D 
 
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Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
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 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027829971 
 
GERMAN OPINION 
 
 AND GERMAN POLICY 
 
 BEFORE THE WAR 
 
 BY 
 
 G. W. PROTHERO, LL.D., Litt.D. 
 
 Fellow of the British Academy and Hon. Vice-President 
 of the Royal Historical Society, 
 
 Cornell University Library 
 D 515.P96 
 
 3 1924 027 829 971 
 
 LONDON 
 
 Oflices of the Royal Historical Society, 
 
 22 Russell Square, W.C. 
 
 1916 
 
GERMAN OPINION 
 
 AND GERMAN POLICY 
 
 BEFORE THE WAR 
 
 BY 
 
 G. W. PROTHERO, LL.D., Litt.D. 
 
 FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY ' • 
 
 AND HON. VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY 
 
 LONDON 
 OFFICES OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY 
 22 RUSSELL SQUARE, W.C. 
 1916 
 
i\35i(ft3r 
 
PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 The following pages are somewhat expanded, especially in 
 the latter part, from notes of a lecture given last year. 
 The main thesis which I endeavoured then to put before 
 my audience, namely that the establishment of German 
 influence in the Balkans and in the Turkish Empire is the 
 fundamental object of German policy, appears to me to have 
 received corroboration from recent events in South-Eastern 
 Europe. These events are not to be regarded, as some 
 have regarded them, as ' afterthoughts,' or as the desperate 
 efforts of a Power thwarted in other directions ; on the 
 contrary they are incidents -in the execution of a plan con- 
 ceived long ago, to which the crushing, or — ^if that proved 
 impossible — ^the maiming, of France and Russia was but 
 the necessary preliminary step. 
 
 G. W. P. 
 
 February, igi6 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGES 
 
 I. The Philosophy of Militarism . . . 1-12 
 
 II. Circumstances and Conditions, Aims and 
 
 Tendencies, of Modern Germany . , 12-33 
 
 III. German Policy during the last Twenty- 
 five Years . . . ' . . . . 33-86 
 
GERMAN OPINION AND GERMAN POLICY 
 BEFORE THE WAR. 
 
 An address given before the Royal Historical Society on January 21, 191 5. 
 By G. W. PROTHERO, Litt.D., LL.D., F.B.A., Hon. V.P. R.Hist.Soc. 
 
 Few members of this audience wiU be unacquainted with 
 the remark of Aristotle, that poUtical disturbances spring 
 from small occasions but from great causes. The remark 
 is essentially true with regard to the struggle in which 
 this country is now engaged. My object to-day is not to 
 discuss the immediate occasions of the War, or the course of 
 the diplomatic negotiations which preceded the outbreak ; 
 nor shall I attempt to apportion the blame for the failure 
 of those negotiations. These questions have been ade- 
 quately discussed by many capable writers in Great Britain 
 and abroad, and the general conclusion appears to most 
 people no longer doubtful. , This ground, therefore, need 
 not be traversed anew. I wish rather to direct your atten- 
 tion to the deeper causes of the conflict : (i) to the ideas 
 and principles, the ambitions and motives, which have 
 prcjduced in Germany a state of mind favourable to war ; 
 (2) to the historical events and the economic and political 
 conditions which have contributed to strengthen the 
 warhke tendency thus aroused ; and (3) finally to the 
 course of international politics, especially diuring the last 
 ten or eleven years, which, I will not say rendered an armed 
 conflict inevitable, but made it very difficult to avoid. 
 We shall see that a mass of hopes and fears, of resent- 
 ments and suspicions, of incitements to a warlike solution 
 was gradually accumulated, which only required a spark 
 to be kindled into flame. 
 
 B 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE 
 
 First, then, as to the ideas and principles which have 
 come to dominate the political mind of Germany. We 
 are apt to single out, as the most notable characteristic 
 of the modern German Empire, its militarism ; and the 
 word is habitually, if vaguely, used — ^like charity — ^to cover 
 a multitude of sins. Now, what do we mean by militarism ? 
 The ' New English Dictionary ' defines it as follows : 
 
 ' The spirit and tendencies characteristic of the professional 
 soldier ; the prevalence of military sentiments or ideals among 
 a people ; the political condition characterised by the pre- 
 dominance of the military class in government or adminis- 
 tration ; the tendency to regard military efficiency as the 
 paramount interest of the State.' 
 
 The definition is accurate enough, but it hardly brings out 
 the fact that militarism involves two distinct things. It 
 is, in the first place, a certain conception of the State ; 
 in the second place, it is a politico-military system based 
 on that conception. Under the militarist conception the 
 State is regarded— one might say, worshipped — as a sort 
 of superhuman entity, quite distinct from and superior 
 to the human beings who compose it. It is independent 
 and sovereign, absolved from all rules and restrictions 
 which stand in the way of its welfare or its aggrandisement. 
 It is based on force — it is force ; it is in constant com- 
 petition with other States, in a condition of latent or open 
 war ; it is justified in obtaining its ends by force of arms ; 
 and the paramount nature of its aims and duties sanctifies 
 all methods. Thus, in the case of the State, morality, in 
 the ordinary sense of the word, is abjured ; or rather, a 
 new ethical code of political morality is set up — a Jesuitical 
 or Machiavellian system of ethics, which, though ostensibly 
 applied only to the State, must obviously react on the 
 obligations of individuals. 
 
 So much for the idea. The organisation of the State 
 depends upon it and corresponds to it. If the State is 
 
MILITARISM 3 
 
 based on force, its primary organ, its chief visible embodi- 
 ment, is the army. The primary duty of the citizen is 
 miUtary service, and every able-bodied citizen is primarily 
 or potentially a soldier. Discipline being indispensable to 
 an army, all citizens, whether actually civilian or military, 
 must be drilled and disciplined. Since an army must be 
 under centralised and concentrated command, the State 
 also, which is coterminous with the army, must be auto- 
 cratically governed, at least in the ultimate resort. Political 
 despotism follows inevitably from military concentration. 
 Socially, the military class — ^the class, that is, that per- 
 manently adopts soldiering as a profession — ^takes precedence 
 of all others. Centralised organisation is substituted for 
 individual effort. Science and education, schoolmasters 
 and professors, commercial enterprise, industrial and 
 colonial expansion, are regarded primarily from the same 
 point of view — ^that of contribution to the forces of the 
 State — and are more or less subject to the influence of that 
 idea. I am not concerned to criticise this system, or to 
 examine its ulterior effects upon a nation. All I wish to 
 point out is that, when once this apotheosis of the State, 
 and the conception of it as force, have become engrained 
 in the leaders of a people and the bulk of their followers, 
 the rest follows as a logical consequence ; and you get a 
 stupendous machine, not only capable of vigorous defence 
 but irresistibly tending towards aggression. 
 
 Such being the outcome of these ideas, we have next to 
 ask to what kind of teaching this peculiar mental condition 
 is due, on what philosophical basis it is buUt up. I do not 
 pretend to be a metaphysician or to have more than a 
 superficial acquaintance with German philosophy ; but 
 this is perhaps of less importance in the present inquiry, 
 for it is not the truth or falsehood of the philosophical 
 theories concerned that is now in question, but the effect 
 they had upon the public mind when filtered through 
 many intermediaries, and largely perverted or distorted 
 in the process. It is not to be supposed that the average 
 
4 KANT AND GOETHE 
 
 educated German, still less the mass of the people, could 
 really follow the arguments of a Kant or a Hegel in regard 
 to that most difficult of sciences, metaphysics; but the 
 German mind has a peculiar aptitude for grasping and 
 being influenced by general ideas, and also for selecting 
 from the whole body of a great man's teaching, e.g. from 
 that of Darwin, just those portions which appeal to its 
 emotions or suit its circumstances, and neglecting the 
 reservations or modifications which are necessary to a full 
 understanding of his theory. And it is only this national 
 effect, this popular assimilation of the philosophical theories, 
 with which we are now concerned. 
 
 The system of political thought and organisation which 
 may be summarised as Militarism seems to have a double 
 origin. It is traceable to the two greatest names in German 
 literature — Kant and Goethe. The trains of thought 
 started by these great men developed separately for a long 
 time, until at length, metamorphosed almost out of recog- 
 nition, and taking in many extraneous elements by the way, 
 they became capable of fusion in the political theory that 
 now holds the field. The two roots from which this theory 
 sprang are the doctrine of Duty taught by Kant, and the 
 doctrine of Self-culture not only taught but practised by 
 Goethe. Strange that from so noble an origin should spring 
 a body of principles which are a danger to the progress of 
 man and the civilisation of the world ! 
 
 Kant taught the transcendent duty of submission to 
 the moral law ; but law and liberty were for him brought 
 into harmony by reason. The submission to the moral 
 law must be a willing and deliberate submission ; that is, 
 the will and the reason must jointly enter into it; the 
 free will, actuated by reason, must consciously submit. 
 The act of submission, to be of any value, must be pure of 
 selfish or material considerations ; it must freely recognise 
 the absolute validity of the moral law. Once recognised, 
 the duty of obeying it becomes a ' categorical imperative ' ; 
 an attitude of respect and awe is alone permissible in the 
 
KANT AND FICHTE 5 
 
 face of it. Religion is the feeling that springs from the 
 recognition of moral duty as the commandment of God. 
 Wordsworth's ' Ode to Duty,' whether actually influenced 
 by Kant or not, puts forward a similar ideal. Let us recall 
 his noble lines : 
 
 ' Stem lawgiver ! yet thou dost wear 
 The Godhead's most benignant grace ; 
 Nor know we anything so fair 
 As is the smile upon thy face . . . 
 Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong. 
 And the most ancient heavens /through thee are 
 fresh and strong.' / 
 
 This transcendent idea of duty is the one dominant 
 outcome of Kant's ethical teaching in the German mind. 
 But there are two kinds of duty, private and public ; the 
 duty of man to man, the duty of the citizen to the State. 
 It was a great national episode — the Wars of Liberation — 
 which gave a special turn to the general idea, and laid 
 special emphasis and sanction on, the duty to the State. 
 Between 1806 and 18 15 the State took up a more and more 
 dominant position in the mental horizon of Germany, 
 and especially of Prussia. To the State the Prussian hadV 
 always looked for aid and direction ; to it now more than | 
 ever he owed salvation and protection. In such times, 
 when the nation nerves itself to throw off a foreign yoke, 
 and triumphs, it is natural that civic duty should take 
 on a peculiar sanctity. 
 
 This tendency was strongly aided by the teaching of 
 Fichte, who enforced the idea of civic duty and self-sacrifice 
 in his Addresses to the German People. For Fichte, as 
 for Hobbes and Locke, the State is the outcome of contract ; 
 but Fichte follows Hobbes rather than Locke in his deduc- 
 tions from the theory. Here you have the dividing line 
 between the absolutist doctrine prevalent in Germany, and 
 the liberal tendencies which have governed our political 
 development since the Revolution of 1688. Locke regarded 
 the contract as one equally binding on both parties — 
 
b FICHTE AND HEGEL 
 
 sovereign and people — with the consequence that, if the 
 sovereign fails to act according to it, the people is released 
 from its obligations. Hobbes regarded it as an abdication, 
 on the part of the people, of powers which could not be 
 resumed. The sovereign becomes, through the voluntary 
 cession of unlimited authority, a Leviathan, thenceforward 
 irremovable and irresistible. So, with Fichte, the State 
 embodies the popular will ; and the commands of its 
 executive must be obeyed. The form of the State is com- 
 paratively a matter of indifference ; ' every political 
 constitution,' he says, ' is legitimate, provided it does not 
 bar progress.' As the definition of progress must be left 
 to the State, the proviso is no bar to absolutism. In his 
 Addresses Fichte insists that rights and duties are combined 
 in the State ; from the State the citizen derives what rights 
 he enjoys ; from it he learns what duties he has to per- 
 form. Nay, further, the State becomes his religion ; his 
 individuality is sunk in it ; its future is his future. In 
 Fichte, too, the new theory of Nationality found an 
 eloquent and whole-hearted supporter. The State is the 
 Nation in its active shape ; in and through the State the 
 Nation is preserved. ' The individual,' says Treitschke, 
 ' sees in his country the realisation of his earthly immor- 
 tality.' 
 
 To this theory Arndt and Korner gave poetical expression 
 in their impassioned prose and verse ; they inflamed the 
 moral sense of patriotic duty with the emotion of self- 
 sacrifice to a high and noble aim. But the philosophical 
 basis was supplied or at least largely developed by Hegel, 
 the real founder of the German theory of the State. In 
 his ' Philosophy of Law,' the State appears as the outcome 
 of spirit, ' the world which the spirit has made for itself,' 
 the highest embodiment of conscious reason. It is not 
 only the unity in which all minor forms of social organisa- 
 tion — ^legal, economic, educational, &c. — combine and are 
 perfected ; it is also that in which all individual aims 
 harmoniously join. Patriotism is the conviction ' that 
 
HEGEL AND TREITSCHKE 7 
 
 my particular interest is contained and secured in the 
 interest and end of the State.' Thus Hegel went beyond 
 Fichte in his elevation of the State to something almost 
 divine. He differed too in refusing to regard the form of 
 the State as unimportant ; for him, organic civil unity 
 could only find adequate expression in a monarchy. There 
 must be some one human being to embody and personate 
 the State. Hegel had lived through the French Revolution ; 
 and Kant's Republic of the Nations was for him a dangerous 
 dream. The Kingdom of Prussia under Frederick the Great, 
 with his high notion of duty and his conception of personal 
 monarchy, was a close approximation to Hegel's ideal. 
 
 Now it is in the army that the State is most visibly 
 embodied for the multitude. Universal military service 
 makes every able-bodied man an active participator in the 
 State ; it brings home to everyone the notion of civic duty 
 and self-sacrifice in the most concrete and tangible form. 
 The general theory of duty, so strongly inculcated by Kant, 
 at once gives force to, and becomes concentrated in, the 
 duty of soldierly obedience and discipline. And here it 
 is that the great work of Clausewitz on war becomes 
 important from the civic point of view. Clausewitz not 
 only insisted on the duty of every citizen to serve in the 
 army, and on war as the ultima ratio of State policy, but 
 he made its principles intelligible to aU. Intelligence was 
 CEiUed in to aid the moral sense, to show how the paramount 
 duty of service to the State could best be discharged. / 
 
 From these forerunners it is but a short step to 
 Treitschke, the great historian, who is the otltcome of 
 Hegel on one side, and on the other of the historical facts, the 
 victorious wars, which he had witnessed. Hegel repudiated 
 the idea that the State rests on force; Treitschke, with 
 these facts before him, embraced it. In his Politik he 
 combines, more clearly and completely than any other, 
 the theory of the State as a semi-divine entity, with the 
 theory that it is based on Force ; from which it follows 
 that the army is its highest manifestation, and war its 
 
8 GOETHE 
 
 primary business. ' War,' he says, ' is statecraft par excel- 
 lence. Only in war does a people really become a people. 
 War is a radical medicine for the ills of State.'* And again : 
 ' The living God will take good care that war, as a stern 
 medicine for humanity, shall constantly recur. . . . Wars 
 cannot cease ; they cannot and should not, so long as the 
 State is sovereign among sovereign States. 'f These views, 
 finally, are embodied, still more crudely, in Bernhardi, for 
 whom war is the climax of civilisation, and in a host of 
 other German pamphleteers. Might is recognised as Right ; 
 and Schiller's famous line, ' Die Weltgeschichte ist das 
 Weltgericht,' is taken to mean that the verdict of History — ■ 
 in other words, success — determines what is just. Thus has 
 Kant's ' categorical imperative ' been perverted, by passing 
 through a series of refracting media, into the duty of serving 
 in the army and of making war. 
 
 This, then, is one of the main lines which German thought 
 has followed. But there is another. The second cmrent 
 which has gone to form the present theory of politics is 
 tiraceable, I think, to Goethe, with his idea of self-culture, 
 a sort of sublimated selfishness, elevated also to the sphere 
 of duty. It is, however, an idea of duty very different 
 from that of Kant or Fichte — the duty of the individual to 
 himself. For Goethe the State hardly existed, except as 
 a convenient machine for social administration. He had 
 little patriotism ; he turned a deaf ear to the call of the 
 State in the hour of danger. He cared naught for Germany, 
 despised Prussia, and admired Napoleon, if he did not, like 
 Heine, go so far as to adore him. Goethe's ideal is not 
 self-abnegation or stirrender to the moral law, as with 
 Kant, still less self-sacrifice to, or fusion in, the State, as 
 with Fichte. It is self-cultivation, self-elevation, not by 
 mere enjojnnent, but by self-discipline and Entbehrung. 
 There is nobility too in this aim — for the noble-minded 
 man, the great man ; but it is tainted, for the ordinary man, 
 by the emphasis laid on self. 
 
 * PoUtik, i. 60. f lb. i. 76, 77. 
 
SCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE g 
 
 This tendency is carried still further by Schopenhauer, 
 who elevated the Will — ^in which self and self-consciousness 
 are most clearly visible — ^to the rank of a fundamental 
 principle. The world, for him, is ' Will and Idea ' ; the 
 Will is the ultimate fact, inseparable from self, that by 
 which man becomes self-conscious, by which he really lives. 
 As for the State and all that according to Hegel (his hete 
 noire) it involves, he would not hear of it. We are a long 
 way, it appears, from the line of thought which culminates 
 in Treitschke and Bernhardi. Yet we shall see them 
 presently combine. 
 
 It was from the idea of self-culture and the dominance 
 of will-power, combined with Darwin's theory of the Struggle 
 for Life and the Survival of the Fittest — that Nietzsche's 
 notion of the Superman was evolved. Schopenhauer cursed 
 the Will to Live, as uselessly prolonging our misery ; but 
 Schopenhauer was a pessimist. The force of Will might 
 be put to other uses than self-annihilation ; it was reserved 
 for Nietzsche to discover them. There is much else in 
 Nietzsche besides the Superman — for instance much scorn 
 poured on Germany, and especially on Prussia ; but, after 
 all, the ideal of the Superman is the fertilising germ in his 
 teaching. The Superman is the highly endowed individual, 
 the bom superior person, who by diligent self-culture and 
 self-denial in minor things raises himself to a position 
 of predominance above his fellows. The hero-worship 
 practised by Heine, extolled by Carlyle, finds in him its 
 object. By virtue of this superiority he acquires not only 
 the power but the right to govern. He is in a constant 
 state of war — ^first, with his weaker self, then with his 
 weaker neighbours. Nietzsche's feeling about war is 
 shown by such sayings as ' It is said that a good cause 
 justifies war ; but I say unto you that a good war justifies 
 any cause.' So Frederick the Great had said ' I take first J 
 it is for the professors afterwards to find the justification.' 
 And again : ' My brethren in war, I love you from the very 
 heart. Your enemy shall ye seek, your war shall ye wage. 
 
10 NIETZSCHE AND GOBINEAU 
 
 and for the. sake of your thoughts. Ye shall love peace 
 as a means to new wars, and the short peace more than 
 the long. To the good warrior soundeth " Thou shalt " 
 pleasanter than " I will." So live your life of obedience 
 and of war. What mattereth a long life ? ' Obedience 
 and War ! — it is Prussian militarism in three words. 
 Darwin, who recognised the moral law as profoundly modi- 
 fjdng the original struggle for life (Schopenhauer's Will to 
 Live), is accepted only as laying down the law of nature 
 (Hobbes' homo homini lupus), still universally valid. It 
 is a return to nature, or rather a recognition of its eternal 
 law, that is preached. In his ' Antichrist,' Nietzsche 
 execrated Christianity as opposing this return. Might is 
 Right ; the strong man can, and therefore may and ought 
 to rule as he likes. And his method is not persuasion, 
 or of what use is his strength ? It is force and war. 
 
 We come at last to the point at which the two currents 
 of thought which we have traced are fused in one. If the 
 strong man may and should rule, so may a strong combina- 
 tion of individuals, in other words the strong State. Did 
 not Nietzsche himself make the step, when he divided the 
 world into ruling and servile races ? And which is to be 
 the strong and therefore dominant State ? To the German 
 the answer is obvious. But it was not always so. Fichte 
 indeed had told his hearers that it was ' they, among all 
 modern peoples, to whom the germ of human perfection in 
 a special sense is entrusted, and on whom the lead in its 
 development is conferred.' But few Germans, before the 
 days of Bismarck, were convinced of this. A strong impulse 
 was, however, given by the fantastic but attractive theories 
 of the Frenchman, Count Gobineau, who, writing in the 
 forties of last century, indicated, in his essay on ' The In- 
 equality of Races,' the, Teutonic race as the race of the future. 
 By the Teutonic race Gobineau meant a good deal more 
 than the German people ; but it was easy for Germans to 
 convince themselves, however wrong the view may be, 
 that they alone had kept pure the Teutonic breed. He 
 
THE MILITARIST THEORY II 
 
 hated and despised democracy, fatal, in his view, to the 
 retention of racial superiority. The theory stimulated 
 national pride, and was admirably calculated to support 
 the military-absolutist system to which, for more practical 
 reasons, the Germans were inclined. 
 
