotty, and Albini, 
 which must have been overwhelming had these been 
 men of energy and decision, had there been between 
 them a fixedness and unanimity of purpose ; and which, 
 even as it was, might well have been fatal. 
 
 Of this Tegetthoff seems to have been quickly aware. 
 The ironclads were turned, as soon as the threatened 
 attack could be seen; the signal was to support the 
 second division ; and with that they charged back again. 
 For a few minutes the centre of the battle was enveloped 
 in smoke. When it cleared away the fight was virtually 
 at an end. 
 
 The Austrian ironclads were painted black, but their 
 funnels were all differently coloured, so that a glimpse 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 185 
 
 through the smoke was sufficient to identify the ship. 
 Between the Italians there was no such difference ; they 
 were all painted grey, and, under the circumstances, 
 were undistinguishable from each other. There was 
 thus no choice of an enemy, and once again in the 
 smoke, Tegetthoff's order was simple, ' Earn everything 
 grey ! ' Backwards and forwards, it is impossible to 
 say how often, the ships passed; the Don Juan and 
 the Kaiser Max hunted the San Martino ; the Prinz 
 Eugen, Salamander and Drache took the pressure 
 off the Kaiser and Novara, and engaged the rear 
 division. Moll, the captain of the Drache, was killed ; 
 and for a few minutes the command devolved upon a 
 young ensign, Weyprecht, who afterwards won European 
 fame as the commander of the Arctic discovery ship 
 Tegetthoff. Twice, in the smoke, the Ferdinand 
 Max rammed a grey mass, but inefficiently ; the angle 
 of impact was too oblique. A shell from one of her 
 48-pounders, a smooth, round, old-fashioned shell, burst 
 in the Palestro's ward-room, and set her on fire. 
 Suddenly through the smoke, a stationary grey mass 
 was dimly seen. Tegetthoff pointed her out to his flag- 
 captain, Baron von Sterneck. The engine-room telegraph 
 carried down the order, ' Full speed ahead ! ' The Max 
 started forward and struck the grey mass— an enemy's 
 ship — abreast the foremast, on the port side. It rolled 
 to starboard through an angle roughly estimated at 45°; 
 then, as the Max backed out of the hole she had made, 
 it rolled heavily to port, showing the deck and the terror- 
 stricken crowd on it to the appalled conquerors, and 
 sank. At such a moment, seconds are as years ; but it is 
 believed that between the blow and the disappearance the 
 
186 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 time did not exceed two minutes ; it was 20 minutes past 
 11 ; ' 37 minutes since the first shot had been fired. 
 
 The Elisabeth, a paddlewheel despatch-boat which 
 had followed Tegetthoff into the thick of the fight, was 
 ordered to pick up as many of the drowning men as she 
 could ; but the Italian ships, knowing nothing of what 
 had happened, presently drove her away. She was 
 struck four times, had one man killed and four wounded ; 
 and was compelled to look out for her own safety. 
 It was then, and only then, known from the prisoners 
 that the sunken ship was the Be d'ltalia. Amongst 
 the few picked up by the boats of one of the Italian 
 ships was the commander, Del Santo : his deposition 
 can scarcely fail to be interesting. He says that after 
 the first Austrian charge, the Ferdinand Max ' began a 
 series of evolutions with the intention of sinking us ; 
 keeping up all the time a very hot fire of musketry and 
 artillery, at a distance of only a few yards.' It seems 
 therefore that no attempt was made to turn the tables ; 
 the idea of sinking the Max did not occur to the Italians. 
 
 ' Two or three times our men were called to repel boarders, 
 as the enemy threatened our stern or broadside, and once the 
 division of firemen, to extinguish the fire which an enemy's 
 shell had kindled in the admiral's cabin. Our ship's com- 
 pany behaved splendidly, and especially those of them 
 stationed on the poop, where they were quite without shelter. 
 Amongst these was Boggio, the deputy, who, with his eye- 
 glass in his eye, was firing away with his revolver, determined 
 to sell his life as dearly as possible. AH at once, as the 
 smoke slightly lifted, I saw the Ferdinand Max coming 
 down against us on our port side. I rushed to warn the 
 
 1 The time of the Kaiser ineffectually ramming the Be di Portogallo 
 is given as llh. 17m. The two were thus almost simultaneous. 
 
TEGETTHOEF. 187 
 
 captain of it. As our rudder had been rendered almost un- 
 serviceable by the enemy's fire, he gave the order, ' Pull speed 
 astern ! ' but it was too late to prevent the enemy striking us 
 just abreast the foremast. The ship did not feel any such 
 shock as one would think the necessary consequence of the 
 blow, but heeled over to port, very gradually, and sank.' 
 
 With the Be d'ltalia sunk, and the Palestro at a 
 distance trying to extinguish the flames, the action in 
 the centre was at an end. The two fleets collected 
 themselves, but in a changed position. The Austrians 
 were now in-shore and covering Lissa. The Italians 
 had been pushed out to seaward ; the Palestro blew up 
 about two o'clock ; and, thoroughly cowed by the loss 
 they had sustained, they were in no humour to attempt 
 to regain their position. The Austrians, on the other 
 hand, had accomplished their purpose, and there was no 
 reason why they should hazard their advantage by a 
 fresh attack on a force still numerically superior. They 
 waited for a couple of hours, and seeing no intention on 
 the part of the enemy to renew the engagement, they went 
 into St. Giorgio ; the gun-vessels first, then the wooden 
 frigates, the ironclads following ; the Ferdinand Max, 
 the last of all, let go her anchor about sundown. 
 
 Such in its broad facts was the battle of Lissa, con- 
 cerning which, as I have already said, some curiously 
 wrong ideas have got into circulation. These are as- 
 suredly not worth looking for and contradicting one by 
 one ; but perhaps the most common of them is, that an 
 Austrian wooden line-of-battle ship rammed and sank an 
 Italian ironclad, and from that the inference is drawn 
 that a wooden ship can encounter an ironclad on fairly 
 equal terms. As giving rise to and supporting such an 
 
188 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 inference the mistake is therefore important. So far as 
 it is possible to trace its origin, I think it arose from a 
 confusion between the Ferdinand Max and the Kaiser 
 Max, and the Kaiser, three totally distinct ships ; the 
 two first were ironclads, the third a 90-gun ship. What 
 the Ferdinand Max and the Kaiser severally did, I have 
 already told at length ; but as opposed to the popular 
 misrepresentation, I will say, in so many words : The 
 ship which rammed and sank the Italian ironclad was 
 herself an ironclad of nearly the same size ; and the line- 
 of battle ship, which rammed an ironclad, injured herself 
 very much and her enemy very little. That of the whole 
 Austrian loss of 38 killed, 35 were on board the wooden 
 ships, and 24 of them on board the Kaiser alone, shows 
 how little the efficiency of the two classes of ships can 
 be compared. As to other absurd stories that have been 
 circulated, it would be trouble thrown away to repeat 
 them or to contradict them. 
 
 As is very well known, the Italians were excessively 
 disgusted with the result of the action, so different from 
 what they had nattered themselves it would be. Persano 
 was loudly accused of gross misconduct— of cowardice — 
 of treason — of everything that was vile; and that so 
 persistently, that after some delay it was determined to 
 bring him to trial. But he was a Senator — a peer of the 
 realm, so to speak — and could not, according to the con- 
 stitution, be tried by a court-martial. The whole Senate 
 was therefore formed into a High Court of Justice. The 
 trial lasted for several months : a vast number of wit- 
 nesses were examined ; and their evidence, joined to the 
 detailed Austrian accounts, leaves us little to wish for so 
 far as knowledge of the facts is concerned ; a knowledge 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 189 
 
 of motives can never perhaps be satisfactorily ascer- 
 tained. 1 
 
 The court, which on 29 January, 1867, acquitted the 
 admiral on the more serious charges of cowardice and 
 treason, on 15 April found him guilty of negligence and 
 incapacity (negligenza e imperizia). On 27 June he had 
 manifestly disobeyed his instructions, which were to clear 
 the Adriatic of the enemy's ships ; on the cruise from 
 8 to 13 July he had equally violated his instructions by 
 not seeking an opportunity to attack the enemy, or to 
 blockade him in his harbours ; and finally at Lissa he 
 had let himself be surprised by the enemy, he had made 
 no disposition for battle, had called no council of war, 
 had gone without general intimation on board the Affon- 
 datore, had permitted the enemy to break his line, had 
 managed the Affondatore badly, and had left the battle 
 to itself ; and the court therefore sentenced him to be 
 deprived of his rank as admiral, to be dismissed the 
 service, and to pay the costs of the trial. 
 
 1 Rendiconti delle udienze pubbliche dell' Alta Corte di Giuslizia 
 nel dibattimento della causa contro V Ammiraglio Senatore Conie Carlo 
 Pellion di Persano, preceduti dalla relazione della Commissione d'ls- 
 truttoria (Firenze, 1867). The fullest Austrian account is in Oesterreichs 
 Kampfe im Jahre 1866 ; Nach Feldacten bearbeitet durch das k. k. 
 Generalstabs. Bureau fur Kriegs-Geschichte (Wien, 1869), vol. v. As 
 Tegetthoff was, in 1869, at the War Office, I think it is probable that he 
 revised this history of the naval campaign, and the sketch of his own 
 life which accompanies it. The account given in the Archiv filr Seewesen 
 for 1866 must also be considered semi-official ; but is much shorter, and, 
 by so much, less perfect. There are, of course, many other Austrian 
 and Italian accounts. Persano's own version of the story is L' Ammi- 
 raglio C. di Persano nella campagna navale dell' anno 1866. Confuta- 
 zioni, schiarimenti e documenti (Torino, 1873). The French accounts, 
 as given in the Revue Maritime, vols, xviii. and xix., may also be referred 
 to ; and the very interesting narrative that appeared in the Revue des 
 Deux Mondes (15 Nov., 1866), and which, rightly or wrongly, has always 
 been attributed to the Prince de Joinville. 
 
190 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 There has been in England a tendency to believe that 
 Persano was a victim, sacrificed to the Italians' wounded 
 self-love : for myself, after a careful study of the minutes 
 of the trial, I would accept the decision as just, and even 
 lenient. It is, of course, impossible to offer at length 
 the grounds for this opinion ; they fill a closely printed 
 quarto of nearly 300 pages. But in a few words, nothing 
 would more strongly support it than the opening sen- 
 tences of Persano's own address in reply to the charge. 
 He might almost have been condemned out of his own 
 mouth. 
 
 ' I cannot understand (he began) bow I should be accused 
 of having failed in my duty against the enemy's fleet, which 
 came upon us almost before it was signalled, and whilst we 
 were in considerable embarrassment from the fact that our 
 ships had lately come in from a long voyage and were short 
 of stores.' 
 
 He then enumerated a number of defects, some of 
 which had been repaired a month before, and went on : 
 
 ' So that of the eleven ironclads there were not more than 
 four fit for a long chase. The other seven were, at best, only 
 fit to take part in a battle, but could not be relied on for a 
 chase ; and the more so as most of them wanted the guns and 
 ammunition necessary for fighting with ironclads. 
 
 ' If Tegetthoff had come really with a wish to fight, he 
 would not have withdrawn as soon as we were ready to meet and 
 attack him. I could not, of course, suppose that he had come 
 merely to go away again ; and it was therefore my duty, in 
 the first place, to form the fleet so as not to expose it to need- 
 less risk ; and then to oppose and attack the enemy. But 
 instead of that, he went off after a short time, two or three 
 hours perhaps, much to our regret, and notwithstanding the 
 dashing conduct of our ships' companies.' 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 191 
 
 Of which, a great part is not true ; a great part is 
 irrelevant ; a great part is self-condemnatory ; and all is 
 extremely silly. It is impossible to think or speak with 
 respect of a man who at such a critical period, when 
 honour, perhaps life, was at stake, could give voice to 
 such imbecile maunderings ; and so, in the words of the 
 old sagas, he is now out of the story. 
 
 Tegetthoff s reception from his country was, as might 
 be expected, very different. It is believed that the result 
 of the battle had a very distinct influence on the terms 
 of the peace which was concluded shortly afterwards, 
 and was the direct means of preserving to Austria the 
 Dalmatian and Illyrian provinces. It may well be that 
 this was so; undoubtedly, had Lissa fallen, Austria 
 would have stood in a very different position with regard 
 to the Adriatic. But coming in a time of great depres- 
 sion and calamity, the moral effect of the victory was 
 greater than any mere material advantage, and the 
 nation and the government hastened to show honour to 
 their champion. The news was sent to Vienna by tele- 
 graph ; and by telegraph on the very next day Tegetthoff 
 received a message from the emperor promoting him to 
 be a vice-admiral. Decorations were showered on him ; 
 but perhaps of all these, the one most grateful to him 
 was that sent by the Emperor of Mexico in an autograph 
 letter, dated Chapultepec, 24 August, 1866, which ran 
 thus: 
 
 My deab Beak-Admibal Baeon von Tegetthoff, — The 
 glorious victory which you have gained over a brave enemy, 
 vastly superior in numbers and nurtured in grand old naval 
 traditions, has filled my heart with unmixed joy. When I 
 handed over to others the care of the navy which had become 
 
192 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 so dear to me, and relinquished the task of making the land 
 of my birth great and mighty by sea, amid the clash of con- 
 tending nations, I looked hopefully to you and the young 
 generation of officers and men whom I had been proud to see 
 growing up and striving in a noble emulation under my com- 
 mand. I felt deeply thankful at being able to leave to Adria 
 so many ships — a body of which such an able staff of officers 
 and such brave sailors constituted the soul. Although Pro- 
 vidence has led me into another track, my heart still burns 
 with the fire of naval glory ; and bright and joyful for me 
 was the day when the heroic fleet to which I had dedicated 
 my youth, under your heroic leadership, wrote down, with a 
 blood-red pen, 20 July, 1866, on the pages of naval history. 
 For with the victory of Lissa your fleet becomes enrolled 
 amongst those whose flag is the symbol of glory, and your 
 name is added to the list of the naval heroes of all time. To 
 you, the officers, and the ships' companies, I send my heart- 
 felt good wishes ; and you, as a remembrance of your admiral 
 and friend, and as a proof of my admiration, I invest with the 
 Grand Cross of my Guadalupe Order. 
 
 Maximilian. 
 
 After the end of the war, Vice-Admiral Tegetthoff 
 travelled for a few months in France, England, and the 
 United States. His visit could scarcely be called private, 
 though in name, at least, unofficial ; but he had never- 
 theless the direct object of seeing the great naval arsenals 
 of those countries, and studying their organisation. He 
 had returned from America, and was on his way to Paris, 
 the seat, then in 1867, of a ' Great Exhibition,' when he 
 was recalled by telegraph to Vienna. There he received 
 the honourable though melancholy commission to go to 
 Mexico, to reclaim from the government (if it may be so 
 called) and bring home the body of the late Emperor 
 Maximilian. This duty was performed, though not 
 
TEGETTHOFF. 193 
 
 without difficulty and delay raised by the government and 
 Juarez : the body was recovered and brought to Vienna, 
 where it now lies in the imperial vault. So great 
 throughout Germany was the interest felt in this deep 
 Mexican tragedy, and — notwithstanding the recent de- 
 velopment of the North German and Austrian navies — 
 so little familiarity is there with nautical matters, that 
 I am barely overstating the case if I say that to the 
 majority of even educated Germans, Tegetthoff is not so 
 much the victor of Lissa, as the bringer home of Maxi- 
 milian's body. 
 
 But his career was drawing to a close. In March, 
 1 868, he was appointed head of the naval section of the 
 War Office, and commander-in-chief of the navy, and 
 this he held till his death, which took place, after a short 
 illness, on 7 April, 1871 ; in the words of the semi-official 
 notice — ' zu friih fur Oesterreich.' 
 
 The portraits of Tegetthoff that I have seen represent 
 a hard Scotch type of face. I do not know how far they 
 are to be trusted, but they are not out of keeping with 
 his recorded character. He is described as a man of few 
 words, emphatically a man of action, one able to execute 
 his meaning, but not always able to tell it ; at the same 
 time ready to speak out, and sharply too, if occasion 
 called for it or the good of the service required it. But, 
 as has happened to other naval officers, there were 
 moments when he was tempted by feelings of disgust or 
 dissatisfaction ; and once, at least, he had made up his 
 mind to retire into private life. That he was persuaded 
 to remain for the glory and welfare of his country, is 
 perhaps not the least of the benefits which the Austrian 
 navy received from the unfortunate Maximilian. 
 
 o 
 
194 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 PRIVATEERS AND PRIVATEERING. 1 
 
 I. FORTTJNATTJS WEIGHT. 
 
 Since the Congress of Paris, in 1856, declared that 
 ' privateering is, and remains abolished,' the expediency 
 of England's assent to this, from a national as well as 
 from an international point of view, has been often dis- 
 cussed. On the one side it has been alleged that such 
 assent is a wanton sacrifice of one of our most powerful 
 weapons ; that in consequence of it we should now enter 
 on a naval war with, so to speak, our right hand tied 
 behind our back. On the other, it has been urged that 
 privateering is prejudicial to our commercial interests, 
 would tell more against us than for us, would destroy 
 our carrying trade, would cause our ships to transfer 
 their allegiance to other flags, is repugnant to the ad- 
 vanced civilisation of the age, and converts war against 
 nations into piracy against individuals. The case as it 
 stands gives room for a very pretty quarrel, and will 
 probably so continue until the sharp experience of war 
 solves the question one way or another ; nor do I think 
 it is difficult to foresee what that way will be. It is 
 scarcely to be doubted that, when we are engaged in a 
 
 1 Fraser's Magazine, October, 1881. 
 
FORTUNATUS "WKIGHT. 195 
 
 European war, our enemy will endeavour to attack us, 
 to injure us, by ' cruisers,' such as a few years ago 
 Eussia openly proclaimed her intention of fitting out ; 
 and the defensive measures adopted by our own admiralty, 
 the instructions under which merchant steamers are 
 built and surveyed, leave as little room to doubt that we 
 should at least follow suit. But between such cruisers 
 and the privateers of old there would be little effective 
 difference. The command might be vested in regularly 
 commissioned officers, but it would be equally the duty 
 of these to plunder and destroy rather than to fight. The 
 work done would be very much the same as that which 
 was done formerly by private men-of-war ; though the 
 cruisers would have a higher responsibility, would be 
 more under control, and would add enormouf ly to the 
 cost of the war. They would have to be paid for doing 
 what the old privateers paid for permission to do. 
 
 Whether the system of waging maritime war against 
 an enemy's commerce is altogether advantageous is 
 another point on which much argument has been ex- 
 pended. That it may cripple the enemy's resources is 
 obvious ; but the advantage does not necessarily lie all 
 on one side, and it may occasion serious injury to our 
 own. In former days the treasure ships belonged to the 
 enemy until they became ours by capture ; in the present 
 age the treasure and the ships that carry it are English, 
 and it is difficult to picture the consternation in the City 
 on hearing of the loss of some steamer bringing home- 
 ward a rich freight of diamonds from the Cape or of gold 
 from Australia. But as we clung steadfastly to the right 
 of making prize of the Spanish plate-ships, it is not to 
 be expected that any enemy which fate may now send 
 
 o 2 
 
196 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 us will waive his claim to the English steamers, if only 
 he has the power to assert it, and against that it behoves 
 us to be on our guard. It seems, however, probable that, 
 under the existing rules of the Declaration of Paris, but 
 few large prizes will be made, such as founded many a 
 fortune in the last or earlier centuries, when international 
 scruples did not exist, and naval opinion was absolutely 
 single as to the advisability and even necessity of making 
 captures and sharing them out amongst the captors. 
 This opinion, rooted in the ' custom ' of the sea, was as 
 old as the English nation, and had descended from the 
 days of Hengist and Horsa, of Harry Page — the Arripay 
 of the French chroniclers — of Drake, or Frobiser, or 
 Lancaster, down to the times when Commodore Wager 
 took the great gal eon, or Anson gutted the Acapulco ship. 
 The stories of such times seem to the seaman of to- 
 day like the fairy tales of childhood, too good to be true ; 
 but from a strictly naval point of view they Lave their 
 dark side, and it is very certain that, of the quarrels 
 between senior officers which so often disgraced our 
 service, a great number were due, directly or indirectly, 
 to the natural but unchivalrous desire of making money. 
 The feud between Eodney and Arbuthnot, on the coast 
 of North America, in 1780, was one pf these. The 
 friendly relations between Lord St. Vincent and Nelson, 
 which led to such glorious results, were interrupted by a 
 lawsuit on their rival claims for prize-money ; and the 
 ill-feeling which Nelson and Sir John Orde entertained 
 for each other was at least strengthened by pecuniary 
 considerations. 1 Lord Howe's conduct on the ' First of 
 
 1 See Nioolas's Nelson Despatches, vol. vi. pp. 307, 319, <fte. 
 
FORTUNATUS WEIGHT. 197 
 
 June ' was angrily criticised by many, as though he 
 might have rendered the victory still more decisive had 
 he not been over-anxious about the security of the prizes. 
 Sir John Jervis was similarly spoken of after the battle 
 of St. Vincent ; and after the battle of the Nile, the 
 burning several of the prizes, whose preservation would 
 have taxed the efficiency of the fleet, appeared to Nelson 
 a measure of very grave responsibility, as defrauding the 
 men under his command of moneys to which they were 
 justly entitled. 1 The bitterness which frequently arose 
 out of considerations of prize-money was undoubtedly 
 increased by the disproportionate share of the senior 
 officers. Of the prizes just referred to as burnt at the 
 Nile, Nelson estimated the share of the commander-in- 
 chief as 3,750Z., of a captain as 1,000£. ; but of a lieu- 
 tenant as 751., and of a seaman as 21. 4s. Id. In face of 
 such figures it is all very well to talk of prize-money as 
 encouraging seamen to do their duty, but its principal 
 use was to offer great chances to the senior officers, and 
 its real evil was the promoting jealousy and ill-will 
 between the flag-officers, and even the captains. This, 
 however, naval officers would have been slow to acknow- 
 ledge. 
 
 But whilst blind to the evil that not unfrequently 
 resulted from the distribution of prize-money amongst 
 ships of war, every officer had a keen, perhaps an exag- 
 gerated sense of the evil effects of privateering. On this 
 point there was a unanimity so marked as to lead to a 
 suspicion that sometimes at least it arose out of a grudge 
 that private ships should carry off rich prizes which 
 
 1 Nelson Despatches, vol. iii. p. 115. 
 
198 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 might otherwise have fallen to the king's cruisers. 
 Privateers were of course men whose main idea in 
 coming afloat was to make the war profitable to them- 
 selves and their owners ; they had not the same respon- 
 sibility as the captains of ships of war, and they were 
 practically independent even of the commander-in-chief 
 of the station, to whom, therefore, they were at once 
 a source of annoyance and pecuniary loss. Vernon's 
 opinion of them in 1740 was that they were little better 
 than pirates. He wrote to the governor of the French 
 Leeward Islands, who had complained of their conduct •- 
 ' Your Excellency well knows that the granting commis- 
 sions to privateers is no part of my province, nor are 
 they immediately under my control. I know too well what 
 lawless libertines they are, in all nations, and heartily 
 wish no nation countenanced them. And I believe your 
 Excellency may have heard of my inclination for bring- 
 ing them to answer for any of their base or treacherous 
 proceedings, which, as far as lays in my way, I shall 
 always give a helping hand to.' l And, sixty years later, 
 Nelson's opinion was no whit more favourable. ' I have 
 exceedingly to lament,' he wrote from the Mediterranean 
 in 1804, ' that conduct so disgraceful to the character of 
 the British nation is practised by the Gibraltar privateers 
 in these seas every day, as complaints are constantly 
 laid before me, from the government of Sardinia, of their 
 nefarious conduct, which I have transmitted to the 
 governor of Gibraltar for his interference, as naval com- 
 manders have no authority whatever over those pirates.' 
 And again : ' The conduct of all privateers is, as far as I 
 
 1 Horns Office Eecords (Admiralty), No. 77 ; 12 Sept. 1740. 
 
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 199 
 
 have seen, so near piracy that I only wonder any civilised 
 nation can allow them.' ' 
 
 "When, therefore, it is urged, as is frequently done, 
 that the Declaration of Paris ought to be cancelled, it is 
 well that those who so urge should be reminded that, in 
 the old days of privateering, whilst Liverpool or Bristol 
 was rapidly growing rich at the expense of his Majesty's 
 enemies, as Dartmouth or Poole had done centuries 
 before, every naval officer, and more especially every 
 naval officer in high position, considered the system 
 a disgrace to civilisation, and the men who worked 
 it as scarcely better than pirates. It is impossible 
 to say how much of this was real hatred of ruffianly 
 practices, how much envy of their success, how much 
 jealousy of their independence. A naval commander is 
 necessarily a despot, even if a beneficent one, and an 
 armed ship carrying on independent war within the 
 limits of his command trenches on his prerogative, and 
 may occasionally complicate or prevent the execution of 
 his plans. One instance of this is worth relating. 
 
 On January 27, 1781, Sir George Rodney, then com- 
 manding in the West Indies, received instructions to 
 wage active war against the Dutch, and more especially 
 to seize on St. Eustatius and other settlements which 
 had been prominent in carrying on an illicit trade with 
 the Americans. This was done at once. But whilst 
 Bodney was arranging matters at St. Eustatius, the 
 Dutch governor of Demerara and Essequibo, conscious 
 of his defenceless condition, opened negotiations, as the 
 result of which his Majesty's ships Surprise and Barbuda 
 were sent to take possession of the colonies, and arrived 
 1 Nelson Despatches, vol. vi. pp. 62, 79. 
 
200 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 on 27 February. But, as the Dutch feared, they had 
 been anticipated by a squadron of privateers, which had 
 entered the river on the 24th, had seized on all the ships, 
 and, with scant courtesy, had enforced a surrender of 
 the town. They agreed that the inhabitants should 
 remain in peaceful possession of their property, but, as 
 the Dutch afterwards complained, their people went 
 on shore and took everything they liked. 
 
 ' They also,' the complaint ran, ' released all our prisoners, 
 white and black ; some of them were under the sentence of 
 death, which did put us in the greatest anxiety for our own 
 negroes, who would be glad of such an opportunity to rise 
 against the inhabitants, and which situation was represented 
 to the captains : and what made our case more dismal was 
 that all the passages up and down the river were stopped ; by 
 which we were prevented from sending any news up the river 
 to put the inhabitants at ease, which occasioned the greatest 
 uneasiness amongst the women and children, some of whom 
 were several days in the woods, and some people who were in 
 their boats were robbed of their baggage.' 
 
 Such as it was, however, the capture was effected 
 by the privateers ; the men-of-war had no share in the 
 prize-money, and but small consolation in finding out 
 that the privateers had none either, that they had no 
 commission to attack the Dutch, and that the whole be- 
 came a droit of the admiralty. 
 
 Many similar instances might easily be gathered. 
 The conduct of the privateers too frequently needed pal- 
 liation, which angry and disappointed naval officers 
 were not in any humour to give, and the very name of 
 privateer became a reproach, not only in the service but 
 in the country at large; so that, at the present day, 
 many a wealthy man would be almost more ashamed of 
 
FORTUNATUS WEIGHT. 201 
 
 having it believed that his grandfather or great-grand- 
 father made his money as a privateer, than that he had 
 made it as a smuggler or a highwayman. And yet the 
 privateers were, in their day, a most important item in 
 the naval strength of the country, with this additional 
 and especial merit, that they were most numerous and 
 strongest when the royal navy was weakest or most 
 severely taxed. Evidently the time when the king's ships 
 swept the enemy's flag from the seas was not the best for 
 private adventurers to go a-cruising ; but when the king's 
 ships could barely hold their own, the chances of rich 
 prizes were numerous and tempting. It is thus that in 
 looking for valuable services of privateers, we find them, 
 not in the periods of our national glory, not during the 
 wars of the French Eevolution, when Howe, and Hood, 
 and Nelson crushed the French navy ; not during the 
 later years of the Seven Years' War, when Hawke, and 
 Boscawen, and Saunders grandly maintained England's 
 supremacy; but during the war of American Independence, 
 or the war of the Austrian Succession, when the fortunes 
 of the navy were at a low ebb, and disgraceful courts- 
 martial, such as those on Keppel, or Palliser, or Brereton, 
 on Mathews, or Lestock, or Mostyn, or Cornelius Mitchell 
 fill a large space of our naval annals. In such times of 
 disaster and disgrace, the rough and ready work of the 
 privateers appeared more brilliant, and had a very real 
 national importance. To attempt any statistical mea- 
 surement of it would be difficult, if not impossible, but 
 some idea may be formed from the statement that on 
 2 January, 1781, thirteen days after the declaration of 
 war against Holland, 545 letters of marque passed the 
 Stamp Office. The number of ships in the country was 
 
202 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 scarcely equal to the extraordinary demand ; but the 
 curious nature of the Dutch led them to supply it ; and 
 just as in 1672 they sold gunpowder to the French, so in 
 1781 they built privateers specially for the English 
 market. 1 
 
 It is scarcely less difficult to attempt any relation of 
 the services rendered by the privateers, or of the bold 
 deeds which they frequently performed ; but of the many, 
 some few have escaped oblivion, and may be still worthy 
 of record. Here, for instance, is one. 
 
 In July 1781, the Tygress of Appledore, carrying 22 
 six-pounders, and 130 men, whilst cruising on the west 
 coast of Ireland, fell in with a Dutch 50-gun ship, escort- 
 ing two large merchantmen, who had gone north about, 
 to avoid the Channel. This 50-gun ship, under British 
 colours, chased her and overtook her. The Tygress, 
 being well within gun-shot, lay to, supposing that, 
 according to custom, a number of her men were to be 
 pressed. She found out her mistake, when the stranger, 
 hoisting the Dutch flag, ordered her to strike. She 
 refused to do so, and made sail, to try and escape. A 
 running fight thus began and continued for two hours, 
 when the Dutchman's mainmast went over the side ; and 
 the Tygress, taking up a position on her bow, plied her 
 with the six-pounders and small arms for nearly an 
 hour ; at the end of which time, having succeeded, though 
 with heavy loss, in clearing the wreck, the Dutch ship 
 got round, and beat off her enemy by the superior weight 
 of her stern guns. She was, however, in no condition 
 to pursue ; and the Tygress, leaving her helpless, went 
 to look for the two merchant ships, both of which she 
 1 Morning Herald, 3 January, 1781. 
 
FORTUNATTJS WRIGHT. 203 
 
 captured the next day. They were each of about 600 
 tons, laden with ' masts, cordage, pitch, tar, turpentine, 
 and other naval stores,' from Ostend to Cadiz. The 
 money value of the prize was the privateer's only reward. 
 Had the Tygress belonged to the navy, had a king's ship 
 of her force beaten off a 50-gun ship and taken two large 
 prizes from under her convoy, the commander would 
 have been posted, and his distinguished services blazoned 
 in our naval records. Being as it was, we can say no 
 more than that his name was Thomas Hall. 
 
 The same might be said of Captain Devereux, com- 
 manding the Drawblood, of Milford, mounting twelve 
 guns, which on 6 March, 1781, off Cape Clear, captured 
 a Dutch privateer, carrying eighteen 9 -pounders and one 
 hundred men. Dutchmen do not yield readily, and it 
 took three hours' hard fighting and the killing or wound- 
 ing of sixty men, before this ship hauled down her 
 colours. She proved to be of 700 tons burden, laden, 
 as the others, with naval stores. The Drawblood had 
 eleven killed and sixteen wounded — a loss on both sides 
 which compares with or exceeds that of any single action 
 of the war, if we except that of the Serapis and Bon- 
 homme Bichard, which neither English nor Americans 
 are disposed to consider a single action, and in which, 
 at any rate, the ships were of immensely greater force. 1 
 
 Scarcely less notable was the capture on 16 April, 
 1780, of a Spanish sloop of war by the privateer Ellen, 
 apparently of Liverpool, commanded by Captain Borrow- 
 dale. The Ellen, which mounted eighteen light 6- 
 pounders, and had on board sixty-four men, all told — 
 of whom many, including a Captain Blundell of the 79th 
 1 See post, Chap. XI. 
 
204 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 regiment, were passengers — was making a passage to 
 the West Indies, under orders of urgent haste. Her 
 small complement shows that she had no aggressive 
 intentions ; but, when overhauled by the Spaniard, she 
 prepared to defend herself. She shortened sail, and — 
 to prevent the enemy opening fire at long range, and 
 thus getting the advantage of a presumably heavier ar- 
 mament — hoisted American colours. At the same time 
 her guns were double-loaded with round shot and grape ; 
 and Borrowdale, encouraging his men, ' recommended 
 to them a cool and determined courage, entreated them 
 to fire quick, to take" good aim, and to fight the ship to 
 the last extremity.' We seem almost to have before us 
 the old sea-dog described by Captain Marryat : — 
 
 The Captain stood on the carronade : ' First Lieutenant,' 
 
 says he, 
 ' Send all my merry men aft here, for they must list to me ; 
 I haven't the gift of the gab, my sons — because I'm bred 
 
 to the sea ; 
 That ship there is a Spaniard, who means to fight with we ; 
 That ship there is a Spaniard, and if we don't take she, 
 'Tis a thousand bullets to one, that she will capture we.' ' 
 
 And so, as the Spaniard ranged up alongside to wind- 
 ward, he hauled down the American colours, hoisted the 
 English, and poured into her his whole broadside, with 
 a volley of musketry. The astonished and entirely dis- 
 abled Spaniard fell to leeward and received the Ellen's 
 other broadside in the same fashion, after which she put 
 
 1 The verses, which I have here adapted, occur in Snarley-yow. It 
 is curious to find a writer, with Marryat's intimate knowledge of sea- 
 affairs, speaking of carronades in the time of William III. They were 
 first ordered for use in the navy in 1779. The Ellen had not any ; but, 
 in 1780, she might have had, if her owners had chosen. 
 
FOKTUNATUS WEIGHT. 205 
 
 before the wind and endeavoured to make off. But the 
 privateer held on to her advantage, and after a running 
 fight of an hour and a half the Santa Anna, a commis- 
 sioned sloop of sixteen guns — heavy 6-pounders — ex- 
 clusive of swivels, and 104 men, hauled down her colours, 
 and accompanied the Ellen to Jamaica. 
 
 I give these as instances of our privateers doing good 
 and valiant services as men-of-war. Their capability of 
 annoying or distressing the enemy in the special way 
 for which they were licensed, has never been doubted ; 
 but, when put into figures, it appears that from the 
 commencement of the war with France, in July 1778, 
 to the following May — that is to say, in a period of ten 
 months — the value of the prizes taken by Liverpool ships 
 alone amounted to 1,025,600Z., of which 170.000Z. is 
 assigned to the Knight, and 75,000Z. to the Ellen, pre- 
 sumably the same whose gallant action the next year I 
 have just related. But the list to which I here refer 
 ends before the beginning of the war with Spain, the 
 country which had always furnished the richest prizes. 
 War was declared on 16 June ; and on 23 October, almost 
 before the Grand Fleet of England, under an incompetent 
 administration, had done sheltering itself behind the 
 shoals of Spithead from the combined fleet of France 
 and Spain, two privateers, the Amazon of Liverpool, and 
 Banger of Bristol, captured, off the Azores, a ship of 800 
 tons homeward bound from Manila. She carried eighteen 
 guns and a complement of 150 men ; but her defence 
 would seem to have mainly consisted in a resolute attempt 
 to escape ; for though she lost heavily, her captors had 
 only one man killed. This was a prize worth having. 
 ' She was deeply laden with gold, silver, silk, coffee, china, 
 
206 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 cochineal, and indigo, and also great private adventures 
 which were not registered. The value of the whole was 
 supposed to exceed 300,000L' 
 
 Here is part of the bill of lading of another, a ship 
 of 700 tons, from the South Seas, captured about the 
 same time by the Shark of London and Sprightly of 
 Guernsey : 3 chests of doubloons, 47 chests of silver, 
 200,000 dollars, 1 chest of white silver, 270 marks, 9 
 small chests of gold, 400 tons of cocoa, 15 bales of fur, 
 150 tons of bar copper, and many other things. 
 
 No such prizes at this time fell to the lot of the royal 
 navy; nor indeed, considering the small numbers 
 amongst which they were divided, have such prizes often 
 been taken. But my object here is not so much to 
 tantalise our seamen with these golden memories of the 
 past, or to make them regret that their lot is cast in an 
 age of iron and of international forbearance ; it is rather 
 to speak of the privateers as an effective constituent of 
 England's naval power, such as they certainly were, not- 
 withstanding the many abuses to which the system was 
 liable. In doing so, it would be easy to gather together 
 a number of isolated examples ; of names which, being 
 nothing more than names, would convey little meaning 
 and excite little interest. I prefer rather to dwell on the 
 careers of two men, whom superior merit distinguished 
 above all others, and of whose services romance or history, 
 or the dusty records in Fetter Lane, have preserved some 
 of the details. 
 
 Fortunatus Wright lives in the pages of Smollett. 
 He is there described as ' a native of Liverpool, who, 
 though a stranger to a sea life, had, in the war of the 
 
FOETUNATUS "WRIGHT. 207 
 
 Austrian Succession, equipped a privateer, and dis- 
 tinguished himself in such a manner by his uncommon 
 vigilance and valour that if he had been indulged with a 
 command suitable to his genius he would have deserved 
 as honourable a place in the annals of the navy as 
 that which the French have bestowed upon their boasted 
 Du Guay-Trouin, Bart, and Thurot.' I doubt, however, 
 whether Smollett is entirely correct in his statements 
 regarding Wright's early life. His father, who was of 
 Cheshire origin, was a master mariner and shipowner, 
 and I have little doubt that Wright himself followed the 
 sea in his youth, probably as his father's apprentice, or 
 afterwards in command of one of his father's ships. The 
 evidence is indeed very strong that he was far from a 
 stranger to a sea life. William Hutchinson, for many 
 years dock-master at Liverpool, and who, on the title- 
 page of his ' Treatise on Practical Seamanship,' styles 
 himself as distinctively ' Mariner ' — the sort of man who, 
 in the last century, would have divided the human race 
 into seamen and landlubbers — speaks with evident pride 
 of having served under Fortunatus Wright, and fre- 
 quently refers to the practice of 'that great,' 'that 
 worthy hero,' as illustrating different points of seaman- 
 ship. He had, however, retired from the sea, and settled 
 down as a merchant and shipowner. Beyond that little 
 is known, but it is believed that he became involved in a 
 tedious and costly lawsuit on account of one of his ships 
 with letters of marque detaining a vessel in which the 
 Turkey Company had an interest. In this there is 
 possibly some confusion with a later incident, the cir- 
 cumstances of which are before us ; ' but at any rate we 
 1 See post, pp. 214-6. 
 
208 STUDIES IN NAVAX HISTORY. 
 
 may accept the statement that, consequent on this law- 
 suit, and not caring to abide another with which he was 
 threatened, he realised his property, and left Liverpool. 1 
 In June, 1742, we find him in Italy, where he got into a 
 curious, though half-comical, difficulty with the guard at 
 the gate of Lucca. It appears that there was a standing 
 order that all strangers coming into the town should 
 deliver up their pistols or other firearms. Wright, being 
 ignorant of this rule, and having but an imperfect 
 knowledge of the language, refused to comply. On this 
 the officer on duty, with much violence of voice and 
 manner, ordered out the guard of twenty men, who 
 .advanced against him with levelled muskets. Wright, 
 not to be behindhand, cocked his pistol and swore he'd 
 be the death of the foremost of them ; but then, as in 
 ancient days — 
 
 Was none who would be foremost 
 
 To lead such dire attack : 
 But those behind cried ' Forward ! ' 
 
 And those before cried ' Back ! ' 
 
 Eventually thirty more men were ordered up, and, some 
 way or other, the fifty managed to escape the threatened 
 pistol shot, to seize Mr. Wright, disarm him, and convey 
 him to the inn, where they confined him, with a guard 
 at the door, and two sentries in his bedroom. The 
 guard was, however, taken off immediately afterwards on 
 
 1 For these personal details I am indebted to the kindness of Mr. 
 Fortunatus Evelyn Wright, at present Consul for Sweden and Norway 
 at Christchurch, New Zealand. Mr. F. E. Wright, or rather his elder 
 brother, Mr. Sydney Evelyn Wright, formerly a paymaster in the Navy, 
 is the lineal representative of the hero of this chapter, as well as of 
 John Evelyn, the author of ' Sylva,' and the first treasurer of Greenwich 
 Hospital. 
 
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 209 
 
 the interposition of a Lucchese nobleman to whom he 
 had introductions, and on his giving his word not to 
 stir out ; but three days later, at four o'clock in the 
 morning, he received a message by an officer that spoke 
 English — ' That since he had been so daring as to insult 
 the Eepublic by endeavouring to enter the town by force 
 of arms, it was therefore ordered that he should forth- 
 with leave the State and never presume to enter it again 
 without particular permission; that there were post- 
 horses waiting at the door of his house, as also a guard 
 of soldiers to see him out of the territories of the 
 Eepublic' And so he was put on his way to Florence, 
 where, or at Leghorn, I fancy that he lived for the next 
 three or four years. 1 
 
 When war with France was proclaimed in March, 
 1744, the English merchants in Leghorn suffered much 
 annoyance from the French privateers that swarmed on 
 the coast ; and it seems to have been at their instigation 
 if not also, in the first instance at least, at their expense, 
 that Wright fitted out the brigantine Fame, and waged 
 a war of reprisals. 
 
 This is Mr. Hutchinson's account of it, written in 
 1777 :— 
 
 Cruising the war before last, in the employ of that great 
 but unfortunate hero, Fortunatus Wright, in the Mediter- 
 ranean Sea, where the wind blows generally either easterly or 
 westerly, that is either up or down the Straits, it was planned, 
 with either of these winds that blew, to steer up or down the 
 common channels the common course, large or before the 
 
 1 Dr. Doran's Mann and Manners, vol. i. p. 72. A fuller account of 
 this and other little known episodes in Wright's career is to be found in 
 the official correspondence of Mr. (afterwards Sir Horace) Mann, and of 
 Mr. Goldsworthy or Mr. Dick, Consuls at Leghorn. 
 
 P 
 
210 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 ■wind in the daytime without any sail set, that the enemy's 
 trading ships astern, crowding sail with this fair wind, might 
 come up in sight, or we come in sight of those ships ahead 
 that might be turning to windward ; and at sunset, if nothing 
 appeared to the officer at the masthead, we continued to run 
 five or six leagues, so far as could then be seen, before we laid 
 the ship to for the night, to prevent the ships astern coming up 
 and passing out of sight before the morning, or our passing 
 those ships that might be turning to windward ; and if nothing 
 appeared to an officer at the masthead at sunrise, we bore 
 away and steered as before. And when the wind blew across 
 the channels, that ships could sail their course either up or 
 down, then to keep the ship in a fair way ; in the daytime to 
 steer the common course, under the courses and lower stay- 
 sails, and in the night under topsails with the courses in the 
 brails, with all things as ready as possible for action, and to 
 take or leave what we might fall in with. 
 
 This manner of cruising proved successful. In the 
 ' Gentleman's Magazine,' under date 31 December, 1746, 
 we read : ' Came advice that the Fame, privateer, had 
 taken sixteen French ships in the Levant, worth 
 400,000J.' One of these, carrying twenty guns and 150 
 men, had been fitted out by the French factories on the 
 coast of Caramania, specially to put an end to Mr. 
 Wright's cruise, but was herself captured and sent into 
 Messina. An adventure, which savours strongly of fiction, 
 though it is probably enough founded on fact, is related 
 in the ' Gentleman's Magazine ' for 1757, but refers to 
 this time. 
 
 A certain Selim, an Armenian, on his passage to 
 Genoa, had, in the usual style of the eighteenth century 
 romances, been captured by Algerine corsairs, and 
 carried into slavery, from which by the aid of and in 
 company with his master's daughter, the beautiful Zaida> 
 
FOKTUNATUS WEIGHT. 211 
 
 he escaped on board a French private ship-of-war, then 
 on the coast, but ordered to cruise off Malta and capture 
 a bold Englishman called Fortunatus Wright. Ten days 
 later they sighted Malta, and at the same time a ship 
 which turned out to be the one they were looking for, 
 and which they presently engaged. Selim conducted 
 Zaida below, and stayed by her for some time ; but 
 anxious to take part in the fight he rushed on deck, was 
 the foremost to repel the English boarders, whom he 
 followed to their own ship, calling to the French to come 
 on. He was speedily overpowered and thrown below. 
 Selim's narrative continues : — 
 
 Thus I was made a prisoner, and my fair Moor left a prey 
 to all the wretchedness of despair. After several vain attempts 
 to board each other, the two ships parted ; the French steered 
 towards France, and I was carried into Malta. . . . The good 
 captain whose prisoner I was, observing my despondence, 
 ordered me to be set free, though I had killed one of his men, 
 and when I informed him, by a Maltese interpreter, of my 
 unhappy story, and my resolutions to go in quest of Zaida, he 
 gave me 100 guineas and advised me to sail for England, 
 where, though I am unhappily exiled from it, said he, you 
 will be generously treated, and will hear the fate of the French 
 privateer. 
 
 Shortly afterwards Selim got a passage to Bristol, 
 where the first thing he saw was the French vessel, 
 which had been captured by some other cruiser and sent 
 in as a prize, and a few days later discovered his lost 
 Zaida. The story on the face of it is a romance, but 
 there is in it nothing impossible or even improbable. 
 Fortunatus Wright was cruising in the neighbourhood of 
 Malta, and his whole career, so far as we know it, was a 
 succession of romances. 
 
 p 2 
 
212 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 Here is another story of the same date, which we 
 have on the authority of the first Earl of Charlemont, 
 who says it came to his knowledge during his residence 
 at Malta, about 1750, and was related to him ' by the 
 most credible eye-witnesses.' l No names are mentioned, 
 but there is scarcely room for doubt that the hero of 
 it was Fortunatus Wright. He is described by Lord 
 Charlemont as a captain, commanding an English pri- 
 vateer of some force, and ' of such skill and bravery, 
 that he reigned paramount in the Mediterranean, daily 
 sending into the port of Malta French prizes of consider- 
 able value.' In a society such as then ruled in Valetta, 
 this stirred up much angry feeling, the Austrians or 
 Piedmontese jeering the French or Spaniards, and many 
 duels took place in consequence. At length the French 
 knights, irritated beyond measure by the taunts of their 
 adversaries, and the continued success of the English 
 captain, determined to put a summary stop to both, and 
 sent urgent representations to Marseilles ; in consequence 
 of which an armed vessel, of force almost double that 
 of the Englishman, was specially equipped and sent to 
 Malta, under the command of ' an officer of the highest 
 character for courage and naval knowledge.' After being 
 duly feted by the French party he sailed out of harbour 
 to look for the Englishman, as to a certain victory. 
 Days passed by ; both parties were aglow with expecta- 
 tion, and the ramparts on the sea front were constantly 
 thronged by anxious crowds. Two ships at last appeared 
 in sight. As they came nearer it was seen that the one 
 was towing the other ; that the one was the French ship 
 
 1 Memoirs of James Caulfield Earl of Charlemont, by Francis 
 Hardy, vol. i. pp. 47 et seg. 
 
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 213 
 
 for which they were looking ; that the other was much 
 shattered. They hoisted French colours, and who so 
 jubilant as the French knights ! Amid exulting cheers 
 they turned into the harbour, between St. Elmo and 
 Eicasoli. All Valetta, Senglea, and II Borgo were called 
 to witness the triumph of the French ; when — cruel 
 disappointment ! — the white flag suddenly disappeared, 
 giving place to the victorious flag of England. The 
 Marseilles ship was a prize to the English privateer. 
 
 Hutchinson relates an experience of his own in 1747, 
 but does not state whether he was then in the Fame 
 with Fortunatus Wright. From the tone of his book 
 generally, my impression is that he was, and was officer 
 of the watch at the time ; but he may have been in 
 independent command. He says : 
 
 Cruising in the Mediterranean with the prisoners of three 
 French prizes on board, at their entire liberty upon deck, 
 apprehending no danger from them, upon an occasion I 
 imprudently ordered all our sails to be clued up, and all our 
 people upon deck to go up and hand them with all possible 
 expedition. One of our French captains thought to avail 
 himself of the advantage of our people being mostly aloft. I 
 providentially, however, perceived he was going to give the 
 alarm for his people to rise and take the ship ; and putting 
 my hand in my pocket, took hold of my pocket pistol, and ran 
 close up to him, and told him coolly that he should be the 
 first that should die by the attempt, which stopped his pro- 
 ceeding, and I calmly ordered our people to come down as 
 fast as passible ; which they did. 
 
 Meantime Wright, with a genius peculiarly his own, 
 was becoming the focus of a series of international dis- 
 putes, in themselves not uninteresting. On 19 Decem- 
 ber, 1746, the Fame seized a French barque, on her 
 
214 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 way from Marseilles to Naples, carrying the servants and 
 equipage of the Prince of Campo Florida, and furnished 
 with a pass from the King of England. About the 
 prince's goods and chattels there was no dispute, but the 
 vessel's name was not mentioned in the pass, and she 
 was accordingly sent in. The British consul was aghast 
 at the insult, as he chose to call it, offered to his 
 Majesty's pass ; and wrote a very strong letter to Wright, 
 who was not in the Fame at the time, urging on him 
 that the French ship must be set at liberty. This 
 Wright would not admit ; but afterwards, on the repre- 
 sentation of the minister, he consented to refer the 
 matter to the naval commander-in-chief, who directed 
 him to release his prize. 1 A more serious affair happened 
 very shortly afterwards. 
 
 Early in 1747 complaints were made by the Ottoman 
 Porte that Turkish property on board French ships had 
 been seized by English privateers, and especially by 
 Captain Fortunatus Wright in the Fame. The matter 
 was referred to Mr. Goldsworthy, the English consul at 
 Leghorn, with instructions to inquire into it ; and, calling 
 on Captain Wright for an explanation, he received a 
 reply which was far from satisfactory to the Turkish 
 merchants. The two ships named, he wrote, ' had each 
 of them a French pass, and both of them belonged to 
 Marseilles. They also hoisted French colours and struck 
 them to me ; nay, the latter engaged me for a consider- 
 able time under these colours. For these reasons I 
 brought them to Leghorn, and have had them legally 
 condemned in the admiralty court, by virtue of which 
 
 1 Goldsworthy to Duke of Newcastle, 26 December, 1746 ; 2, 9, 23 
 January, 1747. 
 
FOKTUNATUS WEIGHT. 215- 
 
 sentence I have disposed of them and distributed the 
 money.' ' 
 
 The Turkey Company had, however, sufficient interest 
 to enable them to procure an order that Turkish property 
 on board even French vessels was not prize; and in- 
 structions to that effect were sent out both to the 
 privateers and admiralty courts in the Mediterranean. 
 These additional instructions were dated 30 March, 
 1747. Wright positively refused to allow them, in his 
 case, to be retrospective ; and having got the money, 
 he had, above all other claims, the very strong one of 
 actual possession. As he would not give it up, an order 
 came out from home to have him arrested and sent to 
 England. The Tuscan government readily lent their aid, 
 and clapped him into prison, but there their assistance 
 ended. They would not give him up to Mr. Goldsworthy, 
 who vainly urged that, as captain of an English private 
 ship, he was subject to consular jurisdiction ; and so 
 poor Wright was kept in the fortress of Leghorn for 
 about six months, when orders came from Vienna to 
 hand him over to Goldsworthy, who, whilst waiting for 
 an opportunity to send him to England, received orders 
 to set him at liberty, ' as he has now given bail in the 
 High Court of Admiralty to answer the action commenced 
 against him.' 
 
 The action, however, seems to have run on to great 
 length. The special ground of it was the seizure of 
 Turkish property on board a French ship, Hermione, 
 ca.ptured by the Fame on 26 February, 1747, the pro- 
 ceeds from which Wright refused to disgorge. He was 
 
 1 Goldsworthy to the Deputy-Governor of the Turkey Company, 
 20 February, 1747. 
 
216 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 arrested on 11 December, 1747 ; was set at liberty on or 
 about 10 June, 1748 ; but in June, 1749, the suit was 
 still pending ; and Wright, in a letter to Goldsworthy, 
 dated 4 June, after a long statement of his case, con- 
 cludes in no ignoble manner : 
 
 The cargo was all sold at public auction, for which I have 
 proper vouchers ; therefore I am surprised at the manner the 
 Turkey Company have represented this affair, or that they 
 should trouble his Grace, after they have prosecuted me, after 
 they had caused me to be confined near six months at their 
 instance, and have since found their libel totally rejected, 
 and that I am acquitted from the charge. They attacked me 
 at law : to that law I must appeal ; if I have acted contrary 
 to it, to it I must be responsible ; for I do not apprehend I 
 am so to any agent of the Grand Signior, to the Grand Signior 
 himself, or to any other power, seeing I am an Englishman 
 and acted under a commission from my prince. 
 
 The body of this letter is in a clerk's writing ; the 
 subscription and signature only are by Wright ; but these 
 are sufficient to show that he wrote like a gentleman of 
 culture and education. The hand is not of a commercial 
 character, still less is it the hand of a rude seaman, more 
 familiar with the marling-spike than the pen. 
 
 A year later the correspondence about the Hermione 
 was still going on, with, as far as Wright was concerned, 
 no results. Whether it died out from exhaustion or 
 whether it merged in some diplomatic settlement with 
 the Porte, I do not know ; but it seems quite certain that 
 Wright did not pay. It would, however, appear that the 
 statement — to which I have referred — that the Fame's 
 prizes in 1746 were valued at 400,000L, was a gross 
 exaggeration. Wright was owner as well as captain of 
 the brigantine, and her ship's company must have been 
 
FORTUNATUS WEIGHT. 217 
 
 small ; his share of such a sum would havp '-ondered him 
 wealthy ; but he does not come before us in the after 
 years as a wealthy man. In 1750 he was engaged with 
 Hutchinson, the ' Mariner,' in buying and fitting out as 
 a merchant ship the old 20-gun ship Lowestoft ; and, 
 as she made sundry trading voyages to the West Indies 
 and to the Mediterranean, it would seem that Wright was 
 settling down into a man of business at Leghorn, where 
 he resided with his wife and family, though I am unable 
 to say what degree of truth, if any, there is in his alleged 
 statement to Selim, that he was ' unhappily exiled ' from 
 England. 
 
 When the troubled relations between France and 
 England, in 1755 and early in 1756, foretold a speedy 
 renewal of war, Wright prepared at once to take his part, 
 and set about building a small vessel at Leghorn. But 
 the interests and policy of Tuscany, closely bound up 
 with those of Austria, were this time linked to those 
 of France, and the neutrality professed by the Tuscan 
 Government was in reality a very thinly- veiled partiality. 
 On the declaration of war they at once took measures to 
 prevent the English ships in port increasing their crews 
 or armament, whether with a view to going a-privateering, 
 or merely in order the better to defend themselves from 
 attack. Wright's character was well known ; the desti- 
 nation of his little vessel, the St. George, more than 
 suspected ; and precautions were thus, as a matter of 
 course, taken to prevent her equipment for purposes of 
 war. Captain Wright, therefore, with assumed candour, 
 applied to the authorities to know what force he might 
 take on board to leave the port as a merchant ship, and, 
 after some consultation, this was fixed at four small guns 
 
218 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 and 25 men. The government took every precaution to 
 ensure this limit not being exceeded ; and Wright, in, as 
 we must suppose, a spirit of fun, urged them to have 
 guard boats rowing round him, to make more certain. 
 Finally, as he took leave of the governor, he asked him 
 if he was satisfied that he had complied with the limitation, 
 and obtained from him a certificate to that effect. 
 
 And so he sailed out of port on 28 July, 1756 ; but 
 with him also sailed four richly laden merchant ships, 
 homeward bound to England, which, amongst other 
 valuable things, carried an efficient armament and ship's 
 company for the St. George. They had scarcely gained 
 an offing, before they saw coming towards them a vessel, 
 which they made out to be a large French xebec, known 
 to be cruising in the neighbourhood. The guns and men 
 were hastily sent on board the St. George, which then, 
 though still very inferior to the xebec, stood towards her. 
 The xebec, on her part, came on, expecting an easy victory. 
 It is said, in the ' Gentleman's Magazine,' that she had 
 been fitted out by the merchants of Marseilles with the 
 special object of destroying Wright, whose exploits in the 
 last war still rankled in their memory ; it is certain that 
 she had been waiting for him for some time ; that her 
 captain had asked in Leghorn, ' Pray, when does Wright 
 intend to come out ? He has already made me lose too 
 much time ; ' that he was well informed of the very small 
 force of the St. George, and counted on securing the 
 whole five, without much difficulty. He caught a Tartar. 
 The St. George had still no more than twelve guns, 
 including the four of very small calibre with which she 
 left Leghorn ; and her crew, got together in this way, at 
 the last moment, numbered only seventy-five, of which 
 
FOKTUNATUS WRIGHT. 219 
 
 the additional fifty were men of all nations — Slavonians, 
 Venetians, Swiss, Italians, and a few English. The xebec 
 was of at least double the force, and had her crew pre- 
 sumably in efficient order ; the more astonishing, therefore, 
 the merit of Captain Wright, who plied his guns with 
 such vigour, that the enemy attempted to carry him by 
 boarding, but was repulsed with great slaughter, and 
 finally took to flight, so badly treated that it was doubtful 
 whether she would be able to get to port. Wright pur- 
 sued her for some little way ; but seeing another French 
 ship making towards his convoy, he returned to cover 
 them, signalling to them to return to Leghorn, where he 
 also anchored the next morning. 
 
 He had scarcely done so, when he was ordered by the 
 governor to bring his vessel within the Mole, under pain 
 of being brought in by force. As holding a commission 
 from the King of England, he refused ; and two snows ' 
 were ordered to anchor alongside him, to take charge of 
 him. The masters of the English ships in the Mole 
 offered to haul out, and make common cause with Captain 
 Wright ; who, however, preferred putting the thing into 
 Mann's hands. Mann immediately demanded redress 
 from the regency. They would not give it ; they com- 
 plained that Wright had deceived them ; had gone out 
 with more men and arms than he had shown to the 
 examining officers ; had violated the neutrality of the 
 port ; had made an improper use of the emperor's colours, 
 and had repeatedly disobeyed their orders to come within 
 the Mole. Mann's position, in reply, was that he had 
 
 1 Of vessels which in the last century were peculiar to the Mediter- 
 ranean, a snow differed but slightly from a brig ; a xebec had lateen sails 
 on three masts ; a tartan had only one mast, also with a lateen sail. 
 
220 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 not deceived them : that the men and arms went out of 
 Leghorn on board other ships ; that the engagement was 
 twelve miles outside ; that the Frenchman was the aggres- 
 sor ; and that as to their orders, they had no business to 
 give them ; that Wright, before sailing was within their 
 jurisdiction; that he had then complied with their in- 
 structions, and that he held a certificate to that effect 
 from the governor; but that after sailing under the 
 English flag and now bearing the king's commission, he 
 owed no obedience to the authorities of Leghorn, and 
 that their action was a gross injustice and a breach of 
 neutrality. 
 
 And so the affair was argued for a couple of months, 
 and might have been argued for many more, had not 
 Sir Edward Hawke, the naval commander-in-chief, who 
 had just been sent out to supersede the Hon. John Byng, 
 explained his view of the matter. As soon as it came to 
 his knowledge, he sent Sir William Burnaby in the Jersey 
 of 60 guns, with the 50-gun ship Isis, to convoy what 
 merchant ships were waiting, and to bring the St. George 
 away, maugre the captain of the port, the governor of 
 Leghorn, the regency, or the emperor himself. The 
 governor protested ; but Sir William put it, without un- 
 due periphrasis, ' that his orders were to take Captain 
 Wright away under his protection; and in case either 
 the barks or the forts fired, he would be sorry to see 
 himself under the indispensable necessity of returning 
 shot for shot.' The governor preferred dealing with the 
 men of the pen, and sought comfort from Mr. Dick, the 
 consul, who, however, had none to give him, and told him 
 ' he had heard Sir William Burnaby say he would take 
 her away.' ' Well then,' said the governor piteously, 
 
FORTUNATUS WEIGHT. 221 
 
 ' there's an end of it ; what can we do ? the French will 
 see it's not our fault.' And so on 23 September, the 
 Jersey and Isis departed, the St. George accompanying 
 them, and sixteen rich merchant ships, homeward bound. 
 Wright, being thus at liberty, after a short and fairly 
 successful cruise, put into Malta, where, however, the 
 partiality for the French was as dominant as at Leghorn. 
 The English ships in the harbour were kept in the closest 
 seclusion. ' Our ships, persons, and colours,' wrote one 
 of the sufferers, ' ' are treated with the utmost scandal, 
 shame, and indignity, even to the highest degree, and 
 with such cruel severity that it is almost impossible for 
 anybody to believe it that have not been eye-witnesses 
 of it. . . . Captain Fortunatus Wright, of the St. George 
 privateer, has been used here in a most barbarous manner.' 
 Barbarous is the writer's way of saying arbitrary, or un- 
 friendly. Unfriendly, for he was not allowed to buy 
 slops and bedding for his men, of which he was sorely in 
 need. Arbitrary, for having received on board a number 
 of English seamen, put ashore there from ships taken by 
 French privateers, he was ordered to land them again. 
 He refused to do so ; he would be unworthy the commis- 
 sion he had the honour to bear if he delivered up British 
 subjects who had taken refuge under the British flag; 
 whereupon a galley royal came and lay alongside him. 
 Her captain told Wright his orders were to sink him, if 
 he offered to stir an anchor, and, if he made any resist- 
 ance, ' to board him and cut every soul to pieces.' So 
 the men were forcibly taken out of the ship and landed, to 
 wait for some more convenient season ; and the St. George, 
 
 1 Captain Robert Miller of the ship Lark at Malta, to Consul Dick at 
 Leghorn, 3 November, 1756. 
 
222 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 without the stores she was in want of, put to sea oh 
 22 October. 
 
