;;:;;}£"• iJiaggiiiiiiLi 4EI*43, :•''■:■:. ;:■■■■■■ Jfteto $orfc fi>tate College of ggrfculture 8t Cornell Wnibtviitg Sibaca, &. ». Htbrarp Cornell University Library HE 1843.H65 Procedure before the Interstate commerce 3 1924 013 692 912 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924013692912 INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND RAILWAY TRAFFIC COURSE Prepared under Editorial Supervision of Samuel MacClintock, Ph.D. The subjects listed bejbw^ constitute the basic material of a course in Interstate Commerce and Railway Traffic. This course is' especially designed to meet the constantly growing demand for efficiently teained men in "railroad and' industrial traffic work; to assist, students to pa6S the exam- inations for government service under the ' Interstate Com-, merce' Commission} and t'd' meet the demand for men com- petent to direct the work of eqmmereial organizations and traffic bureaus. With the exception of the Atlas of Railway Traffic Maps,, , the subjects listed below are covered in an ' average of approximately 200 pages each. ' Atlas of Railway Traffic Maps ' Traffic Glossary Freight Classification; Some Ways of Reducing Freight , -Charges. ■: '.,*..■„ ''.■-, Freight Rates: Western Territory; Bases for Freight Charges Freight Rates: Official Classification Territory and Eastern Canada; Industrial Traffic Department Freight Rates: Southern Territory ,-"' Publication and Filing of Tariffs Freight Claims; Investigation of Freight Claims; Routing Freight Shipments; The Bill pf Lading; A Primary Lesson in Transit; Demurrage Railway Organization; Statistics of Freight Traffic; Railway Accounting Express, and Parcel Post ' ,. Ocean Traffic and Trade » Railway Regulation The Act to Regulate Commerce and Supplemental Acts Conference Rulings; Procedure Before the, Interstate Commerce Commission ; Grounds of Proof , in Rate Cases Application of Agency Tariffs The Law of Carriers of Goods Practical Traffic Problems LASALLE EXTENSION UNIVERSITY. 7> PROCEDURE BEFORE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND GROUNDS OF PROOF IN RATE CASES C. R. HILLYER, LL.B., LL.M. Of Cassoday, Butler, Lamb & Foster Former Attorney for the Interstate Commerce Commission Former Attorney for the Bureau of Corporations La Salle Extension University - C hie a, go * 1917 8 - 137 Copyright, 1916 LaSaixe Extension University PROCEDURE BEFORE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1. Introduction The Interstate Commerce Commission, under the act creating it and endowing it with powers and under the decisions of the Supreme Court, is a "tribunal" vested with the power of hearing evidence and determining what are reasonable practices and rates of transporta- tion and what rates and practices are free from unjust discrimination or undue preference. This sentence describes in a word nine-tenths of the Commission's functions, so far as the shipping public is concerned. The Commission has many other duties and powers which directly affect the carriers and which have been heaped upon it from time to time as Congress has seen fit, but the shippers in interstate commerce are chiefly concerned with its fundamental remedial powers above outlined. It is safe to say that nearly all the time of the Commission as a body and of the Commis- sioners as individual members is taken up with enforcing the first four sections of the law that pertain to the functions above specified. 1 1 Other features of the Commission's jurisdiction will be referred to in succeeding pages. No adequate knowledge of the Commission and its .work can be attained without a careful reading of the Act, in connection with this treatise. 1 2 PROCEDURE How does a complaining shipper proceed to call th attention of this tribunal to his particular grievance am invoke the operation of this governmental force f Unde our Anglo-Saxon institutions all procedure under fori of law must be conducted upon a definite and orderl; basis so that no arbitrary action shall be possible and s< that all interests affected may receive due and prope consideration. The Commission is not a court, but operates as an arn of Congress, and therefore belongs to the legislative branch of government. It reports to Congress directb and not through the President or other executive officer and this further emphasizes its independent characte: and its affiliation with the legislature as distinguishe< from the executive and judicial departments of govern ment. The Commission has. not inaptly been likenec to a special permanent committee of Congress ; and thii is but natural, since it is to Congress that the commerd clause of the Constitution grants the power to regulat commerce between the states. When it is said that the Commission is an "adminis trative body, " it is meant thereby to distinguish it f ron a judicial body. The latter can only be started up ty the appeal of parties to it for the redressing of pas wrongs. An administrative tribunal can proceed judi cially, but can also move on its own initiative. Whei set in motion, a court can only give relief to the identica parties before it on the pleadings. But an adminis trative tribunal can fix general rules, practices, an< rates for the future which will bind many parties no named in the pleadings. "With this very general statement of the legal statu of the Commission and of its jurisdiction, we are some BEFORE THE COMMISSION 3 what prepared to comprehend the procedure when it is called upon to enforce the provisions of the Act to Eegulate Commerce. The Act itself sets forth very simple rules of pleading and evidence. As to the former, it states that any person, firm, corporation, etc., 2 may file a petition briefly stating the facts complained of against carriers subject to the Act. The Commission is then commanded to forward a copy thereof to the carrier or carriers, who shall satisfy or answer the same in writing. ' The Commission is then empowered to investigate the matter, and the principal rule of evidence specified in the Act is that all parties in interest shall be given a full public hearing. When this simple procedure has been pursued, the Commission is empowered to exercise its discretion and, after consideration of all the facts of record, to make its findings and enter an order fixing the reasonable or non-discriminatory rate or practice. 3 So much for the requirements of the statute. Simple though these requirements are, they must be method- ically and carefully observed, because unless this is done the order of the Commission, which the complainant may finally obtain in his favor, can be successfully attacked in the courts if the carrier can show that the Commission has not followed the simple statutory provisions as to pleadings and evidence. The Commission has been in existence for thirty years and has always held to the view that the practice before it should be as simple and devoid of technicalities * Sec. 13 of the Act; also Commission's Rules II and III, which give in- structions in the preparation and filing of complaints and which will be supplied by the Commission upon application. The Commission revised its rules March 20, 1916. 8 Sec. 15 of the Act. 4 PROCEDURE as possible. It must, however, proceed in accordance with the steps outlined in the statute, or its findings will not be binding upon the carriers. It is from this twofold point of view that the Commis- sion has drafted its procedure. It has made it as simple as possible, yet has safeguarded the procedure so that no technicalities can be raised, should its orders be finally assailed in the courts. The procedure involved in the consideration of each case is symbolized in the formal wording of the Commission's order, which gives finality to each case before it, setting forth the fulfillment of the terms of the Act as follows : ' ' This case being at issue, upon complaint and answers on file, and having been duly heard and submitted by the parties, and full investigation of the matters and things involved having been had, and the Commission having made a full report containing its findings of fact and conclusions thereon, it is ordered that" — then follow the requirements which the Commission lays upon the carrier or carriers. 2. Infobmal Cases (a) Informal Complaints Not Involving Recovery of Damages The simplest procedure before the Commission occurs upon what is designated by the Commission (there being no reference thereto in the statute) as the "informal docket." This process is nothing more or less than a correspondence bureau to which are referred letters from the public in reference to any matter within the juris- diction of the Commission. The Commission gives such communications a file number and takes up the matter by letter with the carriers, and through the medium of this BEFORE THE COMMISSION 5 correspondence an adjustment is reached if possible. The annual report of the Commission to Congress shows that during the past year 6,500 such informal matters were listed. Nothing is required except a letter to the Commission setting forth the facts definitely and suc- cinctly, and upon its receipt the Commission proceeds in the informal manner above outlined. Many of these informal complaints brought to the at- tention of the Commission can be adjusted to the satis- faction of all concerned by a little co-operation between the carrier and the consignor or the consignee. If the matter in hand can be disposed of without resorting to the Commission, it is much better to handle the question in that manner. In any event, as to informal complaints not involving recovery of damages, the carrier should be given an op- portunity to adjust matters before taking the matter up with the Commission. (b) Informal Complaints Involving Recovery of Damages Section 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce provides that "All complaints for the recovery of damages shall be filed with the Commission within two years from the time the cause of action accrues and not after." In Blinn Lumber Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 18 I. C. C. 430, the Commission decided that the period of two years within which complaints may be filed is to be computed from the date of the delivery of the shipment. In all cases the complaint must be filed by or on behalf of the party who has borne the transportation charges as such. See International Agricultural Corporation v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 29 I. C. C. 391, and 5a PEOCEDUEE Oden & Elliott v. Seaboard Air Line Eailway, 37 I. C. C. 345. With respect to the circumstances under which the informal presentation of a complaint operates to stay the statute of limitations, the Commission holds that the informal complaint (a) must be filed with the Commis- sion within two years from the time the cause of action accrues; (b) must name the defendant carrier or car- riers; (c) must allege a violation of the Act and ask affirmative relief; and (d) must describe the shipment by naming the point of origin and destination, the con- signor and consignee, the date of the shipment, the ini- tials and number of car in case of carload shipments, or must give such available information as may be reason- ably necessary to identify the shipment. A notification to the Commission "of the possibility or intention of future filing of complaint for the recovery of damages" is not such a filing as is contemplated by the statute. Complaints embodying such a statement of the ship- ments, as indicated above, should be filed with sufficient copies in order that a copy thereof may be sent to each defendant carrier as notice to it of the complaint; there must be one additional copy for the use of the Com- mission. When a complaint for reparation has been before the Commission informally on the special docket or other- wise, and the parties have been notified by the Com- mission that the complaint is denied or that it cannot be determined informally, or when the parties volun- tarily withdraw the complaint from informal considera- tion, it may not be reconsidered informally if it is not again submitted within six months from the date of such notification or withdrawal, nor may it be filed as a for- mal complaint unless so filed within six months from the date of such notification or withdrawal; Provided, how- BEFORE THE COMMISSION 5b ever, that this ruling does not apply when the two-year period from the date of delivery of the shipment has not expired. See Rule III of the Rules of Practice. See Page 35, Section 14, "Special Reparation Docket." There have been a number of complaints dismissed recently because they were not filed within the prescribed time limit; so it is important to bear this requirement in mind. 3. Formal Oases It frequently happens, however, that after a matter has been under correspondence for some time, the Com- mission comes to the conclusion that it is useless to pursue it further in an informal way and thereupon advises the complainant that the only course left open under the law is to file a formal complaint. In giving this advice the Commission is putting the complainant upon the only road which, if followed up, will lead to a point where the statute will give the Commission power to order the carrier to grant such relief under the law as the Commission may finally conclude that the com- plainant is entitled to. A petition or complaint 4 may be filed as the result of the failure of an adjustment upon the informal docket as above described; or as is the case in the more impor- tant complaints, the matter may be first called to the attention of the Commission by the filing of a formal complaint. When this course is decided upon, it becomes highly important to observe the Commission's printed rules of practice. These rules are revised from time to time. They contain forms of complaints and answers, 4 In filing: petitions^briefs, petitions of intervention, or petitions for re- hearing, it is better to file them in printed form, as they are far more apt to receive a wider circulation and consequently greater considera- tion in the Commission. 6 PROCEDURE etc., and other information which should be referred to and literally followed. (a) Form of Complaint The form of complaint is set out in the rules of the Commission in as simple a manner as possible, yet in practical experience a considerable percentage of the petitions received at the Commission have to be returned and attention called to the plain requirements of the Act and the rules. (See Eule III and form on p. 20 of Eules.) In a recent decision of the Commission, Com- missioner Prouty announces that the complaint must state the facts so that the Commission may apprehend the point at issue and the defendant may be advised as to what it shall answer or defend. 5 The rates or practices complained of must be definitely set out or described, and the particular portions of the Act under which relief is sought should be referred to by section of the Act, such as Section One or Section Three. When the complaint is accepted by the Commission it receives a docket number in the formal docket, on which 964 cases were entered last year. There is also bound with the petition, under the same docket number, all the correspondence and exhibits and other papers that come to the Commission bearing upon this particular subject- matter of complaint. This, with all subsequent proceed- ings in the case bound with it, becomes a public record and no portion of it can leave the possession of the Commission. The complainant should not undertake to ' 26 I. C. C. Rep. 382. BEFORE THE COMMISSION 7 make up the record in the case, however, until the pro- ceeding comes on for hearing. (b) Answer The case is at issue as soon as the twenty days 6 have expired within which the carriers are to satisfy or answer the complaint. (See Eule IV and p. 22 of Eules for form.) It infrequently happens that the record is completed to the satisfaction of both parties and the Commission by the filing of complaint and answer accompanied by a statement of facts agreed to by both parties, and when this is done the Commission will, in its discretion, pro- ceed to determine the issues raised and nothing further has to be done by the parties. 7 (See Eule IX.) (c) Hearing In a large majority of cases, however, the carriers deny the allegations in the complaint, and when the issues are so joined the Commission sets the case down for formal hearing in a federal courtroom at the com- plainant's home town or at some convenient point in that general locality. (See Eule X.) The case will be heard either by a Commissioner in person or by an Examiner. In recent years, due to the pressure of business before the Commission, compara- tively few cases are heard by the Commissioners them- selves, although in earlier days the testimony in all cases ' Thirty days, when the carrier's office is west of El Paso, Salt Lake City, or Spokane. ' Commission's Eules IV and V. 8 PROCEDURE was heard by the Commissioners, and frequently in the presence of the entire Commission. The complainant will receive formal notice from the Commission that his case is set for hearing at ten o'clock on a certain morn- ing in the federal courtrooms before an Examiner, men- tioning him by name. The writer has sat as Examiner in hundreds of these proceedings in many sections of the country. There probably always will be a discussion as to just what the powers of the sitting Examiner are. The law says that the Examiner ' ' shall have power to administer oaths, examine witnesses, and receive evidence." The narrowest possible view to take of this wording is that he has no control over the introduction of evidence and that he sits merely to administer oaths and to receive whatever the parties desire to make a part of the record. This view is entirely too narrow and has never received the sanction of the Commission. As a pure matter of law it is doubtful whether a Commissioner himself act- ing individually has any more power or control over the record than does an Examiner, for the reason that the rulings of each are only final under the law when they have received the approval of, and then become rulings of, the Commission. "When the record made before an Examiner is com- pleted, the duties of the Examiner in connection with that particular case are just begun. In the heavy volume of contested cases (containing 165,000 pages of record last year), it can be readily seen that the consid- eration of the records in the first instance must be left to the able assistance of the examining corps. It is therefore of the first importance that the questions of the Examiner be fully answered and that he be treated BEFORE THE COMMISSION 9 with every consideration that would be accorded a judge presiding at a trial. A word to the wise is sufficient. The record in the case, including the pleadings and such other papers as have reached the Commission, will be present at the hearing, which is essentially an investi- gation into the facts concerning the particular transaction complained of. It is the duty of the Examiner rep- resenting the Commission to guide the evidence towards the disclosure of the necessary facts bearing upon the issues in the complaint so as to enable the Commission to apply the law thereto and administer and enforce the statute as commanded by Congress. The Commission requires that the complainant be prepared to produce his proof as to the matters alleged in his complaint. While the Commissioner or Examiner will aid him (if necessary) in making the record in such form as will conform to orderly arrangement, and will attempt to see that no essential matters are left uncov- ered, and will make such other inquiry and examination as he may deem advisable under the circumstances, still the complainant should bear in mind that it is his case, and while the outcome of it may be and frequently is of a public nature, the duty rests upon him to produce competent witnesses personally cognizant of the facts which are to be proved. It is not sufficient for the complainant to mass together disconnected allegations and then dump his troubles on the Commission for it to unravel and make out a case for him, should he be found to have one. A complain- ant who attempted this some years ago was advised in the Commission's report 73, that it would not consider a *■ Dallas Freight Bureau v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co., 12 I. C. C. 433. 10 PROCEDURE case "thrown at it" in this fashion. It has been neces- sary for the Commission to repeat this warning from time to time. The theory of the law is that the issues before the Commission partake of a public character, as the carriers are exercising a public function; that inasmuch as the government has adopted the policy of permitting privately owned companies to own and operate the public highways of interstate commerce, it is the duty of the government to guarantee to the public adequate service at the hands of these carriers at reasonable rates and without unjust discrimination. Following out this the- ory, the law attempts to make its operation as simple and as free from expense as possible. The case is set down for hearing at the home of the complainant so as to avoid traveling expense to him, while the carrier's representatives and the Commission's representative journey there for his convenience. The expensive tran- script of record is supplied him free of charge and at the hearing the Commission or its representative is under the law required to make a full investigation, the result of which may inure to the benefit of the com- plainant. Notwithstanding all this, however, the com- plainant's case must of necessity largely depend upon his own preparation in advance, and the greater his skill therein the better his chances of winning. The duties of the parties to a case and the practice of the Commission is well expressed by Commissioner Clements, in a proceeding before him, as follows: Neither party to the case presented any witnesses at the hearing and there is no evidence before the Commission other than the small exhibit of compo-board and the expense bill covering the shipment. Whatever may be the merits of this BEFORE THE COMMISSION 11 complaint, it is clearly evident that the Commission has not before it the presentation of facts, circumstances, and condi- tions bearing upon the question of the reasonableness of the rate charged, which appears to have been in accordance with the published tariff, necessary to an intelligent and proper determinatidn of the matters in question. Without other show- ing than that just indicated, we are asked to condemn the existing rate and to establish a just and reasonable rate to be applied in the future and to enter an order awarding repara- tion, which order and findings may be received in court as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. "We cannot upon mere complaint and suggestion justly take such impor- tant action. "While it is the duty and practice of the Commission to exhaust its activities in developing the pertinent facts necessary to the full investigation and hearing of complaints before it, it is but reasonable that a party complaining should also take such action as may be within his power to aid the Commission by presenting such evidence as will show the pertinent facts, circumstances, and conditions bearing upon the questions in- volved. Upon the showing made the complaint will be dis- missed without prejudice. It will be so ordered. 8 It is apparent, therefore, that if interests of consider- able importance are involved, the preparation and trial of a case should be in the hands of one skilled in the work before the Commission. The practice has of neces- sity become highly specialized. In the course of many years numerous principles as to reasonableness of rates and discriminatory practices have been evolved. 9 Other matters, such as the interpretation of the published tariffs and the comprehension of the reports of carriers filed with the Commission, have become important and 8 19 I. C. C. Rep. no. •See Grounds of Proof m Rate Gases. 12 PROCEDURE unless the case is a very simple one, a knowledge of and familiarity with these and other things is essential. The carriers, as a rule, are ably represented at the hearing by counsel and competent traffic men, who listen carefully to all that the complainant and his witnesses have to say, who take advantage of the opportunity open to all parties to cross-examine witnesses, and who intro- duce evidence on behalf of the carriers. Their skill enables them to develop a record of the most favorable kind for their contentions, and many an unsuspecting complainant realizes by the time he brings his second complaint that it pays to match skill with skill. (d) Printed Briefs When the hearing is closed and all parties have been fully heard, the parties are at liberty to prepare printed briefs and abstracts of the testimony and to file the same with the Commission on the dates fixed at the closing of the hearing by the Commissioner or the Examiner. 