M84 
 1853 
 
 : .. :■ --,.'■; -;''■.'■ 
 
The Anthon Libi\ary. 
 
 < i » i » 
 
 COLLECTED BY CHARLES ANTHON, 
 
 Professor of Greek and Latin in 
 Columbia College* 
 
 Pwchased by Cornell University, 1868. 
 
BT111 .M C 8 4 e i853 VerS,,y "^ 
 
 Investigatiori o| the Tririity of Plato an 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 029 373 671 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029373671 
 
AN 
 
 INVESTIGATION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 TRINITY OF PLATO 
 
 AND OF 
 
 PHILO JUDvEUS. 
 
Be'Xrioy tffws eiriarKe\j/a(TdaL t Kal dtawoprjaai, tus XeytTai, Kaiirep 
 
 'TrpocrdvTovs tjjs TOtavTTjv yevofievij'S ^ijTtfcreu**, ita t^ ipikovs ai/8pa$ 
 
 tlvayayelv Ta eMij. delete 3' av ?o-ws (34\tiov eli/ai, «ai 3eii/ ctt! 
 
 <ro)rr}pia ye Ttjs d\?j0e/as, /cat to olKeia dvaipeiv, aXXus tc /cat 
 
 <t>i\o<r6(povs ovtos • d/x(poTp yap ovtoiv (piKoiv, oaiov irpoTtfiqv ti}v 
 
 dXijdeiav. 
 
 Abistot. Ethic. Nicom. Lib. i. Cap. iv. 
 
AN INVESTIGATION 
 
 OB THE 
 
 TKINITY OF PLATO 
 
 AND OF 
 
 PHILO JUDilUS 
 
 AND OF THE EFFECTS WHICH AN ATTACHMENT TO THEIE WRITINGS 
 
 HAD UPON THE PRINCIPLES AND REASONINGS OF THE 
 
 FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 
 
 By CAESAR MORGAN, D.D. 
 
 CHAPLAIN TO THE LORD BISHOP OF ELY 
 
 (SMUT) for tge jSgnDta of tije 2Sm&«:ssitg #«s« 
 
 CAMBRIDGE 
 LONDON JOHN W. PARKER WEST STRAND 
 
CORNEL! 
 
atrtjerttseuunt to tije present ©Uftton. 
 
 Cesar Morgan, the Author of the following work, 
 was educated at the Grammar School of Haverford- 
 west, and at Chrisfs College, Cambridge, where he was 
 admitted a scholar in the year 1769. He took the 
 degree of B.A. in 1773, that of M.A. in 1776, and 
 that of D.D. in 1793. In the year 1775 he was 
 elected to a Fellowship of his College, which he vacated 
 by marriage in VT1Q, the year in which his tutor, 
 Archdeacon Paley, ceased to be a member of that 
 Foundation. 
 
 He subsequently became Chaplain to Bishop Yorke, 
 by whom he was presented to the Vicarage of Littleport 
 and to a stall in the Church of Ely in 1804, having 
 been previously a minor canon in the same Cathedral. 
 
 In 1785 Mr Morgan obtained the honorary prise 
 given by Teyler's Theological Society at Haarlem 
 for an essay, of which the following is the title, A 
 demonstration that true philosophy has no tendency to 
 undermine divine revelation, and that a 'well-grounded 
 philosopher may be a true Christian*. The essay was 
 originally printed at Haarlem in 1786, subsequently 
 at the Cambridge University Press in 1787. In 1795 
 Dr Morgan published his 'Investigation of the Trinity 
 
 * See note, page 164. 
 
 a3 
 
VI 
 
 of Plato and of Philo Judaeus, etc.' a treatise which 
 
 probably attracted much attention at the time of its 
 
 publication: but is now very little known, although 
 
 it forms a most valuable, indeed necessary, supplement 
 
 to the writings of Bull, Allix and Horsley on the same 
 
 subject. The republication of the work will, it is hoped, 
 
 procure for it a wider circulation than it has hitherto 
 
 found. 
 
 The present edition has been carefully revised, 
 
 the references of the quotations have been verified and 
 
 completed, {all additional matter being enclosed between 
 
 brackets), and a synoptical Table of Contents has been 
 
 prefixed. The paging of the original Edition is noted 
 
 in the margin. 
 
 H. A. HOLDEN. 
 Trinity College, 
 
 1853, February g. 
 
TO 
 THE HONOURABLE AND RIGHT REVEREND 
 
 JAMES, 
 
 LORD BISHOP OF ELY. 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 The work which I have now the honour 
 
 of addressing to your Lordship, though begun, and in a 
 
 great measure executed, under the pressure of bodily 
 
 infirmity and amidst numerous daily avocations, has 
 
 been often carefully reviewed by me at leisure. For 
 
 this leisure, I am proud thus publicly to acknowledge 
 
 that I am indebted solely to your Lordship's unsolicited 
 
 patronage. It has been sometimes a subject of debate 
 
 among nice observers of human nature, whether a 
 
 relaxation from business and an encrease of income 
 
 bring with them those means of real enjoyment, which 
 
 men fondly expect from them. But of this there can 
 
 be no doubt, that it is a great consolation to the weary 
 
 spirit not to be obliged to toil when the strength faileth. 
 
 Whatever, therefore, shall be my future designation in 
 
 this life ; 
 
 Seu me tranquilla senectus 
 Expectat; seu mors atris circumvolat alis; 
 Dives, inops, Eomse, seu sors ita jusserit, exul ; 
 Quisquis erit vitse color; 
 
vm Dedication. 
 
 As long as I support this 'frail and feverish being;' 
 I shall ever retain the warmest sense of the favours 
 conferred upon, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship's 
 
 Most grateful and devoted 
 
 Servant and Chaplain, 
 
 CiESAR MORGAN. 
 
SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Introduction. Value of acquaintance with the writings of ancient 
 philosophers, particularly those of Plato: his acquaintance 
 with the doctrine of the Trinity of persons in the Divine 
 nature, heretofore not doubted : passage in the Philebus mis- 
 construed by Cudworth: doctrines of Plato generally mis- 
 apprehended by the Fathers of the Christian Church : hence 
 necessity for original examination of his writings: Ammo- 
 nius, Plotinus, Cudworth, Le Clerc: "plan pursued by the 
 Author : anecdote : Mosheim differs from Cudworth in his 
 interpretation of Plato p. i 
 
 Plato's Epinomis, passage in examined and meaning of the word 
 Xrfyos deduced: doctrine of the Dialogue, what p. 1 
 
 The Parmenides, difficulty of, arising from its being so abstracted : 
 variety of opinions about, Serranus, Le Clerc : Cudworth 
 follows Plotinus : peculiarity of the Dialogue in relation to 
 Socrates: examination of it: subject of the debate: illustrated 
 from the Philebus: from the Republic, Book v: Aristotle's 
 exception to the reasoning of Melissus and Parmenides ... p. 8 
 
 Plato's Doctrine of Ideas: Aristotle's doctrine on the same : division 
 of knowledge into two kinds in the Philebus p. 23 
 
 Determination of the meaning of -n) dyaSSv in Plato : mistake of 
 Plotinus, Cudworth : the question concerning the greatest 
 good considered of the highest importance by all sects of 
 heathen philosophers : Cicero : Socrates, his exposition of it 
 in Plato, in Xenophon : Aristotle's conclusion that there is not 
 a common good, directed against Plato's theory : Td dyadov 
 never intended by Plato to express a person p. 27 
 
 The Philebus: misinterpretation of passage in (i/ous eo-xi yeuouo-Tijs 
 tou iravTuv aWiov) : _ Context of it examined : Platonic doc- 
 
Synopsis of Contents. 
 
 trine, that the soul of man is akin to and derived from the 
 soul of the Universe, supported hy quotations from Cicero 
 and Maximus Tyrius P- 36 
 
 Plato's Epistles P- 43 
 
 The Cratylus — passage in, examined p. 47 
 
 The Timceus — subject of investigated: derived from the Treatise 
 of Timaeus the Locrian, concerning the Soul of the world : 
 meaning of terms employed in : Plato's opinion concerning the 
 Eternity of the world : doctrine of Pythagoras, of the Stoics : 
 hypothesis of Plato's acquaintance with the doctrine of three 
 hypostases in the Divine nature not countenanced by any of 
 the above passages p. 48 
 
 This doctrine not attributed to him by the subsequent philosophers 
 of Greece or Rome p. 61 
 
 Philo Judseus the cause of its being so attributed: conformity 
 between his principles and those of Plato proved against the 
 assertion of Allix : his use of the term Xo'yos 0eTos : design 
 of Philo's writings overlooked by his interpreters: his use 
 
 of KOff/ids i/oijtos : of Xoyoe p. 63 
 
 Allegorical method of interpreting Scripture was derived from 
 Philo: notion that the philosophical principles of Pagan 
 antiquity were directly or indirectly derived from Scripture, 
 common to Jewish and Christian writers of old, e. g. Josephus, 
 Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus : Origen : Philo's al- 
 legorical method in high estimation among the Fathers, 
 Clemens and Theophilus: effect of these two circumstances 
 on the reasonings of the Christians of the second century 
 traced in Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tertullian : 
 error of Praxeas : orthodox writers and heretics of the second 
 century agreed in their original general principles, but 
 differed in their application of them : illustration of this 
 from a passage of Tertullian concerning the system of Va- 
 lentinus : Gnostics, their doctrines said by Irenseus to be 
 primarily derived from the philosophy of Plato : testimony 
 
Synopsis of Contents. xi 
 
 of Clemens Alexandrinus to the same effect: of Plotinus: 
 Gnostic heresies wrongly supposed to owe their origin to 
 the Oriental Philosophy alone : true statement of the case : 
 establishment of the school of Ammonius Saccas at Alex- 
 andria: important effect of on Christianity: frequent en- 
 deavours on the part of Christian writers to make out a 
 conformity between their own profession and heathen tra- 
 dition, not responded to by the Pagan philosophers till this 
 time, when they began to proclaim that there was nothing 
 new in Christianity : Plotinus, his writings : the principal 
 doctrine which he endeavours to prove by abstract reasoning, 
 and to support by Plato's authority, is a Trinity in the 
 Divine nature : quotations from : allegorical mode of inter- 
 preting Pagan mythology assailed by Arnobius : Origen an 
 admirer of Philo's system : heresy of Sabellius, refuted by 
 Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, who was defended by Atha- 
 nasius because the Arians tried to shelter themselves under 
 his authority : controversy between Arius and Alexander to 
 be understood by a reference to the sophisticated doctrines 
 of Philo p. 120 
 
 Conclusion p. 149 
 
LIST OF EDITIONS USED BY THE AUTHOR. 
 
 Athanasius . . . Paris. 1627 
 
 Athenagoras .... Paris. 1636 fo. 
 
 Clemens Alexandrinus . . Paris. 1640 
 
 Cudworth's Intellectual System . London 1673 
 
 Iren^eus Paris. 1639 
 
 Justin Martyr . . . Paris. 1636 
 
 Origenes .... Huet. Roth. 1668 
 
 Origenes contra Celsum. . . Spencer. Cant. 1677 
 
 Philo Jcd2eus .... Tumeb.etHoeschel.Pam.1640 
 
 P la to Serramis, Paris. 1578 
 
 Plotinus. . Basilete 1580 
 
 Tertulliancs .... Pamelius, Paris. 1608 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 A LL the works of God are wonderful in their 
 -*--*- kind and display, in either a minute or stupen- 
 dous manner, the wisdom and benevolence of the 
 Creator. Philosophy, in its several branches, initi- 
 ates men into the great mysteries of the creation, 
 and, by unfolding the principles, upon which it was 
 at first conducted and is still supported, leads us to 
 admire, to reverence, and adore the author of all 
 ii things. It is for this reason the most valuable gift, 
 that by the ordinary course of nature has been 
 bestowed upon man. 
 
 There is nothing in the whole order of exist- 
 ence, upon which the supreme Being has not im- 
 pressed unequivocal marks of himself; and there- 
 fore nothing in nature is so insignificant, or so far 
 removed from us (provided it can be subjected to 
 the notice of our understanding or our senses) that 
 the pontemplation of it will not be highly gratifying 
 to a rational mind, and useful for some of the 
 various purposes of human life. But, as intellectual 
 and moral beings assert an undisputed claim to the 
 first place in the scale of nature, and approach 
 nearest in rank and excellence to the Deity ; the 
 morgan. A 
 
ii Introduction. 
 
 contemplation of the mind itself, the source of that 
 distinction and superiority over other less favoured 
 animals of its powers and defects, and of the best 
 methods of extending the one and correcting the 
 other, must be the most noble, the most exalted, 
 and at the same time the most useful exercise of 
 the human intellect. 
 
 On this account I have ever set a high value 
 upon the knowledge of pagan antiquity, particularly 
 upon an acquaintance with the writings of the phi- 
 losophers of ancient Greece. In them we see the hi 
 human understanding in its natural and unassisted 
 state, putting forth its most vigorous and best 
 directed exertions in the pursuit of truth ; and we 
 may thence learn to set a just value upon that 
 communication of wisdom, so pure, so simple, and 
 so unadorned, which is tendered to us in the 
 Gospel of Christ. 
 
 But, besides this general advantage which at- 
 tends the study of all the philosophic writings of 
 ancient Greece, that have escaped the wreck of 
 time ; the writings of Plato stand eminently dis- 
 tinguished by a privilege almost peculiarly their 
 own. They were for some ages the principal study 
 of the Fathers of the Christian Church ; and the 
 doctrines which I have undertaken particularly to 
 discuss, were, by their fond partiality, in a manner 
 incorporated into the system of Christianity. By a 
 
Introduction. iii 
 
 strange fatality, all sects of religion, however they 
 differed from each other in the conclusions which 
 they deduced from it, agreed in this opinion, that 
 the great and distinguishing doctrines of Christian- 
 ity were to be found in the writings of Plato. 
 Nor is that opinion abandoned by the generality of 
 iv the Christians of the present day, who recur to the 
 writings of the early defenders of our faith, for a 
 knowledge of the doctrines maintained by the 
 Church in those primitive times. 
 
 The course of my own reading had led me to 
 adopt the commonly received opinion, that Plato 
 had some knowledge of the profound and mystical 
 doctrine of the Trinity. I was the less inclined to 
 question the truth of this opinion, as it was almost 
 the only one in which the controversialists of the 
 present day were generally agreed. When, there- 
 fore, I was excited to enter into a minute examina- 
 tion of this subject, my original object was not to 
 ascertain the truth of the opinion, that Plato was 
 acquainted with the doctrine of the Trinity of per- 
 sons in the divine nature. Of this I entertained 
 no doubt. But I wished to know by what autho- 
 rity, or by what train of reasoning, he was led to 
 embrace this doctrine ; by what arguments he sup- 
 ported it ; and in what sense he explained it. So 
 far was I from entertaining prejudices in favour of 
 the side of the question, which I have since found 
 
 A2 
 
iv Introduction. 
 
 reason to maintain, that I did not even suspect the 
 possibility of its being true, at the time when I 
 instituted the inquiry. 
 
 When I first read the Philebus, I was much v 
 more disposed to distrust my own understanding, 
 than to believe that Cudworth could possibly have 
 been guilty of so glaring a mistake in the meaning 
 [Plato of the passage, on vovs eari yevovcrrt/s rod iravroiv 
 
 E] alriou. I read over the passage many times, and 
 
 considered it with the most intense exertion of 
 thought ; nor could I prevail upon myself to adopt 
 my own interpretation of it, till I was clearly con- 
 vinced by repeated examinations, that it could not 
 admit of any other. 
 
 When I discovered that the doctrine could derive 
 no countenance from this passage, I still supposed 
 that I should find it clearly proved in others. But 
 the same disappointment still attended me in my 
 inquiries. The farther I proceeded, the more I was 
 persuaded, that the abstract doctrines of Plato are 
 at present but little understood : that false notions 
 of them were gradually introduced among the early 
 Fathers of the Christian Church, in a great mea- 
 sure by mistaken interpretations of the writings of 
 Philo Judjeus : and that those erroneous opinions 
 were extended and formed into a system by Ammo- 
 ttius Saccas. The most essential parts of this sys-: vi 
 tem have, by the authority of him and his immedi- 
 
Introduction. 
 
 ate followers, been almost implicitly embraced ever 
 since. 
 
 It may perhaps be thought a proof of great 
 presumption, to undertake to oppose the concur- 
 rent voice of the best and wisest men for so many 
 ages. But when it is recolleted, how many errors 
 of antiquity have been confuted since the revival of 
 literature and the introduction of sound philosophy 
 into this kingdom, some will, I trust, be disposed 
 to pay a candid and unprejudiced attention to the 
 reasonings which. I shall produce in the following 
 Treatise, and will pass an impartial sentence, ac- 
 cording as they shall be influenced by the prepon- 
 derating evidence. 
 
 The writings of the Fathers abound with many 
 fanciful and mystical interpretations of the Holy 
 Scriptures themselves, which the sober criticism of 
 the present age would hardly be prevailed upon to 
 admit. If, therefore, we submit not implicitly to 
 their authority in matters which fell more regularly 
 within their province ; why should we think them 
 infallible upon subjects which were more remote 
 vii from their immediate department, and more ob- 
 scure and abstracted in their own nature ? 
 
 To urge in their favour that they lived nearer 
 the time of Plato than we do, by many hundred 
 years, is a mere fallacy. They were too far re- 
 moved from him to derive any authority from that 
 
vi Introduction. 
 
 presumption. Even at their time and in their cir- 
 cumstances, the best and only satisfactory method 
 of arriving at a correct knowledge of the opinions 
 of Plato, was by a careful perusal of those writings 
 in which they are maintained. 
 
 This source is open to us as well as to them. 
 To those writings I appeal, and shall endeavour to 
 extract their genuine sense by a careful attention 
 to the context, to the chain of argument which the 
 author is carrying on, and to the point which he is 
 endeavouring to establish. If any ambiguities still 
 remain, I shall endeavour to clear them up by 
 recurring to other dialogues of the same author, 
 where the same terms are used, the same topics 
 explained, and the same arguments enforced in a 
 more simple or more perspicuous manner. This 
 I have ever considered as the most certain and 
 only rational method of arriving at the genuine viii 
 meaning of any author, sacred or profane. 
 
 I shall produce in support of many of my inter- 
 pretations, pointed, and, as I think, decisive pas- 
 sages from other ancient authors. I do not know 
 that my general doctrine is in one instance 
 contradicted by the testimony or reasoning of 
 any pagan writer, from the time of Plato to the 
 latter end of the second, or the beginning of the 
 third century of the Christian sera, when the Lec- 
 tures of Ammonius, and the writings of his scholar 
 
Introduction. vii 
 
 Plotinus, gave a new turn to the heathen philoso- 
 phy. The sages who lived in the intermediate 
 time, however distinguished they may have been 
 by their genius and industry, and how much soever 
 they may have reverenced and imitated Plato, had 
 not sagacity enough to make those discoveries 
 which were reserved for the sophists of Alexandria. 
 They, in the decline of all other branches of learn- 
 ing, were able to explore the dark recesses of the 
 Platonic philosophy, and to point out in it, and 
 develope mysterious doctrines, which had escaped 
 the penetration of Greece and Eome, when they 
 ix were supposed to have cultivated philosophy and 
 the arts with the greatest celebrity and success. 
 
 In the course of my inquiry, I shall be under 
 the necessity of differing very widely from Dr Cud- 
 worth, whose authority is deservedly held to be of 
 the greatest weight in all speculations of this kind, 
 when there is nothing but man's authority to which 
 we can appeal. But when the case is capable of 
 being examined and determined by legitimate rea- 
 soning, that decision is superior to all human au- 
 thority. At a time when these kingdoms were 
 distracted by contending parties in Church and 
 State, Dr Cudwokth must have been closely em- 
 ployed in laying up that fund of knowledge, from 
 which he afterwards so copiously drew his materials, 
 while he was composing his True Intellectual System 
 
viii Introduction. 
 
 of the Universe. In that work he has repelled the 
 assaults of Atheism, and defended the principles 
 of natural religion with astonishing skill and erudi- 
 tion. But, by resigning himself too implicitly to 
 the guidance of Plotinds and Proclus, he has given 
 his sanction to opinions, which in earlier times em- 
 barrassed the reasonings of the orthodox, and dif- 
 fused a specious air of consistency over the doc- x 
 trines of heretics. 
 
 While I detect a few inadvertencies in the wri- 
 tings of this great man, which are the more dan- 
 gerous on account of his general excellencies, I 
 never for a moment forget, or cease to reverence, 
 his superior attainments ; and I always rejoice that 
 his destination in life was conformable to his fa- 
 vourite pursuits, which is almost the consummation 
 of the earthly happiness of a literary man. For, 
 next to his intellectual endowments, it was the 
 peculiar felicity and distinguishing honour of Cud- 
 worth, to be placed at the head of a great literary 
 society*, at a time when it was highly renowned 
 for having recently produced Mede and Milton, 
 both eminent for their various learning, and the 
 one as profound a Divine, the other as sublime a 
 Poet, as the world ever saw. 
 
 * Fuller, in his History of the University of Cambridge, 
 which was published in the early part of the mastership of 
 Dr Cudworth, speaks of Christ College in the following terms • 
 
Introduction. ix 
 
 xi I conceive that what I have said about differing 
 in opinion from Cudworth will justify me in not 
 submitting implicitly to the authority of Le Clerc, 
 and other ingenious men, whose names are, with 
 the greatest reason, in the highest esteem, and 
 whose learning, abilities, and laborious exertions, 
 have contributed much to the support, illustration, 
 and advancement of rational religion and genuine 
 Christianity. 
 
 When a train of reasoning appears to any mind 
 to be founded upon solid and incontrovertible prin- 
 ciples: when each succeeding step of the argument 
 is apprehended to arise necessarily out of that which 
 preceded it, and the conclusion seems to be a clear 
 and satisfactory deduction from the whole; I do 
 not see what room there can be for the interposi- 
 tion of any human authority. While the mind is 
 so circumstanced, it cannot submit to the authority 
 without renouncing its reason. However modest a 
 man possessed of such a mind may be ; however 
 diffident of his own powers ; how much soever he 
 may be disposed to submit to the opinions of others 
 upon proper occasions ; he cannot, in this instance, 
 xii listen to the voice of authority, till he shall be con- 
 
 ' It may without flattery be said of this house, Many daugh* 
 ters have done virtuously, but thou excellest them all ; if we con- 
 sider the many divines, who in so short a time hare here had 
 their education,' p. 91. 
 
 A5 
 
Introduction. 
 
 vinced that his principles are uncertain, or his de- 
 ductions fallacious. Nor is he unreasonable in re- 
 questing those who undertake to accompany him in 
 the investigation, to confine their attention entirely 
 to those essential points which exclude the consi- 
 deration of all foreign and adventitious circum- 
 stances, till they are invalidated. 
 
 When I seriously entertained the thought of 
 laying my sentiments before the public, I was im- 
 pressed with so strong a sense of the dignity of the 
 subject, that I thought myself bound in duty to 
 lay by the produce of my labours till the warmth of 
 inquiry had subsided : to review it repeatedly at 
 distant intervals : and to peruse, with the strictest 
 attention, what had been advanced by others that 
 seemed to bear any relation to the subject. 
 
 It would have been a much more easy task to 
 me to have been diffuse, and seemingly more ela- 
 borate, in exhibiting as well my own opinions as 
 those of others. But I have taken some pains to 
 be as brief in my expositions as was consistent with 
 order and perspicuity. 
 
 It would answer no useful purpose to combat xiii 
 all the systems which appear to me to be erroneous; 
 or to invalidate the many arguments that may seem 
 to bear some weight against the opinions which I 
 have advanced. I thought it would best answer 
 the purpose that I had in view if I confined myself 
 
Introduction. xi 
 
 chiefly to a simple exposition of the genuine mean- 
 ing of the passages which are usually produced in 
 defence of the opposite doctrine, and of the prin- 
 cipal reasons that induced me to adopt the inter- 
 pretation which I have exhibited. 
 
 I therefore request that no reader will, from a 
 slight and superficial view of the subject, and under 
 the influence of a few popular positions and obvious 
 objections, hastily condemn, in a summary manner, 
 what I have here laid down ; but will give me cre- 
 dit for having bestowed much consideration upon 
 the arguments usually advanced on the other side 
 of the question, and for having satisfied myself after 
 deep reflection, of the insufficiency of them to main- 
 tain the cause, for the support of which they were 
 produced. 
 
 To induce him the more readily to grant me 
 xiv this indulgence, I will take the liberty of reciting 
 to him a well-authenticated story. "When the pre- 
 sent authorized translation of the Old and New 
 Testament came out under the auspices of King 
 James, that great work did not escape critical cen- 
 sures. It happened that one of the translators, 
 soon after the completion of that arduous under- 
 taking, made a visit to a friend in a part of the 
 country where he was not generally known. On 
 the Sunday he accompanied his friend to the parish 
 church, where the officiating clergyman, in the 
 
xii Introduction. 
 
 course of his sermon took an opportunity of depre- 
 ciating the new translation in general terms, and in 
 particular assigned five reasons why a certain pas- 
 sage ought to have been differently translated. As 
 the preacher dined that day with the gentleman, 
 the translator did not omit to advert in private to 
 the discourse that had been publicly delivered. 
 Among other things, quae dicenda forent, he told the 
 preacher that those five reasons which he so pom- 
 pously displayed in the pulpit had been all consi- 
 dered and deliberately weighed by the translators 5 
 but that thirteen more forcible reasons had con- 
 strained them to render the passage in the manner 
 in which it stood in the present translation. 
 
 I am not insensible to the great weight of op^ xv 
 posing authorities. I have, however, the satisfac- 
 tion to find that I do not stand quite alone in many 
 of my opinions. The very learned and judicious 
 Mosheim has taken frequent opportunities of con- 
 demning the subtilties of the later Platonists. 
 
 Ei [lev 817 erapov ye KeXeiere p.' avrbu e\e<T0ai, 
 H&s av eirur 'Obvarjos iym 6eloto \a8oip.rjv, 
 Ov irepi (lev 7rp6<ppav Kpabttj Kal 6vp.bs ayqvap 
 '%v TtcuiTt a-tn tt6voi<ti, (pi\ei Se e IlaXXar 'Adrjinj ; 
 
 In those valuable notes which accompany his ' 
 Latin Version of Ccdworth he often expresses his 
 dissent from his author's interpretations of Plato 
 and Philo ; though the nature and extent of his 
 
Introduction. xiii 
 
 undertaking did not require that he should always 
 enter into a minute examination of the precise 
 meaning of the passages in question *. 
 cvi In my investigation of the opinions of the Fa- 
 thers of the Christian Church, I acted exactly in 
 the same manner as I did when I examined the 
 writings of Plato and Philo, as far as concerned 
 the doctrines which they taught, and the meaning 
 of the passages in which those doctrines were ex- 
 pressed. When they quoted the writings of other 
 authors, whether sacred or profane, in defence of 
 their tenets, I took the same liberty with them 
 which I have always thought myself not only author- 
 ized, but bound to take in matters of such high im- 
 port with every other uninspired writer. I exam- 
 ined with all possible care and attention the fidelity 
 and accuracy of the quotation, the justness of the 
 exposition, and the force of the application and 
 deduction. If I seemed to myself to detect errors 
 in any of those particulars, the respect which I en- 
 tertained for the venerable authors on account of 
 their industry, learning, and piety, did not suffer 
 me to judge of them lightly or rashly. No fondness 
 for novelty, no pleasure in discovering the defects 
 
 * Nimis mihi longa, eaque huic institute) parum conducens 
 ingredienda esset disputatio, si totam explicare vellem et ex- 
 planare Platonis augumentationeni. — Mosheim. Observ. ad Pag. 
 627. Tom. i. 
 
xiv Introduction. 
 
 of others influenced my judgment. Genuine truth 
 was the only object of my inquiry ; and indeed I 
 was conscious that nothing but truth could bear mexvii 
 up against such great, such long-established, and 
 such accumulated authority. 
 
 When I endeavoured, with all the candour that 
 I was capable of exercising, to trace their errors 
 and false reasonings to their source, I thought I 
 saw them originate from an ardent zeal for the 
 advancement of the great cause which they had 
 undertaken, the cause of God and of his Christ* 
 This led them, without due consideration, to em- 
 brace the opinion that the doctrine of a Trinity of 
 Persons in the Divine Nature is taught in the writ- 
 ings of Plato and Philo Judjeus ; an opinion, ac- 
 cording to my conception, so remote from the truth, 
 that nothing but error can be founded upon it. 
 With an examination of this opinion, I shall begin 
 the investigation. 
 
EPINOMIS. 
 
 THE following passage in the Epinomis is sup- [p. 986. oj 
 posed by 'some to establish Plato's belief of 
 the creation of the world by the Logos, the second 
 person of the Holy Trinity: ^vvairoTekwv Koafiov, 
 ov era^e \oyos o iravrwv OeioTa-ros opaTov. 
 
 Before the design and general reasoning of 
 the Dialogue be considered, it will be proper to 
 observe, that a strong tincture of Pythagorean 
 principles is conspicuous in many of the Dialogues 
 of Plato, but in none more than in the Dialogue 
 now under contemplation. 
 
 The Epinomis is to be understood to be a 
 continuation of the dialogue Hepl NofxoOea'ias, and 
 is carried on by the same characters. This cir- 
 3 cumstance, as well as the subject of their future 
 inquiry, is stated very clearly by Clineas 2 in the 
 beginning. The Athenian, who undertook to dis- 
 cuss the subject, having touched upon the neces- 
 sary, the ornamental, and the useful arts, con- 
 cludes, that the knowledge of none of them will 
 
 1 Vide Clerioi Epist. Critic, vn. p. 241. Amst. 1700, and 
 Bruckeri Hist. Crit. Philosoph. Pars II. Lib. ii. cap. 6, § 1, 
 p. 692. 
 
 2 Ta p?v yap SWa, ws (pa/iev, airavra Sie£ijX0o/iev, Sera rjv irepi 
 VOfiaiv 6e<riv o Se peyitrrov evpelv re Ka\ ei7reiv, tl ttote [ladtav 
 BvrjTOS avSpaiTros irocpos av eir), tovto ovtc emofiev, ovre cvpop.(i>. 
 vvv &e ireipa>p.e8a toOto fir) KaTakiireiv. [p. 973. A,B.] 
 
EPINOMIS. 
 
 intitle any one to the name of a wise man. He 
 then proceeds to inquire, what knowledge that is, 
 the want of which would render man the most 
 irrational of animals. This, he says, is the know- 
 ledge of number, which he considers as the gift of 
 some god to man. For it would be absurd to sup- 
 pose, that the author of all other good things 
 to us should not be the author of the greatest 
 also, which is Wisdom. Without the knowledge 
 of number a man cannot have reason (X070S 3 ;) if 
 he were destitute of sound reason, he would not be 
 wise, if he should not attain wisdom, which is a 3 
 very considerable ingredient in all virtue, he would: 
 not be completely good or happy. 
 
 The God, that gave number, is the heaven, 
 who taught men the first principles of numera- 
 
 3 Srepd/ieros Se diKridovs Xdyov, aoKpos ovk av JTOTe •yevoiTO" 
 otio Bi aocpia pr] irpcxreir), jrdo-rjs aperfjs to piyiarov pipos, ovk 
 av ere reXeW dyaBbs yevopsvoS) evba.Lp.atv Trore yevoiTO' ovrats 
 dptBpbv piv dvdynri irao-a viroTl8eo-8ai.. [p. 977 D.] This doctrine 
 is similar to what he says in his Republic, (Lib. vii. p. 522.) to 
 ee re Kal ra Svo Kal ra Tpla ftiayiyvdo-Kew. Ae'yo) 8e avrb cor iv 
 K£<pa\ala dpidpov re Kal \oyto-pov rj ov% ovrat 7repl tovtoiv e^et, 
 cbs ndo-a re^vr) re Kal iivio-Trjpr] aVayKaferat avrfov piroxps yiyve- 1 
 o-6ai ; and in the Philebus : Hao-wv nov re^vcof av r« dpiBprjTiKrlv 
 Xmpi^a, Kai pcTprjTiKfjv, Kal aTariKijv, toy eiros elirelv, (pavkov to 
 KaTaketTroptvov eKdorrjs av yiyvoiro. [p. 55 E.] 
 
 4 The same method of instructing men in number is like- , 
 wise mentioned in the Timceus, p. 39 [b] : "HXiov- iva on pd- 
 Accrra els airavra (palvot tov ovpavov, perda-^ot re dpidpov to. £ata, 
 oo-ois tjv irpoo-fJKOv, padovra napd rrjs ravrov Kai opoiov nepKpopas. 
 Philp also, adopting the same doctrine, says, the stars were 
 placed in heaven to answer many purposes — rioXXcov xfyw — 'U 
 
 ijpepZv, prjvZv, fViavTwv, a 817 Kal pirpa yiyovc eidvs re ro ypn- 
 
 o-ipmrarov, f] dpidpov (pirns eSei^3r], xpdvov napatpjvavTos airr/v 
 eVc yap pias fjpepas ro h, Kal eVe 811011/ ra bio, Kal ck rptav ra rota.' 
 Hfpl Koo-powouas : pag. 11, 12. 
 
EPINOMIS. 
 
 tion by the 4 succession of day and night, the varia- 
 tions of the moon, &c. He likewise taught them, 
 what is more important, the mutual 5 relations and 
 proportions of number by the arrangement of the 
 seasons and the elements, which renders the earth 
 fertile and productive. 
 
 Pie then considered the heavenly bodies, and 
 asserted them to be 6 animated, and endued with 
 4 perfect wisdom, on account of the regularity and 
 constancy of their motions, so different from those 
 of men. Know, says he, that there are round the [p. sm. a.j 
 whole heaven eight powers, akin to each other (eioVX- 
 (prh dWijXwv) one of the sun, one of the moon, &c. 
 Let not any of us suppose, that some of them are 
 
 8 Upbs aXXijXa navTa. aptSfiou del \oyi£eo-0ai dvepav re Kal 
 
 verav yiyvopevtov ovk e^aio-itav ovde dperptov. [p. 979 A.] 
 
 6 This sentiment is adopted by Philo, He pi Kotrp.tmouas, 
 p. 16. ao-Trep ot darepes' ovtoi yap £ad re elvai Xeyovrai, Kal 
 £aa voepa. Origen, who was an admirer of Philo, is thus ren- 
 dered by his translator Ruffinus in the Procemium to his 
 Treatise Hepl 'Apxtov. "De sole autem et luna et stellis, utrum 
 animantia sint, an exanima, manifeste non traditur.' This, as 
 well as many other opinions of Pythagoras and Plato, appears 
 to have been originally derived from the East. Pococke, in 
 stating Sharestanius's account of the Sabians, who sprung from 
 Chaldea, says, ' it was a tenet of one sect of that religion, that 
 the bodies of the seven planets were the abodes of spiritual 
 beings or intelligences, who possessed them in the same manner, 
 as our bodies are possessed by our souls; and that they are 
 living, rational bodies, animated by intelligences : ' Sacellorum 
 cultores sacella vocant septem planetarum corpora, esse hsec 
 spiritualium seu intelligentiarum habitacula, quae eodem loco 
 illis sunt, quo animabus nostris corpora. Esseque ea corpora 
 viventia, rationalia, ab intelligentiis animata.' Pocock. Specimen 
 Hist. Arab. p. 139. The Indians held this doctrine concerning 
 the fixed stars, and with them agreed the Arabians, ib. and 
 p. 163. Vide Maimon. de Fimd. Leg. p. 33. 
 
EPINOMIS. 
 
 gods, and some not — but let us all say, that they 
 are all brothers and in kindred departments — and 
 let us not assign to one the honour of the year, 
 to another the honour of a month, and to others 
 none of that portion of time, in which each per- 
 forms his course, accomplishing, in conjunction 
 with the others, that visible order which the most 
 divine reason of all established r . Inasmuch as that 
 harmony, which is at present to be illustrated, and j 
 which produces the year and the seasons (by the 
 contemplation and imitation of which a wise man 
 will attain an harmony of soul, the source of per- 
 fect happiness) is not the result of the motions of 
 any of them taken separately, but is the joint 
 effect of all — In the same manner Plato likewise 
 v e iFd v i describes crwcppocrvvri in a state, or public virtue, j 
 comparing it to dp/novia. 
 
 Goodness and happiness, both in this world 
 and the next, are to be attained by first admiring 
 this harmony, and then endeavouring to under- I 
 stand and acquire it in ourselves, as far as is 
 possible for human nature. Thus is made out the 
 importance of the knowledge of number, which 
 was taught men by the heaven. Without the 
 
 1 Uavres 817 navTas \eyap.iv re K ai <f>up.ev abtkfpovs r thai, Kai 
 iv ade\<pah poiptur K ai np.as [office] a)roSjS<S/«K, pij T <a p.h ivtav- 
 t6v, t<3 &= wva, toXs hi /iijre two. fiolpav toittco^v, /xt/tc riva xpo- 
 vov, iv § 8i^ep X erat tov airov ttoXow, £vvairoTe\£v KdV/iov, bv eragt 
 Xdyos 6 iravrav 0€i6raTos 6par6v. 
 
 s This doctrine is likewise adopted by Philo, Uepl Koctjk. 
 p. 17: To 8i, Travroiav 6eapaTav a KaTanX-qKriKaTaras p,iv i"x a 
 ris oia-las, KaTtmXrjKTiKaraTas Si rhs 7i-oioY>,rar, eavp.aa-uordras 8e 
 ras Kivjo-w KaX xopeias, iv rd| fo -«< npp.otrp.ivas Ka \ Aprf^ a 'xa- 
 \oyiats Kai mpdbav av^avims. 'Ev oh faao-i ■njv apxi-rmroj) 
 
EPINOMIS. 
 
 knowledge of number and its proportions there 
 cannot be reason (\6yos), without reason, wisdom, 
 without wisdom an harmony of soul, virtue, and 
 happiness 8 . 
 
 According to this interpretation of the passage 
 5 before us, it does not immediately relate to the 
 creation of the world, nor does it at all express 
 the personality of the Logos. Pythagoras first 
 called the world ko<t[w$, on account of the order 
 and symmetry of its parts. The word is here used 
 in its original signification, and the passage alto- 
 gether means, that the heavenly bodies, by their 
 regular and well-proportioned motions, conjointly 
 produce that beautiful order, which the divine wis- 
 dom marked out. It is to be observed, that the 
 word \oyos, os era^e Koafiov, has not even an article 
 prefixed to it ; which, I conceive, it would have had, 
 if it had been intended to express a person. 
 
 Nothing is more common in all authors, than 
 to attribute effects to qualities in the abstract with- 
 out intending to attribute personality to the qualities 
 themselves, or to signify any thing more of them, 
 than that beings, endued with such qualities, have, 
 by the exertion of them, produced such effects 9 . 
 
 Kai a\q8r) Kai 7rapa5ecyp.aTiKr]V fjLovfTLKrjv ovk av dpAprot rts eivai 
 Aeya>*>* a(j> tjs ol fiera ravra avOpconoi ypayjrdp.epoi rais eavrcou 
 TJrvxdZs, avayKcuoTaTTjv Kai dfa'kip.wTaTTjv Te^vr/v rm /3i'o> TrapeSocrav. 
 
 9 Thus Cicero, Le Legibus, i. 7 : Dasne igitur hoc nobis, Pom- 
 pom (nam Quinti novi sententiam) Deorum immortalium na- 
 tura, ratione, potestate, mente, numine, sive quod est aliud 
 verbum, quo planius significem quod volo, naturam omnem 
 regi? — Id, quod tibi concessi, quorsum pertineat, expecto. — 
 Hue pertinet, animal hoc quem vocamus hominem generatum 
 esse a summo Deo — Solum est — particeps rationis — Quid au- 
 
EPINOMIS. 
 
 In the Dialogue before us, Plato, when hey 
 speaks of the universe merely as a production, 
 ascribes it to soul (\|/-ux>7)> an active and governing 
 
 p. 988. [d.] principle (^pv^rjs o'varis aiTias tov bXov), in opposi- 
 tion to body, which is passive and subject to con- 
 
 p. 983. [d] trol (apxpnevov Kai ava'iTiov iracrijs Tra9>]s). But when 
 he is speaking of the harmony and congruity of 
 the parts of the whole, he assigns it to reason or 
 intelligence, that faculty which is conversant with 
 order and proportion, in opposition to chance or 
 the random tendencies of matter. 
 
 The doctrine maintained in this Dialogue, is 
 essentially the same, as that which has been em- 
 bellished in modern times by the pens of Shaftes- 
 bury and Hutcheson, viz. that virtue is founded in 
 a love of order and proportion. It is a doctrine 8 
 which appears everywhere in the writings of Plato, 
 
 tern est, non dicam in homine, sed in omni coelo atque terra, 
 ratione divinius? Quae cum adolevit, atque perfecta est, no- 
 minatur rite sapientia. Again, ii. 13 : Cum summos Deos esse 
 coneedamus, eorumque mente mundum regi, et eorundem be-, 
 nignitatem hominum consulere generi. And to this same pur- 
 pose in his Dialogues, De Nat. Dear. ii. 38: Quis enim hunc 
 hominem dixerit, qui, cum tarn certos cceli motus, tarn ratos 
 astrorum ordines, tamque inter se omnia connexa et apta vide- 
 rit, neget in his ullam inesse rationem, eaque casu fieri dicat, 
 quae quanto consilio gerantur, nullo consilio adsequi possumus? 
 An cum machinatione quadam moveri aliquid videmus, ut 
 sphEeram, ut horas, ut alia permulta ; non dubitamus, quin ilia 
 opera sint rationis ? Cum autem impetum coeli cum admirabili 
 celeritate moveri vertique videamus, constantissime conficien- 
 tem vicissitudines anniversarias cum summa salute et conser- 
 vatione rerum omnium ; dubitamus, quin ea non solum ratione 
 fiant, sed etiam excellenti divinaque ratione? Xenophori 
 Memorab. i. 4. speaks of Zpya yv<ip,r, s and Zpya irpovolas, which 
 he likewise attributes aorpov tivos b^iaipyov K a\ (piKo&ov t<ty- 
 
EPINOMIS. 
 