 ' The large French privateer,' wrote Mr. Miller, ' of thirty- 
 eight guns, and upwards of 300 men, commanded by Captain 
 Arnoux, was in this port at the same time, and sailed just 
 twenty-four hours after Wright, to take him, as Wright still 
 was in sight of the port. But when the great beast of a 
 French privateer came out, Wright played with him, by 
 sailing round him and viewing him, &c, just to aggravate 
 him, as Wright sailed twice as fast as him ; and indeed she 
 is a prodigious dull sailer for a privateer, and very crank.' 
 
 And beyond the fact that he cruised for some months, 
 and made many prizes, we know little more. On 22 
 January, 1757,. Mann wrote to Mr. Pitt that the regency 
 had been lamenting the decay of the Leghorn trade ; 
 that he had pointed out that their gross partiality, and 
 their violent action in the matter of Fortunatus Wright, 
 were two of the causes of this decay; that, yielding 
 to these representations, they had assured him of their 
 intention to observe a strict neutrality ; and that, on 
 the strength of this, he had written to Captain Wright, 
 ' that he might send aU the French prizes he had made 
 to Leghorn, as, at my request, he had kept them in 
 deposit till he should hear from me that he might do it 
 with safety.' But in two months' time he had to write : — 
 
 ' The council sent a gentleman belonging to the Secre- 
 tary's office to me, earnestly to desire that, in order to avoid 
 any further inconveniences with regard to him, I would order 
 Captain Wright to keep at such a distance from the port as 
 would not oblige the government to take any notice of his 
 being there. . . . Finding that they thought themselves tied 
 up by the orders they received lately from Vienna with regard 
 to Captain Wright, I thought it my duty, purely for the sake 
 of avoiding any new disputes, to write to the consul in the 
 
FORTUNATUS WRIGHT. 223 
 
 manner they desired. The estafette was immediately sent 
 back to Leghorn with my letter, in order that, as soon as 
 Captain Wright's vessel appears in sight of the port, a bark 
 may be sent off to him, with the consul's directions not to 
 enter into the harbour.' 
 
 The end is sad enough, not only as telling the fate of 
 a man whose whole career is more romantic than any 
 romance, but as telling of the low ebb to which, for the 
 moment, the incompetence of the government and the 
 misconduct of the commander-in-chief had reduced the 
 English power and the English prestige in the Mediter- 
 ranean. Under date 2 July, 1757, Mann wrote : — 
 
 'The trade of Leghorn, upon which the wealth of this 
 whole state chiefly depends, is reduced to the lowest ebb, 
 insomuch that the arrival in that port of a single prize a few 
 days ago was looked upon as an object of such importance and 
 exaggerated by the Italians in terms that sufficiently showed 
 that they are npw convinced how much their welfare depends 
 upon the navigation of the English merchant ships not being 
 interrupted. The French have many tartans disguised, but 
 well armed, that cruise between Leghorn and Porto Perrajo, 
 ready on all occasions to intercept such as are of no force, at 
 the [same] time that they can run near the shore when a ship 
 of any strength appears. A few stout privateers, as in the 
 last war, would totally prevent this, and they would enrich 
 themselves by the French vessels from Marseilles that would 
 fall into their hands. Captain Wright, of the St. George 
 privateer, did great service of this kind in the beginning of 
 the war ; but it is feared by some circumstances, and by his 
 not having been heard of for some months, that he foundered 
 at sea. Several prizes made by him have lain some months 
 at Cagliari in Sardinia, waiting for an opportunity to get with 
 safety to Leghorn.' 
 
 There would seem to be no doubt that Fortunatus 
 Wright perished in the way here suggested— a man of 
 
224 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 whom history has said but little; of whom, judging 
 from what I have been able to recover after this lapse of 
 time, it might have said a good deal. But the narration 
 I have given, though wanting in many details, is still 
 sufficient to explain the fact, recorded in the 'Gentle- 
 man's Magazine,' that the French government, and the 
 merchants of Marseilles, or the echelles of the Levant, 
 offered large rewards for his capture ; and the more 
 certain fact that, at the request of the English mer- 
 chants at Leghorn, he was specially commended to the 
 home government by Mr. Mann. Of his more purely 
 personal history, what I have been able to collect amounts 
 to very little. I have already said that during these last 
 years he lived at Leghorn with his wife and family; 
 that his handwriting is that of a man of education ; 
 and that when he first appeared at Lucca, in 1742, he 
 was travelling as a gentleman of means, with a private 
 servant, and letters of introduction to a Lucchese noble- 
 man. We might thus confidently assume that he was a 
 man of good social position, even if we did not know that 
 his daughter Philippa married Charles, the grandson of 
 John Evelyn of Wotton, whose daughter Susanna in due 
 time married John Ellworthy Eortunatus Wright, her 
 first cousin once removed. This John Ellworthy served 
 as a lieutenant in the navy during the war of American 
 Independence, and retired after the peace of 1783. He 
 was accidentally killed in 1798 at Liverpool, where he 
 was master of St. George's Dock, and where some of his 
 descendants still reside. Others, of an elder branch, 
 emigrated several years ago to New Zealand, where — as 
 I understand — there is no present likelihood of the race 
 becoming extinct. 
 
225 
 
 CHAPTEE VII. 
 
 PBIVATEEBS AND PBIVATEEBING. 
 
 II. GEORGE WALKER. 1 
 
 In the last chapter I related the career of Fortunatus 
 Wright, a man who, though captain only of a privateer, 
 did, in a time of very great abasement, nobly support 
 the honour of the English flag in the Mediterranean. 
 I propose now to speak of another whose name may well 
 be paired with his — a man who resembled him alike in 
 bravery, in success, in misfortune. His history, written 
 by one of his followers, but modestly curtailed of almost 
 all personal matter by himself, has come down to us. 2 
 The book is scarce, and very little known ; but even in 
 its condensed and abridged form, the narrative is one 
 which, from the quaint simplicity of its style, the life- 
 like character of its portraits, the rollicking, reckless 
 nature of the adventures it describes, may compare not 
 unfavourably with some of the most admired romances 
 of Defoe. And I have every confidence in its truth. I 
 have tested it in many particulars, and have convinced 
 myself of the author's perfect honesty. Even the slight 
 
 1 Frazer's Magazine, November, 1881. 
 
 2 The Voyages and Cruises of Commodore Walker during the late 
 Spanish and French Wars. 12mo. Dublin: 1762. 
 
 Q 
 
226 STUDIES IN NAVAX HISTORY. 
 
 mistakes are evidence of it : they are mistakes, perhaps 
 of mere carelessness, perhaps of imperfect recollection, 
 very different from the class of mistakes which a clever 
 forger would have made. I have thus felt authorised to 
 trust to the guidance of this nameless writer, checking 
 his narrative by reference to other accounts to which I 
 have had access, but to which he certainly had not, and 
 in every case with satisfaction and approval. 
 
 As to when, or where, or of what parentage George 
 Walker was born, I have been unable to gain any infor- 
 mation. But indirectly I am led to suppose that he was 
 a Londoner, and of respectable, probably commercial, 
 family. At an early age he entered the Dutch navy, 
 and served in it in several actions against the Turks — 
 actions of which history takes no notice, and which we 
 may presume to have been really against corsairs in the 
 Levant, whilst cruising for the protection of trade. Later 
 on, he returned to England, and having acquired or 
 inherited sufficient money to purchase a merchant ship, 
 commanded her himself for some years. 
 
 When the war which followed the stupid excitement 
 about Jenkins's ear broke out in 1739, he was principal 
 owner and commander of the ship Duke William, trading 
 from London to South Carolina, and in order the better 
 to prepare for defence, or to be ready for whatever might 
 turn up, but with no immediate intention of cruising, he 
 took out letters of marque. His ship mounted twenty 
 guns, but had only thirty-two men ; the object of her 
 voyage being, in the first place, simply trade. 
 
 On arriving at his destination, he found that the 
 coast of the Carolinas was infested by two Spanish 
 jprivateers; and, in the absence of any man-of-war, 
 
GEORGE "WALKER. 227 
 
 offered his ship to the colonial government. The offer 
 was accepted, the men put on wages as in the king's 
 ships, and their number increased to 130. Several 
 gentlemen of the country entered as volunteers, and 
 Walker, in command, cleared the coast without diffi- 
 culty. He took and destroyed a fortified depot which 
 the Spaniards had established on one of the small islands 
 adjacent, and convinced them that their continued cruis- 
 ing in that neighbourhood would be more dangerous than 
 they had expected. Towards the end of 1742 he sailed 
 for England, having three merchantmen in convoy ; but 
 in a tremendous gale in December, whilst still 200 leagues 
 westward of the Scilly Islands, the convoy having been 
 scattered, the Duke William sprang a most serious leak 
 — a number of most serious leaks, and was with great 
 difficulty, and by incessant pumping, kept afloat, until, 
 just at the last extremity, one of her convoy came in 
 sight. The utterly exhausted crew were taken on board 
 her, their ship sinking directly afterwards. The change 
 was, however, but little for the better, and their new 
 ship was able to keep afloat only by the aid of the ad- 
 ditional hands at the pumps ; and so with much dis- 
 comfort and great danger they made the land ; when, 
 on his arrival in town, Mr. Walker found that, by some 
 mistake, the insurance of the Duke William had been 
 allowed to run out about two months before she 
 foundered. 
 
 His fortune was thus at a low ebb, and for the next 
 year he served as master of a vessel trading to the Baltic, 
 till, in the autumn of 1744 — war having been declared 
 against France in the previous spring — he was offered 
 the command of the Mars, a private ship of war of 26 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 guns and 130 men, to cruise in consort with another — 
 the Boscawen, a larger ship belonging to the same owners. 
 The two sailed from Dartmouth in November, and within 
 a couple of days fell in with a French frigate of 26 guns and 
 270 men of force — that is, about equal to the Boscawen. 
 This ship, however, was unfortunate in her captain : the 
 Mars attacked the Frenchman, but was left unsupported, 
 so that after a smart action she was beaten to a stand- 
 still ; and the enemy, also roughly handled, was able to 
 get away before the captain of the Boscawen could make 
 up his mind to prevent him. 
 
 A few weeks later, one wild, rainy night in the begin- 
 ning of January, they came suddenly upon two large 
 ships. So dark was it, that they did not sight them 
 until close to them ; when, by the voices and language, 
 they knew them to be French, and, by their state of 
 confusion and dismay, judged them to be rich Martinico- 
 men, homeward bound. Now two rich Martinico-men 
 would agree wondrous well with two hungry privateers, 
 who accordingly hung on to them all night, waiting for 
 day to make their attack. When day broke, however, 
 they discovered them to be two ships of war, one of 
 74, the other of 64 guns. The Boscawen, being on the 
 weather quarter, and having a captain gifted with a 
 large share of prudence, immediately hauled her wind 
 and made off ; the Mars, being to leeward, was unable to 
 do so ; and going free had little chance of escaping two 
 large vessels. The officers of the Mars thought that if the 
 Boscawen had joined them, and the two ships had kept 
 together, the Frenchmen would not have meddled'with 
 them, being anxious to get into Brest without any avoid- 
 able delay ; but seeing the Mars by herself they could 
 
GEORGE WALKER. 229 
 
 not resist the temptation of picking up an easy prize. 
 A signal was made from the other for the 64-gun ship 
 to chase, which she did, and rapidly gained on the 
 Mars. On this, Captain Walker, addressing himself to 
 his officers and ship's company, said : — 
 
 ' Gentlemen, I do not mean to be so rash as to attempt a 
 regular engagement with so superior a force. All I ask of 
 you is to confide in me and my orders, to get away if pos- 
 sible without striking ; and be assured I shall employ your 
 assistance neither in revenge, or vainglory, or longer than I 
 think it of use to our design. The ship which pursues us is 
 certainly the best sailer of the enemy, by being ordered to 
 the chase ; if by good fortune we bring down a topmast or 
 yard, or hurt her rigging, so as to retard her pursuit, we 
 may entirely get clear.' 
 
 So, with colours flying, and firing from time to time 
 what guns would bear, the Mars kept ahead of the 
 64-gun ship, which, however, continued to gain, though 
 but slowly. The 74 too, began to come up, but it was 
 two hours before they had so far advanced as to bring 
 their broadsides to bear; when, as they ran out their 
 lower tier, Walker ordered the colours to be struck, and 
 considering that he surrendered to the ship whose first 
 pursuit had embarrassed him, he went on board the 
 smaller of the two. This was the Fleuron, 1 with her 
 consort, the Neptune, homeward bound from the West 
 Indies, carrying an enormous treasure in specie, French 
 and Spanish combined, amounting, it is said, to near 
 four millions sterling, and with their ships' companies 
 almost disorganised by sickness. The captain of the 
 
 1 Undoubtedly Fleuron ; but by some mistake, which I cannot ex- 
 plain, the narrative calls her Florissant. 
 
1*30 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 Fleuron received Mr. Walker and his officers with no 
 more politeness than any captain of a ship of war would 
 have shown to a privateer. 
 
 ' How dare you,' he said, ' in so small a ship, fire 
 against a force like me ? ' 
 
 'If you will look at my commission,' answered 
 Walker, ' you will find I had as good a right to fight as 
 you ; and if my force had not been so inferior, I had 
 shown you more civil treatment on board my ship. 
 
 ' How many of your men have I killed ? ' asked the 
 Frenchman. 
 
 ' None at all, sir,' was the reply. 
 
 ' Then sir,' he continued, ' you have killed six of 
 mine, and wounded several. You fired pieces of glass.' 
 
 This Walker denied, but to little purpose ; and he 
 and his officers were, rudely and uncomfortably enough, 
 penned between two guns on the main deck. The 
 question of the broken glass was, however, inquired into, 
 when it appeared that what had been reported as bits 
 of glass were in reality bits of silver money ; and that 
 an Irishman had rammed a pocketful of shillings and 
 halfcrowns into the last gun that was fired, swearing 
 that if the Frenchmen wanted his money, they might 
 take it and be damned. The little joke once explained, 
 mollified the Frenchmen ; the prisoners were treated 
 with more courtesy, and in the course of the next day 
 the relations between Walker and the captain of the 
 Fleuron became almost friendly. It was thus that on 
 the third and fourth days of his imprisonment, Mr. 
 Walker had full cognisance of one of the most dis- 
 graceful incidents in the history of tbe British navy. 
 
 At daybreak on Sunday, 6 January, 1745, the two 
 
GEORGE WALKER. 231 
 
 Frenchmen, with the Mars in company, were seen and 
 chased by four English ships of the line. The Frenchmen 
 were in much alarm, for their treasure was enormous, and 
 their crews, enfeebled by pestilence, were in no condition 
 to defend it. The captain of the Fleuron spoke frankly 
 enough of their danger, telling Mr. Walker that he had 
 at the time thought it ill-judged of the commodore, under 
 the peculiar circumstances, to lose time and distance 
 over an object so paltry as the Mars ; but for that con- 
 founded chase, they would have been now well-nigh into 
 Brest. 
 
 Shortly after, as the English ships were fast gaining 
 on them, Mr. Walker was sent below ; and though per- 
 mitted from time to time, as the action did not begin, to 
 visit the deck, it was not till the following evening, when 
 the danger was over, that he was allowed full liberty. 
 What happened during these two days was briefly this : 
 One of the ships, the Captain, of 70 guns, turned aside 
 to run down and take possession of the Mars. Another, 
 the Sunderland, a 60-gun ship, carried away her main- 
 topmast, and dropped astern out of sight. The other 
 two, the Hampton Court, of 70 guns, and the Dread- 
 nought, of 60, continued the chase ; the Hampton Court 
 came up with the flying enemy, ranged alongside, but 
 waited for the Dreadnought's coming up, to engage ; but 
 the Dreadnought was a dull sailer, and could not get up ; 
 so the Hampton Court shortened sail to wait for her. 
 The same thing was repeated again and again ; till, on 
 the afternoon of the second day, the English ships gave 
 over the pursuit as useless. As a matter of course, the 
 captain of the Hampton Court was afterwards tried by 
 court-martial ; but, almost equally as a matter of course 
 
232 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 — in the then existing state of nayal discipline — he was 
 pronounced to have ' done his duty as an experienced 
 good officer and as a man of courage and conduct.' The 
 minutes of this court-martial were published at the time, 
 and excited much controversy, public opinion by no 
 means accepting the decision of the court as satisfactory. 
 When philosophic readers of history are nowadays dis- 
 posed to consider the execution of Byng, twelve years 
 later, as unjustifiable or unnecessary, they ought to re- 
 member that a number of cases such as the one I have 
 here referred to had forced the Parliament to pass a new 
 Naval Discipline Act, in 1749 ; and that, supported by 
 this, the accumulated wrath of years fell on Byng as a 
 first example ; a second was not found necessary. 
 
 But meantime the Neptune and Fleuron, with much 
 exulting and self-glorification, got safely into Brest, 
 where the officers of the Mars were landed as prisoners 
 at large. The very next day, Mr. Walker was writing to 
 his friend, the captain of the Fleuron, begging that he 
 might have back his letter of credit, which had been 
 impounded along with his other papers, when people 
 came running into the inn, crying that the Fleuron had 
 been blown up, and that all her crew had perished. 
 This was in the main true. As a first step towards 
 clearing out the ship, the gunner had sent the greater 
 part of the powder on shore, leaving, however, four 
 barrels still in the magazine, and a good deal of loose 
 powder which had been spilled in emptying back the 
 cartridges. Whilst the men were sweeping this together, 
 a glass lantern which hung in the gun-room was handed 
 down to them. The handle of it gave way ; the lantern 
 fell on the deck and was smashed. The lamp rolled. 
 
GEORGE WALKER, 233 
 
 amongst the loose powder, which acted as a train leading 
 to the four barrels. The after part of the ship was blown 
 up, and with it, the captain, the officers, and a great part 
 of the ship's company. The rest took refuge in the fore 
 part of the ship, which almost immediately burst into 
 flames and burnt with great fury. By some extra- 
 ordinary neglect the guns had been left loaded, probably 
 since the meeting with the Hampton Court, and now 
 discharged themselves in quick succession, as the fire 
 reached them. Boats from the shore were thus afraid 
 to venture to the assistance of the refugees, the most of 
 whom perished miserably ; and the wreck, having burnt to 
 the water's edge, went down, taking with it the treasure and 
 everything else on board, nothing having been discharged, 
 excepting the fatally insufficient part of the powder. 
 
 Mr. Walker's letter of credit was thus lost, and his 
 party consequently threatened with some inconvenience. 
 They were, however, able to arrange matters in a satis- 
 factory manner, and, after some pleasant adventures, 
 to negotiate an exchange, and to return to England 
 within a little more than a month; when they found 
 that the Mars had been bought in by her former owners, 
 who were fitting her out for another cruise with the 
 Boscawen. They had, however, resolved not to employ 
 again the former captain of the Boscawen ; and now 
 offered the command to Mr. Walker, and at his sugges- 
 tion appointed his late first-lieutenant to be captain of 
 the Mars. 
 
 The Boscawen had been the French frigate Medee, 
 and captured by Boscawen in the Dreadnought, almost 
 immediately on the declaration of war. She had then 
 carried twenty-six nine-pounders, and a complement of 
 
234 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 238 men ; but Walker now thought proper to increase 
 her armament to thirty guns, many of them twelve- 
 pounders, and to give her a complement of 314 men, 
 making her, of course, more powerful as a fighting ship ; 
 though, as was afterwards proved, her scantling was not 
 strong enough for the increased weight. Her equipment 
 being finished before that of the Mars, she put to sea 
 by herself on 19 April, 1745, and four days later, on the 
 edge of the Soundings, fell in with the privateer Sheer- 
 ness, mounting twenty-two guns. The next morning, 
 25 April, at daybreak, they sighted eight ships in com- 
 pany, and gave chase. The Boscawen, which sailed 
 remarkably well, left the Sheerness far behind ; and the 
 eight ships, which were French, seeing only one of the 
 enemy coming up, formed line and waited for her. 
 These were air privateers, and though on a much smaller 
 scale than the Boscawen, carried in the aggregate about 
 120 guns, most of them probably three- or four-pounders, 
 and 400 men. The largest of them was in the middle, 
 and the Boscawen receiving the fire of the sternmost 
 ones, reserved her fire till she was abreast of this, when 
 she poured in a heavy broadside. It was stoutly re- 
 turned ; five others of the French ships clustered round 
 her, raking her ahead and astern and firing into her as 
 they best could ; so that for a time the Boscawen was 
 closely pressed. But after three-quarters of an hour the 
 largest of the enemy, to which her principal efforts had 
 been devoted, drew out of the fight, hauled down her 
 colours, and presently sank. It was impossible to 
 render any assistance, for four of the others continued 
 the engagement. The fifth, the smallest of all, had 
 previously struck, and now did what she could to succour 
 
GEORGE WALKER. 235 
 
 the drowning men ; but she was only able to pick up 
 sixteen out of a complement of eighty-four. After 
 another three-quarters of an hour the Sheerness came 
 up, and the enemy, having had enough of the Boscawen, 
 waited for no further attack. Two of them had made 
 off at the beginning, and the largest was sunk ; but the 
 other five were taken possession of ; and Walker, finding 
 all the prizes, as well as his own ship, much shattered, 
 and having also some 220 prisoners, resolved to put into 
 the first port, and anchored in King's Eoad, Bristol, on 
 30 May. 
 
 Two months later he sailed again, but under cir- 
 cumstances that the superstitious nature of seamen in 
 the middle of last century rendered awkward. There 
 was an old story of the French prisoners, when the 
 Medee was captured, that the wife of a gunner had been 
 murdered on board ; and this now cropped up again, 
 when a seaman of good and sober character declared 
 that he had seen a ghost which told him the ship would 
 be lost. It was not without great difficulty that Walker 
 got his men reassured ; and even then, from time to 
 time, the old terror returned, and the cruise was not 
 successful. They met few ships, and what they did 
 meet were not prizes ; they got into trouble at Madeira, 
 where some of the men, in silly and ignorant jest, visited 
 a church and put some soot into the holy water ; and, 
 cruising from there to the northward, they got into a 
 gale of wind. 
 
 It was by this time December ; the scantling of the 
 ship was slight for her size, her planks insecurely 
 fastened with iron nails whose heads were rusted away ; 
 her guns were too heavy for her strength, and she 
 
236 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 suffered a violent shock from the fall of her main-yard, 
 the rope that supported it (strap of the jeer-block) having 
 given way. She thus leaked like a sieve ; it was impos- 
 sible to keep her dry ; it was soon deemed impossible to 
 keep her afloat. Walker consented therefore to make the 
 best of his way to the nearest port ; but the men, panic- 
 struck and mindful of the ghost, formed a design to seize 
 the boats. This was frustrated by the captain's watchful- 
 ness ; but from that time ' he never quitted the quarter- 
 deck, nor once lay down for seven days, sleeping only as he 
 stood, leaning on the barricade or rail of the quarter-deck; 
 for the men watched every motion and every word, and, 
 had he disappeared a minute, it is believed the duty of 
 the ship had stopped, the officers themselves sometimes 
 being as desponding as the men.' And thus, after 
 twelve days of extreme danger, they made St. Ives, on 
 the coast of Cornwall. Boats at once put off to their 
 assistance, and towed the ship into the bay ; but her 
 anchors had been cut away long before, and she was 
 extremely deep from the quantity of water in her hold ; 
 it was thus impossible to anchor her in the roadstead, 
 and difficult to tow her within the pier. This last they 
 attempted to do, but, with the heavy sea rolling into the 
 bay, she was thrown to leeward, and struck on the rocky 
 shore, parting asunder as she touched. The land was 
 fortunately near, and a great number of boats close at 
 hand, so, one way or another, all the men were picked 
 up, except four ; and of these, three had seen, or had 
 persuaded themselves that they had seen, the ghost. 
 Walker's ill-success did not, however, stand in the way 
 of his career ; it was known that, but for his determina- 
 tion and conduct, the loss would have been a disaster, 
 
GEORGE "WALKEE. 237 
 
 and he was presently asked to undertake a much more 
 important command. 
 
 During the summer of 1745 a number of London 
 merchants had fitted out three large privateers, which had 
 cruised in company, under the command of a Captain 
 Talbot as commodore. Their success had been enormous. 1 
 The share of each seaman amounted to 850L ; that of 
 the officers in proportion. The owners received the sum 
 of 700.000Z., which, as the rebellion in Scotland was just 
 breaking out, they offered as a loan to the government. 
 Captain Talbot's share would seem to have dulled his 
 appetite for adventure. He now joined himself to the 
 number of the owners, who resolved to fit out a still more 
 powerful squadron, the command of which they offered 
 to Captain Walker. The fame of Captain Talbot's success, 
 and Walker's reputation, 'drew together such numbers 
 of seamen to offer themselves, that near as many were 
 refused as would have manned a like number of ships, 
 though at this time there was a great scarcity of hands, 
 both in the government's and merchants' service.' 
 There was thus little delay in completing the equipment, 
 and by the end of April, the four ships, King George, 
 Prince Frederick, Duke, and Princess Amelia, styled 
 collectively, the Eoyal Family, were ready to sail from 
 Bristol. They carried in the aggregate 122 guns and 
 970 men. In going out the Prince Frederick took the 
 ground, and the others, having waited for her till 3 May 
 put to sea without her. 
 
 On the 11th they saw a large fleet to leeward, and 
 drawing nearer, made them out to be merchant ships 
 under the convoy of several ships of force, which, how- 
 
 ■ Beatson's Naval and Military Memoirs, i. 294. 
 
238 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 ever, were all to leeward of them. Walker saw his 
 opportunity and continued his course towards them. 
 They turned out to be the English outward-bound trade, 
 for Newfoundland and the West Indies, with the Milford 
 and Eye, ships of war. Walker went on board the Eye, 
 to inform the captain of the whereabouts of three French 
 men-of-war he had seen the day before ; and in course 
 of conversation pointed out that had he been a French- 
 man, or, being English, had the fleet been French, he 
 could have made any number of prizes, and brought 
 them off in spite of the convoy. ' True, sir,' answered ■ 
 the captain (his name was Craven), ' and what censure 
 would have fallen on his Majesty's officers ! And yet, 
 let me do all I can, these masters of common vessels who 
 sail better than the rest will keep to windward ; for as 
 to firing at them, I have done it till I am tired, and may 
 fire away every shot in the ship.' In this instance, 
 Walker, stretching to windward, compelled the convoy 
 to bear down under the lee of their escort ; but similar 
 misconduct was the rule of ships under convoy all 
 through last century, and was the direct cause of several 
 serious misfortunes. 
 
 The men had been engaged for eight months, and at 
 the end of that time, the Eoyal Family put into Lisbon, 
 having made prizes estimated at considerably over 
 220,000Z., without the loss of a single man. There the 
 ships refitted, and the majority of the men entered for 
 another period of eight months ; the place of those who 
 did not do so was easily filled up, and on 10 July, 1747, 
 the Eoyal Family again put to sea, being increased to 
 six by the addition of the Prince George, and of the 
 Prince Edward tender. Three days afterwards the Prince 
 
GEOBGE WALKER. 239 
 
 E dward foundered by reason of a curious accident . Being 
 in chase of a number of strange ships, and crowding sail, 
 the heel of her mainmast started out of the step ; and 
 the mast forcing its way through the ship's bottom, and 
 at the same time falling aft, sent her down immediately, 
 stern first. Her commander and two men only were 
 picked up. 
 
 After many interesting and exceedingly lucrative ad- 
 ventures, the squadron put into Lagos Bay to water, and 
 about five o'clock on the morning of 6 October, the King 
 George and Prince Frederick, having filled up, were 
 standing out of the bay, when they sighted a large ship 
 coming in towards Cape St. Vincent. The commodore 
 immediately made the signal to chase. He himself, in 
 the King George, of 32 guns and 300 men, tried to cut 
 her off from the land ; the Prince Frederick, of 26 guns 
 and 260 men, to keep to seaward of her ; the Duke and 
 Prince George, which were far to the eastward, but still 
 in sight, crowded sail after them; and a settee, acting 
 as tender to the King George, was sent in to hurry out 
 the Princess Amelia, which was still engaged in watering. 
 ' The chase,' says our narrator, ' seeing herself likely to 
 be hemmed in by the King George and Prince Frederick, 
 was obliged to bear away, making all the sail she could 
 to the westward, without doubt taking us for larger ships 
 tban we were, whilst we took her for a less than she 
 really was.' 
 
 What she really was, was the Spanish line-of-battle 
 ship Glorioso, of 70 guns and 700 men. From first to 
 last she had a strange adventurous voyage. Whilst 
 homeward bound from the Spanish main with an enor- 
 mous amount of treasure, said to be three millions, on 
 
240 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 board, she had been met near the Azores by the English 
 ships Lark of 40, and Warwick of 60 guns. The Warwick 
 attacked her manfully enough, but, being unsupported 
 by the Lark, was reduced to a wreck, her masts shot 
 away, or crippled, her rigging cut to pieces, and the 
 Glorioso pursued her way. The captain of the Lark, 
 who was the senior officer, was tried by court-martial 
 and cashiered ; but the mischief had been done. A few 
 days later, the Glorioso fell in with the Oxford of 50 guns, 
 in company with the Shoreham frigate and Falcon sloop ; 
 but these, recognising her as of superior force, left her 
 alone ; conduct for which a court-martial afterwards 
 honourably acquitted them. And so the Glorioso got 
 safely into Ferrol, where she landed her precious freight, 
 and had sailed thence for Cadiz, when, as has just been 
 said, she was sighted off Cape St. Vincent by the Eoyal 
 Family. 
 
 The ships, as already detailed, continued to chase, 
 and about noon the King George came up with her. As 
 she did so, it suddenly fell a dead calm ; and the two 
 ships lay within gunshot of each other — the Prince Fre- 
 derick being some distance to the southward, and the 
 others out of sight astern. Thus lying, the Spaniard 
 hoisted her colours, and ran out her lower tier, thereby 
 showing that she was a 70- or 74-gun ship; but there 
 was no wind to blow out her colours, or permit it to 
 be seen whether they were Spanish or Portuguese. 1 In 
 this state of uncertainty, and anxious, even if the 
 stranger was Spanish, to have the assistance of her 
 
 1 At that time both ensigns were white, with the royal arms in the 
 middle. Evidently, in a calm, it would be difficult or impossible to dis- 
 tinguish them. 
 
GEORQE WALKER. 241 
 
 consorts, the King George made no sign, but waited for 
 the chase to take the initiative. Why, on the other 
 hand, the Glorioso did not fire at the King George as at 
 a target, it is impossible to say. Her treasure having 
 been landed, she had no uneasiness on that score ; and 
 her heavy scantling and weight of metal made her, in 
 any comparison of force, superior to the whole Koyal 
 Family together. She ought assuredly to have begun 
 by sinking the King George. But she did not ; and after 
 about an hour of apparent indecision, ran in her lower 
 tier and shut her ports. 
 
 On board the King George, meantime, there was some 
 speculation as to what the stranger was ; but the general 
 opinion was that she was a moneyed ship homeward 
 bound from the West Indies ; and this was confirmed 
 when, as, about five o'clock, a light breeze sprang up 
 from the northward, she again put her head to the east. 
 The King George followed, but, the wind being extremely 
 light, did not come up with her till eight o'clock. The 
 Prince Frederick, not having got the breeze so soon, was 
 still far astern, and the others were quite out of sight, 
 even if it had been daylight. The moon shone brightly 
 and concealed neither the insignificance of the one nor 
 the huge bulk of the other, as the King George, ranging 
 alongside the Glorioso, hailed her in Portuguese; she 
 received no answer. She hailed again in English, and 
 was answered in English by a cross question, demanding 
 the name of the ship. On her reply, the Spaniard, 
 without further word or notice fired his whole broadside, 
 dismounting two of the King George's guns, and bringing 
 down her maintopsail yard. This ' salute ' was not un- 
 expected nor unprepared for ; the men were lying down 
 
 E 
 
242 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 at their quarters, and jumping up, returned it before the 
 sound was well out of the guns ; and thus began a battle 
 that has absolutely no parallel in naval history- 
 There are plenty of instances of a frigate hanging on 
 to and embarrassing the retreat of a line-of-battle ship, 
 detaining her till some heavier ship came up. Thus, in 
 1756, the English 60-gun ship Warwick was brought to 
 bay by the French frigate Atalante ; thus, in 1795, the 
 Berwick of 74 guns was captured by the action of the 
 Alceste ; and thus, in 1800, was the French Guillaume 
 Tell of 80 guns delayed and finally captured by the per- 
 tinacity of the Penelope. Other noteworthy actions have 
 there been between frigates and ships of the line ; as 
 when, in 1781, the French Minerve defended herself for 
 an hour against the 74-gun ship Courageux, being aided 
 by the heavy sea, which prevented the Courageux open- 
 ing her lower deck ports. But I know of no instance 
 except the present in which a frigate of any nation volun- 
 tarily placed herself, in smooth water and fine weather, 
 alongside an enemy's ship of the line and engaged her 
 yard-arm to yard-arm ; and that this frigate should be 
 a much-despised privateer makes the affair still more 
 remarkable. The narrator of Captain Walker's voyages 
 has tried to explain the peculiar circumstances which 
 rendered such an engagement possible. He says : 
 
 The Spaniards repeated their firings with incessant warmth, 
 but not with a continued execution ; for, though they fired as 
 fast as they could, yet their firings after the two first broad- 
 sides were extremely irregular, only firing four or six guns at 
 one time, owing, we may suppose, to the great weight of their 
 guns, which made them less governable than ours were to us. 
 And in this we had the advantage of them from our nearness ; 
 
GEOBGE WAXKER. 243 
 
 for as we continued to fire our broadsides so equally regular 
 and well throughout the whole engagement, that the last was 
 near as good as the first, not a shot eould possibly miss them ; 
 and thereby, also, the fire of our small arms took place, which, 
 like a storm of fiery hail, beat against the enemy with such 
 incessant force that, as we were afterwards informed, they 
 fled from their quarters more than once. . . . 
 
 All which amounts to little more than saying that a 
 12-pounder is lighter than a 24, and a line-of-battle 
 ship is easier to hit than a frigate ; statements which 
 may be accepted as true, without admitting that they 
 explain the very remarkable facts of the engagement. 
 One condition alone was in the frigate's favour. The 
 Spanish ships of that time, and through the century, 
 were remarkably large, stout, and roomy ; but their 
 ports were so small that they could not admit heavier 
 ordnance than 24-pounders, and their sides were so thick 
 that the angle of training or depression was unduly 
 limited ; and it might thus quite well happen that a very 
 inferior vessel, being outside this angle, could be reached 
 only by an occasional shot. Nevertheless, after about 
 three hours, the position of the King George began to 
 get critical. Most of her running rigging was cut to 
 pieces ; her maintopsail yard was shot away, her fore- 
 mast quite disabled, the mainmast badly wounded. ' We 
 could not work our ship, and bravery became a virtue of 
 necessity.' There was all this time so little wind that it 
 was half-past ten before the Prince Frederick came up 
 and drew off some of the enemy's fire. She did more — 
 she put the enemy to flight ; for the Glorioso, not caring 
 to continue the fight with two, when one had kept her 
 so well employed, made sail at eleven o'clock, and so 
 
 left them. 
 
 E 2 
 
244 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 The English loss of men was trifling compared with 
 what might have been expected : the King George had 
 but one man killed and fifteen wounded, though of these 
 seven afterwards died ; the Prince Frederick had three 
 men severely wounded. The King George was, however, 
 so shattered that Captain Walker would not run the risk 
 of ordering the Prince Frederick to hang on to the flying 
 enemy : it was too possible that he might himself stand 
 in need of her assistance. But with the morning the 
 state of the King George was less threatening, and the 
 Duke and Prince George having also come up, Walker 
 sent the three in chase of the Spaniard, following slowly 
 in his own ship. 
 
 And shortly, coming in from the eastward, was seen 
 a large ship. After an anxious hour, she was made out 
 to be an English man-of-war — a ship of the line ; and 
 Walker, to save time, sent one of his little tenders to 
 her with a note, hastily explaining the situation. _ She 
 was found to be the 80-gun ship Eussell, homeward 
 bound from the Mediterranean ; and her captain, Buckle, 
 sending a verbal message to Walker, thanking him for 
 his intelligence, crowded sail in pursuit. After the 
 Eussell came the Princess Amelia, which also was sent 
 on ; and so, pursued and pursuing, they passed away to 
 the westward, the crippled King George being left a long 
 way astern. And suddenly her anxious officers saw the 
 flying enemy in hot action with the headmost ship. This 
 they took to be the Prince Frederick, but the distance 
 was too great to make her out. The fire was exceed- 
 ingly brisk. Walker was inclined to blame her captain 
 for engaging so determinedly without support, and said, 
 ' Dottin will fire away all his cartridges and be obliged 
 
GEORGE WALKER. 245 
 
 to load with loose powder, by which some fatal accident 
 may happen.' The words had scarcely left his lips, 
 when the ship at which their eyes were straining 
 appeared a pillar of smoke. ' Oh, Heavens ! ' he cried, 
 ' she's gone. Dottin and all his brave fellows are now 
 no more.' 
 
 The ship was indeed blown up, but she was not the 
 Prince Frederick. The Dartmouth, of 50 guns, cruising 
 to the westward, had heard the firing of the previous 
 night, and was plying to windward to see what it was all 
 about. She thus fell in with the Glorioso, and engaged 
 her in a running fight, which, as the two ships closed, 
 gradually became warmer, until by some accident, never 
 explained, the fire reached her magazine, and she blew 
 up. The Prince Frederick, then fast coming up, had 
 her boats out at once, but of the 300 that formed her 
 crew fourteen only were saved. One of these, a young 
 lieutenant named O'Brien, a cadet of the Inchiquin 
 family, had been blown out through a port, and was 
 picked up insensible on top of a floating gun-carriage. 
 He recovered himself as he was being taken on board, 
 and greeted Captain Dottin with the light-heartedness 
 once supposed to be a national characteristic. ' Sir,' he 
 said, ' you must excuse the unfitness of my dress to come 
 aboard a strange ship ; but really I left my own in such 
 a hurry that I had no time to stay for a change.' 
 Appalled, we may believe, by the fate of the Dartmouth, 
 the privateers ventured no further attack, though they 
 still continued the chase ; but about one o'clock in the 
 morning the Eussell came up alongside and within pistol- 
 shot of the flying enemy. A couple of guns, fired rather 
 as a summons to surrender, were responded to by her 
 
246 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 broadside ; and the action, thus begun, continued with 
 great warmth for nearly five hours, when, about six 
 o'clock, the Spaniard's maintopmast was shot away, upon 
 which he directly struck. 
 
 All the time of the engagement (wrote Captain Buckle 
 in his official letter) we were within musket- shot of each 
 other. Both ships are in a very shattered condition : all my 
 stays and backstays, a great many of my shrouds, and the 
 boats shot through and through. I called to them to get 
 out theirs, but they was in the same condition, which obliged 
 me to stay until one of the privateer's boats came on board, 
 when I immediately sent her away for the captain. . . . The 
 time of the action I was greatly put to it, having but 400 
 men when I begun, Mr. Byng x having stripped me to that 
 number when I left him, and twenty of them were sick and 
 not able to come to their quarters. Upon this consideration, 
 being so very weak, and their numbers so much superior, I 
 have sent away the Prince George privateer with 230 of the 
 prisoners, to Lisbon, under the convoy of her consort the 
 Prince Frederick, with a letter to our minister there relating 
 thereto. I have also taken 100 of the privateersmen on board 
 me, and sent away the same number of our own on board the 
 prize. I find myself obliged to leave between 300 and 400 of 
 her seamen to help work her, but hav« this day taken out all 
 the powder to prevent their doing any mischief. 
 
 The very weak state of the Eussell will partly 
 explain why the Glorioso, which did not destroy the 
 King George, was able to make such a long defence 
 against an 80-gun ship ; but the Spanish 70-gun ships of 
 that date were extremely stoutly built, and thus capable 
 of a great deal of passive resistance. Notwithstanding 
 her heavy armament, her offensive powers were clearly 
 
 1 The Honourable John Byng, then (in 1747), as nine years after- 
 wards, to our woe, commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean. 
 
GEORGE WALKER. 247 
 
 very limited, which may have been due to the oauses 
 spoken of above. Her guns may have been, in some 
 measure, masked when in action with: smaller vessels; 
 and it would appear, from the report of Captain Erskine 
 of the Warwick, as well as from the experience of Captain 
 Walker, that her powder was bad — spoiled possibly from 
 careless stowing whilst in the tropics. It is only thus 
 that I can interpret Captain Erskine's attributing his 
 small loss in men, though his rigging and masts were cut 
 to pieces, not only to — 
 
 First, the enemy being a much higher ship, so his upper 
 deck shot on a level must have gone over us in close engage- 
 ment, which is the reason we suffered so mueh in our rigging, 
 mast, and sails ; and as it was night, he did not perceive the 
 advantage of his height for his small arms. Second, his 
 endeavouring to dismast us to facilitate his escape. 
 
 'But also to — 
 
 Lastly, his overcharging his guns with too great weight of 
 shot, that but few of them came through our sides, although 
 most part of the engagement we were within pistol-shot. 
 
 And the historian of Mr. Walker's voyages, whilst 
 dwelling most especially on reasons similar to the first 
 and second of these, speaks also of the enemy's shot as 
 not having force to come through, but sticking in the 
 ship's side. 
 
 The King George was nevertheless a great deal 
 knocked about, and put into Lisbon to refit, her consorts 
 being directed to return to their cruising ground. Of 
 course their chagrin was great when they learned that 
 the Glorioso— which was said to have three millions 
 sterling on board— had landed her treasure at Ferrol; 
 but it was the fortune of war, and they were doubtless 
 
248 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 to some extent consoled by the reflection that they had 
 worthily assisted in bringing such a powerful enemy to 
 action. One of their owners, however, who had come 
 out to Lisbon, did not take quite the same view ; and 
 going on board the King George almost as soon as she 
 anchored, ' gave Mr. Walker a very uncouth welcome 
 for venturing their ship against a man-of-war.' ' Had 
 the treasure,' said Mr. Walker, ' been aboard, as I 
 expected, your compliment had been otherways ; or had 
 we let her escape from us with that treasure on board, 
 what had you then have said ? ' 
 
 After some months more cruising, without any 
 notable occurrence, peace was concluded, and, his ship 
 having been disposed of at Lisbon, Mr. Walker returned 
 home in the packet, which, on the passage, he, by 
 presence of mind and ' bounce,' preserved from an 
 Algerine corsair. Afterwards, he commanded a ship in 
 the North Sea trade ; but, having lost what money he 
 had accumulated, and having got involved in a dispute 
 with his former owners about the accounts of the Koyal 
 Family, as to the circumstances of which we have no 
 details, he was by them imprisoned for debt shortly 
 after the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, and kept 
 in durance vile during its continuance. His career may 
 thus be considered as having closed with the brilliant 
 episode of the capture of the Glorioso. Of his further 
 life I have no account ; but a notice in the Gentleman's 
 Magazine tells us that he died on 20 September, 1777. ' 
 
 I have related the career of Commodore Walker at 
 this lengtb, because it seems to me to afford a remarkable 
 and typical instance of the good service which a privateer 
 1 Gent. Mag. vol. xlvii. p. 460. 
 
GEORGE WALKER. 249 
 
 was capable of rendering, not only by destroying the 
 commerce of the enemy — though the value of the prizes 
 made by the Eoyal Family was said to amount to 400,000Z. 
 — but, and more especially, by supplementing the work 
 of the royal navy. It is admitted that privateers are 
 not to be employed in future wars. The name, at least, 
 is abolished : the reality, in its more important character- 
 istics, will, I do not doubt, revive on the first pinch. If 
 the ships of the royal navy prove insufficient in number 
 for the requirements of a maritime war, they will assuredly 
 be supplemented in the future, as they have been in the 
 past, by the ships of private owners. 
 
 It seems, therefore, most desirable that the relation- 
 ship between the navy and the merchant service should 
 be re-established on something like its former footing. 
 Formerly, an officer of the merchant service could enter 
 the navy, be rated at once as a midshipman, and after 
 two years be made a lieutenant ; the number who did so 
 enter, and serve as midshipmen, master's mates, masters, 
 and lieutenants, was considerable. If few rose beyond 
 the rank of lieutenant, it was that they were stopped by 
 want of interest rather than by their antecedents ; and a 
 sufficient number did rise to accentuate the possibility. 
 Formerly, also, on the other hand, an officer of the navy, 
 in time of peace — if a poor man, as a naval officer very 
 commonly is — took service in a merchant ship, almost as 
 a matter of course. He earned his living, he cultivated 
 his professional knowledge ; and when war again broke 
 out, he was as ready as ever 
 
 To point the guns upon the chase, 
 And bid the deadly cutlass shine. 
 
 This is — unfortunately, as I think — a thing of the 
 
250 STUDIES HT NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 past. Nowadays, when, a naval officer finds ifrdifficult to 
 get employment — a difficulty that in time of peace is of 
 common occurrence — he retires ; he goes into trade, he 
 becomes a stock-broker, a wine merchant, an ironmonger, 
 a grocer, a director of companies, or what not ? He earns 
 his living — sometimes; but the quarter-deck knows him 
 no more. It is not only that he has been taught from 
 his boyhood to look down on his brothers of the merchant 
 service ; it is that they also, by a feeling of reciprocity, 
 are doubtful about him. On this point I may quote the 
 words of Sir Donald Currie : 
 
 An immense additional advantage by way of strength to 
 the Eoyal Navy and to our maritime power would be drawn 
 from the union of the Mercantile Marine with the Royal Navy, 
 in the event of war. At present, there is so much jealousy 
 between the services, that naval officers cannot get employment 
 in merchant shipping to the extent to which their merits 
 entitle them. The captain or officer of a merchant ship has 
 no chance of joining the navy. But this interchangeableness 
 or harmony of action would engender such feelings of mutual 
 sympathy and support as would present a power of vital energy 
 and patriotic vigour such as Eussia, France, or Germany can 
 never be expected to display. ' 
 
 I fully believe, with Sir Donald, that the gain to the 
 country by thus drawing closer the bonds between the 
 two services, would be enormous — an increase of power 
 and efficiency which might prove of the most vital 
 importance. I believe also that it would conduce to 
 another gain of very great and real, though, as compared 
 to the increase of efficiency, of secondary importance — it 
 would, and more and more each year, tend to reduce the 
 
 1 Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. xxiv. (1880), 
 p. 92. 
 
GEOKGE WALKER. 251 
 
 naval estimates, now swollen, in time of peace, to some- 
 thing like eleven millions sterling. The retired pay of 
 officers who have been virtually driven out of the service 
 by the necessity of living, however small it may be to the 
 individual, amounts, in the aggregate, to a very large sum. 
 If war was declared and our fleet suddenly increased, the 
 active list of all ranks would have to be increased in 
 proportion. Juniors would have to be promoted by hun- 
 dreds. War, in the present day, however sharp and de- 
 cisive, would probably be short ; and on the return of 
 peace — with or without honour — the overloaded list would 
 be again reduced by some system of retirement similar to 
 that previously enforced. The country would thus have 
 to pay, not only its officers for doing the work, but also 
 a very large and continually increasing number for not 
 doing it ; would, in short, be taxed in order to maintain 
 the gulf between the queen's and the merchants' ser- 
 vice. But if this gulf is itself an evil, why should it 
 be maintained ? I believe that it is an evil, and that it 
 might be done away with— not by any violent or radical 
 innovation, but rather by a judicious return to the practice 
 of the past. The exclusiveness, which I deplore, is itself 
 the innovation ; a thing but of yesterday — of yesterday, 
 that is, as compared to the age of our navy, which I love 
 to trace back beyond the times of the Tudors, beyond the 
 times of Ethelred or Alfred, back even to those early 
 times when our rude forefathers scoured the North Sea, 
 and made ' the Saxon shore ' no safe dwelling-place for 
 folk of Welsh blood or unfriendly tongue. 
 
252 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 THE FBENCH PBIVATEEBS. 
 
 I. JEAN BAET. 1 
 
 In one of the most solid of his essays, 2 Mr. (not then 
 Lord) Macaulay drew an interesting and instructive 
 comparison between the policy of the Church of Eome 
 and that of the Church of England, in respect of their 
 treatment of enthusiasts — a class of men whom the one 
 converts into dangerous enemies, the other into grateful 
 and energetic supporters. ' The Church of Eome,' he 
 said, ' unites in herself all the strength of establishment 
 and all the strength of dissent. With the utmost pomp 
 of a dominant hierarchy above, she has all the energy 
 of the voluntary system below.' A man may be vulgar, 
 ignorant, and extravagant, yet ready to do and suffer 
 things which it is for her interest that somebody should 
 do and suffer. ' She accordingly enlists him in her ser- 
 vice, assigns to him some forlorn hope, and sends him 
 forth with her benediction and applause.' 
 
 If it were allowable to do so, a somewhat similar 
 comparison might be made between the naval systems 
 of France and England. Notwithstanding its popular 
 
 1 Fraser's Magazine, March, 1882. 
 » Eanke's History of the Popes. 
 
JEAN BART. 253 
 
 origin and national growth, notwithstanding the glories 
 of the Elizabethan age, and the stout-hearted if un- 
 scrupulous service of men like Drake, or Hawkyns, or 
 Frobiser, the English navy, becoming, during the last 
 two hundred years, more and more a close body, has 
 ended by excluding from its ranks all talent, all genius, 
 all energy, except that which has been regularly culti- 
 vated within itself. This exclusiveness has, undoubtedly 
 its advantages. In a service like ours, scattered, in 
 peace, all over the world ; whose captains have frequently 
 to take on themselves diplomatic or political functions, 
 to exercise magisterial powers, to decide on questions of 
 national right or international law, it is well that its 
 officers should be trained by a strict and uniform edu- 
 cation and discipline to the performance of the many 
 and varied duties which may, without warning, be 
 thrust upon them. There is thus a tendency for them to 
 become more and more citizens of the world ; for their 
 conduct to be judged at home by their tact and delicacy 
 in settling disputes abroad, without trouble to the govern- 
 ment or excitement to the newspapers. 
 
 It is, no doubt, a very great convenience to a govern- 
 ment to have such a body of diplomatic agents spread 
 over the world. But, after all, the first requirement for 
 the navy is efficiency in war ; as compared with that, 
 every other quality is of little value ; and there is per- 
 haps room to think that this, in its fullest extent, is not 
 to be obtained by barring a seaman from fighting for 
 his country, because the accident of his birth and up- 
 bringing has kept him clear of her Majesty's training 
 ships. The rule, though more absolute now than ever 
 before, is no new one. Early in last century it was 
 
254 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 ordered that no one should be made a lieutenant unless 
 he had served six years at sea, two of them in the rating 
 of midshipman on board one of his Majesty's ships; 
 and this regulation was seldom broken through — never, 
 perhaps, without some quibble which family interest 
 suggested and permitted. The rule gradually changed 
 itself into one still stricter : it became customary to 
 require six years' service in the navy as a qualification ; 
 and though this was done without admiralty order, the 
 examining officers commonly enough enforced it. 
 
 In 1740 it was proposed to Mr. Walker — whose for- 
 tunes I have related in the last chapter— to enter the 
 king's service. He refused ; for, by the regulations, he 
 could not enter in any capacity higher than midshipman; 
 and even as a lieutenant, he would have been loth to 
 serve except in an independent command. But Walker 
 was undoubtedly a man who, under a more elastic 
 system, might have proved a worthy compeer of 
 Saunders or Saumarez or Brett. Another and similar 
 instance is that of Captain Phillips, ■ of the Alexander 
 privateer, whose name was a good deal talked of in 1746. 
 His Majesty's ship Solebay, of 20 guns, had been picked 
 up on the coast of Portugal, in the summer of 1744, by 
 the French fleet under M. de Bochambeau, and had been 
 since fitted out as a French ship of war. On 10 April 
 (O.S.), 1746, she was standing into St. Martin's Eoad, in 
 the Isle of Be, in convoy of a ship laden with naval 
 stores, when she was Bighted by the Alexander, chased, 
 and captured. The account given to the admiralty, by 
 Captain Phillips himself, was that he came up with the 
 Solebay just at the entrance of the road, and boarded 
 her athwart the bowsprit, sword in hand, and cut her 
 
JEAN BART. 255 
 
 out, about 3 p.m. ; the wind at S.S.W., fair for his run- 
 ning in and coming out. He was asked how many men 
 she had on board, and answered ' that she had 230, and 
 he had but 140 ; that they kept a very bad look-out, but 
 as soon as he boarded her they were forced to fly from 
 their quarters ; they killed fifteen of her men, and he 
 lost but three.' ' 
 
 A private letter from Mr. Legge, 2 one of the lords 
 of the admiralty, to Anson, who also was a member of 
 the board, adds, ' The king has been spoken to in rela- 
 tion to Captain Phillips, who retook the Solebay, and is 
 so well satisfied with his behaviour, that he gives us 
 leave to reward him as we think proper. In all respects 
 the action seems to be as gallant as one need wish to see 
 in a summer's day. Phillips himself is very desirous to 
 be made a captain in the king's service. But this, we 
 suppose, you will have a great objection to, as well as we 
 have. Medals and money, we think, should be given 
 liberally, and should be glad of your thoughts, and his 
 Grace's (the Duke of Bedford, then first lord of the 
 admiralty), if with you, upon this subject.' Eventually 
 the acknowledgment took the form of 500 guineas in 
 cash and a gold medal of the value of 200 guineas ; and 
 Mr. Phillips was heard of no more in naval history. Of 
 his antecedents we now know nothing : he gave his 
 address at Lloyd's Coffee House, and was therefore 
 presumably of respectable appearance and behaviour : 
 that he was a good seaman and a gallant officer would 
 seem beyond question ; and of such, in that gloomy year 
 of 1746, the service had not one too many. 
 
 1 Admiralty Minute, 29 April, 1746. 
 
 1 1 May, 1746. Barrow's Life of Anson, 139. 
 
256 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 Considering this point of discipline and order, it is 
 interesting to examine how it has been dealt with in the 
 navy, to which, more than any other, it was our lot 
 during the last century to be opposed. We find that the 
 French have gone on a system not, indeed, diametrically 
 opposite to our own, but still differing from it in an 
 extreme degree. The French navy as reorganised_by 
 Colbert was, in name and realityTa purely aristocratic 
 corps. _The_officers, necessarily of noble family, entered 
 as cadets, under the name of gardes de la marine, and~ 
 formed a most exclusive body, jealous, in an extreme 
 d'egree7~or their privileges and their birthright. Officers 
 who, in the beginning, were entered from the merchant 
 service, were styled 'blues' (officiers Ileus), 1 a term 
 analogous, in usage at least, to the English * tarpaulin ' 
 of the seventeenth century. The hostility of the more 
 aristocratic gardes towards the ' blues ' was unrelenting : 
 as ensigns, they might be tolerated ; but as lieutenants, 
 we are led to understand that they had a very rough 
 time of it. In the long run, the feeling against the 
 ' blues ' proved too strong ; officers from the merchant 
 service seldom rose to the higher ranks ; the navy con- 
 tinued the most aristocratic service under the Crown, 
 and at the Kevolution paid the penalty, in being denuded 
 of officers. 
 
 In the regular line of navy, then, there was no room 
 for those ' blues ' who aimed at distinction ; they stood 
 aloof from it, taking service rather in private ships of 
 war, which thus attained an importance in the scale of 
 national defence far beyond that of the English priva- 
 
 1 So called from their uniform breeches being blue. The more aris- 
 tocratic officers of the navy wore red breeches. 
 
JEAN BART. 257 
 
 teers. It seems to have been no unusual thing to confer 
 naval rank on these men ; to permit them the use of a 
 king's ship ; to sanction their engaging a ship's company 
 under the king's authority, though at private cost, and 
 to warrant their cruising against the enemy in the 
 interest and advantage of those who fitted her out, as 
 well as of the country at large. Ships so cruising were of 
 course privateers in name and in reality, but privateers 
 of a force and efficiency which strictly private ships of 
 war were scarce likely to equal ; and, with little or no 
 cost to the government, they formed a powerful supple- 
 ment to its established navy. Large ships, even ships 
 of the line, were frequently so employed ; and though 
 these were sometimes owned by private individuals, they 
 were more commonly lent by the king ; for, though 
 wealthy and patriotic merchants or corporations might 
 equip such, they were clearly of a strength and cost 
 beyond the requirements or the commercial advantage 
 of the mere freebooter. 
 
 This custom, which seems to have grown up or, at 
 least, to have received a marked development after the 
 battle of Malaga (13-24 August, 1704), gave rise to a 
 curious difficulty about the exchange of prisoners, the 
 circumstances of which are best detailed in the official re- 
 presentation of the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded 
 to Lord Dartmouth, one of the Secretaries of State, 
 1 March, 1710-1 1. 1 It runs thus :— 
 
 The French king, within these four years having had no 
 fleet at sea, has made a sort of piratical war, and for that 
 purpose has not only given great encouragement to privateers, 
 
 1 Home Office Eeeords (Admiralty), No. 28. 
 
258 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 but also lent his capital ships, with guns and ammunition, to 
 such as would be at the charge of fitting them out and arming 
 them as they call it 'on course,' and these men of war are 
 then called ' corsairs.' Sometimes they are commanded by 
 the French king's officers of a lower rank, as a lieutenant of 
 a capital ship, a lieutenant of a frigate or an ensign of a ship ; 
 and sometimes they are commanded by one who never had 
 any commission of the French king, but only an order from 
 the Secretary of State for marine affairs and a commission 
 from the Grand Admiral of France ; and this is the case of 
 M. de Varennes, who (as we are credibly informed) is no more 
 than a garde-marine, and had only for that voyage and that 
 course a commission from the Count de Toulouse to command 
 the Happy, a man-of-war of 60 guns. As the French would 
 never recede from their demands about the exchange of our 
 commanders of 6th rates, sloops and brigantines, and as 
 (notwithstanding these reasons given by us, that they had 
 neither commissions as captains, nor any rank in the fleet) 
 the French did still insist that the said commanders (being 
 actually in the queen's service and pay" 1 could not be exchanged 
 but as captains of men of war, that is, for 20 men, we have 
 complied with it ; but at the same time, whenever any of the 
 French king's ships of force have been taken, we thought we 
 could do no less than to propose an exchange of the com- 
 manders of the said ships for our captains of men-of-war, or 
 for 20 men. To that end we gave leave last year to M. de 
 Varennes and lately to M. Lamoinerie, commander of the 
 Superbe, a ship of 56 guns, 1 to go into France, taking 
 their parole to return into England after three months, in 
 case they could not procure their exchange for a captain 
 of a British man-of-war, or 20 men ; and by these means we 
 thought to have established that as a rule in the exchange. 
 But it seems the French court is unwilling to yield that point ; 
 and for that purpose M. Pontchartrain has sent back M. de 
 
 1 Captured by the squadron under Admiral Aylmer in the Soundings, 
 30 July, 1710. 
 
JEAN BART. 259 
 
 varennes, according to the term of his parole, and (as we are 
 informed) he will send back M. Lamoinerie. 
 