 Gobineau's book, hardly noticed elsewhere, germinated 
 slowly in the German brain. His Rassentheorie was studied ; 
 a Gobineaugesellschaft was founded ; and the astonishing 
 successes of the period 1864-71 brought it general credence 
 in Germany. It was developed to an absurdity by such 
 writers as Woltmann, who claimed Dante, Lionardo and 
 many other great men of the past as Germans ; and with 
 more plausibility and a great show of learning by H. S. 
 Chamberlain. The theory has now obtained universal 
 acceptance across the Rhine. The Kaiser himself has 
 declared his people to be ' the salt of the earth ' ; and a 
 host of minor persons, professors and pamphleteers, have 
 preached it consistently, before and still more blatantly since 
 the War. In Germany the Germans are honestly believed 
 to be the chosen people, and Germany the Super-State, 
 destined to rule the world and deserving its predominance. 
 
 Here, then, the two currents of thought flow together 
 into a mighty stream. Obedience to the moral law, in 
 other words duty, is incumbent on all. The primary and 
 fundamental duty is duty to the State. The State is force ; 
 its essential embodiment is the army, its primary business 
 war. Self-culture is also a duty ; the Will is power ; like , 
 the Superman, the State which has Kultur (i.e. organisation) 
 and Will becomes the Super-State. This is what the 
 German State has become. It is within its power, therefore 
 it is its right and its duty, to rule the world. But this 
 dominance cannot be obtained except by force of arms. 
 It is therefore incumbent on every German to support it 
 in this attempt ; and the end is so great and good that it 
 justifies all means. 
 
 Such is the theory ; and we must remember that in 
 Germany theories are apt to be put into practice. That 
 
12 GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF GERMANY 
 
 Schwdrmerei which is so characteristic of the German mind 
 is easily transferred to politics ; the dream of universal 
 dominion has' seized upon a whole nation. ' Reflexion,' 
 said Mme. de Stael, • calms other peoples ; it inflames the 
 German.' And so the German mind has been prepared 
 for war. 
 
 II. 
 
 We have next to consider the events, the circumstances 
 and conditions, which contributed to strengthen this 
 peculiar state of mind, and led Prussia first, and afterwards 
 the rest of Germany, to give it practical expression. 
 
 First, look at the geographical position of Prussia and 
 of Germany. In early days, under the Great Elector, 
 Prussia was a little State in a vast plain, with no natural 
 frontier at all, except where parts of her dominions touched 
 the sea. Expanded as she was by Frederick the Great, 
 the Prussian State was a straggling, ill-compacted domain, 
 its western lands cut off from the main body, exposed to 
 attack all round. The Government had to be, as Frederick 
 expressed it, ' tou jours en vedette ' — always ready, always 
 on the watch. Moreover, as I need hardly remind you, 
 Germany was until the latter haK of the last centmry little 
 more than a geographical expression. Torn between the 
 conflicting claims of Prussia and Austria, and open to the 
 intrigues of foreign Powers, Germany was disunited within 
 , and indefensible without . It was not till after the successful 
 wars of 1864-71 that Germany could consider herself in 
 these respects — political unity and military defensibility — 
 comparatively safe. Since then, the Vosges have formed 
 a natural boundary on the south-west ; the neutral States 
 of Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland protect her from 
 attack on the west and south ; the alliance with Austria 
 secures her on the south-east. But on the east she still 
 has no natural limit ; and the Russian frontier is only 
 180 miles from. Berlin. Moreover, her position in the 
 centre of Europe, though it has great strategical advantages, 
 
EARLIER HISTORY I3 
 
 exposes her to simultaneous attack on two fronts. Lastly, 
 her coast was till recently subject to the disadvantage of 
 being cut in two by Denmark — a difficulty not completely 
 obviated by the Kiel Canal ; and, when her ships pass out 
 into the North Sea, there lies England, like a huge break- 
 water, right across her path to the Atlantic — a fact which, 
 in case of British hostility, exposes her merchant shipping 
 to peculiar hazard. In such conditions it is not surprising 
 that the military spirit biurnt itself into the very heart 
 of the Prussian people, from whom it has spread to the 
 rest of Germany. 
 
 Next, what is the teaching of history for the German 
 people ? The history of Prussia for 130 years, from the ac- 
 cession of Frederick the Great to the triumph of Bismarck, 
 is on the one hand a history of successful war, on the other 
 a tale of humiliation illustrating the danger of being un- 
 prepared for war. Throughout the whole period, Prussia 
 depended on her army to a degree unparalleled in any other 
 State. France, it is true, in the great days of Louis XIV., 
 made conquests by force of arms. War created the Empire 
 of Napoleon ; and, for a time, successful war raised the 
 prestige of the Second Empire. The British Empire was 
 also largely the result of war, naval and military, in all 
 parts of the world . But in neither country was war brought 
 home to the people, except in France by the invasions of 
 1814 and 1815, in so intimate and terrible a form as it 
 constantly was to the inhabitants of Prussia. Modern 
 Prussia was made by Frederick the Great in two great 
 wars, waged largely, it must be remembered, on Prussian 
 soU. The army which his father founded, and which he 
 developed and led to victory, kept up the military prestige 
 of Prussia till the end of the century, and was so dominant 
 a factor in its greatness, that Mirabeau could say with 
 truth ' The only industry of Prussia is war.' But the 
 obsolescence of Frederick's system and the want of leader- 
 ship in Prussia nearly proved the country's ruin. In the 
 clash with Napoleon, Prussia was humiliated and reduced 
 
14 . WAR IN PRUSSIAN HISTORY 
 
 to an almost servile condition ; it was the revival of the 
 army on a national basis, and the introduction of universal 
 military service, which raised her from the dust in the 
 Wars of Liberation. But again neglect of military pre- 
 paration gave a set-back to Prussian ambitions ; and in 
 the surrender at Olmiitz (1850) she was forced to yield 
 the hegemony to Austria. Twelve years later, it became the 
 first care of Bismarck to reform and strengthen the army ; 
 for this he dared to violate the constitution and to stake 
 his own political existence. The man ' of blood and iron ' 
 achieved his aim, and in three successful wars he created the 
 German Empire under Prussian rule. 
 
 This achievement fixed an indelible mark not only on 
 the soul of Prussia but on that of Germany. Germany 
 became Prussianised ; the Prussian view of the State, the 
 Prussian military system, were gratefully adopted through- 
 out the land ; and, whatever remains of the old German 
 Partikularismus. may still be found, they are wholly in- 
 effective. It is non-Prussians, like Treitschke and others, 
 who have given Prussianism a philosophical basis ; and 
 many of its strongest supporters are to be found in 
 the South. Moreover, a whole school of historians, from 
 Dahlmann and Droysen to Sybel and Treitschke, contri- 
 buted their aid to the Prussianising process, by teaching 
 and writing German history from the Prussian point of 
 view. The policy of Prussia was praised as a far-sighted 
 national policy from Frederick the Great to William the 
 First. Even Ranke supported the political theory by 
 concentrating attention on the diplomatic relations of 
 States ; and Mommsen aided absolutism by his impassioned 
 paneg5iTic of Caesar. 
 
 The sudden rise of Germany was due to the army ; 
 an overweening behef 'v\ the army, an exaggerated concep- 
 tion of military power, was the inevitable result. Thence- 
 forward the army, which had made the Empire, was kept 
 up to retain it. Bismarck, it is true, stood mainly on the 
 defensive for the rest of his political life ; he was satisfied. 
 
ECONOMIC EXPANSION I5 
 
 and he thought the nation should be satisfied, with the 
 triumph he had won. It was now the time for consoHdation, 
 not for conquest. In diplomatic intercourse, the army, 
 kept in the highest state of efficiency and readiness, would 
 give sufficient weight to German demands without going 
 the length of war. On these principles he acted ; and, 
 though twice at least he was on the brink of aggression, it 
 cannot be said that, during the last twenty years of his 
 rule, his policy was aggressive. But during the period of 
 peace the nation did not cease to believe in, nor did it 
 neglect, the army ; quite the contrary. With the recollec- 
 tion of Jena and Olmiitz in their minds, the Germans took 
 care that they should not be found defenceless again. Had 
 this been all, the rest of the world would have had no cause 
 for alarm. But it was not all. The German leaders, at 
 least, came to regard the weapon of defence as an instru- 
 ment of aggression. The causes which have led to this 
 all-important change have next to be considered. 
 
 The economic expansion of Germany during the last 
 half-century, especially during the last quarter of that 
 time, has been nothing short of marvellous. The economic 
 progress of the United States since the Civil War has perhaps 
 been equally rapid, but across the Atlantic the growth of 
 military resources has not kept level with it. Military 
 tendencies are often regarded as antagonistic to com- 
 mercial and industrial growth, but this is not necessarily 
 the case. It was not so in England under Elizabeth ; it 
 was not so when Walpole was driven from ofl&ce for his 
 pacific policy towards a commercial rival, or when Chatham 
 received the thanks of the City for having made commerce 
 to flourish by war. It has certainly not been the case 
 with Germany during the last fifty years. 
 
 The enormous industrial and commercial growth of 
 Germany since 1870 could never have taken place — in 
 spite of Mr. Norman Angell — without the successful war 
 which united the nation, finally swept away its internal 
 barriers, and conferred upon it that security from invasion. 
 
l6 RESULTS OF ECONOMIC EXPANSION 
 
 that self-confidence within and that respect from without, 
 which are indispensable to economic expansion on a large 
 scale. What the industrial and commercial expansion 
 of Germany has been you may read in Prince Billow's 
 book, ' Imperial Germany,' or in the works of Mr. W. H. 
 Dawson and others. I am not going to burden you 
 with statistics, but I may remind you that since 1870 the 
 foreign trade of Germany has more than trebled, rising 
 from 360 to 950 millions, while her mercantile shipping 
 has grown in like proportion. In the iron trade Germany 
 has long outstripped Great Britain ; in the application of 
 science, especially chemistry, to manufactures she is far 
 ahead. The Industrial Revolution which took place in 
 England in the eighteenth century has been repeated in 
 Germany on a larger scale ; she has passed from a mainly 
 agricultural to a mainly industrial country. Her popula- 
 tion has risen from 41 to 67 millions ; the yearly addition 
 (though the rate of increase is falling) is nearly a million. 
 Emigration has sunk from about 200,000 a year to a 
 negligible quantity. The change has been enormous ; the 
 social character of the whole people, and with this its 
 aims and ambitions, have been revolutionised. What, from 
 our partictilar point of view, are the chief results ? 
 
 In the first place, the growth of wealth, combined with 
 military power, has inspired great and, within limits, justi- 
 fiable self-confidence. A hundred, even sixty years ago, 
 Germany, compared with France and England, was a poor 
 country ; now she is very rich. She has the military force ; 
 she has also the wealth to support it, the sinews of war. 
 As the Jingo doggerel put it, ' She's got the ships, she's got 
 the men, she's got the money too.' She is fully conscious- 
 of her power ; her national pride and national ambitions 
 have grown with it. Her elevation, so sudden and complete, 
 from a humble position to the first rank among the nations, 
 could not but intoxicate a people, especially one so 
 susceptible as the German. It has come to confirm the 
 ideas of Gobineau and his followers with the logic of facts. 
 
SELF-CONFIDENCE AND MATERIALISM I7 
 
 A nation so triumphant in war, so prominent in the arts 
 of peace, must surely be the select people, fated by an 
 observant Providence to rule the world. Military success 
 alone would hardly have accomplished this change of 
 temper ; it needed the great accession of wealth, and the 
 organisation of the national resources — financial, industrial, 
 and commercial to establish it. The phenomenon of the 
 ' swollen head,' so often observed in parvenus, especially in 
 that class known as nouveaux riches — to which Germany 
 belongs — ^has been repeated on a gigantic scale ; and the 
 temptation to use the new resources in the acquisition of 
 more wealth by force of arms has become overpoweringly 
 strong. Remember Bliicher's observation ' Was fiir 
 Plunder ! ' as he rode down Cheapside with the Allied 
 Generals in 1815. The Prussian soldier has always been 
 inclined to loot ; it was now to be the turn of the State. 
 Accordingly an alliance has been struck between two 
 parties hitherto opposed — the pure militarists, the Junkers 
 and the military chiefs, the Agrarians, on the one side ; the 
 great captains of industry and finance, the Ballins and 
 the Gwinners, on the other. Their interests appearing to 
 converge, they have agreed to pursue henceforward a 
 policy of aggrandisement in common. The class hitherto 
 dominant in Prussia, of whom it was literally true that 
 their only industry was war, has been immensely 
 strengthened by the adhesion of the commercial and in- 
 dustrial leaders, disposing of vast wealth and controlling 
 immense material resources. 
 
 It is true that the new spirit of confidence in Germany 
 has its weak sides. The growth of industrialism and com- 
 mercialism has radically altered, or at least obscured, those 
 qualities for which Germany was once admired and even 
 loved — the qualities of simplicity and kindliness, of Gemiith- 
 lichkeit and Biederkeit, the unselfish pursuit of literature 
 and science for its own ends. The old values have been 
 upset ; Germany has become materialised. The com- 
 iiiercial spirit, the taint of unscrupulous competition, 
 
 C 
 
l8 MATERIALISM AND DELUSION 
 
 have invaded every walk of life. Force and fraud are 
 become legitimate means in the race to become rich ; 
 " rem, Si possis, recte ; si non, quocunque modo rem.' 
 This, no doubt, has been more or less the case in every 
 nation, our own included, but in none so obviously as in 
 the German. Their literature has become hard and cruel, 
 their fiction often coarse and brutal. History is distorted 
 by a disingenuous and narrow patriotism. Science is 
 pursued, not for itself, but for its applicability to the 
 piusuit of wealth. Forty years ago, when I was a student 
 at Bonn, the Greek professor Bernays told me he feared 
 that the growth of commerce and militarism which would 
 result from the victories of 1870 would undermine the 
 old ideals of Culture ; and the prophecy has come true. 
 Nietzsche himself said that ' the German Empire would 
 destroy the German mind.' 
 
 The effects of these new tendencies on the foreign policy 
 of Germany are too obvious to require pointing out. But 
 it may be worth while to call attention to another outcome 
 of this overweening pride. Nothing obscures the judgment 
 so much as vanity and self-conceit. A false appraisement 
 of oneself is certain to lead to a false opinion of one's 
 neighbours. And this has been notably the case with 
 Germany. Always somewhat unsympathetic and therefore 
 unintelligent of others, the Germans have been led by their 
 pride on the one hand, by their desires on the other, into 
 the grossest miscalculations as to the mind of foreign nations, 
 and even as to the political conditions of other countries. 
 Never has it proved more true that the wish is father to 
 the thought. The Germans have been led to believe that 
 France was utterly decadent ; that Russia would collapse 
 at a blow ; that England would never fight, and that, if 
 she did, her Colonies would desert her, India would revolt, 
 and the British Empire would crumble to pieces. There 
 is no end, in fact, to the delusions and false hopes which 
 have been nourished in the minds of Germans, as a result 
 of this habitual glorification of themselves and depreciation 
 
EARLIER GERMAN COLONIES ig 
 
 of their neighbours. Their vanity has destroyed their 
 -judgment. 
 
 So much for the moral effects of commercial and in- 
 dustrial expansion in Germany. Its political results have 
 been even more important, and bear more directly on our 
 subject — the deseper causes of the War. Among these 
 political results the first to be noticed is the demand for 
 colonies. Colonies, of a sort, Germany has long possessed, 
 but not such as were of great practical value to the country 
 of their origin. I refer to the numerous scattered settle- 
 ments of German-speaking people which are to be found 
 in neighbouring and even more distant countries — in 
 Hungary, in Poland, in Western and Southern Russia as 
 far as the Caucasus, in the Balkans and in Syria. More 
 than seventy years ago, Friedrich List had advocated the 
 colonisation of Hungary and the valley of the lower Danube, 
 and had pointed out that these undeveloped but fertile 
 lands offered excellent prospects to German settlers. But 
 his ideas had to wait for another generation before they 
 were revived in connexion with much vaster schemes. 
 Little is known of these outposts of Deutschtum outside 
 Germany ; and even in that country slight attention was 
 paid to them till quite recent times. The later German 
 settlements in South America, especially those in Brazil 
 and Argentina, have attracted more remark, because they 
 seem to offer greater potentialities, even a way of evading 
 the prohibitions of the Monroe Doctrine. Of late the 
 tendency has been to regard all such settlements as possible 
 nuclei from which German influences, economical and 
 poUticaJ, may radiate ; and the remarkable persistency 
 with which, in some cases after many generations, these 
 settlers have preserved their national language, habits, and 
 ideas undoubtedly lends support to such views. More- 
 over, these settlements now fall into their place as parts of 
 that scheme of ' peaceful penetration ' which has of late 
 been pursued with such success in Holland and Belgium, 
 in Italy, in Northern France, and even in some parts of the 
 
 C 2 
 
20 THE NEED OF COLONIES 
 
 British Empire. But, whatever value these colonies might 
 eventually acquire, they were of no great immediate im- 
 portance. It was something of a very different kind that 
 Germany began, in the latter part of the last century, to 
 require. 
 
 German writers on this subject habitually urge the 
 arguments that colonies are needed, firstly, in order that 
 the surplus of the teeming population may not be lost to 
 the Empire by emigration to non-German lands, and, 
 secondly, in order that fresh reservoirs of the raw material 
 used in German factories may be opened up, and new 
 markets for the disposal of German manufactures, with 
 unrestricted rights of entry, may be provided. This 
 became still more important after the adoption in 1879 
 of a protectionist policy, with its Consequent tendency to 
 over-production. It is true that, of late years, the growth 
 of population has ceased to be a cause of immediate alarm, 
 for the increase of industrial activity has almost entirely 
 absorbed it ; there has, indeed, been a considerable immi- 
 gration. But this, it is argued, can only be a temporary 
 solution ; the time will inevitably come, and come soon, when 
 Germany will be over-populated, and the surplus of hands 
 and brains will flow out to strengthen and enrich Germany's 
 competitors, and be lost for ever to Deutschtum. 
 
 The need of reservoirs of raw products and of new 
 markets for German manufactures, under German control, 
 is even more immediate and insistent. The supplies of coEil, 
 iron, and other metals in Germany are not inexhaustible ; 
 other countries, with nascent industries, will more and 
 more desire to keep their supplies for themselves ; materials 
 for textile industries (wool and cotton), rubber, many 
 metals, are only to be got on a large scale in countries more 
 or less primitive, agricultural or uncivilised. Moreover, 
 many markets for manufactured goods are already protected 
 by customs barriers which it taxes even German skill and 
 persistency to surmount ; profits are diminished, and even 
 loss incurred, by such processes as ' dumping ' in order 
 
THE COLONIAL MOVEMENT 21 
 
 to force closed doors. The prospect that these barriers 
 may be raised still higher alarms the trading community. 
 The McKinley tariff in the United States, the denuncia- 
 tion of the commercial treaty in Canada, raised loud out- 
 cries ; while the chances of Tariff Reform in England have 
 been anxiously canvassed by German economists. These 
 dangers and their consequences have been impressed on 
 the public by many writers ; and the necessity of evading 
 or overcoming them furnishes convincing material for 
 the Pan-German League. To these material incentives 
 must be added the vague yearning after world-power 
 which fills so many ambitious German minds, and has 
 driven so many German pens. A great people like the 
 German could not be content with Europe. Germany 
 must become a Weltmacht ; and, to be a Weltmacht, you 
 must have a colonial empire. Without her oversea 
 dominions and dependencies. Great Britain, the World- 
 power par excellence, v^ould be nothing at all. 
 
 Such were the ideas and motives that animated the 
 Colonial Movement which began in Germany about 1880. 
 Two years later it took shape in the foundation of the 
 German Colonial Society. It was about the same time 
 that the ' scramble for Africa ' commenced. In 1879 
 the Belgian occupation of the Congo began, and the Dual 
 Control was established in Egypt. Next year France 
 resumed her activities in West Africa, and in 188 1 occupied 
 Tunis. In 1882 Great Britain took control of Eg3^t and 
 about the same time of Basutoland, while Italy occupied 
 Eritrea. In 1883 the French, who had been pushing into 
 Upper Nigeria, began to occupy Madagascar ; and next 
 year we took Bechuanaland and Nyasaland. Bismarck 
 had hitherto tiurned a deaf ear to all the prayers and 
 warnings of the colonial party. His policy was not colonial 
 expansion, but consolidation ; he was reluctant to add 
 the danger of friction abroad to his preoccupations in 
 Europe ; Germany had no money to spare for colonial 
 enterprise, and no fleet to protect her colonies if founded. 
 