 In his Republic 10 , he discourses at large upon the 
 importance and connexion of harmony and rhythm 
 in music, arts, and manners. In the same book 
 Plato compares knowledge, passion or anger, and 
 appetite, to the council or senate, the military, 
 and the artizans, &c. in a state. It is the preroga- 
 tive of knowledge to direct passion, and the duty 
 of passion to aid knowledge in keeping the appe- 
 tites in subjection ; and that harmony, which is the 
 result of their performing each their several func- 
 tions in due order, constitutes the just and perfect 
 state of the mind of man, and, as it were, the 
 health of the soul. Hence he concludes, that as a 
 city, whose members preserve a regular subordina- 
 tion, will flourish more than one that is torn by 
 contending parties ; — and as sound health is better 
 than disease; — so virtue is, on its own account, 
 more desirable than vice. 
 
 1° Tovtcdv eveKa KvpiaTarrj ev povaiKtj TpotpT), on pahiara 
 Karadverat els to ivrbs ttjs ^rv^ris o Te pvSpbs Kai apuovia, kcu 
 eppcofieveo'TaTa airreTat avrrfs, (pepovra rfjv €vo-^jxoo~vvrjv Kai iroiei 
 evo-)(TJpova, idv tis opSSs Tpafpfj — \jcal on av tcov 7rapakei7rop.eva>v 
 Kai prj Kakas drjptovpyTjdevrcov i] fir/ Kakms fpvvrcov 6£vraT av al- 
 adavoLTo'] 6 e«€i rpa<pe\s [cos efiet Kai 6p6Ss 8f] bvo~xepaiva>v] ret pep 
 Ka\a iiraivo'i, Kai ^alpcuv, Kai KaTabexopevos els ttjv \jtV)(Tp> TpecpoiT 
 av an airrav, Kai ylyvotro Kakos T€ KayaOos : Lib m. p. 401 [d].. 
 Again, 'Opas odv on as appovia nvi rj o~a>(ppoavvi] <opola>Tat. IV. p. 
 431 [e]. 
 
PARMENIDES. 
 
 HTHE Parmenides is perhaps one of the most diffi- 9 
 -*- cult of the Dialogues of Plato. The expression 
 and the reasoning are so general and abstracted, 
 particularly in the part where ei>, ev 7roXXa, and ev 
 Kal 71-oXXa are discussed; that it is not easy to 
 determine precisely the meaning of those terms. 
 
 Serranus supposes the one infinite Being and 
 second causes to be the subjects of discussion. 
 Other authors, deservedly of great name, have 
 thought that they have discovered the three per- 
 sons of the ever-blessed Trinity delineated under 
 the articles ev, ev troWa, and ev Kal noWa. Le Clerc, 
 in his Ars Critica, P. 11. S. 1. cxiv, delivers his opi- 
 nion concerning it in the following terms : Primus 
 omnium tria principia constitute Parmenides, et post 
 eum Plato ; qui an consenserint, non satis liquet, quod 
 Parmenidis non supersit prater obscura fragmenta. 
 Plato autem dixit primum esse to ov, o'ltiov airavTwv, 
 ens, causam omnium rerum : secundum vero Xoyov, 
 Rationem et Rectorem prcesentium et futurorum : ter- 10 
 tium denique yj/v^v koct/ulov, animam sive spiritum 
 mundi. 
 
 The passages, referred to in support and illus- 
 tration of this opinion in other parts of Plato's 
 writings, will be considered in their order. I shall 
 at present confine myself to the Parmenides, con- 
 
PABMENIDES. 
 
 cerning the subjects of which Dialogue Cudworth Int <f^f l - 
 had before acceded to the same opinion upon the Seep ■ 646 > &c - 
 authority of Plotinus, as appears from the following 
 extract : " Wherefore Parmenides his whole philoso- 
 phy (saith Plotinus) was better digested, and more 
 exactly and distinctly set down in Plato's Parme- 
 nides, where he acknowledged three Unities subor- 
 dinate, or a Trinity of divine hypostases. Which 
 observation of Plotinus is, by the way, the best 
 key, that we know of, for that obscure book of 
 Plato's Parmenides " The last part of the quo- 
 tation seems to me to imply that he accepted 
 this key, not because he was perfectly satisfied 
 with it, but because he knew of no other so 
 good for unlocking the intricacies of that obscure 
 book. He in fact appears to have considered it 
 as the most plausible hypothesis that had fallen 
 in his way. If, therefore, we can obtain a key 
 from the book itself, which will unlock its intri- 
 cacies in a manner consistent with the subject of 
 the discourse, with the train of reasoning adopted 
 i in it, with the philosophic principles of the charac- 
 ters introduced, and with the manner of their ap- 
 plying those principles ; I am persuaded that every 
 judicious reader will acknowledge such a key to be 
 infinitely more valuable, than any arbitrary hypo- 
 thesis of Plotinus, however specious it may have 
 appeared, before this key was presented to him. 
 
 Before I enter upon the investigation, it will 
 be proper to observe, that Parmenides is the chief 
 speaker of the Dialogue; and that the princi- 
 ples, advanced in it, are the principles of that 
 
io PABMENIDES. 
 
 philosopher, from whom Plato differed in opinion 
 on some particular points, as we are told by Aris- 
 totle. 
 
 Let it be no objection to this observation, that 
 the discourse was held in the presence of Socrates* 
 that he bore a part in the beginning of it, and that 
 he was in a great degree the occasion of the 
 whole. Socrates was the master of Plato ; and 
 the sentiments and reasonings which are assigned 1 
 to him, may in general be safely considered as the 
 sentiments and reasonings of Plato himself. It 
 was likewise the usual custom, and indeed the 
 chief employment of Socrates, to correct what he 
 saw amiss in the practice and opinions of those 
 with whom he conversed ; and, above all, to detect 
 the fallacious principles, and refute the false rea- 
 sonings of the philosophers and sophists of his 
 time. His express approbation, therefore, and his 
 tacit aquiescence, had commonly the same ten : n 
 dency, though perhaps not so often the same 
 force. 
 
 But upon the present occasion, Socrates is 
 represented in a situation, in which he does not 
 often appear in the works of Plato. He is intro- 
 duced in this Dialogue at a time of life when he 
 was not a teacher, but a learner ; when it was 
 customary with him, as he tells us in his Phcedo, to 
 attend the different philosophers of distinguished 
 note ; in order that he might be able, by impartial 
 observation, to discover whose doctrine was most 
 consistent with the reality of things, and of course, 
 under whose guidance, he should put himself in his 
 
PARMENIDES. 
 
 future inquiries. It was not till he despaired of 
 receiving any effectual assistance from others, that 
 he struck out a method of philosophizing pecu- 
 liarly his own. In this Dialogue, therefore, con- 
 trary to what is the case in most others, we must 
 not consider the acquiescence and approbation of 
 Socrates as the same. 
 
 Yet even here Plato appears to treat his mas- 
 ter with exquisite delicacy. He makes him indeed 
 propose his objections to the principles of Zeno, 
 and defend the consequences deduced from those 
 objections with an ingenuousness suitable to his 
 age ; and he at length makes him, with the same 
 ingenuousness, acknowledge himself confounded by 
 his veteran antagonist, who was by long practice 
 versed in all the subtleties of disputation. But 
 13 when Parmenides is prevailed upon to explain his 
 own principles, the office of replying, and of 
 course either of opposing or of expressing an 
 acquiescence, is transferred to Aristotle ; and So- 
 crates takes no part in the remainder of the Dia- 
 logue. 
 
 I have thought it necessary to make these 
 observations, lest any one should think, that it is 
 a serious objection to the interpretation here pro- 
 duced, if the principles attributed to Parmenides 
 should seem not always exactly to agree with the 
 principles maintained by Plato under the character 
 of Socrates, in other parts of his writings. I will 
 now proceed to examine the Dialogue itself. 
 
 Among the persons of the Dialogue was Par- 
 menides, an old philosopher, who had maintained 
 morgan. B 
 
12 PABMENIDES. 
 
 ev eivai to irav, 
 
 av, 1( that the universe is (one thing j; 
 by which, I conceive, he meant one (system^ and 
 that all the things which subsist have a mutual 
 connexion with each other, and subsist in it as 
 parts of one whole. Zeno was a friend of Parme- 
 nides, and some years younger than himself. He 
 had maintained, ov iroXXa eivcu, ' that [it] is not 
 many', does not consist of separate unconnected 
 parts. Socrates, then a youth, was desirous of 
 knowing the meaning and foundation of those 14 
 doctrines, which Zeno affirmed not to be pre- 
 cisely the same, though his reasoning operated as 
 a defence of the doctrine of his friend. 
 
 The first point which demands our attention, is 
 to discover what is the real subject of the Dia- 
 logue. The nature of the objection urged by 
 Socrates, the reply to it by Parmenides, and the 
 defence of it afterwards by Socrates, deserve our 
 serious consideration ; as they may fairly be sup- 
 posed to be founded upon the subject of debate. — 
 As so many parts enter into the composition of the 
 universe, it is obvious, that, if it can be deno- 
 minated one_thing, it must be so, because it is 
 capable of being comprehended under one e!$09 or 
 general abstract form. Now the difficulty that oc- 
 curred to Socrates in the doctrine of Zeno, which 
 
 1 It is probable, that his theological opinion did not essen- 
 tially differ from that of Thales : 6AAHS vovv tov koVjxou rbv 
 6e6v rA 8e irav eptyvxov apa Kai Smpovav ir\ijpes u Stobsei 
 Eclogce Physical, 1. [2. § 29]. This was also the great outline of 
 the theology of the Stoics. 
 
 2 Ov vopifas clvai aM Kaff avrb cld6s rt 6poi6Tr,ros, K al r<5 
 toioirtp aS SXKo ti ivavriov, & tan avofioiov; tovtoiv 8e, Svoiu- 
 
PARMENJDES. 13 
 
 denies a plurality, was this, that there are many 
 distinct 2 ei'5jj, general abstract forms, each sub- 
 sisting separately and independently. What does 
 Parmenides reply to this ? Does he say, You mis- 
 take the nature of the thing or being, the unity of 
 which I maintain ? No. He undertakes to shew 
 15 the contradictions, which, according to his rea- 
 soning, would arise from supposing, that the 
 several eiStj, ' species' or general abstract forms, 
 subsist unconnectedly, and in a manner that 
 is inconsistent with the unity of to irav, 'the 
 universe' 3 . 
 
 I am well persuaded that the language and 
 mode of reasoning adopted in this Dialogue, will 
 appear very harsh and forced to modern appre- 
 hensions, which are more conversant and better 
 pleased with the dictates of sound sense confined 
 within its proper limits, than with the logical sub- 
 tilties of ancient metaphysics. But if we would 
 arrive at the genuine sense of an author, we must 
 be contented to accompany him upon his own 
 terms, and to reason with him upon his own prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 The specimen, which I have produced, will 
 perhaps be sufficient to convince most people that 
 I have rightly stated the subject of the debate. If 
 
 ovtoiv, koi ipe kcu <re Kcu to aKKa, a 8r/ iroXKa KaXoO/xei', fieTaXa/i- 
 jjavuv ; Kai ra jikv, Ttjs d/iottJnjros /iEraXa^jSayoyra, Sfwia yiyve- 
 a-dai, TavTfl re koi Kara toctovtov, Strop av jieTakajiftavri ; ra Se 
 Trjs cj/ofio«5T)jTOS clvotiota ; [p. 128 E.J 
 
 3 'Opas ovv, cpavai, <b SaKpares, oar] r/ airopla, idv Tis as eibr) 
 ovra aira naff iavTa diopt^r/rm. [p. 133 A.] 
 
 B8 
 
i4 PARMENIDES. 
 
 any be yet doubtful concerning it, I would recom- 
 mend it to them, to peruse with attention the 
 whole of the conversation, if I may so call it, be- 
 tween Parmenides and Socrates, as it is set down 
 at large in the original. Will they then be able 
 to believe, that Socrates found a difficulty in ac- 
 knowledging a perfect Unity, or in denying a 
 plurality in the Deity, as distinct from the Uni- 
 verse ; because he supposed different abstract forms r 6 
 of equality and inequality, of greatness, justice, 
 beauty, and the like, to subsist by themselves sepa- 
 rately and independently of each other, .and seve- 
 rally to belong, either connectedly or disjunctively, 
 to the several individual external Actions or 
 Beings ? Will they be able, in the next place, to 
 conceive, that Parmenides, instead of urging the 
 want of connexion between the doctrine and the 
 objection, should undertake to point out the incon- 
 sistencies that would arise from admitting the 
 truth of the opinion upon which the objection 
 is built ; and that the whole of the following con- 
 versation should be employed, on one part, in 
 endeavouring to explain away those inconsistencies; 
 and on the other part, to shew the insufficiency of 
 the explanations, and the still greater difficulties, 
 that would result from them? If, besides con- 
 ceiving and believing all this, they can think it 
 possible, that the discourse should be carried on 
 through so many debates, objections, replies, and 
 rejoinders, without either party mentioning, or in 
 the most distant manner alluding to the real and 
 original subject of doubt and dispute ; I confess 
 
PARMENIDES. "15 
 
 I know of no argument or mode of reasoning that 
 is capable of reaching them. 
 
 When Socrates seemed disposed to acknow- 
 ledge that he was puzzled with the difficulty of 
 the question, Parmenides told him that he had 
 17 plunged into the depths of philosophy in the morn- 
 ing of life, before he was sufficiently exercised. He 
 praised indeed his ingenuity, but recommended it 
 to him to exercise himself first in the discussion of 
 more simple topics ; by which means he would 
 afterwards be able with less difficulty to investigate 
 more intricate and complicated subjects. The kind 
 of exercise which Parmenides recommended, as 
 suited to the present state of Socrates, was hypo- 
 thetical reasoning both positively and negatively 
 upon the same subject. For instance, 4 If a thing 
 be so, what will be the consequence ? Again, If 
 a thing be not so, what will be the consequence ? 
 After some entreaty, Parmenides is prevailed upon 
 to give Socrates a specimen of what he meant. 
 He says, B he will begin from himself and an hypo- 
 thesis of the truth of his own tenet, which was the 
 un ity of the Un iverse, ev ehai to ■kolv. Concern- 
 ing which he will enquire, first, If it be true : se- 
 condly, If it be not true, what will be the con- 
 sequence. 
 
 * Xprj 8e Kal rode en irpos rovra noieiv, prj pj&vov, el emiv 
 eKatrrbv vrrondipevov, aKonelv ra o-vpfiaivovTa ex T?js viroBeo-eas, 
 aKKa Ka\ el p-q «m to avrb tovto vironOetrBai, el fioiXei fmKkov 
 yvpvao-Brjvm. [p. 135 E.] 
 
 5 [Boij\e<r#e] Sar epov ap^apai Kai rrjs epavrov vnoSeo-eas, nepi 
 toO evos avrov wrodepevos, e'i re ev eoriv, e'l re pfj ev, ri XP*I fy'V-' 
 fiaiveiv. [p. 137 B.] 
 
16 PABMENIDES. 
 
 From the hypothesis of his tenet with respect 
 to unity being true, he shews, first, that unity itself 
 in its most simple state, as it is predicated of the 18 
 Universe, indicates nothing beyond itself but mere 
 unity. It contains no other quality whatever. It 
 implies neither beginning, nor end, nor shape, nor 
 identity, nor diversity, nor time, nor place, nor ex- 
 istence, nor non-existence, nor any other property. 
 Secondly, if in the hypothesis of unity be included 
 existence, which must be the case when you come 
 to consider the several parts that are comprehended 
 under this most simple unity, and as it were tied 
 together by it, an infinite multitude will immedi- 
 ately branch out from it. For the unity according 
 to the hypothesis thus stated will imply existence, 
 and existence unity ; so that they necessarily beceme 
 
 To re yap hi to bv de\ "<rx*h kcu to bv to hi, afore avaynrj, 
 bv del yiyvopfvov, prjhiiTOTC hi ctvai ovkovv aireipov av ro ir\ij3os 
 
 ovto> to hi bv ur/, [p. 143 a.] This will appear very peculiar 
 reasoning to those, who have not some acquaintance with the 
 language of ancient metaphysics. But Aristotle tells us, that 
 this verb, e'o-ri, is, by its efficacy to destroy the unity of unit 
 in being predicated of it, gave such disturbance to the philoso- 
 phers, who maintained an unity of principle, that some of them, 
 as Lycophron, struck it out. Others changed the form of the 
 expression ; as, for instance, they would not say, The man is 
 walking, but, The man walks ; lest, by applying the word is, 
 they should make one thing to be many. As if, says Aristotle, 
 unity and existence were expressed only in one manner : 'Edo- 
 pvjiiovvTo 8e xai oi vo-repot, KaQajrep oi dpxatoi, prj 7rore o-vpfialvti 
 airoTs apa to giro hi flvai Km noXKa. Aid oi piv to eo-rii/ d<pcl- 
 Xok, ao-ircp KvK6<ppav oi de ttjv \i£w pereppiBpi^ov, on 6 av- 
 Bpmros oi Xewo's itrnv d\\a XcXeuK<orai, oifie Pa8i£a>v io-Ttv, dXka 
 ^aSifei- iva p), T0 ? i"' irpoo-dirTovres, jroXXa elvai noiao-i t& h>, as 
 pova X S>s Xeyopevov row ivbs fj tov ovros.—Natur. Auseult. Lib. I. 
 [Oh. 2. ed. Sekk.] Plato in Thecetetus gives a similar account of the 
 
PARMENIDE13. 17 
 
 two, and consequently can be no longer one 6 . Now 
 19 says he, unity, when by the hypothesis it partakes 
 of existence, becomes many ; though, when it is 
 contemplated alone by the understanding in its 
 simple state, it appears Only an unit 7 . This rea- 
 soning of our author is thus ridiculed by Theopom- 
 pus, ev yap e<TTi ov$e ev ' rd oe cvo /xo\k ev eariv, Py^ 1 ^^, 
 
 ti 1 n\ ' Xjib.lll.8egm. 
 
 us (prjai LlAaTwi>. 26.] 
 
 Moreover, not only ev, when it partakes of 
 ovaia, 'existence', will become many in number, 
 that is, branch out into an infinite multitude of 
 units or species ; but also each of those will be 
 rendered limited in its nature, {treTrepauixevov av eirj) 
 distinguished by a particular form. The specific 
 forms, thus infinite in multitude, though they 
 branch out from ev, ' unit' 8 , and centre in it, will be 
 
 doctrine of some philosophers concerning the material elements: 
 "Ey© yap av eboKow aKOveiv Tivav, on ra pev irpayra olairepeX q-toi- 
 \eia, c§ av ijpe'is re o-vyKclucOa fan TaXXa, \6yov ovk ex 01 ' a ^ ro 
 yap Kaff avrb ekaxrrov ovopaaai povov e'lrj, irpoo-evnelv 8e ovbtv aXXo 
 8vvar6v, oijff as eariv, ov6* as ovk eo-nv 17817 yap av ovo-lav, rj prj ov- 
 ariav avra npoarWeo-dai. deiv 8e oiiSev irpoo-cpepeiv, elirep airo eKeivo 
 povov tis epei, p. 201, 2. 
 
 ? Auto to ev, 6 Si} cpap.iv ova-ias peTe\eiv, eav airo tj diavoiq 
 povov Kaff avrb \aj3apev, avev tovtov, 0$ (papev pere^eiv, Spa ye ev 
 povov (pavrjo-erai r) (cat jroXXa to avrb tovto ; ev, oipai eyaye, 
 [p. 143 A.] 
 
 s Plato in the Philebus explains at large the process of re- 
 ducing many distinct things to one. Things, which in their 
 own nature admit of more or less, such as hot, cold, swift, slow, 
 &c, are not only many and various, but also opposite to each 
 other. Yet being collected and classed under the genus of un- 
 limited, they become one. Or, as he expressed it again, The 
 unlimited presented many genera ; but being impressed with 
 the genus of more and its opposite, it appeared one : IloXXa ye 
 Kai rb aireipov wapea , \eTo yevrj' Spas 8' £irur<ppayia-devTa ra tov 
 
i8 PABMENIDES. 
 
 not only different, but often directly opposite to 20 
 each other, and thus express all the qualities that 
 can come under observation ; limited in their na- 
 ture, as being severally one, and confined to a par- 
 ticular and appropriated form; and unlimited in 
 number, as there is many a one : /ecu ireirepaafievov 
 Kai aireipov ifKriQei. 
 
 Again, after %v iroWa, many species, each of 
 which is properly an unit, partaking of existence 
 and limited in its form, there arise from the hypo- 
 thesis the several particulars in nature one and 
 many (ei> Kai 7ro\\d) connected with time, and 
 partly partaking of existence and partly not?. 
 These individuals, subject to generation and de- 
 struction, are unlimited both in number and in 
 nature 10 . The specific form gives them a limitation 21 
 in their relation to other species ; while their own 
 nature produces an unlimited variety in the parti- 
 culars of the same species. 
 
 This will receive illustration from the Philebus, 
 in which Dialogue Plato makes Socrates divide the 
 
 paKXov Kai ivavrlov yevei ev e<pdi>t), p. 26 [d]. How much more 
 easy is it, says he, to reduce under one head those things, 
 which by their nature are limited, and are not severally many ! 
 Kal pfjv to ye trepas otfre jroXXa eiftev, °" T ' ebvo-Ko\aivopep as ovk 
 fjv iv (pvo-ei. — lb. 
 
 9 T6 iv el eoTiv, otov SieXrfKvdapev, ap* ovk dvdyia] avrb, ev re 
 ov Kai TroXXa, Kai pyre iv prjre TroXXa, (cat perexo" XP^ V0V ' "" /*'" 
 eanv ev, oio-ias pere^etv jrore; on Se ovk coti, p.rj pere^etv aS 
 irore ovo-ias, [p. 155 E.] They are called iv Kai TroXXa, as con- 
 sisting of idea or form, which is one, and matter, which is de- 
 nominated many. 
 
 10 Ovkovv ovtcos de\ o-Koirovvn avrfjv Kaff avTrjV tiji/ erepav (bvo-iv 
 
 tov e?8ovs, So-ov av avrrjs del opmpev, aireipov eo-rai irkridei Xoir 
 
 aXXots &j tov evos avp.flal.vei, ck pev tov ivbs Kai eg eavrav Koiva- 
 
PARMENIDE8. tp 
 
 principles of things into two kinds. First, matter 
 and its qualities, which admitting in its own nature 
 degrees of more and less, and having nothing in 
 its nature to confine those qualities, he calls airetpov, 
 'unlimited'. Secondly, specific form, which con- 
 taining in its own nature a principle of limitation, 
 he calls yrepas, and e%ov irepas 11 . 
 
 The first he likewise calls 7ro\\a, as being many 
 in its nature 12 . But the latter is opposed to it as 
 being characteristically different ; since it does not 
 admit of that denomination in its nature 13 . Though 
 he had 14 before Said that each kind is divided into 
 many in number. Out of these two conjoined 
 arises a third class, which comprises all particular 
 things 15 . 
 %% Of this union he produces several instances : 
 among others, in disorders a proper limitation, ap- 
 plied to the constituent parts of the body, produces 
 health 16 . Again, limitation being applied to sharp, 
 flat, swift, and slow sounds, which are in their own 
 nature unlimited, constitutes music. 
 
 vt\aavrav, as eolKev, erep6v ti yiyveaBai ev avTois, o 8rj wepas 
 7rdpeo~xe 7rpbs aXkrjXa' 77 fie avratv <pv(Tis Kaff eavrctj aireiplav. 
 [p. 158 a] 
 
 11 Tot 6ebv ekeyojiev ?rou to p.ev cmeipov 8eT£at rav Svrav, to 
 Se wepas. [p. 23 c] 
 
 12 "On fie rpcmov Tiva to aneipov ?roX\a iun ireipatrojiai <j>pa- 
 £eiv. [p. 24A.] 
 
 13 Kai ji-qv Toye irepas oifre fl-oXXa el%ev. [p. 26 D.] 
 
 M Ta hio tovtchv ireipdficda noWa eKarepov eo~xio~p.evov (cat 
 8ie<nrao-p.evov Wovres, els ev ndKiv eKarepov o-uvayayovres. p. 23 
 
 M. 
 
 15 To Be Tplrov i£ d^Kpolif tovtoiv ev rt ^VfifMiayofievov. 
 *6 \p ovk ev p.ev vauots fj tovt&v opOrj Koivcovta ttjv vytelas 
 <j*v(riv iyevvr](re; p. 25 [e], 
 
 B 5 
 
so PARMENIDES. 
 
 Plato, in the fifth Book of his Republic, has 
 put into the mouth of Socrates a doctrine of e'lStj, 
 ' species', similar to what is here laid down. ' Since'; 
 says he, ' handsome and ugly are opposite to each 
 other, they are collectively two, but separately one. 
 The same may be said of just and unjust, of good 
 and evil, and all species. They are each separately 
 one, though by a participation of actions and bo- 
 dies, and of each other, they appear severally to 
 be many' 17 . ' These', he says, ' consisting partly of 33 
 existence and partly of non-existence, are the ob- 
 jects of opinion ($d%a), that holds a middle place 
 between knowledge, which embraces essential 
 forms, and ignorance, to which absolute non-entities 
 are assigned'. 
 
 When Parmenides had shewn that the present 
 state of things would result from the positive hypo- 
 thesis of the unity of the universe ; he proceeded 
 to argue upon the negative hypothesis, which was 
 found to lead to very different conclusions. 
 
 The reasoning of Parmenides is founded upon 
 the abstract nature of an unit, and is intended to 
 shew, that the present state of things results from 
 the unity of the universe. Hence if this reasoning 
 
 17 'E;j-«8i7 ecrriv ivavriov Ka\bv altrxpai, 8uo avT& eivai. irSs 
 8 ov ; ovkovv, €7TGi8ri dvO) Ka\ eu eKarepou. Kai tovto. Kat 7rep\ 
 SiKalov Kai ddtKov, kol ayaOov Kai kcikov, Kai iravratv raiv tlbay 
 jrepi airbs Xoyof avrb p.kv, ev emo-rov cival, t% 8e Tav irpa£cav 
 Kai o-wpaTB>v Kai dXX^Xa>v Koivaviq Travraxpv <f>avra£6p.eva, sroXXa 
 <pali>eo-8ai eKaarov, p. 467 [a]. Again in the tenth book: EiSos 
 yap ttov tl iv eKao-rov elddapev TiSca0at 7ripl eKaa-ra Ta iroWa, 
 oh Tavrov ovopa em<pipopev. rj ov p.av6aveis ; MavSavm. O&fiev 
 Srj Kai vvv o,ti ^ouXfi toiv ttoXXSc. oTov, <?( 6i\c Kt ttoXXcu jtou 
 eio-i Kkivai Kai Tpa.7re£at. Ms §' oil; 'A\\h Ideal ye jr v irepl 
 
PARMENIDES. 21 
 
 were allowed, the necessity of a Creator would be 
 superseded, and the universe, considered as a whole, 
 would have the principle of existence in itself, be 
 independent and eternal. 
 
 Aristotle, in his Quaucrj dtcpocuris, examines the 
 opinions of the different philosophers concerning 
 the principles of things. In the second chapter 
 34 of the first book he accuses Melissus and Par- 
 menides of assuming false principles, and of rea- 
 soning unsyllogistically from them. He says, that 
 the assumption of their first principle was inconsis- 
 tent with an investigation of nature ; that a true 
 natural philosopher could no more dispute with 
 them, than a geometrician could dispute with one 
 who denied the first principles of geometry. The 
 force of the objection consisted in this, that they 
 deduced a system of physics from a metaphysical 
 principle. In the following chapter he urges the 
 absurdity of treating unit as a principle of produc- 
 tion, which is considering that as a substance, 
 which in itself expresses only quantity or number. 
 In the first chapter of the thirteenth book of his 
 Metaphysics, Aristotle himself acknowledges unity 
 and existence to be true metaphysical principles 
 
 ravra ra trKevTj Suo* /iia jikv kXiwjj, fiia 8c Tpairitjjs, p. 596 [b]. 
 In the latter of which passages in particular it is to be observed, 
 that several c iStj or Ibeai are said to be n-oXAa, many in number, 
 and the particulars classed under each ISea are ra iroWa, 'the 
 many,' and that each separate e'Sos or tSea is iv Znao-rov nepl 
 eKaa-ra ra 7roX\a. Thus Aristotle, stating the difference of the 
 language that was held by Plato, and some other philosophers, 
 concerning the principles of things, says, 'O fiev (UXarav) ravra 
 7T0iet vXrjv, to 5e iv ro eldos' oi 8e rb [lev iv to inroKeipLevov v\rjv, ra 
 Si cvavria 8ia<f>opas Kai e'iBrj. — Nat. Ausc. I. 6. [Ch. 4. ed. Bekker.J 
 
22 PABMENIDES. 
 
 and to comprehend all subsisting beings : 7ras yap 
 Acyos /ecu Tracra emaTr/txri twv kol9o\ov kch ov twv 
 etr^aTtoi/, coctt eir] av ovtw twv TrpwTwv yevwv Tavra 
 06 ytyvoiT av to tb ov Kat to eV raura 'yct/j jkaKiaT 
 av VTro\rj<p6eir] trepteyeiv Ta ovTa iravTa. 
 
25 PLATO'S 
 
 DOCTRINE OF IDEAS. 
 
 TT may not be improper in this place to say 
 -*- something of Plato's general doctrine of Ideas. 
 He divided all objects into two grand classes, de- 
 nominated, from the different methods by which 
 we become acquainted with them, rather than 
 from their own nature, Intelligibles and Sensibles : 
 (vor/rd kcu a'iu9r]Td.) The first are the objects of 
 the understanding, and the other of the senses 1 . 
 The intelligibles, which were single in their several 
 kinds (ei> eKdGTov), were considered as the only 
 real existences and the objects of knowledge. The 
 sensibles, which were the many (rd iroWd), being 
 of a very different description, were the founda- 
 tions of opinion only. 
 
 Under the class of sensibles he comprehended 
 not only every particular external object, of what 
 kind soever, but also every particular act or con- 
 crete quality belonging to it. There were many 
 beautiful, many good, and many just things (71-oXXa 
 KaXa, TroXXa dyaOd, kcli iroWd di/cata), which were 
 all classed under sensibles {a'ujQrird) ; since the 
 26 notice of all particulars is conveyed by the senses. 
 But the intelligibles (ret vonrd) were those things 
 which are to be comprehended only by the under- 
 
 * Ta flip Sfj opaadai (pafiev, voel&dai 8' ou- ras 8' ad Ibeas 
 voeicrdat fiey, opa&dai 8' oil.—De Rep. VI. p. 507 [b]. 
 
84 PLATO'S Doctrine of Ideas. 
 
 standing with reason 2 . In this class were included 
 not only spiritual substances, but also all general . 
 abstract qualities (t. e. to ayadov nai to 6ikcuov.) 
 So that, in fact, ev eKacrrov vorirov was the general 
 or abstract idea, and to -koXKo. aiaOrird the several 
 particulars arranged under it. 
 
 Aristotle, who viewed nature with a more 
 curious eye, and who was not so much under the 
 influence of a lively and refined imagination, 
 formed a very different judgment upon the sub- 
 ject. He maintained that bodily or material ob- 
 jects were most properly entities 3 . He divided 
 entities (owi'ai) into primary and secondary. By 
 primary entities he meant particulars, as a particu- 
 lar man or a particular horse. By secondary en- 
 tities he meant the species and genus, under which 
 the particulars are classed. Thus the primary 
 entity is a particular man : and the secondary en- 
 tities are the species man and the genus animal 4 . 
 His doctrine, therefore, is in this respect directly 27 
 opposite to that of his master. For he maintains 
 
 2 No^o-ft pera \6yov irepikriirrov. — Timceiis, p. 28 [a]. 
 
 3 Ovalai be im\i(TT efoai Sokovcti to. cra'fiara. — De Anvnui) II. 1. 
 And again : Aeyto 8' ovcrlas p-ev ra tc air\a trajxaxa, olov irvp 
 (cm yfjv, Ka\ $<ra o-vcrTot^a tovtok, teai oara e< rovTav.—De Ccelo, 
 III. 1. 
 
 i Aevrepai be oialai Xeyovrai ev ols eibea-iv al irpatas ova-ldi 
 Xeyopevai vnap^ova-f ravra re kol ra rmv elbmv tovtOv yevrj- 
 oiov, 6 t\s SvGpanros ev e'lbei p.ev Imapxei tS> dvdpairar yevos be 
 rov eioavs earl to £S>ov bevrepai oiv avTai. Xeyovrai ovo-lai, oloV o 
 re avdpcoiros Kal t& £5>ov. — Categor. 5. 
 
 5 At Trp&Tai, oio-lai, bia. to rdis aXXois anraaiv vnoKela-Bai— 
 KvpuoTwra ovo-lai Xeyovrai — Mi) oia-Sv oiv rav Trparmv ova-lav, 
 dbvvarov ratv SXXav n etvai. — Ibid. 
 
 6 Udo-a be ova-la Sonet rdbe n o-qpaiveiv on p,ev olv rav 
 
PLATO'S Doctrine of Ideas. 25 
 
 that particulars are the only proper entities : that 
 the species and genus exist only in a second- 
 ary sense ; and that they could not exist at all, 
 were it not for the particulars or primary entities 5 . 
 Now, says he, an entity seems to point out some 
 actual and particular thing, which a primary entity 
 truly and indisputably does. Indeed by the con- 
 struction of the sentence a secondary entity ap- 
 pears to do so, but does not in reality. It expresses 
 only the quality 6 . 
 
 The reason why many philosophers held general 
 ideas to be the real entities, was, as Aristotle very 
 justly observed 7 , that they regarded particular 
 objects as transitory and fleeting. On this account 
 38 Plato characterizes his entities as always the 
 same, and permanent in their nature and rela- 
 tions to each other (act Kara ra aura teal wcravTws 
 e^ovra). In the Philebus he divides knowledge 
 into two kinds : First, experimental knowledge, 
 which he places in a secondary class, as being con- 
 versant about fluctuating and perishable things. 
 
 irpt&Tcov ovfritav dvaptfiurfiriTrjTOV Kal dKjjdes corn* on rode ti enj- 
 
 fiaivct- aropov yap Kai €v dpidpcp to drjXovpevov io-Tiv. eVi 8e 
 
 tcou deurtpav ovencov (palverai pAv opolcos tco o-fflpan Tfjs TrpotT- 
 rjyoptas robe Ti orfpaivtiv, orav c'ttt; avdpairov 17 £&ov ov pf/v 
 akqdis ye- aKKa paKKop 7roiov ti o-rjpaiver oi~ yap \cv inserit Bekker] 
 cart ra viroKeipevop, aJcnrep f] irpaTTj oucr/a, aXXa Kara 7roXkcov 6 
 avdpanros Xeyerat Kal to £g>ov. — Ibid. 
 
 1 Ta pev ovv iv toIs alo-8r]ToXs KaBeKaara peiv ivopi£ov Ka\ 
 pivciv oioev airav. — Metaph. xi. 12. 2we/3i7 &' ij nepl rav 
 clSSv 8o|a rots tlirovtn, Sta ro ireioSrjpat nepl ttjs a\r]6eLas rois 
 'HpaK\eiTelois Xoyois, cos ndpTtav rav al(r6r]Tcdv ael peavtcov. cuctt f 
 e'lirfp £moTr)pri twos coral Kai (ppoinjo-is, erepas detv Tipas (fivcreis 
 curat irapa rar alo-BrjTas pevovcras ; ov yap curat r&v peovrav cVt- 
 arfjprjv. — lb. cap. 4. 
 
26 PLATO'S Doctrine of Ideas.' 
 
 Secondly, abstract knowledge, which is entitled td 
 the first class, as it respects things unchangeable 
 and permanent 8 . 
 
 Philo Judseus, no inconsiderable Platonist, 
 
 founds a curious interpretation of Scripture Upon 
 
 mpi-m? this doctrine of Plato. He says that the sacred 
 
 Xepou/SijuL, 
 
 p. 116, §15. wr it m g S on this account style God the husband, 
 not of a virgin ; for that is changeable and mortal 
 — but of virginity, which is of a permanent na- 
 ture 9 . 
 
 8 'Em<TTr)fi.T] 8fj ononj/it/s Sidfpopos, i? /icv cm ra yiyvopeva kai 
 d7roXKvpeva diroj3\eirov<ra, i] be em ra p.r)Te yiyvopeva pr)Te cmoh- 
 Xvpeva, Kara ravra he Kai ao-avTcos Svra dci. TavrrjV els to aXr/Bcs 
 em<TKOTrovfievoL tfyrjo-dpeBa eKeivrjs dkrjdeo-Tepav clvai, p. 61 [d]. 
 This is similar to what he had said a little before ; Tfjv rrepl 
 t6 ov Kai to ovroas Kai to Kara Tavrbv acl 7re<pvKos, irdirnns cyayc 
 olfiai yyeto-dai £vp.7ravras o&ois vov Ka\ 0-p.iKpbv TrpoaypTrjTat, 
 fiaKpa SK^Qeo-Tarqv chat yvacriv, p. 58 [a]. 
 
 9 AtdVep 6 xPV a 'l Jios [Jerem. iii. 4.] 7re(pi\aKTai 6ebv avhpa 
 eiirav, ov irapBevov — Tpewri] yap f)8c Kai 6vt\tt\ — aKKa napffevias, 
 trjs del Kara ra alrd Kai aaavTas c^oioTj! Ideas. 
 
20 CONCERNING TO ArAOON. 
 
 TTTE will now examine what Plato has discoursed 
 * * in his Treatise De Republica, irepl Trjs rov 
 ayaOov Iceas, which he calls fxeyiaTov fj.a6qfj.ct. As 
 Plotinus, Cudworth, and many others, suppose to intellectual 
 
 dya96v to mean the Supreme Being 1 , it will be ® 9 -«Foii. 
 proper to consider it with some attention. 
 
 "We know that all the sects of heathen philoso- 
 phers did, with the greatest reason, look upon the 
 question concerning the Greatest Good 2 as one of 
 the most important that could engage their atten- 
 tion. Cicero, in his Treatise concerning Laws,\P.i L fo- 
 
 ' ° ' Lib. 1. cap. 3.] 
 
 which he wrote in imitation of Plato, says, that the 
 question is immediately connected with that sub- 
 ject ; as it is the business of him who draws the 
 30 plan of a State always to have an eye to the great- 
 est good of the subjects, which he can never do, 
 unless he knows wherein that good consists. 
 
 But let us observe in what manner Plato makes 
 
 1 Brucker seems to think that Plato here describes the 
 second hypostasis in the divine nature. Historic/, Oritica Philo- 
 sophic, Pars n. Lib. 11. 6. § 1. 
 
 2 Quid est enim in vita tanto opere quserendum, quam cum 
 omnia in philosophia, turn id, quod his Libris quseritur, quid 
 sit finis, quid extremum, quid ultimum, quo sint omnia bene 
 Vivendi recteque faciendi consilia referenda? quid sequatur 
 natura ut summum ex rebus expetendis, quid fugiat ut extre- 
 mum malorum ? Qua de re cum sit inter doctissimos summa 
 dissensio, etc. — De Finibus, 1. 4. 
 
28 Concerning to ArAeoN. 
 
 Socrates enter upon this discourse irepl rijs rod 
 dyaOov ioVas, or, as he elsewhere calls it, to dis- 
 cover what is the most excellent of human posses- 
 
 puieb. p. 19 sions or acquirements : 71730s to oie\eo~9ai t'i rwv 
 avvpunrivwv KTtj/uaTwv apicrrov. 
 
 He states it as the most difficult and at the 
 same time the most important attainment ; without 
 which indeed every other possession and attainment 
 would be of no value 3 . Having warned his hearers 
 of the difficulty and importance of the question, he 
 proceeds to state the opinions of others concerning 
 it. The multitude think it to be pleasure ; but 
 those who are more refined, esteem it to be know- 
 ledge or wisdom 4 . The subject of enquiry, there- 
 
 \BeLegg.i. fore, was plainly that which Cicero calls controver- 
 sam rem et plenam dissensionis inter doctissimos*, and 
 which he describes to be that to which all things 
 are referred, and for the sake of obtaining which 
 all things are to be done 6 . Hence, it appears that 31 
 it must have been what the nature of the enquiry 
 implies, and what all philosophers, how much soever 
 they differed in other respects, esteemed it, either 
 the possession of some external object capable of 
 being enjoyed, or some personal qualifications, 
 either corporeal or mental, capable of the most 
 
 3 H oiet Tt irkeov eivat 7rao~av kttjitiv €KTTJO'0ai ) pfj pAvroi 
 ayadtjv ; 77 iravra raXXa (ppovelv [avev tov dyadov] KaXop be K(i\ 
 dyadov pr)hev (ppoveiv ; VI. p. 505 [b] . 
 
 * Tois fikv jtoXXoii qdovrj Soke! clvai to ayaOov, rols 8e Kop^ffO- 
 rcpois rpp6vrj<ns. [Ibid.] 
 
 8 These are terms very similar to those which Socrates uses 
 in speaking of it: ovkovv on pev peyaKat nai jroXXal dpfpurPri- 
 njVeij nfpl atrov <j>avep6v. [Ibid. D.] 
 