 Your lordship sees now where the point lies. The French 
 pretend that a private commission of the Grand Admiral does 
 not give any post or any rank in their navy, and they will not 
 allow of any to be sea-officers but those who are commissioned 
 by the French king himself. To this we answer that the 
 queen gives no commission, and that the commanders of our 
 men of war have no other commission but from the Lord High 
 Admiral of Great Britain, or the Lords appointed to execute 
 that office ; and we cannot but think the commission of the 
 Grand Admiral of France to be equivalent to that of the Lord 
 High Admiral here. 
 
 In the next place we have a very great disadvantage in 
 that part of the exchange. All our officers having their com- 
 missions by them when they are taken, there cannot be the 
 least dispute about their rank, and the number of men to be 
 allowed for each ; but it is quite otherwise with the French. 
 Within these two years we have taken three or four large 
 French men-of-war, and when we receive the list of the 
 prisoners, we find a vast number of officers, as first, second 
 and third captain, three or four lieutenants and as many 
 ensigns ; but when we come to examine into their qualities, 
 most of them allege they are not the French king's officers 
 but only corsairs, having only the Grand Admiral of France's 
 commission ; and in the very case of M. de Varennes, as also 
 M. Lamoinerie of the Superbe, they pretend there is. not one 
 officer. This we look upon as chicanery, for at this rate, if 
 we could take the whole French fleet, perhaps they would not 
 allow one single commander to be the king's officer. This 
 we signified to [the French agent for exchange], as also that 
 we had nothing to do with their new distinctions between 
 corsairs and French men-of-war, when in reality they were 
 the same ships. . . . The argument of M. de Varennes that 
 he has no rank nor post in France, and should be commanded 
 at sea by the least officer of the king's, is of no weight with 
 
 s 2 
 
260 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 us, since we are not to be governed by their rules and by their 
 subordination of their marine officers ; besides that our com- 
 manders of 6th rates, sloops and brigantines, have no more 
 rank in the British fleet than M. de Varennes has in France, 
 and as for what the French commissaries have alleged, that 
 this is a new pretence set up by us, nothing of it having been 
 mentioned in our original agreement, we own it is a new 
 proposal ; but they must also confess that their turning their 
 French men-of-war into corsairs is likewise a new thing. 
 
 The French, however, seem to have carried the point, 
 which told much in their favour, not only with respect 
 to the corsairs, but also on account of the practice, 
 which continued through the century, of appointing lieu- 
 tenants to the command of frigates or even ships of the 
 line. M. Chadeau de la Clocheterie, who commanded 
 the Belle-Poule in her song-renowned combat with the 
 Arethusa, was a lieutenant, and was immediately after 
 the action promoted to be captain. Had the Belle-Poule 
 been captured, M. de la Clocheterie's value in the table 
 of exchange was 10 men ; if, on the other hand, the 
 Arethusa had succumbed, Captain Marshall's value was 
 15 men, although the Arethusa was by much the smaller 
 ship of the two. As to corsairs the old rule held ; their 
 captains were exchangeable for 4 men. 1 And yet, even 
 at this time, some of the corsairs were very large. 
 
 In the summer of 1780, the Comte d'Artois, a 64- 
 gun ship lent by the king, and commanded by a lieutenant 
 of the navy, was for some time a very serious trouble on 
 the south coast of Ireland. No ordinary cruisers could 
 tackle such a foe. At last Captain Macbride, in the 
 Bienfaisant, of 64 guns, was sent to look after her, and, 
 in company with the 44rgun ship Charon, fell in with 
 
 1 Code ilea Prises (1784), p. 832. 
 
JEAJS BAET. 261 
 
 her on 13 August, off the Old Head of Kinsale. The 
 Comte d'Artois was crowded with men — her ship's com- 
 pany numbered upwards of 600 ; that of the Bien- 
 faisant certainly not more than 500, probably not more 
 than 450. The Charon was at some little distance, 
 and the Comte d'Artois attempted to close with her 
 principal antagonist, and carry her by boarding. ' It 
 was a daring though unsuccessful attempt,' wrote Cap- 
 tain Macbride ; ' after an hour and ten minutes' smart 
 action, her rigging and sails cut to pieces, twenty- 
 one men killed and thirty-five wounded, she struck. 
 The Bienfaisant had three killed, twenty-two wounded, 
 one man slightly wounded in the Charon.' The Bien- 
 faisant had been three years in commission and several 
 times in action ; she had thus, even without the support 
 of the Charon, a distinct advantage over the compara- 
 tively untrained privateer : had the Comte d'Artois been 
 able to lay her on board, and bring on a hand-to-hand 
 fight, with her superiority of brute force the result might 
 have been very different. 
 
 But this is only one instance of the great force of 
 some of these private ships of war. Another may be 
 cited in the 50-gun ship Apollon, which on almost 
 exactly the same spot captured the Anglesea, of 40 guns, 
 on 29 March, 1745 (0. S.), an event to which the decision 
 of the consequent court-martial gave a tragic interest. 
 The Anglesea was caught quite unprepared, her captain 
 having persuaded himself that the ship coming down on 
 him before the wind was his consort, the Augusta. He 
 was killed by the second broadside; so also was the 
 master; the first lieutenant was on shore, sick; the 
 second lieutenant, Baker Phillips, on whom the command 
 
262 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 devolved, was a young man of scanty experience; he 
 consulted hastily with Mr. Taaffe, the third lieutenant, 
 and the boatswain. There seemed nothing to be done; 
 the ship was in no posture for fight, and lay at the mercy 
 of a more powerful enemy. He ordered the colours to 
 be struck ; and it is difficult, even now, to see what else 
 he could have done : but the court-martial assembled 
 to inquire into the affair, whether influenced by the 
 political crisis then pending, by a suspicion that Mr. 
 Phillips was an adherent of the House of Stuart, and 
 had traitorously betrayed his trust, or on some other 
 grounds more difficult to conceive, pronounced that he 
 had not done his duty, that he had not done his utmost 
 to put the ship in order of fighting, or to encourage the 
 inferior officers and men ; and therefore sentenced him 
 to death — to be shot by a platoon of musketeers : but, 
 having regard to the distress and confusion the ship was 
 in at the captain's death, when he came to the command, 
 and to his being a young man and inexperienced, they 
 recommended him for mercy. This recommendation the 
 Lords Justices refused to act on, and the sentence was 
 duly carried out. There is a romantic tradition — but, 
 as far as I have been able to trace the course of events, 
 quite unsupported by facts— that the wife of Mr. 
 Phillips, on the refusal of the Lords Justices, obtained 
 a pardon or reprieve for her husband from Queen Caro- 
 line ; that she herself posted to Portsmouth, the bearer 
 of this message of mercy, but arrived only to find that, 
 at his own request, in order to avoid the pain of a parting 
 interview with his wife, the hour of his execution had 
 been anticipated, and he was "already dead. 
 
 Another instance, which I may not omit, is that of 
 
JEAN EAHT. 263 
 
 the Elizabeth, a 64-gun ship, belonging to the king, 
 but privately fitted out, in 1745, to convoy the young 
 Pretender to Scotland. Whilst on this service she was 
 met, on 9-20 July, broad off Ushant, by the Lion of 
 60 guns, commanded by Captain (aftewards Sir Peircy) 
 Brett. The two ships pounded each other to a standstill, 
 and made the best of tbeir way to their respective ports. 
 ' As I was not so happy as to take him,' wrote Captain 
 Brett, ' I have only the satisfaction left that I spoiled 
 his voyage.' He mentions also one little incident of an 
 especial interest, and which has, I think, been generally 
 misrepresented. In company with the Elizabeth was a 
 small ship of sixteen guns, on board which Prince Charles 
 and bis personal staff were tempting their fortune. I 
 believe it is commonly said that this small ship — no 
 match, of course, for the Lion — made off at once during 
 the engagement. This was not the case. What Captain 
 Brett, quite ignorant of the peculiar circumstances, wrote, 
 is — ' The small ship, in the beginning of the engagement, 
 made two attempts to rake me ; but I soon beat him off 
 with my stern chase. He did us little or no harm ; and 
 after that lay off at a great distance.' That she after- 
 wards pursued her way, whilst the Elizabeth put back — 
 her voyage being spoiled — is, of course, matter of familiar 
 history. 
 
 More remarkable than any of these are the Mediter- 
 ranean campaigns of M. de Lage, during the years 
 1745-6 ; campaigns which in England have been little 
 known, because, in truth, there is little to know ; the 
 noteworthy facts about them being the peculiar circum- 
 stances of their organisation and equipment. M. de Lage 
 was not a nice man. I know of nothing about him 
 
264 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 worthy of admiration or approval, except, perhaps, his 
 excessive impudence. Some forty years before, he had 
 gone, in the train of the Bourbons, into Spain; and 
 voyaging from there to the Pacific, and, in some way or 
 other, trading between China and Peru, had got together 
 a very considerable fortune. On his return to Spain, by 
 mingled self-assertion and bribery, he obtained a com- 
 mission as captain in the Spanish navy, and was ap- 
 pointed to the San Isidro, of seventy guns, in which ship, 
 and in the fleet under Navarro, he served during 1740, 
 1741, and 1742. 
 
 In the course of this latter year he was separated 
 from the fleet in a gale of wind, and took refuge in 
 Ajaccio ; where on 2 March, 1743, his ship was burnt by 
 Commodore Martin, whose respect for the neutral port 
 was satisfied with sending a message to the governor 
 that he was going to attack the enemy's ship, but would 
 give him time to order his people out of the way, unless 
 the Spanish ship fired first. 
 
 De Lage, after this, seems to have been borne as a 
 supernumerary on board the Spanish flagship ; he was 
 in her in the indecisive action fought off Cape Sicie on 
 11-22 February 1744 ; and took charge of the ship when 
 her captain was killed and the admiral wounded. After- 
 wards, with his bombastic humour, he did very real 
 service to the English. He claimed for himself the 
 honours of the day. According to him, the Eeal would 
 have been taken had he not fortunately been on board. 
 The captain was killed ; the admiral was an arrant 
 coward, who went down to the cockpit, and sat there on 
 a coil of rope, with his face buried in his hands. It was 
 he, De Lage, that defended the ship against the Marl- 
 
JEAN BART. 265 
 
 borough ; it was he that pointed the guns which sank 
 the fire-ship ; it was he that did everything. The 
 French, already sick of the Spaniards, gladly accepted 
 De Lage's story, and scouted their allies as not able even 
 to defend their own ships. A deadly feud between the 
 two services was the consequence; and any concerted 
 action of Spaniards and French became an impossibility. 
 
 After this, Spain was no safe dwelling-place for De 
 Lage. He returned to France, and, with unblushing 
 effrontery, succeeded in persuading the Duke de Pen- 
 thievre, then Admiral of France, that he, De Lage, was 
 the hero of the age, the one man who might re-establish 
 the old glories of the French navy. The duke accord- 
 ingly gave him a provisional commission as commodore, 
 and authority to equip, at his own expense, a squadron 
 of two ships of the line and two frigates. The ships' 
 companies were to be stronger than those in the king's 
 service ; were to be subject to the same discipline, and 
 their pay was to be one-third more than usual, in ad- 
 dition to their share of prize-money and a provision for 
 their widows. Soldiers of the marines were to be allowed 
 him in the same way ; with the additional condition that 
 an indemnity of forty francs was to be paid to the cap- 
 tains of companies for each one who deserted or was 
 killed ; and the number of these available not being suffi- 
 cient, he was authorised to raise a company of 150 men. 
 
 Notwithstanding the high pay offered, the sailors had 
 the greatest repugnance to embark in this expedition ; 
 they had an idea it was bound to the West Indies, where, 
 a few years before, the squadron under the Duke d'Antin 
 had lost nearly half its men by sickness ; and they had 
 a special dislike and mistrust of De Lage himself, whose 
 
266 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 manners and language and actions spread terror amongst 
 the seafaring population all along the coast. The ap- 
 pointed levy was not sufficient to man him ; and the 
 want was increased by continual desertions. He there- 
 fore, on his own authority, instituted a press, and laid 
 violent hands on all the fishing and coasting boats. On 
 this, all the sailors of the neighbourhood took to the 
 mountains ; the terror spread, and the inhabitants of the 
 villages followed ; the petty officers, who had always been 
 counted on, also went off, and the workmen in the dock- 
 yard, afraid of being sent on board the ships, were no 
 longer to be found. Proclamations and punishments 
 were of no good, and not till after De Lage had sailed 
 did things resume their wonted course. This was in the 
 middle of April, 1745. 
 
 Fifteen days after his departure, De Lage returned, 
 his ships having been damaged in a gale. His temper, 
 and insolence, and the airs which he — a mere privateer, 
 as they considered him — put on, had rendered him hate- 
 ful to all the officers of the port ; and it was with the 
 greatest difficulty that the commander-in-chief could ob- 
 tain for him the necessary assistance. Again, arid once 
 again, he put to sea, and each time returned after a short 
 and unavailing cruise. In a fourth attempt he succeeded 
 in capturing two small prizes of no great value, and in 
 safely bringing in a convoy to Marseilles. But at each 
 return his men deserted by scores ; after this last, they 
 went off in crowds, even by swimming, in spite of De 
 Lage's threats, sword and pistol in hand. They com- 
 plained of ill-usage and of bad provisions. During tbe 
 last cruise sixty men had died, and on coming into port 
 200 had been sent sick on shore. Finding himself thus 
 
JEAN BART. 267 
 
 weakened, De Lage resolved to lay up the largest of his 
 ships, one of seventy-four guns ; but it was not till 
 January 1746 that the others were ready for sea, and 
 they were still sadly short of men. Even the sailors 
 they had were ready to desert if they got the chance : 
 they feared the voyage, suspected they were not likely to 
 get any prize money, and doubted even of their wages. 
 Finally the squadron put to sea on 2 April ; it consisted 
 of the 54-gun ship Oriflamme, and the two 30-gun 
 frigates Diane and Volage. 
 
 On 4 April, being then in the neighbourhood of Cape 
 St. Martin, on the coast of Spain, the Volage, which 
 had chased out of sight of her consorts, fell in with 
 the Stirling Castle of 70 guns. She took to flight, the 
 Stirling Castle pursuing. A stern chase is proverbiaUy 
 a long one : the Stirling Castle could only fire her bow 
 guns, and those occasionally and with but little effect ; 
 with her stern guns the Volage manfully held her own ; 
 it was not till after her main-topmast was shot away, 
 and she lay exposed to the Stirling Castle's broadside, at 
 short range, that she hauled down her colours. During 
 the night she rolled away her fore-topmast and her mizen- 
 mast ; and the next morning, whilst her captors were 
 trying to get her a little in order, the Oriflamme and 
 Diane came in sight. The Stirling Castle had herself 
 received a good deal of damage from the Volage's stern 
 guns, and her captain hastily judged that she was not 
 equal to the two ships of the enemy. He abandoned his 
 prize, leaving in her a lieutenant and twenty -five men, 
 and some of the prisoners. The Volage was thus retaken ; 
 but De Lage made no attempt to pursue the Stirling 
 Castle, feeling probably, on his part, sufficiently well 
 
268 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 satisfied to be left alone. For not destroying the Volage, 
 the captain was afterwards reprimanded by a court- 
 martial ; but at that time our naval prestige was not 
 brilliant; and for a 70-gun ship to decline an engage- 
 ment with a ship of 54 guns, supported by a frigate, was 
 considered prudent and not blamable. 
 
 This affair, however, put an end to De Lage's cruise ; 
 he returned to Toulon, where he arrived on 1 May. The 
 three ships were put out of commission ; but the men's 
 pay was not forthcoming. The thing had been a specu- 
 lation, and had not succeeded : no prizes had been taken, 
 and neither M. de Lage nor the merchants who had fitted 
 him out had the necessary funds. The accounts were 
 thus not settled for a long time ; and the greater part of 
 the charge would seem to have been eventually defrayed 
 by the government. 1 
 
 Notwithstanding the scale of his adventure, or, 
 perhaps I should rather say, in consequence of the very 
 peculiar circumstances of his equipment and his dis- 
 mantling, as well as the very slight success that attended 
 his cruising, the name of De Lage has no great place in 
 the naval history of France. A different fate has been 
 that of some of De Lage's predecessors; men who, 
 starting from a much lower point than De Lage, and 
 with much less pretension, did accomplish a good deal, 
 and achieve a renown which, overspread with much 
 fable, has towered over all the more orthodox glories of 
 the French navy. Of these, the most remarkable in 
 point of popular fame is Jean Bart. 
 
 It is difficult to explain — indeed, I do not clearly 
 
 1 V. Brun, Guerres Maritimes de la France : Port de Toulon, ses 
 armaments etc., torn. i. pp. 311-319. 
 
JEAN BAET. 209 
 
 know — why popular fancy should have taken hold of 
 Jean Bart for the sort of apotheosis with which he 
 has been honoured. In general estimation he is the 
 ideal and quintessence of heroic achievement and naval 
 glory ; a sort of French counterpart of Drake, Hawke, 
 Eodney, and Nelson, all rolled into one, with an 
 additional seasoning of Faulknor, Sidney Smith, and 
 ' brave ' Broke. Bartiana are innumerable ; and he has 
 been the subject of as much fable and as wild romance 
 as Arthur or Charlemagne. Possibly enough some 
 Englishmen have thus been led to look on his very 
 existence as a myth. This, however, is a mistake. He 
 was, in his day, a very real personage, a bold seaman 
 and a successful cruiser; his services, as such, were 
 acknowledged and rewarded by the king ; but his very 
 peculiar fame — which belongs principally to a later 
 period — is, I believe, due to his being of very humble 
 origin ; it was thus a glorification of the ' people ' that 
 afterwards claimed the attributive ' sovereign,' and a 
 protest against the imbecility and ignorance of some 
 courtly favourites of the ruling ' harlotocracy.' 
 
 Jean Bart, 1 a native of Dunkirk, and thus by birth a 
 subject of France, but by blood a countryman rather of 
 
 1 There are three lives of Jean Bart which have some pretensions to 
 being original works. One by Richer, published in 1776, which is little 
 more than a collection of floating legends. One by Eugene Sue, published 
 in 1835 under the imposing title of Histoire de la Marine frangaise i 
 which is in reality an absurd romance ; the author's part of the work 
 scarcely pretends to be authentic, but it contains a number of original 
 papers, letters, and reports, which are really valuable. The third is that 
 by Vanderest, published in 1840; undoubtedly the best, though far 
 indeed from perfect. All others (and they are very numerous) are based 
 on these, mostly on Bicher ; they appear as iloges, chapbooks or volumes 
 in libraries for the young, and have no historical value whatever. 
 
270 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 the Tromps and De Euyter, was born in 1650, of poor 
 but perhaps not too honest parents : his father and his 
 grandfather before him followed the sea; privateers — 
 not without a taint of piracy — in time of war, as French- 
 men, or Dutchmen, against Spain ; and in time of peace, 
 fishermen, coasting traders, and apparently smugglers. 
 In some such employment Jean Bart spent his early 
 years ; but in 1665 or 1666 he is said to have taken 
 service with the Dutch, and, if tradition may be accepted, 
 under the personal command of De Euyter himself. In 
 this there is nothing improbable ; he was certainly more 
 Dutch than French; and there is no difficulty in the 
 way of our believing that he was present in one or both 
 of the actions of 1666, and at the burning of the English 
 ships in the Medway in 1667. He continued in the 
 Dutch service for six years ; he is said to have risen in it 
 to the rank of lieutenant, which is possible, and — as he 
 was a bold man and a thorough seaman^-not improbable. 
 I accept, then, the statements that he learned his early 
 seamanship, that he acquired his intimate knowledge of 
 the coasts and tides of the North Sea as a fisherman 
 and a smuggler ; and that he gained his first experience 
 of naval war and naval discipline under De Euyter. 
 
 When war between France and Holland broke out in 
 1672, his double nationality pulled each way; but he 
 elected to be a Frenchman. As by blood and by six 
 years' service he was a Dutchman, it is not, perhaps, too 
 uncharitable to suppose that the commerce of the Dutch, 
 incomparably richer than that of the French, was the 
 lure that decided his choice ; that it seemed to offer more 
 direct profit and advantage ; whilst, on the other hand, 
 he would have, as a Frenchman, fewer rivals. That 
 
JEAN BAET. 271; 
 
 this is the correct view of his conduct would appear 
 more probable from the fact that, on returning to France, 
 he did not seek for service under the crown, although 
 the young navy was then mustering its strength to send 
 forth the squadron which, under D'Estrees, was effec- 
 tively, or in appearance, united with the English during 
 the campaigns of 1672 and 1673. On the contrary, he 
 entered on board a Dunkirk privateer, where he saw a 
 better opening for his talents, and served in a subordi- 
 nate capacity for two years ; it was not till 1674 that he 
 was entrusted with a small command. Here he quickly 
 came to the front, and till the end of the war continued 
 actively cruising against his former associates, in com- 
 pany with others, like himself, of doubtful nationality — 
 men with such names as Keyser, Jacobsen, Doom, or 
 one, if not three, that appears in French travestied as 
 Hennarker, Mesmaker, or Neumarker. 
 
 That his cruising was fairly successful may be as- 
 sumed. Some of his prizes are spoken of as frigates — 
 whether state's ships or privateers is uncertain ; and 
 though he seems thoroughly to have understood the im- 
 portant tactical axiom that ' two are greater than one,' 
 and with the help of Keyser, Jacobsen, or others, to have 
 taken care to be in the majority at the point of attack, 
 we may easily believe that he had numerous opportunities 
 of proving his courage and determination, as well as his 
 forethought and tactical skill. Especial mention is made 
 of his capturing the Neptune, of 30 guns, and the Palme, 
 of 24, a feat which, added to others before it, brought 
 his name to the notice of the minister. On 18 Sep- 
 tember, 1676, Colbert wrote to the superintendent of 
 Dunkirk : — 
 
272 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 His Majesty has been pleased to learn that a Dunkirk 
 privateer, commanded by Captain Jean Bart, has taken a 
 Dutch man-of-war of thirty-two guns. As it is important to 
 stimulate these captains to continue the war which they wage 
 against the Dutch, herein is enclosed a gold chain, which his 
 Majesty has thought fit to award to Captain Bart, as a recom- 
 pense for what he has done. 
 
 The letter then continues : 
 
 As his Majesty might derive considerable advantages from 
 these privateer captains of Dunkirk, if they would form them- 
 selves into a squadron under the command of one of their 
 number, in order to carry on the war against the enemy, his 
 Majesty desires you to forward a nominal list of the captains, 
 with a report as to their several characters and capabilities, 
 a statement of what they have done during the war, and of 
 the size and efficiency of their ships : and also to ascertain 
 whether, in return for such aid as his Majesty might be able 
 to give them, as, for instance, by furnishing them with ships 
 for the cruise, free of payment, or by offering other advan- 
 tages, they could be induced to carry out the plan • above 
 mentioned. 
 
 To this, on 24 September, the superintendent replied 
 that, if such a scheme should be carried out, he believed 
 most of the privateers would willingly serve under Bart, 
 who, though still young, had won a high reputation 
 amongst them by his bravery and success. ' But,' he 
 added, ' on whatever service they are ordered, their 
 actions will depend on their own interest, and I think 
 that they will be ready to receive and requite the assist- 
 ance his Majesty proposes. At any rate, it will induce 
 them, when cruising, to consider ships of war as a special 
 object of attack.' And a few days later, 28 September, 
 after more exact inquiries, he wrote : — 
 
JEAN BART. 273 
 
 The thing still seems to me feasible, if the proper measures 
 are taken with the merchants and the seamen, who are always 
 mistrustful of engagements for the service of his Majesty. If 
 you are prepared to lend the king's ships without payment, I 
 would recommend that one should be put at the disposal of 
 Captain Bart and his owners, who have lost by his last 
 voyage, and who now ask, as a recompense for the capture of 
 the Dutch man-of-war, the remittal of the claim of the ad- 
 miralty, instead of the regulation grant of five hundred livres 
 per gun. If this should be allowed, it will put into the heads 
 of other owners to desire the same, and thus to give in to your 
 ideas of utilising them. All the rest will be easy. 
 
 To this is appended an exact list of thirty-three pri- 
 vateer captains belonging to Dunkirk, with fifteen frigates 
 and twelve smaller craft. 
 
 Colbert's design, however, fell through, whether from 
 jealousy amongst the shipowners and the several cap- 
 tains, or because the government was not prepared to 
 pay what these; would have considered an equivalent for 
 giving up the more lucrative branch of privateering to 
 follow the more warlike ; and thus Jean Bart continued, 
 in company for the most part with his friend Keyser, to 
 cruise against the Dutch for the private advantage of 
 himself and his owners. 
 
 After the peace of 1678, he received a commission as 
 lieutenant in the navy, which he is said to have accepted 
 unwillingly, preferring to be the captain of his own 
 ship, if only a privateer, rather than a lieutenant, even of 
 a king's ship. It was urged on him that he would pro- 
 bably be a captain at the end of a year. ' I'm a captain 
 already,' he answered. ' Of a king's ship ? ' was sug- 
 gested. ' Of a Dunkirk privateer,' was his reply. In 
 point of fact, Bart probably knew very well the discom- 
 
274 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 forts to which he would have been subjected, had he 
 consented to leave the social rank to which he was born 
 and bred, to enter one whose restraints his rough temper 
 would have felt to be unbearable. He thus never served 
 in the subordinate capacity, but in 1681 was appointed 
 by a certain M. Omaer, a shipowner of Dunkirk, to the 
 command of a small squadron which he fitted out 
 against the Salee pirates. The expedition was, however, 
 so far sanctioned by the government that it hired out 
 the frigate Vipere to M. Omaer, and allowed Bart his 
 pay as a lieutenant. Bart applied for pay as a com- 
 mander (capitaine de frigate), but this was refused. On 
 3 June he put to sea in the Vipere, with two smaller 
 ships, and off the mouth of the Tagus fell in with the 
 frigate Mutine, commanded by M. de Bethune, a captain 
 in the navy (capitaine de vaisseau), who took Bart's little 
 squadron under his orders, and a few days later drove 
 two of the Salee rovers ashore on the coast of Portugal. 
 The pirates were seized on shore by the Portuguese, who 
 made slaves of them, and at first refused to give them 
 up, a refusal which drew forth a letter, 6 August, from 
 Colbert to the French ambassador at Lisbon : — 
 
 The King understands that the Chevalier de Bethune and 
 the commandbr of the Dunkirk frigates, having met two Salee 
 vessels, engaged them, and drove them ashore, one near Cape 
 Mondego, the other at some other place on the coast ; and as 
 the Turks who were on board these vessels clearly belong to 
 those who defeated and reduced them to this extremity, his 
 Majesty orders me to acquaint you that it is his desire that 
 you represent this to the Prince of Portugal, and earnestly 
 move him to be pleased to give the necessary orders to have 
 the said Turks given up to the Chevalier de Bethune and the 
 Dunkirk commander. 
 
JEAN BART. 2 "5 
 
 From all which it appears that Lieutenant Bart's 
 share in the transaction, such as it was, was merely of 
 secondary importance, and very different from what his 
 eulogists — ignoring M. de Bethune and the Mutine 
 frigate — have represented it to be. 1 Amidst the tissue 
 of fiction woven round Bart's history, it is refreshing to 
 come across a passage of which the late M. Jal has given 
 us an authentic account. 
 
 Bart's cruise was of no long duration ; on 15 Oc- 
 tober he arrived back at Dunkirk, peace having been 
 made with the Moors ; and during the next seven years 
 would seem to have been erigaged in the peaceful pur- 
 suits of commerce, though he is said to have been em- 
 ployed during the autumn of 1683 in giving effect to the 
 aggressive policy of Louis XIV, and, whilst cruising in 
 the Serpente frigate, to have seized on a Spanish ship 
 laden with 350 soldiers for Flanders. This is doubtful ; 
 but it is at any rate certain that for a few months in the 
 following spring he did command the Serpente, then 
 one of a small squadron which, under M. d'Amblimont, 
 cruised for the protection of the coasting trade against 
 the Ostend privateers. 2 His commission as commander 
 (capitaine de frigate) was dated 14 August, 1686; but he 
 had no further service under the government until the 
 breaking out of the war with Holland and Erjgland, 
 when he was appointed to the frigate Bailleuse, of 24 
 guns. 
 
 In the early days of this command he is said to have 
 been guilty of an act of the most unmitigated brutality, 
 
 1 Jal's Abraham Du Quesne et la Marine de son temps, ii. 390. 
 
 2 Ibid. ii. 479. M. Jal clearly does not attach any credit to the story 
 of the Spanish transport : I am inclined to think it true in fact, but 
 that M. Vanderest has wrongly dated it. 
 
 T 2 
 
276 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 which even modern French writers have professed to 
 admire, as worthy, they say, of the heroic virtue of a 
 Brutus or a Manlius. In an engagement with a Dutch 
 privateer, his son Cornil, a child of ten years old, showed 
 symptoms of fear. Enraged at such behaviour in a 
 child of his, Bart, with his own hands, bound the boy 
 to the mainmast, and kept him there so long as the 
 fight lasted, preferring to expose his son thus to the 
 greatest danger, rather than permit him to survive as a 
 coward. We may not quite see the greater bodily danger 
 to which the boy was exposed, though there can be little 
 doubt of the mental ; but, in point of fact, there is no 
 reason to suppose that the story has a word of truth in 
 it. There is absolutely no evidence in support of it, 
 beyond some hearsay gossip that Bicher picked up and 
 printed nearly a hundred years afterwards. It was 
 then, as it has been ever since, the aim to describe Bart 
 as a brutal ruffian, a character which had unspeakable 
 charms for the Jacobin spirit then latent, but shortly to 
 attain such a terrible development. 
 
 The events of the following summer are more his- 
 torical. In the early spring Bart was directed to take 
 under his command the Chevalier Forbin in the Ser- 
 pente, and to go to Havre, thence to convoy a number 
 of ships to Brest. Forbin was an officer of the aristo- 
 cratic navy, a brave man and a good seaman, but boast- 
 ful to an extreme degree, full of contempt for all ' blues,' 
 mixed with hatred of the particular one under whose 
 orders he was now put, or — as he would have preferred 
 to say — with whom he was associated. His memoirs, 
 written professedly by himself, and certainly under his 
 direct sanction, are most amusing, but very far from 
 
JEAN BART. 277 
 
 trustworthy. 1 The reputed author assumes to himself 
 throughout the principal part in every adventure of 
 which he had a share, and loses no opportunity of say- 
 ing spiteful things of his companions, especially of Jean 
 Bart, whom he describes as tall, stout, well-made, but 
 of mean presence, rude in manner and in speech, unable 
 to read, or write beyond signing his name ; brave, indeed, 
 but without talent, and quite unequal to any compre- 
 hensive design. The memoirs of Forbin would, by 
 themselves, be of little historical value, but they become 
 useful when compared with other records, and on their 
 negative evidence full dependence may be placed. When 
 they omit a story that tells in favour of Forbin, or to 
 the discredit of Jean Bart, the omission amounts almost 
 to proof of that story's falsehood. 
 
 It was in May, 1689, whilst convoying some twenty 
 merchant vessels to Brest, that these two were met off 
 the Casquets by the Nonsuch, of 48 guns, commanded 
 by Captain Boomecoyle. They vainly attempted to per- 
 suade the convoy to stand by them and make a good fight. 
 The merchant ships fled, and the Bailleuse and Serpente 
 were taken after a stout resistance, in which the captain 
 and master of the Nonsuch were killed, the command 
 devolving upon the boatswain, Bobert Sincock, who took 
 the prizes into Plymouth, and was shortly afterwards 
 promoted to the rank of captain. Bart and Forbin were 
 meantime put in prison ; but, as their good luck had it, 
 a kinsman of Bart's, commanding an Ostend vessel — 
 probably a small privateer — put into Plymouth, and being 
 
 1 Memoires du Comte de Forbim, Chef d'Escadre, Chevalier de l'Ordre 
 Militaire de St. Louis. 2 vols. 12mo. Amst. 1729. They are reprinted 
 in the Petitot collection. 
 
278 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 informed of Bart's condition, went to see him. He was 
 easily persuaded to assist in a project to escape, the more 
 readily as Forbin had been able to get a bill cashed, and 
 had plenty of ready money. A Flemish surgeon who had 
 been allowed to visit them, and two boys told off to attend 
 on them, were also made parties to the plot. The Ostender 
 had a boat ready for them, with provisions and a compass. 
 The surgeon got them a file ; they filed away the bars of 
 the window, twisted their sheets into a rope, and went 
 down. There was no further obstacle, and they embarked 
 without delay. In going out through the Sound they 
 were hailed by a man-of-war, near which they were 
 obliged to pass. Bart could speak sufficient English, and 
 answered ' Fishing-boat ! ' and so they got clear out to 
 sea. The weather was fine, though foggy, and without 
 further adventure they made the coast of Bretagne, near 
 St. Malo, after a passage of nearly forty-eight hours, 
 Bart having rowed the whole time without resting except 
 to snatch a mouthful of food. 
 
 Their bold defence and their hazardous escape com- 
 mended them to M. de Seignelay, the minister of the 
 navy, and they were both promoted to be captains 
 (capitaines de vaisseau) ; nor was it long before further 
 employment was found for them. In December, Bart 
 was appointed to the Alcyon, a frigate of 30 guns, which 
 during the next year was attached to the grand fleet 
 under Tourville, and was present at the battle off Beachy 
 Head. This seems to have been his only service with 
 the fleet. During the rest of the war he was employed 
 strictly as a cruiser in the North Sea, slipping in and out 
 of Dunkirk with a skill and craftiness that set the watchful 
 care of his enemies at defiance. These evasions were so 
 
JEAN BART. 279 
 
 numerous that it is difficult, if not impossible, to dis- 
 tinguish them ; but in no one instance were they made 
 by force. I note this specially, as giving the direct lie to 
 one of the silliest and most absurd of the stock stories of 
 his biographers. It is said that, on going to court, the 
 king asked him how he had got out of Dunkirk. On this, 
 he ranged some dozen of the gentlemen standing round 
 in a crowd before him ; then suddenly rushing into the 
 thick of them, knocking down some, tripping up others, 
 or violently elbowing them on one side, he passed through, 
 and turning round, said, ' That's the way I did it.' And 
 we are gravely called on to believe that the king laughed 
 approvingly at this outrage, and that the gentlemen of 
 his court tamely endured it. Our conception of a French 
 gentleman at the end of the seventeenth century is widely 
 far of the mark if such conduct would not have ensured 
 M. Bart's being spitted on one of a dozen small swords 
 before the day was an hour older. 
 
 Although it is not exactly stated, it is implied by 
 Eicher, whom all follow, that this incident took place 
 after his cruise of 1691. Now, in this cruise he was 
 accompanied by Forbin, who has given us an account of 
 it that, in many details, is worthy of belief. If by any 
 stretch of conscience Forbin could have boasted that they 
 passed out by force, or even with any risk of it, he would 
 certainly have done so. What he says is — 
 
 We put to sea in the night-time, passed without any obstacle 
 through intervals between the enemy, and sailing very well, 
 were by daybreak out of sight of them. Towards the next 
 evening we saw four sail steering the same course. Bart was 
 at first of opinion that these were enemy's ships, detached from 
 the blockading squadron in pursuit of us ; but I pointed out to 
 
280 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 him that, as we had been out of sight of the enemy in the 
 morning, as our ships were clean and all fast sailers, and as 
 we had been carrying a press of sail all day, it was quite 
 impossible for any of the blockaders to have thus gained on us. 
 
 They were, in fact, he says, three English merchant 
 ships, under convoy of a 44-gun ship, all of which they 
 took and sent into Bergen. They then came across the 
 Dutch herring-fleet, with a man-of-war, which they took 
 and burnt ; afterwards landed on the coast of Scotland 
 and burnt some houses, but were driven off by the yeo- 
 manry, and so went on to join their prizes at Bergen. 
 In all this, allowing for Forbin's exaggeration and bragga- 
 docio, there is nothing in the least unlikely ; but none of 
 our naval histories mention the circumstances of the 
 cruise further than Burchett, who has shortly — 
 
 About this time — the end of July — fifteen or sixteen 
 privateers got out of Dunkirk, and ranging along the northern 
 coast, under command of Monsieur Du Bart, landed in North- 
 umberland, where they burnt a house of the Lord Widdrington's 
 and did some other mischiefs. 
 
 Burchett is generally correct, so far as he goes; but it 
 appears from Hodgson's ' History of Northumberland ' 
 that it was in 1693 that the French burnt some cottages 
 belonging to Lord Widdrington, though it is possible 
 enough that they paid two visits to that remote and 
 exposed neighbourhood. 
 
 Bergen is the scene, and this autumn of 1691 is there- 
 fore the time of another absurdity of Bart's biographers. 
 He made there, says Bicher, the acquaintance of an 
 Englishman commanding a large ship, who expressed 
 the great desire he had to meet him at sea. This Bart 
 assured him would be quite easy, if he chose to wait a few 
 
JEAN BABT. 281 
 
 days, which the Englishman agreed to do. When he was 
 ready, he therefore sent the Englishman word that he 
 would sail the next day, who answered, with all his heart, 
 but meantime invited Jean Bart to breakfast. At first, 
 unwilling to interchange any such civilities with an 
 enemy, Jean Bart refused ; afterwards, however, he 
 consented, and went on board. He breakfasted, drank 
 his glass of brandy, smoked his pipe, and said, 'It's time 
 to go.' Said the Englishman, ' No : you're my prisoner. 
 I have pledged my word to carry you to England.' Jean 
 Bart, with a look of rage and indignation, lighted his 
 match, and rushed out of the cabin, upsetting some of the 
 crew who were in his way, and calling out, ' No ! I am 
 not your prisoner ! I will blow up the ship.' So saying, 
 and holding the lighted match, he ran to a barrel of 
 powder which they had, by chance, hoisted up out of the 
 magazine. This barrel, we may suppose also by chance, 
 must have been open. The English crew, in this immi- 
 nent danger, were panic-struck, and the Frenchmen from 
 the neighbouring ships, having heard Jean Bart's cry, at 
 once took boat, came on board in numbers, cut down 
 many of the English, made the rest prisoners, and took 
 possession of the ship, which they carried out of the 
 neutral port and brought safely to Dunkirk. 
 
 It is unnecessary to dwell on the numerous absurdities 
 of such a story : it is sufficient to say thai Forbin, who 
 dwells in some detail on their stay in Bergen, does not 
 speak of it. We may be quite sure that if they had 
 captured an English ship of war there, or an English 
 ship of any kind, Forbin would have described himself as 
 the captor; that if there had been anywhere an open 
 barrel of powder, Forbin's would have been the hand 
 
282 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 that held the match. On their return from this expedi- 
 tion, the two presented themselves at Court. ' Here comes 
 Forbin with his bear,' said the courtiers, according to 
 Forbin. If the bear had been guilty of any distinct 
 barbarism, Forbin would certainly have told us of it ; and 
 this negative evidence is, I have already said, positive 
 proof that Bart did not engage the gentlemen-in-waiting 
 in fisticuffs, nor insist on smoking in the anteroom. 
 
 It would be tedious, as well as difficult, to follow out 
 in detail M. Bart's numerous cruises, in all of which, 
 either by ruse or good fortune, he eluded our blockading 
 squadrons. But his principal achievements were against 
 the Dutch. In the summer of 1694, in command of a 
 squadron of six ships, ranging from one of 54 guns 
 downwards, he encountered a similar Dutch force, which 
 had made prize of a large grain-fleet destined for France. 
 This squadron he engaged, captured two of the ships of 
 war, recaptured the convoy, and in a season of great 
 scarcity, brought the grain safely in. It was in acknow- 
 ledgment of this service that he received letters of nobility, 
 and was made Chevalier of the Order of St. Louis. 
 
 In 1695, when the English fleet under Lord Berkeley 
 made an unavailing attack on Dunkirk, Bart commanded 
 one of the forts, and took a prominent part in the defence ; 
 but perhaps his most brilliant exploit was in the summer 
 of 1696. In May of that year it became known in England 
 that Monsieur du Bart — as he was always called on this 
 side of the water — was preparing to sail from Dunkirk 
 with a squadron of nine ships. It was of course an 
 object to prevent him ; the port was closely blockaded by 
 a large force, English and Dutch, of which Bear-Admiral 
 Benbow had the command. Benbow, in his boat, went 
 
JEAN BART. 283 
 
 almost into the harbour ; found that the enemy was ready 
 for sea, and, from the wind and tide, was led to suppose 
 that they would attempt to go out by the north passage. 
 He took his measures accordingly. The next day was 
 hazy; when the fog lifted on the following morning, Bart 
 and his ships were not to be seen. They had slipped out 
 through the east passage. To look for them was a vain 
 task. On 30 May the English admiral learnt that Bart 
 had been seen to the northward ; he wished to follow ; but 
 the Dutch contingent, having been put under his orders 
 for the blockade of Dunkirk, refused to go with him else- 
 where. Bart meantime was on the Dogger Bank, in the 
 neighbourhood of which, on 18 June, he fell in with a fleet 
 of seventy Dutch merchant ships, under convoy of five 
 ships of war, of inferior force. These last he captured 
 and burnt, dispersed the convoy, and took some thirty of 
 them. He was interrupted by the approach of a large 
 fleet of what seemed to be men-of-war. If they really 
 were so, they must have been Dutch ; for Benbow spent 
 the summer vainly looking for him. Bart, like a will-o'- 
 the-wisp, seemed to be everywhere, except where he was 
 heard of. It was not till the middle of September that 
 Benbow succeeded in getting a distant view of the object 
 of his search, and then the pursuit was to little purpose ; 
 his only satisfaction was that by falling in the day before 
 with a number of English and Dutch East Indiamen, he 
 had kept them out of the Frenchman's clutches. After 
 this Bart returned into Dunkirk, and laid up for the 
 winter ; but his services were considered deserving of 
 special recognition. He was promoted to the rank of 
 commodore (chef d'escadre) in a letter from the king, 
 which, in no commonplace manner, praises his bravery 
 
284 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 and conduct, ' as having been useful to the state during 
 the scarcity of provisions,' and adds, 'that after having 
 entrusted him at different times with the command of our 
 squadrons in the North Sea, in which he has acquitted 
 himself to the advantage and glory of our arms, it is just 
 to join to the duties of commodore, the rank also, and 
 the privileges.' This is dated 1 April, 1697, and may be 
 considered as closing his peculiar career. His only service 
 in the new rank was the conveying the Prince de Conti, 
 a candidate for the throne of Poland, to Dantzic, in the 
 following September. 
 
 M. Jal, at once the most learned and the most accurate 
 of French naval historians, assures us that Bart carefully 
 selected his squadron, taking with him none but light 
 fast-sailing ships, because he knew that the important 
 mission was entrusted to his reason and prudence rather 
 than to his courage; and that thus he passed without 
 misadventure through those seas where the English and 
 Dutch were cruising. 1 The voyage is, in fact, now and 
 to us, principally remarkable as affording a text for what 
 is perhaps the most absurd of the many absurd stories 
 which are supposed to illustrate Bart's character. During 
 the passage, it is said, his little squadron was chased by 
 the enemy's fleet. Bart, as soon as they were reported, 
 called his son, the same whom eight years before he had 
 bound to the mainmast, and who, thanks to that rude 
 lesson, was now fit for any service, however desperate— 
 and gave him whispered instructions. The chase con- 
 tinued for eight hours — from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. is specified — 
 at the end of which time the enemy was no longer in 
 sight. Bart then went down to the cabin, where the prince, 
 
 1 Dictionnaire Critique, s.v. Conti; 
 
JBAN BART. 285 
 
 knowing nothing of the day's excitement — though it 
 had lasted over breakfast and dinner time — was quietly 
 sitting. 
 
 ' You've had a narrow escape, Monseigneur,' said he. 
 
 ' What do you mean ? ' asked the prince. 
 
 ' Why,' answered Bart, ' that we've been chased by 
 three 80-gun ships and nine frigates; we've run them 
 out of sight, and there's nothing more to fear.' 
 
 ' The devil ! Monsieur Bart : but if they had taken us ? ' 
 
 ' Oh, Monseigneur, that was quite impossible.' 
 
 ' Eh ! what ? why impossible ? ' 
 
 ' Because,' answered Bart, ' I had stationed my brave 
 Cornil in the gun-room with a lighted match, and strict 
 orders to put it into the powder if we should be over- 
 powered.' 
 
 ' Good heavens ! ' cried the prince, ' you would never 
 have done such a thing ! ' 
 
 ' Certainly I would have done it,' said Bart. 'It shall 
 never be said that I let you be taken, when the king 
 ordered me to take care that you were not taken.' 
 
 This story, utterly absurd and entirely without foun- 
 dation, is supposed to illustrate the unflinching and de- 
 sperate courage of the man ; many other stories equally 
 absurd, equally without foundation, have the same ten- 
 dency. French writers and gossipmongers have chosen 
 to represent him as of the most reckless courage, d'une 
 bouillante intrepidite, which went headlong against all odds, 
 with uncalculating impetuosity. The other side of his 
 character, according to the same illustrations, was a 
 violence of manner, a coarseness and indecency of lan- 
 guage, which have rendered his name almost proverbial, 
 and more especially won the affections of the sans-culottes 
 
286 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 of the Eevolution. For these stories there is no historical 
 evidence ; they are absurd, improbable, impossible on the 
 very face of them ; but I reject them, in the mass, not 
 for their absurdity, improbability, or impossibility, but 
 because there is no trace of them for more than fifty 
 years after Commodore Bart's death, which happened, 
 peacefully in 1702, just as the new war was breaking out. 
 It is these absurd inventions which have stood in the way 
 of Bart's fame; people, English people especially, have 
 doubted the worth of the hero of such fables. But putting 
 on one side everything which is not historical, his repu- 
 tation will rise far higher ; he will then appear, not as a 
 coarse, imbruted ruffian, but as a bold seaman, a skilful 
 pilot, and a daring warrior ; of undaunted courage, but 
 crafty and prudent, rather than blindly ferocious ; illite- 
 rate, it may be, but not uneducated ; rude in speech and 
 gesture, but not bestial ; in fact, neither god, nor devil, 
 nor baboon ; an enemy, but still a man. 
 
 Of Bart's personal appearance I can say nothing 
 beyond what Porbin has told us, which should, perhaps, 
 be read with the most favourable interpretation. There 
 are, indeed, pictures of him in existence ; whether contem- 
 porary or not, I am unable to say ; but, judging of them 
 from prints I have seen, they differ so widely from each 
 other, that it is utterly impossible they can all be likenesses. 
 In his private capacity he seems to have been amiable 
 and domestic; a fond husband and an affectionate father. 
 He was twice married, and left a numerous offspring, 
 whose descendants still keep alive in France his deservedly 
 honoured name. 
 
287 
 
 CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 THE FRENCH PRIVATEERS. 
 
 II. DU GTJAY-TROUIN. 1 
 
 If we put on one side the peculiar and more than half- 
 mythical history of Jean Bart, there is perhaps no officer 
 of the French navy whose fame has taken deeper hold of 
 the popular fancy than Du Guay-Trouin. It is certainly 
 more widely spread than that of Tourville, Gallissonniere, 
 or Suffren, any one of whom a critical judgment might 
 pronounce superior to him in the qualities of high com- 
 mand. Tourville, although, indeed, with a considerable 
 superiority of force, won, off Beachy Head, the one decisive 
 French victory over a fleet of which the English formed 
 a chief part ; Gallissonniere, by cool skill and cautious 
 bravery, turned the blundering and the negligence of 
 his antagonist to good effect, and was the real captor of 
 Minorca ; and Suffren, in the East Indies, distinguished 
 above all his compeers by his audacious and restless 
 energy, showed himself in tactical genius the direct pre- 
 cursor of our own Nelson. But though history acknow- 
 ledges these as the greatest names in the French naval 
 chronicle, and though the names of large ironclads or 
 
 1 Fraser's Magazine, April, 1882. 
 
288 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 cruisers keep alive among seamen the memory of their 
 distinguished services, to the intelligence of the great 
 mass of the people their fame is, as I understand it, at a 
 far lower pitch than that of Du Guay-Trouin. This may, 
 to some extent, be due to the fact that Du Guay-Trouin's 
 exploits had about them an adventurous and personal 
 character which was wanting to those of the other officers 
 I have named. Suffren, for instance, served principally 
 on board ships of the line and in large fleets ; he never 
 held any independent command, never was employed on 
 detached service, until, as a commodore, he sailed for 
 the East Indies. Du Guay-Trouin, oh the other hand, 
 never served except as his own commander-in-chief. 
 Whether the force with him was large or small, it 
 was his ; his personality thus pervades the whole of his 
 career, and renders him the one prominent feature in 
 every action in which he had part. This circumstance 
 had undoubtedly a very great influence in the spreading, 
 or rather — if I may use a French word which has no 
 exact English equivalent — in the vulgarisation of his 
 fame ; but much is still due to the fact that the man 
 was sprung from the ranks of the people, was amongst 
 naval officers a ' blue,' and nothing but a ' blue.' This 
 appealed to the secret instincts of a large body of the 
 people ; and when Hawke or Boscawen or Eodney were 
 capturing or destroying the king's fleets, and banging l 
 the aristocrats who commanded them, it was pleasing to 
 the unwitting fathers of future republicans to remember 
 that the time had been when an officer whom the aris- 
 tocrats looked on with scorn, had reversed the fortune of 
 
 1 This is the word used by a naval minstrel of last century. See 
 post, p. 326. 
 
DU GUAY-TKOUIN. 289 
 
 the great game, and had shown that the English might 
 possibly be beaten, even at sea. 1 
 
 For at least a couple of centuries the Trouins had held 
 a leading place amongst the merchants and shipowners 
 of St. Malo, and for many successive generations some 
 member of the family had been French consul at Malaga. 
 In the third quarter of the seventeenth century this 
 office was held by Bene Trouin, the younger brother of 
 Luc Trouin, who owned and commanded a ship named 
 La Vierge sans Macule, a privateer in time of war, a 
 trader, chiefly to the Spanish ports, in time of peace. 
 He possessed also a small landed property, La Barbinais, 
 from which according to custom, he took a distinguishing 
 name. This Luc Trouin de la Barbinais had married a 
 young Maloine, Marguerite Boscher, whose name, how- 
 ever, would seem to tell of a German or Dutch ancestry, 
 and by her had sons and daughters. Luc, the eldest 
 son, was destined to succeed his father in the somewhat 
 mixed business which he carried on ; the second, Bodolphe, 
 died young ; the third, Bene, named after his uncle and 
 godfather, the consul at Malaga, was born on 10 June, 
 
 1 The principal authority for the life of Du Guay-Trouin is his own 
 Mimoires, published at Amsterdam in 1748, and since then in the 
 Petitot collection. The memoir by Cunat (Saint-Malo illustri par ses 
 marins, p. 170) is also a valuable, and in many respects an independent 
 work ; that by Landelle is a mere compilation. Since this sketch was 
 originally written, another and interesting work has been published, 
 Duguay -Trouin et Saint-Malo, la CiU Corsaire, d'apres des documents 
 inedits, par l'Abbe M. J. Poulain. A close comparison of the Mimoires 
 with our own histories, and with our unpublished records, has led me 
 to form a very high opinion of Du Guay-Trouin' s truthfulness : a certain 
 partiality or occasional exaggeration he may have yielded to, but 
 assuredly not to such an extent as our own historians, who had no 
 excuse but that of paltry and ill-timed 'spread-eagleism.' The name 
 is foreign : the vice is not— I grieve to say— un-English. 
 
 U 
 
290 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 1673. There were two still younger, Etienne and 
 Nicolas. 
 
 In accordance with the old and still prevalent custom 
 of France, Bene was entrusted to the nursing care of a 
 peasant woman living in the village of Le Gue, nigh to 
 the paternal estate, a simple circumstance which led to 
 his being afterwards known as Trouin du Gue, a name 
 which was gradually corrupted till it became Du Guay- 
 Trouin, and so, in his later years, he himself wrote it, 
 though officially he was Bene Trouin du Guay. As the 
 consul at Malaga enjoyed the friendship of the arch- 
 bishop, it was determined that his interest should be 
 used in favour of his godson, who was accordingly, at 
 an early age, sent to the college at Bennes, where his 
 young head was duly tonsured, and his neck encircled 
 with the little collar of the divinity student. Bene, 
 whose infancy had been passed on the wharf and 
 amongst the ships of St. Malo, and who had already 
 pictured himself a sailor, objected strongly to the process, 
 but in vain. Old Luc had a strong will, a keen eye to the 
 family interest, and had quite made up his mind that, 
 for his son number three, the clerical would be a profit- 
 able line of business. He died, however, in the spring 
 of 1688, and, as his brother at Malaga had died the year 
 defore, young Bene's mother so far yielded to her son's 
 objection to the church as to allow him to exchange it for 
 the law. The lad was therefore sent to Caen, where his 
 studies took the form of fencing, brawling, love-making, 
 and drinking. It was his ambition to fight a duel, and in 
 two or three he succeeded in getting himself duly pinked, 
 so that his time was pretty fairly divided between the 
 preliminary dissipation and the resulting sick-bed. He 
 
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 291 
 
 made the acquaintance of a professional gambler, ' a 
 capital fellow,' who taught him how to control fortune, 
 ' but,' he adds, ' of these lessons I never made any bad 
 use.' He assisted an older comrade in the abduction of 
 a young girl, and finally, having got possession of some 
 twenty louis, set off to Paris for a spree. Fortunately 
 for the lad, his elder brother, Luc, now De la Barbinais, 
 who had succeeded his uncle in the consulship at 
 Malaga, had been driven home by the outbreak of war 
 between Spain and France. He was thus in Paris 
 when Bene came there, and the boy, accidentally 
 hearing his brother's name, took fright, and forthwith 
 fled back to Caen. Here De la Barbinais found him a 
 few days later, and having been informed of his irre- 
 gular, not to say vicious line of life, took him home, 
 convened a family meeting to consider his case, and 
 straightway packed him off to sea on board the Trinite, 
 a so-called frigate of eighteen guns, fitting out as a priva- 
 teer by the house of Trouin. He was then just turned 
 sixteen. 
 
 It was the summer of 1689. War had broken out 
 with England and Holland, in addition to Spain. Pri- 
 vateering promised to be active, and Bene Trouin found 
 himself engaged in a life which offered all the charms of 
 excitement and adventure. He had fallen on his true 
 vocation, and, during this autumn of 1689 and the next 
 year, won golden opinions from the officers to whose care 
 he was entrusted ; so much so that in the spring of 1691 
 his brother, De la Barbinais, the head of the house, 
 judged him fit to command one of their cruisers. He 
 was thus barely eighteen, and had been at sea not more 
 than nine or ten months in all, when he was appointed 
 
 v 2 
 
292 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 captain of the Danycan 1 of 14 guns. His popular 
 biographers attribute this speedy promotion to his sur- 
 passing merit. Without questioning this merit, we 
 would rather attribute it simply to his relationship to 
 the head of the firm ; for to talk of his being under the 
 circumstances a thorough seaman is downright nonsense. 
 The Danycan had no sooner got to sea than she was 
 caught by a gale of wind and blown right out of the 
 Channel. She managed, however, without any great 
 harm, to put into the Shannon, where, as the storm 
 moderated, Trouin landed in Clare, pillaged, burnt a 
 couple of vessels lying in the mud, and embarked again 
 in face of a detachment of troops from Limerick. The 
 remainder of his cruise was to no purpose. The Danycan 
 sailed so badly that she could not overtake anything, 
 and on her return to St. Malo her young captain was 
 transferred to the Coetquen, of 18 guns. In this he put 
 to sea on 4 June, 1692, having, it is said, a commission 
 from the ex-king of England, James II, and in company 
 with the Saint- Aaron, of similar force, commanded by a 
 certain Jacques Welch, the son of an Irishman settled 
 at St. Malo, 2 and now commissioned by King James. 
 These two ships cruising together presently fell in with 
 a large fleet of English merchantmen, of which they took 
 five and the two small men-of-war that formed their 
 escort. They were standing, with their prizes, for the 
 Breton coast, when they were chased by an English 
 squadron. The Saint-Aaron and the prizes got into 
 St. Malo, but the Coetquen's retreat was cut off, and she 
 
 1 The name of a family of St. Malo ship-owners and corsairs. Cunat, 
 St. Malo, de., p. 272. 
 
 2 Cunat, Saint-Mah, &o., p. 248. 
 
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 293 
 
 only escaped by running into the shoal water and in- 
 tricate passages inside the Isle of Brehat, and so into 
 the anchorage of Erqui, nine leagues to the westward. 
 Here the English ships could not follow, and in attempt- 
 ing to do so got into great danger. Trouin himself, 
 when he wished to come out, was sorely put to it, for 
 his pilot, and all the officers who might have taken his 
 place, had been killed or wounded. If, as he has re- 
 corded, he brought the ship out without previous know- 
 ledge and without assistance, it speaks vastly more for 
 his nerve and power of command than does the capturing 
 of dozens of defenceless merchantmen, or of the pitiful 
 small craft then employed to convoy them. It speaks 
 also of a wonderful instinct or intuition, and of a great 
 deal of good luck, for, as is shown on our modern charts, 
 the place is as nasty a one as a sailor would wish to see 
 his ship in. For the rest of the cruise he had the entire 
 charge. A storm drove him into the Bristol Channel. 
 He anchored under the lee of Lundy Island ; but pre- 
 sently an English ship of 60 guns was seen making for 
 the same shelter. The position of the Coetquen was 
 critical, but Trouin cut his cable, and went out on one 
 side of the island whilst the enemy was coming in on 
 the other.. It was some time before the line-of-battle 
 ship could get round and follow in chase. The Coetquen 
 sailed well, night came on, and she escaped ; and, after 
 capturing two West Indian ships laden with sugar, 
 Trouin returned to St. Malo. In this cruise he had 
 undoubtedly shown himself possessed of the ready wit 
 and presence of mind requisite for his adventurous pro- 
 fession. The strain which had been put upon him 
 enforced the lessons which were presented to him, and 
 
294 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 under such circumstances a man such as Bene Trouin 
 learns quickly. 
 
 Towards the end of the year his brother gave him 
 the command of the Profond, of 32 guns ; a king's ship 
 equipped for cruising on terms of partnership between 
 the government and the house of Trouin. The govern- 
 ment provided the ship with her rigging, naval stores, 
 and armament, receiving in return one-fourth of all 
 prizes. The merchants found the officers and men, 
 their pay and provisions. The ship, though built and 
 fitted as a man of war, was to all intents a privateer, 
 although probably better suited to the work than an old 
 merchant ship turned into a cruiser by the simple pro- 
 cess of putting a few guns on board. The Profond sailed 
 from Brest in the last days of December 1692 ; but she 
 proved a dull sailer, and her cruise was every way un- 
 successful and unfortunate. A Swedish man-of-war met 
 her in the night, mistook her for an Algerine pirate, 
 and engaged her warmly till daybreak ; fever broke out 
 amongst the crew ; she had eighty men sick ; and finally, 
 early in March, had to put into Lisbon in great distress. 
 On returning to Brest, Trouin was, in June, appointed 
 to the Hercule, of 28 guns, also a king's ship, fitted out 
 in the same way as the Profond, and after a fairly suc- 
 cessful cruise, came back to Brest in the end of the year. 
 His next ship, still on the same footing, was the Dili- 
 gente, of 36 guns and 250 men, in which he sailed from 
 Brest on 16 January, 1694, and after cruising for a 
 couple of months off Cape St. Vincent and the entrance 
 of the Straits, was joined in the Tagus by the Hercule, 
 now commanded, for the same owners, by a M. de la 
 Bouexiere, and having, as second captain — or, as we 
 
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 295 
 
 would say, first lieutenant — Trouin's cousin, Jacques 
 Boscher. Off Ushant they fell in with four Dutch mer- 
 chant ships, which would appear to have been East 
 Indiamen ; at any rate, they carried from twenty to 
 thirty guns ; and the one that was engaged by the Her- 
 cule succeeded in beating her off. The Diligente, of 
 greater force, and more daringly commanded, captured 
 the commodore of the squadron, but the others escaped. 
 The prize was sent in under the command of Boscher ; 
 and, Trouin separating himself from La Bouexiere, by 
 whose misconduct, cowardice, or ill-fortune he felt him- 
 self aggrieved, went for a solitary cruise in the English 
 Channel. 
 
