QJorneU Mmnetaitg Etbrarjj 
 
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 BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE 
 
 SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 HENRY W. SAGE 
 
 1891 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
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 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028064339 
 
FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
« History does not teach principles, but prudence. "-Burke. 
 
FRANCIS JOSEPH I 
 
 HIS LIFE AND TIMES 
 
 AN ESSAY IN POLITICS 
 
 BY 
 
 R. P. MAHAFFY 
 
 FORMERLY WHEWELL SCHOLAR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AT CAMBRIDGE 
 OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARK ISTER'AT- LAW ; TEMPORARY CAPTAIN THE DEVON REGIMENT 
 
 LONDON 
 DUCKWORTH AND CO. 
 
 3 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C. 
 
 1915 
 
 1 i» 
 
Published 1908 
 Second Edition I9'5 
 
 All Rights Reserved. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The following pages contain an attempt to 
 summarise the events of the life of the 
 oldest, and in one sense, the most important 
 of European sovereigns, and to pronounce a 
 fair judgment as to the part which he has 
 played in the history of his country. The 
 brevity of this book shows at once that a great 
 deal has been left out ; and it contains little 
 that is not familiar to those who have followed 
 the story of Austria- Hungary in the last fifty 
 years. I intended to publish it on or about 
 December 2, 1908, when the Emperor- King 
 should have been sixty years on the throne ; 
 and I hoped that the occurrence of that anni- 
 versary would have given it a chance of being 
 read. Since the book was written, events have 
 occurred in Europe which have directed English 
 attention in an unusual degree to Austria- 
 Hungary. These events have not made it 
 
vi FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 necessary to alter or omit anything ; indeed 
 they are to a great extent explained by the 
 facts in this book and by the view which is 
 presented of the life and work of the Empe'ror- 
 King. In order to bring it up to date, an 
 appendix on recent events has been written. 
 This addition was, however, not composed in 
 the leisure of the Long Vacation as was the 
 case with the others, and may show signs 
 of hasty preparation. Yet I hope it will 
 serve to correct the false impressions which are 
 abroad in this country as to the Emperor-King's 
 recent action. 
 
 My first acquaintance with Austria- Hungary 
 was made in 1889, when I had just left school ; 
 but in 1894 I went to Hungary on a commis- 
 sion for a friend, the late Mr. J. G. V. Porter 
 of Belleisle, in the County Fermanagh, who 
 desired to have a report on the Hungarian 
 Constitution. I was at Budapest in the 
 summer of 1894, when the Civil Marriage 
 crisis was at its height, and met there many 
 of the leading men in Hungary, from whom I 
 learnt what it would be hard to learn from 
 books. In 1896 I again visited Austria- 
 Hungary as the correspondent of a London 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 newspaper. In both years I had occasion to 
 travel about the country, and saw a good deal 
 of it. The friendships then made have been 
 interrupted in some cases by death. Those 
 which have been preserved have enabled me 
 to hear frequently from a country which, for 
 politicians, is the most interesting in Europe. 
 
 It is difficult to write a book which neces- 
 sarily deals with many matters of controversy 
 without taking a side. The view presented in 
 the following pages is on the whole favourable 
 to the Magyars and their claims, in the past, 
 if not in the present. I have no doubt that 
 the view held by the Hungarians, for which 
 they fought nobly in 1849, and which received 
 a striking vindication in 1867, was the right 
 one ; but I am aware that some people think 
 otherwise, and regret that the Compromise of 
 1867 was ever concluded. In modern times 
 the Hungarians have advanced claims which 
 cannot be fully satisfied without grave danger to 
 the military strength of the monarchy. More- 
 over, they are constantly charged with need- 
 less persistence in the use of their language 
 in Hungary. Critics ask why they could not 
 have been content to keep the German 
 
viii FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 language which they had in 1867, and which 
 is one of the great languages of the world. 
 I do not think that it was possible for the 
 Hungarian leaders of 1867 to say, " Now that 
 the oppression for which German stood is 
 gone, we will keep German and not revive 
 Magyar." Such a course would in theory 
 have been the best ; but in such matters the 
 best course is often impracticable. On the 
 other hand, I think that the Hungarian leaders 
 of to-day ought not to persist in a policy which 
 must lead to the division and weakness in the 
 army of the monarchy ; and I do not believe 
 that, in the future, their fellow-countrymen 
 would think worse of them if they abstained 
 from the full prosecution of their claims. I do 
 not give this opinion without some diffidence, 
 for I know it is contrary to the view held by 
 many prominent men in Hungary. But they 
 must remember that compromise has been of 
 good service to them in the past. If their 
 predecessors had held out for the maximum 
 of concession, Hungary would not now be what 
 she is. 
 