Concerning TO ArAeoN. 29 
 
 perfect enjoyment, or a mixture of those several 
 ingredients 7 . 
 
 Socrates was asked again, whether he thought 
 the greatest good to be knowledge, or pleasure, or 
 something else different from those 8 . He told 
 them that he could not display to them to dyaOop 
 itself; but he would set before them its offspring 
 most like itself, which he afterwards explained to 
 be knowledge in the mind and truth in things. By 
 which I conceive him to mean, that to dyaOov, the 
 most general idea of good, must be an abstract of 
 the universal good, an object infinitely beyond the 
 capacity of the human intellect, at least in the 
 present state of man ; but that some resemblance 
 of it may be attained by knowledge exercised upon 
 32 the truth of things. These, he says, are not to p sw- 
 dyaOov, but dyaOoeiSij. They spring from the uni- 
 versal good. In the Second Alcibiades, Socrates is [p i« &] 
 made to ask what kind of state that would be which 
 should be composed of men skilled in all other arts 
 and sciences avev tjJs tov jSeXtio-toii eiriaT^ixrj^. 
 Alcibiades is soon prevailed upon to acknowledge 
 that it would be a state of the greatest confusion 
 and anarchy: 'Ap ovk av opOws Xeyoi/uev, (jxxvres [p. us b] 
 ttoAAjJs Tctjoa^jjs Te Kai avo/x'tas /xecrrrjv elvai Tt\v 
 ToiavTtjv iroKiTe'tav. 
 
 6 Pinem bonorum, quo referuntur omnia, et cujus apiscendi 
 causa sunt facienda omnia. — De Legg. 1. 20. Or, in the lan- 
 guage of Plato, o &tj &6)kei pev cmcura ijrvx'l' Kai tovtov eveKa 
 Ttdvra irparrei. • 
 
 1 Tayadov 8e oIkcwv ti Kai bvcrafpalperov. — Arist. Ethic. 
 Nicom. I. 3. 
 
 8 TL&Tfpov eitujTr\p.r)V to ayadov <\>rjs eivai, rj rjhovfjv, % oaXK 
 ti itapa Tavra, p. 606 [b]. 
 
30 Concerning TO ArAedN. 
 
 p.99[c]. Plato, in the Phcedo, makes Socrates, in dis- 
 
 cussing the doctrine of Anaxagoras, speak with 
 disapprobation of his not referring things to good- 
 ness and fitness as their causes : ws aXtjOws ro dya- 
 66v ical Seov %vv$e7v /ecu fyveyeiv oiioev oiovrai. Here 
 Seov, and of course to dyaQov, to which Socrates 
 would refer the composition and support of things, 
 must be the final cause. If any doubt of this 
 could remain, it would be completely dispelled by 
 a reference to what Socrates said in the pre- 
 ceding page he expected from the profession of 
 Anaxagoras. 'When', says he, ■ Anaxagoras pro- 
 fessed that things were disposed by mind, I never 
 imagined that he would assign any other cause for 
 them than this, that it is best they should be in the 
 manner in which they are' 9 . 
 
 I will endeavour to throw some light upon this 33 
 subject from the works of contemporary writers. 
 
 Xenophon was a scholar of Socrates at the 
 same time with Plato, and has also handed down 
 to posterity many of the discourses of that great 
 teacher of morality to the Gentiles. Not being, 
 like Plato, the founder of a sect and a lecturer by 
 profession, he did not study to form an ingenious 
 system with materials, culled with the nicest art 
 from the traditions of diverse countries and the spe- 
 culations of diverse masters. He told his artless 
 tale with an unaffected though elegant simplicity. 
 
 9 Ov yap av jtotc ovtov wpyv, (pio-Kovrd ye u ff A v0 $ a t T fr 
 KeKoa-fiTJcrdai, aXkTjv riva avrois alriav eireveyKuv, rj on BeknaTOV 
 avra ovrtas *X flv *°' 7 ""'j <B0"7re/> e^et. 
 
 io Ei n elbeiij ayadov. [i.e. if he knew of any thing good.] 
 
Concerning TO ArA90N. 31 
 
 It is not wonderful that the discourses of Socrates 
 should appear different in the hands of such differ- 
 ent relators. One of the most striking points of 
 distinction is this, that in Xenophon Socrates 
 always leads those who dispute with him from ab- 
 stract and general reasonings to particulars. 
 
 It happens that he has preserved a discourse 
 between Socrates and Aristippus concerning the 
 very subject of which we have been treating. As 
 Xenophon is supposed not to have been on the 
 most friendly terms with Plato, I cannot help think- 
 ing that by a particular expression he meant to cast 
 some ridicule upon this doctrine of our author, 
 which Aristotle likewise seems to have thought very 
 open to reprehension from the frequent strictures 
 which he has passed upon it. 
 34 Xenophon tells us that Aristippus, desirous of mmorab.m, 
 ensnaring Socrates, asked him if he knew what 
 good is 10 ? Do you mean, says Socrates, good for 
 a fever ? No. For weakness of eyes ? No. For 
 hunger ? No. Then, says he, if you ask me whe- 
 ther 1 know anything good, that is good for nothing, 
 I neither know nor desire it 11 . He then proceeded 
 to shew that there was nothing absolutely and uni- 
 versally good ; for that good referred to some end ; 
 and things that were handsome and good for some 
 purposes, were unseemly and bad for others. 
 
 Aristotle begins his Ethics with asserting that 
 
 11 \pa yap [leg. ye] e<prj, iparas fie, ei n otfSa irvperov 
 ayadov ; ovk eytay , e<prj. aXV 6<])0a\[iias 1 ouSe tovto. dXka Xifiov ; 
 ovSe Xi/iou. aXka p.rjv, e(pr], e'iy iparqs pe, e'i ti ayadov oiSa, o 
 firjBevos ayaQpV eo~ttv 9 oijT ■ oida, ^Vi oVre dco/xat. 
 
32 Concerning TO ArASON. 
 
 some good is the object of all our aims and pursuits; 
 therefore that which all things desire is called good 
 in an absolute sense, or The Good 12 . This in the 
 second chapter he farther styles happiness. But 
 here he gives us the same account that we have 
 seen before in Plato and Cicero. Men doubt about 
 the nature of this happiness 13 . The many, ( '» 
 ■n-oWol), as Plato also calls them, think that it con- 35 
 sists of external things — as pleasure, riches. Some 
 were of opinion that there was something good in 
 itself which was the cause to other things of their 
 being good 14 . 
 
 Having in the third chapter confuted the 
 opinions of the multitude, he undertakes, in the 
 fourth chapter, to controvert the latter opinion, 
 which was entertained by those whom he deno- 
 minates the wise. This he calls to KadoXov and 
 the opinion of some friends. He maintains that 
 there can be no common or general idea of good 
 (ovk av e'lij Koivri tjs eirJ tovtwv loea), because good 
 is expressed in so many different ways : in the 
 subject, as in God and the soul ; in the quality, 
 as in the virtues; in the quantity, as in modera- 
 tion, in time, and place, and so forth. Again, 
 having distinguished good 'into ends and means 
 (to. juei/ naff avra, Qarepa $e Sul ravTa) let US, 
 says he, consider, if they be expressed according, 
 to one idea. The conclusion, which he draws from 
 
 12 Ilao-a Tex"1 ta» tf3<ra p.e668os, Sfiolas be npa§ls Tf (tai irpo- 
 alpea-is ayaGov twos i(pietr(ku SoKt-i. 81b KaKas dtrscpijvavTO rdyadiv 
 0$ iravra itplerm. I. 1. 
 
 13 Hep\ 8e tfjs tidai/toi/las, Tit l<rriv, an<{>ur(3riTov<n, 
 
Concerning to ArAGON. 33 
 
 his reasoning, is, that there is not a common good 
 according to one idea (ovk eanv apa to dyaOou 
 koivov Tt Kara, /ulav i§eai>). Thus Xenophon and 
 Aristotle arrive at the same point by different 
 roads. 
 
 It appears most evident to me, that Aristotle 
 36 throughout this whole chapter is controverting 
 the doctrine of Plato concerning to dyaQov, and 
 all his reasonings imply, that he understood his 
 master to mean by it one general abstract idea 
 of good, under which all other things intitled good 
 are classed, which he calls koivov n kclOoXov kuI ev, 
 and again, ev ti to Koivfj KaTtiyopov/xevov ayaQov. 
 
 Aristotle begins his Cheat Morals with an 
 enquiry about the same to dyaQov, which he pro- 
 nounces to be the end of all knowledge and 
 power (jrdo-ri<s eViinv/iuj/s kol cvvdnews eo-Ti ti teAos),- 
 and says, that the idea of good is that by par- 
 taking of which other things are good 16 . Having 
 come to the same conclusion by nearly the same 
 reasoning as before, he attacks Plato more closely 
 for introducing such general and abstract specula- 
 tions into political disquisitions. The profession 
 of no particular art or science comprehends the 
 knowledge of the good of every one. The phy- 
 sician knows not what is good in the art of a 
 pilot, nor again the pilot what is good in the pro- 
 fession of a physician ; but each knows and is con- 
 
 11 Uapa ra 7roXXa ayada, aXXo n naff avrb euiai, b Kai ToTffSe 
 jrSow aiTiov i<m rov eiVcu ayada. 
 
 15 Ou TaXXa fieratr^ovra ayadd corf tovto 8' iariv ij ifiea 
 rayaBov. 
 
34 Concerning TO ArAGON. 
 
 cerned about the good of his own occupation. So 
 neither does it concern politics to treat of a good 
 which is common to all things. Wherefore, when 
 any one undertakes to discourse of good, he ought 
 not to speak of the idea. But the men, against 
 whom this reasoning is directed, think, that they 37 
 ought to treat of the idea; for they ought to 
 treat of what is most completely good. — This, 
 says he, can have no relation to politics, con- 
 cerning which we are now speaking But perhaps 
 
 the person professes to use this general good as 
 a first principle, from which he will proceed to the 
 particular good. But neither is this right ; for he 
 should use the principles peculiar to his subject 
 (del xa? ap^ds oiKeias \a/u.(3di>eiv) . Otherwise he 
 would resemble a man, who, in order to prove that 
 the angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
 angles, should begin with proving the soul im- 
 mortal. Now we can prove the proposition, with- 
 out proving the immortality of the soul; and in 
 like manner we can speculate upon other goods, 
 without the abstract universal idea of good (aveu 
 tov Kara Ttjv loiav aya9ou). Therefore this is 
 not the peculiar principle of that good which you 
 are seeking. 
 La. i. s. Most of this reasoning is repeated in his Ethics 
 
 to Eudemus, particularly, that a general abstract 
 good is of no use in politics 16 . He calls it likewise 
 to tov ayaGod e?8os. And that you may not SUp- 
 18 "On iih oiv ovk ea-nv ax/ro n dya66v, %« dnoptas roiairas, 
 rail Sn oi XPWW H? ttoXitikS, aAXa ?8i6v ti aya66v, avirep icai 
 rats SXKais. 
 
Concerning TO ArAGON. 33 
 
 pose it different from other species or general 
 ideas, he says, wut etvai avro to dyadov tijv 
 3° iceav tov ayaQov' Kal yap ywpicrTrjv etvai tuv [xere- 
 ■yovTiav, wairep Kal ras ak\as iSeas- 
 
 I think, I have now said enough to prove that 
 Plato did not intend by the term to ayaQov to 
 express a person, and therefore that he could not 
 mean by it the supreme Being, the first person of 
 the Trinity ; but rather the final cause of things, 
 as he says in the Philebus, to ye fiyv ov eveica to p 5t 
 eveKa tou yiyvofievov aei ylyvoiT av ev Trj tov 
 ayaQov fxo'ipa. eicelvo eo~Ti. 
 
 In the Philebus, in which Plato professedly 
 treats of the same subject, he does not soar quite 
 so high into the regions of abstraction. The ques- 
 tion having been started, whether pleasure (j^oi»J) 
 or intellect and knowledge (vovs Kal eiriar^ixr)) 
 are the greatest good ; in the course of the en- 
 quiry he divides both pleasure and knowledge into 
 two kinds, differing from each other in degrees 
 of truth and reality; and concludes, that neither 
 of them separately, but that a mixture of the most 
 pure parts of each, constitutes that good which is 
 the subject of enquiry. 
 
 II NCv 87 Tis \6yos ifiqvv&ev rjpiv, acrirep Kai tear ap^as, prj 
 
 fijTeiv iv t& afilitra /3io> rdyaBbv, dXV iv ra fitKrut, [p. 61 B.] Et 
 
 to. akrjde&TaTa TprjpaTa eKarepas ISoipev Trp&rov £vp.p.i£avTes, apa 
 iKava. ravTa £vy<eKpapJva Toy ayairrjTorraTOV /3iov direpya<rap.eva 
 napexew VpXv ; p. 61 [e]. 
 
 MORGAN. 
 
PHILEBUS. 35 
 
 ItoRML 8 T N Cudworth's Intellectual System is the follow- 
 
 r. 
 
 ing passage : " In his Philebus, though he agree 
 thus far with those other ancient philosophers, 
 cos del tov iravTos vovs ap^ei, ' that mind always 
 rules over the whole universe"; yet does he add 
 afterwards, on vous eari yevovaTrji tov iro.vrwv 
 aiTiov, 'that mind is' (not absolutely the first 
 principle but) 'cognate with the cause of all things;' 
 and that therefore it rules over all things with 
 and in a kind of subordination to that first prin- 
 ciple, which is Tagathcm, or the highest good. — 
 "Where when Plato affirms, that mind or his second 
 divine hypostasis is yevovo-Trjs with the first; it 
 is all one as if he should have said, that it is 
 ervyyevtjs, and o/ioeio^, and 6/xoyevijs with it ; all 
 which words are used by Athanasius as synony- 
 mous with 6fxoovo-ios ' coessential ' or 'consubstan- 
 tial' ". 
 
 Plato often speaks of the authority which the 
 mind or soul in general exercises over the body, 
 which it animates and informs. He applies to them 
 severally the epithets, governing and governed 40 
 [p. 34c] (Jxpy_wv kui apyonevov). — In the Timceus, speaking 
 of the creation of the universe, he says, ' The soul, 
 which was prior in time and superior in dignity, 
 was appointed by the Creator as a mistress and 
 
PHILEB US. 37 
 
 governor over the subject body' 1 . Hence it is 
 reasonable to suppose, that vov<$, os ap-^et tov 
 iravTos, is the mind of the universe (tov Travros). — 
 But, in order to arrive at the full meaning of the 
 passage upon which Cudworth has given this com- 
 mentary, it will be proper to consider the context, 
 and to observe the train of reasoning that led 
 to it. 
 
 A dispute had arisen between Philebus and 
 Socrates, whether pleasure or intellect contributed 
 most to the good of man. In the course of the 
 enquiry Socrates divided all things now existing 
 in the universe (iravTa ra vvv ovra ev tm ttuvti) 
 into four parts. First, what is unlimited (aireipov) [p. 27 b] 
 viz. those things which admit of degrees, and have 
 no principle of limitation within themselves, such 
 as hard, soft, harder, softer, &c. Secondly, limi- 
 tation (irepai). Thirdly, things produced by the 
 union of limitation with what is in its own nature 
 unlimited (koivov). And fourthly, the author or 
 cause of the union (to tjjs curias yevos.) — Having 
 proved that pleasure is of the kind of the unli- 
 mited, he then asks, To which of the foremen- 
 41 tioned divisions can we without impiety assign 
 wisdom, and knowledge, and mind, or intellect ? 
 ((bpovrjcriv 06 Kal eiriGTrifxriv Kai vovv eU t'i ttotb [p. 13 a j 
 twv irpoeiprifxevrnv vvv Gevres ovk av acrepoi/xev ;) or, 
 as he asks the same question again in other 
 words, Of what kind they are (vovv Kal k-KiaTtifxr\v ^ 2 8 cj 
 epo/u.evo$ otto'iov yevovs elev). This, says he, is 
 
 1 'O Se Kal ycvetrei Kai apery nporepav Ka\ npeo-pVTepav ^vx^v 
 aupaTos, as SecmoTiv Kai apfynxrav dp£op.£vov a-weoTTjcraro. 
 
 C 2 
 
38 PHILEB US. 
 
 easy ; for all wise men agree, that mind is king of 
 heaven and earth. And perhaps they say well. 
 But let us, if you please, enter into an examina- 
 tion of the kind itself (clvtov tov "yevovs) more at 
 large. 
 
 [ P . 28 d.] Shall we, says he, assert that an irrational 
 
 power and chance preside over the universe; or on 
 the contrary, as those who have gone before us 
 say, that some wonderful mind and intelligence ar- 
 ranges and directs it? (yovv kcu (ppovtjalv two. 
 OavfxaaTrjv avvraTTovaav oiaKvpepvav ;) Protarchus, 
 one of his opponents, readily admits that mind 
 disposes all things (vovv irdvTtx Siaicoaixeiv). Socrates 
 encourages him to persist in this opinion, and as- 
 sures him that he will take his share of the danger 
 and censure, if any doughty disputant should affirm 
 that those things were not so disposed, but pro- 
 
 [p. 29 a.] ceeded in a disorderly manner (otclv dvtjp Metros 
 <prj TauTa fit] ovtws aAX araKTtos evety). 
 
 He then states the constituent parts of the visi- 
 ble world and human nature. The fire with which 
 we are conversant, is supplied and replenished by 
 the elemental fire which subsists in the universe 43 
 (ev t<£ 7ravrl) in a perfect state. It must be said 
 also of our bodies that they proceed from and are 
 supported by the great body of the Universe. Do 
 we not say that our body has a soul 2 ? Whence 
 
 2 See this reasoning adopted in Cic. De Nat. Deor. n. 6, 7. 
 
 s We find an argument similar to this both in Xenophon 
 and Cicero. Now 8e p.6vov apa oidapov ovra ere elrvxas mas 
 SoKtls o-vvapndo-cu ; K a\ rdSe ra imppeyie?) K ai ttX^Bos &r«pa Si' 
 atppovivtjv rim, as o'iu, evraKTas e X fi.v s — Xen. Memorab. I. 
 4.R8]. 
 
PHILEB US'. 39 
 
 did it receive it, if the body of the universe be not 
 animated, and have the same things as this of ours, 
 and still more beautiful ? There are, therefore, in 
 the universe a kind, unlimited limitation, and some 
 cause, not unimportant, presiding over them (airei- [p. 30 c.j 
 pov, Trepan, Kai tls ew avTols curia ov <pav\rf) arrang- 
 ing and constituting years, seasons, and months, 
 which is most justly called wisdom, and mind, or 
 intellect 3 . But wisdom and intellect cannot sub- 
 sist without soul 4 . Therefore, we must acknowledge 
 that there is in the nature of Jupiter (that is, the 
 universe) a royal soul, and a royal mind, on account 
 of the power of the cause. Think not, says So- 
 43 crates, that I have produced this reasoning to no 
 purpose. It supports those who said of old that 
 mind always governs the world. It also furnishes 
 this answer to my enquiry, That mind is of the 
 same kind with the cause of all things. 
 
 It is evident, first, that the following passages 
 all mean the same thing, viz., Nouj ecrrl (iaaikevs 
 Tjfilv ovpavov KO.L yijs — Now /ecu (ppovrjaiv Tiva 9av/ua- 
 aTrjv avvTaTTovaav oia.KvfSepvc}.v — Now iravra oiaicotT- 
 [xeiv — Ael tov ttccvtos vovs apyei ; and that they are 
 put in opposition to the following sentences ; Ta [p. ssd.] 
 fcvfjLTravTa Kal rooe to KaKov/xevov oKov eiriTpo- 
 ireveiv ttjv tov aXoyov Kal e'ucrj ovvafxiv, Kal Ta birrj 
 ervyev, and "ATaKTws e^eti/. Secondly, that the two 
 
 Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam 
 stulte arrogantem, ut in se rationem et meritem putet inesse, 
 in coelo mundoque non putet ? — Cic. de Leg. n. 7. 
 
 4 Philo says, that intellect (vavs) is to the soul what the 
 pupil is to the eye. *ux5 Tlva ^XW n-^dairep Kopjjv iv 6<p8akpQ. 
 Hep\ Koo-ponoitas, p. 14. 
 
4 o PHILEB US. 
 
 following passages express, and the third refers, to 
 
 [p. 58 a.] the same question : <bpovr}aw 5e Kal i-KiaTi\fi.r\v nai 
 row 6is tl 7TOT6 Ttoi/ it poeiprjfxevwv vvv oepTes, ovk acre* 
 (ioifxev ; — No?!/ Kal k-Kio~Tr\\i.r\v epo/xevos oirolov yevovs 
 
 [p. 28 c] e l ei/ — Ata fiaicpoTepwv b", ei fiovXei, tjjv aice-^nv avrou 
 tov yevovs TroiqcrwfxeOa. — And that the answer to this 
 question is, Nou? earl yevovo-Ttis tov Travrcov air'tov 
 \e%6evTOs twv TeTTapwv, wv rjv rjuiv ev tovto. As 
 Socrates himself immediately after expresses in di- 
 
 [p. 30 e .\ rect terms, e%eis yap ciqirov vvv ritxwv ijorj Ttjv airo- 
 Kpiaiv. Thirdly, that Nous, which is said to be 
 yevovaTr]? tov ttolvtcov aiTiov, of the same kind or 
 akin to the cause of all things is the human mind 
 or intellect considered as a source of good in oppo- 
 sition to pleasure (qSovri), which, consisting of sen- 
 sations, was stated to be of the kind of unlimited 44 
 (aireipov). For Socrates proceeds thus : It has now 
 been satisfactorily shewn by us of what kind it is, 
 
 [ P . 3i a j and of what power it is possessed (ov fjev yevovs earl 
 Kal Tiva 7roTe wvafxiv KeKTtjrai) ; and also the kind 
 (yevos) of pleasure in like manner some time ago 
 appeared. He then repeats the result of the pre- 
 ceding investigation : ' We should remember these 
 things concerning both ; that mind is akin to the 
 cause, and. in a manner of the same kind with it 
 (vow [J.ev aiTias i\v j^vyyevrjs Kal tovtov ayeoov rod 
 yevovs) ; but pleasure is itself unlimited, and of a 
 kind that neither has nor ever will have in and of 
 itself, either beginning, or middle, or end.' 
 
 This doctrine, that the soul of man is akin to 
 the soul of the universe and derived from it, ap- 
 pears frequently in the writings of Plato and his 
 
PHILEB US. 41 
 
 followers. In the tenth book of his Republic, he p « u w 
 characterizes it as related to the divine and immor- 
 tal, and always existing (a!s avyyev^ oiicra rip re 
 deiij) Kal aOavarip kui aei 'ovti). 
 
 It abounds everywhere in Cicero : Quod prcevi- 
 deat animus per se, quippe qui Deorum cognatione 
 teneatur. De Divin. 1. 30 : Necesse est cognatione 
 divinorum animorum animos humanos commoveri, 49. 
 When we consider how copiously Cicero drew his 
 materials from Plato, and what a variety of passages, 
 almost literally translated, he has transfused into 
 AS his works ; it is not unreasonable to suspect that 
 he had our author and his doctrine immediately in 
 his eye when he wrote the following part of his 
 Treatise concerning Laws: Cumque alia, quibus pjb.i. 8.] 
 cohcerent homines, e mortali genere sumserint, quce 
 fragilia essent et caduca ; animum esse ingeneratum a 
 Deo : ex quo vere vel agnatio nobis cum coelestibus vel 
 genus vel stirps appellari potest. Jam vero virtus 
 eadem in homine ac deo est, neque ullo alio ingenio 
 prceterea : est autem virtus nihil aliud quam in se 
 perfecta et ad summum perducta natura. Est igitur 
 homini cum Deo similitudo. Quod cum ita sit, quce 
 tandem potest esse prior certiorve cognatio ? 
 
 Moreover, both Cicero, and Maximus Tyrius, 
 another professed admirer and follower of Plato, 
 have applied this very doctrine of the human mind's 
 being derived from the divine, as an argument to 
 prove the very same point for which Plato has 
 here produced it, viz., the superior efficacy of intel- 
 lect above sensual pleasure to promote the real 
 good of man. Cicero prefaces his reasoning with 
 
42 PHILEB US. 
 
 [Tuscuiame an immediate reference to Plato : Ex hoc igitur 
 
 JSisput. Lib. v. 
 
 cap. i2. §87.] pi a f 0n i s q Uas i quodarn sancto augustoque fonte nostra 
 omnis manabit oratio. Having spoken of the nature 
 and origin of vegetables and irrational animals, he 
 next proceeds to man, the proper subject of his en- 
 
 \im cap.™, quiry. Ut bestiis aliud alii prcecipui a natura da- 
 tum est, quod suum quceque retinet nee discedit ab eo; 
 sic homini multo quiddam prcestantius : etsi prmstantia 46 
 debent ea dici, quae habent aliquam comparationem : 
 humanus autem animus, decerptus etc mente divina, 
 cum alio nullo, nisi cum, ipso deo, si hoc fas estdictu, 
 comparari potest. Hie igitur, si est excultus, et si 
 ejus acies ita curata est, ut ne eweetur erroribus, fit 
 perfecta mens, id est, absoluta ratio, quod est idem 
 virtus. Et si omne beatum est, cui nihil deest, et quod 
 in suo genere eocpUtum atque cumulatum est idque vir- 
 tutis est proprium : certe omnes, virtutis compotes, 
 beati sunt. 
 
 The passage in Maximus Tyrius stands thus : — 
 E^ei /xev yap, e^et vovv Kai \oyov — Kal Trapa /nev 
 6vt)Trjs 7rX>]fi[xe\e[a9 to aaifia eyovTt, e/c oe tjJs d9a- 
 vctTov aTroppoqs tov vovv oia\aix/3dvovTi — 'loiov oe crap- 
 kwv fxev rjoovai, vov oe \oyos — evTavda To'tvvv yjTei 
 to avOpwTrov ayadov, birov to 'epyov — evTavda to 
 epyov, birov to bpyavov ' evTavda to bpyavov, oirov 
 to aw^ov — tl 'yvyris opyavov , vovs- C*]T6i to epyov- 
 tl vov epyov ; (ppovrjcrK ' evpes to ayaOov. Dissert. 
 
 XXXIV. 
 
47 EPISTLES. 
 
 The Second Epistle to DIONYSIUS. 
 
 THE reasoning and expression used in the Phi- 
 lebus will serve to throw some light upon a 
 passage in the second Epistle to Dionysius : <J>»)s [p. 312 d.] 
 yap o»7 Kara, tov ske'ivov \6yov, ov% Ixavws aTrooeoei^- 
 6ai croi wept Trjs tov wpcoTov (pvcxews. Qpacneov or/ 
 o~ol 01 awiyixwv — woe yap e%ei Trepi tov iravTwv pa- 
 ciXea iravT eo~Tt Kai eiceivov eve/ca iravTa' Kai eicelvo 
 aiTiov airdvTixiv twv koKwv. oevTepov oe irepl tu oevrepa 
 Kai Tp'iTov Trept Ta Tp'iTa. 
 
 When we consider the character of Dionysius, 
 and call to mind that the 'purpose of Plato's visit- 
 ing him was to inculcate moderation upon him ; it 
 is natural to suppose, that the reasoning used in the 
 Philebus, would constitute a very important part of 
 the Lectures delivered by the Philosopher to the 
 48 Prince. He would state to him that there are in 
 the universe three principles, a-rreipov, irepas, Kai to 
 Trj<t airias yevos : and as in the universe the most 
 noble and beautiful- productions are formed by the 
 operation of mind or intellect connecting limitation, 
 
 1 Plato explains this purpose in his seventh Epistle, which 
 was directed to the friends of Dio. He says, that Dio, having 
 attached himself to virtue in preference to pleasure and luxu- 
 rious living (dpcT^i' irepi irXeiovos ^Sovrjs rrjs re aWr/s rpv<j)jjs 
 qyair7]Kms, p. 327 [b]), was desirous that Dionysius also should 
 be brought to the same state of mind. He therefore prevailed 
 upon Plato to make a voyage to Syracuse for that purpose. 
 
 C 5 
 
44 EPISTLES. 
 
 with the things that are in themselves unlimited; 
 so also in man the greatest good is produced by 
 connecting limitation (wepas) with the pleasing sen- 
 sations (riSoval) which are in their own nature un- 
 limited. • 
 
 We might likewise expect to find, that as long 
 as the prince thought proper to continue the con- 
 nection with the philosopher, this subject would 
 engage a considerable part of their attention. 
 
 The passage in question confirms this reasonings 
 and is illustrated by it; though it is designedly 
 involved in obscurity, that, in the case of the let- 
 ter's miscarrying, it might not be understood by 
 any but those who had some previous knowledge 
 of the principles of the author. In it is contained 
 an enumeration of the three principles ; the first of 
 which, tov iravTwv fiacriXea, is the same as to irdv- 
 twv aiTtov, fiaarikevs ijiuv ovpavov ical yrjs, by which, 
 iPMiebus, from a mixture of the other two principles, wpai re 
 Kai baa aXka iravra ijfuv yeyove, twv ts aire'ipuiv /cat 
 twv Trepas e-^ovrwv avufxi^OevToov. 
 
 ' The human mind,' proceeds Plato, ' is earnestly 
 desirous of learning the nature of these things, 
 looking into the things of itself that are related to 
 them ; none of which it has in a perfect state. 49 
 But there is nothing of this kind (that is, of a state, 
 which is not perfect) with respect to the king, and 
 [ P . 313 a] the things which I have mentioned : tov §j /3a- 
 aiXeuis irepi ical wv elirov ovoev £<ttI toiovto. Conse- 
 quently, the knowledge which the mind acquires of 
 the nature tov Trpiorov, by looking into the corre- 
 sponding things of itself, must be inadequate.' 
 
E FIST LUIS. 45 
 
 Plato here alludes to what is taught in the 
 Philebus ; first, that the constituent parts of man 
 are of the same kind with the constituent parts of 
 the universe ; secondly, that those parts in man are 
 imperfect, but in the universe they are perfect. 
 
The SIXTH EPISTLE. 50 
 
 [ P . 323b] "VTEAR the latter end of Plato's sixth Epistle is 
 -L^ the following passage : tov twv ttolvtciov 6eov, 
 rjyefj.ova twv tb ovtwv Kai -rail' fxeWovTwv, tov re Jj'ye- 
 [xovos kcu aiTiov TcaTepa kvoiov. The author here ap- 
 pears to me to express himself according to the 
 system of a creator and a creation. I -conceive, 
 that tov •n-dvTwv Qeov corresponds with to iravruiv 
 a'tTiov and fiaaiXev? rjixiv k. t. \. in the Philebus, 
 the universe or the soul of the universe. Accord- 
 ing to this interpretation aWiov iraTepa nvpiov must 
 mean the eternal, self-existent being, the Creator 
 of the universe, who is called in the Timceus 5>/au- 
 ovpyos and irctTtjp. 
 
5 i CRATYLUS. 
 
 THE same terms in the Philebus are likewise ex- 
 planatory of the following passages in the 
 Cratylus: Ov yap'ecrriv rifxiv nal toIs etXAots Traatv, [p. 39c a.] 
 octtk earlv a'lrios [xaWov tov <£rjv, rj 6 ap^wv re Kal 
 j3a<rt\evs tQv iravTwv. avfxf&a'ivei oiiv op9ws ovofia^e- 
 <jQai ovtw9 (ZJyya) to> 8eos elvai, 01 bv t£rjv aei Traai 
 toTs ^waiu vwap-^ei. Cudworth saw the necessity of 
 referring here to \J/-ux>7 \ the third hypostasis of his 
 Platonic Trinity, those very titles, which in other 
 passages he supposes to be applied as distinguishing 
 characteristics to the two other hypostases. But 
 the truth is that they all refer to that one principle 
 of life and intelligence, which was supposed to per- 
 vade the universe, and regulate all its motions and 
 operations. 
 
 1 Hanc ego mallem interpretationem junioribus, a quibus 
 profecta est, Platonicis, Plotino et ceteris reliquisset vir doctis- 
 simus, quam suam fecisset. Nee enim, quamvis Plato Saturni, 
 Jovis et Coeli loco isto mentionem faciat, ullum ego ibi vesti- 
 gium video trium illorum principiorum, multo minus cum tri- 
 bus his Platonicorum principiis tria Grrsecorum nomina componi 
 cerno. Pessimi, meo judicio, Platonis interpretes sunt, qui 
 post natum Servatorem Platonicorum adoptarunt sibi vocabulum. 
 Quorum quidem animi, quoniam tribus illis principiis toti erant 
 infecti et imbuti, ideo ubivis ea quoque sagacius, quam fas erat, 
 in Platone venabantur, cujus quippe prsecepta videri volebant 
 unice inculcare. — Mosbem. in he. Tom. 1. p. 380. 
 
TIMM US. & 
 
 fFHE Timceus of Plato cuts so distinguished a 
 -*- figure in the present question, and has been so 
 often quoted and referred to by authors, that we 
 may venture to enter upon an examination of it 
 without any further preface. 
 [p. 27 dj Timseus, who is the supposed expositor of the 
 
 system advanced in this Dialogue, divides things 
 into two classes. First, what is without beginning 
 and unchangeable, which is comprehended by the 
 understanding with reasoning. Secondly, what is 
 made, and perishes, and is the subject of opinion 
 only, being in its nature variable, and having no- 
 thing in it so stable, as to furnish the materials of 
 knowledge properly so called. 
 
 What is made, necessarily implies an author. 
 Now whatever the Creator forms, looking at what 
 is invariable and using such a pattern, must be 
 completely beautiful. But whatever he forms, 
 looking at what has been made and using such a 
 pattern, will not be completely beautiful. 
 
 Having considered the universe, and concluded 
 from its being visible, that it was made ; he next 
 enquires whether the Creator in forming it looked 53 
 at an invariable pattern, or at one that was made, 
 and asserts, it is manifest, from the beauty of the 
 work and the excellence of the Creator, that he 
 
TIM ^E US. 49 
 
 looked at what is unchangeable. For, says he, that 
 is the most beautiful of the things which have been 
 made, and he is the best of causes. Thus it was 
 formed according to a pattern, comprehensible by 
 reason and thought, and unvarying. 
 
 Having thus distinguished the image and the 
 pattern, he states the nature of the account which 
 he is about to give. He calls it only a probable rp 29 ci 
 story and probable reasonings (eiKora pvOou k<x\ 
 e'lKOTas \6yovs) which they must be content, on 
 account of the imperfection of their common 
 nature, to accept, instead of such expositions as 
 would correspond with the dignity of the subject. 
 These latter, in opposition to the others, he calls 
 auTols ofJLo\oyovfjievou$ /ecu airriKpifitoixevovs \oyovs. [p- 29 c] 
 
 He then proceeds to inquire into the reason 
 and manner of the creation. The first he attri- 
 butes to the goodness of the Creator. With re- 
 spect to the manner, he says, the Creator took 
 what is visible, viz. matter 1 , which moved irregu- 
 larly and disorderly, and reduced it to order from 
 disorder, on account of the excellence of the former 
 above the latter. 
 54 He considered also (Koyurdiievos) that what is [p . 30 B .] 
 intelligent is more excellent than what is devoid of 
 intelligence; but that there cannot be mind or 
 intelligence without soul or life. On account of 
 this reasoning (dia tov \oyianov rovSe) having con- 
 stituted a mind in a soul and a soul in a body, 
 
 1 AXXa Kai tovtov [I. tovto] irakiv 6 pi.eya\6(j}a>vos nXarfflV o&x 
 
 6/»oXoy«i, Xeyav dpxas ehat Qebv, Kai v\r]V Kai irapaSeiypa Her- 
 
 mise Irrisio Gentil. Philosoph. [c. xi. p. 221]. 
 
50 TIM^EUS. 
 
 he composed the whole, that he might complete a 
 work most beautiful and excellent in its nature. 
 Thus ought we to say, according to a probable 
 account (/caret \6yov tov eiKora) that this world 
 was in truth made an animated and intelligent 
 being by the Providence of God (Sid rfiv tov Qeou 
 yeveaOai irpovoiav). The whole composition of 
 the soul, he says, was completed according to the 
 mind of the composer (Kara, vovv ^vviaTavri). 
 
 When he speaks afterwards of the production 
 of time, in which this animated and intelligent 
 being should exist, he says, Therefore from such 
 [p. 38 c] reasoning and consideration of God (e£ ovv Xo- 
 •you Kal eiavoias Qeou roiavrrjs) the sun, &c. was 
 made. 
 
 From all this it appears most evident to me, 
 that \oyi<Tfi.os, irpovoia, Xd'yos, and otdvoia Qeov 
 are only operations of the supreme intelligence, as 
 p. «[ci Trpovo'ias Oewv is of the inferior gods. 
 
 I will now examine the nature of the pattern 
 and the image spoken of in this discourse. 
 
 1 have already shewn at large, that, in the writ- 55 
 ings of Plato, general or abstract ideas are con- 
 sidered as the real entities, on account of the 
 stability of their nature, different from particular 
 existences, which are in a state of perpetual 
 change; and that he denominated them ever- 
 existing, as they bear no relation to time, nor are 
 they affected by it. I will, however, produce a 
 passage or two more to confirm a point of so much 
 importance in determining the meaning of the pat- 
 tern mentioned in the Timceus, a misconception 
 
TIMJ3US. Si 
 
 concerning which has been very extensive in its 
 operation. 
 
 It is one of the leading principles of the Pla- 
 tonic Philosophy, that general or abstract ideas 
 only can be the foundation of real knowledge; as 
 they only are exact and permanent in their nature 
 and relations 2 . 
 S 6 The Timceus of Plato is derived from the trea- 
 tise of Timaeus the Locrian, concerning the soul 
 of the world. In this treatise the pattern {irapa- to 
 Seiyiua) is called iSea and elSos, the idea and the 
 specific form, which was eternal and co-existent 
 with v\tj, matter, but distinct from and opposite 
 
 2 Arguing upon this principle in his Dialogue concerning a 
 Republic, (Lib. v. [p. 479 a]), he reprobates the pretensions to 
 wisdom advanced in favour of those men, who are conversant 
 with particulars only. 'AiroKpiveada 6 xpv a " r ° s > ° s avT0 l** v KaXov 
 Kai ibeav Tiva ovtov KaXKovs firjbefiiav qyeiTai del Kara Tavra acrav- 
 Ttos ()(ov(rav TroXXa be Ta KaKa vofii^ei eKelvos 6 <f>L\o6eap.a>v, Ka\ 
 ovftofifi avexop-evos, av Tiff ev to Ka\ov fpi} eivai Kai biKaiov Kai TaAAa 
 ovra. True philosophers he characterizes thus, [p. 479 e] : 
 tow aira cKaara deapevovs Kai del Kara to avra acravrms ovra. 
 Again, in the beginning of the following book, he defines phi- 
 losophers, [p. 484 a], oJ tov del Kara Tairq. daavras expvTos 
 Svvapcvoi i<f>airT£<r6ai. The terms in which he describes the 
 vmphilosophic, deserve our particular attention : tov ovtos eVd- 
 otov eo-Teprjpevot Trjs yvcoaetas, Kai prjbev evapyes ev Tij tyvxij e^ovTes 
 irapabeiypa. Again, (p. 486 [d]), speaking of the turn of mind 
 to be expected in a philosopher, he says, ep-perpov apa kol ev%a- 
 piv ^rjTapev irpos toXs aXXois hiavoiav (pvo-et, r^v eVi ttjv tov Svtos 
 Ibeav eKaOTOV to avTOtpves eiayatyov irape^ei. By the two last 
 cited passages it appears, that the terms Iftea and napabeiypa 
 are used to express abstract ideas. Agreeable to this is the ac- 
 count which Diogenes Laertius gives of the philosophy of Plato: 
 *Eorfc be tg>v elbav ev eKaorov atbiov tc Kai v6rjpa, Ka\ irpbs tovtois 
 airades' bio Kai (pr/a-iv iv tj (pvaei Tas Ideas iaravai KaBanep napa- 
 Seiypara- to. 8' aWa Tairais carnival, tovtov opoiiopara Katfeo-roTa. 
 [Lib. iii. Segm. 13]. 
 
52 TIM^US. 
 
 to it. What was formed at the creation by the 
 conjunction of these two, is called their offspring 
 (to. 6/c tovtcov eKyova). Information concerning 
 these three is attained by three different ways — : 
 concerning idea or specific form, by the mind 
 according to knowledge — concerning elemental 
 
 [p. Mb] matter, by spurious reasoning (Xoyia/xip voOqi), so 
 called, because it does not arrive at that certainty 
 and precision which are attained by abstract rea- 
 soning — concerning their offspring, particular ma- 
 terial objects, produced by the union of specific 
 form with elemental matter, by sensation and opi- 
 nion. 
 
 q>. 94 c] y? e are t understand, says the philosopher, 
 
 that, before the creation, there were Idea or ab- 
 stract form, Matter, and God the Creator. Now 
 God saw matter assuming specific form (rrjv iSeav) 
 and changing, in all ways indeed, but disorderly. 
 He was therefore desirous of bringing it to order, 57 
 of converting it from its indeterminate state, and of 
 making it determinate — that there might be dis- 
 tinctions of bodies, and that they might not receive 
 undirected changes. 
 
 Let us now consider Plato's description of the 
 pattern. He says that it contained within itself all 
 intelligible animals ; as this world contains us and 
 all other living creatures. For God, desiring to 
 make this world resemble, as much as possible, the 
 most beautiful of intelligibles which was in all 
 respects perfect, made it one visible animal, having 
 within it all corresponding animals, according to 
 its nature. If due allowance be made for the 
 
TIMJEUa. 53 
 
 peculiar language of the Pythagorean and Pla- 
 tonic schools, nothing can be more plain than that 
 the pattern signifies no more than the abstract 
 idea, according to which the universe was formed, 
 with parts in the one answering to parts in the 
 other 3 . 
 