 On 3 May he was chased by the Prince of Orange, of 
 60 guns, 1 and finding that the Diligente could leave her 
 at pleasure, he kept ahead under easy sail, flying the 
 English ensign, which, presently, by way of insult and 
 bravado, he tied up into a weft, thus making to his 
 pursuer the signal to ' come on board.' Hereupon the 
 Prince of Orange fired three or four guns at him, which 
 Trouin — who about this time began to be publicly called 
 Du Gue — returned, forgetting or careless of the fact that 
 
 1 A hired ship, but evidently of force, even if not quite of sixty guns. 
 She was on her way from Milford to Plymouth, with a fleet of colliers in 
 convoy, and her log for this day reads : — ' April 23 (O.S.). — This morn- 
 ing see a sail in the SSE, who came bearing down to us, which proved 
 to be a French privateer of fifty guns, who, finding how he wronged us 
 in sailing, played with us, we using our endeavour to speak with him, 
 firing several shot at him, and he too at us again, under English colours ; 
 but viewing us well, made sail from us, being, as I suppose, for pur- 
 chase which might be easierly gotten. Land's End, SE£E., 6 leagues.' 
 ' May 8 (O.S.). — Yesterday evening anchored in Plymouth Sound.' Her 
 captain at this time was Samuel Vincent, afterwards favourably known 
 in his association with Benbow in the West Indies. 
 
296 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 he was under English colours. And so they -separated* 
 But nine days later, on 12 May, the Diligente fell in 
 with a squadron of six ships of the line then cruising 
 between the Land's End and Cape Clear, which chased 
 her in amongst the Scilly Islands, and having shot away 
 her fore and main topmasts, captured her, notwith- 
 standing all the fine things Captain Trouin du Gue 
 meant to do if untoward fate had not prevented him. 
 The affair, as simply described from the English point 
 of view, offers nothing very remarkable. I quote from 
 the journal of Captain Thomas Warren, of the Monk, 
 merely translating his dates into ordinary reckoning : — 
 
 May 2 (O.S.), 1694 :— At 4 this morning had sight of a 
 sail SE of us. Commodore made a signal to chase — a hard 
 gale — all gave chase. At 10 saw Cape Cornwall, at which 
 time I was within five miles of the chase — the Adventure 
 close by her — he hoisted his colours, and the Adventure his— 
 the former, a white ensign — the Dragon next to the Adven- 
 ture. All run in between Sicily and the Seven Stones. At 
 11 the Adventure fired several broadsides into her, he in the 
 meantime plying his stern chase. At noon were abreast of 
 St. Mary's Sound, where several ships lay at anchor. Wind 
 NNE, hard gale with rain. At half -past two the Adventure 
 shot the Frenchman's main-topmast by the board, then the 
 Dragon fired a whole broadside into her. I being at the same 
 time under his stern, gave him a broadside also, upon 
 which he struck. My boat was the first aboard and brought 
 the captain and the rest of the officers aboard of me. She 
 was one of the King of France's men-of-war carrying thirty- 
 six guns, but could mount forty. 
 
 After this the Adventure, and the next day the 
 Dragon,, took the prize in tow, and at noon on 5 May 
 (O.S.) the squadron, consisting of the Monk, Mary, 
 
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 297 
 
 Dunkirk, Buby, Dragon, Adventure, and prize anchored 
 in the Sound. On the following day the French captain 
 and officers were sent on shore to prison. This, then, in 
 its naked simplicity, is the English story ; but as related 
 in the ' Memoirs of Du Guay-Trouin ' it is something 
 much grander, and puts a very different colour on the 
 business. Yet I feel bound to consider Du Guay-Trouin's 
 account : firstly, because it is that which the French 
 accept as history, and on which, or similar stories, they 
 to a great extent base their estimate of the man ; and, 
 secondly, because I cannot say that it is not correct. It 
 was, indeed, written long after the event, but the broad 
 facts agree with those noted at the time by Captain 
 Warren. What Du Guay-Trouin says is, that finding 
 himself jammed between the enemy's squadron and the 
 coast of England, he was obliged to fight. 
 
 One of the English ships named the Adventure first over- 
 took me, and we maintained a running fight for nearly four 
 hours, before any other of their ships could come up. ... At 
 length my two topmasts were shot away ; on which the Ad- 
 venture ranged up alongside me, a short pistol-shot off, and 
 hauled up her courses. Seeing her so near, it occurred to me 
 to run foul of her and board her with my whole crew. Forth- 
 with I ordered such of the officers as were near to send the 
 people on deck, got ready the grapnels, and put the helm 
 over. We were just on the point of hooking on to her, when 
 unfortunately one of my lieutenants, looking out through a 
 port and seeing the two ships so close together, took it into 
 his head there was some mistake, as he could not think that, 
 under the circumstances, I had any intention of boarding ; 
 and so, of himself, ordered the helm to be reversed. I had 
 no idea of what had been done, and was impatiently waiting 
 for the two ships to clash together, ready to throw myself on 
 board the enemy ; but seeing that my ship did not obey her 
 
298 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 helm, I ran to the wheel, and found that it had been changed 
 without my order. I had it again jammed hard over; but 
 perceived, with the keenest vexation, that the captain of the 
 Adventure, having guessed by the expression of my face what 
 I had meant to do, had let fall his courses, and was sheering 
 off. We had been so near that my bowsprit had broken his 
 taffrail ; but the mistake of my lieutenant made me lose the 
 opportunity of one of the most surprising adventures ever 
 heard tell of. 1 In the determination I was in to perish or to 
 capture this ship, which was much the fastest sailer of the 
 squadron, it is more than probable that I should have suc- 
 ceeded, and should thus have taken back to France a much 
 stronger ship than that which I abandoned. And, not to 
 speak of the credit which would have attached to the execution 
 of such a plan, it is quite certain that, being dismasted, there 
 was absolutely no other way for me to escape from forces so 
 superior. 
 
 So he was surrounded, and brought to close action 
 by five of the ships, whereupon his men began to fly 
 from their guns and to take refuge in the hold. 
 
 I was busy trying to put a stop to this panic, had cut 
 down one and pistolled another, when, to crown my misfor- 
 tune, fire broke out in the gun-room. The fear of being 
 blown up made it necessary for me to go below ; but having 
 got the fire put out, I had a tubful of grenades brought me, 
 and began throwing them down into the hold ; by which 
 means I compelled the deserters to come up and to man some 
 of the lower deck guns ; but when I went up on the poop I 
 found, to my astonishment and vexation, that some cowardly 
 rascal had taken advantage of my absence to haul down the 
 colours. I ordered them to be hoisted again ; but my officers 
 represented that to do so would be simply giving up the rem- 
 
 1 Unfortunately no log or journal of the Adventure for this date 
 has been preserved; it would have been interesting to have had her 
 captain's version of this. 
 
DU GUAY-TEOUIN. 299 
 
 nant of my ship's company to be butchered by the English, 
 who would give no quarter if the flag was hoisted again after 
 being struck for so long, and that further resistance was 
 hopeless, as the ship was dismasted. 
 
 He was still hesitating when he was knocked over by 
 a spent shot and stunned. When he came to himself 
 the ship was in possession of the English. He was 
 taken on board the Monk, whose captain treated him 
 with much kindness and generosity : ' with as much 
 care,' he says, 'as if I had been his own son.' After 
 cruising for twenty days 1 the squadron returned to 
 Plymouth, and Du Guay-Troum, after receiving many 
 civilities from the officers, was allowed to go about a 
 prisoner at large, making many pleasant acquaintances, 
 and an especially intimate one with a young person 
 whom he describes as ' une fort jolie marchande,' an 
 extremely pretty shop-girl. This good time was rudely 
 put a stop to by the Prince of Orange coming in, and 
 her captain accusing him of firing on him under English 
 colours. On this charge he was put under close arrest, 
 though his friends were allowed to come and see him ; 
 amongst others ' la jolie marchande,' with whom one of 
 his guards, a refugee French officer, now fell desperately 
 in love. He implored his prisoner's good offices with 
 the girl, and between the two the poor refugee was fooled 
 to the top of his bent, whilst Trouin ran down to the 
 wharf, got on board a boat already provided, and with 
 four of his companions pushed out to sea. It was ten 
 
 1 This possibly means from the time of leaving Plymouth ; the dates 
 of Captain Warren's journal show that it does not mean from the time 
 of the capture. But as the Mimovres were written many years after- 
 wards, a mistake of this kind would be pardonable. 
 
300 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 o'clock in the evening of 18 June-. 1 As tbey passed out 
 through the Sound, they were hailed by two men-of-war 
 lying there. 'Fishers,' they answered, and went on 
 without hindrance. 
 
 All night, and all the next day, they rowed on with 
 but little wind. As night again came on a breeze sprang 
 up, and they made sail ; but being worn out with fatigue 
 they all went to sleep, Trouin holding the tiller. Sud- 
 denly they were struck by a squall and nearly swamped. 
 Fortunately, as the steersman woke, let fly the sheet and 
 put the helm hard up, the boat answered the helm and 
 righted ; but she was full of water, all their pro-visions 
 were spoiled, and they were some fifteen leagues from 
 the land. However, they managed to bale out the boat 
 with their hats, and about eight o'clock on the following 
 evening made the coast of Bretagne, where they stumbled 
 into the nearest village, ate black bread, drank milk, and 
 slept the sleep of the weary on a bundle of clean straw. 
 Afterwards they made the best of their way to St. Malo, 
 where Trouin learned that his brother, La Barbinais, 
 was at Bochefort, engaged in fitting out the king's ship 
 Francois, of 48 guns, intending to appoint him to the 
 command as soon as he was exchanged. On this news, 
 M. du Gue was speedily at Bochefort and on board the 
 Francois, which he found ready for sea, and in her he 
 started at once in search of fortune. 
 
 Being well to the westward, he met it on 13 January 
 1695, in the shape of the Nonsuch, also of 48 guns, 
 
 1 In the Mimoires the time is said to be ' vers les six henres du soir,' 
 and the date is not mentioned. As it appears from the context that it 
 was dark, the six is undoubtedly a misprint for dix ; and it is so given 
 by Cunat, who refers to the official depositions. 
 
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 301 
 
 convoying a number of mast ships from New England. 
 One of these, named the Falcon, evidently a stout ship 
 and well armed, mounting, according to Du Guay- 
 Trouin, 38 guns, 1 he engaged sharply, and, having 
 crippled her, ran down to the Nonsuch, in the smoke of 
 a broadside ranged alongside her, and threw his grapnels, 
 intending to board ; but he was compelled to haul off by 
 a fire which broke out in the poop of the Nonsuch and 
 raged for a while with great violence. Presently the fire 
 was extinguished and he returned to the charge ; but as 
 he again threw his grapnels, fire broke out in his own 
 foretop ; the foremast was enveloped in flames, and he 
 was obliged, for a second time, to haul off. Before he 
 could get the fire under, it was dark ; the convoy had 
 dispersed, and he, and the two English ships with which 
 he had been engaged, lay to, repairing their damages. 
 With daylight on the 14th he renewed his attack on the 
 Nonsuch, with great guns and small-arms, and was on 
 the point of again attempting to board her, when the 
 fall of her fore and main masts obliged him hastily to 
 sheer off; then as the Nonsuch could no longer defend 
 herself or escape, he went to take possession of the 
 Falcon, which was trying to make off. Having cap- 
 tured her, he returned to the Nonsuch, whose mizenmast 
 had followed the others, and which, being quite helpless, 
 hauled down her flag on his approach. 
 
 This is Du Guay-Trouin's account of this engagement, 
 and is in the main fully confirmed by the evidence given 
 at the court-martial on the officers of the Nonsuch, after 
 their return from captivity. No mention was, indeed, 
 
 1 He speaks of her throughout as the Boston. Her name was cer- 
 tainly Falcon, but it may have been distinctively Falcon of Boston. 
 
302 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 made of the fire in the poop, or of the enemy's attempts 
 to hoard ; hut the independent actions with the Falcon 
 and the Nonsuch, the crippling them separately, and the 
 surrender of the Nonsuch on the 14th, when she lay a 
 helpless log on the water, all these are clearly enough 
 stated, and would quite bear out the judgment of the 
 court that Captain Taylor had not made the necessary 
 preparations for fight, and had thus exposed the convoy 
 to great hazard. Of Captain Taylor's courage, however, 
 there was no question. With a really very superior 
 force — for the Nonsuch and Falcon together were far 
 more than a match for the Francois, which, nominally, 
 was not more powerful than the Nonsuch alone — he had 
 been taken at such disadvantage as to be altogether 
 inferior ; but he fought his ship bravely, and fell, 
 endeavouring to repair his fault. After his death 
 no further defence was made ; and, indeed, none was 
 possible. 
 
 This Nonsuch 1 was the ship which, in 1689, had 
 captured the Eailleuse and Serpente, and carried Jean 
 Bart and Forbin prisoners to Plymouth. Du Guay- 
 Trouin, referring to this circumstance, says that he 
 found the commissions of these officers in the captain's 
 cabin. I am quite unable to explain this; nor can I 
 understand how they could possibly be there. The 
 statement that the ship was commanded by the same 
 captain is certainly wrong. In the engagement with the 
 Eailleuse and Serpente, the Nonsuch was commanded 
 by Captain Boomcoyle, who was killed, as well as the 
 master, and was succeeded by the boatswain, who, being 
 made a captain, served honourably for. many years, and 
 
 1 See ante, p. 277. 
 
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 303 
 
 died a natural death in 1702. It does not appear 
 that Captain Taylor had had any connection with the 
 Nonsuch till his promotion to her, in North America, 
 a few months before his death ; though he may have 
 been a midshipman or mate in her in 1689. It is the 
 only suggestion that I can offer, and for it I have no 
 authority. 
 
 It was already blowing hard when the English ships 
 surrendered. They had scarcely been taken possession 
 of when a violent gale sprang up. The Nonsuch was a 
 wreck; and it was with great difficulty that Trouin's 
 cousin Boscher succeeded in getting her into Port Louis. 
 The Falcon, shattered by shot and the storm, fell in 
 with four Dutch privateers off Ushant, and was recap- 
 tured : the Francois herself, having lost her mizenmast 
 and both fore and main topmasts, managed to fetch 
 into Brest. The story of his achievement ensured 
 Trouin an honourable welcome. France began to be 
 proud of him, and the king sent him a sword of honour, 
 to which M. de Pontchartrain, then Secretary of State 
 for the Navy, added a flattering letter, desiring him, in 
 conclusion, to refit his ship as soon as possible, and to 
 join the squadron under the Marquis de Nesmond then 
 at Bochelle. This he did. 
 
 The squadron consisted, besides the Francois, of four 
 ships of from 50 to 62 guns, and putting to sea, pre- 
 sently — on 26 April, 1695— met three English ships in 
 the chops of the Channel. These were the Hope of 70 
 guns, Anglesea of 48. and the Boebuck fire-ship. They 
 had sailed from the Nore in the end of March, in com- 
 pany with the Captain of 70 guns, the Montagu of 60, 
 and a large convoy for the Straits ; but two days before, 
 
304 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 by the negligence of the officer of the watch on board the 
 Hope, they had parted company, and were now caught at 
 a disadvantage by this very superior force. As the French 
 squadron bore down against them, one, the St. Antoine, 
 of 56 guns, attacked the Anglesea, and endeavoured to 
 lay her on board ; but her captain, M. de la Villestreux, 
 being killed at the critical moment, the attempt was 
 repulsed, and her fore topmast being shot away about 
 the same time, she fell astern, whilst the Anglesea made 
 good her escape. The Eoebuck, also, having no force, 
 and under the circumstances being useless as a fire-ship, 
 made off unpursued, and the five Frenchmen clustered 
 round the Hope, which, after stoutly defending herself 
 for some seven or eight hours, was forced to yield ; 
 having, according to the deposition of her lieutenant, 
 ' both pumps going most of the time, and seven feet 
 water in the hold ; we had lost all our masts, and the 
 ship rolled so much that we could not manage any of 
 our guns.' For his gallant defence Captain Eobinson 
 was rightly commended by the court-martial, which 
 recognised that the loss of the Hope was due to her 
 having separated from her consorts and convoy; the 
 circumstances of which were somewhat curious. On 
 sailing from the Nore, two of her lieutenants were left 
 behind on impress service ; she had only one lieutenant 
 on board, and her captain was most of the time sick and 
 prostrate with alternate attacks of gout and gravel. Her 
 ship's company consisted, for the most part, of newly 
 raised, perfectly raw men, and by the captain's orders, 
 the one lieutenant devoted himself to day duty, and to 
 the exercising these raw men at the great guns, the 
 night watches being taken by the master and the senior 
 
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 305 
 
 mate. On the night of 23-24 April, this mate had the 
 middle watch, that is from midnight to four o'clock ; he 
 let the ship get taken aback, paid her off on the wrong 
 tack, made no signal to the other ships, and said nothing 
 about it to the captain, who was confined to bed with an 
 attack of gravel, and might probably, if he had been 
 disturbed, have made use of unparliamentary, not to 
 say un-Christian language. The weather was thick; 
 and nothing was known about it till daylight, when 
 the lieutenant came on deck ; but it was then too late. 
 All this was proved to the satisfaction of the court, 
 which decided that the officer of the watch, the mate, 
 was guilty of negligence and disobedience. Had no par- 
 ticular result attended on his fault, possibly no severe 
 notice would have been taken of it. As it was, his 
 sentence seems, in the present day, peculiar. It was 
 ordered ' that he be carried with a halter about his neck 
 from ship to ship, to all the ships at Chatham and Gilling- 
 ham, and his crime be read by beat of drum by each 
 ship's side ; that all the pay due to him in his Majesty's 
 service be forfeited to the chest at Chatham ; and that he 
 be rendered incapable of for ever serving his Majesty in 
 any capacity for the future as an officer.' That the mate 
 was very much in the wrong is not to be disputed; 
 whether the admiralty, that sent a 70-gun ship to sea 
 with a perfectly raw ship's company, an invalid captain, 
 and only one lieutenant, was not very much more in the 
 wrong, is a question that was not raised at the court- 
 martial, but which can scarcely help suggesting itself to 
 a thoughtful reader. 
 
 On the return of the squadron to Brest, Trouin, still 
 in the Francois, was ordered to cruise to the northward, 
 
 x 
 
306 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 towards the Orkneys and Shetlands, with the Fortune, of 
 56 guns, in company ; and, after some fruitless months, 
 was coming south round the west of Ireland, when, near 
 the Blaskets, he fell in with three large East Indiamen, 
 all heavily armed. But an armed merchantman is no 
 match for a properly equipped man-of-war, even though 
 of the same nominal force, and, after a stout resistance, 
 these three were taken possession of by the Francois and 
 Fortune, and conveyed to Port Louis. Du Guay-Trouin, 
 in his Memoires, says that ' the riches with which they 
 were laden gave a profit of more than 2,000 per cent., in 
 addition to all the pillage which it had not been possible 
 to prevent.' The English accounts estimate the loss 
 roughly at a million sterling. Possibly on the strength 
 of his share of this money, M. Trouin du Gue started 
 for Paris. 
 
 He was still in the first flush of youth, and we may 
 fairly suppose that the spoils of the Indies lay uneasy 
 in his pockets; but in his Memoires he attributes his 
 journey to his desire to be introduced to the Count de 
 Toulouse and to M. de Pontchartrain. The latter was 
 pleased to present him to the king, for whom, he says, 
 ' from my earliest youth I had felt an extreme love and 
 reverence. On actually seeing this great monarch my 
 admiration was redoubled. He deigned to appear satis- 
 fied with my humble services, and I went out from the 
 presence-chamber with my heart deeply touched by the 
 sweetness and nobility which marked his words and his 
 most trifling aetions, so that my desire to render myself 
 worthy of his esteem became still more ardent.' He 
 went, therefore to Port Louis, and fitted out the Non- 
 such, or, as he calls her, the Sans-Pareil, reducing her 
 
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 307 
 
 armament to forty-two guns, and on 7 July, 1696, he 
 sailed for a cruise on the coast of Spain. 
 
 The Sans-Pareil, being an English-built ship, lent 
 herself readily to a privateer's ruse ; and, having learned 
 that three Dutch merchant ships were at Vigo, waiting 
 for an English man-of-war which was appointed to 
 convoy them, M. du Gue appeared off that port one morn- 
 ing at daybreak, and brought the ship to in English 
 fashion and under English colours. Suspecting no evil, 
 two of the Dutch ships came out at once ; the third, 
 fortunately for herself, was not quite ready to sail, and 
 so escaped. In charge of his two prizes, laden with 
 masts and naval stores, Trouin was making his way 
 back to Port Louis, when, on the morning of 24 July, at 
 daybreak, he found himself close in with and to leeward 
 of the whole English fleet,, then cruising in the Bay of 
 Biscay, under the command of Lord Berkeley. 1 
 
 ' There was no time,' he says, ' for hesitation : I ordered the 
 prize officers to hoist Dutch colours, and to run away to lee- 
 ward, saluting me with seven guns each ; and trusting to the 
 goodness and soundness of the Sans-Pareil, I stood towards 
 the fleet, as boldly and peaceably as if I had really been one 
 of their number rejoining after having spoken the Dutchmen. 
 Two capital ships and a 36-gun frigate had at first left the 
 fleet to overhaul me ; but on seeing what I was doing, the 
 ships returned to their station : the frigate — impelled by her 
 unlucky fate — persisted in endeavouring to speak the two 
 
 1 This fleet left the Channel on July 4 (June 24, O.S.), and anchored 
 at Spithead on its return on August 9 (July BO, O.S.), between which 
 dates, therefore, the incident above described must have taken place. 
 Eugene Sue, giving a copy of Du Guay-Trouin's official letter (Hist, de 
 la Marine franqaise, torn, v., p. 110), dates it ' Au Port Louis, le 30 mai, 
 1796 ' — that is with two palpable blunders : the letter is, however, I 
 believe, genuine. 
 
 x 9, 
 
308 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 prizes, and I saw that she was rapidly coming up with them. 
 I had by this time joined the fleet, tranquil enough in appear- 
 ance, though inwardly I was fuming at the prospect of my 
 two prizes being taken by this frigate : and as I perceived 
 that my ship sailed much better than those of the enemy who 
 were near me, I kept away little by little, at the same time 
 forereaching on them, and then suddenly bearing up, ran 
 down to place myself between the prizes and the frigate. I 
 should have liked to lay this on board and carry her in sight 
 of the whole fleet ; but her captain, being suspicious, would 
 not let me get within musket-shot of him, and sent his boat 
 to me. But when the boat was half-way, her people made 
 out that we were French, and turned to go back ; on which, 
 seeing that we were discovered, I hoisted my white flag and 
 poured my broadside into the frigate. She answered with 
 hers ; but not being able to sustain my fire, she hauled her 
 wind, and with a s'gnal of distress flying, stood to meet the 
 capital ships, which hastily ran down towards us : as they 
 stopped to render her assistance, and to pick up her boat, I 
 was able to rejoin my prizes, and without misadventure to 
 take them to Port Louis.' 
 
 This is Du Guay-Trouin's unsupported, uncorrobo- 
 rated narrative ; but it seems to me probable enough 
 and perfectly credible. There is no question that, with 
 a crew of nearly three times the numerical strength of 
 the frigate's, and favoured by the surprise, he would 
 have carried her, if only he had been able to lay her on 
 board. It would have been a brilliant feat, but really 
 not a very difficult one. The incident is one not likely 
 to be found, and it is not found, in our English histories. 
 It may have been mentioned by Lord Berkeley in his 
 official report of the cruise; but, unfortunately, Lord 
 Berkeley's letters, or, indeed, any admiral's letters of 
 that date, have not been preserved, at least in their 
 
DU GUAY-TEOUIN. 309 
 
 proper place. More probably still, it may be mentioned 
 in the log of the frigate, or of one or other of the capital 
 ships ; but not having their names, I have not yet been 
 able to find any traces of it. However, as I have said, 
 I incline to believe that Du Guay-Trouin's narrative, as 
 it stands, is a fair description of what occurred, and 
 gives a correct though curious idea of the very lax 
 organisation of the fleet, when a stranger could thus 
 come into it and not be immediately detected. But not- 
 withstanding the laxness in this respect, Lord Berkeley's 
 cruise in the Bay was by no means an idle one. He 
 met, indeed, no formidable enemy at sea ; but applying 
 himself to harrying the coast, he burned all the villages, 
 houses, and shipping, and swept off all tbe cattle of the 
 islands Groix, Houat, and Hoedic ; whilst a detached 
 squadron, sent into the Isle of Be, bombarded and de- 
 stroyed the towns of St. Martin and Olonne. 
 
 On Du Guay-Trouin's return to Port Louis he wrote 
 an account of the cruise to M. de Pontchartrain, describ- 
 ing his success at Vigo, his meeting with and escape 
 from the English fleet, and passing on to speak in fuller 
 detail of a circumstance which — more, indeed, than his 
 mere adventures — bears on the point to which I have 
 already called attention, the peculiar relation and atti- 
 tude of officers of the navy to the officers of privateers, 
 even when employed in the king's service. It is for 
 this reason that I give here the account of it as written 
 by himself : ' — 
 
 Off the Isle Groix I met a large ship which for some time 
 did not show any flag, and flew no pennant nor any other 
 
 1 Not in his M&movres, but in the official letter, quoted by Sue (Hist, 
 de la Marine frangaise, torn. v. p. 110, &o.) with many mistakes or mis- 
 prints, both of place and time. 
 
310 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 mark of distinction. I hailed her, and was answered that she 
 was from Bayonne. The rate at which we passed each other 
 did not permit me to hear more ; but I and all my officers 
 supposed that she was a Bayonne privateer. Shortly after, I 
 lowered a boat to send a message to the prizes ; on seeing 
 which the ship hoisted her pennant, fired several musket- 
 shots at the boat, and then began firing great guns. At last, 
 one of her shot cut the halliard of the boat's sail ; on which 
 I went straight to the ship to speak to the captain and ask 
 why he had thus fired on me without any provocation. I was 
 told to come on board ; when the captain, far from hearing 
 what I had to say, threatened, in the most violent manner, to 
 have me ducked from the yard arm, 1 and that, although I 
 protested, as was truly the case, that we had believed him to 
 be a Bayonne privateer. This threat, so contrary to what 
 seems to me due to my rank, would have goaded me to some 
 extreme measures if I had not considered my own private 
 honour as subordinate to the king's orders ; so that I made 
 no reply beyond saying that I should complain to your 
 Grandeur, in whose justice I had every confidence. . . . Your 
 Grandeur is not unaware that several of the officers of the 
 navy look on our success with anything rather than pleasure ; 
 as this one showed very clearly on this occasion by thus in- 
 sulting me, whilst he behaved civilly enough to the skippers 
 of the two Olonne vessels in company, who had committed 
 the same fault as I had, if fault there was ; neither threaten- 
 ing to duck them, nor making use of the abusive language 
 which I pass over in silence ; for your Grandeur well knows 
 that such unmeasured threats cannot but cause bitterness. 
 This, then, Monseigneur, is what makes me call on you for 
 justice, without which I shall be unwillingly compelled to give 
 up the idea of my intended cruise : and, in fact, this affair is 
 
 1 ' De me faire donner la cale '—to have me keel-hauled ; but keel- 
 hauling did not usually mean hauling under the keel, though sometimes 
 it did : ordinarily it meant nothing more than tricing the criminal up to 
 the yard-arm, and letting him go by the run. 
 
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 311 
 
 of importance to all my associates, who — but for your pro- 
 tection — would be daily exposed to similar outrages. The 
 captain of whom I complain is M. de Feuquieres, commanding 
 the Entreprenant. 
 
 Of the steps which M. de Pontchartrain took to salve 
 the wounded feelings of the insulted privateer, or to re- 
 strain the jealousy and insolence of the king's officers, 
 no mention is made ; and not the least curious part of 
 the whole transaction is that there is no allusion to it in 
 the Memoires. But when he wrote these in his old age, 
 Du Guay-Trouin was a ' Lieutenant-General of the king's 
 naval's forces,' had commanded fleets and expeditions, 
 and had probably learned to consider himself as one of 
 the nobility and an officer of the navy, having altogether 
 different interests from those of a plebeian, captain of a 
 privateer. 
 
 When the Sans-Pareil was refitted she again put to 
 sea, having in company the Leonore of 16 guns, com- 
 manded by Etienne Trouin, Eene's younger brother, and 
 at this time not quite twenty years old. After a short 
 cruise on the north coast of Spain they were in want of 
 water, and attempted to force a landing in the face of 
 the Spanish militia, who mustered to oppose them. A 
 sharp conflict took place, in which Etienne received a 
 mortal wound. He was carried on board the Sans- 
 Pareil, and died in the course of two days. The elder 
 brother was deeply affected by the loss of this youth, 
 whom he tenderly loved ; and returning shortly after- 
 wards to Brest, he went into retirement for several 
 months, sick in mind and body, haunted by the memory 
 of his loss, and the idea of the boy expiring in his arms. 
 It was not till the beginning of the next year, 1697, that 
 
312 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 he returned to active life, and then only at the persua- 
 sion of M. Desclouzeaux, the intendant of the navy at 
 Brest, who was fitting out a squadron of three ships, 
 apparently on his own account, although not improbably 
 at the charge of the government; for, indeed, it is im- 
 possible to conceive a wider opening for peculation and 
 appropriation than that afforded by allowing the in- 
 tendant thus to equip a private squadron. The allowing 
 a foreman of labourers to keep hogs in the biscuit store- 
 house, whilst his wife kept a marine store outside, as 
 happened, once at least, at Portsmouth, was trifling in 
 comparison. 1 
 
 Of this squadron, sent out specially to look for a 
 Dutch merchant fleet from Spain, Du Guay-Trouin took 
 the command, in the St. Jacques des Yictoires, of 48 
 guns ; the Sans-Pareil, commanded by his cousin, Jacques 
 Boscher, was the second ; and the third was the little 
 Leonore. They sailed from Brest towards the middle of 
 March, and on the 22nd, being then some thirty miles 
 north-west from Ushant, they sighted the object of their 
 cruise, but convoyed by three ships of war, two of fifty, 
 and one of thirty guns. Du Guay-Trouin did not con- 
 sider his force equal to the attack of such an escort, and 
 for two days hung on to it, hoping for some opportunity 
 of getting in amongst the convoy. But on the 24th he 
 was accidentally joined by two privateers out of St. 
 Malo, the one of thirty, the other of thirty-eight guns, 
 and, so reinforced, he resolved to attack. The three 
 Dutchmen were lying to, to windward of their convoy 
 and in line ahead, the smallest ship in the middle ; and 
 
 1 Parliamentary Reports, 1783. 
 
DU GUAY-TEOUIN. 313 
 
 Du Guay-Trouin determined to push on in the St. 
 Jacques, and engage the Dutch commodore, who headed 
 the line in the Delft. The Sans-Pareil was to engage 
 the rearmost ship, the Hondslaardijk, and the two St. 
 Malo men were to pit themselves against the frigate in 
 the middle, whilst the Leonore went in amongst the 
 convoy. The allotment of antagonists was rendered un- 
 availing by the action of the Hondslaardijk, which pre- 
 vented the St. Jacques from passing her, and the two 
 ships fell foul of each other, whilst the Sans-Pareil 
 pressed on to attack the Delft, which received her with 
 extreme warmth. Fire broke out under her poop, ex- 
 ploded a number of cartridges, killed or blew overboard 
 more than eighty men, and threatened to extend to the 
 magazine, so that Boscher was forced to cut loose his 
 grapnels, and to bear away as fast as possible. Du 
 Guay-Trouin had meantime thrown half his ship's com- 
 pany on board the Hondslaardijk, and without much 
 difficulty had made himself master of her. He now 
 pushed on to support or to avenge Boscher, and ran his 
 ship aboard the Delft. 
 
 ' This new attack,' he tells us, ' was very bloody, both by 
 the very heavy fire, on both sides, of guns, muskets, and gre- 
 nades, and by the splendid courage of the Baron de Wasse- 
 naer, 1 who received me with astonishing boldness. Four 
 several times the bravest of my officers and men were re- 
 pulsed ; and so many of them were killed that, in spite of my 
 vexation and efforts, I was constrained to bear away in order 
 to give a short breathing-time to my people, who were some- 
 
 1 Willem, Baron van Wassenaer Starreburgh, nephew of that Opdam 
 van Wassenaer who commanded the Dutch fleet in the great fight off 
 Lowestoft on 3-13 June, 1665, and lost his life in the blowing up of the 
 Eendracht. 
 
314 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 what disheartened, and also to repair damages, which were 
 more than slight,' 
 
 The two privateers had meantime captured the Dutch 
 frigate, and Du Guay-Trouin now ordered the largest of 
 these, the Faluere, of 38 guns, to occupy the attention 
 of the Delft, while the St. Jacques was lying by. Sans- 
 Pareil, St. Jacques, or Faluere, it was much the same to 
 Van Wassenaer, who received his new assailant with his 
 old determination ; and the Faluere, roughly handled 
 and having lost her captain, ran down to leeward as her 
 consorts had done before her. Du Guay-Trouin hailed 
 her to follow him, and together they would avenge the 
 death of her captain. 
 
 ' And then,' he says, ' with head down, I rushed against 
 the redoubtable Baron, resolved to conquer or to perish. This 
 last act was so sharp and so bloody that every one of the 
 Dutch officers was killed or wounded. Wassenaer himself 
 received four very dangerous wounds, and fell on his quarter- 
 deck, where he was seized, his sword still in his hand. The 
 Faluere had her share in the engagement, running alongside 
 of me, and sending me forty men on board as a reinforce- 
 ment. More than half of my own crew perished in this 
 action. I lost in it one of my cousins, first lieutenant of my 
 own ship, and two other kinsmen on board the Sans-Pareil, 
 with many other officers killed or wounded.' ' 
 
 The night following this battle was extremely stormy, 
 and the ships, with shattered rigging and torn hull3, 
 leaking at every seam, with crews weakened and ex- 
 hausted, were in a position of extreme peril. The St. 
 Jacques was kept afloat only by pumping and baling, in 
 
 1 De Jonge (GescMedenis van het Nederlcmdsche Zeewezm, vol. iii. 
 pp. 521 et seq.) accepts Du Guay-Trouin's account of this stubborn 
 fight as substantially correct. 
 
DU GUAY-TKOUIN. 315 
 
 which work the Dutch prisoners were made to assist, 
 and by throwing overboard all her upper-deck and 
 quarter-deck guns, spare masts, shot, everything that 
 could go. But the horrors of the night, the dead and 
 dying below, the ship scarcely floating, the swelling 
 ■waves threatening each moment to engulf her, the wild 
 howling of the storm, and the iron-bound coast of Bre- 
 tagne to leeward, were all together such as to try 
 severely the courage of the few remaining officers and 
 men. At daybreak, however, the wind went down ; they 
 found themselves in with the Isle Groix and the Breton 
 coast ; on their firing guns and making signals of dis- 
 tress, a number of boats came off to their assistance ; 
 and in this guise was the St. Jacques taken into Port 
 Louis, followed in the course of the day by the three 
 Dutch ships of war, twelve of the merchant ships, the 
 Leonore, and the two St. Malo privateers. The Sans- 
 Pareil did not get in till the next day, ' after having been 
 twenty times on the point of perishing by the fire and by 
 the tempest.' 
 
 Du Guay-Trouin's success naturally won for him a 
 distinguished renown. He had captured three Dutch 
 ships superior in force to his own three. The St. Malo 
 men were probably overlooked, and an exaggerated ac- 
 count of his victory went abroad ; but in any case his 
 victory was brilliant enough, and all the more so by reason 
 of the brilliant defence of Baron van Wassenaer. It was 
 so considered by the king on the report of the Count de 
 Pontchartrain ; and he rewarded the service by sending 
 Du Guay-Trouin a commission as commander in the navy 
 (capitaine de frigate), on which the young commander 
 set off to Paris, and was again presented to the king, 
 
316 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 who was pleased personally to express bis satisfaction, 
 and some little time after to allow him to equip — at his 
 own expense, or at that of his friends— two of the royal 
 ships, Solide and Oiseau. With these and two private 
 ships he was on the point of sailing for a cruise, when 
 the Peace of Eyswyk, in September 1697, put an end to 
 his hopes of glory or of gain. When war with England 
 and Holland again broke out in 1702, Du Guay-Trouin 
 was a king's officer ; and the story of his career from 
 this time belongs rather to the history of the war, in its 
 connection with which it ought to be considered. I do 
 not propose, therefore, to follow out the events of his 
 riper age with the same exactness with which I have 
 dwelt on those of his earlier years, whilst he was forcing 
 his way into notice ; but some of his adventures have a 
 purely personal interest, and as such tend to illustrate 
 the character of the man. This is one. 
 
 On 23 November, 1704, being then in the Jason of 
 54 guns, having in company the Auguste of the same 
 force, and the frigate Valeur commanded by his brother 
 Nicolas, he met, in the Soundings, the two English ships 
 Elizabeth of 70, and the Chatham of 48 guns. That the 
 Elizabeth, brought to close action by the Jason, hauled 
 down her flag after a feeble defence, is to be read in our 
 own chronicles, 1 as well as the wretched fate which fell 
 on her captain as the punishment of his misconduct : 
 the Auguste, being a heavy sailer, was unable to overtake 
 the Chatham, which thus escaped. On their way back 
 to Brest with their prize they fell, in with two large 
 Dutch privateers, one of which, the Amazone of 40 guns, 
 
 1 Charnook, Biographia Navalis, vol. ii. p. 886. 
 
DU GUAY-TROUIN. 317 
 
 they captured after a stout resistance ; but the Valeur, 
 having gone on an independent cruise, and after some 
 success, met a large privateer, which brought ber to close 
 action. The Valeur made good her defence, and escaped ; 
 but during the action the young Trouin had his hip 
 shattered by a cannon ball, and survived his return to 
 Brest only a few days. 
 
 When the Jason and Auguste were refitted, Du Guay- 
 Trouin sailed once more in quest of adventures, and 
 on the night of the second day again fell in with the 
 Chatham. When morning broke the Jason and Auguste 
 had her between them, within musket-shot, and a sharp 
 action began, which continued for several hours, the 
 Chatham putting herself before the wind and making all 
 sail in her endeavour to escape. So intent were the 
 pursuers on the chase, that they suddenly found them- 
 selves at no great distance from the English fleet, then 
 cruising in the Soundings, under the command of Sir 
 George Byng, and towards which the Chatham, whether 
 intentionally or by accident, had led them. The position 
 was now reversed, and the Jason and Auguste were 
 chased by the fastest ships of the squadron, which came 
 up with them rapidly, the Auguste being at all times a 
 very dull sailer. On this, after a hasty consultation, 
 the Frenchmen separated ; the Auguste keeping well to 
 windward, and the Jason going away free, hoping to 
 draw the English ships after her in a wild-goose chase. 
 But the English were numerous enough to separate too. 
 According to Du Guay-Trouin, six ships followed the 
 Auguste, engaged as they came up with her, and took 
 her after a stubborn fight. The Jason, on her side, was 
 overtaken and brought to action by the Worcester, or, as 
 
318 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 Du Guay-Trouin has preferred to call her, the Honster ; J 
 only the Worcester was of 50 guns, arid the Honster 
 of 64 ; a difference which explains Du Guay-Trouin's 
 statement that after a short engagement, yard-arm to 
 yard-arm, the Honster found herself very much mauled 
 and dropped astern. 'I should have taken her right 
 off,' he says, ' if she had not borne up very sharply, and 
 if ' — it is difficult not to notice the French use of the if 
 in such eases, — ' if she had not been sustained by several 
 large ships close at hand, which would have fallen upon 
 me before I could have got clear of her.' So he kept on 
 his way, gaining on his pursuers, till, some three-quarters 
 of an hour afterwards, he was again engaged by the 
 Honster, which this time, however, was content to hang 
 on his quarters, firing as opportunity offered ; and so 
 midnight came, and with it the wind died away. The 
 other English ships had crept up, and now lay becalmed 
 in different directions, all round the Jason. 
 
 ' They did not annoy me,' he says, ' for they were persuaded 
 that I could not escape them, and that at daybreak they would 
 capture my ship with less risk and greater ease. I was myself 
 so convinced of this, that I called together my officers to tell 
 them that, seeing no probability of saving the king's ship, I 
 was determined to maintain the honour of his arms to the 
 last extremity ; that I therefore meant to make no reply to 
 the fire of the ships which surrounded us, but to steer straight 
 for the commander-in-chief of the enemy ; that I myself would 
 take the helm until we were grappled with him ; and that as 
 such an attack would be unexpected by him, we might have 
 a chance of performing a brilliant feat before succumbing to 
 
 1 Honster in the Mimovres, and thence in all published French 
 accounts. It was possibly written Houster, which for a Frenchman 
 would not be a bad shot at the real name. 
 
DU GUAY-TEOUIN. 319 
 
 numbers ; and that in any case the king's flag should not, 
 whilst I lived, be hauled down by any hands but those of his 
 enemies.' 
 
 After this discourse, he says, he felt his mind more 
 at ease, and went below to lie down ; but finding it im- 
 possible to sleep, he came again on deck, and spent the 
 time in looking at the ships by which he was surrounded, 
 and especially at that of the commandant, distinguished 
 by her three lanterns at the stern and a light in the 
 main-top. I will let him tell the rest. 
 
 In the midst of this melancholy occupation I fancied, about 
 half an hour before daybreak, that the horizon right ahead of 
 us was growing black, and that this blackness was increasing. 
 I judged that we should have the breeze from that quarter ; 
 and as my courses were hauled up and my topsails lowered 
 on account of the calm, I had them set at once, without any 
 noise, and all the other sails as well, ready to catch the breeze 
 which was coming up : then with what oars I had, I got the 
 ship's head round, bringing her broadside to the expected 
 wind. It really did come ; and as my sails were all ready, set 
 and trimmed, I forged ahead at its very first breath. The 
 enemy, who had gone to sleep in confidence, were quite un- 
 prepared : they were all taken aback, and before they could 
 make sail and wear their ships I was a good gun-shot away ; 
 and as the wind was freshening, I rapidly increased my dis- 
 tance. The Honster alone could get near me, and cannonaded 
 me on the quarter, but could not sustain my broadsides. In 
 this way the chase lasted till noon, by which time it was blow- 
 ing fresh, and I had left the other ships far astern. I began 
 now to drop the Honster, and looked on myself as though 
 risen from the dead, for I had firmly resolved to be buried 
 under the ruins of the poor Jason. 
 
 In relating this I am obliged to trust almost entirely 
 to the Memoires ; for the account given iu our English 
 
320 STUDIES" IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 histories is so curiously incorrect, that no dependence 
 "whatever can be placed on it. It would appear from 
 these that the Jason and Auguste were chased and the 
 Auguste captured in July or August 1703 ; and that the 
 ships which captured her were the Chatham, Greenwich, 
 and Medway. 1 But there is no doubt whatever that the 
 Auguste was captured about the middle or end of January 
 1705, the date to which, by inference, Du Guay-Trouin's 
 Memoires would assign it; and it is equally certain 
 that neither the Chatham, Greenwich, nor Medway was 
 engaged with the Auguste. The minutes of the court- 
 martial on the wretched captain of the Elizabeth prove 
 that the ship was taken, as I have already said, on 
 12 November (O.S.), 1704; and a letter from Captain 
 Bokenham, of the Chatham, dated ' Crookhaven, 17 
 January (O.S.), 1704-5,' says :— 
 
 On the 13th past, in the night, I lost company with the 
 admiral, and the next morning by daylight fell in with Mouns r 
 Dugee in the Jason and 1/ August, the two ships that took 
 the Elizabeth. They both gave me chase till about one 
 in the afternoon. Soon after I saw a sail, and gave chase 
 and came up with him (being the Constable of St. Malo, of 
 30 guns and 169 men), who after half an hour's dispute 
 struck, his mainmast coming by the board at the same time, 
 being then about WSW, thirty leagues from Cape Clear. . . 
 The French captain confirms that the ships were the same 
 that took the Elizabeth, he having been on board Mouns r 
 Dugee the day before. 
 
 It is thus quite certain that the Chatham did not turn 
 on the Auguste, and had no hand in her capture. Her 
 log has, unfortunately, not been preserved, neither has 
 
 1 Lediard, p. 775 ; Charnock, Biographia Navalis, vol. iii. p. 39. 
 
DU GUAY-THOUIN. 321 
 
 that of the "Worcester. The logs of the Greenwich and 
 Medway are, however, extant, and have no mention of 
 the capture of the Auguste ; though it appears that the 
 Medway was engaged with a French ship of war of 60 
 guns — probably enough the Jason — which escaped in the 
 darkness. But our records of this period are almost as 
 defective as our histories are inaccurate ; there are no 
 letters from the admiral in command of the fleet ; and it 
 is at present quite impossible to say more on this matter 
 ■ than that nothing appears in evidence that can controvert 
 or, indeed, does not support Du Guay-Trouin's narrative. 
 To.follow out the rest of Du Guay-Trouin's life would 
 be almost to write the naval history of France during 
 this period. I will therefore only refer to the action of 
 21 October, 1707, when he, in company with Forbin, 
 captured or destroyed an English squadron of two 80- and 
 two 50-gun ships ; a third, 80 alone, the Eoyal Oak, had 
 the doubtful good fortune to escape. 1 Du Guay's share 
 in this was brilliant, and on his return to France, the 
 king, Louis XIV, conferred on him a pension of 1,000 
 livres ; which, however, he begged might be passed on to 
 his second captain, who was, he represented, a poor man, 
 and had lost a leg in the engagement. Afterwards, being 
 at court, and called on to relate to the king the events of 
 the fight, he is described as having said incidentally, 
 '- J'ordonnai a la Gloire de me suivre ; ' on which the king 
 interrupted him with ' Bt elle vous fut fidele ! ' 2 The 
 
 1 Charnock, Biog. Nav., vol. ii. p. 117. 
 
 2 The genuineness of this anecdote seems very doubtful. It is not 
 mentioned by Du Guay-Trouin, to whom the royal joke would have been 
 a neat compliment ; and it bears a suspicious resemblance to the really 
 historical remark of M. de St. George to Anson after the battle off Cape 
 
322 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 Gloire, however, passed over to the English eighteen 
 months later, when she, in company with the Achille, 
 commanded by Du Guay in person, and their prize, the 
 Bristol, a 50-gun ship, fell into the midst of the Channel 
 fleet. The Achille, escaped, not without difficulty ; but 
 the Bristol was recaptured, and the Gloire lowered her 
 flag to the Chester, whose captain was that Thomas 
 Mathews who some thirty-five years afterwards, com- 
 manded our fleet in the Mediterranean. 
 
 Du Guay Trouin's good services were considered as 
 far above the loss of the Gloire, and in the following 
 July, 1709, they were formally acknowledged by letters 
 of nobility and the grant of arms, the blazon of which is : 
 Argent, an anchor sable ; on a chief azure, two fleur de 
 lys or ; with the motto ' Dedit hasc insignia virtus.' The 
 arms which, under the similar circumstances, had been 
 given to Jean Bart were : Argent, on a fess azure, a fleur 
 de lys or ; in chief, a saltire sable ; in base, a lion passant 
 gules : both thus bearing a distinct reference to the arms 
 of France. Many other noble and valiant deeds did Du 
 Guay-Trouin after this, including the capture of Bio in 
 1712. After the peace he was, in 1715, raised to flag 
 rank as chef d'escadre, having, for ten years before, had 
 the actual command of squadrons. He received the 
 higher grade of Ueutenant-gSneral in 1728, and, older in 
 honour than in years, died on 27 September, 1736. 
 
 And now, looking back on the chronicle of the past 
 which I have here faintly outlined, can we wonder that, 
 in France, popular esteem has been lavished on the 
 memory of Du Guay-Trouin ? From small beginnings 
 
 Finisterre on 3 May (O.S.), 1747 : ' Monsieur,' lie said, ' vous avez vaincu 
 l'lnvincible, et la Gloire vous suit.' 
 
DTJ GUAY-TEOTJIN. 323 
 
 he forced his way out of the cold shade into the hot sun- 
 light. At a time of great depression, when at La Hogue, 
 at Gibraltar, at Toulon, the French navy had been pretty 
 nigh destroyed, he, almost alone, supported tbe French 
 cause at sea, and won many signal successes. It matters 
 not that he often won them by means of superior force : 
 the greater, in fact, was his merit, that with very inferior 
 resources he could so often find himself superior at the 
 place of meeting. But the points to which I have more 
 especially wished to call attention are these : that Du 
 Guay-Trouin was not, in the early part of his brilliant 
 career, an officer of the French navy ; that he was received 
 into the French navy only when his name was already- 
 famous both in France and England ; and that, even 
 now, the French navy is not so exclusive but that officers 
 from the merchant service may — though exceptionally — 
 obtain commissions in it. In the English navy it is not 
 so. Whatever laxity there may have been in the seven- 
 teenth century, there is none now. In our army, some 
 fifteen commissions are each year given to men from the 
 ranks ; but, in our navy as at present organised, promo- 
 tion whether from the merchants' service, or from before 
 the mast, is utterly impossible ; and though this impossi- 
 bility may have certain advantages, may render our service 
 more self-contained and more homogeneous, the study of 
 careers such as those of Jean Bart and Du Guay-Trouin, 
 on the one hand, of George Walker and Fortunatus Wright 
 on the other, leads me to doubt whether a possibility tbe 
 other way might not also sometimes have its own advan- 
 tages, of greater national importance than even strict 
 homogeneity, and strict conformity to regulation pattern. 
 
 T 2 
 
324 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 THE FRENCH PRIVATEERS. 
 
 III. THUEOT. 1 
 
 The question of fortifying the several commercial har- 
 bours and seaports round our coasts has been often 
 proposed and argued on, and is, in reality, one which 
 too closely affects our material interests to be treated 
 as lightly or carelessly as it often is treated, and which 
 deserves more consideration than it commonly gets. 
 ' Britannia needs no bulwarks ' is a favourite reply ; a 
 poetical vaunt, a bit of bounce, that sounds well, and 
 that, in 1801, when it was first written, sounded almost 
 better. With the tidings of the First of June, of St. 
 Vincent, Camperdown, and the Nile still ringing in the 
 public ears, we can quite understand the proud boast 
 which a few years' further experience showed thinking 
 men might be a very unsafe one. Had Villeneuve been 
 a man of moderate ability and moderate nerve, Britannia 
 might have wished very heartily for bulwarks ; and the 
 martello towers, which were built shortly after, showed 
 that it was even then considered just as well to have 
 some such things along the steep. 
 
 It is not, however, of that stirring period of eighteen 
 hundred and war-time, that I am now about to write. 
 1 Eraser's Magazine, January, 1878. 
 
THUROT. 325 
 
 I am going to endeavour to recall the memory of an 
 older war, and a still earlier scare ; when a French 
 invasion seemed imminent; when flat-bottomed boats 
 were got ready all along the north coast of France ; when 
 all along the south coast of England soldiers, militia 
 and volunteers, were mustered to oppose the expected 
 landing ; when Garrick wrote, and Boyce composed, and 
 Champness sang that spirit-stirring song, ' Hearts of 
 Oak,' which is still the recognised call of our seamen to 
 quarters, though such lines as — 
 
 We'll still make them fear, and still make them flee, 
 And drub 'em on shore as we've drubbed 'em at sea — 
 
 hint at a possibility of invasion after all. 
 
 But then, as half a century later, the boldness and 
 decision of English admirals, acting on the timidity and 
 vacillation of the French, nullified the well-planned 
 strategy of the French government ; then, on 18 August, 
 1759, Boscawen — ' Old Dreadnought,' as our sailors 
 loved to call him — broke up, dispersed, captured, burnt, 
 or drove on shore the Toulon fleet, under M. de la Clue, 
 as it tried to pass out of the Mediterranean to join the 
 fleet at Brest, and obtain the command of the Channel ; 
 then Hawke — ' as a hawk on his quarry ' — pounced down 
 on that Brest fleet, as, on 20 November, 1759, it was 
 entering Quiberon Bay, to embark the troops mustered 
 in Morbihan ; and made that brilliant and glorious smash 
 of the French navy which was historically, nautically, 
 and politically, the precursor and rival of Trafalgar ; the 
 memory of which in France is perpetuated as ' lajournee 
 de M. de Conflans,' though in England it is but feebly 
 remembered as Hawke's action, and to many of us the 
 name of Quiberon Bay now conveys no definite meaning. 
 
326 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 But, nevertheless, so far as we were concerned, Quibe- 
 ron Bay was the decisive battle of the Seven Years' War. 
 Had the result of it been reversed, had it been the 
 English fleet that was annihilated, the relative positions 
 of France and England during the next four years, and 
 in the negotiations which then ensued, would have been 
 extremely different. Historians have not recognised 
 this ; and even at the time the victory seems to have been 
 taken very much as a matter of course. The possibility 
 of the result of a meeting between the two fleets being 
 not exactly what it was, seems never to have occurred to 
 our enthusiastic countrymen, who had, less than three 
 years before, shot one of their admirals for strategic 
 defeat and tactical imbecility ; not, indeed, for positive 
 cowardice, but, at any rate, for very gross misconduct. 
 Hawke was thanked by Parliament for his great victory, 
 and a pension followed shortly after, but he did not get 
 his peerage for seventeen years. Even at the time, the 
 fleet was so neglected by the government, now that the 
 strain — unacknowledged though it was — was taken off, 
 that the necessary stores and provisions were not sent to 
 it ; and our seamen were exposed to great and uncalled- 
 for hardships and privations, while keeping up the strict 
 blockade on the shattered remnants of the enemy's navy. 
 The feeling of the fleet was expressed in some wretched 
 doggrel, which none the less conveys a very painful idea 
 of injustice and neglect : 
 
 Ere Hawke did bang 
 
 Monsieur Oonflans, 
 
 You sent us beef and beer ; 
 
 Now Monsieur's beat, 
 
 We've nought to eat, 
 
 Since you have nought to fear. 
 
THUEOT. 327 
 
 All this, however, is matter of history more or less 
 familiar. But coincident with these great events, smaller 
 events were taking place. Coincident with the French 
 idea of a great invasion in the south of England, which 
 was extinguished by Boscawen and Hawke, was enter- 
 tained by the French another idea, that of a landing in 
 the north of England or Ireland, not indeed in any force, 
 but still in such force and under such circumstances as 
 might, and as it was hoped would, direct to the north a 
 considerable part of the army mustered in the south, 
 would thus weaken the defence, and render the under- 
 taking of the invaders comparatively easy. The charge 
 of this expedition was given to a man whose name 
 indeed, Thurot, is in all our histories, but of whose 
 career no one English book, or French book either, gives 
 any complete or correct account. In the local records, 
 the corporation books of many towns, the mention of 
 Thurot's name shows that he was a much more real 
 personage in the minds of the worthy burghers than 
 De la Clue or Conflans. And yet, even then, he was to 
 some extent mythical, and his earliest biographer, the 
 Bev. John Francis Durand, 1 writing immediately after 
 his death, in 1760, says : — 
 
 In the course of a few weeks I have known him to be 
 a Scotchman, an Englishman, and an Hibernian ; he was 
 
 1 Genuine and Curious Memoirs of the famous Captain Thurot, 
 written by the Bev. John Francis Durand, with some of Mons. Thurot's 
 Original Letters to that Gentleman, now i/n England. To which is 
 added u, much more faithful and particular Account than has been 
 hitherto published of Ms Proceedings since his Sailing from the Coast of 
 France, October 18, 1759. Dublin, 12mo, 1760. I have said in the text 
 that these Memoirs are curiously inaccurate. Even such a trifling 
 matter as this last-mentioned date is incorrect. 
 
328 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 successively the young Pretender, a reformed pirate, and a 
 bastard of the blood royal of Prance, and I make no doubt 
 that if he had kept the sea a little longer he would, in his 
 turn, have been the brother of the Grand Turk, or the nephew 
 of the Pope of Eome, unless the newspapers had thought fit 
 to give us broad hints that he was those very great person- 
 ages themselves in disguise. 
 
 Durand's little book is the only Life of Thurot which 
 has been written in English; but though the author 
 makes great claim to authenticity, as having been an 
 intimate friend of Thurot for many years, he has left 
 us a farrago of nonsense which we may believe Thurot 
 himself crammed him with. Durand was a clergyman, 
 and is said by Entick, also a clergyman, to be worthy of 
 credit ; it is more than can be said of his book, which 
 can only be trusted for the few years when Thurot was 
 living in London, or a frequent visitor to it ; or when, in 
 the latter part, it quotes or refers to official papers ; but 
 the account which it gives of Thurot's early life and 
 active career is simply and entirely false; it has not 
 even the semblance of truth. 
 
 Francois Thurot, 1 the son of an innkeeper and post- 
 master in a small way of business, was born at Nuits, a 
 petty town of Burgundy (Cote d'Or) on 22 July, 1726. 
 As a boy he is said to have been of a violent and quarrel- 
 
 1 The French notices of Thurot referred to are : 
 
 (1) Adresse a Messieurs les BeprAsentans de la Nation Francaise. 
 
 Par Mile. Thurot. 1790. 
 
 (2) Vie du Capitame Thurot. Par M. * * *. Paris, 1791. 
 
 (3) Journal Historique du Capitame Thurot dans sa Croisiire sur 
 
 les C6tes d'Ecosse et d'Irlande. ■ Dunkerque, 1760. 
 
 (4) Journal de la Navigation d'une Escadre Francoise, partie du 
 
 port de Dunkerque aux ordres du capitame Thurot, le 15 
 Octobre, 1759. 
 
THUKOT. 329 
 
 some disposition ; and when, after having had a fair 
 education at the Jesuits' College at Dijon, he was, at 
 the age of sixteen, bound apprentice in the shop of a 
 druggist in that town, he launched out into all sorts of 
 juvenile dissipations and debauchery. This, as is often 
 the case, led to the worst kind of rowdyism ; and he 
 ended his career in Dijon by robbing his aunt of her 
 silver dishes and flying from the town. Naturally 
 enough, he ignored Dijon and Nuits for the rest of his 
 life ; he seems to have passed himself off as a native of 
 Boulogne, when, some short time after, he turned up at 
 Dunkirk, and, being almost or quite destitute, obtained 
 employment as a surgeon on board a privateer fitting 
 out to take advantage of the war with England. He 
 was then barely eighteen, and his knowledge of surgery 
 was such as he had picked up during his few months in 
 the druggist's shop ; so that it was, perhaps, in some 
 respects, fortunate for the crew of the privateer that she 
 was captured by the English almost at once ; and that 
 they and their surgeon were put out of harm's way in a 
 prison at Dover. 
 
 Thurot remained a prisoner for about a year, during 
 which time he learned English; and having won the 
 good opinion of his gaolers, and probably being out on 
 parole, he one night seized a small boat, and put to sea 
 with no further equipment than a pair of sculls ; with 
 these, and with his shirt for a sail, he reached Calais in 
 the course of the next day. The success of this bold 
 escape made some noise, and was the means of intro- 
 ducing him to the Marechal de Belle-Isle, who advised 
 him to study navigation and take to a seafaring life. 
 He did both ; he entered as boy on board a privateer, 
 
330 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 and rose rapidly to higher ratings ; after two cruises he 
 was entrusted with an independent command, and by 
 his activity, energy, and good fortune, won some repu- 
 tation and a large share of prize-money ; so that, when 
 peace was concluded in 1748, although but twenty-two, 
 and having been only three years at sea, he was in a 
 position to fit out a merchant-ship at his own risk and 
 expense. For the next few years he lived a good deal 
 in London, lodging — according to Mr. Durand — at the 
 house of an apothecary in Paddington, where he passed 
 as a gentleman. He spoke English remarkably well for 
 a foreigner, sang, played the flute and the French 
 horn, was free with his cash, and was, altogether, good 
 company. 
 
 ' But,' says Durand, ' the chief bent of his inclination leaned 
 towards navigation and fortification ; he had always some 
 little plans, purely the efforts of his unformed genius, relative 
 to those arts about him, which he was constantly showing to 
 his companions ; and never seemed so thoroughly happy as 
 when he got with people that had a smattering of the above- 
 mentioned sciences. The last time he was in England he 
 lived in a court in Carey Street, Lincoln's Inn Fields, and 
 was there instructed in the mathematics by one Mr. Donnelly, 
 an Irish gentleman, famous for his knowledge and abilities in 
 mathematical studies.' 
 