22 THE PARTITION OF AFRICA 
 
 Such were his reasons for abstention. But in 1884 the 
 pressure became too strong for him, and he gave way. 
 After much negotiation with Great Britain, in which it 
 must be said we played a sorry part, Bismarck proclaimed 
 a German protectorate in South-west Africa, and sanctioned 
 the occupation of Togoland and Cameroon. In the same 
 year the Colonial Conference at Berlin announced to the 
 world that Germany was henceforth to take her share of 
 ' the white man's burden ' — and the white man's plunder, 
 German colonial expansion had begun. 
 
 The era of great colonial companies followed — ^the 
 German East Africa Company in 1885, the British East 
 Africa Company in '86, the British South Africa Company 
 in '89, and many others. The islands of the Southern Pacific 
 attracted German enterprise ; and parts of North Guinea, 
 Samoa, and other islands were occupied. In the last 
 decade of the nineteenth century a series of treaties settled 
 many possible causes of friction ' and determined the 
 boundaries of the various colonies in Africa — ^Anglo-French 
 conventions in 1890, 1898, and 1899 ; an Anglo-German 
 convention in 1890, and a secret one in 1898 ; an Anglo- 
 Portuguese treaty in 1891, and many other minor arrange- 
 ments. Never before was a whole continent parcelled out 
 with so little trouble. Germany had got her ' place in the 
 sun,' though it must be allowed that her acquisitions were 
 small in area and generally poor in quality compared with 
 those made in the same period by other Powers, especially 
 France and England. Nor can it be said that her colonial 
 possessions have, so far, added to her strength, or attained 
 the object for which they were acquired ; almost all of 
 them have cost more, some very much more, than they 
 have brought in. But there they are — or rather were — 
 a nucleus, at least, which Germany hoped to enlarge in 
 due time, by diplomacy or arms. And the desire for such 
 enlargement has been — as we saw in the negotiations im- 
 mediately preceding the War — an important element in 
 German policy. Colonies are regarded as essential to a 
 
CENTRAL-EUROPEAN CUSTOMS UNION 23 
 
 Welimacht ; and, if all the most eligible parts of the earth 
 are already occupied — ^well, they must be taken from a 
 country with a stationary population, like France, or from 
 a small State, like Belgium, which, being neutralised in 
 Europe, has no right to any foreign possessions at all. 
 
 Grerman colonies have proved rather disappointing, 
 but even if they had been more successful they would 
 hardly have satisfied German ambitions, or been regarded 
 as sufficient outlets for or feeders of German trade. Com- 
 mercial and industrial exigencies have prompted other 
 schemes and methods. Commercial treaties, advantageous 
 to Germany, form one of these methods. A notable 
 example is the treaty forced upon Russia during the Russo- 
 Japanese War, which gave valuable rights to German 
 products while lajdng a heavy duty on Russian corn. The 
 certainty that Russia would not renew this treaty on its 
 expiration in 1916 has been regarded as a minor cause of 
 the War ; and the making of similar or much more one- 
 sided treaties with the States to be defeated by, Germany 
 is frequently held up by German writers as one of the 
 advantages to be derived from a military triumph. 
 
 But commercial treaties are only a minor item in the 
 German programme. The idea of an immense expansion 
 of the existing Customs Union hovers before the eyes of 
 many German writers. We find it at least as far back as 
 the year 1892, in a work by Julius von Eckhardt, entitled 
 •' Berlin- Wien-Rom.' A great Mitteleuropdischer Z Oliver ein 
 is to be formed, embracing Austria, Italy, Switzerland and 
 other small States, which will be either forced to join or 
 economically starved into adhesion. The number of 
 States so brought under the aegis of Germany varies in 
 other proposals, according to the ambition of the writer ; 
 but it is always so large as to be completely self-supporting, 
 while the economic pressure which it will be able to exert 
 on other States or Leagues will be irresistible. In a remark- 
 able pamphlet published in 1895, ' Germania Triumphans,' 
 the ultimate triumph of Germany is foretold as being 
 
24 GROWTH OF SOCIALISM 
 
 accomplished in 1915, after a series of gigantic wars ; and 
 these wars are due originally to commercial rivalry alone, 
 and to the attempts of other Powers to stifle German 
 trade by means of tariff leagues. That commercial unity 
 paves the way for political, the history of the Zollverein is 
 there to prove ; and these writers make it clear that what 
 they contemplate is a vast combination of States under 
 German hegemony, in other words under Prussian rule, 
 which shall ensure world-wide domination. Whether com- 
 mercial or political control is the ultimate aim matters 
 little ; the point is that politics and trade are regarded 
 as inseparable, and that successful war is the means by 
 which the double end is to be achieved. When this is 
 accomplished universal peace will reign, and triumphant 
 Deutschtum will regenerate the world. Such are the dreams 
 and such the projects which have occupied many active 
 German brains during the last twenty years or more. 
 But commercial and colonial expansion, going hand in 
 hand, have had other notable results. 
 
 One of these is the rapid and menacing growth of 
 Socialism. It is true that the Social-Democratic party is 
 by no means wholly Socialist ; the majority of its members 
 are rather what we should call Democrats or Radicals ; 
 its immediate aim is not Socialism, but political reform— 
 a radical change in the constitution. This is, however, 
 of no importance in the present connexion ; the point is 
 that a large and growing section of the artisan population, 
 and not the artisan only, demands political reforms which 
 would cut at the root of the existing bureaucratic autocracy. 
 The danger has long been obvious ; divergence of opinion 
 on the question how to meet it is said, on good authority, 
 to have been the immediate cause of Bismarck's dismissal 
 in ifSgo. But of late years it has grown alarmingly ; in 
 1912 the Social-Democrats numbered no in a Reichstag 
 of 357 members. The prospect of domestic revolution has 
 driven rulers into foreign war before now ; and it can 
 hardly be doubted that the spectre of Socialism and the 
 
THE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM 25 
 
 menace of a revolutionary proletariat have contributed 
 to make the great capitalists, the dominant military party, 
 and the Emperor himself, already inclined on other grounds 
 to war, more ready to adopt this solution as an alternative. 
 Another danger appears also to have arisen from the 
 peculiar methods by which German industry and commerce 
 have been expanded, and from the necessities which these 
 methods impose. These methods and necessities do not 
 seem to have attracted much attention in this country, 
 but have been ably expounded by foreign writers, notably 
 by Prof. Denis and M. Baillod in France, by Prof. MiUioud 
 (of Lausanne) in his book ' La Caste dominante allemande,' 
 and by others. According to these writers, German in- 
 dustrial and financial expansion has been built up on a 
 vast system of credit. The result is a huge and growing 
 accumulation of debt. The necessity of securing the 
 capital already involved, and the pajnnent of interest, 
 necessitate a larger output and therefore an increased 
 outlay, the capital for which can only be obtained by an 
 increase of indebtedness. The manufacturers and the 
 financiers who support them are therefore involved in 
 a vicious circle. The magnificent edifice is hollow at 
 the base. Meanwhile they spend profusely ; the whole 
 standard of living has risen ; the thrift' which is so con- 
 spicuous in France, and to which the financial soundness 
 of the French nation owes so much, is wanting in Germany. 
 A comparison of German exports and imports tells a similar 
 tale. M. Baillod shows that while, down to about thirty 
 years ago, exports and imports were fairly balanced, since 
 1887 the excess of imports has gone on growing, tiU it has 
 reached in thirty years the sum of over 240 millions sterling. 
 In this country, as we know, imports habitually exceed 
 exports ; but the difference is covered by the large profits 
 on our carr3dng trade and the interest on our foreign loans. 
 Neither source of supply exists to any appreciable extent 
 in Germany. In spite, therefore, of the enormous growth 
 of trade, especially overseas trade, Germany is in reality 
 
26 NECESSITY OF CONSTANT GROWTH 
 
 poorer by 240 millions. Thus, in order to secure the 
 progress made and to avoid collapse, the pace has ever to 
 become faster, the output larger — and this in the face of 
 gorged markets, and markets which show a tendency to be 
 more and more closed to foreign goods. 
 
 In the presence of these conditions, imagine the 
 difficulties that would arise from the establishment of 
 a Customs Union between France and Russia, or a Tariff 
 League embracing the British Empire, or a great rise of 
 tariffs in the United States, involving such restrictions as 
 would practically stop the sale of foreign products in those 
 countries. All manufacturing communities would be hard 
 hit, but it is obvious that a community which is already 
 deep in debt would suffer most. Wages would fall ; 
 unemplojnnent would increase ; the grievances of the 
 Social-Democrats would become more acute ; a political 
 revolution might even be the result. This danger has 
 been — ^if we are to believe the writers referred to — an ever- 
 growing preoccupation of the German authorities. The 
 necessity of fresh and unrestricted markets is vital to their 
 trade, and therefore to the whole political and military 
 system depending thereon. But there is no apparent 
 way of obtaining fresh colonial or other reservoirs and 
 markets, or even making sure of those that exist, except 
 by war or by diplomatic efforts backed by military force, 
 which may easily lead to war. This, it is suggested, is 
 the main argument which has been employed to convince 
 the leading Socialists that war was inevitable. Some ex- 
 planation is certainly required to account for the readiness 
 with which that party abandoned their former attitude and 
 placed themselves at the disposal of the Government ; 
 and the suggestion that they have been influenced by the 
 arguments referred to is at least worth consideration. 
 If the facts stated about the condition of German trade 
 and industry are true, or even approximately true, it is 
 impossible not to see in them a powerful contributory 
 incentive to war. 
 
THE GERMAN NAVY 27 
 
 Two other results of colonial and commercial expansion 
 have still to be noticed — the German fleet and the Drang 
 nach Osfen. The two objects for which the German fleet 
 was originally formed, or at least those which were adopted 
 to justify its formation, were the defence and extension of 
 oversea colonies, and the protection of oversea commerce. 
 Such colonies were for the most part obtained, as we have 
 seen, in the eighties and nineties of last century ; and it 
 was during the same period that foreign trade began to 
 take on such enormous proportions. To both develop- 
 ments the establishment and strengthening of the German 
 fleet were primarily due. Without a fleet, neither colonies 
 nor commerce could be regarded as secure ; both would 
 be at the mercy of a stronger naval power. Such were 
 the reasons alleged in the preamble to the first Navy Law. 
 The reasons were good ; the need was obvious ; the growing 
 wealth of Germany supplied the means to meet it. The 
 ulterior aims that were subsequently disclosed, or not ob- 
 scurely implied, were not likely to discredit the enterprise 
 in the eyes of a people prepared, as we have seen, for w£ir, 
 and glad to find a new weapon ready to its hand. 
 
 The German Navy has been the special creation of 
 the present Emperor. Bismarck had frowned upon such 
 efforts, as he had upon colonisation, and for the same 
 reasons. But the Emperor had no sooner got rid of this 
 check on his proclivities than he began (about 1890) to 
 reorganise the Admiralty. In 1897 Admiral Tirpitz was 
 appointed as its head. In 1898 the first Navy Law was 
 promulgated, with a comparatively modest programme. 
 Two years later, while Great Britain was in the thick of 
 the South African War, the second Navy Law was passed. 
 It doubled the strength of the fleet ; but what was even 
 more notable than this increase was the challenge thrown 
 out in the accompanying memorandum, which contained 
 the following passage : ' To protect Germany's sea-trade 
 and colonies, in existing circumstances, there is only one 
 means. Germany must have a battle-fleet so strong that, 
 
28 GROWTH OF THE NAVY 
 
 even for the adversary possessing the greatest sea-power, 
 a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil 
 his position in the world.' After this it was impossible 
 to mistake the ulterior object of the German Navy. Other 
 Navy Laws followed, increasing both strength and efficiency, 
 in 1908 and 1912 ; and in the latter year the German 
 Government refused (when Lord Haldane went to Berlin) 
 to retard its rate of building except on terms which would 
 have left Germany free to pursue a policy of aggression in 
 Europe without fear of British intervention. 
 
 The creation of a great navy was welcomed throughout 
 Germany. The Emperor himself led the agitation in its 
 behalf ; and phrases like ' Our future is on the water ' 
 and ' Bitter is our need of a strong fleet ' rang through the 
 whole Empire. Austria, the ally, was urged to follow suit, 
 and obeyed the call. A host of pamphleteers supported 
 the Imperial efforts ; the Navy League {Flottenverein), 
 founded in 1898, now embraces over a million of members 
 and associates ; books (like that of Troeltsch) were written 
 to show that the German Navy, though smaller than the 
 British, would probably prove superior in fighting qualities 
 — a view also adopted by Bernhardi ; and it was universally 
 expected to do great things in the coming war. It is easy 
 to see how the Navy, originating in colonial and commercial 
 needs, due therefore primarily to economic growth, must 
 have increased the confidence of the German people, 
 relieved them from certain fears, and thus proved a direct 
 incentive to war. 
 
 I come finally to the last outcome of the combination of 
 philosophical ideas with political and economic aims and 
 motives which I have to mention — the Drang nach Osten, 
 the pressure to the East. It is also, in some ways, the most 
 important outcome, because most directly and immediately 
 connected with the present war. So far as I am able to 
 judge, it supplies the master-key to German foreign policy. 
 The conquest of the Orient can, I believe, be shown by 
 reference to a long series of German publications and to 
 
GERMANY AND THE EAST 29 
 
 recent events to be its principal objective, the great aim 
 to which all other aims are more or less subsidiary. It 
 explains much that would otherwise be difficult to under- 
 stand, more especially the intense interest which Germany 
 takes in the maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
 It is also the most idealistic (if I may use the word) of 
 German aims ; it opens up the widest possibilities to the 
 imagination ; and idealistic conceptions have a peculiar 
 fascination for the German mind. 
 A modern poet has remarked : 
 
 ' If you've 'eard the East a-calling, 
 You will never 'eed naught else.' 
 
 It would be an exaggeration to attribute to the Germans 
 so exclusive a devotion, but there is no doubt that upon 
 them, and especially on their romanticist Emperor, the 
 East has exercised a great and growing attraction. Real- 
 politik scorns the guidance of sentiment ; but this is no 
 reason why it should not turn it to use. The German 
 sentiment for the East is of considerable antiquity. The 
 practical eye of Moltke discerned, in the forties of the 
 last century, its potentialities for his nation ; he even 
 conceived a German Principality of Palestine. I have 
 already referred to the views of List, in connexion with 
 German colonisation of the lands to the east of Germany. 
 In the next generation after the Franco-German War, 
 explorers like Sachau travelled in Asia Minor and Meso- 
 potamia, and pressed upon their countrymen the notion 
 that those regions, once so prosperous and fertile, might be 
 reclaimed for civilisation by German labour and German 
 capital. One of the most influential of German publicists, 
 Paul Botticher, better known under his pen-name, Paul 
 de Lagarde, revived and developed, about 1880, the ideas 
 of List. Writing in the National-Zeitung, he says : ' How 
 often are we to repeat to our countrymen who emigrate to 
 America, that they can find at their very doors magnificent 
 countries only waiting to be exploited ? ' And again : 
 
30 THE DRANG NACH OSTEN 
 
 ' We must create a Central Europe by conquering for 
 German colonisation large spaces to the east of our fron- 
 tiers.' He foresaw that a great war would be necessary for 
 this purpose, and urged his countrymen to prepare for 
 it. A year or two later, Constantin Frantz suggested the 
 establishment of a great Central-European Confederation, 
 extending from Holland to the Balkan States, and involving 
 the retirement of Russia beyond the Dniester. For this 
 end, he said, ' Prussia must be able to wage an offensive 
 war in the grand style.' Later writers carried their views 
 still further, so as to include not only Tiu'key in Eiuope 
 but the whole Ottoman Empire. Able officials like Dern- 
 burg (afterwards Colonial Minister and lately propagandist- 
 in-chief in the United States), clever and learned publicists 
 like Paul Rohrbach, professors like Anton Sprenger and 
 Ernst Hasse, and enthusiasts like Friedrich Naumann, 
 pointed to the Nearer East as the goal of German hopes, 
 the most promising object of German efforts. The Pan- 
 German League adopted the policy with ardour. 
 
 The attitude of these writers towards Turkey and Austria 
 deserves a moment's attention. Both these States are 
 regarded as of the first importance for the realisation of 
 German ambitions ; but, whereas it was at first supposed 
 that they were too far gone in the process of disruption to 
 be saved, and that all that Germany could expect was to 
 obtain a large portion of their disjecta membra, it is now 
 generally maintained that they can be brought in their 
 entirety within the sphere of German influence. For this 
 purpose the German element in Austria-Hungary must 
 not only be maintained but placed in a position of unques- 
 tioned superiority ; the ' slavising ' of that empire must, 
 at all costs, be prevented. Ardent patriots protested 
 against the Magyarisirung of the Germans in Hungary, and 
 deplored the progress of the Czechs in Bohemia. It was 
 proposed that the non-German elements under Austrian 
 rule should be expropriated, as has recently been attempted 
 in Prussian Poland, and that alien nationalities should 
 
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND TURKEY 
 
 31 
 
 be confined, like the Red Indians in North America, to 
 ' reserves.' ' Pure Deutschtum,' urged Friedrich Lange, 
 must be substituted for Slaventum. Austria, in short, 
 must be thoroughly germanised. We recall the old dispute 
 between the Grossdeutsche and Kleindeutsche parties which 
 xaged in the sixties of the last century. The question was 
 then solved by the exclusion of Austria from the new 
 German Empire ; Prussia was not yet strong enough to 
 impress itself on the rest of Germany, and on Austria into 
 the bargain. But, now that Germany has been satis- 
 factorily prussianised, the old idea of a Grossdeutschland, 
 to include Austria-Hungary, has been revived in another 
 form. So too with Turkey. In 1896 the Pan-German 
 League, in an official publication, spoke of the dissolution 
 of the Ottoman Empire as imminent, and anticipated no 
 objection, on the part of other Powers, to Germany ' claiming 
 a portion ' of its territories. Now it claims the whole ; 
 and the means to this end is a close alliance, with all 
 the advantages which an alliance with Germany implies. 
 Rohrbach (' Der deutsche Gedanke ') discovers, between 
 the nature of the German and that of the Turk, if not a 
 profound relationship of character, certain traces of affinity 
 — a conclusion in which we may readily acquiesce. The 
 Turk, says this writer, is the chief material and moral 
 force of the East. There is therefore, in his Empire, ' a 
 sphere in which the German Gedanke may have a great 
 future, not only by way of material colonisation, but also 
 with a view to political domination and moral influence.' 
 
 Thus the ground was prepared, the favourable mental 
 attitude produced. The craze for colonisation was at its 
 height, as we have seen, in the eighties of last century. A 
 certain disillusionment followed. Colonies in fruitful and 
 habitable portions of the earth were no longer to be had 
 — at least without fighting for them. Here was a wide 
 area, unoccupied or occupied only by wandering tribes or 
 semi-civilised peoples, imder the nominal sway of a decadent 
 Power. Here the superfluous population of Germany might 
 
32 THE ABSORPTION OF TURKEY 
 
 be disposed in promising settlements ; German capital could 
 be profitably employed in railways and irrigation works, 
 in mining and agriculture ; increasing prosperity would 
 provide growing markets for German produce ; a country 
 rendered fit for husbandry and possessing untold mineral 
 wealth would supply raw materials for manufacture and 
 food for the toiling millions at home. 
 
 To these economical incentives were added the political 
 and other advantages to be drawn from a close connexion 
 with Turkey. Financial and economic control over 
 Turkey, European and Asiatic, meant not only the chance 
 of utilising excellent military material which, under 
 German tuition, could be formed into a first-rate army ; 
 it meant also the control of South-Eastern Eiu^ope and 
 the Eastern Mediterranean, the command of the Danube 
 from source to mouth, the severance of Russia from the 
 open sea, and an end to the Russian dream of celebrating 
 an Orthodox Mass in Santa Sophia. More than that, the 
 submission of Turkey to German guidance would mean 
 the practical possession of Bagdad, and a road to the Persian 
 Gulf ; whence it would be easy to bring pressmre to bear 
 not only on Persia but on Russian territory east of the 
 Caspian, and even on India. Rohrbach, in his essay on 
 the Bagdad Railway, dwells complacently on the prospect 
 of using the Turkish army as a ' spear-head ' against the 
 English in Egypt, in case we should oppose German designs 
 elsewhere. 
 