 Aristotle distinguishes the causes of things into mur. ausc. 
 four kinds : Pirst, the subject matter, as brass 
 in the composition of a statue, &c. Secondly, 
 the specific or generic form. Thirdly, the author. 
 Pourthly, the final cause. The terms in which 
 he describes the second kind, or specific and 
 generic forms, are these, to el^os /ecu to izapa- 
 58 oeiyixa' touto o earlv 6 Xoyos o tov t'i r\v elvai 
 koI to. tovtov yevrj. 
 
 With respect to the nature of the soul of the 
 universe, it may be proper, first, to observe that 
 mind and soul do not signify two distinct inde- 
 pendent existences, as some have supposed, "fyvyfj, 
 soul, when considered separately, signifies the prin^ 
 ciple of life : Now, mind, the principle of intelli- 
 gence. Or, according to Plutarch, soul is the ?w. Quast. 
 cause and beginning of motion, and mind of order 
 and harmony with respect to motion 4 . Together 
 they signify an intelligent soul (evvovs ^x>7) which 
 is sometimes called a rational soul {^vyri XoyiKtj). 
 Hence, when the nature of the soul is not in ques- 
 tion, the word ^v^ is used to express both. Thus 
 
 3 Notjtos lirayji Koo-fios to tov (pawopJvov rov8e ap^erv7rov, 
 Ideais aopaTois o~vo~Ta8e\s too'irep ovtos aap.ao'i.v opaTots. — Philo 
 Judseus, De Confus. Ling. p. 345. 
 
 4 *UXV y<*P atria Kivrjcrcws Ka\ ap)(ij, vovs &e rd^eas Ka\ avp.- 
 (pavias irep\ kIvtjo-iv, 
 
54 TIM2EU8. 
 
 P79M. in the Phcedo the soul (ypv X v) is said sometimes to 
 use the body for the examination of things (t<£ 
 a-wfxari irpocrxprJTai ek to (TKOire'iv ti) ; at which 
 times, according to the principles of Plato, it 
 forms confused and imperfect notions of things, 
 and is involved in error. But, when it examines 
 things by itself, it arrives at what is pure and 
 always existing and immortal and uniform, and 
 is free from error. Here the highest operations 
 of vov$, ' mind,' are indisputably attributed to ^vyy, 
 ' soul.' 
 
 Aristotle, describing \|/ux»7; ' soul,' says, that 59 
 during anger, confidence, desire, &c. it participates 
 with the body ; but that the act of understanding 
 belongs peculiarly to itself 5 . Again, he says, Plato 
 in the Timceus, in the same manner as Empedocles, 
 makes the soul out of the elemental principles of 
 things; for that like is known by like 6 . Soon after 
 he says, that soul has in it a principle both of mo- 
 tion and of knowledge 7 . 
 
 It is evident, that irav To$e or KocxfMK, here 
 treated of by Plato, is the system of heaven and 
 earth, and of the several natures contained in them 8 . 
 And that vovs /ecu ■\|/u^>) kog/jlov is, as Cicero ex- 
 presses it, vis quondam sentiens, quce est toto confusa 
 mundo, performing the same functions in the great 
 body of the universe at large, that human souls do 
 in our bodies, giving life and motion to its several 
 
 6 $aiV€rai Se rav TrXetarau ovOev avev aafiaros Trdtr^ew' ovte 
 iroictv, oiov opyi£e<r$ai, Bappciv, eVi#v/ieu/, okas ai<r8aveo-8ai. pd- 
 Xtora 8 cmkcv 'Lhwv to voclv. JTepl fy^s, Lib. I. cap. 1. 
 
 6 Toj> avrbv Tp6rrov iv to Tipdlw TtKaTav tij» ■^rvx^v Ik to>v 
 crmx'iuv 7roiei- yiyvda-Kea-dai yap 6/xoi'oj opowv. cap. 11. 
 
TIM^EUS. 55 
 
 parts, directing those motions with consummate 
 wisdom, and communicating different portions of its 
 essence to the different beings that are contained 
 60 within the bounds of its all-comprehending circum- 
 ference ; thus effecting and maintaining the varia- 
 tions of times and of seasons, the changes of or- 
 ganized and unorganized matter, and the uninter- 
 rupted succession of animated and rational beings. 
 The proof of the existence of this rational soul, 
 animating and directing the universe, was derived, 
 as has been already observed, from the observable 
 fecundity of nature, and the order and harmony of 
 its parts and motions. 
 
 That Trctv ToSe or Koo-fios was not eternal a parte 
 ante is manifest from the whole tenor of the rela- 
 tion. We have the reasoning of the Creator con- 
 cerning this future God, before he was created 
 {XoyiafjLos Qeov irepi tov ecro/xevov 6eoi>). We have a [p. 34 b.j 
 direct assertion of the creation of it : Sid §q tov [p. 30 b.] 
 \oyuTfwv Tovoe, vovv fiev ev ^v%fj, -vJ/v^j/i/ Se kv gco/uuxti 
 avviuTas, to irav ^vvereKTctlveTo : on account of 
 this reasoning having constituted a mind in a soul 
 and a soul in a body, he composed the whole. 
 Thus this world was made by the providence of 
 God an animated and intelligent being (£wov e/u.\f/v- 
 
 VOl/ eVVOVV T€). 
 
 Nay, the philosopher does not even stop here, 
 
 1 'Eirel Be Kal kivt)tikov e'8ok« tj ^v^fj ttvai <a\ yvapia-TiKov. 
 Ibid. 
 
 8 K6<r/xos pzv ovv earl av<TTrjfm it; ovpavov Kal yrjs Kal t&v iv 
 tovtois ntspiexopsvwv (pitreav Aristot. TJepl Korrfiou, Cap. 1. 
 
 AijXos yap 6 Xoyifofiej/os 6eos 6 Sj^toupyos- 6 Se i<r6p.evos Kal 
 yiyvojievos aU\ 6 /edoyios. — Stobsoi Eel. Phy. I. [2. § 28.] 
 
56 TIM^i US. 
 
 but lays before us the order of the work and the 
 particulars of the composition ; the result of which 
 
 [p. 34b.] is contained in the following words: lia Travra $q 
 Tavra evSalixova 9eov avrov eyevvtjcraro. Time is 
 said to have been made with it ; that, having been 
 made together, they might also be dissolved toge- 61 
 ther, if there should ever be a dissolution of them 
 
 [p. 38b] (ji/a ay.a yevvt]9evT6s a/xa /ecu \v9wo~iv, av irore \v<tk 
 civtwv yevrjrai). That it is not incapable of being 
 dissolved is clear from the declaration of the Cre- 
 
 [p « a.] ator to the Gods, whom he styles 9eol 9emv : ' every 
 thing that has been compacted is dissoluble. 
 "Wherefore since you have been made you are not 
 immortal (to /xev ovv Sij oeOev irav \vtov — Si a 
 icai eirenrep yeyevt]tj9e, a&avaToi /xev ovk eerre).' 
 It is manifest, likewise, from the terms in which 
 to irav, the universe itself, is described in the 
 
 p. 94 m. treatise of Timasus the Locrian : tovtov eirolt] 9eov 
 yevvaTov, oviroKa ^aprjao/xevov vw a\X(p aWup, efw 
 tco avTov avvTerayfieva) 9ew, e'nroKa SjjXero avrov 
 ciaKvev. 
 
 It will be proper to repeat here an observation, 
 which was made at the beginning of the examina- 
 tion of the Parmenides. Plato in the Timcms, as 
 well as in that Dialogue, is unwilling to make him- 
 self or Socrates responsible for the truth of the 
 doctrines which are maintained in it. He therefore 
 does not, according to his usual custom, advance 
 them as the sentiments of Socrates ; but attributes 
 them to another for whose credit he is not so much 
 concerned. He, moreover, does not pretend that 
 the knowledge of them was attained by the princi- 
 
TIMJEUS. 57 
 
 pies of reason ; but he founds their truth upon the 
 authority of tradition. 
 
 6% This observation will serve to explain a circum- 
 stance which must otherwise appear very extraor- 
 dinary. The real opinion of Plato concerning the 
 eternity of the world has been much controverted 
 at different periods of time. If the Timceus repre- 
 sented the genuine sentiments of Plato, it would be 
 impossible for any rational doubts to be entertained 
 upon the subject. For this Dialogue not only con- 
 tains the most express declarations that the world 
 had a beginning, but also explains the nature of the 
 different parts of which it was composed; and states 
 the order in which they were at first severally cre- 
 ated and afterwards compacted. But if we consider 
 him in this Dialogue as only representing the senti- 
 ments of another, without intending to pledge him- 
 self absolutely for the truth of them ; nothing deci- 
 sive and incontrovertible can be derived from this 
 Dialogue for settling the controversy. 
 
 In this Dialogue the Creator, who existed eter- 
 nally, is distinguished from the intelligent soul of 
 the world, which, we are told, was actually created, 
 though prior in time and superior in dignity to the 
 body of gross matter which it animates and modifies. 
 This intelligent soul is generally considered by the 
 ancients as the principle and source of life and in- 
 telligence, and the supporter of order and harmony 
 in the universe; and therefore in all ordinary cases 
 
 63 an investigation of the nature and origin of things 
 usually terminates in it. 
 
 Minucius Felix informs us, that the God of Py- oetavim.c 
 
 ' J six. CS ?■] 
 
58 TIMJEUS. 
 
 thagoras was described in terms of the same im- 
 port : Pythagoras Deus est animus, per universam 
 rerum naturam commeans et intentus ; ex quo etiam 
 animalium omnium vita capiatur. 
 
 Eecourse was seldom had to any other being, 
 except to account for the origin of the universe in 
 opposition to those who maintained, that it existed 
 from eternity. They, who asserted that the uni- 
 verse was created, were under the necessity of pro- 
 viding a Creator. But they seldom made any other 
 use of him, than just to account for the origin of 
 the world. Hence Plato excuses himself from en- 
 larging upon the nature and attributes of this su- 
 preme Being, by saying that it is difficult to disco- 
 ver the Maker and Father of this universe ; and 
 when he has been discovered, it is impossible to 
 Timai. p. 28 declare him to all : Tov /jlbv ovu 7roiijTtjv ko.1 irarepa 
 Tovoe tov iravTos evpeiv re epyov teat evpovra ets 
 ttclvtcis aovvaTov Xe'yeiv. In this case, however, the 
 soul of the world, the principle of life and intelli- 
 gence, the supporter of the succession of beings, 
 and the maintainer of order in the universe, held 
 only the second place. Whereas, on the other 
 hypothesis, this same principle is held to be the 
 first cause. 
 
 What Origen says of the Stoics and Platonics 64 
 is perfectly agreeable to this: the Greeks affirm 
 that the whole world is a God : the Stoics that it 
 is the first God: the Platonics that it is the second 9 . 
 
 9 2atf>as Sq t&v oXow koV/uov Xeyovow eivai 6ebv, SraHKOi ph 
 tov irpmrov' ol d' airb liKdravos tw Seirepov. — Contra Celsum, 
 
 Lib. V. p. 235. 
 
TIM2E US: 59 
 
 The Stoics maintained the eternity of the world. 
 They had therefore occasion to account for no 
 more than the succession of beings, and the wisdom 
 and order with which the affairs of the universe 
 were conducted. For this the soul of the world 
 was sufficient, and was esteemed their first God. 
 The Platonics derived most of their opinions from 
 the Timceus, in which the doctrine of a Creator is 
 taught. He therefore was necessarily the first God; 
 and the soul of the world could occupy only the 
 second place of dignity in this system. An atten- 
 tion to this distinction will serve to account for 
 that apparent inconsistency in the principles of 
 Plato, to which Cicero makes Velleius the Stoic DeNat - Dm '- 
 
 lab. 1. cap. 12. 
 
 object. 
 
 It would be easy to produce a great number of 
 instances from the writings of Plato, Cicero, and 
 others, in support of what is here laid down. But, 
 as on any supposition it is equally impossible to 
 discover in this Dialogue the doctrine of the Holy 
 6S Trinity; it would lead me too far from the imme- 
 diate subject of my enquiry to dwell any longer 
 upon this topic. For the same reason, because I 
 would not meddle with anything that is not imme- 
 diately and necessarily connected with my subject, 
 I have declined entering into the controversy con- 
 cerning Plato's opinion of the nature and mode of 
 the subsistence of ideas. Whether it be determined 
 that Plato taught that they subsisted notionally or 
 substantially in the divine intellect ; the decision, 
 I conceive, will not of itself tend in the slightest 
 degree to prove Plato's doctrine to have been, that 
 morgan D 
 
6o TIMJEUS. 
 
 the intellect is personally distinct from the Supreme 
 Being, to whom it belongs. Still less, if possible, 
 can the question be affected by any other hypo- 
 thesis concerning the nature and mode of the sub- 
 sistence of ideas. 
 
 Having examined all the principal passages, 
 which are produced from the writings of Plato, to 
 prove that he was acquainted with the doctrine of 
 three hypostases in the divine nature ; and having 
 shewn, as I conceive, that none of them, in their 
 true and genuine signification, do actually counte- 
 nance the hypothesis; I will endeavour to inves- 
 tigate the subject farther, and trace out the origin 
 and progress of the opinion in later times. 
 
66 OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF THE OPINION OF 
 THE PLATONIC TRINITY. 
 
 OEVERAL sects of Pagan Philosophy in a man- 
 ^ ner derived their origin from the school of 
 Plato, yet no one of them, whether it professed to 
 adopt his opinions in the whole, or only in part, 
 either affirmed or denied this article, which, if it 
 had been really maintained by Plato, must have 
 held so distinguished a place among his tenets. 
 Even Cicero has taken no notice of this striking 
 peculiarity; though he not only was a passionate 
 admirer and imitator of Plato, but also made it 
 the chief employment of his latter days to trans- 
 pose into the Roman language the most important 
 doctrines and reasonings of the several sects of 
 Grecian Philosophy. This profound silence is too 
 remarkable and too general to be attributed to 
 chance. Neither the high estimation in which the 
 writings of Plato were held, nor the penetration 
 and industry of the many learned men, who either 
 propagated or avowedly deviated from his opinions, 
 will permit us for a moment to suppose that this 
 article could have been wholly overlooked, or re- 
 garded as a circumstance of no moment. 
 67 If this opinion cannot be found in the writings 
 of Plato, and is not attributed to him by the sub- 
 sequent philosophers of Greece and Rome, it is of 
 
 D2 
 
6a Of the PL A TONIC TRINITY. 
 
 importance to investigate, by what means it gained 
 admission among men. For this purpose it will 
 be necessary to examine at large the writings of 
 Philo, an Hellenist Jew, who studied at Alex- 
 andria. 
 
 ■* ^ 
 
68 AN ENQUIRY INTO THE DOCTRINES OF 
 
 PHILO JTJDiEUS. 
 
 Num censes igitur subtiliore ratione opus esse ad hcec refellenda ? 
 Nam mentem, fidem, spem, viriutem, honorem, victoriam, salu- 
 tern, concordiam ceteraque ejusmodi, rerum vim habere vide- 
 mus, non Deorum. — Cic. de Nat. Deor. hi. 24. 
 
 TDEFOEE I enter upon this enquiry, I wish to 
 -^ remark, that it is confined entirely to the opi- 
 nions of Philo himself. I do not mean to deter- 
 mine any thing about the doctrines of the Jews 
 relative to the divine nature in the time of Philo : 
 though all expositions of them, which are founded 
 Upon different interpretations of Philo, must, as 
 far as they depend upon such interpretations, be 
 affected by my reasonings, if they be allowed to 
 be valid. Least of all would I have it supposed, 
 that I mean to deny that many passages of the 
 Old Testament refer to the second person of the 
 ever-blessed Trinity, when I deny that Philo's in- 
 terpretations of them have any such reference. 
 
 A distinguished 'writer upon this subject has 
 affirmed that Philo was not a Platonist. If he 
 69 had meant by this assertion that Philo did not 
 adopt all the opinions of Plato, it must have been 
 admitted. For it was scarcely possible for him to 
 do this, without abandoning the religion of his 
 fathers, which, with all his bias towards philo- 
 1 Allix's Judgment of the Jewish Church, p. 354. 
 
64 Doctrines of PHILO JUDJEUS. 
 
 sophy, he does not appear to have entertained any 
 thought of doing. But the author, to whom I 
 refer, goes farther. He says, Philo had been so 
 little acquainted with Plato's works, that he brings 
 some of Plato's opinions upon the credit of Aris- 
 totle 2 . It is a question of words, whether he 
 should be called a Platonist or an Eclectic ; be- 
 cause he did not abandon Judaism, and, embracing 
 all the opinions, prove his doctrines by the au- 
 thority of Plato. But it is of importance to the 
 present enquiry to shew, that Philo was so well 
 acquainted with the principles of Plato, that he 
 made great use of them in his own theological 
 works. 
 
 Philo has adopted Plato's division of things 
 into the two great classes, Intelligibles and Sen- 
 sibles (vorird Kal a'icrdr)Ta), the former of which he 
 characterizes in the language of Plato, as always 
 the same in their properties and relations (del 
 Kara ra avra Kai tfcraJrais eyovTa) ; but the latter 
 he states, on the contrary, to be subject to per- 
 
 veomfkio petual changes (fl-ae yap to alaBr/Tov ei> yevecret 
 Kal fxeraftoXals, ovoeTrore Kara rd aura ov.) Like 
 
 p. is. him in Philebus, he calls the stars living and intel- 
 
 ligent beings (£wd re etvai XeyovTai Kal £a)a voepd ;) 70 
 where likewise he says, that man derives his ideas 
 of music, and virtue, which consists in well-har- 
 monized affections, from the harmony that is con- 
 spicuous in the works of creation. From this men, 
 who were formed after them, inscribed on their 
 
 2 I presume he alludes to what Philo says, Tlepl \(p6ap<rlas 
 KSo-pov, p. 941. : 
 
Doctrines of PHILO JUDiEUS. 65 
 
 own souls, and delivered down the most necessary 
 and most profitable rules of life {a<f> %s o\ fierd p. ir. 
 Tavra avOpaiiroi eyy pcttyafxevoi Tails eavrwv y]/vj(ats 
 dvayKaioTaTyv /ecu w<pe\ina)TaTr]v Teyvriv Tip piip 
 Trap&Soaav. In conformity with this doctrine, he 
 styles wisdom a well-harmonized and completely 
 musical symphony of virtues (evdpfxocrTov ical irafi- JM c™ w . 
 fnovaov <rvn<pu>viuv apeTwv.) In the same language p 326 - 
 he describes vicious folly to be an inharmonious, 
 discordant, untuneful symphony (dvdpfuxrTov ko.1 p- 32a 
 eKixeXrj ko.1 a/iovaov avn<pwvlav.) Again, as Plato 
 in his Timceus calls time an image of eternity, 
 so Philo calls eternity the archetype and pattern 
 of time (dpxeTvirov tov yjpovou kcu vapdoeiyfxa %f%£™ 
 
 > / ., p. 298. 
 
 auev). 
 
 But, above all, it is most evident that he had 
 the Timceus of Plato in his eye when he wrote 
 his treatise of the Creation of the World, and that 
 he grounded his explanations upon the same prin- 
 ciples. Thus, having divided things into intel- 
 ligible, which are eternal, unchangeable and per- 
 manent ; and sensible, which are generated, are 
 71 changeable and fleeting; he enquires, whether the 
 world had a beginning. This question he answers 
 as readily as Plato did, and upon the same prin- 
 ciple : Since it is visible and the object of sense, it 
 must have been made (e-irel oi/v ojootos re ical alaOrj- [ P . 3.] 
 tos 606 o kocthos, avayicala) 1 } av e'/jj Kal yevtjTo?.) 
 This is precisely the reason which was before as- 
 signed by Plato in Timceus for the world's having 
 had a beginning: It was made; for it is visible 
 and tangible, and has a body, that is, a body of 
 
66 Doctrines of PHILO JUD^US. 
 
 [p. 28 b.] gross matter (yeyovev' oparos yap airTO<s re ean 
 Kai aw/ua e^uiv). 
 
 Again Philo tells us, that God foresaw that an 
 imitation could not be beautiful without a beau- 
 tiful pattern ; and that nothing material was fault- 
 less, which had not been framed according to an 
 archetype and intelligible idea. On this account, 
 when he resolved to create this visible world, he 
 first modelled the intelligible one, that by this 
 incorporeal and most divine pattern he might 
 construct the material world 3 . This material world", *]% 
 which was to be the image of the intelligible* 
 Was to contain as many kinds of sensible beings 
 as there were intelligibles in the pattern 4 . This 
 intelligible world, according to Philo, was com- 
 posed of ideas. It is not allowable, he said, to 
 affirm or suppose that it subsisted in any place. 
 But we shall know where it did subsist, by pur- 
 suing the analogy of things in ourselves 5 . When 
 a city is to be built for some great prince or poten- 
 tate, a man, well-instructed in architecture, comes 
 forward, and, having examined the situation, first 
 describes within himself almost all the parts of the 
 
 3 TLpoKa$a>v 6 6ebs are Gf or, ort plpr/pa Kakbv ovk av jrore 
 yevoiro Kakov 8ix a 7rapa8eiypaTos t ovde tl tcov ala&rjTtov aWTratnov, 
 b pfj 7rpos apx^TVirov Kai voryrrpi IBeav aTreiKovtadr], f$ovkrj8els top 
 oparbv tovtovL Koirfwv drjpiovpyrjo-ai, 7rpO€^€TV7T0V tov vorjrbu, Iva 
 Xpnp-evos aacopara Kai deoetBeo-TOTa irapaSeiypari, tov (TcopariKov 
 drrepya(TT]Tai, p. 3. In this passage he clearly had in his eye 
 the following one of Plato upon the same subject in the dia- 
 logue above mentioned : "Onov pcv ovv av 6 Srjptovpyos, tt/jos ro 
 Kara ravra t-^pv fikiirav aei, roiovra tw\ irpovxpripevos TrapaSeiy- 
 fiari rrpi I8edv Kai '8vvap.iv &irepyatj]Tai, Kakbv ef dvayKrjs ovrais 
 xiiroTeXetcroai Trav* oS 5' av els to yeyovbs, yevvrira irapabeiypati 
 
Doctrines of PHILO JUD^US. 67 
 
 city that is to be built, temples, places of exercise, 
 courts of justice, market-places, harbours, docks, 
 &c. Then, having received the types of each of 
 them in his mind, as in wax, he frames an intel- 
 ligible city, and stamps the images of the several 
 parts on his memory. To this model he looks 
 73 when he begins to execute his well-arranged plan 
 with stone and wood, making the material sub- 
 stances like each of the incorporeal ideas. Some- 
 thing of this kind must we conceive of God, who, 
 having purposed to build a capital city, Erst ima- 
 gined the types of it ; of which he constituted the 
 intelligible world, and then used it as a pattern, 
 when he finished the sensible world. As there- 
 fore the city, predelineated in the architect, had 
 no external place, but was stamped upon the mind 
 of the artist ; in the same manner also the world 
 composed of ideas cannot have any other place 
 than the divine intellect, which arranged it. 
 
 Having discoursed a little upon the cause of 
 God's creating the world, he returns to his ana- 
 logy. If, says he, any one would use plain words, 
 unadorned by figures, he would say, that the intel- 
 
 7rpo<rxp(ipevos, ov koKov, p. 28. [b]. 
 
 4 Upeo-ftwepov vewrepov dirciKovurpa, Toaavra irepU^ovra al- 
 oSrjTa ytvrj, oo-airep iv iiieivio votjto, [p. 3.] This is evidently 
 taken from the description which Plato gave of the pattern, 
 according to which the Creator formed the present world : to. 
 yap br) vorjra £toa Travra eKslvo iv iavra ireptkafibv ex«» Kada-irep ode 
 
 6 Koapos iJ/^Sff, oo-a re aWa dpippara avvio-TTjicev opara. [Timceus, 
 
 p. 30 D.] 
 
 5 Tbv Se €K Taif l&env o-vveoTutra Koo~pov iv to7Tg> tiv\ Xiyeiv rj 
 vnovoelv, ov Qepnov jj 8' iKpco~Tr]Kev elaopefla, TrapaKoXovdrjo-avTes 
 eUopi TU/J tS>v Trap' fjpiv. [p. 4] . 
 
 D5 
 
68 Doctrines of PHILO JUDJEUS. 
 
 ligible world is nothing else but the 6 intellect of 
 God, while he was now making the world. For 
 the intelligible city is nothing else but the rea- 
 soning of the architect, while he is now projecting 
 to build the material city. 
 
 The plain meaning of all this is, that the 
 divine Being, when he purposed to create the 
 world, first conceived ideas of the several parts 74 
 of which it was to consist. These ideas he formed 
 into one plan, and thus constituted the intelligible 
 world. This he used as a pattern in his creation 
 of the material world, which he made to corre- 
 spond with it in every particular, the several sub- 
 stances which composed the one answering to the 
 several ideas which composed the other. It is not 
 allowable to assert or suppose that this intelligible 
 world, thus composed of ideas, had a real and 
 external existence, as some philosophers may have 
 maintained. It was no more than the ideal plan 
 in the intellect of the Creator ; in the same manner 
 as the ideal plan of a city, which is to be built, 
 subsists only in the intellect of the architect, and 
 has no existence external to it. So that, to use 
 plain language, the intelligible world is nothing 
 else but the reasoning of God, when he was about 
 to create the material world ; just as the intel- 
 
 6 If the reader wishes to see a complete specimen of the 
 exertions of a subtle genius in support of a system, let him look 
 into Norris's Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World. He will 
 there see how much that ingenious writer, aided by St Augustin 
 and Malebranche, could extract from this doctrine. 
 
 1 T&v fieXKovrav anoreXeicrdai <ra>p.dTaiv do-cofiarovs ISeas rrj 
 V™X3 dewpmv, irpos as efiei, KaBairfp an dp^irxmov ypa<pfjs ical 
 
Doctrines of PHIL O J U DUETTS. fy 
 
 ligible city was only the reasoning of the architect, 
 when he was about to build a material city. 
 
 He uses the same language in the third book 
 of the Life of Moses, when he is speaking of the 
 pattern of the tabernacle and the several parts 
 of the furniture of it, which was shewed to Moses 
 in the mount, and according to which he formed 
 the earthly tabernacle. The incorporeal ideas, 
 which were impressed upon his mind, served as 
 75 a pattern according to which he formed the mate- 
 rial objects*. 
 
 Philo was not satisfied with giving this general 
 account of the nature of the intelligible world. He 
 proceeded to state the principal parts of which 
 it was composed, and the order in which they were 
 framed. First, the Creator formed in the intel- 
 ligible world an incorporeal heaven and an invisible 
 earth, and the idea of air, and a void : then the 
 incorporeal essence of water, and breath or spirit, 
 and light, which was also incorporeal, and the intel- 
 ligible pattern of the sun, and of all the luminous 
 stars, that were to subsist throughout the heaven. 
 
 In his treatise Uepl rov tis 6 Twi^&e'uov rrpay- 
 fxaTwv KXrjpovo/xos, he attributes the formation of 
 things to the art of God (»; tov Qeov Teyyr\ — P . 502. 
 $e<*r)miovpyi]xe.) And again he styles nature the 
 sacred logos or reason (»} <pvcn<s — o \epo\ Xoyoi). p-506. 
 
 vorjTcav TrapabeiyixaTOiv alo-dijra fiip.rjjjiaTa a.7T£iKovio-8rjvai 6 p.ev ovv 
 
 TUiros tov irapafteiypaTos eveo~<ppayi£tTO rfj biavoiq tov irpo(pi]Tov t 
 dia^coypacpovfievos Kai 7rpo8iairkaTT6p.evos atpavas avev v\rjs dopaTois 
 €i8e<n' to S 1 a7rorc\e<rjUa irpos rbv tvttov cfijj/uoupyeiTO, ivairojiaT- 
 Topevov Tas o~(f>payi$as tov ts^vitov Tals irpoo-<p6pois eKaarm likiKais 
 ovaiais. [p. 665.] 
 
70 Doctrines of PHILO JUDJEUS. 
 
 If it had been the professed design of Philo 
 to guard against the possibility of annexing a dis- 
 tinct personality to Aoyos 0e?os or Aoyos Qeov, 
 which I have rendered ' the divine intellect ' and 
 ' the intellect of God,' I do not see how he could 76 
 have used terms more precise, or illustrations more 
 apposite. 
 
 Yet the author, to whom I before referred, has 
 maintained that the passages in Philo for the exist- 
 ence of the Aoyos, as a person coeternal with the 
 Father, are so evident, that they cannot be denied. 
 Indeed he conceives them to be so evident, that, 
 though he has quoted abundantly upon the same 
 subject from the Chaldee Paraphrasts, yet he rests 
 the weight of his cause upon Philo, who, he says, 
 writ much larger and clearer than they did ; and 
 will contribute to explain some of the quotations 
 p 146 - taken out of the Paraphrases in use at Babylon and 
 Jerusalem. 
 
 However, notwithstanding this confidence in 
 the authority of Philo, and in the propriety of his 
 own interpretations of his doctrines, he makes 
 some concessions, which detract much from the 
 efficacy of either the authority or the interpreta- 
 tion. ' After all that I have alleged from Philo 
 and the Paraphrases' says he, ' I do not pretend 
 to affirm that they had as distinct notions of the 
 Trinity as we have ; nor do I deny but that some- 
 times they put a different construction on the 
 texts which we have cited in proof of this mys- 
 tery : nay, I own that their ideas are often , con- 
 fused when they speak of these things, and par- 
 
Doctrines of PHILO JUMEUS. 7 1 
 
 77 ticularly they refer sometimes that to the second 
 person which should be ascribed to the third, and 
 that to the third which properly belongs to the 
 second.' 
 
 But this is not all. He allows that Philo, in 
 one instance at least, fell into error by endea- p is*- 
 vouring to accommodate Moses his notions to 
 the notions of a particular philosophy. He next 
 admits that Philo, who had gathered his notions, 
 as other Jews did, from reading the books of the 
 Old Testament, together with their traditional in- 
 terpretations, was not so much a master of them 
 as to make them always consist with one another. 
 In the next sentence he does not deny that Philo pp. 155, iss. 
 was not constant to himself. Indeed he could 
 not deny this ; as he had himself before charged 
 him with inconsistency, in making God, when he 
 was engaged in his work of creation, address him- d? confusion. 
 
 o " Lvig. p. 349. 
 
 to the angels, and employ them as assistants in 
 his work. pp. 128, 129. 
 
 An animated and ingenious 8 writer of the pre- 
 
 6 Whitaker, in his History of Arianism. Without entering 
 into the general merits of the question discussed by this learned 
 author, I beg leave to make a remark upon his interpretation 
 of a passage of Scripture, which appears to me not to be well 
 founded. St Matthew, xxii. 34, tells us, that when our Saviour 
 had answered the ensnaring question of the Sadducees con- 
 cerning the resurrection, the Pharisees also assembled, and put 
 a question to him on their part. St Mark, xii. 28, informs us, 
 that the Pharisee who put the question was a scribe. But Mr 
 W. asserts, that these scribes were outwardly Pharisees and in- 
 wardly Sadducees, that they came in to the aid of the baffled 
 Sadducees, and that our Saviour alluded to this repugnance 
 between their external profession and internal sentiments, when 
 
72 Doctrines of PHILO JUD^EUS. 
 
 sent day, who has trodden boldly in the steps of 78 
 Allix, and enforced the same mode of interpreta- 
 tion with great energy, has been obliged, in sup- 
 port of that mode, to impute to Philo not only 
 p 36. exertions of his fancy at the expence of his judg- 
 p. 107. ment, but also a spirit of subtilizing being into 
 power, and of dividing the Logos in two. 
 
 I readily allow that Philo's interpretations of 79 
 Scripture are generally very fanciful, and that 
 his works exhibit a curious mixture of Pagan phi- 
 losophy and Rabbinical learning. But I am per- 
 suaded that many of those inconsistencies, and all 
 
 he addressed this question to them, 'What think ye of Christ? 
 Whose son is he?' 
 
 I dissent from this explanation for the following reasons. First, 
 Neither of the Evangelists, who mention the transaction, give 
 any direct intimation that they were inwardly Sadducees. They 
 call them simply either Pharisees or scribes. Secondly, St Mark 
 says, that the scribe who put the question to Jesus knew that 
 he had answered the Sadducees properly (etdws, on xa\as airois 
 aweKpidtj). This he would not have known, or have thought, if 
 he had been a Sadducee. Thirdly, St Mark says, that Jesus, 
 perceiving that the scribe who had asked him the question, 
 replied intelligently (wwe^Bi), said to him, ' Thou art not far 
 from the kingdom of God.' Fourthly, St Mark says, 'That 
 Christ, as he was teaching publickly in the temple, asked, How 
 say the scribes, that Christ is the son of David ? ' Whereby it 
 seems to be implied, not merely, that it was the opinion of those 
 particular men then present, but that it was the established 
 opinion of the doctors of the Law. Fifthly, the question is 
 put by St Luke, xx. 41, in terms still more general : ' How say 
 they, that Christ is David's son ? ' By this it may be intimated, 
 that it was the received opinion of the Jews in general at that 
 time. Mr Whitaker supposes, that a difference between the 
 opinion of the scribes and that of the people at large is inti- 
 mated by the evangelist, Mark xii. 37, when he subjoins, ' the 
 common people heard him gladly.' It is surely taking too much 
 for granted to maintain, that our Saviour's reasons would not 
 
Doctrines of PIIILO JTJDjEUS. 73 
 
 that spirit of subtilizing being into power, with 
 80 which he has been charged, are not justly to be 
 imputed to him, but to his interpreters, who have 
 not attended to the avowed design of his writings, 
 and to the principles which he laid down for the 
 accomplishment of that design. 
 
 The design itself he declares explicitly in his 
 Treatise Hepl "Euyxucrews AidXeKTwv ; in which he cp- 319 J 
 undertakes to shew, that under the literal nar- 
 rative is contained a moral or spiritual meaning, 
 which is to be considered as the true sense, the other 
 being only a shadow 9 . After he had gone through 
 
 hare been able to work conviction in the people, unless they had 
 been ' consentaneous to all their notions of the Messiah,' p. 410. 
 It is fully as natural to suppose, that the common people, not hay- 
 ing speculated so much upon the subject, and being less enslaved 
 by preconceived opinions and rooted prejudices, were more open 
 to conviction, and more ready to acknowledge the justness of his 
 reasonings. St Mark, vi. 20, uses the same expression, when he 
 speaks of the manner in which Herod heard John the Baptist j 
 in which passage it is scarcely to be conceived that he has any 
 allusion to Herod's preconceived opinions. Again, in the Acts 
 of the Apostles, xvii. 11, it is said, 'That tho Bereans received 
 the word with all readiness of mind,' (jiera iraarjs npodvfiias). 
 Yet this word, which they thus received, appears to have been 
 so far from being consentaneous to all their previous notions of 
 the Messiah, that they searched the Scriptures daily, to see 
 whether those things were so. Sixthly, These men must have 
 been very shallow pretenders indeed, if, when a question of 
 that kind was asked them in public by a person, whom they had 
 obviously been endeavouring to ensnare, they should immedi- 
 ately return an answer according to their concealed opinions 
 and not according to their outward profession. Without, there- 
 fore, forming a precise opinion of the system maintained by the 
 learned author, I think he can derive no support for it from the 
 transaction in question. 
 
 9 Origen adopted from Philo the principal of allegorizing the 
 Scriptures. His account of it is thus rendered by his transla- 
 
74 Doctrines of PHILO JUMEUS. 
 
 [p. 347.] the whole of his explanation, These, says he, are 
 my opinions. Others, following the plain and ob- 
 vious meaning of the words, think that the origin 
 of the Greek and Barbarian languages is here 
 described. I do not censure them. Perhaps they 
 also give a true account. I would, however, ex-, 
 hort them not to rest in it, but to pass on to the 
 figurative interpretations, and assure themselves 
 that the literal circumstances recorded in the 
 Scriptures are, as it were, shadows of bodies, but 
 that the qualities indicated by them are the things 81 
 which in reality subsist 10 . 
 
 It is natural to suppose, that a man who deals 
 in such subtilties should occasionally vary in the 
 degrees of his refinements. He may also naturally 
 be expected to be sometimes led into a seeming 
 inaccuracy of expression, by his having in some re- 
 spects adopted the sentiments and in more respects 
 the expressions of Plato. But it is not so natural 
 to suppose that he should argue upon contradictory 
 principles, which are generally the result of cooler 
 judgment and more deliberate consideration. Nor 
 is it quite so customary for a writer to subtilize 
 being into power, as it is to personify power, and 
 by so doing to invest it with a figurative being. 
 But whatever judgment may be formed of these 
 
 tor : Cum ergo de his talibus et horum. similibus Spiritui Sancto 
 esset intentio illuminare sanctas animas, quae se mysterio dederant 
 veritatis; se,cundo loco habetur Me prospectus, ut propter eos, qui vel 
 non possent vel nollent huic se labori atque industrice tradere, quo 
 hcec tanta et talia doceri vel agnoscere mererentur, involveret et 
 occultaret sermonibus usitatis sub praetextu histories cujusdam et 
 warrationis rerum visibilium arcana mysteria. — Tlepi 'Apx&ii. 
 Lib. iv. cap. 11. 
 
Doctrines of PHILO JUDJETJS. 75 
 
 observations, every body, I think, must allow, that 
 Philo himself is the best explainer of his own prin- 
 ciples; and that those, which he has exhibited in 
 Tiis cooler moments, must be the genuine interpre- 
 tations of them, how extravagantly soever he may 
 seem to have refined upon them in the fervor of 
 his imagination. 
 
 I have already shewn how careful he was to in- 
 culcate upon his readers, in the beginning of his 
 treatise Tlepl KoanoTroi'ias, that noa/uos vo^ros, which 
 he placed in the intellect of the Deity, and which 
 he sometimes denominated the divine intellect, 
 82 meant nothing more than the abstract design or 
 the reason of God, when he purposed to create the 
 
 (world ; and was similar to the plan of a city formed 
 in the mind of an architect. Most of the authors 
 who have written upon this subject, instead of tak- 
 ing this declaration as a guide, when they examine 
 what Mr Whitaker calls the exertions of his fancy 
 at the expence of his judgment, have collected a 
 multitude of detached passages seemingly attribut- 
 ing a direct personality and agency to the \070s, 
 and have applied the conclusions, deduced from 
 them, to what they call an explanation of this clear 
 and explicit declaration. I shall therefore take the 
 several appellations by which the Logos has been 
 
 10 [TavTa piv fiiiets' oi fie Tots epxj)ave&i Ka\ irpo^eipois povov 
 eiraKokovdovvres oiovrai yeveaiv SiaXe/crav 'EWyvcov re Kal Bapj3a- 
 pmp vTroypd<j)ecr6aL — obs ovk av alrtao-apevos — uras yap akrjdei 
 
 Kal avToi xP&vrai Xoyft) TrapaneXevaaifi' av, pfj eVl tovt<ov o-rrjvaty 
 
 jierekdeiv fie eVl ras rpomKas dirodoa-eis, voplaavras ra ph> prjra rav 
 Xprjo-poiv o-Ktds Ttvas too-avei aaparcov eipai, ras 5* ipifiaivopevas 
 Swdpeis xa i<f>etTTcoTa okr/deia irpdypara!\ 
 
•;6 Doctrines of PHILO JUDjEUS. 
 
 denominated, and consider a few instances under 
 each, which may serve to explain all others of the 
 same class. 
 
 First, we will consider it as being the image of 
 [ugisAiiegw. God (eiKwv) and the shadow of God (cncia). Philo 
 
 in. § 31, p. v # / _ . 
 
 79 •' has explicitly declared, in the explanation of Bese- 
 
 leel, how /cdoyios i/ojjtos, the intelligible world, the 
 reason or intellect of God, the abstract form of 
 the universe, is entitled to these appellations. 
 " The shadow of God is his \oyos, or reason, which 
 he used as an instrument or organ, when he made 
 the WQrld. This shadow and image is also another 
 archetype. For as God is the pattern of the image 
 which we have now called the shadow; in the same 
 manner the image is the pattern of other things 11 ." 
 Having thus shewn that the pattern and shadow 83 
 and image are relative terms, and that koct/uos voijtos, 
 the intelligible world, which he also calls \6yos Oeov, 
 and which is the pattern of the sensible world, is 
 also itself the shadow or image of God, he pro- 
 ceeds to shew in what sense it is the shadow. 
 
 [§ 32, p. 79] " The wisest philosophers have maintained, that it 
 
 H [2/aa Oeov 5e 6 \6yos aiirov eariv, tp KaOdnep opydva 7rpo- 
 (rxpri<rafievos CKOo-poTroiei. Avtt) Se t) mem Kai to atravci diteiKd- 
 purfia ereptav eoriv ap^ervtrov, Qo-irep yap 6 Oebs irapdbeeypa rfjs 
 (Ikovos, tjv o-Kiav wvX KeieKijKev, ouTtor rj elxav aXKav yiyverai irapa- 
 Seiyjua.] 
 