 I owe much more than formal thanks to Dr. 
 Friedjung's admirable, if somewhat elaborate, 
 
PREFACE ix 
 
 books on Austria, which are referred to in 
 the notes ; to M. Eisenmann's Le Compromis 
 Austro- Hongrois, and to the same author's 
 excellent chapters in Lavisse and Rambaud's 
 Histoire Ge'ne'rale. Miss Arnold Forster's Life 
 of Francis Dedk, M. Ch6radame's L'Autriche, 
 etc., and Mr. Stillman's Union of Italy have 
 also been freely used. For the Hungarian 
 side of the question I have relied more on my 
 own intimacy with Hungarians and their 
 views, and on long friendship with Hungarian 
 politicians, than on any other source. The 
 best books on this side are in Magyar, of 
 which I know very little. It is fortunate that 
 the Hungarians are such good linguists that 
 anybody who knows French and German can 
 talk freely with them. 
 
 I have not, in the following pages, said 
 anything about the Emperor- King's private 
 life ; and I have purposely avoided reference 
 to family events and to the domestic mis- 
 fortunes with which he has been afflicted. 
 Such information as I have on these matters 
 is, I need hardly say, not at first hand, and 
 I think it undesirable that, in topics of the 
 kind, authors should pretend to a knowledge 
 
x FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 which they do not possess. I am sorry to 
 feel that the deliberate omission of the per- 
 sonal element will lose this book some friends 
 amongst readers who desire chiefly to know 
 which is the favourite soup of this or that 
 sovereign, and whether he prefers brown eyes 
 or blue. At all events no one will read it 
 under any misunderstanding on this point. 
 
 I have abstained from pedantic adherence 
 to the terms " Emperor-King " and " Austria- 
 Hungary. (1 The position of affairs is now such 
 that readers no longer need to be constantly 
 reminded of the absolute legal equality between 
 the hereditary dominions of the House of 
 Hapsburg and the Kingdom of St. Stephen. 
 
 Inner Temple, 
 November 4, 1908. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 1848-1851 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Austria in 1848 — Failure of the Vienna Revolution — 
 Parentage and Education of Francis Joseph — The 
 Constitution of 1 849 — Revolt in Hungary — Vilagos 
 — Novara — Olmiitz . . . . 1 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 1851-1859 
 
 The "Bach System" — The Concordat of 1855 — Th e 
 Crimean War and its Results — Relations with 
 Russia and France — Victor Emanuel — Magenta 
 and Solferino . . . . -37 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 1859-1866 
 
 Schmerling and Liberalism in Austria — Schemes for a 
 new Constitution in Germany — Prussia and Austria 
 — The Schleswig- Holstein Question — Sadowa — 
 General Benedek . . . . -67 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 1861-1867 
 
 Dedk and the Hungarian Liberals — Passive Resistance 
 in Hungary — The Negotiations of 1865 — The 
 Results of Sadowa — The Ausgltich of 1867 . 105 
 
xii FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 1867-1878 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Federalist Movement in Austria — The Hohenwart 
 Ministry ahd its Failure — Home Rule in Croatia 
 — Tisza's Ministry — Austria and France in 1 870 — 
 The Russo-Turkish War — Bosnia and the Herze- 
 govina . . . . . . 126 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 1879-1893 
 
 Auersperg and Taaffe Ministries in Austria — The 
 Liberal Party in Hungary — Tisza — Progress of the 
 Nationalist Question — The Balkan Question again 
 — The Emperor's Policy . . . .163 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 1893-1908 
 
 Civil Marriage in Hungary — Progress of Events in 
 Austria — The Badeni Ordinance and its Results — 
 The Army Question in Hungary — Decline of the 
 Hungarian Liberal Party — The Renewal of the 
 Ausgleichvn. 1 897 and 1907 — Sixty Years . 200 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 1 908-1914 
 
 Bosnia and the Herzegovina — Congress of Berlin — 
 Annexation — Weights in the Balance — Looking 
 backward ..... 232 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 1848-1851 
 
 Austria in 1848- — Failure of the Vienna Revolution — Parentage 
 and Education of Francis Joseph — The Constitution of 
 1 849 — Revolt in Hungary — Vilagos — Novara — Olmiitz. 
 