 He seems, then, to have passed his time in London 
 in an easy, social, sometimes studious, occasionally dis- 
 sipated manner ; vanishing for months together, no one 
 knew where, when his money ran short. Durand clearly 
 knew nothing about him during these absences, beyond 
 what Thurot himself chose to tell ; and in that there was 
 evidently a good deal of romance. It is, however, quite 
 certain that he was actively engaged in smuggling; 
 
THUROT. 331 
 
 possibly in piracy also ; and that his misdeeds brought 
 him -within the grasp of the law, apparently both in 
 England and in France. In 1753, his ship, the Ar- 
 gonaute of Dunkirk, of 160 tons, -which sailed from Re 
 for Ostend in March, was in July seized by the custom- 
 house officers of the Baltimore district — a district 
 embracing the south-west extremity of Ireland, and 
 notorious enough as the haunt of smugglers and pirates, 
 for which, as the map will show, it was curiously well 
 adapted. The allegation on behalf of Thurot runs : — 
 
 The seizure was made on a charge of illegal practices 
 contrary to the revenues and to the other laws of the country, 
 but no instances are' given of these illegal practices, nor is 
 there any other mention of what laws he had broken. Nor 
 could such be cited ; for the officer who made the seizure has 
 affirmed on oath, in his deposition, that he seized the ship 
 only because it had, in a former voyage, fraudulently intro- 
 duced a cargo and had carried wools out of it. It is admitted 
 that in his second voyage be had met with a tempest, and 
 that since bis arrival on the coast, where he had been tossed, 
 he bad not committed any act contrary to law. 1 
 
 If the statement is true, Thurot had been singularly 
 unfortunate in his choice of an anchorage, for there 
 is not a port in the whole district at which a foreign 
 merchant-ship could have any legitimate business. It 
 would appear that this was the opinion of the English 
 government, for the claim for redress was not allowed at 
 the time, and must have been summarily ended by the 
 outbreak of hostilities in the following year. But in 
 1790 Thurot's daughter reverted to it, and in her ad- 
 
 1 Foreign Office, France, No. 467. Mimoire toudhant le vaisseau 
 VArgonaute, le 5 juin, 1754. 
 
332 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 dress to the French government, urged her claims for a 
 pension on the grounds that her father had been ruined 
 by legal process in England, on suspicion of being en- 
 gaged in contraband trade. The suspicion was, ap- 
 parently, not confined to England, if, as Durand says, 
 he was imprisoned in France, first in Dunkirk and after- 
 wards in Paris, for smuggling; the French laws, in 
 respect to tbat offence, being extremely severe. It is 
 quite possible that Thurot's peculiar views of commerce 
 and navigation were objected to on both sides of the 
 Channel ; and Durand's account is consistent, and pre- 
 tends to be based on actual knowledge. 
 
 Nevertheless, smuggler or pirate, he had in France 
 a reputation as a bold seaman; and when war was 
 on the point of breaking out, his name was mentioned 
 at court as that of a man likely to prove serviceable. 
 The king sent him a commission in the royal navy, and 
 his old patron, the Marechal de Belle- Isle, procured for 
 him the command of the Friponne, a small sloop, in 
 which he cruised, as before, in the Channel, waging a 
 profitable war against English commerce. 
 
 Whilst thus employed, he is said to have conceived 
 the possibility of setting fire to Portsmouth and utterly 
 destroying the dockyard. His plan was simplicity itself. 
 He was, it is stated, to glide (glisser) into the harbour in 
 the dead of night, in a large boat carrying fifty men. 
 His biographer, M. * * *, thinks that nothing prevented 
 his doing this but the jealousy of the aristocratic 
 courtiers, and the carelessness of the minister who dis- 
 cussed the project in presence of some traitor, who sold 
 the secret to the English government. Had it not been 
 for that, it was only ' necessary to elude the most active 
 
THUROT. 333 
 
 vigilance, and to face the guard of a harbour the entrance 
 of which bristled with cannon.' These, to Thurot, would 
 have been trifles; but the English, being forewarned, 
 took such additional precautions as rendered the brilliant 
 scheme quite hopeless. 
 
 It is difficult to say how much, or how little, truth 
 there is in this, but I see no reason to doubt that a wild 
 and daring adventurer, like Thurot, may have proposed 
 some such scheme ; partly, perhaps, with a real intention 
 of attempting it ; partly also, with a view of being pre- 
 vented by the government, and of adding to his reputa- 
 tion at a cheap rate. But certainly, if the project was 
 seriously proposed, the French government refused to 
 entertain it ; instead of doing so, it appointed Thurot to 
 the command of a squadron to cruise in the Channel. 
 
 This squadron, consisting of two 36-gun frigates, the 
 Marechal de Belle-Isle and the Chauvelin, each mounting 
 twenty-eight twelve-pounders on her maindeck, and two 
 small sloops, sailed from St. Malo on 16 July, 1757. Very 
 shortly after starting, one of the sloops, looking out ahead, 
 was picked up by some English cruisers ; but the others 
 escaped. On the early morning of 25 July, off Portland, 
 they fell in with the English frigate Southampton (32 
 guns, Captain Gilchrist '), on her way from Portsmouth 
 to Plymouth, with stores and specie. As the action that 
 ensued is one which the French biographer considers 
 especially glorious, it is well to point out that the French 
 frigates were each of them more than a nominal match 
 for the Southampton ; that the two together had a very 
 great superiority of force, independently of three small 
 
 1 The maternal grandfather of Admiral the Earl of Dundonald. 
 Autobiography of a Seaman, i. 34. 
 
334 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 craft in company, which took no part in the engagement ; 
 that they attacked and were beaten off ; and that whether 
 they were silenced and dropped astern, as Gilchrist 1 re- 
 ported, or were simply unable to follow and prevent the 
 Southampton making off, as M. * * * says, is a matter 
 of little consequence. The main point is the same ; that 
 Thurot, with two frigates against one, each larger, 
 heavier, and with a more numerous crew, did not capture 
 the one ; and with the best will in the world, it is diffi- 
 cult to see the great glory which, from this non-capture, 
 redounds to the French navy. 
 
 A comparative statement of the force of the com- 
 batants will put this in a clearer light : 
 
 Southampton 26 12-pounders 6 6-pounders 220 men. 
 
 Belle Isle 28 12-pounders 8 6-pounders 400 men. 
 
 Chauvelin 28 „ 8 „ 400 „ 
 
 Total 56 12-pounders 16 6-pounders 800 men. 
 
 It looks to me, indeed, as if M. Thurot had conceived 
 his special work to be plundering comparatively helpless 
 merchant-ships, rather than fighting sturdily defended 
 men-of-war ; and that, when he found the Southampton 
 no easy capture, he stomached his loss — amounting, on 
 board the Belle-Isle alone, to 14 killed, 26 wounded — 
 and hauled to the wind. Clearly it was no part of Captain 
 Gilchrist's duty, when he was specially employed in 
 carrying specie, to go out of his way to engage an enemy 
 of more than double his strength. That this is the 
 correct view to take of Thurot' s conduct seems confirmed 
 by the facts of another action which he fought off Flush- 
 
 1 Captain's Letters, G. No. 12, 26 July, 1757. Beatson's account 
 (Nov. and Mil. Memoirs, ii. 86) is a pretty close copy of Gilchrist's letter. 
 
THUEOT. 335 
 
 ing, on 1 August, with the Seahorse (Captain Taylor), a 
 24-gun frigate, carrying twenty-two 9-pounders, two 
 3-pounders, and 160 men. The Belle-Isle, which, in her 
 engagement with the Southampton, had suffered much 
 in her rigging, had been partially dismantled in a squall 
 off Ostend, and was in tow of the Chauvelin, their sloop, 
 the Gros Thomas, in company, when the Seahorse, with 
 two small craft, the Eaven and Bonetta, bore down 
 against them. After an engagement lasting three hours 
 and a half, at first with the Chauvelin alone, and after- 
 wards with the two together, the Seahorse was almost 
 dismantled and had 8 men killed, 17 badly wounded. 
 She was of much smaller force than either the Belle-Isle 
 or the Chauvelin, and ought to have been captured. 
 That she was not, was due not so much to her material 
 strength, as to the moral weakness of her opponents, whc 
 have boasted — as of a victory — of having forced her to 
 sheer off. In point of fact, she was too much disabled 
 either to sheer off or to continue the attack, and the 
 French frigates were content to leave her and retire into 
 Flushing. 
 
 It was 18 September before they were refitted and put 
 to sea. According to the story told by the French chro- 
 niclers, they were scarcely well out of the port before they 
 were chased in again by an English squadron, consisting oi 
 three ships of the line and two frigates. The Chauveliri 
 got back without difficulty ; but the Belle-Isle, carrying 
 away her foretopsail-yard, was overtaken, and sustained 
 a heavy fire before she could escape. It is difficult tc 
 say that any story, plausibly told, is absolutely and en- 
 tirely false ; but if this is not so, it is certainly much 
 exaggerated. The York, the only line-of-battle ship oe 
 
336 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 the coast at the time was anchored off Gravelines from 
 the 13th to the 21st, and did not see the ships in the 
 interval. This, it might be said, is only negative evi- 
 dence ; what is very positive evidence is that Vice-Ad- 
 miral Smith — Tom of Ten Thousand — the commander- 
 in-chief in the Downs, writing to the admiralty on 
 Tuesday, 20 September, said : 
 
 ' Yesterday Mr. Berkley came in a cutter from Flushing 
 and acquaints me the two French frigates sailed from thence 
 on Sunday morning, with two Ostend and two Dunkirk pilots 
 on board : that they steered towards Ostend, but shortly hauled 
 their wind, as he supposed to chase him, when he observed 
 the large ship carry away her topmast, and he seems certain 
 the head of her mainmast was likewise gone. They both im- 
 mediately returned to Flushing and anchored within the 
 buoys.' 
 
 It is, of course, quite possible that the Frenchmen 
 did get a distant view of some ships which Mr. Berkley 
 did not see ; that they believed them to be English ships 
 of the line, and that they hauled their wind to avoid 
 them. But the heavy fire — the several broadsides poured 
 into the Belle-Isle within pistol shot — must be admitted 
 to be pure imagination. 
 
 When Thurot had again refitted, the two ships, Belle- 
 Isle and Chauvelin, stood, out to the northward, and 
 cruised with some success on the east coast of England 
 and Scotland. On 5 October they were driven by stress 
 of weather into the Moray Frith, and anchored off Banff, 
 to the no small dismay of the provost and burgesses, 
 who expected nothing less than the enforcement of a 
 heavy contribution. The accident of opportunity might 
 have suggested this to Thurot, and there was no force to 
 
THUROT. 337 
 
 prevent him ; but during the night the gale freshened ; 
 the Chauvelin parted her cables and drifted out to sea, 
 leaving her anchors behind ; and in the morning the 
 Belle-Isle weighed, and went to look for her, very much 
 to the relief of the townspeople of Banff, who, for once, 
 realised the danger to which they were exposed so far as 
 to raise a sum of 400J. to construct a battery for their 
 future defence. 1 
 
 The two ships did not meet outside, and we may con- 
 clude that the Chauvelin made the best of her way back 
 to France : the Belle-Isle, on the other hand, kept north- 
 wards ; and having, under the Dutch flag, obtained some 
 provisions at the Shetland Islands, crossed over to' 
 Bergen, picking up on her way (19 October) a prize, de- 
 scribed as a royal frigate of 26 guns : this it certainly 
 was not ; but it may have been an armed merchant-ship, 
 or possibly a privateer. During this year the French 
 cruisers were very active, and took— according to Beat- 
 son 2 — 571 British ships, most of which, however, were 
 of trifling value. The number of prizes taken by us 
 amounted to no more than 364 ; but of these, ' 115 were 
 either privateers of force or armed merchant ships, 
 carrying a great number of guns, and manned with 
 upwards of 10,000 seamen ; ' so that, on the whole, the 
 balance was believed to be in our favour. 
 
 Thurot anchored at Bergen on 30 October, and re- 
 mained there a couple of months, refitting his ship, 
 which, though only a month at sea, was much in want 
 
 1 The Statistical Account of Scotland (vol. xiii. p. 20) gives a ludi- 
 crous description of the meeting of the corporation of Banff ; the date 
 there given (1759) is, however, a mistake : Thurot was not near Banff 
 in 1759. 
 
 2 Naval and Military Memoirs, ii. 90. 
 
338 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 of it. Here a curious incident occurred, which marks 
 the character of the man : he was short of naval stores 
 such as blocks, ropes, and spars; and offered to buy 
 them from the captain of a French ship, in the port, 
 consigned to a Norwegian merchant. The captain re- 
 fused to sell ; and Thurot, not to be baulked, or, as his 
 biographer puts it, ' guided by his zeal for the interests 
 of his country,' sent a party on board, and with the 
 strong hand seized on what he wanted ; ' an act of vio- 
 lence,' adds M. * * *, ' which would, under other circum- 
 stances, have been most blamable,' and which, as it 
 was, nearly got him into trouble with the Norwegian 
 authorities. 
 
 He left Bergen on 25 December, and was no sooner 
 outside than he got into a furious storm, which again 
 dismasted the Belle-Isle, whose ill-luck in that respect 
 suggests that Thurot was not quite such a good practical 
 seaman as he is represented. Under jury-masts, and 
 with continual bad weather, the Belle-Isle was driven 
 north beyond the 65th parallel ; it was slowly, and with 
 much difficulty, that she worked her way south again, 
 and did not reach Gothenburg till 1 February, 1758. 
 
 At Gothenburg Thurot remained till 12 May, and 
 then, going south, capturing several coasters and col- 
 liers, he was, on the morning of the 26th, off the entrance 
 to the Frith of Forth. There he met and engaged the 
 Dolphin of 24, and the Solebay of 28 guns. The two 
 English frigates, caught a mile apart, were very roughly 
 handled ; but Thurot, who apparently mistook them, in 
 the first instance, for merchant ships, was quite satisfied 
 with having secured his own safety, and made no attempt 
 io push his advantage to the point of victory. The 
 
THUKOT. 339 
 
 match between the two sides was tolerably equal, though 
 the Belle- Isle had a certain superiority both in weight of 
 metal and in number of men ; and, in boarding, might 
 perhaps have carried one before the other could assist 
 her ; but she had lost 19 killed, 34 wounded, and simple 
 hard fighting was not the vocation of her crew. 
 
 Thurot, however, remained in Scotch waters, and 
 made many prizes between S. Abb's Head and the Naze 
 of Norway ; his continued presence deeply impressed the 
 coast population ; his engagement with the Dolphin and 
 Solebay was magnified by vulgar report, and he became 
 the bugbear of a people who were unaccustomed to .the 
 neighbourhood of enemies' ships. Twelve vessels, mostly 
 small snows, brigs, or brigantines, are named as prizes 
 taken between 26 May and 12 July ; and on the 13th, 
 off the Skaw, he encountered a fleet of merchant ships — 
 seventeen armed pinks — presumably the Baltic trade. 
 With these he had a brisk engagement ; they mounted 
 an aggregate of 130 guns, and clustering round the Belle- 
 Isle, seemed for a time as if they might take her ; in the 
 end, Thurot broke through them, put them to flight, and 
 cut off one of their number, the George and Joseph : 
 heavy rain and a dark night permitted the rest to 
 escape. 
 
 The English government, wearied with the continual 
 complaints about one frigate being left to threaten the 
 coasts of England and Scotland, and almost to stop the 
 North Sea trade, sent several ships to look after the 
 Belle-Isle; but though constantly chased, Thurot suc- 
 ceeded in eluding his pursuers, in maintaining his ground, 
 and in making several captures, till towards the middle 
 of August ; when, finding the station too hot for him, he 
 
 z 2 
 
340 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 stretched across to the Faroe Islands. Having obtained 
 some fresh provisions, he came back ; and as the ship 
 was making a good deal of water, put into Lough 
 Swilly. 
 
 It gives a curious idea of the conditions of naval war 
 in the year 1758, to read of an enemy's frigate quietly 
 taking up her position in Lough Swilly to refit ; but even 
 then it was not safe to stay long. Thurot resumed his 
 cruise, and off the west coast of Scotland and northern 
 entrance to St. George's Channel, took several prizes ; 
 amongst which are named the Henry, mounting 18 guns ; 
 the Charleston, of 12 guns, laden with cloth stuffs, from 
 Liverpool to Carolina ; the Britannia, of 14 guns, with 
 porcelain, to New York ; and the Admiral Euyter of 18 
 guns, laden with sugar, coffee, and indigo ; but, formid- 
 able as the armament of these sounds, it must be borne 
 in mind that the guns of a merchant- ship were small, 
 meant merely to repel any desultory attack of petty 
 pirates, and were useless against a regularly armed ship ; 
 not one of these prizes seems to have even attempted any 
 resistance. 
 
 By 13 September Thurot was back at Bergen, and 
 cruising from there, again took several prizes ; but towards 
 the end of the year he ran down to Ostend, and early in 
 January discharged his crew and officers, or, as we should 
 say, paid off, at Dunkirk. 
 
 M. Thurot seems now to have spent some time at 
 Paris, and to have been consulted freely by the govern- 
 ment as to the projected invasion of England. The 
 public feeling of France — so far as France had a public 
 feeling — was no doubt just then very bitter against 
 England. 
 
THUROT. 341 
 
 Not only was England at war, and a natural enemy, 
 but four times within the last two years had she 
 defiled the soil of France; and though on the first 
 occasion, the attempt on Eochefort, in September 1757, 
 was altogether abortive; and on the last, the troops 
 which landed near St. Malo, on 3 September, 1758, were, 
 to the number of 800, killed, made prisoners, or driven 
 into the sea at St. Cas, on the 11th ; the auccess on the 
 two other occasions had been sufficient to kindle not only 
 material fires at the time, as at St. Malo in June 1758, 
 but also very much and noisy indignation. The attack 
 on Cherbourg in August 1758, was worst of all ; and even 
 St. Cas following directly afterwards could not wipe away 
 the memory of it. 
 
 Cherbourg, though very different from what it now 
 is, had been a pet fancy of Louis XV and of Cardinal 
 Fleury : there is no doubt that it was meant, from the 
 beginning, as a standing menace to England : as such 
 its docks had been dug out and fortified against wind and 
 waves and English arms ; and as such it was broken up 
 and destroyed by the expedition under Commodore Howe, 
 — ' Black Dick ' as he was more familiarly called : the 
 mole and fortifications were turned over into the harbour 
 and basins : the work of years was undone in a few days : 
 it seemed almost in mockery that the gate of the grand 
 sluice bore the inscription : 
 
 Hanc jussit Lodovix, suasit Florseus, et undis 
 
 Curavit mediis Asfeldus surgere molem : 
 
 Non aliis votis almae prssentior urbis. 
 
 Ars fraenavit aquas, fluctus domuitque minaces : 
 
 Hinc tutela viget, stat copia, gloria crescit ; 
 
 Hine Bex, hinc sapiens, herosque manebit in aavum. — 
 
342 STUDIES rsr NAVAE history. 
 
 which was, not unaptly under the circumstances, para- 
 phrased by one of the English officers : 
 
 Louis and Fleury must, with Asfeld, now 
 Besign to George, to Pitt, to Bligli and Howe. 
 One blast destroyed the labour of an age, 
 Let loose the tides and bid the billows rage ; 
 Their wealth and safety gone, their glory lost, 
 The king's, the statesman's, and the hero's boast. 
 
 The wrath of France and of the French government 
 was extreme, and it was not lessened by Bear-Admiral 
 Kodney bombarding Havre-de-Grace, on the 3rd and 
 following days of July, 1759, as he wrote in his official 
 letter, ' for fifty-two hours without intermission, with 
 such success that the town was several times in flames, 
 and their magazines of stores for the flat-bottomed boats 
 burnt with great fury, for upwards of six hours.' Albion 
 was to be crushed ; Carthage was to be destroyed ; and 
 whilst the Marquis de Conflans and the Duke d'Aiguillon 
 arranged this in the south, Thurot undertook, with a 
 small force, to make a diversion in the north, according 
 as circumstances rendered expedient. 
 
 The force put at his disposal for this purpose con- 
 sisted of his old ship, the Marechal de Belle-Isle, now 
 mounting 44 guns, of which four were 18-pounders, 
 carried, it would seem, in extra ports on the lower deck ; 
 three smaller frigates, and two corvettes ; and all of 
 these, in addition to their complements, which were 
 smaller than was usual in French ships, carried a 
 number of soldiers, amounting in the aggregate to about 
 1,200 : these were borne for service on shore, under the 
 command of a brigadier-general, M. de Flobert. 
 
THUEOT. 
 
 343 
 
 In more exact detail, the squadron was as follows : — 
 
 Marechal de Belle-Isle 44 guns 
 
 Begon . . . 36 „ 
 
 Blonde . . . 36 „ 
 
 Terpsichore . . 24 ,, 
 
 Amarante . . . 18 ,, 
 
 Faucon . . . 18 „ 
 
 600 men 
 
 600 
 
 400 
 
 300 
 ?150 
 ?150 
 
 With this force, nominally most respectable, Thurot 
 weighed from Dunkirk on 15 October, 1759. On the 
 26th he arrived at Gothenburg, having not only passed 
 through the English cruisers which, under Commodore 
 Boys and Sir Peircy Brett, blockaded the coast off 
 Dunkirk and Ostend, but taken several prizes on the 
 way. 
 
 A quaint letter, which Durand has preserved, gives 
 the impressions of a Liverpool skipper, a Captain Bim- 
 mer, who had seen the squadron at Gothenburg. The 
 Belle-Isle, he says, ' has a black lion-head, and appears 
 very ill-hogged in the midships, and is painted black 
 and red;' one of the other frigates 'has a yellow lion- 
 head standing remarkably high, is painted yellow and 
 black ;' and so on through the rest of them. The fashion 
 which prevailed to the last, of painting ships of the line 
 and frigates black with white stripes, and which was, I 
 believe, definitely introduced by Sir John Jervis when in 
 command of the Mediterranean fleet, no doubt had some 
 advantages ; but the artistic eye, comparing it with the 
 fashions of the past, as exemplified in some of the 
 models at Greenwich, in the museum of the Koyal Naval 
 College, may almost regret the uniform simplicity which 
 superseded them. 
 
 But a more remarkable passage in the letter just 
 
344 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 referred to, is that which speaks of the condition of the 
 squadron :— 
 
 The frigates when they came into Gothenburg were very 
 foul, as if come off from a long voyage, and were destitute of 
 many necessaries — had very few seamen on board, but full of 
 land forces, commanded by a major-general ; most of the 
 soldiers were in blue, faced with white, and others all white. 
 Whilst they remained at Gothenburg, nineteen days, they 
 were fully employed cleaning their ships, getting new top- 
 masts, new rigging for their vessels, victualling and watering ; 
 and the Swedes assisted them all in their power, sending 
 them their East Indian ships' boats to water with, and pro- 
 curing them cables in lieu of those they had ordered to be 
 made, which would have detained them before finished. 
 
 And this after eleven days at sea from their first 
 leaving France ! 
 
 The squadron left Gothenburg on 15 November, and 
 meeting with a succession of southerly gales, was driven 
 northward, and put into Bergen ; the Begon, of 36 guns, 
 presumably the ' yellow and black ' frigate mentioned by 
 Captain Eimmer, and one of the corvettes had parted 
 company; and as Bergen had been given out as a 
 rendezvous, Thurot waited there for several days ; they 
 did not, however, appear, and he left without them on 
 5 December. 
 
 The weather, that winter, seems to have been ex- 
 ceptionally and persistently bad, and the squadron, now 
 reduced to four ships, was driven away to the westward, 
 and on 28 December came to an anchor in Westmanna- 
 haven in Stromsoe, one of the Faroe Islands. Whilst 
 there Thurot wished to procure fresh provisions for his 
 ships' companies ; and as the governor made difficulties, 
 he landed a party of men, at once to intimidate the 
 
THUROT. 345 
 
 authorities, and to lay hands on whatever they could 
 get. The display of force was sufficient, and a small 
 supply of bullocks, flour, brandy, and tobacco was sent 
 on board. It may be noticed that at that time the Faroe 
 Islands were a favourite haunt of smugglers, and a place 
 of call for Danish and Dutch East Indiamen ; now that 
 Smuggling, as well as these branches of the East India 
 trade, has been done away, the resources of the islands 
 have probably much diminished, and any supplies they 
 could furnish would scarcely be worth the notice of a 
 body of more than 1,200 men. 
 
 During the stay of the squadron at Stromsoe a 
 quarrel broke out between M. de Flobert and Thurot, 
 which was the cause of serious embarrassment both then 
 and afterwards. Flobert had displayed all along a feel- 
 ing of jealousy at being subordinated to Thurot, as well 
 as of pique at Thurot's refusal to communicate the tenor 
 of his private instructions and the full purport of the 
 expedition. A circumstance, trivial in itself, was suffi- 
 cient to set the match to the ready fuel. Thurot had 
 learned that one of the soldier-officers had been grum- 
 bling about the hardships of the cruise, and the pro- 
 visions, in what he rightly considered an unofficer-like 
 way ; and had felt it his duty to reprimand him sharply. 
 Flobert took up the matter in support of his junior ; 
 worked himself into a rage, and, mad with passion, 
 ordered up a corporal and two file of the guard to put 
 Thurot under arrest. This obliged Thurot to produce 
 an order from the king, in proof that he was absolutely 
 commander-in-chief of the expedition ; and Flobert — I 
 quote here from the 'Life,' by M. * * * — 
 
346 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 ' fearing to compromise his authority by persisting in his 
 imprudent step, drew back, and the quarrel was for the time 
 appeased ; leaving, however, a leaven of animosity which con- 
 tinued to ferment, occasioned many difficulties, and threw 
 into the minds of the soldiers a germ of insubordination 
 which produced very bad effects.' 
 
 In point of fact this quarrel between Flobert and 
 Thurot was an extreme instance of a cause which, in the 
 last century, and in England more than in Prance, ren- 
 dered futile so very many expeditions in which sea and 
 land forces were required to act in conjunction. Of 
 these Vernon's failure at Cartagena in 1741 was perhaps 
 the most marked and the most disastrous ; but there 
 were scores of others ; and the constant recurrence of 
 difficulties seems to point to a radically false system and 
 an honest misunderstanding, rather than to mere cap- 
 tiousness and personal dislike. At the same time, it is 
 too true that there was, between soldiers and sailors, a 
 very mutual feeling of jealousy and contempt, which the 
 officers in no small degree shared with their men. This 
 was strong enough, no doubt, on the part of the soldiers, 
 but was perhaps even stronger amongst the sailors, who 
 saw their favoured and courtly rivals sea-sick and help- 
 less on board ship, but had no opportunity of seeing 
 them in their own sphere of duty and distinction. The 
 pipe-clay, the powdered head, the stiff clothing and 
 etiquette of the soldier were all repulsive to the ' tar ' of 
 the olden time. Had he been versed in Shakespeare, he 
 would probably have described the object of his scorn in 
 the words of Hotspur, as ' neat and finely dressed — fresh 
 as a bridegroom — perfumed like a milliner ;' as it was, 
 he drew up a table of precedence, which continued in 
 
THUROT. 347 
 
 vogue till not very many years ago. I have myself 
 heard it said, and meant too, 'A messmate before a 
 shipmate ; a shipmate before a stranger ; a stranger 
 before a dog ; but — a dog before a soldier.' 
 
 When we remember the numerous instances to be 
 found in our own annals in which joint expeditions failed 
 from disagreement or want of perfect concord between 
 two commanding officers of the different services, not 
 otherwise connected, it is not to be wondered at if a 
 French soldier of good family, M. de Flobert, was in- 
 dignant at the circumstances that compelled him to 
 act subordinately — or rather insubordinately — to a 
 sailor, not even a genuine naval officer, an ex-smuggler, 
 a privateer, a man of no family, a rotwrier, a Francois 
 Thurot. Possibly, nay probably, Thurot was at fault in 
 some of the conventionalities of French society, for he 
 had never had any opportunity of seeing or practising 
 them : but, after all, Thurot's name lives in history ; 
 Flobert's probably comes before many readers now for 
 the first time. 
 
 The constant succession of gales which obliged 
 Thurot to remain at the Faroe Islands, compelled him 
 to put the men on short allowance of bread, ten ounces 
 per day, and to stop the double rations issued to officers 
 and servants, promising, however, that they should be 
 paid savings, that is, the equivalent in money. Flobert 
 insisted that a council of war should be called, and stated 
 that, in his opinion, as their force had been lessened 
 by the loss of the two ships, Begon and Faucon, and 
 was now weakened by the want of provisions, it was im- 
 perative on him to return to France at once. Thurot re- 
 plied : the speech, as reported, is most likely apocryphal, 
 
348 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 but it has been accepted by the French, and serves 
 at any rate to illustrate the sense in which they have 
 considered his character. He said, then : — 
 
 That as they could not get provisions at the Faroe Islands, 
 they must go and look for them in England, where they would 
 find abundance. That the winds, which had long been con- 
 trary, would change, and three days would bring them to 
 their destination : the only honourable way to be useful to 
 their country was to make a diversion— which might lead to 
 great results — by attacking the enemy in their homes, and by 
 braving all risks in this glorious attempt ; certainly not by 
 returning shamefully to France after so much toil and fatigue, 
 without having ventured to undertake anything. For the 
 rest, the direct route lay past England, and on the English 
 coast he would land ; it was absolutely necessary to make a 
 descent ; he was determined to do so ; the reasons offered for 
 a retreat so dishonourable as had been proposed could have 
 no influence with a force on which the safety of the country 
 depended ; and, in fine, that to grumble at the difficulties, or 
 even the calamities incidental to war, was not showing the 
 courage and firmness necessary to the career of arms. 
 
 Thurot carried his point. On 26 January, 1760, the 
 squadron left Stromsoe, with a fresh wind from north- 
 west, and by the 30th was on the north coast of Ireland. 
 It was his intention to enter Lough Foyle, and attack 
 Londonderry; there does not seem to have been any- 
 thing to prevent him, except the weather, which, with a 
 southerly gale, drove him off the coast. And meanwhile, 
 a mutiny broke out amongst the officers of the troops, 
 which was the more dangerous as the soldiers formed 
 the largest part of the ships' companies. The Amarante 
 deserted the squadron ; the Terpsichore had arranged to 
 do the same ; Thurot hailed to say that if the wind did 
 
THUEOT. 349 
 
 not shift he would run back to Bergen and get pro- 
 visions ; the Blonde replied that it was none too soon. 
 M. de Busilly, commanding the troops on board the 
 Terpsichore, complained bitterly of the short allowance 
 of provisions, and said that all the officers were decided 
 to return to France. Thurot pointed out that their 
 doing so might lead to results disagreeable to them- 
 selves ; but finding his authority set at naught, he con- 
 sented, as a compromise, to go to Bergen. 
 
 The wind, however, now changed to the north-west, 
 and he proposed to enter St. George's Channel; but 
 Busilly impudently notified to him, in the name of the 
 officers of the Terpsichore, that they were going to pass 
 to the west of Ireland, and return to France. Thurot 
 ordered Dernaudais, the captain of the Terpsichore, to 
 follow the Belle-Isle, saying that if he refused he should 
 be responsible before the king for his conduct. Busilly 
 answered that he would take all the responsibility on 
 himself ; that it was his intention, as soon as he arrived 
 in France, to lay a complaint of Thurot's conduct before 
 the court, and have him punished. Dernaudais, who 
 had every wish to obey his commodore, was forced by 
 Busilly and the other soldier-officers to yield, and to 
 make off towards the west ; Thurot fired a shot across 
 the Terpsichore's bows ; he had to fire a second before 
 she would bring to ; and Dernaudais, having gone on 
 board the Belle-Isle, had to prove that he had been 
 constrained by his officers. He was sent back to his 
 ship, bearing to the mutineers the assurance that they 
 should be severely punished. The Blonde seems to have 
 been just at that time more favourably disposed ; she 
 passed under the Belle-Isle's stern, and her captain, 
 
350 STUDIES IJST NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 M. Larreguy, hailed that Thurot might count on 
 him. 
 
 The next day Thurot judged it necessary to reduce 
 the ration of bread to eight ounces. Flobert ordered 
 that only five ounces should be issued to the soldiers. 
 These naturally complained that they got less than the 
 sailors, and Thurot at once gave directions that they 
 should get the same. Flobert, whose order seems to 
 have been quite unwarranted — to have been given only 
 to provoke disturbance amongst his men — was furious. 
 He insisted on a council, and demanded that the captain 
 should explain his navigation, for the day before it had 
 been agreed that he was to enter St. George's Channel, 
 and now he was standing towards Londonderry. Thurot 
 replied that, in fact, he meant to go to Londonderry. 
 Flobert asked what he would do if the wind still pre- 
 vented his entering. In that case Thurot would con- 
 tinue his route. ' Well then ! ' cried Flobert, ' if to^ 
 morrow morning, at six o'clock, we are not in the port of 
 Londonderry, and you do not then give up this project, 
 I will have you arrested, and will myself take charge of 
 the ship.' Thurot is described as being more surprised 
 than angry, and as contenting himself with saying, ' If 
 you take it in that way there's nothing more to be said ; 
 your threats do not intimidate me; I do not fear you, 
 and I defy you to arrest me.' 
 
 Flobert, screaming with rage, rushed out of the 
 cabin, ordered the sentry to prevent Thurot leaving it, 
 and called the guard to arms. Thurot took his pistols, 
 pushed past the sentry, and went out on the quarter- 
 deck. The guard had fallen in, but the men were un- 
 willing to execute off-hand the orders of their command- 
 
THUEOT. 351 
 
 ant, whose fellows had, meantime, pointed out to him 
 that he was exceeding his power. Flobert gave way, 
 and Thurot, to put an end to the scandalous scene, and 
 to prevent anything of the sort happening again, wished 
 to read out his instructions from the king, and the com- 
 mission appointing him commander-in-chief of the 
 squadron. Flobert forbade the soldiers to listen to him. 
 Thurot then said that he would have it posted up for all 
 to read. Flobert gave orders that whoever attempted to 
 post it up should be arrested. It was now Thurot's turn 
 to give way ; ' he had the complaisance not to make his 
 instructions public ' — not to post them up — and so calm 
 was restored. 
 
 That same night the Belle-Isle hove-to off the 
 entrance to Lough Foyle, and in the darkness her two 
 consorts left her, having a.greed between themselves to 
 pass round to the west of Ireland. By a mistake in 
 their reckoning, however, they rejoined her next day, 
 but too late to carry out the commodore's purpose. The 
 wind had shifted to the south-west, and it was no longer 
 possible to enter the Lough. 
 
 Meanwhile, in gales, disturbances, and quarrels, time 
 slipped away. It was 15 February; the daily allowance 
 of bread was reduced to five ounces, and Thurot, firmly 
 resolved not to go back to France, anchored in Claigeann 
 Bay in the island of Islay. Here he learned from a man, 
 McDonald, who came off as pilot, of the decisive defeat 
 which Conflans had sustained. It was an event three 
 months past, but was news to him, and disturbed his 
 plans, as he saw that, of course, the great project of 
 invasion could not be carried out. He was, however, 
 still unwilling to return without attempting something 
 
352 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 which might be for the honour, if not very much for the 
 material advantage of Prance. But it was absolutely 
 necessary, in the first place, to get some fresh provisions 
 and bread, for his crews were sickly ; and, as the popu- 
 lation of the island, with the repressive measures of the 
 English Government after ' the Forty-five ' still in their 
 memories, refused to furnish any supplies, the natural 
 course would have been to take them by force. This 
 Thurot was unwilling to do ; for his instructions were 
 positive not to attempt any hostile landing in Scotland, 
 where it was hoped the Jacobite feeling might itself 
 make a diversion in favour of French arms. 
 
 In this dilemma he came to an arrangement with 
 McDonald — who seems to have acted throughout as his 
 agent — to land his men as a demonstration. It was 
 the merest of demonstrations. The poor, half-starved, 
 scurvy-smitten wretches were no sooner landed than they 
 * began to dig up every green thing they saw upon the 
 ground, even the grass, which they devoured with the 
 utmost eagerness.' The bullocks, nevertheless, were 
 produced ; forty-eight were driven in, and after a diffi- 
 culty with Flobert, who wished to ' requisition ' them, 
 were very honestly paid for by Thurot. In a similar 
 way, he got a small but grateful supply of oatmeal and 
 flour ; and putting to sea on the 19th, a Lisbon trader, 
 laden with oranges, was, under the circumstances, a 
 most valuable prize. 
 
 About midnight on the 20th he entered Belfast 
 Lough. On the previous evening he had detailed his 
 plans to Flobert. 
 
 ' There are two objects before us,' he had said, ' Belfast 
 and Carrickfergus. I will land you at Whitehouse. You will, 
 
THUROT. 353 
 
 in the first instance, attack Belfast ; it is a rich commercial 
 town, and has neither fortifications nor troops. Threaten to 
 set fire to it, and the inhabitants 'will hasten to furnish the 
 stores and provisions of which we are so much in need. You 
 will be able, besides, to levy a large contribution. After that 
 you will go to Carrickfergus, a town of but small size, and 
 poor. It will be quite easy to seize on the castle, which is 
 old, ruinous, and without defence. You will set at liberty 
 the French prisoners who are there, and extract from the 
 people such a contribution of provisions and money as their 
 small means will permit; and will re-embark before the 
 English ships are apprised of our landing. The whole thing 
 is to be done off-hand; the enemy must not have time to 
 organise any opposition.' 
 
 The plan seems to have been excellent, but Flobert, 
 either out of contradiction, or a pedantic adherence to 
 prescribed rules, insisted on attacking Carrickfergus 
 first. He would land at Kilroot, two or three miles to 
 the north-east of Carrickfergus, or nowhere ; and unable 
 to overcome his mutinous obstinacy, Thurot, sooner than 
 do nothing, consented. The landing of about 600 men 
 was effected by noon on 21 February, 1760. 
 
 As soon as Lieut. -Col. Jennings, who commanded at 
 Carrickfergus, learned that three strange and suspicious 
 ships had anchored at Kilroot, whilst waiting for further 
 information, he sent all the prisoners to Belfast, and 
 made what preparations he could for defence. These 
 were but few. Although Carrickfergus was, in a way, 
 the military depot of the north of Ireland, the castle was 
 ruinous, the town was unfortified, and there were in 
 garrison only 200 men, almost all young recruits, and, 
 as yet, quite undisciplined. Accordingly, when Flobert 
 attacked, little opposition could be made ; the men retired 
 
 A A 
 
354 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 into the castle, and after a short stand, in which some 
 50 French were killed and wounded, they capitulated on 
 terms sufficiently favourable. The troops were not to 
 be sent prisoners to France, but exchanged against an 
 equal number of French ; the castle (such as it was) 
 was not to be demolished ; the town was not to be burnt 
 or pillaged, but was, as a ransom, to supply the squadron 
 with provisions. The course of events rendered these 
 conditions practically vain ; and though the town was 
 not set on fire, it was pretty well ransacked, as was, 
 indeed, to be expected from men whose officers had set 
 them no good example of obedience, and who had been 
 confined on board ship for four months. 
 
 Thurot had meanwhile weighed, stood further into 
 the bay, and anchored off Whitehouse. From there, on 
 the next day, he landed, and in ah interview with 
 Flobert, pressed him to advance at once on Belfast, 
 which, he understood, was defended by only 200 regulars 
 and some militia. Flobert, notwithstanding this and 
 the wish of his own officers, refused to move. 
 
 The next day, the 23rd, Thurot wrote to Flobert, still 
 urging him to attack Belfast ; again pointing out that 
 they could get plenty of provisions there, could levy a 
 rich contribution, and that it would be easier to re- 
 embark. That he could not stay long, as the enemy 
 would gather in on him; that, in fact, he must sail 
 next day ; and that, unless he got provisions, he would 
 not re-embark the troops: it would be better that 
 they should remain prisoners in Ireland than die of 
 hunger on board. Flobert's reply to his commanding 
 officer is a valuable commentary on the discipline of the 
 period. 
 
THUROT. 355 
 
 If, he wrote, you had done with your ships the hundredth 
 part of what I have done with the quarter of my detachment, 
 we should not be in the wretched plight in which, by your 
 fault alone, we now are ; for this you shall answer to the 
 king, who, when he entrusted you with the conduct of a de- 
 tachment, did not give you permission to sacrifice it, in a 
 barefaced manner, in trying to carry out impossible and 
 chimerical plans. If you had had the common sense to see 
 that famine is the only evil without remedy and beyond the 
 courage of the king's troops, you would not now be reduced 
 to the cruel threat of abandoning us to the discretion of the 
 king's enemies. It is your duty to abide whatever may hap- 
 pen, rather than not re-embark the detachment. I summon 
 you, in the king's name, to run all hazards rather than 
 abandon us. 
 
 M. de Cavenac, who, on Plobert being wounded, had 
 taken the command, wrote in much the same sense ; and 
 again, shortly afterwards, that the enemy were muster- 
 ing in force, and that it was necessary to re-embark at 
 once. Thurot, in threatening to abandon the troops, 
 had undoubtedly threatened what he could not and durst 
 not perform ; and finding that their, officers would not 
 lead them against Belfast, he embarked them on the 
 evening of the 25th. Of provisions he seems to have 
 obtained none, except a few potatoes. The mayor and 
 three townsmen had been taken on board as security 
 for the promised supplies ; but as these were not 
 forthcoming on the 24th, it was arranged that the town 
 should pay 1,000Z. instead; and two of the hostages 
 were sent on shore to see about it; the two others, 
 Mr. Chaplin, the mayor, and Mr. Spaight, a merchant 
 of Carrickfergus, being kept on board. Thurot was 
 anxious to get out of the bay, but a stormy wind from 
 
 A A 2 
 
356 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 the northward prevented him, and he could not weigh 
 till midnight of the 27th. It was half-past four on the 
 morning of the 28th when he rounded the light on the 
 island of Copeland. 
 
 The delay which had been enforced on him had per- 
 mitted the government to bring up a small squadron 
 from the south of Ireland. It cannot but appear strange 
 that there should have been at that time no ships of war 
 in the northern waters ; for it had been known for weeks 
 past that Thurot was on the coast, and great alarm 
 had been felt at all places which were, or thought they 
 were, worth attacking. At Whitehaven, where some 200 
 merchant ships, coasting vessels and others, were lying, 
 there was great excitement, and 600 volunteers took up 
 arms to defend the place ; but how these were to defend 
 the shipping does not appear. Liverpool in the same 
 way, then rising fast into importance, and especially 
 obnoxious for the number of its privateers, assembled 
 a considerable number of troops, mostly of the local 
 militia. An old townsman, who, under the name of a 
 ' nonagenarian,' published his recollections a few years 
 ago, has described the scene, which would be still fresh 
 in the memory of his mother when he was a little 
 boy:— 
 
 ' Everton Hill,' he says, 'was alive with people from the 
 town waiting the freebooters' approach. A party of soldiers 
 was then encamped on the hill, and I have been told that the 
 men had orders, on Thurot's appearance, to make signals if by 
 day, and to light up the beacon if at night, to communicate 
 the intelligence of the French fleet being off the coast to the 
 other beacons at Ashurst and Billinge, Eivington Pike, and 
 elsewhere, and so spread the news into the north; while 
 
THUROT. 357 
 
 signals would also be taken up at Halton, Beeston, the 
 Wrekin, and thence to the southward.' ' 
 
 But there seems to have been no attempt to defend 
 the river, and Thurot might, practically without opposi- 
 tion, have done a good deal of mischief amongst the 
 shipping, and have destroyed the rising fortunes of the 
 Bolds, the Colquitts, and others whose names are per- 
 petuated in the modern streets. 
 
 Notwithstanding all this preparation and excitement, 
 no ships had been sent north ; and when the Duke of 
 Bedford, then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, had news of 
 the landing at Carrickfergus, he had to send, quite 
 promiscuously, to the different seaports, to inform the 
 captains of any of his Majesty's ships that might happen 
 to be there, of the enemy being on the coast. Luckily, 
 and only luckily, there did happen to be three frigates at 
 Kinsale : the .ZEolus, of 32 guns, Captain Elliot, Brilliant 
 and Pallas, each of 36 guns. They belonged to Hawke's 
 fleet on the coast of France, had been blown off their 
 station, had run short of provisions, had put into Kin- 
 sale, and had been detained by a succession of southerly 
 gales. Their presence at Kinsale when the Lord- 
 Lieutenant's letter arrived on 24 February, was the 
 result of a very curious succession of accidents. On re- 
 ceipt of the news they had got to sea with all haste, and 
 had come off the entrance of Belfast Lough on the even- 
 ing of the 26th, but during the gale had not ventured 
 inside. It was thus that, on the morning of the 28th, 
 when the French squadron came round Copeland Island, 
 
 1 Recollections of Old Liverpool, by a Nonagenarian (Liverpool, 1863), 
 p. 146. 
 
358 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 it saw, and was immediately seen by, the iEolus and her 
 consorts. 
 
 It was no part of Thurot's plan to fight a squadron of 
 English frigates, and he did not wait for their attack. 
 They gave chase, and closed with him about nine o'clock ; 
 the iEolus, leading, engaged the Belle-Isle ; the Pallas 
 and Brilliant, as they came up, assisted her ; and after a 
 smart action, lasting for about an hour and a half, 
 Thurot was killed, and his ship hauled down her colours. 
 The Blonde and Terpsichore had not shown any wish to 
 fight, and being chased by the Pallas and Brilliant, 
 struck almost at once ; they thus sustained little or no 
 damage or loss ; but the Belle-Isle had suffered consider- 
 ably in men, in spars, and in hull. Captain Elliot, in 
 his official letter, estimates the enemy's loss, in killed 
 and wounded, at 300; the French accounts — probably 
 not including the less severe cases — speak of 90 hors de 
 combat ; and, whichever account we accept, the loss was 
 very great, and had fallen almost entirely on the Belle- 
 Isle, which was also with difficulty kept from sinking, as 
 she was taken, with the other prizes, into Bamsay Bay, 
 in the Isle of Mann. 1 
 
 The presence of the French frigates on the coast had 
 caused such vivid alarm, that the rejoicing over their 
 capture was somewhat excessive, and was accompanied by 
 much boasting. The action was no doubt highly credit- 
 able to Elliot and his companions, and a very important 
 service was performed just when it was most needed; 
 
 1 M. de Flobert had been left at Carrickfergus, wounded, and thus 
 fell into the hands of Lord Charlemont, who seems to have been favour- 
 ably impressed by his manners and kindly disposition, though he speaks 
 also of his pedantic notions of military science and discipline. , See 
 Hardy's Memoirs of the Earl of Charlemont, i. 110 et seg_. 
 
THUEOT. 359 
 
 but there was not in reality much to boast about ; and I 
 cannot but think that Nelson was prompted by an im- 
 perfect knowledge of the facts when he wrote on 11 
 January 1804 : 1 'his [Elliot's] action with Thurot will 
 stand the test with any of our modern victories.' Nomi- 
 nally the French squadron was superior to the English ; 
 independent of the result, it was not so effectively. The 
 French guns were heavier, but several had been struck 
 below during the bad weather in the northern seas, and 
 had not been remounted ; the ships too were of slighter 
 scantling, the Belle-Isle more especially, which was badly 
 hogged even at Gothenburg, and after her capture was 
 not thought worth buying into the service. The number 
 of men, again, was nearly double that of the English, but 
 very many of them were sickly, if not sick ; and the bulk 
 were soldiers, who — under such officers as they had — 
 were not only useless in action, but worse than useless, 
 as getting in the way, and swelling the list of killed and 
 wounded. Even had the Blonde and Terpsichore stuck 
 gallantly by their consort, the result must have been the 
 same ; for the three English frigates were in good order, 
 well manned and ably commanded ; but the manner in 
 which these two kept aloof, by throwing the whole weight 
 of the contest on the Belle- Isle, rendered it beyond ques- 
 tion easier and the sooner come at. 
 
 About Thurot himself there seems little room for 
 doubt ; his contemporaries, alike friends and enemies, 
 speak of him as a bold, daring man, active, energetic, and 
 full of resource ; and the fact that during the greater 
 part of three years he kept the English coast in a state 
 of continual apprehension, escaping from, eluding, and, 
 1 Nioolas's Nelson Despatches, v. 366. 
 
360 STUDIES IN KAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 when need was, fighting the English cruisers with which 
 the narrow seas were swarming, is sufficient evidence of 
 his high qualities as a corsair and a leader of a flying 
 squadron. I have already shown how, on different occa- 
 sions, he declined to push his success against English 
 ships of war to a decisive issue ; notably against the 
 Southampton and against the Seahorse — against this 
 last more especially. In doing so I have not wished to 
 impute any base motive to Thurot, whose courage must 
 have been of proof; but I do think that both these 
 actions, and in a less degree that which he fought against 
 the Dolphin and Solebay, illustrate the principle which 
 was then, and continued to be during the century, the 
 ruling principle of the French navy — that of avoiding 
 decisive action; 1 a principle which might occasionally 
 lead to strategic advantage, but which on the other hand 
 exposed them to great tactical danger and absolute loss 
 — as was clearly exemplified on 20 November, 1759, ' la 
 jowmee de M. de Conflans ' — and which effectually pre- 
 vented their winning any brilliant success. Thurot 
 fought well when he was forced to fight ; but he con- 
 sistently avoided action whenever he could avoid it, and 
 when he could not, he quitted it at the earliest possible 
 opportunity. He thus, throughout his career, obtained 
 only the reputation of an active and untiring corsair. 
 Had it been otherwise, he might have gained a higher 
 reputation as a warrior, by capturing the Southampton 
 or the Seahorse, against each of which he had an over- 
 whelmingly superior force ; and at the last, might have 
 made a much sturdier resistance against the .ZEolus and 
 her consorts. Had he stood boldly towards the English 
 1 Compare Victoires et ConguStes, torn. vii. p. 251. 
 
THUEOT. 361 
 
 squadron, his companions would scarcely have had the 
 unblushing cowardice to stand away ; but as he crowded 
 sail from the enemy, they did the same ; and by rate of 
 sailing and accident of position, had an excuse — sufficient 
 for them, though it would not have been sufficient for 
 single-hearted, honest, and honourable men — to keep 
 out of the fight. 
 
 As to the conduct of M. de Flobert, and the whole 
 body of soldier-officers, the story of which throws a 
 curious light on the capabilities or incapabilities of French 
 discipline, there can be but one opinion. Whatever 
 grievances he had, or thought he had, it was his duty to 
 his country and his king to have backed up the com- 
 modore. His complaints might and should have waited, 
 after due remonstrance, till their return to France. 
 There can be little doubt that had Flobert entered into 
 Thurot's views and schemes, Belfast would have been 
 sacked. Against a sudden onset such as Thurot proposed, 
 there were no possible meanB of effective resistance ; 
 though after three days' delay, things would certainly 
 have been very different. 
 
 And the history of Thurot's whole career, and more 
 especially of this last campaign, seems to me to show 
 that a naval force, however numerous and active, is not 
 in itself sufficient to protect our commerce from loss, our 
 coasts from insult, and our towns from pillage, at the 
 hands of a small squadron, or even of a single ship, 
 commanded by a man of talent and enterprise. That 
 Thurot failed in inflicting very serious loss on our towns 
 and our shipping, seems to have been due not to any 
 wise precautions of the government — though the elder 
 Pitt was secretary of state — not to the superior might of 
 
362 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 our navy, though that crushed him at last ; but to the 
 exceptional severity of the season, to the inherent weak- 
 ness of French sailors, the inefficiency of French equip- 
 ment, and the bad discipline of French soldiers. But it 
 is not wise always to trust our safety, our prestige, or 
 our honour either to the caprice of the weather or to the 
 presumed incapacity of a possible enemy. 
 
 In person, Thurot is described as of middle height, 
 stout-built and well-made, ' rather robust than genteel, 
 rather comely than handsome ; very brown and extremely 
 florid, with a small scar under his left eye.' Of his 
 private life we know little or nothing ; he died poor, 
 leaving an Irishwoman (nee Smith) who passed as his 
 wife, and a daughter six months old, dependent on the 
 state, which at that time, meant Madame de Pompadour. 
 We find the daughter coming forward in 1790, with a 
 petition for further support, and being awarded, at the 
 instance of Barrere, a pension of 1,000 francs. His 
 biographer, M. * * *, says that he married about the 
 year 1750 ; but according to Durand, who appears to 
 write in good faith and of personal knowledge, he was, 
 about that time and after, living in Shadwell with an 
 Irish trull whom he had picked up in that not very re- 
 putable neighbourhood. Whether this was Miss Smith, 
 the future Mdme. Thurot, or not, is a point on which 
 history does not pronounce an opinion. 
 
363 
 
 CHAPTEE XL 
 
 PAUL JONES, 
 'TEE PIBATE.' 1 
 
 In the foregoing chapter I have related one of our past 
 experiences of a bold and energetic corsair ; but Thurot 
 is not the only man who, in spite of our naval power, 
 has spread alarm along our coasts ; and the lesson is 
 too important to be lightly set aside. I propose, there- 
 fore, to follow up that story with an account of the 
 remarkable man whose name served for many years as 
 the controller of the peace of northern nurseries — a police 
 duty that has more recently, as I am told, been entrusted 
 to the Jabberwock or the Bandersnatch. 
 
 It is close on one hundred years since an unnamed 
 minstrel of the streets sang in a ballad more frank than 
 polite : 
 
 Of heroes and statesmen I'll just mention four 
 
 That cannot be matched if we trace the world o'er ; 
 
 For none of such fame ever stept o'er the stones 
 
 As Germain, Jemmy Twitcher, Lord North and Paul Jones. 
 
 Through a madheaded war which old England wiU rue, 
 At London, at Dublin, and Edinburgh too, 
 The tradesmen stand still, and the merchant bemoans 
 The losses he meets with from such as Paul Jones. 
 
 1 Eraser's Magazine, April 1878. 
 
364 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 If success to our fleets be not quickly restored, 
 
 The Leaders in Office to shove from the board, 
 
 May they all fare alike, and the De'il pick the bones 
 
 Of Germain, Jemmy Twitcher, Lord North and Paul Jones. 
 
 Of the first three members of this quartette, I have 
 nothing to say here ; their misdeeds are chronicled in 
 every English history. The fourth is, to most English 
 readers, only a name, or if he is anything more, he is 
 ' the pirate.' Paul Jones strongly objected to the word 
 as applied to himself ; he had, he said, looked in the dic- 
 tionary, and found the meaning of pirate to be ' an enemy 
 of mankind.' Now, he was not the enemy of mankind, 
 but only the enemy of England. 
 
 Antonio never yet was thief or pirate, 
 Though I confess, on base and ground enough, 
 Orsino's enemy. 
 
 With a tu quoque argument, not wanting in ingenuity, 
 he urged, that as England was then at war with the 
 whole of America, the greater part of Europe, and much 
 of Asia, not to speak of a bit of Africa, she, in point of fact, 
 came as near being the enemy of mankind as could well 
 be conceived ; that England was therefore the pirate, not 
 Paul Jones. 
 
 But pirate or not, his career and conduct are worth 
 inquiring into and discussing. In doing so I shall en- 
 deavour to write as becomes a student of naval history, 
 not as a professional eulogist, still less as an angry reviler. 
 If I can do this I may claim some degree of merit ; for 
 though the life of Paul Jones has often been written, it 
 has never yet been written except in a tone of extravagant 
 praise or of senseless disparagement. It is not so that 
 any man's life ought to be written. Fas est ab hoste doceri. 
 
PAUL JONES. 365 
 
 If Paul Jones did us great harm at a very trying period of 
 our history, it is worth our while seriously and calmly to 
 inquire what he did, how he did it, and how, in the future, 
 similar harm, injury, or insult is to be guarded against. 
 The Lives of Paul Jones, to which I have just referred, 
 divide themselves broadly into the two classes I have 
 named. The latter are either chap-books or are based 
 on chap-books : they are dictated by ignorance, or spite, 
 or panic : they have little or no foundation in fact, and, 
 as historical records, they are of no value whatever. The 
 others, whatever pretext of originality they make, may 
 be virtually resolved into two, which, being written or 
 edited under a strong personal as well as national bias, 
 call for great caution in accepting their statements. Of 
 these, one was published as far back as 1825 : its author, 
 Mr. Sherburne, was Eegistrar of the United States' Navy, 
 and had access to many public records and papers, which 
 he quotes from or embodies : he was also able to collect 
 various private or semi-private letters, and was on terms 
 of familiar and domestic intimacy with men who had 
 themselves taken part in the events he has described. He 
 is thus, in many respects, a competent witness, and is 
 entitled to every consideration which his avowed partisan- 
 ship permits. The other, published in 1830, is based on 
 certain private papers in the possession of Miss Janette 
 Taylor, a niece of Paul Jones : it supplements the first 
 in many interesting points, but is, more even than Mr. 
 Sherburne's, Jones's own account of his conduct under 
 circumstances which writers less partial than himself 
 might well speak of in less favourable terms. 1 
 
 1 Of the other Lives of Paul Jones, I may mention one by Captain 
 A. Slidell Mackenzie, U.S.N., which, take it all in all, is the most satis- 
 
366 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 John Paul was born in Scotland, in the stewartry of 
 Kirkcudbright, in the parish of Kirkbean, 1 on 6 July, 1747. 
 About his birth and early years there was no romance 
 whatever, and there is no mystery. He was of respec- 
 table though humble parentage ; his father, Jobn Paul, 
 being head gardener to Mr. Craik, of Arbigland, and his 
 mother, Jean Macduff, the daughter of a neighbouring 
 farmer. He was the youngest of five children— two, still 
 younger, dying in infancy. He received the ordinary 
 education of a Scottish peasant lad at the parish school, 
 and at the age of twelve was bound apprentice on board 
 the Friendship, of Whitehaven, a ship belonging to Mr. 
 Younger, a merchant in the American trade. His first 
 'voyage was to the Eappahannock. 
 
 Neither is there anything remarkable, romantic, or 
 mysterious in his early career. He is described as 
 steady, anxious to learn, and devoting much of his 
 spare time on shore to study. His elder brother had 
 settled in Virginia, where he was doing well ; and with 
 him, in a society above what he might otherwise have 
 
 factory that has been published; and a short- one by Mr. J. Fenimore 
 Cooper, in his Lives of Distinguished American Naval Officers. In 
 these there is nothing original, and their value is purely critical. There 
 is also one more, which is of no value, but which, on account of its 
 pretensions, ought not to be overlooked : its title is, Mimovres de Paul 
 Jones . . . icrits par Im-mime en Anglais, et traduits sous ses yeuxpar 
 le citoyen Andre, An. VI. 1798. It is probable enough that the subject- 
 matter was furnished by Jones, but rather, I incline to think, as current 
 gossip than in a written form. 
 
 1 A distinguished officer of our navy was also born in Kirkbean — 
 Admiral John Campbell. He was the son of the parish minister ; en- 
 tered into the service as a volunteer from a small coasting vessel in which 
 he was apprentice ; served as midshipman, master's mate, and master 
 with Anson, in the Centurion ; was flag captain to Hawke at Quiberon 
 Bay, and captain of the fleet under Keppel in the action off Ushant. 
 
PAUL JONES. 367 
 
 had access to, young Paul seems to have resided whilst 
 in America. After he had made a few voyages in this 
 service, Mr. Younger failed, and the boy, thrown out of 
 employment, obtained a berth as third mate on board 
 the King George of Whitehaven, a slaver. He remained 
 in her, or under the same owners, for some three or 
 four years. He was nineteen when he was appointed 
 first mate of the Two Friends of Jamaica, also a slaver, 
 and in her he continued for two years. Altogether, he 
 would appear to have served in the not very ennobling 
 capacity of mate of a slaver for not less than five years, 
 up to the critical age of twenty-one ; and though he then 
 left the Two Friends and the slave trade, there is not 
 the slightest authority for saying, as Captain Mackenzie 
 has said, that he did so ' impelled by an irresistible 
 feeling of disgust at the cruelties and horrors with which 
 it was attended.' There is simply no evidence as to the 
 cause of his leaving the Two Friends : he may have 
 quarrelled with the skipper ; but as he went home a 
 passenger in a brigantine, the John of Kirkcudbright, it 
 is perhaps more likely that five or six years of a tropical 
 climate, of the coast of Africa and the slave trade, had 
 told on his health and had made him desirous of a change. 
 It is also likely enough that, after serving actually at sea 
 for nine years, he thought himself fit for a higher rank 
 than that of mate of a slaver, and had determined to 
 chance the finding it. 
 
 Fortune stood his friend. The master and the mate 
 of the John both died on the homeward voyage ; the 
 passenger, John Paul, took the command and brought the 
 vessel safely to Kirkcudbright ; and the owners, to whom 
 he was thus introduced, appointed him, in acknowledg- 
 
368 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 ment of his services, to the joint office of master and 
 supercargo. In command of the John, he made two 
 voyages to the West Indies ; and his owners having then 
 dissolved partnership, he seems to have been engaged 
 for some time in smuggling between the Isle of Mann 
 and the Solway Frith. 
 