10 The Commission will not extend these dates except in rare cases and for good cause shown, and a brief received after the date named at the hearing will be returned by the Commission. Too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the impor- tance of doing this work well. During his service with the Commission the writer read all briefs filed in cases heard and handled by him. A majority of them were poorly conceived and wholly undependable. It was necessary to discard the briefs and go back to the record. 10 Instructions for preparing briefs are clearly set forth in Commission's Rule XIV. BEFORE THE COMMISSION 13 In the great number of cases that must be disposed of, a well-briefed case will get the consideration that a poorly briefed one cannot. Of course the making of the record is of the first importance. Assuming that you have a fine record, your one opportunity to convince the Commission of that fact is in a skillfully prepared brief. Before attempting to write a brief, consult some textbook on the subject. It is in the brief that the commerce attorney or the traffic officer meets his severest test. The length of the brief is of importance. The case should be stated in from one to three printed pages. The abstract of testimony depends upon the length of the record. Carefully frame from one to ten findings of fact that you believe the Commission should make and collect under each the portions of the record that prove the fact. Make it to the point. The argument should never exceed fifty printed pages if you expect it to be read by many people. If the case is of such a character that you can print but ten to twenty-five pages of argument so much the better. If you have a carefully prepared exhibit or two that you believe are controlling, be sure, to print them in the brief, but do not print too many. All the care and pains taken in presenting the brief will be highly valued at the Commission by those who handle the case and write the decision. It is the one contribution that you can make towards lightening the labors of those who have a heavy responsibility to carry. (e) Oral Argument If the case is one of importance and application to the Commission is made in the record or by letter, the parties 14 PROCEDURE will be given an opportunity to argue the case orally before the whole Commission in Washington. There can be no question of the importance of taking advantage of this opportunity if the case is one that warrants the time and expense. While the record as made receives careful consideration by the Commission, an oral argu- ment is the one opportunity the parties have to make their plea, in person or by counsel, face to face with the seven men upon whom the law reposes the responsibility of deciding the issue. It will be seen, therefore, that there are four points in the proceeding at which a formal case may be finally submitted to the Commission for decision: (1) upon the filing of complaint and answers when the parties so stipulate and when the Commission, from an examina- tion of the pleadings or agreed statement of facts, con- cludes that nothing further is necessary to aid it in applying the law thereto; (2) at the conclusion of the hearing after both, parties waive their right to file briefs and have Oral argument; (3) at the date fixed for the filing of the reply brief, should no argument be desired ; (4) at the close of the oral argument. (f) Adjournments and Extensions of Time In but few cases and only for good cause shown does the Commission continue a hearing or extend time, it being the rule that the parties and interveners must appear at the time set, prepared to submit everything they desire to have go into the record before the conclu- sion of the hearing. The Commission looks with dis- favor upon continuances and adjourned hearings. 11 1 Manufacturers Ey. Case, 28 I. C. C. Rep. 95. BEFOKE THE COMMISSION 15 When dates have been set for filing briefs and for oral argument, the Commission does not readily extend the •time, as the pressure of new cases requires that the old cases be pushed to completion. (g) Depositions and the Record Section 12 of the Act permits the testimony of wit- nesses to be taken by deposition in the manner and form there prescribed, but as a practical matter this method will not be open to parties except upon very exceptional showing to the Commission of conditions which make it necessary. The experience of the Commission has been that little is to be - gained from information derived in this way. The proceeding under a formal complaint is an investigation rather than a lawsuit, and as the word indicates, the investigation is for the purpose of throw- ing all possible light upon the subject for consideration. In this respect it is different from the making of a record according to the strict rules of evidence obtaining in suits at law. While from a reading of the Act one might naturally suppose that many of the records before the Commission were made by depositions, as a matter of fact it is the rarest thing in the actual work before the Commission. It is found essential in the administration of the law to have present at the hearing either one of the Com- missioners or an Examiner in order that the proceedings shall bring out all the facts and the record be completed under the control of one skilled in the law and in trans- portation matters, and this Would be impossible if depo- sitions before uninformed magistrates composed the 16 PROCEDURE record. In a certain case in which the record was made by depositions and no opportunity afforded the Commis- sion to satisfy itself of the facts as it could have do'ne> at a hearing, the Commission commented unfavorably upon the record and was compelled to dismiss the com- plaint. 12 The finding of the Commission must, under a decision of the Supreme Court, 13 conform to the record made in the particular case, and the record is therefore of con- trolling importance in interstate commerce cases. It is necessary to have in the record all that is relied upon in substantiation of the allegations contained in the petition. The proceedings at the hearing are all stenographic- ally reported under the absolute control of the Commis- sioner or Examiner presiding, and one copy of the record is furnished free to the leading complainant and one copy free to the leading respondent in the case. The Commission retains the original. There are no free copies of records in cases on the investigation and sus- pension docket or in the general investigations. During the year 1915 the Commission conducted 1,543 hearings at which 200,438 pages of testimony were taken. As a general rule it will not be more than six months from the filing of the complaint before all the necessary steps provided in the statute will have been taken and the decision of the Commission published. The law requires the Commission to serve a copy of its opinion' and order upon the parties to the case. This concludes the procedure in the average interstate commerce case. 12 16 I. C. C. Rep. 549. 13 Louisville & Nashville Case, 227 U. S. 88. BEFOEE THE COMMISSION 17 4. Petitions foe Reheabing oe Reopening of Case In a recent case where the dissatisfied party attempted to have a court review the Commission, he was told to go back to the Commission with a petition for rehearing before coming to a court. (See Rule XV.) When the decision of the Commission is entered, one of the parties may feel sufficiently aggrieved with the result to desire to call the matter to the attention of the Commis- sion again. A party may also desire to reopen a case after final submission, but before decision is rendered. The Act affords to such party the right to file with the Commission a petition for a rehearing or reopening. It lies within the discretion of the Commission whether it will grant this petition or not. Upon its receipt it is carefully examined to see whether it holds out promise that a further hearing will develop any facts that would materially affect the case, whether the Commission has incorrectly understood the facts or made erroneous deduc- tions from the record, or whether it has committed errors of law. It is not an infrequent occurrence for the Commission to receive petitions for rehearing or reopening from either one party or the other, and the Commission is always ready and willing to reconsider a matter when there is prima facie evidence showing that any injustice may have been done. It has full power under the statute to modify, amend, or annul its findings and orders at any time, and while it will not reopen or prolong a case after it has once been disposed of, except for good cause shown, the Commission is, in the words of Commissioner Mc- 18 PROCEDURE Chord, open day and night for the purpose of correcting mistakes that it may have made. A petition to rehear a case already decided should point out defmately just what errors of fact or erroneous conclusions of law have been made. It is not proper to base such a petition upon the plea that upon the facts the Commission should have decided differently. A peti- tion to reopen a case not yet decided should outline in brief what additional showing it is desired to make, so that the Commission can know when passing upon the petition whether the new matter is of a character to be helpful in deciding the case. If the petition for rehearing or reopening is granted, the case will be set down again for hearing argument or briefs, one or all as the case may demand, and the course already outlined will be pursued and a supplemental report and order entered by the Commission. Should the petition for rehearing or reopening be denied, the parties will simply receive a formal notice to that effect, and the litigation, so far as the Commission is concerned, is closed. 5. Eesort to Cottrts The Supreme Court decided that the Commerce Court, which then reviewed the findings of the Commission, had no jurisdiction to review a so-called "negative" order of the Commission, that is, an order dismissing complainants' petition. 14 The Commerce Court was abolished January 1, 1914, and its business was trans- ferred to special tribunals consisting of three United States judges that may be assembled for the purpose of 14 Proctor and Gamble Case, 225 U. S. 282. BEFORE THE COMMISSION 19 reviewing the findings of the Commission at places where jurisdiction of the parties may be obtained. It has never been held that the proper United States court could not review any order of the Commission, when the ques- tion was whether the order or findings of the Commission were " (1) Beyond the power which it (the Commission) could constitutionally exercise; or (2) beyond its statu- tory power; or (3) based upon a mistake of law." 15 The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia seems to the writer to be the proper federal tribunal in which a shipper can by writ of certiorari force the Commission to determine a case upon the record before it and other- wise proceed in accordance with the statute and the Constitution. The importance of the record in a rate case was established by the Supreme Court in the L. & N. Case. 16 The Court there called attention to the fact that: The statute gave the right to a full hearing, and that con- ferred the privilege of introducing testimony, and at the same time imposed the duty of deciding in accordance with the facts proved. A finding without evidence is arbitrary and baseless. And if the government's contention is correct, it would mean that the Commission had a power possessed by no other officer, administrative body, or tribunal in our govern- ment. It would mean that where rights depended upon facts, the Commission could disregard all rules of evidence and capriciously make findings by administrative fiat. Such authority, however, beneficially exercised in one case, could be injuriously exerted in another ; is inconsistent with rational justice, and comes under the Constitution's condemnation of all arbitrary exercise of power. 15 Union Pacific Case, 222 U. S. 541. "227 U. 8. 88. 20 PROCEDURE The importance of the facts in the record is further emphasized by the Court in the B. & 0. Southwestern Case. 17 There the Court said: We remark that it is stated in the Commission's report that they base their conclusion more largely upon their own investi- gation than upon the testimony of the witnesses. It would be a very strong proposition to say that the parties were bound in the higher courts by a finding based on specific investiga- tions made in the case without notice to them. In several cases in the courts where the finding and order of the Commission have been in question, the Supreme Court has stated that there must be substan- tial evidence in the record to sustain the order. 18 And where the question presented to the court is as to the existence of such substantial evidence, it has been said: The consideration of such a question involves not an issue of fact, but one of law which it is the duty of the courts to examine and decide. 19 It will be seen, therefore, that while a finding of fact made by the Commission concerning a matter within the scope of the authority delegated to it is binding and may not be re-examined in the courts, it is undoubted that where the question is whether an order or finding was rendered without any evidence, or without substan- tial evidence to support it, or is contrary to the evidence, the issue presented is one of law which can be examined into and set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. In the Humboldt Steamship Case, 20 the Supreme Court has decided that when the Commission refuses to exer- 17 226 u. s. 14. 18 Union Pacific Case, . . . U. S. . . . 18 Fla. East Coast Case, 234 U. S. 185. 20 224 U. S. 474. BEFOBE THE COMMISSION 21 cise its jurisdiction, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, it can be compelled to do so by a writ of mandamus issuing out of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. This writ of mandamus cannot control the manner in which the Commission shall employ its discretion upon a given state of. facts. It can only enforce the administrative action of the Com- mission. It can compel the Commission to act under the statute, but not how it shall act or decide. We have now traversed the entire course that a cause of action before the Commission can take from its possi- ble inception in a letter from a complainant to the Com- mission until it is passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States. As a practical proposition, the vast majority of cases never get any further than an order of the Commission. While the carriers resort to the courts only in a small per cent of the total cases decided, the few which have gone up from the Commis- sion have as a rule involved interests or questions of very great magnitude. As we are confining ourselves to practice before the Commission no attempt is made to cover cases before the courts. What has been said as to the courts is only by way of general information. The preceding pages have dealt with the course that is pursued by the ordinary case. There remain a num- ber of other subjects to be discussed which frequently come up in the work before the Commission. 6. Intebvbnees The subject-matter of a complaint filed may prove to be of vital interest to many shipping interests 22 PROCEDURE besides the complainant, and, moreover, although the complainant may name a limited number of carriers as parties defendant, the effect of the order upon car- riers other than those named may be of the first importance. Take, for instance, a complaint attacking the rate on coal from a group of mines. The rate of transportation on an article like coal absolutely controls the price at points of consumption, and therefore any change in the rate will vitally affect all competitors of the mines receiving a reduction. Such change in the rate will also seriously affect the tonnage movement, and therefore the carriers serving the competing mines are as much inter- ested as the shippers themselves. It is not unusual in the Commission's work that a very modest-appearing complaint will gather weight in such proportions that by the time the proceeding is well under way the original parties to the case find themselves surrounded by many warring factions. Permission must be obtained from the Commission for leave to intervene in a proceeding pending before it. A formal petition is filed with the Commission setting forth the petitioner's interest in the proceeding, and, if leave is granted, the intervener is permitted to take active part in the proceedings, to have notice of hearings, to produce and cross-examine witnesses, to file briefs, and to be heard in person or by counsel at the oral argument. 21 Frequently the Examiner will permit intervention at the hearing, but the parties will not be required to fur- nish such an eleventh hour intervener with copies of 21 Sec. 2 of the Blkins Law ; Commission's Rule II. BEFORE THE COMMISSION 23 exhibits as they cannot be expected to prepare for any interveners except those who have obtained previous permission. It is therefore good practice to file a formal petition of intervention well in advance of the hearing as this insures receipt of all notices from the Commission in connection with the case and otherwise gives one a proper standing. The Commission may consider together a group of cases all involving much the same issues, principles, or state of facts. This means that they will be heard, briefed, argued, and decided at the same time. The only effect such consolidation has upon the procedure is that the various parties are required to confer together and agree upon some plan for the proper presentation of the evidence and handling of the case so that unnecessary time will not be consumed in introducing cumulative evidence or in unnecessary repetition in briefs and upon the argument. 7. Witnesses and Subpoenas It is very unusual in the practice before the Commis- sion to experience difficulty in securing the attendance of the necessary witnesses upon the hearing. The com- plainant is, of course, anxious to offer his proof in sup- port of the allegations contained in his petition and sees to it that the necessary witnesses are present at the time set for hearing. The carriers, as a rule, are ready and willing to defend their rates and practices and will appear at the hearing by skilled counsel and experienced traffic men. There is therefore an opportunity for the complainant or his 24 PROCEDUEB counsel, or the Commissioner or Examiner before whom the case is heard, to obtain at first hand from the car- riers ' representatives much valuable information bearing directly upon the issues involved. Should either party at the hearing, however, desire the issuance of a subpoena to any particular witness, a Commissioner under the law has authority to issue" it. If the hearing is before an Examiner, it is customary for him to have in his possession subpoenas signed by a Commissioner which he will issue in his discretion. Subpoenas for the production of books and papers will be issued only upon application in writing to the Commission, and this should be attended to well in advance of the hearing. 22 8. Repakation When a complainant seeks to have the Commis- sion exercise its power under section 16 of the Act, and enter a finding that the complainant has been damaged, and award him a sum of money from the carrier or carriers as reparation, there are important details connected with the procedure in such a case. Reparation may be awarded for damage suffered from any violation of the Act. The record in a proceeding wherein the complainant is seeking reparation is one that must be made with great care, as the law com- mands that in reparation cases the Commission shall state its findings of fact; and if its order is to be worth anything to the complainant in the recovery of the 22 Commission's Rule XII. BEFORE THE COMMISSION 25 sum named, the procedure must be in accordance with the letter of the law. (See Rule III.) "When the complainant intends to seek reparation upon past shipments at a rate which it is alleged was unreasonable or otherwise unlawful, he must include a prayer for reparation in the complaint at the time he attacks the reasonableness of the rate. There is noth- ing in the law requiring this, but it is a rule of the Commission and is founded upon reason. 23 The Act limits the right of recovery of damages to shipments that moved within two years prior to the time of filing the complaint. The Commission has held that the two years begins to run from the time the shipment was delivered to the consignee, 24 so that the complaint can include only such shipments as were not delivered more than two years prior to the day the complaint is filed with the Commission. In fixing the date when a complaint is filed, the Commission will adopt the date of filing of an informal complaint if such complaint is deemed to describe the shipments sufficiently and to give other data necessary under the Act. Where reparation is sought, the complaint should state the name of each claimant. This means the shipper who was damaged; the naming of a commercial body of which he was a member is not sufiicient. If only a simple movement of one commodity between two points is involved, an accurate statement thereof is necessary. Where the localities involved are numerous, it will be enough to indicate definitely the territorial or rate group. Where the case is broad in scope or where many shipments are involved, the Commission will first deter- 3 12 I. C. O. Eep. 223. ' This ruling has been sustained by the Commerce Court. 26 PROCEDURE mine whether the complainant has been damaged. In case of an affirmative finding opportunity will be afforded to make proof respecting the shipments. A statement should then be filed giving for each shipment the date of delivery, car initial and number, points of origin and destination, route, commodity, weight, rate applied, charges collected, rate found reasonable and charges applicable thereunder, and amount of reparation payable upon basis of findings. This statement should be adjusted between the parties and certified by the carriers that collected the charges as to accuracy. 25 When a claim for reparation on the informal docket has to be transferred to the formal docket, or when it has been withdrawn by the parties, formal complaint thereon must be filed within six months from date of withdrawal or notification by Commission that it cannot be disposed of except on formal complaint. In other words, where reparation is an issue, the element of time assumes importance both in the bringing of the original complaint and in the following-up of proceedings once instituted. If the Commission can be said to have a policy towards the question of reparation, it is fair to say that it is generally opposed to granting it. Where the illegality proven is an unjust discrimination, it is a practicable impossibility to prove damages under the strict require- ments laid down by the Commission. It will be neces- sary for Congress to define more definitely what shall constitute damages under the Act, or for the courts to prescribe a workable rule for the Commission. In cases where the Commission enters an award of 25 See form 5, p. 24, Commission's Rules, and Rule V, also 21 I. C. C. Rep. 45. BEFORE THE COMMISSION 27 reparation, it uniformly allows interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date the freight money was paid to the railroad company. If the award of the Commission is not paid by the carriers, the complainant sues in the courts, and the law makes the findings and order of the Commission prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The statute gives a party the choice of seeking reparation, in the first instance, before the Commission or suing directly in the courts for damages, but he may not do both. 9. Suspension op Tabipps The amendment to section 15 of the Act, passed in 1910, greatly increased the jurisdiction of the Commis- sion by giving it the power to suspend the operation of any tariff filed with the Commission stating new rates, fares, or charges, if done prior to the effective date of the tariff. This power ranks second only to the rate- making power to fix rates upon complaint of shippers bestowed upon the Commission in 1906, which, however, relates only to rates already in effect. In recent years the rate cases arising under suspension proceedings are among the most important before the Commission. The Commission may upon protest of shipper, or upon its own motion, after reasonable notice to the carriers, enter upon a hearing concerning the propriety of any new rate, fare, or charge, pending which the Commission may suspend the operation of the schedule for 120 days, and for a further period of six months when necessary in order to complete its investigation. If the Commission has not disposed of the matter at 28 PROCEDURE the end of ten months, the new rates go into effect automatically. The statute commands the Commission to give to suspension proceedings preference over all other ques- tions pending before it and to decide them as speedily as possible. It further requires that at the hearing, if the rate involved is one that was increased after Jan- uary 1, 1910, the burden of proof to show that the increased rate is just and reasonable shall be upon the carrier. The burden of proving that a rate is reasonable per se includes as well the duty of showing that it is relatively reasonable, i. e., that it does not unjustly discriminate. 