 12 [Of SoKovvres apurra (pikocroepetv etpatrav, 8n carb rov Kocrjuov 
 feat ratv fiepav clvtov Kai t5>v ewrrap^ovo'av tovtois Svvapeav avri- 
 \rjijriv e7roirjtrdp,eda rov alriov. Qcnrcp yap ei ns iSot deSrjfitovp' 
 yr/pevr/v olxtav e'lripeXas, irpmrvKaiois, aroats, dvSpacri, yvvaiKavinm, 
 toXs SKKois olKo8ofirifiatnv, tvvoiav \rfyerai rov rfxybrov, — oi yap 
 avev rexyr)s Kai brjpiovpyov vofuet rr)v olieiav diroTeXeadijvai, rbv 
 airov Si rpoirov Kai e'jrl TrdXecoy, xai veu>s , Kai iravrbs eXarroj/or rj 
 
Doctrines of PHIL JUDjEUS. 11 
 
 is from the world and its parts and their powers 
 that we must derive our conception of its author. 
 For if a person should see a house, a city, a tem- 
 ple, or any other building, constructed with their 
 several parts harmonizing with each other, he would 
 form a conception of an artist. For he would sup- 
 pose that those things could not have been exe- 
 cuted without skill and a builder. So also, when a 
 person has entered into this world, as into a very 
 great house or city, and has beheld the heaven re- 
 volving in a circle, and all things contained within 
 it ; and the planets and fixed stars moving harmo- 
 niously, &c. — and moreover, living beings, mortal 
 and immortal, and different kinds of plants and 
 fruits; he will truly reason, that those things were not 
 formed without perfect art ; but that God was and 
 is the disposer of this universe. They, who reason 
 thus, have a conception of God by means of his 
 shadow, forming a notion of the artist by means of 
 his works 12 . 
 84 . The plain meaning of this is, that the mind of 
 man in its natural state, represented by Beseleel, 
 is not able by its own strength to attain any idea 
 
 fxelfrvos Ka.Ta<TK(va<r[iaTos own 81) Ktzi cl<rek6dv ris cJoTTep els 
 
 peylarqp olkiav fj 776k1.11 TOvfte tqv Kotrfiov, Kai 6eaaap.evos ovpavbv 
 cV Kvxkta irepnroXovvra, Kai iravra cvtos ovveikrjtpora, jfKavrjTas Se 
 Kai aTrkavels dcrepas Kara Tavra Kai cScaurcas Ktvovpivovs, ep/ieXas 
 re xai ivapjtovlas, Kai ti5 iravrl <&(piklpa>s, -fiv 8e top petrairaTov 
 %apov Xa^ovaav, v&aros re Kai depos xuaeis ev fiedopitp reraypivas, 
 en 8e f(3a Bvryra re av Kai dOavara, Kai (pvrav Kai Kaprtatv 8m<popas, 
 Xoyieirai 8ij7rov, on raira ovk avev jii(yx\s wavreKovs 6e6riptoipyrjTai, 
 aXAa Kai rjv Kai eoTw 6 roSSe tov iravrbs Srjfjuovpyos 6 6eos. Ot 8q 
 ovtws iitikoyi£6p.evoi, 8«a a-Kias tov 8ebv KaTakafificnioviTi, 810 rav 
 epyav rbv Te^vLTrjv Karavoovvres.] 
 
-?8 Doctrines of PHILO JUDJEUS. 
 
 of the Deity, but by contemplating those marks of 
 his attributes which he has impressed upon his 
 works. These exhibit an image and reflect a 
 
 [§33, p. 79.] shadow of the Supreme self-existent Being. But 
 the perfect and thoroughly-purified mind, repre- 
 sented by Moses, which is initiated into the great 
 mysteries, does not acquire its knowledge of the 
 author from the things that were made, of the per-* 
 manent being from the shadow ; but, rising above 
 what was made, receives a manifest representation 
 of him, so as to derive from himself a conception 
 of him and his shadow, which was, his Logos and 
 this world 13 . 
 
 This process of the understanding in tracing out 
 the Deity through the sensible and intelligible 
 world is described in a similar manner in his Trea- 
 
 [p. is, §23.] tise Yiepl Ko<tixottouck. "The mind, having tra- 
 versed sea and land, and surveyed the several na- 
 tures, rises into the air, and examines its several 
 productions; whence it is carried higher into the 
 ether and the heavenly courses of the stars. 
 Thence, led by a love of wisdom, it is elevated 
 
 13 [*Eori &e Tis TeXetoTepos Kal fiaXXov KSKadapfiivos vovs, fa 
 fxeydXa p.vo~Ti]pia pvtjOeis, otrris ovk dno tcHv yeyovdrav to ainov 
 yva>pi£ei, as av diro o~Kcas t6 pevov dXX* virepKvtyas to yevvrjTov, 
 %[i<fiao~iv ivapyfj tov dyevvrjTov \ap,/3dvet t as an avrov avrov Kara- 
 Xapjidveiv, ami tx\v rnadv avrov, oirep ijv, tov tc Xoyov Kal Tovfie tov 
 K6crpov.~\ 
 
 14 [Kai renvois Kal eVionfpKs ?roXvcrx'8e(f re avarepvav oSovs, 
 Kal Xeaxpopovs ando-as, Sta yrjs ep^crat Kal OaXaTTrfSf tcl ev eKaripa 
 (pvosi diepevvapevos. Kal ndXiv tttjjvos dpdels, Kal tov depa Kal ra 
 tovtov TradnpaTa KaTao-Keyjrdpevos, dvaTepay (peperat rrpos aldepa Kal 
 Tas ovpavlovs ireptofiovs. HXovtjtcov re Kal dirXavav ^opelais ovp* 
 'irepijroXrjSfls Kara roils rrjs povo-iKrjs reXei'ous vdpovs, iiropevos epu>rt 
 o-o<pias 7rodr]yeTovvTi, irdcrav ttjv. alo-8i]T^v ovo-Lav ijrepKvyjras, fv- 
 
Doctrines of PHIL JUD^EUS. 79 
 
 above all sensible, and advances to the intelligible 
 85 essence ; and, having contemplated in it the patterns 
 and ideas of those sensible things which it saw here, 
 surpassing beauty, it is seized with a sober ebriety, 
 and grows frantic like the Corybantes, being filled 
 with a different and better desire and longing, by 
 which it is conducted to the very highest top of 
 the intelligibles, and seems to proceed to the great 
 king himself. But while it desires to see him, the 
 pure and unmixed splendors of heavenly light rush 
 forth as a torrent, so as to darken the eye of the 
 understanding with their brightness 14 ." 
 
 Moreover, the Deity is said to be attended by 
 two shadows, which are also called 15 powers ($uvd 7 
 nets), De Abrahamo, p. 367. By means of these 
 there is a threefold representation of one subject. 
 Not that, properly speaking, there can be any 
 shadows of God ; but the term is used in a figura- 
 tive sense to assist the illustration of the subject. 
 In the middle is the Father of all, who is called in 
 the Holy Scriptures the existent Being, and on 
 each hand are the oldest and nearest powers of the 
 
 Tavda enteral rfjs vorjTrje. Kal mv eiSev ivraiiBa aiaOryrav, ev eKelprj 
 ra irapaheiypara Kal raj Ideas deaaapevos, VTrepfiaWovra KaXkt], 
 pedij vrj<pakiw Karao-xedels, aanep oi Kopvf3avTiwvTes, hdovviq, 
 ere'pov yepioSels ipepov Kal <n66ov fieXrlovos, icf>' oi irpbs Tqv aKpav 
 a\jri8a irapairepCpSels t&v votjt&v in avrov Xevai Sokci top peyav 
 $ao-ikea. T\ixop.ivov he l&eiv, Beiov (fxaros aKparoi Kal apiyeis avyal 
 Xupappov rpoirov eKxeovrai, ms rats pappapvyais to ttjs htavoias 
 Sppa ovcoTodmap.] 
 
 15 Plato in his Dialogue De Rep. Lib. v. p. 477. [c], gives this 
 definition of powers : <br\<ropev hvvdpeis elvai yivos n ovrav, ah 817 
 Kal fipets Svv&peda a Svvapeda — and knowledge he denominates 
 the most energetic of all powers : Ilaow ye hvvapeav eppapeve- 
 <rTarr]v. 
 
80 Doctrines of PHILO JUDjEUS. 
 
 existent Being, which are denominated the creative 
 and the regal powers. The creative power is God ; 
 for by this he founded and arranged the world. ! 
 The regal power is Lord ; for that which made has 
 a just right to control and govern what is made. 
 Thus, being in the middle, and attended by each of 
 his powers, he presents an appearance sometimes of 
 one, sometimes of three : of one, to the completely 
 purified mind that can attain to the simple and 
 complete idea without any other aid ; of three, to 
 the mind that cannot form a conception of exist- 
 ence from itself alone without something else, but 
 conceives of it from its actions either as creating 
 or as governing 16 . 
 
 When the supreme Being is called the existent, 
 he is spoken of in an absolute sense, and by his 
 proper denomination (icupiws) ; but when he is called 
 God, it is catachrestieally: for those several powers, 
 which he exerted in the creation, express not the 
 
 * 8 [M^ pivroi vofwrara tis eVi 6eov ras <riaas nvpioXoyeia-Bai' 
 Karaxprjais ovSparos avro povov carl, irpos ivapyeoripav epJpacrtv 
 tov brjKovpevov npdypaTos. *E7rei to ye aKr]6es ov% ovnas ix €l * 
 aXV eanv, as av tis Trjs akydetas iyyvTara lo'Tapevos ewroi, iraTrjp 
 jiev rav o\a>v 6 peaos, os iv rais If pais ypa(pais Kvpiq ov6pan 
 KaktiTai 6 "Qv at be wap* e/carepa irpepfivTaTai Kal eyyvrarai tov 
 ovtos bvvdpeis, Sv ij pev iroirjTiKrj, rj de av ^ao-iKiKr/ Trpoa-ayopeveTai. 
 Kal ij pev JTOM/TtKq Beos- TavTjj yap idr/Ks tc Kai SieKoo-prjo-e tA 
 7rSv. 'H 8c ftao-iKucfi Kvpios- Blpis yap ap^eiv Kal Kpareiv t& 
 77eiroir}Kos tov yevopevov. Aopv<popovpevos ovv 6 peo'os v<p* eKarepas 
 Tap bvvdpeav Trape^ec T% opaTiKQ hiavoiq Ton pev evbs, Tore be 
 rpiav (pavracrlav evos pev, orav &Kpa>s KaBapBe'iaa i) '^fVX'l' Kal M 
 povov Ta irkrjdr] Tap dpidp&v, dWa Kal Trjv yeiTova povdbos bvdba 
 imepfiao-a, npos Tt)v apiyfj Kal do-ipnkoKOV Kal Kaff avTrjv oibevos 
 embea to irapdirav Iheav eVe/yi/raf Tpiav be, orav prjiru ras peya- 
 \as TekeaBela-a TeXeraf, in ev Tais Ppaxyripais 6pyid(rjTai, Kal prj 
 
Doctrines of PHILO JUD^US. 81 
 
 principle of his existence, but his relations to other 
 things {varavel irpos t'i). As, when his regal and 
 beneficent powers are spoken of, he must be a king 
 of some thing, and a benefactor of some thing; 
 that which is governed or benefited being alto- 
 gether distinct from it. Akin to these is also his 
 creative power, which is called God: for by this 
 power, the father, who begat and framed, establish- 
 ed all things. Hepl rwv MeTovofnaXfifiLevaiv, p. 1048. 1,r 
 It may be proper to observe, that in the former 
 instances which I quoted, the image, or shadow of 
 87 God, is spoken of as one, as it referred to that 
 power of God which was delineated and shadowed 
 out in the creation of the world ; but in the latter 
 quotations, there is also another shadow of him, as 
 governor and judge of that world which he created. 
 Those who have maintained from this and other 
 similar passages, that Philo had a knowledge of a 
 plurality of persons in the Godhead, have done it 
 principally to shew, that he had a more accurate 
 
 ftvvrjTai to ov Svev erepov Tivbs i£ avTov povov KaTakafielv, aXKa bia 
 Tav dpapivcov, fj kti£ov rj ap^ovJ] 
 
 H ['AXXa yap ovd" enelvo wpoarJKev ayvoitv, on to iyd dpi 
 #e6s trbs XeyeTat Kara^pijo'TiKas ov fcvpias. To yap ov, § ov iaTiv, 
 oi^i rav np6s ii' avrb yap eavrov wXiJpes, Kai airb cavra iKavbv, 
 Ka\ npb ttjs tov Kotrpov yevecreas, Kai pera rfjv ylveaiv tov Travrbs iv 
 opoia. "Arpewrov yap Kai a/ieTajSXijrov, XP$£ 0V erepov to irapairav 
 ovoevbs, more auToC p£v chat to iravra, prjSevbs fie Kvpias atrA. 
 T<S» fie bwipeav, as ereivev els yeveo-w iif evepyeo-iq tov avara- 
 Bevros, ivlas <ru/ij3e/37j« \eyea6ai daavel irpos n, TrjV (BacnXiKrjv, Ti)i» 
 etepyeriKyv fiao-Ckevs yap twos Kai evepyeTr/s nvbs, erepov iravras 
 fiao-Ckevopevov Kai eiepyeTovpevov. Tourmp avyyevrjs iori Kai ij 
 noirjTiKrj dvvapis, 17 Kakovpevt] Beos' fica yap tovttjs ttjs bwapeas 
 eBtjKe tcl iravra 6 yevvr\o-as (cot Te\viTevo-as iraTr)p, tSore to " iyd 
 dpi debs cros" io-ov «jtI ru "iyd elpi jraiijrqs Kai fiij/itovpydj."] 
 
82 Doctrines of PHILO JUDjEUS. 
 
 knowledge of the divine nature than he could be 
 supposed to have had, if he had conceived it to 
 have been in all respects a simple monad, as much 
 one in personality as in essence. Whereas Philo 
 says, that the terms are catachrestically used which 
 represent him under the appearance of three, as 
 the existent 18 Being attended on either hand by 
 those two of his powers which were first exerted, 
 and are most closely and intimately connected with 
 his essence, viz. first, his power of creation, and ! 
 secondly, his power of governing that which he had 
 created. 
 
 This mode of expression and illustration was 
 adopted, he said, in order to aid the conceptions 
 of imperfect minds, which are unable to compre-> 
 hend the simplicity of one self-existent, independent 
 being, and by arguing a priori to perceive how 
 from this pure essence as from their proper foun- 
 tain, proceed the powers of creation and govern- 
 ment, and the several objects upon which those 
 powers are to be employed. Finite intelligences, 
 which cannot thus contemplate him at once in his 
 essence, are obliged as it were to divide him, and 
 view him in detached parts in his acts, but chiefly 
 
 18 Origen in his first Homily on Isaiah, viz. on chapter vi., 
 seems to have derived his ideas from hence, when he is ex- 
 plaining the vision of the Lord sitting upon a throne high and 
 lifted up, surrounded by Seraphim. The passage is thus ren- 
 dered by his translator : Si video eum regnantem coelestibus 
 virtutibus, video eum sedentem super thronum excelsum et 
 elevatum. Quid est, quod dicit, Coelestibus virtutibus ? Throni, 
 dominationes, principatus, potestates, virtutes ccelestes sunt. — » 
 Qua: sunt ista duo Seraphim ? Dominus meus Jesus et Spiritus 
 Sanctus. Testimonium enim dat Scriptura, quia ejus mundan- 
 
Doctrines of PHILO JUDJEUS. 83 
 
 in those acts of his which are prior in time to all 
 others, most immediately arise out of his essence, 
 and extend to all created beings, viz. his acts of 
 creation and government. Thus arguing a poste- 
 riori they ascend to the summit of intelligibles, 
 and there contemplate images of the power and 
 goodness of the first cause impressed upon his 
 works, and catch as it were a shadow of him who 
 cannot be contemplated in his essence. 
 
 These powers are called (Ile^t Xepovfil/x, p. 112) 
 his goodness and authority or sovereign power, and 
 are denominated the two highest and first powers 
 belonging to the one truly existing God. By his 
 89 goodness he created the universe, and by his sove- 
 reign authority he governs what he created. Be- 
 tween both these is his \070s, which is expressed 
 by the symbol of the flaming sword. This con- 
 nects them together; for it is by his X070S that 
 God is governor and good. This preceded all 
 things, and was meditated before all things, and is 
 conspicuous in all things 19 . Here \6yos is the plan, 
 the design, by which (to speak after the manner of 
 men) God acted in the creation and government of 
 the world. The unity of design in both so con- 
 nects his goodness and authority, that there are 
 
 tur labia ab uno ex seraphim, qui missus est ad auferenda ejus 
 peccata. Unus autem ex seraphim Dominus meus Jesus Chris- 
 tus est, qui ad auferenda peccata nostra a patre missus est. 
 
 19 [p. 113. *EA.eye de fioi, Kara tov eva ovrtos oWa 6ebv bvo ras 
 ava>Tara> eivai Kai irpdras Svvaueis, dyadorrjTa Ka\ iijovo-iav. Kai 
 ayaSoTrjTi p.ev to Trap yey evvrjKevat, e^ovala Se tov yevvrjdevTos ap^civ. 
 Tpirov 8c crvvaycoybv a/Kpoiv p-eaov thai \6yov \6yta yap Kai 
 ap%ovTa ku\ ayaObv eivai tov 6gov. avrb iravra obdavav irapTjpel- 
 ifraTo, Kal irpb iravrav voovfievov Kai eVri irao~i tpaiv6p,eyov~]. 
 
 MORGAN E 
 
84 Doctrines of PHILO JUDjEUS. 
 
 manifest indications of each in the acts of the 
 other. 
 
 When the general design of the universe, form- 
 ed by the existent Being, is spoken of, it is called 
 \6yos. His several designs of the separate parts, 
 though included in the general design, are called 
 plurally \6yoi, and are said to be sent, as well as 
 nepi toS the singular: rows eavrov Xoyovs GiriKovplas evem 
 &4' 5 2>w- T< "" (pi^apeTwv atrosTeWei. By these powers was 
 S.Vms-*" formed the incorporeal and intelligible world, the 
 archetype of this which appears, being composed 
 of invisible ideas, as this is of visible bodies. 
 Hep;™; The supreme Being is perpetually said to be 
 
 on arpeiTTOv 
 
 ^solns'ai surrounded by these powers, as guards of state and 90 
 attending ministers, Sopv(popov/xei"p irpos tcov Svvd- 
 peoov. 
 
 Not to mention that Isocrates uses the same 
 expression to signify a person's being guarded by 
 the good-will of the citizens (tj5 twv ttoXItuv evvolq. 
 
 £. e l ?a""" r ' 1 82 <'°P v( P P '"f x evo$'); Philo uses it to express the human 
 mind's being attended by the senses, whose busi- 
 ness it is to furnish it with notices of colours, 
 
 ■Btpmiyx- sounds, tastes, and smells. Again, wealth, fflorv. 
 
 SiaA. p. 822, ° > o J > 
 
 !"t5;£. T ° B and honours, are said to be the attendant ministers 
 
 p ' m - (J)opv<p6poi) of the body, the senses those of the 
 
 "aw™' SOuI ' A-g*™' reasons are said to be the attendants 
 
 p. 828. an( j g Uar( i s f the soul of the wise : t>opv(p6poi mi 
 
 vwepixcfxpi y[svxfjs. And sacred and holy reasonings 
 
 and words are called the garrison and sentinels of 
 
 p. 324 the soul: \epovs nal 6aiovs Xoyovs aJ-j-JJs (bpovpovs 
 
 tcai (pvAciKas ovtcis. 
 
 These powers of the one existent Being, and. 
 
Doctrines of PHILO JUDiEUS: 85 
 
 the external expressions of them, his words and *■ 32i] 
 actions, are said to be spoken of in the Scriptures 
 under the emblems of angels. Thus, when young 
 and old in Sodom are stated to have combined 
 against the angels, the spiritual doctrine contained 
 under that narrative is that there was a general 
 disposition to wickedness ; and that young and old, 
 with one accord, as if they had bound themselves 
 91 together by an oath, set themselves in opposition 
 to the divine words and actions, which it is cus- 
 tomary to call angels: lias h', ws (prjaiv, 6 Xaos 
 TrepieKUKktotrav a/xa rrjv o'ltclav, veoi tb /cat irpeapvTai, 
 Kara twv Oe'tcov 'epyaiv Kal Xoywv avvo^oaafxevoi, o'us 
 Kakeiv edos ayyeXovs. Again, aOavarois Xoyois, obs ny^i too 
 Ka\e7v 'e9os ayyeXovs. p - m 
 
 One of the passages produced to prove the 
 personality of the Xoyos, according to Philo, is that 
 wherein he says that the angel who met Hagar, 
 when she fled from the face of Sarah, and brought n ep i xe P0 ^. 
 
 p. 108. 
 
 her back, was the divine Xoyos. But who or what, 
 according to the same interpretation, was Hagar, 
 and Sarah from whom she fled? By Hagar is 
 meant human discipline and the circle of the arts 
 and sciences, who departed from her mistress, Sa- 
 rah, the emblem of virtue, and was brought back 
 by the angel, who is the divine Xoyos 20 (os eo-ri 
 Oelos Xoyos), which he elsewhere calls 21 right reason 
 
 20 Tr/v \x.iur\v jrmSeiav Trjv tols iyKVxktois yiopevovcrav opSjiev 
 *&.yap, d\s /iev e£iov<rav otto ttjs apxov(rr}s dpertjs kappas, [a7ra£ de 
 ttjv irportpav 6S6v v7ro<rrpe(pov<rau. fj Tore ptv airo8paora\ Karayerai, 
 VTravrrjiravTos ayyeXov, os eari Setoff \6yos. 
 
 21 HpoaTrjaatisvos rov opdbv avrov \6yov, irpwroyovQV viov. 
 
 E2 
 
86 Doctrines of PHILO JUD^US. 
 
 (opQos X070S). Hagar fled to avoid the austere and 
 gloomy life of the virtuous 22 . Afterwards Hagar y % 
 and her son Ishmael, who signifies the sophist, 
 were driven out by Abraham, an emblem of the 
 wise man, at the instigation of Sarah, perfect 
 virtue or wisdom. 
 
 In like manner Philo says (p. 114) that the 
 angel, who stood armed to oppose Balaam, was the 
 X070S of God. But in order to understand the 
 true meaning of the assertion, it is requisite to 
 consider who or what Balaam was, who is said to 
 have been thus opposed. Balaam, says Philo, sig- 
 nifies a foolish people (/uaTaiov \aov) who ride in 
 pursuit of gain upon an ass, which signifies hus- 
 bandry, merchandize, or any other lucrative em- 
 ployment. When he finds that these stop in their 
 course, and do not carry him to the object at which 
 he aims, he wishes for a sword, that is, a power of 
 reasons and words, to chastise them for the failure. 
 But those things, though destitute of the organs of 
 speech, utter a language more distinct than that of 
 any tongue, and point out to him an angel, that is, 
 the word of God, standing armed with divine ven- 
 geance to oppose his progress. 
 
 It is manifest that, in these instances, 0e7o? 
 \070y and Qeou \070s, are no more persons, because 
 
 Hepi Fecopylas Ncoe, p. 195. Ols ay 6 op8bs \6yos tira(3aXKg 
 ir€ifrBT]<r6fj.€j/oVt t. e. \oyKTjxbv, acirep rata biKaarrjV abcapohoKqrov. 
 
 Ilfpi roO on arpcTTT. p. 301. 'O Seios Xoyos o opdbs Xdyoj. 
 
 Ilepi tov e€oirep,7TT. p. 583. 'O rrje <pv<rea>s 6p66s \6yos, os 
 KvptcoTepq KXytrei irpo<Tovop.a^Tai, decr/ibs, vopos Setos av, Kaff hv 
 \ra T!pour)Kovra (cat imfiaXKovra eKaorois direvepydrj.] Ilepl Ko- 
 trfioir. p. 33. 
 
Doctrines of PHILO JUD^EUS. 87 
 
 they are represented by the emblems of angels, 
 93 than merchandise or agriculture is an animal, be- 
 cause they are supposed to be represented by the 
 ass. 
 
 In the same spirit of emblematizing he says, 
 that by 23 Eve is meant the senses. It would be 
 too tedious to discuss the several moral and reli- 
 gious doctrines, supposed to be conveyed under 
 the characters of Cain, Jacob, Laban, his daugh- 
 ters, his cattle, &c. p. 119 : the ark and the ani- 
 mals contained in it, p. 186 : Joseph, his wife, and 
 father-in-law, p. 577 : Eebecca, p. 379 : Leah, and in 
 short all the persons and places mentioned in the 
 Pentateuch. The specimens already given are suf, 
 ficient to shew that they are emblematic and 
 figurative. Now it is well known that the per- 
 sonality of an emblem by no means proves the per- 
 sonality of the thing signified by that emblem, 
 which is some quality, virtue, or duty, as the gene- 
 ral result of the whole story is some moral or 
 religious doctrine, which is inculcated under the 
 form of a narrative. 
 
 In the same figurative language the Lord's host 
 signifies the several virtues 24 ; and the leader of 
 the Lord's host, that divine order and harmony 
 displayed in the arrangement of the universe, from 
 which men derive the principles of virtue and 
 
 22 Ayap, ?J pear] Ka\ eyKvickios ffaifieia, Kav tov aiitTTrjpou Kai 
 VKvBpanov tS>v (piXapirav txTrohpavai fiiov (TTrovSaarj. p. 109. 
 
 23 UpotrqyopiKas p,ev yvvaiKa, ovofiacmicas 8e EiW, alviTTop.cvos 
 aur8rjaiv. Ilepi XepovPip., p. 118. 
 
 2 * 'SrpaTos Se Btios al apcrai, (pihoBeav inep/ia^ol ^v)(&v, 
 p. 198. 
 
Doctrines of PHILO JTJDjEUS. 
 
 p-341. -wisdom. It is also called the first-born \6yos, the 94 
 eldest angel, being as it were the archangel with 
 
 p £ 9* many names. The sensible world is called the 
 younger son of God, and the intelligible world 
 is called the elder son. In the passage, " The 
 horse and the rider hath he thrown into the sea," 
 the rider, he says, is the mind, and the horse 
 the passions 25 . And when the lawgiver forbids 
 the use of horses in war, he says, he does not 
 speak of real cavalry, which is necessary for both 
 offence and defence, but of the irrational and un- 
 restrained and ungovernable motions of the soul 26 . 
 
 p. 48. Virtue in general is expressed by paradise, and 
 the several virtues by the trees planted in it. 
 
 The divine Xo'yo? is said to be the cement, 
 the bond of union, by which the several parts of 
 the universe are kept together 2r . But the same 
 properties are likewise ascribed to the order and 
 plan according to which the universe was con- 
 structed 28 . 
 
 Mosheim supposes that Philo (De Abrahamo, 
 p. 367) alludes to some among the Jews who as- 
 serted the doctrines of three natures in God. 
 Whereas in the passage alluded to Philo appears 
 most evidently to me to be speaking of those 
 who are not, as he figuratively expresses it, initi- 
 ated into the great mysteries, and who are not 
 
 25 Terpairovv Kai aKiprr)TiKhv Kai vmpavxov — mi6av Te Kai 
 Kcuuav akKifiaiTaTov oritpos — irpbs Se km 6 cmftaTrjs avrmv vovs, 
 p. 199. 
 
 26 'AXXa wept Tij r Kara ^jruxV" oX^yov Kai apirpov Kai aireidovs 
 (popas, p. 200. 
 
Doctrines of tt±LLiU JVuJETJS. 89 
 
 able to contemplate the existent Being in his simple 
 state, without something else to aid their concep- 
 tions. They are therefore obliged to have recourse 
 to his acts, and to consider him as creating or 
 governing, when they endeavour to form a notion 
 of him. Indeed the notion, which is formed in 
 this circuitous manner, partakes of a pious opi- 
 nion ; but that which results from a direct view, 
 does not partake of, but is, a pious opinion, or 
 rather, surpasses opinion and is the truth itself. 
 This is the language in which he generally speaks 
 of the popular and the sublime theology, as distinct 
 from each other in degree rather than in kind. 
 
 2 ? Actyo) afplyyerat Beta' kgWci yap eart Kai §e<rpbs o$to$, 
 p. 507. 
 
 28 HayKaXa r£ rfjs aKoKovSias eippa K€XP1 Ta h p. 14. Ta|is $' 
 aKoXovOia Kai elpfids earl irporjyovpei/ap Tivtav Kai eiroptvaiv. 
 
THE 95 
 
 FATHERS of the CHRISTIAN CHURCH. 
 
 'Eyewrja-c roivvv airov ovft ovras, as av Tis vorjcreiev audpdirau, 
 aXV as oiSev avTos p.6vos. ov yap to, nas eyetnnjcrev, emetv e7ray- 
 yeWopeBa, aXAa to, ov% ovtg>s bia.fiefiaioiiJ.e8a- Ka\ ovx ly/ieis 
 dyvooiifiev povov ttjv e/c ivaTpbs tov vlov yevvrjo~\v, dWa Kal nao-a 
 yewrjTTj (pio-is. — Cyril. Catech. xi. p. 96. 
 
 PHOTIUS informs us that from Philo was 
 derived the allegorical method of interpreting 
 Scripture, which prevailed in the primitive Church, 
 This arose from very natural causes. 
 
 First, they who have been favoured with a 
 divine revelation, and have by grace availed them- 
 selves of it, enjoy a great and manifest advan- 
 tage over those who are left in a great measure to 
 the exertions of their own minds, and are obliged 
 to trace out the invisible things of God by intri- 
 cate reasonings and deductions from the things, 
 which do appear in the constitution and govern- 
 ment of the world. What even learned men 
 among the latter do hardly guess and with labour 
 find out, is plain and obvious to the meanest 
 and most uncultivated understandings among the 97 
 former. 
 
 Yet this advantage, great as it really is, has 
 not always been sufficient to satisfy the pretensions 
 of those who have been blessed with a divine reve- 
 lation. Not contented with the bright sunshine 
 which blazes around them, they will scarcely allow 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. pi 
 
 the benighted heathen the dim taper of human 
 reason to guide their steps in their laborious travels 
 over the dark mountains. Whatever the Apostle 
 Paul may have said in his various expostulations 
 with the Gentiles, and particularly in his Epistle to 
 the Romans, there are some far wiser, in their own 
 conceit, than seven men that can render a reason, 
 who boldly maintain, that whatever glimmerings of 
 light the Pagans of old have been able to strike 
 out by mere dint of labour and study, have been 
 all either directly or circuitously derived from the 
 sacred writings 1 . 
 
 Traces of this opinion are to be found in some 
 degree in the works of ancient authors, both Jewish 
 and Christian, though it did not shoot up to the 
 extravagant height to which some have carried it 
 in later days. I should depart from the tenor of 
 my subject, if I did more than barely mention the 
 well-known example of Josephus among the former. 
 98 Among the latter, the instances are numerous. As 
 I proceed with my work, I shall, in confirmation of 
 what I have here advanced, produce some strong 
 and pointed passages from Justin Martyr and Cle- 
 mens Alexandrinus, both of them writers of the 
 second century. 
 
 To Christians who had embraced these senti- 
 ments, the writings of Philo must have been an 
 invaluable treasure. The manner in which he has 
 applied the principles of Plato to illustrate the Mo- 
 saical account of the Creation and other parts of 
 
 1 *E£ ov ($[\<0Vos) olfxai Kal 7ras 6 dWTjyopcKos ttjs ypa(prjs ev 
 TJj iKKki)arlci Xoyos eV^ex apx^v titrpvijvm, Photius, p. 96. 
 
 E 5 
 
9 2 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 the Old Testament, was admirably calcixlated to 
 flatter their prejudices, and furnished them with 
 specious arguments in support of the opinion which 
 they so strenuously maintained. 
 
 Secondly, many were converted to the Christian 
 religion who had previously made considerable pro- 
 gress in the Platonic or 2 Eclectic Philosophy, and 
 retained many of their former prejudices. Others 
 were struck with the great respect that was paid to 
 philosophy, and with the superior skill which its 99 
 professors displayed in the arts of controversy. On 
 this account they frequented the schools of Alex- 
 andria, in which masters of profound learning and 
 great celebrity explained and inculcated, with be- 
 witching eloquence, the speculations of the sages 
 of ancient Greece. 
 
 These men, having the sacred volumes in one 
 hand and the writings of Plato in the other, if they 
 believed them both to be true, must have thought 
 the principles and doctrines of each consistent with 
 those of the other : for it is impossible that one 
 truth should be opposite to, or at variance with, 
 another. To these men, therefore, the writings of 
 Philo must have been as acceptable as to those 
 
 2 The following is a description which Clemens Alexandri- 
 nus gives of the Eclectic philosophy. " By philosophy I mean 
 neither the Stoic, nor the Platonic, nor the Epicurean and 
 Aristotelean. But whatever things have been properly said by 
 each of those sects, inculcating justice and devout knowledge, 
 this whole selection I call philosophy." ®iKoo-o<piav tie, ov rrjv 
 Stcolktjv \eytt} t ovde ttjv XtKaTan/tK^v, r[ ttjv 'EnLKOvpfLov Te Kai \pi~ 
 (TTOTcXiKrjv aXX oo~a eiprjrai ivap' eKaa-rij rwv aipeo-ewv tovtgv Ka~ 
 \5>f, SiKatoavvrjv ptr evo-efiovs imtrrrip.-qs exSiSao-Koira, tovto 
 (rv/xTrav to (kKcktikov <pi\ocro<piav <pr)p.\. Stromm. Lib. I. p. 288. 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 93 
 
 ■whom I mentioned before; and indeed, for the 
 same reason, namely, for his having so industriously 
 and speciously marked out a seeming conformity 
 between two works, if I may so call them, both of 
 which they so highly reverenced. 
 
 The writings of Philo came the more strongly 
 recommended to these men, because the method 
 of interpretation, which he has adopted, may be as 
 commodiously applied by Christians to reconcile 
 ioo the principles of Plato and the doctrines of the 
 Gospel, as it was by Philo to explain the contents 
 of the Old Testament by the same principles. 
 
 First, there are to be found in the writings of 
 many of the fathers of the Christian Church evi- 
 dent traces of the opinion, that the heathens de- 
 rived all the principles of their knowledge from the 
 sacred Scriptures ; and even that the wildest stories 
 of their mythology originated from the same source. 
 Thus, in the Address to the Greeks*, attributed to 
 Justin Martyr, the author boldly asserts, that Or- ^wp .§ 14. 
 pheus, and Homer, and Solon, the legislator of the '* 0it0 ^ 
 Athenians, and Pythagoras, and Plato, and some 
 others, received great assistance from the writings 
 of Moses, e/c tjJs Ma)i/creft)s laropias aofpekriQevTes. 
 He affirms, that hence they derived the knowledge 
 
 But though the followers of the Eclectic philosophy professed 
 to select the truth from the doctrines of the several sects ; yet 
 the authority of Plato, in their estimation, far surpassed that of 
 any other, and the bulk of their tenets concerning God and the 
 human soul was composed of his doctrines. 
 
 3 Though there is reason to doubt whether this address 
 was really the work of Justin, it serves to shew, in conjunction 
 with the other quotations, that this opinion prevailed among 
 the early Christians. 
 
94 The Fathers of the Christian Church'. 
 
 of the unity of God, and some of the mysteries of 
 [ P i8d.§20, the divine nature. He maintained, that Hato, in 
 
 1). 68.] 
 
 the beginning of the Timceus, in describing the 
 principle of existence, obscurely alluded to the ap- 
 pellation which the supreme Being assumed to him- 
 self in the book of Genesis ; but that he varied the 
 form of expression, in order to evade the censure 
 
 [p. 20 r. § 22. of the court of Areopagus : that when he speaks 
 
 of an ancient account, he means the law of Moses 4 : ioi 
 that when he mentions men beloved of God, he 
 thinks of Moses and the other prophets, from whose 
 writings he learned the doctrine of a future judg-> 
 ment 8 : that when he made el$o$, ' specific form,' the 
 third principle after God and matter, he was led to 
 the use of the expression by a passage in the writ- 
 ings of Moses, which, for the want of an enlight- 
 ened instructor, he did not correctly understand : 
 
 Exoa. xxv. -to. "Look, that thou make them after the pattern 
 which was shewed thee in the Mount." And again, 
 " According to all that I shew thee, after the pat- 
 tern of the tabernacle and the pattern of all the 
 instruments, even so shall ye make it 6 ." Plato, 
 says he, having met with these passages, supposed 
 that some separate specific form existed, before 
 
 4 'Evravda 6 TlXaratv o-atp&s Kai (pavep&s tov iraKaibv Xoyou 
 Mavtreais ovouafci v6p.ov^ tov pev ovopaTos Mtovo-eW, <po(Sa tov 
 Kcoveiov, pepvijaflai fiefiiW. p. 24 [b]. 
 
 5 ''AvBpas fie Tivas erepovs tg> ©e<5 <pikovs aval vopi£ei y el prj 
 Ma>vo-ea Kai tovs \oirrois 7rpo(pJ]ras ; a>v Tals irpo<prjrelais ivTv^aiv, 
 Kai tov nepl Kpio-eas Trap 1 avT&v pepadrjKaJs Aoyop, eV reS 7rp<oTCO Trjs 
 
 rp. 330 e, JJoXiTeias Xdyo) ovra irpoavatptovel, p. 24 [b]. 
 
 6 HXarmv fie perh tov Bebv Kai tyjv v\rjv to etSos Tplrrjv ap^v 
 elval Xeymv, Kai [ouk I. Otto] aX\68ev ivoBev aXAa irapa. Mavcraas 
 ttjv 7rpo(pao-iv ei\r]<pa>s (paiverai, to pev tov etfious ovopa dnb T&V 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. $5 
 
 what is the object of the senses ; which form he 
 also often calls the pattern of the things that were 
 102 made 7 . He then proceeds to point out the mis- 
 takes into which Plato fell in reading the Mosaical 
 account of the Creation, and the manner in which 
 he was led by those mistakes to imagine an intelli- 
 gible world, and other opinions that appear in the 
 Timseus. It is unnecessary to give a minute detail 
 of these things, and of the allusion which, in the 
 second Apology for Christians, Justin states theMp»'»M 
 Philosopher to make to the shape of the cross, the 
 knowledge of which he is supposed to have obtained 
 from the story of the brazen serpent in the history 
 of Moses. 
 
 In his Dialogue with Trypho the Jew he asserts, p.k[»j 
 that the devil formed many of the mythological 
 stories of the Greeks in imitation of the several 
 circumstances foretold of Jesus Christ ; in the 
 same manner as the magicians of Egypt imitated 
 the miracles that were performed by Moses. One 
 instance of this is Bacchus, the son of Jupiter, who, 
 having been torn to pieces, after his death rose 
 again and ascended into heaven ; whose mysteries 
 also are celebrated with wine. Another instance is 
 
 jEsculapius, who is represented as curing diseases 
 
 "^ 
 
 Moluccas pepa8r]Kcbs prjrmv, ov 8iSa^5eir Se TrfViKmira irapa t£>v 
 eiSorw on ot&ev ektos pvo-TCKfjs Beapias tS>v dno Mav<rea>s flpt]- 
 pevav <ra<pws yiyvdxTKeiv earl bwarov. Ttypafpe yap MoiiioTjs ms 
 toC ©eoC irepl rijs a-KTjvrjs Trpbs ovtov elpijKoros outois, k.t.X. p. 28. 
 [d. § 29. p. 98.] 
 
 ? Toutois ovv ivTVx&v 6 nXarau» km ov fieri ttjs trpotrrfKovcrrjs 
 Beapias 8e§ap.evos ra yeypappiva prjTa, aqBr] eldos Ti x a >P to " rov 
 irpovnapxeiv toO alaBr/Tov- o Ka\ irapao'eiyp.a T&v yevopevav ovopa- 
 £ei TToAXdias. p. 29 [a]. 
 
g6 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 XApoiog. i. c. and raising the dead. Again, we hear of Perseus; 
 
 22 : Dial, cum 
 
 p^'cb. 6 /' 1 w ^o was born of a virgin. Again, when the Per- 103 
 sians say that Mithras was born of a rock, they are 
 supposed to have taken the idea from the book of 
 the prophet Daniel, where the kingdom of God is pre- 
 figured by a stone cut out of a rock without hands. 
 
 p ■«• Clemens Alexandrinus, in his Admonition to the 
 
 Gentiles, expostulates with Plato, and asks him 
 whence arose his conjecture about truth and genu- 
 ine piety. I know your teachers, says he, though 
 you may wish to conceal them. You are indebted 
 to the Hebrews for such of your laws as are true, 
 and for your opinion of God 8 . To the same origin, 
 he refers the knowledge which Xenophon had at- 
 tained of the Supreme Being 9 . 
 
 In the first book of his Stromata he gives an 
 instance of a law which, he says, Plato borrowed 
 from the Hebrews ; wherein he orders every one 
 to abstain from the water of his neighbour, till he 
 has tried every method, without success, of pro- 
 
 3 Pc-L-f' curm g water in his own possessions 10 . In page 
 
 8 H66ev, <» liKdrav, akrjBeiav alptTTj] ; irodev 17 r£j> \6yav a(p- 
 
 6ovos xoprjyla ttjv 6eoo-ej3etav fiaj/reverac ; otfia o~ov tovs fitfia- 
 
 (TKaKovs, Kav arroKpvTTTeiv edeXrjs — v6povs, ocroj aXr/Seis, jsal ho^av 
 ttjv tov 6eov, irap' airav tocpcXr/o-ai tosv ''Efipaiav : [p. 60. ed. Pott. 
 
 §70.] 
 
 9 H60€v Spa 6 tov VpvWov croc/>i£ei-cu ; rj 817X089 Trapa rtjs irpo- 
 (pr)Ti.hos rtjs 'Efipaiav 8eo-m£ovo-rjs (SSe Tray; [Ibid. § 71.] 
 
 10 '■£„ yoy V TO ts No/* cus 6 ■«£ 'Ej3pcuW <piX6o~orpos XlXaraV 
 KeXevet tovs yempyois fir) iiraphevaai pijSe \ap.fSav(0> vhcap trap' 
 cTepa>v, eav firj irporepov opv£avTes 7rap' avT&v a^pi TJ ? ff TTap8evloy 
 KaKovp.evrjs, avvbpov ivpao-i t!jv yrjv: p. 274. [p. 321. ed. Potter.] 
 