 The possibilities, in short, both economic and political, 
 were practically boundless. But, to secure so great a 
 prize, it was indispensable that the Austro-Hungarian 
 Empire should not only be maintained, but should 
 dominate the Balkan Peninsula. The disadvantage of a 
 close alliance with a State so divided in itself, and in so 
 precarious a political condition, as Austria-Hungary, has 
 induced some German publicists to advocate a rupture of 
 the connexion ; but this view appears to be very rare. 
 The vast majority of writers regard the connexion a,s 
 
SUMMARY 33 
 
 essential ; and it is clear that the gre?it scheme could in 
 no other way be carried out. The road from Berlin to 
 Byzantium and thence to Bagdad — ' the three B's ' — 
 runs through Vienna. Hence the policy which has led to 
 the present war. 
 
 Recent incidents will establish more clearly the thesis 
 that the attempt to dominate the East forms the keystone 
 of German Weltpolitik ; but it will be more convenient to 
 take these in chronological order, and as connected with 
 other matters, in a survey of the events immediately leading 
 up to the present war, to which I next invite your attention. 
 We have seen how the German mind was prepared by 
 philosophical theory, by the experience of the past, and 
 by the teaching of historians, to embrace certain views of 
 the State and of war, which produced a warlike tendency ; 
 we have also seen how this tendency was confirmed and 
 strengthened by confidence arising from a great accession 
 of financial and economic resources ; how from economic 
 progress a colonial empire and a great fleet arose ; how, 
 finally, economic necessities and political ambitions, com- 
 bined with the teaching of many eloquent writers, familiar- 
 ised the people with the idea of war as a legitimate means 
 of solving their difficulties and realising the national 
 aims. We have now to see how the events of the last few 
 years have led up to the actual outbreak, by gradually con- 
 vincing the German people that their interests demanded 
 the adoption of a method to which they were already, by 
 theory, training, and experience, predisposed. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Looking broadly at the events of the last twenty-five 
 years, we perceive certain main lines of German expansionist 
 policy gradually unfolding themselves — a colonial policy, 
 manifested in various parts of the globe, in Africa, Asia, 
 South America, but especially in regard to the question of 
 Morocco ; a Near-Eastern policy, which may also be called _ 
 
 D 
 
34 CAUSES OF FRICTION 
 
 in a sense, colonial, displaying itself in the Balkans, in 
 relations with Turkey, and in far-reaching schemes like 
 the Bagdad railway ; a military policy, visible in the 
 rapid and continuous growth, after 1898, of the war-fleet, 
 and in frequent additions to the strength of the army, 
 designed to support those schemes. Less obviously, in 
 some departments indeed almost invisibly, a policy of 
 economic expansion is pushed on, by great steamship lines 
 depending largely on Government support, by lavish 
 expenditure on colonial progress, by the peaceful pene- 
 tration — financial, commercial, and industrial — of neigh- 
 bouring States, and by many thoughtful measures calcu- 
 lated to improve economic conditions at home, and to allay 
 socialistic discontent. On the other hand, we see signs 
 of growing anxiety on the part of other States, increasing 
 suspicion of Germany's intentions ; and a new grouping 
 of the Great Powers is gradually formed, in which the 
 so-called Triple Entente — England, France, and Russia- 
 faces the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
 and Italy. Thus it was hoped that a ' Balance of Power ' 
 would be maintained, and European peace preserved. 
 But by Germans the formation of the Entente was stig- 
 matised as Einkreisungspolitik — a policy of encirclement, 
 designed to hem in Germany and to prevent her further 
 expansion. 
 
 On the side of the Entente Powers — apart from the views 
 of certain chauvinistic sections, which no doubt have 
 existed, more or less, in all three countries — ^the combination 
 was genuinely defensive ; but it is easy to see how it might 
 appear to anxious German minds to be, at least potentially, 
 aggressive. It must be remembered that Germany had 
 causes of friction with each of. the three Entente Powers— 
 with France, the incurable sore of Alsace-Lorraine and 
 (latterly) Morocco ; with Russia, the question of Deutsck- 
 tum against Slaventum and (latterly) the Balkan question ; 
 with Great Britain, naval supremacy and commercial 
 rivalry. Should all these questions become acute at the 
 
THE SHARE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 35 
 
 same time, a hostile combination of a very dangerous 
 kind was obviously possible. Moreover, the Triple Alliance 
 had one weak spot, in the craving of Italy for a better 
 strategic frontier and for Italia irredenta, and in her rivalry 
 with Austria in the Adriatic. Hence the German fears ; 
 and fear is one of the most potent causes of war. If a 
 combined attack were probable or even possible, would 
 it not be better to anticipate it while there was a likelihood 
 of victory ? The belief in the existence of a wide-spread 
 plot against the life of Germany, and the idea of a preventive 
 war to thwart it, took hold of the German mind ; and a 
 war which anticipates attack may be regarded as a defensive 
 war. Such is the reasoning which has been consistently 
 presented to, and universally accepted by, the German 
 people. Such is their defence and justification. 
 ' These being the broad facts, apparent on a superficial 
 investigation, let us endeavour to see them in somewhat 
 larger detail, and to trace out, in their chronological develop- 
 ment, the phases through which German policy passed 
 during a period of forty years, and the events connected 
 with that policy which led, by a sort of logical sequence, 
 to the present collision. 
 
 In concentrating attention on the policy and aims of 
 Germany, I am not unmindful of the fact that Austria- 
 Hungary is an important member of the Germanic firm. 
 The exact share which the statesmen of Vienna and of 
 Pesth have had in determining the policy of the Triple 
 Alliance cannot now, and possibly never will, be defined. 
 But it is clear that the dominant partner throughout, and 
 to an ever-increasing degree in recent years, has been 
 Germany. However prominent Austria-Hungary may have 
 seemed occasionally to be, e.g. in October 1908 and in 
 July 1914, no one will deny that the originating ming, the 
 motive force, and (at times) the curbing hand, have all 
 along been in Berlin. Italy, again, though her ambitions 
 and her needs have often been subjects of grave and doubt- 
 less anxious consideration for German statesmen, has been 
 
36 BISMARCK'S FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 still less of a determining element in the Central League ; 
 and, at all events since the close of the last century, has 
 tended more and more to go her own way. It is with 
 Germany then that we have, first and last, to reckon ; it 
 is with her policy and her aims that we are really concerned. 
 
 Although Bismarck, in respect of colonial expansion 
 and of contact with Turkey, yielded to some extent, as I 
 have already said, to modern aims and ideas, the character 
 of his government during its later years (1870-1890) is 
 quite different from that of William II which followed. 
 Further, in the reign of the present Emperor, a remarkable 
 change took place about the year 1905; mainly in consequence 
 of the Russo-Japanese War. A policy hitherto cautious 
 and not obtrusively aggressive gave way in that year to 
 one of ominous activity ; serious crises in international 
 affairs rapidly succeeded one another ; and the menace 
 of war became more and more acute. The dates 1890 and 
 1905 are thus of primary importance in our survey. I 
 shall deal shortly with the first two periods, and at gteater 
 length with the last, as having the most direct bearing on 
 our subject. 
 
 In order to realise the change which took place in 1890, 
 let me endeavour to indicate the principles of Bismarck's 
 policy, and the international position in which he left 
 Germany and Europe at the time of his fall. Aggressive 
 and enterprising, even hazardous, as was Bismarck's 
 conduct of affairs during his first nine years of power, his 
 actions during the last nineteen years, from the Peace of 
 Frankfort onward, may be summed up in the words caution 
 and consolidation. The very greatness of his triumph 
 made him anxious lest a combination of States should seek 
 to deprive him of it. He suffered, as Schouvaloff said, 
 and as he himself confessed, from a perpetual cauchemar 
 des coalitions. Russia was already his friend ; her support 
 had been invaluable ever since he had won it by his Polish 
 policy in 1863 ; it was further secured when, in 1871, his 
 
THE PEACE OF BISMARCK 37 
 
 assistance enabled her to erase the Black Sea clauses from 
 the Treaty of Paris. But from the two other great Con- 
 tinental Powers— Austria and France— he had to fear a 
 war of revenge. In the case of Austria, which would gladly 
 have aided France in 1870, had s)ie been prepared, the 
 wisdom of his moderation in 1866 was soon made plain. 
 Austria now accepted the fait accompli, and recognised her 
 exclusion from Germany ; and in 1872 the Dreikaiserbund 
 was formed. This league was, in fact, a revival of the old 
 Holy Alliance — a compact, but without any formal docu- 
 ment, for the maintenance of peace on the basis of the 
 status quo, the suppression of revolutionary efforts, and 
 joint action in Eastern affairs. In 1873 Italy was admitted, 
 by a similar verbal agreement, to partnership with the 
 three Empires in the task of maintaining European peace. 
 France was thus isolated, as after 1815 ; a war of revanche, 
 even had her internal condition allowed it, was made im- 
 possible ; and Austria was directed to look for compensation 
 for her German and Italian losses in the Balkan Peninsula. 
 But the understanding with Russia was not absolutely 
 secure ; and the first rift was made when the Tsar inter- 
 vened in 1875 to save France from a war of annihilation, 
 threatened by Bismarck on account of the French Army 
 Law and his fears of a royalist Restoration which would 
 cross his aims in the Kulturkampf. Bismarck, it is true, 
 strenuously denied that he had cherished any such intention. 
 But it was universally believed to have existed ; and in 
 any case he was deeply offended with the Russian Chan- 
 cellor. Three years later he had his revenge. 
 
 The Eastern Question, dormant for twenty years, was 
 revived by the insurrection in Herzegovina (1875), due in 
 some measure to a scheme of reform which the three Eastern 
 Powers had presented to the Porte. Serbia subsequently 
 attacked Turkey ; the ' Bulgarian atrocities ' followed ; 
 and the Tsar was hurried, by an outbreak of national 
 emotion, into a Turkish war. Before he entered upon it, 
 he sought an understanding with Germany as to the probable 
 
38 AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE 
 
 outcome. Bismarck declining to pledge himself, the Tsar 
 turned to Austria, and, in the secret treaty of Reichstadt 
 (1876), purchased her benevolent neutrality by the promise 
 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was hoped that Austrian 
 aggrandisement in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula 
 would be more than balanced by Russian gains, direct or 
 indirect, on the eastern side. But the Tsar was doomed to 
 disappointment. The Peace of San Stefano, which brought 
 the Russo-Turkish War to a close, seemed indeed not only 
 to promise a settlement of the Eastern Question, at least 
 for a long time, but also to secure a dominant influence 
 for Russia in the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula. 
 But the Congress of Berlin altered all this. Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina were occupied by Austria ; but the ' big 
 Bulgaria ' to which Russia looked for compensation was 
 reduced to small dimensions, and what was left was divided 
 into two separate States. Russia not only lost prestige, 
 but by her unwise and ungrateful policy towards Rumania 
 alienated the affections of that country for thirty years. 
 Turkey recovered a great part of what she had abandoned ; 
 and the seeds of future trouble were sown in the restoration 
 of her sovereignty over Macedonia. 
 
 At the Congress of Berlin Bismarck claimed to have 
 played the part of an ' honest broker ' ; but strict imparti- 
 ality was not what Russia had expected, and her relations 
 with Germany could not remain on the same friendly 
 footing as before. So deeply was the Tsar annoyed that 
 he even threatened war ; and for a short time relations 
 between Petrograd and Berlin were seriously strained. 
 Bismarck was quick to perceive his chance ; and the Austro- 
 German alliance of 1879 was the result. This treaty, not 
 officially divulged till 1888,^ pledged each Power to active 
 assistance in case of an attack by Russia on either, and 
 to benevolent neutrality in case of attack by another Power. 
 It has lasted to this day. Bismarck, it is true, did not 
 
 ' Its purport was, however, known ; and it was inunediately welcomed 
 by Lord Salisbury as a guarantee of European peace. 
 
THE RE-INSURANCE TREATY 39 
 
 regard it as a sufficient safeguard ; he had no intention 
 of falling out with his great neighbour, and still longed for 
 security on his eastern front. In 1881 the Tsar, Alex- 
 ander II, died ; two years later Gortschakoff followed him 
 to the grave. His old rival removed, Bismarck set him- 
 self to renew the former connexion, and in 1884, at Skierne- 
 wice, he entered into a secret agreement — the so-called 
 ■ reinsurance ' treaty— with Russia. It was at a time when 
 his colonial policy, involving possibilities of friction with 
 England, was maturing, and when Russia was not only 
 intent upon ousting Prince Alexander of Battenberg from 
 Bulgaria, but was also, contemplating an advance in Central 
 Asia, which two years later nearly brought her into conflict 
 with England over the Penjdeh affair. Both parties had 
 therefore an interest in coming to terms. The treaty, in 
 what are probably Bismarck's own words,^ arranged ' that 
 if either of them [Germany or Russia] were attacked, the 
 other would remain benevolently neutral.' Russia, thus 
 protected, was emboldened to go forward in Asia, where, 
 in 1885, she seized Penjdeh, and in the Balkans, where she 
 kidnapped Prince Alexander, and presently made herself 
 mistress of Bulgaria. Germany, on her side, was able to 
 act with more decision in colonial matters. Bismarck now 
 laid hands on South-West Africa, and proclaimed Germany's 
 appearance as a Colonial Power by the Congo Conference at 
 Berlin. Nevertheless, a certain coolness recurred when, 
 in 1887, the Tsar again intervened, on the occasion of the 
 Schnabele incident, to hinder Bismarck from attacking 
 France ; and in 1890, after the Chancellor's fall, his successor, 
 Caprivi, declined to renew the treaty. It was, however, 
 kept a secret till 1896, when Bismarck, taunted with having 
 done nothing to prevent the Franco-Russian alliance, 
 disclosed it. Its non-renewal was then defended on the 
 ground that it was incompatible with the Austrian alliance. 
 Whatever the cause, the fact that the alliance with Austria- 
 Hungary was retained, while the arrangement with Russia 
 
 1 Hamburger Nachrichten, October 24, 1896. 
 
40 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 
 
 was dropped, indicated a momentous deflection in the 
 policy of Germany, and a departure from Bismarckian 
 lines. It was, indeed, the parting of the ways. 
 
 Meanwhile, however, Bismarck had secured another 
 ally. In 1881 France, acting on a suggestion made by Lord 
 Salisbury to M. Waddington during the Congress of Berlin, 
 and on significant hints from the Chancellor, occupied 
 Tunis. This was naturally a cause of deep annoyance to 
 Italy ; Rome was again threatened by a new and more 
 dangerous Carthage. Isolated as Italy was, she could 
 expect no compensation ; and the menace to her security 
 drove her to join the Austro-German League in the following 
 year. Thus was formed the Triple Alliance, which, renewed 
 on several occasions, remained a governing factor in 
 European politics for over thirty years. Rumania, after 
 1879 — it is still uncertain whether the treaty of 1883 was a 
 formal alliance or not — ^was virtually another member of 
 the league. 
 
 Thus entrenched and fortified by compacts with all 
 his important neighbours, save France, Bismarck could 
 feel safe. Anglo-German relations were friendly ; Lord 
 Salisbury was well-inclined ; and Bismarck declared in 
 1885 that the friendship of England was more important 
 to Germany than the future of Egypt. France was on bad 
 terms with Italy, which was still resenting the occupation 
 of Tunis and smarting under the failure of her colonial 
 enterprises. The Egyptian Question, not to mention 
 boundary difficulties in West Africa and other coloniEd 
 troubles, separated France from Great Britain. The 
 progress of Russia in Central Asia aroused anxieties in 
 England which Lord Salisbury vainly strove to allay by 
 the advice to study large maps and not to be ' mervous.' 
 The policy of combination on the one side and separation 
 on the other had admirably succeeded. Germany was 
 growing richer every day ; and there appeared no probability 
 of that • nightmare ' coalition which subsequently took 
 place. Such was the condition of prosperity and security 
 
BISMARCK AND TURKEY 41 
 
 in which Bismarck left the German Empire, when in 1890 
 he resigned the reins of power into the hands of the young 
 and impetuous Emperor. With his departure from the 
 scene the character of the drama changed. 
 
 The amazing activity of the new ruler, and the warlike 
 utterances with which William II began his reign, caused 
 no little fluttering of the dovecotes ; but, as years passed 
 by and Germany did not adopt a menacing attitude, inter- 
 national anxiety was somewhat allayed. The Emperor 
 had, however, already shown his hand, if Europe in general 
 failed to perceive his game. The views of Oriental policy 
 which I have already described had begun to sink into 
 the German mind soon after the Franco-German War, but 
 they remained vague and visionary till a much later date. 
 Bismarck, with his caution and strong common-sense, 
 would have nothing to say to them. His remark, made so 
 late as 1888, that German interests in the Balkans were not 
 worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier, was 
 typical of his state of mind. As in the matter of the 
 colonies and the fleet, he was reluctant to embark on a policy 
 of adventure ; and no doubt his growing age strengthened 
 his objections. Nevertheless he was ready to take advantage 
 of opportunities, especially such as enabled him to further 
 the economic progress of Germany, on which his heart 
 was set. For many years British influence had been 
 predominant in Constantinople. But, when Gladstone came 
 into power in 1880, pledged as he was by his utterances 
 in and before 1878, 4 different tone was adopted by our 
 Foreign Office, and British influence at the Porte began 
 to wane. Another blow was dealt to it by our occupation 
 of Egypt in 1882. Bismarck seized the opening thus 
 given. He was .able to persuade the Sultan that Germany 
 was the true friend of Turkey, and he used the good-will 
 of the Turkish Government to promote German financial 
 and commercial interests in the Ottoman Empire. Further 
 than this, however, he would not go. 
 
42 WILLIAM II. AND TURKEY 
 
 The young Emperor, immediately on his accession, 
 manifested his inclination towards a more active policy. 
 The Drang nach Osten began to pass from the visionary 
 phase into the area of practical politics. In 1889 the 
 Emperor paid his first visit to Constantinople, and knit 
 up a personal friendship with the Sultan, Abdul Hamid. 
 German pubhcists at once grasped the importance of this 
 visit, and extolled their ruler's activity and foresight. 
 Bismarck did not like the journey, stiU less the views which 
 the Emperor announced on his return ; and this divergence 
 was probably one of the reasons which led to the Chancellor's 
 dismissal in 1890. In 1898 the Emperor again visited the 
 Golden Horn, went on to Jerusalem, figured in Eastern 
 costume, and at Damascus proclaimed himself the protector 
 of Turkey and the friend of Mohammedanism throughout 
 the world. We may remember that this announcement 
 closely synchronised with the first German Navy BiU, the 
 Battle of Omdurman, and the episode of Fashoda, which 
 nearly brought about a war between England and France. 
 Still larger concessions were soon afterwards obtained 
 from the Porte ; and the project of the Bagdad Railway, 
 which was to link up Berlin with the Middle East, was 
 launched. The ' peaceful penetration ' of the Ottoman 
 Empire — the preliminary to its political subjugation — had 
 begun. 
 
 Meanwhile important events had happened elsewhere ; 
 and of these the gravest, in its effect on the position of 
 Germany, was the formation of the Franco-Russian alUance. 
 The first indication of such a possibility was given, as we 
 have seen, in 1875 ; twelve years later another warning 
 note was heard. The Tsar's intervention naturally won 
 the gratitude of France ; fear of Germany and acute 
 colonial rivalry with England prompted her to approach the 
 Power which alone could check Berlin, and whose progress 
 in the East was a cause of alarm to this country. The 
 rapid recovery of France from the sufferings of 1870 and 
 her great wealth enabled her to offer the financial assistance 
 
THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE 43 
 
 of which Russia has always been in need. Hitherto Petro- 
 grad had drawn chiefly on Berhn ; but, after the aUenation 
 of 1887, the supply showed a tendency to dry up, just at 
 the time when money was badly wanted for the Trans- 
 Siberian Railway and other expensive schemes. The Paris 
 bankers came to Russia's aid, and by the year 1894 had 
 advanced no less than 160 millions sterling ^ to that country. 
 The ground for an understanding was thus firmly laid ; 
 and certain obstacles to a closer union were gradually 
 removed. The death of the old Emperor William I and 
 his son in 1888 broke the personal tie which had hitherto 
 united the Courts of Berlin and Petrograd. The in- 
 stabiUty of French governments naturally repelled the 
 Russian autocracy ; but in 1889 the Boulanger incident 
 showed that the Republic was more firmly seated than 
 had hitherto been supposed. When the compact of 1884 
 was dropped, Russia required support in Europe if she were 
 to prosecute her Far-Eastern policy with good hope of 
 success. France was her natural ally, for both countries 
 were still at odds with Great Britain ; and friction in Siam 
 brought England and France to the verge of war in 1893 
 The result of all these circumstances was the Franco- 
 Russian alliance. A military convention was signed in 
 1891 and confirmed in 1894 ; and a year later M. Ribot 
 could publicly speak of Russia as the ' ally ' of France. 
 