26 But the carriers do not concede the correctness of this attitude of the Commission. The Commission has said that where a rate has been lowered after January 1, 1910, and then advanced to a lower level than on Janu- ary 1, 1910, this statutory burden of proof still rests upon the carriers. 27 Under its power of suspension of rates the Commis- sion has established a docket known as the "investiga- tion and suspension docket," upon which it enters all suspension matters and gives them prompt attention. One hundred and ninety-nine such cases were instituted during the past year. In the practical handling of these matters it has a Board of Suspensions composed of officers of the Commission, which passes upon all suspen- sion matters in their preliminary stages. Tariffs filed with the Commission are effective thirty days after filing, and during this period, if shippers desire the sus- pension of a tariff, they are frequently given a prelimi- '32 I. C. C. Rep. 449; 35 I. C. C. Rep. 85. '26 I. C. C. Rep. 669; 28 I. C. C. Rep. 269. BEFORE THE COMMISSION 29 nary hearing before the Board, but the aggrieved parties should act promptly and file their protest at least ten days before the effective date of the tariff. There are a vast number of tariffs becoming effective every day in the year, and if the suspension is worth considerable to the shipper, it is highly advisable to go to Washington and place the facts before the Board in person. An appointment can be made by telegraph a few days ahead, and the informal hearing will not last longer than from one to two hours. In practically no other way can a shipper further the suspension of a tariff. There should be present someone who can set forth fully the history and the basis of the rates involved. It is facts of this character that the Board will call for, and not what the shipper imagines is going to happen to him if the new rates become effective. A petition for suspension must indicate the schedule affected by its so-called "I. C. C." number and give specific reference to the parts thereof complained against, together with a statement of the grounds of such complaint. The protest should include repre- sentative rates both present and proposed. It is not necessary to obtain permission to intervene in cases heard under this docket. Any interested party may appear and participate in the proceeding. Should the preliminary hearing or the application without the preliminary hearing result in the temporary suspension of the objectionable tariffs, the case then comes on for formal hearing. At the hearing the com- plainant is greatly assisted by the terms of the Act placing the burden of justifying the increased rate upon the carriers. This reverses the usual order of things as the testimony of the carrier is taken first and as 30 PROCEDURE complaining interests have the complete disclosure of the carrier's case before they proceed with their own. The carrier also files the opening and the reply briefs and opens and closes the oral argument, which is the reverse of the case with ordinary complaints. Other- wise, the proceeding follows the general course already described for formal hearings. At the conclusion of the proceeding, the Commission enters an opinion and an order either withdrawing its temporary suspension and permitting the tariffs to become effective or requiring the carriers to continue their former rates for a period of two years. 10. Proceedings upon the Commission's Own Motion An important part of the Commission's duty to enforce the provisions of the Act is performed by means of the comprehensive, general, and sweeping investigations into the rates and practices of the carriers, which are under- taken by the Commission upon its own motion, and which the Act specifically gives it authority to institute and to enter binding orders as a result thereof. There is always pending before the Commission one or more of these investigations. Such an inquiry as this was the investigation into the transit privileges accorded by the carriers upon shipments of grain, lumber, and other commodities. The Commission appoints an attorney to take particular charge of each one of these investiga- tions, and the control of the hearings, production and examination of witnesses, etc., are largely left to him. One can scarcely appreciate the vast interests frequently affected by such an investigation. The transit investi- gation, in which the writer was the Commission's BEFORE THE COMMISSION 31 attorney, involved practically all the carriers of the country and hundreds of appearances were entered on behalf of milling, grain, lumber, cotton, and other industries. These hearings are usually of such importance as to be before a Commissioner or the Commission sitting as a body. The parties in interest are permitted to enter appearances in person or by counsel, may produce and cross-examine witnesses, file briefs, and participate in the oral argument. When one of these investigations is started, it is well for all parties in any way interested to be represented, for there is no telling when something may develop that will seriously affect them. The Commission institutes these investigations by entering a formal order, which is served upon the carriers involved. So far as inter- ests other than the carriers are concerned, it is given wide publication in the press of the country, so that all persons affected will have notice thereof. The hearings are held in the important centers most affected by the subject-matter, and their progress receives attention in the press and trade papers, thus further advising the public of its pendency. At the present time (1916) there are pending inves- tigations of the kind here considered into the private car lines, lumber products, bills of lading, coal and ore rates, rates on live stock and animal products, and cement rates in Western Trunk Line Territory. 11. Fourth-Section Investigations The fourth section of the Act makes it unlawful to charge more for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, or to charge more as a through rate than the sum of the intermediate rates. 32 PROCEDURE The carriers are, however, permitted to apply to the Commission for relief from these requirements, and the Commission sets these applications down for formal investigation. The general procedure is the same as before described, except that the entire burden of proof rests upon the carriers, and as a rule the shipping interests do not appear, although the Commission wel- comes their participation. The Fourth Section Board, composed of three employees of the Commission, handles all fourth-section matters in their preliminary stages. At the conclusion of the proceeding the Commission enters an order either denying the carrier's application or granting it the permission it seeks. During the year 1915, 673 such applications were received by the Com- mission. The most significant rate adjustments in the country which contravene the fourth-section principle are the rates to the Eocky Mountain Country, which exceed the rates to the Pacific coast, and the so-called base point system in the Southeast. The Commission is constantly adjusting the rates in these two fields, and in addition it is confronted with many other violations of the prin- ciple here and there throughout the country. The Commission has assumed to take the same juris- diction over through rates that exceed the combination of intermediate rates as over rates that violate the long- and-short-haul clause. The statute, however, condemns as unlawful every through rate that exceeds the combina- tion of intermediates, and gives the Commission no power to grant relief to carriers in such an instance. It follows, therefore, that the only lawful charge is the lower combination of rates, and that is the rate that should be paid in the first instance. BEFORE THE COMMISSION 33 12. Switch Connections Under the first section of the Act a petition may be filed with the Commission for the purpose of compelling a common carrier to construct and maintain a switch connection with a lateral branch line of road or private side track, under certain conditions. While the trial of a case of this kind has features that are wholly peculiar to it, they pertain to matters of evidence intended to show the demand for exercise of the power of the Com- mission under the particular provision of the law invoked, and the formal procedure is the same as has already been described. The Supreme Court has recently decided that the use of the term "lateral branch line" limits the Act to a somewhat narrow class of lines known as "feeders," and does not include independent or parallel and competing lines of road. It must not only be alleged and shown that there is a real transportation demand for such a connection, but that the connection is entirely practicable and feasible from a physical or operating standpoint. It should be understood that the Act refers merely to a switch connection and does not include side tracks, which are often known as "switches." The Commission cannot compel the installation of private side tracks. The Panama Canal Act has empowered the Commis- sion to require physical connection between lines of railroad and the docks of water carriers. 13. Through Boutes and Joint Hates In addition "to the fundamental control which the Commission exercises over the carriers under the pro- visions of the statute dealing with the rates and practices 34 PROCEDURE of the carriers and requiring that they shall be reason- able and non-discriminatory, the public has a right under section 15 of the Act to file petitions seeking through routes and joint rates. This power of the Commission is quite frequently invoked, and when the cause comes on for hearing, the peculiar nature of the case is reflected in the character of the evidence produced to show the demand for the exercise of this power of the Commission, while the formal procedure remains about the same as has already been described. In a case of this kind it should be alleged and proved that the present method of handling the traffic as through transportation is an unreasonable practice, and also that the through transaction should have a joint rate lower than a com- bination of intermediate rates. It would, of course, be unfair to demand the establishment of joint rates for a single shipment. There must be a practical demand or a convincing showing of necessity for such through arrangements. It has become the almost universal practice of inter- state carriers to accept a shipment anywhere tendered for transportation and to issue a through bill of lading to any point in the country. This constitutes a through route. Furthermore, the statute now gives a shipper the right to designate the routing of the shipment. Car- riers sometimes do not make their lowest rates apply via a certain route, and it is in cases of this kind that complaints are filed for the purpose of opening up the route in question on the rate sought. In such a case the Commission will consider the practical necessity for another route. Moreover, the statute will not permit a carrier to be "short-hauled" as the phrase is. That is, a carrier receiving a shipment is entitled to haul it and BEFORE THE COMMISSION 35 to get the earnings for its service so long as it can render the service needed in a satisfactory manner and with reasonable directness. The statute recognizes the separately established por- tions of a through charge. It thus legalizes the combina- tion of rates where there is no through joint rate. Each part of the combination rate is primarily designed to take care of a local movement, which may involve a short haul and two terminal services. When two such rates are applied upon a through long haul with two terminal services instead of four, there is basis for 'a complaint as to the unreasonableness of the combina- tion rate and the establishment of a lower through joint rate. The Commission may require the publication of joint rates equal or lower in amount to two local rates, or a local and a proportional, if by so doing the con- venience of the public is served in ascertaining the cor- rect rates. 28 The Panama Canal Act of 1912 empowered the Com- mission to establish through routes and joint rates via rail and water routes, and this provision has been repeatedly enforced. 14. Special Reparation Docket The Commission's attention is constantly being called to instances where the carriers have collected money from shippers in the course of business which it appears they had no legal right to take. The collection may have been due to misconstruction of a tariff, to error in compiling and printing a tariff, or to some other such error. In view of the stringency of the law against rebates, however, the carrier is careful not to make a8 19 I. C. C. 336. 36 PROCEDURE refunds to shippers until the Commission is satisfied as to the reason for such refund. The payment of money to a shipper would be disclosed to the Commis- sion in its regular inspection of the carrier's accounts. All matters of this character are listed upon the Commission's "special reparation docket." The Com- mission furnishes the carrier with a blank application 29 which it is required to execute and in which the carrier, among other things, admits that the charges collected were excessive and unreasonable and in violation of section 1. Five thousand five hundred and fourteen applications were received by the Commission during the year 1912 and approximately $300,000 were refunded upon drders of the Commission. This work of the Commission is appropriately described in the following quotation taken from Conference Ruling No. 200. It might be well to state that while cases coming forward on this docket are adjusted in an informal manner, this special docket is not an informal docket except in respect to the form of pleadings and the character of the hearing. The Commission cannot on the special docket exceed the authority exercised by it on the formal docket, nor may • it omit any require- ment with respect to cases on the special docket that the law imposes on it in the disposition of cases on the formal docket. In all cases, whether on the formal or the special docket, the law requires a complaint and answer and a full hearing, and provides that where damages are awarded, the report of the Commission shall include the findings of fact on which the award is made. The Commission has endeavored to simplify the procedure on the special docket by accepting the applica- tion of the carrier as the equivalent of a complaint and answer, and by accepting as a sufficient compliance with the require- ments of section 15 for a full hearing its admission that the 29 Form No. 5. BEFORE THE COMMISSION 37 rate charged under the circumstances then existing was unreasonable. It will therefore be observed that the Commission's action in special reparation cases springs from the same authority which it exercises in formal cases. It not infrequently happens that a case will go from the special docket to the formal docket because the parties fail to comply with the rules under the special docket. Sometimes the parties appear at the formal hearing of a case and ask to have it go to the special docket. This will not be allowed because the efforts to settle upon the informal and special dockets have usually failed before the case is set down for formal hearing. After the formal hearing the Commission will have authority of law to decide the case; so when it is once set for hearing, economy of time requires that the Com- mission proceed at once to dispose of the case. The carriers are generally favorable to settlements on the special docket because the Commission ordinarily only orders the future rate established for one year, whereas, if the Commission conducts a formal investigation, it requires, as a result thereof, the maintenance of the rate for two years. The special reparation docket should not be confused with the informal docket, or with repara- tion claims on the formal docket, hereinbefore' described. 15. Division of Inquiry The general duty of the Commission under the Act to see that the provisions of the law are enforced, makes it necessary for the Commission to give special attention to all information coming to it as to violations or sup- posed violations of the law and which entail criminal 38 PROCEDURE responsibility upon the perpetrators, particularly under section 10 of the Act, and also under the Elkins law. In order to keep itself advised as to whether the law is being thus criminally violated, the Commission maintains a Division of Inquiry manned by a corps of skilled inves- tigators known as "special agents." The results of the work of this division go to the Federal Department of Justice or to a grand jury in the locality where the violation of law occurred. Seventy-two indictments were obtained during the year 1915 for violations of the statutes. These include such offenses as collecting charges in excess of the tariff rates wherein the carriers and their employees are the ones indicted, or mis-billing of shipments by shippers in order to obtain rates which are really not applicable upon the shipments moved. Offenses of this latter kind are of course com- mitted by the shippers, and they alone are the ones indicted. The general run of indictments, however, involves devices resorted to by carriers and shippers to defeat the published rates, and in such cases it is the policy of the Commission to secure the indictment of all parties connected with the transaction, including the railroad company, its employees and agents, and the shippers and consignees profiting by such schemes. An interesting set of indictments obtained in 1915 were those obtained against the railroads serving a town from which they advanced rates but failed to publish the advances or post them in the local stations until five or six days after the advances became effective when the Act says they shall do this thirty days before. The Commission has recently had many instances brought to its attention where the railroads were advanc- ing rates secretly without giving shippers a chance to BEFORE THE COMMISSION 39 protest. The indictments in question will have a whole- some effect in stopping these illegal practices. There is no form of procedure in connection with this work unless the Commission finds it necessary to exam- ine certain witnesses under oath, and proceedings of this kind would come under the heading of "Proceedings upon the Commission's Own Motion," already described. 16. Other Activities op the Commission In addition to the work of the Commission involving formal procedure, with which we are particularly con- cerned, a very large part of the annual appropriation of approximately two million and a half dollars, which the Commission spends, and a large share of the personnel of the Commission's force, have to do with administra- tive matters such as the Division of Statistics, which gathers and compiles the statistics relating to the inter- state railroads in the country; the Division of Carriers' Accounts, which keeps a large force in the field contin- ually going through the files and records of the carriers to see that their accounts are kept in accordance with the requirements of section 20 of the Act, and for the further purpose of investigating all items which appear to conflict with the carriers' responsibilities under the law. There are also the Accident Division, the Safety Appliance Division, and service for the inspection of locomotive boilers. Congress has authorized and directed the Commission to proceed with the valuation of the railroads of the country, and this work is now well under way and will cost several million dollars, employ hundreds of people, and take several years to complete. The Act makes 40 PEOCEDUEE specific provision for determining in court any disputes between Commission and carrier as to the proper amounts to be credited in the value of a railroad. One of the most important duties of the Commission is that imposed upon it by the statute of making recom- mendations to Congress for new legislation which experi- ence has demonstrated as necessary for the proper regulation of interstate commerce. Each year the annual report to Congress contains the Commission's views along this line. For instance the last annual report recommends that a period of three years be provided for the beginning of all actions relating to transporta- tion charges subject to the Act and also that there be some control over railway capitalization. Under a provision in the fourth section of the Act, as amended in 1912, if a rail carrier should reduce its charges for the purpose of meeting water competition, and, after successfully meeting such competition, and driving the water carriers out of business, should then attempt to advance its rates, it will not be permitted to do so unless and until the Commission investigates the matter and finds that the proposed advance is due to something besides the elimination of water competition. In addition to the regulation of rail carriers, and water carriers when they are operated under joint control, management, or arrangement with rail carriers, the Commission is, by special legislation, given regulatory powers over express companies, pipe lines, sleeping car companies, and telephone, cable, and telegraph companies, including wireless companies. The Panama Canal Act (1912) contains a provision which has developed into considerable importance. It prohibits a rail carrier from owning or controlling a BEFORE THE COMMISSION 41 competing water carrier after July 1, 1914, and author- izes the Commission to determine the fact as to competi- tion and, under certain limitations, to modify the application of the law in particular cases. This act also extends the Commission's jurisdiction to transportation by rail and water by authorizing it to require physical connection between lines of railroad and docks of water carriers and to establish through routes and joint rates over rail-and-water lines. This acf grants to the Com- mission other powers regulating rail-and-water lines. 17. Conclusion The foregoing pages on practice before the Interstate Commerce Commission are intended to give a simple non- technical account of the Commission's work and what is expected of one going before it for the purpose of moving that body to action under the terms of the Act. It has been difficult to cover even this ground within the limits appropriate for the purpose in hand. Before a person can call himself a commerce lawyer, however, he has a long road to travel. He should not only be well grounded in the law in its broadest aspect, but he must keep up with the current work of the Commission through its published opinions and annual reports. He should undertake to look somewhat into the history of transportation in general in this and other countries, and as time permits he should go back over the volumes containing the opinions of the Commission and the annual reports of that body since it was instituted. Nor is this all. Since the passage of the Act, in 1887, there has been constant litigation under it in the federal courts, and these decisions have a direct bearing upon 42 PROCEDURE the enforcement of the Act by the Commission and the rights of the various parties under the law. There are involved questions of constitutional, statutory, and administrative law bearing upon the powers of the Commission and the application of these laws to trans- portation problems. No attempt has been made to cover the procedure of a case in the courts, as that subject is so involved with the shifting of jurisdiction by statutes from one court to another, as well as other inherent difficulties and statutory requirements, that it can be grasped only by the trained lawyer. As already stated, however, but a small percentage of the many thousands of proceedings before the Commission reach the courts, and the present purpose is primarily to deal with that vast majority which end in a decision of the Commission. It seems hardly necessary to add that the real out- come of a case depends not so much upon the formal procedure in the trial of the case as upon the proof offered at the hearing in substantiation of the com- plainant's cause and the skill with which the record is compiled by the parties. The evidence that should be offered in particular cases depends upon the facts peculiar to each case and constitutes the subject of a separate lecture. TEST QUESTIONS These questions are for the student to use in testing his knowledge of the assignment. The answers are not to be sent to the University. 