CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY GIFT OF E. T. Paine The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924031498599 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY PSYCHOLOGICAL. ETHICAL, METAPHYSICAL; WITH QUOTATIONS AND REFERENCES. BY WILLIAM FLEMING, D.D., FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IX THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW. JFottrtj) GEbttton. REVISED AND LAEGELT RECONSTRUCTED BY HENRY CALDERWOOD, LL.D., PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH. NEW YORK : SCRIBNER AND WELFORD, 743 AND 745 BROADWAY. 1890. PEEFACE TO FOUKTH EDITION. In preparing a new edition of Professor Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy, it has been found impossible to adhere to the plan adopted in last edition, of retaining the form in which the book came from the Author's hands. Such an interval has elapsed since his death, and so many important additions have been made to philosophic literature since that time, that a reconstruction of the work had become needful. In undertaking the task of revision, the objects con- templated have been the following : — (1) to indicate varia- tions in usage that have occurred in the history of philosophic -terms ; (2) to guide students in their use of a large library by ample references to the literature of the subject ; (3) to meet urgent demands in course of study by selecting appropriate ■quotations from standard authors. In prosecuting revision with these objects in view, quotations have been withdrawn which seemed of secondary importance. Fully one half of the book is new, bringing it quite up to the date of publication. An intention formed at the outset of showing in the text the new matter introduced was early abandoned, because of the risk of encumbering the page by constant reappearance -of brackets. Throughout the laborious work of revision, verification, and selection of extracts I have been very ably supported by Mr James Seth, M.A., whom I, with the consent of all Tl PREFACE TO FOUBTH EDITION. •concerned, appointed Assistant Editor. Mr Seth was Baxter Scholar in Philosophy in this University in 1881 ; became Ferguson Scholar in Philosophy in 1882, in competition open to all the Scotch Universities; and was Assistant to my colleague, Professor A. Campbell Fraser, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics. Mr Seth undertook revision of all the logical terms, and, besides continuous work over the whole book, has contributed occasional articles, marked with his initials. Since beginning the duties of Assistant Editor, Mr Seth has been appointed Professor of Mental Philosophy in Dalhousie College, Halifax, Nova Scotia. In addition to the aid given by Mr Seth, I have had the advantage of revision of MS. and contribution of several articles, marked [J. W.], by my former Class Assistant, Mr James Weir, M.A., Vans Dunlop Scholar in Logic and Metaphysics, 1882 ; and I have had further valuable help in careful revision of proofs by my present Class Assistant, Mr William Mitchell, M.A., Vans Dunlop Scholar in Moral Philosophy, 1886. To these three gentlemen I tender publicly my warmest thanks for unwearied and efficient service in the preparation of the present edition, and in the endeavour to secure accuracy throughout the list of references. HENEY CALDEEWOOD. University of Edinburgh, December 2,ith, 1886. The Editor will feel obligation to those using the Vocabulary if they report to him any error detected in the references. PEEFACE TO THIED EDITION. The fact that the Vocabulary of Philosophy by the late- Professor Fleming soon passed through two editions shows that it has supplied a want felt by those entering upon philosophic study. Eecognising this, I have willingly re- sponded to the request to edit a new issue of the work. My purpose has been to retain the book as nearly as possible in the form in which it came from the hands of Professor Fleming. Occasionally I have withdrawn some quotations, when their numbers seemed too large. Additional manuscript left by Professor Fleming has been carefully examined, and some part of the new matter has been introduced. Vocables, have been inserted, the absence of which left a blank in a Vocabulary of Philosophy. In only one thing have I thought it needful to depart from Professor Fleming's plan. I have ventured to introduce definitions of the leading vocables. These definitions con- stitute the new feature in the edition now published, and are- enclosed within brackets, to indicate the portions for which L must be held responsible. H. CALDEEWOOD. The University of Edinburgh, Uth Septemh er 1876. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ABILITY and INABILITY— (Natural and Moral). Ability, Natural — power to act, characteristic of a living being, implying possession of vital organ or mental faculty, and presence of conditions requisite. Inability — the negation of either of these, consequent on loss of power or lack of oppor- tunity. The distinction applies equally to organic and to intellectual life. Moral Ability is sufficiency of ethical motive for fulfilment of all ethical law. Moral Inability is deficiency in ethical motive, consequent on want of harmony between personal inclination and personal obligation. The reference to "moral inability " introduces to the rela- tions of Philosophy and Theology. Natural Ethics maintains adequacy of power requisite for personal responsibility not- withstanding moral disorder. Christian Ethics, proceeding from this position, emphasises moral disorder, maintains man's inability to effect escape from it, and at the same time dis- covers Divine intervention for. deliverance. The moral ability of natural ethics involves these things — knowledge of moral law; power of understanding to decide upon the application of such law in varying circumstances; motive forces impelling to action, thereby giving occasion for self-government; and will- power, or inherent power of rational self-control, by restraint of impulse, reflection on duty, rational determination, and sub- ' sequent action. What is here meant by " inability " is per- A 2 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. sistence of disinclination to act in accordance with moral law, consequent upon disturbed harmony of the moral nature. In Christian ethics this has its counterpart in the doctrine of Grace, or Divine Salvation, by direct action of the moral influence of the Divine Spirit. On its philosophical side, see Principal Shairp on " The Moral Dynamic " (Studies in Poetry and Philosophy, p. 348). ABSCISSIO INFINITL— "A series of arguments in which we go on excluding, one by one, certain suppositions, or certain classes of things, from that whose real nature we are seeking to ascertain ;; (Whately's Logic, bk. ii. ch. iii. sec. 4). ABSOLUTE (dbsolutum, ab and solvo, to loose from). — (1) Adjective, applied to the essence of a thing, apart from its relations or varied representations ; (2) to the perfect or com- pleted form of existence; (3) substantive, "The Absolute,'' the Self-existent, Self-sufficient Being, independent in nature and in action — the Uncaused — the Cause of all existence besides. " The term absolute is of twofold (if not threefold) antiquity, corresponding to the double (or treble) signification of the word in Latin. (1) Absolutum means what is freed or loosed; in which sense the absolute will be what is aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, dependence, &c, and is thus tantamount to to airoXvTov of the lower Greeks. In this meaning, the Absolute is not opposed to the Infinite. (2) Absolutum means finished, perfected, completed; in which sense the Absolute will be what is out of relation, &c, as finished, perfect, complete, total, and thus corresponds to to o\ov and to rekeiov of Aristotle. In this acceptation (and it is that in which I exclusively use it) the Absolute is diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the Infinite" (Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 14, note). "By the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being. By the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible limita- tion ; that than which a greater is inconceivable, and which consequently can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence, which it had not from all eternity '' (Mansel, Limits of Religious Thought, p. 45). " The plain and etymological meaning of the term is freed VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 3 or loosed, and hence it means freed from restriction or condition. In this sense it is evident that the Infinite must be absolute, for that which is not limited does not afford the possibility of restriction. This is the sense in which philosophers have uniformly used the word ; and in this sense Sir W. Hamilton admits that ' the Absolute is not opposed to the Infinite ' " (Calderwood, Philosophy of the Infinite, 3rd ed., p. 165). These definitions were the basis for discussion of the question whether the Absolute can be known under the conditions of consciousness. Hamilton, arguing against Cousin, maintained the negative (Discussions, pp. 1-38). Mansel supported the position (Limits of Religious Thought; see also Mansel's Essays, p. 154, Philosophy of Kant, and German Philosophy). Calder- wood argued the contrary on the basis of faith and cognition (Philosophy of the Infinite). Hamilton's position was accepted as an illustration of the doctrine of relativity of knowledge (J. S. Mill's Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 1-129 ; Herbert Spencer's First Principles, 3rd ed., pt. 1, — The Unknowable, pp. 1-126). The position of Herbert Spencer is indicated in the opening part of the First Principles, with extended quotations from Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought. The following passages will indicate the general course of the arguments : — -"We are not only obliged to suppose some cause, but also a first cause We cannot think at all about the impressions which the external world produces on us, without thinking of them as caused ; and we cannot carry out an inquiry concerning their causation without inevitably committing ourselves to the hypothesis of a First Cause. But now, if we go a step further, and ask what is the nature of this First Cause, we are driven by an inexorable logic to certain further conclusions It is impossible to consider the First Cause as finite. And if it cannot be finite, it must be infinite. Another inference concerning the First Cause is equally unavoidable : It must be independent. If it be dependent, it cannot be the First Cause ; for that must be the First Cause on which it depends Thus the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, total ; includ- ing within itself all power, and transcending all law. Or, to 4 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. use the established word, it must be absolute " (pp. 37, 38). Treating of conflicting religious systems, Herbert Spencer sa y S : — "Not onlyis the omnipresence of something which passes comprehension that most abstract belief which is common to all religions, which becomes the more distinct in proportion as they develop, and which remains after their discordant ele- ments have been mutually cancelled; but it is that belief which the most unsparing criticism of each leaves unquestion- able, or rather makes ever clearer " (p. 45). Philosophy is ultimately, by its very nature, a search for the Absolute — first for absolute truth, as distinct from mere appearance, and afterwards for The Absolute Being, as the source and explanation of all dependent existence, ens realis- simum. Thus Plato ascends from the manifold to the one, finding in the idea the key to all varieties of manifestation in the world, and passes beyond ideas to that which is more than idea — The Good — the centre and source of existence, "far exceeding essence in dignity and power " {Republic, vi. 507- 509). So it has been in modern philosophy, Spinoza maintain- ing that thought is true only as we think all things in God (Ethics, pt. ii. prop. 32). Kant, while insisting that we cannot have logical demonstration of the Divine existence, granted that the reason seeks to transcend the sphere of the understanding, in order to reach the Absolute, and held that in the practical sphere, duty implies Deity (Critique of Pure Reason and of Practical) ; in succession to this come the speculations of Fichte and Schelling, concerning the Absolute, and still later, of Hegel, who, defining philosophy as the thinking view of things, makes it in substance a philosophy of The Absolute, maintain- ing that all existence is strictly a manifestation of the Absolute in the evolution of Being according to Dialectic. In Britain, philosophy, regarding absolute intelligence as the First Cause, source of all finite existence, turned speculation for a time on the possibility of a knowledge of the Absolute, while granting belief in the transcendent reality (Hamilton and Mansel), and more recently, the Sensational School, interpreting a theory of Evolution, has discoursed of the " Unknowable " treating it as "an ultimate religious truth of the highest VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 5 certainty, ..... the deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts — that the power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable" (Spencer's First Priniples, p. 46). — V. Infinite, Unconditioned, Eeal. ABSTINENCE (abs teneo, to hold from or off). Voluntarily refraining, for a moral or religious end, from things which our nature needs or delights in. Its practice is implied in the supremacy of moral laws, whenever duty conflicts with inclination. It corresponds to 'Amx& in the precepts of Epictetus, 'Avixov ka rfj i/^XB> in opposition to ?fo> Aoyos) ; but exoteric is employed in the sense of ' outwardly directed, addressed to the respondent (irpos h-epov)' " (Ueberweg's Hist, i. 143). " In the life of Aristotle, by Mr Blakesley " (published in the Ency. Met.), " it has been shown, we think most satis- factorily, that the acroamatic treatises of Aristotle differed from the exoteric, not in the abstruseness or mysteriousness of their subject-matter, but in this, that the one formed part of a course or system, while the other were casual discussions or lectures on a particular thesis " (Mot. and Met. Phil., by Maurice, note, p. 165). ACTION. — (1) Exercise of vital energy; (2) intelligent, self- directed exercise ; Aristotle defines voluntary action as " that the apxr) of which is in the agent himself " (iV. Ethics, iii. i. 20) ; (3) ethical,- — action when subjected to moral law. In so far as moral actions are completed, or efficient, in the sense of reaching an end, they have a threefold form — (a) the motive or inward disposition impelling to action, (6) the overt act in which the inward motive expresses itself, (c) the purpose or contemplated end for attainment of which the action is done. Each one of these is in an ethical sense an action, i.e., activity subject to moral law. ACTUAL (quod est in actu) is opposed by Aristotle to potential. A rough stone is a statue potentially; when chiselled, actually. " The relation of the potential to the actual Aristotle exhibits by the relation of the raw material to the finished article; of the unemployed carpenter to the one at work upon his building ; of the individual asleep to him awake. Potentially the seed is the tree, but the grown-up tree is it actually; a potential 12 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. philosopher is the philosopher not philosophising ; even before the battle the better general is the potential conqueror; in fact, everything is potential which possesses a principle of motion, of development, or of change; and -which, if un- hindered by anything external, will be of itself. Actuality or entelechy, on the other hand, indicates the perfect act, the end as gained, the completely actual (the grown-up tree, e.g., is the entelechy of the seed-corn), that activity in which the act and the completeness of the act fall together, e.g., to see, he thinks and he has thought, he sees and he has seen, are one and the same, while in these activities which involve a becoming, e.g., to learn, to go, to become well, the two (the act and its completion) are separated " (Schwegler, Hist, of Phil., Stirling, p. 108; ef. Lotze, Metaphysic, bk. i. sec. 41). — V. Ebal. ACTIVE POWERS was the term employed by the early Scottish philosophers to designate the moral powers, as con- trasted with the " Intellectual Powers." " The Active Powers," in contrast with the " Intellectual " or " Cognitive " powers, were regarded as the powers concerned with human action, as contrasted with thought. The designations are inappropriate, inasmuch as the intellectual powers are eminently active, and the moral powers must include intellectual as a first requisite (Keid's Intellectual Powers, essay i. ch. vii.; Reid's Active Powers, introd., and essay i. ch. i. ; Stewart's Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, Introd. Works, vi. 117 ; Hamilton's Reid, notes 242a, 511a). ADEQUATE (adasquo, to equal), sufficient, applied to our cognitions. Our knowledge of an object is adequate or com- plete when it extends to all the properties of that object. Spinoza says : — " By an adequate idea, I understand an idea which, considered in itself, without relation to the object, possesses all the properties and intrinsic characters of a true idea" {Ethics, pt. ii. defin. 4). He explains : — " I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that work which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and its object (ideato) " (Ethics, pt. ii. defin. 4). According to prop. 35, " Falsehood consists in the absence of the cognition which inadequate or imperfect and confused ideas involve." VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 13 ADMIRATION — Delight in contemplation of an object involving (a) a standard, (b) comparison, (c) sense of agreeable feeling, attracting the mind towards the object awakening such feeling. " We shall find that admiration is as superior to surprise and wonder, simply considered, as knowledge is superior to ignorance ; for its appropriate signification is that act of the mind by which we discover, approve, and enjoy sbme unusual species of excellence" (Cogan, On the Passions, pt. i. ch. ii; Buckle, History of Civilisation, ii. 188). ADSCITITIOUS (from ad-sciso, to seek after), that which is added or assumed. "You apply to your hypothesis of an adscititious spirit, what he (Philo) says concerning this irveC/m fletov, divine spirit or soul, infused into man by God's breath- ing '' (Clarke, Letter to Dodwell). AESTHETICS (ala&rja-K,) feeling as dependent on physical sensibility, perception by the senses, — applied by Plato (Phcedo, cxi.) to vision of an intellectual order, ato-^crts iw 6eS>v. (1) Commonly, the science of the beautiful, or philosophy of the fine. arts. (2) In the philosophy of Kant it is kept to its primary meaning, as concerned with knowledge obtained through the sensory. ^Esthetics is the science of the beautiful or the philo- sophy of the fine arts. Philosophy deals with the principles of all experience and activity ; and, as concerned with the experience of the beautiful and with its representation or creation in works of arts, it is called jEsthetics. Its sphere is, in one sense, a subdivision of the province of Psychology, which deals with all forms of experience. And, indeed, sesthetical in- vestigations form no small part of many psychological treatises, e.g., the works of Stewart, Eeid, and Hamilton. Properly, however, the point of view of aesthetics is different from that of psychology. The latter regards aesthetic experience as one among other forms of human experience, to -be classified accordingly. JEsthetics, on the other hand, seeks for a philo- sophy of this particular form of experience, seeks, on the one hand, to account for its subjective nature as experience, by tracing the principles that underlie it ; and, on the other, to answer the question whether there is an objective correlate to 14 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. the experiences, — whether there is or is not an absolute beauty. It is only recently however, and especially in Germany, that the province of JSsthetics has been clearly denned. Baumgarten was the first definitely to limit its sphere. Here, as elsewhere, it is to Aristotle that we owe the elements of subsequent teaching. He laid the foundation of JUsthetics in his Rhetoric and Poetics. Plato had not dis- tinguished the ^Esthetical from the Ethical, but had found the two in his corruption of KakoKayaOia. He had also, in his Republic, cast discredit upon the work of the artist, which he regarded as mere imitation. He had, however, maintained the existence of an absolute beauty — avrb rb ko\6v — the archetypal idea in which all beautiful things participated. Aristotle, on the contrary, distinguished carefully between the conceptions of the beautiful and the good, defended the calling of the artist, and denied the existence of an absolute good. In modern times, the greatest work on ^Esthetics is Kant's Critique of Judgment, which is an account of the necessary and universal principles of aesthetic experience, an application of the critical or transcendental principle to the particular form of experience. Kant has been followed by Schelling and Hegel, and by the transcendental school generally. Besides dis- cussions specifically philosophical, there is a great deal of sesthetical investigation in the works of Lessing (who, in his critical accounts of individual works of art, has emphasised general festhetic principles), Goethe, Schiller, Jean Paul, and in England in the writings of Euskin. Bain and Spencer have applied the principle of evolution to ^Esthetics (Baum- garten's JSsthetica, 2 vols., Frankfort, 1750-8; Burke, The Sublime and Beautiful ; Alison, On Taste ; Lord Jeffrey, art. "Beauty," Eney. Brit, 8th ed. ; Bain, Emotions and Will; Cousin, True, Beautiful, and Good; Spencer, Principles of Psychology, ii. 627; Sully, Outlines of Psychology,^. 531, and art. "^Esthetics," Ency. £««., 9th ed., Danieron, Gours de JEsthetique; M'Vicar, The Philosophy of the Beautiful. For an account of the various theories : Bain, Mental and Moral Science ; and for German theories, Lotze, Geschichte der JSsthetik Deutschlands). The term Transcendental ^Esthetic is used by Kant, in VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 15 its etymological sense, to denote the science of the el priori conditions of sensuous experience, i.e. of perception. This is the title of the first part of the Critiqim of Pure Reason, where is an account of the principles which make perception possible, viz., Space and Time. Kant says: — "The science of all the principles of sensibility, d, priori, I call transcendental aesthetic " (Critique of Pure Reason, pt. i., note; Meiklejohn, p. 22). By transcendental sesthetic, Kant means all that is essential to the action of the sensory, distinct from physical, sensibility, and the sensation consequent upon impression made on the sensory organ. What is involved besides he designates "the pure forms of sensuous intuition," — these are space and time. AETIOLOGY (amo, cause; Xoyos, discourse), a philosophy of causes. In Ehetoric, the form of speech in which the reason is given, along with a statement made. AFFECTION (ad and facio). — (1) Passive, an impression made on the sensory system. (2) Active, a disposition towards persons, urging the agent to seek the good or hurt of others. The affections are motive forces, in close relation to the intel- ligent nature, and superior to desire. " There are various principles of action in man which have persons for their immediate object, and imply, in their very nature, our being well- or ill-affected to some person, or at least to some animated being. Such principles I shall call by the general name of affections, whether they dispose us to do good or hurt to others " (Reid, Active Powers, essay iii. pt. ii. ch. iii.-vi.). One of the most important divisions of empirical psychology as concerned with Feeling, is that which treats of the natural history of the affections, or the laws of their development (Bain's Emotions and Will, ch. iii.; Cyple's Process of Human Experience, ch. x. p. 267 ; Sully's Outlines of Psychology, p. 489). AFFERENT. — The name applied to the sensory nerves, which carry the effect of impression from the surface of the body to the nerve centres — spinal cord, medulla, or cerebrum. AFFIRMATION (mi-c^oons) is the attributing of one thing to another, or the asserting that something exists. The 16 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. antithesis of Negation. A mental affirmation is a judgment ; expressed, it becomes a proposition. (See these terms.) A FORTIORI. — Argument from the greater to the less, as when that which has been proved to hold true of a whole class is inferred to hold true of a part of the class. This form of argument is especially common in mathematics. AGNOIOLOGY (Aoyos ti}s dyvoias, theory of true ignor- ance), a section of Philosophy intermediate between Epistem- ology and Ontology. " Absolute Being may be that which we are ignorant of. We must, therefore, examine and fix what ignorance is, what we are and can be ignorant of" (Ferrier, Inst, of Metaph., 48). — V. Agnosticism. AGNOSTICISM.— A philosophic theory, based on the relativity of human knowledge, which maintains that the Absolute Being, as the Unconditioned, cannot be in any sense known ; or, as Herbert Spencer states it — " that the power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable" (First Principles, p. 46). The term is sometimes employed, in a wider sense, to describe a theory which denies the existence of the Absolute as unknown. But this use of the term is inappropriate, for such a theory is not a logical deduction from the former, since we cannot reason from ignorance to non- existence, and what is implied is Gnosticism rather than Agnosticism. The popular Agnosticism of the present day, both philosophic and scientific in its historic associations, rests on the relativity of human knowledge, favouring a suspension of judgment or scepticism as to the transcendent or supersensible. While the relativity of human knowledge is matter of agreement, thinkers differ according as they hold or deny the rational certainty of an intelligent First Cause, according as they recognise belief based on necessary principles of the reason, or admit the certainty only of that which is directly known as present to the mind. Hamilton, while denying that the Infinite Being can by us be known, maintained that the existence must by us be believed (Discussions, p. 15; Letter to Calderwood, Metaph., ii., app., p. 530). So it is with Mansel (Limits of Religious vu»jJ4.i3uijJi.K.i UK .rj.ll.LUSU.FiiY. 17 Thought and Letters, Lectures, and Reviews, pp. 157, 189). J. S. Mill, while declining assent to belief in an Infinite Being, specially insisted on the relativity of knowledge involving the impossi- bility of knowledge of the Absolute (Examination of Hamilton, pp. 72-129). Herbert Spencer, pointing to the reconciliation of religion and science, opens the First Principles with special treatment of the Unknowable (pp. 1-123). ALTRUISM. — The theory which makes a regard to the happiness of others the basis of moral distinctions, or consti- tutes a phase of the Utilitarian or Greatest Happiness theory, standing in contrast to Egoism, which was the earlier phase of the doctrine. Egoism makes personal happiness the end of life ; Altruism insists that we must find our own happi- ness in that of others. In contrast not only with the Egoism of Hobbes, but with the more benevolent scheme of Bentham, both Comte and Mill held " that the more altruistic any man's sentiments and habits of action can be made, the greater will be the happiness enjoyed by himself as well as by others " (Sidgwick's Outlines of the History of Ethics, p. 257). J. S. Mill says : — " Pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends" (Utilitarianism, p. 10). But, he adds, the " standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether" (ib., p. 16). " Utility would enjoin that laws and social arrangements should place the interest of any individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole " (ib., p. 25). AMBITION (from ambio, to go about seeking place or power), desire of power, — regarded as one of the primary or original desires of human nature (Beid, Active Powers, essay iii. pt. ii. ch. ii. ; Stewart, Active Powers, bk. i. ch. ii. sec. 4). AMPHIBOLY (afiif3o\ia, ambiguity). — A proposition of a doubtful or d ouble sense.. Aristotle distinguishes it from equivocatio, o/joovu/jiia, ambiguity in terms taken separately (The Sophistical Elenchi, ch. iv.; Organon, transl. Owen, ii. 544; Opera, ed. Buhle, iii. 528; Whately's Logic, bk. iii. sec. 10). The term is applied by Kant to the confounding of pure notions of the understanding with objects of experience, and attributing to the one characters and qualities which belong to 18 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. the other (Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Analytic of Principles, — bk. ii. ch. iii. app., entitled, "Of the equivocal nature or Amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection from the substitution of the transcendental for the empirical use of the understanding "). ANALOGUE (dvaAoyos, proportionate). — That which cor- responds with another, resembling in nature, structure, or function. " By an Analogue is meant an organ in one animal having the same function as a different organ in a different animal. The difference between Homologue and Analogue may be illustrated by the wing of a bird and that of a butterfly : as the two totally differ in anatomical structure, they cannot be said to be homologous, but they are analogous in function, since they both serve for flight" (M'Cosh, Typical Forms, p. 25). In Logic a term is analogous whose single signification applies with equal propriety to more than one object — as the leg of the table, the leg of the animal (Whately, Logic, bk. iii. sec. 10). ANALOGY (dvaXoyta, proportion). — An argument from Analogy is a defensive argument, in support of any suggested hypothesis, drawn from similarity of phenomena recognised in different relations. The argument from analogy is not construc- tive in nature, being competent only for defence, or suggestion. It has been " defined ' the similarity of ratios or relations.' It is the inference that, because two phenomena resemble in some points, therefore they resemble in all. Its value depends on the importance of the points of resemblance observed, and on their proportion to the points of difference and to the whole points. In popular language we extend the word to re- semblances of things as well as relations. Analogy in this sense has exercised an immense influence on the formation of language. In innumerable cases visible or tangible things lend their names to invisible and spiritual, from a resemblance more or less striking between them" (Thomson, Laws of Thought, 3rd ed., p. 327). "Analogy does not mean the similarity of two things, but the similarity or sameness of two relations. .... If A has VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 19 the same relation to B which C has to D, then there is an analogy. If the first relation be well known, it may serve to explain the second, which is less known; and the transfer of name from one of the terms in the relation best known to its corresponding term in the other, causes no confusion, but on the contrary tends to remind us of the similarity that exists in these relations, and so assists the mind, instead of misleading it" (Coplestone, Four Discourses, p. 122). "As analogy is the resemblance of ratios (or relations), two things may be connected by analogy, though they have in themselves no resemblance; thus as a sweet taste gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear, and hence the same word, ' sweet,' is applied to both, though no flavour can resemble a sound in itself. To bear this in mind would serve to guard us against two very common errors in the interpretation of the analogical language of Scripture : — (1) The error of supposing the things themselves to be similar, from their bearing similar relation to other things; (2) the still more common error of supposing the analogy to extend further than it does, or to be more complete than it really is, from not considering in what the analogy in each case con- sists" (Whately, Logic, bk. iii. sec. 10). "The meaning of analogy is resemblance, and hence all reasoning from one case to others resembling it might be termed analogical; but the word is usually confined to cases where the resemblance is of a slight or indirect kind. We do not say that a man reasons from analogy when he infers that a stone projected into the air will fall to the ground. The circumstances are so essentially similar to those which have been experienced a thousand times, that we call the cases identical, not analogical. But when Sir Isaac Newton, reflect- ing on the tendency of bodies at the surface of the earth to the centre, inferred that the moon had the same tendency, his reasoning, in the first instance, was analogical. "By some writers the term has been restricted to the resemblance of relations: thus knowledge is said to bear the same relation to the mind as light to the eye — to enlighten it. But although the term is very properly applied to this 20 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. class of resemblances, I think it is not generally confined to them" (Sam. Bailey, Discourses, p. 181, 8vo, London, 1852). Berkeley distinguishes between Metaphorical and proper anology. " Analogy is a Greek word used by mathematicians to signify a similitude of proportions. For instance, when we observe that two is to six as three is to nine, this similitude or equality of proportion is termed analogy. And, although proportion strictly signifies the habitude or relation of one quantity to another, yet, in a looser and translated sense, it hath been applied to signify every other habitude, and con- sequently the term analogy, all similitude of relations or habitudes whatsoever. Hence the schoolmen tell us there is analogy between intellect and sight ; forasmuch as intellect is to the mind what sight is to the body : and that he who governs the state is analogous to him who steers a ship. Hence a prince is analogically styled a pilot, being to the state as a pilot is to his vessel. For the further clearing of this point, it is to be observed, that a twofold analogy is dis- tinguished by the schoolmen metaphorical and proper. Of the first kind there are frequent instances in Holy Scripture, attributing human parts and passions to God. When He is represented as having a finger, an eye, or an ear; when He is said to repent, to be angry, or grieved, every one sees the analogy is merely metaphorical; because these parts and passions, taken in the proper signification, must in every degree necessarily, and from the formal nature of the thing, include imperfection. When, therefore, it is said the finger of God appears in this or that event, men of common sense mean no more, but that it is as truly ascribed to God as the works wrought by human fingers are to man ; and so of the rest. But the case is different when wisdom and knowledge are attributed to God. Passions and senses, as such, imply defect; but in knowledge simply, or as such, there is no defect. Knowledge, therefore, in the proper formal meaning of the word, may be attributed to God proportionally, that is, preserving a proportion to the infinite nature of God. We may say, therefore, that as God is VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 21 infinitely above man, so is the knowledge of God infinitely above the knowledge of man, and this is what Cajetan calls analogic, proprie facta. And after the same analogy we must understand all those attributes to belong to the Deity, which in themselves simply, and as such, denote perfection" (Berkeley, Min. Phil., Dialog. 4; Fraser, Selections from Berkeley, 2nd ed., pi 258). Kant, in his Transcendental Analytic, bk. ii. ch. ii. sec. 3, treats of " Analogies of Experience," saying that " experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions." The analogies of experience referred to are these three — the permanence of substances through all changes in phenomena, — all changes take place according to the law of the connection of cause and effect, — all substances perceived in space, coexist in a state of complete reciprocity of action (Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, p. 132; MaxMuller, ii. 155). Analogy and Induction. — In Induction we argue from some cases observed to all cases of the same phenomena. In Analogy we argue from partial to complete resemblance between two cases, from some points observed to resemble to all points (Locke, On Human Understanding, bk. iv. ch. xvi. sec. 12; Butler, Analogy of Religion; Beattie's Essay on Truth, pt. i. ch. ii. sec. 7; Stewart's Elements, vol. ii. ch. iv. sec. 4; Stewart's Essays, v. ch. iii. ; Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. xx. ; Ueberweg, Logic, p. 491, transl.). ANALYSIS (ava Xvto, resolutio). — Separation of the parts of a complex whole, either actually, as in physical structure ; or by observation and comparison, as in the phenomena of consciousness. In mental philosophy, the resolution of our experience into its simple or original elements, with a view to reconstruction of these with full regard to their relations in the mental state to which they belong. In Empirical Psychology, the first requisite is Introspection, (q.v.); the next comparison, distinguishing the elements present in a complex experience. Analysis is the first requisite for interpretation of experience, for attempting a philosophy of the development of mind, and for determining the possibilities of 22 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. human life. Thus philosophic procedure must in the first instance be analytic. Still more important for the progress of philosophy is the synthesis afterwards effected. — V. Synthesis. Analysis is Real, when a chemist separates two substances; Logical, when we consider properties separately, as the pro- perties of the sides and angles of a triangle ; Psychological, when we distinguish the elements which constitute a state of consciousness; Metaphysical, when we distinguish the elements which make experience possible. Abstraction is analysis, since it is decomposition, but what distinguishes it is that it is exercised upon qualities which by themselves, or out of relation to others, have no real existence. " Hae analysi licebit, ex rebus compositis ratiocinaticme colligere simplices; ex motibus, vires moventes; et in universum, ex effectis causas; ex causisque particularibus generates; donee ad generalissimas tandem sit deventum " (Newton, Optics, 2nd ed. p. 413). Eeid's Inquiry, Introd. (Hamilton, p. 99); Stewart's Elements, pt. ii. ch. iv. ; Hamilton's Metaph., i. 98, lect. vi. ; Sully, Outlines of Psychology, app. i. ANALYTICS (Tel AvaXvriKa).— The title Analytics given to a portion of the Organon, the logical treatises of Aristotle. It does not appear that Aristotle gave this title to the Prior and Posterior Analytics when the books were written. Twice, however, in the Metaphysics he uses the term avak-uTiKa. as applicable to the division of logic involved. Once {Metaph., iv. 3) he charges some philosophers with ignorance of analytics, alleging that they hold their position Si' dxcuSevo-iai/ w avaXvriK&v. And, more directly, referring to his own Logical Treatises, he says (Metaph., vii. 12) that no statement has been made concerning definition in the Analytics, ifi Sow iv tois dvaXuriKois mpl bpurpov /jlyj lipr/rav. The title to draAvruca was afterwards applied to the books now bearing the name, which treat of the analysis of thought, the Prior dealing with the syllogism, the Posterior with proof and the conditions of knowledge. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 23 ANIMA MUNDI (soul of the world).— The hypothesis of a force, immaterial, and inseparable from matter, giving to matter its form and movement, which is coeval with the birth of philosophy. Pythagoras obscurely acknowledged such a force, holding that the world was living and intelligent, koct/xov efjLijrvxov, voepov (Biog. Laert., bk. viii. p, 25). From Pythagoras it passed into the system of Plato, who held that pure spirit, the seat of eternal idea, could not act directly upon matter. In the Timceus, " the most obscure " of the dialogues, as Jowett says, in which the influence of Pythagoras is conspicuous, Plato gives an account of the origin of the world, teaching that " the world became a living soul and truly rational — rbv Koa-fiov £,5>ov €fnApv\ov, ewovv — through the providence of God," (Timcem, 30). This is in accordance with the fixed plan of the Creator, for he "put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, and framed the universe to be the best and fairest work in the order of nature." The soul of the world was the source of all life, sensibility, and movement. The doctrine was prominent in the teaching of the Stoics, in whose system the anima mundi usurped the place and even the name of God. It is closely allied to the prevailing pantheism of their thought. Straton of Lampsacus identified it with nature. The School of Alexandria, on the other hand, adhering to the views of Plato, recognised intelligence and Deity as above the anima mundi, which they conceived as intermediate between the Creator and His works. The hypothesis of the anima mundi was not entertained by the scholastic philosophers. But it reappeared under the name of Archceus — the vital principle — in the systems of Agrippa of Nettesheim, Paracelsus, and Van Helmont. In more recent times Henry More recognised a principium hylarchicum, and Cudworth a plastic nature, as the universal agent of physical phenomena, the cause of all forms of organisation, and the spring of all the movements of matter. ANIMISM. — A doctrine of soul as distinct from body, and separated from it at death. For the extent to which such a doctrine is believed among uncivilised tribes, v. Tylor's Primitive Culture, 2 vols., a valuable store of evidence, gathered from all available sources. 24 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ANTECEDENT (antecedo, to go before).— In a relation, whether logical or metaphysical, the first term is the antecedent, the second the consequent. Thus, in the relation of causality, the cause is the antecedent, and the effect the consequent. "Antecedent is that part of a conditional proposition on which the other depends" (Whately, Logic, bk. ii. ch. iv. sec. 6).— V. Peoposition Hypothetical. ANTHROPOLOGY (avOpwiros and Aoyos, the science of man). — Among naturalists it means the natural history of the human species. According to Latham (Nat. Hist, of Varieties of Man), anthropology determines the relations of man to the other mammalia ; ethnology, the relations of the different varieties of mankind to each other (p. 559). In Germany the term includes all the sciences which in any point of view relate to man — soul and body — individual and species — facts of history and phenomena of consciousness — rules of morality as well as material interests. "Anthropology is the science of man in all his natural variations. It deals with the mental peculiarities which belong specifically to different races, ages, sexes, and tempera- ments, together with the results which follow immediately from them in their application to human life " (Morell, Psychology, p. 1). Hamilton's Metwph., lect. i. vol. i. p. 136; Tylor's Anthro- pology; Journal of Anthropological Institute, from 1871, — a store of facts concerning the natural history of the human race ; Moral Anthropology ; Kant's Ethics, Semple, 3rd ed., p. 165. ANTHROPOMORPHISM (^pawros, man; p-op^, form). The representation of Divine attributes as if they were only human attributes enlarged. The ascribing of bodily members to Deity is wittily exposed by Cicero (Be Fat. Deor., lib. i. cap. 27). Spinoza, holding that all things are in God, maintained that God is an extended being (Ethics, pt. ii. prop, ii.); but, he adds, when referring to the fact that "some persons feign to themselves an image of God consisting like a man of a body and mind, and susceptible of passions," " all who ever thought of the Divine nature in any proper way, deny that God is corporeal .... nothing VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 25 can be more absurd than a conception of the kind associated with God, the absolutely infinite being " (pt. i. prop. xv. schol.). "We ought not to imagine that God is clothed with a human body, as the Anthropomorphites asserted, under colour that that figure was the most perfect of any " (Malebranche, Search after Truth, bk. iii. ch. ix.). Hume applies the name to those who think the mind of God is like the mind of man (Dial, on Nat. Relig., pts. iv., v.), in which Anthropomorphism is critically examined, as opposed to the doctrine of the " mysterious, incomprehensible nature of the Deity " presented by " Demea," and the views supported by "Cleanthes," that though the Deity "possesses many powers and attributes of which we can have no comprehension," " our ideas, so far as they go," must be "just and adequate, and correspondent to his real nature " (Hume, Works, Green's ed., ii. 405). That the first cause must be absolute, infinite Intelligence, is clear on the admission of a first cause ; but that the absolute intelligence can be such in nature and action as human intelligence is impossible. V. Cousin, Hist, of Philos., Wight, i. 34; Fairbairn's Studies in Philosophy, p. 51. ANTICIPATION (anticipatio, Trpd^i/as). — The power of the mind to project itself from the known into the unknown, in the expectation of finding what it is in search of. The term was first used by Epicurus to denote a general notion, which enables us to conceive beforehand of an object which has not come under the cognisance of the senses. But general notions, being formed by abstraction from a multitude of particular notions, were all originally owing to sensation, or mere generalisations a posteriori. Buhle {Hist, de la Phil. Mod., torn. i. pp. 87, 88) gives the following account: — " The impressions which objects make on the senses, leave in the mind traces which enable us to recognise these objects when they present themselves anew, or to compare them with others, or to distinguish them. When we see an animal for the first time, the impression made on the senses leaves a trace which serves as a type. If we afterwards see the same 26 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. animal, we refer the impression to the type already existing in the mind. This type, and the relation of the new impression to it, constituted what Epicurus called the anticipation of an idea. It was by this anticipation that we could determine the identity, the resemblance or the difference of objects actually before us, and those formerly observed." The language of Cicero (Be Nat. Deor., lib. i. cap. 16) seems to indicate that by Epicurus the term irpokijif/K was extended to what is supersensual, and included what is now called knowledge a priori. " Quae est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat, sine doctrina anticipationem quandam Deorum ? quam appellat TrpoX-q^/iv Epicurus, id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nee intelligi quidquam, nee quceri, nee disputari potest." And according to Diogenes Laertius (lib. vii. sees. 51, 53, 54), the Stoics denned Trp6\f)tyivo-ei) to the particular, and the cause to the effect ; but since we know the particular before the universal, and the effect before we seek the cause, the particular and the effect are each prior in respect to us (irporepov 7rpos ^uas)" (Anal. Post., i. 2 ; Top., vi. 4; Metaph. v. (A), xi. 1018, ed. Berol; Thomson's Outlines of the Laws of Thought, 3rd ed., p. 68). — V. Demonstration. ARBOR PORPHYRIANA — V. Porphyry (Tree op). ARCH-3J3US, the name given by Paracelsus to the vital principle which is the source of the growth and continuation of living beings. — V. Anima Mundi. ARCHETYPE (dpxv, first or chief; and ™W, form), a model or first form. — " There were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal, immutable, which they called intelligible ideas, all originally contained in one archetypal mind or under- standing, and from thence participated by inferior minds or souls " (Cudworth, Intell. Syst., p. 387). " There is truth as well as poetry in the Platonic idea of 38 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. things being formed after original archetypes. But we hold that these archetypes are not uncreated, as Plato seems to suppose; we maintain that they have no necessary or inde- pendent existence, but that they are the product of Divine wisdom; and that we can discover a final cause for their prevalence, not, indeed, in the mere convenience and comfort of the animal, but in the aid furnished to those created intelligences who are expected to contemplate and admire their predetermined forms" (M'Cosh, Meth. of Div. Gov.,hk. ii. ch. i. sec. 4). In the philosophy of Locke, the archetypes of our ideas are the things really existing out of us. " By real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a con- formity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes" {Essay on Human Understanding, bk. ii. ch. xxx.). ARCHITECTONIC. — " By the term Architectonic, I mean the art of constructing a system .... the doctrine of the scientific in cognition " (Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, 503; Max Midler, ii. 714). Kant proposes "to sketch the plan of the Architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason," adding that, by Beason he understands "the whole higher faculty of cognition, the rational placed in con- tradistinction to the empirical." ARGUMENT (arguo, from apyds, clear, manifest), to show, reason, or prove ; procedure towards truth by inference (Whately, Logic, bk. ii. ch. iii. sec. 2). The term argument in ordinary discourse has several mean- ings : — (1) It is used for the premises in contradiction to the conclusion, e.g., "the conclusion which this argument is intended to establish is," &c. ; (2) it denotes what is a course or series of arguments, as when it is applied to an entire dissertation ; (3) sometimes a disputation or two trains of argument opposed to each other ; (4) lastly, the various forms of stating an argument are sometimes spoken of as different kinds of argument, as if the same argument were not capable of being stated in various ways (Whately, Logic, app. i.). "In technical propriety argument cannot be used for VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 39 argumentation, as Dr Whately thinks, but exclusively for its middle term. In this meaning, the word (though not with uniform consistency) was employed by Cicero, Quintilian, Boethius, &c; it was thus subsequently used by the Latin Aristotelians, from whom it passed even to the Kamists; and this is the meaning which the expression always first, and most naturally, suggests to a logician" (Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 147). In this sense the discovery of arguments means the dis- covery of middle terms. Argument (The Indirect).— It is opposed to the Ostensive or Direct. Of Indirect arguments several kinds are enumerated by logicians : — Argumentum ad hominem, an appeal to the principles or consistency of an opponent. Argumentum ex concesso, a proof derived from some truth already admitted. Argumentum a fortiori (q.v.). Argumentum ad judicium, an appeal to the common sense of mankind. Argumentum ad verecundiam, an appeal to our rever- ence for some respected authority. Argumentum ad populum, an appeal to the passions and prejudices of the multitude. Argumentum ad ignorantiam, an argument founded on the ignorance of an adversary. Argumentum per impossibile, or Beductio ad ab- surdum, is the proof of a conclusion derived from the absurdity of a contradictory supposition. These arguments are called Indirect, because the conclusion that is established is not the absolute and general one in question, but some other relative and particular conclusion, which the person is bound to admit in order to maintain his consistency. The Beductio ad dbsurdum is the form of argument which more particularly comes under this denomination. This mode of reasoning is much employed in geometry, where, instead of demonstrating what is asserted, everything that contradicts the assertion is shown to be absurd. For, if everything which 40 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. contradicts a proposition is absurd, or unthinkable, the pro- position itself must be accepted as true. ARGUMENTATION is opposed to intuition and con- sciousness. It is used by Price as synonymous with deduction (Review, ch. v.). " Argumentations nomine tota disputatio ipsa comprehenditur, constans esc argumento et argumenti confutatione " (Cicero). ART (Latin ars, from Greek apery, strength or skill ; or from apa> to fit, join, or make agree). — (1) Skill in practice j (2) more generally, skill in giving embodiment or representa- tion to the ideal. "Art has in general preceded science" (M'Cosh, Meth. of Bis. Gov., p. 151). Art is defined by Lord Bacon to be " a proper disposal of the things of nature by human thought and experience, so as to make them answer the designs and uses of mankind." It may be defined more concisely as the adjustment of means to accomplish a desired end (Stewart, Works, ii. 36, Hamilton's edition). " The object of science is knowledge ; the objects of art are works. In art, truth is a means to an end ; in science it is the only end. Hence the practical arts are not to be classed among the sciences " (Whewell, Phil, of Induct. Sci., aph. 25). " The distinction between science and art is, that a science is a body of principles and deductions, to explain the nature of some object matter. An art is a body of precepts, with practical skill, for the completion of some work. A science teaches us to know, an art to do " (Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, p. 16, 2nd ed. ; p. 13, 3rd ed.). " Science gives principles, art gives rules. Science is fixed, and its object is intellectual ; art is contingent, and its object sensible " (Harris, Dialogue on Art). The difference between art and science is regarded as merely verbal by Sir William Hamilton in Edin. Rev., No. 115; for contrary view see Preface of St Hilaire's translation of the Organon, p. 12 ; Whewell, Phil, of Induct. Sci., pt. ii. bk. ii. ch. viii. " The principles which art involves, science evolves. The truths on which art depends lurk in the artist's mind unde- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 41 veloped, guiding his hand, stimulating his invention, balancing his judgment, but not appearing in the form of enunciated propositions. Art in its earlier stages is anterior to science- it may afterwards borrow aid from it" (Whewell, Phil, of Induct. Sci., ii. Ill, 112, new ed.). ASCETICISM (ao-KT/jo-K, exercise). — Practice of self-denial beyond the requirements of moral law, avowedly for the attainment of a higher moral life. The exercise of severe virtue among the Pythagoreans and Stoics was so called. " This name may be applied to every system which teaches man not to govern his wants by subordinating them to reason and the law of duty, but to stifle them entirely, or at least to resist them as much as he can ; and these are not only the wants of the body, but still more those of the heart, the imagination, and the mind Asceticism may be distinguished as religious, which is founded on the doctrine of expiation, and seeks to appease the divine wrath by voluntary sufferings, and philosophical, which aims at accomplishing the destiny of the soul, developing its faculties, and freeing it from the servitude of sense'' (Diet. des. Sci. Phil.). ASSENT (ad sentio).