 The terms of the alliance have never been divulged, but 
 it appears certain that it was merely a defensive compact. 
 Security in Europe was the primary object in view ; but 
 this security could be, and indeed was, utilised for enter- 
 prises far afield. France was encouraged to push forward 
 still more adventurously in Africa. In 1896 the Marchand 
 Mission started from the French Congo for the Upper Nile. 
 Arriving at Fashoda, just before the Battle of Omdurman, 
 
 ^ The whole amount advanced by France to Russia, from public and 
 private sources, was estimated in 1914 by Paul Rohrbach (• Der Krieg 
 und die deutsche Politik '), oti the bases of French statements, at 
 ;£8oo,ooo,ooo; 
 
44 FASHODA AND THE TRANSVAAL 
 
 Colonel Marchand found himself face to face with a victorious 
 British force. Some little time before, the French Govern- 
 ment had sounded the Russian as to its attitude in case 
 of the collision which was clearly possible, and had received 
 an assurance from Petersburg that Russia would support 
 France.^ But, when the crisis came. President Faure and 
 M. Delcasse decided, for whatever reason, that Fashoda 
 was not worth a war. They accordingly gave way, and 
 recalled Colonel Marchand. A convention, in which France 
 abandoned her claims on the Egyptian Sudan, was the 
 result ; but a natural feeling of soreness for some time 
 prevailed across the Channel. In West Africa, also, there 
 was for some time serious friction ; but the difficulty was 
 overcome by a judicious compromise, and in 1899 the 
 respective boundaries were defined. Still there remained 
 Eg37pt ; the fisheries question in Newfoundland was 
 troublesome ; sore spots enough existed in various parts 
 of the globe to relieve Germany of anxiety lest the two 
 ancient rivals should put aside their quarrels and combine 
 to check her ambitions. 
 
 Apart from these difficulties with France, Great Britain 
 was occupied, during a large portion of this period, with 
 the troubles in South Africa which culminated in the Boer 
 War. The origin of these troubles, dating from the 
 annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, and intensified ty 
 the unfortunate war of 1881, cannot be attributed to 
 German influence. It is none the less true that the future 
 of the Boer Republics began, from that time, to interest 
 German expansionists ; and the possibility of knitting up 
 relations with the farmers of the Transvaal cannot but 
 have occurred to Bismarck when he resolved to annex 
 South- West Africa.^ The encouragement which President 
 Krtiger received from Berlin had much to do with his 
 
 * See articles and documents in the Figaro, February 18 and 22, 1904. 
 
 ' It was doubtless in view of possible trouble with the Boers that a 
 secret clause was added to the Anglo-Portuguese Boundary Treaty of 
 1 891, enabling Great Britain to send troops through Portuguese territory 
 — a stipulation afterwards utiUsed in the relief of Mafeking. 
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR 45 
 
 resistance to British claims ; and the Emperor's telegram, 
 sent on the morrow of the Jameson ' raid,' was loudly 
 applauded in Germany. It was the first incident which 
 roused the British public to a sense of German hostility. 
 When the South African War broke out, there is no doubt 
 that the Boers expected active assistance from Germany ; 
 and, if what they had taken to be promises were not redeemed 
 by the formation of a European Coalition in their favour, 
 in the winter of 1899-1900, the reason is probably to be 
 found in the secret Anglo-German convention of 1898. 
 This arrangement settled the respective claims of the two 
 countries in case of a liquidation of the Portuguese colonial 
 empire, which was then regarded as imminent, and left 
 everything south of the Zambesi within the sphere of 
 British influence.^ In view of this understanding, the 
 German Government could hardly have intervened in the 
 struggle — at least, so long as its issue remained doubtful. 
 It is also not improbable that the self-restraint exercised in 
 Berlin is partly traceable to Mr. Rhodes' visit in March 
 1899,2 at which some sort of understanding is said to have 
 been reached by the Emperor and his visitor respecting 
 Imperial plans in Mesopotamia and those of Rhodes in 
 South Africa. Be this as it may, the proposal for a 
 coalition against Great Britain, which emanated from 
 Russia and was not immediately rejected by France, 
 fell through when it appeared that Germany was not 
 likely to come in.* The attitude of the German Govern- 
 ment during the Boer War appears — though details are 
 still obscure — to have been ' correct ' ; and the danger passed 
 when our iiltimate victory seemed secure. But the perils 
 of ' splendid isolation ' impressed themselves forcibly on 
 the British Government, and had much to do with the 
 changes in foreign policy which followed. Another outcome 
 of the struggle was that the importance of sea-power, which 
 
 1 See ' The Anglo-German Agreement,' Fortnightly Review, October 1898. 
 « See The Life of Cecil Rhodes, by Sir L. Michel,. 
 
 » See ' Count MuravieflE's Indiscretion,' Fortnightly Review, December 
 1900. 
 
46 RUSSIA, CHINA, AND JAPAN 
 
 alone enabled us to bring the war to a successful close, 
 afforded an object-lesson not lost upon the German people. 
 Its teaching was utilised in the famous Navy Law of 1900. 
 
 Meanwhile, in the Far East, a conflict was preparing, 
 which bade fair to employ the energies of Russia for some 
 time to come. The firstfruits of her alliance with France 
 were seen in the combination of those Powers, in concert 
 ■with Germany, to upset the Treaty of Simonoseki (1895), 
 which had ended the Chino- Japanese War, and to deprive 
 Japan of the most important results of her victory. The 
 outcome of this somewhat nefarious transaction was mainly 
 to the advantage of Russia. Japan was forced to retrocede 
 Port Arthur to China ; but Russia had no intention of 
 leaving that great fortress in Chinese hands. Early in 
 1896 she made a secret treaty with China, securing an 
 optional lease of Port Arthur or of Kiaochau, together 
 with important concessions in Manchuria, including the 
 right to make a railway to the Liaotung Peninsula. She 
 strengthened this advantage by advancing money to enable 
 China to pay the Japanese indemnity ; and, in the autumn 
 of 1896, the Cassini Convention made her influence para- 
 mount in Pekin. In 1897 Germany, taking advantage of 
 the murder of two German missionaries, seized the valuable 
 port of Kiaochau, and extorted from China important 
 rights over the province of Shantung. The acquisition 
 was one on which the Emperor seems to have set a special 
 value ; and enormous sums of money have been spent in 
 the development of the latest German colony. Early in 
 the following year Russia occupied Port Arthur, upon 
 which England, by arrangement with Japan, occupied 
 Wei-Hai-Wei ; and early in 1899 ^ convention between 
 England and Russia recognised British rights in the 
 Yangtse Valley, as a set-off to the recognition of Russian 
 influence in Manchuria. 
 
 These encroachments on the integrity of China led to 
 a great outburst of national feeling in that country ; and 
 the ' Boxer ' troubles were the result. The siege of the 
 
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 47 
 
 Legations at Pekin (1900) forced the Powers to intervene, 
 and furnished Russia with a pretext for occupying Man- 
 churia. When the troubles came to an end, she found 
 other reasons for retaining the ground she had gained. 
 About the same time Russian speculators obtained con- 
 cessions on the Yalu river ; and it became increasingly 
 probable that Russia would soon attain at Seoul the same 
 dominant position which she had already won at Pekin. 
 Now, Korea is for Japan very much what Belgium is to 
 Great Britain ; and the Russians at Seoul and Masampho 
 would have been as menacing to Japanese security as a 
 German occupation of Brussels and Antwerp would be to 
 this country. Japan made up her mind to fight rather 
 than incur this danger, and found in England the support 
 she required. Hence the Anglo- Japanese alliance of 1902, 
 and the Russo-Japanese War which began two years later. 
 
 How far it is true that Germany prompted Russia to 
 the enterprise must remain for the present doubtful ; 
 certain it is that, on consideration of a highly advantageous 
 commercial treaty, the German Government gave the 
 Tsar certain pledges which enabled Russia to denude her 
 western front of troops, in order to transport them to the 
 scene of war in Manchuria. German shipowners were 
 allowed to sell ships to Russia, to be converted into 
 cruisers ; and German financiers provided a loan. If the 
 war was not due to German advice — which indeed would 
 have been superfluous — ^it was favourable to German 
 interests, and was therefore facilitated by Germany. 
 
 This is not the place to discuss the Anglo- Japanese 
 alliance or the war that followed. What I am concerned 
 to point out is the enormous effect which the issue of that 
 war produced in international and especially European 
 politics. No one acquainted with the history of Europe 
 in the nineteenth century can fail to be struck by the 
 dominant position which Russia occupied during almost 
 all that time. Courted by Napoleon I, and dividing the 
 Continent with him, it was she who gave his Empire its 
 
48 RESULTS OF THE RUSSIAN DEFEAT 
 
 first deadly blow. After 1815 she led the forces of reaction ; 
 and her policy in the Near East kept the Western Powers 
 in constant alarm. The Crimean War exposed her real 
 weakness ; nevertheless, a few years later she weighed as 
 heavily as ever in the scale of European politics. It was 
 her goodwill that enabled Napoleon III to vanquish Austria 
 and emancipate Italy. Courted by Bismarck, her bene- 
 volent neutrality allowed him to overthrow Austria and 
 France, and to create the German Empire ; and, except 
 for one brief interlude, a good understanding with Russia 
 was the keynote of his foreign policy. Even the compara- 
 tively unsuccessful war of 1878 only temporarily dimmed 
 her prestige. It recovered more than it had lost through 
 the alliance with France ; and it can hardly be doubted 
 that the fear of a collision with Russia kept the projects 
 of William II, especially his designs in the Near East, 
 within bounds for fifteen years. 
 
 But now all this was to be altered. Russia challenged 
 the young Asiatic Power, and was grievously defeated. 
 Nor was this all. The result of the war, combined with 
 lamentable social and political conditions at home, pro- 
 duced internal disorders which, added to the immense 
 losses of men and materiel in the Far East, rendered a 
 vigorous foreign policy impossible for a long time to come. 
 In short, Russia was eliminated from international calcu- 
 lations ; it was as if, in the solar system, Saturn had 
 suddenly fallen from heaven. A balancing force had been 
 removed ; the relations of all the other planets were 
 changed. More especially, a constant source of anxiety for 
 Germany disappeared — at least for a time. The Kaiser's 
 hands were freed. 
 
 The most notable features of the period (1890-1904) 
 which we have now passed in brief review are these. For 
 the policy of consolidation at home and restraint abroad, 
 which marked the later years of Bismarck's sway, was 
 substituted a more active and adventurous policy, a policy 
 of expansion, not yet indeed obviously aggressive, but 
 
SUMMARY OF THE PERIOD 49 
 
 rather preparatory for aggression. Incidents but little 
 noticed at the time, such as the Emperor's visits to the 
 East, the launching of the Bagdad railway, the acquisition 
 of Heligoland, are now seen to mark stages in the execu- 
 tion of a consistent and considered plan. Other incidents, 
 such as the Kriiger telegram and the seizure of Kiaochau, 
 which made more noise, fall into their place in the same 
 scheme. Above all, the creation of a great navy, starting 
 from the Navy Bills of 1898 and 1900, began to attract 
 attention in this country, and roused apprehensions which 
 the events of the subsequent period did nothing to allay. 
 Meanwhile the internal prosperity of Germany advanced 
 by leaps and bounds ; and the confidence of the country 
 grew with the increase of its wealth. New ideas, new 
 hopes and ambitions, began to permeate political circles, 
 and inflamed the utterances of a host of writers. The Bis- 
 marckian system began to be regarded as obsolete. The 
 great scheme of a Central European Customs Union was 
 launched. The idea of a vast semi-colonial empire or pro- 
 tectorate, extending from the Balkans to the Persian Gulf, 
 took shape. The Pan-German League, with its all-embrac- 
 ing notions of nationality, its far-reaching schemes of con- 
 quest, appealed to the visionary side of the German mind. 
 The Navy League and other similar associations supplied a 
 practical and immediate aim, and strengthened the idea of 
 combined national effort for a great end. It was a period 
 of rapid internal development, both of forces and ideas, 
 during which the foundations were laid for expansion and 
 ultimately for aggression abroad. The nature of this growth 
 was little understood or even observed outside Germany. 
 England, France, Italy, and Russia were all occupied beyond 
 the frontiers of Europe ; what was going on in Germany 
 escaped their attention. Nevertheless, especially towards 
 the end of the period, a vague feeling of suspicion and 
 apprehension began to spread. The Bismarckian grouping 
 of the Powers gave way ; or rather the Powers outside the 
 central bloc tended to substitute coalition for their previous 
 
 E 
 
30 CHARACTER OF GERMAN POLICY 
 
 isolation. The Triple Alliance still held firm, but France 
 and Russia drew together, and England and France began 
 to search for a way of composing their mutual jeal'ousies. 
 The Triple Entente was already visible on the horizon. 
 Such was the position when the Russo-Japanese War took 
 place. 
 
 We now enter upon another period, one full of ' alarums 
 and excursions ' which have led on, almost inevitably, to 
 the present war. I am far from asserting that Germany, 
 ten years ago, had conceived the deliberate intention of 
 provoking a European conflict. What I maintain is that 
 the course of action initiated by the German Government 
 in 1905 was one of an increasingly self-assertive, if not 
 actively aggressive, character, calculated to encourage 
 ambitions in the German people and fears in other nations 
 which divided Europe into two armed camps ; and that 
 a policy of demands and threats, of diplomacy backed by 
 a constant ' rattling of the sabre,' was bound eventually 
 to lead Germany into an international position in which 
 diplomatic pressure could no longer ensure a triumph, and 
 war became, for a fully armed and self-confident people, 
 the only alternative. Clausewitz regarded war as the 
 continuation of policy. That depends on the policy. A 
 policy was pursued by Germany which was bound, sooner 
 or later, to result in war. 
 
 Let us note, at the outset, the dates of certain events 
 in the Far East. The war between Russia and Japan 
 began in February 1904. After a long series of sanguinary 
 engagements. Port Arthur fell at the end of the year ; and 
 the remains of the first Russian fleet passed into the hands 
 of the victors. In February and March 1905 was fought 
 the last great land-battle, that of Mukden ; and in May 
 the second Russian fleet was destroyed in the Battle of 
 Tsushima. President Roosevelt intervened, and the Peace 
 of Portsmouth was signed in September. 
 
 I pass over the more remote effects of the Japanese 
 
FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN 51 
 
 victory, which re-echoed throughout Asia— the annexation 
 of Korea, the revolution in China, the growth of nationalist 
 feeling and the stimulation of ' unrest ' in India, the revo- 
 lution and the grant of a constitution in Persia. In the 
 Near East also the triumph of an Asiatic over an European 
 Power had a perceptible influence, in the growth of the 
 Young Turk movement, which issued in the revolution of 
 1908, and in the nationalist agitation in Egypt. Even in 
 the Far West, the fear of Japanese aggression began to 
 occupy the mind and to affect the policy of the United 
 States. In short, the victories of Japan, like the ocean- 
 waves engendered by the earthquake of Krakatoa, were felt 
 all round the world. What we are here concerned with 
 is their immediate effect on the European position. 
 
 For some time past the Governments of France and 
 Great Britain had felt that the existence of a number of 
 causes of friction between them was detrimental to both 
 countries ; and efforts had been made by well-disposed 
 persons on both sides of the Channel to bring about a better 
 understanding. These efforts, however, had not made 
 much way before the Russo-Japanese War. At an early 
 stage in the hostilities it became evident that a Russian 
 victory was improbable, and that, at all events, a long and 
 exhausting struggle was in prospect. With Russia fully 
 occupied in the Far East, France practically fell back again 
 into the isolation from which she had escaped in 1891. 
 So long as England was unfriendly, or even indifferent, 
 she was exposed unaided to dangers from across the Rhine 
 such as had threatened her in 1875 and 1887. The situ- 
 ation was too hazardous to be endured. There was only one 
 possible supporter — Great Britain, with whom France had 
 nearly gone to war six years before. But in the interval 
 some causes of trouble had been removed ; and a King 
 was on the English throne who undoubtedly laboured — 
 even if his influence in this respect has been sometimes 
 exaggerated — ^in the cause of peace. Above all, it was felt 
 in England that> if the situation was tg be saved and the 
 
52 THE ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT 
 
 peace of Europe preserved, it could only be by common action 
 on the part of the two western Powers. The result was the 
 Anglo-French agreement of April 1904, which set at rest all 
 outstanding questions between the two countries. France 
 recognised the position of England in Eg3?pt ; England, 
 somewhat vaguely, acknowledged French claims in Morocco ; 
 Madagascar was registered as French ; French and English 
 possessions in Nigeria were finally delimited, rival interests 
 in Siam reconciled, and the ancient disputes about the 
 Newfoundland fisheries brought to a close. There was no 
 further obstacle to concerted action in European affairs. 
 
 The stability and value of the agreement were soon 
 to be tested. In the following year (1905) Germany made 
 the first of several attempts to destroy it. The ground she 
 chose for this effort was the question of Morocco. To 
 understand her action and the events that followed, it 
 will be necessary to go back a few years, and trace briefly 
 the circumstances which brought Moroccan affairs into such 
 prominence. Since the retirement of Bismarck Franco- 
 German relations had been, if not precisely friendly, on a" 
 tolerable footing. Germany had shown dissatisfaction at 
 the Franco- Russian alliance ; and Bismarck had, as we 
 have seen, been blamed for not guarding against it. But 
 the Government made no attempt to undo what had been 
 done, for it had no desire to pick a quarrel with either of 
 the contracting parties at the time. The Allies, moreover, 
 were busily engaged outside Europe — France in Africa and 
 Indo-China, Russia in preparing for advances in the Far 
 East ; and for some years the Bismarckian policy of 
 encouraging such occupations was pursued. During the 
 first decade of his reign, the German Emperor showed an 
 inclination to remain on good terms with France ; and 
 overtures for an understanding were made, on several 
 occasions, by the German Foreign Office. M. Hanotaux, 
 French Foreign Secretary from 1894 to 1898, was strongly 
 in favour of a Franco-German entente ; but his successor, 
 M. Delcass^, was of a different mind, and declared, on the 
 
THE QUESTION OF MOROCCO 53 
 
 morrow of Fashoda, that he would never be satisfied until 
 he had reconciled England and France. Nevertheless, 
 German attempts to win over the French were repeated in 
 1900 and igoi ; they failed principally because the accept- 
 ance of overtures from Berlin would have implied acquies- 
 cence in the Treaty of Frankfort and the final abandonment 
 of Alsace-Lorraine. 
 
 It was about this time that Morocco began to take a 
 leading place in French colonial policy. So far back as 
 1880 the condition of that country had been the subject 
 of international discussion ; and at the Conference of 
 Madrid, held in that year, the German delegate — it was 
 before the days when Germany had a colonial policy at all 
 — ^was instructed to support France. For some twenty years 
 after this date, the French Government had been content 
 with a slowly advancing trade, furthered by private effort ; 
 and at the end of the century France held unquestionably 
 the first place in Moroccan commerce. Great Britain came 
 next, and Germany third, but a long way behind. Until 
 the death of the Sultan Mulai Hassan in 1894 England held 
 a predominant political position at Fez ; but under his 
 successor her influence declined, and an anarchical condition 
 began to supervene. The idea of a British protectorate 
 was more than once suggested, as was also that of an Italian 
 protectorate ; but neither suggestion led to any practical 
 results. When Lord Lansdowne took office as Foreign 
 Secretary, England — ^largely owing to the experience of the 
 Boer War — was definitely abandoning the ' splendid isola- 
 tion ' on which she had hitherto prided herself ; and in M. 
 Delcass^ she found a statesman ready to meet her half-way. 
 