1. How many kinds of proceedings before the Commission can you name? 2. With what branch of the federal government is the Commission most closely allied? 3. What are the duties of an Examiner presiding at the hearing? Does this complete his duties? 4. What is expected of the complainant at the hearing? 5. How is the carrier usually represented at the hearing? 6. Upon what grounds can the courts review the findings of the Commission? 7. What findings of the Commission are final? 8. How are the criminal provisions of the law enforced ? 9. How is leave for oral argument before the Commission obtained ? 10. Where is oral argument before the Commission held? 11. Where is the hearing of the case conducted? 12. Before whom may hearings be held? 13. Before whom is the argument of the case always made? 14. Distinguish between the special docket and the informal docket. 15. How can the Commission be compelled to take juris- diction under the law? ' 16. When is the issue in a proceeding joined? 17. Upon what theory are the Commission's rules of pro- cedure based? 18. Name the officers and boards in the Commission who handle cases. 43 44 PROCEDURE 19. In what two classes of cases is the burden of proof upon the carriers! 20. What United States Supreme Court case points out the importance of the record before the Commission in interstate commerce cases? 21. How are the transcripts of record distributed by the Commission ? 22. Who may intervene in a proceeding before the Com- mission and how is permission obtained? 23. Distinguish between a petition for rehearing and a petition for reopening. 24. Why does the Commission discourage the filing of depositions ? 25. When does the Statute of Limitations begin to run? 26. Upon what docket are cases involving the suspension of tariffs entered? 27. What are some of the new powers and duties given to the Commission by the legislation of 1912? 28. Who may participate in proceedings under the "inves- tigation and suspension docket"? 29. What is the relative importance of a printed brief in a formal case? INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION RULES OF PRACTICE BEFORE THE COMMISSION IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE, WITH APPROVED FORMS REVISED, AMENDED AND ADOPTED MARCH 20, 1916 1916 THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. Balthasar H. Meyee. Judson C. Clements. Edgar E. Clark. James S. Harlan. Charles C. McChord. Henry C. Hall. Winthrop M. Daniels. George B. McGinty, Secretary. PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE. The Commission has become convinced that no adequate analysis of rate compilations or tabulated statements offered as exhibits can ordinarily be made at the hearing of a case when such rate compilations or tabulated statements have not been filed and served prior to that time. It is therefore pro- posed to amend the Rules of Practice so as to require the filing and service of rate compilations and tabulated statements in advance of the hearing. Before adopting such an amendment the Commission desires to test its practicability and requests that such compilations or tabulated statements be filed as though the amendments shown below were now in effect. The Commission further requests that its attention be directed to situations in which the proposed requirements are found objectionable. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE III. To each complaint must be attached a descriptive list of such rate compilations and tabulated statements as are filed therewith in ac- cordance with rule XIII, as amended. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE XIII. All rate compilations and tabulated statements which the com- plainant intends to offer in evidence must be filed with the Com- mission at the time the complaint is filed, and any compilations and statements which the defendant desires to submit in answer thereto must be filed with the Commission within 30 days thereafter. Similar data in rebuttal must be filed with the Commission 15 days after the service of the tabulations filed by the defendants. In investigation and suspension cases the respondents must file with the Commission all rate compilations and tabulated statements which they intend to offer in evidence within 15 days from the date of service of the suspension order upon their agents in Washington. Protest- ants must file any compilations or statements they desire to submit in answer thereto within 30 days thereafter. Similar data in 3 4 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. rebuttal must be filed with the Commission 15 days after the service of the tabulations filed by the protestants. These periods will not be extended except upon application to the Commission and for good cause shown. Five copies of all compilations and statements referred to in the two preceding paragraphs must be filed with the Commission, and the Commission will supply three copies thereof to opposing counsel upon request. In special cases the Commission may require additional copies to be furnished. Except where such compilations and statements are filed with the complaint, a notice describing such compilations and statements must be served upon all adverse parties. RULES OP PRACTICE BEFORE THE COMMISSION IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE. I. PUBLIC SESSIONS. Sessions of the Commission for hearing evidence or oral arguments will be held as ordered by the Commission. The office of the Commission at Washington, D. C, is open each business day from 9 a. m. to 4.30 p. m. II. PARTIES. Any person, firm, corporation, company, or association, or any mercantile, agricultural, or manufacturing society or other organization, or any body politic or municipal organization, or any common carrier, or the railroad commissioner or commis- sion of any State or Territory, may complain to the Commis- sion of anything done, or omitted to be done, in violation of the provisions of the act to regulate commerce, as amended, by any common carrier subject to the provisions of said act. Any such party may appear and be heard in person or by attorney. Two or more complainants may join in one complaint against two or more defendants, if the complaint involves substan- tially the same principle, subject, or state of facts. If a complaint relates to matters in which two or more carriers, engaged in transportation by continuous carriage or shipment, are interested, the several carriers participating in such carriage or shipment are necessary parties defendant. If a complaint relates to rates, regulations, or practices of carriers operating different lines, and the object of the pro- 5 6 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. ceeding is to secure correction of such, rates, regulations, or practices on each of said lines, all the carriers operating such lines should be made defendants. If a complaint relates to provisions of a classification it will ordinarily be sufficient to name as defendants the carriers forming one or more through routes between representative points of origin and destination. If the line of a carrier is operated by a receiver or trustee, both the carrier and its receiver or trustee must be made defendants in cases involving transportation over such line. Any person may file an intervening petition in any proceed- ing prior to or at the time the case is called for hearing, but not after except for good cause shown. Such petition shall set forth the grounds of the proposed intervention and the petitioner's interest in the proceedings. Intervention will not be permitted except upon allegations that are reasonably perti- nent to the issues already presented. Leave granted on such petition will entitle interveners to have notice of hearings, to produce and cross-examine witnesses, and to be heard in person or by attorney upon brief and at the oral argument. The petition need not be verified, but must be signed in ink by petitioner or his duly authorized attorney. The petitioner must furnish as many complete copies thereof as there are parties to the case, and three additional copies for the use of the Commission. III. COMPLAINTS. Complaints must be typewritten on one side of the paper only, or be printed. In either case the complaint must con- form to the specifications of rule XXI. The names of all parties, complainant or defendant, must be stated in full, with- out abbreviations, and the address of each complainant, with the name and address of his attorney, if any, must appear upon each copy. The complaint need not be verified, but must be signed in ink by the complainant or his duly authorized attor- ney. The complainant must furnish as many complete copies RULES OP PRACTICE. 7 of the complaint as there may be parties defendant to be served, including receivers or trustees, and three additional copies for the use of the Commission. The Commission will serve the complaint upon each defend- ant by leaving a copy with its designated agent in the District of Columbia, or, if no such agent has been designated, by posting a copy in the office of the secretary of the Commission. Complaints should be so drawn as fully and completely to advise the defendant and the Commission wherein the pro- visions of the act have been violated and should set forth briefly and in plain language the facts claimed to constitute such violation. Two or more grounds of complaint involv- ing the same principle, subject, or state of facts, may be included in one complaint, but should be separately stated and numbered. The several rates, regulations, and discrimi- nations complained of should be set out by specific reference to the tariffs in which they appear whenever that is practicable. Where the rate attacked is one increased after January 1, 1910, the complaint should so state. In case discrimination in violation of sections 3 or 4 of the act is alleged the complaint should specify and describe in detail the particular preference or advantage to any per- son, company, firm, corporation, locality, or traffic, which is relied upon as constituting such discrimination. Appropriate allegation should also be made in such case to present for decision the issue as to whether or not such rates, charges, or other matters complained of are just and reasonable. In case a violation of section 4 is alleged the complaint should specify and describe in detail the particular violation of that section, giving tariff references whenever practicable. In case the discrimination alleged is between intrastate and interstate or foreign traffic the complaint should so state with sufficient definiteness fully to disclose the allega- tion made in respect to any tariff provision prescribed, estab- lished or compelled by state authority. The Commission de- sires in such cases to notify the state authorities of the com- plaint, and complainant must furnish sufficient copies for that purpose. Except under unusual circumstances, and for good cause 8 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. shown, reparation will not be awarded unless specifically prayed for in the complaint or in an amendment thereto filed before the submission of the case. After a final order has been entered upon a complaint in which reparation is not sought or, if prayed, has been denied, the Commission will not ordinarily award reparation upon a complaint subsequently filed and based upon any finding upon the first complaint. Where reparation is sought the complaint should state (a) that complainant makes claim for reparation, (b) the name of each individual claimant asking reparation, (c) the com- modities transported, (d) the names of defendants against which claim is made, (e) the period of time within which or the specific date upon which the shipments were made, and (f) the points of origin and destination, either specific- ally, or, where they are numerous, by a definite indication of a defined territorial or rate group of the points of origin and destination. Under a general rate adjustment chal- lenged in the complaint, or upon many shipments under a particular rate, or where many points of origin or destina- tion are involved, it is the practice of the Commission first to find and determine in its report as to the reasonableness of the rate or rates in issue, and whether the parties seek- ing reparation have borne the transportation charges, as such, have been damaged, and are entitled to reparation; thereafter giving to such parties an opportunity to make proof respecting the shipments upon which reparation is claimed. In such cases freight bills and other exhibits bear- ing on the amount of reparation should be reserved until called for and should not be filed with the complaint. The parties, however, should be prepared to produce at the hear- ing the freight bills and other exhibits bearing on the amount of reparation, for the reason that they may become necessary in developing other facts in the case. When complaints for the recovery of damages have been before the Commission informally and the parties have been notified by the Commission that the complaint is- of such a BULBS OP PRACTICE. 8a nature that it cannot be determined informally, or when the parties voluntarily withdraw the complaint from in- formal consideration, formal complaint thereon must be filed within six months from the date of such notification or with- drawal. Otherwise the parties will be deemed to have aban- doned their complaint and the same will not be entertained : Provided, however, That this rule does not apply to formal complaints for the recovery of damages filed within two years from the date of the delivery of shipments. RULES OF PRACTICE. 9 IV. ANSWERS. Answers must be typewritten on one side of the paper only, or be printed. In either case the answer must conform to the specifications of rule XXI. One copy of each answer must, unless the Commission orders otherwise, be filed with the secretary of the Commission at his office in Washington, D. C, within 30 days after the day of service of the complaint, by defendants whose general offices are at or west of El Paso, Tex., Salt Lake City, Utah, or Spo- kane, Wash., and within 20 days by all other defendants, and a copy of each such answer must be at the same time served personally or by mail upon the complainant or his attorney. The Commission will, when advisable, shorten or extend the time for answer. Answers should be so drawn as fully and completely to advise the complainant and the Commission of the nature of the defense, and should admit or deny specifically and in detail each material allegation of the complaint. Whenever it is apparent from the complaint, either by direct allegation or otherwise, that a departure from the requirements of the fourth section of the act is involved, the answer should set forth by number the particular application or order which protects such departure. An answer denying that a discrimi- nation is undue or unjust should explain fully wherein such discrimination is not undue or unjust. It is desired that every effort be thus made to narrow the issues upon hearing. If a defendant satisfies a complaint either before or after answering, a signed acknowledgment thereof must be filed by both parties, stating when and how the complaint has been satisfied. V. FORMAL CLAIMS FOR REPARATION BASED UPON FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION. When the Commission finds that reparation is due, but that the amount can not be ascertained upon the record before it, the complainant should immediately prepare a statement in 10 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. accordance with Form 5, showing as to each shipment upon which reparation is claimed the date of delivery, car initials and number, points of origin and destination, route, commod- ity, weight, rate applied, charges collected, rate found reason- able and charges applicable thereunder, and the amount of reparation payable upon the basis of the findings. Such statements should not include any shipments which were transported upon rates other than those included in the Commission 's findings nor any shipments which were delivered at destination more than two years before the complaint was informally or formally presented to the Commission. The statement should then be forwarded to the carrier which col- lected the charges for certification as to its accuracy. Such certification should cover not only the movement of the ship- ments and the amount of charges but also the amount of reparation claimed under the Commission's findings. Dis- crepancies, duplications, or other errors in such statements should be adjusted by the parties and an agreed statement submitted to the Commission in accordance with Form 5. VI. SERVICE OF PAPERS. Notices and copies of papers, other than complaints, depo- sitions, and intervening petitions, must be served upon all parties personally or by mail. When any party has appeared by attorney, service upon such attorney will be deemed proper service upon the party. VII. AMENDMENTS. Amendments to any complaint or answer in any proceeding will be allowed or refused by the Commission at its discretion. VIII. CONTINUANCES AND EXTENSIONS OF TIME. Continuances and extensions of time will be granted or denied by the Commission at its discretion. RULES OF PRACTICE. 11 IX. STIPULATIONS. Parties to any proceeding may, by stipulation in writing filed with the secretary, or presented at the hearing, agree upon the facts, or any portion thereof, involved therein. It is desired that the facts be thus agreed upon as far as and whenever practicable. X. HEARINGS. When issue is joined upon formal complaint by service of answer, or by failure of defendant to answer, the Commission will assign a time and place for hearing. Witnesses will be examined orally before the Commission or one of its examiners, unless their testimony be taken by deposition or the facts be agreed upon as provided for in these rules. At hearings on formal complaint the complainant shall open and close. At hearings upon applications for relief from any provision of the act the applicant shall open and close. At hearings of investigation and suspension proceedings the re- spondent shall open and close. At hearings of all other investi- gations, on the motion of the Commission, the Commission shall open and close, except that upon proper notice in advance of the hearing the Commission may prescribe a different order. In hearings of several proceedings upon a consolidated record the presiding commissioner or examiner shall designate who shall open and close. Interveners shall follow the party in whose behalf the intervention is made, and in all cases where the intervention is not in support of either original party the presiding commissioner or examiner shall designate the order of procedure for such interveners. XI. DEPOSITIONS. The deposition of a witness for use in a proceeding pending before the Commission may, after issue joined, be taken in compliance with the following rules of procedure, prescribed under section 17 of the act, but not otherwise. 12 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. Such depositions may be taken before a special agent or examiner of the Commission, or any judge or commissioner of any court of the United States, or any clerk of a district court, or any chancellor, justice, or judge of a supreme or superior court, mayor or chief magistrate of a city, judge of a county court or court of common pleas of any of the United States, or any notary public not being of counsel or attorney to either of the parties nor interested in the event of the proceeding or investigation, according to such designation as the Commission may make in any order made by it in the premises, except that where such deposition is taken in a foreign country it may be taken before an officer or person designated by the Commission or agreed upon by the parties by stipulation in writing to be filed with the Commission. Any party desiring to take the deposition of a witness in such a proceeding shall notify the Commission to that effect, and in such notice shall state the time when, the place where, and the name and post-office address of the party before whom it is desired that the deposition be taken, the name and post- office address of the witness, and the subject matter or matters concerning which the witness is expected to testify, whereupon the Commission will make and serve upon the parties or their attorneys an order wherein the Commission shall name the witness whose deposition is to be taken and specify the time when, the place where, and the party before whom the witness is to testify, but such time and place, and the party before whom the deposition is to be taken, so specified in the Com- mission's order, may or may not be the same as those named in said notice to the Commission. Every person whose deposition is so taken shall be cautioned and sworn (or affirm, if he so request) to testify the whole truth and nothing but the truth concerning the matter about which he shall testify, and shall be carefully examined. His testimony shall be reduced to typewriting by the officer before whom the deposition is taken, or under his direction, after which the deposition shall be subscribed by the witness and certified in usual form by the officer. After the deposition has been so subscribed and certified it shall, together with two copies thereof made by such officer or under his direction, RULES OF PRACTICE. 13 be forwarded by such officer under seal in an envelope ad- dressed to the Commission at its office in Washington, D. C. Upon receipt of the deposition and copies the Commission will file in the record in said proceeding such deposition and for- ward one copy to the complainant or his attorney and the other copy to the defendant or its attorney, except that where there are more than one complainant or defendant the copies will be forwarded by the Commission to the parties designated by such complainants or defendants as the case may be. Such depositions must be typewritten and must conform to the specifications of rule XXI. No deposition shall be taken except after 6 days' notice to the parties, and where the deposition is taken in a foreign country such notice shall be at least 15 days. No such deposition shall be taken either before the proceed- ing is at issue or, unless under special circumstance and for good cause shdwn, within 10 days prior to the date of the hear- ing thereof assigned by the Commission, and where the depo- sition is taken in a foreign country it shall not be taken after 30 days prior to such date of hearing. "Witnesses whose depositions are taken pursuant to these rules and the magistrate or the officer taking the same, unless he be an examiner of the Commission, shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid for like service in the courts of the United States, which fees shall be paid by the party or parties at whose instance the depositions are taken. XII. WITNESSES AND SUBPOENAS. Subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses from any place in the United States to any designated place of hearing may be issued by any member of the Commission. Subpoenas for the production of books, papers, or docu- ments (unless directed by the Commission upon its own mo- tion) will issue only upon application in writing. Applications to compel witnesses who are not parties to the proceedings, or agents of such parties, to produce documentary evidence must 14 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. be verified and must specify, as nearly as may be, the books, papers, or documents desired and the facts to be proven by them. Applications to compel a party to the proceeding to produce books, papers, or documents need only set forth in a general way the books, papers, or documents sought, with a statement that the applicant believes they will be of service in the determination of the proceeding. Witnesses whose testimony is taken orally are entitled to the same fees as are paid for like services in the courts of the United States, such fees to be paid by the party at whose instance the testimony is taken. XIII. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. Where relevant and material matter offered in evidence is embraced in a document containing other matter not material or relevant and not intended to be put in evidence, such document will not be received, but the party offering the same shall present to opposing counsel and to the Commission true copies of such material and relevant matter, in proper form, which may be received in evidence and become part of the record. In case any portion of a tariff, report, circular, or other document on file with the Commission is offered in evidence, the party offering the same must give specific reference to the items or pages and lines thereof to be considered. The Commission will take notice of items in tariffs and annual or other periodical reports of carriers properly on file with it or in annual, statistical, and other official reports of the Commission. When it is desired to direct the Commission's attention to such tariffs or reports upon hearing or in briefs or argument it must be done with the precision specified in the second preceding sentence. In case any testimony in other proceedings than the one on hearing is introduced in evidence, a copy of such testimony must be presented as an exhibit. When exhibits of a documentary character are to be offered in evidence, copies should be furnished opposing counsel for use at the hearing. RULES OF PRACTICE. 15 All exhibits showing rates or distances must, by proper I. C. C. number reference, indicate the tariff authority for the rates, and must also show by lines and junction points the route via which the distances are computed, as well as the authority for the distance scale used. Whenever evidence can be condensed in tables, that method of presentation should be adopted. Where agreed upon by the parties at or after the hearing, the presiding commissioner or examiner, if he deems advisable, may permit the filing of specified documentary evidence as a part of the record within a time to be fixed by him, but which shall expire not less than 10 days before the date fixed for filing and serving the opening brief. Documentary evidence will not be received after the close of testimony except as above provided. XIV. BRIEFS. Unless otherwise specifically ordered, briefs may be filed upon application made at hearings or upon order of the Com- mission. Briefs must be printed in conformity with the speci- fications of rule XXI, and contain an abstract of the evidence, assembled by subjects, with reference to the pages of the record whereon the evidence appears. There should be in- cluded requests for specific findings which the parties think the Commission should make. Documentary exhibits should not be reproduced in briefs, but may, if it is desired, be reproduced in an appendix to the brief. Analyses of such exhibits should be included in the abstract of evidence under the subjects to which they pertain. In cases involving a discrimination in rates against one com- munity or locality and in favor of another community or locality, or otherwise involving a relationship of rates, and in investigation and suspension cases, the party who is required to file the first brief shall insert therein, opposite the statement of the case, a small map or chart of the territory showing the rate structure involved. The abstract of evidence should fol- low the statement of the case and precede the argument. Every brief of more than 20 pages shall contain on its front 16 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. flyleaves a subject index with page references, the subject index to be supplemented by a list of all cases referred to alphabetically arranged, together with references to pages where the cases are cited. Briefs for the various parties shall be filed in the same order as governs in the taking of their testimony at hearings. At the close of the testimony in each case the presiding com- missioner or examiner will fix the time for filing and service of the respective briefs as follows, unless good cause for varia- tion therefrom is shown : For the opening brief, 30 days from close of testimony; for the brief of the opposing party, 15 days after the date fixed for the opening brief ; for reply brief, 10 days after the date fixed for the brief of the opposing party. Briefs of interveners shall be filed and served within the time fixed for the brief of the party in whose behalf the intervention is made, or within such other time as may be fixed by the pre- siding commissioner or examiner. Briefs not filed with the Commission and served so as to reach opposing counsel on or before the dates fixed therefor will not be received except by special permission of the Commission. Parties who fail to file opening brief, as required by this rule, will not be permitted to file reply to brief of opposing party. All briefs must be filed with the secretary and be accompanied by notice, showing service upon all opposing counsel who appeared at the hearing or on brief, and 15 copies of each brief shall be furnished for the use of the Commission, unless otherwise ordered. Ap- plications for extension of time in which to file briefs shall be by petition, in writing, stating the facts on which the applica- tion rests, which must be filed with the -Commission at least five days before the time for filing such brief. ORAL ARGUMENT. Oral argument will be had only as ordered by the Commis- sion. Applications therefor shall be made at the hearing or in writing within 10 days after the close of testimony. XV. I1EHEARINGS. Applications for reopening a proceeding after final submis- sion, or for rehearing or reargument after decision, must be KULES OF PRACTICE. 17 by petition stating specifically the grounds relied upon, and copies thereof must be served by- the party filing the same upon all opposing counsel who appeared at the hearing or on brief. Application for rehearing that part of any case relat- ing to reparation or other damage for past injuries must be filed with the Commission within 60 days after service of the order therein. If such application be to reopen the proceeding for further evidence, the nature and purpose of such evidence must be briefly stated, and the same must not be merely cumulative. If the application be for a rehearing, the petition must specify the matters claimed to be erroneously decided, with a brief statement of the alleged errors. If any order of the Commis- sion is sought to be reversed, changed, or modified on account of facts and circumstances arising subsequent to the hearing, or of consequences resulting from compliance therewith, the matters relied upon by the applicant must be fully set forth. At least 10 copies of all such applications must be filed with the Commission and be accompanied by notice showing service upon all opposing counsel. Such adverse parties may file a reply to such petition for rehearing or reopening within 10 days from the date of service upon them. Such reply must be served upon the attorney for petitioner and 10 copies must be filed with the Commission. XVI. TRANSCRIPTS OP TESTIMONY. One copy of the testimony will be furnished by the Com- mission for the use of the complainant and one copy for the use of the defendant, without charge. If two or more com- plainants or defendants have appeared at the hearing, such complainants or defendants must designate to whom the copy for their use shall be delivered. In proceedings instituted by the Commission on its own motion, including proceedings involving the suspension of tariffs, no copies of testimony will be furnished without charge. 18 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. XVII. COMPLIANCE WITH ORDERS. When an order has been issued, the defendant or defendants named therein must promptly notify the secretary of the Com- mission on or before the date upon which such order becomes effective whether or not compliance has been made therewith. If a change in rates is required, the notification to the secre- tary must be given in addition to the filing of proper tariffs. XVIII. APPLICATIONS UNDER FOURTH SECTION. Any common carrier subject to the act to regulate commerce, as amended, may apply to the Commission, under the proviso clause of the fourth section, for such authorization as it is empowered to grant thereunder. Such application must be verified and conform to rule XXI. The application should specify the places and traffic involved, the rates, fares, or charges on such traffic for the shorter and longer distances, the carriers other than the applicant which may be interested in the traffic, the special nature of the case, the character of the hardship claimed to exist, and the extent of the relief sought by the applicant. Upon the filing of such application the Commission will take such action as the circumstances of the case require. XIX. SUSPENSIONS. Suspensions of tariff schedules under section 15 of the act will not ordinarily be considered unless application therefor is made in writing at least 10 days before the time fixed in the tariff for such rates to take effect. Applications for suspen- sions must indicate the schedule affected by its I. C. C. num- ber and give specific reference to the items against which protest is made, together with a statement of the grounds thereof. When application for the suspension of tariff schedules is made, seven copies of such application should be furnished. RULES OP PRACTICE. 19 XX. INFORMATION TO PARTIES. The secretary of the Commission will, upon request, advise any party as to the form of complaint, answer, or other paper necessary to be filed in any proceeding. XXI. SPECIFICATIONS OF COMPLAINTS, ANSWERS, BRIEFS, PETITIONS, APPLICATIONS, ETC. All complaints, answers, petitions, applications, depositions, or other papers to be filed, if typewritten, must be on paper not more than 8J inches wide and not more than 12 inches long, and weighing not less than 16 pounds to the ream, folio base 17 by 22 inches, with left-hand margin not less than 1J inches wide. The impression must be on only one side of the paper. Whenever such papers are printed they, as well as briefs, must be in 10 or 12 point type, on good unglazed paper, 5£ inches wide by 9 inches long, with inside margin not less than 1 inch wide, and with double-leaded text and single-leaded citations. XXII. ADDRESS OF THE COMMISSION. All communications to the Commission must be addressed to Washington, D. C, unless otherwise specifically directed. APPROVED FORMS. These forms may he used in cases to which they are applicable, with such alterations as the circumstances may render necessary. No. 1. COMPLAINT. BEFORE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. The Railroad Company, - Railway Company. [Insert corporate title, with- out abbreviation, of car- rier, or carriers, necessary defendants.] The complaint of the above-named complainant , respect- fully shows : I. That [complainant should here state nature and place of business, also whether a corporation, firm, or partnership, and if a firm or partnership, the individual names of the parties composing the same.] II. That the defendant above named is a [are] common carrier engaged in the transportation of passengers and property, wholly by railroad [or, partly by railroad and partly by water], between points in the state of and points in the state of , and as such common carrier is [are] subject to the provisions of the act to regulate com- merce approved February 4, 1887, and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto. III. That [state in this and subsequent paragraphs, to be numbered TV, V, etc., the matter or matters intended to be complained of, naming every rate, rule, regulation, or practice the lawfulness of which is challenged, and also each point of origin and point of destination between which the rates com- plained of are applied. Whenever practicable tariff references should be given.] [Where discrimination is charged, the facts constituting the basis of the charge should be clearly stated; that is, if the discrimination be under section 2, the person or persons 20 RULES OF PRACTICE. 21 claimed to be favored and the person or persons claimed to be injured should be named, and the kind of service and hind of traffic, together with the claimed similarity of circum- stances and conditions of transportation, should be set forth. If the discrimination be under section 3, the particular person, company, firm, corporation, locality, or traffic claimed to be accorded undue or unreasonable preference or advantage, or subjected to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, should be stated. If the discrimination be under section 4, the particular provision of the section claimed to be violated — that is, whether the long-and-short-haul provision or the aggregate of intermediate rates provision — as well as the facts constituting such violation should be stated.] X. That by reason of the facts stated in the foregoing paragraphs complainant has [have] been subjected to the payment of rates [fares or charges] for transportation which were when exacted, and still are, (1) unjust and unreasonable in violation of section 1 of the act to regulate commerce, and [or] (2) unjustly discriminatory in violation of section 2, and [or] (3) unduly preferential or prejudicial in violation of section 3, and [or] (4) in violation of the long-and-short- haul [or, aggregate of intermediate rates] provision of section 4 thereof. [Use one or more of the allegations numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, according to the facts as intended to be charged.] Wherefore complainant pray that defendant may be [severally] required to answer the charges herein ; that after due hearing and investigation an order be made commanding said defendant [and each of them] to cease and desist from the aforesaid violations of said act to regulate commerce, and establish and put in force and apply in future to the trans- portation of between the origin and destination points named in paragraph hereof, in lieu of the rates [rules, regulations, or practices] named in said paragraph, such other maximum rates [rules, regulations, or practices] as the Com- mission may deem reasonable and just [and also pay to com- plainant by way of reparation for the unlawful charges hereinbefore alleged the sum of , or such other sum as, in view of the evidence to be adduced herein, the Commis- sion shall determine that complainant is [are] entitled to 22 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. as an award of damages under the provisions of said act for violation thereof], and that such other and further order or orders be made as the Commission may consider proper in the premises. Dated at , 19 — . [Complainant's signature.] , No. 2. ANSWER. BEFORE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. v. [-Docket No. The Railroad Company. The above-named defendant , for answer to the com- plaint in this proceeding, respectfully state : I. [Here follow appropriate and responsive admissions, denials, and averments, answering the complaint paragraph by paragraph.] Wherefore defendant pray that the complaint in this proceeding be dismissed. The Eailroad Company, By ■ , [Title of officer.] No. 3. INTERVENING PETITION. BEFORE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. V. Docket No. Comes now your petitioner, , and respect- fully represents that he has an interest in the matters in litigation in the above-entitled proceeding and moves that RULES OF PRACTICE. 23 he may be allowed to intervene in and become a party to said proceeding, and for cause of intervention says : I. That [intervener should here state nature and place of business, and whether a corporation, firm, or partnership, etc.]. Hi [Intervener should here set out specifically its interest in the above-entitled proceeding in accordance with the last paragraph of rule II of the rules of practice.] Wherefore said prays leave to intervene and be treated as a party hereto with the right to have notice of and appear at the taking of testimony, produce and cross- examine witnesses, and be heard in person or by counsel upon brief and at the oral argument, if oral argument is granted. Dated at , 19 — . [Intervener's signature.] No. 4. PETITION FOR REHEARING. BEFORE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. V. Docket No. Comes now the complainant [or defendant] in the above- entitled proceeding and respectfully petitions the Commis- sion to grant a rehearing therein, and in support of said petition respectfully shows : I. [Eere set out specifically the matters claimed to be erroneously decided, with a brief statement of the alleged errors, in conformity, with rule XV of the rules of practice.] "Wherefore petitioner prays that a rehearing be granted in the above-entitled case and that the Commission enter such further order or orders in the premises as to it may seem reasonable and just. Dated at , 19—- [Petitioner's signature.] o S5 H s « H Q I? H H g a PL. si © g Pi o 6 ft! I g 3 Ssl o C 3 o u 2 > G.3 t- ■* CO CO "* iH tH H N ecus eg -SC TC US vfj ;^^^ ;£ oi 6 Ph • CO - t- N A «D O jj aidd CO CO CO fl goo i? 1 C cS a o 5 c3 S I- o 1 * N C/J fc N W o N 1-3 o & 2 M iZi GROUNDS OF PROOF IN RATE CASES This subject is closely allied to the one of practice before the Commission, and to the Act to Regulate Com- merce, but as both of these subjects are covered else- where in this course, we have purposely refrained from quoting the Act or discussing procedure. 1. A Rate Case Rate cases before the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion under the Act to Regulate Commerce are of two kinds: (1) a case in which a rate for the transportation of property in interstate commerce is challenged as being unreasonable, and (2) a case in which a rate is complained of as being unduly discriminatory or unjustly prejudicial to one locality, person, or particular descrip- tion of traffic, and unduly favorable to another locality, shipper, or description of traffic. A complaint may challenge a large number of rates on a commodity from a point or group of points at which the commodity is produced to the market or markets to which it is transported for consumption. Again, a rate case may be brought by a business community and may assail the whole schedule of rates to or from such com- munity under one or both of the above-mentioned heads. When rates are unreasonable in the opinion of the Interstate Commerce Commission, they are in violation of section 1 of the Act, which says that all rates for the transportation of persons or property in interstate 1 2 GKOUNDS OP PROOF commerce must be "just and reasonable." Section 15 vests in the Commission tbe power to say, after a full hearing thereon to all parties interested, what is a just and reasonable rate. As illustrating how conclusive and final the finding of the Commission is as to the reasonableness of a rate, attention is called to a case where the carrier admitted the rate to be unreasonable, yet the Commission did not so find. 1 In proceedings under section 1, therefore, the complaint must allege jthat the rate or rates attacked are unjust, unreasonable, and in violation of section 1 of the Act. The other kind of rate case raises the issue that rates are unjustly discriminatory or unduly prejudicial. Sec- tions 2 and 3 of the Act prohibit rates of this character. When attacking rates on this ground, the complaint must allege that the rates are unjustly discriminatory in violation of section 2 of the Act, or unduly prejudicial to one shipper, locality, or description of traffic, and unduly preferential to another, in violation of section 3. Here, again, Congress leaves to the Commission's dis- cretion the determining power. There is a distinction between sections 2 and 3 that will be pointed out later. 2. Our Present Scope The post of Interstate Commerce Commissioner is an exalted one in our federal government. Where can one point to any group of men that exercises greater powers under law than does this tribunal? It regulates the transportation charges of the greatest commercial nation in history — transportation charges which are the life- blood of a score of billions of invested capital in the 1 26 I. C. C. Eep. 6. GROUNDS OF PROOF 3 railroads— transportation charges which mean pros- perity or adversity to vast industries and whole com- munities and which, therefore, affect quite directly and personally every citizen of the republic. • It is to the judgment of men possessing the ability and experience to occupy a post of the kind just described that one must bring his proof in his attack or in his defense of railroad rates under the act of Congress. Surely, therefore, there is present every incentive to know just what is the best and most approved method of winning the Commissioners ' favor- able consideration of a case that is worth presenting to the Commission. Experience in such matters is a most valuable asset, but in the large number of formal cases annually presented to the Commission (a thousand or more) from all parts of a vast country, there must always be a heavy percentage of new ' ' appearances ' ' at the bar of this tribunal. Many of these men are hopelessly lost before they are well started with their cases. Counsel and advice before undertaking the trial of a rate case would in recent years have saved a vast sum of money and countless days of labor in working up and presenting to the Commission evidence which it has felt compelled to brush aside and shut off from view in deciding the case, because some legal, financial, economic, or traffic principle had been quite wholly overlooked in the course of preparation for trial. It is all too common an experience at the Commission for those who are engaged in analyzing and marshaling the facts in presented cases to be compelled to pass over quantities of evidence placed in the record because it rests upon a false and misleading theory; evidence, which if followed, would lead the Commission so far 4 GROUNDS OF PROOF astray that its opinion would fail to win the approval of sound-thinking men, and would compel a court to upset any finding and order of the Commission based thereon. There is a vast opportunity for individual action and ingenuity in planning a rate contest, as well as for a difference of opinion as to what should or should not be controlling in passing upon particular issues and rates. Every traffic manager and every rate "expert" has his own particular theories. But passing these all over, the important point for us is to approach a rate case from the standpoint of the Interstate Commerce Commission (one might well say from the standpoint of the individual Interstate Commerce Commissioners, as their particular views and theories are known and understood) and so far as possible to present only those facts, principles, and arguments as one has good reason to believe will appeal to the seven men in whose hands the decision of the case finally rests. The countless grounds upon which rate cases might be fought out before the Commission are so broad and far-reaching that it will be necessary at the outset to place certain limits, beyond which we shall not venture. Taking the general issues of unreasonableness and of unjust discrimination in freight rates, we shall attempt to point out the primary facts and arguments that when presented to the Commission will have a tendency to convince the minds of the Commissioners of the correct- ness of the stand taken that the rates in question are or are not in violation of the Act. Among the many kinds of evidence that may be pre- sented in a rate case it will not be denied that some of them carry great weight with the Commission, while GROUNDS OF PROOF 5 others have but slight bearing upon the outcome of the case. 3. What the Commission Considers In order to determine what subjects should be dis- cussed herein as controlling the action of the Commis- sion, an analysis was made of the current printed