 11 Qihoo-otpia bk ovk aneo-TaXrj imb Kvplov akX rj\8e, tp7jO-\, 
 KXaffeTcra, rj irapa KXeWou 8o0eio-a- c'It otv bivapis rj ayyeXos /ladav 
 n ttjs dXrjdeias na\ jifj mrafiuvas iv avTrj, Tavra cvemievae ko\ 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 97 
 
 IO4304, he says that Numa was a Pythagorean ; but 
 that it was in consequence of what he learned from 
 Moses, that he prohibited the Romans from making 
 an image of God. In page 309 is quoted, from [|vu. ^m. 
 the Gospel of St John, the saying of our Saviour, rs. John x. sj 
 that all before him were thieves and robbers. This 
 some men applied to the philosophers, to whom 
 the 11 arch-apostate surreptitiously communicated 
 detached portions of divine wisdom. Yet, says 
 Clemens, this philosophy, stolen as it were by Pro- 
 metheus, retained a little fire emitting some useful 
 light, a faint resemblance of divine wisdom. The 
 Grecian philosophers, who lived before the coming 
 of our Lord, may indeed be called thieves and 
 robbers, for having, without acknowledging it, taken 
 portions of truth from the Hebrew prophets, and 
 appropriating them, as if they were their own doc- 
 trines 12 . He produces the authority of Aristo- 
 bulus to prove that Plato was guided by the law of 
 
 105 the Jews 13 . He quotes the following passage from 
 Numenius, a Pythagorean philosopher : What is 
 Plato but Moses speaking the Attic language w ? 
 
 Kktyas cil&agev. p. 310. [§ 17, p. 366.] 
 
 13 'Eotu/ ovv kuv <f>i\o<TO(j>lq rfj KAan-ei'077, Kadanep viro Xlpo- 
 pr/Scas, nvp dXiyov (Is <j>as cmrqdaov xpr]irLpa>s ^anrvpovpevov, 
 i%vos ri o-otpias Kai kii/tj<tis 7rapa Q(ov m ravra 8* av (KV KAenrat 
 Kai Ararat ol nap "EXA^t <pi\6<ro<poi, Kai irpo T7JS rav Kupiou 
 irapov&ias irapa rav 'Efipa'iK&u 7rpo<prjTav pepr] ttjs a\r]deias ov 
 kot €7rtyva>(Tiv XaftovTes, aAA* cos T&ia a<pzT(pio , ap(VOi toypara, 
 p. 312. ■[$ 17, p. 369.] 
 
 13 KarrjKoXovdtjKc Se Ka\ 6 TiKarav rrj Kaff rjpas vopo6«ria, teal 
 fpavepos i<m ircpicpyacrapaios encurra rav iv avrfi Xeyopevav, p. 342, 
 [p. 411.] 
 
 14 Ti yap eoTJ TlXarav, rj Wlavtrijg arriKiffflc; p. 342, [§ 22, 
 p. 411.] 
 
98 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 That Plato was assisted by the writings of Moses, 
 
 when he composed his treatise on Laws, is again 
 
 rsxxv. p. 4i9.] asserted (p. 349). In the second book (p. 367) he 
 
 [§ v. p. 439.] \f J \r / 
 
 says, that the fable of Minos associating with Jupi- 
 ter was invented by some who had heard that God 
 had conversed with Moses, as a man converses with 
 his friend. 
 
 I will not stop to remark the many conformi- 
 ties and resemblances which he has pointed out 
 in the moral injunctions and observations of the 
 Gentile philosophers and the inspired writers, par- 
 ticularly in the fourth book of his Stromata. Nor 
 
 [ P . 642] will I dwell upon what he says at the end of that 
 book, that the Hyperborean and Arimaspian cities, 
 the Elysian fields, and the Republic of Plato, are 
 images (et/covas) of the church, the heavenly Jeru- 
 
 [§xi. p. 686] salem. In the fifth book, p. 580, after mentioning 
 some doctrines of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, 
 he affirms that they were derived from Moses 15 . In 
 
 [p. too foiio the 592d and the following pages, he enumerates 
 many doctrines in confirmation of the same posi- 
 
 [ P . 705] tion concerning Plato. In p. 595, he alleges the 
 authority of Aristobulus, that the Peripatetic phi- 
 losophy was taken from the law of Moses. I shall io5 
 conclude this topic with the following passage : 
 
 [p. 7070 Kat to avvoXov, TluOayopas /cat "SwKpaTrjs /cat IlXa- 
 toov \eyovres aicoveiv (pwvtjs Qeov, ty\v Karao~Kev>]v 
 twv o\wv Qewpovvres aicpipaJs vtto Qeov yeyovvlav 
 
 15 Uapa Mwvaias roiavra <piko<ro<pri<TavTes oi rav 'EW^ttav 
 axpoi. 
 
 16 Avo fie irapeiXrjcpapev KeXtrous yeyovivm 'EmKovpelovs' tov 
 fiev irp6repov Kara Nc/3<aca- tovtov 8e Kara 'kbpiavbv koi Kararepa, 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 99 
 
 kcli crvve^o/xevriv aciaXe'nrrws' aKrjKoaai yap tou Mwii- 
 aews \eyovTos, EIttb kui eyevero. 
 
 Secondly, these sentiments naturally led those 
 who entertained them to regard with a favourable 
 disposition the writings of Philo, in which the plan 
 is laboriously pursued of reconciling Divine Reve- 
 lation and Pagan philosophy, and of expounding 
 Scripture history upon heathen principles. 
 
 Origen, in the beginning of his treatise against 
 Celms, being desirous of giving his readers some 
 idea of the qualities of his antagonist, and of the 
 time in which he lived, says, We are told that 
 there were two men, Epicureans, of the name of 
 Celsus ; the first in the time of Nero, but this in 
 the time of Adrian and later 18 . Now, whatever 
 practices Celsus really observed and objected to in 
 the Christians, may fairly be presumed to have 
 been of some duration and extent in his time ; 
 particularly if the charges were avowed and de- 
 fended by the Apologist. One of the things, 
 which Origen states him to impute to the Chris- 
 107 tians is, that they, in conjunction with the Jews, 
 adopted allegorical explanations of the transac- 
 tions recorded in the Books of Moses 1? . Origen 
 supposes that Celsus referred to the works of 
 Philo, and of some still more ancient, such as 
 Aristobulus ; and concludes, that he had never 
 read those works himself, but had only heard that 
 there were writings which contained allegorical 
 
 Lib. 1. p. 8. 
 
 17 *ij<rii», on xai 'lovbalav Km Xpurriavav ol eirteLKetrTepoi 
 TaiiT akkrjyopovo-i. Lib. IV. p. 196. 
 
ioo The Fathers of the Christian Church'. 
 
 explanations of the law ; otherwise he would not 
 have spoken in so contemptuous a manner of such 
 valuable compositions 18 . 
 
 These instances seem to me to prove that the 
 writings of Philo, and the allegorical mode of inter- 
 pretation adopted by him, were in high estimation 
 among Christians very early in the second century 
 at the latest. The works of the Fathers of the 
 Church in that age, particularly among the Greeks, 
 abound in imitations, allusions, and direct refer- 
 ences to him. 
 
 SpXto?]' Clemens Alexandrinus, (Strom. Lib. i. p. 284.) iof 
 
 discoursing about heavenly wisdom and philosophy, 
 undertakes to confirm his reasonings by the tes- 
 timony of Scripture. For this purpose he intro- 
 duces the allegorical interpretation of Abraham, 
 Sarah, and Agar, which interpretation he sup- 
 ports by the authority of Philo, and then pursues 
 the same train of thought through Rebecca, Jacob, 
 
 Lib. i. cap. 5 and Thamar. In like manner in his UaiSayuyos 
 
 [§ 21, p. 110.] ' ' 
 
 he allegorizes the characters and story of Isaac, 
 Rebecca, and Abimelech. In the same style he 
 interprets the command of Moses to abstain from 
 the flesh of swine, the eagle, &c. which he makes 
 to signify a prohibition from voluptuousness and 
 [§ vffi. p. 677] rapacity (Strom. Lib. v. p. 571). Thus also he ex- 
 \iMd. p. 678] plains (p. 572) Joseph in his coat of many colours 
 
 18 AoKel Se p,oi Kal aKr}Kolvai, on eWl o-vyypappara ir€pU)(ovTa 
 ras rov popov aWrjyoplas' airep el apeypanei, ovk ap e\eyei' t at 
 yovp SoKOvtraL irepX avr&p dWrjyopiai yeypacpSai, ttoKv tS>v pv8a>P 
 alirxiovs fieri Kal aTonwepat, to prj&apfj prjSapas appoo-8ijvai Sv- 
 papepa, Qavpacrrj} tlpl kcu iravrairao-ip apaitjQr\T<£i pcopiq ovpaTTTOVtrat. 
 coixe Be irepX t&p $i\copos (rvyypapparap ravra \iyeiv, rj xal rap 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 to signify a man endued with various knowledge. 
 
 In p. 583, the three days which Abraham spent [§ rf. p. 690.] 
 
 in going to the place where he was to sacrifice his 
 
 son, are made to signify the degrees by which a 
 
 man advances to the knowledge of spiritual things. 
 
 And in p. 574, he bestows high encomiums upon ts i*. p. 6T9] 
 
 the utility and dignity of these allegories, and the 
 
 interpretations of them. 
 
 Theophilus, in his second book of Autolycus, [§ 13 toil] 
 p. 94 foil, partly with hints taken from Philo, partly 
 with additions of his own, to make the whole apply 
 to Christianity, deduces a variety of allusions to 
 109 the great mysteries of religion, the nature of God, 
 the doctrine of the Trinity, the condition of man, 
 and the dispensations of Providence, from the 
 number of days employed in the creation of the 
 world, the portion of them which preceded the 
 creation of the luminaries of heaven, and the differ- 
 ent productions of the several days. 
 
 I think I have now incontrovertibly established 
 these two facts. 
 
 First, That the early Christians entertained the 
 opinion that the philosophical principles and my- 
 thological stories of Pagan antiquity were de- 
 rived either immediately or circuitously from the 
 books of the Old Testament. 
 
 Secondly, That the allegorical writings of Philo 
 
 ert apxaioT€oa>v, oiroia cart ra 'ApMTToftovXov. trro^a^opai Se rbv 
 KfXow pr/ aveyvmKevai ra /3i/3Xi'a, «rel 7roXXa^oO ovtcos eVire- 
 Tcvx$at jioi (paiverai, wore alpeBrjvai av mi roiis iv "EXXijtri (pi* 
 \o<ro<f>ovvTas oiro rav \eyop.£vn>v iv ols ov /xovoi/ 17 (ppacrts i^r/- 
 OTci/rcu aXXa nai vo^fiara Kal Soy/iara jcai ij xprj&is twv as o"erat 
 airb tgbv ypatpav fivdav 6 KeXtroy, p. 198. 
 
102 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 were in high estimation among the same people, 
 and that the principles of interpretation which he 
 had adopted were received as just and wise. 
 
 I shall now proceed to enquire into the effects 
 which these two opinions conjointly produced in 
 the reasonings of the Christians of the second 
 century. 
 
 The first effect which I shall point out is this. 
 We saw that Philo by an allegorical mode of 
 interpretation explained the things, persons, and 
 transactions, recorded in the Old Testament, to 
 signify moral and intellectual qualities and opera- 
 tions. The Fathers of the Christian Church pro- 
 ceeded farther, and again converted those quali- 
 ties and operations, with the supposed emblematic n C 
 things, persons, and transactions, into other per^ 
 sons and transactions under the Gospel covenant. 
 
 Because in the Timceus of Plato the Creator 
 is said to have used an ideal world as a pattern 
 when he formed the present sensible one, Philo 
 also, when he commented upon the Mosaical ac- 
 count of the creation, and applied to it the prin- 
 ciples of Plato, represented the Supreme Being as 
 forming within himself a plan of the work which 
 he was about to accomplish. This plan, he says, 
 was nothing else but the reason or reasoning of 
 God, in the same manner as the plan of a city, 
 formed by an architect, is the reasoning of that 
 architect. Because the arrangement of this plan 
 of course preceded the creation of the things 
 which were to be formed according to it, he calls 
 it the first-born (irpwTOToicos), by which word he 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 103 
 
 expresses likewise the difference of its nature from 
 that of external things, since it was the natural 
 production of the divine intellect by a reflex act, 
 if we may so express it. In other parts of his 
 works he makes several things, persons, and actions, 
 emblematically representative of the divine wis- 
 dom and its dealings with men. Because St John 
 has called Christ 6 \6yos, and he is elsewhere 
 styled TTOfciTOTOKos, it has been concluded that all 
 in which Philo has said of what he calls 6 \6yos, is 
 expressive of Christ in a literal sense. 
 
 Philo asserted that the two Cherubim over the 
 mercy-seat were intended to signify the creative 
 and governing powers of God. The creative power 
 is said by Justin Martyr to be Christ, and is called 
 by him a certain rational power, which God begat 
 of himself in the beginning, before all created 
 beings 19 . In his second Apology for the Christians, 
 he calls the author of our salvation the reason, 
 of which the whole human race partakes ; and 
 asserts, that they who lived according to reason 
 are Christians, even though they were esteemed 
 Atheists ; as among the Greeks Socrates and 
 Heraclitus, and such as were like them 20 . 
 
 In like manner Athenagoras, stating the eter- 
 nity of the son of God, and his consubstantiality 
 with the father, says, I will tell you in short what 
 
 !9 \px¥ irpo iravrav rav KTitTfiurav 6 Geoy yeyivvt]K€ Svvap.lv 
 Tiva eg iavroi Xoyiicnv: p 284 [a. Dialog, c. Tryph. § 61.] 
 
 20 \6yov ovra, ov ttav yeW avBpamav peTeo-x^ *<" ol pera 
 \6yov Pidaavres Xpumavoi A<n, Kav a9eoi ivopicrdrjaav oiov iv 
 "EXX?)(n p.h 2<oKpaTrji ml "HpaxXctTOj Kai 01 Sp.0101 aureus : p. 83, 
 [D. Apol.1. § 46.] 
 
104 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 his being a son means : That he was the first pro- 
 duction of the father, not as a thing that was 
 made ; for God, being an eternal mind, from the 
 beginning had reason in himself, being eternally- 
 reasonable 21 . 
 
 •Theophilus, in the second book of his Address torn 
 Autolycus, explains in the same manner the X070? 
 as being always resident in the heart of God; 
 for, before any thing was made, God had him as 
 his counsellor, being his own mind and intellect. 
 And when God willed to make whatever he coun- 
 selled, he begat this prophoric logos, the first-born 
 of all creation 22 . 
 
 Tertullian, in his Treatise against Hermogenes, 
 seems to pursue the same idea. Speaking of the 
 nature of wisdom, he says, 23 When he perceived 
 it necessary for the works of the world, he imme- 
 diately establishes it and generates it in himself — 
 Wisdom was born and established as soon as God 
 began to dispose himself to set in order the works 
 of the world — Though he had been about to make 
 it of matter, he had before made it in wisdom, 113 
 by meditating and arranging — He afterwards sets 
 
 21 iraXs ri fiovkerai, ipa 8ia ^pa^eaiv irpaTOV ytvv7){ia eivcu 
 tm rrarpi, ov^ <»£ yevofievov e£ "px*i s 7°P ° ©for, vovs dt&ios av, 
 cl%ev avros iv eavrip tov \6yov, aibims XoyMos &v. [Su/pplic. 
 pro Christian. § 10.] 
 
 22 'AXrjdela 8«;yeircu tov \6yov, tov ovra SiimavTos ivSiadeTOV 
 iv Kapbiq &eov. npb yap n yiyvecrBcu, tovtov cl%e aip.fiovkov, 
 iavrov vovv, Kal (ppovTjviv ovra' Snore 8e rj8e\rjo~£V 6 Qeos 7rottjcrat 
 ocra eftovXtvo'aTO, tovtov tov Xoyov eyevvyo'e irpofyopiKOV, 7rpo)TO- 
 tokov Trdo-Tjs KTio-ecos: P. 100, Ed. Paris. 1636. fo. [Ch. I.] 
 
 23 Denique ut necessariam sensit ad opera mundi, statim 
 earn condit et generat in scmetipso — Sophia scilicet ejus exinde 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 105 
 
 forth this order in a more distinct manner. Wis- 
 dom was first established. After that was sent 
 forth the word, by which all things were made, 
 and without which nothing was made. In this 
 passage the author evidently meant by sophia, 
 wisdom, the internal conception, and by sermo, 
 word, the external expression or command. Athe- 
 nagoras has expressed something of the same kind, 
 though not exactly in the same manner : the son 
 of God is the logos of the father in idea and 
 energy 24 . 
 
 Upon this order Tertullian enlarges in his 
 Treatise against Praxeas. Before all things God 
 was alone, being to himself both world, and place, 
 and all things. Now he is said to have been alone, 
 because there was nothing externally beside him. 
 Yet he was not even then alone ; for he had with 
 him what he had in himself, namely, his own 
 reason. Even God is reasonable, and reason was 
 in him first, and so all things were by him. — 
 Although God had not yet sent forth his word, 
 he had it within himself with and in his reason, 
 by secretly considering and arranging with him- 
 
 nata et condita, ex quo in sensu Dei ad opera mundi disponen- 
 da coepit agitari, p. 416. Tertullian, contrary to some other 
 of the Fathers, reprobated refinements upon the word 'Apxv- 
 "Principium sive initium inceptionis est verbum non alicujus 
 substantia nomen — Etiam ex materia facturus fuisset, ante in 
 sophia cogitando et disponendo jam fecerat. — Primo sophiam 
 conditam initium riarum in opera ejus: dehino et sermonem 
 prolatum, per quem omnia facta sunt, et sine quo factum est 
 nihil." [p. 275, ed. Bigalt. Paris. 1634.] 
 
 24 'e<tt\v 6 vibs tov 6eo0 Xo'yos tov Trarpos iv Ibeq Kai ivepyeiq. 
 [Supplic. pro Christ. § 10.] 
 
lo6 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 self what afterwards he was about to utter by 114 
 the word 25 . This he proposes to illustrate by 
 what takes place in man, who was made after the 
 image of God, and has also reason in himself. 
 Whenever he thinks, he speaks within himself, has 
 a collocutor, and holds a conference with his rea- 
 son 26 . Thus, says he to his adversary, there is 
 in you a kind of secondary speech, by which you 
 speak in thinking, and by which you think in 
 speaking. Your very discoursing faculty becomes 
 another person. How much more fully does this 
 take place in God? 
 
 Tertullian seems to have been aware that the 
 wisdom and word of God, according to his ex- 
 planation, might be taken for a quality or an act. 
 He therefore supposes his opponent to ask, if he 
 maintained the word to be a substance ; to which 
 question he answers decidedly in the affirmative. 
 In reply to this his adversary is made to object, 
 that a word is something void, empty, and incor- 
 
 25 Ante omnia enim Deus erat solus, ipse sibi et mundus et 
 locus et omnia. Solus autem, quia nihil aliud extrinsecus 
 prseter ilium. Ceterum ne tunc quidem solus; habebat enim 
 secum, quam habebat in semetipso, rationom suam scilicet. 
 Rationalis etiam Deus, et ratio in ipso prius : et ita ab ipso 
 omnia — Etsi Deus nondum sermonem suum miserat, proinde 
 eum cum ipsa et in ipsa ratione intra semetipsum habebat, 
 tacite cogitando et disponendo secum, quae per sermonem mox 
 erat dicturus. p. 845. [p. 637, A, B ed. Rigalt."] 
 
 26 Ita secundus quodammodo in te est sermo, per quem 
 loqueris cogitando, et per quem cogitas loquendo. Ipse sermo 
 alius est. Quanto ergo plenius hoc agitur in Deo ? p. 846. \lb. d.] 
 
 27 Ergo, inquis, das aliquam substantiam esse sermonem, 
 spiritu et sophise traditione constructam? Plane — Quid est, 
 dices, sermo, nisi vox et sonus yocis, et (sicut grammatici tra- 
 dunt) aer offensus, intelligibilis auditu; ceterum, yacuum nescio 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 107 
 
 "5poreal, the mere voice and sound of the mouth, 
 and, as grammarians call it, impelled air, intel- 
 ligible by hearing. Our author therefore in sup- 
 port of his assertion advances the following reason: 
 I say that nothing empty and void can come forth 
 from God — and that what proceeded from so great 
 a substance, and made such great substances, is 
 not itself void of substance 2r . He afterwards pro- 
 ceeds to illustrate the mutual relation of the three 
 persons of the Holy Trinity by the root, the tree, 
 and its fruits ; a fountain, a river, and a stream ; 
 the sun, a ray of light, and the apex of the ray. 
 
 116 We have seen, that, according to Philo, in 
 order to assist the understandings of men, who 
 were unable to contemplate God under the simple 
 character of the one self-existent Being, he was 
 represented as attended by two principal powers 
 and attributes, and considered under the threefold 
 character, as the principle of existence, the prin- 
 ciple of wisdom and goodness, and the principle of 
 
 quid et inane et incorporale ? At ego nihil dico de Deo inane 
 et vacuum prodire potuisse, ut non de inani et vacuo prolatum ; 
 nee carere substantia, quod de tanta substantia processit, et 
 tantas substantias fecit, [p. 638 b]. The language which Gazalius 
 uses in speaking of the Coran is similar to this : Ipsum (Deum) 
 prseterea loqui, imperare, prohibere, promittere, minari, ser- 
 mone seterno, antiquo, qui subsistat in essentia ipsius, nee simi- 
 lis sit sermoni creaturarum, quique non consistat voce, quas 
 oriatur e commotione seris, et collisione corporum, neque Uteris 
 quse conficiantur concursu labiorum, aut motione linguae, et esse 
 Alcoranum, Legem, Evangelium, et Psalterium, libros ab ipso 
 demissos super Apostolos suos, et legi Alcoranum Unguis, inscribi 
 libris, reponi cordibus, ita tamen ut interim sit antiquus, sub- 
 sistens in essentia Dei, nee obnoxius fiat separation*! et divisioni. 
 Pocock. Spec. Hist. Arab. p. 288. 
 
 MORGAN F 
 
108 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 power and authority. These were supposed by- 
 Christian writers to indicate the three persons of 
 the Holy Trinity, revealed in the Gospel Dispensa- 
 tion. According to this doctrine, the second per- 
 son is spoken of either as the 28 mind of the first, 
 or as the 29 reasoning faculty of that mind, or as 
 the 30 internal operation or production of that fa- 
 culty, or as the 31 external expression of that pro- 
 duction. 32 Athenagoras combines three of those u 
 senses together. 
 
 Hence Praxeas, perceiving, that by this mode 
 of interpretation, personality was to be attributed 
 
 28 NoCs km \6yos tov Trarpbs o vlos tov Qeov. Athenag. p. 10. 
 [Suppl. pro Chr. § ix.] "0\os vovs, oXos <p<Ss Trarpaov. Clem. 
 Alex. [Stromm. Lib. vii. cap. 2, p. 831.] 
 
 29 Rationalis enim Deus, et ratio in ipso prius — quse ratio 
 sensus ipsius est. Tertullian, p. 845, [p. 637 b.] 
 
 80 Sophia scilicet ipsius exinde nata et condita, ex quo in 
 sensu Dei ad opera mundi disponenda coepit agitari. Tertull. 
 p. 416. Cum ratione enim sua cogitans atque disponens ser- 
 monem, earn efflciebat, quam sermone tractabat, p. 845. Cle- 
 mens Alexandrinus [Stromm. Lib. v. cap. 3, § 16, p. 654] having 
 quoted John xvii., I am the truth, thus expatiates upon it: 
 'O 8e \6yos tov Qeov, 'Eycb, <pt]cr\v, elpl 77 akqBeia. va apa BeaprjTos 
 6 Xoyos" rovs 8e akrj6tvovs, e(pTjj tptKococpovs, rivas Xe-yeiy ; tovs ttjs 
 aXTjOelas, f]V S* eya>, <ptKo8edpovas. iv 8e r<3 Qaidpto (p. 247) 7repl 
 ahTjOetas, as Ideas Xeycov 6 UXdrav dyXaarei. rj de Iftea tvvorjiia tov 
 Qeov' oirep oi fidp[3apoi \6you elprjKCMri tov Qeov. 
 
 31 Cum dicit Deus, Fiat lux; hssc est nativitas perfecta 
 sermonis. Tertullian, p. 846, [p. 638 b.] 
 
 82 NoSs, \6yos, o-o(pia t vlbs tov iraTpos, p. 27 [§ x]. This mode 
 of explaining the nature of the second and third persons of the 
 Holy Trinity, led some of the principal sects among the Maho- 
 metans to deny the existence of the divine attributes; lest by 
 admitting them they should seem to infringe the fundamental 
 article of their faith, the simple unity of the Deity. The ac- 
 count of Abul Farajius is : " Quod ad Motazalas attinet, illud, 
 de quo inter eos in universum convenit, hoc est, quod attributa 
 seterna ab essentia Creatoris, qui supra omnia excelsus, amove- 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 109 
 
 118 to mere qualities, operations, and relations, main- 
 tained that the Trinity in the divine nature was 
 not a Trinity of persons, but was intended to ex- 
 press the different offices and relations of the same 
 identical Being. In consequence of this position 
 he asserted, that God the Father himself descended 
 into the womb of the Virgin ; that he was born of 
 her ; that he suffered ; in short, that he was Jesus 
 Christ 33 . 
 
 In all these cases it is highly necessary to ob- 
 serve the mode of reasoning which is adopted ; and 
 to distinguish between the general doctrine laid 
 
 ant, fugientes distinctionem personarum, quam constituunt 
 Christiani." Poc. Spec. Hist. Arab. p. 18. Another author 
 reasons in this manner upon the same principle: "Infidelitatis 
 arguuntur Christiani, quod tria statuunt seterna ; quid ergo de 
 iis pronuntiandum, qui septem aut plura statuunt?" lb. p. 216. 
 Wasel, the founder of this class of sects, thus expresses himself 
 upon the subject in general terms : " Quicunque asserit signifi- 
 catum aut attributum aeternum, duos statuit Deos." lb. By 
 this language they meant nothing more, than to assert the 
 simple and indivisible essence of the Deity, which, according to 
 the metaphysical notions of those ages, would not be consistent 
 with an acknowledgment of his attributes. For instance, when 
 they denied the attribute of knowledge to the Deity, they 
 affirmed, " Deum per essentiam suam scire, non per scientiam." 
 That in this embarrassed mode of expressing themselves, they 
 had an eye to the metaphysics, which then prevailed among 
 Christians, seems evident from the following passage of Share- 
 stanius: "Dicunt illi, qui se aequitatis assertores vocant, Deum 
 excelsum unum esse essentia sua, nullam esse ei divisionem, 
 nullum attributum, unum etiam operibus suis, nee socium ipsi 
 esse, nee seternum alium prater essentiam ipsius, nee consortem 
 in operibus ipsius, nee fieri posse, ut reperiantur duo seterna, 
 atque hoc est unitatem asserere." Ibid. 
 
 33 Ipsum dicit patrem descendisse in virginem, ipsum ex ea 
 natum, ipsum passum, denique ipsum esse Jesum Christum. 
 Tertull. Adv. Praxeam. p. 844, [p. 634 a]. 
 
 f2 
 
no The Fathers of the Christian Church, 
 
 down, and the explanations made use of to illus- 
 trate the nature of it. Thus the most approved 
 writers of the second century rested upon the au- 
 thority of the Scriptures, the general doctrine of 
 the eternal generation of the Son of God, his unity 
 with the Father, and his being the person by whom 
 all things were made, and without whom nothing 
 was made that was made. But when they proceeded 
 to particular explanations of this general doctrine, 
 they had little or no assistance from the Scriptures, 
 if we except a few figurative passages, which they 
 explained in a literal sense 34 . Their principal de- 
 pendence was upon their own ingenuity and imagi-119 
 nation, furnished with wrong conceptions of things 
 and modes of reasoning, by their mistaking the 
 principles and designs of Plato and Philo. This 
 led them to explain the unity of the second person 
 of the Holy Trinity with the first, by denominating 
 the second the mind of the first, thus making a 
 distinction between God the Father and his own 
 mind, and assigning a separate personality to each; 
 as if God the Father were any other than mind, 
 or it were conceivable that any being should un- 
 derstand by an intellect which was personally dif- 
 ferent from it, and which of course possessed a 
 separate consciousness. This led them to explain 
 the eternity of the second person, by denominating 
 him the reason of the first, who existed from eter- 
 
 34 An obscure expression is a weak basis for an elaborate 
 system. Critic. Obs. on Vlth Book of the iEneid. 
 
 35 Clemens Alexandrinus says, that the heads of the prin- 
 cipal heresies of his time were born in the reign of the emperor 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. in 
 
 nity, and was always possessed of reason. Hence 
 it was, that the second person is described to be 
 the wisdom of the first, or that operation of the 
 divine reason and that plan of proceeding which 
 was laid in the divine intellect before all creation. 
 Hence, likewise, the author of our salvation is as- 
 serted to have been literally that word which was 
 projected from the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, 
 when he said, Let there be light, and there was 
 light; which is termed by Tertullian, the perfect 
 nativity of the word. 
 iao The orthodox writers of the second century 
 seem to have differed from the heretics 35 not so 
 much in their prime abstract principles and modes 
 of reasoning, as in their superior reverence for the 
 canonical Scriptures and the doctrines obviously 
 contained in them, and their ready reference to 
 them alone in confirmation of their tenets. The 
 former steadily adhered to the doctrines of the 
 Scriptures, but had recourse to peculiar principles 
 and modes of reasoning, in order to explain and il- 
 lustrate the nature of real beings, whose existence 
 and general character are revealed in the word of 
 God, and to make them appear consistent with the 
 philosophical tenets or popular opinions of those to 
 whom they wished to recommend them. Many of 
 the heretics set out with similar principles and 
 modes of reasoning ; but instead of confining them 
 
 Adrian, and lived to the time of the elder Antoninus : irepi tovs 
 A&piavov rov BafTtKcas xpovovs ol ras alpeo-ets eTrivorffravTEs yey6- 
 vaai, Km fieXP 1 7 e T '7 S 'A-vravivov rov irpeo-fSvrepov dUrcivav ijAiKias. 
 Stromm. Lib. vin. [p. 764, p. 898, Potter.'] 
 
ii2 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 to the explanation of acknowledged doctrines es- 
 tablished upon the authority of the Scriptures, 
 they gave up the reins to a wild imagination, and 
 unchecked by authority, they proceeded as far as 
 their fantastical principles and reasonings would 
 carry them, in quest of new and unauthorized doc- 
 trines and imaginary personages. 
 
 I shall endeavour to illustrate what is here as-iai 
 serted, by a passage in that treatise of Tertullian, to 
 which I have so often referred. Tertullian, having 
 advanced what has been already stated concerning 
 the reason and wisdom and word of God, seems to 
 have been aware of the resemblance which his 
 principles and reasonings bore to those that were 
 maintained by Valentinus. He therefore under- 
 took to obviate the objection, by pointing out the 
 difference that was between them. Observe now 
 in what he represents that difference to consist. 
 It is not in the principles which he lays down ; it is 
 not in the reasonings and illustrations which he 
 uses ; but it is in the doctrines to which those prin- 
 [ P . 6S9b] pies, reasonings, and illustrations are applied: Hoc 
 si qui putaverit me irpofioX^v aliquam introducere, id 
 est, prolationem rei alterius ex altera, quod facit Va- 
 lentinus, alium atque alium JEonem de *dEone produ- 
 lutatur, i. m- cens ; primo quidem dicam tibi, non ideo non utitur 
 \cmm, i Ki- et Veritas vocabulo tsto et re ac sensu ejus, quia et hoz- 
 resis utitur ; immo hceresis potius ex veritate acceptor 
 quod ad mendacium suum strueret. Prolatus est sermo 
 Dei an non ? Hie mecum gradum fige. Si prolatus 
 est, cognosce probolam veritatis ; et viderit hceresis, si 
 quid de veritate imitata est. Jam nunc quceritur, 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 113 
 
 quis quomodo utatur aliqua re et vocabulo ejus. Va- 
 lentinus probolas suas discernit et separat ab auctore 
 
 met ita longe ab eo ponit, ut ^3Eon patrem nesciat 
 
 Apud nos autem solus filius patrem novit, et sinum 
 patris ipse exposuit, et omnia apud patrem audivit et 
 vidit, etc. p. 846. 
 
 What those doctrines of Valentinus were, may 
 be seen at large in Irenaus. The fact seems 
 to be, that Valentinus and other heretics, in the 
 same manner as the orthodox, adopted erroneous 
 principles, which led them into false doctrines. 
 They learned at one time to speak of mind, as a 
 person distinct from the principle of existence ; at 
 another time, to attribute substance and personality 
 to reason ; at another time, to wisdom ; at another 
 time, to the word expressive of power and autho- 
 rity. But they did not sufficiently attend to a yery 
 material circumstance, to which the orthodox paid 
 more regard, that all those positions were originally 
 advanced to explain established and well authenti- 
 cated doctrines, and the nature of real personages. 
 They began with them as first principles and un- 
 questioned truths, and framed such doctrines as 
 seemed to arise out of them. Thus they were in- 
 duced to adopt the doctrine of a perfect iEon be- 
 fore all things, eternal, incomprehensible, invisible, 
 and unbegotten. Considering mind, reason, wis- 
 dom, truth, life, &c. as distinct in their meaning, 
 they attributed a distinct personality to each, and 
 devised a series of jEons, projected one from an- 
 other in a long course of succession. 
 
 133 We have seen that Plato maintained the spe- 
 
114 '-i'Ae Fathers of the Christian, Church. 
 
 cific forms to be the real entities. By these, Philo 
 stated him to mean the mere motions of the mind. 
 But the several sects of Gnostics considered them 
 as real things, that had a proper and actual subsist- 
 ence, and held that every species of sensible fleet- 
 ing things had an ideal permanent representative. 
 It was easy and natural for them, thus disposed, 
 and in a great measure free from the restraints of 
 the doctrines of the canonical Scriptures, to fall in 
 with the Eastern philosophy, and to embrace a 
 doctrine which admitted of an extensive list of 
 jEons, such as man, church, thought, will, &c., each 
 the chief of a particular order of beings similar to 
 himself. 
 
 This primary derivation of the doctrines of the 
 Gnostics from the philosophical opinions of Plato, 
 Adv. meres, is expressly aflirmed by Irenaaus, in which chapter 
 it is stated that they also borrowed many of their 
 notions from the theories of other philosophical 
 sects, and from the poetic mythologies of ancient 
 Greece. Non solum quae apud comicos posita sunt 
 arguuntur, quasi propria proferentes ; sed etiam quae 
 apud omnes, qui Deum ignorant, et qui dicuntur phi- 
 losophi, sunt dicta, Time congregant, et quasi centonem 
 ex multis et pessimis panniculis consarcientes subtili 
 eloquio sibi ipsis prceparaverunt. He says, indeed, 
 that they affected to confirm their wild theories by 
 Scripture ; but it was by the most forced and arbi-124 
 trary interpretations of it, by collecting detached 
 expressions and names, and treating them as one 
 continued narration, just as if a person should un- 
 dertake to frame a story by tacking together verses 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 115 
 
 widely dispersed through the works of Homer. But, 
 says he, when the Word, the Only-begotten, and 
 Life, and Light, and Saviour, and Christ, and Son 
 of God are proved to be one and the same Being, 
 and it is shewn that this same person was made 
 flesh for us, the fabric of their Ogdoad is dissolved ; 
 and, when this is dissolved, their whole hypothesis 
 falls to the ground 36 . 
 
 Clemens Alexandrinus also, in the third book 
 of his Stromata, discourses upon the use which Epi- 
 phanes, Carpocrates, Marcion, and other heretics, 
 made of the principles and doctrines of Plato, and 
 other philosophers. He says, that Epiphanes was 
 instructed by his father, Carpocrates, in the doc- 
 i2jtrines of Plato 37 , some of which he had mistaken; 
 that Marcion derived some improper notions from 
 the same source, and that he made an unskilful use 
 of others. He attributes some of the errors of 
 Cassianus to too great an attention to Plato ; and he 
 quotes from the writings of some of those heretics the 
 very expression in the Parrnenides, ev rjv to. iravra, 
 
 36 *Ej/os yap tov avrov heiKvvpevov \6yov Kai povoyevovs Kai 
 £g)^s Kal (ptoTos Kai (ratTrjpos Kai XpioToO /cat vlov Oeou, Kai tovtov 
 avrov (rapKadevros V7rep qpav, \e\vrai 77 rrjs 'OyfioaSos o-Krjvomjyia. 
 ravrrjs Se XiKvpevrjs, biarreirraKev airav irdo-a y vwodeais. Irense. 
 adv. Hcer. Lib. 1. p. 40. 
 
 3 ? ''ETraiSei&rj pAv ovv irapa ra> irarpi rr/v re iyK.vKki.ov naiSeiav 
 Kai to Xlkdraivos, p. 428. [p. 511.] AokcX Se poi Kal tov likaravos 
 napaiaiKOfvai ev rjj TroXireia \<papevov\, p. 430, [514]. Oi (pCkoo-o- 
 <pot Se, wv ep.vr\o-b\)p.ev (Hvdayopas re Kai UXarav) nap av rrpi 
 yevetnv KaKrjv thai. acre/3o3s eKpaBovres 01 carb MapKiavos, p. 431, 
 [516]. Ovk acra(j>5>s SeSeixdai ij/ilv vopi£a>, ras a(j>oppas rav |«Va>v 
 boypartav rap MapKia>va irapa HXdraivos d^apla'Tcos re Kai apad&s 
 eTk-qtyivai, p. 434, [520]. -qyeirai Se 6 yevvaios ovros HkaraviKco- 
 rcpov, p. 466, [553]. 
 
 15 
 
n6 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 p. 466. — Tertullian calls Valentinus apostate, here- 
 [p. 375a] tic, and Platonist. {De Came Christi, cap. xx.) 
 Relucere ideis semina Gnostidce et Valentininw hcere- 
 seos. De Anima, p. 322. 
 
 It would be easy to multiply passages from 
 Tertullian and others, in support of what is here 
 advanced. I will close this topic with one testi- 
 mony from the writings of an author in the begin*- 
 ning of the next century; a testimony upon this 
 subject as unexceptionable as any one that can be 
 obtained. The author whom I mean is Plotinus ; 
 a man inferior to few in application, acuteness of 
 genius, and profound knowledge of the various me- 
 thods in which the men of those times interpreted 
 the philosophical opinions of Plato, and applied 
 them to subjects of theology. 
 
 The ninth book of his second Ennead was writ- 
 ten professedly to discuss the doctrines of the 
 Gnostics. After having examined some of their 
 principal doctrines at large, he says, ' These things 
 have been partly taken from Plato; but whatever i^5 
 new things they have introduced, in order to form 
 their own system of philosophy, those are found to 
 be destitute of truth 38 .' He then produces one in- 
 rTtaams.p. stance of this from the Timwus. Plato said, that 
 as mind sees ideas in that which is a living being, 
 the Creator devised that the universe should con- 
 
 38 OXtoff yap avrois to. pev irapa roO Itkaravos eTKrjnTar ra 
 Be, o<ra Katvoropovatv, iva Ibiav <pi\o<ro<pLav Bcoprai, ravra e£a> rrjs 
 aKr)6tias evprjrai, p. 203 [p]. 
 
 39 'E.L7t6vtos yap avroV) jj7rep odv vovs ivovvas Ihias iu T<5, 6 
 ecrrc fSov, Kadopa, Tooravras Kal 6 To8e iroiwv to nav bitvorjOri (r^eiw 
 ol Se, oi (Tvvivres, tov piv eXa/3oj» iv ^o-v^lq. 'i^ovra iv airm iravTa 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 117 
 
 tain as many. But the Gnostics, not understanding 
 this, conceived one mind at rest, having in it all 
 entities; another mind beholding what was in it; 
 and a third mind devising 39 . He next shews in 
 what manner their ideas of the corruption of matter, 
 and the impurity of all terrestrial things, were de- 
 rived from Plato's direction to abstract the thoughts, 
 and to withdraw the mind as much as possible from 
 the influence of the body. He again intimates, p. 215 [g.] 
 that they were led to hate the nature of the body 
 in consequence of having heard Plato 40 complain 
 much of it, on account of its being so great an im- 
 pediment to the soul. 
 127 The conclusion, which I would draw from the 
 whole of the topic, is this : First, that the original 
 general principles, adopted by both the orthodox 
 and the heretics of the second century, were the 
 same, and that the latter differed from the former, 
 chiefly in consequence of the more unrestrained 
 and licentious use which they made of those princi- 
 ples. Secondly, that the chief of those principles 
 were derived immediately from the mythological 
 stories and the tenets of the philosophers of Greece, 
 particularly of Plato. 
 
 I have been the more particular in this enquiry, 
 because Mosheim, and after him Brucker, has as- 
 serted, that the Gnostic heresies were derived 
 
 Ta ovtcl' rov fie vovv erepbv irap avTov Oeapovvra, rbv fie 8iapoovp.e- 
 vov, p. 204 [a.] 
 
 40 Ka/rot et kcu fiKTsiv avrois eVoiei ttjv tov (rdpaTos (pvaiv, 
 fitdrt aKTjKoacn TjXdravos TroWa fMefi-^ajxevov td> crco/urn, ota iji7r6- 
 fiiov irape^av [ipmohia Trape^ei, Oreuzer] t% tyvxti- 
 
1 1 8 the Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 solely from the oriental philosophy. The real state 
 of the case seems to me to be this : 
 
 First, The genuine doctrines of Plato, in many 
 points, bear a strong resemblance to the oriental 
 philosophy; whence indeed they were derived by 
 Pythagoras and Plato. The same may be said of 
 the mythologies of ancient Greece, which in a 
 great measure originated from the same source. 
 