—(\) To think the same— to be of the same mind ; (2) intellectual acceptance of a proposition. The term is generally used as implying a measure of faith or belief in the absence of intuition or reasoned proof. " Assent is that act of the mind by which we accept as true a proposition, a perception, or an idea. It is a necessary part of judgment; for if you take away from judgment affirmation or denial, nothing remains but a simple conception, without logical value, or a proposition which must be examined before it can be admitted" (Bid. des. Sci. Phil.). — V. Belief, Con- sent. ASSERTION (ad sero, to join to, to declare), in Logic, affirmation (Whately, Logic, bk. ii. ch. ii. sec. 1). — V. Affibma- tion. ASSERTORY, Affirmative. — Judgments have been dis- tinguished into problematic, assertory, and apodeictic. " The problematic is that which expresses logical possibility only, that is, a free choice of admitting such a proposition, and a purely 42 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. optional admission of it into the understanding. The asser- tory, logical reality or truth The apodeictic represents the assertory as determined by the very laws of the under- standing, and therefore as asserting a priori, thus expressing logical necessity" (Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Transc. Anal., bk. i. ch. i. sec. 3.; Max Miiller's transl., ii. 67). ASSOCIATION (associo, to accompany). — Applied to laws of mental combination which facilitate recollection — commonly called " Association of Ideas." " The law of associa- tion is this — That empirical ideas, which often follow each other, create a habit in the mind, whenever the one is pro- duced, for the other always to follow" (Kant, Anthropology, p. 182). The philosophy which traces all knowledge to experi- ence regards association as also a means of developing higher powers. The laws of association as commonly stated are these : — (1) Similarity ; (2) Contiguity ; (3) Repetition ; — mental pheno- mena, similar, or often occurring together, recall each other. The bond becomes stronger as the relation in consciousness recurs. Dispute has been raised over the question whether we may hold such associations as indissoluble or inseparable (J. S. Mill's anamination of Hamilton, 3rd ed., p. 220). " Ideas, that in themselves are not at all alien, come to be so united in some men's minds that it is very hard to separate them ; they always keep company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding but its associate appears with it " (Locke's Essay, bk. ii. ch. xxxiii. sec. 5). Locke, Essay, bk. ii. ch. xxiii.; Hume, Essays, essay iii.; Hartley, Observations on Man; Keid, Intellectual Powers, essay iv.; Stewart, Elements, vol. ii. ch. v.; Brown, Lectures, lect. xxxiii.; Hamilton's Reid, notes d** and d***, p. 889 ; Hamil- ton's Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 223 ; J. S. Mill's Examina- tion of Hamilton's Philosophy, 3rd ed., p. 219 (especially on " Insolubility," the " Revivability," and the " Associability " of Feelings); Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology, i. 228; Bain's Senses and Intellect, 2nd ed., p. 327. On the bearing of association on evolution of mind, or developmentof knowledge, — J. S. Mill's Examination of Hamilton, ch. xi.; Herbert Spencer's VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 43 First Principles, " The Knowable." Criticism of the theory, — Calderwood's Handbook of Moral Philosophy, pp. 98-122. ASSUMPTION (assumo, to take for granted).— (1) The accepted premiss from which an inquiry or argument takes its start ; (2) with emphasis on the prefix, it is used to designate the subordinate premiss, connected with the more general. Of enunciations or premises, that which is taken universally is called the proposition, that which is less universal and comes into the mind secondarily is called the assumption (Trendelenburg, Notrn in Arist.). The assumption is thus the minor proposition in a syllogism, the major being named in contrast the presumption. The terms more commonly in use are sumption, and subsumption. ATHEISM (a priv., and 0eds, God).— The doctrine that there is no God. The term is properly applied to every theory of the universe which does not postulate an Intelligent First Cause. Every Materialistic Theory is Atheistic. Under this title falls to be included the theory which seeks to account for existence by reference to matter and motion, first attributed to Diagoras of Melos (Ueberweg's History, i. 80; Schwegler, p. 26); and the early elemental theories of Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus. Atheism has been distinguished from Anti-theism; and the former has been supposed to imply merely the non-recog- nition of God, while the latter asserts His non-existence. This distinction is founded on the difference between unbelief and disbelief (Chalmers, Nat. Theol., i. 58), and its validity is admitted in so far as it discriminates merely between sceptical and dogmatic atheism, (Buchanan, Faith in God, i. 396). "The verdict of the atheist on the doctrine of a God, is only that it is not proven. It is not that it is disproven. He is but an atheist. He is not an anti-theist n (Chalmers, ut supra). Plato, treating of Atheism as a disorder of the soul (Tavnjv t?)v voa-ov), says : — " There have always been persons, more or less numerous, who have had the same disorder. I have known many of them, and can tell you this, that no one who had 44 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. taken up in youth this opinion, that the Gods do not exist, ever continued in the same until he was old " (Laws, bk. x. p. 888 ; Jowett's Plato, 1st ed., iv. 398). " To believe nothing of a designing principle or mind, nor any cause, measure, or rule of things but chance, so that in nature neither the interest of the whole, nor of any parti- culars, can be said to be in the least designed, pursued, or aimed at, is to be a perfect atheist" (Shaftesbury, Inquiry Concerning Virtue, bk. i. pt. i. sec. 2). Hi soli sunt athei qui mundum rectoris sapientis consilio negant in initio constitutum utque in omni tempore administrari (Hutcheson, Metaphysics, pt. iii. cap. i.). • Atheism is erroneously applied to Spinoza's system, which is at the opposite extreme from Atheism. — V. Aoosmism. Equally unwarrantable is it to describe the theory of Evolution as Atheistic. As a theory, it leaves untouched the question of the origin of existence. Mr Darwin says: — •" There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms, or into one ; and that whilst the planet has gone cycling on accord- ing to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning, endless forms, most beautiful and most wonderful, have been and are being evolved (Origin of Species, p. 577). By theological writers of the 16th century, the name of Atheism is applied to the unbelief of such persons as Pom- ponatius ; and in the 1 7th it is used by Bacon (Essay on Atheism), Milton (Paradise Lost, bk. vi.), and Bunyan (Pilgrim) to imply general unbelief. Toward the end of the same century it is found, e.g., in Kortholt (Be Tribus Imputoribus, 1680), to include Deism such as that of Hobbes, as well as a Pantheistic scheme like Spinoza's. Tillotson (Sermon on Atheism) and Bentley (Boyle Lectures) use the word more exactly ; the intro- duction of the term Deism induced in the writers of the 18th century a more limited and exact use of the former term. ATOMISM (a, priv.; and re/wo, to cut, — that which cannot be cut or divided is an atom), the theory of the universe which traces its origin to primitive indivisible particles of matter, differing in f orm and in their relations to each other. The theory VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 45 is that which accounts for existence by the action, interaction, and combinations of atoms. Leucippus and Democritus were the founders of the School of Atomists (Diog. Laert., bk. ix. pp. 30- 49). The conception, however, belongs to eastern thought, as in the Nya'ya Philosophy, according to Kanada's aphorism, No. 7, "ultimate difference is that which resides in eternal substances," as in the case of two atoms (The Bhaisha' Parich- chhada and its commentary, by V. P. Bhatta, with an English version, Calcutta, 1851). Under the theory, atoms differing in size and form, endowed with power of motion, explain attraction and repulsion, and account for the homogeneous and the different. Along with an atomic theory, there has quite commonly been held the existence of an intelligent First Cause, — and incorporeal Deity. The natural tendency with such a theory, however, is towards Materialism. Ueberweg's History, i., Leucippus and Democritus, p. 67, Epicurus, p. 205 ; Schwegler's History, pp. 25, 26 ; Lucretius, p. 138 ; Cud worth's Intellectual System, bk. i. ch. i. sec. 18 ; Stewart's Active Powers, vol. ii. note a, Works, vii. 369, " Various Hypotheses in explanation of the activity apparent in the universe.'' ATTENTION (attendo, to stretch towards), concentrated observation, the voluntary directing of the energy of the mind towards an object. " The phrase direction of consciousness might often be advantageously substituted for it " (Holand's Mental Physiology, p. 14). It implies Will, as distinct from Intelligence and Sensibility, being the voluntary direction of intelligence. According to Dr Keid, "Attention is a voluntary act; it requires an active exertion to begin and to continue it ; and it may be continued as long as we will ; but consciousness is involuntary, and of no continuance, changing with every thought " (Intellectual Powers, essay i. ch. v.). According to Reid, Attention to external things is observation. Attention to the subjects of our own consciousness is reflection. Attention and abstraction are the same process, viewed in different relations (Hamilton's Metaphysics, lect. xiii. i. 236). 46 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. ATTRIBUTE {atbribuo, to ascribe), anything that can be predicated of another. " Attributes are usually distributed under the three heads of quality, quantity, and relation " (Mill, Logic, 2nd ed., i. 83). In the Schools, the definition, the genus, the proprium, and the accident, were called dialectic attributes ; because, accord- ing to Aristotle {Topic, lib. i. cap. vi.), these were the four points of view in which any subject of philosophical discussion should be viewed. "By this word attribute" said Descartes (in his letter to Eegius), "is meant something which is immovable and inseparable from the essence of its subject, as that which con- stitutes it, and which is thus opposed to mode." Thus unity, identity, and activity are attributes of the soul ; for I cannot deny them, without at the same time denying the existence of the soul itself. Sensibility, liberty, and intelligence are but faculties. In God there is nothing but attributes, because in God everything is absolute, involved in the substance and unity of the necessary being. In Deo non prqprie modos aut qualitates sed attribute/, tantum dicimus esse (Descartes, Prin. Phil, i. n. 57). Spinoza defines attribute as "that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence ;" mode as "the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is perceived through, something other than itself " {Ethics, pt. i. defins. 4 and 5). AUTHENTIC ( chance {Physics, ii. 4-6). AUTONOMY (airbi vdfuos, itself a law).— Autonomy of the will is Kant's phrase for the doctrine that the human will is a law unto itself, or carries its guiding principle within itself. " Autonomy of Will is that quality of Will by which a Will (independently of an object willed) is a law to itself " (Meta- physics of Ethics, Semple, 3rd ed., p. 55 ; Kant's Theory of Ethics, Abbot, 3rd ed., p. 59). Bearing on this, Kant's leading positions are these: — " Eeason is given to man as the governor of his Will, by its sway to constitute it altogether good" (Semple, 5); the notion Duty comprehends under it " that of a good Will, considered, however, as affected by certain inward hindrances" (7); Duty is the necessity of an act out of reverence felt for law " (11) ; the formula of " ideal legality " is this — " Act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal " (13); " ethical ideas have their origin and seat altogether a priori in the Reason " (23) ; an intelligent being " alone has the prerogative of acting accord- ing to the representation of laws, i.e., according to principle, or has a Will " (25) ; " freedom of will is autonomy, i.e., that property of will by which it determines its own causality, and gives itself its own law " (58) ; " reason must have a causality of its own, adapted for determining the sensory according to its own principles " (74). AVERAGES. — Calculable proportions in view of all the variety of conditions concerned in occurrences. This is de- scribed in Logic as the doctrine of Probabilities (Quetelet, On Probabilities, transl. Downes; De Morgan, Cambridge Phil. Transactions). "Chance may be described as the amount of belief with which we expect one or other out of two or more uncertain events " (Thomson's Laws of Thought, 3rd ed., p. 331). As applicable to the occurrence of crime, as of accident, Lotze says : — " As soon as we know that the general economy of the universe apparently requires yearly a certain average of crime just as much as a certain average of temperature, we can hardly help seeing even in intellectual life the unbroken VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 49 sequence of a blind mechanism" (Microcosmus, translation, i. 25). AXIOM (a£Co>na, from dfiou, to think worthy), (1) a position of worth or authority, (2) the basis of demonstration, (3) a self-evident proposition. " Philosophers give the name of axioms only to self-evident truths that are necessary, and are not limited to time and place, but must be true at all times and in all places " (Keid, Intellectual Powers, essay ii. ch. xx. ; Hamilton, Reid's Works, note a, sec. 5; Stewart, Elements, pt. ii. ch. L). Aristotle applied the term to all self-evident principles, which are the grounds of all science (Anal. Post, lib. i. ch. ii. 13 and ch. iii. 5), things immediate, tol apeo-a, which do not admit of proof. According to him they were all sub- ordinate to the supreme condition of all demonstration, the principle of identity and contradiction. The Stoics, under the name of axioms, included every kind of general proposi- tion, whether of necessary or contingent truth. In this sense the term is employed by Bacon, who, not satisfied with submitting axioms to the test of experience, has distinguished several kinds of axioms, some more general than others (Novum Organum, lib. i. aphor. xiii., xvii., xix., &c). The Cartesians, in applying the methods of geometry to philosophy have followed Aristotelian usage. BEAUTY. — Beauty is absolute, real, and ideal. The absolutely beautiful belongs to Deity. The really beautiful is presented to us in the objects of nature and the actions of human life. The ideally beautiful is aimed at by art. Plato identified the beautiful with the good, to koXov kia), which, united to virtue, forms true wisdom. Plato notices prudence, fortitude, and temperance, and in connection with or arising out of these, justice, which he considers not as the single virtue of giving all their due, but as the perfection of human 58 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. nature and of human society. The term justice had been employed in the same large sense by Pythagoras. According to the representations of Plato, prudence is the governing virtue; courage is the right kind of fear, on guard against the real dangers ; temperance is the harmony of desires with intelligence ; and justice is every man doing his proper work. " The four cardinal virtues are rather the necessary and essential conditions of virtue, than each individually a virtue. For no one can by itself be manifested as a virtue, without the other three" (Thurot, De V Entendement, torn. i. p. 162). " Justice, temperance, fortitude, and prudence, the old heads of the family of virtues, give us a division, which fails altogether ; since the parts are not distinct, and the whole is not complete. The portions of morality so laid out, both overlap one another, or are undistinguishable ; and also leave parts of the subject which do not appear in the distribution at all " (Whewell, Systemat. Mor., lect- iv.). Clodius, De Virtutibus quas Cardinales Appellant, 4to, Leips., 1815 ; Plethon, De Quatuor Virtutibus Cardinalibus 8vo, Basl., 1552. CASUISTRY.— (1) Disputation as to conflicting duties, that is, duties which seem to demand attention at the same time, yet cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. In the best sense, Casuistry is a system of the rational grounds for adjust- ment of such conflict. It does not imply dispute as to right and wrong ; it presupposes the absence of such dispute ; (2) in an evil sense, equivalent to sophistry, wilful concealment of truth under the subtleties of dialectic. A department of ethics " the great object of which is to lay down rules or canons for directing us how to act wherever there is any room for doubt or hesitation " (Stewart, Active Powers, bk. iv. ch. v. sec. 4). The science of cases, or of those special varieties which are for ever changing the face of actions as contemplated by general rules (De Quincey, On Casuistry). To casuistry, as ethical, belongs the decision of what are called cases of conscience— that is, cases in which from special circumstances the existence of obligation, or the degree of it, is involved in doubt. VOCABULARY 0¥ PHILOSOPHY. 59 CATEGOREMATIC (Karrjyopiu), to predicate).—" A word is so called which may by itself be employed as a Term. Adverbs, Prepositions, &c, and also Nouns in any other case besides the Nominative, are Syncategorematic, i.e., can only form part of a Term " (Whately, Logic, bk. ii. ch. i. sec. 3). CATEGORICAL.— V. Proposition. CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE (Imperativ hategor- isch). — The direct command " Thou shalt," of the Moral Law. " Such an Imperative as represents an action to be in itself necessary, and without regard to anywhat out of and beyond it " (Semple's translation of The Metaphysic of Ethics, new ed., p. 27). " An imperative, which, irrespective of every ulterior end or aim, commands categorically " (ib., p. 27). " The representation of an objective principle, so far as it necessitates the will, is called a Commandment or Keason, and a, formula expressing such is called an Imperative" (ib., p. 25). This formula Kant presents in three forms : — (1) Act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal " (13) ; (2) " act from that maxim only when thou canst will law universal " (34) ; (3) " act as if the maxim of thy will were to become, by thy adopting it, a universal law of nature " (34). All three forms point to universality as characteristic of the Ethical Imperative, the first expresses the authoritative in the law ; the second indicates that the Will must be its own legislator ; and the third, that the imperative belongs to the fixed law of nature. CATEGORY (Karrryopia), to predicate), a class to which things or thoughts may be referred. The categories are the highest classes under which objects of knowledge can be arranged in subordination and system. Philosophy, in seeking to know all things, finds it is impossible to know all things individually. Things and thoughts are, therefore, arranged in classes, according to common properties. When we know the definition of a class, we attain a formal knowledge of the individual objects of knowledge contained in that class. This attempt to render knowledge in some sense universal has been made in all ages of philosophy, and has given rise to the categories which have appeared in various forms. The earliest table of categories known is that of the 60 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. Pythagoreans, preserved by Aristotle in the First Book of his Metaphysics, ch. v. p. 3. It consists in a series of opposites or contraries, as Odd, Even, &c. Aristotle makes them ten in number, viz., ovo-la, substance ; ir6s — " Non sentimus, nisi sentiamus nos sentire — non in- telligimus nisi intelligamus nos intelligere." "No man," said Reid, " can perceive an object without being conscious that he perceives it. No man can think without being conscious that he thinks." As on the one hand we cannot think or feel without being conscious, so on the other hand we cannot be conscious without thinking or feeling." This view of consciousness, as the common condition under which all our faculties are brought into operation, and con- sidering these faculties and their operations as so many modi- fications of consciousness, has of late been generally adopted ; so much so, that psychology, or the science of mind, has been denominated an inquiry into the facts of consciousness. All that we can truly learn of mind must be learned by attending to the various ways in which it becomes conscious. None of the phenomana of consciousness can be doubted. Hamilton identifies consciousness with immediate knowledge. He says consciousness and immediate knowledge " are terms universally convertible ; and if there be an immediate know- ledge of things external, there is consequently the conscious- ness of an outer world " (see Metaph., lects. xii. and xiii.). He protests strongly also against the view that consciousness is a separate faculty, considering it rather as the condition of the exercise of all the faculties. The reliability of consciousness has been disputed. It has VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 87 been said that " the madman's delusion, which is only an ex- treme instance of error growing out of causes that are constantly at work to pervert an individual's feeling and to vitiate his reasoning, is of itself sufficient to excite profound distrust, not only in the objective truth, but in the subjective worth, of the testimony of an individual's self-consciousness " (Maudsley, Physiology and Pathology of Mind, p. 18, 3rd ed.). In this, consciousness and judgment are confounded. " The immediate apprehension of the mental images imme- diately presented to me is necessarily true. Error is possible only when they are subsumed under a general notion. In this sense, internal perception, more trustworthy than external, is the foundation of all philosophical knowledge. That we have a perception of our own inner mental (psychic) life, into which existence immediately enters, without the admixture of a foreign form, is the first stronghold of the theory of knowledge" (Ueberweg, System, of Logic, p. 88, Lindsay's transl.). See Hamilton, Metaph., lects. xi.-xvi., and note H in ReicPs Works; Mill, Examination of Hamilton, chaps, viii. and ix. CONSENT {Con, with, and sentio, I feel, or think). — Voluntarily expressed agreement with another in thought, feel- ing, or action. Assent expresses a conviction of the understanding ; Consent, acquiescence of disposition and will. The one accepts what is true ; the other agrees to participate in what is approved as either right or desirable. CONSENT, UNIVERSAL, Argument from, to the necessity of the truth involved. " These things are to be regarded as first truths, the credit of which is not derived from other truths, but is inherent in themselves. As for probable truths, they are such as are admitted by all men, or by the generality of men, or by wise men ; and among these last, either by all the wise, or by the generality of the wise, or by such of the wise as are of the highest authority " (Aristotle, Topic., bk. i. ch. i.). Cicero used it to prove the existence of the gods. De quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est. Esse igitur deos, confitendum est (De Nat. Deor., lib. i. cap. xvii.). 88 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. The argument is also used (De Nat. Deor., lib. ii. cap. ii. ; and Tuscul. Qucest., lib. i. cap. xiii., where we read Omni autem in re, consensio omnium gentium lex natural putanda est). Multum dare solemus prcesumptioni omnium hominum. Apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri (Seneca, Epist., cvii., cxvii.). Bacon is against this argument in the preface to his Instau- ratio Magna, aphorism 77. Eeid applies this argument to establish first principles (Intellectual Powers, essay i. ch. ii.). — V. Authority. CONSEQUENCE, CONSEQUENT (con sequor, to fol- low from or with). — A consequence is a conclusion or inference which is true or false, according as it follows or does not follow from the premisses. Consequent is the term applied to the second member of a hypothetical proposition (q.v.). CONSERVATIVE FACULTY.— Hamilton's designa- tion for memory proper, the other faculties connected with memory being the Reproductive and the Representative (see Metaph., lect. xxx.). CONSILIENCE of INDUCTIONS takes place when an induction obtained from one class of facts coincides with an induction obtained from a different class. This consilience is the test of the truth of the theory in which it occurs (Whewell, Philosoph. Induct. Sci.). Paley's Roraz Paulina, gathering together a number of "un- designed coincidences," is an example of the consilience of inductions. CONSTITUTIVE (German, constitutiv), that which, being an essential condition of knowledge, goes to the structure of the object of knowledge, that is, as opposed to that which is merely regulative of the procedure of our minds. This is Kant's use of the term. While sensory impression does not of itself give " rational cognition," our intelligence provides conditions in accordance with which a rational cognition is constituted. These are the " forms " of the sensory, and the " categories " of the understanding. Taking the manifold content of sensi- bility, we attain to rational knowledge by the aid of conceptions which lead to synthetical unity. The conditions of the possi- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 89 bility of experience are thus also the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience. While the forms of intuition and the categories of understanding are constitutive (i.e., actually constitute the object of knowledge), the ideas of reason are only regulative, ideals towards whose realisation experience is always striving, but which are never realised as objects in experience. The distinction between " Constitutive " and " Eegulative " appears at various points in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Thus, treating of "the analogies of experience," he distin- guishes the principles of the understanding into mathematical and dynamical, making the former, as concerned with the possi- bility of existence, constitutive, while the latter, as concerned with variable relations, are only regulative (Meiklejohn's transl., p. 134 ; Hutchison Stirling's Text-Book to Kant, p. 285). When we pass to the ideas of the reason, the idea being " a necessary conception of reason, to which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense " (Meiklejohn, p. 228), of which there are three, — the Soul, the Universe, and God, — these transcendental ideas are only regulative (ib., p. 407). CONTEMPLATION (contemplor, means originally to gaze on a shire of the heavens marked out by the augur). — " Keep- ing the idea which is brought into it (the mind) for some time actually in view, which is called contemplation " (Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. ii. ch. x. sec. 1). CONTINENCE (contineo, to restrain), the virtue which consists in governing the appetite of sex. It is most usually applied to men, as chastity is to women. Chastity may be the result of natural disposition or temperament — continence carry- ing with it the ideas of self-government, struggle, and victory. CONTINGENT (contingo, to touch). — (1) Occurrences dependent upon events which we cannot forecast ; (2) variable possibilities under fixed law. An event, the opposite of which is possible, is contingent ; an event, the opposite of which is impos- sible, is necessary. " In popular language, whatever event takes place of which we do not discern the cause why it should have happened in this manner, or at this moment, rather than another, is called 90 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. a contingent event ; as, for example, the falling of a leaf on a particular spot, or the turning up of a certain number when dice are thrown." All events are, in a sense, necessary, as form- ing part of the universal causal nexus, but we call those con- tingent whose necessity we cannot trace (Taylor, Elements of Thought). — V. Arbitrary. CONTINUITY (Law of). — (1) Persistence of movement through successive stages; (2) persistence of being through successive transformations. In the latter reference, now the most familiar, it is the expression of the indestructibility of matter and energy. The law of continuity, though originally applied to continuity of motion, was extended by Charles Bonnet to continuity of being. He held that all the various beings which compose the universe form a descending scale without any chasm or saltus, from the Deity to the simplest forms of unorganised manner. A similar view had been held by Locke and others. The principle of continuity was one of the guiding ideas of the philosophy of Leibnitz. Kant also holds that " all phenomena are continuous quantities " (Critique of Pure Season, Antici- pations of Perception). For more recent usage in physical science, see Balfour Stewart's Conservation of Energy, and Tait's Recent Advances of Physical Science. " The grand principle of Conservation of Energy is simply a statement of the invariability of the quantity of energy in the universe (Tait, p. 17). Modern science proclaims the continuity of Law, i.e., that the transition from lower to higher laws is not abrupt, but gradual, the former surviving, as it were, in the latter. CONTRACT (contraho, to draw together). — A voluntary agreement involving mutual obligations. Viewed ethically, the obligation to fulfil a contract is the same with that to fulfil a promise (Aristotle, Rhet., i. 10; Eth. N., v. 2, 13). The framing and fulfilling of contracts have in all countries been made the object of positive law. The consideration of the various kinds and conditions of con- tracts thus belongs to Jurisprudence. In Roman law a dis- tinction was made between parts or agreements entered into VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 91 without any cause or consideration antecedent, present or future, and pacts which were entered into for a cause or con- sideration, that is, containing a crwaAAay/xa, or bargain, or a quid pro quo — in which one party came under obligation to give or do something, on account of something being done or given by the other party. Agreements of the latter kind were properly contracts, while those of the former were called bare pacts. A pactum nudum, or bare pact, was so called because it was not clothed with the circumstances of mutual advantage, and was not a valid agreement in the eye of the Eoman law. Nuda pactio obligationem non facit. It is the same in English law, in which a contract is defined as " the agreement of several persons in a concurrent declaration of intention, whereby their legal relations are determined " (cf. Maine's Ancient Law, ch. ix.). — V. Status. CONTRADICTION (Principle, Law, or Axiom of), (contradico, to speak against; contradictio, avrtyaa-is). — It is usually expressed thus : — A thing cannot be and not be at the same time, or a thing must either be or not be, or the same attribute cannot at the same time be affirmed and denied of the same subject. Aristotle laid down this principle as the basis of all Logic, and of all Metaphysic (Metapk., lib. iii. cap. iii. sec. 3; lib. ix. cap. vii. ; lib. x. cap. v. ; lib. iv. cap. iii. sec. 13; lib. iv. cap. v. sec. 59 ; lib. iii. cap ii. sec. 12; Analyt. Prin., ii. 2, 53, B, 15). Attacked in ancient times by the Sceptics and Epicurus, and in the Middle Ages by the Scotists, it has been subjected by modern philosophers to a searching scrutiny. Locke re- pudiated it as useless for the purpose of attaining real know- ledge, its only use being, according to him, didactic and argumentative (see Essay on Human Understanding, iv. 7), Leibnitz (Nouv. Essays, iv. 2, sec. 1) vindicated its value and its innate character against Locke's attack. Considering it insufficient, however, as the basis of all truth and reasoning, he added the principle of the sufficient reason (q.v.). Kant thought this principle good only for those judgments of which the predicate is implied in the subject ; or, as he called them, analytic judgments ; as when we say, .all body has extension. 92 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. The idea of extension being implied in that of body, it is a sufficient warrant of the truth of such a judgment, that it implies no contradiction. In synthetic judgments, on the con- trary, we rest either on a priori grounds of reason, or on the testimony of experience, according as they are a priori or a posteriori. Hegel considers it as the true expression of the procedure of thought at a certain stage — that of the ' abstract ' understanding. But the distinctions which seem to under- standing to be absolute are overcome by reason, which finds a deeper unity in the identity of opposites ; and thus, though all thought proceeds according to the principle of contradiction, that principle is not to be taken as a final statement of truth, but only as its provisional expression {Logic of Hegel, Wallace, p. 189). Hamilton considers this principle, which he calls the law of non-contradiction, equally primary with that of Identity, the one being the positive and the other the negative expression of the same law [Lectures on Logic, i. 81-2). — V. Identity. Ueberweg, System of Logic, pp. 235 ff, transl. by Lindsay. CONTRADICTORY.— The Contradictory of any Term is its mere negation, e.g., notovhite is the contradictory of white. So the contradictory of any Proposition is its mere negation, e.g., Some men are not white is the contradictory of All men are white. The contradictory of the Universal Affirmative (A) is the Particular Negative (0) ; of the Universal Negative (E) the Particular Affirmative (I). Of two contradictory proposi- tions, one is necessarily true and the other false. CONTRAPOSITION.— A so-called "immediate inference," which is in reality only a different form of statement, e.g., Every S is P ; therefore, No notrP is S. It consists in denying the original subject of the contradictory of the original predicate. CONTRARY. — Aristotle defines contrary, " that which in the same genus differs most;" as in colour, white and black; in sensation, pleasure and pain ; in morals, good and evil. Contrary, like contradictory, is applied both to Terms and Propositions. This relation to one another is different from that of contradictions, e.g., " Pleasure and pain are opposed to each other as contraries, not as contradictories, that is, the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 93 affirmation of the one implies the negation of the other, but the negation of the one does not infer the affirmation of the other; for there may be a third or intermediate state, which is neither one of pleasure nor one of pain, but one of indifference" (Hamilton, MetapL, lect. xlii. vol. ii. p; 436). Of Propositions, the Universal Affirmative (A) and the Universal Negative (E) are opposed to one another as contraries, and of these both can- not be true, and both may be false. Thus, the affirmative of the one implies the negative of the other, but not vice versd. Sub-contrary propositions are the particular affirmative (I) and the particular negative (0). Of these both may be true, and only one can be false. CONVEESION.— The transposition of the subject of a proposition into the place of the predicate, and of the predicate into the place of the subject. The proposition to be converted is called the convertend, and that into which it is converted the converse. Logical conversion is one species of Immediate In- ference, the truth of the converse being inferred from the truth of the convertend by conversion. No term must be distributed in the converse which was undistributed in the convertend. It is of three kinds, viz., simple conversion, conversion per accidens or by limitation, and conversion by negation or contraposition. COPULA (The) is that part of a proposition which indi- cates that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject. This is sometimes done by inflection; as when we say, Fire burns ; the change from burn to bums showing that we mean to affirm the predicate burn of the subject fire. But this function is more commonly fulfilled by the word is, when an affirmation is intended — is not, when a negation ; or by. some other part of the verb to be ; and the copula may always be resolved into this form. Sometimes is is both copula and predicate, e.g., "One of Jacob's sons is not." But the copula, merely as such, does not imply real existence, e.g., " A faultless man is a being feigned by the Stoics " (see Whately, Logic, bk. ii. ch. i. sec. 2 ; Mill, Logic, bk. i. ch. iv. sec. 1 ; Fowler, Deductive Logic, p. 25). COROLLARY. — Applied to a consequence following from something already demonstrated, an additional element of knowledge made good by some previous attainment. This is 94 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. in accordance with the etymology of the word, which in its earlier uses signified a surplus or addition, and is so used by Shakespeare (Tempest, act iv. scene i.). CORRECTIVE.— V. Punishment. CORRELATE. — V. Belation. COSMOGONY (ratr/tos, world; yiyvopai, to come into being), a theory of the origin of the world. The different cosmogonies may be comprehended under two classes : — 1. Those which represent the matter though not the form of the world to be from eternity. 2. Those which assign both the matter and form of the world to the direct agency of a spiritual cause. Pythagoras is reported as having taught that the monad was the beginning of all, from this an indefinite duad, from these numbers, next signs, then plane figures, then solid bodies, then the four elements — fire, water, earth, and air, — whence the world, which is possessed of life and intellect (Diog. Laert., lib. viii. 48). The Atomists, Leucippus and Demo- critus, taught that the origin of all was in indivisible and eternal atoms, similar in nature but differing in form and position (Aristotle, Metaph., i. 4). According to Aristotle, matter is eternal ; God acts directly upon the heavens ; Nature has in it the principle of motion and rest ; all motion is directed to an end ; and, in course of the motion, the elements are originated, and beyond this, organised being. COSMOTHETIC IDEALISTS.— An alternative desig- nation applied by Hamilton to Hypothetical Dualists, — a class which constitutes, he says, "the great majority of modern philosophers. Denying our immediate or intuitive knowledge of the external reality, whose existence they maintain, they, of course, hold a doctrine of mediate or representative perception, and, according to the various modifications of that doctrine, they are again subdivided into those who view, in the immediate object of perception, a representative entity present to the mind, but not a mere mental modification, and into those who hold that the immediate object is only a representative modification of the mind itself" (Metaph., lect. xvi.). VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 95 COSMOLOGY, Rational. — A theory of the universe, satisfying the requirements of human reason. — V. Meta- physics. COURAGE (dvSjoeta). — The manly or soldierly virtue, — the second of the Cardinal virtues described by Plato {Republic, lib. iv. 429), defined as the right kind of fear. CRANIOLOGY— A theory of the skull, designed by re- ference to its measurement and form to supply data for judg- ment concerning brain-power and mind. CREATION. — The origin of finite being. Unless we deny the existence of God, we must either believe in creation or accept one or other of the two hypotheses, of which the one may be called theological dualism, the other pantheism. According to the former, there are two necessary and eternal beings, God and matter. According to the latter, all beings are but modes or manifestations of one eternal and necessary being. A belief in creation admits only one necessary and eternal being, at once substance and cause, intelligence and power, absolutely free and infinitely good. CREDIBILITY.— 7. Testimony. CREDULITY— (1) The exercise of mind in accepting the testimony of others ; (2) facility of assent, in absence of suffi- cient evidence " (Lotze, Microcosmus, i. 374 ; Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, pt. vii. sec. 4 ; Reid, Inquiry, ch. vi. sec. 24; Active Powers, essay iii. pt. i. ch. ii. ; Stewart, Active Powers, bk. iv. pt. i. ch. iii.). CRITERION (xpiT^piov, Kpivf.iv, to discriminate; Kptr^s, judge). — (1) An organ by which truth is attained; (2) a ground of judgment, or a test of certainty, including forms of evidence, or standards of judgment. It has been distinguished into the criterion a quo, per quod, and secundum quod — or, the being who judges, the organ or faculty by which he does so, and the rule according to which he judges. The last is criterion in the proper sense. "With regard to the criterion (says Edw. Poste, M.A., Introd. to transl. of Poster. Analyt. of Aristotle), or organs of truth, among the ancient philosophers, some advocated a simple and others a mixed criterion. The advocates of the former were 96 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. divided into Sensationalists or Rationalists, as they advocated sense or reason ; the advocates of the latter advocated both sense and reason. Democritus and Leucippus were Sensation- alists; Parmenides and the Pythagoreans were Rationalists; Plato and Aristotle belonged to the mixed school. Among those who advocated reason as a criterion, there was an import- ant difference : some advocating the common reason, as Hera- clitus and Anaxagoras ; others, the scientific reason, or the reason as cultivated and developed by education, as Parmenides, the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristotle. In the Republic (bk. vii.), Plato prescribes a training calculated to prepare the reason for the perception of the higher truths. Aristotle requires education for the moral reason. The older Greeks used the word measure instead of criterion ; and Protagoras said that man was the measure of all truth. This Aristotle interprets to mean that sense and reason are the organs of truth, and he accepts the doctrine, if limited to these faculties in a healthy and perfect condition." The question of the criterion of truth became still more prominent in the Post- Aristotelian schools. " If truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its object, then this object must thereby be distinguished from others. Now an universal criterion of truth would be such as holds good of all cognitions, without distinction of their objects. It is plain, however, that as in the case of such a criterion there is abstraction from every matter of cognition (reference to its object), and truth precisely concerns this matter, it is quite impossible and absurd to ask still after a criterion of the truth of this matter of the cognitions ; and that, therefore, it is impossible also to assign any adequate criterion of truth that shall at the same time be universal. What is to be said here, then, is that of the truth of cognition as regards matter there is no universal criterion to be required, for any such were a contradiction in itself. But it is equally plain, as regards cognition in mere form (all matter apart), that a logic confined to the universal and necessary rules of the understanding must furnish first in these rules criteria of the truth. For what contradicts these is false, inasmuch as the understanding VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 97 would then contradict its own universal rules of thought, and consequently its own. self. .... The merely logical criterion of truth, agreement of cognition, namely, with the universal and formal laws of the understanding and reason, is certainly the conditio sine qua non, or the negative condition of all truth. Further, however, logic cannot go; and the error which concerns not the form, but the matter, is not to be detected by any touchstone of logic" (Kant's Critique of Pure Season, pt. ii., introd., sec iii. ; Stirling's Text-Book of Kant, p. 176, Meikle- john, 51). On the criteria of Evidence or Testimony, see Sir G. C. Lewis, On Authority in Matters of Opinion. CRITICISM, CRITIQUE (Kritik),—(l) test of the merits of a work ; (2) employed by Kant to designate a philosophy attained by critical discrimination of those elements of know- ledge which are given by the Understanding or by the Keason, in contrast with those derived from experience. " That all our knowledge begins with experience admits of no doubt .... but it by no means follows that all arises out of experience It is, therefore, a question whether there exists a know- ledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions 1 Knowledge of this kind is called a priori in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has sources & posteriori, that is, in experience From all that has been said, there results the idea of a particular science, which may be called the Critique of Pure Reason. For reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge a priori We can regard a science of the mere criticism of pure reason, its source and limits, as the propaedeutic to a system of pure reason. Such a science must not be called a Doctrine, but only a Critique of Pure Eeason " (Kant's intro- duction to the Critique of Pure Season). — V. Transcen- dental. CRUCIAL INSTANCE. — A case of a phenomenon which alone is sufficient to decide between two rival hypotheses (see Bacon, Nov. Organ., bk. ii. aph. 36 ; Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. viii. andx.; Fowler, Inductive Logic, pp. 149-152). — V. Hypothesis. CUMULATIVE (The Argument). — An argument gain- ing in force by increase of evidence and of reasons as it a 98 VOOABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. advances, each new point having additional testimony for the conclusion. Its strength does not lie in the connection of the points with each other, but simply in their sum. For example, " the proof of a Divine agency is not a conclusion which lies at the end of a chain of reasoning, of which chain each instance of contrivance is only a link, and of which, if one link fail, the whole fails ; but it is an argument separately supplied by every separate example. An error in stating an example affects only that example. The argument is cumulative in the fullest sense of that term. The eye proves it without the ear, the ear with- out the eye " (Paley, Nat. Theol., ch. vi.). CUSTOM (Consuetudo).— (1) A common practice ; (2) the familiar. It is distinguished from habit, facility acquired by repetition. On the subject of Customs and Customary Law, see Maine, Ancient Law, ch. i., and the same author's Village Communities in the East and West. CYNIC — One of the schools of Philosophy, formed after the days of Socrates, noted for the prominence given to that part in the teaching of Socrates which urged self-denial and independence of external advantages. After the death of Socrates, some of his disciples, under Antisthenes, were accustomed to meet in the Cynosargos, one of the gymnasia of Athens, — and hence they were called Cynics (Diog. Laert., lib. vi. cap. xiii.). Antisthenes was the founder of the school. He treated, as Plato did, of the distinction between opinion and knowledge, — Trapa Sof^s Kai cwtoT^/tiys (Diog. Laert., lib. vi. cap. xvii.), and insisted that virtue is the true requisite for a happy life. " To the Cynic nothing is good but virtue, nothing bad but vice, and what is neither the one nor the other is for man indifferent" (Zeller, Philosophy of the Greeks, Reichel's transl., Soc. and the Socrat. Schools, p. 256). Diogenes is the name most familiar as representative of the school, being pre-eminently " The Cynic," by his teaching, character, and habits giving definiteness to the name, though somewhat exaggerating its characteristics. He is well de- scribed by Zeller as " that witty and eccentric individual, whose imperturbable originality, ready wit, and strength of character, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 99 admirable even in its excesses, no less than his fresh and vigorous mind, have been held up to view as forming the peculiar type of character of the ancient world" (ib., p. 245). The weakness of the school lay in its ascetic tendency, carried even to the extent of contemptuous disregard of the ordinary notions and susceptibili- ties of men. This school is the historic percursor of the Stoics. OYRBNAIC— Another school of Philosophy, formed from amongst those who had come under the sway of Socrates. Its founder was Aristippus of Cyrene, who was attracted to Athens by the fame of Socrates (Diog. Laert., lib. ii.). Under his guidance the thought and practice of the school tended in the contrary direction from that of the Cynics, exalting pleasure as the desirable, not as if escape from pain were enough, but making attainment of pleasure by direct effort, guided by regard to the known consequences of actions, the end of life. While at the opposite pole from asceticism, it still insisted on the need for self- regulation as a necessary condition for happiness in life. On ac- count of the prominence given to enjoyment, the school favoured in some measure a sceptical tendency in thought, along with self-indulgence in practice. The historic relations connect the Cyrenaics with the Epicureans of later days (Zeller, Philosophy of the Greeks, Soc. and the Socrat. Schools, Eeichel, ch. xiv.). DiEMON (SaXfianv or Sai/xoviov). — The term (1) in earliest usage meant a god, one of the order of deities ; (2) later, an inferior deity, acting the part of a messenger for the gods, specially in communicating their will to men ; this is the sense in which it is applied to the daemon or genius of Socrates; (3) in latest use, an evil spirit. Socrates declared that he had a friendly spirit, or Daemon, who restrained him from things he was about to do. " He is a great spirit (Saipmv), and like all that is spiritual he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal." " And what is the nature of this spiritual power?" Socrates said. " This is the power," Diotima said, " which interprets and con- veys to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and rewards of the gods ; and this power spans the chasm which divides them, and in this all is bound together " (Plato's Symposium, 202, Jowett). 100 TOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. In his Apology, Socrates refers to the coming of the Saipoviov as a well-known characteristic of his life, inconsistent with the charge of atheism brought against him. The Daimonion is spoken of as a Voice, a God, and a Messenger from the God. Plutarch has a Dialogue on the Daemon of Socrates, and Apuleius also wrote De Deo Socratis (Ueberweg's Hist., i. 236). DARWINIAN THEORY— DARWINISM.— V. Evo- lution. DATUM, that which is given or granted, as a position from which to reason. Thus facts are the data for observational science ; axioms for mathematics ; and the conditions of the understanding and first truths of the reason are the data for metaphysics. DEDUCTION (de ducere, to draw from), drawing a parti- cular truth from a general, antecedently known, as distinguished from Induction,, rising from particular truths to a general. The syllogism is the form of deduction. " An enunciation in which, from the truth of certain assertions, the truth of another assertion different from the first is inferred " (Aristotle, Prior Andlyt., bk. i, ch. i.). The principle of deduction is, that things which agree with the same thing agree with one another. The principle of induction is, that in the same circumstances, and in the same substances, from the same causes the same effects will follow. The mathematical and metaphysical sciences are founded on deduction; the physical sciences with empirical Psychology rest on induction. Mill holds that all reasoning is ultimately inductive. For his views as to the relation of induction and deduction, the nature of the syllogism and mathematical inference, see Logic, bk. ii. See also Whewell, Phil, of Induct. Sci. For the Kantian use of the term, see next article. DE FACTO and DE JURE.