volume of the Commission's decisions to see, if possible, what were the potent facts and arguments that were being relied upon by the Commission in rendering its decisions. The volume in question contained decisions in eighty cases that may be denominated rate cases. We divided these into (1) cases raising the issue of unrea- sonableness under section 1 of the Act, (2) cases raising the issue of unjust discrimination under sections 2 and 3 of the Act, (3) cases involving both unreasonableness and unjust discrimination. It appears from a study of these cases that the most frequently used character of evidence that is being considered by the Commission is the comparison of rates. That is to say, the complainant before the Commission, or the carrier defending its rates, points to other rates that the carriers or the Commission have established and which are presumed to be reasonable. From these it is argued that the rates in question are or are not reason- able. This form of proof was employed in sixty-eight of the eighty rate cases. Moreover, the Commission based its decision in whole or in part in these cases upon that character of evidence. The next most important subject found to be con- trolling the action of the Commission was the character of service demanded of the carrier by the particular 6 GROUNDS OF PROOF traffic, that is to say, the comparative expense to the carrier in transporting the commodity involved. The decisions in twenty-one of the eighty rate cases depended in whole or in part npon evidence of this character. Comparative distance the traffic was hauled was the basis of decisions in twelve of the cases. Volume of the tonnage moving and value of the commodity hauled are mentioned by the Commission as the basis of its deci- sion, at least in part, in several of the cases. Only from the data obtained after this analytical study of the current opinions of the Commission can one venture to offer suggestions as to matter of proof in rate cases that can with confidence be relied upon as being material to the issues presented in the trial of rate cases before the Interstate Commerce Commis- sion at the present time. 4. Basis of Rate Regulation Common carriers are engaged in what is known as a public calling. Moreover, they possess certain powers of government which have been conferred upon them, such as the power of eminent domain to take the prop- erty of private individuals upon compensation therefor. Hence, they have always been subjected to public regula- tion as to their charges, under the common law. Prior to the advent of Commissions, a shipper could recover an unreasonable charge through the cumbersome process of a suit in court. He did not always have an action, however, for a discriminatory rate. While the fundamental basis of federal regulation is the provision in the Constitution conferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce, the power GROUNDS OF PROOF 7 of the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate the rates of carriers is not as broad or as unlimited as this common-law power or even as inclusive as the power of Congress under the constitutional provision. The Commission can exercise only such portion of the commerce power as is expressly stated in the Act to Eegulate Commerce. In making its decisions there- under, it must put its finger upon the actual wording of the statute as justification for whatever it does. As might naturally be suspected, therefore, the Commission has been taken into court many times on the plea that in reaching its decision it exceeded its statutory author- ity. The courts have had no hesitancy in annulling the action of the Commission whenever it has gone beyond the confines of the Act no matter how laudable the purpose of the Commission may have appeared. The Commission cannot base rates on wise policy. 2 There is an impression abroad that the Act to Eegu- late Commerce was, for the most part, intended to correct unjust discriminations in the transportation charges and practices of railroads. It has been so stated in the decisions of courts and in the reports of the Commission, but that impression is hardly borne out by the figures above given, which show that over half the cases raised the issue of unreasonableness. 5. Cases Involving All the Bates op a Carrier Cases involving ' the reasonableness of a whole or a substantial portion of a schedule of rates of the carriers should be clearly distinguished from the ordinary rate case arising upon the complaint of a shipper or group "219 u. S. 443. 8 GROUNDS OP PROOF of shippers. It is almost inconceivable that a single complainant or even a body of shippers would undertake to upset the entire schedule of a carrier or group of carriers. No one has ever undertaken this herculean task. The interstate law requires the complainant to set out definitely the rates attacked, and then he must prove his allegations. The carriers several times have alleged that their net revenues were too low, and have demanded that the Commission enter a finding upon that issue when passing upon wholesale advances proposed by the carriers. The carriers have never yet pointed to any place in the statute empowering the Commission to enter a finding that the net revenues of the carriers are insufficient. The law merely says that the Commission can fix a just and reasonable rate. The courts have never yet determined that the Commission possessed any power under the statutes to pass upon such an issue and deter- mine that the net revenues of the carriers were insuffi- cient. The letter of the Act requires the Commission to pass upon the lawful character of the rates themselves, and the most that can be said of the effect of the evi- dence dealing with the revenues of the carriers is that it might have some bearing upon the reasonableness per se of the individual rates. It is true that in the 1914 Five Per Cent Case 3 a majority of the Commission found that the revenues of the eastern carriers were deficient and for that reason permitted a general advance in rates. It is quite significant, however, that when the western carriers in 1915 in a similar proceeding demanded of the Commission a finding that their revenues were insufficient, a majority of the Commission declined to enter any such finding and proceeded to GROUNDS OF PROOF 9 dispose of the proposed rates upon the separate com- modities involved as though they were individual and separate rate cases. The Commission permitted some of the advances and denied others and wholly ignored the issue raised by the carriers as to their need of revenue. 381 The carriers filed a vigorous petition for rehearing, demanding that the Commission enter a find- ing as to whether or not the revenues of the carriers are sufficient. This was summarily denied. 4 Certain states have prescribed schedules for a sub- stantial portion of the tonnage moving in state com- merce, and the courts in passing upon these rates have held that the carrier is entitled to a reasonable return upon the value of the property devoted to the public use. While a proceeding of this character affects all the rates, no question of the unreasonableness per se of a particular rate or rates is raised. In deciding the 1915 advance rate case the Commis- sion based its findings upon the ordinary grounds- of proof in rate cases, which we shall proceed to discuss. 6. "Just and Reasonable Rates" Undek Section 1 of the Act Section 1 provides that all charges shall be just and reasonable. This expression does' not mean that a rate is unjust and unreasonable because it is discriminatory. 3 32 I. C. C. Eep. 325. 3a 35 I. C. C. Eep. 497. 4 In the 1915 case the writer argued against the right of the Commission to do more than pass upon the lawfulness of the rates themselves. Judge Clement's dissenting opinion in the Eastern 1914 Case (32 I. C. C. Rep. 336) is an able discussion of this law point. 10 GEOUNDS OF PROOF Section 1 does not lean on any other section. It is full and complete within itself. It means that the rate must be a fair price to the carrier for the transportation service it performs and that it must likewise be a just one to the shipper for the transportation service that he receives. Forty-nine of the eighty rate cases in the current volume of the Commission's reports raised only the general issue of unreasonableness of the rates inherently. When a shipper complains to the Commission that his rate is unjust and unreasonable and in violation of section 1, and the carrier answers denying that that is so, a direct issue as to the reasonableness of the rate is joined, and Congress has named the Interstate Commerce Commission as the deciding tribunal. Assuming that the simple steps provided in the statute have been followed 5 until the issue is joined and the case set for a hearing, the burden is upon the complain- ant (if the rate has not been advanced since January 1, 1910) to proceed with the presentation of the evidence and the arguments that he relies upon to convince the Commission of the correctness of his complaint. The simplest case of this character would be one involving a single rate upon a single commodity between two points. A more complex issue would be one involving rates on a large number of commodities between a large number of points, or one involving the rate on the same commodity but between numerous points, or still again one involving rates on a number of commodities between two or a limited number of points. Be it understood that in the present quest we are 5 Fully explained in Procedure Before the Interstate Commerce Com- mission. GROUNDS OF PROOF H passing over entirely what the lawyer calls the obiter dicta, or general discussions in the decisions, and are attempting to go directly to what is called in legal phraseology the ratio decidendi, the reason for the decision. In the passing of the years since 1887, when the Com- mission was instituted, there have been mentioned many theories and arguments upon which to base or justify rates of transportation. We are interested only in those that have survived to the present day and are now recognized as possessing weight in the deliberations of the Commission. The Commission has itself ceased to give weight to certain theories that it once recognized, and it now considers of much importance certain prin- ciples that it once passed over quite entirely. The courts have from time to time narrowed the scope of the Commission's view by pointing to matters that it had erroneously considered and which therefore ren- dered its opinion a nullity. It might be added that shippers still continue to base complaints upon these discarded theories in apparent ignorance of just what the Commission can or cannot lawfully consider. It may be a matter of surprise to some to learn that many years ago the Commission announced that the relative cost of service to the carrier could not enter into the making of a rate. It was thought by the Commission at that time that the "value of the service to the shipper" was a most important feature for con- sideration. At the present day the relative importance of these theories has become reversed, and in many cases the relative expense of the service to the carrier is a most important feature. The value of the service to the shipper was said to mean that the commodity 12 GROUNDS OF PROOF reached the market at a profit to the shipper. It was soon discovered that a public body could not employ any such theory as this and do justice to all parties before it, 6 and it has been practically abandoned as hereinafter pointed out. (a) Rate Comparisons An examination of the Commission's current opinions indicates that comparison between rates is a common and accepted method of making proof of the reason- ableness or unreasonableness of rates. Such proof is predicated upon the theory that the rates used for the standard of comparison are just and reasonable rates, and they should therefore be looked at from this point of view before they are offered. The value of rate comparisons also depends upon whether or not the con- ditions surrounding the rates attacked are substantially similar to those surrounding the rates used by way of comparison. Great danger lurks in the superficial use of comparitive rates as evidence in rate cases. A rate comparison is a valuable tool when properly used, but a hazardous one in the hands of a novice. Everyone familiar with the trial of rate cases has witnessed the crumbling of many rate proceedings because they were based upon ill-advised rate comparisons. Your comparison may be with rates upon the same commodity applying elsewhere in the country. In intro- ducing such evidence it is of advantage to show that the comparative rates operate under similar conditions to the rates attacked. In other words, the true status of the relationship between the rates attacked and the 6 Abbott v. E. T. V. & G., 2 I. C. C. Rep. 436. GROUNDS OP PROOF 13 rates used for comparison should be brought out. Every effort should be taken to guard against any surprise in this direction. It should be known whether or not the traffic is actually moving upon the rates used for comparison, for if nothing is moving upon them they are of little evidentiary value, and are appropriately denominated "paper rates" by the Commission. Furthermore, much risk is involved in the use of rates for purposes of comparison until one knows as much about the history of the rates so used as he does about his own rates which he is attacking. Opposing counsel will leave no stone unturned to show that the condi- tions are different. In order to give your comparisons weight, show: 1. That the comparative rates were not forced upon the carrier by competition of any kind. 2. That they are not intrastate rates and therefore forced by state authority. 3. That the conditions of transportation are similar. 4. That the cost of service is not greater in the case of the rates attacked than is true of the rates used for comparison. 5. That the volume of traffic under the two sets of rates is comparable. 6. That the comparative rate does not apply upon a lower grade or value of the commodity in question. 7. What difference, if any, in the minimum carload weights or the rules governing the movement. 8. That they are not controlled by the long-and-short- haul requirements. These and other surrounding circumstances absolutely control the strength or weaknesses of rate comparisons, and it is readily seen that much depends upon the 14 GROUNDS OP PROOF wisdom and care with which comparative rates are selected. To avoid an embarrassing outcome to any shipper or carrier who has to rely upon comparative rates, whether such rates have been fixed by the Commission in other cases or have been voluntarily published by the carriers, the rates should be made the subject of patient study until one knows their complete history and application; what the basis of the rates was originally; how the rates are published and how they are constructed; whether they are joint or combination rates, local or proportional, the Commission holding that rates should be compared with like kind of rates. 7 As an illustration of the force and effect of compara- tive rates, Table 1 is taken from a proceeding which attacked, a rate of 7y 2 cents per 100 pounds for the movement of cement in carloads to a large consuming market from a group of mills averaging a distance of 110 miles from said market. A table dealing with such widely scattered territories as this one does must, of course, be very general in character and, if necessary, the circumstances and con- ditions surrounding each rate should be explained. It is hardly likely, however, that any great number of the rates offered for comparison would cover transportation under more favorable conditions than the transporta- tion under the rate attacked. As a matter of fact, in the case in question the relative expense of the service to the carrier under the rate attacked was far more favorable than under any of the rates offered for com- parison, and the table shown had compelling force in the disposition of the case. ' Conference Ruling 304. GROUNDS OF PROOF 15 TABLE 1 Rate in t, i, , „ , , ~ „ Miles Cents Portland, Colo., to Denver, Colo 146 5 Portland, Colo., to Trinidad, Colo 175 5 Mason City, Iowa, to Minneapolis, Minn 152 5 Utica, 111., to Milwaukee, Wis 185 5 Coldwater, Mich., to Chicago, 111 156 5 Hannibal, Mo., to St. Louis, Mo 120 4 Syracuse, Ind., to Chicago, 111 118 4% Sugar Creek, Mo., to St. Joseph, Mo 107 4 Sugar Creek, Mo., to Kansas City, Mo 12 1% Bonner Springs, Mo., to Kansas City, Mo 17 1% The obvious deduction from this table is that a rate of 71/2 cents for a distance of 110 miles is "out of line," as the traffic man says, and "unreasonable per se," as the commerce attorney would put it, both meaning that the 7y 2 cent rate is in violation of section 1 of the Act. Frequently the comparison consists of rates on other commodities but which are in some way analagous to the commodity in question. Whatever the comparative commodity may be, its analogy or lack of analogy to the commodity in question should be definitely pointed out on the record. If it is such an article that it should take the same rates as the commodity in question, that should be demonstrated. If the rates upon the com- modity concerning which the case is about might well be somewhat lower than the rates upon the commodity compared, that fact should be emphasized. If any indorsement is needed for judging rates, by comparisons, there is a recent one from the Supreme Court of the United States in the Nashville Coal Case (238 U. S. 15), upholding a decision of the Commission which used com- parisons in fixing reasonable rates. (b) Relative Expense to the Carrier of Hauling the Commodity The relative cost of the service to the carrier has now 16 GROUNDS OF PROOF become a matter of chief concern in many of the rate cases before the Commission. This does not mean the absolute cost, in dollars and cents, of rendering a par- ticular service, but rather the relative cost compared with the cost of transporting other commodities moving in interstate commerce or with the average cost of moving all commodities that move upon the rails of the carrier involved. This relative expense to the carriers in rendering service in the transportation of a certain commodity may be shown by an introspective analysis of the transportation characteristics connected with the par- ticular commodity. 1. If it is carload traffic, does the article load heavily per car? The carload is said by the Commission to be a fair unit of comparison. 2. Are there frequent damage claims filed by the ship- pers of a particular commodity? Frequent or excessive claims upon traffic make for higher rates. 3. What are the facts as to the empty movement of the cars serving the traffic in question? Is the traffic in the commodity in question moving with or against the current of empty equipment? 4. Is there a loaded movement both ways? For instance, is raw material moving into an industry in the same class of vehicle that the product moves out, and can a car be loaded at the same spot where unloaded? 5. Is the equipment of such character that it must be empty when it moves back for new loads, as a tank car, for example, or other special equipment? 6. Does the commodity in question leave refuse in the car or damage, soil, or corrode the equipment in any way? GROUNDS OF PROOF 17 7. Is it necessary to brace the commodity in the cars with cleats or stanchions nailed to the permanent wood- work of the cars? 8. Does the traffic in the commodity in question move uniformly and steadily or does it move only at certain seasons of the year? Uniform movement is less costly than irregular movement. 9. Does the traffic in question require any special serv- ice at the hands of the carriers or does it move in the general run of box-car equipment on regular trains? 10. How many carriers are involved in the haul? 11. Is the commodity fragile or subject to damage while in transportation, and if subject to damage would it entail a total loss or would there be heavy salvage due to the nature of the commodity? 12. Is it a commodity that is conveniently and ade- quately packed for shipment? 13. What are the physical characteristics of the haul? Are the grades and curvatures of the track excessive? 14. Is much required in the way of terminal or switch- ing service, reconsignment en route, transit practices, or reshipment? 15. Are the cars unduly detained in the service, and does the shipper furnish his own cars? 16. What is the length of haul of the particular traffic? These are the chief transportation characteristics which must be thoroughly considered by both sides to the controversy, for it may well be assumed that the side in whose favor the facts may be, will not fail to bring them out. The opposing side should be prepared to modify or offset the effect of such testimony by showing such of the transportation characteristics of the commodity as may rebut the showing made. 18 GROUNDS OF PROOF In a few cases the attempt has been made to figure the absolute cost of moving certain commodities of very- heavy tonnage usually moving in trainloads. The Com- mission has carefully considered such evidence, calling attention to the fact that there are certain items of cost that cannot be" actually allocated to any particular traffic. However, a large per cent of the cost can be so allocated and the doubtful items apportioned upon an arbitrary basis that approaches more or less the actual cost. In the future it is reasonable to expect that in a few cases involving very heavy tonnage it will be well worth while to go into this method of proof. In fact, the Commission has stated as much. 8 Its use, however, will be limited because of the small number of cases involving sufficient tonnage and the expense of employ- ing expert accountants. It does not follow that even though the exact cost of moving the traffic could be ascertained and a profit added thereto, the Commission would feel called upon to fix absolutely the rate upon the result that is reached. The cost of the service is only one of many elements entering into the making of a rate, and everyone familiar with traffic matters knows that there must always be a large number of commodities the charges upon which bear little or no relation whatever to the actual cost of the service. The average cost of moving all traffic on a particular railroad or on all the railroads in the United States may be ascertained from the statistics published annually by the Commission. The specific items desired will prob- ably not be shown in the statistics, but sufficient informa- 8 1910 Advance Rate Case, 20 I. C. C. Rep. 357; 22 I. C. C. Rep. 604; 24 I. C. C. Rep. 285. GROUNDS OF PROOF 19 tion as to other items will there appear to enable one to compute for himself much valuable data. These figures, of course, relate to the average of all traffic moving, and this includes long hauls and short hauls, high-grade traffic and low-grade traffic, traffic moving over trunk lines of heavy tonnage and over branch lines of light traffic density and high cost of service, carload and less-than-carload traffic. All these elements and others which may arise in specific cases have a direct bearing upon the use of such figures. One should not use evidence of this character until fully satisfied as to the bearing that such elements, information, and data may have upon the particular traffic concerning which the rates are in question. An example of how the statistics of the Commission may be used is as follows : The statistics will show the individual carrier's total rail operating expenses plus the taxes. They will also show the revenue car miles. From these figures may be computed the cost of moving a loaded car for one mile on a particular road, but as this figure will include passenger service it may be assumed that the freight cost would be actually lower than the result obtained. Therefore, in using the figure in connection with freight rates, it might be assumed that the average cost of moving a loaded freight car for one mile would be somewhat less than the figure obtained. The statistics will also show the average number of tons per car, and therefore the cost of moving one ton for one mile for that particular road on all traffic can be obtained. From this result, using the average load per car of the commodity in question and the distances involved in the particular rate case, one can 20 GROUNDS OF PROOF obtain a figure representing the cost of moving a oar of the commodity in question between two points and compare such cost with the actual revenue that the carriers collect for the service. This figure-will throw some light on the profit there may be in the transaction for the railroad company. The result, however, can only approximate what the actual figure would be. If the movement were over a branch line, the cost would be in excess of the average on all traffic. If over a main line, the service would cost less than the average on all traffic. From the official statistics many valuable comparisons can be worked out, showing the facts as to the particular traffic in question when compared with the average upon all traffic moving over the different carriers' lines. As an illustration of one way in which the Commis- sion's statistics can be used, Table 2 is a reproduction of an exhibit which was offered in a case attacking the rates on paper from Kalamazoo, Michigan, to various points. It will be observed that the average revenue upon all traffic on the Michigan Central Railroad was 6.67 mills per ton per mile for an average haul of 158 miles. On paper, however, from Kalamazoo for about the same distance its earnings were twice the average on all traffic, being in some cases in excess of 12 mills. It might be added that the testimony in this case brought out forcibly the transportation characteristics of paper as a commodity, and the record showed that paper was about an average commodity. That is to say, it was not as high a class of traffic as many articles (furniture, for example), nor was it as low a grade of traffic as many commodities that are moving (coal, for example). A careful analysis of all the transportation GROUNDS OP PROOF h3 Ph o O CO fc H I Q ©© rH rH iH rH rH t-H t-H rH i-H rH rH rH rHrH *° t. 