 Advances towards an understanding with Italy had 
 already been made by the French Government ; and a 
 commercial treaty (1898) paved the way for a more thorough 
 understanding. This was achieved in the Franco-Italian 
 convention of 1900, confirmed two years later, under which 
 France gave Italy a free hand in Tripoli, while Italy promised 
 to raise no objection to a French advance in Morocco 
 
54 FRENCH POLICY IN MOROCCO 
 
 This new orientation showed itself on the occasion of the 
 renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1902, when the clauses 
 of the treaty aimed especially at France, and adopted by 
 Crispi at a time when Italy was very sore over Tunis, were 
 left out, and the treaty became, so far at least as Italy was 
 concerned, one of a merely defensive kind. Certain com- 
 mercial agreements were made about the same time (1901-2) 
 with the Sultan of Morocco, facilitating the ' peaceful 
 penetration ' of the country by French trade. With Spain 
 also a settlement was attempted in 1902. The French 
 proposals were then declined in Madrid ; and it was not till 
 after the Anglo-French agreement had been signed (April 
 1904) that a secret convention was made with Spain, de- 
 limiting the respective spheres of action of the two countries 
 in Morocco (October 1904). 
 
 I have dwelt at some length on these preliminaries 
 because the change of policy implied by the conventions 
 with England and Spain, taken together with the exclusion 
 of Germany from any share in the settlement of Morocco — 
 as to which she had on previous occasions been consulted — 
 was a very momentous one. I will not discuss the wisdom 
 of this policy, beyond remarking that it was evidently 
 hazardous. The point to observe is that it was new, and 
 that it was productive of very serious consequences. 
 
 Intimation of the Anglo-French agreement, so far as 
 Egypt was concerned, was at once given by the British 
 Government to that of Germany ; the French Government 
 informed the German Ambassador in Paris of the arrange- 
 ment about Morocco. The German Government raised no 
 objections. Prince Radolin told M. Delcassd that he found 
 the French declarations about Morocco natural and reason- 
 able ; and Count von Biilow made a similar statement in 
 the Reichstag. Although the Emperor, in a public speech 
 made shortly afterwards, gave somewhat cryptic utterance 
 to his resentment, his Government took no overt action 
 so long as the issue of the struggle in the East remained 
 uncertain. But the Pan-German League was active ; 
 
GERMAN INTERVENTION 55 
 
 and the Russian defeats, especially the fall of Port 
 Arthur, produced a change in the attitude of Germany. 
 In January 1905 M. Rouvier, a politician opposed to 
 Delcass6, succeeded M. Combes as Premier ; and intrigues 
 against the Minister of Foreign Affairs at once began. 
 The German Government, being questioned by the French 
 Ambassador, declared that, not having been formally 
 consulted with regard to Morocco, it did not consider 
 itself bound to observe the Anglo-French agreement. 
 On March 31, shortly after the Battle of Mukden, the 
 German Emperor landed at Tangier and made a speech 
 in which he proclaimed himself the champion of Moroccan 
 integrity. This was followed by the demand for an inter- 
 national conference to consider the question anew ; and 
 Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck was sent to Paris to 
 require the dismissal of Delcass^. Active negotiations 
 followed ; Europe became anxious ; the French Govern- 
 ment, tmprepared for war, was alarmed. Towards the end 
 of May the Battle of Tsushima finally destroyed all hope 
 of Russian intervention ; and on June 6 the Council of 
 Ministers in Paris, in spite of Delcass^'s opposition, resolved 
 to accept the German demand. Thereupon the Foreign 
 Minister resigned. 
 
 This first success was not likely to satisfy Germany ; 
 on the contrary, it could only encourage her to further 
 activity and greater truculence. Moreover, it is to be 
 remembered that the Conservative Government in England 
 was, at the time, in a state of rapid dissolution ; and the 
 Germans may well have fancied that a Liberal Ministry, 
 already pledged to a change of policy in South Africa, would 
 adopt a different attitude nearer home. The Government 
 of Mr. Balfour, however, at an early stage of the proceedings, 
 intimated to Berlin that, * in the event of an unprovoked 
 attack upon the Republic, popular feeling in England would 
 not suffer the French to be left unsupported ' ; and this 
 timely warning doubtless contributed to the maintenance 
 of peace. 
 
56 THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 
 
 The principle of a conference once accepted, the bases 
 of discussion had still to be arranged ; and it was not till 
 September — ten days after the conclusion of the Peace of 
 Portsmouth — ^that the agreement was signed. Even with 
 the reservations that were made, the enforced recognition 
 that Germany and her allies had a right to share in the 
 settlement of Morocco was a diplomatic triumph of great 
 importance for Berlin. Nor can it be -denied that, although 
 German interests in Morocco were small in comparison with 
 those of England and France, Germany had some ground 
 for asserting that so large and valuable a territory, and 
 one so near to Europe, should not be disposed of by three 
 Powers without attention to the wishes of the rest. When 
 we consider the importance of colonial expansion to 
 Germany, and remember that Morocco was one of the 
 few remaining portions of the earth's surface available 
 for European colonisation of a residential kind, it is not 
 surprising that the German Government should have 
 asserted its claim for consideration. It was the high-handed 
 manner in which that claim was pressed, and the use which 
 was made of the comparative isolation in which France 
 found herself at the time, that gave genuine cause for 
 alarm and irritation. 
 
 The Conference met at Algeciras in January 1906, and 
 sat for three months. To describe the discussion in detail 
 would occupy too much space. It must sufi&ce to say that 
 Germany strove hard to isolate France ; and that the 
 conditions which she sought to impose were such that the 
 chances of peace and war seemed for some time to be evenly 
 balanced. But the British Government, maintaining herein 
 the policy of its predecessor, held firm to the Entente ; 
 and Germany, receiving satisfaction on minor points, and 
 finding all Europe, with the exception of her ' brilliant 
 second,' Austria, arrayed against the concession of further 
 demands, at length gave way. In the end, while the 
 ' integrity of Morocco ' was formally recognised and the 
 principle of the ' open door ' maintained — at least for a 
 
THE CASABLANCA INCIDENT 57 
 
 ^ecified time — ^predominant political influence in that 
 country was conceded to France. The first attempt to 
 break up the Anglo-French Entente had failed ; and our 
 friends emerged from the conflict with more advantage 
 than they could have expected a year before. 
 
 This was not, however, to be the end of the Moroccan 
 question ; and it will be convenient to carry the story a 
 stage further before passing to other matters. Early in 
 1908 civil war broke out in Morocco. The reigning Sultan, 
 Abdul Aziz, was forced to fly from the capital and took 
 refuge in French territory. Germany promptly recognised 
 the pretender, Mulai Hafid, and sent a consul to Fez, 
 thus infringing the compact which attributed political 
 predominance in Morocco to France. Eventually Mulai 
 Hafid was recognised by the other Powers concerned. 
 
 This difiiculty was hardly settled, when the so-called 
 Casablanca incident (September 1908) — a trivial dispute 
 between French and German officials respecting some 
 deserters of the Foreign Legion in a Moroccan port — raised 
 another storm. The incident, which might have been 
 easily settled by a Power peaceably disposed, was converted 
 by Germany into an international question of the first 
 magnitude ; and the attitude she assumed was as menacing 
 and peremptory as it had been three years before. But 
 things in France had improved in the interval ; the French 
 army was in better trim ; and confidence in the Entente 
 (recently strengthened by the adhesion of Russia) was 
 more strongly established. Clemenceau and Pichon held 
 firm ; and Germany, whose attention was largely occupied 
 by the Balkan crisis, eventually agreed to submit the 
 question to the Hague tribunal. Even then the matter 
 was not settled. The publication in the Daily Telegraph 
 (October 1908) of the famous interview with the Emperor 
 caused so much excitement and annoyance in Germany 
 that the Government thought it advisable to divert public 
 attention by another attempt to bully France. They 
 suddenly demanded that France should make a public 
 
58 THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT 
 
 apology for the action of her of&cials, before the questioji 
 was submitted to the tribunal. But France, supported by 
 England and Russia, again refused to humiliate herself ; 
 and the incident, which threatened to end in tragedy, was 
 closed by an almost comic compromise. 
 
 Finally, in February 1909, almost simultaneously with 
 the settlement of the Bosnian question, a convention was 
 signed between France and Germany. The object aimed 
 at was to facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras. 
 It was agreed that Germany should enjoy perfect equality 
 of commercial rights in Morocco, and that France should 
 have the political control necessary for the maintenance of 
 order, with a view to the enjoyment of those rights. This 
 convention, combined with the decision of the Hague 
 tribunal on the Casablanca incident, given in May 1909, 
 seemed to promise quiet for some time to come. 
 
 We must now turn to another storm-centre, the Near 
 East. But before entering on it, we have to take note of 
 an event of first-rate importance in regard to international 
 relations — ^the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. This 
 convention was the natural though not immediate conse- 
 quence of the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. For many 
 years there had been difficulties between the two Powers 
 with regard to their respective interests or spheres of 
 activity in the East. In 1878 they had been on the verge 
 of war about Turkey. Russia then retaliated by intrigues 
 at Cabul, which led to the Afghan War of 1878-9. In 
 1886 the Penjdeh incident nearly brought about an armed 
 collision. The Anglo- Japanese alliance (1902) aimed at giving 
 mutual security against Russian aggression, and, by localis- 
 ing the war, enabled Japan to defeat her mighty antagonist. 
 The growth of Russian influence at Lhassa provoked the 
 Tibetan expedition of 1903-4 ; while in Persia conflicting 
 interests produced a situation constantly tending to become 
 more serious. In short, with Russia, as with France before 
 1904, Great Britain had many points of friction, rendering 
 
THE NEAR EAST 59 
 
 impossible that harmonious co-operation which the aggres- 
 sive spirit displayed by Germany in the Moroccan crisis 
 had proved to be eminently desirable. 
 
 Chastened in spirit by her defeats in the Far East and 
 by the domestic disturbances which added to her weakness, 
 Russia was now in a condition to welcome the overtures 
 made by the Conservative Government in England and 
 continued by their successors. The negotiation was long 
 and difficult, but an end was reached in the Anglo-Russian 
 agreement of August 1907, which established a working 
 compromise with regard to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. 
 The arrangement was not in all respects satisfactory, 
 especially with regard to Persia ; but it at least enabled 
 the two Powers to work together harmoniously in Europe. 
 The Dual Entente thus became a Triple Entente ; and it 
 was hoped, at least in this country — ^where pacific ideas 
 prevailed and the Entente was regarded as purely defensive 
 ^-that it would prove a bulwark of European peace. In 
 Germany, however, it was resented as Einkreisungspolitik, 
 a policy deliberately adopted by the enemies of Germany 
 with the malign intention of forcing on the country a strait 
 waistcoat, which it was the duty, as well as the interest, 
 of a powerful and self-respecting State at all costs to destroy. 
 
 We may now briefly consider the previous course of 
 affairs in South-Eastem Europe, in order to understand 
 the conditions under which the Balkan Question again 
 forced its way in 1908 to the forefront of European politics. 
 After 1885, when Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia coalesced 
 into one State, the history of the Near East for the next 
 twenty years cannot be said to have been uneventful. 
 But such disturbances as occurred were localised ; and the 
 European Concert was, generally speaking, efficacious, not 
 indeed in removing the deep-seated origins of trouble, 
 but in preventing them from causing a European confla- 
 gration. The Serbo-Bulgarian War, which followed (1886) 
 the amalgamation of Bulgaria, ended quickly in a 
 Serbian defeat, and was prevented by Austrian intervention 
 
6o GREECE AND RUMANIA 
 
 from producing any other results. In the same year Greece, 
 desirous of making war on Turkey, was hindered by a 
 naval blockade from carrying out her intention. 
 
 Revolutionary movements in Crete, aiming at a union 
 with the Greek kingdom, were for many years the chief 
 source of trouble. An insurrection broke out in 1889 ; and 
 religious differences between the Christians and Mahom- 
 medans in the island embittered the racial conflict thence 
 arising. In 1895 the Sultan succeeded in allaying the 
 quarrel, but it broke out afresh in the following year ; and 
 the desire for annexation found a growing response in 
 Greece. In 1897 Colonel Vassos, accompanied by Greek 
 supporters, landed in Crete ; but the Powers, while promising 
 autonomy, ordered him to leave. National feeling in 
 Greece had, however, risen by this time to bursting-point ; 
 and the ' Thirty Days' War ' with Turkey followed. The 
 Greeks were badly beaten ; the Powers again intervened ; 
 and the status quo was restored. A temporary settlement 
 of the Cretan question was achieved in the following year 
 (1898). The Turkish officials left the island ; and Prince 
 George of Greece was installed as High Commissioner, 
 under the nominal suzerainty of the Porte. In 1906 the 
 Prince resigned, and his place was taken by M. Zaimes ; 
 but the compromise was maintained, with the support of 
 international troops, till 1909. It should be observed that 
 from these transactions, so far as they were to the disad- 
 vantage of Turkey, the German Government, so far as 
 possible, held aloof. A German contingent was, however, 
 sent to join, for a time, the contingents of the other Powers 
 in Crete. 
 
 Meanwhile Rumania, which had become a kingdom 
 in 1881, pursued the even tenour of her way. Her intimate 
 connexion with the Central Powers, established after the 
 Russo-Turkish War, was maintained under her Hohen- 
 zoUern ruler. King Charles, and was strengthened by a 
 military convention in 1896. This convention appears 
 to have been renewed, with more specific objects, in 1900.^ 
 
 1 Gn^chofE, L'Alliance Balkanique, pp. 6i, 62. 
 
BULGARIA AND SERBIA 6l 
 
 Remote from the chief areas of disturbance, poHtically 
 within the German group, but from the cultural point of 
 view dependent rather on Latin civilisation, Rumania made 
 great social and economic progress during a period of 
 thirty-five years. 
 
 Bulgaria, on the other hand, fell gradually into the 
 orbit of Russian influence. Two years after her junction 
 with Eastern Rumelia, the Prince, Alexander of Batten- 
 berg, was forced to abdicate ; and Ferdinand of Coburg, 
 a grandson of Louis Philippe, was chosen Prince in his 
 stead. His great minister, Stambuloff, resisted Russian 
 influence imtil his dismissal in 1894. Ferdinand made 
 his peace with the Tsar ; and thenceforward the foreign 
 policy of Bulgaria was distinctly Russophil. By a con- 
 vention between Russia and Bulgaria signed in 1902, as 
 a counterpoise to Austrian influence in Serbia, Russia 
 undertook to uphold the integrity of Bulgaria. 
 
 Meanwhile Serbia had passed through stormy times. 
 Under the last two kings of the Obrenovitch dynasty, 
 Milan and Alexander — Milan assumed the royal title in 
 1882 — Serbia was dominated by Austrian influence, which 
 found expression in the Austro-Serbian convention of 1900- 
 But Milan, constantly tampering with the constitution, 
 became so unpopular that in 1889 he abdicated in favour 
 of his son Alexander, who, after his coming of age in 1893, 
 proved as incapable and ill-advised a ruler as his father. 
 His unfortunate marriage, his proscription of the Radical 
 party, and his obstinate adherence to the Austrian con- 
 nexion, combined to fan the fire of national discontent to 
 a white heat ; and in 1903 he and his Queen were murdered 
 by a group of officers, in circumstances of great brutality. 
 Peter Karageorgevitch succeeded ; and the foreign relations 
 of Serbia .at once took on a different colour. The new 
 direction was indicated by a secret treaty between Serbia 
 and Bulgaria signed in 1904,^ and by a Serbo-Bulgarian 
 convention in igo6, which was regarded as a step towards 
 a customs-union between the two countries. Austria 
 
 1 Gu^chofi, V Alliance Balkanique, p. 14. 
 
62 MONTENEGRO, TURKEY 
 
 showed her resentment by imposing a prohibitive tariff on 
 the chief article of Serbian export — ^pigs ; and her relations 
 with Serbia have been unfriendly ever since. 
 
 Of Serbia's neighbour, Montenegro — separated from 
 her, however, by the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, for thirty, 
 years in the occupation of Austria-Hungary — nothing need 
 be said except that, to the extent of her capacity, she 
 followed in the wake of wealthier States, and, largely by 
 the aid of Italian capital, gradually put on some at least 
 of the externals of civilisation. It was not till 1910 that 
 her Prince followed the example of other Balkan rulers, 
 and adopted the title of King. As a Slav State, Monte- 
 negro looked to Russia for support against aggression on. 
 the part of her great neighbour to the north. To sum up,- 
 the rivalry between Austria and Russia in the Balkan 
 peninsula was fairly evenly balanced till 1903, Serbia and 
 Rumania going with the former, Montenegro and Bulgaria 
 with the latter. But in that year the balance was upset 
 by Serbia going over to the Russian side — a change in which 
 Austria was not likely to acquiesce. 
 
 During this period, especially after the German Emperor's 
 second visit in 1898, Turkey was falling more and more 
 under German influence. Alienated from Russia, Germany 
 looked to Turkey to balance the loss. While continuing 
 to strengthen her commercial connexion and her financial 
 control at Constantinople, she was careful not to annoy 
 the Sultan by inconvenient suggestions on behalf of the. 
 oppressed communities subject to his control, or still more 
 disagreeable interventions such as those on which the other 
 Powers occasionally ventured. Germany could not altogether 
 abstain from taking a part in the European Concert, but 
 the ' flute ' on which she performed was seldom heard ; and, 
 when it produced any sound at all, it played a tune more 
 pleasing to the Turk than was that given out by the rest 
 of the band. 
 
 This attitude was especially manifested in regard to 
 th§ troubles in Macedonia — ^the real storm-centre of the 
 
MACEDONIAN TROUBLES 63 
 
 Balkan Peninsula. In that extraordinary melange of 
 nationalities and religions, Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians 
 lived together in inextricable confusion ; even Rumania 
 had, in the wandering shepherds known as Kutzo-Wlachs, 
 an excuse for putting a finger in the pie. National animosi- 
 ties were accentuated by the religious differences between 
 the Orthodox, the Hexarchists, and the Patriarchists. 
 Oppression, anarchy, and internecine strife were chronic ; 
 and, as the hour of Ottoman dissolution seemed approaching, 
 each of the interested States sought, by violent but covert 
 action on behalf of its own nationals, to advance its claim 
 to the disputed territory at the expense of its rivals. It 
 was obvious that any serious disturbance in this region 
 affected the interests of the neighbouring Balkan States, 
 and consequently those of the Great Powers which, through 
 the minor States, sought to extend their influence over the 
 whole peninsula. 
 
 Such a disturbance was threatened by the Greco- 
 Turkish War of 1897. In view of this event, Turkey had 
 for some time cultivated good relations with Bulgaria ; and 
 it was feared that the Bulgarians might join the Turks 
 against Greece with a view to obtaining concessions in 
 Macedonia. Austria and Russia therefore came to an 
 understanding (April 1897), by which they agreed that the 
 status quo should be maintained, while recognising each 
 other's respective spheres of influence in the west and east 
 of the Peninsula. For a time the danger was evaded ; but 
 it recurred in 1903, when the state of things in Macedonia 
 Wcis passing from bad to worse. Some sort of intervention 
 appeared inevitable ; and Great Britain put forward a 
 proposal for the intemationalisation of the disturbed 
 districts. At this moment Russia was preparing for the 
 conflict in Manchuria, and had no wish to see other Powers 
 settling Balkan affairs while her energies were occupied 
 elsewhere. The Tsar therefore approached the Emperor of 
 Austria, whose foreign policy was then directed by the 
 p^ci^c Goluchpwski ; and a meeting between the two 
 
64 aehrenthal's policy 
 
 sovereigns took place at Murzsteg (September 1903), at 
 which a programme of reforms for Maicedonia was drawn 
 up. This was pressed upon the Sultan, and theoretically 
 accepted ; but, as the requisite supervision was not provided, 
 the reforms produced little or no resTilt. 
 
 The policy of co-operation with Russia was naturally 
 unpopular with the forward party in Vienna, and detested 
 by the Magyar element in the Dual Monarchy. The feeling 
 grew that a chance of pushing Austrian interests in the 
 Balkans had been lost in 1903, and that something must 
 be done to balance the disadvantageous change in Serbian 
 policy. The Russian defeats in the Far East appeared 
 to afford an opportunity which it would be absurd to 
 neglect. These views produced a change in the Austrian 
 ministry. The German Emperor made no secret of his 
 dissatisfaction at the inadequacy of the assistance which 
 the Austrian representative had given him at Algeciras — 
 his remark about the ' brilliant second ' was interpreted 
 as conveying a reproof under the guise of praise ; and 
 in 1906 Goluchowski retired. His place was taken by a 
 Hungarian, Count Aehrenthal ; and Austrian policy entered 
 upon an active phase. Its chief object was to incorporate the 
 provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, placed under Austrian 
 protection in 1878, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Once 
 fully in possession of these districts, and occupying the 
 Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, Austria might push her way to 
 Salonika, and thus gain direct access to the ^gean. This 
 project, as we shall see, had the full support of Germany. 
 