 It is only natural that there should be some little 
 doubt as to this period of Paul's life. A smuggler who 
 afterwards attains some social distinction, is scarcely 
 likely to speak too plainly of the past ; and his American 
 biographers, jealous of their hero's reputation, have 
 maintained that he was engaged in legitimate trade. 
 They have argued that between home ports — between 
 the Isle of Mann and England or Scotland — smuggling 
 was out of the question. A reminiscence of Dirk 
 Hatter aick might have corrected such an error, even 
 had they no other sources of knowledge ; for, in point of 
 fact, smuggling continued to be carried on between the 
 Isle of Mann and England until the customs dues were 
 equalised in 1853. 
 
 Whether smuggling did or did not agree with Paul's 
 prospects we have no certain knowledge. A year or two 
 later he was in command of the Betsy of London, in 
 the West Indian trade, and was afterwards trading on his 
 own account at Tobago and Grenada. To enter on this 
 business he must have had some capital, which, we 
 may suppose he got together by his smuggling specu- 
 lations. In 1773 his brother in Virginia died without 
 children, and intestate, leaving, it is said, a considerable 
 property. John Paul ' took charge of the estate on be- 
 half of his family,' but it does not appear that the family 
 ever got one penny of it. It is impossible to say what 
 
PAUL JONES. 369 
 
 became of this money : perhaps it had no real existence ; 
 perhaps it was swallowed by the ventures in Tobago 
 or Grenada ; perhaps it was squandered in reckless 
 dissipation : there is simply no evidence. A confused 
 letter written by John Paul four years later speaks of 
 some 1 ,200Z. as due to him from Tobago ; but how or 
 why these debts had been left outstanding for so long a 
 time is not explained. All that seems certain is, that 
 after his brother's death he spent the next two years in 
 America, and most of the time, according to his own 
 statement in the letter just referred to, in a state of 
 poverty, almost of destitution. 
 
 Whether a bustling, energetic man like John Paul 
 would subsist for twenty months on a small sum if he 
 had a good business, may seem more than doubtful. Of 
 his reasons for so subsisting, for abandoning, at the age 
 of twenty-six, both his business as a merchant and his 
 calling as a seaman to go into hiding so close that all the 
 researches of his admiring biographers have not been able 
 to find out where he was or what he was doing, there is 
 not a trace : and we cannot be surprised that the world, 
 and those who know the world, such as Sir Peter Teazle 
 described it, have been ready to doubt both the honesty 
 of John Paul, and the purity of John Paul's character. 
 
 From this mysterious hiding he emerged in December 
 1775, and under the assumed name of Jones — an alias 
 which his future career rendered notorious — joined the 
 revolutionary navy, then first forming. 
 
 I have been thus particular in tracing the early life 
 of John Paul, because its detail, uninteresting in itself, 
 appears to offer some explanation of both his character 
 and his choice of a career. A peasant lad, who had been 
 
 B B 
 
370 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 knocking about the world in small trading ships from the 
 time he was twelve years old; who had served during 
 five or six years, as he was growing from boyhood into 
 manhood, on board a slaver ; a Manx smuggler, a ruined 
 merchant, possibly, a fraudulent bankrupt, or too clever 
 executor, is not the man whose path we should expect to 
 find obstructed by needless or even customary scruples. 
 The world was his oyster ? with his sword he would open 
 it. He felt himself capable of achieving distinction, if 
 only he had a field for his talents ; and he had seen 
 enough to make him believe that in the war then breaking 
 out, the revolutionary side would give him the greatest 
 opportunities. To him, country was an idle word, 
 patriotism an unknown idea. Through life, the one 
 object of his worship and admiration was himself. It has 
 been urged plausibly enough, that mere selfishness or 
 greed would have prompted John Paul to have sought 
 for service rather in command of a privateer, and to 
 have cruised against English commerce, which would 
 have been decidedly more lucrative than service on board 
 a ship of war. It does not, however, follow that John 
 Paul so considered it. He may — for aught we know to 
 the contrary — have been unable to find a merchant will- 
 ing to entrust him with a command. He may have felt 
 that a commission in the national navy would gratify his 
 vanity more than sacks of dollars or doubloons. He was — 
 his whole after-life proves him to have been — the vainest 
 of men ; and it is quite possible that on this, the turning 
 point in his career, it was his vanity that steered his 
 selfishness. It is difficult to detect in his conduct, 
 apart from his assertions, any trace of what Captain 
 Mackenzie has called ' a chivalrous longing for glory ; ' 
 
PAUL JONES. 371 
 
 and, in any case, I positively deny the ' enthusiasm in 
 the cause of America.' 
 
 But whatever were the guiding motives of Paul, or 
 Jones, as he now became, what is certain is that he 
 applied for and obtained a commission in the newly 
 born continental navy; that in December 1775 he was 
 appointed first lieutenant of the Alfred, a frigate of 
 thirty guns, and three hundred men, the flagship of 
 Commodore Hopkins ; and that he served in her in the 
 first operation undertaken by an American squadron — 
 the attack on and capture of New Providence — and on 
 6 April, 1776, as they were returning, in the engage- 
 ment with the English 20-gun frigate, Glasgow. The 
 six American ships ought to have effected an easy 
 capture ; but they were badly fitted, badly manned, badly 
 officered ; and notwithstanding their enormous superiority 
 in numbers, the Glasgow, though roughly handled in a 
 running fight of several hours' duration, succeeded in 
 making good her escape. 
 
 After this, Jones was appointed to the command of 
 the Providence, sloop, carrying 12 four-pounders, and 
 employed in convoying American ships along the coast, 
 or in cruising against English commerce, in which he 
 had a very marked success. On September, he fell 
 in with the Solebay, 1 of 28 guns, nine-pounders, near 
 Bermuda, and, mistaking her for a merchant ship, ran 
 down to engage her. Between a frigate such as the 
 Solebay, and the little Providence, there could be no 
 contest ; the sloop hauled her wind and endeavoured to 
 
 1 Built in 1763, of 619 tons. The old one, mentioned ante pp. 254, 
 338, of 429 tons, built in 1742, had been sold out of the service very 
 shortly after her engagement with the Belle-Isle. 
 
 b b 2 
 
372 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 escape : but the frigate outsailed her, and, after a chase 
 of four hours, got within musket-shot on her lee quarter. 
 The situation was critical. Jones edged away to leeward 
 so gradually that Captain Symonds of the Sblebay pro- 
 bably thought that he was weathering on the chase ; but 
 having thus, without awakening suspicion, brought tbe 
 frigate on her weather quarter, the Providence's helm 
 was put sharply up, and, crowding sail, she went off dead 
 before the wind. The Solebay's lee ports were closed, 
 her lee guns apparently not cast loose ; and before she 
 could follow, or get a gun to bear, the Providence was 
 well away, on her best point of sailing. Jones's escape 
 is by no means without a parallel : that of Lord Dun- 
 donald in the Pallas, 1 from under the guns of three 
 French line-of-battle ships, will probably at once recur 
 to the reader, and other similar instances might easily 
 be found ; but it is no light praise to compare, even with 
 a difference, the deed of an untried man and an untried 
 crew, under the guns of an English frigate, with one of 
 Dundonald's smartest pieces of seamanship. 
 
 A few days later, the Providence was again chased by 
 the Milford, a frigate of the same force as the Solebay, 
 but her she outsailed with ease, and the occurrence is no 
 further noteworthy than as having given Jones the op- 
 portunity of writing a grandiloquent despatch. He was 
 shortly afterwards appointed to the Alfred for a cruise, 
 and then again to the Providence ; and finally, after 
 various plans and changes of plans, to the command of 
 the Banger, a new frigate-built ship of 26 guns, which 
 was ordered to cross over to Prance. 
 
 His appointment is conveyed in a resolution of Con- 
 
 1 Autobiograpluy of a Seaman, i. 177. 
 
PAUL JONES'. 373 
 
 gress dated 14 June, 1777 ; the same which also decreed 
 that ' the flag of the thirteen United States be thirteen 
 stripes, alternate red and white ; that the union be 
 thirteen stars, white in a blue field, representing a new 
 constellation ; ' and it is said, principally — I. believe 
 entirely — on Jones's own authority, that this • flag was 
 first hoisted on board the Eanger, and by Jones's own 
 hands. But Jones also claimed to have hoisted, on board 
 the Alfred, two years before, the earlier revolutionary 
 flag — a pine-tree, with a rattle-snake coiled round its 
 root, and the motto, don't tread on me ; and though it 
 is undoubted that these flags were first hoisted at or 
 within a few days of the dates named, and though there is 
 nothing impossible involved in the statement that Jones 
 hoisted them both for the first time, the coincidence is im- 
 probable ; and on such a point, flattering to his vanity, 
 Jones's unsupported testimony, difficult to contradict, is 
 entitled to very little weight. 
 
 The difficulties in the way of fitting out the Eanger 
 were very great. The supply of stores was extremely 
 scanty, and there was no money; it was 1 November 
 before she sailed, and then with only a single suit of sails 
 and one 30-gallon cask of rum. The ship herself was 
 of a scantling so slight that Jones determined not to take 
 the quarter-deck or forecastle guns on board ; and her 
 armament was thus reduced to 18 guns on her main deck l 
 — probably 6-pounders. 2 On the passage, she showed her- 
 self extremely crank, and after her arrival at Nantes her 
 
 1 I have here, and throughout, used the term main deck in its modern 
 sense ; in the last century what we now call the main deck was called 
 the upper deck, and really was so from the main to the foremast. 
 
 2 When the Eanger was taken at Charleston in April 1780, she 
 carried 20 six-pounders. 
 
374 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 masts had to be shortened and her stowage re-arranged, 
 in hopes of making her stiffer ; but when all was done, 
 she was still very far from being an efficient cruiser. 
 
 The relations between England, France, and the 
 revolted States of America were at that time peculiar. 
 The Peace of Paris, in 1763, which had wound up the 
 Seven Years' War with England, still rankled in French 
 bosoms. It was felt that, by its terms, this peace was a 
 standing injury and insult to France, to which the war 
 had been a series of disasters and humiliations, sustained 
 — it is difficult to apportion exactly the praise or blame — 
 at the hands of Hawke and Conflans, Boscawen and 
 De la Clue, Saunders, Wolfe, Pitt, and Madame de 
 Pompadour. The French navy had been destroyed, the 
 French colonial empire had been wiped out, and now, 
 after fifteen years' peace, nursing their strength, enlisting 
 soldiers and building ships, under a new king and a male 
 government, it was hoped that the time for revenge had 
 arrived. There was no present cause of quarrel with 
 England, but the French people caught eagerly at the 
 idea of England's embarrassment, and brought the pres- 
 sure of what public opinion France had on the govern- 
 ment, which gave a not unwilling friendship to the 
 American States, extended it into an official recognition, 
 and, on 6 February 1778, to a distinct treaty of alliance 
 with 'the United States of America,' in which stand, 
 amongst others, such articles as these : 
 
 II. The essential and direct end of the present defensive 
 alliance is to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and 
 independence, absolute and unlimited, of the said United 
 States, as well in matters of government as of commerce. 
 
 VIII. Neither of the two parties shall conclude either 
 
PAUL JONES. 375 
 
 truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent 
 of the other, first obtained ; and they mutually engage not to 
 lay down their arms until the independence of the United 
 States shall have been formally or tacitly assured by the 
 treaty or treaties that shall terminate the war. 
 
 Notwithstanding this, and though the American 
 commissioners, Benjamin Franklin and his colleagues, 
 were publicly and officially received at the French Court, 
 though the English seas swarmed with French privateers 
 under the American flag, there was no declaration of 
 war ; and when, some few months afterwards, the Eng- 
 lish government, weary of the duplicity of the French 
 ministry, and of the real though veiled hostility of the 
 French people, forced their hand by seizing the Licorne 
 and Pallas (18 June, 1778), they and their partisans in 
 England complained bitterly of the breach of interna- 
 tional faith, in commencing hostile operations without a 
 formal declaration. An amusing sample of this is con- 
 tained in one of Mason's letters to Horace Walpole, 14 
 August, 1778 : 
 
 ' Our poor country,' he says, ' from being once a well-bred 
 gentleman, is now turned a downright blackguard. A gentle- 
 man, when he has received an affront, sends his challenge, and 
 then fights his duel. A blackguard, in similar circumstances, 
 drives iris fist directly at the jowl of his adversary, and waives 
 the ceremonial of the challenge. I leave you to make the ap- 
 plication ; only I protest that had Keppel been victorious, I 
 should have hesitated about ringing the three cracked bells 
 in my country steeple ; for I can never think a fair victory 
 can be gained over an enemy before war has been declared.' 
 
 We may think it strange that Mr. Mason, living in 
 the society of the eighteenth century, should be so 
 ignorant of the customs of the duello as not to know that 
 
376 STUDIES. IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 disputes or quarrels between armed gentlemen were, by 
 almost legal rigbt, settled off-band in a ' casual ren- 
 counter,' or tbat bis poetical reading did not furnisb 
 bim witb many a precedent ; for, according to tbe text of 
 tbe Faery Queene, a mere unwelcome presence was, in 
 tbe days of cbivalry, sufficient reason for coucbing tbe 
 ' steele-headed speare.' His ignorance of bistorical pre- 
 cedent is not so singular, for writers of tbe present day, 
 men far above Mason in botb knowledge and ability, have 
 been influenced by a similar error. 
 
 But, looking back through our . modern annals, the 
 fact stands out clearly that a declaration on either side, 
 as a beginning of war, is very exceptional. The wars 
 with Spain in 1588, in 1718, and in 1739; the wars 
 with Holland in 1652, in 1665, and, infamy and all, in 
 1672 ; or with France in 1744, in 1755, and now again 
 in 1778, were all opened by actual hostilities on one part 
 or the other, which, after a more or less long interval, 
 a declaration sometimes followed. It is well that this 
 should be remembered ; for though international lawyers 
 lay down the rule that hostilities, actually undertaken, 
 may be considered, at the option of tbe injured party, as 
 equivalent to a declaration of war, there is a very general, 
 but, as I have just shown, a very mistaken idea that such 
 a course is irregular, one that is not to be looked for — 
 one, therefore, that need not be guarded against. 
 
 Jones, having taken the Eanger from Nantes to 
 Brest — and having on the way obtained, after some 
 negotiation, and, as he asserted, for the first time, a 
 return salute and the formal recognition of the American 
 flag from M. de la Motte Picquet, commanding the 
 French .fleet in Quiberon Bay— refitted at Brest, and 
 
PAUL JONES. 377 
 
 from thence sailed on 10 April for a cruise. His local 
 knowledge had suggested to him the possibility of harry- 
 ing the coasts of the Irish Sea, of Cumberland, Wigton 
 or Kirkcudbright, Antrim, and the Isle of Mann. He 
 arrived on what may be considered as his station on 18 
 April ; and having a fair wind, determined to commence 
 operations by burning the shipping in Whitehaven, a 
 considerable port at the present time, but relatively of 
 more importance a hundred years ago, when Liverpool 
 and Glasgow had not yet swallowed up all the American 
 trade. But the next morning, as he was off the harbour, 
 the wind freshened to a gale blowing dead on shore ; and, 
 far from being able to land his men, Jones had to exert 
 himself to the utmost to save his ship. It was not 
 without difficulty that he escaped from this very serious 
 danger. 
 
 On the 21st, being off the entrance of Belfast Lough, 
 he learned that the Drake, a sloop of war, was at anchor 
 inside, and conceived the bold idea of carrying her by 
 surprise. His plan was to run in in the dark, let go his 
 anchor on top of the Drake's, swing down across her 
 bow, and board. It was not known, not even suspected, 
 that an American cruiser was on the coast ; some pri- 
 vateers had, indeed, been giving trouble, capturing and 
 destroying coasting vessels and others ; but the idea of 
 one of these attacking a ship of war had probably never 
 been entertained : for all practical purposes, to the 
 officers and men of the Drake at anchor, it was a time 
 of peace ; and as was then, and for long after, the 
 custom of the service, the watch was most negligently 
 kept. It was a cold night, blowing fresh, and the 
 chances are that not a dozen men on board were awake, 
 
378 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 whilst on shore there were neither forts nor soldiers. In 
 any case, the Banger had more guns, and a larger ship's 
 company than the Drake ; and the plan, though dashing, 
 was by no, means extravagant. As it happened, how- 
 ever, the Banger had too much way on, and though she 
 let go her anchor accurately enough, she passed the 
 Drake, and brought up on her quarter. Even then there 
 was no alarm ; and Jones, with apt presence of mind, 
 immediately cut the cable, so as to make it appear that 
 it had parted, and stretched out to seaward, intending 
 to return and try again. But this he was not able to 
 do, for the wind freshened to a fierce gale, and he had 
 again to provide for the Banger's safety, and to shelter 
 under the lee of the Scotch coast. 
 
 The next day, 22 April, the weather' had moderated, 
 and he determined to have another try at Whitehaven. 
 A light breeze brought the Banger off the town in the 
 early part of the night ; and by midnight the two boats, 
 carrying thirty-one officers and men, all told, shoved off 
 from the ship. They had hoped to be inside the harbour 
 while it was still dark, but the strong ebb tide delayed 
 them somewhat, and, by the time they had reached the 
 outer pier, day was beginning to break. 
 
 The harbour was, as it still is, dry at low water ; this 
 Jones knew, and had counted on. The ships, to the 
 number of nearly 300, of all sizes up to 400 tons burden, 
 were helplessly aground ; nor, if they were set on fire, 
 could . water possibly be got to extinguish the flames. 
 One of the boats was sent to burn the ships on the north 
 side ; Jones with the other, landed on the New Quay ; 
 the West Pier had not then been built. At the land 
 end of the quay stood a battery, which had been built 
 
PAUL JONES. 379 
 
 eighteen years before, after Thurot had frightened the 
 burghers into some sense of possible danger; but the 
 danger had been forgotten, and the battery had been 
 neglected : it was little more than a ruin, armed with a 
 few worn-out and honeycombed old guns, in charge of a 
 few equally worn-out old pensioners, who at four o'clock 
 in the morning were sound asleep in their beds. Jones, 
 with a few men, clambered over the rampart of the 
 ' battery,' captured ' the guard,' and spiked ' the guns,' 
 of which, he says, there were thirty : he does not say 
 what condition they were in. Then, leaving his party 
 to set fire to the ships on the south side, he, with one 
 man, went off to another so-called battery, 200 yards 
 distant, on the point of the beach opposite Tom Hurd's 
 rock ; this had apparently no guard at all, and its guns, 
 such as they were, were spiked without opposition. 
 
 When he returned to the quay he found that his 
 orders to set fire to the ships had been disobeyed ; that 
 the candles had burnt out, and there was no light. The 
 boat had come back fiom the north side without doing 
 anything; the lieutenant in charge of it said that 
 ' nothing could be gained by burning poor people's pro- 
 perty ; ' the officer left in charge of the second party 
 had possibly the same idea. It was almost sunrise ; the 
 inhabitants were beginning to wake up, to assemble in 
 alarm ; and nothing had been done. 
 
 Jones, excessively angry, did at the last moment get 
 a light, kindle with his own hands a large fire in the 
 steerage of one ship, high and dry amongst a number of 
 others, empty a tar barrel into the flames, and, having 
 seen it well a-low, make off to the boat. It was time, for 
 the sun was now up, and the townsmen were gathering 
 
380 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 in numbers that threatened every moment to become 
 formidable. But the guns, even if there were any that 
 could be called serviceable — which is doubtful — had been 
 spiked, and the boats effected their retreat without loss. 
 One man only was missing, and he had deserted; he 
 seems to have been a Whitehaven man, David Freeman 
 by name ; to have slipped away from his party in the 
 grey of the morning, and to have done his best to wake 
 up his fellow-townsmen. It was thus to the double 
 treachery of this rascal, as much as to the incapacity or 
 sentiment of the subordinate officers, that Whitehaven 
 owed its safety. 
 
 The injury to the English or Irish trade might have 
 been enormous ; as it was, the affair was regarded rather 
 as an insult, the irony of which was heightened by the 
 fact that it was offered on St. George's Day. But that 
 thus insignificant little party, notwithstanding all delays 
 of wind and tide, of fools and traitors, came still so near 
 to the destruction of the town and the shipping, is a fact 
 that no lapse of time should permit us to forget. 
 
 Jones had a particular weakness, common, perhaps, 
 to most self-half-educated men, for fine writing, and his 
 report of this attempt is very ' fine.' 
 
 ' The inhabitants,' he says, ' began to appear in thousands, 
 and individuals ran hastily towards us ; I stood between them 
 and the ship on fire, with a pistol in my hand, and ordered 
 them to retire, which they did with precipitation. The flames 
 had already caught the rigging, and began to ascend the 
 mainmast : the sun was a full hour's march above the horizon, 
 and as sleep no longer ruled the world, it was time to retire. 
 We re-embarked without opposition, having released a number 
 of prisoners, as our boats could not carry them. After all my 
 people had embarked I stood upon the pier for a considerable 
 
PAUL JONES. 381 
 
 space, yet no person advanced. I saw all the eminences 
 round the town covered with the amazed inhabitants.' 
 
 As soon as the boats got on board, the Eanger stood 
 across into Kirkcudbright Bay, and anchoring there, 
 landed a small party on St. Mary's Isle, a prettily wooded 
 peninsula about a mile below the town, on which stood 
 the house of the E arl of Selkirk. From early childish recol- 
 lections, Jones had an exaggerated idea of the political 
 importance of the earl : it was therefore his intention 
 to carry him off as a prisoner ; to hold him as, in some 
 measure, a hostage for the safety of several self-called 
 Americans, prisoners of war, and compel, or through his 
 influence persuade, the English government to acknow- 
 ledge a system of exchange. Kidnapping a private gentle- 
 man, and constituting him a prisoner of war, is an idea 
 that in modern times has occurred only to Captain John 
 Paul Jones ; but it did occur to him, and Lord SelkirB*s 
 accidental absence from home was the only reason why 
 effect was not given to it. 
 
 Jones, on learning that his project had thus fallen 
 through, ordered his men down to the boat. They re- 
 monstrated. They said that the English, landing on the 
 American coast, did not spare private property, and they 
 thought it very hard that they Bhould be made to do so, 
 now that they had a chance of reprisal. They demanded, 
 rather than requested, leave to go up and loot the house. 
 As a compromise Jones sent them up under the orders 
 of two lieutenants, Simpson and Elijah Hall, the last of 
 whom was afterwards Mr. Sherburne's father-in-law, and 
 may fairly be supposed to have biassed his judgment in 
 respect to this affair. The robbery seems to have been 
 committed with almost burlesque civility ; the men stayed 
 
382 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 outside, and drank Lady Selkirk's health in prime Scotch 
 whisky, whilst Messrs. Simpson and Hall, indoors, 
 cleared the breakfast table of the silver tea equipage— the 
 teapot with the tea-leaves still in it. With this they 
 returned to their boat, went on board, and the ship 
 immediately weighed and stood out to sea. 
 
 The value of the booty is said to have been, at the 
 outside, not more than 100L, though vulgar report ab- 
 surdly magnified it. Jones's share in the transaction 
 seems to have been altogether against his will, and caused 
 by the rowdyism and want of discipline of his men, whom 
 he was unable to control ; none the less, it was on Jones 
 that the weight of popular indignation fell ; he was cried 
 down as a pirate, a buccaneer, or a burglar of the lowest 
 and most brutal type, and it is as such that, in the minds 
 of many, his fame has been preserved, thanks to sundry 
 outrageous pictures and jingling ballads. A few verses 
 of one of these will be sufficient : 
 
 You have heard o' Paul Jones ? 
 
 Have you not ? Have you not ? 
 And you've heard o' Paul Jones ? 
 
 Have you not ? 
 
 He was a rogue and a vagabond ; 
 
 Was he not ? Was he not ? {bis) 
 
 He came to Selkirk-ha', 
 
 Did he not ? Did he not ? (bis) 
 
 And stole the rings and the jewels a', 
 
 Did he not ? Did he not ? 
 Stole the rings and the jewels a', 
 Did he not ? 
 
 And so on, and so on, till the hearers have had enough of it. 
 
PAUL JONES. 383 
 
 The morning after this ill-judged or unfortunate affair, 
 24 April, Jones was again off the entrance of Belfast 
 Lough, intending to find some opportunity of attacking 
 the Drake should she be still there. As if to meet his 
 wishes, she was seen slowly working out against the tide 
 and a light easterly breeze. 
 
 The Drake had been warned of the Eanger's presence 
 on the coast, whether by signal smokes or otherwise. 
 The occurrences of the night of the 21st had excited her 
 curiosity, and still more so as, when she weighed her 
 anchor on the afternoon of the 22nd, she had found a 
 strange anchor and 56 fathom of cable, newly cut, 
 entangled with it. She is said even to have received 
 information of the previous day's attempt on Whitehaven : 
 but evidently, whatever information she had was very 
 vague ; and seeing the Eanger hove- to off the mouth of 
 the Lough, she unsuspiciously sent her boat on board to 
 ask the news. The boat, boat's crew and officer, were of 
 course detained. The wind was easterly, a nice working 
 breeze, but it was evening before the Drake got outside, 
 clear of the land. The Eanger ran down towards her, 
 hauled up her courses, and lay-to, with the main-topsail 
 to the mast ; but as the Drake came within hail on her lee 
 quarter she filled again and gathered steerage way. The 
 Drake hailed : ' What ship is that ? ' Answered the 
 Eanger in the Jonesian dialect, ' This is the American 
 continental ship Eanger ; we wait for you, and beg you 
 will come on ; the sun is little more than an hour high, 
 and it is time to begin.' 
 
 In language, Jones was the most wordy of men ; in 
 deed, he was short, sharp, and to the point. Almost 
 whilst the answer to the hail was being shouted back he 
 
384 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY, 
 
 put his helm up, and as his ship paid off, passed slowly 
 across the Drake's bows and poured in a raking fire at 
 very close range. The Drake thus began the action at 
 a serious disadvantage, and as she in turn bore up and 
 engaged broadside to broadside, the heavier armament 
 and better-sustained fire of her opponent knocked her to 
 pieces : in sixty -five minutes she was a wreck and struck 
 her flag ; her captain shot through the head, her lieutenant 
 mortally wounded, three others killed and twenty 
 wounded. The loss of the Eanger was in comparison 
 trifling — one officer and two men killed, five wounded. 
 
 This action, such as it was, was the first naval suc- 
 cess of the Americans. They had captured in open fight 
 a British ship of war ; their exultation was very great, 
 and the more so as Jones, in his report, described the 
 Drake as a 20-gun frigate — mounting two guns more 
 than the Eanger. This was true only to the uninitiated. 
 The Drake was rated as a 14-gun sloop ; and though she 
 did actually carry 20 guns, they were but four-pounders, 
 and all exposed. He was, however, right in saying that, 
 in addition to her complement of 100, she had taken on 
 board some 50 or 60 volunteers for the occasion : they 
 were mostly landsmen, but able to do duty as small-arm 
 men. But it appears from the evidence on the court- 
 martial that the ship was not in a fit state for actual 
 service. She had no lieutenant, gunner, boatswain or 
 master's mate ; though while she was under way, work- 
 ing out of the lough, ' Lieutenant William Dobbs, 1 from 
 a principle that does honour to his memory,' voluntarily 
 came on board and acted in the station of a lieutenant. 
 
 1 Mr. Dobbs was at Belfast on impress service, and was thus able to 
 bring with him a number of the newly raised men. 
 
PAUL JONES. 385 
 
 The powder was worthless ; ' ' our shot had not force 
 enough to go through her sides, though we were not 
 above half a pistol-shot distance from her all the time of 
 the engagement ; the impression of which was shown me 
 on the 7 May, 1778.' The matches were bad, cartridges 
 were not filled, powder was not handed : ' many people 
 placed at the great guns, early in the action, were obliged 
 to quit their quarters to light matches, which frequently 
 used to extinguish, and in search of cartridges, which 
 were, a great part of the time of the engagement, not to 
 be had ; the people stationed at the small arms obliged 
 to quit their quarters for want of ammunition.' And 
 every witness tells the same story. ' She wanted powder 
 for the great guns and small-arms, owing to the acting 
 gunner not handing the powder up : there was not a suffi- 
 cient number of musket cartridges filled ; the matches 
 frequently went out during the engagement. I believe 
 it was owing to the badness of the match and unskilful- 
 ness of some of the men.' ' Four of the aftermost guns, 
 by the sudden rise of the quarter-deck, were rendered 
 useless ; the major part of the other guns, when fired, 
 used to fall upon their muzzles. I apprehend from the 
 fore-trucks being too low. I believe the guns were pur- 
 chased by the merchants.' A ship in such a condition — 
 without officers, without guns, without powder, without 
 match — scarcely needed to meet a more powerful enemy 
 to become a ready prize. The American was more power- 
 ful : her scantling was stouter, her guns were heavier 
 and were sheltered. Against such, the Drake could have 
 little chance ; and what chance she might have had she 
 threw away, in permitting the Eanger to rake her at the 
 outset, and in afterwards engaging broadside to broadside. 
 
 c c 
 
386 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 Nothing but superior skill and seamanship could possibly 
 have given her the victory, and these she does not seem 
 to have had. The Eanger was well handled and well 
 fought ; the Drake was neither one nor the other ; and, 
 in point of mere pluck, there could be little difference 
 between the two. 
 
 Her expiring efforts, however, were sufficient to cut 
 short the Eanger's cruise ; and when he had somewhat 
 refitted, Jones, with the two ships, stood away to the 
 northward, rounded the north coast of Ireland, and pass- 
 ing down the west side, returned to Brest, where he 
 arrived on 8 May, having thus been absent rather less 
 than a month. He seems to have occupied some of his 
 leisure during the return voyage in concocting a letter to 
 Lady Selkirk — a letter which his American biographers, 
 after some extraordinary process of reasoning, have called 
 romantic, but which is, in reality, as offensively silly 
 as anything that even Jones ever wrote : it is, indeed, 
 only its extreme silliness that prevents its being called 
 by some worse name. The purport of it is his extreme 
 admiration for Lady Selkirk, his regret that his men had 
 taken her plate, his intention of buying it in, and his 
 hope that she would accept it as a present from him : 
 his only object had been to mitigate the horrors of war, 
 by carrying off the earl, her husband. The description 
 of the fight with the Drake is, however, too rich to be 
 slurred over ; it is unique of its kind. It runs : 
 
 'Had the earl been on board the Eanger the following 
 evening, he would have seen the awful pomp and dreadful 
 carnage of a sea engagement ; both affording ample subject 
 for the pencil, as well as melancholy reflection for the con- 
 templative mind. Humanity starts back from such scenes of 
 
PAUL JONES. 387 
 
 horror, and cannot sufficiently execrate the vile promoters of 
 this detestable war. The British ship of war Drake, mounting 
 twenty guns, with more than her full complement of officers 
 and men, was our opponent. The ships met, and the advan- 
 tage was disputed with great fortitude on each side for an 
 hour and four minutes, when the gallant commander of the 
 Drake fell, and victory declared in favour of the Eanger. 
 The amiable lieutenant lay mortally wounded, besides near 
 forty of the inferior officers and crew killed and wounded ; a 
 melancholy demonstration of the uncertainty of human pro- 
 spects, and of the sad reverses of fortune which an hour can 
 produce. I buried them in a spacious grave, with the honours 
 due to the memory of the brave.' 
 
 As a note to the letter, I may add that, after a delay 
 of some years, the plate was restored — teapot, tea-leaves 
 and all. 
 
 The strong feeling against England, which agitated 
 France in May 1778, gave a certain welcome in that 
 country to Paul Jones. A short, thick-set man, with a 
 vulgar type of face, swarthy and sunburnt, bright 
 sparkling eyes, perky expression and a restless manner 
 — anything less like the courtly old French noblesse can 
 scarcely be imagined. But he seems to have been the 
 fashion for a time, the hero of the people, the lion of 
 the Court, and — principally on his own assertion — the 
 darling of the ladies. How far his overweening vanity 
 and unblushing mendacity gave a brevet rank to his fair 
 admirers there is no occasion to inquire. But when he 
 attempted to turn his popularity and the applause of the 
 vulgar to good account, he found, as others have done 
 that, in the affairs of the world, such froth does not 
 weigh much. 
 
 He wanted money both for the necessary repairs and 
 
388 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 the current expenses of his ship. The commissioners 
 could not and would not give it him ; and when Jones 
 drew on them for 24,000 livres — say, 1,000L — they 
 promptly dishonoured the bill. On this, naturally 
 enough, an angry correspondence ensued ; and it appears 
 that for some time Jones was left absolutely dependent, 
 not only for ship's stores, but for men's provisions, on 
 what money he could raise by the sale of various small 
 prizes which he had sent in. 
 
 Under these circumstances it is not to be wondered 
 at that the ship's company, bound together by no tie 
 of patriotism or discipline, became discontented and 
 mutinous. Simpson, the first lieutenant, headed the 
 mutineers at Brest, as he had headed the robbers at St. 
 Mary's Isle. He said that Jones had formally promised 
 him the command of the Eanger, and that, at any 
 rate, he and the ship's company were Americans, and 
 were not going to be put upon by a foreigner such as 
 Jones. Neither Jones nor the commissioners had au- 
 thority to stamp out this mutiny. It seems that the 
 command of the Eanger really had been promised to 
 Simpson, when it was hoped that the Amsterdam ship 
 — the Indienne, or South Carolina, as she was eventually 
 ealled — would be ready for Jones ; and though this hope 
 had been rendered vain by the energetic or threatening 
 remonstrances of the English minister at the Hague, the 
 only plan that could be devised for quieting the dis- 
 turbances on board the Eanger was to give Simpson the 
 promised command, and send the ship and him and the 
 mutinous crew home together. 
 
 Meantime Jones had been anxiously proposing several 
 schemes for, as he conceived, forwarding the American 
 
PAUL JONES. 389 
 
 cause by harrying the coast of his native country. 
 Amongst these, the burning the shipping and town of 
 Whitehaven occupied a prominent place ; others were 
 the sacking and burning of Ayr, of Greenock, of Port 
 Glasgow, of the shipping in the Clyde ; on.the other side, 
 Newcastle might, he thought, be burned, and the Baltic 
 trade might be cut off. There is no doubt that many or 
 all of these schemes might have been, carried out, had the 
 means at Jones's disposal been equal to his will ; but he 
 had no ship, no men, and no money, and the commis- 
 sioners were unable, the French government unwilling, 
 to entrust him with them. At first, indeed, there 
 seemed a chance of his being put in command of a 
 French ship, or even of a French squadron, to cruise 
 against England under the American flag ; but when, in 
 July, war between England and France was declared, 
 effectively, though without the customary formalities, 
 there was no longer any occasion for this duplicity, and 
 the French ships sailed under the French flag. The 
 minister of the French navy, M. de Sartine, who had 
 before then rather encouraged his pretensions, would 
 no longer hold out any hopes of employment ; and in his 
 rage and vexation Jones's correspondence passed through 
 various and amusing phases of vanity, self-love, flattery, 
 and invective. 
 
 It was not till the following spring that he could 
 obtain authority to commission, as a ship of war under 
 the American flag, the Due de Duras, an old East India- 
 man, then lying at L'Orient, and capable of mounting 
 forty guns. She was to be fitted out and armed by the 
 French government, and Jones was to endeavour to pick 
 up a crew of Americans. 
 
390 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 ' But,' wrote Sartine, ' as you may find difficulty in raising- 
 a sufficient number, the king permits you to levy volunteers 
 until you obtain men enough. It shall be my care,' he added, 
 'to procure the necessary officers, and you maybe assured 
 that I shall contribute every aid in my power to promote the 
 success of your enterprise.' 
 
 He — the French minister — then went on to give him 
 — the American captain — his instructions : 
 
 As soon as you are prepared for sea, you will set sail, 
 without waiting for any ulterior orders ; and you will yourself 
 select your own cruising ground, either in the European or 
 American seas, observing always to render me an exact 
 account of each event that may take place during your cruise, 
 as often as you may enter any port under the dominion of the 
 king. So flattering a mark of the confidence with which you 
 are honoured cannot but encourage you to use all your zeal in 
 the common cause ; and I am persuaded that you will justify 
 on every occasion my favourable opinion of you. 
 
 In conclusion, he gave him permission to change, 
 the name of his ship from Due de Duras to Bonhomme 
 Eichard, as Jorjes had requested, out of compliment to 
 Dr. Franklin, whose ' Poor Eichard's Almanac ' had given 
 him the hint, 1 ' If you would have your business done, 
 go ; if not, send,' on which he had acted at the turning 
 point of the negotiations regarding the ship. 
 
 The armament of the Bonhomme Eichard was 
 peculiar : it consisted of 12-pounders on the main-deck, 
 9-pounders on the quarter-deck, and 6-pounders on 
 the forecastle ; but in addition, in the gun-room on the 
 lower deck, were six 18-pounders ; and extra ports were 
 
 1 Poor Richard's Almanac had been translated into French under 
 the title La Science du Bonhomme Richard. 
 
PAUL JONES. 391 
 
 cut, to permit her to fight these all on one side. She 
 thus mounted forty guns in all. The ship, a converted 
 merchantman, was a makeshift throughout, including 
 what seems now the curious device of a frigate-built ship 
 thus carrying a partial lower battery. 1 
 
 The crew was as mixed as the armament. A few self- 
 called Americans were got together : merchant seamen 
 out of employ loafing about the French ports, or renegade 
 prisoners of war ; but even these did not at first amount 
 to more than thirty. About 150 were French volunteers, 
 peasants newly enlisted by promises of bounty and booty ; 
 the rest were outcasts from every nation in Europe and 
 from some in Asia ; English or Irish, Swedes, Norwegians, 
 Portuguese, Lascars, are all prominently named. Before, 
 however, the ship was finally ready for sea, a cartel arrived 
 with 119 American prisoners of war, and of these it is 
 believed that a large proportion entered on board the 
 Bonhomme Eichard ; some of them certainly did ; but 
 when all is said, it is doubtful whether of the 380 men 
 with which she sailed from L'Orient on 14 August, 1779, 
 even the eighty were Americans. 
 
 With the Bonhomme Eichard were associated the 
 Alliance, an American-built frigate of 36 guns, manned, 
 for the most part, by Americans, but commanded by a 
 Frenchman, Pierre Landais, the master of a French 
 merchant ship, who had taken service under the Ameri- 
 can government ; a man, it would appear, of low birth 
 and disreputable antecedents ; a man of neither temper, 
 courage, nor conduct ; the Pallas, a French ship of 32 
 
 1 Thufot's Belle-Isle was apparently armed in a similar manner on 
 her last cruise (cf. ante, p. 342) ; and it seems probable that the practice 
 was not uncommon amongst French corsairs or privateers. 
 
392 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY, 
 
 guns, commanded also by a Frenchman, Cottineau ; the 
 Cerf of 18 guns and the Vengeance of 12 ; French like 
 the Pallas, in all respects ; but like her also sailing 
 under the stars and stripes. In the whole squadron the 
 only American of character or reputation was Eichard— 
 afterwards well known in American naval history as Com- 
 modore — Dale. He was now twenty-three years of age, 
 and having just escaped from an English prison, joined 
 the Bonhomme Eichard while she was fitting out, and 
 was appointed her first lieutenant. 
 
 The first proceeding of the squadron was as remark- 
 able as its composition. The several captains of the five 
 ships signed an agreement, or concordat as it has been 
 called. By it they pledged themselves to act together 
 under the commission from the United States govern- 
 ment, unless ordered otherwise by the French minister ; 
 the proportion of prize money to each ship was to be 
 regulated by the French and American ministers jointly ; 
 but the division to the men was to be made according 
 to American prize law. The practical effect of this con- 
 cordat was to constitute the command of the squadron 
 a petty republic, of which the several captains formed 
 what may be styled the Directory, and according to their 
 individual pleasure or whim, obeyed or disobeyed the 
 orders of the nominal commander-in-chief. 
 
 The squadron put to sea on 14 August ; on the 23rd, 
 being off Cape Clear, a number of men, twenty in all, 
 with one of the officers — the third lieutenant — of the 
 Bonhomme Eichard, took the opportunity of a calm and 
 fog to desert with two of the ship's boats ; the Cerf also 
 parted company and did not rejoin. The independent 
 
PAUL JONES. 393 
 
 feeling of the captains showed itself in insolence and in- 
 subordination. Landais came on board and reproached 
 Jones in the most disrespectful manner for losing his 
 boats, saying that he — Landais — was the only American 
 in the squadron, and that he meant henceforth to act ac- 
 cording to his own judgment. It may perhaps be thought 
 doubtful how far all this is true ; but it does not rest 
 merely on Jones's report; it is fully corroborated by other 
 and independent witnesses ; for Landais's conduct was 
 afterwards officially inquired into, and his gross mis- 
 conduct throughout the whole cruise officially proved. 
 Party intrigue, indeed, prevented his being punished ; 
 but he was eventually retired from the service as insane. 
 From the neighbourhood of Cape Clear, where 
 several prizes were made, the squadron passed to the 
 north, along the west coast of Ireland. The rendezvous 
 seems to have been Cape Wrath, and the ships, sepa- 
 rated by carelessness or bad weather, rejoined each 
 other in that neighbourhood, where they made two 
 valuable prizes estimated as worth 40.000Z. These 
 prizes Landais, without orders, sent to Bergen, where 
 the Danish government gave them up to the English : a 
 restitution which afterwards gave rise to some curious 
 negotiations. 
 
 A day or two later, the Alliance again parted company, 
 and the other three ships sailed down the east coast of 
 Scotland. On 14 September they were off the Forth, 
 and having a leading wind up the firth, Jones conceived 
 that he might lay Leith and Edinburgh under a heavy 
 contribution, capture a 20-gun ship that was at anchor 
 in Leith roads, and second the attack which he had been 
 
394 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 given to understand the grand fleet of France and Spain 
 was, about the same time, to make in the south of 
 England. The idea was formed with correct judgment ; 
 though, in point of fact, that fleet had been already 
 repelled; beaten back, not by the prudence and fore- 
 thought of the English government, represented by Lord 
 Sandwich ; not by the tactical skill of our admirals, 
 represented by Sir Charles Hardy; not even by the 
 valour of British seamen, compelled, by a shameful par- 
 simony and their inadequate numbers, to shelter behind 
 the sandbanks of Spithead ; but by the culpable ignor- 
 ance and criminal carelessness of M. de Sartine ; by the 
 bad provisions, the dirt, and the uncalled-for hardships 
 of the French and Spanish sailors and soldiers ; by scurvy, 
 dysentery, and putrid fever. M. d'Orvilliers, with his 
 utterly disorganised fleet, anchored in Brest roads on the 
 same day that Jones, hoping to make a diversion in his 
 favour, was off the Forth. 
 
 But Jones, although commodore of the squadron, was 
 powerless ; he could not order, he could only advise ; and 
 neither of his colleagues, the captains of the Pallas and 
 Vengeance, would agree to the bold measure he advo- 
 cated. It was only after a long discussion carried far into 
 the night, and the argument that 200,000L were waiting 
 to be picked up, that they at last consented. But in 
 the morning the wind was foul, and the progress of the 
 squadron working against it was slow. A small collier 
 was captured, and the master — Andrew Bobertson by 
 name — agreed, as a ransom, to pilot them into the Leith 
 roads. On the next day, the 16th, as they were in with 
 the coast of Fife, under English colours, a boat came off 
 from a gentleman of the neighbourhood to ask for some 
 
PAUL JONES. 395 
 
 powder and shot to defend himself against ' the expected 
 visit of the pirate Paul Jones.' Jones, in the quality 
 of a king's officer, sent him a polite message and a barrel 
 of powder, regretted that he had no shot of the size 
 wanted, and had taken the liberty of keeping one of his 
 boatmen as a pilot. These little incidents are important 
 as showing that a bold corsair has no difficulty in laying 
 hands on the requisite pilots. 
 
 The wind continued westerly, and during the 16th 
 and 17th the squadron beat slowly up the firth. Its 
 character had by this time been recognised. The alarm 
 was extreme ; the excitement was intense. A rude 
 pretext at a battery was hastily thrown up at Leith, but 
 the confusion and panic were too great to permit hopes 
 of any serious resistance. In making a tack to the 
 northward, the ships headed towards Kirkaldy, and stood 
 over to within about a mile of the town. The minister 
 — celebrated amongst even Fife eccentricities — held a 
 prayer-meeting on the beach. On both sides of the 
 Forth the game seemed to be in Jones's hands. The 
 ships were almost within gunshot of Leith, when the 
 wind, foul all along, freshened suddenly to a fierce gale, 
 and drove them back : they were obliged to bear up and 
 run out of the Forth. 
 
 When the squall had passed, they were too far to 
 seaward to return at once ; and Jones, thinking that the 
 alarm had been given too effectually to allow him to 
 repeat the attempt, determined to direct his course to the 
 southward. His wish was to carry out in the Tynewhat 
 he had failed to do in the Forth. He fully understood 
 that the wholesale destruction of Tyne shipping would, 
 by stopping the supply of sea-coal at the beginning of 
 
396 ' STUDIES, IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 winter, be a most severe blow to London ; but Captain 
 Cottineau, whom, by the terms of the concordat, he was 
 bound to consult, was obstinate in his refusal. They 
 accordingly continued their voyage, and on the morning 
 of 23 September fell in with the Alliance. 
 
 Landais's conduct throughout would seem to have 
 been directed by hatred of Jones and by cupidity, rather 
 than by cowardice, or even treason. Had he wished 
 merely to provide for his own safety, it would have been 
 easier to return, as he had come, by the west of Ireland. 
 As he decided to go rather by the east of England, it 
 would seem that he was quite aware of the possible 
 advantage of cruising in a sea alive with English 
 commerce, and of doing so by himself. Such considera- 
 tions will, I think, explain many of his so-called 
 ' vagaries.' He was disgusted at meeting again with the 
 squadron, and did not pretend to be otherwise when, an 
 hour or two later, they sighted a large fleet of merchant 
 shipping — pronounced by the pilot to be the Baltic 
 trade— coming southwards round Elamborough Head. 
 It was under the convoy of two ships of war, the Serapis 
 of 44 guns, and the Countess of Scarborough, a hired 
 vessel, mounting 20 guns, presumably 6-pounders, on a 
 flush deck. These, on making out the American ships, 
 of which they probably had warning, stretched to the 
 southward, with the wind at about south-west, so as to 
 place themselves between their charge and the possible 
 enemy ; whilst the convoy stood in shore on the other 
 tack. Jones made the signal to form line of battle, a 
 signal to which the Alliance paid no attention, but stood 
 towards the convoy, hoping perhaps to be able to pass 
 by the ships of war, and to capture a number of the 
 
PAUL JONES. 397 
 
 merchantmen. Jones's idea was to fight, Landais's to 
 plunder. 
 
 About six o'clock the two English ships, which had 
 been standing together towards the south, tacked, thus 
 crossing ahead of the Americans, and keeping between 
 them and the convoy. It was a lovely autumn evening, 
 aud Flamborough Head, distant barely a league, was 
 crowded with people, whom the rumours of the day had 
 drawn to the neighbourhood : as the sun set, the full 
 harvest moon rose and lighted up the scene, permitting 
 them to see, or to fancy they saw, the events that were 
 passing off their coast. 1 
 
 About half-past seven the Bonhomme Eichard was 
 within hail of the Serapis, to windward but somewhat on 
 her quarter, both ships standing in for the land on the 
 port tack. The hail was answered, as it was followed, by 
 a broadside ; the fire seems to have been simultaneous ; 
 and in this way began a fight which, in modern naval 
 history, has no parallel. I will therefore pause a 
 moment to take an exact view of the opposing forces. 
 
 The Pallas, 2 a 32-gun frigate, mounting, in all prob- 
 ability, 9-pounders on her main-deck, bore away for 
 the Countess of Scarborough, a ship utterly unable to 
 contend effectively with such an opponent. She did 
 indeed offer a very creditable resistance, but after an hour 
 was obliged to haul down her colours, and the Pallas, 
 
 1 There was meantime great excitement at Hull. See Albemarle's 
 Memoirs of Rockingham, ii. 383. 
 
 2 The French frigates of 32 guns were of two classes, one mounting 
 12-, the other 8-pounders (French weight) on the main-deck. I fancy 
 this Pallas was of the smaller class — if indeed she was a king's ship at 
 all, which is not quite clear ; for a Pallas had been captured by Keppel 
 in the preceding year. 
 
398 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 occupied for the rest of the time in taking possession of 
 her prize, had no share in the fight with the Serapis. 
 
 The Alliance is spoken of as of 36 guns, but being 
 American, without any establishment, it is difficult to 
 say what her armament was. In the English or French 
 navies, 36-gun frigates at that time carried 12-pounders 
 on the main-deck ; and I should think it most likely 
 that the Alliance did so too, though it i3 of course 
 possible that she had only 9-pounders. I believe that, 
 of the squadron, the Alliance was most like a ship of 
 war, had she only been properly commanded ; but under 
 a man like Landais she proved of little value. In the 
 early part of the engagement she is described as sailing 
 at some distance round the Pallas and the Countess of 
 Scarborough, firing promiscuously at both of them, 
 which, in the dark, while the moon was only yet rising, 
 did as much harm to friend as to foe ; and she does not 
 seem to have at any time really engaged the Serapis in 
 support of her consort, the Bonhomme Eichard. 
 
 But the force of the Serapis was such as might be 
 considered not a very unequal match for the Bonhomme 
 Eichard and the Alliance together. She was of a class 
 then much esteemed for service in the narrow seas and 
 smooth water, being particularly handy by reason of their 
 shortness. She was a 44-gun two-decker ; on her lower 
 deck she mounted 18-pounders; 12-pounders on her 
 main-deck. The double battery and the heavier guns 
 gave her an undoubted superiority over the Bonhomme 
 Eichard, two of whose makeshift 18-pounders in the gun- 
 room — old worn-out guns — burst at the second round, 
 killing and wounding a number of the men, and partly 
 blowing up the deck overhead. The accident spread a 
 
PAUL JONKS. 399 
 
 panic amongst the ship's company, which Jones, by 
 personal exertions, was able to stop ; but, naturally, no 
 further attempt was made to use the rest of these guns. 
 
 But, more even than in armament, the Serapis was 
 superior to the Bonhomme Eichard in rate of sailing and 
 handiness. She seems to have had it in her power to 
 sail round her enemy and to weather on her at pleasure. 
 Although she began the action to leeward, broadside to 
 broadside, she presently shot ahead, and crossed the 
 Bonhomme Bichard's bows, passing to windward and 
 raking her as she did so, then back again, again raking 
 her. The advantage lay entirely with the Serapis 
 which ought, beyond a doubt, to have won an easy 
 victory. Captain Pearson was a brave man and a good 
 seaman, but he was not equal to unwonted emergencies ; 
 and when, after about an hour's engagement, Jones, 
 finding the Bonhomme Richard seriously ill-treated by 
 the heavier guns and superior sailing of the Serapis 
 resolved to grapple with her, Pearson had not the 
 tactical skill nor the presence of mind to prevent him or 
 to free his ship. 
 
 It may be left an open question by what manoeuvre 
 Jones caught the Serapis. In their official reports, 
 Jones said, and Pearson said, that the Bonhomme 
 Bichard being to windward, kept away, and so ran 
 across the bows of the Serapis ; and these were the men 
 in charge of the two ships at the time. On the other 
 hand, Dale, who was in command of the Bonhomme 
 Bichard's main-deck, and could not possibly see what 
 was being done, wrote in a private account that the 
 Serapis ' wore short round on her heel,' and tried to 
 pass astern of the Bonhomme Bichard to rake her ; and 
 
400 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 his statement, made in greater detail to Mr. Cooper, 
 described the ' Serapis ' as having been ' box-hauled,' 
 an evolution now practically obsolete, but then in favour 
 amongst short ships in smooth water. Except from a 
 purely technical point of view, it is not of much conse- 
 quence ; but the fact is certain that the jib-boom of the 
 Serapis was caught in the starboard mizen rigging of 
 the Bonhomme Eichard ; that Jones, with his own 
 hands, lashed it to the Bonhomme Bichard's mizen- 
 mast ; that the Serapis's starboard anchor hooked the 
 Bonhomme Bichard's quarter ; and that the two ships 
 swung together bow and stern, their starboard sides 
 touching each other. 
 
 Pearson, hoping that the Bonhomme Eichard might 
 drift apart, let go his other anchor ; but he did not 
 know, and was probably unable to learn, bow it was 
 that the two ships were so closely locked : they swung 
 together with the tide, setting to the north-west, and so 
 continued. 
 
 In number of men the adversaries were nearly equal, 
 but whilst the lower deck ba,ttery of the Serapis gave her 
 an overpowering superiority below, it employed more 
 men, and left the Bonhomme Eichard with a marked 
 superiority above. The 18-pounders of the Serapis 
 smashed the Bonhomme Eichard into chips, and 
 silenced her main-deck guns ; but the men, thus driven 
 on deck and to the tops, swept the quarter deck and 
 forecastle of the Serapis with musketry and hand 
 grenades, and drove her men below. There was some 
 skirmishing below, through the ports ; some above, across 
 the nettings ; but on neither side was there any organised 
 attempt to board. 
 
PAUL JONES. 401 
 
 Meantime the Alliance, which might, under the 
 existing circumstances, have anchored athwart the stern 
 of the Serapis, and, without danger to herself, have 
 ended the action in a few minutes, contented herself 
 with sailing round the two ships, firing indiscriminately 
 at either or both, not only with round shot but with 
 grape. Pearson in his report naturally speaks only of 
 the damage he sustained from this fire ; but American 
 writers maintain that the loss which it inflicted on the 
 Bonhomme Richard was much greater; and it seems 
 well established that the material assistance rendered by 
 the Alliance was worse than useless ; though, of course, 
 Pearson could not know that at the time, and her 
 presence had a very positive and dispiriting effect. 
 
 Still, even under the disadvantageous circumstances 
 in which the Serapis was placed, the crushing power of 
 her 18-pounders against the rotten timbers of the 
 Bonhomme Biehard must, sooner or later, have ended 
 matters in her favour, had not a singular accident, or 
 rather the union of ingenious daring on one side and 
 unpardonable carelessness on the other, changed the 
 appearance of affairs about ten o'clock. A seaman of 
 the Bonhomme Biehard had laid out on the main-yard, 
 carrying with him a bucket full of hand grenades. One 
 of these he succeeded in throwing down the Serapis's 
 main hatchway on to her lower deck. A number of 
 cartridges had been placed there in the rear of the guns, 
 and amongst these the grenade fell. The explosion ran 
 from the mainmast aft, disabled many of the guns, and 
 killed, wounded, or horribly scorched every man at them. 
 The effect was disastrous, and for a minute it was de- 
 bated whether the Serapis should not surrender. 
 
 D D 
 
402 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 But on board the Bonhomme Bichard things were as 
 bad. The carpenter came up to Jones and said the ship 
 was sinking; the gunner hearing this ran aft to haul 
 down the flag ; but finding that the flagstaff and flag had 
 already been shot away, began to bellow : ' Quarter ! for 
 God's sake, quarter ! ' till Jones stopped his noise by 
 staving in his skull with the butt end of a pistol. Pear- 
 son, on this, attempted to board, but was repelled; a 
 counter attempt by Jones was also repelled. The 
 master-at-arms of the Bonhomme Bichard, hearing the 
 carpenter's statement and the gunner's outcry, released 
 the prisoners from the hold. More than a hundred of 
 them rushed on deck; they might and should have 
 rendered themselves masters of the ship, or at least 
 have enabled their friends of the Serapis to do so, but 
 they were bewildered and panic-stricken ; Jones, with a 
 presence of mind and an impudence that rises to the 
 sublime, set them to work at the pumps, and at the 
 pumps they continued. One only amongst them retained - 
 his self-possession, and escaping on board the Serapis 
 through a port, told Captain Pearson the state the 
 enemy was in. It was too late to be of any real use. 
 Both ships were, in fact, thoroughly beaten, and it was 
 almost a matter of chance which should give in. I 
 believe the Alliance decided it. She had not assisted 
 the Bonhomme Bichard as she ought to have done ; her 
 fire had caused as much damage to friend as to foe, but 
 she served to discourage the Serapis, and that discour- 
 agement was sufficient to turn the scale. About half- 
 past ten the Serapis struck and was taken possession of. 
 The Bonhomme Bichard was with difficulty kept afloat 
 through the night, and sank about ten o'clock the next 
 
PAUL JONES. 403 
 
 forenoon. There is no trustworthy return of killed and 
 wounded ; the numbers are said to have been about 200 
 on board the Serapis, 120 on board the Bonhomme 
 Eiehard ; but this is little better than a guess, and it is 
 very probable that they were much larger : the accounts 
 are widely different, rising to nearly 300 for each ship ; 
 and all that can be positively said is, that, as compared 
 with the numbers engaged, it is the bloodiest combat on 
 modern record. 
 
 Throughout the action, Jones's conduct as the captain 
 of a ship of war is beyond all praise. His ship was in 
 every way very inferior to the Serapis, and Pearson was 
 a man of known courage and good repu'e. I do not 
 think, though every American writer thinks, that Jones 
 took the Serapis, not only single-handed, but against 
 the treasonable assistance of Landais, in the Alliance. I 
 think, though contrary to the position of every American 
 writer, that it was the mere presence of the Alliance that 
 determined the result. The presence of the Pallas was 
 also not without effect. In this I think that Pearson's 
 report is agreeable to common sense, untrammelled by 
 national prejudice, if indeed national prejudice has any- 
 thing to do with the matter. But, on the other hand, I 
 think that it is impossible to overrate the ability, the 
 pluck, the determination, and the presence of mind with 
 which Jones fought and won the battle. The Alliance 
 gave Pearson an excuse for striking his flag. It was 
 Jones, Jones alone, rather than the Bonhomme Bichard, 
 who first beat him to a standstill. 
 
 The Countess of Scarborough was captured, the 
 Serapis was captured ; the convoy, valued at 600,000Z., 
 was saved ; the Bonhomme Bichard was sunk, and Paul 
 
 D D 2 
 
404 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 Jones's cruise was of necessity ended. The court 
 martial, held at Sheerness on 10 March, 1780, decided 
 'that Captains Pearson and Piercy, assisted by their 
 officers and men, had not only acquitted themselves of 
 their duty to the country, but had, in the execution of 
 such duty, done infinite credit to themselves by a very 
 obstinate defence against a very superior' force.' Put- 
 ting, too, the credit or discredit of the affair on one side, 
 the material advantage was held to be in favour of 
 England ; and the statesmen of the time, the illustrious 
 trio of the ballad, did not care to examine too critically 
 into the rest. Neither did the merchants of London, 
 whose merchandise was safe. They presented Pearson 
 with a sword of honour ; and the king knighted him. 
 He was a decent, honest man, and had done his best ; 
 but his best was not what ought to have been rewarded. 
 A government that wishes its officers to achieve impossi- 
 bilities should not reward even the best intended failures. 
 Jones's remark on hearing of it is characteristic and 
 pardonable : ' Should I have the good fortune to fall in 
 with him again, I'll make a lord of him.' 
 
 With the sinking of the Bonhomme Eichard, leaving 
 the conqueror, with his mongrel crew, afloat in the dis- 
 masted ship, the interest of Jones's career as affecting 
 English naval history ends. Jones wished to go to 
 Dunkirk, but his orders were to put into the Texel, and 
 thither his colleagues insisted on his going. The ships 
 lay there for some time, but as Sir Joseph Yorke, the 
 English minister at, the Hague, protested against their 
 being admitted, asserting that Jones was a rebel and a 
 pirate, the prizes flew French colours, and were afterwards 
 bought in, at a low figure, by the French government. 
 
PAUL JONES. 405 
 
 It is unnecessary to enter on any detailed account of 
 Jones's stay at the Texel, of his taking the command 
 of the Alliance, of his breaking the blockade established 
 by the English squadron under Captain Eeynolds, and 
 of his passage to L' Orient. Neither will I more than 
 mention his quarrels with Landais, with the mutinous 
 crew of the Alliance, and with the commissioners at 
 Paris. Franklin alone appears to have supported him ; 
 and as our information concerning the whole affair is 
 based almost entirely on Jones's own reports, it is 
 impossible to pronounce any decided opinion about it. 
 Eventually Landais was restored to the command of the 
 Alliance, sent to America, and retired from the service. 
 He lived to an extreme old age, and to the last main- 
 tained that it was he, and not Jones, that captured 
 the Serapis. 
 
 After hanging about the French court and Parisian 
 society for some months, making love, as it would 
 appear, in very indifferent verse to women of very in- 
 different morals, Jones was ordered to take the Ariel, a 
 20-gun ship lately captured from the English, across the 
 Atlantic. He did not, however, sail till 18 December, 
 1780; and having in the course of his voyage inter- 
 changed shots one dark night with an unknown vessel, 
 an English, or possibly an American, privateer, which 
 his report magnified into a large English frigate, he 
 arrived at Philadelphia on 18 February, 1781. 
 