'hj ?! 03^3"= rt^bjio too torn £►*& 5 03>C>C O.GO.G o op O" " d cj 3 cog Ph M ttj >MPh : *: u 5? °~ S* o co ^+j .. _ 5 - u S?2 Q oG» J> S>h->3hj B > oj t- a^H>i «JSh «5 e 10 o a "PS * : co : 2?> a* gPH g«i C«^ ■as 21 22 GROUNDS OF PROOF characteristics of paper as a commodity (shown on page 16 ante) indicated that it was about the average of all. Therefore, it might reasonably be expected that the earnings upon the rates on paper would be about the average earnings upon all traffic, and, with respect to paper rates in the country generally, such was shown to be the fact. The commodity in question should be carefully con- sidered from every point of view to ascertain whether it is a high-class or a low-class traffic in the parlance of railroad men, or whether it is an average commodity. If it is an average commodity it might well be compared with the average statistics on all traffic, such as above indicated. If it is a high-class traffic, it should pay rates which earn somewhat higher than the average on all, and if a low-class traffic, it might well pay earnings lower than the average on all traffic. In determining just what character of traffic the commodity in question may be, the transportation characteristics hereinabove referred to should be considered, such as the weight of a carload of the commodity, its value, the character of service it requires, etc. There can be no doubt that in passing upon the reasonableness of a rate on a particular commodity a full exposition of the facts above discussed is of great help to the Co mm ission. It serves to put the commodity in its proper relationship with all the other commodities moving, and it discloses whether or not the commodity is receiving fair or abnormal rates of transportation. While evidence as to relative cost of service is exceed- ingly important in many cases, one should not lose sight of the fact that it is comparative in character and that it is but a part of the many elements that may enter GROUNDS OF PROOF 23 into the reasonableness of a rate. In connection with certain commodities its value may be very small indeed. (c) Distance the Traffic is Hauled The Commission is entitled to detailed figures giving the distances and the rates attacked or those used for comparison. This can best be placed in the record by means of tabulations setting out the mileages and routes via which the rates apply. The distances offered should fairly reflect actual conditions. The Commission has said that it would consider the distances via the short feasible routes. This does not mean the shortest pos- sible route that can be figured via the lines of half a dozen or more carriers. A good traffic witness can tell at a- glance what is a short, workable, natural route for the movement of the traffic. He will save himself much embarrassment on cross-examination if he applies the rule of reason to his distances, and refrains from exer- cising his ingenuity in working out the shortest possible distance regardless of all other considerations. It is a common error in rate cases to offer distances that do not stand up under cross-examination. Under the law a carrier is not compelled to short-haul itself. That is, it is entitled to handle traffic coming on its line for a considerable distance towards the point of des- tination before turning it over to a connection, if its line runs in that general direction, and provided no injustice is done the traffic by compelling it to pay for long, roundabout, expensive service when there is a shorter feasible route. When long lines desire to participate in certain com- petitive traffic, they are at liberty to do so, provided they 24 GROUNDS OF PEOOP do not haul the same at less than cost, and therefore add to the expense of other traffic. But when the reasonable- ness of the rates is brought in question, the service over such a line is manifestly more expensive than over a shorter workable route. For that reason a reasonable rate should be determined by the distance and earnings over the shorter workable or feasible route. 9 In the matter of determining what mileage distances shall be offered to the Commission, the traffic witness must be a man of experience in the territory in question, and must offer convincing testimony of the reasonable- ness of the distances and routes which he places in evi- dence. Rates are not made absolutely on distance any more than they are made absolutely on any one of a large number of bases. Distance is usually one of the factors that may enter into the particular rates at issue. It is really an element in the cost of the service, as it will be assumed that if all the other circumstances and condi- tions are similar it will cost the carrier more to haul the same traffic 500 miles than 100 miles. Just how much more is a matter for the determination of the Com- mission in its discretion under the law, if the case is one in which distance is important. That distance is worthy of much weight in nearly all rate cases may spring from the fact that the fourth section of the Act recognizes dis- tance when it prohibits a greater charge for the shorter than for the longer haul. The Commission has said that distance, in the absence of other influences, is a con- trolling element. 10 Where a commodity is moving to market from a "6I.C. C. Rep. 143; 16 I. 0. C. Rep. 563; 27 I. C. C. Rep. 175. 10 7 I. C. C. Rep. 180; 5 I. C. C. Rep. 264. GROUNDS OF PROOF 25 number of producing points, and it is important to deter- mine the actual distance of the movement, the weighted average mileage should be determined. This is done by- multiplying the number of tons moving over each route by the distance, adding all the ton miles thus obtained, and dividing by the aggregate tons shipped. This will give the weighted average distance, and shows exactly the actual distance the carriers are hauling the traffic. When measuring distances on a rate which applies to widely divergent points of destination it is unfair to use a distance to a nearby point or to the most distant point. The distance offered should fairly reflect the distance to the zone of destination as a whole. It seems almost unnecessary to give the above warning, but the fact is distances are discredited frequently because of the infirmity pointed out. The Commission has in many cases based its findings largely upon distances, but it has done so only where it has found all the other surrounding conditions to be similar. It has fixed mileage rates for grain, for cotton- seed, and for live-stock and packing-house products. Many rate adjustments, however, on articles of heavy tonnage, such as coal, are upon the group basis, and if the group appears to have worked out with substantial equity to all parties concerned, it will not be disturbed merely because a point on one side of the group pays the same rate as a point on the far side of the group. In connection with the distance the commodity is hauled upon the rates in question, there are important principles to be kept in mind, and one of them is the rule of decreasing returns, or, as it is more commonly expressed, that as the distance increases the earnings per ton per mile should decrease. This is an almost 26 GROUNDS OF PROOF universal principle of rate-making if distance cuts any figure in the rates at issue. It is a principle that rests upon the relative expense to the carrier of hauling a commodity a further distance when once the transporta- tion is started. In an important case attacking the adjustment of rates on coal from competing groups of mines in Illinois to points in Iowa and the northwest, counsel for the mines in southern Illinois introduced Table 3 to show that the rule of decreasing returns to the carrier as the length of haul increases was fairly well observed by the present adjustment. The Commission found such to be the case and refused to disturb the rates. TABLE 3 Statement op Short-Line Average Distances and Earnings Upon the* Present Rates to Livermore, Iowa Earnings Per Ton Mile Present Under Present From Miles Rate Rate (Mills) Third Vein District 306 $1.85 6.05 Fulton County District 318 1.85 5.82 Wilmington District 372 1.85 4.97 Springfield District, North 390 2.25 5.77 Springfield District, South.... 458 2.25 4.91 Danville District 444 2.42 5.45 Centralia District 490 2.45 5.00 Du Quoin District 525 2.55 4.86 Belleville District 529 2.45 4.63 Southern Illinois District 553 2.55 4.61 Brazil-Clinton District 506 2.45 4.84 Sullivan-Linton District 528 2.55 4.83 Princeton District 660 2.62 3.97 The Commission found that per ton mile revenue of 4.61 mills for a distance of 553 miles in the case of Southern Illinois shown above was not out of line with earnings of 6.05 mills for 306 miles in the case of the Third Vein field. GROUNDS OF PROOF 27 The only exception to this rule is, where the trans- portation passes over an unproductive territory or a territory of expensive operation, such as mountains. Decreasing earnings may then reasonably change to increasing or constant earnings. Another matter closely allied to the one just referred to, is the length of the haul compared with the average length of haul of all traffic. This figure, for each railroad and for the country as a whole, can be found in the Commission's annual report of statistics. In other words, is the service involved a long haul or a short haul? Short hauls are relatively more expensive to the carriers because of the fact that the heavy element in the cost of service is the terminal expense and that is incurred no matter what the length of the haul, (d) Earnings In rate cases the term "earnings" means the revenue of the carrier upon certain rates for a definite amount of service. Earnings per ton mile, per car mile, and per train mile mean the earnings that the carrier receives for hauling a ton, a car, or a train a distance of one mile. A table of distances may well contain other columns showing the rates and the earnings thereon. Such information is almost necessary for the Commission to have in passing upon the reasonableness of rates. As illustrating what is meant, see Table 3. The Commission is an expert rate tribunal, and can tell almost at a glance from the earnings that are disclosed how they compare with rates on other com- modities or with rates on the same commodity between 28 GROUNDS OF PROOF other points, or how they fit in with the earnings of the carriers (individually or collectively) on all traffic as shown hy the statistics published by the Commission. The Commission knows from long experience approxi- mately how profitable rates are which yield, say, 25 cents per car mile on a certain commodity for a distance of 500 miles in a certain section of the country. The Commission has doubtless fixed many such rates on the same or similar commodities and under substantially the same conditions, and is therefore aided greatly in the exercise of its discretion by a glance at the showing here suggested. The earnings upon the rates in question can be compared with the earnings upon other rates upon the same commodity, with the earnings upon rates upon other commodities, or with the average earnings of a carrier or carriers upon all traffic. Those familiar with freight rates know that the average earnings per ton mile for the country as a whole are approximately 7% mills; that the average per car mile earnings are 15 cents; that the typical average haul in the United States is about 143 miles; that the average amount received from each ton of freight is $1,079; that the average freight revenue per train mile is $2.89; that the average number of tons of. freight per train is about 383 ; that the number of cars to a train is about 22. The published statistics give the above information for each carrier and more besides, and they*should be examined for the particular carriers that are parties to the case. These official statistics may be compared with the figures for the traffic and rates involved in the complaint. GROUNDS OP PROOF 29 The Commission has said that per car earnings with distance considered, or per car mile earnings, are fre- quently of much more value than ton mile earnings because the latter reflect neither the car loading nor car mileage. It is a fact that traffic yielding low ton mile earnings may be very remunerative because of farther carriage and heavy loading. 11 (e) Value of the Commodity .The first annual report of the Commission announced that "the most important element in the rate" is the value of the commodity. At the present day, however, it is somewhat dangerous to attempt to fix rates of trans- portation upon any one particular basis, and for this reason one should not too readily rest the determination of a rate case upon one line of argument, such as the value of the commodity. If, upon investigating the situ- ation, it appears to be the fact that the rate in question fits in quite well with all the numerous canons of rate- making, except one only, it may be doubtful whether the chances of success would be sufficient to justify a carrier in raising such a rate or a shipper in seeking to have it lowered. In the original classification of all traffic for the purpose of giving each kind its proper place in the whole schedule of rates applicable upon the entire ton- nage of the carriers, there can be no question but that one of the first inquiries made is as to the value of the commodity. If the commodity is extremely valuable and otherwise of a high-grade character, it is placed in the first class, or among the list of articles that « 22 I. C. C. Rep. 620. 30 GROUNDS OF PROOF take the highest rates of all. Thus, expensive silk goods worth many thousands of dollars per car would be so classified, and the margin between the rate and the price of the article would be so wide that the freight rate would enter only a minute degree into the price of the article to the consumer. If the commodity possesses a very low value, such as a carload of coal, which would not be worth much more than $100, the commodity would scarcely be able to stand more than a very low rate, lower than the lowest class. The Commission has said that there are few articles 'in the price of which the freight rate enters more largely than in the case of coal. Looking at freight rates from the broad scope just outlined, the value of the commodity is an extremely important item. In contesting a rate case, however, the value of the commodity with respect to the particular rate will doubtless have already influenced the rate through classification and otherwise to such an extent that it can cut but little figure in any further adjustment of the same. For the reasons given one may or may not derive much help in a rate case from evidence relative to the value of the commodity. Nevertheless, a careful traffic man or commerce lawyer will thoroughly post himself upon the relative values of the commodities that take similar ratings. He will also ascertain just what treatment his commodity has received, and be fully prepared to take advantage of or meet any situ- ation that may arise in this regard. The theory that a manufactured article ordinarily takes a higher rate than the material from which it is made rests in part upon the argument of the value of the commodity. Of course, there is an item of cost of service in con- GROUNDS OF PROOF 31 nection with the value of an article in the insurance which the common carrier is compelled to accord to traffic in its possession. If the article is a valuable one and is damaged while in the possession of the carrier, the carrier is compelled to pay more in the way of loss and damage claims than if the article is one of low value. The actual cost of this insurance, however, is very low indeed, and the total payments for loss and damage upon most commodities bear such a slight percentage to the total freight receipts upon the par- ticular commodity that it actually figures down to almost an insignificant amount, much less than 1 per cent, as a rule, of the total freight revenue on the commodity. In fixing freight rates in accordance with the value of the commodity, the insurance feature, therefore, enters into the situation to but a limited degree. It is frankly admitted by everyone conversant with freight rates that higher rates upon the valuable commodities are not usually placed there because of the insurance charge, but for the reason that the traffic can stand it, and the service rendered the shippers of such commodities is said to be more valuable to them. This, of course, is a very indefinite statement and in the general run of rate cases does not carry great weight for either one side or the other. A case representing the use of values as evidence in a rate contest is one where a shipper of a commodity used as a tree spray sought the same rate as was applied on sheep dip. The record showed that one article was worth but a few hundred dollars per car while the other was valued at several thousand dollars, it was decided that the difference in value precluded the same rate for both. 32 GROUNDS OF PROOF In concluding this subject it may be added, that the Commission has given this element in the rate greater consideration when it has been adjusting the rates upon competitive articles, like hogs and hog products, lumber and products thereof. (f) Rate History In a rate case the Commission will inquire how long the rate under consideration has been in effect, and it should be shown how the rate has fluctuated, running back as far as it is possible to go, and what have been the influences that have affected the rate in the past, as well as at the present time. It may be that the influences that have shaped the rate have been of such character that the Commission will be inclined to counteract them in its decision. For instance, it is now an established principle that the Commission may not lawfully predi- cate rates upon the necessity of the shippers. Efforts to equalize market competition may not be offered to justify or require rates that are unreasonably low or that permit unjust discrimination. If the rate has long been in effect, that constitutes a significant fact. 12 If the rate has been advanced from time to time, that fact would produce an entirely differ- ent effect upon the Commission than if it had been reduced from time to time. (g) Rate Basis Let the Commission know precisely how the rates are constructed from the standpoint of technical rate con- struction. In connection with the history of the rates '■ 15 I. C. C. Rep. 63. GROUNDS OF PROOF 33 show (1) just how the rates are made, that is, whether they are joint rates, or made on the combination of local rates, or local and proportional rates; (2) what the rela- tionship of the class rates is to the commodity rate in question, that is, if the article takes a commodity rate as distinguished from its proper class basis. The writer is reminded of an instance when, as Exam- iner for the Commission, he was hearing cases in a west- ern city. The traffic witness of a railroad was testifying that a certain commodity rate on scrap iron under attack was a reasonable rate because it was less than the class rates usually applied on scrap iron. Later in the same day the same witness was testifying in another case about rates on potatoes which were higher than the class rates usually applied to potatoes, but upon cross-exami- nation was unwilling to employ the same principle for his potato rates that he had invoked for his scrap-iron rates. This incident illustrates the necessity of know- ing the relative basis of the rate under consideration so as to take advantage of every situation that may favor your contentions. Look into the question of the rate territory in which the traffic is moving, and show the relation between rates in that territory and rates in other territories. For example, it is quite generally conceded that rates upon the same commodity might be, as a rule, somewhat higher in Western and Southern classification territories than in Official Classification Territory by reason of the heavier volume of tonnage in the latter territory. If the rates base upon a certain basing point, this circum- stance should be fully explained to the Commission. Less-than-carload rates should bear a just relationship to carload rates on the same commodity. 34 GROUNDS OP PROOF If the case involves a through rate made up of sepa- rately established rates, it is not sufficient to prove the unreasonableness of the various factors. The Commis- sion has said that it and the public were interested in the charge as a whole; that it must have before it evidence as to the through combination charge; that some regard must be had to the measure of the through rates as an entity. 13 Facts relating to the history of the rate or the manner in which the rate is based may be valuable as evidence for one side or the other, but they are always helpful to the Commission. The trials before the Commission are investigations of all the facts with relation to the specific rates at issue, and as the foundation of any rate case the Commission is entitled to have the parties to the controversy co-operate in presenting all the fore- going facts freely and frankly. (h) Volume and Regularity of the Tonnage This is purely a cost of service argument. Carload rates are lower than the less-than-carload rates because the traffic can be handled more cheaply. When, however, the carriers attempted to make the rates upon a train- load basis lower than those upon a carload basis the Commission called a halt. The carload is, therefore, the accepted standard for making rates. The Wisconsin Commission, which has gone further than any other rate-regulating body in ascertaining the cost of service, has chosen the carload as the basis of its calculations. ' 30 I. C. C. Rep. 102. GROUNDS OP PROOF 35 The demand for equal rates upon a commodity that moves to the extent of several hundred thousand car- loads a year, with a commodity that moves irregularly or only to the extent of a few carloads, will not appeal to the Commission. There may be cases where traffic is not moving for the very reason that the rate is too high to permit the movement. It is not always safe therefore to take the volume of the traffic into considera- tion in determining' a reasonable rate. There is no argument introduced into a rate case that is more open to criticism, than the volume of the traffic. It may well be questioned whether as a matter of public policy it is proper to give the big shipper any con- sideration on account of the volume of his shipments. The fact remains, however, that the opinions of the Commission frequently refer to the volume of tonnage as justifying the reasonableness of rates. It is import- ant, therefore, to be fully advised as to what is moving on all the rates in issue and on any rates used in com- parisons. In taking a commodity out of the classification and giving it a commodity rate, the traffic manager gives great consideration to volume of tonnage. When, how- ever, he has sought to advance a rate applying upon a vast tonnage, he has found it difficult to justify his acts because of the heavy tonnage involved and the low cost of service where the movement is regular and heavy. Relative tonnage volumes are usually well known, and this class of evidence is easy of production. It is important only where the relative difference is large, and in cases where it is advisable to go into the subject of volume, detailed figures are not required. 