— With some offences the penalty attaches to the offender at the instant when the fact is committed ; in others, not until he is convicted by law. In the former case he is guilty de facto, in the latter dejure. De facto is commonly used in the sense of actually or really, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 101 and de jure in the sense of rightfully or legally; hence the philo- sophical use of the terms. A de facto proof is a mere " natural history" of the facts; a de jure proof is a vindication of their existence; e.g., the principle of causality may be proved de facto, i.e., it may be shown to be as a matter of fact accepted and acted upon by men; or dejure, i.e., it may be shown to be the necessary presupposition of the facts of experience, or of ex- perience itself. This last is the Kantian method of proof, called by him Transcendental Deduction. DEFINITION (deflnio, to mark out limits), " is used in Logic to signify an expression which explains any term so as to separate it from everything else, as a boundary separates fields " (Whately). A Definition is a categorical proposition, consisting of two parts or members, viz., a subject defined (membrum definitum) and the defining attributes of the sub- ject, i.e., those by which it is distinguished from other things {membrum difiniens). Logicians distinguish definitions into Nominal and Real. Those are called Nominal which explain merely the meaning of the term; and real, which explain the nature of the thing signi- fied by the term. See Whately, Logic, bk. ii. chap. v. sec. 6. " By a real, in contrast to a verbal or nominal definition, the logicians do not intend ' the giving an adequate conception of the nature and essence of a thing;' that is, of a thing con- sidered in itself, and apart from the conceptions of it already possessed. By verbal definition is meant the more accurate determination of the signification of a, word; by real the more accurate determination of the contents of a notion. The one clears up the relation of words to notions; the other of notions to things. The substitution of notional for real would, perhaps, remove the ambiguity. But if we retain the term real, the aim of a verbal definition being to specify the thought denoted by the word, such definition ought to be called notional, on the principle on which the definition of a notion is called real; for this definition is the exposition of what things are com- prehended in a thought" (Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 691, note). On the question whether logical Definition is real or nominal, 102 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. various views are held. On the one hand, e.g., Mansel says : — " In the sense in which nominal and real definitions were dis- tinguished by the scholastic logicians, logic is concerned with real, i.e., notional definitions only ; to explain the meaning of words belongs to dictionaries or grammars " (Prolegom., Logic, p. 189). Whately, on the other hand, holds that "Logic is concerned with nominal definitions alone " (Logic, bk. ii. ch. v. sec. 6). Mill also says — "The simplest and most correct notion of a definition is a proposition declaratory of the mean- ing of a word " (Logic, bk. i. ch. viii. sec. 1). Accordingly he considers a Definition a " purely verbal " proposition. " There is a real distinction between definitions of names and what are erroneously called definitions of things ; but it is that the latter, along with the meaning of a name, covertly asserts a matter of fact. This covert assertion is not a de- finition, but a postulate. The definition is a mere identical proposition, which gives information only about the use of language, and from which no conclusions respecting matters of fact can possibly be drawn. The accompanying postulate, on the other hand, affirms a fact which may lead to conse- quences of every degree of importance. It affirms the real existence of things, possessing the combination of attributes set forth in the definition, and this, if true, may be foundation sufficient to build a whole fabric of scientific truth" (Mill, Logic, bk. i. ch. viii. sec. 6). Real definitions are sometimes divided into essential and accidental. An essential definition states what are regarded as the constituent parts of the essence of that which is to be defined ; and an accidental definition (or description) lays down what are regarded as circumstances belonging to it, viz., properties or accidents, such as causes, effects, &c. But in reality all Definition is essential, and hence is not to be con- fused with Description (q.v.). The Definition is an account of the essence of the notion or thing ; hence it must contain the genus proximum and the differentia. For various other classifi- cations of Definitions, see Ueberweg's System of Logic, p. 164, Lindsay's transl. The Faults of Definition are thus enumerated by Ueberweg VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 103 {Logic, p. 172, Lindsay's transl.):— (1) Too great width or narrowness; (2) Redundancy, or the mention of derivative determinations or properties, besides the essence ; (3) Tautology, when the notion to be defined is repeated in the Definition ; (4) Circulus in Definiendo, or the attempt to define a notion by means of those notions which presuppose it ; (5) Definition hj figurative expression or by mere negatives. Aristotle, Topic, lib. vi. ; Poster. Analyt., lib. ii. ; Port Royal Logic, part i. ch. xii., xiii., xiv. ; part ii. ch. xvi. ; Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. iii. ch. iii. and iv. ; Eeid, Account of Aristotle's Logic, ch. ii. sec. 4. DEIST (Deus, God).— (1) Properly the Latin form, iden- tical in significance with the Greek form, Theist (0eos, God) ; (2) technically distinguished from Theist, Deist being used to designate one who believes in an Eternal Being as the source of all finite existence, but denies his Personality, or, at least, his personal government of the universe ; Theist, to describe one who believes in God's direct personal government in accord- ance with fixed laws, and for righteousness, — popularly, one who admits natural, but denies revealed religion ; (3) antagonism of meaning so complete that " Deistic " has been made equiva- lent to denial of the " Theistic " position, by acceptance of a materialistic (atheistic) scheme of existence, although the term is etymologically the contradiction of unbelieving, and especi- ally of atheistic thought. Granting a distinction between Transcendental Theology and Natural Theology, Kant takes Deist to describe the believer in the former — Theist as the name for the believer in the latter. " If by the term Theology I understand the cognition of a primal being, that cognition is based either upon reason alone (theologia rationalis) or upon revelation (theologia revelata). The former cogitates its object either by means of pure trans- cendental conceptions, as an ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium, and is termed transcendental theology ; or by means of a conception derived from the nature of our own mind, as a supreme intelligence, and must then be entitled natural theo- logy. The person who believes in a transcendental theology alone is termed a Deist ; he who acknowledges the possibility 104 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. of a natural theology also a Theist " (Kant's Critique of Pure Season, Critique of all Theology, Transcendental Dialectic, bk. ii. ch. iii. sec. 7 ; Meiklejohn, 387. The term Deist was used, towards the close of the seventeenth century and beginning of the eighteenth, as descriptive of unbelievers united by their opposition to revealed religion (Leland's View of Deistical Writers; Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, ii. 371 ; L. Stephen's English Thought in the Eighteenth Century ; Lecky's History of Rationalism). DEMERIT.— 7. Merit. DEMIURGE (817/Aiovpyos) (1) originally, a skilled work- man; (2) later, to describe God, as the maker of the world, as "Architect.'' Socrates and Plato represented God under the image of Architect, — the World-Builder. For Plato's treat- ment, see specially the Timmus, Ueberweg's Hist., i. 123; Schwegler's Hist., 79, 82. DEMONSTRATION (demonstro, to point out; to cause to see). — (1) In old English writers this word was used to signify the pointing out of the connection between a conclusion and its premises, or between a phenomenon and its asserted cause; (2) it now denotes a necessary consequence, and is synonymous with proof from first principles. To draw from a necessary and universal truth consequences which necessarily follow, is demonstration. To connect a truth with a first prin- ciple, to show that it is this principle applied or realised in a particular case, is to demonstrate. The result is science, knowledge, certainty. Those general truths arrived at by induction in the sciences of observation are certain . knowledge. But it is knowledge which is not definite or complete. It may admit of increase or modification by new discoveries, but the knowledge which demonstration gives is fixed and unalterable. A demonstration may therefore be defined as a reasoning consisting of one or more arguments, by which some proposi- tion brought into question is shown to be contained in some other proposition assumed, whose truth and certainty being evident and acknowledged, the proposition in question must also be admitted as certain. Demonstration is direct or indirect. Direct demonstration is VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 105 descending — when starting from a general truth we come to a particular conclusion, which we must afBrru or deny; or ascend- ing — when starting from the subject and its attributes, we arrive by degrees at a general principle, with which we con- nect the proposition in question. Both these are deductive, because they connect a particular truth with a general prin- ciple. Indirect demonstration is when we admit hypothetically a proposition contradictory of that which we wish to demons- trate, and show that this admission leads to absurdity, that is, to an impossibility or a contradiction. This is demonstratio per impossible, or reductio ad abswrdum. It should only be employed when direct demonstration is unattainable. The theory of demonstration is to be found in the Organon of Aristotle, "since whose time," says Kant, "Logic, as to its foundation, has gained nothing." DEONTOLOGY (to Siov, what is due, or binding ; proper or suitable ; Aoyos, discourse). — Theory of duty. The etymo- logical sense is a doctrine of duty ; yet it was specially attrac- tive to Bentham, the expounder of Utilitarianism, who urged that the word "ought" should be banished. " Deontology, or that which is proper, has been chosen as a fitter term than any other which could be found to represent, in the field of morals, the principle of utilitarianism, or that which is useful" (Bentham, Deontology; or, the Science of Morality, i. 34). " The term deontology expresses moral science, and expresses it well, precisely because it signifies the science of duty, and contains no reference to utility " ( Whewell, Preface to Mackin- tosh's Prelim. Dissert., p. 30). " The ancient Pythagoreans defined virtue to be *E£is tov SeoiTos ; that is, the habit of duty, or of doing what is binding, the oldest definition of virtue of which we have any account, and one of the most unexceptionable which is yet to be found in any system of philosophy ; ' (Stewart, Active and Moral Powers, bk. iv. ch. 5, § 2). Hamilton (Beid's Works, p. 540, note) observes that ethics are well denominated deontology. DESCENT.— V. Evolution. 106 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. DESCRIPTION. — Expanded or accidental definition, giving not only the essence, but properties and accidents in addition, or the latter alone without the essence; e.g., "a triangle is a space enclosed by three straight lines, and whose angles are equal to two right angles." — V. Definition. DESERT.— V. Merit. DESIGN (designo, to mark out). — Adaptation of means to ends. The evidence of design consists in the marks found in objects or events, of adaptation to the attainments of definite results. A philosophic theory of such evidence is named Teleology (reAos, end, and Aoyos, discourse), the theory of ends, awkwardly named " final causes." " What is done, neither by accident, nor simply for its own sake, but with a view to some effect that is to follow, is said to be the result of design. None but intelligent beings act with design ; because it requires knowledge of the connection of causes and effects, and the power of comparing ideas, to conceive of some end or object to be produced, and to devise the means proper to produce the effect. Therefore, whenever we see a thing which not only may be applied to some use, but which is evidently made for the sake of the effect which it produces, we feel sure that it is the work of a being capable of thought " (Taylor, Elements of Thought). For Kant's criticism of the argument from design as, at the most, proving only an architect of the universe, and thereby driving us back on something more than the testimony of ex- perience, see Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, ch. iii., Meiklejohn's transl., p. 370; Werke, Eosencranz, ii. 470. On the argument for the being of God from the evidences of design, or the adaptation of means to ends in the universe, see Xenophon, Memorabilia of Socrates, bk. i. ch. iv. ; Buffer, Treatise on First Truths ; Reid, Intellectual Powers, essay vi. ch. vi. ; Stewart, Active and Moral Power, bk. iii. ch. ii. ; Paley, Nat. Theol. ; Bridgewater Treatises ; Burnett Prize Essays; Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 167 ; Janet's Final Causes. — V. Cause (Final.) DESIRE. — Craving, uneasy sense of want, with longing VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 107 for satisfaction. Desire may have its origin either in the body or in the mind, but it is in every case a mental condition, and under personal control on this account. Even physical desire is liable to increase or diminution in accordance with intelligent self-direction in the matter. While Desire implies intelligence, it is not the mere efflux or product of intelligence ; even when the object of desire is known, it is not solely in consequence of knowing it that we desire it, but because we have an inclination towards certain objects or ends in which there is a fitness to give us pleasure. Our desires of such ends or objects are natural and primary. Natural, but not instinctive, for they imply intelligence; primary, and not factitious, for they result from the constitu- tion of things, and the constitution of the human mind, ante- cedent to experience and education. Green uses the word Desire in a still more restricted sense, distinguishing mere natural impulses which involve only a feeling of self from Desires proper which involve the conscious- ness of self. " The latter involves a consciousness of its object, which in turn implies a consciousness of self. In this consciousness of objects which is also that of self, or of self which is also a consciousness of objects, we have the distinguish- ing characteristic of desire (as we know it), of understanding and of will, as compared with those processes of the animal's soul with which they are apt to be confused. And this conscious- ness is also the common basis which unites desire, understand- ing, and will with each other'' (Prolegom. to Ethics, bk. ii. ch. ii. p. 123; cf, also Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, bk. i. ch. iv.). DESTINY (destmatum, fixed). — The necessary and unalter- able connection of events ; of which the heathens made a divine power, superior to all their deities. The idea of an irresistible destiny, against which man strives in vain, pervades the whole of Greek tragedy. Also Destiny of Man, referring to the final fulfilment of his being. — V. Fatalism. DETERMINISM.— The theory that all our volitions are determined by the force of motives within, which motives pro- duce their results as invariably as physical forces effect their 108 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ends. Determinism is opposed not only to liberty of indiffer- ence, or the doctrine that man can determine himself without motives, but to self-determination in government of motives. Determinism is the name more recently preferred by the upholders of this theory of Will, instead of Necessitarianism (J. S. Mill's Exam, of Hamilton's Philos., 552). This name is applied by Hamilton (Reid's Works, p. 601, note) to the doctrine of Hobbes, as contradistinguished from the ancient doctrine of fatalism. — V. Necessity, Fatalism, Liberty. DETERRENT. — V. Punishment. DEVELOPMENT. — V. Evolution. DIALECTIC (SiaXcyo), to distinguish; SiaXrjKTiKtj Texyrj, the art of picking out and combining ; Dialehtik).— Rationalised procedure within the mind, combining things in accordance with rational conditions. " The Greek verb 8iaXey«r0, to put one's hand to a thing), an attempted proof — is a syllogism confirmed in its major or minor premiss, or in both, by an incidental proposition. This proposition, with the premiss to which it is attached, forms an enthymeme or imperfectly expressed syllogism. The in- cidental proposition is the expressed premiss of the enthymeme, and the premiss to which it is attached is the conclusion, e.g.., " covetousness is sin, for it is a transgression." EPICUREANISM.— The philosophy of Epicurus and his followers. Epicurus was born in Samos, 341 or 342 B.C. He came to Athens about 306 B.O., and taught philosophy there for more than thirty years, his disciples being gathered in his own garden, afterwards bequeathed to his followers for a meet- ing-place. His name is specially associated with the doctrine that pleasure is the chief good (Diog. Laert., bk. x.). His school thus stood out as antagonistic to the Stoics, these two VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 133 being historically the parting of two streams of thought, repre- sented still in the Utilitarian and Eational Theories of morals. The Stoics and Epicureans separate and select different ten- dencies appearing in the Aristotelian Ethics, the Stoics taking the true meaning of Aristotle, and placing in prominence the warning that we are most prone to be led astray by pleasure ; the Epicureans taking, in their most general sense, the earlier statements of Aristotle, that happiness is that which all seek after. The leading Epicureans in Athens were Metrodorus, Poly- aenus, Hermarchus, and Apollodorus. The school gained con- siderable influence at a later period in Eome. The teaching of Epicurus included the criteria of truth, natural science, and ethics. The criteria of truth are "the senses, the preconceptions, and the passions." He distin- guishes between opinion and certainty, urging that we ought to judge of things obscure by analogy with those directly per- ceived. Under natural science he taught that the world is infinite, that atoms are the source of all, and that all atoms are endowed with equal power of movement, by means of which existence is necessarily determined. Everything which men said about the gods he regarded as fallacious. In ethics he maintains that pleasure is the chief good, holding that this is proved by the fact that all animals, from the moment of their birth, are delighted with pleasure and offended with pain. By pleasure he means " the freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from confusion." " Every pleasure is a good on ac- count of its own nature, but it does not follow that every plea- sure is worthy of being chosen." " The beginning and greatest good of all these things is prudence, teaching us that it is not possible to live pleasantly unless we also live prudently and honourably and justly." But he adds, " we choose the virtues for the sake of pleasure, as we seek the skill of the physician for the sake of health " (see Diog. Laert., bk. x. ; Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, Eng. transl, Beichel, ch. xv. p. 382 j Guyan, La Morale d' Epicure; W. Wallace, Epicureanism). EPISTEMOLOGY (A.dyos r^s ^nor^s, the science of 134 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. true knowing) — "the doctrine or theory of knowing, just as Ontology is the doctrine or theory of being " (Ferrier, Inst, of Metaph., p. 46). EPISYLLOGISM. — In a chain of reasoning, or Sorites (q.v.), the individual syllogisms into which it may be resolved are called respectively pro-syllogisms and epi-syllogisms, accord- ing as they are considered as inferences from earlier, or as premisses of later syllogisms. EQUANIMITY, a balanced self-regulation of life. EQUATION, correlation of equals. — This is one view of the nature of Judgment (q.v.) (see Jevons, Substitution of Similars ; Venn, Symbolic Logic). EQUIPOLLENOE.— V. Permutation. EQUITY («7T£iK€ia or to iaw, as distinguished from to vofiLKov). — That which determines the equal between man and man, in view (1) of natural rights, (2) of voluntary contract. It is described by Aristotle (Ethics, bk. v. ch. x.) as that kind of justice which corrects the irregularities or rigours of strict legal justice. All written laws must necessarily speak in general terms, and must leave particular cases to the discretion of the parties. " Equity, in its true and genuine meaning, is synonymous with natural justice ; and to this the judge must have recourse where the laws are silent, and there is nothing else to guide his decision" (Lord Mackenzie, On Soman Law; cf. Maine, Ancient Law). EQUIVOCAL (ceque vocare), applied to a vocable, or pro- position bearing a double meaning. An Equivocal, or ambiguous term in Logic, is one which has more than one signification, each of its significations being equally applicable to several objects (Whately, Logic, bk. iii. sec. 10 ; Watt's Logic, ch. iv. ; Locke's Essays, bk. iii. ch. ix. and x.). EQUIVOCATION, the act of deliberately using language in a double sense with the view of deceiving. In morals, to equivocate is wilfully to offend against the truth, by using language of double meaning in such a way as to be misunderstood, or to favour misunderstanding. VOCABTJLAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 135 ERROR. — Deviation (1) from fact in observation, (2) from the laws of Logic in reasoning. Error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true (see Locke, Essay on Human Understand- ing, bk. iv. ch. xx.). ESOTERIC, opposed to EXOTERIC (trwOev, within; ffco, without). — (1) Secret or hidden doctrine, communicated only to the initiated, exoteric being doctrine publicly taught ; (2) scientific teaching, in contrast with more popular, which is exoteric. " The philosophy of the Pythagoreans, like that of the other sects, was divided into the exoteric and the esoteric ; the open, taught to all; and the secret, taught to a select number " (Warburton, Div. Leg.). According to Origen, Aulus GeUius, Porphyry, and Jam- blichus, the distinction of esoteric and exoteric among the Pythagoreans was applied to the disciples — according to the degree of initiation to which they had attained, being fully admitted into the society, or being merely postulants (Ritter, History of Ancient Philosophy, i. 342). Plato is said to have had doctrines which he taught publicly to all — and other doctrines which he taught only to the few. There is no allusion to such a distinction of doctrines in the writings of Plato. Aristotle (Phys., lib. iv. cap. ii.) speaks of opinions of Plato which were not written. But it does not follow that these were secret — 'Ei/ tois Aeyo/Aei/ois aypdois Soy/uwiv. They may have been oral. Aristotle speaks of some of his writings as exoteric; and others as acroamatic, or esoteric. The former treat of the same subjects as the latter, but in a popular and elementary way ; while the esoteric are more scientific in their form and matter. In modern literature the terms are used in this last sense. A technical or scientific statement is said to be esoteric, a popular one exoteric. Still, the older sense is implicitly re- tained, esoteric teaching being synonymous with confidential and thorough presentation of belief, exoteric with accommoda- tion to the view generally accepted. Ravaisson, Essai sur la Metaphysique dJAristote; Tucker, Light of Nature, vol. ii. ch. ii. ; Sir A. Grant's Aristotle's Ethics, 136 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. app. b, 3rd ed., i. 397; Blakesly, Life of Aristotle. — V. Acroa- MATICAL. ESSENCE (essentia, from essens, the old participle of esse, to be), Being, as it is distinguished by necessary properties, apart from accidental. The Greeks had but one word for essence and substance, viz., ovcria. The word wrdoTcuns was latterly introduced. Hence 1 it is difficult to determine what exactly was Aristotle's doctrine of Essence. It was the perfect form, the notion of the thing itself — to ri fy elvai— its reXos, which was only realised in the final result. Aristotle's doctrine of Essence is broadly dis- tinguished from Plato's by the former's insistance on the imminence of the form or essence in the matter of the actual phenomenon, as opposed to the transcendence of the Platonic Idea, its existence apart from and independent of the sensible appearance. In the scholastic philosophy a distinction began to be estab- lished between essence and substance. Substance was applied to the abstract notion of matter — the undetermined subject or substratum of all possible forms, to vn-OKfi/jLevov ; Essence to the qualities expressed in the definition of a thing, or those ideas which represent the genus and species. Descartes defined substance as " that which exists so that it needs nothing but itself to exist" — (Princ. Phil., par. 4, sec. 1) — a defini- tion applicable to Deity only. Essence he stripped of its logical significance, making it the_foundatipn , of all, those qualities and modes which we perceive in matter. Among the attributes of every substance there is one only which deserves the name of essence, and on which the others depend as modi- fications — as extension, in matter, and thought, in mind. He thus identified essence and substance. With Leibnitz essence and substance were the sanoe^yjzjj^fora^or power. Spinoza defines Essence as " that which being given, the thing is neces- sarily given, and which being wanting, the thing necessarily ceases to exist ; or that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing, can neither exist nor be conceived " (Eth., pt. ii. def. 2). And attribute he defines as " that which the mind perceives of substance as constituting its essence " VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 137 (Eth., pt. i. def. 4); the two attributes actually perceived of the one substance being, as with Descartes, Thought and Extension. According to Locke, "essence may be taken for the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is " {Essay on Human Understanding, bk. iii. ch. iii. sec. 15). Locke distinguishes the real and the nominal essence. The nominal essence depends upon the real essence ; thus the nominal essence of gold is that complex idea which the word "gold" represents, viz., "a body yellow, heavy, malleable, fusible, and fixed;" but its real essence is the constitution of its insensible parts, on which these qualities and all its other properties depend, which is wholly unknown to us (see Essay, bk. iii. ch. iii. sec. 15 ff.). Kant, like previous philosophers, distinguishes between the Essence or Thing-in-itself and its appearance. Hegel denies that this is an ultimate distinction, maintaining the identity of Essence and Appearance, Noumenon and Phenomenon. By the logic of essence Hegel means the exposition of the categories of the finite world of relations, such as substance and accident, cause and effect, content and form. " It is important to remark the change of meaning which this word has undergone in its transmission from the ancient to the modern schools of philosophy. Formerly the word ' essence' (pia-Ca) meant that part or characteristic of anything which threw an intellectual illumination over all the rest of it. . . . Nowadays it means exactly the reverse. . . . The ' essence ' is the point of darkness, the assumed element in all things which is inaccessible to thought or observation " (Ferrier's Instit. of Metaph., p. 249). ETERNITY. — Infinite Duration, without beginning and without end, characteristic of the Divine existence. Our con- ception of Eternity implies a present existence, of which neither beginning nor end can be affirmed. The schoolmen spoke of eternity, a parte ante, and a parte post (q.v.). The Scotists maintained that eternity is made up of successive parts, which drop, so to speak, one from another. The Thomists held that it is simple duration, excluding the past and the future. Plato said, time is the moving shadow of eternity. So Spinoza : — In seterno non datur guando, nee ante, nee post. 138 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. On man's conception of eternity, see Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. ii. ch. xiv.; and xxviii. sec. 15; Mansel's Examination of Mr Maurice's Theory of a Fixed State out of Time, and the whole discussion as to knowledge of the Infinite. ETERNITY OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.— Deus non est duratio vel spatiwn, sed durat et adest. This scholium of Sir Isaac Newton contains the germ of Clarke's Demonstration of the Being of God. Time and space are qualities, and imply a substance. We cannot think of them as not existing. And as we think of them as infinite, they are the infinite qualities of an infinite substance, that is, of God, necessarily existing. " To exist in time is the same thing as to exist imperfectly. God, in the language of Plotinus, is necessarily axpovos, time- less " (Jules Simon, Hist, de I'Ecole d' Alexandrie, pref.). Cf. Kant's arguments in the JEsthetic, where he demonstrates the subjectivity of space and time, thus avoiding the error, other- wise, as he thinks, unavoidable, of attributing to the Divine intuition the conditions of space and time (see Critique of Pure Reason, p. 43, Meiklejohn ; suppl. xi., Max Muller, i. 421). ETHICS. — (1) Synonymous with " Moral Philosophy," the philosophy of the right in conduct. According to Kant, a philosophy of " the laws of freedom," in contrast with " the laws of nature." (2) According to etymological usage (^fluca, from £0os, custom) the term applies to that department of moral science which treats of practice as tested by moral law. Aristotle (N. Eth., lib. ii.) says that rj8os, which signifies moral virtue, is derived from £0os, custom ; since it is by re- peated acts that virtue, which is a moral habit, is acquired. Cicero (De Fato, lib. ii.), says, Quia pertinet ad mores quod rjOos illi vocant, nos earn partem philosophice, De moribus, appel- lare solemus; sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare Moralem. " Ethics extend to the investigation of those principles by which moral men are governed ; they explore the nature and ex- cellency of virtue, the nature of moral obligation, on what it is founded, and what are the proper motives of practice " (Cogan, On Passions, introd. ; Calderwood's Handbook of Moral Philo- sophy; Potter's Elements of Moral Science ; on modes of stating VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 139 the problems, Sorley's Ethics of Naturalism, ch. i. ; Sidgwick's Outlines of the History of Ethics. ETHNOGRAPHY, ETHNOLOGY (t6vos, a tribe or nation, and (a) ypa<£o), — (6) Aoyos). — "Ethnography embraces the descriptive details, and Ethnology the rational exposition of the human aggregates and organisations known as hordes, clans, tribes, and nations, especially in the earlier, the savage and barbarous, stages of their progress. Both belong to the general science of Anthropology, or the natural history of man- kind, being related to it as parts to a whole " (art. " Ethno- graphy," in Ency. Brit., 9th ed.; see Spencer's Descriptive Sociology; Ethnological Journal). — V. Anthropology. EUD^JMONISM (eiSai/towa, happiness), that system of moral philosophy which makes happiness the test of rectitude. On the common basis of the agreeable or desirable, there are two forms of Ethical Theory, (1) the Hedonistic (rjSovrj, pleasure, voluptas of the Latins), which makes personal pleasure the law of life, and is known as Egoistic Hedonism ; (2) the Eudsemonistic (or Eudaimonistic) which makes general happi- ness the test, termed also Altruistic Hedonism, and Utili- tarianism, its maxim being "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Bentham, the original expounder of the Greatest Happiness theory, considers " Happiness " not always appropriate, be- cause it " represents pleasure in too elevated a shape" to include the whole requirements of life (Deontology, i. 78). In ancient philosophy the term is applicable to the philo- sophy of the Cyrenaics and Epicureans. Its modern upholders are Hobbes, who is Egoistic, whereas the more recent thinkers take the Altruistic form of the theory, — Bentham, Hume, James Mill, J. S. Mill, — who introduces difference of quality in pleasure, — Bain, Sidgwick. Hobbes' Leviathan; Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, and his Deontology; Hume's Inquiry; Mill's Fragment on Mackintosh; J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism; Bain's Emotion and Will and Moral Science; Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics. For criticism of this philosophy, see Kant's Ethics, Semple 140 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. or Abbott; Grote's Exam, of Utilit. Phil; M'Cosh's Exam, of Mill's Phil.; Lorimer's Institutes of Law; Calderwood's Hand- book of Moral Philosophy. Kant's criticism is stated thus : — " The principle of happiness may, indeed, furnish maxims, but never such as would be com- petent to be laws of the will, even if universal happiness were made the object. For, since the knowledge of this rests on mere empirical data, since every man's judgment of it depends on his own particular point of view, which is itself, moreover, very variable, it can supply only general rules, not universal " {Analytic of Practical Reason; Abbot's Kant's Theory of Ethics, p. 125). EVIDENCE (e and video, to see), the ground or reason of knowledge, the light by which the mind apprehends things, whether immediately or mediately. Fulgor quidam mentis assensum rapiens. It is used (1 ) comprehensively as synonymous with Proof, and so equivalent to reasoning or inference in general, both deductive and inductive. Thus Mill calls his Logic " a connected view of the Principles of Evidence." (2) It is restricted to that branch of Proof called Testimony, either direct, from witnesses ; or circumstantial, from concomitant facts (see Locke, Essay, bk. iv. ch. xv.; Butler, Analogy, introd.; Glassford, Essay on Principles of Evidence; Campbell, Philo- sophy of Rhetoric, bk. i.; Gambier, On Moral Evidence; Sir G. C. Lewis, On Authority in Matters of Opinion). — V. Testimony. EVIL is the negation or the contrary of good. It is (1) physical, (2) moral, (3) metaphysical. In its physical appli- cation, that which injures ; in its ethical, that which violates moral law ; in its metaphysical, imperfection or lack of power. Physical evil consists in pain or suffering. Moral evil originates in the will of the agent, who could not have been capable of moral good without being liable to moral evil, a power to do right being, ex necessitate rei, a power to do wrong. Metaphysical evil is the absence or defect of powers and capacities, and the consequent want of the higher attainment which jnight have followed the full and perfect possession of them. It arises from the necessarily limited nature of all VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 141 created beings. Some would resolve these into one another, e.g., moral evil into physical or metaphysical. " Every man calleth that -which pleaseth and is delightful to himself, good ; and that evil which displeaseth him " (Hobtaes, Human Nature, ch. vii. sec. 3). " The voluntary application of this natural good and evil to any rational being, or the production of it by a rational being, is moral good and evil " (King, Essay on Origin of Evil). " Metaphysical evil consists simply in imperfection, physical evil in suffering, and moral evil in sin" (Leibnitz, On Goodness of God). EVIL, ORIGIN OP. — The theories concerning the origin of evil have been very varied — (1) the doctrine of pre-existence, or that the evils we are here suffering are punishments or expiations of moral delinquencies in a former state of exist- ence ; (2) the doctrine of the Manicheans, which supposes two co-etemal and independent agencies, the one the author of good, and the other of evil; (3) the doctrine of optimism, that evil is part of a system conducted by Almighty power, under the direction of infinite wisdom and goodness (Stewart, Active and Moral Powers, bk. iii. ch. iii. sec. 1); (4) the doctrine of human liberty ; (5) the doctrine of Pantheism, that Evil is mere negation, the necessary concomitant of finite existence (Spinoza and Hegel) ; (6) the doctrine of Pessimism, that exist- ence as such is necessarily evil (Schopenhauer and Von Hart- mann). On the origin of evil, its nature, extent, uses, &c, see Plato, Timneus and Gorgias; Aristotle, Metaph., i. 6 ; Cicero, Be Fini- bus; Seneca, Malebranche and.Fenelon, Clarke and Leibnitz; Bang ; J. Midler. EVOLUTION, — progress of being by development from within, under external conditions conducive to advance. (1) Organic or Biological Evolution implies (a) development of varieties within the same species, either by natural selection, under altered external conditions, or by artificial intervention under care of man ; (b) according to Darwin, development of species under the varying conditions already named. (2) Dialectic Evolution, according to Hegel, is (a) unfolding of 142 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. consciousness, (b) unfolding of the universe as a whole, in accord- ance with the logical relations of the categories of the under- standing. The Theory of Biological Evolution, in its most advanced type, seeks to complete a systematic history of life from its rise to its highest form, inclusive of man as an intellectual and moral being. This is the breadth of range contemplated by Darwin and by Herbert Spencer, the former having given special attention to scientific observation as concerned with relations of the lower species, the latter having devoted large attention to the possibilities of mental evolution. Darwin's theory may be summarised thus : — Given one or more primordial germs, the history of life must be determined by the external conditions under which it has subsisted. Observation should, therefore, be directed on the laws affect- ing organic history, and on the evidence, supplied by structure, of the relation of distinct forms of animal life. The laws mainly applicable are the following : — (1) " The struggle for existence," on account of limited supply of food, in accordance with which the strongest gain the best, and, as a consequence, there is "survival of the fittest"; (2) adaptation to environ- ment, in accordance with which the varying conditions of existence lead to variation in organic form ; (3) hereditary transmission, securing the continuance in successive genera- tions of adaptation of organism to environment. After external conditions comes evidence from organic structure, showing that all organism is built up on a commo.n system, and that higher orders, in their embryonic stages of development, pass through the forms belonging to lower organisms (Darwin's Origin of Species; Descent of Man; Alf. Russell Wallace, Natural Selection ; Ernest Hackel's General Morphology). Spencer's definition of Evolution is as follows : — " Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion ; during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity ; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transforma- tion" (First Principles, pt. ii. ch. xvii. p. 396). This is, accord- ing to Spencer, the universal Law of existence. " There are VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 143 not several kinds of Evolution, having certain traits in common, but one Evolution going on everywhere after the same manner. "While any whole is evolving, there is always going on an evolution of the parts into which it divides itself this equally holds of the totality of things, as made up of parts within parts from the greatest down to the smallest So understood, Evolution becomes not one in principle only, but one in fact. There are not many metamorphoses similarly carried on ; but there is a single metamorphosis universally progressing, wherever the reverse metamorphosis has not set in. In any locality, great or small, throughout space, where the occupying matter acquires an appreciable individuality, or distinguishableness from other matter, there Evolution goes on; or rather, the acquirement of this appreciable individuality is the commencement of Evolution. And this holds uniformly ; regardless of the size of the aggregate, regardless of its inclusion in other aggregates, and regardless of the wider evolutions within which its own is comprehended " (First Principles, pt. ii. ch. xxiv. sec. 188, pp. 545-7). According to Hegel, Dialectic, or the Evolution of the Idea, is the law at once of thought and of existence. This is the inevitable "onward movement" of the Notion, according to which all distinctions are gradually subsumed in an ever higher and fuller unity, till at last there stands out " the organisation of thought pure and entire, as a whole, and in all its details. This organism of thought, as the living reality or gist of the external world and the world within us, is termed the Idea " (Wallace, Logic of Hegel, Proleg., p. 174). Thus "the Idea" " realises itself, as the absolute reason which is in the world — which is in that world its absolute signification The Absolute Idea is the process which produces itself; and to trace that process is the problem of Logic " (ib., p. 171). For Evolution as concerned with Ethics, see Comte, Philosophic Positive, Martineau, ii. 148 ; Spencer, Data of Ethics, pp. 12-20; Wake, Evolution of Morality; Simcox, Natural Law). EXAMPLE. — V. Analogy, Instance. EXCEPTION. — A case not recognised as covered by ordinary law. Science can admit no absolute exception to law ; 144 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. its constant task is to show that apparent exceptions are in reality cases of higher laws. EXCLUDED MIDDLE (Principle, Law, or Axiom of) Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria. — " By the principle of ' Contradiction ' we are forbidden to think that two contradictory attributes can both be present in the same object ; by the principle of ' Excluded Middle ' we are forbidden to think that both can be absent. The first tells us that both differentiae must be compatible with the genus : I cannot, for example, divide animal into animate and inanimate. The second tells us that one or the other must be found in every member of the genus " (Mansel, Prolegom. Logica, ch. vi. p. 208. The formula of this principle is — " Everything is either A or not A : everything is either a given thing, or something which is not that given thing." That there is no mean between two contradictory propositions is proved by Aristotle (Metaphysics, bk. iii. ch. vii.). " So that if we think a judgment true, we must abandon its contradictory ; if false, the contra- dictory must be accepted " (see Thomson, Laws of Thought, pt. iv. sec. 114). The truth of this axiom has been strenuously attacked by Hegel in particular. He maintains that all exist- ence being a development, the truth lies in neither of the con- tradictories, but in their union. Ueberweg, in defence of the axiom, says that the attack arises from a confusion of contrary with contradictory (see his System of Logic, pp. 263 ff., Lindsay's transl.). Mill also contends that, "between the true and the false there is always a third possibility — the unmeaning " (see his Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 473, 3rd ed.). EXISTENCE (exsisto, to stand out)— Being. Existence and Essence. — According to Spinoza, the essence of God implies existence. In this he follows Anselm and Descartes. The latter finds the existence of a Perfect Being "comprised in the idea, in the same way that the equality of its three angles to two right angles is comprised in the idea of a triangle," and that, " consequently, it is at least as certain that God, who is this Perfect Being, is, or exists, as VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 145 any demonstration of Geometry can be" {Method, pt. iv.). This view is open to Kant's criticism of the Ontological proof of the existence of God {Critique of Pure Reason, Transc. Dia- lectic, ch. iii. sec. 4, pp. 364 /., Meiklejohn's transl.). EXOTERIC— V. Esoteric. EXPEDIENCY,— Dictate of Prudence. A wise regard to results in the use of competent means for legitimate ends. Expediency is a word much used by the advocates of the doctrine of Utility. Paley has said, Whatever is expedient is right. Whewell {Elements of Morality, bk. ii. ch. xxv.) says : — "The main significance of such assertions is in the rejection which they imply of any independent and fundamental mean- ing in the term right. .... In the common use of language, we speak of actions as expedient when they promote some end which we have selected, and which we do not intend to have questioned." EXPERIENCE (e/Mreipta, experientia). — (1) The know- ledge involved in the present facts of consciousness ; (2) a posteriori knowledge, in contrast with a priori; (3) accumu- lated knowledge concerning the general conditions of life and effort. According to Aristotle {Analyt. Poster., ii. 19), from sense comes memory, but from repeated remembrance of the same thing we get experience. Similarly, Bacon and Spinoza characterise our ordinary unsystematic sense-knowledge as experientia vaga. In this wide sense Experience may be said to be coextensive with the contents of consciousness. " Experience, in its strict sense, applies to what has occurred within a person's own knowledge. Experience, in this sense of course, relates to the past alone More frequently the word is used to denote that judgment which is derived from experience in the primary sense, by reasoning from that in com- bination with other data." This gives " conclusions from ex- perience. It is in this sense only that experience can be applied to the future, or to any general fact ; as, e.g., when it is said that we know by experience that water exposed to a certain temperature will freeze " (Whately, Logic, app. i.). In recent times the term has acquired a more precise mean- ing, which dates from the attempt of Kant, in answer to the K 146 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. empiricism of Locke and the scepticism of Hume, to supply a Philosophy of Experience (Erfahrung). Locke (Essay on Human Understanding, bk. ii. ch. i.) assigned experience as the only and universal source of human knowledge. "Whence hath the mind all the materials of reason and knowledge 1 To this I answer in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by our- selves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking. These are the fountains of knowledge from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring — that is, sensation and reflection." Hume agreed with Locke in thus tracing all knowledge to experience. All Ideas, he says, may be resolved into corre- sponding Impressions. The idea of necessary connection, e.g., may be resolved into that of constant conjunction in experience, and the association bred by custom between impressions so conjoined. Hume's account was, however, confessedly inadequate. " All my hopes," he said, " vanish when I come to explain the prin- ciples that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness" (Treatise on Human Nature, Green & Grose's ed., i. 559). These words exactly define Kant's problem, viz., to reach a rational explanation of experience by disengag- ing the a priori or formal elements on which its possibility depends. — V. Category, Apperception. The doctrine opposed to pure Experientialism is, that man has knowledge a priori — knowledge which experience cannot give, and without which there could be no experience — upon which all generalisations of experience proceed and rest. " That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt But it by no means follows that all arises out of experience It is therefore a question which requires close investigation, and is not to be answered at first sight, whether there exists a knowledge altogether inde- pendent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions? VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 147 Knowledge of this kind is called a priori, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience" (Kant's Entile of Pure Reason, introd., Meiklejohn's transl., p. 1). " Experience is an empirical cogni- tion ; that is to say, a cognition which determines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of percep- tions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception in a consciousness" (ib., p. 132). The scientific attitude towards experience is thus described by Sir John Herschel (" On the Study of Natural Philosophy," Lardner's Cyclopaedia) : — " The great, and indeed the only ulti- mate source of our knowledge of nature and its laws is ex- perience ; by which we mean not the experience of one man only, or of one generation, but the accumulated experience of all mankind in all ages, registered in books, or recorded by tradi- tion. But experience may be acquired in two ways : either, first, by noticing facts as they occur, without any attempt to influence the frequency of their occurrence, or to vary the circumstances under which they occur ; this is observation : or secondly, by putting in action causes and agents over which we have control, and purposely varying their combinations, and noticing what effects take place ; this is experiment. To these two sources we must look as the fountains of all natural science." — V. Cyples, Process of Human Experience. Experience (Analogies of). — V. Analogy. EXPERIMENT.— Voluntary application of tests for the discovery of truth. Herschel has distinguished Observation and Experience as passive and active observation. In experiment we do not passively observe Nature, but we interrogate her (Bacon). " Beason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, how- ever, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose " (Kant, Critique of Pure Beason, pref. to 2nd ed., p. xxvii., Meiklejohn's transl.). "For the purpose of varying the circumstances (Bacon), we may have recourse 148 TOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. (according to a distinction commonly made) either to observa- tion or to experiment ; we may either find an instance in nature suited to our purposes, or, by an artificial arrangement of circumstances, make one " (Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. vii. sec. 2). " When, as in astronomy, we endeavour to ascertain causes by simply watching their effects, we observe; when, as in our laboratories, we interfere arbitrarily with the causes or circum- stances of a phenomenon, we are said to experiment " (Thomson and Tait's Natural Philosophy, vol. i. sec. 369). Observation proceeds from effect to cause : experiment from cause to effect. Some sciences are most observational, as Astronomy; others are more experimental, as Chemistry. But the two methods run into one another ; and the distinction between them is one rather of degree than of kind. — V. Expbeibncb. — [J. S.] BXPBBIMBNTUM CRUCIS.— A crucial or decisive experiment in attempting to interpret the laws of nature ; so called, by Bacon, from the crosses or way-posts used to point out roads, because they determine at once between two or more possible conclusions. A and B, two different causes, may produce a certain number of similar effects ; find some effect which the one pro- duces and the other does not, and this will point out, as the direction post (crux), at a point where two highways meet, which of these causes may have been in operation in any particular instance. Thus, many of the symptoms of the Oriental plague are common to other diseases ; but when the observer discovers the peculiar bubo or boil of the complaint, he has an instantia crucis which directs him immediately to its discovery. The experimentum crucis is specially common in experimental sciences like chemistry. But crucial instances may also be discovered by mere observation. Bacon (Nov. Org., bk. ii. sec. 36) says: — "Crucial instances are of this kind ; when in inquiry into any nature the intellect is put into a sort of equilibrium, so that it is uncertain to which of two, or sometimes more natures, the cause of the nature inquired into ought to be attributed or assigned, on account of the frequent and ordinary concurrence of more natures than one ; the instances of the cross show that the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 149 union of the one nature with the nature sought for is faithful and indissoluble ; while that of the other is varied and separ- able; whence the question is limited, and that first nature received as the cause, and the other sent off and rejected." EXPLANATION.— The accounting for phenomena (1) scientifically, by bringing them under their laws; (2) philosophi- cally, by the reduction of lower laws to ultimate Law, or by the exhibition of the principles or presuppositions which underlie the procedure of scientific as well as of ordinary thought. — [J. S.] EXPLICATIVE.— A designation applied by Kant to judgments, equivalent to Analytic (q-v.). EXPLICIT. — Opposed to Implicit: eqaivalentto Actual (q. v.). EXTENSION (extendo, to stretch from). (1) Extension (Physical) is that essential property of matter by which it occupies space ; it implies length, breadth, and thickness, without which no material substance can exist ; but it has no respect to the size or shape of a body. According to the Cartesians, extension was the essence of matter, as thought was the essence of mind (res extensa and res cogitans). So Spinoza made Thought and Extension the attributes of the one Substance. According to Locke, it is one of the primary qualities of matter. Berkeley resolved it, with the other pri- mary qualities of Locke, into sensation. Kant, in his doctrine of Space, makes it subjective or phenomenal. " The notions acquired by the sense of touch, and by the movement of the body, compared with what is learnt by the eye, make up the idea expressed by the word extension" (Taylor, Elements of Thought). See Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. ii. ch xiii., see also ch. xv. ; Eeid, Inquiry, ch. v. sees. 5,6; Intellectual Powers, essay ii. ch. xix. ; Hobbes, Phil. Prima, pars ii. cap. viii. sec. 1 ; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ^Esthetic. (2) Extension (Logical), when predicated as belonging to a general term, means the number of objects included under it. Intension or comprehension means the common characters belonging to such objects. " I call the comprehension of an idea, those attributes which it involves in itself, and which cannot be taken away from it 150 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. without destroying it ; as the comprehension of the idea triangle includes extension, figure, three lines, three angles, and the equality of these three angles to two right angles, &c. " I call the extension of an idea those subjects to which that idea applies, which are also called the inferiors of a general term, which, in relation to them, is called superior, as the idea of triangle in general extends to all the different sorts of triangles '' (Port. Boy. Logic). We cannot detach any properties from a notion without extending the list of objects to which it is applied. Thus, if we abstract from a rose its essential qualities, attending only to those which it connotes as a plant, we extend its application, before limited to flowers with red petals, to the oak, fir, &c. On the other hand, as we narrow the sphere of a notion, the qualities which it comprehends increase. If we restrict the term body to animal, we include life and sensation — if to man, it comprehends reason. Thus emerges the law of the reciprocal relation of the ex- tension and intension of terms, viz., that the increase of the one implies the decrease of the other, and vice versd. EXTERNALITY or OUTNESS.