 This was the end of his service in the American 
 navy : there was either no command for him, or no 
 willingness to entrust him with one. His deeds had 
 been brilliant. His aptitude for command in actual 
 jight was undoubted ; but we may very well believe that 
 
406 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 his aptitude for command under the every-day circum- 
 stances of long-continued cruising was seriously ques- 
 tioned. His whole service had been one prolonged, 
 quarrel with his subordinates, and it is impossible to 
 suppose that everybody he had to deal with was always 
 in the wrong, he himself always in the right. He was 
 vain, greedy, and selfish. Whatever was done, he 
 claimed the whole credit of it ; and he is, perhaps, the 
 one only instance of a commander of daring, skill, and 
 good luck, who was always unpopular, whose men, in all 
 ranks, were always on the verge of mutiny. 
 
 After the peace of 1783, Jones proposed to the 
 American government to commission a large frigate, at 
 once for the instruction of young officers, and to show 
 the flag in European waters : he, of course, would be 
 the proper person to command her, with the rank of 
 rear-admiral. Congress did not see things quite in the 
 same light, and Jones was not employed. He then, as 
 none of the prize money due by the French government 
 had yet been paid, volunteered to go to Paris and urge a 
 settlement. His offer was accepted. He went to Paris, 
 and after many delays, extending over nearly two years, 
 and after much chicanery on the part of the French 
 government and its agents, he did recover the money — 
 181,000 livres. Of this sum Jones claimed 13,000 
 livres as his own share, but, in addition, he charged 
 against the fund 48,000 livres as his expenses during the 
 two years ; and as he had the money in his own hands, 
 he paid himself first. 
 
 Even his biographers have been unable to see in this 
 that philosophic indifference to money of which he used 
 to boast. The only excuse that he condescended tq 
 
PAUL JONES. 407 
 
 make was that he had to go to court and to keep good 
 society; that the ambassador, who did the same, was 
 allowed 2,000Z. a year, and that he therefore was certainly 
 entitled to 2,000£. for two years. He professed great 
 indignation that his claim should be questioned at all. 
 ' The Board of Treasury,' he wrote, ' have been pleased, 
 in their report, to treat me as a mere agent, though 
 employed in that delicate concern. In France I was 
 received and treated by the king and his ministers as a 
 general officer and a special minister from Congress.' 
 ' Eventually,' adds Captain Mackenzie, ' his claim was 
 allowed, the fact of his having already received and dis- 
 posed of the money contributing, no doubt, to narrow 
 down and simplify the question.' 
 
 In 1787, after this business had been settled, he 
 returned to America, and, a few months later, back again 
 to Europe with a special but carefully defined mission to 
 Copenhagen, to push the claim against the Danish 
 government on account of the two prizes which Landais 
 had sent into Bremen. These had been valued at 
 40,00(M. There had been some negotiation at London 
 and Paris about this, and the Danes had offered 10,000Z., 
 but the offer had been refused. Jones was now sent as 
 ' agent,' but with no power to settle anything without 
 authority from the United States' minister at Paris, or 
 to receive the money ; and he was to be allowed for 
 expenses five per cent, on whatever should be recovered. 
 This, we may suppose, Jones thought paltry ; and, as the 
 Danish government found it inconvenient to pay up, it 
 seems to have had no trouble in persuading Jones to accept 
 the patent of a pension of 1,500 crowns, and say no- 
 thing more about it. Jones naturally kept his share in 
 
408 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 this transaction secret ; and when, after a year or two, 
 the knowledge of it leaked out, he urged that the patent 
 was given purely as a mark of esteem, and that the pen- 
 sion had never been paid. How much of this is true 
 there are no means of knowing, and I am content to rest 
 my opinion on the remark of Captain Mackenzie, that 
 ' an awkward coincidence with regard to this pension is 
 that it was dated on the very day that he agreed to sus- 
 pend the negotiation and remove it to Paris.' 
 
 Meantime Jones had entered into a correspondence 
 with the Eussian government, and had agreed to take 
 service in the Eussian navy with the rank of rear- 
 admiral. In April, 1788, he started from Copenhagen 
 for St. Petersburg. He got easily enough as far as 
 Stockholm ; but aB the sea was still partially frozen, he 
 had some difficulty in getting farther, and it was only 
 after an adventurous passage of four days in an open 
 boat that he landed at Eeval. 
 
 In Eussia he remained for about a year, serving 
 creditably enough for some months against the Turks ; 
 and being present, though having no active share in the 
 decisive victory in the Liman on 7 June, 1788. 1 But as 
 before with his subordinates, so now with his superiors, 
 he could not agree. He was under the orders of Potem- 
 kin, with whom he speedily got up a quarrel. Potemkin 
 was as vain as Jones, and had the advantage of un- 
 controlled power. Jones was therefore sent back to 
 St. Petersburg, and while living there, very much in the 
 shade, a charge was preferred against him of having 
 committed a criminal assault on a little girl, twelve 
 
 1 See Dictionary of National Biography, s.n. Samuel Bentham, 
 iv. 282. 
 
PAUL JONES. 409 
 
 years old. It was possibly false : it certainly was never 
 proved, nor was it insisted on ; and Jones was permitted 
 to leave the country. He retired to Amsterdam, and 
 seems to have entertained the idea of entering the ser- 
 vice of Sweden : the negotiation fell through ; so also did 
 his endeavours to return to Eussia. He was anxious to 
 fight somebody, but does not seem to have cared very 
 much as to the flag he was under or opposed to. In the 
 course of 1790 he went to Paris, where, on 18 July, 
 1792, he died of dropsy, induced or aggravated by disease 
 of the liver. 
 
 The character of Paul Jones resolves itself very dis- 
 tinctly under two different heads — professional and 
 moral. As a commander, Jones'B merits and faults will 
 sufficiently appear from the account I have given of his 
 services. He was a man of distinguished talent and 
 originality ; a thorough seaman, and of the most deter- 
 mined and tenacious courage. On the other hand, his 
 vanity was excessive ; his desire for ' glory,' as he him- 
 self wrote, was ' infinite ; ' and in aiming at it, he never 
 hesitated to throw over the claims of all others. His life 
 was thus spent in a never-ending series of squabbles, all 
 more or less discreditable, with his subordinates, with 
 his equals, with his superiors. The governments which 
 he served showed their sense of his conduct by awarding 
 him, in America, a gold medal ; in France, a sword of 
 honour ; and in both, by not employing him again. His 
 biographers have lamented that a man of his genius 
 had not greater opportunities of distinction : If — they 
 have argued — he had only had command of an efficient 
 Bquadron, what might he not have done ! Judging from 
 the invariably mutinous conduct of his men and officers, 
 
410 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 we may doubt whether he could have held command of 
 an efficient squadron. 
 
 His moral character may be summed up in one word 
 — detestable. I do not here speak only of the great 
 damning fact that, without sense of injury on the one 
 side, or of affection on the other, but merely as a matter 
 of vulgar self-interest, he waged war against his native 
 country, although 
 
 ' — this alone might from his part 
 Sever each true and loyal heart.' 
 
 I speak equally of his character in its more personal 
 relations. The same selfish vanity which made him a 
 renegade, made him a calculating liar, incapable of 
 friendship or love. He is said to have been free with 
 his purse ; his conduct relative to the Paris or Copen- 
 hagen prize money shows that he was unscrupulous in 
 filling it. Whenever his private actions can be examined, 
 they must be pronounced to be discreditable ; and as to 
 many others that appear to be so, there is no evidence 
 in his favour, except his own unsubstantiated and worth- 
 less testimony. 
 
 But it is not specially to say this that I have written 
 this chapter. So far as our country is concerned, the 
 moral character of our enemy is a matter of indifference. 
 The points of importance are his manner of carrying on 
 war, and the probability of that being repeated. I have 
 sufficiently described the first ; I would urge the necessity 
 of considering the second. 
 
 Many of our seaports, with shipping and warehouses 
 far more valuable than any of 100 years ago, are still 
 as utterly defenceless; nay, more so, for the offensive 
 
PAUL JONES. 411 
 
 powers of an enemy are increased enormously. Shoals 
 and sandbanks will not stop a commander of skill and 
 determination : even if every Englishman or Scotchman 
 was of approved honesty, if there was none ready to sell 
 his birthright for a mess of pottage, there are hundreds 
 of Americans, Germans, Frenchmen, Eussians, men of 
 every nation in or out of Europe, who know the way into 
 the Forth or the Tyne, the Clyde or the Mersey, just as 
 well as do the local pilots. French pamphleteers have, 
 within the last few years, revelled in the anticipation of 
 the mischief that might be done to our undefended 
 towns, with a minimum of cost or risk. Plans have been 
 put forward for fitting a steam launch to squirt blazing 
 petroleum over ships or buildings. With such a boat, 
 incalculable damage might be done before the presence 
 of an enemy was thought of ; and I conceive there would 
 be no difficulty in scattering liquid fire in a more de- 
 structive manner and from a much greater distance than 
 by a squirt. We, threatened with such weapons, may 
 pronounce them atrocious, illegal, monstrous; but the 
 real question is not whether it is right to use such 
 weapons, but whether there is a possibility of their being 
 used. All history teaches that, in war, there is no such 
 thing as an illegal weapon, if only it suits the conveni- 
 ence of the enemy. I have been endeavouring to show, 
 from the story of the past, that we ought to be armed 
 against the indefinite possibilities of the future. 
 
412 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 THE FBENCH PRIVATEERS, 
 
 IV. ROBERT SURCOUF. 1 
 
 The gigantic development of modern commerce will 
 necessarily give to its defence in time of war a more 
 serious importance than it has ever yet had. That, by 
 either belligerent, the enemy's commerce will be a prin- 
 cipal object of attack maybe assumed; in what particular 
 way the attack may be made is supposed to be uncertain. 
 The supposition seems, if not a mere pretence, to be 
 based on ignorance of human nature and the custom of 
 war. Can any sane person really believe that a future 
 Napoleon — whatever his nationality — would be bound by 
 the rules of a Declaration of Paris ? or that, if it suited 
 his purpose, he would scruple to declare the Declaration 
 null and void ? I cannot doubt that in future wars with 
 a maritime country, the main fact of privateering will 
 remain as in time past. The details may be modified ; 
 the form of commission may be different ; but the abso- 
 lute fact will be as heretofore. To what extent it may 
 be carried will depend on the wealth and the trade, the 
 power, ability, and moral scruples of the respective 
 belligerents. So considered, we have, as very practical 
 1 United Service Magazine, February and March, 1883. 
 
SUECOUF. 413 
 
 questions, to discuss what effect such an attack is 
 capable of producing, and what may be the best way 
 of guarding against it. 
 
 Our forefathers, as is well known, gathered their 
 merchant ships in large convoys under the escort of 
 ships of war. It was a mode of proceeding distasteful 
 to the one and irksome to the other. Naturally the 
 officers of our ships of war did not like it, for it withdrew 
 them from active, brilliant, or possibly lucrative enter- 
 prise, to a service on which the enemy was to be avoided 
 rather than sought, on which dull safety was the aim, 
 rather than glorious victory, and which, with a great 
 deal of difficulty and vexation, brought with it small 
 chance of distinction and none of emolument. And on 
 the other hand, the masters of merchantmen, if they 
 found themselves in a good ship, and had, as was com- 
 monly the case, a pecuniary interest in an early market, 
 chafed under the delay which worse-sailing ships forced 
 on them ; and the delay was not always the fault of the 
 ships ; the ignorance and incompetence of some of the 
 masters was as irritating and embarrassing as the undue 
 eagerness, obstinacy, and inattention of others. It has 
 therefore been assumed that in any future naval war the 
 system of convoys will not be attempted. 1 Most certainly, 
 naval officers will not be anxious that it should be. 
 Whether the merchants, for whose benefit it was devised, 
 may not be driven to a different opinion is a question 
 which time alone can answer. But if not in convoys, 
 how then is our commerce to be protected ? Is it to 
 
 1 See a paper by Bear-Admiral Colomb on Convoys, are they any 
 longer possible ? in the Journal of the Eoyal United Service Institution, 
 25 March, 1887. 
 
414 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 protect itself ? I believe the theory that it may do bo 
 is widely accepted, though the way in which it is to do 
 so has never been satisfactorily explained ; and though I 
 read of merchant-ships carrying 40-pounders, or even 
 heavier guns, and flying the blue ensign, I doubt very 
 much whether the few guns, or the scanty, imperfectly- 
 trained crew, would enable the blue ensign to fly long in 
 the immediate presence of an enemy's ship of war. But 
 I am not now going to dwell on my own personal doubts. 
 I prefer examining into the historical antecedents of the 
 theory ; and, by seeing how far armed merchant-ships 
 have, in former days, been able to defend themselves., 
 forming some warranted opinion as to how far they may 
 be able to do so in time to come. 
 
 Many hundred years ago, practical experience decided 
 in favour of a permanent distinction between merchant- 
 ships and ships of war; notwithstanding which, mer- 
 chant-ships continued to be armed, chiefly as a defence 
 against pirates and savages. Sometimes, however, the 
 armament was spoken of as efficient against men-of-war ; 
 and was carried to such an extent that engagements 
 with merchant-ships have been added to the roll of naval 
 achievement. Notably has this been the case with the 
 celebrated capture of the Acapulco ship by Commodore 
 Anson. Every boy has read the story and admired the 
 boldness with which the Centurion — her crew reduced 
 by sickness and death — sailed from Macao to look for 
 this gigantic adversary, of nearly double her tonnage, 
 and with more than double her number of men : and not 
 only to look for, but to find, to fight, and to capture. 
 It may be well to instil into the boyish mind a belief 
 that Englishmen are a match for double their number of 
 
SURCOUP. 415 
 
 Spaniards, or of any other people ; it is a belief that has 
 often led to very practical results : but in this particular 
 instance, when we examine the story technically and 
 critically, the consideration is forced on us that the 
 Centurion was a man-of-war, and that — however big — 
 the Nuestra Senora de Covadonga was only a merchant- 
 ship ; as emphasizing which, it is well to look beyond 
 the familiar account written by the commodore and his 
 friends. This does indeed tell how the Spaniard had 67 
 men killed and 84 wounded, whilst on board the Centurion 
 were only 2 killed and 17 wounded ; and remarks : ' of 
 so little consequence are the most destructive arms in 
 untutored and unpractised hands.' This short comment 
 is, however, not likely to catch the attention, or even be 
 fully understood by the ordinary reader ; for the exact 
 meaning of it we have to refer to the little-known nar- 
 rative by Mr. Thomas, the ship's schoolmaster, which, 
 describing the Covadonga, says : — 
 
 ' She had ports for mounting 64 guns, but had, I think, 
 to the best of my remembrance, but 40, and was so 
 lumbered that she could not fight all of them ; 17 of those 
 were brass, I think all twelve-pounders, but no two of them 
 alike, but I suppose picked up here and there at different 
 times as they could procure them. . . . Her defensive wea- 
 pons were swords and cutlasses, poleaxes, and a dangerous 
 sort of pike, the wood handle of which was about seven foot 
 long and headed with a double-edged iron about eighteen 
 inches long, very sharp, and which alone was enough to destroy 
 all the men who should enter on the nettings, or to push back 
 those who might attempt to enter in any other parts : but I 
 fancy they were in so much haste and hurry that they forgot 
 most of these below ; for we afterwards found many of them 
 in the gun-room, a place where they could be of no manner of 
 
416 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 service. . . . Though indeed it appears that the general was 
 really very confident of success and expressed himself after 
 that manner before the fight to some of his officers ... it 
 would never bear to charge him with not clearing the guns 
 between decks, they being so lumbered that it would have 
 been morally impossible for him to have got them clear in 
 three times the time he had for it from the first sight he had 
 of us to the time of the engagement. Indeed what I think 
 they might very justly and with the most reason imaginable 
 call him to a strict account for, was his not endeavouring to 
 get away from us at first.' 1 
 
 And yet this Covadonga was a half-and-half sort of 
 craft ; was a government ship, regularly commissioned, 
 and entitled to fly the royal standard. She was, how- 
 ever, a Spaniard ; and there are many amongst us who 
 would fain believe that the victory was won by English^ 
 men over Spaniards, rather than by a man-of-war over 
 a merchantman. I propose, therefore, in more fully 
 inquiring into this question, to eliminate, or indeed to 
 reverse the supposed advantage of nationality ; and to 
 do this, by tracing, in some detail, the history of priva- 
 teering in the Indian seas during the last great war 
 with France, and in following out the career of a certain 
 Captain Surcouf, with whose name few English readers 
 are perhaps now acquainted, but who, some eighty years 
 ago, was a very real power in the eastern seas, and 
 whose memory still lives in France as the one bright 
 spot in a time of deep naval gloom. 
 
 Eobert Surcouf 2 may be properly enough described 
 
 1 A True and Impartial Journal of a Voyage to the South Seas and 
 round the Globe m His Majesty's Ship Centurion, by Pascoe Thomas, 
 Teacher of the Mathematics on board the Centurion (1745) ; pp. 288- 
 290. The book has never been reprinted, and is now scarce. 
 
 2 So far as the French side of his career is concerned, I base my 
 
SUECOUF. 417 
 
 as a privateer by birth. A native of St. Malo, the 
 chosen home of French privateers, he was descended, on 
 the mother's side, from a grand-uncle of Du Guay- 
 Trouin : on the father's side, he was the great-grandson 
 of an earlier Eobert Surcouf, a contemporary of Trouin'g, 
 and himself also a daring and successful cruiser. He 
 was born on 12 December, 1773 ; and after a childhood 
 distinguished — we are told — by a high-couraged fondness 
 for fighting, for tearing his clothes, and for kicking his 
 schoolmaster's shins, he was sent to sea in March, 1789, 
 on board the Aurore, a merchant-ship bound to the 
 East Indies, and trading at first between Mauritius and 
 the coast of India. In the following February she took 
 in a cargo of negroes for the West Indies ; but she had 
 scarcely left her port before she got into a storm — a 
 pre- scientific cyclone — which dashed her on the African 
 shore. The crew, and the black women with their chil- 
 dren, who were unfettered, were saved ; but it was found 
 impossible to release the four hundred wretches chained 
 below, and they perished to the last man : the hull was 
 thrown up on the beach, and seemed capable of being 
 repaired ; but it was a full fortnight before the fearful 
 mass of putrefaction could be cleared out. In the loath- 
 some task, young Surcouf came to the front by his 
 energy and courage ; and when the captain chartered a 
 
 narrative principally on the Histoire de Bobert Swcouf, Capitwine de 
 Corsaire, pubUie d'apris des documents authentiques : par Ch. Cunat. 
 The author claims also to have gained much of his information first- 
 hand, from Surcouf himself or the companions of his voyages ; and, 
 judging by a close scrutiny of the leading facts, I have come to the 
 conclusion that he has not been purposely untruthful, though he 
 has written throughout in a spirit of almost grotesque exaggeration not 
 perhaps uncommon in the lower class of French historians. 
 
 E E 
 
418 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 country vessel to carry part of his crew to the Mauritius, 
 he took the lad with him as his chief officer. By what 
 series of accidents it does not appear, but the crazy and 
 ill-found boat was driven far to the eastward; after 
 great suffering for want of water and provisions, they 
 made the coast of Sumatra ; and so, after a three months' 
 voyage, got to Penang, or, as it was then more commonly 
 called by the English, Prince of Wales Island. Prom 
 there they took a passage to Pondicherry in a French 
 merchant-ship, and finally arrived at Mauritius, towards 
 the middle of December. For some months longer Sur- 
 couf continued with his old captain, as chief officer of a 
 brig trading to Madagascar. The school of seamanship 
 was rude, but, we may believe a thoroughly good one ; 
 and when, towards autumn, the lad, not yet eighteen, 
 made up his mind to return to France, and shipped on 
 board the corvette Bienvenue, he was rated as quarter- 
 master (timonier), and served as such during the home- 
 ward voyage. She was put out of commission at 
 L'Orient, on 3 January, 1792. 
 
 After a few months at home, Surcouf was off again 
 to Mauritius, chief officer of a vessel which would seem 
 to have been engaged partly in the slave-trade, until the 
 war with England broke out, when the blockade of the 
 island drove him on board a corvette equipped by the 
 governor, who gave him the local rank of ensign. M. 
 Cunat implies, rather than asserts, that he continued in 
 this employment for more than a year, and had his small 
 part in the engagement on 22 October, 1794, between 
 the French squadron Cybele and Prudente, large frigates, 
 with the Coureur, brig, and the Jean Bart, privateer, and, 
 on the other side, the two English ships, Centurion of 50, 
 
SUECOUF. 419 
 
 and Diomede of 44 guns ; an engagement in which 
 the Centurion received such damage as to be obliged to 
 withdraw from the station, taking with her also the 
 Diomede. Although not quite so heroie, so Curtius- 
 like, as Cunat describes it — for the forces were not so 
 utterly disproportioned — the affair was, no doubt, as 
 creditable to the French as it was the reverse to the 
 English ; 1 but leaving that on one side, there seems no 
 clear reason for supposing that Surcouf had anything to 
 do with it. We may believe that if he had, his future 
 career would have been very different ; not impossibly, 
 more distinguished ; and we may be quite sure that if 
 his biographer could have adduced one jot of evidence 
 of his being in any one of the ships, he would have 
 described him as the hero of the day. It seems to me 
 more probable that the young man's service on board 
 the ship of war — whichever it was— was short ; that the 
 constraint and discipline of even a colonial and revolu- 
 tionary ship was irksome to him, and that he got out of 
 her at the first opportunity. 
 
 It is at any rate quite certain that shortly after this 
 he was busy carrying slaves from Africa to Bourbon, or 
 rather Keunion, a traffic which, in February, 1794, the 
 Bepublic had pronounced illegal and contrary to the 
 rights of man. It was, however, profitable; and to 
 young Surcouf the chanee of breaking the law and 
 oppressing the nigger was a further inducement. The 
 colonists wanted slaves; the making them contraband 
 raised the price ; the smuggling required and remu- 
 nerated daring, and the unholy trade went on briskly 
 for some months. At length the attention of the colonial 
 J See James's Nwval History {edit. 1860), i. 236. 
 
 E E 2 
 
420 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 government was called to the continued malpractices 
 of M. Surcouf in the brig Creole; and orders were 
 given, both in the Isle of Prance and in Eeunion, to 
 arrest him. The news reached him as he was taking in 
 a cargo in Madagascar; but none the less he ran his 
 slaves, landed them by night at Grande Chaloupe, on 
 the west side of Eeunion, and stood, impudently enough, 
 into St. Paul's Bay, where he anchored at daybreak. 
 His people were still busy removing the traces of negro 
 occupation, when three police agents came on board. 
 They were earlier than was expected, and had no diffi- 
 culty in finding sufficient proof of the business the 
 Creole had been upon. It was a new and very flagrant 
 breach of the law ; and as they drew up their report, 
 they told Surcouf he must accompany them on shore. 
 ' Quite at your service, citizens,' said the young captain, 
 with the blandest courtesy ; ' but the cook is just bring- 
 ing aft the breakfast which I hope you will do me the 
 pleasure of taking before we go.' The invitation was 
 accepted, and the party went down to the cabin; 
 Surcouf, in a few hasty words, leaving his chief mate in 
 charge. 
 
 The breakfast was good ; the wine was excellent ; and 
 the guests enjoyed themselves without thought of the 
 future, or of their host's probable anxieties ; whilst on 
 deck, the chief mate, having sent the officers' boat on 
 shore, quietly cut the cable and made sail to seaward. 
 It was not till the Creole got out of the bay and felt 
 the swell of the south-east wind, that the officers below 
 had any idea of what was going on. They rushed 
 on deck, and saw their position with dismay. Eealising 
 that under existing circumstances their host was not a 
 
SURCOUF. 42 1 
 
 man to stick at trifles, they ordered him to return 
 instantly, threatening him with the terrors of the legis- 
 lature ; to which Surcouf replied that just to keep clear 
 of these he was going to carry them over to Africa 
 and put them on shore amongst their dear frienda the 
 negroes. And so he left them to their own reflections. 
 As the day wore on, they lost sight of land : the brig, 
 under small sail, rolled heavily in the swell, and they 
 were extremely sea-sick. 
 
 Night came on, with the horrors of darkness ; the 
 wind blew fresh and they fancied it a storm ; they were 
 excessively miserable — miserable enough in the present, 
 still more miserable as to the future when they could 
 bring themselves to think of it. So, in very humble 
 spirit, they entered into a negotiation with their master, 
 and were able to come to terms. They were to write a 
 new report to the effect that they had found no trace of 
 negroes on board the Creole ; that she had none of the 
 marks of a slaver, and that she had been forced out to 
 sea by the rollers setting in. Surcouf, on his part, 
 agreed to put them on shore ; but not to let them off too 
 easily, carried them to the Isle of France, where he 
 landed them eight days later, and where, thanks to the 
 complicity, or, as M. Cunat calls it, the good-will (bien- 
 veillanee) of three most respectable and deservedly 
 influential men, members of council, he escaped the 
 penalties to which his nefarious traffic had properly sub- 
 jected him. 
 
 He did not, however, care to tempt fortune again in 
 this particular way ; and the course of the war seemed 
 to offer him a more honourable as well as more lucrative 
 path. He accepted the command of a vessel of 180 tons 
 
422 STUDIES IK NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 fitting out as a privateer. Her name was Modeste, and 
 her equipment was conformable ; she carried four guns 
 — 6-pounders, and thirty men. The name could be 
 changed and she became the Emilie ; but her armament 
 was unaltered, being probably limited by the means or 
 credit of her owners. The colonial government refused 
 her a letter of marque, thinking her, perhaps, too con- 
 temptible, and wishing rather to concentrate the forces 
 of the island. Much to Surcouf's disgust, he had to sail 
 as a peaceful trader to the Seychelles for turtle ; and 
 left Port North-West, as the republicans had named Port 
 Louis, on 3 September, 1795. It is a date that marks 
 the beginning of Surcouf's career. 
 
 Whether Surcouf had already made up his mind to 
 go privateering, with or without a letter of marque, or 
 whether he was purely the child of circumstance, may 
 seem doubtful ; he certainly went to the Seychelles, and 
 lying in the roadstead of Mahe, began taking in his 
 cargo. By chance, or otherwise, he had also received on 
 board a number of sailors who were scattered amongst 
 the islands and wanted a passage to the Isle of Prance, 
 when one afternoon — it was 7 October — two large Eng- 
 lish ships were seen making for the anchorage. They 
 may have been men-of-war ; it suited Surcouf to think 
 they were, and cutting his cables, he went out on one 
 side as they came in on the other. He concluded that 
 as the English had made the Seychelles their cruising 
 ground, it was unsafe for him to return, and that he 
 was free to go in quest of adventure. The quest led him 
 over to the neighbourhood of the Andaman Islands and 
 the coast of Sumatra, sailing, according to his biogra- 
 pher, in an aimless kind of way for three months, and 
 
SUECOUF. 423 
 
 ■once only interrupted by an English wood-boat, which 
 had the impertinence to fire on him as a summons to 
 bring to, and which, purely in self-defence, he was 
 obliged to take possession of, and send to the Isle of 
 France. The fact is, of course, that he was cruising : 
 having no licence or letter of marque, he was, in point 
 of law, a pirate ; and his having provisions for this 
 lengthened time at sea, with an increased crew, is 
 presumptive evidence that the whole thing was pre- 
 determined. 
 
 Having taken his first step with the wood-boat, the 
 rest came naturally. A few days later, he met, off the 
 Sandheads, two vessels laden with rice, in charge of a 
 pilot brig ; he had no difficulty in making himself 
 master of all three ; sent the two rice-ships and the 
 Emilie to the Isle of France, and transported himself 
 with the remainder of his crew, twenty-three in number, 
 on board the pilot brig, which is spoken of as the Car- 
 tier, and which appeared better suited for his purpose 
 than his former ship. After another week he captured 
 another rice-ship, the Diana, and having put a prize 
 crew on board her, resolved to accompany her to the 
 Isle of France. He was proceeding to carry this into 
 effect, when standing over to the Orissa coast, he caught 
 sight of the Company's ship Triton, lying in Balasur 
 Eoads. She was a vessel of 800 tons, and is described, 
 with perhaps not very much exaggeration, as mounting 
 26 twelve-pounders on her main deck, and as having on 
 board 150 men. As compared with the Cartier, she was, 
 very literally, a ' Triton among the minnows.' On board 
 the Cartier, reinforced by all the available men from the 
 Diana, there were nineteen, exclusive of a few, perhaps 
 
424 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 half-a-dozen, Lascars from the different prizes ; but the 
 Cartier's appearance favoured a surprise, and with his 
 people all hidden from view, the Lascars only showing, 
 and himself steering, Surcouf ran down to the big ship. 
 The officers and passengers were at dinner ; in the heat 
 of the afternoon most of the crew were probably asleep ; 
 the careless watch took for granted that the brig was, as 
 she looked, the expected pilot-boat, and thought nothing 
 more about it till they suddenly found her alongside, 
 and the Frenchmen, armed with pistol and cutlass, 
 jumping on board. Of defence, in the strict sense of the 
 word, there was none. The few who made any oppo- 
 sition were at once killed ; the others were thrown down 
 the hatchways, and the hatches clapped on ; the halliards 
 of the port-lids -were cut, so that the ports could not 
 be opened ; and the English were virtually prisoners, 
 between decks. A few volleys of musketry down the main 
 hatchway anticipated an attempt to blow up the quarter- 
 deck; a little desultory firing from the poop windows 
 was easily quelled, and with the loss of one man killed 
 and one wounded, the Frenchmen were masters of the 
 ship. The loss of the English was greater, but small 
 compared to what it might have been had resistance 
 been possible. The captain, a midshipman, one of the 
 passengers — a soldier officer, and two seamen, five in all, 
 were killed, and six wounded ; the prisoners were put on 
 board the Diana and allowed to make the best of their 
 way. The little Cartier was recaptured off Madras by 
 the English 74-gun ship Victorious; but the Triton, 
 under the command of Surcouf, was carried safely to 
 Mauritius. 
 
 As a bit of privateering — which the English, if it had 
 
SUECOUF. 425 
 
 failed, would rightly have called piracy — the capture of 
 the Triton seems to me really very clever, though the 
 heroics in which M. Cunat indulges are of course utterly 
 out of place. ' At the sight of the English,' he says, ' at 
 the recollection of their country, these eighteen heroes 
 chose rather to die than to dishonour themselves by 
 cowardly surrender.' There was no question of either 
 dying or surrendering, if they had not thought fit to 
 attack: the Triton would certainly not have begun. 
 ' This ship ' — the words are attributed to Surcouf — ' this 
 ship shall be our tomb, or the cradle of our glory.' I 
 don't suppose for a moment that he said anything of the 
 sort ; I think he most probably put the case very plainly 
 and truthfully before his eighteen men ; that his words 
 were somewhat like : — ' Here's a fine fat Indiaman with 
 a hold full of dollars and rupees. It's all ours, if you'll 
 make a dash : most of her men are asleep, and those 
 that aren't will think we're the pilot. Only remember 
 if they should overcome us, they'll hang us as pirates.' 
 But whilst I think that M. Cunat's description of the 
 combat is absurd, I am bound to say that the one which 
 was published at the time in England is entirely false, 
 and self-contradictory. According to the ' Gentleman's 
 Magazine ' for June, 1796 — 
 
 ' The Triton was seized by a party of Frenchmen in a 
 schooner which had been captured a few days before by the 
 Modeste, French privateer. The whole number did not exceed 
 twenty-five, who, it was proved, had broken their parole, 
 escaped from Calcutta in a dingey, and contrived to get pos- 
 session of the pilot schooner, under which description they 
 were permitted to come alongside the Triton. The moment 
 they had boarded her they killed every person who had the 
 
426 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY, 
 
 misfortune to be upon deck. Those who unfortunately fell 
 victims to the treachery of these savages were, &c. &c.' 
 
 How the pilot boat, schooner, or brig was captured 
 by the Modeste and got possession of by the dingey, does 
 not appear ; and for the rest, the men had, as I have 
 narrated, come there fairly enough. Their attack was a 
 legitimate surprise, and they do not seem to have acted 
 as savages, or to have killed more than the circumstances 
 rendered justifiable and necessary. It is said, too, on 
 independent authority, that the prisoners were kindly 
 and liberally dealt with ; that they were allowed to take 
 their private property with them on board the Diana, 
 and that some ladies, passengers, were treated with 
 great politeness. 1 
 
 When Surcouf arrived at the Isle of France, he was 
 excessively disgusted to find that the government claimed 
 his prizes — the wood-boat, the rice-ships, and, above all, 
 the Triton — on the simple ground that he had no letter 
 of marque. About the law of the case there could be 
 no doubt ; it was in France the same as in England, 
 and in England the prizes would have unquestionably 
 been droits of admiralty. If a merchant-ship, being 
 attacked, should capture her assailant, the government 
 claim might properly be waived in her favour ; but in 
 the case of the Emilie, cleared for the Seychelles, and 
 making prizes off the Sandheads, there seemed no reason 
 why the law should not take its course. 
 
 The owners complained loudly. They had flattered 
 themselves they had fallen on a good thing, and were pro- 
 
 1 Madras Courier, 9 and 10 February, 1796, quoted by M. Cunat. I 
 have not been able to verify the reference, but see no reason to doubt its 
 correctness. 
 
SUECOUI'. 42* 
 
 portionally disappointed. They asserted that the prizes 
 had been taken for the public benefit, that the arrival 
 of the rice-ships had saved the island from famine ; that 
 the colony owed a debt of gratitude to Surcouf and 
 themselves. ' It is,' they wrote, ' with the most lively 
 grief that we learn that in place of those sentiments of 
 gratitude which the conduct and success of the Emilie 
 ought to give rise to, the ship is, on the contrary, 
 threatened with confiscation, and deprived of the fruit of 
 her captures, because she was not provided with a com- 
 mission for cruising. . . . We hope that the colony may 
 be spared the pain of seeing those who have saved it 
 from distress now punished and ruined.' This remon- 
 strance, however, produced no effect. Public opinion on 
 the island, and several of the leading members of the 
 government declared in favour of the Emilie ; but the 
 law was implacable; on which account Surcouf deter- 
 mined to carry his cause to France, and plead it before 
 the nation. The home government took a friendly view 
 of the case ; poor as they were, it was of more conse- 
 quence to encourage maritime enterprise -than to enrich 
 the treasury with the spoil ; and the prizes, or the amount 
 they had realised, were ordered to be made over to the 
 owners, officers, and ship's company of the Emilie. It 
 was found that they had been sold nominally for 1,700,000 
 livres, which, reduced to cash, was valued at 660,000 
 livres, and this was the sum that Surcouf would seem 
 finally to have received. 
 
 The decision, however, had taken time. Before it 
 was settled, fourteen months had slipped away, part of 
 which time Surcouf had occupiea in making love to 
 a townswoman, Mile. Marie Blaize, and part in super- 
 
428 STUDIES Iff NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 intending the equipment of the ship Clarisse, of Nantes, 
 the command of which, as a privateer, had been offered 
 to him. When his lawsuit was happily ended, and the 
 ship ready to sail, he decided, apparently, that his 
 marriage might wait, and he put to sea towards the end 
 of July, 1798 ; the Clarisse carrying 14 guns, eight- and 
 twelve-pounders, and having a crew of 140 good men of 
 Nantes, or St. Malo, with Nicolas Surcouf, her captain's 
 elder brother, as chief officer. 
 
 After a quick run to the line, he fell in there with a 
 large English ship, which mounted, it is said, 26 guns, 
 22 of them on a main deck ; a merchant-ship, no doubt ; 
 well armed, and possibly an Indiaman, but, if so, not 
 under the Company's flag. 1 Possibly she trusted to her 
 strength, possibly she did not recognise her danger until 
 it was too late for her to avoid the Clarisse' s attack. 
 She defended herself stoutly, and after a sharp fight, 
 succeeded in beating her off, shooting away her fore top- 
 mast, and so left her. To the Clarisse ' there remained,' 
 according to M. Cunat, ' from this terrible struggle, 
 nothing but the glory of having seen the Jack of the 
 three United Kingdoms fly before our victorious flag.' 
 The privateer would, no doubt, rather have had the gold 
 than the glory ; and to the merchant-ship to escape was 
 a full measure of success. But even in his sorry brag, 
 M. Cunat is incorrect ; for in 1798, Ireland was not repre- 
 sented in the Jack, and the three kingdoms were not united. 
 
 Off Eio Janiero, the Clarisse had a little compensation, 
 
 ' As the flag, like the Company, is now a thing of the past, there are 
 many who will not know that it differed from the flag of ordinary 
 merchant-ships in having a striped field, red and white, resembling in 
 this the flag of the United States of America. It was colloquially known 
 as ' the Company's Gridiron.' 
 
SURCOUF. 429 
 
 capturing a brig, which was sold at Bourbon for 400,000 
 francs ; and on 5 December, she herself arrived at the 
 Mauritius. After refitting, Surcouf went for a cruise 
 in the Bay of Bengal ; and in the Bay of Soosoo, on the 
 coast of Sumatra, he found two English ships at anchor, 
 taking in a cargo of pepper. A shoal prevented his 
 running them on board at once. In number of guns they 
 were superior ; and it was no part of his policy to batter 
 or be battered more than necessary. After a sharp 
 cannonade, the larger of the two was carried by the 
 Clarisse's boats, commanded by Nicolas Surcouf, who, at 
 the head of 40 men, boarded her in the smoke. The 
 other cut, and tried to run herself ashore, but was inter- 
 cepted by the Clarisse, and captured. ' It was a brilliant 
 feat of arms,' says Cunat, 'in which our flag had 
 triumphed over an enemy of superior force.' I repeat 
 such expressions, not because they are true, not because 
 they are not absurd ; but because English writers have 
 often been guilty of similar exaggerations ; and English 
 newspapers daily describe petty skirmishes, afloat or 
 ashore, in terms that would be ridiculous if applied to 
 Trafalgar or Waterloo. 
 
 Short and unequal as the combat had been, the 
 Clarisse had suffered considerably in hull, spars, and 
 rigging, and Surcouf determined to accompany his prizes 
 to the Isle of France, and there refit. Having done this, 
 he again put to sea, on 16 August, 1799, and presently 
 stretched over to his old cruising ground on the coast of 
 Java or Sumatra, where, on 1 October, he picked up a 
 Dane, neutral as to her flag, but English as to her cargo : 
 he sent her to the Isle of France. A Swede that he next 
 fell in with had better fortune, being outward bound from 
 
430 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 Stockholm with a Swedish cargo. A Portuguese vessel, 
 with 116,000 dollars on board in hard cash, paid the 
 penalty for the English alliance ; after which the Clarisse, 
 turning northwards into the Bay of Bengal, captured a 
 country ship off Madras ; and on 10 November another, 
 the Auspicious, a large vessel mounting 20 guns, on the 
 Orissa coast. From this time onwards she seems virtually 
 to have blockaded Calcutta, cruising off the Sandheads 
 in the most persistent and audacious manner. Early 
 on the morning of 30 December, however, having chased 
 an American ship in shore, she was espied by the Sybille 
 frigate, then lying at single anchor, which immediately 
 weighed and put to sea in chase. The wind was light 
 and the weather hazy, but slowly and steadily the frigate 
 gained on the privateer. The Clarisse's case appeared 
 desperate, and Surcouf resorted to extreme measures — 
 eight of her guns he hove overboard, and all her spare 
 spars and booms ; started and pumped out a quantity of 
 her water ; eased off the lanyards of the shrouds and 
 backstays ; knocked away the stanchions of the decks, 
 and struck out the wedges of the masts — measures which 
 gave the ship an incredible elasticity, and which, in a 
 very light breeze dying away to an almost perfect calm, 
 enabled the Clarisse gradually to increase her distance. 
 By midnight she was lost in the darkness ; being further 
 to seaward, she probably had more wind, and was push- 
 ing under a press of sail to the southward, while the 
 Sybille was lying becalmed, with her head all round the 
 compass ; and thus, when day dawned, she had run 
 her pursuer clean out of sight. 1 We may suppose that 
 
 1 Cunat describes this chase as having begun alter dark on the 30th, 
 and as having continued all that night, all the next day, and into the 
 
SURCOUF. 431 
 
 81 December was spent in bringing her back, so far as 
 possible, to her proper trim and condition. On the next 
 day she captured the Jane, a ship laden with rice for 
 Bombay. The capture of the Jane does not, in itself, 
 differ from the capture of many other armed ships which 
 were quite unequal to sustain the attack of a regularly- 
 equipped ship of war, even if only a privateer ; it differs 
 only in this, that I have been fortunate enough to obtain 
 a copy of a letter ' written on 8 January by the Jane's 
 master to her owners, giving a detailed account of the 
 circumstances attending on her loss, and which is most 
 interesting as evidence concerning this special, perhaps 
 extinct phase of maritime war. 
 
 ' You will no doubt be surprised to receive a letter from 
 me dated at Bemblepatam (? Bimlipatam), but such is the 
 fortune of war. We were captured by the Clarissa, French 
 privateer, M. Surcouf, commander, on 1 January, after a very 
 respectable defence for a country ship. But that you may 
 have a clear view of our proceedings, I will begin my narrative 
 from the 30th ult. On the morning of that day we passed 
 through Saugor Boads ; and in a few hours after, we joined 
 the Honourable Company's ships Manship and Lansdowne, 
 bound to Negapatam and Madras. In the afternoon a boat 
 from the American ship Mount Vernon came alongside of all 
 the ships, the officer of which informed us that they had been 
 chased the day before by a French privateer mounting 18 
 guns, but had happily been relieved by the Sybille frigate, 
 who pursued the privateer out of the roads. 2 This information 
 
 second night — the night of the 31st : but on this question of date I have 
 preferred following the Sybille's log. 
 
 1 P. E. O. — Admiral's Despatches, East Indies, No. 11. 
 
 2 There is here a strange confusion of dates. ' The day before ' is 
 29 December ; Cunat puts the chase of the American through the night 
 of the 30th and all through the 31st ; but from the Sybille's log it is 
 quite certain that she weighed anchor on the 30th, at 8 a.m. 
 
432 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 determined me to keep company with the Indiamen two or 
 three degrees to the southward of Point Palmyras, conceiving 
 them to be a very sufficient protection against privateers. 
 On the 31st, at 7 a.m., the pilot left us, Point Palmyras bear- 
 ing W.byS. 27 leagues. We pursued our course to the S.W. 
 in company. Between 7 and 8 o'clock we were spoke by 
 H.M.S. Sybille returning from the chase of the privateer. 
 Throughout the night we had moderate winds from the east- 
 ward. At daylight on 1 January, the Indiamen were five or 
 six miles ahead. At the same time we saw a strange sail to 
 the windward, standing to the northward, who, on perceiving 
 us, bore down with great caution, because, as M.Surcouf 
 afterwards told me, he took one of the ships to be either the 
 Sybille or Nonsuch ' seeing the other two ships safe into the 
 sea. When I saw the strange sail altered her course, I took 
 it for granted that she was the privateer which the American 
 had given intelligence of, and immediately ordered a gun to 
 be fired as a signal to the Indiamen. We continued the signal 
 till about 8 o'clock. When the privateer saw that the ships 
 ahead paid no attention to our firing, she hoisted English 
 colours, up studding-sails and royals, and came on with more 
 confidence. At half-past 8 she gave us a shot, hauled down 
 the English colours, and hoisted the French national flag. 
 We returned her fire from a 6-pounder which we got down off 
 the deck into a stern port in the great cabin, at the same 
 time carrying every sail after the Indiamen, anxiously hoping 
 that the continual firing would bring them to our assistance ; 
 but we looked in vain, for they never made the smallest move- 
 ment to assist us. 
 
 ' At 9, the privateer having got very near us, they began to 
 fire grape shot from the two brass 36-pounder cohorns, which 
 they had mounted forward. At this time it came on a light 
 squall from the southward, which brought the Indiamen 
 directly to windward of us. During the squall we carried a 
 press of sail, and the firing ceased on both sides. The superior 
 
 1 Some other ship was meant : the Nonsuch was not on the station. 
 
SUBCOUF. 433 
 
 sailing of the privateer soon brought her up again, when she 
 commenced a smart fire of musketry and grape shot from one 
 of the 36-pounder cohorns, the other having been disabled 
 early in the action. At 11 our powder was wholly expended, 
 the last gun we fired being loaded with musket cartridges. 
 The Frenchman then prepared to board us ; they triced up 
 graplins to their main and foreyard arms, and Surcouf gave 
 orders to board, animating his men with a promise of liberty 
 to plunder. Seeing that we were incapable of resisting the 
 force that was ready to be thrown on board of us, I was under 
 the necessity of ordering the colours to be hauled down, and 
 we were taken possession of by an officer from the Clarissa, 
 formerly mounting 18 guns, but now no more than nine 
 4-pounders, one 9-pounder, and 2 cohorns already mentioned. 
 She has likewise several bell-mouthed blunderbusses in each 
 top, which we saw them sending down after we were on board. 
 Her reduced force is owing to her being chased by the Sybille 
 frigate. At that time she threw overboard four 12-pounders, 
 three 9-pounders, with their carriages, and all the spars ; 
 sawed through a bulkhead which runs across abaft the main- 
 mast and separates the officers from the crew ; knocked down 
 all her stanchions, and got the axes and saws up to cut off the 
 poop, when unfortunately it fell little wind, and they found 
 they could save themselves without having recourse to this 
 last resource. 1 
 
 ' The crew consists of M. Surcouf, his brother, four officers 
 and a surgeon, sixty Europeans of several nations, ten Kaffirs, 
 eleven Lascars, and a Serang, who entered when he took 
 the Albion, and a few Malays. Surcouf sent on board the 
 prize one officer, by trade a tailor, sixteen Frenchmen, and 
 ten Lascars ; they were employed until sunset shifting the 
 prisoners and refitting the rigging. All this time the India- 
 men were in sight to the S.W. At sunset, Surcouf, viewing 
 them from the poop, requested I would tell him, upon my 
 
 1 I repeat this here as a measure of the trustworthiness of Cunat 
 notwithstanding some mistakes, and much absurd chawovmsme. 
 
 F F 
 
434 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 honour, whether they were Indiamen or not. I repeated what 
 I had said, that they were two Company's ships with whom 
 I had kept company ever since we left the pilot. He replied 
 they were two Tritons, alluding to the easy capture which he 
 made of that ship, and said the commanders deserved to be 
 ,shot. This was the universal opinion of the French officers. 
 I fear their conduct will be attended with bad consequences 
 to the Honourable Company's ships, as it has given the 
 Frenchmen a very contemptible opinion of them, and will 
 subject them to many attacks, which a spirited behaviour 
 would have freed them from. The prize made sail about 7 
 p.m., steering S.S.E., and was accompanied by the priva- 
 teer until daylight on the 2nd, when they parted, the pri- 
 vateer steering to the westward, and the prize continuing her 
 course. On the 4th, we fell in with a Pariah snow, from 
 Bengal, bound to Madras, which the privateer brought to, 
 took out all her bales, 40 bags of rice, two bales of twine, a 
 coir cable, and a chest of sugar-candy, and then put the crew 
 of the Jane on board her, together with the second officer of 
 the Auspicious — a very rich prize which he captured about 
 seven weeks ago, bound from Bengal to Bombay, loaded with 
 4,000 bags of rice, 500 bags of sugar, and 375 bales of piece 
 goods. We landed at Bemblepatam yesterday, from whence 
 I have written you these particulars. Surcouf does not mean 
 to come anymore near the Sandheads, being very much afraid 
 of the Sybille and Nonsuch ; but intends to cruise in the 
 latitude of 19° or 20° ; and should he be joined by La 
 Constance, as he expects, the trade of Bengal will be entirely 
 cut off, until they have surfeited themselves with prizes, and 
 return to the Mauritius to recruit their crews.' 
 
 This letter is a very remarkable voucher for M. 
 Cuuat's general good faith. The capture of the Aus- 
 picious and the Jane, which he miscalls James — the 
 
 seizure of the Pariah snow, a native coasting vessel 
 
 and the chase by the Sybille, are all described in 
 
SURCOUF. 435 
 
 essentially the same manner by the two widely different 
 writers. It is also evidence that there was nothing 
 exceptionally brutal in the behaviour of Surcouf and his 
 men. Plunder, of course, was their main object, but 
 the captain of the Jane has nothing to tell of any gross 
 ill-usage; on the contrary, he implies that Surcouf s 
 behaviour towards himself was friendly, and that the 
 prisoners as a body were fairly well treated. On one 
 point only are our two authorities in apparent contra- 
 diction : on the composition of the Clarisse's crew. On 
 leaving Prance they were, according to Cunat, a specially 
 fine body of French seamen ; on capturing the Jane 
 they were, according to the Jane's captain, a miscel- 
 laneous gathering of the nations. The discrepancy is 
 only apparent, for, counting only her present cruise, the 
 Clarisse had sent away many men in prizes, from which 
 she had probably enough entered others in their place ; 
 Danes, Portuguese, Swedes, Irish, even English, had all 
 come before her, just as much as the Lascars or Malays 
 more particularly mentioned. As to the statement that 
 the officer who took charge of the Jane was a tailor by 
 trade, its rigid accuracy cannot now be gauged ; it may 
 have been the writer's way of saying that he differed 
 from him in some details of seamanship ; on the other 
 hand, he may have been the purser or the master-at- 
 arms. We may at any rate assume, as beyond contro- 
 versy, that on board a ship which cruised, as the 
 Clarisse did, on an enemy's coast for six months, and 
 that, apparently, without even carrying away a spar, the 
 executive officers were sailors, whether they were also 
 tailors or not. 
 
 On the day after he had disembarrassed himself of 
 
 F F 2 
 
436 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 his prisoners, Captain Surcouf fell in with two large 
 American 1 ships, sailing in company. They mounted 
 each some 16 carronades, and confident in their strength, 
 closed, one astern of the other, and stood on under easy 
 sail. Against such an armament the Clarisse, with 
 all her biggest guns at the bottom of the sea, could do 
 little. Surcouf saw at once that his only chance was to 
 board, and went straight at the sternmost of the two. 
 His jib-boom caught in her main shrouds, and was 
 broken off, but it served as a bridge by which Nicolas 
 Surcouf and some 30 men gained the American's deck, 
 and carried her without much trouble. Her consort 
 fled; the Clarisse attempted to pursue, but having 
 already lost her jib-boom, she carried away her fore top- 
 mast, and the chase escaped. With her armament, and 
 in the disabled state of her pursuer, the American might 
 have chosen her distance, and, avoiding being laid on 
 board, have pounded the Clarisse into submission. But 
 fighting was not her trade, and even 16 carronades of 
 large bore did not convert a merchant-ship into a man- 
 of-war. 
 
 His damage, however, and the heavy drain on his 
 ship's company, decided Surcouf to return to the Isle of 
 France, and he anchored at Port North-West (Louis) in 
 the early days of February. He had no wish to stay 
 idle, and as the Clarisse was in need of a thorough refit, 
 he accepted the offer of the Confiance, a remarkably fine 
 ship — one of the wonders of the sea, says M. Cunat — 
 which had just come out from France. His brother 
 
 1 There was not at this time declared war between France and the 
 United States; but there was much angry feeling, and their ships 
 mutually preyed on each other. Cf. Brenton's Naval History, ii. 185, 187. 
 
SUKCOUF. 437 
 
 Nicolas would seeni r about the same time, to have taken 
 command of the Adele, a small vessel mounting 12 guns, 
 and in her to have gone a-cruising on his own account, 
 but with what success I know not. Cunat makes no 
 mention of this chapter in Nicolas's career, so all 1 1 can 
 say regarding it is that it was rudely stopped by his 
 falling in the way of the English sloop Albatross on the 
 night of 12 November, 1800. 
 
 In the story of Surcouf the Clarisse has no more 
 place. Under another captain she sailed again, when 
 refitted, made one valuable prize— a ship from London 
 to Calcutta, which had been insured for 60,000£. ; but 
 after this, changing her cruising ground to the Gulf of 
 Aden and the upper part of the Arabian Sea was, about 
 the middle of August, herself picked up by the 50-gun 
 ship Leopard, carrying the flag of Eear-Admiral Blankett, 
 on his way from the Eed Sea to Bombay. 
 
 Surcouf had meantime transformed the Confiance 
 from a merchant ship into a privateer. It was the 
 middle of April before the necessary work was com- 
 pleted. When ready, the ship was a model of beauty 
 and symmetry ; and, painted black, with her upper works 
 straw colour, would appear lower in the water and more 
 ' varmint ' like. She mounted 18 guns. Her crew was 
 made up of 160 Europeans, 25 volunteers from the 
 Bourbon militia, and some negro servants, about 200 
 in all. During the south-west monsoon the Bay of 
 Bengal was neither a safe nor an advantageous cruising 
 ground, and Surcouf s first idea was to establish himself 
 in the Straits of Sunda, and off Batavia. He found, 
 however, that station occupied by the American frigate 
 Essex, whose immediate neighbourhood might, he judged, 
 
438 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 be disagreeable, so he drew back, and having watered 
 at the Seychelles, cruised for a while off the south-east 
 end of Ceylon, from Dondra Head to the Little Basses, 
 by which all ships for Madras or Calcutta, whether from 
 Bombay or Europe, must needs pass. 
 
 The place was no doubt well chosen, though it was 
 one where he was almost as likely to find an English 
 frigate as an English merchant ship. He was chased 
 more than once, and though the fast sailing of the 
 Confiance saved her, he got disgusted with the station, 
 which, by the fortune of war, had given him nothing but 
 danger. He preferred to risk the chance of bad weather 
 in the Bay, where the luck immediately changed, and 
 he made several captures in rapid succession. Fourteen 
 ships are reported as having fallen, about this time, 
 either to the Confiance or to a fellow-cruiser, the 
 Malarcic. The largest and richest of all was the Com- 
 pany's ship Kent, from England for Calcutta, which, at 
 the very end of her voyage was, on 7 October, 1800, met 
 by the Confiance. The result of the meeting was de- 
 scribed by the Bengal correspondent of the ' Gentleman's 
 Magazine,' under date 8 October. 
 
 With great concern we announce the capture of the Kent, 
 East Indiaman, yesterday, in the Bay of Bengal, off the 
 Sandhead, by the Confiance, French privateer, of 26 guns, 
 and 250 men, after an obstinate engagement of nearly one 
 hour forty-five minutes, in which Captain Eivington was un- 
 fortunately killed, bravely defending the Company's property 
 till the last moment of his existence, when he exclaimed, ' Do 
 not give up the ship ! l Mr. Cator, a free merchant, also fell, 
 
 1 Thirteen years, it may be remarked, before Lawrence rendered 
 these words classical for Americans. They are surely more noble and 
 
SUECOUF. 439 
 
 covered with wounds. The Kent was in 25 fathoms, and 
 took the Confiance for a pilot sloop. The crew of the Con- 
 fiance were all armed with sabres and pistols, and had been 
 thrice encouraged with liquor previously to their boarding, 
 after which the fight continued desperate for twenty minutes. 
 General St. John and his family were on board the Kent, and 
 appear to have been particularly unfortunate : all his jewels, 
 plate, and baggage had been burnt on board the Queen ; and 
 he was now almost destined to behold his lovely wife, daughter 
 to the Margravine of Anspach, and his three charming 
 daughters, victims to the lawless excesses of a savage banditti. 
 The gallant Captain Pilkington, the general's aide-de-camp, 
 was severely wounded in defending the general's family. The 
 French behaved with a cruelty almost unexampled in sea- 
 fights, giving no quarter, and stabbing with their sabres even 
 the sick in their hammocks. Previous to their boarding, the 
 Kent had evidently the advantage, and had the crew been 
 equally armed with offensive weapons, or had more musketry, 
 the Confiance would, in all probability, have paid dearly for 
 the rashness of her attempt. This is the same ship which 
 was beat off formerly by the Arniston. 1 ... In violation of 
 the rights of humanity as those of war, the commander of 
 the banditti who took them pillaged them of every article of 
 wearing apparel, and after having done so put them, in- 
 cluding six ladies, in an open Arab boat, with no other 
 sustenance than a little bad water and some dates ; in this ■ 
 dreadful state they continued four days, till they reached 
 Calcutta. 
 
 As the writer's information must have been got from 
 
 more appropriate in the mouth of a dying merchant-captain— to whom 
 the assurance of his ship's safety is victory — than as spoken by the 
 captain of a frigate which had just sailed out of port to fight an enemy 
 of somewhat inferior force. 
 
 1 This is probably a mistake ; Cunat, at any rate, knew nothing 
 about it, or he would have described it, even if he had to rate the 
 Arniston as a line-of-battle ship. 
 
440 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 the people in the boat, and as he dated his letter'the day 
 after the capture, the four days, at any rate, is a very 
 evident exaggeration. Otherwise, so far as the bare 
 facts are concerned, there is little to object to. Clearly 
 the writer could know nothing about the liquor that was 
 thrice served out, and he over-estimates the force of the 
 Confiance both in guns and men ; but on the whole 
 his facts are fairly correct, judged even by M. Cunat's 
 standard. The colouring of the whole affair is, of 
 course, very different : brutality, or heroic determina- 
 tion ; savage banditti, or worthy sons of France — the 
 terms are interchangeable, according to the views and 
 nationality of the writer. But in point of fact, the 
 charges which the English reporter brings against the 
 assailants are frankly enough admitted by Cunat. ' My 
 lads,' he describes Surcouf as saying, as he turned the 
 hands up, while the two ships were yet some distance 
 apart, ' you mustn't let the look of this big fellow frighten 
 you ; it is not a ship of war ; I pledge you my word it is 
 only a Company's ship. She would indeed be too much 
 for us with guns, so we'll board her. Get your arms 
 ready. It'll be warm work no doubt ; but you shall have 
 an hour's pillage to pay you for it.' ' 
 
 The numbers on board the Confiance had been re- 
 duced by her many prizes : Cunat estimates them as 
 about 130 on 7 October. It is impossible to say how 
 many souls were on board the Kent : she had received 
 some— possibly all— who had been saved when the Queen, 
 a fellow-Indiaman, was burnt in San Salvador Bay, on 
 the coast of Brazil; and may thus have held, what 
 
 1 The actual words, according to Cunat, were : ' Pour prix de l'assaut 
 terrible que vous allez livrer, je vous accorde une heure de pillage.' 
 
SURCOUF. 441 
 
 with men, women, and children, nearly 200. This is, of 
 course, no measure of the Kent's fighting strength : of 
 men, she may have had about 150 ; but these were 
 neither trained to arms, nor indeed had they arms. 
 With the Kent's heavier armament, they might have 
 done very well if they could have kept the Confiance at 
 a distance : for hand-to-hand fighting they were utterly 
 unprepared. When the Confiance ranged alongside and 
 grappled the Indiaman ; when musketry from her tops 
 swept the Indiaman's decks; when Captain Eivington 
 fell, killed by a grenade thrown from the privateer's 
 main-yard ; when the Frenchmen, Creoles, and Negroes, 
 armed with cutlass and pistol, jumped on board, the 
 Englishmen offered indeed such resistance as they could ; 
 but without a captain, without organisation, without 
 Bkill, almost without arms, they were speedily beaten 
 below, and their flag hauled down. The bulk of the 
 Kent's crew were on the main-deck, stationed at the 
 guns : the chief officer attempted to rally them and re- 
 take the ship ; but they were unarmed and scattered : 
 volleys of musketry were fired into them from the upper 
 deck, and a determined charge swept them into the orlop, 
 where a third struggle took place. 'It was warm,' says 
 Cunat, ' for the Frenchmen were exasperated by the 
 obstinate resistance of the enemy.' The warmth was 
 mainly on one side ; and the obstinate resistance was 
 made with handspikes, rammers, or any bits of wood that 
 could be picked up ; as the result of which, the English 
 lost 11 killed and 44 wounded : the French had 16 
 wounded, three of whom afterwards died. 
 
 And then came the pillage. Surcouf had promised 
 it— French privateers frequently did ; I daresay English 
 
442 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOKY. 
 
 privateers did too — and the men were now determined 
 to have it. And they did have it : in that Cunat agrees 
 with the reporter ; but on one point he differs, and I be- 
 lieve Cunat is right. 
 
 ' As soon,' he says, ' as Surcouf learned that there were 
 ladies among the passengers, he himself went respectfully 
 to reassure them, and had sentries placed on their cabins. 
 Amongst them was a German princess, daughter of the Mar- 
 grave of Anspach, who accompanied her husband, General 
 St. John. One of these sentries was a young Creole named 
 Durhone, with whom I was afterwards, in the years 1808-9, 
 a fellow-prisoner at Pondicherry for eighteen months. 1 He 
 has often spoken to me of the incidents of this combat, and 
 amongst others, of his driving back two sailors who attempted 
 to force his post.' 
 