36 * GROUNDS OP PROOF 7. Cases Involving Section 2 of the Act Before discussing the production of evidence that will prove violations of sections 2 and 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, a clear understanding should be reached as to the distinguishing characteristics of these two sections, because they are frequently confused in proceedings before the Commission. These sections prohibit unjust discrimination in the broad sense of the word, but the character of discrimi- nations referred to in the two sections is so different that evidence as to one may not cover a violation of the other. One should, therefore, definitely plead violations r>? one or both sections as desired, and specify in his proof what section it is directed against. "The discrimination defined in section 2 may arise as between shippers of like kinds of traffic under sub- stantially similar circumstances and conditions." 14 It is, therefore, necessary to show that the traffic is like in kind, and the Commission will undertake to determine as a condition precedent to a violation of this section whether the traffic between which discrimination is alleged is like in kind. For instance, it was held in the case above cited that corn starch was not a like kind of traffic to other products of corn, such as meal, grits, etc., because starch is a more expensive product and requires a much more elaborate form of manu- facture. For these reasons it was held that it was not a violation of section 2 of the Act to charge materially higher rates upon starch than upon the other products of corn. Section 2 of the Act also applies only when the trans- 14 31 I. C. C. Rep. 593. GROUNDS OF PROOF 37 portation takes place "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions." The carriers have attempted to read into this section the condition of competition. They say the Act does not prohibit different treatment of even like kinds of traffic when the articles do not compete in the market. In other words, in order to establish discrimination under section 2 of the Act it is necessary that there be an advantage to one shipper and a corresponding disadvantage to another. The courts have held that this is not a proper construction to be placed upon the wording of the Act because the phrase "under substantially similar circum- stances and conditions" refers to matters of carriage or transportation and does not include commercial competition. This view has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. 15 The law does not prohibit all discriminations. It covers only unjust discrimination, and this somewhat limits the scope to the discretion of the Commission. The great difficulty in proving that the traffic is like in kind with other traffic, that the discrimination is undue, and finally that the transportation is performed under substantially similar circumstances and conditions has tended to render the instances where a violation of this section can be proved rare indeed. In a case involving a violation of section 2, the three foregoing matters of proof are conditions precedent to the establishing of a case under said section. In addi- tion thereto, all that was pointed out when discussing violations of section 1 of the Act, such as the rate history, rate comparisons, relative cost of service, distances, earnings, value of the commodity, volume "225 U. S. 326. 38 GEOUNDS OF PROOF of the traffic, etc., should be fully developed in the record for both sets of rates or practices between which the discrimination is alleged. It will be found that in the trial of rate cases there is much in the way of rate exposition that must be made to the Commission in every case if it is fully presented, but when once presented will serve more than one purpose. For instance, under the headings of "Dis- tances" or "Earnings" or "Relative Cost of Service," the evidence might show that the rates were excessive and unreasonable and in violation of section 1, and the same evidence might also show a relationship that would prove a violation of sections 2 or 3. 8. Cases Involving Section 3 or the Act This section prohibits what is generally called "unjust discrimination," although those words are only found in section 2. Literally stated,, section 3 prohibits undue advantage to one shipper and undue prejudice to another. This language has been held to mean that there must be competition present to effect this prefer- ence to one shipper and this prejudice to another, although the Act does not so state. As a shipper usually feels this discrimination in his business before the thought , comes to him that he will complain against it, the evidence to substantiate a case of this kind is not so hard to produce. It should be placed in the record in as definite a form as possible, and it must not be merely a general expression of opinion that such disadvantage exists. Witnesses should be prepared to be very specific in showing definite, concrete examples upon which their conclusions are based, such as figures GROUNDS OF PROOF 39 giving actual loss of business and a decreasing tonnage from the complainant, together with an increasing ton- nage from the territory or shipper alleged to be favored by the freight rates. Proof of loss of business is not an essential element in a discrimination case, however, as the injured party may have elected to absorb the unlawful rate out of his profits and thus maintained his volume of sales pending determination of the rate case. Again, com- plainant may never have obtained any business due to the unlawful discrimination in freight rates. It may be appropriate to repeat in this connection that the Commission will not in any case rely upon the unsupported opinions of witnesses. 158. They must be in a position to give the facts and information upon which their opinions rest ; that is to say, they must offer convincing, definite, specific testimony, facts, and figures. The detailed data as to the rates which have been discussed at length for cases involving section 1 of the Act will be found in large measure to be applicable here. For instance, in giving the distances and earn- ings it would be appropriate to discuss what is known as the natural advantage of location. Each shipper is entitled to reap the full benefit of his foresight or good fortune in finding himself favorably located with respect to manufacture, or obtaining a supply of material, or in distributing his product to the markets. As a matter of law he cannot be deprived of this natural advantage. It is unlawful for the carriers to offset, by means of rates, his natural advantage by equalizing with him some competitor not so favorably situated. 18 »»13 I. C. C. 105; 28 I. C. C. 497. "23 I. C. C. Rep. 109; 22 I. C. C. Rep. 121; 23 I. C. C. Rep. 391; 21 I. C. C. Eep. 543; 222 U. S. 46, 541. 40 GROUNDS OP PROOF This can be brought out in connection with the showing offered under section 1 by giving relative distances, cost of service, etc., for both the complainant's point of ship- ment and for that of his competitor, to the same markets. Table 4 is intended to show up unjust discrimination in violation of section 3, as to the rates on a certain com- modity produced in Wisconsin and Michigan and com- peting for sale at the same markets. TABLE 4 Rate Earnings ( Cents Earnings Per Car Distance Per 100 Per Car Mile From To (Miles) Lbs.) (Dollars) (Cents) Michigan Jefferson City, Mo. ... 550 29 116.00 21.09 Wisconsin Jefferson City, Mo. . . . 623 20 "80.00 12.84 Michigan New Orleans, La 1071 35 140.00 13.07 Wisconsin New Orleans, La 1141 31% 126.00 11.01 Michigan Oklahoma City, Okla. 963 77 308.00 32.00 Wisconsin Oklahoma City, Okla. 963 66 264.00 27.40 The value of the above table rests upon the fact that the cost of service, carriers, competitive conditions, and practically everything was shown to be the same for both competitors if not more favorable for the Michigan competitor, yet with distance in favor of Michigan, Wisconsin was unduly favored in the rates. The testimony further showed that on the foregoing adjustment of rates, Wisconsin had driven Michigan from the field. Many important cases arise under section 3 from the competition between raw material and finished product. One set of manufacturers is located near the supply of raw material and another is located at the markets of consumption. One is shipping the material, the other the product. The Commission has in such con- GROUNDS OF PROOF 41 tests called for a showing as to the relative cost of transporting the competing commodities and has decided the issue largely upon the result of such showing. We have already sufficiently referred to the elements in this kind of proof on page 16. 9. Burden of Proof In suspended rate cases and in cases attacking rates that have been advanced since January 1, 1910, the so-called ' ' burden of proof ' ' is upon the carrier. In other rate cases the burden is upon the person attacking the established rate. The party to the proceeding not having this burden should not depend upon making out a case by the cross-examination of opposing wit- nesses. Regardless of where the burden rests the Commission expects a full hearing as to the merits of each side of the controversy, and if the facts are not forthcoming from one side, the other should be pre- pared to give the information. The essential thing is that the Commission be acquainted with all the facts relative to the rates in question rather than that it shall get this information from one side or the other. Too much cannot be expected from cross-examination in rate cases. The witnesses for the railroads are expert traffic witnesses, who give all their time to explaining rates in proceedings before the Commission, and it is not infrequent that witnesses for the larger shippers are men of the same experience. Much time will be saved, therefore, in trying a case with your own witnesses rather than to attempt to draw it out of a hostile witness of professional character. Under the decisions of the courts the findings of the 42 GROUNDS OF PROOF Commission must rest upon the record made after full hearing. The paramount duty, therefore, is to see that the record is made as strong for your contentions as possible and that your case does not stand upon tech- nicalities of pleadings or order of proof. 10. Reparation In addition to fixing reasonable rates for the future and wiping out unjust discriminations, if the Commis- sion finds that a shipper has been damaged by reason of unlawful rates or practices of the carriers it may under the law award reparation from the carrier to the shipper. While this kind of a proceeding usually forms a part of the main case attacking rates themselves, it has distinguishing legal charactertistics, which should be clearly recognized. Orders of the Commission fixing rates for the future must be obeyed by the carrier unless set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction, or the carrier pays a fine of $5,000 per day. It is needless to say that the carriers obey these orders in every instance. An order for the payment of money, however, under the Constitution, can have no such compelling force, and the carriers have frequently refused to obey such orders. It is then necessary for the shipper to go into court and sue the railroad for the amount named in the Commission's order. Many of these orders have been enforced in the courts, but from recent decisions it is quite apparent that an order of the Commission for the payment of reparation must rest upon evidence (1) of a very particular nature as to the shipments in question upon which reparation is claimed, giving dates and weights of shipments, and GEOUNDS OF PROOF 43 points between which the shipments moved; (2) the record must show that these shipments were delivered to consignee within two years prior to the time of filing the complaint; 17 and (3) the record before the Commission should contain direct evidence of the damage which has resulted to the shipper by reason of the unlawful acts of the carrier. This is especially true where the unlawful act is discrimination. It is no longer sufficient to assume that because a shipper paid a rate which the Commission finds to be unduly discriminatory, it was discriminatory at the time it was paid, or that he is entitled to an award of reparation in the amount of the difference between the rate paid and the non-discriminatory rate fixed for the future. The shipper must specifically prove where and how and in what definite amount he has been damaged. If he fails to do all these things, the order of the Commission will not be worth much to him in the courts. 18 The showing of damage can be made by evidence of losses in the purchase of raw materials, as against competitors who enjoyed preferential rates and could therefore outbid the complainant in the purchase of raw material. Or it might be shown by evidence as to the difference between the prices at which the com- modities of the various shippers were sold, and also the connection between said prices and the freight charges. Damage might be shown in most any way that could be proved in a suit for damages in a court of law. The development of this subject under the decisions is so recent that it is difficult to state definitely " See Procedure Before the Interstate Commerce Commission, page 23. 18 29 I. C. C. Rep. 32; International Coal Case, 230 U. S. 200; Meeker Case, 236 U. S. 412. 44 GROUNDS OF PROOF just what the law as construed by the courts actually means. Doubtless, more light will be thrown on this subject by forthcoming decisions. The same difficulties are not encountered in seeking reparation for collection of an unreasonable rate under section 1. If the Commission finds that an unreasonable rate was paid, it is presumed that the shipper was damaged in the amount of the difference between the rate paid and the rate the Commission finds reason- able. The Commission must find, however, that the rate was unreasonable at the time it was paid. Although the power of the Commission to award reparation for damages suffered by reason of a violation of the Act is plenary, it is fair to say that the Com- mission is ultra-conservative about finding such damages. 11. False Grounds The testimony of the shipper that he needs a lower rate in order to be able to do business at a profit satisfactory to himself, which is so often heard in rate cases, can under the law be of no help whatsoever, but is very likely to do his case material harm. By such testimony he at once shows the Commission that his case rests at least in part upon the false and misleading theory that the carriers can be compelled to make rates that will permit a particular shipper to engage in business at a profit, irrespective of the reasonableness of the rate per se to the carrier for its service. Witnesses should be warned to base their claims for a different rate upon some specific violation of law, and on cross-examination not to roam around through their commercial, financial, and business difficulties GROUNDS OF PROOF ' 45 which, however interesting as a hard-luck story, furnish the Commission with no ground for changing existing freight rates under the law. Let it be borne in mind that the carrier is entitled under the law to reasonable compensation for the service which it renders any and all shippers. The fact that the business of a complaining shipper cannot afford to pay present rates to get to market at a profit, or at what the shipper may deem a sufficient profit, has no bearing on the case and no recognition in the Act to Regulate Commerce. The fact that the carrier quoted the shipper a lower rate than the lawful rate and obtained the business on such quotation possesses no virtue in proving that the lawfully published rate is unreasonable. Yet commerce attorneys and traffic witnesses persist in telling the Commission such facts. Neither is testimony to the effect that the railroads led the shipper to establish himself on its lines by promises of freight rates and concessions worthy of much consideration on the issue of whether present rates are unjust and unreasonable. The Supreme Court criticised the Commission for basing a finding on such a consideration. 19 The offering of contracts between carrier and shipper for the maintenance of a rate as any evidence in an issue of reasonableness or discrimi- nation is wholly a waste of time. 20 On the other hand, the carrier charged with discrimi- nation is wasting its time if it attempts a justification on the ground that it is protecting industries on its own lines against the competition of industries not so located, » Willamette Valley Case, 219 U. S. 433. ! ° 130 U. S. 396; 219 U. S. 467. 46 GROUNDS OF PROOF or that the preferential rate is maintained through some contract with a shipper. The writer has heard many 1 traffic officers of the railroads assert positively that a rate must be reasonable because traffic was moving on it. It is fair to add, however, that with the coming into power of a younger generation of traffic managers, many of the old fallacies are no longer urged, and the records made in rate cases now contain more in the nature of sound, helpful facts upon which an opinion can be legitimately based. , When carriers explain a rate in their tariffs as being due to a clerical error the Commission will not accept it if the rate has been in effect two years. 21 The Commis- sion has awarded reparation for damages due to such error. 23 It would hardly seem necessary to mention the above considerations, but evidence of the various kinds referred to is constantly being offered in rate cases before the Commission by parties who do not seem to- be advised that they are thus practically compelling the Commission on the record so made to decide the case aarainst them. i & c 12. Conclusion In addition to the so-called "rate cases" the Commis- sion can, upon showing of general public need, order carriers to establish through routes and joint rates. Thus, it can compel connecting carriers to unite their lines into practically one system for the rendering of service to the public. The exercise of this power is not 21 28 I. C. C. 459. 22 28 I. C. C. 422. GROUNDS OP PROOF 47 very frequent because the carriers have voluntarily- established through routes and joint rates in nearly all cases. The Commission can now, under the amendment of 1912, order in through routes and joint rates between a railroad and a connecting water carrier upon evidence indicating a general public necessity for the service demanded. Occasionally, the Commission is called upon to exercise its power under the Act to compel switch connections upon proper showing that the traffic of shippers reasonably demands the connection. A majority of the Commission has held during the past year that the Commission has power to compel the furnishing of transportation facilities, such as cars of suitable character for traffic tendered. 23 But, as stated in the beginning, our discussion is limited to rate cases, as it is principally cases of that kind that occupy the attention of the Commission and possess vital interest to the shippers generally. One who studies the current opinions of the Commis- sion and who has knowledge and experience concerning the accepted and rejected bases of lawful rates and of the limitations drawn around the Commission by the courts, knows that a heavy percentage of rate cases are either ill-conceived or are woefully mishandled during trial. Every examiner of the Commission is continu- ally trying cases where, despite all he can do to the contrary, the records is so inefficiently made, sometimes by shipper and sometimes by carrier, that the Commis- sion cannot possibly gather from it essential facts upon which to base a decision. The trial of rate cases is a comparatively new *33 I. C. C. 52; 34 I. C. C. 64; 34 I. C. C. 179. 48 GROUNDS OP PROOF business, and that may be one explanation of the vast amount of ignorance, lack of skill, and one may almost say absurdity, that too often confronts the Commission in the trial of rate cases. To lawyers unfamiliar with rate cases let it be gen- erally observed that a rate case is essentially one of rate facts and rate principles. That lack of experience in such matters cannot be made up for by skill in other lines of practice, and the assistance of a qualified traffic expert will be essential to the conduct of any rate case. To the traffic manager let it be stated that no matter how great his skill in his line, he should realize that a rate case is a proceeding under what has now become an involved body of statute and case, law, and in important matters he should seek the assistance of commerce counsel. The railroads and larger industries have concluded that the traffic manager and the commerce attorney form a team that pulls together and that when either tries to "go it" alone the progress is around in a circle. The best judges of the truth of what is stated above must necessarily be the members of the Interstate Commerce Commission and its Examiners, who pass upon the presented cases. In the foregoing pages it is not claimed that anything more has been accomplished than to point out with some degree of detail such leading grounds of proof in rate cases as are known to possess potency in the determi- nation of issues raised in such cases before the Inter- state Commerce Commission under the Act to Regulate. Commerce. Some effort has been made to indicate the proper form in which such evidence may be presented to the Commission, and a word of caution has been added here and there against offering evidence that GROUNDS OP PEOOP 49 cannot possibly aid in the winning of a rate case, but which will needlessly consume the time of the Commis- sion and the other parties who must be present to defend their rates or protect their interests. TEST QUESTIONS These questions are for the student to use in testing his knowledge of the assignment. The answers are not to be sent to the University. 1. "What is generally meant by a rate case before the Inter- state Commerce Commission? 2. "When rates are unreasonable, what section of the Act to Regulate Commerce do they violate? 3. "When rates are unjustly discriminatory, what sections do they violate? 4. Why does the Commission often have to disregard evi- dence presented for its consideration? 5. "What character of evidence is most frequently used in presenting rate cases to the Commission? 6. In what percentage of cases does the author state that the relative cost of service plays an important part? 7. How does the Commission's power to regulate rates compare with the common-law power over rates? 8. How do relative cost of service to the carrier and value of service to the shipper compare in importance in rate cases at the present time? 9. What factors should be considered in making compari- sons of rates ? 10. Mention some of the factors affecting the expense of service which are considered in adjusting rates. 11. How may official statistics be used to furnish informa- tion of value in rate cases? 12. Under what circumstances has the Commission based findings upon the distance principle? 13. How may earnings on the rates be used in adjusting rates ? 14. What part may the history of a rate play in the adjust- ment of that rate? 15. What has the Commission said as to the interest of the public in the through rate, as against the factors in that rate? 16. Why might it be unjust to take the volume of traffic into consideration in making a rate? 50 TEST QUESTIONS 51 17. What evidence is necessary under the statute before a violation of section 2 of the Act can be established? 18. Why may not too much be expected from the cross- examination of witnesses? 19. If a carrier does not obey an order of the Commission for the payment of money, what action must be taken? 20. What is it necessary for the shipper to prove in order to secure reparation? 21. Give briefly some considerations which do not carry weight in rate cases. 22. Distinguish the attempts of the carriers to increase whole rate schedules from actions taken to secure the adjust- ment of a single rate or a number of individual rates. 23. What interesting question of the Commission 's power is raised in the Western Advance Rate Case, 1915 ?