 Secondly, This resemblance was increased by 
 the manner in which the philosophy of Plato was 
 taught at Alexandria, when that city became a 
 distinguished seat of learning. 
 
 Thirdly, It was customary for those who aspired 
 to eminence in their profession, to affect a more 
 profound knowledge of the sublime doctrines of 
 philosophy relating to God and the human soul. 138 
 Por this purpose they were not satisfied with what 
 Plato taught upon those subjects ; but, after they 
 had gone through the course of education in his 
 school, they applied to the oriental philosophy, 
 
 siramm. Lib. from which Plato himself drew. Clemens Alex- 
 
 1. p. 274. 
 
 [p. 322.J andrinus enumerates the several masters under 
 whom he himself studied. Among these one was 
 from the east. Plotinus, who was himself a kind 
 of second father of the later Platonists, undertook, 
 though he failed to accomplish, a journey into the 
 east, for the purpose of perfecting himself in the 
 philosophy of those countries. 
 
 We may hence be able to account for the high 
 pretensions to wisdom which the Gnostics ad- 
 vanced, and for the contempt with which they 
 treated Plato and his followers, with whom they 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 119 
 
 had set out in the pursuit of truth. They looked 
 upon him as one who had made but very little pro- 
 gress in the ways of true knowledge, and was 
 qualified to teach men only the first rudiments of 
 science. But they arrogated to themselves the 
 name of sages, who were initiated into the great 
 mysteries of God and nature. This contemptuous 
 treatment of Plato and his doctrines could not 
 fail to produce a proportionable degree of animo- 
 sity in the later Platonists, whose vanity was se- 
 verely wounded by the arrogant pretensions of the 
 Gnostics. 
 139 These patch-work systems of heresy (if I may 
 be allowed to borrow the idea of Irenseus) will 
 the less surprise us, if we recollect an opinion, 
 which generally prevailed in that age, that most 
 of the sects of Grecian and Barbarian philosophy 
 contained severally some scattered portions of 
 truth, which it was the business of a wise man to 
 collect and combine in one consistent scheme 41 . 
 
 While these general principles prevailed, as 
 well among the orthodox Christians as among 
 heretics, Ammonius Saccas, who was educated a 
 Christian, established a school at Alexandria. Phi- 
 losophy at this time had gained an undoubted 
 
 41 This opinion is thus stated by Clemens Alexandrinus : £u/t- 
 iravre s ovv "EXKrjvcs re nal Bapftapoi, oo-oi TakrjSovs dpixBrjaav, oi fxkv 
 ovk okiya, 01 8e fitpos n, Amp apa, tov rijs aKrjdetas Xoyou i'xovTzs 
 
 dvabet^Oelev ovrats ovv 17 re fiapfiapos tf re ^'EXKrjviKrj <pt\o(rotpta y 
 
 ttjv aiS tov akr/Bemv airapaypov Ttva ov Ttjs Aiovvaov p.vdo\oyias, rrjs 
 Se roC Aoyov tov Hvtos ad Qeo\oyias irenoir)Tai. 6 fie to. o~ijipi)fteva 
 o~vv$£is avdts, Ka\ ivoTrotrjo-as TeXetov tov \6yov aKtvb*vva>s cv 'ttro 
 on Karoi/^crat tx\v akr\6uav. Slromm. Lib. I. p. 298, [p. 349.] 
 
i2o The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 ascendency in the church ; and the nature of the 
 situation, in which Ammonius was placed seemed 
 
 ■I' 
 
 to call upon him to support at once the character \ 
 of divine revelation and human philosophy. As he 
 left no writings behind him, we can judge of his 
 abilities only from their effects, and the testimony 
 of others. These unite in placing him in the most 
 conspicuous point of view. In his endeavours to 
 render more complete the agreement between the 130 
 several stories of Pagan mythology, the tenets of 
 the Grecian and Oriental philosophers, and the 
 doctrines of the Gospel, he entirely changed the 
 whole state of the question, effected a complete 
 revolution in philosophy, and made no inconsider- 
 able impression upon the Christian profession. By 
 the refinements of his speculations and the copi- 
 ousness and force of his eloquence, he seems to 
 have exercised an almost uncontrollable influence 
 over the minds of men in the personal discharge 
 of his office as a public teacher. And from him 
 sprung a sect, the members of which, for their 
 learning and acutenesss, have been the admiration 
 of great numbers in all succeeding ages. 
 
 Ammonius is said to have differed in prin- 
 ciples from Clemens in the following respect. 
 Clemens affirmed, that truth was dispersed in dif- 
 ferent portions through most of the stories of 
 Pagan mythology and the several sects of philo- 
 sophy; and that the great error of the heathens 
 consisted principally jn this, that each nation, party 
 and sect, having but a portion of truth, and some 
 of them a very small portion of it, persuaded 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 121 
 
 themselves that they possessed the whole 42 . Where- 
 as Ammonius is said to have affirmed, that each 
 sect and party would be found to be possessed 
 131 of all the most important doctrines of true reli- 
 gion, if their principles, tenets, and mythologies, 
 were properly interpreted. This step alone was 
 wanting in order to make the junction between 
 Christianity and Paganism complete. If the point 
 could be fully accomplished, it would follow of 
 course that the school of Ammonius would be 
 frequented by men of all parties who repaired to 
 Alexandria for instruction in philosophy and reli- 
 gion. The event was answerable to the greatness 
 of the undertaking, and the splendid abilities of the 
 undertaker. 
 
 Before the time of Ammonius, Christian writers 
 had for different purposes endeavoured to make 
 out a conformity between their own profession and 
 the traditions and principles of those to whom they 
 addressed themselves. Sometimes they did this in 
 order to mitigate the abhorrence in which they were 
 held by their Pagan persecutors, and to convince 
 them of the innocence and reasonableness of the 
 doctrines which they taught and practised. At other 
 times their views were more extensive and disinter- 
 ested, and were directed to the conversion of those 
 to whom their discourses were delivered. They 
 represented to them, that the mythological tradi- 
 tions and philosophical speculations, which were so 
 
 42 At Ttjs (pikoo-ocplas ttjs ts fiapfiapov rrjs re 'EWrjviKrjs alpl- 
 <reis, (KaiTTrj, amp %\a^v, as jracrav av%el rfju a\ri8eiav. Stromm. 
 Lib. I. p. 298, [p. 349.] 
 
122 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 highly esteemed by the Gentiles, were but faint 
 and very imperfect copies of divine wisdom that 
 was to be found only among Christians complete 133 
 in all its parts, and with undiminished lustre. They 
 exhorted them therefore to repair to the sacred 
 volumes, where those celestial treasures are depo- 
 sited, and to enrol themselves in that order of 
 men who glory in professing and practising the 
 most sublime truths and the purest morality, and 
 in inculcating the same profession and practice 
 upon others. Sometimes their object was to make 
 philosophy appear respectable in the eyes of their 
 fellow Christians, from a conviction that it tended 
 to strengthen their intellectual powers, to enlarge 
 their capacities, and refine their conceptions, and 
 give them more just and comprehensive views of 
 the ways of God in man. Perhaps also those good 
 men were not quite free from some tincture of 
 vanity in this respect. As they were undoubt- 
 edly ambitious of being reputed philosophers as 
 well as Christians, they probably felt some plea- 
 sure in exalting their profession. 
 
 Yet all this while, Christianity, its doctrines, 
 and language, seem to have engaged very little of 
 the attention of Pagan philosophers. They saw no 
 purposes of interest, ambition, or vanity, that were 
 to be answered by concurring in those forced 
 interpretations, in order to promote a seeming 
 conformity. They were indeed often pressed by 
 the Christian apologists with the gross impurities 
 that were recorded in the histories of their gods*, 
 and the Stoics, whose system of religious faith 133 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 123 
 
 comprehended them all, had given them a spe- 
 cimen of the excellent use that might be made of 
 physical interpretations. Yet all those circum- 
 stances appear to have made but a slight impres- 
 sion upon their minds before the time of Ammo- 
 nius ; and they betray no symptoms of having even 
 suspected that their popular mythologies, poetical 
 fables, and philosophical tenets, contained either 
 those express declarations of theological doctrines, 
 or those obscure allusions to them, in which their 
 successors so confidently affirmed that they every 
 where most obviously abounded. 
 
 But when the reputation of Ammonius gave 
 a consequence and dignity to the doctrines which 
 he professed, the scene was suddenly changed. 
 The Pagan philosophers seemed at once to be 
 roused, as it were, from a profound sleep. A 
 thick veil appeared to have been drawn from their 
 eyes. Men of the most refined wit, the most 
 acute genius, and the most extensive learning, 
 thought it an employment worthy of their noblest' 
 faculties and attainments to search for the great 
 mystery of revelation, the Trinity of Persons in 
 the Divine Nature, among the doctrines and tra- 
 ditions of men. They tortured their invention a 
 thousand ways in order to accomplish their pur- 
 pose ; and they did not disdain to use scriptural 
 language and scriptural figures and illustrations in 
 i34the prosecution of it. Now the withered arm was 
 impiously lifted up against him who gave it strength. 
 Now the Pagan ventured to enter into competition 
 
124 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 with the Christian concerning the purity of their 
 respective moral precepts. Now he presumed to 
 assail the authenticity of the revelation, by assert- 
 ing that Christ and his disciples proclaimed no- 
 thing new concerning either the nature of God or 
 the duty of man, but only set forth in a new form 
 what was known to the world long before. 
 
 The most illustrious of the Pagan scholars of 
 Ammonius was Plotinus. He stands eminently 
 distinguished by the manner in which he applied 
 the hypothesis and principles of his master to the 
 decoration of the mythology and philosophy of 
 Greece. The acuteness of his genius, his ab- 
 stracted mode of reasoning and expression, and 
 his unremitting application of metaphysical sub- 
 tilties, gave a wonderful degree of reputation to 
 
 his system. 
 
 It seem'd 
 For dignity compos'd and high exploit : 
 But all was false and hollow 43 . 
 
 If we refer to the detached original stories and 
 reasonings which he undertook to illustrate and 
 conjoin ; if we attempt to explore the foundations 
 of what, by the power, as it were, of his magic art, 
 appeared in the eyes of some men to be a solid 
 and stately building ; we shall be surprised to 
 discover that it is nothing more than the baseless 13. 
 fabric of a vision. 
 
 P 8 Milton, Paradise Lost, Book n. v. 110.] 
 
 44 'hp^eTVirov oiov Kai napadeiyfia clkSvos tovtov ovtos Kai fit* 
 ckuvov Svros. Enn. m. Lib. ii. cap. 1. [p. 255 B.] 
 
 45 'H tov vov Kai tov Svtos (pvo-is /crfir/ios iariv 6 akrjdtvbs Kai 
 irpaiTos. [Ibid. B.] 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 125 
 
 The writings of Plotinus are to be considered 
 as philosophical lectures, in which he undertakes, 
 not to investigate, but to prove and illustrate cer- 
 tain doctrines by a variety of arguments and state- 
 ments. The principal of those doctrines, to which 
 his chief attention is directed through all his works, 
 is a trinity in the divine nature ; (Ennead II. &>■ 
 Lib. ix. Cap. i. and elsewhere.) This doctrine, 
 so conspicuous and important in the Christian dis- 
 pensation, he endeavours to prove by abstract 
 reasoning, to support by the authority of Plato, 
 and to illustrate by mythological stories. He calls 
 his three principles, the first, the good (rd'yadov) 
 or the existing (to ov), the second, mind {vow), 
 the third, soul (^y'^Jj). He says, that mind is the 
 archetype and pattern of this world, which is the 
 image of it, and which exists by means of it 44 ; 
 that the nature of mind and the existing is the 
 true and first world 45 . Mind, having imparted 
 something of itself to matter, made all things, 
 itself remaining motionless and quiet. That which 
 136 flowed from it was reason 46 . It was reason that 
 gave harmony and an unity of composition to all 
 things 4r . But this universe is not, like the intel- 
 ligible one, mind and reason. It only partakes of 
 mind and reason. Wherefore it stood in need 
 of harmony by the concurrence of mind and 
 necessity. The latter tends to defect and dis- 
 
 46 NoCj roivvv SoCs ti iavrov els vXtjv, aTpefifjs (tal r/av^os xa 
 ■nkvTa elpydfero- ovtos 8e 6 Xdyor, i< vox) pveis. Cap. 2, [p. 
 256 A.] 
 
 47 ToO Sc Xdyov in alroU rrjf Appoviav Ka\ piav rrjv avvra^ai 
 els xa oXa jroiov/iivov. Ibid, [c] 
 
126 The Fathers of the Christian Church, 
 
 proportion ; but mind controls necessity 48 . He 
 again repeats this sentiment, that the reason or 
 soul, which presides over this universe, is not, 
 like that of the intelligible world, pure mind and 
 soul, but suspended from the latter, and, as it 
 were, an effulgence from both 49 . This reason 
 therefore, though it proceeds from one mind and 
 one life, each of them perfect, is neither one life 
 nor one mind, nor every where perfect ; and does 
 not impart itself whole and entire to those things 
 to which it imparts itself 50 . 
 \Ennmd. in. Jn his treatise on the nature of Love, he 
 
 Lib. v. p. 292 ' 
 
 G foll] makes use of these principles to explain the birth 137 
 of that urchin, as related by Plato in his Sym- 
 posium. There was, he says, a twofold Venus : 
 one the daughter of Jupiter and Dione, the other 
 the heavenly Venus or the divine soul, descended 
 from Ccelus the first principle, but the immediate 
 production of Cronus, mind, the second principle, 
 without a mother, that is, without any commu- 
 nication with matter, and without any relation to 
 marriage ; as there is no marriage in heaven, every 
 thing there being pure and unmixed. It is more 
 immediately connected with mind than the light 
 with the sun. This heavenly Venus, following 
 
 48 'EotI yap to irav roSe 011%, aancp eKct, vovs Kal \6yos, aWa 
 fiercx " vov Kal ^dyov 816 Kal i&fq&r/ appovlas, ovvekSoVTOs vov Kal 
 dvdyKTjs. rrjs pkv irpbs to x^p°» e\(cou<Tijs Kal els akoyiav (pepovaTjs 
 — apxovros Sc vov Spas arayxiji. Ibid. 
 
 49 'Eoti tolvvv ovtos (6 Aoyos) ovk aKpaTos vovs, ovtf avrovovs, 
 ovSc ye tyvxqs Kadapas to yevos' qpTTjpevos 8e eKeivrjs, Kal oiov 
 exXa/xi^is i£ d/KpoTv vov Kai TJrvx'l 1 - [p. 267 D.] 
 
 *° "Hkcov toIvvv oStos 6 \6yos i< vov ivos Kal fa^s pias, jtXij- 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 127 
 
 Cronus, or, if you please, his father Coelus, asso- 
 ciating with him and beloved by him, brought 
 forth heavenly love. 
 
 But the soul of this universe also has a love q>. 294 » ] 
 attending her, who is concerned in marriages. 
 This love was begotten at the birth of Venus, in 
 the gardens of Jupiter, upon Tiev'ia, poverty, by Tl6pos, 
 abundance. In this fable, he says, that Jupiter [ P . 298 b.j 
 does not mean the third principle, as it usually 
 does, but the second, viz. mind. For Venus signi- 
 fies the divine soul. Tl6pos signifies the reason of 
 all things : not abstract universal reason, or, as 
 he expresses it, reason remaining in itself, but an 
 effulgence from it, and mixed with Ylevla, inde- 
 finite matter void of qualities 51 . Nectar, with which 
 138 IIojoos is said to have been intoxicated, signifies 
 divine wisdom, flowing into the soul at the birth of 
 Venus. The gardens of Jupiter are the glory and 
 splendor of the divine mind. (C. viii. ix. x). [pp- 298,299.] 
 
 In the fifth JSnnead, the first book, and the 
 seventh chapter, he applies the story of Cronus 
 or Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter, to a similar pur- 
 pose. Cronus, the wisest God, signifies the divine [p. 489 b.] 
 intellect, which devours its own offspring 62 ; that is, 
 absorbs within itself the divine reasons, not suffer- 
 
 povs ovtos eKarepov, ovk ea-Tiv ovre £0)77 p.La, ovre vovs ris ety, ofire 
 eKatrra^ov 77X77/377?, ovde didovs eavrov ols didatrtv o\ov re Kal 
 TTavra. Ibid, [s], 
 
 51 'Ek Xoyou ou /lelvavros iv avra, aXka p.i)(8evTOS .dopioria. 
 Enn. m. Lib. v. cap. 7, [p. 297 b.] 
 
 62 The Stoics interpreted Cronus to signify time, his off- 
 spring days, months, and years, etc. "Kpovos dicitur, qui est 
 idem xpovos, id est, spatium temporis. Saturnus autem est 
 
128 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 ing them to sink into matter, and to be fostered 
 by Rhea. From him, however, sprung Jupiter, the 
 divine soul, the light and impression of the mind, 
 revolving round it, and attached to it : a power 
 too great to be unproductive. 
 
 In aid of this solemn trifling he had recourse 
 to the philosophical principles of Plato. In the 
 prosecution of his plan, he considers the Par~ 
 menides, the Timceus, and to ayaOov or universal 
 good, and contemplates them as if they all treated 
 the same subject in exactly the same point of 
 view ; though the Parmenides was intended to 
 explain the phsenomena of the universe, accord- 
 ing to the principles of Parmenides, on the sup- 139 
 position of its having existed from eternity. Ti- 
 mseus, on the other hand, proceeds upon the sup- 
 position that the world was created, and under- 
 takes to delineate the order in which that great 
 work was performed, the relative dignity of the 
 separate parts, and the ingredients of which they 
 were severally composed. In neither of these trea- 
 tises does Plato make himself absolutely respon- 
 sible for the doctrines which are advanced in 
 them. And in his dialogue concerning a Eepublic, 
 he is not treating of the first and efficient cause, 
 
 appellatus, quod saturetur annis. Ex se enim natos comesse 
 fingitur solitus, quia consumit setas temporum spatia, annisque 
 pneteritis insaturabiliter expletur." Cio. De Nat. Deor. Lib. ii. 
 cap. 25. 
 
 63 AvrapKee ov avra els ayaBbv, ovbev av deoiro Tijs voytreas ttjs 
 nepi avrov. Erin. vi. Lib. vii. cap. 38, Tp- 730 a]. The terms 
 in which lie describes it, are not unlike the account, which 
 Cicero gives of the Gods of Epicurus : " Nihil agit : nullis occu- 
 pationibus est implicatus : nulla opera molitur : sua sapientia 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 129 
 
 but of the final cause. It is obvious how forced 
 an interpretation it must be that aims at blend- 
 ing such inconsistencies in one system. But this 
 is not all. The manner in which this scheme is 
 conducted adds greatly to the confusion that 
 necessarily arises from the nature of the scheme 
 itself. 
 
 He affirms that the terms ev, ev iroKka, and 
 ev Ka\ noWd in the Parmenides signify the three 
 principles in the divine nature ; and that to dya- [p. 490 bj 
 6ov, which I have shewn to signify the final cause, 
 is equivalent to ev the first principle, {Ennead VI. [p. 731.] 
 Lib. vii. C. xl. and elsewhere) the root, as it were, 
 of the tree, {Ennead VI. Lib. vin. C. xv. Ennead V. !> wo d, p . 
 Lib. iv. C. i.) the first intelligible, a simple unit 
 {Ennead V. Lib. 11. C. i.) ungenerated and selfsuf- [p. sis.} 
 ficient, not standing in need of intellect to com- 
 4oplete its perfection 53 . Whereas the second prin- 
 ciple, mind, which, he says, is the same as ev 7roX\a, 
 requires the intelligible for the exercise of its 
 powers and the fruition of its enjoyment, and of 
 course for the perfection of its nature 54 . Mind 
 has essence and intelligence, which are many. 
 {Ennead VI. Lib. vii. C. xxxvii, [p. 728] M ). It is 
 also all things, and therefore many. {Ennead III. 
 
 efc virtute gaudet : habet exploratum fore se semper cum in 
 maxumis turn in seternis voluptatibus." De Nat. Deor. I. 19. 
 
 54 c O fiev yap vovs toO ayaQov, to d* ayadov ov deirai eKtlvov. 
 Enn.iu. Lib. viii. cap. 10, [p. 352 d]. 'Opa 6 vovs intlvov koi 
 deiTai avrov fiovov e/cetvos Se tovtov oiidev. JEnn. v. Lib. i. cap. 
 6, [p. 487 P]; Lib. iv. cap. 2, [p. 518]. 
 
 Da Avo ovTa tovto to ev opov vovs Kai ov, kcii i/ow kcli voovpevov. 
 6 fiev vovs Kara to voeiv to be tv Kara t6 voovfxevov. JEnn. V. 
 Lib. i. cap. 4, [p. 485 e]. 
 
130 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 f«; : |sy Lib. m. C. iii — Ennead V. Lib. ix. C. vi.) It is 
 generated of the first principle by a reflex view of 
 itself 66 . 
 
 As mind is generated from the first principle 
 by a reflex view, so it also, being at rest, out of 14 
 its essence produces soul. The soul, not indeed 
 at rest but in motion, begat likewise an image. 
 Looking at the principle whence it sprung, it was 
 filled ; and having proceeded to different and con- 
 trary motion, she generated an image of herself, 
 sensation, and the nature which is in plants 5r . 
 Soul is the reason of the mind, and an energy of 
 it ; as that is of the first principle. But the rea- 
 son of the soul is obscure 58 . As the emitted reason 
 is an image of the reason in the soul, so is the 
 soul the image and reason of the mind ; and it is 
 all energy and life, which it sends forth for the 
 subsistence of other things. One may be com- 
 pared to the heat which resides in fire, the other 
 to that which it communicates 59 . The soul, being 
 one as subsisting in the divine nature, is also many 
 
 68 lias ovv vovv yevva, r) on tJ iirurrpotpfj irpbs avro impa. jj fie 
 opao-is avrrj vovs. Enn. v. Lib. i. cap. 7, [p. 488 a] : ov yap 
 TeXziov ra prjSiv ijjreiv pr)hk %x ilv > M$* Bei<rdcu, olov lirepeppvr]. /cat 
 to virepirXrjpes avrov ireiroirjKev aXKo, to fie yevopevov els avro 
 e7T€(TTpd(prj /cat iirXrjpcoOrj, /cat eyeveTO irpbs avro (Skeirov. /cat vovs 
 ovtos. /cat r] pev irpocKeTvo \irpbs e/cetvo I. Creuzer] oracrts auToC to 
 ov enovqaev >) 8c irpbs avTO 6ea, top vovv. eVet ovv cart [earij I. 
 Creuz.] irpbs aWb Iva tfifl, opov vovs yiyverai /cat ov. Enn. V. 
 Lib. ii. cap. 1, [p. 494 b]. 
 
 6 ' Ovtojs ovv ov olov eKelvos, Ta ofioia 7rotet, bvvap.iv irpo^eas 
 noXkrjv. etfios fie /cat tovto avTov, aairep avro avTOV irporepov 
 irpoe%ee. Kfl! avTT] e'x Trjs ovcrias ivipyeia i/'ux? 5 W^OT '■ Creuz.], 
 tovto pevovras eKeivov yevopevrj. /cat yap 6 povs pivovros tov irpb 
 avTov iyevero. y fie ov pevovo-a iroiel, dXXct KtvrjBeto-a eyivva e'ISoikov. 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 131 
 
 ^aas consisting of the reasons of the things that are 
 made 60 . 
 
 She made all animals, breathing into them Eim.v.v&.i 
 
 ' ° c. 2. [p. 482 a. 
 
 life : whatever the earth or the sea nourishes, and p - 48S] 
 whatever are in the air or in heaven, the stars and 
 the sun. She arranged this great heaven, and 
 makes it revolve in regular order, being a nature 
 different from the things which she arranges, and 
 moves, and causes to live. When she communi- 
 cates life to them, they come into being ; when 
 she quits them, they perish. Without her, matter 
 is a dead carcass ; but she flows into it, and en- 
 lightens it. As the rays of the sun, illuminating 
 a dark cloud, make it shine, and give it an aspect 
 of golden splendor, so also soul, entering into the 
 body of heaven, gave it life and immortality. 
 
 It should seem that it would be a bold under- 
 taking and an arduous task to reconcile this 
 theory with the doctrines laid down in Timwus. 
 In this theory mind and soul are stated to be 
 the second and third principles, and to be co- 
 
 ito? flip ofiv (SKeirovtra odev iyevsTO, i:\rjpovTai. 7rpoi\0ovo~a Se eiff 
 KtVTjtnv aXKrjv Kai ivavriav, yevva etdcoXoz/ avrfjs, aiffBijiriv Kai (pvcriv 
 ■rijv iv toIs (pvroXs. lb. [p. 494 c] 
 
 68 'H tyvxr] \6yos vov, Kai ivepyeid tis, axrirep avTos eKeivov. 
 nXXa i/'i'x? 5 F £> " ap-v8pos 6 \6yos. Erin. v. Lib. i. cap. 6, [p. 
 487 f]. 
 
 69 'H T|t>X') — eiKciv Tis icm vov. oTov \6yos 6 iv npocpopa \6yov 
 tov iv ^fv^fj, ovtcd toi Kai owj \6yos vov. Kai r) Tvatra ivipyeia. Kai 
 r\v itpoterai £torjV els aXXou vvoo-Taaiv. oiov irvpos, to fiiv J} o-vvovo-a 
 Sepporris, i) Se fjv napix™- Erin. v. Lib. i. cap. 3, [p. 484 B.] 
 
 60 To 8i ttoiovv qv ^v^Jj, tovto Spa ?rXJ;#os iv. ri ovv to irkrj- 
 601; oJ Xoyoi tSv yiyvop.ivav. Enn. vi. Lib. ii. cap. 5, [p. 
 699 b]. 
 
 MORGAN Gr 
 
132 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 eternal and co-essential with the first principle, 
 and to flow necessarily from it by a gradual 
 process ; that is, mind from the first principle, and 
 soul from mind. Soul, in like manner, from the 
 same necessity of its nature diffusing the emana-i 
 tions of its essence through matter, and giving it 
 form and life, constituted the visible world, with all 
 that it contains. In the Timceus the three prin- 
 ciples, as has been justly observed, are the Cre- 
 ator, Idea which is denominated the pattern, and 
 Matter. Out of the two last the first is said by a 
 voluntary and deliberate act (/3oi/X»?0ety kcu Xoyiea- 
 fxevos) at the beginning of time to have made the 
 universe, consisting of mind in soul and soul in 
 body. But Plotinus was not discouraged by the 
 difficulty, that would have deterred a less enter- 
 prizing genius ; and he has shewn by the manner 
 in which he surmounted it, that nothing is arduous 
 to a sophist, who is indulged with an arbitrary 
 assumption of abstract principles and senigmatical 
 interpretations. He says that Plato does not always 
 appear to assert the same doctrines ; so that it 
 
 61 Ov tclvtov Xeyrnv 7ra.vTa.xrj (paiverai, Iva av Tis in paoias to tov 
 avopos PoiXriixa dSev. Enn. IV. Lib. viii. cap. 1, [p. 469 B.] 
 Cicero in his dialogue, De Nat. Deor. Lib. i. cap. 12, makes 
 Velleius the Stoic bring the same charge of inconstancy of 
 principles against Plato : De Platonis inconstantia longum est 
 dieere, etc. The instances which he produces, are taken from 
 the Timceus and the Books of Laws. If he had thought that 
 the Timceus and the Parrnenides treated precisely of the same 
 subject, and that in both those dialogues Plato intended to 
 convey his own sentiments; the strongest possible argument 
 that could have been advanced, might have been obtained from 
 a comparison of the different doctrines maintained in those two 
 dialogues. For Velleius clearly perceived, that the positive 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 133 
 
 is not easy to ascertain his opinion 61 : that he 
 i44does but obscurely intimate, (yviynEvos — aiviTro- 
 
 ftevos. Ennead VI. Lib. ir. Cap. xxii.), that mind [p. en a.] 
 sees ideas in the first principle, together with the 
 principal consequences deduced from it : that when 
 the production of mind or soul is mentioned, it is 
 not intended to signify a production in time, but 
 only to point out the order of causes 62 : that ac- 
 cording to Plato mind sees ideas in the living, 
 which he calls also the intelligible : that by the 
 contemplation of those ideas is generated reason 
 or soul, which divides them into the several exist- 
 ing reasons or souls : that the universal soul was 
 not any where, and did not come any whither ; 
 but body, being near it, partook of it : it was not 
 in body, nor does Plato say so ; but body was in 
 it. Other souls proceed from it, and return to it ; 
 but itself is always above, in that, whose nature is 
 existence. Ennead III. Lib. ix. Cap. i. ii. [pp. 356, ssr.j 
 
 H5 If we consider the almost innumerable stories 
 of Pagan mythology, together with the various me- 
 thods of relating and explaining them, we shall 
 
 creation of the world was taught in the Timceus. But Cicero 
 understood the principles of reasoning too well to put such an 
 objection into the mouth of any of his disputants, whom he 
 represents as the leading men of their several sects : tree trium 
 disciplinarum principes. It was incumbent upon Plato to pre- 
 serve a consistency of principles and doctrines in the same dis- 
 course. But it was by no means necessary, that he should 
 maintain the same doctrines in explaining the physiology of 
 Parmenides and the cosmogony of Timseus. 
 
 62 'Eiwro8<»j> Se ffjiiv rora yepea-is fj iv %p6va, tov \6yov nepl 
 Tav ae\ ovrav 7roiovfievois. tc5 Se Xoyfi> ttjv yevetriv TvpovairrovTas 
 avTois, alrias Kai raijtas avrols mrohaaei. Enn. V. Lib. i. cap. 6, 
 "[p. 487 C] 
 
 G2 
 
134 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 readily see that it would not be difficult for so sub- 
 til a genius to cull something from them, which to 
 those, who revered his authority, might seem to 
 carry with it an air of probability, and to fall in 
 with his favourite system. 
 
 The allegorical method of interpreting the Pa- 
 gan mythology was attacked with great spirit and 
 {Adv Nan- acuteness by Arnobius. The new theological mode 
 
 ones. Lib. iii. " ° 
 
 cap. 37, sqq] Q f interpretation does not appear to have attracted 
 his notice. He confines himself chiefly to the phy- 
 sical explanations, which were more ancient and 
 general, though most of his observations are equally 
 applicable to the other. One of the most obvious 
 objections is, that both the accounts and interpre- 
 tations of different authors are at great variance 
 with each other. Among other instances he men- 
 tions the Muses, who, according to Mnaseas, were 
 the daughters of Tellus. and Ccelus. Other accounts 
 made them the daughters of Jupiter and Memory, 
 or Mind. Some said, that they were virgins; 
 
 63 [Nee defuerunt, qui scriberent Jovem, Junonem ac Miner- 
 vam Penates existere, sine quibus vivere ac sapere nequeamus 
 sed qui penitus nos regant ratione, colore ac spiritu. Ut videtis, 
 efc hie quoque nihil concinens dicitur, nihil una pronuntiatione 
 finitur, nee est aliquid fidum, quo insistere mens possit veritati 
 suk proxima suspicione conjiciens.] 
 
 64 From this account it should seem, that very little stress 
 can be laid upon the following passage in Cudworth's True 
 Intellectual System, p. 451. ' Nevertheless it may justly be sus- 
 pected, as G. J. Vossius hath already observed, that there was 
 yet some higher and more sacred mystery, in this Capitoline 
 Trinity, aimed at; namely, a Trinity of divine Hypostases. 
 For these three Roman or Capitoline Gods, were said to have 
 been first brought into Italy out of Phrygia by the Trojans, 
 but before that, into Phrygia by Dardanus, out of the Samothra- 
 cian Island; and that within eight hundred years after the 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 135 
 
 others affirmed, that they were mothers. Ephorus 
 said, that they were three in number ; Mnaseas, 
 that they were four; Myrtilus, that they were 
 seven ; Crates, that they were eight ; Hesiod, that 
 they were nine. 
 
 46 Again, concerning the Penates, Nigidius as-w. c.4o,6<jq.] 
 serted, that they were Neptune and Apollo who 
 encircled Troy with walls. The same man, in other 
 places, mentions four kinds of Penates. Csesius 
 thinks, that they are Fortune, Ceres, Genius Jovi- 
 
 alis; and Pales, a male, an attendant of Jupiter. 
 Varro maintains, that neither their number, nor 
 their names are known. The Tuscans affirm, that 
 they are six males and six females. " Nor, says he, 
 have there been wanting men who maintained that 
 they are Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva 63 . So that, 
 you see, there is nothing consistent in all this, no^ 
 thing determinate, nothing upon which the mind 
 can rest with even a probability of truth 64 ." 
 
 47 '■ You may interpret the connexion of Jupiter 
 
 Noachian Flood, if we may believe Eusebius. And as these 
 were called by the Latins Dii Penates, which Macrobius [Sa- 
 turnalia, Lib. iii. cap. 4, § 6. ed. Janus], thus interprets, Dii 
 per quos penitus spiramus, per quos habemus corpus, per quos 
 rationem animi possidemus, that is, The Gods, by whom we 
 live, and move, and have our being ; but Varro in Arnobius 
 [I. c] Dii qui sunt intrinsecus, atque in intimis penetralibus colli, 
 ' the Gods, who are in the most inward recesses of heaven ;' so 
 were they called by the Samothracians Kd/3«poi or Cabiri, that 
 is, as Varro rightly interprets the word, 8eo\ bvvarol, or Divi 
 Pates, the powerful and mighty Gods. Which Cabiri being 
 plainly the Hebrew D^TUD g ives just occasion to suspect, that 
 this ancient tradition of three divine hypostases (unquestionably 
 entertained by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato amongst the 
 Greeks, and probably by the Egyptians and Persians) sprung 
 originally from the Hebrews.' 
 
136 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 with Ceres, to signify rain gliding into the bosom 
 of the earth. Another may give it a more plausible 
 meaning : a third may assign a different one ; and 
 each particular thing may receive an infinite num- 
 ber of interpretations, according to the different 
 geniuses and dispositions of the interpreters. For 
 as the supposition of an allegory is adopted in ob- 
 scure cases, and there is no certain and determinate 
 end to which the meaning is necessarily directed, 
 every man is at equal liberty to strain it to his own 
 opinion. How then can you extract certainties 
 from ambiguities, and affix one signification to a 
 story, which admits of innumerable expositions 65 ?' 
 Again, "Why do you select particular stories, or 
 parts of stories ? If they be all allegory, give the 
 interpretation of each particular. If they be partly 
 allegorical, and partly literal, by what rule or art 
 do you distinguish one from the other 66 ?' 
 
 'Your interpretations are directly opposite to 14 
 
 [66 Vos Jovis et Cereris coitum imbrem dicitis dictum tel- 
 luris in gremium lapsum : potest alius aliud et argutius fingere 
 et veri cum siinilitudine suspicari, potest aliud tertius, potest 
 aliud quartus atque ut se tulerint ingeniorum opinantium qua- 
 litates, ita singulse res possunt inflnitis interpretationibus ex- 
 plicari. Cum enim rebus ab occlusis omnis ista quse dicitur 
 allegoria sumatur, nee habeat finem certum, in quo re qua) 
 dicitur sit flxa atque immota sententia, uni cuique liberum est 
 in id quod velit attrahere lectionem et affirmare id positum, in 
 quod eum sua suspicio et conjectura opinabilis duxerit. Quod 
 cum ita se habeat, qui potestis res certas rebus ab dubiis su- 
 mere, atque unam adjungere significationem dicto, quod per 
 modos videatis innumeros expositionum varietate deduci ? Ar- 
 nobius adv. Nat. Lib. v. cap. 34.] 
 
 [06 Eligitis qucedam vestrse conyenientia Voluntati, et ex 
 ipsis obtinere contenditis nostras atque adulteras lectiones in- 
 teriori esse superpositas vertitati. Quod tamen ut vobis ita 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 137 
 
 ancient usage. Allegories were formerly adopted 
 in order to clothe mean and impure things in a 
 comely dress, and to invest them with a dignity 
 which did not naturally belong to them. But, ac- 
 cording to your expositions, the most august and 
 chaste things are recorded in most obscene lan- 
 guage. Why were not things stated in literal 
 terms? Was there no danger in making goda 
 adulterers ? If the shade of allegorical obscurity 
 had not involved the subject, the truth would have 
 been obvious to the learner, and the dignity of the 
 gods would have been preserved inviolate 67 .' 
 
 The most eminent of the Greek fathers of 
 the third century was Origen. He was educated 
 at Alexandria, and one of his name was a scholar 
 of Ammonius. Whether it was he, or a Pagan 
 philosopher, is not quite so certain. He was a 
 man of great industry, genius, and learning. But 
 his judgment was not always able to moderate the 
 
 sese habere, quemadmodum dicitis, annuamus qui scitis aut 
 unde cognoscitis, utra pars sit sentential historise scripta sim- 
 plicibus, utra vero sit dissonis atque alienis significationibu3 
 tecta. Ibid. cap. 36.] 
 
 [ 87 Antea mos fuit in allegorica dictione honestissimis sensi- 
 bus obumbrare res turpes et foedas prolatu honestorum conves- 
 tirier dignitate. At vero vobis auctoribus per turpitudinem 
 dicuntur res graves et castitate pollentia obscenis commemo- 
 rantur in vocibus, ut quod olim pravitas veterum verecundia 
 contegebatur, nunc verniliter turpiterque dicatur, dignorum 
 elocutione mutata. Quid prohibet, quid obstabat suis unam- 
 quamque verbis et suis significationibus promere. — An deos 
 adulteros dicere periculum habuit nullum? — Quod si allegories 
 csecitatis obumbratio tolleretur et facilis ad discendum res esset 
 et deorum dignitas conservaretur illsesa. Arnob. adv. Nat. 
 Lib. v. cap. 41.] 
 
138 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 fervor of his imagination. He was a warm admirer 
 of Philo, and adopted without reserve the alle- 
 gorical mode of interpreting Scripture, which an 
 injudicious use of his principles in the second cen- 
 tury had introduced into the church of Christ. 
 
 Like the Valentinians, he maintained, that ap-^fi, 
 tomi.Tom. it. 'beginning,' indicated a person; and discoursing 
 Be«*] upon the first chapter of St John's Gospel, he says, 141 
 that it may signify the supreme Being. Thus : 
 ' The word was in the beginning will signify, that 
 it was in God the Father 68 .' Christ is also the be- 
 ginning, being the wisdom of God, and ' the begin- 
 Hom. in em. ning of his ways :' Proverbs viii. 22. Thus, com- 
 p 0i 52'c?°™.' "' menting upon the first verse in the book of Genesis, 
 'In the beginning God created the heaven and 
 the earth,' he says, What is the beginning of all 
 things but our Lord and Saviour Christ Jesus, the 
 first-begotten of every creature? In this begin- 
 ning therefore, that is, in his word or reason, God 
 made the heaven and the earth. Like Plotinus, he 
 says, the Father is in all respects one and simple ; 
 but our Saviour is many 69 , on account of the va- 
 riety of his names and relations, as being the way, 
 the truth, and the life ; as being wisdom and right- 
 eousness, and ■ sanctifieation, and redemption — av- 
 T-oaAjffleta, the ' prototype of the truth,' which is in 
 
 68 Ovk drdjnos Se Kal tov t5>v okav 8ebv ipei ns apx^v, o-a(j>ais 
 vpowlwrav on apx^l uioO o irarfjp — iv apxv V ° ^oyos, \6yov voaiv 
 tov tiiov iraph to etvai Iv Ta irarp\ "htyopevov eivai ev apxjj> p. 17. 
 
 69 'O 8e6s pev oSv navrrj ev cart Kcii cafKovv, 6 8e awTrjp ypav 
 TroXXa yiyverai, p. 19, [Opp. Tom. IV. p. 21 D.] 
 
 W \o~d>pa.TOV {mSo-rao-iv noiKiKav Beapjjparav, ircpiexovrav tovs 
 to>v oXav \6yovs, £aivav km olovel ep^rvxpv. Comm. in Johann, 
 p. 36, [Opp. Tom. iv. p. 39 e.] 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 139 
 
 reasonable souls, p. 99. — auTooiKaioawri vj ovaiu>§m, [Opp.Tom.iv. 
 
 . j . P- 107 c] 
 
 •substantial righteousness/ p. 100. — proceeding from [«**. p. ios 
 
 A.J 
 
 the Father, as will does from mind. He terms him 
 the living, and, as it were, animated incorporeal 
 
 50 substance of various theorems, containing the rea- 
 sons of all things 70 . He distinguishes the divine 
 intellect or wisdom from the logos, though he as- 
 signs them both to Christ. For the Scriptures so 
 explicitly declare the logos, to which they attribute 
 the Creation, to have been Christ, the second per- 
 son ; that he could not, as Plotinus did, assign it an 
 hypostasis distinct from intellect, and denominate 
 it the third person in the divine nature. Having 
 quoted Psalm xlv. 1, he says, the heart signifies the 
 intellectual power of God; the logos that power 
 which declares the things contained in it 71 ; and he 
 says, that the logos always was in wisdom. 
 