 Undoubtedly, however, in this time of pillage, there 
 was much roughness and excess : Cunat deplores it, and 
 says that Surcouf was much vexed at it, and cut the 
 hour very short ; but the English, who were the sufferers, 
 naturally spoke of it in much stronger language. The 
 next day the two ships made sail together for Mauritius, 
 where they arrived about the middle of November ; and 
 Surcouf, feeling perhaps that he could now afford a 
 holiday, agreed to take the Confiance back to France in 
 her original capacity of merchant ship, although with a 
 letter of marque, or, as the French and English then 
 called such a ship, as an aventurier. On the passage 
 he captured and ransomed for 10,000 dollars a Portuguese 
 bound from Lisbon to Eio Janeiro ; and, escaping the 
 blockading squadron, although at one time hardly pressed, 
 he anchored at Eochelle on 13 April, 1801. 
 
 1 M. Cunat was a young officer on board the ' Adele ' privateer, which 
 was captured by the 74-gun ship Eussell, on 5 December, 1807. 
 
SURCOUF. 443 
 
 The tender memory of Mile. Blaize had very pos- 
 sibly a good deal to do with the home-coming of Eobert 
 Sureouf : he was married to her on 28 May ; and the 
 happy couple went to spend the honeymoon and their 
 spare cash in Paris. They then took up their abode at 
 St. Malo, where, if the peace, which about this time in- 
 tervened, had continued, Sureouf would probably have 
 settled down into a respectable merchant and ship-owner. 
 The change from a life of rude adventure was very great, 
 and his wild energy found various outlets and gave rise 
 to a number of semi-comical anecdotes. This is one : 
 
 In investing his money, which must have amounted 
 to a very considerable sum, he became the owner of a 
 house then occupied by M. Blechamp, the father of Mme. 
 Lucien Bonaparte, holding in St. Malo the office of naval 
 commissioner and marine superintendent. 1 For some 
 reason which does not appear, Blechamp was annoyed 
 at the sale of his house : possibly he wished to buy it 
 himself ; possibly he thought a merchant skipper's buy- 
 ing a house over the head of a naval commissioner was 
 a piece of impertinence : at any rate, he permitted him- 
 self to speak somewhat slightingly of his new landlord. 
 The disparaging remark was repeated, of course with 
 exaggerations, until it reached his landlord's ears : and 
 a formal notice to quit at the end of the term was the 
 immediate consequence. Shortly afterwards Sureouf 
 was told that his tenant, in preparing to move out, 
 was carrying away a number of the fixtures. He took 
 measures to ascertain that it really was so ; and having 
 armed himself with a pistol, proceeded to the house, 
 forced his way in past the orderly at the door, and 
 1 Commissmre-ordonnateur : we have nothing exactly corresponding. 
 
444 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 rushing upstairs, found a workman busy taking down the 
 cranks of the bells. He had him down the ladder in 
 less than no time ; and the bell-hanger, terrified out of 
 his wits at the sight of the pistol, took to his heels and 
 fled. Surcouf then marched into the office, and, with 
 angry voice and gesture, demanded to see the commis- 
 sioner. M. Blechamp was fortunately not at home ; 
 but when he came in and learned what had happened, 
 he made out an order to Surcouf to repair to Brest im- 
 mediately, and sent it by a couple of gendarmes, who 
 had instructions to accompany him. Surcouf, who was 
 not only a rated merchant captain, of several years 
 seniority, but had, some time before, 29 June, 1800, been 
 appointed an unattached ensign in the navy, felt the 
 indignity thus put upon him. In order to evade it, he 
 pretended to be sick, too sick to travel ; and meantime 
 wrote an account of the affair to his friends in Paris, and 
 to Decres, the minister of the navy, demanding redress 
 for the way in which the commissioner had abused his 
 power. When he thought his letters must have reached 
 Paris, he managed to slip out of his house unknown to 
 the sentries at his door, and set off for Brest in a post- 
 chaise. The commissioner, however, having discovered 
 the evasion, sent off the gendarmes riding post after him, 
 and one of them overtook him at the last stage. Sur- 
 couf was determined not to appear in Brest as a prisoner ; 
 and between him and the gendarme there was a lively 
 altercation, in which — as it would appear — the pistol was 
 again produced. They managed, however, to compromise 
 matters, and the gendarme agreed to follow the post- 
 chaise at such a distance as to seem in no way connected 
 with it. Surcouf thus drove into Brest, and went at 
 
SUHCOTJF. 445 
 
 once to report himself to the prefect, who had already 
 received a telegraphic message very much in his favour. 
 The conduct of M. Blechamp was disapproved ; and in 
 the end, he was sentenced to make compensation for the 
 damage he had done to Surcouf's property. 
 
 "When the war with England again broke out, the 
 first consul, who had heard of Surcouf as a thorn in 
 the side of his enemy, sent for him, and is said, in a 
 personal interview, to have proposed giving him the rank 
 of captain in the navy, and the actual command of two 
 frigates, for a cruise in the Indian seas. It is impossible 
 to say how far this proposal was real : that something 
 of the sort was said is possible ; but it is still more pos- 
 sible that Surcouf's vanity mistook a vague suggestion 
 for a definite proposal. Whatever it may have been, he 
 declined it ; not choosing to subject himself to the orders 
 of an admiral, even though that admiral were Linois, 
 ' whose prowess at Algesiras was,' according to M. Cunat, 
 ' the presage of a series of brilliant successes.' M. Linois's 
 successes in the East are a favourite theme with a certain 
 class of minor French historians, but no one has ever 
 yet calmly and honestly enumerated them. So far as 
 I can trace them, they were of a distinctly negative 
 character : his success against the fleet of merchant 
 ships under Commodore Dance, on 14 February, 1804 ; 
 his success in Vizagapatam Eoads, on 18 September, 1804 ; 
 his success against the convoy escorted by the Blenheim, 
 on 7 and 8 August, 1805, would each, in the English 
 service, have merited a court-martial, and been rewarded 
 with a severe reprimand. 
 
 As we have said, even under the orders of an admiral 
 so distinguished, Surcouf declined to serve. He was 
 
446 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 made a Chevalier of the Legion of Honour ; but he pre- 
 ferred the company, or the rule, of Mme. Surcouf, nee 
 Blaize, to that of even the hero of Algesiras ; and devoted 
 himself, his talents, and his capital, to fitting out a 
 number of privateers, and carrying on the war in his 
 own fashion, and very much, it would appear, to his 
 own profit. One, the Caroline brig, he despatched to 
 the Indian Ocean, under the command of his brother 
 Nicolas, whom the peace of Amiens had, presumably, 
 set at liberty. Two others cruised in the Channel. It 
 was not till towards the end of 1806, when news had 
 come of the capture of Linois in the Marengo, on 13 
 March, that Surcouf could resolve to adventure himself. 
 He then had a ship specially built, a ship of 400 tons, 
 carrying 18 guns and 192 men ; and, as indicating his 
 return to his former statidn, he called her the Eevenant. 
 Now revenant, which primarily means ' one who comes 
 back,' has the every-day though secondary meaning of 
 ' a ghost ; ' and Surcouf, in grim humour, gave his 
 vessel a ghost for a figure-head — a corpse in the act of 
 throwing off its shroud. This ghostly craft put to sea 
 on 2 March, 1807, and in due time arrived at the Isle 
 of France. 
 
 Of his petty adventures on the way, it would be 
 tedious to speak; but the discipline and drill which 
 Surcouf established on board the Eevenant, a privateer 
 pure and simple, are worth noticing. The tactics to 
 which he trusted for success were closing and boarding 
 as soon as possible : it would clearly be very bad policy 
 to remain at a distance, pounding and being pounded 
 with great guns, till the enemy — and possibly also the 
 Eevenant — wss reduced to a wreck : the value of his 
 
SURCOUF. 447 
 
 prize would be less ; the difficulty of sending her into 
 port might be very great ; and his own cruise might be 
 brought to an untimely end. Besides all which, many 
 of the large Indiamen carried a much heavier armament 
 than the Eevenant, and might very well be able to beat 
 her off or disable her, if only they could keep her at a 
 proper distance. Surcoufs object was, therefore, to 
 train his men for close fighting ; and for this end he 
 established systematic exercise with small arms and 
 cutlass. Fencing, sword-play, or shooting at a bottle 
 hanging from one of the studding-sail booms, occupied 
 a great part of the time. And not only had he to drill 
 them to the use of arms : he had to train them to their 
 work as sailors, and to teach them the habits of civilised 
 beings. He had, too, a most unpromising lot of raw 
 material. Cunat is not likely to have erred in the 
 direction of unduly disparaging a French crew ; he pre- 
 fers Bpeaking in terms of exaggerated praise ; so that, 
 in the present instance, his evidence may be frankly 
 accepted. The crew of the Eevenant was — he says — a 
 heterogeneous collection of men of every country and 
 of every profession, recruited from all possible quarters, 
 even from prisons and hospitals. Such a ship's com- 
 pany was a mixture of all conceivable vices ; to maintain 
 strict discipline was at once important and difficult ; and 
 very severe punishments were requisite. The captain's 
 manner of life was thus the very opposite of that free- 
 and-easy association which is commonly supposed to be 
 the essence of privateering. Surcouf, we are told, 
 maintained an extreme formality, even with his officers : 
 they were sometimes invited to dine with him; but, 
 ordinarily, he spoke to no one but the first lieutenant or 
 
448 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 the officer of the watch : when he came on the quarter- 
 deck, no one but himself might walk the weather side ; 
 more frequently he reclined on the taffrail, smoking, in 
 company with a few passengers, towards whom he did 
 not preserve the same formality. His system answered ; 
 he got his crew well together and in good order ; they 
 became, in the words of Cunat, ' brave sailors, true sons 
 of old Armorica.' And, as commonly happens, success 
 followed on painstaking. 
 
 After refitting, and when the south-west monsoon in 
 the Bay of Bengal was coming to an end, Surcouf took 
 up his old cruising-ground : the frigate Piemontaise was 
 there also ; and the two continued for several months 
 virtual masters of the bay. This was particularly hard 
 on the merchants of Calcutta, whose commerce had, 
 only the year before, been similarly scourged by the 
 Bellone privateer, commanded by one Jacques Perroud. 
 The Bellone, however, had been happily caught on 
 9 July, 1806, as in a trap, between the coast of Ceylon, 
 the Little Basses, the Battlesnake sloop, and the 
 74-gun ship Powerful. Several other privateers were 
 caught about the same time, ' but ' — wrote Sir Edward 
 Pellew, better known, perhaps, as Lord Exmouth, who 
 then commanded in India — ' I reflect with much plea- 
 sure on the capture of La Bellone in particular, as well 
 from her superior sailing, as her uncommon success 
 in the present and preceding war against the British 
 commerce, in the Indian and European seas. The com- 
 mercial interests of this country are particularly secured 
 by her capture, which could not have been expected but 
 under very favourable circumstances.' 
 
 Things had thus looked brighter at Calcutta; and 
 
StTRCOUF. 449 
 
 now this Eevenant, in company with the Piemontaise, 
 was making them worse than ever. The East India 
 Company, and the independent merchants of Bombay, 
 had been in the habit of collecting their ships in con- 
 voys, a system -which those of Calcutta had disdained, 
 as causing delay. The loss thus fell almost entirely on 
 them, merchants, shipowners, and underwriters ; and 
 they lost not only their money, but also their temper. 
 They sent a wildly angry memorial to the admiralty, 
 blaming everybody, except themselves ; and more espe- 
 cially charging the admiral with neglecting their interests. 
 This document, dated 10 December, 1807, says : — 
 
 ' Your memorialists cannot decline the painful duty of 
 more particularly adverting to the recent capture of no less 
 than nineteen British ships and vessels within the short period 
 of two months, and at a station which the regular visitation 
 of the enemy's cruisers, at the opening of the north-east 
 monsoon, obviously pointed out as pre-eminently requiring 
 protection. . . . All the captures to which your memorialists 
 here particularly refer were made in the Bay of Bengal by 
 two French frigates, and a privateer named the Eevenant, of 
 16 guns. It was the lot of this privateer to make the greater 
 part of these captures ; and his depredations were committed 
 chiefly in view of the coast of Coromandel, where he has re- 
 mained upwards of three months, distant little more than 
 400 miles from Calcutta, and within 100 leagues of Madras 
 Boads, the principal station of his Majesty's ships ; and 
 where, at the same time, the flag of a British rear-admiral, 
 and several of his Majesty's pennants, were displayed. It will 
 scarcely be believed that the privateer, in which the enemy 
 has thus extended with success his depredations along our 
 defenceless shores, still continues on his station ; and not- 
 withstanding the extent of the British naval force in this 
 country, such is the unprotected state of our seaboard, that 
 
 G G 
 
450 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 this successful privateer, already so destructive to our com- 
 merce, and though of a force contemptible when compared 
 with the smallest of his Majesty's ships, continues to spread 
 consternation throughout the ports of India. . . . Nor can 
 your memorialists foresee any probable cause to induce the 
 enemy's privateer to relinquish the station he thus trium- 
 phantly maintains, until the number of his captures be such 
 as to require more men to navigate them than the privateer 
 can supply, or until, satiated with success, he may voluntarily 
 retire from our coast. . , . Your memorialists conceive that 
 there is no similar instance of a privateer continuing an un- 
 interrupted series of operations for a period of upwards of 
 three months, on a coast of the British empire, in the direct 
 track of their chief navigation, and within less than 300 miles 
 of a principal station of his Majesty's ships : nor do your 
 memorialists believe that the most extensive branch of British 
 commerce, either European or colonial, ever suffered such a 
 series of single captures, in so short a period, as has been 
 made by the Bevenant privateer, on the coast of Coromandel.' 
 
 And they go on to say that the sums paid by the 
 insurance offices in Calcutta alone, for losses during 
 September and October 1807, amounted to no less than 
 291,256Z. 
 
 Sir Edward Pellew had little difficulty in showing 
 that, beyond the necessary hazard in time of war, the 
 fault was mainly their own, inasmuch as they had neg- 
 lected or refused the convoy which had been liberally 
 offered. And the numbers of French privateers — among 
 others the Adele, already spoken of — captured by the 
 English cruisers at this very time ; the capture of the 
 Piemontaise herself a few months later, 8 March, 1808 ; 
 and the fact that the Eevenant was repeatedly but vainly 
 chased, sufficiently show that her success was due not to 
 any carelessness of the admiral, or of the captains under 
 
SURCOTO. 451 
 
 him, but to her own superior sailing, and still more to the 
 care and watchfulness of her captain. How much these 
 last, the personality of Surcouf himself, had to do with it, 
 would seem established by the future fortunes of the ship. 
 By the middle of January, 1808, the time spoken of 
 by the Calcutta merchants had arrived : the Eevenant's 
 crew was reduced to 70, and Surcouf determined to re- 
 turn to the Mauritius, where he anchored on the 31st 
 of the month. When the ship was again ready, he sent 
 her to sea in the charge of Potier, his chief officer, to 
 look for a Portuguese, homeward-bound from Goa, of 
 which he had intelligence. Potier took up his station on 
 the coast of Natal, where, on 24 May, he sighted, over- 
 took, and captured the object of his search. The Por- 
 tuguese is described as a ship of the largest size, of — we 
 may suppose — 1,200 or 1,500 tons ; pierced for 64 guns, 
 but actually mounting 34 ; and having on board, amongst 
 other passengers, a body of 50 soldiers — possibly in- 
 valids. In mere numerical estimation, the disparity was 
 excessive : but the question was really one of the relative 
 value of men and arms on board a merchant ship and a 
 ship of war. Against such numbers of men and soldiers, 
 presumably effective, Potier felt that their usual tactics 
 would be rash ; he was obliged to try, in the first in- 
 stance to reduce, or at any rate, to weaken, the enemy 
 by force of guns ; and so, taking up and cleverly main- 
 taining a position on her quarter, he kept up a continuous 
 fire. The mark was big, and every shot told ; whilst 
 the fire of the Portuguese, at a smaller target, was wild 
 and desultory : presently her port-lanyards were cut by 
 grape shot ; the guns were blinded, and the sea was too 
 heavy to risk blowing the port-lids away. On deck, the 
 
 a o 2 
 
452 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 soldiers, passengers, and men taken from the useless 
 guns, plied the assailant with musketry, and were an- 
 swered with showers of grape and langridge ; the fight 
 was going on briskly, and the merchant ship was bravely 
 holding her own, when, through some carelessness, a 
 barrel of powder caught a spark and blew up. The 
 accident was decisive, and after a few minutes' vain 
 attempt to overcome its effect, the Portuguese was com- 
 pelled to lower her flag. 1 
 
 When the privateer and her prize returned to Port 
 Louis — which, having discarded the republican name of 
 Port North-West, was now Port Napoleon — the governor, 
 General Decaen, laid his official hands on the Eevenant. 
 The French men-of-war on the station had just then 
 been practically wiped out : the last of them, the Semil- 
 lante frigate, had returned disabled, barely escaping from 
 the Terpsichore. The resources of the colony were not 
 equal to refitting the Semillante as an effective ship of 
 war; and Decaen accordingly claimed the Eevenant, 
 which he established as a corvette. Surcouf in vain 
 protested against the forced sale of his property, which 
 to him seemed very like confiscation. Decaen was not 
 only firm, but threatened to embark Surcouf on board 
 her as a sub-lieutenant — an ensign. Forced thus to 
 yield to fate, Surcouf accepted the command of the Se- 
 millante, which had been bought by a mercantile house 
 at Port Louis, had been re-named the Charles, and was 
 
 1 M. Cunat's note may be here properly reproduced : ' Trie account 
 of this combat is taken from the journals kindly lent me by my friends 
 MM. JLamarre-Peigne, Michel- Villeblanche, and A. Duhaut-Cilly, dis- 
 tinguished sailors and companions of Captain Potier.' The combat is 
 unquestionably a very brilliant episode in the history of privateering, 
 even though Surcouf personally had nothing to do with it. 
 
SUKCOUF. 453 
 
 now fitting to go home as an aventurier. When this 
 was agreed on, a fresh quarrel arose with the governor, 
 who gave Surcouf a positive order to carry to Prance 
 all the officers of the Portuguese ship, lately captured. 
 Surcouf refused, pointing out that his doing so would be 
 extremely dangerous, as his crew was very largely com- 
 posed of Portuguese sailors, who had preferred service 
 to imprisonment, but — with their own officers to lead 
 them — might probably prefer Lisbon to St. Malo as a 
 destination. Decaen would not listen to his objections, 
 but bluntly said that unless the Charles took the pri- 
 soners, he would not sign her clearance. In order to get 
 his legal papers, therefore, Surcouf was compelled to re- 
 ceive the prisoners ; and with them on board put to sea 
 on the morning of 21 November ; but as soon as he got 
 an offing, he unceremoniously bundled them and their 
 traps into the pilot-boat, leaving them to make the best 
 of their way on shore, whilst the Charles, under a press 
 of sail, was leaving the island far behind. Decaen was 
 furious, and sequestrated all Surcouf s property in the 
 colony ; in happy ignorance of which Surcouf pursued 
 his way, and reached France in safety, though not without 
 risks run both from the English cruisers and from ship- 
 wreck. It was his last voyage, and, ending successfully, 
 as did all his other voyages, we cannot but assign a large 
 share of credit to this man, who at such a time and 
 under such circumstances as his, pursued such a career, 
 without one single instance of what the world is apt to 
 call bad luck, but which is more frequently the result of 
 bad management. Uniform success means unceasing 
 care. 
 
 The Eevenant, which, under Surcouf's command, had 
 
454 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 cruised — as the memorialists of Calcutta had pointed out 
 — for five months in the very thick of the English 
 squadron, was sent, as the Jean corvette, commanded by 
 Lieutenant Morice, to cruise on the same station. She 
 had scarcely got well into the Bay of Bengal, before, on 
 
 8 October, she was captured by the Modeste. Nor was 
 this difference of fortune only for Lieutenant Morice, 
 who seems to have been a brave and able officer. The 
 ship was again re-named Victor, and put to sea as an 
 English man-of-war, commanded by Captain Edward 
 Stopford, one of a family whose name has been honour- 
 ably known in our navy for the last hundred years. 
 About a year afterwards, 2 November, 1809, she was 
 captured by the French frigate Bellone ; and still keep- 
 ing the name of Victor, again became a French corvette. 
 As such, she was surrendered at the capitulation of 
 Mauritius, 3 December, 1810, and was — I believe — 
 broken up. 1 
 
 Surcouf had meantime claimed and obtained an order 
 for the restitution of his property in Mauritius, and had 
 settled down on shore as the owner of a fleet of privateers. 
 M. Cunat names eight of his ships employed in European 
 seas ; one of which, the Benard — a cutter of 70 tons, 
 with a crew of 60 men, mostly Portuguese — fought, on 
 
 9 September, 1813, one of the most desperate actions 
 on record, with the Alphea schooner, of 111 tons and 
 41 men and boys. The Benard's armament consisted 
 
 1 In attempting this comparative estimate of Surcouf 's abilities, it 
 
 must not be forgotten that he had — in the matter of escaping pursuit 
 
 one great advantage over both Stopford and Morice. In presence of any 
 probable danger, it was his first business to get away from it : it was 
 the business of these others rather to see if they could not overcome the 
 danger. 
 
SUECOUF. 455 
 
 of ten 8-pounder carronades, and four 4-pounders ; that 
 of the Alphea, of eight 18-pounder carronades. Between 
 the two there was not much to choose in point of 
 strength ; and the fight continued with equal fortune 
 and fury until by — what James has called — a fatal acci- 
 dent, the Alphea blew up. It would seem uncertain 
 whether any of Surcouf's cruisers found their way to 
 Eastern waters ; Cunat does not speak of any ; but a 
 letter from Vice-Admiral Bertie, the commander-in-chief 
 at the Cape of Good Hope, to the secretary of the 
 admiralty, dated 2 September, 1809, would imply that 
 Surcouf had not forgotten the scene of his own exploits. 
 
 ' Of the number of aventuriers fitted out and running for 
 the Isle of France, I am to state that the Charwell has cap- 
 tured the Hyene, a very fine vessel of 230 tons, pierced for 
 18 guns and masted as a man-of-war, which is arrived here ; 
 and the ' Nerelde ' has captured the Agile, of a similar de- 
 scription . . . and it appears, by an intercepted letter found 
 on board the latter vessel, addressed by Captain Surcouf to 
 General Decaen, that, besides a number of privateers fitting 
 out by himself and a society of merchants with whom he is 
 associated, he is in treaty with the Minister of Marine for La 
 Eevanche frigate, which they intend to arm and send out 
 with a cargo ! ' 
 
 Whatever schemes of this sort Surcouf may have had 
 were of course put an end to by the capture of Mauritius ; 
 and the peace, in 1814, necessarily altered the nature 
 of his business. He continued, however, a prosperous 
 ship-owner and ship-builder, and one of the most influ- 
 ential burghers of St. Malo, until his death in 1827. 
 
 In person, Bobert Surcouf was somewhat short and 
 stout ; in his later years, almost corpulent. His whole 
 life having been spent in command, often of very rugged 
 
45d STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 subjects, his force of character was strongly developed ; 
 and in civil life he was often violent if not brutal. 
 M. Cunat tells many anecdotes illustrative of this, which 
 he considers a most honourable feature ; they are not 
 worth repeating, and are very possibly grossly exagge- 
 rated. In his family he was brusque and taciturn ; little 
 given to talk over past adventures, except, occasionally, 
 when the pride of an old privateer led him to relate the 
 story of the capture of the Kent. Withal, generous to the 
 poor. One anecdote not less grotesque, perhaps, but less 
 rude than others, will enable us to part from him in 
 kindlier mood. Walking home one night, as he passed 
 the gate of his ship-building yard, he saw a man come 
 out carrying a heavy bundle, which he vainly tried to 
 hoist up on his shoulders. Surcouf went up to him and 
 asked what he was doing. The man, who, in the dark, 
 - did not recognise him, said, ' You might give us a lift 
 up with this bundle of wood, that's a good fellow.' ' Did 
 anyone give it you, then ? ' asked the owner. ' Faith 
 no,' was the answer : ' I might have waited long enough 
 for that.' Surcouf made no further objection, and helped 
 the man to get the bundle on his back ; only, as he went 
 off muttering his thanks, the owner called after him — 
 * I advise you not to try that on again : M. Surcouf is 
 just the man to have you taken up for it.' 
 
 Surcouf is gone; honourably buried at St. Malo 
 beneath a tombstone which — according to the picture of 
 it given by M. Cunat — bears a ridiculous likeness to a 
 clock-face. Another war may very well see a successor, 
 his equal in daring and conduct, playing the same part 
 on a larger field. The points to which I have specially 
 wished to call attention are those facts which may be 
 
SUECOUF. 457 
 
 repeated in the future ; and — whether a ship correspond- 
 ing to the Confiance or the Eevenant is commanded 
 by an independent rover, or by a regularly-commis^ 
 sioned officer — the capture of the Kent, and the destruc- 
 tion of trade in the Bay of Bengal, are incidents which 
 a bold enemy will try to repeat in the next naval war. 
 What the Bay of Bengal was at the beginning of the 
 north-east monsoon, the several ' crossings ' will be now. 
 And the trade that will be aimed at on these will be, not 
 the wealth of the East, but the every-day necessities of 
 English life — the corn, the beef, the mutton. The stress 
 will be felt not by a few wealthy merchants or brokers 
 in Calcutta, but by the millions of hungry fathers of 
 starving children in London, in Liverpool, in Manchester, 
 and throughout the length and breadth of the country. 
 Are ships laden with these invaluable commodities able 
 to fight their way or to run the gauntlet of the enemy's 
 cruisers ? It was seen in 1807 how difficult it was to 
 stop the ravages of one ship ably commanded, even when 
 her cruising ground was known within a comparatively 
 short distance, and when there was an overpowering 
 naval force almost on the spot. A similar difficulty may 
 again occur ; a similar problem may demand a solution : 
 but in this, as in other things, to be forewarned is, or 
 should be, to be forearmed. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ADM 
 
 ADMIRAL of France, his prero- 
 gatives, 10 
 
 Agosta, battle of, 85-8 
 
 Algiers, bombardment of, by Du 
 Quesne, 91 
 
 Alms, Captain, his gallant conduct 
 in command of the Monmouth, 
 119, 141 
 
 Anglesea, capture of the, 2S1 
 
 Anson, Commodore, captures the 
 Acapulco ship, 196, 414-6 
 
 Aristocratic nature of the French 
 navy, 51 
 
 Arundel, Earl of, regains command 
 of the Channel, 27 
 
 Arundel, Sir John, his fleet 
 wrecked, 22 ; infamous conduct 
 of, ib. 
 
 Austrian navy, of but slight im- 
 portance, 151-3 ; its develop- 
 ment after 1848, 153-4 ; inactive 
 in the war of 1859, 156 ; state of 
 in 1866, 162-3 
 
 BART, Jean, mention of, 50 ; 
 birth and early service, 270 ; 
 a Dunkirk privateer, 271 ; lieu- 
 tenant de vaisseau, 273 ; serves 
 in squadrons of the navy, 274-5 ; 
 capitame de frigate, 275; is 
 
 BEL 
 said to have committed an act 
 of gross brutality, 276 ; is 
 associated with Forbin, 276-7, 
 281-2 ; is captured and taken to 
 Plymouth, 277 ; escapes, 278 ; 
 capitaine de vaisseau, ib. ; com- 
 mands the Alcyon at Beachy 
 Head, ib. ; his boorish behaviour 
 at Court, 279 ; ravages the coast 
 of Northumberland, 280 ; advent 
 ture at Bergen, 281 ; ' Forbin 
 with his bear,' 282 ; Chevalier of 
 the Order of St. Louis, 282 ; his 
 arms, 322 ; is pursued by Ben- 
 bow, 283 ; chef d'escadre, ib. ; 
 carries the Prince de Conti to 
 Dantzic, 284-5 ; his death, 286 ; 
 his character, 285-6 
 
 Baumes, M. de, commands the 
 galleys, 67 ; his quarrel with Du 
 Quesne, 68 
 
 Beaufort, Due de, Admiral of 
 France, 72 ; quarrels with Nu- 
 chezes, 74 ; his want of educa- 
 tion, ib. ; his incompetence, 75 ; 
 his death, ib. 
 
 Belfast, proposed attack on, 353 
 
 Belle Isle, Marechal de, patron of 
 Thurot, 329, 332 
 
 Belle Isle, Marechal de, a ship, 
 commanded by Thurot, 333 et 
 
460 
 
 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 BEE 
 seq., 342 et seq. ; is captured off 
 Eamaay, 358 
 
 Bergen, Bart's adventure at, 281 ; 
 Thurot refits at, 337-8; Paul 
 Jones sends prizes to, 393 
 
 Berkeley, Lord, curious incident 
 during his command, 307-9 
 
 Blues (officiers bleus), their difficult 
 position, 256 ; origin of the 
 name, 256 n. ; gallant conduct of 
 two, 126 
 
 Bocanegra, Admiral of Castile, 8 
 
 Bonhomme Richard, the, her 
 equipment, 390-1 ; her cruise, 
 392-402 ; engagement with the 
 Serapis, 397-402 ; founders, 402 
 
 Boscawen, Admiral, attacks the 
 French off Louisbourg, 97 ; de- 
 feats M. de la Clue off Lagos, 
 98, 160, 325 
 
 Boscawen privateer, the ; was the 
 Medee, 233; her cruises, 228, 
 234-5 ; a ghost on board of, 235 ; 
 she founders, 236 
 
 CAPE of Good Hope, defended by 
 Suffren, 107 
 Carrickfergus, taken and pillaged, 
 
 354 
 Carronades, introduction of, 204 n. 
 Chateau-Renault, a Knight of St. 
 
 John, 50 
 Cherbourg, English defeated at, 
 
 21 ; destroyed by Howe, 341 
 Cillart, M. de, astounding conduct 
 
 of, 125-7 ; is cashiered, 143 
 Clarisse privateer, the, commanded 
 
 by Surcouf [q.v.], 428-36; is 
 
 chased by the Sybille, 430; is 
 
 captured by the Leopard, 437 
 Classes, enrolment of, in France, 47 
 
 CUD 
 
 Clisson, Olivier de, Constable of 
 France, taken prisoner, 27 
 
 Clue, M. de la, chef d'escadre, is 
 blockaded in Cartagena, 97 ; de- 
 feated off Lagos, 98, 160, 325 
 
 Colbert, Jean Baptiste, his birth, 
 30 ; Mazarin's secretary, 31 ; 
 overthrows Fouquet, ib. ; Con- 
 troller of Finance, 32 ; financial 
 reform, 34 et seq. ; encourages 
 manufactures, 36, and com- 
 merce, 39 ; reconstructs the 
 French navy, 43 et seq. ; his 
 death, 56 ; character, 56-7 
 
 Commerce, developed by Colbert, 
 39; protection of, considered, 
 413 ; scourged by Surcouf, 449 
 
 Companies, founded by Colbert, 39 
 
 Comte d'Artois, a French pri- 
 . vateer, is captured, 251 
 
 Confiance privateer, commanded 
 by Surcouf, 437-42 ; captures 
 the Kent, 438-42 ; returns to 
 France, 442 
 
 Conflans, M. de, defeated by Hawke, 
 99, 325 
 
 Conti, Prince de, his voyage to 
 Dantzic, 282-3 
 
 Convoy, convoys ; disastrous loss 
 of, 101 ; bad conduct of, 238 ; 
 are they any longer possible ? 413 
 and note 
 
 Copper, first used for ships' bot- 
 toms, 102-3 
 
 Couronne, description of the, 65 
 
 Courtenay, Sir Peter, death of, 
 21 
 
 Cruising, method of, in Mediter- 
 ranean, 209-10 
 
 Crusade of 1366-7, 4 
 
 Cuddalore, siege of, 136 ; is re- 
 lieved, 138 ; battle of, 139 
 
INDEX. 
 
 461 
 
 DAN 
 
 ELL 
 
 DANES, the, at the battle of 
 Heligoland, 158-61 
 
 Dartmouth, plundered and burnt, 
 18; ship so named blown up, 
 245 
 
 De Ruyter, his death, 53, 54, 87 ; 
 engages the French near Strom- 
 boli, 83 ; blocks the Straits of 
 Messina, 84 ; commands the van 
 in the battle of Agosta, 85-8 
 
 Dreadnought (see Hampton Court) 
 
 Du Guay-Trouin, Bene, mention 
 of, 50 ; his family and birth, 
 289 ; early education, 290 ; he 
 gets into scrapes, 291 ; is sent to 
 sea, ib. ; commands a privateer, 
 ib. ; narrow escapes, 293 ; active 
 service, 294 ; chased by the 
 Prince of Orange, 295 ; is cap- 
 tured by the Monk, 296-9 ; es- 
 capes from prison, 300 ; com- 
 mands the Francois, ib. ; captures 
 the Nonsuch [q. v.], 301-3 ; re- 
 ceives a sword of honour from 
 the king, 303 ; captures the 
 Hope, 304 ; and three East In- 
 diamen, 306 ; is presented to the 
 king, ib. ; commands the Non- 
 such under the name of Sans- 
 pariel, ib. ; captures two Dutch 
 ships off Vigo, 307 ; curious ad- 
 venture with Lord Berkeley's 
 fleet, 307-9 ; is threatened to be 
 ducked by M. de Feuquieres, 
 309-11; his brother, Etienne, 
 killed, 311 ; stubborn encounter 
 with a Dutch squadron, 312-4 ; 
 is made ca/pitaine de frigate, 
 315 ; is again presented to the 
 king, ib. ; commands the Jason, 
 316 ; captures the Elizabeth, 
 ib. ; engages the Worcester, 318 ; 
 
 is surrounded by the English 
 fleet, 318-9 ; engagement with 
 an English squadron, 321 ; he 
 relates the details to the king, 
 ib. ; is ennobled, 322 ; chef d'es- 
 cadre, ib. ; Ueutenant-giniral, 
 ib. ; his death, ib. 
 
 Du Quesne, Abraham, mention of, 
 50 ; his quarrel with D'Estrees, 
 52, 81 ; is made a marquis, 54, 
 92 ; his birth, 60 ; a captain in 
 the French navy, 61 ; early life, 
 62 ; joins the fleet under Sour- 
 dis, ib. ; commands a squadron 
 on the Catalan coast, 67 ; his 
 quarrel with De Baumes, 67-9 ; 
 takes service in Sweden, 70 ; 
 commands a squadron at Brest, 
 72 ; is very cantankerous, 73 ; 
 escorts the Queen of Portugal to 
 Lisbon, 76 ; battle of Solebay, 
 77-81 ; second in command in 
 the Mediterranean, 81 ; battle 
 of Stromboli, 83-5 ; of Agosta, 
 85-8; of Palermo, 88-9; com- 
 mands in the Levant, 91 ; bom- 
 bards Algiers and Genoa, ib. ; 
 his death, ib. ; his naval rank, 
 92; his character, 67, 73, 92; 
 portrait of, 60 
 
 Du Quesne-Menneville, Marquis, 
 chef d'escadre, captured by the 
 English, 97 
 
 EDUCATION, naval, remarks on, 
 148-9 
 Elizabeth, the, capture of, 316 ; 
 engagement with the Lion, 263 
 Elliot, Captain John, puts into 
 Kinsale, 357 ; his engagement 
 with Thurot, 358 ; Nelson's 
 opinion of, 359 
 
462 
 
 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTORY. 
 
 EOT 
 
 Enville, Duo d', his death, 95 
 
 Estaing, Comte d'Estaing (Amirnl 
 de France in 1792), his entry 
 into the navy, 51 n. ; commands 
 in North America and West 
 Indies, 100 ; is repulsed at St. 
 Lucia, ib. 
 
 Estourmel, M. d', commits suicide, 
 96 
 
 Estrees, Comte d', vice-amvral, 51, 
 77 ; commands the French divi- 
 sion at Solebay, ib. ; his secret 
 instructions, 79 ; his quarrel 
 with Du Quesne, 52, 81 
 
 Exchange of prisoners, refused by 
 Sir Edward Hughes, 121 ; curious 
 difficulty about, 257-60 
 
 Exeter, the, her great loss at Sa- 
 dras, 114 
 
 •FAMINE, terrible, 32 
 
 J- Financial, confusion in France, 
 33 ; reforms introduced by Col- 
 bert, 34 et seq. 
 
 Flag, the U.S., first hoisted, 373 ; 
 the rattlesnake, ib. ; theE.I.C.'s, 
 428 to. 
 
 Fleuron, the, captures the Mars 
 privateer, 229 ; is chased by the 
 Hampton Court and others, 231 ; 
 is blown up, 232-3 
 
 Flobert, M. de, commands the 
 troops in Thurot's squadron, 
 ■ 342 ; quarrels with Thurot, 345 
 et seg. ; refuses to attack Bel- 
 fast, 353 ; is wounded, 355 ; and 
 made prisoner, 358 n. 
 
 Folkestone, plundered and burnt, 
 18 
 
 Forbin, Chevalier de ; his early 
 career, 50 ; is associated with 
 
 HOP 
 
 Bart [q.v.], 276-7, 281-2; his 
 
 M&mowes, 277 
 Forth, Firth of, Paul Jones enters 
 
 the, 394-5 ; is blown out of, 395 
 Foudroyant, capture of the, 97 
 Fouquet, his downfall, 31 
 
 pENOA bombarded, 91 
 
 ^-" Gilchrist, Captain James, 
 commands the Southampton, 
 333-4 
 
 Glasgow, the, escapes from an 
 American squadron, 371 
 
 Gloire, anecdote about the, 321 and 
 note 
 
 Glorioso, the ; her homeward 
 voyage, 240 ; beats off the 
 Warwick, ib. ; puts into Ferrol, 
 ib. ; engaged by the Royal 
 Family, 239-45 ; by the Dart- 
 mouth, 245 ; is captured by the 
 Russell, 246 
 
 Gravesend sacked and burnt, 23 
 
 Grenada, battle of, 100 
 
 Guernsey taken by the French, 23 
 
 HAMPTON Court, the; does 
 not engage the Neptune 
 and Fleuron, 231; her captain 
 (Savage Mostyn) acquitted by 
 court-martial, 232 
 
 Hastings, plundered and burnt, 
 18,23 
 
 Hawke, Sir Edward, defeats the 
 French in the Bay of Biscay, 96 ; 
 and at Quiberon Bay, 99, 325 
 
 Heligoland, battle of, 158-61 
 
 History, naval, technical import- 
 ance of, 150 
 
 Hope, capture of the, 303-5 
 
INDEX. 
 
 463 
 
 HOT 
 Hotspur commands at sea, 28 
 Hughes, Sir Edward, commands 
 in the East Indies, 110 ; his de- 
 fensive position at Madras, ib. ; 
 fights the battles of Sadras, 
 113-5 ; Providien, 117-20 ; Ne- 
 gapatam, 124-7 ; Trincomalee, 
 129-31; and Cuddalore, 139; 
 his carelessness as to intelli- 
 gence, 128 ; comparative esti- 
 mate of, 141 
 Hutchinson, William, Mariner ; his 
 Treatise on Practical Seaman- 
 ship, 207 ; serves under For- 
 tunatus Wright, 209 ; an adven- 
 ture in the Mediterranean, 213 
 
 ITALIAN ironclad sunk at Lissa, 
 185 ; common mistake about, 
 188 
 Italian navy ; formation of, 164 ; 
 state of, in 1866, 165 
 
 TP1AN DE VIENNE; birth, 2; 
 
 ^ early service, 3 ; joins a cru- 
 sade, 4 ; Vice-Admiral of France, 
 9 ; Admiral of France, 10 ; lays 
 siege to Saint Sauveur, 13 ; con- 
 structs large guns, 14; reduces 
 Saint Sauveur, ib. ; sacks and 
 burns Eye, 17 ; is repulsed at 
 Winchelsea, ib. ; gains a victory 
 at Eottingdean, ib. ; burns Lewes, 
 Folkestone, Portsmouth, Dart- 
 mouth, Plymouth, Poole, and 
 Hastings, 18 ; lays siege to Pont 
 Audemer, 19 ; and captures it, 
 20 ; gains a victory off Cher- 
 bourg, ib. ; sacks and burns 
 Scarborough, Gravesend, Win- 
 
 LIN 
 
 chelsea, Hastings and Ports- 
 mouth, 23 ; takes Jersey and 
 Guernsey, ib. ; goes to Scotland, 
 25 ; devises a ' wooden town,' 
 26 ; is slain, 29 
 Jersey taken by the French, 23 
 Johnstone, Commodore George ; 
 his character, 104 ; is attacked at 
 Port Praya, 105-6 ; his attack on 
 the Cape frustrated, 107 ; is sued 
 by Captain Sutton, ib. 
 Jones, Paul ; see Paul Jones 
 
 T7"ENT East Indiaman, the ; cap- 
 
 K 
 
 ture of, 438-42 ; alleged bar- 
 
 barity on board, 439, 442 
 King, Commodore, his gallantry, 
 114, 142 
 
 T AGE, M. de ; his early history, 
 J-J 264 ; he fits out a squadron 
 
 of privateers, 265; his cruises, 
 
 266-8. 
 Lancaster, Duke of ; his disastrous 
 
 march through France, 9 ; 
 
 general discontent against, 22 
 Landais, Pierre ; commands the 
 
 Alliance in company with the 
 
 Bonhomme Eichard [g.v.], 391 ; 
 
 his gross misconduct, 393, 401, 
 
 403 ; desirous of plunder, 397 ; 
 
 his pretension, 405; his death, 
 
 ib. 
 Latimer, Lord ; accused of selling 
 
 Saint Sauveur, 15 ; sentence on, 
 
 ib. ; afterwards revoked, ib. 
 LeweB, plundered and burnt, 18 
 Linois, M., contre anvwal ; brilliant 
 
 successes of, 445 ; is captured 
 
 in the Marengo, 446 
 
464 
 
 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 LIO 
 Lion, the; engagement with the 
 
 Elizabeth, 263 
 Lissa, frigate action near, in 1811, 
 
 173 ; its importance, 174 ; attack 
 
 on, by the Italian fleet, in 1866 ; 
 
 174-6 ; battle of, 179-87 
 
 MACNAMABA, chef d'escadre, is 
 defeated in the West Indies, 
 95 
 
 Manufactures, encouragement of, 
 by Colbert, 36 
 
 Marines, French corps of, 48 ; a 
 failure, ib. 
 
 Mars privateer, the ; captured by 
 the Fleuron, 229 ; is reoaptured, 
 231 
 
 Maximilian, the Archduke (Em- 
 peror of Mexico) ; head of the 
 Austrian navy, 154 ; visits Brazil, 
 157 ; goes to Mexico, 162 ; con- 
 gratulates Tegetthoff on his vic- 
 tory at Lissa, 191 ; his body 
 brought home by Tegetthoff, 
 193 
 
 Men, enrolment of, by Colbert, 47 ; 
 are pressed by De Lage, 265 ; 
 quality of, under Suffren, 143 ; 
 under Tegetthoff, 169 ; under 
 Paul Jones, 391 ; under Surcouf, 
 433, 435, 447-8 
 
 Merchant service, gulf between it 
 and the royal navy, 249-51, 
 253-5, 323 
 
 Messina, the French at, 81 et seq. 
 
 Monmouth, the, suffers severely at 
 Providien, 119 
 
 Moutray, Captain, in charge of 
 convoy, 101, which is captured, 
 ib. ; dismissed his ship, ib. ; 
 naval commissioner at Antigua, 
 102 and note 
 
 PAU 
 
 NAVY, Austrian ; see Austrian 
 Navy, French ; under Biehe- 
 lieu, 43-4, 65-6, 70 ; under Ma- 
 zarin, 43-4, 70 ; reconstructed 
 by Colbert, 44 et seq. ; a purely 
 aristocratic service, 51, 256 
 
 Navy, Italian ; see Italian 
 
 Navy, the Boyal; gulf between, 
 and the merchant service, 249- 
 51, 253-5, 323 
 
 Negapatam, battle of, 124-7 
 
 Neutral waters, question as to, 105, 
 160 
 
 Nioopolis, battle of, 28 
 
 Nonsuch, the, captures the Bail- 
 leuse and Serpente, 227 ; is cap- 
 tured, 301 ; becomes the Sans- 
 pareil, 306 ; is commanded by 
 Du Guay-Trouin [g.ii.], 307 
 
 Nuchezes, M. de, in joint command 
 of the French fleet, 72; his 
 quarrel with Beaufort, 74 ; ' would 
 rather herd cows,' ib. 
 
 0FFICEBS of the French navy, 
 49 et seq. ; numbers of, 53 ; 
 an aristocratic body, 51, 256 
 Orves, M. d', commands in the 
 
 East Indies, 109 ; dies, 110 
 Osborn, Admiral, blockades the 
 French in Cartagena, 91 
 
 PALEBMO, French victory at, 
 54, 88-9 
 Paul Jones; ballads about, 363, 
 382 ; Lives of, 365 ; birth and 
 early life, 367-9 ; joins the revo- 
 lutionary navy, 369; escapes 
 from the Solebay, 371-2 ; first 
 hoists the U. S. flag, 373 ; com- 
 mands the Banger, ib. ; refits 
 
INDEX. 
 
 465 
 
 PATJ 
 
 PEE 
 
 at Nantes, 374 ; goes for a 
 cruise in the Irish Sea, 377 ; 
 attempts to carry the Drake 
 in Belfast Lough, 377-8 ; to 
 burn the shipping at White- 
 haven, 378-80 ; to kidnap Lord 
 Selkirk, 381 ; carries off Lady 
 Selkirk's tea-pot, 382 ; which he 
 restores, 387 ; engages the Drake, 
 383 ; and captures her, 384-6 ; 
 his letter to Lady Selkirk, 386 ; 
 he returns to France, 386-7 ; his 
 popularity, 387 ; his money dif- 
 ficulties, 388 ; gives up com- 
 mand of the Eanger, ib. ; fits 
 out the Bonhomme Bicbard, 
 390-1 ; has nominal command 
 of a squadron, 392 ; fails in an 
 attempt on Leith, 393-5 ; meets 
 the Baltic trade, 396; his en- 
 gagement with the Serapis, 397- 
 404; lashes the Serapis's jib- 
 boom to the Bonhomme Bichard' s 
 mizenmast, 400 ; knocks down 
 the craven gunner, 402 ; sets 
 the prisoners to the pumps, ib. ; 
 proposes to make Pearson » 
 lord, 404 ; he visits Paris, 405 ; 
 returns to America, ib. ; is sent 
 to Paris as agent for the prize 
 money, 406 ; a large part of 
 which he appropriates, 406-7 ; 
 is sent to Copenhagen to settle 
 a claim for compensation, 407 ; 
 and accepts a pension to himself 
 in lieu, 408 ; enters the Bussian 
 service, ib. ; is present at the 
 battle in the Liman, ib ; leaves 
 St. Petersburg in disgrace, 409 ; 
 his death, ib. ; his character, 
 professional, ib., and moral, 
 410 
 
 Pearson, Captain Bichard; com- 
 mands the Serapis [q.v.], 399 ; 
 is presented with a sword of 
 honour and knighted, 404 
 
 Pembroke, Earl of, defeated at 
 Bochelle, 8 
 
 Persano, Count, Admiral ; birth 
 and early service, 167 ; is made 
 rear-admiral, ib. ; vice-admiral, 
 ib. ; admiral, 168 ; minister for 
 the navy, 167 ; married to an 
 Englishwoman, 168 ; his want 
 of energy and resource, 168, 173, 
 178 ; is compared with Admiral 
 Byng, 171 ; is defeated at Lissa, 
 179-87 ; hoists his flag on 
 board the Affondatore, 180 ; his 
 vacillation, 183 ; is accused of 
 misconduct, 188 ; is tried and 
 dismissed the service, 189 ; his 
 silly defence, 190 
 
 Petroleum, crude ; proposed use 
 of, 411 
 
 Phillips, Lieut. Baker ; surrenders 
 the AngleBea, 262 ; is tried and 
 executed, ib. 
 
 Phillips, Captain, recaptures the 
 Solebay, 254-5 ; wishes to enter 
 the navy, 255 ; receives a gold 
 medal, ib. 
 
 Pilots, easily obtained by an enemy, 
 394-5 
 
 Plymouth, plundered and burnt, 
 18 
 
 Pont Audemer, besieged, 19 ; and 
 captured, 20 
 
 Poole, plundered and burnt, 18 
 
 Portsmouth, plundered and burnt, 
 18, 23 ; proposal to burn, 332 
 
 Praya, Port, action at, 105-6 
 
 Preuilly, Marquis de, commands 
 the French van at Palermo, 89 
 H H 
 
466 
 
 STUDIES IN. NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 PEI 
 
 Prize money, quarrels arising out 
 of, 196-7 
 
 Privateering ; abolished, 194 ; pos- 
 sible revival of, 194-5, 412 
 
 Privateers ; Vernon's opinion of, 
 198 ; and Nelson's, ib. ; naval 
 opinion of, 199 ; capture Deme- 
 rara, 200; render valuable ser- 
 vices, 201 ; brilliant services of, 
 202-5 ; remarkable success of, 
 205-6, 237; extreme develop- 
 ment of, in France, 257 ; inter- 
 national difficulty consequent 
 on this, 257-60; activity of 
 French, 337; without commis- 
 sions are pirates, 423. See 
 Bart ; Boscawen ; Clarisse ; Con- 
 fiance ; Du Guay-Trouin ; Mars ; 
 Eevenant; Eoyal Family; Thu- 
 rot ; Surcouf ; Walker ; Wright 
 
 Providien, battle of, 117-20 
 
 UESNE, Du, see Du Quesne 
 
 EANGEB, the; fitted out by 
 Paul Jones, 373 ; refits at 
 Nantes, 374 ; engagement with 
 the Drake, 383-6 ; returns to 
 France, 386 ; and to America, 
 388 ; is captured at Charleston, 
 373 to. 
 
 Eenau, designs mortars for sea 
 service, 91 
 
 Eevenant privateer, commanded by 
 Surcouf [q.v.~], 446-52; claimed 
 by the governor of Mauritius, 
 452 ; future career of, 454 
 
 Eivington, captain of Kent, is slain, 
 438 ; his dying words, ib. 
 
 Bpchelle ; English defeated at, 8 
 
 SOL 
 
 Eooke, Sir George ; his dying 
 
 words, 58 
 Eottingdean, skirmish at, 17 
 Eouen, early dockyard at, 12 
 Eoyal Family, a squadron of pri- 
 vateers, 237 ; its cruise, ib. et 
 seq. ; engagement with the Glo- 
 rioso, 241-4 
 Eye, plundered and burnt, 17 
 
 SADEAS, battle of, 113-5 
 St. Cas, defeat of the English 
 at, 341 
 
 St. Malo, ships burnt at, 341 
 
 Saint Sauveur, besieged, 13 ; and 
 captured, 14 
 
 Salvert, M. de, his supposed impu- 
 dence, 111 
 
 Scarborough, sacked and burnt, 23 
 
 Seahorse, the, engagement with 
 Thurot's squadron, 335 
 
 Seignelay, Marquis de, minister of 
 the French navy, 55 
 
 Selim and Zaida, romantic story 
 of, 210-1 
 
 Serapis, the, engagement with 
 Bonhomme Eichard, 397-402 
 
 Severe, extraordinary case of the, 
 125-7 
 
 Ships, quickness in building, 4.5 ; 
 built for France by Holland and 
 Sweden, 45, 75 ; want of cleanli- 
 ness and ventilation, 91 ; rotten, 
 143 
 
 Slave trade, horrible story of, 417 ; 
 pronounced illegal by the French 
 Eepublic, 419 ; continued by 
 Surcouf, 420 
 
 Soldiers, naval seorn of, 346 ; mu- 
 tinous conduct of, 348 et seq. 
 
 Solebay, battle of, 54, 77 et seq.. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 467 
 
 SOL 
 
 Solebay, frigate, recaptured, 
 254-5 ; engages the Belle Isle, 
 338 ; Paul Jones escapes from, 
 371-2 
 
 Sourdis, Archbishop of Bordeaux, 
 commands the French fleet, 62 ; 
 quarrels with De Vitry, 63 ; re- 
 duces Ste. Marguerite, 64 ; is 
 superseded, 67 
 
 Southampton, frigate, engagement 
 with Thurot's squadron, 333-4 
 
 Spenser, Sir Hugh, defeated, 27 
 
 Stirling Castle, captures and aban- 
 dons the Volage, 267 
 
 Stromboli, actions off, 82, 83 
 
 Suffren, le Bailli de, birth and 
 early service, 95; a Knight of 
 St. John, 96, 99 ; prisoner of 
 war, ib. ; service as capitaine de 
 frigate, 99 ; as capitaine de vais- 
 seau, 99-103 ; commands a 
 squadron ordered to the East 
 Indies, 103 ; battle of Port 
 Praya, 105-8 ; protects the Cape, 
 107-8 ; arrives at Mauritius, 
 109 ; chef d'escadre, ib. ; does 
 not attack at Madras, 110-1 ; 
 battles of Sadras, 113-5 ; Pro- 
 vidien, 117-20 ; Negapatam, 
 124-7 ; Trincomalee, 129-31 ; 
 Cuddalore, 139 ; entrusts his 
 prisoners to Hyder Aly, 121 ; 
 receives the Grand Cross of St. 
 John, 128 ; captures Trincoma- 
 lee, 129 ; goes to Achen for the 
 stormy season, 1 33 ; relieves 
 Cuddalore, 138 ; his captains 
 mutinous or cowardly, 125-7, 
 129-30, 132, 142-3; difficulties 
 in his way, 122, 143 ; quality of 
 his ships' companies, 139, 143 ; 
 Ueutenant-gine'ral, 145 ; vice- 
 
 SUR 
 
 amiral, ib. ; his reception in 
 France, ib. ; a Knight of the St. 
 Esprit, ib. ; his death, 146 ; es- 
 timate of his character, 117, 
 127, 140, 149 
 Surcouf, Robert, birth and child- 
 hood, 417 ; is sent to sea on 
 board a slaver, ib. ; which is lost, 
 with a full cargo, ib. ; serves on 
 board a ship of war, 418 ; com- 
 mands a slaver, 419 ; tricks the 
 police agents, 420 ; fits out the 
 Emilie, 422; but is refused a 
 letter of marque, ib. ; cruises 
 without one, 423 ; makes several 
 prizes, ib. ; including the Triton, 
 423-5 ; returns to the Isle of 
 France, 426 ; his prizes claimed 
 by the government, ib. ; but are 
 restored, 427 ; he returns to 
 France, ib. ; becomes engaged, 
 ib. ; and marries, 442 ; fits out 
 the Clarisse, 428 ; and sails for 
 the East Indies, ib. ; makes se- 
 veral captures, 429 ; is chased 
 by the Sybille, 430 ; captures 
 the Jane country ship, 431-5 ; 
 and an American ship, 436 ; fits 
 out the Confiance, 437 ; cruises 
 on the coast of Ceylon, 438 ; 
 goes into the Bay of Bengal, ib. ; 
 captures many vessels, ib. ; in- 
 cluding the Kent, 438-42; re- 
 turns to France, ib. ; his ex- 
 periences as a landlord, 443 ; an 
 enseigne de vaisseau, 444 ; de- 
 clines the rank of capitaine de 
 vaisseau, 445 ; receives the 
 Cross of the Legion of Honour, 
 446 ; fits out several privateers, 
 ib. ; and the Bevenant, which 
 he commands, ib. ; manner of 
 
468 
 
 STUDIES IN NAVAL HISTOEY. 
 
 SUT 
 
 life on board, 447 ; his success 
 in the Bay of Bengal, 449-50 ; 
 returns to Mauritius, 451 ; takes 
 command of the Charles, 453 ; 
 refuses to carry prisoners, ib. ; 
 and returns to France, ib. ; in 
 business as ship-owner and 
 builder, 454-5 ; his death, 455 ; 
 his character, 456 
 Sutton, Captain Evelyn, sues 
 Commodore Johnstone, 107 
 
 TEGETTHOFF, Baron von, 
 birth and early service, 151-3 ; 
 his journey through Egypt and 
 Arabia, 154-5 ; captain of third 
 class, 155 ; of second class, 157 ; 
 of first class, 158 ; rear-admiral, 
 161 ; vice-admiral, 191 ; com- 
 mands the Erzherzog Friedrich, 
 155 ; aide-de-camp of the Arch- 
 duke Maximilian, 157 ; senior 
 officer in the Peirasus, 158 ; 
 action off Heligoland, 158-60 ; 
 receives the Order of the Iron 
 Crown, 161 ; commands a squad- 
 ron in the Mediterranean, ib. ; 
 war preparations, 162-4: defeats 
 the Italians at Lissa, 179- 87 ; 
 sinks the Be d' Italia, 185 ; re- 
 ceives honours and congratula- 
 tions, 191 ; travels in France, 
 England, and the United States, 
 192; brings home the body of 
 Maximilian, 193 ; his death, ib. ; 
 character, ib. 
 Thurot, Francois, parentage and 
 birth, 328 ; education and early 
 life, 329 ; prisoner of war, ib. ; 
 escapes, ib. ; sojourn in London, 
 330 ; engaged in smuggling, 
 
 WAL 
 331 ; proposes to burn Ports- 
 mouth, 332 ; commands a squad- 
 ron in the Channel, 333 ; en- 
 gages the Southampton, 333-4 ; 
 the Seahorse, 335 ; the Dolphin 
 and Solebay, 338 ; threatens the 
 coast of Scotland, 336-9 ; refits 
 at Bergen, 337 j and in Lough 
 Swilly, 340 ; undertakes to make 
 a diversion in the North, 342; 
 his squadron, 343 ; provisions 
 at the Faroe Islands, 345 ; 
 quarrels with Flobert, ib. etseq. ; 
 is deserted by several of his 
 ships, 349 ; lands on Islay, 351 ; 
 proposes to attack Belfast, 353 ; 
 attacks Carrickfergus, 353-4 ; 
 alarm on the coast, 356 ; is 
 chased and engaged by an Eng- 
 lish squadron, 357-9 ; is slain, 
 358 ; his character, 359-60 ; ap- 
 pearance, 362 
 
 Tourville, Comte de, early career, 
 50 ; at Palermo, 88 
 
 Trincomalee, capture of, 129 ; 
 battle of, 129-31 
 
 Triton East Indiaman, captured, 
 423-5 
 
 Trouin, Du Guay- (see Du Guay- 
 Trouin) 
 
 Turkey Company, prosecutes 
 Wright, 207, 215-6 
 
 Tyler, John, insurrection- headed 
 by, 23 
 
 WALKER, George, clears the 
 coast of Carolina of Spanish 
 privateers, 226-7 ; declines to 
 enter the navy, 254 ; his ship 
 founders, 227 ; he commands 
 the Mars, 228 ; is captured by 
 
INDEX. 
 
 469 
 
 WAR 
 the Fleuron, 229 ; a prisoner on 
 board, 230-1 ; is exchanged, 
 233 ; commands the Boscawen, 
 233-6 ; commands the King 
 George, 237 ; is commodore of 
 the Royal Family, ib. ; acts as 
 whipper-in to a convoy, 238 ; 
 falls in with the Glorioso, 239 ; 
 and engages her, 241-4 ; puts 
 into Lisbon, 247 ; saves the Lis- 
 bon packet, 248 ; is imprisoned 
 for debt, ib. ; his death, ib. 
 War, renewal of the, in 1369, 6 
 Winchelsea, taken by the French, 
 
 23 
 Wright, Fortunatus, lineage and 
 early life, 207 ; adventure at 
 Lucca, 208 ; settles at Leghorn, 
 209 ; fits out the Fame, ib. ; his 
 method of cruising, ib. ; his suc- 
 
 WRI 
 cess, 210; takes a prize into 
 Malta, 211 ; captures a French 
 ship with an English pass, 214 ; 
 with Turkish property on board, 
 214-5 ; refuses to disgorge, 215 ; 
 imprisoned, ib. ; correspondence 
 about the Turkish property, 
 216-7 ; fits out the St. George, 
 217 ; evades the Tuscan pro- 
 hibition, 218 ; engages a French 
 xebec, 218-9 ; accused of violat- 
 ing the neutrality of the port, 
 219 ; is detained at Leghorn, 
 ib. ; is released by order of Sir 
 Edward Hawke, 220 ; detained 
 at Malta, 221 ; plays with a 
 French privateer, 222 ; is lost at 
 sea, 223 ; his descendants, 208, 
 224 
 
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