— Separateness from self, as applied to all that is known as distinct from the knower. According to Berkeley, " Distance or outness is neither im- mediately of itself perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath a neces- sary connection with it : but is only suggested to our thoughts," by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation, either with distance, or things placed at a distance. But, by a connection taught us by experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for " (Principles of Knowledge, pt. i. sec. 43 ; cf. Dialogue on Divine Visual Language and Essay towards a New Theory of Vision). On the theory of externality, V. Space and Perception. FACT. — (1) Strictly, that which is done or accomplished ; (2) more widely, that which is known as existing. " By a matter of fact, I understand anything of which we VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 151 obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any- individual event or phenomenon which is the object of sensa- tion " (Sir G. C. Lewis, Essay on Influence of Authority). It is opposed (1) to opinion (q.v.). " By a matter of fact, in ordinary usage, is meant something which might, conceivably, be submitted to the senses ; and about which it is supposed there could be no disagreement among persons who should be present, and to whose senses it should be submitted ; and by a matter of opinion is understood anything respecting which an exercise of judgment would be called for on the part of those who should have certain objects before them, and who might conceivably disagree in their judgment thereupon " (Whately, Rhetoric). It is thus opposed (2) to matter of inference. Thus, the destructiveness of cholera is matter of fact, the mode of its propagation is matter of inference. Matter of fact also denotes what is certain, as opposed to matter of doubt. The existence of God is matter of fact, though ascertained by reasoning. It is thus often opposed (3) to theory. " The distinction of fact and theory is only relative. Events and phenomena, con- sidered as particulars which may be colligated by induction, are facts ; considered as generalities already obtained by colligation of other facts, they are theories. The same event or phenomenon is a fact or a theory, according as it is considered as standing on one side or the other of the inductive bracket " (Whewell, Phil. Induct. Sci.). " Theories which are true, are facts " (Whewell, On Induc- tion). — V. Opinion, Appearance. FACTITIOUS (factito, to practise), the result of human work or art, as distinguished from a product of nature. Descartes calls those ideas factitious which are the product of imagination, as opposed to innate and adventitious (q.v.) FACULTY. — A distinct power of the mind, by the action of which a distinct order of mental phenomena is produced. The correlative designation is capacity, — the capability of being influenced or moved under the action of thought, or by external objects. " The word faculty is most properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make 152 VOCABTJLAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. part of the constitution of the mind " (Eeid, Intellectual Powers, essay i. ch. i.). Instead of blind and fatal activity, let the being who has power be conscious of it, and be able to exercise and regulate it ; this is what is meant by faculty. It implies intelligence and freedom. It is personality which gives the character of faculties to those natural powers which belong to us (Diet, des Sci. Phil). We say the faculty of judging, but the power of habit. But, as all our faculties are powers, we can apply the latter term equally to what is original and to what is acquired. And we can say, with equal propriety, the power of judging and the power of habit. Taking into account the distinction of powers as active and passive, "these terms," says Hamilton (Beitfs Works, p. 221), "stand in the following relations. Powers are active and passive, natural and acquired. Powers natural and active are called faculties. Powers natural and passive, capacities or receptivities. Powers acquired are habits, and habit is used both in an active and in a passive sense. The power, again, of acquiring a habit is called a disposition." " Faculty (facultas) is derived from the obsolete Latin facul, the more ancient form of facilis, from which again facilitas is formed. It is properly limited to active power, and, therefore, is abusively applied to the mere passive affections of mind " (Hamilton, Metaph,., lect. x.). When we classify the operations of the mind, assigning them to different powers, we do not suppose the mind divided, or regard the faculties as separate entities or agents. The energy is the same in all the operations, the mind only acting in different relations according to different conditions and laws. This is well put by Alcuin, the friend and adviser of Charle- magne, in the following passage in his work De Batione Animas; — "The soul bears divers names according to the nature of its operations ; inasmuch as it lives and makes live, it is the soul (anima) ; inasmuch as it contemplates, it is the spirit (spiritus) ; inasmuch as it feels, it is sentiment (sensus) ; since it reflects, it is thought (animus) ; as it comprehends, intelligence (mens) ; inasmuch as it discerns, reason (ratio) ; as VOCABULABY OF PHILOSOPHY. 153 it consents, will (voluntas) ; as it recollects, memory (memoria). But these things are not divided in substance as in name, for all this is the soul, and one soul only" (cf. Locke, Essay on Human, Understanding, bk. ii. ch. xxi. sees. 17, 20). Strong objections have been offered against the representa- tion that mental operations, such as reasoning, 'willing, and recollecting, are to be assigned to distinct faculties or powers of mind, in recognition of the diversity of the mental exercise involved. The allegations are, that the reference to faculties has led to an artificial classification of phenomena, and this to an unnatural mode of viewing the relations of mental pheno- mena, inasmuch as phenomena do not occur singly and in succession, but simultaneously in the same state of conscious- ness, in accordance with rational law. There is obvious truth in the objection, and great practical force in it, as fitted to guard against an artificial and mechanical treatment of mental phenomena. Keference to faculties is peculiarly alien to theories of evolution, whether biological or dialectic. The hazard is at once recognised when the synthesis of conscious- ness becomes a leading phase of the philosophic problem. All competent treatment of the phenomena of consciousness, there- fore, recognises the unsuitableness of a dogmatic reference to faculties, and the special risk of error when it assumes an analo- gical form, suggested by organism. The general recognition of this danger will appear from the following extracts : — " It would be well if, instead of speaking of ' the powers (or faculties) of the mind' (which causes misunderstanding), we adhered to the designation of the several ' operations of one mind,' which most psychologists recommend, but in the sequel forget " (Feuchtersleben, Medical Psychol.). " Man is sometimes in a predominant state of intelligence, sometimes in a predominant state of feeling, and sometimes in a predominant state of action and determination. To call these, however, separate faculties, is altogether beside the mark. No act of intelligence can be performed without the will, no act of determination without the intellect, and no act either of the one or the other without some amount of feeling being mingled in the process. Thus, whilst they each have their own distinc- 154 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. tive characteristics, yet there is a perfect unity at the root " (Morell, Psychology). " The judgment is often spoken of as if it were a distinct power or faculty of the soul, differing from the imagination, the memory, avrao-ia). — " Imagination or phantasy, in its most extensive meaning, is the faculty representative of the phenomena both of the external and internal worlds " (Hamil- ton, Beid's Works, note b, sees. 1, 9). " How various soever the pictures of fancy, the materials, according to some, are all derived from sense ; so that the maxim — Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu — though not true of the intellect, holds with regard to the phantasy " (Monboddo, Ancient Metaphysics). Fancy is sometimes distinguished from Imagination, as by Stewart, who says {Elements, ch. v. ; Works, Hamilton's ed., ii. 259), "It is obvious that a creative imagination, when a person possesses it so habitually that it may be re- garded as forming one of the characteristics of his genius, implies a power of summoning up, at pleasure, a parti- cular class of ideas ; and of ideas related to each other in a particular manner ; which power can be the result only of certain habits of association which the individual has acquired. It is to this power of the mind, which is evidently a particular turn of thought, and not one of the common principles of our nature," that Stewart would appropriate the name fancy. " The office of this power is to collect materials for the imagina- tion ; and therefore the latter power presupposes the former, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 161 while the former does not necessarily suppose the latter. A man whose habits of association present to him, for illustrating or embellishing a subject, a number of resembling or analogous ideas, we call a man of fancy ; but for an effort of imagination various other powers are necessary, particularly the powers of taste and judgment ; without which we can hope to produce nothing that will be a source of pleasure to others. It is the power of fancy which supplies the poet with metaphorical language, and with all the analogies which are the foundation of his allusions : but it is the power of imagination that creates the complex scenes he describes, and the fictitious characters he delineates. To fancy we apply the epithets of rich or luxuriant ; to imagination, those of beautiful or sublime." Fancy was called by Coleridge " the aggregative and associa- tive power." But Wordsworth says : — " To aggregate and to associate, to evoke and to combine, belong as well to imagina- tion as to fancy. But fancy does not require that the materials which she makes use of should be susceptible of change in their constitution from her touch ; and, where they admit of modification, it is enough for her purpose if it be slight, limited, and evanescent. Directly the reverse of these are the desires and demands of the imagination. She recoils from everything but the plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite" (Wordsworth, Preface to Works). Mr Sully says (Outlines of Psychology, p. 304, note) : — " The contrast between passive and active imagination appears to correspond to one aspect of the ill-defined and much-discussed distinction between Fancy and Imagination."— V. Imagination. FATALISM. — The doctrine that all human actions are in- evitably determined in the sequence of events. " Fatum is derived from fari; that is, to pronounce, to decree ; and in its right sense it signifies the decree of Providence" (Leibnitz, Fifth Paper to Dr Clarke). Among all nations, however, it has been common to speak of fate or destiny as a power superior to gods and men — swaying all things irresistibly. " Fatalists, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, may be reduced to these three classes : — First, such as asserting the Deity, suppose it irrespectively to decree and L 162 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. determine all things, and thereby make all actions necessary to us Secondly, such as suppose a Deity that, acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world ; from whence, by a series of causes, doth unavoidably result whatsoever is so done in it : which fate is a concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, and is that which was asserted by the ancient Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus. And, lastly, such as hold the material neces- sity of all things without a Deity; which fate Epicurus calls rqv rusv vv elfnapiiivrjv " (Cudworth, Intell. Syst, bk. i. ch. i.). Cicero, De Fato; Plutarchus, Be Fato; Grotius, Philoso- phoriim Sententice De Fato. FEAR. — Agitation of mind on account of apprehended evil, throwing a disturbing, it may even be a paralysing, influence over the body. This form of feeling ranks among the Emotions. PBOHNBR'S LAW.— V. Psycho-Physios. PEELING-. — (1) In its widest sense, all passive experience. In this sense it is applied (a) to the sense of touch ; (b) to all forms of sensibility; (2) in a more restricted sense, it is applied to the pleasurable and painful in mind by contrast with nerve- sensibility on the one hand and thought on the other. This last is the usual sense in modern philosophy, as in Hamilton's division of mental phenomena into Cognitions, Feelings, and Volitions. " This word has two meanings. First, it signifies the perceptions we have of external objects, by the sense of touch. When we speak of feeling a body to be hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold, to feel these things is to perceive them by touch. They are external things, and that act of the mind by which we feel them is easily distinguished from the objects felt. Secondly, the word feeling is used to signify the Bame thing as sensation; and in this sense, it has no object; the feeling and the thing felt are one and the same. Perhaps betwixt feeling, taken in this last sense, and sensation, there may be this small difference, that sensation is most commonly used to signify those feelings which we have by our external senses and bodily appetites, and all our bodily pains and plea- sures. But there axe feelings of a nobler nature accompanying VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 163 our affections, our moral judgments, and our determinations in matters of taste, to which the word sensation is less properly- applied " (Keid, Intellectual Powers, essay i. ch. i.). " The terra feeling is frequently used, in a less proper sense, to signify what we feel or are conscious of ; and in that sense it is a general term for all our passions and emotions, and for all our other pleasures and pains" (Karnes, Elements of Criticism, app.). James Mill identifies feeling and consciousness. He describes sensation as " a particular feeling, a particular consciousness," " a point of consciousness which we can describe no otherwise than by calling it a feeling " {Analysis, 1st ed., i. 7 ; 2nd ed., i. 1 2). Again, he says : — " Though I have these various modes of naming my sensation, by saying, I feel the prick of a pin, I feel the pain of a prick, I have the sensation of a prick, I have the feeling of a prick, I am conscious of the feeling; the thing named in all these various ways is the same " (Analysis, 1st ed., i. 71 ; 2nd ed., i. 224). All sensations are feelings; but all feelings are not sensations. Sensations are those feelings which arise immediately and solely from a state or affection of the bodily organism. But we have feelings which are connected not with our animal, but with our intellectual and moral nature ; such as feelings of the sublime and beautiful, of esteem and gratitude, of approbation and dis- approbation. Those higher feelings it has been proposed to call Sentiments (q.v.). From its most restricted sense of perceiving by the sense of touch, feeling has been extended by some to signify immediate perceiving or knowing in general. It has even been applied in this sense, though quite inaccurately, to the immediate know- ledge which we have of first truths or the principles of common sense. "By external or internal perception, I apprehend a phenomenon of mind or matter as existing ; I therefore affirm it to be. Now, if asked how I know, or am assured, that what I apprehend as a mode of mind, may not be, in reality, a mode of matter, or that what I apprehend as a mode of matter may not, in reality, be a mode of mind ; I can only say, using the simplest language, ' I know it to be true, because I feel, and 164 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. cannot but feel,' or ' because I believe, and cannot but believe,' it so to be. And if further interrogated how I know, or am assured, that I thus feel or thus believe, I can make no better answer than, in the one case, ' because I believe that I feel '; in the other, ' because I feel that I believe.' It thus appears that, when pushed to our last refuge, we must retire either upon feeling or upon belief, or upon both indifferently. And, accord- ingly, among philosophers, we find that a great many employ one or other of these terms by which to indicate the nature of the ultimate ground to which our cognitions are reducible ; while some employ both, even though they may award a pre- ference to one In its present application (to say nothing of its original meaning in relation to touch) we must discharge that signification of the word by which we denote the pheno- mena of pain and pleasure" (Hamilton, Reid's Works, note a, sec. 5). FELICITY. — Practically synonymous with Happiness (q.v.). " The felicity of this life consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied Felicity is a continued progress of the desire from one object to another" (Hobbes, Leviathan, pt. i. ch. ii.). Recent writers also use the word felidfic in the sense of pro- duction of happiness. — [J. W.] PETICHISM. — The term applied to the earliest and lowest forms of Polytheism.. The Portuguese call the objects worshipped by the negroes of Africa fetisso — bewitched or possessed by fairies. It is described as consisting in the ascription of life and intelligence essentially analogous to our own, to every existing object, of whatever kind, whether organic or inorganic, natural or artificial (Comte, Phil. Positive). " To transfer to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings, is among the early and widespread instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion; and although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually displaces this elementary fetichism, and banishes it from the region of reality into those of conventional fictions, yet the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede the acquired habit, and even an intelligent man may be impelled in a moment of agonising pain VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 165 to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he has suffered " (Grote, History of Greece, vol. v. p. 22). In view of incidents such as this, Eeid was of opinion that children naturally believe all things around them to be alive — a belief often encouraged by seniors. FIGURE.— V. Syllogism. FIGURATIVE CONCEPTION.— A Hegelian expres- sion for popular, as opposed to philosophical, thought. "In our ordinary state of mind, thoughts are overgrown and com- bined with the sensuous or mental material of the moment; and in reflection and ratiocination we blend our feelings, intentions, and conceptions with thoughts." "The specific phenomena of feeling, perception, desire, and will, so far as they are known, may be in general described under the name of Concep- tion, as picture-thinking or materialised thought : and it may be roughly said, that philosophy puts thoughts, categories, or, in more precise language, adequate notions, in the place of semi- pictorial and material conceptions. Conceptions such as these may be regarded as the metaphors of thoughts and notions. But to have these figurate conceptions does not imply that we know their significance for thinking, or the thoughts and rational notions to which they correspond. Conversely, it is one thing to have thoughts and general ideas, and another to know what conceptions, perceptions, and feelings correspond to them" (Logic of Hegel, "Wallace, ch. i. sec. 3). — [J. S.] FINAL CAUSE — The end of action as contemplated by an intelligent agent. The word "Cause " is inappropriately used in this case.— V. Cause. It is here equivalent to purpose, or deliberately preferred end, which supplies the reason for acting. This usage seems accounted for by the fact that the purpose of the agent is connected with the true motive for acting. As purpose and end are correlative, their harmony in nature and separation in time are indicated by the phrase " final cause." The end contemplated is naturally described as design. Thus when applied to the Universe as related to the First Cause, the argument from design is an argument as to final causes, inasmuch as the purpose of the Intelligent First Cause may be interpreted by rational explanation of existence, 166 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. and conspicuously by recognition of the adaptation of means to ends. Spinoza, in accordance with his philosophic theory, was strongly opposed to a doctrine of Final Causes. His argu- ment will be found in the appendix to part i. of the Ethics (see Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge ; Eraser's Selec- tions, 2nd ed., p. 105 ; Janet, Final Causes). FINITE.— V. Infinite. FIRST CAUSE. — The origin or source of all dependent being, that is, of all Being which is finite or not self-sufficient. FITNESS and UNFITNESS.— The one is applied to the harmony of right actions with the dignity of our nature and with the order of things under the moral government of the world ; the other to the want of such harmony or to con- flict with established order, involved in wrong action. " They most frequently denote the congruity or incongruity, aptitude or inaptitude, of any means to accomplish an end. But when applied to actions, they generally signify the same with right and wrong; nor is it often hard to determine in which of these senses these words are to be understood. It is worth observing that fitness in the former sense is equally undefinable with fitness in the latter ; or, that it is as impossible to express in any other than synonymous words, what we mean when we say of certain objects, ' that they have & fitness to one another; or sire fit to answer certain purposes,' as when we say, 're- verencing the Deity is fit, or beneficence is fit to be prac- tised.' In the first of these instances, none can avoid owning the absurdity of making an arbitrary sense the source of the idea of fitness, and of concluding that it signifies nothing real in objects, and that no one thing can be properly the means of another. In both cases the term fit signifies a simple percep- tion of the understanding" (Price, Review, ch. vi.). Clarke was the author who specially used the phrase " fit- ness of things," as expressive of the characteristic of right actions in the established order of the universe. He said virtue consists in acting in conformity to the nature and fitness of things. In this theory the term fitness does not mean the adaptation of an action, as a means towards some end designed by the agent; but a congruity, proportion, or suitableness VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 167 between an action and the relations, in which, as a moral being, the agent stands. Clarke has been misunderstood on this point by Dr Brown (lect. lxxvi.) and others (see Wardlaw, Christian Ethics, note e). " Our perception of vice and its desert arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent. And hence arises a proper application of the epithets incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious " (Butler, Dissertation on Virtue). FORCE. — (1) Energy or power capable of moving objects, or affecting some change in the relations of things. For this the term "Energy" is now commonly reserved. (2) The measure of "Energy" acting in given circumstances. According to Leibnitz, by whom the term force was intro- duced into modern philosophy, no substance is altogether passive. The two notions, force and substance, are inseparable ; for you cannot think of action without a being, nor of a being without activity. A substance entirely passive is a contra- dictory idea (see Leibnitz, De primce Philosophice emendatione et de notione substantias). — V. Monad. In like manner Boscovich maintained that the ultimate par- ticles of matter are merely centres of forces, indivisible and unextended points endowed with the forces of attraction and repulsion. For a popular defence of the theory of Boscovich, see Kirkman's Philosophy without Assumptions. According to the Atomic Theory (q.v.) the phenomena of matter were explained by attraction and repulsion ; and modern Materialism explains all changes by these two factors — matter and force (see Biichner's Matter and Force; Spencer's First Principles). " La force proprement dite, c'est ce qui rigit les actes, sans regler les volontes." If this definition of force given by Comte be adopted, it would make a distinction between force and power. Power extends to volitions as well as to operations, to mind as well as matter, whereas force would be restricted to the physical. FORM. — (1) The figure or shape of material objects ; (2) 168 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. the inherent nature of an object, in contrast with the material of which it is constructed ; (3) the condition or law of activity — form of action ; (4) in the philosophy of Kant, that which the mind itself contributes as the condition of knowing, — the form of knowledge, as matter is the given raw material of knowledge. Aristotle opposed Form (eTSos) to Matter (l'Aij). The distinc- tion is essentially the same as that between Swa/us and evip- •yeta. Form was his substitute for the Platonic Idea. It has not, like the latter, an existence apart from the sensible thing, but is realised in its matter. It is defined by Aristotle as Aoyos t^s ovcrtas; and as ova-ia signifies, equally, substance and essence, the question arose whether form should be called substantial or essential ; the Peripatetics espoused the former epithet, and the Cartesians the latter. "Form is that of which matter is the receptacle." Now, although there can be no form without matter, yet, as it is the form which makes the thing what it is, the word form came to signify essence or nature. " Form is the essence of the thing, from which result not only its figure and shape, but all its qualities " (Monboddo, Ancient Metaphysics, bk. ii. ch. ii.). "When we speak of forms we understand nothing more than the laws and modes of action which regulate and constitute any simple nature, such as heat, light, weight, in all kinds of matter susceptible of them ; so that the form of heat, or the form of light, and the law of heat, or the law of light, are the same thing." Again, " since the form of a thing is the very thing itself, and the thing no otherwise differs from the form, than as the apparent differs from the existent, the outward from the inward, or that which is considered in relation to man from that which is considered in relation to the universe, it follows clearly that no nature can be taken for the true form, unless it ever decreases when the nature itself decreases, and in like manner is always increased when the nature is increased " (Bacon, Nov. Org., ii. 13, 17). " That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensa- tion, I term its matter; but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 169 call its form '' (Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's transl., p. 21). Thus Space and Time are forms of knowledge. The Kantian distinction between Form and Matter is criticised by Lotze (Logic, 457, Bosanquet's transl.). Aristotle, Metaphysics, bks. vii., viii. ; Ueberweg's History, i. 157 ; Schwegler's History, 8th ed., i. 105 ; Michelet, Examen Critique de la Metaphysique d'Aristote; Kavaisson, Essai sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote. For Scholastic usage, Ueberweg's History, i. 399. — V. Law, Matter. FORMAL. — Opposed by Descartes, Spinoza, and others, to objective (q.v.), and thus equivalent to objective in modern sense (see Veitch's Descartes, app. 7). FORMAL CAUSE.— V. Cause, Form. FORM ALITER — V. Eminenteb. FORMAL LOGIC— 7. Logic. FORTITUDE. — Bravery, one of the four cardinal virtues of the ancients. According to varied tests, it may involve con- stancy in the face of danger and difficulty, intrepidity in the midst of perils, patience, including submission, resignation. For Plato's account of this virtue, see Republic, iv. 429, where it is represented as the soldierly virtue; for Aristotle's, N. Ethics, bk. iii. chs. vi.-ix. — V. Courage. FREEDOM. — V. Liberty, Free-will. FREE-THINKER.— One who exercises speculativethought, more commonly in critical form, in disregard of authority, of common consent of mankind, and of alleged first principles of faith and conduct. This term is applied to Toland, " a candid Free-thinker," by Molyneux, in a letter to Locke, 1697. Shaftesbury, in 1709, speaks of "our modern free-writers" (Works, vol. i. p. 65). But it was Collins, in 1713, in his Discourse of Free-thinking, who first appropriated the name to express the independence of inquiry claimed by the Deists. There is no parallel word in other languages (see Farrar, Bampton Lectures). FREE-WILL. — Power of self-determination, under guid- ance of intelligence, and superior to sensibilities and motive forces in our nature. " The Will is that kind of causality belong- ing to living agents in so far as they are rational, and freedom 170 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. is such a property of this causality as enables them to originate events, independently of foreign determining causes " (Kant's Metaphysic of Ethics, ch. iii., Semple's tr., 3rd ed., p. 57; Abbott's, 3rd ed., p. 65). Calderwood's Handbook of Mor. Phil., p. 169. On the genesis of the doctrine of Free- Will, see Sully, Sensation and Intuition. Sidgwick {Methods of Ethics, p. 45) regards Free- Will as an unsolved problem. — V. Liberty, Necessity, Will. FRIENDSHIP. — Mutual affection between persons. It springs from the social nature of man, and rests on the esteem which each entertains for the good qualities of the other. (Aristotle, If, Ethics, bks. viii. and ix. ; Cicero, De Amicitia). FULL (The).— V. Atomism. FUNCTION (fungor, to perform). — The special exercise or form of activity belonging to an organ or a power when operating for the attainment of its appropriate end. Each organ of the body and each power of the mind has its peculiar function. " The word functio, in Latin, simply expresses performance or operation ; functio muneris is the exertion of an energy of some determinate kind. But with us the word function has come to be employed in the sense of munus alone, and means not the exercise, but the specific character, of a power. Thus the function of a clergyman does not mean with us the per- formance of his duties, but the peculiarity of these duties themselves. The function of nutrition does not mean the operation of that animal power, but its discriminate character " (Hamilton, Metaph., lect. x.). FUNDAMBNTUM DIVISIONIS.— V. Division. GENERAL TERM.— V. Term. GENERALISATION " is (1) the act of comprehending, under a common name, several objects agreeing in some point which we abstract from each of them, and which that common name serves to indicate;'' (2) the result of this act, e.g., the law of gravitation. "When we are contemplating several individuals which resemble each other in some part of their nature, we can (by attending to that part alone, and not to those points wherein they differ) assign them one common name, which will express VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 171 or stand for them merely as far as they all agree, and -which, of course, will be applicable to all or any of them (which pro- cess is called generalisation) ; and each of these names is called a common term, from its belonging to them all alike ; or a pre- dicable, because it may be predicated affirmatively of them or of any of them " (Whately, Logic, bk. ii. ch. v. sec. 2). The results of generalisation are general notions expressed by general terms. Objects are classed, according to certain properties which they have in common, into genera and species. Hence arose the question which caused centuries of acrimonious discussion, — Have genera and species a real independent exist- ence, or are they only to be found in the mind ? — V. Ebalism, Nominalism, Conceptualism, Specialisation.- — (Eeid, Intellec- tual Powers, essay v. ch. vi.; Stewart, Elements, ch. iv.). Generalisation is of two kinds — classification and generalisa- tion properly so called. When we observe facts accompanied by diverse circum- stances, and reduce these circumstances to such as are essen- tial and common, we obtain a law. When we observe individual objects, and arrange them ac- cording to their common characters, we obtain a class. When the characters selected are such as belong essentially to the nature of the objects, the class corresponds with the law. When the character selected is not natural, the classification is artificial. If we were to class animals into white and red, we would have a classification which had no reference to the laws of their nature. But if we classify them as vertebrate and invertebrate, we have a classification founded on their organisa- tion. Artificial classification is of no value in science, it is a mere aid to the memory. Natural classification is the foundation of all science. It is sometimes, though not properly, called Generalisation. — V. Classification. Generalisation proper is almost synonymous with Induction. The law of gravitation, e.g., is a great generalisation. It is exemplified in the fall of a single stone to the ground. But many stones and other heavy bodies must have been observed to fall before the fact was generalised and the law stated. And in this process of generalising there is involved a principle 172 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. which experience does not furnish. Experience, how extensive soever it may be, can only give the particular ; yet from the particular we rise to the general, and affirm not only that all heavy bodies which have been observed, but that all heavy bodies, whether they have been observed or not, gravitate. In this is implied a belief that there is order in nature, that under the same circumstances the same phenomena will occur. — V. Induction. GENERIC IMAGES. — 7. Conception, Abstraction. GENIUS (from geno, the old form of the verb gigno, to produce). — (1) In ancient times applied to the tutelary god or spirit appointed to watch over an individual. (2) As the character and capacities of men were supposed to vary accord- ing to the higher or lower nature of their genius, the word came to signify the natural powers and abilities of men, more particularly their natural inclination or disposition. (3) The peculiar and restricted use of the term is to denote a high degree of productive or inventive mental power. " Genius," says Blair (Lectures on Rhetoric), " always imports something inventive or creative." " It produces what has never been accomplished, and which all in all ages are constrained to admire. Its chief elements are the reason and the imagination, which are alone inventive and productive. According as one or other predominates, genius becomes scientific or artistic. In the former case it seizes at once those hidden affinities which otherwise do not reveal themselves, except to the most patient and vigorous application ; and as it were intuitively recognis- ing in phenomena the unalterable and eternal, it produces truth. In the latter, seeking to exhibit its own ideas in due and appropriate forms, it realises the infinite under finite types, and so creates the beautiful." " To be able to perceive identity in things widely different, and diversity in things nearly the same, this it is that consti- tues what we call genius, that power divine, which through every sort of discipline renders the difference so conspicuous between one learner and another " (Harris, Phil. Arrang.). GENUINE. — A term applied to documentary evidence. A document is said to be genuine when its authorship cannot be VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 173 disputed, or when the hypothesis of fraud or fabrication cannot be maintained (e.g., Junius). — V. Authentic. GENUS. — A higher class' which includes a lower, called its species. The genus has the larger extension ; the species the larger intension. The distinction between genus and species is a relative one, the class which is called a species in reference to the next higher, becoming in turn a genus in reference to the next lower class. The summum genus is defined as that genus which, being a genus, can never become a species ; i.e., it is the term in any series whose extension is the largest possible. It has been denied that there is any summum genus ; but whether there be any such absolutely or not — as Being — each science, at all events, and each particular inquiry has its own summum genus, beyond which it never goes in the ascending series of species and genera, e.g., Organism is the summum. genus of Biology. Those genera which become in turn species are called subalternate. The proximate genus of any species is that between which and the species no other genus intervenes, e.g., animal is the proximate genus of man. — [J. S.] GNOSTICISM (yvuxrvs, knowledge, as distinct from irixmi). — A general name for the speculation of the first and second centuries of the Christian era, which resulted from the attempt to advance from faith to knowledge under the Christian system. The object was to develop a Christian philosophy. In this speculation, the Jewish Christians and the Alexandrian had a conspicuous share. This speculation was concerned largely with supra-mundane existence. It resorted to allegorical interpretation of Scripture, and was in some of its forms largely influenced by Platonic thought. The theories included under the general name are mystic in form, working out schemes of existence on the hypothesis of ^Eons, occupying an intermediate position between the unsearchable One and the universe. These Mans become the active agents in the origin and government of the world. After the authors of Clementines and the Epistle of Barnabas, the most important names are Cerinthus, Saturninus, Carpo- crates, Basilides, and Valentinus. Ueberwig's Hist, of Phil, i. 280; Neander's Church History, 174 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. vol. ii., Eng. transl, ; Bunsen's Analecta Ante-Nicmna ; Schaff 's History of the Christian Church, vol. i. GOD, in Anglo-Saxon, Good, — the Supreme Being, — Latin (Deus), Greek (®eos). These terms were applied also to spiritual beings superior to man. That department of knowledge which treats of the being, perfections, and government of God, is theology (q-v-)- The true conception of God and of His relation to the universe is the supreme problem of philosophy. To trace the views which have been held as to the Divine nature would be to write the history of philosophy. — V. Absolute, Infinite. GOOD. — (1) Common term for the desirable, applicable to any thing having value in the eyes of men ; (2) in its ethical sense, the quality of an action in harmony with moral law ; (3) " The Good," Summum Bonum, the chief end of life, — that which all seek after (Aristotle) ; (4) " The Good," the Absolute, — God (Plato). For the conception of Good under an evolu- tion theory, see Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 21. — [J. S.] GOOD (The Chief), the Summum Bonum, that which constitutes the true end and blessedness of human life. The discussion of this is the main characteristic of the various answers to the question What is the Chief Good ? (Aristotle's Ethics). Varro enumerated 288 (August., De Civit., lib. xix. cap. i.). The ends aimed at by human action, how various sover they may seem, may be reduced to two — happiness and perfection. The highest end is duty ; the chief good of man lies in the discharge of duty. By consistent fulfilment of this he perfects his nature, and may at the same time enjoy the highest happiness (Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum). — V. Bonum (Summum). GRAMMAR (Universal), from the Greeks, who included under rexyt ypa/ijuararrucij the art of writing and reading letters. Language is the expression of thought — thought is the opera- tion of mind, and hence language may be studied as a help to psychology (Reid, Intellectual Powers, essay i. ch. v.). In Greek, the same word (Xdyos) means reason and language. And in Latin, reasoning is called discursus — a meaning which is made English by our great poet when he speaks of " large VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 175 discourse of reason." In all this the connection between the powers of the mind and language is recognised. Every judgment involves the idea of a substance, of which some quality is affirmed or denied — so that language must have the substantive or noun, the adjective or quality, and the verb connecting or disconnecting. If the objects of our thoughts existed or were contemplated singly, these parts of speech would be sufficient. But the relation between objects, and the connection between propositions, render other parts of speech necessary. It is because we have ideas that are general, and ideas that are individual, that we have also nouns common and proper ; and it is because we have ideas of unity and plurality, that we have numbers, singular, dual, and plural. Tenses and moods arise from dividing duration, and viewing things as conditional or positive. Even the order or construc- tion of language is to be traced to the calm or impassioned state of mind from which it proceeds. Plato has given his views of language in the Gratylus, and Aristotle, in his Interpretation and Analytics, has laid the foundations of general grammar. So in later times the most successful cultivators of mental philosophy have also been attentive to the theory of language (see Max Miiller, Lectures on the Science of Language). GRANDEUR. — Greatness, whether in elevation, or vast- ness, or splendour, relatively to other things. " The emotion raised by grand objects is awful, solemn, and serious." " To me grandeur in objects seems nothing else but such a degree of excellence, in one kind or another, as merits our admiration. " Of all objects of contemplation, the Supreme Being is the most grand The emotion which this grandest of all objects raises in the mind is what we call devotion — a serious recollected temper, which inspires magnanimity, and disposes to the most heroic acts of virtue. " The emotion produced by other objects which may be called grand, though in an inferior degree, is, in its nature and in its effects, similar to that of devotion. It disposes to serious- ness, elevates the mind above its usual state to a kind of enthusiasm, and inspires magnanimity, and a contempt of what 176 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. is mean" (Eeid, Intellectual Powers, essay viii. ch. iii.). — V. Sublimity, Beauty, ^Esthetics. G-RATITUDE, sympathetic appreciation of benevolence shown towards oneself. This sense of kindness done or in- tended is accompanied by a desire to return it, hence described as benevolent. As benevolence between man and man is a duty, gratitude is named a moral affection, that is, gratitude is a disposition, the exercise and cultivation of which is required by moral law (see Chalmers, Sketches of Mental and Moral Philo- sophy, ch. viii.; Shaftesbury, Moralists). GRIEF, one of the Emotions (like Fear) (see Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy, p. 162). HABIT (e£w, habitus). — (1) The law in accordance with which facility in action is acquired by repetition; (2) the acquired facility, whether physical or mental, regarded as a personal possession. In Ethics, a virtue as an acquired tendency. By Aristotle e£is is denned (Metaph., lib. iv. cap. xx.) to be, in one sense, the same with SidOecris, or disposition. His com- mentators make a distinction, and say 2£is is more permanent. There is the same distinction in English between habit and disposition. In the If. Ethics Aristotle uses the term as equi- valent to virtue regarded as a personal acquisition resulting from deliberate and persistent regard to the great end of life {N. Ethics, ii. 5). Mental Habits are distinguished by Aristotle into intellectual and moral. From habit results power or virtue, and the intel- lectual habits or virtues are intellect, wisdom, prudence, science, and art. These may be subservient to quite contrary pur- poses, and those who have them may exercise them spontane- ously and agreeably in producing directly contrary effects. But the moral virtues, like the different habits of the body, are determined by their nature to one specific operation. Thus, a man in health acts and moves in a manner conformable to his healthy state of body, and never otherwise, when his motions are natural and voluntary; and in the same manner the habits of justice and temperance uniformly determine those adorned by them to act justly and temperately " (Aristotle, N. Ethics, lib. i. ch. xiii. ; ii. ch. v. and vi.; v. cap. i.). VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 177 Habits have further been distinguished as active or passive. The determinations of the will, efforts of atteution, and the use of our bodily organs, give birth to active habits; the acts of the memory and the affections of the sensibility, to passive habits. Aristotle (N. Ethic, lib. iii.) proves that our habits are voluntary, as being created by a series of voluntary actions. Actions, according to Aristotle, are voluntary throughout ; habits only as to their beginnings. Habits, having become in a measure fixed in the nature, cannot be changed without volun- tary and long-continued effort to undo what has been done. Thurot (Be VEntendement, i. 128) calls "habit the memory of the organs, or that which gives memory to the organs." Physical habit is in a sense physical memory. Bacon, On Advancement of Learning, bk. vii.; Maine de Biran, L' Influence de Habitude; Dutrochet, Theorie de U Habi- tude; M. F. Bavaisson, De I 'Habitude; Butler's Analogy, i. 5 ; Beid, Active Powers, essay iii. 1, 3 ; Intellectual Powers, essay iv. 4 ; Carpenter's Mental Physiology, bk. i. ch. viii. HALLUCINATION. — A delusion, consequent either on temporary confusion of mind, or on more enduring disorder of thought, originated and continued by an abnormal excitement, or a diseased condition of brain. HAPPINESS. — (1) Agreeable experience in its widest sense ; (2) a higher phase of such experience resulting from harmonious action of our powers under guidance of intelligence. For this higher experience the word Happiness is more com- monly reserved, while Pleasure is used to designate the lower and more transient forms of agreeable sentient experience. The Greeks called the sum total of the pleasure which is allotted or happens to a man eirvx^a, that is, good hap ; or, more religiously, evSai/xoria, that is, favourable providence (Coleridge's Aids to Reflection). To live well and to act well is synonymous with being happy (Aristotle, N~. Ethic, lib. i. cap. iv.). Happiness, ac- cording to Aristotle, is the blessedness of a perfect state, in which the whole powers of the agent are in full activity. Happiness is never desired but for its own sake only. As pleasure is the aim of mere desire, and interest the aim of M 178 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. prudence, so happiness is the aim of wisdom. Happiness is conceived as necessarily an ultimate object of action. That which we contemplate as the ultimate and universal object of desire, must be identical with that which we contemplate as the ultimate and supreme guide of our intentions. As moral beings, our liappiness must be found in our moral progress, and in the consequences of our moral progress : we must be happy by being virtuous " (Whewell, Morality, Nos. 544, 545). On the ambiguity of the term Happiness, see Green, Intro- duction to Hume's Ethical Works, ii. 12. See Aristotle, N. Ethic., lib. Lj Leibnitz, De Vita Beata ; Harris, Dialogue on Happiness. — V. Good (Chief), Perfection, SUMMUM B0NUm). HAPPINESS THEORY OF MORALS,— that which finds in the agreeable the criterion of rectitude. In accordance with this fundamental position, all agreeable experience is included within the area of morals. But, in a rational life, comparisons are inevitable. The agreeable, considered in itself alone, or mere desire in any phase, cannot be allowed to supply the rule of life. The necessity for limitation appears in a rational regard to our good on the whole. Prudential con- siderations are necessary, requiring attention to the utility of actions, or their adaptation to secure our good on the whole. Hence the theory is named Utilitarianism. The standard of morals under this scheme thus becomes the agreeable, as determined by a rational nature, with regard to our good on the whole. After the discrimination of pleasures comes the reference to the interests of all moral agents in the possibilities of happiness. The earlier phase of the theory made personal happiness the test of right conduct, hence named Egoistic Hedonism (Hobbes, though at the same time stating and ex- pounding eternal laws of nature). The later phase has passed over to the general happiness of men as the rational basis for judging of action, hence named Altruistic Hedonism or Eudai- monism, having as its formula — The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number. Its upholders have been, Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Bain. J. S. Mill distinguished between pleasures by reference to their degree, giving the preference to the higher VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 179 or more intellectual pleasures, and constituting those who have had experience of all kinds the sole judges. Bain has criticised adversely this position, alleging that J. S. Mill had given opponents "important strategic positions," and main- taining that he "ought to have resolved all the so-called nobler or higher pleasures into the one single circumstance of including, with the agent's pleasure, the pleasure of others. This is the only position that a supporter of Utility can hold to" (J. S. Mill.- A Criticism, p. 113). Sidgwick (Methods of Ethics) has combined an intuitional element with the Utilitarian Ethics, and has critically examined the rival claims of Utili- tarianism and Intuitionalism. Sidgwick's object is to secure at the outset a basis for moral obligation. Historically, Modern Utilitarianism stands in relation to the Cyrenaic and Epicurean Schools of Ancient Philosophy; prior to both, the Socratic philosophy contained a large Eudai- monistic element; between the two, the Ethics of Aristotle worked out in higher form a theory on the basis that Happiness, as connected with the perfection of human life, is the end of life (Modern Utilitarianism, — Hobbes' Leviathan; Paley's Moral Philosophy ; J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism ; Bain's Moral Science and Criticism of J. S. Mill; Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics). — V. Eud^emonism. HARMONY, the affinity or agreement of relations and movements, adapting them for combination. — The conception that a philosophy of life could be found in the harmony of relations, guiding action according to definite laws of compu- tation, was a favourite one in Ancient Philosophy. It is a natural outcome of the Pythagorean theory of numbers, leading to their doctrine that the soul is a harmony, and consequently that " Virtue is harmony, and also health, and universal good, and God ; on which account everything owes its existence and consistency to harmony" (Diog. Laert., Kb. viii. ch. i. ; V. Zeller, Ueberweg, Schwegler, in loc). This conception is also prominent in Plato's Ethics, as he makes melody and harmony symbolic of true discipline, music and gymnastic being the two sides of education {Republic, bk. iii. p. 410). Pre-established Harmony, the designation of Leibnitz 180 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. for his theory of the Divinely-established relation between body and mind — the movements of monads and the succession of ideas, as it were a constant agreement between two clocks (Syst. Nouv., p. 14; Erdmann, pp. 127 to 133 seq.j Theodicee ; La Monadologie). Let us suppose a mind, the order and succession of whose modifications corresponded with the series of movements to take place in some body, God would unite the two and make of them a living soul, — a man. Here, then, is the most perfect harmony between the two parts of which man is composed. There is no commerce nor communication, no action and re- action. The mind is an independent force, which passes from one volition or perception to another in conformity with its own nature, and would have done so although the body had not existed. The body, in like manner, by virtue of its own inherent force, and by the impression of external objects, goes through a series of movements ; and would have done so although it had not been united to a rational soul. In short, the mind is a spiritual automaton, and the body is a material automaton. But the movements of the body and the modifi- cations of the mind correspond to each other. Like two pieces of clock-work, they are so regulated as to mark the same time; the spring which moves the one is not the spring which moves the other; yet they go exactly together. The harmony between them existed before the mind was united to the body. Hence this is called the doctrine of pre-established harmony. It may be called correspondence or parallelism, but not har- mony between mind and body — for there is no unity superior to both, and containing both, which is the cause of their mutual penetration (Tiberghien, Essai des Cannais. Hum.). This doctrine was first advocated by Leibnitz, as an advance on the doctrine of Occasional Causes, from which it differs " only in this respect, that by the former the accordance of the mental and the bodily phenomena was supposed to be pre-arranged, once for all, by the Divine Power, while by the latter their harmony was supposed to be brought about by His constant interposition." — V. Causes (Occasional). This, however, is only one aspect of the Leibnitzian doctrine VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOFHY. 181 of pre-established harmony, which was not limited to the case of body and mind, but was the outcome of the doctrine of monads. The life of each monad was independent of that of all the rest ; there was no possibility of inter-action, and the correspondence of the life of each with that of all the others could be accounted for only by the postulate of a harmony pre-established by God. HARMONY (of the Spheres). — The ancient philosophers supposed that the regular movements of the heavenly bodies throughout space formed a kind of harmony, determined by the relations to each other of the intervals of separation. The Pythagoreans adduced this as an illustration of their doctrine of the harmony of numbers (Aristotle, Be Coelo, ii. 9). This was a general belief in ancient times, and was a favourite doctrine of the Pythagoreans. HATE. — Eevulsion of feeling against things and persons, regarded as evil. As concerned with persons, it takes the form of antagonism, subject to moral law, and limited specially by the law of benevolence. It is to be ranked among the Affections. Ethical Hate is antagonistic to moral evil. HEDONISM (rjSovr), pleasure) is the doctrine that the chief good of man lies in the pursuit of pleasure. This was the doctrine of Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school ; hence called fjhoviKoi According as personal pleasure alone is considered, or general happiness, it is Egoistic Hedonism or Altruistic Hedonism (cf. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, pp. 107-174). — V. Happiness Theoet and Eud^monism. HEREDITY. — The law of reproduction as it appears in the history of species, implying (1) that each species transmits to offspring its essential characteristics ; (2) that acquired apti- tudes, or forms of adaptation to environment, are transmitted to offspring, thereby providing for physiological advance, or true evolution of organism, and persistence of structural gain in the history of species. There is also hereditary transmission of mental characteristics ; but here the law is more obscure, only a beginning having been made with the effort to gather scientific evidence (V. Darwin, Descent of Man; Carpenter, Mental Physiology ; Galton's Hereditary Genius). HETEROGENEITY, separateness of nature, applicable 182 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. to objects so standing apart from each other that they are regarded as distinct, even when conjoined or contemplated in relation. (1) As concerning material existence, objects which cannot cohere or combine in the constitution of a unity ; (2) as concerning mental phenomena, those which, while combined in thought, are thought as distinct and separate, this separate- ness being essential to the mental relation. According to Spencer's definition, the transition in Evolution is "from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent hetero- geneity" {First Priniples, p. 396). — V. Evolution, Differen- tiation. HETERONOMY (eVepos, another; vo>os, law).— A pro- fessed law of conduct which is inconsistent with our Reason. This is Kant's designation for a false principle of morals, such as receives acknowledgment when personal desire determines the right for us instead of moral law. In contrast with Heteronomy, the recognition of moral law as the absolute law of life is Autonomy of the Will, or Autonomy of the Eeason (Critique of Practical Season, Metaph. of Ethics, Semple's transl., new ed., Calderwood, p. 93 ; Abbott's Kant's Ethics, pp. 51 and 59). " If the Will seeks the law which is to deter- mine it, anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation ; consequently, if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, there always results heteronomy" (Abbott's transl., p. 59). HISTORY (Philosophy of).— The tracing of the rational principles which guide the development of the events of History. The founder was Vico, but Hegel may be called its second founder; and his example in the treatment of history has been followed by his school. The conception of Evolution, both in its physical and dialectical forms, has been brought to bear upon History. Historians of Philosophy also have traced in the development of philosophical systems the necessary march of reason (see Hegel, Philosophy of History, transl. in Bohn's series; Flint's Vico, in Philosophical Classics; Zeller, History of Greek Philosophy, introd.; Schwegler, History of Philosophy, introd., Stirling). HOBBISM (from the name of the author of The Leviathan). VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 183 — The theory that morality is an institution' of society, deriving its obligation from the command of the civil power. Traces of such a view are to be found in the speculation of the Greek Sophists. Hobbes was, however, the first to give it systematic shape. The " natural " condition of man, said Hobbes, is a state of war, i.e., not of actual fighting, but of " the known disposition thereto." Apart from social restrictions, every man seeks the satisfaction of his own desires ; and as the desires of all are irreconcilably opposed, there results a helium omnium contra omnes. This state of anarchy is, however, utterly intolerable, and for the sake of peace men agree to renounce a part of their claims, on condition of being secured in the possession of the rest. To enforce this agreement is the work of civil govern- ment; in Hobbes' view, the best government is absolute monarchy, which must be absolute and irresponsible; the supreme power must be the sole source of law, and law must prescribe morality and religion. Thus the rules of morality are "Articles of Peace"; as means of attaining peace they are appointed by nature, and are eternal, voluntarily adopted by man, and are thus far conventional. Political and religious interests being involved, this political theory was at once vigorously assailed. Among other writers, Cumberland, Cudworth, and Clarke — each in his own way — argued that morality is prior to and independent of positive law. Cumberland asserted a law of Nature ; Cudworth a law of Reason; Clarke a system of moral principles, similar in nature to mathematical relations. It was only in the following generation that a number of thinkers, under the influence of Locke, attacked the egoistic basis on which the political philo- sophy of Hobbes rested. — [J. W.] HOLINESS. — Perfect moral purity. " The perfect accord- ance of the Will with the moral law is holiness" (Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, bk. ii. ch. ii. sec. 4 ; Abbott's transl. Kantfs Ethics, 218). "The term is often used to indicate hatred of evil. It suggests the idea, not of perfect virtue, but of that peculiar affection wherewith a being of perfect virtue regards moral evil ; and so 184 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. much indeed is this the precise and characteristic import of the term, that, had there been no evil, either actual or conceiv- able, in the universe, there would have been no holiness. There would have been perfect truth and perfect righteousness, yet not holiness ; for this is a word which denotes neither any one of the virtues in particular, nor the assemblage of them all put together, but the recoil or the repulsion of these towards the opposite vices — a recoil that never would have been felt if vice had been so far a nonentity as to be neither an object of real existence nor an object of thought" (Chalmers, Nat. Theol.). HOMOGENEITY.— Likeness of nature. Applicable (1) to such similarity among distinct beings or forms of organism that they can be classified as constituting a species ; (2) to parts of organic existence which belong to the composition of an individual ; (3) to thoughts, so closely allied as to consti- tute such a synthesis in our rational procedure, that the elements belong to each other, or are essential to each other. — V. Hetehogeneity, Evolution. HOMOLOGUE (6/tos, same ; Aoyos). — " The corresponding parts in different animals are called homologues " (Whewell). " A homologue is defined as the same organ in different animals, under every variety of form and function. Thus, the arms and feet of man, the fore and hind feet of quadrupeds, the wings and feet of birds, and the fins of fishes, are said to be homologous" (M'Cosh, Typical Forms, p. 25). — V. Analogue. HOMOTYPE (oyuo's, same; tvVos, type).— "The corre- sponding or serially repeated parts in the same animal are called homotypes. Thus, the fingers and toes of man, indeed the fore and hind limbs of vertebrate animals generally, are said to be homotypal " (M'Cosh, Typical Forms). HUMANITY (Religion of ).— This is the religion of Posi- tivism (q.v.). Having undermined the theological basis of Eeligion, as worship of a God outside of and above humanity, by showing that this is only the first stage of intellectual pro- gress, which must be left behind for the metaphysical, and finally for the positive, Comte set himself to substitute for the old a new religion, independent of theological dogma, and abreast of the Positive view of things. The object of Positivist VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 185 worship is Humanity itself, the human race in its totality— pjast, present, and future — which is conceived as the Grand- Etre. Comte constructed an elaborate system of ritual ob- servance, some of the particulars of which are fantastic enough. It should be said that by no means all Positivists accept Comte's religious teaching (see Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive; Harrison, Contemp. Review, 1884; E. Caird, Social Philosophy of Comte ; Flint, Antitheistic Theories, lect. v.). HUMOUR [humor, moisture). — (1) Originally the physio- logical conditions attending on thought and feeling; (2) the changeable flow of disposition ; (3) appreciation of latent traces of similarity and contrast, occasioning sudden changes of dis- position, fitted to amuse. HYLOZOISM {vXrj, matter ; and £017, life).— The doctrine that life and matter are inseparable ; frequently appearing in Ancient Philosophy with speculation as to the life or soul of the world, and the producing power of nature. Strato of Lampsacus held that the ultimate particles of matter were each and all of them possessed of life (Ueberweg's Hist., i. 183). The Stoics, on the other hand, while they did not accord activity or life to every distinct particle of matter, held that the universe, as a whole, was a being animated by a principle which gave to it motion, form, and life (Zeller's Stoics, &c, 125). This doctrine appeared among the followers of Plotinus, who held that the soul of the universe animated the least particle of matter. Spinoza asserted that all things were alive in different degrees. Omnia quamvis diversis gradihus animata tamen sunt. In the whole of this discussion there is a confounding of life with force. HYPOSTASIS.— V. Entity, Subsistentia. HYPOTHESIS (wro'&o-is, supposition).— In Logic, Aris- totle gave the name Beats to every proposition which, without being an axiom, served as the basis of demonstration, and did not require itself to be demonstrated (Anal. Post., i. 2, 72). He distinguished two kinds of thesis, the one which expressed the essence of a thing, and the other which expressed its existence or non-existence. The first is the optcr/xos or defi- nition — the second, the inroOecris. The Hypothesis he defines 186 TOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. as " the taking one of two opposite alternations as true, while it might either be true or false " (i.e., it is not axiomatic) (Anal. Post., i. 2). He thus distinguishes between demonstrative and hypothetical inference (fj Sei/criKws t) ef u?ro0e'o-ea)s). But, while he elaborated his account of the former, he did not pursue the investigation of the latter. The scientific significance of Hypo- thesis could not indeed be appreciated till the advance of science had shown the necessity of a logic of Science or of Induction, of which the doctrine of Hypothesis is an important part. Accordingly, it is only in modern times that the nature and importance of Hypothesis have been carefully attended to. Mill defines Hypothesis as "any supposition which we make (either without actual evidence or on evidence avowedly insuf- ficient) in order to endeavour to deduce from it conclusions in accordance with facts which are known to be real. It is, in short, an assumed law or cause. When a phenomenon that is new to us cannot be explained by any known cause, we try to reconcile it to unity by assign- ing it ad interim to some cause which may appear to explain it. By hypothesis, therefore, is understood the supposing of some- thing, the existence of which is not proved, as a cause to ex- plain phenomena which have been observed. It thus differs in signification from theory (q.v.), which explains phenomena by causes which are known to exist and to operate. " An hypothesis sufficiently confirmed,'' says Ueberweg (Logic, p. 506, Lindsay's transl.), " establishes a Theory, i.e., the ex- planation of phenomena from their universal laws." And Mill says (Logic, bk. iii. ch. xiv. sec. 5) : — " Nearly everything which is now theory was once hypothesis." In order to the conver- sion of Hypothesis into Theory or established law the hypo- thesis must be verified, i.e., the consequences deducible from it must be shown to harmonise with the actual facts, and it must further be shown that it is the only supposition which accounts for these facts. As to the relative value of conflicting hypo- theses, Ueberweg says (Logic, p. 506, Lindsay's transl.) : — " The hypothesis is the more improbable in proportion as it must be propped up by artificial auxiliary hypotheses (hypotheses sub- sidiarse). It gains in probability by simplicity, and harmony VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 187 (or partial) identity with other probable or certain presupposi- tions ( causae prseter necessitatem non sunt multipli- candse). The content of the hypothesis acquires absolute certainty, so far as it succeeds in recognising the supposed reason to be the only one possible by excluding all others conceivable, or in proving it to be the consequence of a truth already established." Between the absolute establishment of a hypothesis and its absolute rejection there is another possi- bility, viz., its correction. This last is the general case. The course of science is through successive hypotheses to more adequate knowledge. " We arrive, by means of hypotheses, at conclusions not 'hypothetical.' Sometimes a single case is sufficient to decide between two rival hypotheses — a case which cannot be explained by the one, and can only be explained by the other." Such a case is called an Experimentum Cruris (q.v.) (Reid, Intellectual Powers, essay i. ch. iii. ; Bacon, Nov. Org., i. 104; Leibnitz, Nov. Ess., 4, ch. xii.; Whewell's Nov. Org. Menov. ; Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. xiv. ; Ueberweg, System of Logic, sec. 134). — [J. S.] HYPOTHETICAL.— Applied both to Propositions and to Syllogisms. The hypothetical proposition — sometimes called conjunction — is a species of conditional proposition. It con- sists of two propositions — called respectively antecedent and consequent — related to each other as condition and conditioned, the truth of the one depending ou the truth of the other, e.g., "If it rains, I shall not go." The hypothetical or conjunctive syllogism is one whose major premiss is a hypothetical proposi- tion, its minor premiss and conclusion being categorical. It is either constructive (modus ponens) or destructive (modus tollens); in the former case the antecedent is affirmed, in the latter the consequent denied. There is no other alternative. Hence the fallacies of affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent. -[J.S.] HYPOTHETICAL DUALIST.— V. Cosmothetic Ideal- ist. I. — The conscious Subject, knowing itself as distinct from the facts of its own experience. — V. Ego, Subject. IDEA (tSea, ctSos, forma, species, image). — I. Common 188 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. modern usage. (1) In its widest sense,' every product of in- tellectual action, or even every modification ; (2) in more restricted use, a mental image of an external object. II. Special usage. (1) Platonic : according to Plato, Ideas are the arche- types of the manifold varieties of existence in the universe. These archetypes belong to the supersensible world, where reality is found, and in the midst of which God dwells ; (2) Kantian : in the philosophy of Kant, Ideas are products of the Reason (Vernunft), transcending the conceptions of the under- standing, being named by him " transcendental ideas." These ideas are three in number — the Soul, the Universe, and God. In the functions of mind they are concerned with the unifica- tion of existence. (3) Hegelian : in the system of Hegel, which finds in the dialectic evolution of the categories of the under- standing the evolution of all existence as a unity, the Idea is the Absolute towards which the Evolution of being is moving. The Idea, as the Absolute, manifests itself through Nature, then through Spirit, and returns upon itself as the Absolute. The Platonic use was objective, the modern is subjective. The idea was to Plato the essence of a thing : there was no immediate reference to a mind in which it existed. The idea was eternal, and existed independently of the finite minds which contem- plated it. In modern usage, on the contrary, ideal existence is synonymous with mind-dependent existence. I. Common Modern Usage. — (1 ) Every product of intellectual action, or even every mental modification. Descartes used the word to designate any impression made upon the brain, but more commonly a mental representation of an object, — "All that is in our mind when we conceive a thing" (Descartes' Method). " It is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking " (Locke's Essay, bk. i. ch. i.). Mill has said : — " The always acute and often profound author of An Outline of Sematology (Mr B. H. Smart) justly says : ' Locke will be much more intelligible if, in the majority of places, we substitute "knowledge of," for what he calls "the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 189 idea of'"" (p. 10). To this Mill adds— "Among the many criticisms of Locke's use of the word Idea, this is the only one which, as it appears to me, precisely hits the mark " (Logic, i. 154, note, bk. i. ch. vi. sec. 3). (2) A mental image of an external object. Thus, in the passage from Locke just given, it stands for "phantasm," as well as for the object of thought generally. " The word is often applied to any kind of thought or notion or belief; but its proper use is restricted to such thoughts as are images of visible objects, whether actually seen and remembered, or compounded by the faculty of imagination" (Taylor's Elements of Thought). Thus in Descartes and Locke the use of the term reaches the utmost width compatible with the preservation of its subjective limitation ; it is coextensive with conscious experience. In Berkeley it begins to be a little more restricted. At first he uses it in Locke's setise, as equiv- alent to phenomenon : but later he distinguishes between idea and notion, and says that "the term idea would be improper by being extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of" {Principles of Human Knowledge, sec. 89). We have a notion, not an idea, of spirits and of relations. His argument "for the subjectivity or mind-dependence of sensible things rests chiefly on their ideal nature, the esse of an idea being percipi. Hume limits the use of the term still further, by distinguishing between impressions and ideas. " The differ- ence betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveli- ness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence we name impressions ; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the first images of these in thinking and reasoning" (Treatise on Human Nature, bk. i. pt. i. sec. 1). Spinoza also limited the Cartesian sense, defining idea "a concept of the mind " (Ethics, pt. ii. def. 3). — The usage of the present day wavers between the earlier or wider usage and that of Hume. Idea is used more loosely as coextensive with phenomenon or object of consciousness; and more strictly it is limited to the phenomena of Memory and Imagination, and the 190 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. conceptions of discursive Thought, the term sensation being reserved for the phenomena of perception. Hume's distinction between Impression and Idea is still accepted in sensational psychology, whether the term is used or not (cf. Spencer's " faint states'' and "vivid states"). (3) Eeid strongly protested against the use of the term idea to designate a representation of the object known, as favouring a false view of external perception. He says : — " Modern philosophers, as well as the Peripatetics and Epicureans of old, have conceived that external objects cannot be the immediate objects of our thought ; that there must be some image of them in the mind itself, in which, as in a mirror, they are seen. And the name idea, in the philo- sophical sense of it, is given to those internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. The external thing is the remote or mediate object ; but the idea, or image of that object in the mind, is the immediate object, without which we could have no perception, no remembrance, no conception of the mediate object The idea is in the mind itself, and can have no exist- ence but in a mind that thinks ; but the remote or mediate object may be something external, as the sun or moon ; it may be something past or future ; it may be something which never existed. This is the philosophical meaning of the word idea ; and we may observe that this' meaning of the word is built upon a philosophical opinion ; for if philosophers had not believed that there are such immediate objects of all our thoughts in the mind, they would never have used the word idea to express them. I shall only add that, although I may have occasion to use the word idea in this philosophical sense in explaining the opinions of others, I shall have no occasion to use it in expressing my own, because I believe ideas, taken in this sense, to be a mere fiction of philosophers. And in the popular meaning of the word, there is the less occasion to use it, because the English words thought, notion, apprehension, answer the purpose as well as the Greek word idea, with this advantage, that they are less ambiguous" (Intellectual Powers, essay i. ch.i.). II. Special Usage. — (1) Platonic: according to Plato, ideas were the only objects of science or true knowledge. Things created being in a state of continual flux, there can be no VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 191 real knowledge with respect to them. But the divine ideas, being eternal and unchangeable, are objects of science pro- perly so called. Philosophy is the upward progress of the soul from the things of sense, which are but the shadows of reality, to the contemplation of their eternal substance and truth, i.e., their ideas. These ideas are the essences of things ; and till we penetrate beyond the manifold of sen- sible existence to its unity ; beyond the many beautiful things, e.g., which we see, to the idea of Beauty (airo to koAov) which, hidden to the eye of sense, reveals itself to the eye of the soul, we know not anything. Nor can we rest satisfied with the comtemplation even of the individual ideas : together they constitute an ideal world (koo-/xos), and till we reach the centre of that world — that Idea which is the unity and source of all the others — we know not perfectly. In the Good, which is more than idea, all existence is summed up: and in its contem- plation knowledge is made perfect. Plato says, in the sixth Book of the Bepublic: — "In the course of the discussion we have referred to a multitude of things that are beautiful, and good, and so on ; and also to an essential beauty, and an essential good, and so on (or, beauty in itself, or good in itself), reducing all those things before regarded as manifold to a single form or entity in each case. The manifold are seen not known ; the ideas are known not seen " (Plato's Bepublic, bk. vi. p. 507, Jowett's transl. ; Davies and Vaughan's transl., p. 228). The manifold varieties are presented to the eye ; the ideas to the intellect, and of these ideas, visible things are only the shadows. (2) Kantian : The term is here applied to the " pure concep- tion of the reason," — transcendental ideas — (God, — the soul, — the universe), — which are essentially different from the forms of the sensory and the categories of the understanding. These ideas, as given by pure reason, are only regulative, guiding our intellectual procedure. As given by the practical reason, they are more than regulative, and represent the really existing. Pure conceptions of the understanding, that is the cate- gories, "do not present objects to the mind, except under sensuous conditions " . . . . they may, however, when applied to phenomena, be presented in concreto But ideas are 192 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. still further removed from objective reality than categories; for no phenomena can ever present them to the human mind in concrete. They contain a certain perfection, attainable by no possible empirical cognition ; and they give to reason a syste- matic unity, to which the unity of experience attempts to approximate, but can never completely attain" (Critique of Pure Season, Meiklejohn, p. 350). " I understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no corresponding objects can be discovered in the world of sense. Accordingly, the pure conceptions of reason are transcendental ideas. They are conceptions of pure reason, for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means of an absolute totality of con- ditions. They are not mere fictions, but natural and necessary products of reason, and have hence a necessary relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understanding " (ib., 228). " Although experience presents the occasion and the starting point, it is the transcendental idea of reason which guides it in its pilgrimage, and is the goal of all its struggles" (ib., p. 364). (3) Hegelian : The term is here employed as the designation of the Absolute. " The idea is truth in itself, and for itself the absolute unity of the notion and objectivity The definition, which declares the Absolute to be the idea, is itself absolute. All former definitions come back to this. The idea is the Truth : for Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the notion. By that correspondence, however, is not meant the correspondence of external things with my concep- tions : for these are only correct conceptions held by me, the individual person. In the idea we have nothing to do with the individual, nor with figurative conceptions, nor with external things. And yet, again, everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the idea, and has its truth by and in virtue of the idea alone. Every individual being is some one aspect of the idea. .... The idea itself is not to be taken as an idea of some- thing or other, any more than the notion is to be taken as merely a specific notion. The Absolute is the universal and one idea, which, as discerning, or in the act of judgment, specialises itself to the system of specific ideas ; which, after all, are constrained by their nature to come back to the one VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 193 idea where their truth lies " {Logic of Hegel, Wallace, pp. 304-5). " The idea may be described in many ways. It may be called reason (and this is the proper philosophical signification of reason); a subject-object; the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and the infinite, of soul and body ; the possibility which has its actuality in its own self; that by which the nature can be thought only as extant. All these descriptions apply, because the idea contains all the relations of under- standing, but contains them in their infinite return and identity in themselves " (ib., p. 306). " The idea is essentially a process, because its identity is the absolute and free identity of the notion, only in so far as it is absolute negativity, and for that reason dialectical It represents the course or round, in which the notion, in the capacity of universality which is in- dividuality, gives itself the character of objectivity, and of the antithesis to objectivity, and in which this externality, which has the notion for its substance, finds its way back to subjectivity through its immanent dialectic " (ib., p. 308). " The idea as a process runs through three stages in its development. The first form of the idea is life ; that is, the idea in the form of immediacy. The second form is that of mediation or dif- ferentiation ; and this is the idea in the form of knowledge, which appears under the double aspect of the Theoretical and Practical idea. The process of knowledge eventuates in the restoration of the unity enriched by difference. This gives the third form of the idea, the Absolute Idea ; which last stage of the logical idea evinces itself to be at the same time really first, and to have a being due to itself alone " (ib., p. 309). See Trendlenburg, Platonis De Ideis; Eichter, De Ideis Platonis; Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy; ReieTs Works, app., notes b and c; Dugald Stewart, Philosophical Essays, app. ii.; Adam Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects, p. 119, note ; Veitch's Descartes, note ii., on Idea ; Fraser's Berkeley in Philosophical Classics, pts. i. and ii. IDEAL, that which the mind contemplates as a repre- sentation (1) of the normal excellence of any being ; perfec- tion; (2) in intelligent life, what ought to be, in contrast with what exists, the right : (3) in art, the conception present to N 194 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. the imagination, which the artist tries to depict, — the Beautiful; (4) the representation in a single individual of all the excel- lencies of an order. " We call attention to two words which continually recur in this discussion — they are, on the one hand, nature or experi- ence ; on the other, ideal. Experience is individual or collec- tive; but the collective is resolved into the individual; the ideal is opposed to the individual and to collectiveness : it appears as an original conception of the mind. Nature or experience gives me the occasion for conceiving the ideal, but the ideal is something entirely different from experience or nature ; so that, if we apply it to natural, or even to artificial figures, they cannot fill up the condition of the ideal concep- tion, and we are obliged to imagine them exact. The word ideal corresponds to an absolute and independent idea, and not to a collective one " (Cousin, The True, Beautiful and Good). " Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognise him as such" (Kant's Groundwork, Abbott's transl., p. 25). The ideal is to be attained by assembling in one whole the beauties usually seen in different individuals, excluding every- thing defective, so as to form a type or model of the species. Thus the Apollo Belvedere is the ideal of the beauty and pro- portion of the human frame ; the Farnese Hercules is the type of manly strength. This ideal can only be attained by followr ing nature. There must be no elements nor combinations but such as nature exhibits. This is the empirical account of the ideal. According to Cicero (Be Oratore), there is nothing of any kind so fair that there may not be a fairer conceived by the mind. We can conceive of statues more perfect than those of Phidias. Nor did the artist, when he made the statue of Jupiter or Minerva, contemplate any one individual from which to take a likeness ; but there was in his mind a form of beauty, gazing on which, he guided his hand and skill in imitation of it. In the philosophy of Plato this form was called 7rapa- Seiy/m Seneca (Epist., lviii. sec. 15-18) distinguishes between VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 195 iSea and eiSos, thus : — when a painter paints a likeness, the original is his iSe'a — the likeness is the eTSos or image. The eiSos is in the work — the iSea is hefore the work. Cicero (De Invent.) states that Zeuxis had five of the most beautiful women of Crotona, as models, from which to make up his picture of a perfect beauty, as illustrating the Platonic sense of irapdSeiyiia. or the ideal. According to this view the beau ideal is a type of perfection contemplated by the mind, projected by the imagination, which may never have been realised, how nearly soever it may have been approached in the shape of an actual specimen. "By ideal I understand the idea, not in concrete but in individuo, as an individual thing, determinable or determined by the idea alone What I have termed an ideal, was in Plato's philosophy an idea of the Divine mind — an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal existences" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's transL, p. 350). " The ideal is therefore the prototype of all things, which, as defective copies (ectypa) receive from it the material of their possibility, and approximate to it more or less, though it is impossible that they can ever attain to its perfection " (ib., p. 356). It is therefore simply the sum total of existence in its systematic unity. The hypostatising of the ideal is God, and the application to it of the categories of the understanding gives rise to the so-called science of Rational Theology. It is the object of the first part of Kant's Dialectic to prove the baselessness of this science, and to show wherein its illusion consists. IDEAL LEGALITY. — Kant's phrase to designate the form of moral law as simple or direct command, — -"Thou shalt.'' Its formula is, — Act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal (Groundwork of Metaphysic of Ethics). IDEALISM, a general term applicable to all theories con- cerning " external existence,'' which make our knowledge of it indirect, by restricting mind to knowledge of its own states. Realism is the general term for all theories of external percep- tion which maintain actual knowledge of the external. The 196 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. source of the antagonism of these conflicting sets of theories is the separation between consciousness and externality, There are, on the one hand, those facts — (1) that our sensa- tions are subjective states, (2) that we have no power to pass from our own states to the objects supposed to occasion them ; on the other hand, these facts (1) that our mental states cannot all be accounted for by simple exercise of our own power, (2) that our sensations are dependent on the sensibility of our own organism, and can be voluntarily repeated by experimental action in the 'use of our organism. The source of perplexity cannot be removed. Even if we grant the distinction between "external" and "internal," we cannot bridge the chasm between them ; we cannot establish intercommunication. Idealism is a unifying of reality, treating the so-called " ex- ternal," as the objectifying of subjective conditions. Idealists maintain that realism is ultimately a reducing of mental phenomena to materialistic conditions, and that it is self- condemned on this account. Idealism wears a variety of aspects. 1. Subjective Idealism. — This regards the subjective pheno- mena as the only phenomena of which we can be assured. As to an external world, it holds that the existence of an outer world cannot be demonstrated, or even that it is non-existent, the hypothesis of such a world resulting from a tendency to misinterpret mental phenomena. All things known to us are the phenomena included in the succession of our own ideas. The esse of what we name external, material, or non-thinking things, is percepi. This has also been named Psychological or Phenomenal Idealism; and by Kant "Material Idealism," in contrast with formal, critical, or transcendental idealism. Sub- jective idealism is the term applicable to the theories of Berkeley and Fichte (see Kant's Critique of Pure Season, Meiklejohn, p. 166; supplement xxi., in Eosencranz's edition of Works; Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge; Fraser's Selections from Berkeley; Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre; Ueberweg's History, ii. 88 ; Schwegler's History, p. 176). 2. Critical Idealism. — Critically distinguishing a posteriori from a priori phenomena in consciousness, and accounting VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 197 or hno% and <7ti£co, intus pungo), an internal stimulus. Literally, immediate stimulus from within. The word carries an acknowledgment of ignorance as to the exact nature of the stimulating power. It applies to an impulse quite apart from the reasoning process in us, and which is independent of the lessons of experience. It has been applied to plants as well as to animals ; and may be defined " the power or energy by which all organised forms VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 221 are preserved in the individual, or continued in the species." It is more common, however, to consider instinct as belonging to animals. " By instinct I mean a natural blind impulse to certain actions without having any end in view, without de- liberation, and very often without any conception of what we do" (Reid, Active Powers, essay iii. pt. i. ch. ii.). "A propen- sity prior to experience and independent of instruction" (Paley's Natural Theology, ch. xviii.). " A blind tendency to some mode of action independent of any consideration on the part of the agent, of the end to which the action leads " (Whately, Tract on Instinct). Eecent discoveries as to (1) the large development of the lobes of special senses at the base of the brain, (2) the co-ordin- ation of the sensory and motor nerves in the subordinate nerve centres, and prominently in the brain, have cleared away a considerable amount of the obscurity as to the action of the lower animals, which made references to instinct carry an admission of superiority on the part of these animals. Superiority of some animals in special senses is clearly estab- lished. More particularly, in the olfactory lobe the most of the quadrupeds are superior to man. They are capable of detecting in this way what men cannot recognise, and have thereby means of guiding their movements which are not at our disposal. So do many animals excel man in power of vision, being sensitive to the action of light in a much higher degree. This is true of fishes and birds. In advance of this, however, increased knowledge concerning the arrangements and relations of sensory and motor nerves, and concerning the internal structure of the cerebrum, has carried us greatly further in interpretation of many actions of animals, which we have hitherto referred to some occult power, regarded as involving a wonderful approach to the exercise of intelligence in us. By excitation of a sensory nerve, a combina- tion of sensory and motor nerves is brought into action, and these are so co-ordinated as to provide for action which in our life we have been accustomed to refer to intelligence. We thus find that the prevailing thought of former times, sanctioned by our use of the term " instinct," which was the cover for our ignor- 222 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ance, was doubly wrong — first, implying often an exercise of intelligence on our part when there was in reality none ; and second, the transference of this error to the life of lower animals, as if by similar phenomena it were proved that they must be possessed either of intelligence similar to ours, or of a power even more mysterious. Thus, what we describe as " the intelli- gent look" of an animal is nothing more than the excitation of the sensory and motor system, under the action of some exter- nal occurrence which has induced the state. What we regard in the bark of a dog, as a warning of the approach of strangers, is only the effect of sensory excitation. The leaders in this line of research have been Hitzig, Ferrier, Hughlings Jackson. See Carpenter's Mental Physiology; Calder- wood's Relations of Mind and Brain; Eomanes on Animal Intelligence. Much more difficult, and quite beyond the range of recent investigations into brain action, are the phenomena which seem to indicate adaptation of means to ends in a manner impossible to us, save by action of intelligent purpose. And the perplexity is considerably increased by the very striking fact, that these phenomena are observed in the activity of insects, even more than in the case of animals of higher orders. Eecent observations, carefully repeated, recorded, and com- pared, have made us familiar with wonderful adaptation to wants and circumstances in the history of bees, wasps, and specially of ants. These forms of action seem quite distinct from those which can be accounted for by simple reference to co-ordinated action of sensory and motor nerves through a nerve centre. They lead more naturally into the hypothesis of some vital instinct, wearing the aspect of functional activity peculiar to the order of life concerned. Ants are proved to communicate with each other ; to guide a selected group from the nest to stores of food ; to carry out of the nest their young, lay them in order in the sunshine, and carry them all back again before sundown ; to store corn in granaries, and when it has been wet by long continuance of rain, to carry out the grain, spread it, turn it, and carry it back when dried. These facts greatly surpass the ordinary occupations of any of the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 223 more highly organised animals, even those which most closely approximate in structure to the human form. They give ample warrant for the remark of Charles Darwin, that " the brain of an ant is the most wonderful point of matter in creation." The occupations recorded are connected with their food and care of the young ; and they are most startling in the case of those ants which store their food. Nothing we know of brain-organisation can help us to say what " instinct " really implies as a power capable of accomplishing results such as those described. The definition of instinct which makes it imply adaptation of means to ends, accomplished as well by an animal the first time without instruction as after repeated practice, is hardly sufficient to meet the requirements, for it applies as much to the running of the chick, which we could not name instinct, as to the building of a nest. On the other hand, we must include in our view of instinct the possibility of acquisition in the history of a species. " We have every reason to believe that the power of special- ised instincts is transmitted from one generation to another, and, where the circumstances favour it, goes on increasing from age to age in intensity, and in particular adaptations to the purposes demanded. All domesticated animals were originally wild ; but when once tamed, the offspring in the next genera- tion partake of the domesticated character by a specialised in- stinct. The case is the same with animals trained to particular purposes. The young pointer signals the game the very first time he takes the field ; the young watch-dog barks at a stranger without ever being taught to do so. All confirmed habits which become a part of the animal nature seem to be imparted by hereditary descent ; and thus what seems to be an original instinct may, after all, be but the accumulated growth and experience of many generations " (Morell, Introd. to Men. Phil.; Lubbock, Ants, Bees, and Wasps, International Scientific Series ; M'Cook, The Agricultural Ant of Texas ; and The Honey Ants and the Occident Ants ; Calderwood, Relations of Mind and Brain, ch. vii. ; Romanes, Animal Intelligence). INTEGRATION. — 7. Differentiation, Evolution. 224 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. INTELLECT (intelligo, to choose between, to perceive a difference), — (1) more exactly, the understanding regarded as a power of comparison ; (2) more widely, the whole rational nature of man. " The term intellect is derived from a verb (intelligere), which signifies to understand ; but the term itself is usually so applied as to imply a faculty which recognises principles explicitly as well as implicitly ; and abstract as well as applied ; and there- fore agrees with the reason rather than the understanding ; and the same extent of signification belongs to the adjective intellectual" (Whewell, Elements of Morality, introd.). Intellect, sensitivity, and will are the three heads under which the powers and capacities of the human mind are now generally arranged. "It is by those powers and faculties which compose that part of his nature, commonly called his intellect or understanding, that man acquires his knowledge of external objects ; that he investigates truth in the sciences • that he combines means in order to attain the ends he has in view ; and that he imparts to his fellow-creatures the acquisi- tions he has made " (Stewart, Active and Moral Powers, introd.). The intellectual powers are commonly distinguished from the moral powers on account of the need for distinguishing between the intellectual life as such and the moral life, as that is con- cerned with self-direction under moral law. But the two are not capable of being separated, inasmuch as there can be no moral life without intellectual, for intellectual power necessarily enters into the action of moral life. When the moral powers are designated ' active, as by Eeid and Stewart, it is meant only to intimate that these powers, whether impulsive or intellectual, are powers which prompt and regulate actions. Intellect and Intelligence are commonly used as synonymous. But Hamilton (Reid's Works, note a, sec. 5) says : By Aris- totle, voSs is used to denote — • " 1. Our higher faculties of thought and knowledge. " 2. The faculty, habit, or place of principles, that is, of self-evident and self-evidencing notions and judgments. " The schoolmen, following Boethius, translated it by intel- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 225 lectus and intelligentia ; and some of them appropriated the former of these terms to its first or general signification, the latter to its second or special." — V. Keason, Understanding. Aristotle distinguished intellectus patiens from intellectus agens. The former, perishing with the body, involves the action of the senses, imagination, and memory, as these furnish the matter of knowledge ; the latter, separable from the body, and eternal, gives that knowledge form. Under the impressions of the senses the mind is passive ; but while external things rapidly pass, imagination does not allow them altogether to escape, but the knowledge of them is retained by the memory. But this knowledge, being the knowledge of singulars, cannot give universal notions, but merely generalised ones. The intellectus agens, however, proceeding upon the information furnished by the senses, actually evolves the idea which the intellectus patiens potentially possessed. His illustration is, that as light makes potentially existing colour, actually to be, so the intellectus agens converts into actuality, and brings, as it were, to a new life, whatever was discovered or collected by the intellectus patiens. As the senses receive the forms of things expressed in matter, the intellect comprehends the universal form, which, free from the changes of matter, is really prior to it and underlies the production of it as cause. The common illustration of Aristotle is that while the senses perceive the form of a thing, as it is to o-i/j-ov, or a height ; the intellect has knowledge of it as implying rm koiAw, a hollow, out of which the height was produced. He thus introduces, even within the vovs, the universal dis- tinction between form and matter, actual and potential. The vovs is, on the one hand, passive and recipient ; on the other, it is active and creative. It creates the world of its knowledge ; for the form of that world is the work or manifestation of intellect. " Thus reason is, on the one hand, of such a character as to become all things ; on the other hand, of such a nature as to create all things, acting much in the same way as some positive quality, such, for instance, as light; for light also in a way creates actual out of potential colour" (Be Anima, bk. ii. ch. v. sec. 1). Thomas Aquinas retains the distinction between the intellect P 226 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. passive and the intellect active; but with him the active or creative intellect becomes merely the power of generalising or abstracting. Sense knows the individual, intellect the universal. You see a triangle, but you rise to the idea of triangularity. It is this power of generalising which specialises man and makes him what he is, — intelligent (cf. Wallace's Introd. to Be Anima, pp. 97-116). INTENSION. — V. Comprehension. INTENTION (in-tendo, to stretch towards). — (1) Purpose cherished within, inoperative ; (2) purpose as directing the use of means for the attainment of a selected end. In morals and in law, intention means that act of the mind by which we con- template and design the accomplishment of some end. Both in law and in morals, intention, according as it is right or wrong, good or bad, affects the character of the action following and the responsibility of the agent. Intention (First and Second) in Logic. " Nouns of the first intention," says Aquinas, " are those which are imposed upon things as such, that conception alone intervening, by which the mind is carried immediately to the thing itself. Such are man and stone. But nouns of the second intention are those which are imposed upon things not in virtue of what they are in themselves, but in virtue of their being subject to the intention which the mind makes concerning them ; as, when we say that man is a species, and animal a genus.'' INTEREST. — By Interest, as a motive, is usually meant the happiness of the individual. So Butler applies the term interested to actions done from self-love. He censures the " con- fusion of calling actions interested which are done in contra- diction to the most manifest known interest, merely for the gratification of a present passion The most natural way of speaking plainly is, to call .... the actions proceeding from [self-love] interested ; and to say of [those referred to in last sentence] that they are not love to ourselves, but move- ments towards something external, — honour, power, the harm or good of another. And that the pursuit of these external objects, so far as it proceeds from these movements (for it may proceed from self-love) is no otherwise interested, than as every VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 227 action of every creature must, from the nature of the thing, be ; for no one can act but from a desire, or choice, or preference of his own " (Preface to Sermons). According to Kant, "Interest is that by which reason be- comes practical, i.e., a cause determining the will. Hence we say of rational beings only that they take an interest in all things ; irrational beings only feel sensual appetites. • Keason takes a direct interest in action then only when the universal validity of its maxims is alone sufficient to determine the will. Such an interest alone is pure " (Critique of Practical Reason, Abbot, p. 116, note; Semple, p. 73). INTERNAL or INNER SENSE— 7. Reflection. INTERPRETATION of NATURE.—" There are," says Bacon {Nov. Org., bk. i. aph. 19), "two ways, and can be only two, of seeking and finding truth. One springs at once from the sense, and from particulars, to the most general axioms ; and from principles thus obtained, and their truth assumed as a fixed point, judges and invents intermediate axioms. This is the way now in use. The other obtains its axioms from the sense and from particulars, by a connected and gradual progress, so as to arrive, in the last place, at the most general truths. This is the true way, as yet untried." " The former set of doc- trines we call," he says (aph. 26), "for the sake of clearness, 'An- ticipation of Nature,' the latter the ' Interpretation of Nature.'" INTROSPECTION, looking within, — the exercise in which consciousness turns upon itself, — or attention is directed on the mind's own states. It is a mode, not a method of philoso- phising. The method is Induction, the mode in this is obser- vation of internal experience. Consciousness supplies the data, attention concentrates on our possessions, arid by this mode the knowledge obtained by the inductive method may proceed. — V. Reflection. INTUITION (from intueor, to behold). — Immediate know- ledge in contrast with mediate, direct perceiving or beholding. German, Anschauung, Vorstellung, — the presentation of the object, so that it is directly seen. It applies (1) to the presen- tations of the senses, sensuous experience is intuition, supply- ing " the manifold of sense," the lower intuitions ; (2) to the 228 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. presentations of the Eeason as the source of primary truth, presenting truths self-evident, necessary, and universal, — the higher intuitions supplying the first principles of knowledge. These two classes of intuitions are at the opposite extremes, the one supplying the data coming through the sensory ; the other, the first principles coming from the nature of intelligence itself. In the midst is the whole work of discursive thought, which arranges, classifies, generalises, and systematises. The higher intuitions are a priori, but a priori is a term of much wider range, including the forms of the understanding which are the conditions of mediate knowledge. Leibnitz distinguished " knowledge " (cognitio) into intuitive and symbolical. Kant, treating the manifold of sense as the matter of know- ledge, applies the term intuition to the presentation in con- sciousness of any sensuous phenomenon, including the condi- tions under which they are perceived. That presentation which can be given previously to all thought, is called " intuition '' (Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, p. 81). "Intuition" is thus the translation of Kant's term for perception. Space and Time are intuitions of sense. " The perceptions of sense are immediate, those of the under- standing mediate only ; sense refers its perceptions directly and immediately to an object. Hence the perception is singular, incomplex, and immediate, i.e., is intuition. When I see a star, or hear the tones of a harp, the perceptions are immediate, in- complex, and intuitive. This is the good old logical meaning of the word intuition. In our philosophic writings, however, intuitive and intuition have come to be applied solely to pro- positions ; it is here extended to the first elements of perception, whence such propositions spring. Again, intuition, in English, is restricted to perceptions a priori ; but the established logical use and wont applies the word to every incomplex representa- tion whatever ; and it is left for further and more deep inquiry to ascertain what intuitions are founded on observation and experience, and what arise from h priori sources" (Semple, introd. to Metaphysics of Ethics). Thus its scope is extended to include all immediate as opposed VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 229 to mediate knowledge. Kant speaks, e.g., of the intuitive understanding of God, as opposed to the discursive understand- ing of man. This is the general English use of the term. Thus Locke {Essay on Human Understanding, bk. iv. ch. ii. sec. 1): — " Sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagree- ment of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other; and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth the light, only by being directed towards it. Thus, the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two." " Intuition is used in the extent of the German Anschauung, to include all the products of the perceptive (external or in- ternal) and imaginative faculties ; every act of consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an individual, thing, act, or state of mind, presented under the condition of distinct existence in space or time " (Mansel, Proleg. Log., p. 9, note). On the difference between knowledge as intuitive, immediate, or presentative, and as mediate or representative, see Hamilton, Reid's Works, note B. INTUITIONALISM.