 It is said that the Austro-Hungarian Minister, soon 
 after he took office, proposed to the Russian Minister, 
 Isvolski, in the spring of 1907, to renew the Miirzsteg 
 agreement of four years earlier, but with a very important 
 difference. Germany and France were now to be brought 
 into the entente, with certain advantages all round. Austria 
 was to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina ; Russia was to 
 gain the opening of the Dardanelles ; France was to help 
 Germany, financially and otherwise, in the. promotion of 
 
RAILWAYS AND REFORMS 65 
 
 the Bagdad railway, and was to receive, in return, full 
 German recognition in Morocco. The ultimate object — 
 to break up the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian ententes, 
 and to isolate Great Britain — ^must have been apparent. 
 Incidentally the proposal throws light on the relative im- 
 portance attached by statesmen in Berlin to the question 
 of Morocco and that of the Near East. If Austrian con- 
 trol over the Balkans, with all that this implied for both 
 the German Powers, could be secured, Morocco might be 
 neglected. The proposal had its attractions for Russia, but 
 the negotiations with England were on the point of com- 
 pletion, and Isvolski declined. In the following August 
 the Anglo-Russian agreement was signed; 
 
 As a counter-blow to that convention, Aehrenthal now 
 brought forward (February 1908) a proposal for a railway 
 through the Sanjak, which should link up with that already 
 running by way of Uskub to Mitrovitza. Thereupon 
 Russia, acting in concert with Serbia, proposed another 
 railway which should run direct from the Danube to the 
 Adriatic — a project which received the support of Italy. 
 Both these railways, as crossing Turkish territory, would 
 have required the consent of the Porte. While these projects 
 were in the air, England and Russia issued a joint proposal 
 for reforms in Macedonia, which, like the British suggestion 
 of 1903, would have tended to establish international 
 control. A conference of ambassadors on the subject of 
 Macedonian reforms was held at Constantinople ; but its 
 proceedings were rendered abortive by the opposition of 
 Germany and Austria. Aehrenthal had secretly bought 
 the consent of the Porte to the Novi-Bazar railway by 
 promising to resist reforms — conduct which Sir E. Grey 
 with justice stigmatised as disloyal. In June 1908 King 
 Edward VII had an interview with the Tsar at Reval, 
 which was taken to indicate the probability of joint action 
 in the Balkans, and has been supposed by German writers, 
 on very inadequate evidence, to have involved Asiatic 
 schemes of far wider scope. Whatever may have been the 
 
 F 
 
66 THE YOUNG-TURK REVOLUTION 
 
 truth about the interview, it is clear that the prospect 
 of Anglo-Russian intervention in the Balkans was very 
 distasteful to the statesmen of Vienna and Berlin, and 
 stimulated them to action which nearly precipitated a 
 European war. 
 
 The Reval interview had just occurred when a revolu- 
 tion in Turkey took Europe by surprise and gave Austria 
 the opportunity she desired. So far back as 1891 discontent 
 with the despotic and corrupt government of Abdul Hamid 
 had led to the formation of the so-called ' Committee of 
 Union and Progress ' at Geneva. It was subsequently 
 transferred to Paris, whence for some years it carried on a 
 subterranean propaganda in the Turkish Empire, which 
 appeared to have little result. In 1906, however, the 
 Committee felt itself strong enough to move to Salonika ; 
 and its tenets gained ground rapidly in the Turkish army. 
 The imminence of European intervention in Macedonia 
 stimulated its activity ; and suppressive action on the 
 part of the Sultan brought the revolt to a head. In July 
 1908 certain regiments stationed at Salonika marched on 
 Constantinople, overthrew the Sultan's Government, and 
 installed the Committee in power. 
 
 The ' Young Turkish ' revolution was welcomed in the 
 greater part of Europe as an event fraught with the promise 
 of better days for Turkey and the subject races of the 
 Ottoman Empire, and as inaugurating an era of reform 
 which would solve the Eastern Question by removing the 
 causes of perennial disturbance. So convinced were the 
 Powers that reforms would now be voluntarily introduced, 
 that they removed their officials from Macedonia and handed 
 back to the Turks the control they had assumed. From 
 the political point of view the revolution was hailed by the 
 Entente Powers as a set-back for Austria and Germany, 
 whose influence at Constantinople was supposed to depend 
 on the domination of Abdul Hamid. All these expectations 
 were doomed to be disappointed. 
 
 Meanwhile Isvolski had become aware of the Austrian 
 intention to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina at all costs, an 
 
ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 67 
 
 intention which, however, was kept so secret that, when in 
 August King Edward visited the Emperor Francis Joseph 
 at Ischl, nothing whatever was disclosed to him. Isvolski 
 now took up again the project of opening the Dardanelles, 
 which had been dropped for a time when he declined 
 Aehrenthal's proposals a year before. This project he now 
 hoped to carry through by direct arrangement with Austria- 
 Hungary. Two months after the revolution in Constanti- 
 nople (September 1908) he had an interview with Aehrenthal 
 at Buchlau, in which he is said to have consented to the 
 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the condition 
 that Austria should assist in the opening of the Dardanelles. 
 Armed with this (at least conditional) undertaking, he 
 went on to Paris and London, where, however, his project 
 of a deal with Austria appears to have been coldly received. 
 Before he could readjust himself to the situation, the 
 statesmen in Vienna had taken the. step to which he had 
 conditionally assented. 
 
 Their intention was not concealed from Prince Ferdinand 
 of Bulgaria, who was anxious to extract his own profit 
 from the state of affairs in Turkey. At an interview which 
 he had with the Emperor Francis Joseph at Pesth, in 
 September 1908, an understanding as to simultaneous 
 action seems to have been reached. Whether Ferdinand 
 subsequently carried out his share of the bargain, or forced 
 his partner's hand, we do not know. At all events it was 
 agreed that advantage should be taken of the confusion 
 that still reigned in Constantinople, and of the precarious 
 position of the Young Turk Government, already threatened 
 by the forces of reaction. Accordingly, on October 5, 
 Ferdinand proclaimed the independence of his State and 
 was crowned Tsar of Bulgaria ; and two days later Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina were formally armexed by Austria- 
 Hungary. To appease Turkish feeling, the right to occupy 
 the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar was simultaneously given up. 
 The consent of the signatory Powers was not asked for 
 these infractions of the Treaty of Berlin. 
 
 These events raised a great outcry throughout Europe. 
 
68 ATTITUDE OF SERBIA 
 
 The acts themselves might perhaps have been ratified 
 by consent, if done in a less arbitrary and illegitimate 
 fashion, for the formal annexation made little real change 
 in the condition of the two provinces concerned, and the 
 independence of Bulgaria would hardly have provoked 
 remonstrance except from Turkey. But the cynical 
 disregard of treaties, and the insolent contempt for 
 European opinion, which the manner of the action showed, 
 were of evil omen, and naturally caused wide-spread 
 indignation. Anxious that, at least, these things should 
 not form a precedent, the Entente Powers proposed that 
 a conference should be held to discuss the matter ; but 
 Austria-Hungary and Germany refused. 
 
 The strongest opposition to their action was aroused 
 in Serbia, where for some time past the feeling of common 
 nationality and of brotherhood with the Serbs of Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina had been growing stronger. The dream 
 of a South (Yougo) Slav union, of which these provinces, 
 along with Montenegro, would have formed the central 
 part, had stirred the imagination of the Serbian people 
 to its depths. The realisation of such a dream involved* 
 it must be recognised, serious dangers for the Austrian 
 Empire; for a strong Slav State on its southern border 
 would have exercised a powerful attraction on the Slav 
 populations already embraced in the Dual Monarchy. It 
 is not surprising, therefore, that Austria felt bound to 
 oppose the Serbian ambition ; and this hostility was even 
 stronger in the Hungarian portion of the monarchy, where 
 the ruling Magyar race were convinced that their dominant 
 position would be fatally imperilled by an advance of Slav 
 nationality. Nor was this all, for behind Austria stood 
 Germany, firmly resolved that neither a Greater Serbia 
 nor any other obstacle should bar her from realising her 
 dream of preponderance in the Near East. It was now 
 for the first time that the teachings of those thinkers and 
 idealists to whom I have referred above (pp. 28-33) bore 
 manifest fruit ; now for the first time we clearly see, at 
 
RUSSIA HUMILIATED 69 
 
 least in outline, the fundamental cause of the present 
 war. 
 
 During the autumn of the year 1908 and the following 
 winter months, negotiations between the Powers were 
 continued ; and the tempers of the disputants, especially 
 of Serbia, became more and more embittered. The Serbs 
 claimed that at any rate they should receive some com- 
 pensation, in the cession of a comer of Herzegovina which 
 would have given them continuity with Montenegro ; but 
 this was just what Austria was determined to avoid. The 
 British Government protested, but without any intention 
 of taking up arms. Between the Eastern Powers, however, 
 the quarrel came to the verge of open hostility. Austria 
 mobilised part of her army on the Danube, whereupon 
 Russia, in support of Serbia, replied by a partial mobilisa- 
 tion on her side. War seemed on the point of breaking out, 
 when Germany intervened with what was practically an 
 ultimatum to the Tsar — an intimation that, if Russia 
 attacked Austria, she would find the German legions 
 marching with their allies. This was, of course, a justi- 
 fiable Wciming, in view of the fact that an attack upon 
 Austria would have formed a casus belli under the alliance 
 of 1879 '• b^t ^* shows the difficulty of determining what 
 is an ' aggressive ' war. England and France .were disin- 
 clined to go the length of supporting Russia in extreme 
 measures. They counselled peace ; and Russia, whose 
 strength had not yet recovered from the wounds inflicted 
 in the Japanese War, was obliged to give way. The fait 
 accompli was sullenly recognised ; but Russia did not 
 forget the humiliation she underwent in pocketing the 
 German affront. Serbia had naturally to follow suit. 
 A money payment, together with the retrocession of the 
 Sanjak (already mentioned), sufficed to indemnify Turkey 
 for the abandonment of her rights over Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina (February 1909). Similar means were found, with 
 the aid of Russia, to compensate the Porte for the loss of 
 its nominal sovereignty over Bulgaria (April). 
 
70 REVOLUTIONS IN TURKEY AND GREECE 
 
 The net result was a severe diplomatic defeat for the 
 Entente Powers — a defeat to which they need never have 
 exposed themselves had they regulated their policy in 
 accordance with their forces and their strength of will, and 
 acted together in well-considered harmony. The prestige 
 of Germany was much enhanced in the eyes of Turkey and 
 the Balkan States, and that of the Entente correspondingly 
 lowered ; while Prince von Biilow could congratulate his 
 country on the decisive failure of the Einkreisungspolitik. 
 This was a little premature, but there can be no doubt 
 that the episode was highly detrimental to the cause of the 
 Entente in that area which Germany and Austria regarded 
 as of paramount importance. 
 
 Meanwhile the Young Turks, whose seizure of power 
 had been the immediate occasion of the incidents I have 
 narrated, had not had it all their own way in Constantinople. 
 The constitution which Midhat Pasha had introduced 
 thirty-two years before, and which Abdul Hamid had 
 ' suspended ' in 1877, was revived ; and a parliament of 
 the Empire was summoned in accordance with it. But a 
 reaction began ; the Committee was opposed by the 
 ' Liberal Union ' ; and in April 1909 a counter-revolution 
 took place, which restored the Sultan to power. His 
 recovery was, however, of very brief duration ; the army, 
 under Mahmud Shefket, again marched on Constantinople ; 
 and Abdul Hamid was finally deposed. His brother was set 
 up as a 'constitutional' Sultan in his place, but the Committee 
 governed in the Sultan's name. 
 
 The example of Bulgaria naturally affected another 
 outlying province — ^the island of Crete. The demand for 
 union with Greece was revived ; but the Powers, unwilling 
 to inflict another blow on the Young Turk Government, 
 refused. A settlement was difficult, but eventually the 
 Greek flag was hauled down, the foreign troops were with- 
 drawn (July 1909), and the status quo was restored. The 
 Greek ^Government]was obliged to acquiesce, but the rebuff 
 acted unfavourably on its position at home ; and a sort of 
 
FRANCE AND GERMANY IN MOROCCO 71 
 
 revolution took place, in which the army, acting under the 
 direction of the ' Military League,' seized control. But a 
 • saviour of society ' was found in the person of M. Venizelos, 
 who had led, with wisdom and moderation, the nationalist 
 party in Crete. This statesman was called in ; a National 
 Assembly met (September 1910) ; the Military League was 
 voluntarily dissolved ; and Venizelos became Prime 
 Minister. Under him the constitution was revised (January 
 1911) ; and at a general election (March 1912) he was 
 returned to power by an immense majority. 
 
 We must now return to the other end of the Mediter- 
 ranean, and take up again the story of Moroccan affairs, 
 which we left at the point reached by the settlement of the 
 Casablanca incident and the Franco-German convention 
 of 1909. Subsequently to that agreement, several well- 
 intentioned efforts were made with a view to the co-opera- 
 tion of French and German capitalists in opening up the 
 country and exploiting its mineral wealth. Such were the 
 proposed ' Union des Mines,' the attempted combination 
 between the French Ngoko-Sangha Company and a German 
 company in Kamerun, the joint Congo-Kamerun railway, 
 and other projects. For one reason or another, all these 
 schemes broke down ; and this failure produced the impres- 
 sion in Germany that the French were unwilling to carry 
 out their portion of the agreement. The Pan-Germans, on 
 their side, were dissatisfied with the concession of political 
 control to France, and endeavoured to use their commercial 
 position in order to bring about a condominium with that 
 country. Against these efforts Sir E . Grey found it necessary 
 to protest in March 1911. As a condominium was put out 
 of court by the convention of 1909, the Germans fell back 
 on other objects ; but they were divided between the 
 demand for ' compensation,' which they hoped to get in 
 French Congo, and an ' exchange ' which would have given 
 them a footing on the west coast of Morocco. 
 
 The break-down of the Congo-Kamerun railway proposal 
 
72 THE AGADIR INCIDENT 
 
 unfortunately coincided with a French expedition to Fez, 
 undertaken because of the increasing anarchy in Morocco, 
 and the danger to which European residents in Fez appeared 
 to be exposed. The French justified the expedition on the 
 ground that their agreement with Germany gave them the 
 right of political control, and laid on them the duty of 
 maintaining order. The Germans insisted that they had 
 never intended to allow France to convert Morocco into a 
 French province ; Morocco, in short, was not to be ' Tunisi- 
 fied.' Encouraged by their success in the Eastern crisis, 
 by the political disturbances which divided England, and 
 by the instability of French governments, they conceived 
 that the time had come for improving the position which 
 they had been obliged to accept in the Pact of Algeciras. 
 Following the precedent of Tangier, they resolved on 
 another theatrical stroke ; and on July i, 1911, the 
 Panther cast anchor off Agadir. 
 
 This incident plainly meant a demand for a port on 
 the Atlantic, with claims over an indefinite hinterland. 
 An acrimonious negotiation followed. The demand for a 
 portion of West Morocco could not be accepted by France, 
 for, apart from the intrinsic value of the district and the 
 unjustifiable nature of the claim, the French position in 
 Morocco would have been exposed to constant danger 
 from German intrigues, . and the footing gained would 
 have been made a basis for further demands. Nor could 
 it be accepted by England, for, apart from our pledges to 
 France, a German naval station at Agadir or Mogador 
 would have endangered our communications with the Cape 
 and our trade with South America. England therefore 
 intimated that on this point she could not give way '. 
 and Germany shifted her ground. 
 
 For some months the situation was critical. The 
 Germans, asserting that the French advance had destroyed 
 the Pact of Algeciras and relieved them of all obligation 
 to observe their pledges, declared that the new situation 
 thus created justified them in demanding a quid pro quo. 
 
SETTLEMENT OF MOROCCO 73 
 
 It should be added that the validity of the Pact had been 
 limited to five years, and that that period had now elapsed. 
 The attitude of the Caillaux ministrj' was not devoid of 
 suspicious elements ; and the British Government had to 
 make it plain that they must have a voice in the decision. 
 In August war seemed imminent ; but the French Govern- 
 ment gave up the principle of ' exchange ' and accepted the 
 German demand for ' compensation.' The fact was that 
 France had, in the course of the last ten years, gained a 
 vast new province, for which she had already ' compen- 
 sated ' other nations — England in Egypt, Italy in Tripoli, 
 Spain in Tangier. It was Germany's turn to receive pay- 
 ment ; and payment was made by the surrender of the 
 northern part of French Congo, a district important to 
 Germany both for geographical reasons and from its wealth 
 in rubber. The convention embodying this concession, and, 
 on the German side, the recognition of a French protectorate 
 in Morocco, was signed at Berlin on November 4, 19 ii.^ 
 The Agadir ' incident ' was at an end. 
 
 The Pan-Germans and the colonial party were dissatis- 
 fied at not getting more ; but Germany had won an im- 
 portant accession of territory. She had, moreover, success- 
 fully reasserted her claim to compensation for colonial 
 advances made by another country, and her right to be 
 consulted with regard to the disposal of a territory in 
 which her commercial interests were comparatively small. 
 The compromise adopted must be regarded as having been, 
 on the whole, in Germany's favour. The arrogance with 
 which she pushed her claims was not likely to improve 
 her relations with the Entente Powers ; but it is to be 
 observed — ^and the observation is important in regard 
 to our attempt to elucidate the fundamental aims of her 
 policy — ^that, in the negotiations about Morocco, Germany 
 never went so far as to present an ultimatum, as she did 
 in the Balkan crisis of 1909. 
 
 1 The protectorate was formally accepted by the Sultan of Morocco in 
 
74 THE TRIPOLITAN WAR 
 
 We have now to return to Balkan affairs ; and in what 
 follows we approach the last stage of the international 
 quarrel, that which leads directly to the outbreak of the 
 present war. Just at the time when the Moroccan dispute 
 was passing out of its acute stage, towards the end of 
 September 1911, the world was startled by the news that 
 a fresh crisis had arisen in the East. Italy conceived 
 that the time had come to carry into effect the arrangement 
 with France about Tripoli, made ten years before. She 
 accordingly sent an ultimatum (September 26) to the Porte, 
 in which she declared that the treatment meted out 
 by the Turkish Government to ItaUans in Tripoli and the 
 Cyrenaica called aloud for her armed intervention. Three 
 days later war was declared ; and the Italian invasion of 
 Tripoli began. The Turkish forces, especially at sea, were 
 no match for the Italians, who landed without difficulty 
 and proceeded to occupy the coast and the maritime 
 districts. They were unable to penetrate far inland; 
 nevertheless the whole territory was, early in November, 
 formally annexed to the Kingdom of Italy. In the spring 
 of the following year Rhodes and other islands off the coast 
 of Asia Minor were occupied. But the war continued till 
 a fresh storm in the Balkan Peninsula compelled the Turks 
 to make peace with Italy at Lausanne (October 1912). 
 It was agreed that the islands should be retroceded to 
 Turkey when the Turkish troops finally left Libya ; but 
 this stipulation had not taken effect when the present war 
 broke out. 
 
 The storm to which I have referred was the work of the 
 Balkan League, which attacked Turkey in the autmnn of 
 1912. Certain steps had been taken some time before 
 (above, p. 61) which indicated the possibility of joint 
 action between Serbia and Bulgaria ; but circumstances, 
 in Macedonia and elsewhere, were not favourable to any 
 real union. What really convinced the Balkan States of 
 the necessity of combination was the annexation of Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina, and the fear of further Austrian progress ; 
 
THE BALKAN LEAGUE 75 
 
 the occasion which actually called the league into existence 
 was the Tripolitan War. Whether the Italo-Turkish War 
 and the Balkan War that followed are to be connected 
 with the visits paid by the Kings of Serbia and Bulgaria 
 to Petrograd in 1910, and the visit paid by the Tsar to 
 the King of Italy at Racconigi in 191 1, must remain for 
 the present unknown ; but it seems highly probable that 
 Italy counted on a rising of the Balkan States as likely to 
 force the Turks to cede Tripoli — a calculation which was 
 justified by the results. 
 
 It was in March 1911 that M. Guechoff became President 
 of the Council in Bulgaria. He was at once approached by 
 the Serbian Government, which had made similar overtures 
 to his predecessors, with a view to a defensive and offensive 
 alliance. The Bulgarian Premier was at first desirous of 
 coming to an understanding with Turkey respecting the 
 reforms to be introduced in Macedonia ; but a short 
 experience convinced him that the attempt was hopeless. 
 The negotiations with Serbia were going on, when the 
 declaration of war by Italy brought them to a head. The 
 Bulgarian minister was at once authorised by his Govern- 
 ment to conclude a defensive and offensive alliance with 
 Serbia ; but the terms of the agreement raised considerable 
 difficulties. The Serbs insisted on the consent of Russia 
 being obtained — a point to which Bulgaria raised no serious 
 objections ; but the settlement of the frontiers of the 
 two States in Macedonia, in the event of a successful issue 
 of the conflict with Turkey, was hard to arrange. The 
 difficulty would have been removed by the elevation of 
 Macedonia to the position of an autonomous State, as 
 suggested by Btilgaria ; but the Serbs would not hear of 
 this solution. After much discussion it was agreed to 
 divide Macedonia into three zones, of which the northern 
 should fall to Serbia, the southern to Bulgaria, while the 
 partition of the intermediate zone was to be submitted, 
 after the war, to the arbitration of the Tsar. On this basis 
 the treaty of alliance was signed on March 7, 1912. 
 