 In explaining the derivation of the third person 
 of the Holy Trinity, he approaches very near the 
 doctrine of Plotinus. ' The Holy Ghost,' says he, 
 ' seems to stand in need of the Son, who adminis- 
 ters to his subsistence, not only that he might be, 
 but also that he might be wise, and reasonable, and 
 just, and whatever else we ought to understand him 
 to be, by a participation of the forementioned con- 
 
 5iceptions of Christ 72 . And I think, that the Holy 
 
 l?1 Ttju Kaphiav tov Oeov ttjv vorjriKijV avTov Kai TrpoQeTiKrjv 
 ircpi rav oXav 8vvap.1v €K\rj7rTeov, tov fie \6yov T&v eV €K€lvtj 
 iirayyeknuov [1. cmayyekTiKov], p. 42, [Opp. Tom. IV. p. 45 E.] 
 r 72 Movov tov povoytvovs cpv<reL vlov dp^rjSev TVy^dvovros, ov 
 Xpyfciv eoiKe to dytov nvevpa, dtaKovovvTos avTov ttj inroo~Tdo-€i, 
 ov jxovov els to clvai, a\Xct Kai o-6<pov avat, Kai \0yiK0v, /cat SiKatov, 
 Ka) Trav otlttotovv -j(pr} avro vofiv Tvy%dvetv, Kara peroxrjv tcov 
 vpo€iprjp,iv<ov fjpZv Xpurrov iirivoiav k.t.\., p. 57, [Ibid. p. 61 0.] 
 
 G5 
 
J40 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 Spirit communicates the matter, if I may so call it, 
 of the gifts from God to those, who are sanctified 
 by him and the participation of him, the said matter 
 of the gifts being wrought by God, administered 
 by Christ, and sustained by the Holy Spirit.' 
 
 This likewise bears some resemblance to what 
 
 Philo says of the divine powers ; principles, which 
 
 Origen, unawed by the example of Praxeas and 
 
 the Patripassians, whose heresy probably sprung 
 
 from them, has in other places expressly applied 
 
 to the second and third persons of the blessed 
 
 r. 624. [Opp. Trinity. In his first Homily on Isaiah, he says, that 
 
 io7bj ^g t wo seraphim who stood round the throne were 
 
 our Lord Jesus and the Holy Spirit. He quotes 
 
 the authority of Philo for this interpretation in 
 
 p. 757. rrom. both the third chapter of the first book, and in the 
 
 P . 843 pom. second chapter of the fourth book, of his treatise 
 
 I. p. 189 b.] r 
 
 irep\ ap-^uov. 
 
 It is not easy to ascertain exactly the precise 
 opinions of so fanciful an interpreter and so loose 
 a reasoner as Origen. But this, I think, we may 
 venture to affirm, that they were not so exception- 
 able as the principles and reasonings which he ad- 
 vanced in the defence and explanation of them. 
 His principles and reasonings contain in them the ij> 
 seeds of many heresies ; but he often protests 
 
 ?3 Acfyov olov tot in xapbias avBpmirov vopi^ovcri tot tov 6ee>0, 
 Rai. (rocpiav oiroiav Trjv iv ^fv^rj, teal Sm tovto irp6cr<oirov ev tot 
 ©cot Spa tu> \6ya> (paaiv' awntp Kal tov avBpanrov apa t<q> 
 cavTov \6yco avBpamov eva. Athanasius contra Sab. Greg. p. 
 651, [Opp. Tom. I. p. 37 e.] 
 
 W Oi'Se cos tov ivbs Sis ovopa£optvov, wore tov avrbv aWdre 
 pev Traripa, aXXoVf 8e vibv e'auroO yiyveo-daf tovto yap 2aj3e\Xios 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 141 
 
 against those heretical applications of them, and 
 advances, in opposition, sound doctrines. 
 
 The most important heresy which sprung up in 
 the third century was that of Sabellius, whether we 
 consider it in itself or in its consequences. He 
 adopted the usual method of explaining the nature 
 of the Son by stating him to be the wisdom or the 
 reason of the Father. But he maintained that the 
 reason of God was identically the same with God, 
 constituting one person with the Father; in the 
 same manner as a man together with his reason 
 composes one man 73 . Thus the same person, being 
 really one but having two names, is at one time the 
 father, and at another time his own son 74 . 
 
 This opinion of Sabellius was embraced by 
 some bishops of Pentapolis in Upper Libya ; inso- 
 much that scarcely any other doctrine relative to 
 53 the son of God was taught in the churches of those 
 parts 75 . Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, to whom 
 the care of those churches belonged, sent and 
 counselled those who had been guilty, to relinquish 
 that impious doctrine, and return to the true faith. 
 When he found that his expostulations had not 
 produced the intended effect, he wrote them a let- 
 ter in which he undertook to prove the falsehood 
 of the doctrine which they were so strenuous in 
 
 <pp<mj<ras alperiKos cKpidrj. Athan. contra Arian. Orat. IV. 
 p. 456, [Orat. m. § 4, Opp. Tom. 1. p. 553.] To iv Suovvpov, 
 laftcWiov to imTr/Sevfia, tov avrov vlbv Ka\ narepa Xeyovros. Ibid. 
 V. p. 525, [Orat. in. § 9.] 
 
 1,5 'Ev TlevTcmohei rijr ava> Ai/3w;r TTjViKavra rives Tmv etvuTKomav 
 etppovrjaav ra 2a/3eAXiou' not topovtov 'laxvaav rats cirwoiais, <os 
 oXiyou 8etv p.i}Keri iv reus €KKkr]<rLais KrjpvTreo'daL tov viov tov Qeov. 
 Athan. De Sent. Dion, contra Arian. p. 552, [§ 5, Tom. 1. p. 246 v.] 
 
T42 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 propagating. In this letter, while he was perhaps 
 too earnestly insisting upon the difference between 
 the Father and the Son, he made use of reasonings 
 and expressions, which seemed to some men to en- 
 trench too much upon the dignity of the second 
 person of the Holy Trinity. However, when he was 
 accused, he extricated himself from the difficulty 
 either by retracting his error, or by explaining 
 away the seemingly offensive passages in his letter, 
 and by solemn professions of a true faith. Athan- 
 asius defends him by comparing his conduct to 
 that of a skilful physician, who, when he is called 
 in to a patient, considers only the nature of the 
 disorder under which he labours, and administers 
 such remedies for the removal of it, as if applied 
 without any reference to a case of that particular 154 
 description, might have a tendency to produce a 
 malady of a directly opposite nature. 
 
 Whatever ground there was for these insinua- 
 tions to his prejudice, it is certain that in the ensu- 
 ing century the followers of Arius endeavoured to 
 shelter themselves under the authority of the name 
 of Dionysius. Athanasius, who carefully watched 
 every movement of the Arians, did not suffer them 
 long to enjoy this advantage without molestation. 
 He composed an elaborate treatise, in order to 
 vindicate his venerable predecessor from the impu- 
 tation of favouring those opinions, for the suppres- 
 sion of which he himself was exerting all the powers 
 of a vigorous mind and an ardent spirit. 
 
 Arius was a Presbyter at Alexandria ; and the 
 heresy that goes by his name, and which occasioned 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church.. 143 
 
 so much confusion in the church in the fourth cen- 
 tury, either originated from or gave rise to a vio- 
 lent contest between him and Alexander, the bi- 
 shop of Alexandria. Arius explained and defended 
 his principles in a treatise, which he denominated 
 Thalia. But as neither that work nor any writings 
 of his opponent, Alexander, are extant; all the 
 knowledge that we can have of their respective 
 principles, must be derived from the writings of 
 others. Athanasius, who succeeded Alexander in 
 the see of Alexandria, and was considered from 
 155 the first as the strongest bulwark of the cause, may 
 be safely deemed to have given a just representa- 
 tion of the principles of his own party. And as he 
 entered into the controversy more deeply than any 
 other ; it is from him that we have the best chance 
 of collecting the principles of Arius. 
 
 I wish it to be observed that I am now enquiring 
 not about the respective doctrines of the contending 
 parties, (for these are notorious,) but about the 
 principles which led to those doctrines and the 
 modes of explaining them. Arius accused Alexan- 
 der of professing the doctrine of Sabellius, who 
 confounded the persons of the Father and the Son. 
 Alexander accused Arius of degrading the Son to 
 the rank of a creature. 
 
 In order to understand clearly this controversy, 
 it will be proper to call to mind the sophisticated 
 doctrines of Philo, which were composed of hetero- 
 geneous principles, derived from the books of the 
 Old Testament and the writings of Plato. These 
 doctrines were still further distorted by the early 
 
144 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 writers of the Christian Church, and rashly ap- 
 plied to explain the sublime mysteries of our holy 
 religion. 
 
 The word Aoyos is used by Philo in three dis- 
 tinct senses, in each of which it has been applied 
 by Christian writers to the second person of the 
 Holy Trinity. He denominates by it, first, the 
 divine intellect ; secondly, the conception of that 156 
 intellect, the idea or system of ideas which is the 
 production of its reflex act, and the internal object 
 of its contemplation ; thirdly, the external expres- 
 sion of that conception. Thus, when he is speak- 
 ing of the intelligible world, of that plan or pattern 
 which the Deity formed before he created the 
 external world; he says, it is not allowable to 
 say that it is in any place. For as the plan that 
 an architect forms of a city which he is about to 
 build, is not in any place, but in the soul of the art- 
 ist; in the same manner the world of ideas can have 
 no other place but the divine intellect which ar- 
 ranged those things 76 . Farther on he says, if a 
 man would use plain words he would say, that the 
 intelligible world is nothing else but the reasoning 
 of God, while he was in the act of making the 
 world 77 . The use of the word in the third sense is 
 too common for it to be necessary that I should 
 quote any passages to prove it. 
 
 ? 6 Toy avTov rponov oiS" 6 i< rav IBecov KoV/iOS SXKov av e^oi 
 T&rrov, rj tov 6e7ov Xoyov tov ravra SiaKOo-fiijoravTa. He/n Kotr/iO!r. 
 p. 4. 
 
 It Ei 8e Tis idekrjo-ete yv/J-vorepots xP^aa-Qm tois ovofiacriv, 
 ovtih av erepov unoi tov votjtov uvai Koo-p.ov, f) 9fo0 \6yov ijfie 
 Koo-jumoiovvros, p. 5. 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 145 
 
 I have already produced instances, in which 
 the early fathers applied the term in these several 
 significations to Christ. 
 
 If the principles of Alexander were the same 
 1 57 as those which were advanced by Athanasius ; he 
 applied the word Aoyos to the second person of the 
 Holy Trinity in the first sense only. When he is 
 disputing with the Arians about the eternity of the 
 second person, he, with an air of triumph, bids 
 them add this to their question, Whether there 
 ever was a time when the essentially existent God 
 was destitute of reason or intellect* 8 . But in his 
 exposition of faith, in order to make his meaning 
 clearly and accurately understood upon so import- 
 ant a subject, he asserts this doctrine with all ima- 
 ginable caution, to the absolute exclusion of the 
 explanations of Arius, Sabellius, and other here- 
 tics 79 . He said, that the error of the Sabellians 
 arose from their false notions of this reason or wis- 
 dom and word of God, which constitutes the second 
 person of the Holy Trinity. They conceived of 
 God as of man, and supposed that the Word of 
 God was similar to that which issues from the heart 
 of man ; and that the wisdom of God was such as 
 that which is in the soul of man. On this account 
 they say that God together with his word consti- 
 
 ? 8 'O $>v 6eAs %v it6tc SXoyos; Cont. Avian. Orat. n. p. 330, 
 [1. p. 421, § 24, ed. B.] 
 
 W Eis ha fwvoyevrj Xoyoc, (roipiav, vlbv, ix. tov Trarphs avapxas 
 Kai dV'SifflS yeyewrjfihov. Xoyov 8e ov npofyopiKov, ovk ivbiaderov, 
 ovk anoppolav tov rekeiov, ov Tu-rjo-ai TJjs airadovs <pvcrea>s, oilre 
 irpo^okrjV, dXX' vibv avTOTeXrj, £avra re Kai ipepyovvra. k.t.X. 
 Expos. Fidei, p. 240, [Tom. 1. p. 99, ed. B.} 
 
146 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 tutes but one person ; in the same manner as a 
 
 man together with his word or reason composes 
 
 [Qpp.T0m.11. but one man. Cont. Sab. Greq. p. 651. Upon this i«8 
 p. 3Te.] j * # J 
 
 he remarks that the word of a man neither lives 
 nor subsists, and is only the motion of a living and 
 subsisting heart ; and passes away as soon as it is 
 uttered. But the word of the Lord, as the Psalmist 
 declares, endureth for ever in heaven. This he 
 elsewhere calls substantial word and substantial 
 wisdom 80 . 
 
 Arius maintained, on the contrary, that this 
 principle which stated the real wisdom and reason 
 of God to be the Son in the Holy Trinity, is mere 
 Sabellianism. When he denied the eternity of the 
 Son, he did not affirm that there ever was a time 
 when God was without wisdom or reason. He has 
 in himself his own wisdom and his own reason, 
 which is not Christ, but in which he made 
 Christ 81 . 
 
 There are some passages in the writings of 
 Athanasius, which seem to intimate that the prin- 
 ciples of Arius were connected with some Jewish 
 and Grecian tenets. He says, that impiety is intro- 
 duced by their principles, or rather Judaism, differ- 
 ent from that contained in the Scriptures, which 
 has Hellenism closely following it 82 . In another 159 
 
 80 Oi<na>8r]s Xoyos Kai oia-icoSrjs (ro(pta. Contr. Arian. Orat.v. 
 p. 520, [it. § l,p. 618A, ed. Ben.] 
 
 81 26(pos [lev 4(tti Kai ovk akoyos, Ibiav be e^et ip eavTa 
 o-o(f>lav Kai \diov \6yov, ov tov Xpiarbv 5e, dXX* eV a Kai tov XpirrTCtv 
 eVow/o-e. Orat. v. Contra Arian. p. 522, [Or. iv. p. 620 b.] See 
 to the same purpose the third oration, p. 408, [Or. n. p. 487, sq.] 
 
 82 'AdeSrTjs yap (K rovrav ila-ayerai, Kai fiaWov irapa tcls ypa- 
 
The Fathers of the Christian Church. 147 
 
 passage he exhibits a more particular account of 
 the principles of Arius. By comparing that with 
 a passage of the same import near the beginning 
 of Philo Trepl Koa/xoirouas, it will be obvious from 
 what source Arius, as well as Tertullian, derived 
 his notions. God, says he, was alone, and reason 
 and wisdom were not yet. But when he was dis- 
 posed to create us, he then made one being, and 
 named him reason, and son, and wisdom, that by 
 means of him he might create us. There are then, 
 says he, two wisdoms ; one God's own, and subsist- 
 ing with him. In this wisdom the other, the son, 
 was formed 33 . In this passage we have the strong- 
 est features of the twofold logos of Philo ; viz. The 
 intelligible world, which he calls also the reasoning 
 of God when he was in the act of creating the 
 world, the pattern according to which this sensible 
 world was made : and secondly, The wisdom and 
 intellect of God, in which that pattern, the intelli- 
 i6ogible world, was formed. Athanasius in a great 
 number of places controverts the principle of Arius, 
 that the son was produced on our account, and for 
 the express purpose of forwarding our creation; 
 and that he is called the wisdom of God in a figu- 
 rative sense, on account of the great display, which 
 
 (pas 'lovfta'io-pos, ex av *yy^ ff eiraKoKov8ovvTa tov TLXkrjvto-fiov, 
 p. 296, [Epist. ad Episc. JEg. Opp. Tom. I. p. 283 B, ed. B.] 
 
 83 'Hv yap, 0170-1, poms 6 Beos, Ka\ oSira rjv 6 \6yos Kai 77 
 o-oajia- efra SeXijaas yp-as 8r)piovpyrjo-ai, ToYe Se [S17 I. B.] naroirjKev 
 eva nva, Kai <oro/ta<ree avrbv \6yov Kai uiov Kai o-o<ptav, Iva rjuas hi 
 airoS hrjjiiovpyfi<rrj- Sio yoCv crocptas <pi\a\v e'i/ai, plav pet/, rrjv 
 l&lav Ka\ o-vwTrapxovo-av Tta &e$, tov Se vlbv iv avrfj [ravTTj I. _B.] rrj 
 <ro<p{q yeyevrjo-6ai. Orat. II. pp. 310, 11, [Or. I. p. 409 B, c] 
 
 
148 The Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 
 his nature exhibits, of the divine wisdom in which 
 he was formed. 
 
 These modes of explanation and defence were 
 now so thoroughly established, and from this time 
 assumed so regular a form, that it is unnecessary 
 to pursue the subject farther. 
 
i6i CONCL US ION. 
 
 THE inferences which I would draw from the 
 preceding investigation are two : first, That a 
 Trinity of Persons in the divine nature was the 
 genuine and peculiar doctrine of the primitive 
 Christian Church. Secondly, That it is extremely 
 dangerous to affect to be wise in holy things above 
 what is written in the word of God. 
 
 I. How much soever the early writers of the 
 Church differ in their method of explaining the 
 nature of the three divine persons, and their relation 
 to each other ; they are in a manner unanimous in 
 their profession of the general doctrine. The great 
 and important question seems to be, From whence 
 did they derive this opinion ? Most of the defend- 
 ers and opposers of this doctrine in modern times 
 agree in maintaining that the doctrine of the Trinity 
 is delivered and inculcated in the writings of Plato. 
 Hence the orthodox conclude, that, though this 
 great mystery is more fully set forth in the Holy 
 Scriptures, and derives its chief authority from 
 163 divine revelation; yet, either the doctrine itself is 
 congenial to the mind of man, and regularly dedu- 
 cible from principles of reason ; or, that it was 
 handed down in the heathen world by uninterrupted 
 tradition from remote antiquity. The opposers of 
 our faith, on the contrary, infer from the same 
 
150 . Conclusion. 
 
 premises, that the doctrine itself is no part of genu- 
 ine Christianity : that it is the natural production 
 of philosophy, falsely so called : and that it was 
 introduced into the Church of Christ by men, who 
 with their subtleties distorted the graceful form, 
 and corrupted the simplicity of our holy religion. 
 
 In the course of the preceding enquiry, I have 
 found myself obliged to differ in some points from 
 both those parties. After a minute and impartial 
 examination of the writings of Plato, I cannot find 
 anything which sufficiently proves him to have had 
 even an obscure knowledge of the mysterious doc- 
 trine of the Trinity. None of his immediate fol- 
 lowers taught it : none of his personal enemies or 
 philosophical rivals urged it as an objection against 
 him : none of the sects which branched off from 
 the academy professed it. When the arts and 
 learning of Greece were imported into Italy : when 
 poets, philosophers, and statesmen considered it as 
 the most noble employment 
 [Horat. n. inter sylvas Academi quserere verum : 
 
 Eptet.ii.vAS.~l J ^ 
 
 when Plato was esteemed to have spoken as it were 
 the language of the gods ; and all the ingenuity 163 
 and eloquence of Rome were exerted to unfold his 
 principles, and recommend his conclusions — during 
 this long and enlightened period, no traces are to 
 be found in the works of heathen writers of this 
 profound, this peculiar doctrine. 
 
 The discovery was not made till philosophers 
 became Christians, and Christians became philoso- 
 phers. The converted philosopher endeavoured to 
 shew to his unconverted brethren the superior bril* 
 
Conclusion. 151 
 
 liancy of the light which he enjoyed as a Christian. 
 To this purpose he contended that Christianity 
 was not without his evidences even among them- 
 selves : that intimations of the sublime doctrines 
 of revelation were to be found in the writings of 
 the philosophers of Greece : that those sages to 
 whom they looked up with so much reverence had 
 nothing whereof to glory: that they were mere 
 retailers of scraps and fragments from holy writ, 
 mutilated by their ignorance, and obscured by their 
 speculations. 
 
 The conceit was captivating : it was seized with 
 avidity. The Apologist urged the Pagan to ap- 
 proach the pure fountain of God's word, and not 
 to drink of the muddy stream of human specula- 
 tion. The Christian teacher, while he traced out 
 fanciful resemblances, conveyed to his hearers a 
 i64great idea of the extent of his knowledge and the 
 subtilty of his wit. 
 
 If the expedient tended at all to promote the 
 progress of Christianity ; it did so for a very short 
 time. Error is multiform, and its cause may be 
 advanced in ten thousand different ways. But 
 nothing that is not entirely founded on fact, and 
 perfectly conformable to the nature of things, can 
 coalesce with the simple texture of truth, or accord 
 with the symmetry of its parts. The unnatural 
 conjunction will inevitably, sooner or later, weaken 
 the good cause which it was intended to support. 
 It is, to use the words of the prophet Isaiah, ' a staff 
 of a broken reed, whereon if a man lean, it will go 
 into his hand and pierce it.' So are false conceits 
 
152 Conclusion. 
 
 to all that trust in them. The battery was soon 
 turned against Christianity by the sophists of those 
 times. 
 
 The author of our holy profession disclaimed 
 all compromise and communication with the several 
 religions of the heathen world, which he repre- 
 sented to lie in darkness and the shadow of death. 
 He was a light to lighten the Gentiles, and rose 
 with healing on his wings. He told his followers, 
 that no one knew the Father but the Son, and he 
 to whom the Son should reveal him. He unfolded 
 such mysteries concerning the divine nature and 
 proceedings, as even the angels of God had before 
 desired in vain to look into. 
 
 The disputers of this world soon saw the ad- 163 
 vantage which the indiscreet preachers of our holy 
 religion gave them against the high claims of their 
 master and his immediate followers ; and they 
 availed themselves of it to the utmost extent. They 
 readily admitted the supposed fact, that the doc- 
 trines contained in the writings of Plato, and those 
 propounded in the Gospel, were essentially the same. 
 But the conclusion which they drew from this 
 common principle was widely different from that 
 which was held forth by the Christians. They de- 
 nied that the Holy Scriptures were the original 
 fountain of all wisdom. They maintained, on the 
 contrary, that the founders of the different sects of 
 Grecian philosophy and popular mythology, more 
 especially Plato, derived their information from the 
 same source as the author of Christianity, which 
 was no other than the genuine dictates of reason 
 
Conclusion. 153 
 
 and nature. Where then, they triumphantly asked, 
 is the superiority for which you contend over all 
 the nations of the earth ? Why do you call upon 
 us to relinquish the wise and venerable systems 
 and institutions of our ancestors, when you have 
 nothing essentially different to offer us in their 
 stead ? 
 
 The sophists of those times satisfied themselves 
 with the positions, that the characteristic doc- 
 trines of Christianity were really, though obscurely, 
 i66taught in the writings of Plato; and that they 
 were concealed under allegories in the fables of 
 popular mythology. The state of religion and 
 philosophy did not admit of the possibility of their 
 going farther than this point at that time. It was 
 reserved for the disputers of later ages to assert, 
 that those profound doctrines are in truth no part 
 of genuine Christianity : that they were the subtil 
 inventions of men : and that they were originally 
 introduced into Christianity from the writings of 
 Plato. As this assertion has been frequently re- 
 peated, though without the shadow of a proof, 
 it deserved a minute enquiry. 
 
 In assertions of this kind some particular time 
 or person must be pointed out, in order to give 
 a kind of plausibility to the thing asserted. Justin 
 Martyr has been almost unavoidably fixed upon in 
 the instance before us. To have carried up the 
 general corruption much nearer to the time of the 
 apostles would have been scarcely consistent with 
 probability. To have brought it down lower would 
 
ig4 Conclusion. 
 
 have been impossible, as the doctrine of the Tri- 
 nity is manifestly asserted in the works of that 
 Apologist. He was, moreover, familiarly conver- 
 sant with the principles of Plato and other Gre- 
 cian philosophers before he embraced Christianity; 
 and he was particularly fond of proving to his un- 
 converted brethren, the superior advantages which 
 he derived from the study of the Holy Scrip- 
 tures, in consequence of the originality, the purity, 
 and the extent of the discoveries relating to divine 167 
 things that were contained in them. 
 
 If Justin derived his opinion of a Trinity of 
 Persons in the divine nature from the writings of 
 Plato, and from thence transplanted them into 
 Christianity; either he adopted the received no- 
 tions of the Platonists of his own or preceding 
 times ; or by his sagacity he had discovered in the 
 writings of Plato some doctrines, which had es- 
 caped the scrutiny and penetration of all others. 
 That Justin by his sagacity discovered what had 
 eluded the diligent search of the long list of sages 
 of Greece and Rome, who flourished between the 
 days of Plato and the second century of the Chris- 
 tian sera, is, I conceive, what our opponents will 
 not be very forward to advance, or even admit. 
 If they affirm, that the followers of Plato had 
 actually discovered that doctrine in his writings, 
 and had openly and explicitly avowed it in or be- 
 fore the days of Justin, it rests upon them to prove 
 it. As far as my researches have extended, I 
 have not been able to find any one instance, in 
 
Conclusion. 155 
 
 which the doctrine had been maintained by Pagan 
 168 philosophers 1 , in the same plain and decided 
 manner, as by the Fathers of the Christian Church. 
 By these it was propounded as the criterion of 
 their orthodoxy, as the ground-work of their faith. 
 But the cultivators of human wisdom appear to 
 have been total strangers to it; till it was dis- 
 closed to them by a teacher of philosophy, who 
 had been educated in the bosom of Christianity. 
 Then, and not till then, they used it, as a key 
 
 1 The high estimation, in which Lord Montboddo and Dr 
 Heberden are deservedly held by the learned world, obliges me 
 to take notice of the following note in that noble lord's Treatise 
 on the Origin and Progress of Language, Book 11. cap. 2, p. 339: 
 " A learned and worthy gentleman of my acquaintance in Lon- 
 don, Dr Heberden, shewed me a passage in Seneca's Consolatio 
 ad Helviam, from which it appears, that it, (the doctrine of the 
 Trinity) was known to the Stoics. His words are, speaking of 
 the misfortune that had befallen this woman: Id actum est, 
 mihi crede, ab illo, quisquis formator uniyersi fuit, sive ille 
 Deus est potens omnium, sive incorpqralis ratio, ingentium 
 operum artifex, sire divinus spiritus, per omnia maxima et 
 minima Eequali intentione diffusus, sive fatum et immutabilis 
 causarum inter se cohserentium series." Senecee Consol. ad 
 Helviam, cap. 8. To my mind this passage does not appear 
 to have the least tendency towards proving the point, in sup- 
 port of which it is eited. I should as soon undertake to prove, 
 that Pope inculcated the doctrine of the Trinity, from the last 
 line of the first stanza in his Universal Prayer: 
 
 Father of all ! in eVry age, 
 
 In ev'ry clime ador'd, 
 
 By saint, by savage, and by sage, 
 
 Jehovah, Jove, or Lord! 
 The poet asserts, that the first cause is worsbipped by men in 
 all states, however they may differ about the name, by which 
 they address him. In like manner the philosopher refers the 
 calamity to the appointment of the supreme Being, however he 
 may have been characterized by philosophers, and by whatever 
 appellation he is to be distinguished. 
 
 MORGAN H 
 
156 Conclusion. 
 
 to unlock the abstract subtilties of Plato, and to 169 
 throw a decent veil over the extravagant and 
 licentious fables of Pagan mythology. 
 
 Again, the manner in which Plotinus conducts 
 his argumentation, is an object deserving our 
 attention. The Christian opened the sacred vo- 
 lume ; and, as he read, he found, or believed that 
 he found, the profound doctrine of the Trinity of 
 Persons in the Godhead revealed in it. The truth 
 Of the doctrine he rested upon the authority of 
 Holy Writ. For an explanation of the nature 
 of those beings whom it concerns, and of the 
 relation which they bear to each other, where his 
 heavenly guide was silent, he had recourse to the 
 subtilties of human wit. This was the natural 
 course for those to take who derived their inform- 
 ation from another, and rested the truth of their 
 tenets upon the authority of their teacher. 
 
 But this was not the course which Plotinus 
 followed. His object was not to prove the truth 
 of the doctrine by the authority of Plato, but to 
 bend the language of Plato to a consistency with 
 the doctrine. He does not even profess to have 
 learned it from that great master of philosophy; 
 but undertakes to deduce it by general reasoning 
 from abstract notions of entity, mind, and soul. 
 Having thus drawn his conclusions, he next ap- 
 plies them in illustration of the doctrines of Plato. 
 
 This, I conceive, is the exact course which a man 170 
 would pursue, who had derived the doctrine from 
 another source, and wished to prove, that it was 
 also to be found in the writings of Plato. I ask,, 
 
Conclusion. ig7 
 
 Would any one, but a man thus circumstanced, 
 have discovered this profound doctrine in the 
 story of the birth of Venus, or in the mythological 
 fable of Cronus, Rhea, and Jupiter ? 
 
 I will not dwell upon the inconsistencies that 
 frequently occur in the explanations, which are 
 given by the advocates for the Platonic Trinity. 
 They are obliged by their system to make the 
 mythological Zeus sometimes the first, sometimes 
 the second, and sometimes the third hypostasis. 
 And, in their interpretations of Plato, they some- 
 times make Bn/uovpyoi the first, vous the second, 
 and >//yx») the third hypostasis : at other times they 
 make Sriiuuovpyos, at other times i§ea j? Trapdceiyna, 
 at other times ^v^rj the second hypostasis. 
 
 II. The second inference which I would make 
 from the preceding investigation is, that it is ex-t 
 tremely dangerous to affect to be wise in holy 
 things, above what is written in the word of God. 
 It is to this disposition, I conceive, that we are to 
 attribute, in a great measure, the present miserable 
 condition of the Jewish nation. They would not 
 be satisfied with that degree of information which 
 171 Jehovah condescended to give them of the order 
 of his dispensations, and of the nature of that 
 being, who was to come from God as their Saviour 
 and their "King. They rashly speculated upon 
 things that were not revealed, and they framed 
 to themselves a system of belief widely different 
 from the truth. Hence, when in the fulness of 
 time God sent his Son into the world, the world 
 
158 Conclusion, 
 
 knew him not : when he came unto his own, his 
 own received him not. 
 
 The same spirit of curiosity and desire of pry- 
 ing into heavenly things have, though in a different 
 manner, produced very pernicious consequences in 
 the Church of Christ. 
 
 The writings of Philo Judseus furnished the 
 Fathers of the Christian Church with the fatal 
 means of deceiving themselves and others. The 
 figurative language in which that author delivered 
 himself concerning the Logos, whenever he meant 
 by it, either the divine intellect, its internal opera- 
 tion, the ideal object of its contemplation, or the 
 external expression of it, led them to imagine that 
 he attributed to it a real and essential personality. 
 From the epithets affixed to this supposed person, 
 they naturally conceived that he could be no other 
 than our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ. To 
 make this plausible they maintained, that what was 
 expressed by the word Logos, was not in God, as 
 it was in man, a mere power, or operation, or 
 notion, or word; but was a real and living sub- 17a 
 stance, possessed of a personality distinct from 
 the great principle of existence, to which it be- 
 longed. This received countenance from the doc- 
 trines of Plato, that ideas were most properly the 
 real entities. 
 
 Hence was devised the metaphysical argument 
 for the eternity of the second person of the Tri- 
 nity, which was built upon this plain and incontro- 
 vertible maxim, that God the Father could never 
 
Conclusion. 159 
 
 have been destitute of reason. Hence the second 
 person is called by Athanasius substantial Logos 
 and substantial Wisdom. Hence arose the conceit, 
 that he flowed necessarily from the divine intellect 
 exerted on itself. Hence Origen styles him, The 
 living and, as it were, animated substance of vari- 
 ous theorems, containing the reasons of all things. 
 It unfortunately happened, that many signal 
 heresies were produced by men's accepting a false 
 hypothesis and an erroneous explanation, and turn- 
 ing them against the doctrine, for the illustration 
 of which they were devised. — The Gnostics, pre- 
 suming that every production of the divine intel- 
 lect was necessarily a substance, imagined an 
 almost infinite number of such productions, and 
 attempted to explain by them the origin of those 
 several orders of JEons, which constituted so strik- 
 ing a part of the eastern philosophy. 
 173 Praxeas and Sabellius admitted that Christ was 
 the intellect and wisdom of God the Father, and 
 thence concluded, that he was one with him, as 
 well in personality as in essence ; thus attempting 
 to subvert a doctrine by means of an hypothesis, 
 which was founded, if it had any foundation at all, 
 upon the supposed truth of that doctrine, and which 
 was advanced, not to prove, but to explain it. 
 
 Arius seems to have felt the force of the rea- 
 soning of Praxeas and Sabellius ; but he was too 
 well versed in the Scriptures not to see, that a dis- 
 tinct personality is in them attributed to Christ. 
 He therefore perceived the necessity of projecting 
 a new mode of defence; but, like many others, 
 
 H3 
 
160 Conclusion. 
 
 who had gone before him, he embraced hypo- 
 thetical explanations, to the injury of the truth, 
 which was to be explained. He acknowledged 
 with Praxeas and Sabellius, that the real intellect 
 or wisdom of God was no other than God him- 
 self. He admitted with Tertullian, that the imme- 
 diate production of the divine intellect was neces- 
 sarily a living substance. Hence he maintained, 
 that Christ was, what Philo called the intelligible 
 world; or, as Origen styled him, the living and 
 animated substance of various theorems, contain- 
 ing the reasons of all things ; denominated Logos, 
 and Son, and Wisdom, though not the real wis- 
 dom of God, yet formed in it ; not existing from 
 all eternity, but created on our account, that God 174 
 by means of him might create us s . 
 
 Thus it appears that, though Christians did 
 not, as has been maintained by some, derive the 
 great and characteristic doctrines of Iheir holy 
 profession from the impure source of Pagan philo- 
 sophy; they did, at a very early period indeed, 
 adopt principles and modes of interpretation, which 
 but ill accorded with the simplicity of the Gospel. 
 They presumed to intrude with unhallowed step 
 into the sanctuary of the most High, and to attempt 
 with sacrilegious hands to tear off the veil from 
 
 2 So strongly was this hypothesis rooted in the minds of 
 men, that it was not even yet abandoned ; and Arius has been 
 combated on his own ground. It has been admitted, that Christ 
 was the intelligible world, containing the ideas of all things. 
 Yet still his proper eternity has been maintained upon meta- 
 physical principles. The divine intellect is from its own nature 
 ever active. Before all external creation it was employed from 
 
Conclusion. 161 
 
 those august mysteries, which God himself had 
 concealed from human sight. The event was such 
 as might naturally have been expected. Professing 
 themselves to be wise, they became fools; and 
 God gave many of them up unto a reprobate mind. 
 175 All the extravagancies and impurities of the several 
 orders of Gnostics, all the impiety of Praxeas and 
 Sabellius, the heresy of Arius, and the bloody 
 contentions, which rent in sunder the Eastern 
 Church, and paved the way for the reception of 
 the impostures of Mahomet, are to be referred to 
 this source. Hence also have arisen many of those 
 disputes and bitter reproaches, which in latter 
 days have disgraced the Christian name, and in- 
 jured the cause of genuine piety. Hence was 
 derived the most opprobrious of all imputations, 
 that the sublime doctrine of the Trinity, the dis- 
 tinguishing feature of Christianity in every age, 
 was drawn from the dregs of Pagan philosophy. 
 This should serve as a warning to men, if any 
 thing can, to confine themselves in their researches 
 within the bounds that have been prescribed to 
 them by divine wisdom, and to satisfy themselves 
 with such communications, as God has thought 
 proper to make, of his nature and dispensations. 
 If they would act wisely, they should exert 
 
 eternity in an internal contemplation of the ideal pattern of 
 the things, which were in due time to be created. The reader 
 may see this argument very ingeniously drawn out and enforced 
 by Norris, in his Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World; 
 who, in the true spirit of his system, maintains, that all things 
 were made not by Christ, but according to Christ, that is, ac- 
 cording to those ideas or patterns, which compose his essence. 
 
i62 Conclusion. 
 
 their faculties, first, in proving the authenticity of 
 revelation ; secondly, in ascertaining the genuine 
 sense of it. For they may be well assured thatj 
 if God has made to men any revelation of his 
 nature and dispensations, he has revealed as much 
 as is proper for them to know, in their present cir- 
 cumstances. Nay, if they attempt to proceed a 
 step farther than their heavenly guide has conde- 
 scended to conduct them, they will not only be 176 
 disappointed in the expectation of making any real 
 progress, but will even be led out of the way, and 
 removed much farther from the object of their vain 
 pursuit, than if they had stopped at the point 
 where divine Providence had set them their bounds, 
 that they should not pass. 
 
 Of this every one is sensible, with respect to 
 preceding dispensations. We are all ready to ac- 
 knowledge, that the intimation with which God 
 favoured Adam, respecting the seed of the woman, 
 was adapted with wonderful wisdom and mercy to 
 his particular situation : that it conveyed the pre- 4 
 cise degree of information, which the otherwise 
 desperate state of the affairs of our first parent 
 required ; but that it was not sufficient to enable 
 him to trace out that amazing scheme of Provi- 
 dence, which the divine Being afterwards vouch- 
 safed in the fulness of time gradually to disclose 
 
 to the sons of men The same observation will 
 
 apply to every period of the Patriarchal and Jewish 
 dispensations ; till God sent his Son into the world 
 in the likeness of sinful flesh, when perhaps as much 
 of the mystery of godliness was revealed, as is 
 
Conclusion. 163 
 
 requisite to be known by man in this our state 
 of pilgrimage. 
 
 As so extraordinary an atonement was made 
 for the transgression of our first parents, and the 
 depravity of their posterity, the display of that 
 stupendous proceeding seems well calculated to 
 17 7 produce in men a strong sense of the heinous na- 
 ture of sin, and a dread and abhorrence of its 
 pollutions. It is the language of religion, that we 
 are to consider this world as a state of discipline, 
 preparatory to a future life of superior excellence 
 and enjoyment ; and we have every reason to be- 
 lieve, from the representations of the Holy Scrip- 
 tures, that Christ will reign at the head of his 
 saints in his kingdom of glory. In this view it 
 is easy to perceive how expedient it was, that we, 
 who are hereafter to be his subjects, should, in 
 this our state of discipline, have some intimation 
 of the dignity of our Lord and Master. But it 
 does not thence follow, that it is either expedient 
 or consistent with the limited nature of our facul- 
 ties, that the mysteries of the divine nature should 
 be completely unfolded to us ; or that we, who 
 cannot fully comprehend the internal constitution 
 of the most common object, which is exposed to 
 our senses, should be encouraged to pry into the 
 deep recesses of that Being, whose goings forth 
 have been of old from everlasting. Error, and 
 many times impiety, must be the consequence of so 
 rash and overweening a conceit of our own abili- 
 ties. It becomes us rather, and will be found in 
 the end to be most consistent with our true in- 
 
164 Conclusion. 
 
 terest, to be satisfied with that portion of light 
 which God himself has imparted to us in his holy 
 word ; and not to flatter ourselves that we shall be 
 able to encrease it by a pretended philosophy and 178 
 vain deceit, after the traditions of men, after the 
 rudiments of the world, and not after Christ—, 
 Hcec fere dicere habui de Natura Deorum, mm ut 
 earn tollerem, sed ut intelligeretis, quam esset obscura, 
 et quam difficiles explicatus haberet. Cic. de Nat, 
 JDeor. III. 39. 
 
 In a former 3 treatise I undertook to demon- 
 strate, that true philosophy has no tendency to un- 
 dermine divine revelation, and that a well-grounded 
 philosopher may be a true Christian : that the legi- 
 timate object of philosophy, as well as of revela- 
 tion, is truth : that the pursuit of this object, by a 
 careful attention to and investigation of the ap- 
 pearances and operations of nature, has a direct 
 tendency to enliven and invigorate the intellectual 
 powers ; and that the possession of it enlarges the 
 capacity of the mind, and prepares it for the 
 reception and right apprehension of the doctrines 
 of Christianity. — In this I have endeavoured to 
 point out some strikingly-pernicious effects, which 
 have arisen from the rash attempt of men to ex- 
 plain the most profound mysteries of the nature 
 and essence of God, by the vain and groundless 
 conceits of speculative sophists ; instead of con- 
 fining themselves to an investigation of the moral 
 character of the Deity by the united aid of reason 17c 
 
 3 The dissertation, to which the honorary prize was ad- 
 judged, by Teyler's Theological Society, at Haarlem, in April 
 
Conclusion. 165 
 
 and revelation, and of the duties which result from 
 the several relations that he bears to them, of Cre- 
 ator, Preserver, Redeemer, Sanctifier, and Judge. 
 
 I find that in thus asserting and illustrating 
 the use and abuse of reason, when applied to reli- 
 gion, I have conformed, without being aware of it 
 at the time, to the opinion of a man, whose com- 
 prehensive and penetrating mind has contributed 
 not a little towards advancing true philosophy to 
 that exalted state of dignity, which it at present so 
 justly possesses. I will produce this testimony as 
 the conclusion of the whole. 
 
 "By the contemplation of nature to induce 
 and enforce the acknowledgment of God, and to 
 demonstrate his power, providence, and goodness, 
 is an excellent argument, and hath been excel- 
 lently handled by divers. But on the other side, 
 out of the contemplation of nature, or ground of 
 human knowledges, to induce any verity or per- 
 suasion concerning the points of faith, is in my 
 judgment not safe : Da fidei, quce fidei sunt. For 
 the heathen themselves conclude as much in that 
 excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: 
 That Gods and men were not able to draw Jupiter 
 down to the earth; but, contrariwise, Jupiter was 
 able to draw them up to heaven. 
 
 " So as we ought not to attempt to draw down 
 
 180 or submit the mysteries of God to our reason; but, 
 
 contrariwise, to raise and advance our reason to 
 
 the divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge, 
 
 1785. [The prize-medal, which was presented on the occasion, 
 is now in the University Library.] 
 
1 66 Conclusion. 
 
 touching divine philosophy, I am so far from 
 noting any deficienee, as I rather note an excess r 
 whereunto I have digressed, because of the ex- 
 treme prejudice, which both religion and philo- 
 sophy have received, and may receive, by being 
 commixed together; as that which undoubtedly 
 will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary 
 and fabulous philosophy." Bacon of the Advance- 
 ment of Learning. 
 
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