— The theory, especially in ethics, which maintains that moral laws are first principles self-evident to reason. As an ethical theory, it is opposed to Utilitarianism. As designations, however, the former refers to the mode of recog- nition of moral principles, the latter to the end of conduct. For a presentation of Intuitionalism (in ethics), see Price's Review ; Eeid's Active Powers ; M 'Cosh's Method of Divine Government; Calderwood's Handbook of Moral Philosophy; Noah Porter's Elements of Moral Science. For a criticism, see Sidgwick's Method of Ethics. Sidgwick himself seeks a reconciliation of Intuitionalism and Utilitarianism. INVENTION (invenio), to find the construction of some- thing which has not before existed. Discovery is the making manifest something which hitherto has been unknown. There is a true distinction between the invention of Art, the discoveries of Science. In Locke and his contemporaries, to say nothing of the older 230 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. writers, to invent is currently used for to discover. Thus Bacon says, " Logic does not pretend to invent science, or the axioms of sciences, but passes it over with a cuique in sua arte creden- dum " (Adv. of Learning). IRONY (etpon/eta, dissimulation), ignorance affected in order to provoke or confound an antagonist. It was very much em- ployed by Socrates against the Sophists (see Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, Eng. transl., p. 126). " Irony often consists in disdaining qualities that are held in esteem, and this sort of thing Socrates used to do " (Aristotle, iV. Ethics, bk. iv. ch. vii. sec. 14). JUDGMENT is the term applied (1) to the act of com- parison, (2) to its result. Comparison may be more or less complex. It may be (1) the comparison of individual qualities, the result being the formation of a Concept ; (2) the comparison of concepts, the result being the affirmation of their agreement or the reverse, or what is strictly called a Judgment; (3) the comparison of Judgments themselves, the result being an Inference. All these are instances of one and the same operation, viz., Judgment or Comparison, though only the second is called Judgment. The Judgment (called, when expressed in language, the Proposition), consists of three parts : the Subject, Predicate, and Copula (q.v.). There are two main views as to the Nature of Judgment — (1) the Attributive view, (2) the Equational view. (1) The Attributive theory is that of Aristotle and of most subsequent logicians. On this view, the Subject is to be taken extensively and the predicate intensively, and the judgment is to be regarded as an assertion or denial that the individual or class denoted by the subject-term possesses the attribute or attributes connoted by the predicate-term. (2) The Equational theory is upheld by Jevons and others. It takes both the Subject and Predicate in an extensive sense, and regards the Judgment as an assertion of the co-extension of the classes denoted by the Subject and Predicate terms respectively. Judgments have been classified with reference to (1) Quan- tity, (2) Quality, (3) Modality. VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 231 They have further been classified as Analytic, Synthetic, and Identical, or Tautologous (q.v.) (see Ueberwig, System, of Logic Lindsay's transl., pt. iv. pp. 187-224, Lindsay's app., a and b) — V. Proposition. —[J. S.] JUDGMENT as opposed to Knowledge (Locke). — V. Know- ledge. JURISPRUDENCE (jurisprudential the science of rights, resting op the science of the right. Personal rights are based upon what is right in conduct. Jurisprudence is distinguished into universal and particular " The former relates to the science of law in general, and in- vestigates the principles which are common to all positive systems of law, apart from the local, partial, and accidental circumstances and peculiarities by which these systems re- spectively are distinguished from one another. Particular jurisprudence treats of the laws of particular states ; which laws are, or at least profess to be, the rules and principles of universal jurisprudence itself, specially developed and applied." There is a close connection between jurisprudence and moral philosophy. Both rest upon the great law of right and wrong as made known by the light of nature. But while moral philo- sophy treats of that law in all its extent, jurisprudence deals with it only in so far as the law of nature has been recognised in the law of nations or in the positive institutions of society. Jurisprudence has special reference to social duty. It treats almost exclusively of duties of justice, when made the subject of positive law, enforced by external sanctions. The sphere of morality is vastly wider than that of juris- prudence; the former embracing all that is right, the latter only particular rights realised or vested in particular persons. Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pads; Puffendorf, Be Officio Hominis et Civis ; Leibnitz, Jurisprudential Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws ; Mackintosh, Discourse of the Law of Nature and of Nations ; Bentham, Introd. to Principles of Morals and Legislation; Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined; Lorimer's Institutes of Law. JUSTICE (Sucaioo-wj?, justitia). — The equal between man and man — (1) grounded on equal subjection to moral law, and 232 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. consequent equality of rights among men ; or (2) founded upon natural relations or mutual contract. Justice is one of the four cardinal virtues of ancient philosophy. By the Pytha- goreans, and also by Plato, it was regarded as including all human virtue or duty. It consists, Cicero says (De Finibus, lib. v. cap. 23), in suum cuique tribuendo, in according to every one his right. Under Jurisprudence, justice (to vo/jukov) means what positive law requires ; equity (to icrov), what is fair and right in the circumstances of every particular case. Justice is not founded in public or positive law, as Hobbes and others hold, but in natural or ethical law, determining the right. " To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is com- manded or prohibited by positive laws," remarks Montesquieu (Spirit of Laws), " is like saying that the radii of a circle were not equal till you had drawn the circumference.'' According to Aristotle, Justice, in its narrower meaning, is either distributive or commutative. The former relates to the allotment of honour, money, &c, to different members of the community. Its essence is proportion ; for if the persons are unequal, the shares must also be unequal. The latter obtains with reference to contracts and other transactions between members of the community. It presupposes the equal relation of the parties, and its rule is equality (see Aristotle, iV. Ethics, bk. v. ; cf. Lorimer, Institutes of Law). Plato, Republic, iv. 432 ; Aristotle, N. Ethics, bk. v. ; Cicero, De Finibus. See also Hume, Essay iii. and app. iii.; Mill, Utilitarianism, ch. v.; Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, bk. iii. ch. v. — V. Right, Dutt, Equity. KINDS (Natural.) — According to Mill, there are in nature real Kinds, or classes, which are " distinguished from all other classes by an indeterminate multitude of properties not de- rivable from another" (Logic, vol. i. bk. i. ch. vii. sec. 4). " Every proposition by which anything is asserted of a kind affirms an uniformity of coexistence " (ib., vol. ii. bk. iii. ch. xxiii. sec. 2). KINGDOM OP ENDS.— V. End. KNOWLEDGE (yvwa-vs, cognitio). — A general term, in- cluding every product of intellectual activity, whether percep- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 233 tion, comparison, or reasoning. While characteristic of con- sciousness, it wears different aspects, according to the several forms of acquisitive power. Knowledge is simple or complex, according as it is concerned with a single thing, or with rela- tions. It is immediate or mediate, according as the thing itself is known, or knowledge is acquired through some inter- vening representation or process. Locke's distinction between Knowledge and Judgment is peculiar to himself: — " Knowledge is the perception of the con- nection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this per- ception is there is knowledge, and where it is not there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge" (Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. iv. ch. i. sec. 2). And in ch. xiv. sec. 4, he says : — " The mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood. First, knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas. Secondly, judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived but pre- sumed to be so.'' Knowledge supposes a being who knows, an object known, and a relation determined between the knowing being and the known object. This relation, occasioned by the mind's activity, is the act of knowledge ; the content of consciousness, conse- quent on this relation, is the knowledge. Truth may be defined to be the conformity of our thoughts with the nature of its object. Certitude is thus either immediately known existence, or truth brought methodically to the human intelligence ; that is, conducted from facts to generalisations, or from principle to principle, or given in that which is evident of itself. Leibnitz distinguished knowledge as either intuitive or sym- bolical. When I behold a triangle actually delineated, and think of it as a figure with three sides and three angles, &c, according to the idea of it in my mind, my knowledge is intuitive. But when I use the word triangle, and know what it means without explicating all that is contained in the idea 234 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. of it, my knowledge is blind or symbolical (Leibnitz, Be Cog- nitione, &c. ; Wolf, Psychol. Empir.). "A tiling is known immediately or proximately, when we cognise it in itself; mediately or remotely, when we cognise it in or through something numerically different from itself. Immediate cognition, that is, the knowledge of a thing in itself, involves the fact of its existence ; mediate cognition, that is, the knowledge of a thing in or through something not itself, involves only the possibility of its existence. "An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is itself presented to observation, may be called a presentative, and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were viewed by the mind face to face, may be called an intuitive cognition. A mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation, may be called a repre- sentative cognition. " A thing known is an object of knowledge. " In a presentative or immediate cognition there is one sole object; the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing being one and the same. In a representative or mediate cognition there may be discriminated two objects ; the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing being numerically different. " A thing known in itself is the (sole) presentative or intui- tive object of knowledge, or the (sole) object of a presentative or intuitive knowledge. A thing known in and through something else is the primary, mediate, remote, real, existent, or represented object of (mediate knowledge) — objectum quod; and a thing through which something else is known is the secondary, imme- diate, proximate, ideal, vicarious, or representative object of (mediate) knowledge — objectum quo or per quod. The former may likewise be styled — objectum entitativum" (Hamilton, Beid's Works, note b, sec. 1). Hamilton distinguishes between knowledge and belief. The ultimate principles upon which knowledge rests are incom- prehensible or inexplicable ; they cannot be known, but must be believed (see Lectures on Metaphysics, i. 270 ; Discussions, p. 86; cf. Fraser's Berkeley in Philosophical Classics, concluding chapter). — V. Immediate, Intuitive. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 235 LANGUAGE. — Expression of thought, feeling, and pur- pose, spoken or written. The ends of language are (1) the preservation of our own thoughts, (2) their communication to others, and (3) economy of thought (cf. Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. iii. ch. x. sec. 23, and bk. iii., passim ; also Max Miiller, Lectures on the Origin of Language). LATENT MODIFICATIONS OP MIND, movements of mind not present in consciousness, or not observed as present, nevertheless inferred as really occurring, because apparently essential to what is consciously done. Hamilton dwells on the possibility of such movements. He recognises three degrees of mental latency: — (1) All knowledge retained out of consciousness ; (2) habits of action of which the mind is wholly unconscious in its ordinary state, but which are revealed to consciousness in certain extraordinary exaltations of its power, e.g., memory of languages restored during fever ; and (3) mental modifications of which we are unconscious, but which manifest their existence by effects of which we are conscious — " When we hear the distant murmur of the sea — this is a sum made up of parts — and if the noise of each wave made no impression on our sense, the noise of the sea, which is the result, would not be realised." In like manner, one thought rises after another whose consecu- tion we cannot trace to conscious association with the preceding, but both are associated with an intermediate thought which, though latent at the time, is suggested by the first, and in turn suggests the second thought. If a number of balls be placed in a line, and the cue at the end of the line struck, motion will be manifested by the ball at the other end, but not by the intermediate balls. Something like this occurs in the train of thought (Metaphysics, i. 355). — V. Morell's Introd. to Mental Philosophy, pt. i. ch. iii. The same phenomenon on its physiological side is called unconscious cerebration. See Carpenter's Mental Physiology. LAW (Anglo-Saxon, from verb signifying " to lay down," — the expression of a systematised order of events. The significance of such expression varies according to the diversity of sphere in which it applies — (1) Physical, an established 236 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. sequence of material phenomena; (2) Intellectual, a recog- nised condition of rational procedure for attainment of truth, and, more widely, applicable to psychology as a whole, an order of sequence in mental phenomena; (3) Moral, an imperative or direct command, indicating right action, and expressing the will of the moral governor, (a) according to some, a necessary and universal principle of rational life self- evident to the mind, (&) according to others, an induction from experience affecting personal and social advantage and interest, as these are dependent on conduct; (4) Political, a formal statute issued by the Legislature regulating the relations and actions of the people of the State. "That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term a law" (Hooker, Eccles. Pol., bk. i. sec. 2). Laws in their most extended signification are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things ; and, in this sense, all beings have their laws, the Deity has his laws, the material world has its laws, superior intelligences have their laws, the beasts have their laws, and man has his laws " (Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, bk. i. ch. i.). The word has been transferred into the whole philosophy of being and knowing. When a fact frequently observed recurs invariably under the same circumstances, we compare it to an act which has been prescribed, to an order which has been established, and say it recurs according to a law. On the analogy between political laws and laws of nature, see Lindley, Introduction to Jurisprudence, app. ; Austin, Province of Juris- prudence Determined. " It is a perversion of language," says Paley (Nat. Theol., ch. i.), " to assign any law, as the efficient, operative cause of anything. A law presupposes an agent; this is only the mode, according to which an agent proceeds; it implies a power ; for it is the order according to which that power acts." Eeid has said : — " The laws of nature are the rules according to which effects are produced ; but there must be a cause which operates according to these rules. The rules of navigation VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 237 never steered a ship, nor did the law of gravity ever move a planet" (see also Whewell's Astronomy, p. 361). " Experimental philosophers usually give the name of em- pirical laws to those uniformities which observation or experi- ment has shown to exist, but upon which they hesitate to rely in cases varying much from those which have been actually observed, for want of seeing any reason why such a law should exist " (Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. xvi. sec. 1). The use of law in this case is provisional and hypothetical. LEMMA (from Aa/i/Jawo, to take for granted, to assume). — This term is used to denote a preliminary proposition, having no direct relation to the point to be proved, yet serving to pave the way for the proof. In Logic, a premiss taken for granted is sometimes called a lemma. To prove some proposi- tion in mechanics, some of the propositions in geometry may be taken as lemmata. LIBERTARIAN.— One who holds that power of Will implies capability of rational control over motives, including desires, affections, and emotions. " I believe he (Crombie) may claim the merit of adding the word Libertarian to the English language, as Priestley added that of Necessarian " (Correspondence of Dr Reid, p. 88). Both words have reference to the questions concerning self-regulation in moral agency. LIBERTY OF THE WILL— The doctrine of Liber- tarianism is that the Will is such a power as makes it possible to govern or control all the motive forces of our nature, including dispositions and passions, so as to determine personal conduct in accordance with the decisions of the understanding. It implies negatively that impulses or motive forces are not dominant in our life under its normal conditions ; positively, that will is associated with intelligence, and that together they are the true governing powers in human life, every intelligent deter- mination presupposing that motives have been subordinated to thought. The liberty so described is often named Moral Liberty, because it is specially illustrated in the subjection of our life to moral law, and seems to be implied in a Categorical Imperative. Eant makes freedom of will a deduction from the imperative of moral law {Groundwork, ch. iii.). 238 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. " The idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determina- tion or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is pre- ferred to the other " (Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. ii. ch. xxi. sec. 8). " By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand a power over the determinations of his own will. If, in any action, he had power to will what he did, or not to will it, in that action he is free (Eeid, Active Powers, essay iv. ch. i.). It has been common to distinguish liberty into freedom from constraint or co-action, and freedom from necessity. Freedom from co-action implies absence of restraint and of compulsion. Moral freedom exists when our knowledge of moral law and our conviction of duty are the governing powers within the sphere assigned to them. Liberty of this kind is called freedom from necessity. Liberty of Will has in some cases been supported by references to liberty of indifference, that is, the absence of decision in a state prior to determination (Reid, Works, Hamilton, 601). But the action of motive forces in consciousness, and the problem of intelligent determination equally preclude the suggestion of liberty of indifference. " The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings, in so far as they are rational, and freedom would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient independently on foreign causes determining it " (Groundwork; Abbot's Kant's Theory of Ethics, p. 65). " Instead of vainly sought deduction of the moral principle, something else is found which was quite unexpected, that is, moral principle serves conversely as the principle of the de- duction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove, but of which speculative reason was compelled, at least, to assume the possibility I mean the faculty of freedom. The moral law, which does not itself require a justification, proves not merely the possibility of freedom, but that it really belongs to beings who recognise this law as binding on them- selves " (ib., p. 137; cf Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 10; Lotze, Microcosmus, i. 144-7, and 254-261, Eng. transl.). — 7. Free- Will, Volition, Will. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 239 LIFE, the characteristic of vegetable and animal existence, of which we have no scientific explanation. It belongs to organised being, capable of absorption and assimilation of nutriment, having development from a germinal state to maturity, and thereafter subject to decay. A large variety of unsuccessful attempts have been made to account for the pheno- mena of life. There are in ancient philosophy, the elemental theories, and the hypothesis concerning a principle of life in the universe itself — anima mundi — manifesting itself in all the varieties appearing in the world. These theories were purely hypothetical, — attempts to escape the difficulty rather than to solve it. According to Descartes and others, the phenomena of living bodies may be explained by the mechanical and chemical forces belonging to matter. This at least approxi- mates towards a scientific treatment of facts, as it bears upon the activities of organism, which are certainly to be explained by reference to the forces named. The age of science, relying on observation and induction, with use of scientific instruments, has raised the question of the origin of life, with the view of ascertaining whether we can have any scientific evidence of spontaneous generation from material substance. After ex- tended and most careful observation, the conclusion is adverse to this alternative. There is no life known to exist which does not develop from germ, under the action of external conditions favourable to the unfolding of the life already present, and which is found to be of a definite type according to the law of heredity. This investigation naturally concentrated on the lowest forms of organism, under such scrutiny as becomes possible with aid of the microscope (Beale, Protoplasm ; or Life, Force, and Matter; Huxley, Lay Sermons; Tyndall, Nature, xv. 303 ; Bastian's Beginning of Life). Another and larger question has arisen, under the hypo- thesis of evolution according to the law of natural selection, as developed by Charles Darwin, and widely received. May not the vast varieties of living organism now existing have sprung from one or two germinal forms ? The argument here rests upon the following as the most important data : — the struggle for existence ; consequent survival of the fittest ; natural selec- 240 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. tion; natural variation in adaptation to environment; and modification of species under domestication and human direc- tion (C. Darwin, Origin of Species ; Wallace, Natural Selection). In advance of this arises the highest question concerning the life of man under its two aspects, organism and conscious- ness, the physical and the intellectual life, in so far as these may be regarded as distinct, while the life is a unity. The evolution theory claims to include man in nature. This is a legitimate claim. Science must exhaust the field of inquiry, whatever be the difficulties encountered in reaching the highest form of life in the world. In facing this task, the work has fallen largely to the department of Natural History, Com- parative Anatomy, and Histology — Psychology waiting in reserve until the lines of inquiry should approach to its pro- vince. In the field of Natural History reference has been made to the gradual advance of organism towards the human form in the monkey and anthropoid ape ; in Comparative Anatomy it has been ascertained that the brain of the ape is, in external structure and internal arrangement, only a minature and undeveloped form of the human brain; and the more detailed microscopic investigations of Histology have shown that in minute structure the very varied nerve-centres belong- ing to different organisms are similarly provided for fulfilment of common functions. It is thus conclusively shown that all organism, including the human, is constructed on a common plan, — that, for example, from the lowest to the highest order, brain is homologous in structure and function. These are results now scientifically ascertained, while a vast amount re- mains to be done in study of the internal structure and func- tions of brain. On the other side, as concerning human life, we have the facts of consciousness, involving all that belongs to rational life, as it is intellectual, moral, and religious in its manifestations, for these are not in any proper sense distinct lives, but three manifestations of one life. Neither moral nor religious life can exist except as belonging to an intellectual life, and accordingly " intellectual " may be taken as the dis- tinctive description. This life brings with it its own distinctive forms, its conceptions of space and time, and its categories, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 241 such as quality and quantity, without which it cannot act. With these characteristics in view, the range of problem be- comes more obvious. Can " life " here be taken to mean the same thing as when we apply the term to organism ? Can the intellectual be shown to be in the same line as the organic 1 Can it be so placed as to wear the aspect of evolution from organic life ? On the one hand, there are the common char- acteristics of a nerve system, sensory and motor. On the other, there are the special characteristics of intellectual " life," involving thought and its forms, discriminating sensible things, and recognising things supersensible, that is, not visible, nor audible, nor capable of being brought under any phase of general or special sense. It is represented by some that " organic " and " mental " are in the direct line of evolution (C. Darwin, Herbert Spencer) ; that in the case of man these are only two sides of one existence (Bain) : that the two are related in one existence, but so essentially different, that the intellectual cannot be represented as belonging to the order of organic evolution, — the whole Eational, Transcendental, or Idealistic school of thinkers (Carpenter's Mental Physiology ; Calderwood's Relations of Mind and Brain). As to the problem regarding the origin of life, see Huxley, Lay Sermons, No. vii. ; Stirling, As Regards Protoplasm; Bastian's Evolution and the Origin of Life, and his Beginnings of Life. LIMITATION (Conversion by).— V. Conveesion. LOCAL SIGNS.— A term used by Lotze and Wundt to describe the means of the conversion of the non-spatial data of sense into a spatial world. " The single impressions exist together in the soul in a completely non-spatial way, and are distinguished simply by their qualitative content. . . . From this non-spatial material the soul has to re-create entirely afresh the spatial image that has disappeared ; and in order to do this it must be able to assign to each single impression the position it is to take up in this image relating to the rest, and side by side with them. Presupposing this .... that for unknown reasons the soul can and must apprehend in spatial forms what comes to it as a number of non-spatial impressions, 242 VOCABULAET OF PHILOSOPHY. some clue will be needed, by the help of which it may find for each impression the plan it must take, in order that the image that is to arise in idea may be like the spatial figure that has disappeared " (Lotze, Metaphysics, bk. iii. ch. iv., Bosanquet, p. 485). The means of this " localisation " of the impressions are " local signs." " A token of its former spatial position must be possessed by each impression, and retained throughout the time when that impression, together with all the rest, was pre- sent in a non-spatial way in the unity of the soul. Where, then, does this token come from 1 .... It is not until these similar stimuli come in contact with our bodies that they are distinguished, and then they are distinguished according to the different points at which they meet the extended surface of our organs of sense. This accordingly may be the spot at which the token I am describing has its origin, a token which is given along with the stimulus in consequence of the effects produced by it at this spot, and which in the case of each single stimulus is distinguished from that given along with any other stimulus " (ib., pp. 485-6). LOGIC (A.oyi/07, Xdyos, reason, reasoning, language). — The word logica was early used in Latin; while 17 Xoyinri and to XoyiKov were late in coming into use in Greek. Aristotle did not use either of them. His writings, which treat of the syllogism and of demonstration, were entitled Analytics. The name Organon was given to the collected series of his writings upon logic by the Peripatetics (cf. Topics, viii. 14). The reason of the name is, that logic was regarded as not so much a science in itself as the instrument of all science. The Epi- cureans called it Ka.voviK.rj, the rule by which true and false are to be tried. Plato, in the Phsedrus, had called it a part (/*epos), and in the Parmenides the organ (Spyavov) of philosophy (see Trendelenburg, Elementa Log. Arist.). An old division of philo- sophy, originating with the Stoics, was into logic, ethics, and physics. The name is used in a variety of senses. First, there is the most restricted, known as Formal Logic — the science of the laws of thought, as thought (Kant, Hamilton, Mansel, Thom- son). VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 243 At the beginning of the prior analytics, Aristotle has laid it down that "the object of logic is demonstration." "Logic is the science of the laws of thought as thought ; that is, of the necessary conditions to which thought, considered in itself, is subject " (Hamilton, PeicVs Works, p. 698, note). " Logic is the science of the laws of thought It is the science of the form or formal laws of thinking, and not of the matter " (Thomson, Outlines of the Laws of Thought). Second, the theory of evidence, or philosophy of the whole mental processes by which the mind attains to truth, as developed by Mill, who defines Logic as "the science of the operations of the understanding which are subservient to the estimation of evidence." Hamilton's view, according to Mill, restricts the science to " that very limited portion of its total province which has reference to the conditions, not of Truth, but of Consistency " (see his Examination of Hamilton's Philo- sophy). On the question as to how far Logic is concerned with the method and not with the mere form of thought, see Lotze, Logic, p. 26, Bosanquet's transl. Third, an account of the ultimate principles of knowledge in their systematic connection. This is the Transcendental Logic or Critical Method of Kant, so far as it regards Understanding or Eeason, i.e., in the Analytic and Dialectic. Holding that the ordinary (analytic or subjectively formal) Logic gives a sufficient account of the functions of unity in Judgment, he endeavours, with these as a clue, to trace the system of prin- ciples which make possible the synthesis of the manifold in the unity of knowledge (cf. Critique of Pure Reason, Transc. Analytic, introd.). Fourth, a rationalised theory of all known existence, which is the commonly accepted meaning of the term with the transcendental school of philosophy. Thus Hegel calls his entire system a Logic. In this sense Logic becomes identified with Metaphysic. The process of thought and of existence alike being a dialectic movement, the following out of that movement in either of its aspects is a Logic. Thus the term r Dialectic is used by modern philosophy, as it was by Plato, to cover the common province of Logic and of Metaphysic. 244 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. The question has been discussed, whether Logic is a Science or an Art, or both. Whately says : — " Logic, in its most exten- sive application, is the science as well as the art of reasoning. So far as it institutes an analysis of the process of the mind in reasoning, it is strictly a science ; while, so far as it investigates the principles on which argumentation is conducted, and fur- nishes rules to secure the mind from error in its deductions, it may be called the art of reasoning." Logic has been variously subdivided, as Pure, and Mixed, or Applied. The former would embrace the Logic of Deduction ; the latter that of Induction and Testimony. Deductive Logic consists of three parts, corresponding to the three forms in which thought manifests itself, viz., the Concept, the Judg- ment, and the Syllogism. Method, or the scientific arrange- ment of thoughts, is frequently added as a fourth head. For a statement and criticism of the doctrines of the leading logical schools, as well as the discussion of the nature and province of Logic, see art. "Logic," by Adamson, in Encyclopcedia Britannica, 9th ed. LOVE. — The fundamental benevolent disposition in human affection, involving regard, admiration, and eagerness to help. Love and Hate are the genetic affections of mind, from which all the others take their rise. The former is awakened by the contemplation of something which is regarded as good, and the latter by the contemplation of something regarded as evil. MACHINE (Logical). — Jevons, holding that inference is the substitution of similars (q.v.), has invented a Logical Machine for the performance of the process (see his Principles of Science). MACROCOSM (/^a/epos, large ; koV/ios, world). Many ancient philosophers regarded the world as an animal, consisting like man of a soul and a body. This opinion, exaggerated by the mystics, became the theory of the macro- cosm and the microcosm, according to which man was an epitome of creation, and the universe was man on a grand scale. The same principles and powers which were perceived in the one were attributed to the other, and while man was believed to have a supernatural power over the laws of the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 245 universe, the phenomena of the universe had an influence on the actions and destiny of man. MAGNANIMITY (magnus, great ; animus, mind), great- ness of soul, a crowning element in character arising from appreciation of the dignity of human nature, in view of its powers and responsibilities. By ancient moralists magnanimity was described as lifting us above the good and evil of this life — so that while the former was not necessary to our happiness, the latter could not make us miserable. The most striking treatment of mag- nanimity is found in Aristotle's description of " the great-souled man" (If. Ethics, bk. iv. c. iii.). MAGNETISM (Animal). — Under this name have been classified those peculiar physical and physiological phenomena which are produced by a conscious or unconscious influence of one organism upon another, analogous to that of the magnetic force in nature. The impression produced by living beings upon each other was considered a modification of universal law of mutual impression, which has been designated natural magnetism ; for this reason, the artificial method of producing it has been called magnetism. It has also been supposed to be originated by metallic action upon the nerve system. — V. Mesmerism. MAJOR. — Applied both to terms and to propositions, regarded as parts of the syllogism. The major term is that which is the predicate of the conclusion, the minor, that which is the subject of the conclusion. The reason of their being thus designated is that in the Aristotelian logic, the subject and predicate of the conclusion are respectively included and including. The premiss in which the major term is compared with the middle is called the major premiss ; that in which the minor and middle terms are compared being called the minor premiss. — [J. S.] MANICHJE3ISM (so called from Manes, a Persian philo- sopher, who flourished about the beginning of the third century), the doctrine that there are two eternal principles, the one good and the other evil, to which the happiness and misery of all beings may be traced. It has been questioned whether 246 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. this doctrine was ever maintained to the extent of denying the Divine unity, or affirming that the system of things had not an ultimate tendency to good. It is said that the Persians, before Manes, maintained a dualism giving the supremacy to the good principle ; Manes maintained both to be equally eternal and absolute. The Manichean doctrine was ingrafted upon Christianity about the middle of the third century. MATERIALISM, the theory which reduces all existence to unity in matter. I. Ancient, and II. Modern. I. Ancient.— Leucippus and Democritus, Epicureans, esp. Lucretius. — See Atomism. II. Modern. — Essentially the same as ancient atomism. It is, however, more conscious : the distinction between mind and matter having been more deeply realised. Modern materialism, like modern idealism, is more sharply denned and more dog- matically expressed than the corresponding ancient systems. Gassendi, Hobbes, Hartley, Priestley (England) ; La Mettrie and Von Holbach (France). See Lange's History of Material- ism (transl. by Thomas) ; Zeller's History of Greek Philosophy, Pre-Socratic Period (on the Atomists) ; Sellai^s Roman Poets of the Republic (essay on Lucretius) ; Veitch's Lucretius and the Atomic Theory; Munro's Lucretius; Flint's Anti-Theistic Theories, lects. ii., iii., iv., app. v.-xix. Priestley, Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit ; Three Disserta- tions on the Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity; Price, Letters on Materialism and Philosophical Necessity. Under this doctrine, mind is only a function of the brain, its organisation, with hereditary transmission accounting for all that distinguishes the intellect of man. " The brain secretes thought, as the liver secretes bile" (Cabanis, Rapport du Physique et du Moral de V Homme). MATHEMATICS (/ui^um-uciJ [sc. fcrton^] T a /*aftj- /xara), the science of spatial and quantitative relations. Pythagoras and his followers found the ultimate explanation of things in their mathematical relations ; and Spinoza applied the mathematical method of demonstration from Definitions and Axioms to philosophy. Various views have been held by philosophers as to the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 247 nature of mathematical truth. In general it is regarded as the type of universal and necessary truth. Kant, e.g., holds that it is one kind of synthetic knowledge a priori ; and in the ^Esthetic he seeks to answer the question : How is pure Mathe- matics, as a science, possible? (cf. Prolegomena, sees. 6-13). With this may be contrasted the view of J. S. Mill, who, in his Logic, maintains the hypothetical character of mathematical truth. The assertions on which the reasonings of the science are founded do not, any more than in other sciences, exactly correspond with the fact ; but we suppose that they do so for the sake of tracing the consequences which follow from this supposition. " The opinion of Dugald Stewart respecting the foundations of geometry is, I conceive, substantially correct : that it is built upon hypothesis ; that it owes to this alone the peculiar certainty supposed to distinguish it ; and that in any science whatever, by reasoning from a set of hypotheses, we may obtain a body of conclusions as certain as those of geometry, that is, as strictly in accordance with the hypotheses, and so irresistibly compelling assent on condition that those hypotheses are true. When, therefore, it is affirmed that the conclusions of geometry are necessary truths, the necessity consists in reality only in this, that they necessarily follow from the suppositions from which they are deduced " {Logic, bk. ii. ch. v. sec. 1). Cf. Logic, bk. i. ch. viii. sec. 6, where he says, that in the Definitions of geometry there is implied the postulate of the existence of things corresponding to them. — [J. S.] MATTER, as opposed to mind or spirit, is that which occupies space or is extended, and with which we become acquainted by means of our bodily senses or organs. Every- thing of which we have any knowledge is either matter or mind, i.e., spirit. Mind is that which knows and thinks. Matter is that which is known by means of the bodily senses. According to Descartes the essence of mind is thought, and the essence of matter, extension. Leibnitz said the essence of all being, whether mind or matter, is force. Matter is an assemblage of simple forces or monads. His system of physics was dynamical; Newton's, mechanical; Leibnitz having held that the monads possess vital energy. The ultimate reason of 248 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. all movement is, he maintains, a force communicated at creation, which is everywhere, but, while present in all bodies, is differ- ently limited. See Leibnitz, De Primce Philosophice Emenda- tione et de Notione Substantia, or Nouveau Systeme de la Nature et de la Communication des Substances, in the Journal des Savans, 1695. On the various hypotheses to explain the activity of matter, see Stewart, Active and Moral Powers, last ed., vol. ii. note a; and Outlines, pt. ii. ch. ii. sec. 1. Boscovich, Theoria Philos. Naturalis (see Fobce). The properties which have been predicated as essential to matter are impenetrability, extension, divisibility, inertia, weight. To the senses it manifests colour, sound, smell, taste, heat, and motion; and by observation it is discovered to possess elasticity, electricity, magnetism, &c. Matter and Form. Matter as opposed to form is that elementary constituent in composite substances, which appertains in common to them all without distinguishing them from one another. Everything generated or made, whether by nature or art, is generated or made out of something else, and this something else is called its matter. Matter void of form was called v\rj Trpwrrj, or, prima materia ( V. Htlozoism). Form when united to matter makes it determinate, and constitutes body. This distinction (yXr] and etSos) is one of great importance in Aristotle's philosophy. The real is the concrete unity of form and matter — to o-vvoXov. To Aristotle the distinction is thus an objective one. To Kant, on the other hand, it is primarily subjective — a distinction of knowledge ; but since, from his point of view, the conditions of knowledge are at the same time those of being, the distinction becomes also objective. The matter is the " given raw material," the "manifold"; the form is the principle of arrangement which reduces this manifold to unity. The former is a posteriori; the latter, a priori. The "matter" is the incal- culable element in experience, that which must be waited for. The "form" is the universal and necessary characteristic of Experience. Though only the a, priori conditions of perception are called by Kant " forms," the Understanding and the Eeason have each their formal element, the Categories belonging to VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 249 the former, the Ideas to the latter. "That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter ; but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form" {Critique of Pure Reason, Transc. ^Esthetic, sec. 1). " The term matter is usually applied to whatever is given to the artist, and consequently, as given, does not come within the province of the art itself to supply. The form is that which is given in and through the proper operation of the art. In sculpture, for example, the matter is the marble in its rough state as given to the sculptor; the form is that which the sculptor in the exercise of his art communicates to it. The distinction between matter and form in any mental operation is analogous to this. The former includes all that is given to, the latter all that is given by, the operation " (Mansel, Prolego- mena Logica, p. 243, 2nd ed.). MAXIM (maxima propositio, a proposition of the greatest weight), is used by Boethius as synonymous with axiom, or a self-evident truth (Hamilton, Beid's Works, note a, sec. 5). It is used in the same way by Locke (Essay on Human Under- standing, bk. iv. ch. vii.). "There is a sort of propositions which, under the name of maxims and axioms, have passed for principles of science.'' By Kant, maxim was employed to designate a subjective principle, theoretical or practical, i.e., one not of objective validity, being exclusively relative to some interest of the subject. Maxim and regulative principle are, in the Critical philosophy, opposed to law and constitutive prin- ciples. — V. Axiom. MEAN (The) (to fueo-ov or /teeroTijs) is the watchword of the Aristotelian ethics. The term emphasises the great dis- tinction between the ethics as well as the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle. While Plato found the Good, as he found the True, in a world which transcended the world of sight and of ordinary life, Aristotle found both the True and the Good in the actual world of sense and of ordinary life. The great End of life is to be sought in the ends which naturally present themselves ; the life of the rational soul is to be realised in and along with that of the animal and vegetable soul. Sense and 250 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. passion are not to be annihilated, but rationalised or guided and regulated in their exercise by rational principle. Virtue is essentially the complete and harmonious development of all our powers ; it consists in the observance of the mean between excess and defect in the exercise of all. Aristotle illustrates this doctrine in the case of the several virtues, as Temperance, Courage, &c. Eecognising, however, the need of an absolute standard of virtue, he postulated Eight Eeason (op0os Aoyos) as the ultimate guide in questions of conduct, and even admits that absolutely, or in its essential nature, virtue is not the mean, but an extreme. It should be added that, while the doctrine of the Mean is primarily a recoil from the Absolute Good of Plato, it may also be regarded as the development of the Platonic doctrine of Harmony as the essence of Justice (see N. Ethics, bk. ii. ch. vi. ; Sir A. Grant's Aristotle's Ethics ; E. Wallace's Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle). — [J. S.] MEDIATE. — V. Inference. MEGARICS (The).— The third of the Socratic schools, founded by Euclid of Megara. Its interest was more dialectical than that of either of the others. The teaching of the Megarics is called by Schwegler " a Socratic transformation of the Eleatic doctrine.'' Euclid identified the Being of Zeno with the Good of Socrates, maintaining its essentially rational character, and conceding only apparent existence to all else. Thus intel- lectually, the Megarics busied themselves with a negative existence, intended to disprove the reality of the sensuous and manifold, and preparing the way for the post- Aristotelian Scepti- cism ; while, ethically, their inculcation of the necessity of a life of pure reason, in which sense and passion were utterly annihilated, has been well called " only a finer, more intellectual Cynicism" (Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, Eng. transl. ; Schwegler and Ueberweg, Histories of Philosophy, in loc). MEMORY (from memini, preterite of the obsolete form meneo or meno, from the Greek fieveiv, manere, to stay or remain. From the contracted form fx.va.ii> comes lurfiivr], the memory in which things remain). Commonly the power of retaining and reproducing our knowledge. Hamilton says it VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 251 includes a faculty of retention, of reproduction, and of repre- sentation (Metaphysics, lect. xxx.). Consciousness testifies that, when a thought has once been present to the mind, it may again become present to it, with the knowledge that it has formerly been present. When this takes place we are said to remember, and the faculty of which remembrance is the act is memory. " The word memory always expresses some modifi- cation of that faculty which enables us to treasure up, and preserve for future use, the knowledge we acquire This faculty implies two things ; a capacity of retaining know- ledge, and a power of recalling it to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use. The word memory is some- times employed to express the capacity, and sometimes the power. When we speak of a retentive memory, we use it in the former sense ; when of a ready memory, in the latter " (Stewart, Elements, ch. vi. sec. 1). Locke (Essay on Human Understanding, bk. ii. ch. x. sees. 1, 2) treats of retention. " The next faculty of the mind (after perception), whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call retention, or the keeping of those simple ideas, ^which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways : first, by keeping the idea which is brought into it for some time actually in view ; which is called contemplation. The other way of retention, is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been, as it were, laid aside out of sight; and thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet, — the object being removed. This is memory, which is, as it were, the storehouse of our ideas." Memory is neither a decaying sense, as Hobbes would make it, nor a transformed sensation, as Condillac would have it to be ; but a distinct and original faculty, the phenomena of which cannot be included under those of any other power. There is much in favour of the supposition that recollection of sensory impression may be accompanied by renewal of brain activity at the point where the remembered impression is first received (Bain, Mind and Body, p. 89). From this considera- 252 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. tion may come the question, whether we may legitimately infer that there is a species of " physical memory 1 " (Calder- wood, Mind and Brain, p. 352). Hobbes says {Human Nature, ch. iii. sec. 6) : — " By the senses we take notice of the objects without us, and that notice is our conception thereof; but we take notice also, some way or other, of our conceptions, for, when the concep- tion of the same thing cometh again, we take notice that it is again, that is to say, that we have had the same concep- tion before, which is as much as to imagine a thing past, which is impossible to the sense, which is only of things present. Stewart holds that memory involves " a power of recognising, as former objects of attention, the thoughts that from time to time occur to us : a power which is not implied in that law of our nature which is called the association of ideas." But he afterwards draws a further distinction between memory of things and the memory of events (Elements, ch. vi. sec. 1). " In the former case, thoughts which have been previously in the mind, may recur to us without suggesting the idea of the past, or of any modification of time whatever ; as, when I repeat over a poem which I have got by heart, or when I think of the features of an absent friend." Still there is a recognition that the knowledge possessed was previously in possession, and this is impossible without reference to time. Aristotle (De Memoria et Beminiscentia, cap. 1) has said that memory is always accompanied with the notion of time, and that only those animals that have the notion of time have memory. The laws which facilitate the retention or the recurrence of anything by the memory, are chiefly — Vividness, Attention, and Repetition. " The things which are best preserved by the memory," said Lord Herbert (Be Veritate), " are the things which please or terrify — which are great or new — to which much attention has been paid — or which have been oft repeated, — which are apt to the circumstances — or which have many things related to them." In its first manifestations, memory operates spontaneously, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 253 and thoughts are allowed to come and go through the mind without direction or control. But it comes subsequently to be exercised with intention and will] some thoughts being sought and invited, and others being shunned and as far as as possible excluded. Spontaneous memory is remembrance. Intentional memory is recollection or reminiscence. The former in Greek is Mv^ixtj, the latter 'Ara/mjo-is. Sully calls the former passive, the latter active, memory (Outlines of Psycho- logy, p. 276. For Laws of Association, V. Hamilton, Lects. on Metaph., vol. ii. 233 ; Mill's Exam, of Hamilton, 3rd ed. p. 219). — V. Association. Memory, in its spontaneous or passive manifestation and simpler forms, is possessed by the inferior animals. This appears in connection with locality, and the frequently recur- ring sensory impressions. Aristotle denied that they are capable of recollection, such as implies conception. Eeid has remarked that the inferior animals do not measure time, nor possess any distinct knowledge of intervals of time. In man, memory is the condition of all experience, and consequently of all progress. Memory, specially in its pictorial form, involving use of imagination, is liable to be largely stimulated by special ex- citation of brain. This appears in the case of persons under fever or in danger of drowning. Authentic cases of this kind are on record (see Coleridge, Biographia Liter aria; De Quincey, Confessions of an English Opium-Eater ; Barrow, Autobio- graphy ; Hamilton, Metaph., lects. xxxi., xxxii. ; Carpenter, Mental Physiology). Hence the question has arisen, Whether every object of former consciousness may not be liable to be recalled ? Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia ; Beattie, Disserta- tions ; Reid, Intellectual Powers, essay iii. ; Stewart, Elements, ch. vi.; Sully, Outlines of Psychology, ch. vii. — V. Reminis- cence, Conservative Faculty. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. — A rational explanation of the facts of consciousness (Psychology), and of the problems issuing out of these facts (Metaphysics). Mental Philosophy has two divisions, Intellectual Philosophy and Moral Philosophy — 254 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. the Philosophy of knowing, and the Philosophy of right action. To both divisions there belongs a Psychology, or science of mental operations ; and also a Metaphysic, or science of trans- cendent realities. MERIT (meritum, from /Aepos, a part or portion of labour or reward) means good desert, deserving of praise or reward. All right actions are meritorious ; that is, they give warrant for self-approbation on the part of the agent, and are, from the very nature of moral law, entitled to the approbation of all moral beings, and of the Moral Governor himself. We recognise a quality of Tightness in action, and personal duty is connected with the doing of right actions. When our duty is done we experience a sentiment of self-approbation. We thus have the idea of merit or good desert. Eecognis- ing in moral law the expression of the Divine will, religious sentiment strengthens the moral. In the same manner, as in judging of our own conduct, we recognise merit in others. The idea of merit, then, is a primary idea natural to the mind, of man ; not an afterthought, leading to praise of the righjt when we see that it is beneficial (see Price, Iteview, ch. iv.). Bain maintains, on the contrary, that we pay lofty compliments to virtue under pressure of self-interest. The distinction between the philosophic and the theological views of merit consists in this — Under the former, merit is personal desert, essentially connected with the fulfilment of moral law in each morally right action ; under the latter, this personal desert cannot involve modification of ill desert in case of wrong doing, and cannot provide for deliverance from the condemnation due to wrong doing. The two views are in strict ethical harmony. MESMERIC SLEEP.