76 BULGARIA, GREECE, AND MONTENEGRO 
 
 A month later a military convention was signed, which 
 contemplated not only a war with Turkey but armed inter- 
 vention on the part of Austria and Roumania, as a result 
 of their convention of twelve years before (see p. 60). It 
 is clear that Russia was consulted during the negotiations, 
 and that the treaty, with its secret articles, was communi- 
 cated to that Power on its conclusion. The Tsar gave his 
 approval ; but there does not appear to be any published 
 evidence for the assertion of certain French and German 
 writers that he either initiated or guided the negotiation. 
 It is impossible, however, to resist the conclusion that the 
 alliance had in view the defence of Balkan independence 
 against Austrian aggression almost, if not quite, as much 
 as the overthrow of Turkish power. 
 
 Meanwhile informal negotiations between Greece and 
 Bulgaria had been going on since May 1911. They became 
 official in consequence of the outbreak of the war between 
 Italy and Turkey, and the partial mobilisation of the 
 Turkish forces in Europe which immediately followed. 
 The initiative in this case came from Greece, and was 
 actively pushed by M. Venizelos, a personal friend of 
 M. Gu^choff. The difficulties in regard to a partition of 
 the expected conquests in southern Macedonia and Thrace 
 were similar to, if less serious than, those between Serbia 
 and Bulgaria ; but time pressed, and they were simply 
 passed over in the treaty of alliance, which was signed on 
 May 29, 1912. The military convention was not completed 
 till the following September. It is noteworthy that the 
 Greek Government declined to enter into any discussion 
 with Austria, as that Power had given Greece to understand 
 that, in the event of success, it would claim Salonica. 
 Arrangements with Montenegro appear to have been begun 
 at a much later date than those with the other Powers — 
 not till June 1912 ; nor did they, at least so far as Bulgaria 
 was concerned, go beyond a verbal understanding, which 
 was reached in the following August. 
 
 Meanwhile the Young Turk Government in Constanti- 
 
THE FIRST BALKAN WAR 77 
 
 nople was evidently crumbling to its fall. The garrison of 
 Adrianople mutinied ; the Albanians rose in insurrection, 
 and occupied Uskub and other frontier towns ; and on 
 August 14 Count Berchtold, who had become Austrian 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs on the death of Aehrenthal, 
 issued a proposal for reforms in European Turkey, based 
 on the principle of decentralisation and practical autonomy* 
 Meanwhile peace negotiations between Italy and Turkey 
 had begun. The time for action, if Austrian intervention 
 were to be anticipated and the Tripolitan War utilised, was 
 evidently come. M. Sazonoff constantly urged modera- 
 tion, and advised the Allies not to go to war, but they 
 were determined to press their quarrel to extremes. On 
 September 29 the Turkish Government decreed a general 
 mobilisation. Next day the Allies sent an ultimatum to 
 Constantinople, and followed this up by mobilising their 
 forces. The Powers endeavoured at the last moment to 
 stay the conflict for which their mutual jealousies, and 
 their consequent failure to secure the necessary reforms, 
 had supplied an only too weighty justification. On 
 October 8 the Austrian and Russian Governments issued 
 a joint note, strongly disapproving of a rupture, and 
 declaring that they would not allow it to result in any 
 change in the status quo. On the same day the five Great 
 Powers (Italy, being still at war with Turkey, could not 
 take part) combined to urge reform upon the Porte. But 
 this belated attempt at intervention was vain. The Porte 
 having sent no reply to the Allies' demands, war was 
 declared on October 12. Montenegro had already opened 
 hostilities four days before. 
 
 The first result of the war, and of the surprising victories 
 won by the Allies, was that the Powers were forced to 
 abandon the position they had taken up with respect to 
 the maintenance of the status quo ante in European Turkey. 
 So early as November 2, M. Sazonoff, in a circular note, 
 recognised this necessity. Almost at the same time he 
 informed the Allies that Serbia could not be allowed access 
 
78 THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 to the Adriatic. Count Berchtold, on behalf of Austria, 
 made a similar communication at Belgrade. It appears 
 that the resolution in favour of an autonomous Albania 
 had been adopted by Austria in the lifetime of Aehrenthal, 
 so far back, at least, as the spring of 1911. Herein she 
 had the support not only of Russia but also of Italy, which 
 was equally loth to allow the Serbs a footing at Durazzo or 
 Valona. Germany threw her weight on the same side. In 
 the face of this agreement, England and France, had they 
 desired another solution, could hardly have resisted ; but 
 it seems probable that they did not foresee (as did the 
 Germans) the disastrous consequences of this determination 
 on the future of the Balkan League. 
 
 When, therefore, after the declaration of an armistice 
 (November 5) a conference of ambassadors of the neutral 
 Powers and of representatives of the belligerents met in 
 London, in December, it was on this basis that the discussion 
 was carried on. Even with this preliminary understanding, 
 a settlement proved very difficult. At the conference 
 there were two distinct sets of negotiations — ^those between 
 the belligerents and Turkey, and those between the Powers 
 respecting the limits of an autonomous Albania. Russia 
 pressed the claims of Serbia to certain frontier towns ; 
 Greece demanded a large portion of Epirus ; Austria sup- 
 ported the rights of her new creation, Albania. The 
 possession of Scutari, claimed by Montenegro, also proved 
 a dangerous bone of contention. On more than one 
 occasion, a breach between the Powers seemed imminent ; 
 but eventually a compromise was arranged. Serbia and 
 Greece were obliged to acquiesce, but it eventually required 
 an Austrian ultimatum to drive the Montenegrins out of 
 Scutari. 
 
 Between Turkey and the AlUes, on the other hand, 
 a settlement proved unattainable, largely owing to the 
 fact that the Turks were stiU holding out in the fortresses 
 of Scutari, Janina, and Adrianople. In Constantinople 
 opinions were sharply divided between the supporters of 
 
RESULTS OF FIRST BALKAN WAR 79 
 
 peace and those who wished to continue the struggle. In 
 January 1913 a military revolution took place ; the Young 
 Turks recovered power ; and in February the negotiations 
 were broken off. The war was renewed ; and before long 
 the three strongholds fell into the hands of the Allies. 
 Turkey was now obliged to yield, and the Conference was 
 renewed. But the haggling about frontiers continued for 
 many weeks ; and it was not till Sir E. Grey intimated 
 to the delegates that, if they did not come to terms at once, 
 they must leave the country, that peace was signed, on 
 May 30, 1913. 
 
 The Balkan Alliance was triumphant. A combination 
 of four small States had effected, in six months, what 
 the Great Powers had hitherto failed to do. The Christians 
 of European Turkey were relieved from Mahommedan 
 tyranny ; the Cretan question was solved by the union of 
 the island with Greece ; and the Turks were confined to 
 Constantinople and a few mUes of territory on its land- 
 ward side. To Austria and Germany the blow was severe. 
 They had indeed succeeded in interposing, by means of 
 an independent Albania, a westward barrier to South-Slav 
 ambitions, and in checking the economic growth of Serbia 
 by cutting off her access to the sea. But this gain was 
 little to set off against the overthrow of Germany's friend 
 and potential ally Turkey, and the establishment of the 
 Balkan Confederation athwart the roads to Salonika and 
 Constantinople. So serious was the set-back to German 
 ambitions, that Germany at once set about largely increasing 
 her military forces, and levying a special war-tax to support 
 them. The fall of Turkey, and the consequent shifting 
 of the balance of power to the disadvantage of Germany, 
 were publicly urged by the German Chancellor as a justi- 
 fication for these measures. It was obviously to the interest 
 of the German Powers that the Balkan League should 
 disappear ; and, unfortunately, a deadly quarrel between 
 its members came only too opportunely to their aid. 
 
 Differences between Serbia and Bulgaria as to the 
 
8o DISPUTES BETWEEN THE AttlES 
 
 partition of their Macedonian conquests had begun almost 
 immediately after the outbreak of war. When an inde- 
 pendent Albania, stretching from the frontier of Montenegro 
 to that of Greece, was established by the Powers, Serbia 
 put forward a claim to compensation in Macedonia, on 
 the ground that she thus suffered a loss not contemplated 
 when the alliance with Bulgaria was made. A similar claim 
 was advanced by Greece, on the ground of her disappoint- 
 ment in Epirus ; while the possession of Salonika, over 
 which Greeks and Bulgarians had come to blows even before 
 the peace with Turkey, was another cause of dispute. 
 With a view to the enforcement of their claims, these two 
 States, some time before the end of the first war, contracted 
 an alliance against the third. Bulgaria, on the other side, 
 took her stand on the letter of her treaty with Serbia ; 
 "while geographical conditions rendered it practically im- 
 possible to settle with Greece until the Serbo-Bulgarian 
 frontier should have been determined. The treaty, rigidly 
 interpreted, was doubtless on Bulgaria's side ; but equity, 
 not to mention policy, demanded that some concessions 
 should be made to her allies., 
 
 In these circumstances, arbitration seemed to be the 
 only alternative to war. Wisdom dictated such a course ; 
 and to arbitration M. Gu^choff inclined. But a malign 
 influence appears to have intervened ; it has been positively 
 asserted that Austria promised Bulgaria her support in 
 case of war, and both previous and subsequent events 
 render the statement highly probable. Whatever may 
 have been the cause, the minister failed to convert his 
 sovereign to his views, and therefore, on the day of the 
 signature of peace with Turkey, resigned. His place was 
 taken by the headstrong Dr. Daneff, whose arrogant attitude 
 had created a bad impression at the Conference of London 
 during the winter before. The Tsar attempted to intervene, 
 and pressed the disputants to accept his arbitration. Greece 
 and Serbia hesitated. The Bulgarian Cabinet, shrinking 
 from the conflict, was willing to submit its case ; and 
 
THE SECOND BALKAN WAR 8 1 
 
 Dr Daneff prepared to go to Petrograd. But the King 
 and the chauvinist faction in Bulgaria had control over the 
 army ; and on June 29 the Bulgarian troops attacked 
 their former allies. 
 
 Against Greece and Serbia alone the Bulgarians might 
 possibly have been able to make head, but a third enemy 
 now appeared. Rumania, which had taken no part in 
 the Balkan League and had remained inactive during the 
 recent war, subsequently demanded — on regular German 
 principles — that, though she had done nothing to secure 
 the victory over Turkey, she should receive compensation 
 for the gains of the Allies. The Powers had assented ; 
 Bulgaria had not refused ; and by a protocol issued in 
 Petrograd on May 13, a compensation (accepted by 
 Rumania) had been allotted to her in the north-eastern 
 portion of the Bulgarian territory. The outbreak of 
 hostilities, however, afforded too good an opportunity of 
 enlarging this • compensation ' ; and a Rumanian army 
 crossed the Danube and marched on Sofia. 
 
 The Turks naturally availed themselves of the situation, 
 and set about recovering their lost territory, including 
 Adrianople, which the Bulgarians abandoned to its fate. 
 Thus attacked on three sides, Bulgaria wa§ forced to accept 
 whatever terms her enemies thought proper* to impose. 
 The terms were hard. Serbia took the whole of the disputed 
 central zone in Macedonia, while the southern portion, 
 including Salonika and Kavalla, was given to Greece. A 
 large strip on the north-east, including Silistria, was ceded to 
 Rumania ; and the Turks recovered Adrianople and the 
 surrounding territory. Bulgaria was shut off from the 
 iEgean, except on a few miles of coast, including the very 
 inadequate port of Dedeagatch. These cessions were 
 embodied in the Treaty of Bucarest, signed on August 10, 
 1913, and in a Turco-Bulgarian treaty, signed on 
 September 29. A more dramatic reversal of fortune, a 
 sterner llustration of the Nemesis which pursues hubristic 
 
 insolence, has rarely been seen. 
 
 G 
 
82 RESULTS FOR GERMANY AND AUSTRIA 
 
 The second Balkan War modified the results of the 
 first, in two important points, to the advantage of the 
 German Powers. In the first place, Turkey, to a certain 
 extent, recovered her position ; and the moral effect of 
 this revival was probably worth even more than the 
 territory she regained. Secondly — and this was still more 
 important — ^the Balkan League, the only power which 
 could secure Balkan independence against Austria-Hungary 
 on the one side and Turkey on the other, was hopelessly 
 broken up ; while the seeds of deadly animosity and a 
 craving for revenge were sown between its two most 
 important members. On the other hand, Serbia became 
 more than ever the hope and focus of Yougo-Slav national- 
 ism, which threatened the very existence of the Austro- 
 Hungarian Empire ; and Serbia had received an enormous 
 accession of power. Greece, too, in alliance with Serbia, 
 stood across the southward road from Vienna, and was 
 established in possession of Salonika, long the aim of Austro- 
 Hungarian statesmen, and preferable, as a commercial 
 outlet, even to Trieste. 
 
 If Vienna was thus prejudicially affected, it is hardly 
 necessary to point out that the dreams of the statesmen in 
 Berlin — ^the open road to Byzantium and Bagdad, the great 
 Central Euisopean Customs Union which was to include 
 the Balkan States and Turkey, the point-d' appui against 
 England in Egypt and the East — faded into thin air, if the 
 results of the Balkan wars could not be undone. A reversal 
 of these conditions became, therefore, from this moment, 
 the primary object of Austro-German policy. It was only 
 a good opportunity, a satisfactory pretext, that had to be 
 found. 
 
 On more than one occasion, in the year 1913, a war 
 between Austria and Serbia was very near. We have it 
 on the authority of M. Giolitti that, only three days after 
 the signature of the Treaty of Bucarest, Austria sounded 
 Italy as to a war with Serbia. The proposal was declined, 
 on the ground that the Triple Alliance did not contemplate 
 
THEIR ATTITUDE IN THE BALKANS 83 
 
 such an act of aggression ; but there were more potent 
 reasons. Italy, which had joined Austria to keep the 
 Serbians from access to the Adriatic, could not regard with 
 equanimity the substitution of Austrian for Serbian influence 
 in Albania. Nevertheless, the quarrel nearly came to a 
 head. In her anxiety to reach the Adriatic, Serbia had, 
 in the winter of 1912-13, pushed a force across the moun- 
 tains to Durazzo ; and, though she withdrew in the face of 
 the decision of the Powers, she still retained some portions 
 of Albanian territory. Austria, only too anxious to pick 
 a quarrel, sent an ultimatum to Belgrade (October 20), 
 demanding complete retirement ; and Serbia gave way. 
 Even after this, Austria appears to have persisted in her 
 efforts to procure a modification of the Treaty of Bucarest 
 in favour of Bulgaria by force of arms ; and it is understood 
 that only the distinct refusal of Germany to support her in 
 this attempt induced her, for the time being, to desist. 
 
 The best chance for intervention had in fact been lost. 
 A slight movement on Austria's part, at the outset of the 
 second Balkan War, would have turned the scales in favour 
 of Bulgaria, or might have prevented Rumania from 
 joining the Allies ; but either Austria was not ready, or, 
 as seems more likely, she failed to foresee the results of the 
 second war, as there is no doubt the German Powers mis- 
 calculated the results of the earlier conflict. In any case, 
 once the Treaty of Bucarest was signed, it seemed to 
 Germany that a pretext was needed before it could be over- 
 thrown. Moreover, the increase in the German army had 
 not then had time to take effect ; and the widening of the 
 Kiel Canal was not complete. 
 
 But we know from the report of M. Jules Cambon to his 
 Government (November 1913) that the German Emperor 
 had by this time ceased to be in favour of peace ; and, 
 after what has gone before, we need not be surprised. All 
 efforts to break up the Entente — ^in 1905-6, in 1908-9, 
 and finally in 1911 — had failed ; Germany was still 
 ' encircled,' as its people professed to think ; and the Austro- 
 
84 AUSTRO-GERMAN AIMS , 
 
 Hungarian Empire, on whose cohesion the Drang nach 
 Osten depended, was threatened with disruption by the 
 victorious Serbs. Hence the conversion of the Emperor 
 and the triumph of the military party at Berlin. The fact 
 was not likely to escape that shrewd observer, the French 
 Ambassador ; and his statement is borne out by the fact 
 that, according to Rohrbach (' Deutsche Politik '), the 
 Emperor sent an ultimatum to Petrograd that same year. 
 It was at a moment when Russia seemed to be contemplating 
 intervention in Armenia ; and an obvious threat was con- 
 tained in the intimation from Berlin that any movement 
 in that direction would endanger European peace. Russia, 
 feeling that the object was not worth a war in which she 
 might not have had the support of other Powers, desisted ; 
 but the incident is none the less significant. The danger 
 passed, but in 1914 all was ready ; and the occasion of 
 rupture was found in the assassination of the Archduke 
 Franz Ferdinand and his wife at Serajevo on June 28, 1914. 
 
 The attention of this country and, it may be added, of 
 its rulers (as their attitude during the Conference of London 
 showed) has been so concentrated on the growth of the 
 German fleet and (at intervals) on the action of Germany 
 with regard to Morocco, that they have failed to observe 
 what has been, for the last fifteen years or more, the ftmda- 
 mental aim of German policy. A study of Austro-German 
 behaviour in regard to the Balkans and of the possibilities 
 open to German ambitions, combined with an examination 
 of the German mind as displayed in a long series of political 
 writings, points, in my opinion, to the conclusion that the 
 domination of the Nearer and Middle East was the essential 
 object of their diplomacy and their gigantic military pre- 
 parations. I do not mean that the statesmen of Berlin 
 aimed at nothing else^ — ^f ar from it. The eventual absorption 
 of Holland and Belgium, with German-speaking Switzerland 
 and other countries or parts of countries ; the conquest of 
 the French, Dutch, and Belgian colonies ; the diminution 
 
THE CONQUEST OF THE NEAR-EAST 85 
 
 of France and Russia, not to speak of the destruction of 
 British sea-power and the overthrow of the British Empire 
 — all these came within their purview as ultimate objects. 
 But what seemed attainable within a calculable time 
 was the mastery of the Ottoman Empire and the lands 
 that lie between it and the frontier of Austria-Hungary ; 
 and at this they have consistently aimed. Acquisitions 
 in Morocco might come in by the way ; the attitude of 
 Germany in the episodes of Algeciras and Agadir shows 
 that they were only secondary. In regard to the Balkans 
 and Asia Minor they were repeatedly ready, if need were, 
 to go to war. 
 
 Once masters in those territories, the German Powers 
 would obtain what they wanted for their economic growth, 
 throw open a vast region to German enterprise and capital, 
 exclude Russia from the Mediterranean, and menace their 
 chief rival. Great Britain, in the most vulnerable portions 
 of her empire. Russia would undoubtedly resist, and would 
 be aided by France ; but, for all the talk (for home con- 
 sumption) of the Russian bugbear, Berlin was not afraid 
 of France and Russia combined ; and England might 
 be — and to a large extent was — ^lulled into security. The 
 pacific attitude of the British Government during the Con- 
 ference of London, and its persistent efforts to arrive at an 
 understanding with Germany, had doubtless fostered this 
 belief ; and capable German publicists, writing just before 
 the war, congratulated themselves on the agreement with 
 Great Britain respecting the Bagdad railway and German 
 progress in Central Africa, which it is understood was on 
 the point of being signed in the simimer of 1914. 
 
 It may appear presumptuous, especially at this early 
 stage, to offer an explanation of the world-shaking events 
 which we are now witnessing, and to attempt an exposure 
 of Germany's secret plans. But a survey of preceding 
 incidents and the development of German ideas convinces 
 me that the attack on France and Russia was but a pre- 
 liminary step, masking the real aim. This could not be 
 
86 THE FINAL AIM 
 
 attained without the overthrow of those Powers, but such 
 a victory would be, after all, only a means to an end. The 
 frontiers on either hand once secured, the forces of Germany 
 — ^military, economical, and financial — could, without let 
 or hindrance, flood the Nearer and Middle East. From this 
 point of vantage, with enormously increased resources and 
 heightened prestige, the final challenge might safely be 
 issued to Great Britain for the empire of the world. 
 
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