— Abnormal sleep, artificially in- duced, during which mental activity is maintained under direction of the operator. The sleep seems to be induced by artificial methods for wearying the nerves of vision, consequent upon concentration of the eyes, or by passes of the hands of an operator in near contact with the eyes. There seems no warrant for speaking of animal magnetism, or of a current of any kind passing from the body of the operator to the subject, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 255 inasmuch as a person may himself induce the sleep by deter- mined concentration of the eyes. Susceptibility to the soporific effect is increased by repeated subjection to the artificial con- trivances 'which induce it. The longer this subjection is con- tinued, the more hazard there is of establishing abnormal brain susceptibilities. The phenomena of mesmeric sleep seem to warrant these conclusions — that voluntary consent is a neces- sary condition for inducing such sleep; that the organ of vision and optic nerye and optic bulb are placed in the state of somnia, while the other sensory apparatus, and the entire cerebrum unconnected with optic impressions, remain in normal action ; that in this state imagination becomes active, as in ordinary sleep ; and that the agent carries out his purposes as if in the working state, not in the somnolent. METAPHYSICS— that department of mental philosophy which is concerned with speculative problems, transcending those belonging to the nature and relations of the facts of consciousness. The speculative department of philosophy, transcending empirical psychology. (1) In earlier Scottish usage named the Higher Metaphysics, while Psychology was the Lower ; (2) In the Critical Philosophy of Kant, metaphysic includes all the phenomena of consciousness which do not arise from experience, — the whole range of a priori, in contrast with a posteriori elements in consciousness. Kant's application of the term has greatly affected subsequent usage. (3) It is uniformly applied to the speculative department of mental science, including ontology. The origin of the term is com- monly referred to Andronicus of Rhodes, who, in" collecting the works of Aristotle, inscribed upon a portion of them the words Ta pera ra Ca, — dealing with 6v f- ov, — is not clear (Ueberweg's Hist., i. 145 ; Schwegler's Hist., p. 98). Clemens Alexandrinus (Strom, i.) considered metaphysical as equivalent to supemaimral. In Latin metaphysica is synonymous with supernaturalia. 256 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. And in English Shakespeare has used metaphysical as synony- mous with supernatural. In modern philosophy, ldgic and metaphysics have been the designations of the two branches of intellectual philosophy, as distinguished from moral philosophy ; metaphysic in this case including psychology and ontology. Bacon said : — " The one part (of philosophy), which is physics, inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes ; and the other which is metaphysic handleth the formal and final cause" {Advancement of Learning, bk. ii.). In another passage, Bacon thus admits the value of a higher metaphysic. "It is good to erect and constitute one universal science by the name of philosophia prima, primitive or summary philosophy, as the main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves ; which science, whether I should report deficient or no, I stand doubt- ful." Except, however, as proceeding by observation rather than by speculation a 'priori, even this science would have been but lightly esteemed by Bacon. Kant's use of the term will appear from the following passages : — " Beason finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions The arena of these endless contests is called metaphysic " (Preface to 1st edition of Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, xvii.). Metaphysic is thus " a science which shall determine the possibility, prin- ciples, and extent of human knowledge & priori." " In this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investiga- tions of Reason The unavoidable problems of mere pure reason are God, Freedom (of will), and Immortality. The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for its special object the solution of these problems is named metaphysics " (ib., 4, 5). " Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that of the practical use of pure reason, and is, accordingly, either the metaphysic of nature, or the metaphysic of ethics. The former contains all the pure rational principles of VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 257 all theoretical cognition ; the latter the principles which deter- mine and necessitate a priori all action The metaphysic of speculative reason is what is commonly called metaphysic in the more limited sense. But as a pure moral philosophy properly forms a part of this system of cognition, we must allow it to retain the name metaphysic " (ib., p. 509). Meta- physic in the higher sense he finds not in the speculative, but in the practical system of cognition. The outcome of his own work, so far as the Critique of Pure Season is concerned, is the demonstration of the baselessness of metaphysics in the old sense. This result is stated in the dialectic, where he concludes that metaphysics, in its three branches, is grounded in over-confidence of reason in her own powers. The three ideas of metaphysics are not constitutive, but regulative. They are ideals towards the realisation of which experience is always making, but which are never fully realised in any object of experience. There is therefore no legitimate science of metaphysics. The duty of reason is not the construction of a system of truth about God, the world, and man • but self-criticism, the limitation of her work to her true province, the guidance by experience. In a word, her function is transcendental, not transcendent. While, however, he thus denies the validity of metaphsics in the old sense he restores it in a sense of his own; while he denies it in the the sphere of the pure reason, he reaffirms it in that of the practical reason — he establishes, in room of the old ontological metaphysics, a Metaphysics of Ethics (cf. the Prologomena, transl. by E. Belfort Bax, Bohn's series). " The name metaphysics is a creation of Aristotelian com- mentators. Plato's word for it was dialectics, and Aristotle used instead of it the phrase ' first (fundamental) philosophy,' while physics in a like connection is for him 'a second philosophy.' The relation of this first philosophy to the other sciences is defined by Aristotle as follows : — Every science, he says, selects for investigation a special sphere, a particular species of being, but none of them applies itself to the notion of Being as such. There is a science necessary, therefore, which shall make an object of inquiry on its own account, of that K 258 VOOABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. which the other sciences accept from experience, and as it were hypothetically. This is the office of the first philosophy, which occupies itself therefore with being as being, whereas the other sciences have to do with special concrete being. Metaphysics constituting, then, as this science of being and its elementary grounds, a presupposition for the other disciplines, are naturally first philosophy. If there were, namely, says Aristotle, only physical beings, physics would be the first and only philosophy ; but if there is an immaterial and unmoved essence which is the ground of all being, there must be also an earlier, and as earlier, universal philosophy. This first ground of all being is God, and for that reason Aristotle sometimes also calls his first philosophy theology " (Schwegler, History of Philosophy, 8th ed., p. 98, Stirling). METEMPIRICAL. — A term introduced by G. H. Lewes to describe what he regards as the sphere and method of meta- physics. " Since we are to rise to Metaphysics through Science, we must never forsake the method of science ; and further, if in conformity with inductive principles we are never to invoke aid from any higher source than experience, we must, perforce, dis- card all inquiries whatever which transcend the ascertained or ascertainable data of experience. Hence the necessity for a new word which will clearly designate this discarded remainder — a word which must characterise the nature of the inquiries rejected. If, then, the empirical designates the province we include within the range of science, the province we exclude may fitly be styled the Metempirical " (Problems of Life and Mind, 1st series, p. 16). METEMPSYCHOSIS (jierd, beyond; l[x,f ux 6o i , to ani- mate), is the transmigration or passage of the soul from one body to another. This doctrine implies a belief in the pre-existence and future life of the soul. According to Herodotus the Egyptians were the first to espouse this doctrine. They believed that the soul at death entered into some animal created at the moment ; and that after having inhabited the forms of all animals on earth, in the water, or in the air, it returned at the end of three thousand years into a human body, to begin anew a similar course of transmigration. (Among the inhabitants of VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 259 India the transmigration of the soul was more nearly allied to the doctrine of emanation — q.v.) The common opinion is, that the doctrine of transmigration passed from Egypt into Greece. But, before any communication between the two countries, it had a place in the Orphic mysteries. Pythagoras may have given more precision to the doctrine. It was adopted by Plato and his followers, and, according to one of St Jerome's letters, was secretly taught among the early Christians. The doctrine led to abstaining from flesh, fish, or fowl, and this, accordingly, was one of the fundamental injunctions in the religion of Brahma, and in the philosophy of Pythagoras. METHOD (/ie'0o8os, //.era and 68os), the way by which we proceed to the attainment of some object. Method is the following of one thing through another. Order is the following of one thing after another. Every art and handicraft has its method. Cicero translates /niOoSos by via, and couples it with ars (Brutus, cap. xii.; cf. De Finibus, ii. 1). Method may be called, in general, the art of disposing well a series of many thoughts, either for the discovering truth when we are ignorant of it, or for proving it to others when it is already known. Thus there are two kinds of method, one for discover- ing truth, which is called analysis, or the method of resolution, and which may also be called the method of invention; and the other for explaining it to others when we have found it, which is called synthesis, or the method of composition, and which may also be called the method of doctrine (Port Boy. Logic, pt. iv. ch. ii.). " Method, which is usually described as the fourth part of Logic (V. Logic) is rather a complete practical Logic It is rather a power or spirit of the intellect, pervading all that it does, than its tangible product " (Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, 3rd ed., p. 87). The construction of a system implies method. No one was more thoroughly aware of the importance of a right method than Aristotle. He has said (Metaphys., lib. ii.) "that we ought to see well what demonstration (or proof) suits each particular subject; for it would be absurd to mix together the research of science and that of method; two things, the 260 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. acquisition of which offers great difficulty." The deductive method of Formal Logic came at once finished from his hand. And even the inductive method was recognised, and, to a certain extent, followed out by him. Descarte.s, in his discourse on Method, has reduced it to four general rules : — (1) To admit nothing as true of which we have not a clear and distinct idea; (2) to divide every object in- quired into as much as possible into its parts ; (3) to ascend from simple ideas or cognitions to those that are more complex ; (4) by careful and repeated enumeration to see that all the parts are reunited. This method, beginning with doubt as a tentative exercise, proceeds by analysis and synthesis, and accepts evidence in proportion as it resembles the evidence of self-consciousness. Sciences are sometimes distinguished, according to their pre- vailing method, as deductive and inductive (see these terms). Descartes, On Method; Mill, Logic, bk. vi.; Jevons, Principles of Science; Lotze, Logic, 411 (Bosanquet's transl.) — V. System. On the Analytic and Synthetic Method, V. Analysis and Synthesis. On the Methods of Induction, V. Inductive Methods. METHODOLOGY (Methodenlehre) is the transcendental doctrine of method (see Kant, Critique of Pure Season, Meikle- john's transl., p. 431). ■ MICROCOSM (/u/cpos, small ; koct/mk, world). — The world in miniature, commonly applied to Man, whose nature, physical and spiritual in one, is representative of the cosmos as a whole. Bacon (Advancement of Learning, bk. ii.) speaks of " the ancient opinion that man was microcosmus, an abstract or model of the world." Reid says (Active Powers, essay iii. pt. i. ch. i.) : — "Man has, not without reason, been called an epitome of the uni- verse. His body, by which his mind is greatly affected, being a part of the material system, is subject to all the laws of inanimate matter. During some part of his existence his state is very like that of a vegetable. He rises by imperceptible degrees to the animal, and at last to the rational life, and has the principles that belong to all." Lotze has discussed the whole aspects of the cosmos, tested by the life of man, with VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 261 special reference to the conditions of knowledge, in his Micro- cosmos, translated by Misses Hamilton and Jones. His mean- ing in giving his work this name may be gathered from the closing sentences: — "The universal, the class, the state of things, belong to the mechanism into which the Supreme arti- culates itself; the true reality that is and ought to be, is not matter, and is still less Idea, but is the living personal Spirit of God, and the world of personal spirits which He has created. They only are the place in which Good and good things exist; to them alone does there appear an extended material world, by the forms and movements of which the thought of the cosmic whole makes itself intelligible through intuition to every finite mind " (Eng. transl., ii. 728). MIDDLE TERM.— V. Syllogism. MIND. — (1) Self-conscious Intelligence, possessing rational power of self-determination ; (2) more widely — specially from a physiological point of view — to include such recognition of external objects as is provided for through the special senses as related to the cerebrum. In this wider meaning, excluded from mental philosophy, we have discussions as to " mind in animals." " Among metaphysicians, mind is becoming a generic, and soul an individual designation. Mind is opposed to matter ; soul to body. Mind is soul without regard to personality; soul is the appropriate mind of the being under notice " (Taylor's Synonyms). See Lotze, Mierocosmus, i. 144, 267; Calderwood's Relations of Mind and Brain.; Cyples, Processes of Human Experience. MINIMUM VISIBILE, AUDIBILE.— According to Hamilton, the least sensation of sight or hearing of which we can be conscious is composed of an infinite number of impres- sions on the sense-organ, of which we are unconscious (see Metaph., i. 349). MINOR.— V. Major. MIRACLE (miror, to wonder). — An event which, with- out being a violation of the laws of nature, cannot be accounted for by these laws, but implies the operation of causal energy superior to their action. The distinction between the mar- 262 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. vellous and the miraculous is vital here. If, by the progress of science, occurrences deemed marvellous are transferred from the category of " miracles," a double gain is secured, extending the range of science, and clearing the definition of " miracle." (1) Etymologically, a wonder; German, Wunder ; (2) any occurrence which excites the astonishment of the observer as apparently unaccountable, according to the ordinary laws of nature ; (3) an event inexplicable under the laws of nature, which is the result of intelligent purpose and of causal energy directed by such purpose. It is distinct as objective, from subjective experience of the marvellous. " A miracle I take to be a sensible operation, which being above the comprehension of the spectator, and, in his opinion, contrary to the established course of nature, is taken by men to be divine " (Locke, A Discourse on Miracles). "A miracle," says Hume (Essay on Miracles), "is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as complete as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined ; and if so, it is an undeniable consequence that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever derived from human testimony." Hume's argument has been largely criticised, and has led to a more careful definition of " miracle," as related to observa- tion of the ordinary occurrences of nature — ordinary experience being necessarily of ordinary occurrences, leaving " miracle " by its nature, and therefore in its possibility, an occurrence beyond the range of our "firm and unalterable experience" (Mosley, Ore Miracles). MODALITY (modus). — The term employed to denote the most general points of view under which different objects of thought present themselves to our mind. All that we think of we think of as possible, contingent, impossible, or necessary. The possible is that which may equally be or not be, which is not yet, but which may be ; the contingent is that which already is, but which might not have been ; the necessary is that which always is, and must be ; the impossible is that which never is, and cannot be. These are the modalities of being, which neces- VOCABULA.ET OF PHILOSOPHY. 263 sarily find a place in thought, and in the expression of it in judgments and propositions. Hence arise the four modal propositions which Aristotle has defined and opposed (Ilepi epixr/vetas, ch. xii.-xiv.). The term modality, though not used by him, is to be found among his commentators and the scholastic philosophers. Our judgments, according to Aristotle, are either problem- atical, assertive, or demonstrative; or in other words, the results of opinion, of belief, or of science. " The problematical judgment is neither subjectively nor ob- jectively true, that is, it is neither held with entire certainty by the thinking subject, nor can we show that it truly repre- sents the object about which we judge. It is a mere opinion. It may, however, be the expression of our presentiment of certainty; and what was held as mere opinion before proof, may afterwards be proved to demonstration. Great discoveries are problems at first, and the examination of them leads to a conviction of their truth, as it has done to the abandonment of many false opinions. In other subjects, we cannot, from the nature of the case, advance beyond mere opinion. Whenever we judge about variable things, as the future actions of men, the best course of conduct for ourselves under doubtful circum- stances, historical facts about which there is conflicting testi- mony, we can but form a problematical/wd^wieM*, and must admit the possibility of error at the moment of making our decision. " The assertive judgment is one of which we are fully per- suaded ourselves, but cannot give grounds for our belief that shall compel men in general to coincide with us. It is there- fore subjectively, but not objectively, certain. It commends itself to our moral nature, and in so far as other men are of the same disposition, they will accept it likewise. " The demonstrative judgment is both subjectively and objec- tively true. It may either be certain in itself, as a mathe- matical axiom is, or capable of proof by means of other judgments, as the theories of mathematics and the laws of physical science " (Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, 3rd ed., pp. 316-17). In the philosophy of Eant, our judgments are reduced under 264 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. the four categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. In reference to modality they are problematic, assertory, or apodeictical. Hence the category of modality includes possi- bility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity, and contingency (cf. Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, p. 58, ff.\ Ueberweg, Logic, sec. 69). MODE. — A mode is a variable and determinate affection of a substance, a quality which it may have or not, without affect- ing its essence or existence. A body may be at rest or in motion, a mind may affirm or deny, without ceasing to be. They are not accidents, because they arise directly from the nrture of the substance which experiences them. Nor should they be called phenomena, which may have or not have their cause in the object which exhibits them. But modes arise from the nature of the substance affected by them. Modes are secondary or subsidiary, as they could not be without substance, which exists by itself. Substances are not confined to any mode, but must exist in some. Modes are all variable conditions, and though some one is necessary to every substance, the particular ones are all accidental. Modification is properly the bringing of a thing into a mode, but is some- times used to denote the mode of existence itself. State is a nearly synonymous but a more extended term than mode. "Modes, I call such complex ideas, which, however com- pounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependencies on, or affections of, substances " (Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. ii. ch. xii. sec. 4). Modes or modifications of mind, in the Cartesian school, mean merely what some recent philosophers express by states of mind; and include both the active and passive phenomena of the con- scious subject. The terms were used by Descartes as well as by his disciples " (Hamilton, BeioVs Works, p. 295, note). Spinoza distinguishes mode from attribute as follows : — " By attribute I understand that which the mind perceives of sub- stance as constituting its essence. By mode I understand the affections of substance, or that which is in something else, through which also it is conceived " {Ethics, pt. i. defs. 4 and 5). VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 265 In this sense the term is applied to all particular existing things. MOLECULE (molecula, a little mass), as distinguished from atom (q.v.), is the smallest particle of matter (elementary or compound) which can exist in a free state. The molecule of an element consists of similar atoms. The molecule of a com- pound body consists of dissimilar atoms. MOMENT. — A necessary point or constituent in the move- ment of thought. According to Hegel there are three moments in every thought movement — affirmation, contradiction, absorp- tion. This is the trilogy of the Hegelian Logic, according to which the movement of thought is the true philosophy of being. MONAD (fiovds, unity, one). — According to Leibnitz, the elementary particles of matter are vital forces acting not mechanically, but from an internal principle. They are in- corporeal atoms, inaccessible to all change from without, but subject to internal movement. This hypothesis he explains in his Monadologie. Thinking inert matter insufficient to explain the phenomena of body, he had recourse to the ente- lechies of Aristotle, or the substantial forms of the scholastic philosophy, conceiving of them as primitive forces, atoms of substance but not of matter, real and absolute unities, meta- physical points, full of vitality, exact as mathematical points, and real as physical points. These substantial unities are of a nature inferior to spirit and soul, but are imperishable, although they may undergo transformation. "Leibnitz conceived the whole universe, bodies as well as minds, to be made up of monads, that is, simple substances, each of which is, by the Creator, in the beginning of its exist- ence, endowed with certain active and perceptive powers. A monad, therefore, is an active substance, simple, without parts or figure, which has within itself the power to produce all the changes it undergoes from the beginning of its existence to eternity. The changes which the monad undergoes, of what kind soever, though they may seem to us the effect of causes operating from without, are only the gradual and successive evolutions of its own internal powers, which would have pro- 266 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. duced all the same changes and motions, although there had been no other being in the universe " (Eeid, Intellectual Powers, essay ii. ch. 15). " Monadology rests upon this axiom — Every substance is at the same time a cause, and every substance being a cause, has therefore in itself the principle of its own development : such is the monad; it is a simple force. Each monad has relation to all others ; it corresponds with the plan of the universe ; it is the universe abridged; it is, as Leibnitz says, a living mirror which reflects the entire universe under its own point of view. But every monad being simple, there is no imme- diate action of one monad upon another; there is, however, a natural relation of their respective development, which makes their apparent communication; this natural relation, this harmony which has its reason in the wisdom of the supreme director, is pre-established harmony " (Cousin, History of Modern Philosophy, ii. 85-6). — V. Harmony. "A monad is not a material but a formal atom, it being impossible for a thing to be at once material and possessed of a real unity and indivisibility. It is necessary, therefore, to revive the obsolete doctrine of substantial forms (the essence of which consists in force), separating it, however, from the various abuses to which it is liable " (torn. ii. p. 50). Cf. Merz, Leibnitz in Philosophical Classics; Caird, Philo- sophy of Kant, introd., ch. v. ; and Histories of Philosophy (Ueberweg, Schwegler, Erdmann). MONISM (/tdvos, alone or single), the theory of the unity of all being. There are three phases of Monism — (1) Idealistic, (2) Materialistic, (3) Pantheistic. The fundamental question involved is the true interpretation of consciousness as involving a contrast between subjective and objective existence. " The philosophical Unitarians or Monists reject the testimony of consciousness to the ultimate duality of the subject and object in perception, but they arrive at the unity of these in different ways. Some admit the testimony of consciousness to the equipoise of the mental and material phenomena, and do not attempt to reduce either mind to matter or matter to mind. They reject, however, the evidence of consciousness to their VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 267 antithesis in existence, and maintain that mind and matter are only phenomenal modifications of the same common substance. This is the doctrine of absolute identity, — a doctrine first main- tained by Spinoza (unica substantia), and of -which — though in quite different senses — the most illustrious representatives among recent philosophers are Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin. Others again deny the evidence of consciousness to the equi- poise of the subject and object as co-ordinate and co-original elements ; and as the balance is inclined in favour of the one relative or the other, two opposite schemes of psychology are determined. If the subject be taken as the original and genetic, and the object evolved from it as its product, the theory of Idealism is established. On the other hand, if the object be assumed as the original and genetic, and the subject evolved from it as its product, the theory of Materialism is established" (Hamilton, Metaphysics, lect. xvi.). — V. Dualism, Duality of Consciousness. MONOTHEISM (/twos, fco's, one God), the belief that God is essentially one. MOOD.— V. Syllogism. MORAL (moralis, from mos, a custom), (1) the quality belonging to actions as harmonising with moral law ; (2) con- cerned with the recognition of moral distinctions, as when, by abbreviation, we speak of moral judgments and moral senti- ments (see Mill, Essays on Religion, p. 133). There is a popular use of the word moral as applied to reasonings, according to which it is opposed to demonstrative, meaning probable, on the basis of the moral order of the universe. In the classification of mental phenomena it is also opposed to intellectual. Thus we distinguish between the intellectual and the moral nature of man, and between moral habit and intellectual habit. As applied to rules of conduct, moral is opposed to positive. "Moral precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we see; positive precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we do not see. Moral duties arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external command ; positive duties do not arise out of 268 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. the nature of the case, but from external command ; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command received from him whose creatures and subjects we are" (Butler, Analogy, pt. ii. ch. i.). "Why should I be moral?' (see Bradley, Ethical Studies, essay ii.). On the distinction between actions see Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 5. MORAL FACULTY.— The power of the mind by which we obtain our knowledge of moral law. Such a power is postulated under a theory of our knowledge of moral dis- tinctions, which regards such knowledge as a recognition of necessary truth. The theory which makes knowledge of moral distinctions a product of experience as subject to the law of pleasure and pain, does not find occasion for postulating a special power distinct from the understanding. — V. Conscience. MORALITY. — The field of human action coming under the sweep of moral law. Cf. Sully, Sensation and Intuition; Fowler, Progressive Morality ; Lotze, Microcosmus, i. 247 ; Spencer, Data of Ethics, 75, 113 ; Cyples, Process of Human Experience, 298. MORAL PHILOSOPHY, the science of human duty. It is the philosophy of our knowledge of moral law, of the application of such law to human life, and of our relations as moral beings. It includes all that is concerned with personality as subject to moral law. "Morality commences with, and begins in, the sacred dis- tinction between thing and person. On this distinction all law, human and divine, is grounded" (Coleridge, Aids to Reflection). "Formal philosophy is called logic. Material philosophy, however, which has to do with determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject, is two-fold; for these laws are either laws of nature or of freedom. The science of the former is Physics, that of the latter Ethics " (Pref. to Kant's Ground- work). A course of Moral Philosophy should include an analysis of our mental states, as our intelligence is concerned with the distinction between right and wrong; treatment of the VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. 269 problems raised by tbe possession of suob knowledge ; classifica- tion of our natural impulses or inducements to act ; discussion of the possibilities of self-control under moral law, and tbe results of its exercise ; exposition of tbe duties incumbent upon us as moral beings, and a consideration of the relations of moral beings to each other, and to the Moral Governor. Moral Philosophy must, therefore, be a Psychology, a Metaphysic, and Applied Ethics or Deontology. The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of Ethical Theories is the basis on which they ground moral distinctions. Kant has given the following classification of Theories tested by this characteristic : — Subjective. External. Education (Montaigne). Civil Constitution (Mandevile) Internal. Physical Feeling (Epicurus). Moral Feeling (Hutcheson). Objective. Internal. Will of God (Crusius and other theological moralists). Perfection (Wolf and the Stoics). See Critique of Practical Reason, Abbot, 3rd ed., p. 129 ; Semple, 3rd ed., p. 107. MORAL SENSE. — (1) A designation of the moral faculty, used when a transition was occurring from an emotional to an intellectual theory of its nature (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson) ; (2) feeling of reverence toward moral law (Kant, Critique of Practical Season ; Metaph. of Ethics, Semple, 3rd ed., Calder- wood, p. 105). For Kant's objections to the theory of a moral sense as the moral faculty, see Kant's Theory of Ethics, Abbot, 3rd ed., pp. 128, 213. — V. Keverence. MORAL SENTIMENT.— V. Sentiment. MORPHOLOGY (/«>/>, to perceive). — The thing in itself, the real object to which the qualities recognised by us belong. In the philosophy of Kant, Noumenon is an object in itself, not relatively to us. But, according to Kant, we have no knowledge of things in themselves. For, besides the impressions which things make on us, there is nothing in us but the forms of the sensibility and the categories of the understanding, so that, of necessity, we form our conceptions of things in accordance with these three. Kant states his position thus : — " The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which effects that the contents of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form" {Critique of Pure Eeason, Meiklejohn's transl., p. 21). "The empirical intuition is a mere phenomenon in which nothing that can appertain to a thing in itself can be found ; .... in the whole range of the sensuous world, investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as we may, we have to do with nothing but phenomena" (ib., p. 36). So also with the mind, or knowledge of self. " The subject intuites itself, not as it would represent itself immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which the mind is internally affected, consequently, as it appears, and not as it is " {ib., 41). VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 289 " The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated, not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself, solely through the pure understanding, is not self-contradictory for -we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition Things in themselves, which lie beyond the province of sensuous cognition, are called noumena, for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the understanding thinks" (ib., pp. 186-87). For Kant's distinction between cognising and thinking, see p. xxxiii., pref. to 2nd ed. This is Kant's finding as regards the intellectual sphere; in that of the practical reason, as concerned with ethical life, we realise that we belong to the noumenal world ; the negative noumenon of knowledge thus becomes the positive noumenon of moral life (preface to 2nd ed. of Critique of Pure Season, pp. xxxi. and xxxiii., Meiklejohn's transl.). Accordingly, Kant says : — " In the ordinary practical use of the word right, we are not conscious of the manifold representations comprised in the conception. But we cannot for this reason assert that the ordinary conception is a sensuous one, containing a mere phenomenon ; but the conception of it lies in the understand- ing, and represents a property (the moral property) of actions, which belongs to them in themselves " (ib., p. 36). Dr Hutchison Stirling summarises thus : — " A phenomenal world implies a noumenal, and the assumption of such is absolutely necessary in order duly to subordinate and limit the pretensions of sense. It does not follow, nevertheless, that its phenomenal nature attaches any character of useless- ness and meaninglessness to this, the world of time, which we in time inhabit. Here, as evidence from every side assures us, existence is but probationary Under reason we shall discover those relations to the necessary unconditioned, that round and complete our world as an object of intellect. Our practical critique, again, will introduce us to the veritable noumenal world ; while our inquiry into judgment will mediate and justify transition from the one world to the other " {Text- Book to Kant, p. 110; see Adamson's Philosophy of Kant, lect. iii.). — V. Phenomenon. T 290 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. NUMBER was held by Pythagoras to be the ultimate principle of being. His views were adopted to a certain extent by Plato, and attacked by Aristotle. In the Middle Ages, numbers, and the proportions subsisting between them, were employed in the systems of the alchemists and cabalists. But, in proportion as the true spirit of philosophy prevailed, numbers were banished from metaphysics, and the consideration of them was allotted to a separate science — arithmetic and algebra. According to Locke, Number is one of the Primary Qualities of Matter. He devotes ch. xvi. of bk. ii. of his Essay to its consideration. OBJECT, OBJECTIVE (objicio, to throw against).— Object and subject are, etymologically, opposites and correla- tives, the one standing over against the other; Objective pertaining to the object. (1) In Logical usage, object, wti- kclix,cvov, was that which was the opposite to some other thing, oppositum; (2) in Psychological usage there has been a re- versal of the significance of the correlative terms, according to the changing forms of the theory of knowledge, (a) Earlier use, — that which the mind contemplates, whether as presented though our sensibilities, or though the understanding ; that which the mind makes, or "objectifies." According to this, objective applies to all that belongs to this object, which may be the representative, "idea," or conception of that which, existing externally, is the " substance " or " subject." (6) Cur- rent use, — object is the thing known, as distinguished from the mind which knows ; the separate reality, the existence as apart from the knower, called "the substance," under earlier usage. "Objective" here signifies, pertaining to the object known ; whereas " subjective " means pertaining to the mind Objective has thus come to mean that which has independent existence or authority, apart from our experience or thought. Thus moral law is said to have objective authority; that is, authority belonging to itself, and not drawn from anything in our nature. In the Middle Ages, subject meant substance, and this sense I is preserved in Descartes and Spinoza, sometimes even in Reid. j By William of Occam, e.g., objective denotes that which the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 291 mind feigns ; viz., the idea, image, or subjective representa- 1 tion, as opposed to the real object which exists independ- ' ently, or, in Cartesian language, formally. This shows what is meant by realitas objectiva in Descartes (Med. 3) (see Veitch's Descartes, note iii.). The modern usage is due chiefly to the influence of Kant, who, holding that the object known must conform to the con- stitution of the knowing subject, set himself to the analysis of the relations between the objective and the subjective in know- ledge (see preface to 2nd ed. Critique of Pure Season, p. xxviii., Meiklejohn's transl.). Knowledge itself has thus a subjective side and an objective. " The employment of object for purpose or final cause (in the French and English languages) is to be absolutely condemned, as a recent and irrational confusion of notions which should be carefully distinguished" (Hamilton, acid's Works, p. 97, and app., noteB, sec. 1 ; cf. Lotze, Logic, p. 11, Bosanquet's transl.). — V. Subjective. OBLIGATION {pbligo, to bind).— Personal subjection to the authority of law ; oughtness ; duty. (1) The relation of moral life to moral law ; (2) a definite or special phase of this subjection, in view of circumstances or under personal con- tract ; (3) a requirement under authority of civil law. Whewell, Foundation of Morals; Chalmers, Bridgewater Treatise ; Kant's Groundwork, ch. ii. ; Warburton's Divine Lega- tion,bk. i. sec. 4; Stewart's Active and Moral Powers, bk. ii. ch. vi. A doctrine of moral obligation presents the great difficulty in the construction of a Utilitarian theory of morals. How the difficulty has been met may be seen from Mill's Utilitarianism, p. 40 : — " Why am I bound to promote the general happiness ? This difficulty will always present itself, until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold of the principle which they have taken of some of the consequences." This shuns the difficulty ; shifting it from a philosophic problem, and making it a matter of personal attain- ment. Bain makes obligation refer " to the class of actions enforced by the sanction of punishment " (Emotions and Will, 3rd ed., p. 264).— 7. Duty. 292 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. OBSCURE.— V. Clear. OBSCURE PERCEPTIONS.— 7. Perception. OBSERVATION,— (1) commonly, attention directed upon external objects, as distinguished from Reflection, or Introspection, i.e., attention directed upon mental operations. Thus we speak of "observational sciences" meaning physical sciences; (2) attention, whether its object be external or internal, — accord- ing to which Psychology is an observational science. The importance of Observation in the acquisition of scientific truth was emphasised by Bacon, who distinguished between active and passive observation (Nov. Org., i. aph. 100). Herschel makes the same distinction, instead of the usual one between Experiment and Observation. Quite correctly, observation is made to include attention directed upon what is within, as well as upon what is without. " The difference between experiment and observation consists merely in the comparative rapidity with which they accomplish their discoveries ; or rather in the comparative command we possess over them, as instruments for the investigation of truth " (Stewart, Phil. Essays, Prelim. Dissert., ch. ii.). " The business of experiment is to extend the sphere of observation, and not to take up a subject where observation lays it down" (Bailey, Theory of Reasoning, 115). — V. Experiment. OBVERSION.— V. Permutation. OCCASION. — Opportunity for action, as afforded by the presence of conditions favourable to its performance. Occasion is to be distingished from Cause, as ap^r] from alna. " Between the real cause and the occasion of any phenomenon there is a wide diversity. The one implies the producing power, the other only some condition upon which this power comes into exercise. If I cast a grain of corn into the earth, the occasion of its springing up and producing plant, ear, and grain, is the warmth and moisture of the soil in which it is buried ; but this is by no means the cause. The cause lies in the mysterious vital power which the seed contains within itself; the other is but the condition upon which this cause produces the effect" (Morell, Specul. Phil.). OCCASIONAL CAUSES (Doctrine of).— V. Cause. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 293 ONTOLOGY (ov and Adyos), the science of Being- Metaphysics. The name ontology seems to have been first made current iu philosophy by Wolff. He divided metaphysics into four parts — ontology, rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology. Ontology was chiefly occupied with abstract inquiries into possibility, necessity, and contingency, substance, accident, cause, &c, without reference to the laws of our intellect by which we are constrained to believe in them. Ontology is thus the science of principles and causes, that is of the principles and causes of being. Ancient philosophy is characteristically ontological, i.e., it is an inquiry into the principles of Being. Thus Aristotle, though he does not use the name, defines the philosophia prima as iTTumj/jLTj toB ovtos ij ovTOi—Scientia JUntis quatenm Entis, that is, the science of the essence of things ; the science of the attributes and conditions of being in general, not of being in any given circumstances, as physical or mathematical, but as being. Modern philosophy, on the contrary, generally ap- proaches the problem of Being through that of Knowledge; it is, as in Locke and Kant, first a theory of Knowledge, and afterwards a theory of Existence, the former being the basis of the latter. According to the Wolffian school, as above stated, meta- physics contains, besides Ontology, three co-ordinate branches of inquiry, — Bational Cosmology, Bational Psychology, and Ra- tional Theology. The first aims at a knowledge of the real essence, as distinguished from the phenomena of the material world ; the second discusses the nature and origin, as distin- guished from the faculties and affections, of the human soul and of other finite spirits ; the third aspires to comprehend God himself, as cognisable a, priori in his essential nature, apart from the direct and relative indications furnished by his works, as in Natural Theology, or by his Word, as in Bevealed Religion. " These three objects of metaphysical inquiry, God, the World, the Mind, correspond to Kant's three Ideas of the Pure Reason ; and the object of his Critique is to show that, in rela- tion to all these, the attainment of a system of speculative philosophy is impossible" (Mansel, Proleg. Log.). 294 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. OPERATIONS (of the Mind). — The active exercises of the mind, in contrast with its passive experiences. " By the operations of the mind we understand every mode of thinking of which we are conscious" (Reid, Intellectual Powers, essay i. ch. i.). Operation, act, and energy are nearly convertible terms ; and are opposed to faculty, as the actual to the potential (Hamilton). "The various modes of thinking have always and in all language, as far as we know, been called by the name of opera- tions of the mind, or by names of the same import. To body we ascribe various properties, but not operations properly so called." OPINION (opinor, to think).— Unverified Thought. " The essential idea of opinion seems to be that it is a matter about which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can without absurdity think differently Any proposition, the contrary of which can be maintained with probability, is matter of opinion " (Sir G. C. Lewis, Essay on Opinion). Locke defines Opinion, which he identifies with Belief or Assent, as " the admitting or receiving any proposition for true upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so That which makes me believe is something extraneous to the thing I believe " (Essay, bk. iv. ch. xv. sec. 3). So Kant : " Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgment, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjectively suf- ficient, but is recognised as being objectively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Sub- jective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself) ; objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all)" (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 498, Meiklejohn). This modern account of Opinion is essentially the same as Plato's. Between sensible knowledge, which, being only of shadows of things, he identified with Ignorance, and abstract or philosophical knowledge, which he identified with knowledge, he recognised an intermediate sphere — that of Opinion. Know- ledge, strictly so called, is knowledge of the one in the many, of the Idea ; sensible knowledge is knowledge only of the many ; opinion or mathematical knowledge is knowledge which still leans upon the manifold of sense, and uses it as "hypothesis" VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 295 in its ascent into the ideal -world. " They (the geometricians) summon to their aid visible forms, and discourse about them, though their thoughts are busy, not with these forms, but with their originals ; and though they discourse, not with a view to the particular square and diameter which they draw, but with a view to the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on. For while they employ, by way of images, those figures and diagrams aforesaid, they are really endeavouring to behold those abstractions which are only to be seen with the eye of thought" (Republic, bk. vi. p. 510). As Knowledge is of Being, and Ignorance of Non-being, Opinion is of " the interspace between Being and Not-Being." Thus Opinion is the lower stage of " intellectual knowledge ; its source is understanding (Sidvoia), not reason (vous). OPPORTUNITY.— Occasion favourable for action, both in respect of time and of the conditions requisite. OPPOSITION (in Logic).— "Two propositions are said to be opposed to each other, when, having the same subject and predicate, they differ in quantity, or quality, or both. It is evident that, with any given subject and predicate, you may state four distinct propositions, viz., A, E, I, and ; any two of which are said to be opposed ; hence there are four different kinds of opposition, viz., 1st, the two universals (A and E), are called contraries to each other ; 2nd, the two particular (I and O), svbcontraries ; 3rd, A and I, or E and 0, subalterns; 4th, A and 0, or E and I, contradictories " (Whately, Logic, bk. ii. ch. ii. sec. 3). The ■opposition of propositions may be thus exhibited : — All A is B. 1 Contraries — may both be false, but cannot both be No A is B. J true. Some A is B. \ Subcontraries — may both be true, but cannot both be Some A is not B. J false. All A is B. I Contradictories. ' home A is not a. j y Qne must b(j trug and the other falge< taAhR } Contradictories. J ££ A toR } a " d { Somt 1 Fs'not B. } **-** subalternate. " Of two subalternate propositions the truth of the universal 296 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. proves the truth of the particular, and the falsity of the par- ticular proves the falsity of the universal, but not vice versa " (Mill, Logic, bk. ii. ch. i.). These oppositions are generally exhibited in the following figure : — A CONTRAKIES E a °o» <& S § #* \ e I SUBCONTEAEIES O OPTIMISM (optimum) the doctrine that the universe, being the work of an infinitely perfect Being, is the best that could be created. This doctrine under various forms appeared in all the great philosophical schools of antiquity. During the Middle Ages it was advocated by St Anselm and St Thomas. In times com- paratively modern, it was embraced by Descartes and Male- branche, and has been developed in its highest form by Leibnitz. According to him, God, being infinitely perfect, could neither will nor produce evil. And as a less good com- pared with a greater is evil, the creation of God must not only be good, but the best that could possibly be. Before creation, all beings and all possible conditions of things were present to the Divine Mind in idea, and composed an infinite number of worlds, from among which infinite wisdom chose the best. Creation was the giving existence to the most perfect state of things which had been ideally contemplated by the Divine Mind. The optimism of Leibnitz has been misunderstood and mis- represented by Voltaire and others. The doctrine of Leibnitz is not that the present state of things is the best possible in reference to individuals, nor to classes of beings, nor even to this world as a whole, but in reference to all worlds, or to the universe as a whole — and not even to the universe in its present state, but in reference to that indefinite progress of VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 297 which it may contain the germs (Leibnitz, Essais de Theodicee : Malebranche, Entretiens Metaphysiques). ORDER, — (1) intelligent arrangement of objects, or of means to accomplish an end, or of the parts for the good of the whole. Unam post aliam. (2) In the widest sense, the system of things existing in the universe. The primitive belief that there is order in nature is the ground of all experience, leading us to anticipate that the same causes, operating in the same circumstances, will pro- duce the same effects. This may be resolved into a higher belief in the wisdom of an infinitely perfect being, who orders all things. Order in its higher sense has been regarded as affording an accurate representation of the nature of rectitude. Every being has an end to answer. While other beings tend only blindly towards their end, man knows the end of his being, indicating the place he holds in the scheme of the universe, and he can freely and intelligently endeavour to realise that universal order of which he is an element or constituent. In doing so he does what is right. In like manner science, in all its discoveries, tends to the discovery of universal order. And art, in its highest attain- ments, is only realising the truth of nature ; so that the true, the beautiful, and the good, ultimately resolve themselves into the idea of order. ORGAN.- — An organ is a part of an animal or vegetable organism fitted to perform a particular action, the performance of which is called its function. An organ of special sense involves a distinctive terminal arrangement of the peripheral extremity of the appropriated nerve fibre, which connects with a special bulb laid under- neath the cerebrum. ORGANISM.— The structure of vital existence. "An organised product of nature is that in which all the parts are mutually ends and means " (Kant). A distinction is drawn between Vegetative and Animal Life, in accordance with which " Organic Life " is sometimes applied to the lower and more general form. " The body of man, or 298 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. of any one of the higher animals, may be regarded as made xip of two portions which are essentially distinct, though intimately blended, as well in their structure as in their actions, viz., (1) the apparatus of animal life; and (2) the apparatus of vegetative or organic life " (Carpenter's Mental Physiology, p. 29). Protoplasm is the name which has been given to "the formal basis of all life,'' the substance out of which organised existence is built up (Huxley's Physical Basis of Life; Lay Sermons, p. 132 ; Hutchison Stirling's As Regards Protoplasm). " Organic sensation " is the general name for that form of sensibility which is common to all the sensory organs in the animal structure. " The organic sensations and their cerebral centres, probably the occipital lobes, would seem to be the foundation or universal background of the pleasurable or pain- ful emotions in general" (Ferrier's Functions of the Brain, ch. xi. p. 261).— 7. Life. ORGANON or ORGANUM (Spyavov, an instrument), is the name often applied to a collection of Aristotle's treatises on logic ; because, by the Peripatetics, logic was regarded as the instrument of science rather than as itself a science or part of science. In the 6th century, Ammonius and Simpli- cius arranged the works of Aristotle in classes, one of which they called logical or organical. But it was not till the 15th century that the name Organum came into common use. Bacon gave the name of Novum Organum to the second part of his Instauratio Magna. And the German philosopher, Lambert, in 1763, published a logical work under the title Das Neue Organon. The Organon of Aristotle consists of the following treatises : — The Categories, the Be Lnterpretatione, the Analytics, Prior and Posterior, the Topics, and the Sophistical Refutations. "The Organon of Aristotle, and the Organum of Bacon stand in relation, but the relation of contrariety; the one considers the laws under which the subject thinks, the other the laws under which the object is to be known. To compare them together is therefore, in reality, to compare together quantities of different species. Each proposes a different end ; VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 299 both, in different ways, are useful ; and both ought to be assiduously studied" (Hamilton, Eeid's Works, p. 711, note 2). ORIGIN {origo), beginning ; (1) that which is first in the order of time ; (2) that which is first in the order of thought. Cf. Kant, introd. to Critique, sec. i. — " That all our know- ledge begins with experience there can be no doubt But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience.'' ORIGIN OP SPECIES.— V. Species, Evolution. ORIGINATION. — The action of power, giving rise to new- existence — (1) as in creation ; (2) as in volition. The term is much used in discussion concerning liberty and necessity. Does man originate his own actions ? " To deny all originating power of the will must be to place the primordial and necessary causes of all things in the Divine nature Whether, as a matter of fact, an originating power reside in man, may be matter of inquiry ; but to main- tain it to be an impossibility, is to deny the possibility of creation " (Thomson, Christian Theism). " Will, they (Liber- tarians) hold to be a free cause, a cause which is not an effect ; in other words, they attribute to will the power of absolute origination" (Hamilton, Discussions, p. 623 ; see Cairns, On Moral Freedom). OSTENSIVE (ostendo, to show). — Ostensive proof. A proof is direct or ostensive when it evinces the truth of thesis through positive principles ; it is indirect or apagogical when it evinces the truth of a thesis through the falsehood of its opposite. OUGHTNESS. — The characteristic of an action required under a categorical imperative. — V. Duty, Obligation. OUTNESS — Externality. " The word outness, which has been of late revived by some of Kant's admirers in this country, was long ago used by Berkeley in his Principles of Human Knowledge (sec. 43); and at an earlier period of his life, Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, sec. 46 " (Stewart, Philosophical Essays, pt. i. essay ii. ch. ii.). — V. Externality, Distance. PAIN. — Suffering; (1) the disturbed or distressed experi- ence consequent on physical injury; (2) sense of wrong under moral injury. — V. Pessimism. 300 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. PAKZETIOLOGY. — "While Palaeontology describes the beings which have lived in former ages, without investigating their causes, and Aetiology treats of causes without distinguish- ing historical from mechanical causation, Paloetiology is a com- bination of the two sciences, exploring, by means of the second, the phenomena presented by the first. All these sciences are connected' by this bond — that they all endeavour to ascend to a past state, by considering what is the present state of things, and what are the causes of the change " (Whewell, History of Scientific Ideas). The term is not much used. PANTHEISM (was, all ; to ttcLv, 0eos). — Pantheism, strictly speaking, is the doctrine of the necessary and eternal co- existence of the finite and the infinite ; of the absolute con- substantiality of God and nature, considered as two different but inseparable aspects of universal existence. It may take either of two forms. The higher is the absorption of all things in God (Acomism) ; the lower, the absorption of God in all things, which is practically Atheism. In both forms it sacri- fices the notions of Personality, Freedom, and Moral Besponsi- bility. The oldest form of Pantheism is that which appears in Brahminism. In Greece, the Eleatic school, of which the founder was Xenophanes and the chief philosopher Parmenides, was essentially Pantheistic, maintaining the unity and identity of Being, and denying the existence of the finite and changing. Heraclitus recoiled to the opposite extreme, and sacrificed all permanence and identity to the universal flux of Becoming, The Stoics were Pantheistic in their metaphysics. Within the Christian era, Pantheism appears in Gnosticism and Alex- andrian Neo-Platonism, in the speculations of John Scotus Erigena, and of Giordano Bruno, but most conspicuously and consistently in the system of Spinoza. In more recent times there has arisen the Ideal Pantheism of the Transcendental school, of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. See Saisset's Modem Pantheism; Pollock's Spinoza; Mar- tineau's Study of Spinoza; relative portions of Histories of Philosophy, Ueberweg, Schwegler, and Zeller. PARADOX (wapd 8d£a, beyond, or contrary to appear- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 301 ance). — An utterance wearing the semblance of incongruity, yet capable of being interpreted in such a manner as to gain assent. E.g., Butler's paradox : — Even from self-love we should endeavour to overcome all inordinate regard and considera- tion of ourselves ; or the paradox of Hedonism : — Happiness is the end ; but if we aim directly at happiness, we miss it (cf> Mill's Utilitarianism, 23). ■ PARALOGISM (irapaXoyicrfw^, from 7rapaXoyi^o(w.i, to reason wrongly), is a formal fallacy or pseudo-syllogism, in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises. It is distinguished from the Sophism which is a fallacy intended to deceive. Paralogism of Pure Reason. — " The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexceptionable. In this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoidable, though not insoluble, mental illusion" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 237, Meiklejohn). It is a "sophism, not of man, but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free himself." Kant limits the application of the term Paralogism to that illusion which is at the root of Rational Psychology, viz., the inference, "from the transcendental conception of the subject which con- tains no manifold," to " the absolute unity of the subject itself." PAROIMONY (Law of) (parcimonia, sparingness). — Entia non sunt multiplicands, prceter necessitatem. Frustra Jit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora. " That substances are not to be multiplied without necessity ;" in other words, " that a plurality of principles are not to be assumed when the phenomena can possibly be explained by one." This re- gulative principle may be called the law or maxim of parcimony (Hamilton, Reid's Works, note A, p. 751). PART.— V. Whole. PARTICULAR. — V. Proposition. PARTITION. — Physical division, as opposed to logical, e.g., division of the body into its various parts. 302 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. PASSION (passio, jjwxw, to suffer)— (1) highly excited and agitating feeling, violently urging towards a single course of action ; (2) intense emotion ; (3) suffering. " The Passions," is a phase applied to those states of the sensibility which are turbulent, and weaken our power of self- command. Passion is opposed to reason. Plato arranged the passions in two classes, — the con- cupiscent and irascible, hriBv/ua and 0iy*os, the former spring- ing from the body and perishing with it, the latter connected with the rational and immortal part of our nature, and stimu- lating to the pursuit of good and the avoiding of excess and evil. Aristotle included all our active principles under one general designation of Orectic, and distinguished them into the appetite irascible, the appetite concupiscible, which had their origin in the body, and the appetite rational (fioiXrprvs), which is the will, under the guidance of reason. In modern philosophy there are two great treatises on the Passions, that of Spinoza (Ethics, pts. iii.-iv.), and that of Hume (Treatise on Human Nature, bk. ii., " Of the Passions"). PASSIVE, inactive, — as correlative with " active " ; that which is acted upon, as related to that which acts. " Passive experience," that which is the result of physical or mental susceptibility. PERCEIVE, PERCEPTION (capio, to take; per, by means of), simple apprehension, by means of the organs of sense ; (1) commonly applied to external perception, the recognition of an external object by means of the senses. In this ap- parently simple act there are several essential conditions, (a) sensibility belonging to organism, as acted upon from without, commonly by contact, (b) sensation, an impression present in consciousness ; (c) on the inner or higher side, judgment, or action of a comparing power, dealing with present fact, and with previous knowledge remembered ; (2) internal perception, — simple apprehension of any modification present in conscious- ness, in itself a condition of consciousness. Hamilton employs perception to denote the faculty, and percept the individual act of perceiving. Descartes (Prin. Phil., pars. i. sec. 32), says: — "All the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 303 modes of thinking which, we experience may be reduced to two classes, viz., perception, or the operation of the understand- ing, and volition, or the operation of the will. Thus, to per- ceive by the senses (sentire), to imagine, and to create things purely intelligible, are only different modes of perceiving ; to desire, to be averse from, to affirm, to deny, to doubt, are different modes of willing. So Locke {Essay, bk. li. ch. vi.) says : — " The two principal actions of the mind are these two : perception or thinking, and volition or willing." Eeid thought that "perception is most properly applied to the evidence which we have of external objects by our senses." He says (Intellectual Powers, essay i. ch. i.): — " The perception of external objects by our senses, is an operation of the mind of a peculiar nature, and ought to have a name appropriated to it. It has so in all languages. And, in English, I know no word more proper to express this act of the mind than perception. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching or feeling, are words that express the operations proper to each sense ; per- ceiving expresses that which is common to them all." The restriction thus imposed upon the word by Eeid, is to be found also in the philosophy of Kant, who distinguishes between Perception or Intuition, by which objects are given, and Conception, by which they are thought. The former he refers to Sensibility, the latter to Understanding. The science of the principles of Sensibility he calls Transcendental Aesthetic, that of the principles of Understanding Transcendental Analytic. In note d* to ReioVs Works, p. 876, Hamilton notices the following meanings of perception: — (1) " Perceptio, in its primary philosophical signification, as in the mouths of Cicero and Quintilian, is vaguely equivalent to comprehension, notion, cognition in general ; (2) an apprehension, a becoming aware of a consciousness. Perception, the Cartesians really identified with idea, and allowed them only a logical distinction ; th,e same representative act being called idea, inasmuch as we regard it as a representation; and perception, inasmuch as we regard it as a consciousness of such representation; (3) perception is limited to the apprehension of sense alone. This 304 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. limitation was first formally imposed by Reid, and thereafter by Kant. (Kant also distinguishes between sensation, or the matter of perception, which must be given to the mind, and its form which is imposed upon this matter by the mind itself) ; (4) a still more restricted meaning, through the authority of Eeid, is perception (proper), in contrast to sensa- tion (proper). He defines sensitive perception, or perception simply, as that act of consciousness whereby we apprehend in our body, (a) certain special affections, whereof, as an animated organism, it is contingently susceptible ; and (b) those general relations of extension, under which, as a material organism, it necessarily exists. Of these perceptions, the former, which is thus conversant about a subject-object, is sensation proper ; the latter, which is thus conversant about an object- object, is perception proper :" According to Hamilton, following Reid, Perception and Sensation, or the Element of Knowledge and that of Feeling, " though always co-existent, are always in the inverse ratio of each other'' (Metaph., lect. xxiv.). PERCEPTIONS (Obscure), or latent modifications of mind. Every moment light is reflected from innumerable objects, while smells and sounds are affecting us. But we pay no heed to them. These are what Leibnitz (Nouv. Essais) calls obscure perceptions. The sum of these obscure perceptions and latent feelings, which never come clearly into the field of consciousness, is what makes us at any time well or ill at ease. " The mind," he says, " is like an ocean in which there is an infinite multi- tude of very obscure perceptions, and its distinct ideas are like islands which emerge from the ocean." " Confused or insensible perceptions are without consciousness or memory There are a thousand marks which make us judge that there is, every moment, in us an infinity of perceptions; but the habit of perceiving them, by depriving them of the attraction of novelty, turns away our attention, and prevents them from fixing themselves in our memory. How could we form a clear perception without the insensible VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 305 perceptions which constitute it? To hear the noise of the sea, for example, it is necessary that we hear the parts which compose the whole, that is, the noise of each wave, though each of these little noises does not make itself known but in the confused assemblage of all the others together with it Leibnitz attaches the greatest questions of philosophy to these insensible perceptions, in so far as they imply the law of continuity They often determine us without our knowing it, and they deceive the vulgar by the appearance of an indifference of equilibrium. They supply the action of substances upon one another, and explain the pre-established harmony of soul and body. It is in virtue of these insensible variations that no two things can ever be perfectly alike (the principle of indiscernibles), and that their difference is always more than numerical, which destroys the doctrine of the tablets of the mind being empty, of a soul without thought, a substance without action, a vacuum in space, and the atoms of matter" (Tiberghien, Essai des Connaiss. Hum.). " Obscure ideas, or, more properly, sensations with dormant consciousness, are exceedingly numerous It is they which are active throughout the whole process of the forma- tion of thought ; for this goes on, though we are unconscious of it, and gives us only the perfect results, viz., ideas, notions. It is they which in the habitual voluntary motions, for instance, in playing on the piano, dancing, &c, set the proper muscles in motion through the appropriate motor nerves, though the mind does not direct to them the attention of consciousness. It is they which in sleep and in disorders of mind act a most important part. It is their totality which forms what plays so prominent a part in life under the name of disposition or temper" (Feuchtersleben, Med. Psychology, 1847, p. 110). Great attention is given to this subject in recent develop- ments of Psychology, e.g., in Psycho-physics (q.v.) Lewes pro- poses to apply the word subconscious to perceptions which do not appear above the "floor of consciousness." — V. Latent. PERFECTION (perficio ; perfectum, completeness), — (1) relative, (2) absolute, self-sufficiency. "By perfection is meant the full and harmonious development of all our faculties, U 306 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. corporeal and mental, intellectual and moral Human perfection and human happiness coincide, and thus constitute, in reality, but a single end" (Hamilton, Metaph,, i. 20). Perfection is thus relative or absolute. The perfections of God are the attributes belonging to the absolute Being. PERIPATETIC (TrepiiraTem, to walk about), is applied to Aristotle and his followers, who seem to have carried on their philosophical discussions while walking about in the halls and promenades of the Lyceum. Diogenes Laertius says, on the authority of Hermippus : — " He chose a promenade in the Lyceum, in which he walked up and down with his disciples discussing subjects of philosophy, till the time for anointing themselves came, hence he was called (ntjOiTranyn/coj') Peri- patetic. But others say, it was on account of walking with Alexander when he was recovering from an illness" (Diog. Laert., bk. v., Meibomius, i. 269). The disciples of Aristotle were subsequently known as the Peripatetics. PERMANENCE.— This is the first of Kant's Analogies of Experience (q.v.). He calls it the "Principle of the Perma- nence of Substance." It is as follows : — " In all changes of phenomena, substance is permanent, and the quantum thereof in nature is neither increased nor diminished." Permanence, that is, is the time-form of the category of substance (see Critique of Pure Season, Meiklejohn's transl., p. 136). PERMUTATION.— This is a term sometimes applied to a species of Immediate Inference, viz., the predicating of the original subject, the contradictory of the original predicate, and changing the quality of the proposition, e.g., to infer from All A is B that No A is not B. The process is otherwise designated Obversion and Equipollence. PERSON, applied specially to a moral being, as contrasted with animal and thing, — (1) a being capable of exercising under- standing and will — a self-determining intelligence ; (2) applied to the Absolute Being, as self-determining intelligence. Persona, in Latin, meant the mask worn by an actor on the stage, within which the sounds of the voice were concentrated, and through which (personuit) he made himself heard by the VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 307 immense audience. From being applied to the mask it came next to be applied to the actor, then to the character acted, then to any assumed character, and lastly, to any one having any character or station. " Person," says Locke {Essay, bk. ii. ch. xxvii.), "stands for a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places." " He to whom actions can be imputed is called person ,; (Kant, Metaphysics of Ethics, Semple, 3rd ed., p. 172). "Man and every reasonable agent exists as an end in himself" (ib., p. 41). The full significance of personality appears in moral life. Hegel's formula for the ethical imperative is, " Be a person, and respect others as persons " (Grundlinien der Philosophic des RechU, sec. 36, p. 42 ; Werke, viii. 75). PESSIMISM. — The theory of existence which represents that evil prevails in the world, and that the world is the worst possible. This theory in its recent forms is a reaction against the scheme of Hegel, which identifies the rational and the existing, making dialectic movement the key to all being. Schopenhauer's leading work is The World as Will and Repre- sentation, in which he uses " Will " as equivalent to impulse in all its forms, even including the forces of nature. He holds to a progression in the universe from lower to higher forms of impulse, but considers that in the process pain and evil are the inevitable attendants, and therefore that the world is the worst possible. Hartmann, in his Philosophy of the Unconscious, takes a similar view, maintaining that progression is at the cost of suffering to such a degree that it were better the world did not exist, and yet he grants that development implies that the world is the best possible under the conditions. Hartmann's Pessimism has thus involved in it a modified Optimism (see translations of both works, Sully's Pessimism ; TJeberweg's History, ii. 255 and 236). Pessimism admits of no positive ethics, but makes ethical thought negative, tending to asceti- cism, in order to escape the evil, and anticipating unconscious- ness as the end of all. PBTITIO PRINCIPIL begging the question. — V. Fallacy. 308 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. PHENOMENALISM, the theory of knowledge which maintains that all knowledge is only of the phenomenal and transitory, denying on the one hand knowledge of objects as existing independently of our recognition of phenomena, and, on the other, knowledge of necessary and universal truth. — V. Phenomenon, Empieioism. PHENOMENOLOGY. — A science of things as they are recognised by our senses, and of facts as they occur in our experience, as opposed to a science of things as existing in themselves, or in their absolute nature. PHENOMENON (^aivo/ueeov from <£aiVo/AiXav0p(oirevm, to be a friend to mankind), — the love of mankind, — the esteem due to man as a moral being, possessing the powers, possibilities, and responsibilities belonging to every such being. It is thus a, love of our fellow-men required by moral law. [^"PHILOSOPHY (tXoo-otj>Ca, pfy, mind; Xoyos, discourse), appro- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 311 priated by Craniologists to designate the hypothesis that the convolutions of the brain, involving corresponding elevations of the skull, are the index of our different faculties and suscep- tibilities. According to Gall, "its end is to determine the functions of the brain in general, and of its different parts in particular, and to prove that you may recognise different dis- positions and inclinations by the protuberances and depressions to be found on the cranium '* (see writings of Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe). Craniology is thrown into a quite subordinate place, in view of recent investigations as to brain structure, relations of the lobes and convolutions of the cerebrum, and localisation of sensory and motor centres. These investigations discredit Phrenology (c/. Hamilton, Metaph., vol. i. app. ii.). PHYSICAL ((jiva-K, nature). — (1) In etymological sense, natural. This usage, now obsolete, occurs in Locke's Essay, bk. i. ch. i. sec. 2, introd. : — " I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists ; i.e., the consideration of the essential nature of mind. (2) In modern usage, opposed to Psychical or Mental, and equivalent to Material (q.v.). — V. Matteb, Body. PHYSICS, the science concerned with the laws of unor- ganised matter. PHYSIOGNOMY (v are not diagrammatically possible, and the assertion of I involves the assertion of 0, some, on this scheme, being necessarily equal to some but not all (see Venn, Symbolic Logic, ch. i.; Hamilton, Lectures on Logic ; Baynes, New Analytic of Logical Forms ; Ueberweg, System of Logic, app. B, by Lindsay). — [J. S.] QUIDDITY or QUIDITY (quidditas, from quid, what).-- This term was employed in scholastic philosophy as equivalent the to tC rp> eii/at of Aristotle, and denotes what was subse- quently called the substantial form. It is the answer to the question, What is it ? quid est ? It is that which distinguishes a thing from other things, and makes it what it is, and -not another. It is synonymous with essence, and comprehends both the substance and its qualities. Quiddity is the being of a thing considered in order to a definition explaining what it is. It is the complement of all that makes us conceive anything as we conceive it. QUIETISM (quies, rest), the theory which represents the contemplative life as the highest in contrast with the life of activity.* ; A ; controversy was carried on by Fenelon and Bossuet on this subject (see Bonnel, Be la Controversy de Bossuet et Fenelon, sur le Quiitisme; Upham, Life of Madame Guy on, who held that souls might be carried to such a state of perfection that a 334 VOOABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. continual act of contemplation and love might be substituted for all other acts of religion). — V. Mysticism. RATIO. — (1) Reason; (2) method; (3) proportion, when things are compared. When two subjects admit of com- parison with reference to some quality which they possess, the measure shows their ratio, or the rate in which the one exceeds the other. In mathematics, the term ratio is used for proportion; thus, we speak of the ratio which one thing bears to another. In Logic the Extension and Intension of a Term are often, though incorrectly, said to be in inverse ratio. RATIOCINATION. — Reasoning; the process which guides to an inference. " Reasoning is a modification from the French raisonner (and this a derivation from the Latin, ratio), and corresponds to ratiocinatio, which has indeed been immediately transferred into our language under the ratiocination.'' This term " denotes properly the process, but, improperly, also the product of reasoning " (Hamilton's Logic, i. 278). " When from a general proposition .... by combining it with other propositions, we infer a proposition of the same degree of generality with itself, or a less general proposition, or a proposition merely individual, the process is ratiocina- tion (or syllogism)" (Mill, Logic, bk. ii. ch. i. sec. 3). — V. Rational Reasoning. RATIONALE. — The rational basis for a proposition, system, or order of things. — V. Reason. RATIONALISM.— (1) In Philosophy. The system which makes our Rational power the ultimate test of truth. The opposite theory is named Sensationalism, as it makes all knowledge depend on the senses, or Empiricism, as it makes all knowledge depend on experience. According to Rationalism, experience is impossible without intelligence as a prerequisite. The Critical Philosophy of Kant is pre-eminently a scheme of Rationalism as opposed to the Sensationalism which culminated in Hume's scepticism. It finds that Experience in all its forms, even Sensation, is fundamentally constituted by elements whose source is Reason. It is also opposed to' Empiricism, which refers all our know- ledge to sensation and reflection, or experience. According to VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 335 rationalism, reason furnishes elements, without which experience is impossible. (2) In Theology, Rationalism is opposed to Supernatwralism, and maintains that Reason is the ultimate test of revelation, insomuch that what cannot be harmonised with reason, cannot be accepted as true revelation. Supernaturalism maintains that there is a revelation, within the limits of human form, of truth unattainable by reason, and on this account incapable of being tested by reason. Spinoza, in his Traetatus Theologico-Politicus, tried to ex- plain all that is supernatural in religion by reason. And Strauss and others in modern Germany have carried this line of speculation much farther. REAL (The). — The existent. (1) As opposed to the non- existent; (2) as opposed to the nominal or verbal; (3) as synonymous with actual, and thus opposed (a) to potential, and (6) to possible, existence ; (4) as opposed to the pheno- menal, things in themselves in opposition to things as they appear relatively to our faculties ; (5) as indicating a sub- sistence in nature in opposition to a representation in thought, ens reale, as opposed to ens rationis ; (6) as opposed to logical or rational, a thing which in itself, or really, re, is one, may logically, ratione, be considered as diverse or plural, and vice versa (abbreviated from Hamilton, Beid's Works, note b, p. 805). Green maintains that the Real consists in Relations (Prologo- mena to Ethics, bk. i.). The nature of Reality may indeed at once be said to be the leading question in Metaphysics (see Mansel, Metaphysics (Ontology) ; also Bosanquet, Knowledge and Reality). REALISM, as opposed (1) to nominalism, is the doctrine that gen/us and species are real things, existing independently of our conceptions and expressions ; and that, as in the case of singular terms, there is some real individual corresponding to each, so, in common terms also, there is something correspond- ing to each; which is the object of our thoughts when we employ the term (V. Whately, Logic, bk. iv. ch. v. sec. 1). (1) According to Realism the universal exists ante rem or in re. 336 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. The former type of doctrine originates in Plato's Ideal theory ; the latter in Aristotle. Realism, as opposed (2) to Idealism, is the doctrine that in perception there is an immediate or intuitive cognition of the external object, while according to Idealism our knowledge of an external world is mediate and representative (Hamilton, Beid's Works, note c). " The presentationists or intuitionists constitute an object into a sole absolute or total object, viewing the one total object of perceptive consciousness as real, they are Kealists " (Hamilton, note o, Beid's Works, 816). " If the object is not in contact with the organ of sense, there must be some medium which passes between them. Thus in vision the rays of light, in hearing the vibrations of elastic air, in smelling the effluvia of the body smelled — must pass from the object to the organ ; otherwise we have no per- ception " (Reid's Inquiry, sec. 21 ; Hamilton's, p. 186). " The only object of perception is the immediate object. The distant reality is unknown to the perception of sense, and only reached by reasoning " (Hamilton, ib.). " To determine what belongs to the Ego and what to the non-Ego is the great problem of recent times, the answer to which is idealistic or realistic, in proportion as it gives ascendency to the former or to the latter as the source of our cognitions " (Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory, ii. 2 ; Thomson, Outline of Laws of Thought, 3rd ed., sec. 64). REASON (Batio, from reor, to think). — (1) A general name for the intellectual nature of man; (2) the faculty of the higher intuitions, or of a priori truth, in contrast with Reasoning ; (3) the evidence or rational ground upon which a conclusion rests. Ordinary usage makes the term apply to, power or faculty. (1) The more general application occurs when we speak of man as distinguished by " reason " (Locke's Essay, bk. iv. ch. xvii.). Although (2) is the use distinctive of Kant; he also uses the term in the wider sense, adopting " Pure Reason " to describe the higher faculty. " Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the Architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason ; and we begin from the point where the main root of human knowledge divides into two, one VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 337 of which is reason. By reason I understand here the whole higher faculty of cognition, the rational being placed in contra- distinction to the empirical " {Critique of Pure Reason, Meikle- john, p. 505). The Reason — or Pure Reason, as Kant recog- nises it — is the faculty of the higher intuitions — " the highest faculty of cognition " (ib., p. 212); "it contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and principles which it does not borrow either from the senses or the understanding " (ib.). Considering it as a word denoting a faculty or complement of faculties, Hamilton, Beid's Works, note a, sec. 5, says, "Reason has been employed to denote — " 1. Our intelligent nature in general, as distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagination, and memory ; and in contrast to the feelings and desires, including — (1) Conception; (2) Judgment; (3) Reasoning; (4) Intelli- gence (vols). " 2. The legitimate employment of our faculties in general. "3. The dianoetic and noetic functions of reason (as dis- tinguished by Reid, Intellectual Powers, esBay vi. ch. ii.). " 4. The dianoetic function alone or ratiocination, as by Reid in his Inquiry, introd., ch. i. sec. 3 ; ch. ii. sec. 5. " 5. The noetic function alone or common sense. Thus by Kant and others opposed (as Vernunft) to Understanding ( Yer- stand) viewed as comprehending the other functions of thought." In the philosophy of Kant the understanding is distinguished from the reason — 1. By the sphere of their action. The sphere of the under- standing is coincident with the sensible world, and cannot transcend it ; but the reason ascends to the super-sensible. 2. By the objects and results of their exercise. The under- standing deals with conceptions, the reason with ideas. The categories of the understanding are constitutive, i.e., have a direct reference to experience, of whose fundamental objective constitution they are the essential elements. The ideas of reason, on the other hand, are regulative, i.e., do not apply directly to experience, as forming the ground-constitution of its objects, but are only ideals towards the realisation of which experience is always making. This, however, is, according to Y 338 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. Kant, the only legitimate application of the ideas of reason ; and from the constant and necessary tendency of reason to apply them beyond the sphere of experience, or transcendently, arises the dialectic of pure reason. The error consists in the illusion that reason is competent to produce her own object, while in reality, in the speculative sphere, her only legitimate activity is to regulate the understanding in its constitution of the objects of experience. See Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, pp. 213, 256 ; Prolegomena, sec. 59 ; cf. Coleridge, Aids to Reflection. "By the understanding, I mean the faculty of thinking and forming judgments on the notices furnished by the sense, according to certain rules existing in itself, which rules con- stitute its distinct nature. By the pure reason, I mean the power by which we become possessed of principles (the eternal verities of Plato and Descartes) and of ideas (n.b., not images), as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle, in mathematics ; and of justice, holiness, free-will, &c, in morals. Hence in works of pure science, the definitions of necessity precede the reasoning ; in other works they more aptly form the conclusion" (Cole- ridge, Friend). "Mr Coleridge's object in his speculations is nearly the same as Plato's, viz., to declare that there is a truth of a higher kind than can be obtained by mere reasoning; and also to claim, as portions of this higher truth, certain funda- mental doctrines of morality. Among these Mr Coleridge places the authority of conscience, and Plato the supreme good. Mr Coleridge also holds, as Plato held, that the reason of man in its highest and most comprehensive form, is a por- tion of a supreme and universal reason ; and leads to truth, not in virtue of its special attributes in each person, but by its own nature. "The view thus given of that higher kind of knowledge which Plato and Aristotle place above ordinary science, as being the knowledge of and faculty of learning first principles, will enable us to explain some expressions which might other- wise be misunderstood. Socrates, in the concluding part of the Sixth Book of the Republic, says, that this kind of know- VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 339 ledge is ' that of which the reason (\dyos) takes hold, in virtue of its power of reasoning ' (tq tov SiaXeyeaOai 8vra/iE{), Here we are plainly not to understand that we arrive at first prin- ciples by reasoning ; for the very opposite is true, and is here taught, viz., that first principles are not what we reason to, but what we reason from. The meaning of this passage plainly is, that first principles are those of which the reason takes hold in virtue of its power of reasoning ; they are the conditions which must exist in order to make any reasoning possible ; they are the propositions which the reason must involve implicitly, in order that we may reason explicitly; they are the intuitive roots of the dialectical power. " Plato's views may be thus exhibited : — Intelligible "World, voiit&v. Visible "World, dpar6v. Object, . Ideas. iSeai. Conceptions. SictfOia. Things. 5»a, k.t.A. Images. (wives. Process, . Intuition. Demonstration. iTtiariiiLi). Belief, irforij. Conjecture. tincurla. Faculties, Intuitive Beason. vovs. Discursive Beason. \6yos. Sensation. aXa9i\ais. Whewell, On the Intellectual Powers according to Plato, in the Cambridge Phil. Trans., 1855. REASON (Impersonal). — Season, according to Cousin and other French philosophers, is the faculty by which we have knowledge of the infinite and the absolute, and is impersonal. "Licet enim intellectus meus sit individuus et separatus ab intellectu tuo, tamen secundum quod est individuus non habet universale in ipso, et ideo non individuatur id quod est in intel- lectu. .... Sic igitur universale ut universale est ubique et semper idem omnino et idem in animabus omnium, non recipient individuationem ab anima.'' These words are quoted from Averroes. The root and germ 340 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. of this doctrine may be found in the doctrine of Plato, that human reason is a ray of the Divine reason. " In truth," observes Fenelon, " my reason is in myself, for it is necessary that I should continually turn inward upon myself in order to find it ; but the higher reason which corrects me when I need it, and which I consult, is not my own, it does not specially make a part of myself. Thus, that which may seem most our own, and to be the foundation of our being, I mean our reason, is that which we are to believe most borrowed " (Existence of God ; cf. Coleridge, Liter. Bern.). " Season is impersonal in its nature ; it is not we who make it. It is so far from being individual, that its peculiar charac- teristics are the opposite of individuality, viz., universality and necessity ; since it is to reason that we owe the knowledge of universal and necessary truths, of principles which we all obey and cannot but obey It descends from God and approaches man ; it makes its appearance in the consciousness as a guest who brings intelligence of an unknown world, of which it at once presents the idea and awakens the want. If reason were personal it would have no value, no authority beyond the limits of the individual subject Reason is a revelation, a necessary and universal revelation which is want- ing to no man, and which enlightens every man on his coming into the world Reason is the necessary mediator between God and man, the Xdyos of Pythagoras and Plato, the Word made flesh, which serves as the interpreter of God, and the teacher of man, divine and human at the same time. It is not, indeed, the absolute God in his majestic individuality, but his manifestation in spirit and in truth; it is not the Being of beings, but it is the revealed God of the human race " (Cousin, Exposition of Eclecticism, transl. by Eipley). This doctrine of the impersonal reason is regarded by Bouil- lier (Theorie de la Raison impersonelle) and others as the true ground of all certainty. Admit the personality of reason, and man becomes the measure of all things. Truth is individual ; but the truths of reason are universal. No one, says Male- branche, can feel the pain which I feel ; but any one or every one can contemplate the truth which I know. So also on the VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. 341 Hegelian view, Eeason is essentially one and universal ; imper- sonal, though shared in by the individual. REASON (Determining or Sufficient). — V. Sufficient Reason. REASONING-, the rationalising process; logical procedure of the understanding, leading to inference, whether from facts or from principles. " In one of its acceptations it means syllogising, or the mode of inference which may be called concluding from generals to particulars. In another of its senses, to reason is simply to infer any assertion from assertions already admitted ; and in this sense induction is as much entitled to be called reasoning as the demonstrations of geometry. Writers on Logic have generally preferred the former acceptation of the term ; the latter and more extensive signification is that in which I mean to use it " (Mill, Logic, introd., sec. 2). — V. Ratiocination. RECIPROCITY.— The third of Kant's Categories of Re- lation. It is said by Kant to combine the other two in a third relation — that of a cause, which is at the same time an effect, the action and reaction of agent and patient. It is reached by " conjoining the conception of a cause with that of a substance," and is otherwise called the category of Com- munity (see Critique of Pure Season, p. 64 ff., Meiklejohn's transl.). RECOLLECTION.— V. Reminiscence. RECTITUDE. — Rightness; the quality of an action as determined by moral law. To define " rightness " by reference to conscience is insufficient, appealing only to the mode of knowing, not to the thing known. " The authority of con- science " is an abbreviated form for " authority of the moral law as made known by conscience." Moral law is the ultimate rational basis of moral distinctions. " Rectitude of conduct is intended to express the term KaropOaxris, which Cicero translates recta effectio (De Fin-, lib. iii. cap. 14) ; KaTopdiofia he translates rectum factum (De Fin., lib. iii. cap. 7). Now, the definition of KaropOoy/m was v6/wv irpoa-rayfua, ' a thing commanded by law;' that is, by the law of nature, the universal law " (Harris, Dialogue on Happiness). 342 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. The representations of the basis of ethics vary according as theorists adopt the Utilitarian or Intuitional scheme. Utilitarian, ob Happiness Theory. — The basis here is the sensibility of our nature. " Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness ; wrong as they tend to pro- duce 1 the reverse of happiness" (J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism, p. 9). Scheme of Evolution. — " Conduct is a whole, and, in a sense, it is an organic whole, an aggregate of interdependent actions performed by an organism " (Spencer's Data of Ethics, p. 5). "Ethics has for its subject matter that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolu- tion" (ib., p. 19). " The good is universally the pleasurable" (ib., p. 30, External Authority). " Morality is utility made compulsory" (Bain's Emotions and Will, 3rd ed., p. 276). " Morality is an institution of society. The powers that im- pose the obligatory sanction are Law and Society, or the com- munity acting through the Government, by public judicial acts, and, apart from the Government, by the unofficial ex- pressions of disapprobation, and the exclusion from social good offices " (ib., p. 264). Eational Theory. — The basis here is necessary law, inde- pendent of our nature, objective ; and such law is known only through the rational nature, directly from the Keason, a priori, and by a direct or intuitive act. " There must be in morals first or self-evident principles, on which all moral reasoning is grounded, and on which it ultimately rests." These " show us what man ought to be " (Reid's Active Powers, essay iii. pt. iii. ch. vi. ; Hamilton, p. 590). "There is an Imperative which, irrespective of every ulterior end or aim, commands categorically" (Kant's Ethics, Semple, 3rd ed., p. 29, " Groundwork," ch. ii.). " The good differs from the agreeable " (p. 26). " All ethical ideas have their origin and seat, a priori, in reason ; in the reason of the unlettered, of course, as much as in that of the most finished sage" (p. 23). Butler, although he insists mainly i on our constitution, re- cognises the objective distinction : — " If it were commanded to cultivate the principles, and act from the spirit of treachery, VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 343 ingratitude, cruelty, the command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action" (Analogy, pt. ii. ch. iii.). M 'Cosh's Intuitions, pp. 252-357; Calder wood's Handbook of Moral Philosophy, Psychol., ch. iii. p. 30 ; Laurie's Ethica ; Martineau's Idiopsychological Ethics, Types of Ethical Theory, vol. ii. Martineau presents his practical formula thus : — " Every action is right which in presence of a lower principle follows a higher : every action is wrong which in presence of a higher principle follows a lower " (ii. 250). The Hegelian Dialectic reaches the Ethical in the evolution of personality or self-realisation, its maxim wearing this form, "Be a Person" (Hegel's Philosopkie des Beckts, § 36). "The most general expression for the end in itself; the ultimate practical ' Why ' we find in the words self-realisation " (Brad- ley's Ethical Studies, p. 59). " The idea of the absolutely desirable is identical with man's consciousness of himself as an end to himself." It is a " forecast of a well-being that shall consist in the complete fulfilment of himself" (Green's Proleg. to Ethics, p. 210). REDINTEGRATION (Law of) (re-integro) reconstruc- tion. " Parts of any total thought recalled into consciousness are apt to suggest the parts to which they were proximately related " (Hamilton's Beid, p. 897). This is a summary state- ment of the Laws of Association (q.v.). REDUCTION. — The first figure of syllogism is called perfect; because — (1) it proceeds directly on the Dictum de omni, &c, and (2) it arranges the terms in the most natural order. All arguments, though stated originally in any of the other Figures, may be, in one way or other, brought into some one of the four moods in the first figure : and a syllogism is, in that case, said to be reduced (i.e., to the First Figure) Reduction is of two kinds — (1) Direct or ostensive, which con- sists in bringing the premisses of the original syllogism to a corresponding mood in the First Figure, by transposition or conversion of the premisses, and from the premisses thus changed deducing either the original conclusion, or one from which it follows by conversion. (2) Indirect, or reductio per impossible or ad absurdum, by which we prove (in the First 344 VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHT. Figure) not directly that the original conclusion is true, but that it cannot be false; i.e., that an absurdity would follow from the supposition of its being false. All the possible moods are capable of direct reduction except two, Baroko and Bohardo. Directions for the Keduction of the various moods are con- tained in the Mnemonic verses, Barbara Celarent, &c, to be found in all logical text-books. One of the advantages, according to Hamilton, of the Quantification of the Predicate (q.v.), would be the abolition of the distinctions of Figure, and hence of the necessity of Reduction. REFLECTION (re-fiecto, to bend back). — (1) Attention directed upon the facts of personal experience — contrasted with external observation (q.v.); (2) in a wider sense, thought or the reasoning process, whatever its object. According to Locke, Sensation and Reflection are the sources of all our know- ledge. "By reflection I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them ; by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding " (Locke, Essay, bk. ii. ch. i. sec. 4). Locke's use of the term is that followed by most philosophical writers, e.g., Reid, Intellectual Powers, essay i. ch. ii. ; also ch. v., and essay vi. He gives a more extensive (but looser) signifi- cation to reflection {Intellectual Powers, essay iii. ch. v.). Locke also calls reflection internal sense (bk. ii. ch. i. sec. 4), and in this he is followed by Kant, who opposes the inner sense, whose form is time, to the " outer sense," whose form is space. The object of this " inner sense " is the phenomenal or empirical Ego, i.e., the Self is manifested, under the form of Time, in the constantly varying " states of consciousness." This Kant distinguishes carefully from the Transcendental Ego, the uni- versal Subject, which makes the empirical Ego, equally with all other objects of experience, possible. It is by the confusion of these two that the pretended science of Rational Psychology has arisen, that of Empirical Psychology being alone legiti- mate. VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 345 REFLEX ACTION. — Muscular activity, resulting directly from an impression made upon the sensitive organism, — the motor nerves being excited by sudden impression upon the nerves of sensation. Technically, action of subordinate divi- sions of the sensory system, -without consciousness, — the move- ment being effected through a subordinate nerve-centre, named " excito-motor " in contrast with "sensori motor," which implies consciousness of the impression (Carpenter's Mental Physiology, 7th ed., p. 507). REFLEX SENSE. — Hutcheson's name for a mental power, analogous to the senses, by which we have a perception of truth concerning relations. Its exercise is an act of percep- tion, but it depends upon the understanding for its materials. He regards conscience as a Reflex Sense {Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue). REGULATIVE (German, Regulativ).— Kant's designation for conditions of intelligence not in themselves tests of objective truth, or constitutive of objects. " Eegulative " thus stands in contrast with " Constitutive." The first application of this distinction is connected with some of the postulates of empirical thought, namely, classes iii. and iv. of the categories or pure conceptions of the understand- ing. He divides the table of the categories into two — (1) Mathematical, Quantity and Quality, which relate to " objects of intuition," and (2) Dynamical, Relation and Modality, which relate to " the existence of objects either in relation to one another, or to the understanding." This second division Kant regards as regulative, — affording "analogies of experience,'' and "postulates of empirical thought." While the two former, — Quantity and Quality, — are constitutive of objects. The case is different with those principles which bring under a priori rules the existence of objects. For here, existence being in- capable of a priori construction, the propositions concerned will only refer to relation of existence, and consequently will avail to contribute only regulative principles. In this case, therefore, there will be no question of either axioms or anticipa- tions (Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, pp. 67, 134, 407 j Stirling's Text-Booh to Kant, pp. 197, 285). 346 VOCABULAKY OF PHILOSOPHY. The second application of the term is connected with the Ideas,— God, the Soul, and the World. " Pure reason never relates immediately to objects, but to the conceptions of these contained in the understanding An objective deduc- tion, such as we were able to present in the case of the categories, is impossible as regards these transcendental ideas. For they have in truth no relation to any object in experience, for the very reason that they are only ideas " (Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, pp. 233-4). "I maintain that transcendental ideas can never be employed as constitutive ideas, that they cannot be conceptions of objects But on the other hand, they are capable of an admirable and indispensably necessary application to objects, — as regulative ideas, directing the understanding to a certain aim, the guiding lines towards which all its laws proceed, and in which they all meet in one point. This point, though a mere idea {focus imaginarius), that is, not a point from which the conceptions of the understanding do really proceed, for it lies beyond the sphere of possible experience — serves notwithstanding to give to these the greatest possible unity combined with the greatest possible extension " (ib., p. 395). RELATION (re-fero, relatum, to bear back). — "When the mind so considers one thing that it does as it were bring it to and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other, this is, as the words import, relation and respect ; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it, are what we call relatives; and the things so brought together, related" (Locke, Essay, bk. ii. ch. xxv. sec. 1). "Any sort of connection which is perceived or imagined between two or more things ; or any comparison which is made by the mind, is a relation." Eelative is thus opposed to absolute, in the sense of independent existence (Taylor, Elements of Thought). "Another way," says Eeid (Intellectual Powers, essay vi. ch. i.), " in which we get the notion of relations (which seems not to have occurred to Locke), is when, by attention to one of VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. 347 the related objects, we perceive or judge that it must, from its nature, have a certain relation to something else, which before, perhaps, we never thought of; and thus our attention to one of the related objects produces the notion of a correlate, and of a certain relation between them " (see also. Keid's Inquiry, ch. i. sec. 7). Although relations are modes of viewing things, our ideas of relation are not vague nor arbitrary, but are determined by the known qualities of the related objects. In the view of Kant, the Relative is the very essence of knowledge, the condition of truth, for it is only as objects are constituted by the forms of the understanding that know- ledge is possessed. In the view of Hegel, the Relative be- comes the true manifestation of Being, the orderly movement of the categories, involving relation, combination, and evolu- tion, giving reality "itself (cf., Green's insistence on Relation as the essential nature of Reality, in Prolegomena to Ethics, pt. i. ; see also Bosanquet, Knowledge and Reality). RELATIVITY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE— (1) In most general and commonly accepted form, the doctrine that the nature and extent of our knowledge is determined not merely by the qualities of the objects known, but neces- sarily by the conditions of our cognitive powers. In knowing, we know the thing as related to our faculties and capacities ; (2) that we do not know the thing, but only impressions made on our sensibility ; that is, sensations awakened in us, and attendant feelings belonging to us. This leaves it debatable whether there are things or only ideas ; and whether sensa- tions are dependent on impressions from without, in some sense expressing the external (3) That the mind, in the exercise of rational activity, and by application of its " forms " to the intuitions of the sensory, constitutes the objects of know- ledge, from which it follows that we know only phenomena, not noumena, — that " the thing in itself" cannot be known. In its first form the doctrine is the postulate of all philo- sophy, — the implication in every theory of knowledge. In its second form, there are included the antagonistic schemes of idealism and sensationalism. In its third form, we have the 348 VOCABULAEY OF PHILOSOPHY. theory of Kant, in some respects analagous to the second, but giving a different view of the mind's activity, and attributing a different sense to the "object" of knowledge. We have the first formal expression of Kelativity in the Maxim of Protagoras, that "man is the measure of the universe," showing its influence in the later thought of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics {Diog. Laert, bk. ix. p. 51), where the formula of Protagoras is given thus : — ic6vrw )(prjfJLa.TOiv [nerpov avOpumos rusv phi ovruiv s eori, rStv 8e ovk ovroiv