 It is not easy for us, with the Austria of to-day 
 before us, to realise what manner of state, or 
 system of states, was the Austria of December 
 1848. The political condition of the people 
 has undergone vast changes, greater, in some 
 ways, than any which have come to pass else- 
 where in Europe. A new people, the Austro- 
 Hungarian people, is being formed. The 
 map of the country is wholly altered. New 
 races, scarcely heard of in 1848, rise into 
 prominence. New territories have been opened 
 to progress. New cities have sprung up ; and 
 old cities have put on the vesture of youth. 
 A new religious liberty, unknown in 1848, is 
 abroad in the land. These changes make it 
 hard for us to place ourselves, in imagination, 
 in the Vienna of 1848 — the old Vienna, still 
 
2 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 contained within that circular rampart which 
 is now beneath the foundations of the most 
 stately street in Europe. Yet one person 
 in Vienna .is the same as in 1848. It was 
 in December of that eventful year that at 
 Olmutz, the old northern capital of Moravia, 
 Francis Joseph, the present Emperor, and 
 King of Hungary, ascended the tottering 
 throne which had been left vacant by the 
 abdication of his uncle. His personality con- 
 nects the modern Austria with that of the old 
 regime. He was brought up in the school of 
 Metternich, and has lived to see the most 
 modern type of democracy on foot in his 
 dominions. He has conquered or outlived 
 revolution, survived defeat, learnt by mistakes, 
 surmounted difficulties, and profited by adver- 
 sity. He has borne family sorrows with 
 admirable courage, and sustained without 
 failure a public part such as few men have 
 taken in the history of their country. The 
 present essay is an attempt to describe some 
 of the most interesting events of his reign ; 
 and to show how the difficulties which beset 
 him have been met. 
 
 In December 1848 the revolution which 
 broke out in Vienna during the spring of that 
 year had been crushed ; and in Italy the at- 
 tempt of the Italian nation to shake off Austrian 
 
THE OUTLOOK IN 1848 3 
 
 patronage had for the moment failed. Italy 
 and Austria had taken fire in the spring of 
 the year after the outbreak of the February 
 revolution in Paris. Indeed, Italy had taken 
 the lead in revolution ; for it was in the first 
 days of 1848 that the Austrian officers who 
 were smoking in the streets of Milan were 
 attacked by the mob because the consumption 
 of tobacco fed the exchequer of the Hapsburg. 
 In Italy, and also in Hungary, the revolutionary 
 movement was founded on two distinct ideas, 
 democracy and nationality. In England and 
 France political revolutions have not usually 
 been complicated by the rivalry between 
 dominant and obedient races. In the Austria 
 of 1848 they were so; and it is possible that 
 they may be so also in the future. Since 1815 
 the Hapsburgs had been practically in un- 
 disturbed possession of the miscellaneous col- 
 lection of kingdoms, principalities, and powers 
 which had from time to time been brought 
 into their possession by conquest, diplomacy, 
 or marriage. Known since the dissolution of 
 the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 as "Emperor 
 of Austria," the chief of the Hapsburgs was 
 Archduke, King, or Count of Austria, Bohemia, 
 Moravia, Carniola and Carinthia, the Tyrol, 
 Trieste, Dalmatia, and the other territories 
 comprised in the modern omnibus name 
 
4 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 "Austria." He was King of Hungary by virtue 
 of the acceptance (in 1723) by the Hungarian 
 Parliament of the Pragmatic Sanction — the 
 edict by which the last of the old male line 
 of the Hapsburgs declared that he should be 
 succeeded by his daughter Maria Theresa. 
 He was President of the German Confedera- 
 tion, a loosely -built structure of thirty -nine 
 German states which were pledged not to 
 pursue divergent foreign policies and to send 
 delegates to a Congress at Frankfort. He was 
 King of Lombardy and Venetia, and his soldiers 
 garrisoned the two noblest cities of northern 
 Italy. In Parma, Naples and Sicily, petty 
 sovereigns reigned who, whilst they would 
 tolerate no liberty in others, were themselves 
 docile subjects of the Imperial Court of 
 Vienna. In two other Italian states (Tuscany 
 and Modena) ruled grand dukes who were 
 Hapsburg princes and who relied on Austria 
 for support against their Italian subjects. 
 Such a position could only last on sufferance. 
 The Tory advisers of Francis Joseph's two 
 predecessors, Francis and Ferdinand, knew 
 well that concessions either to nationalism or 
 to democracy could not be made without 
 destroying the whole fabric of the empire. 
 It is a mistake to suppose that Metternich, 
 the chief of these advisers, was by nature or 
 
THE ARCHDUCHESS SOPHIE 5 
 
 preference a champion of absolutism. He was 
 merely a cautious Conservative, who saw that 
 the movements which culminated in 1848 spelt 
 destruction for the Austria of his time. 
 
 It was with these views that he committed 
 the education of the young Archduke Francis 
 Joseph to the Marquis de Bombelles, the 
 son of a French refugee, and a strong Con- 
 servative, and to the Abbe Rauscher, a Tory 
 cleric of the old school. The Archduke's 
 father, Francis Charles, was a person of no 
 great significance. On the other hand, his 
 mother, the Archduchess Sophie, daughter of 
 King Max of Bavaria, was a keen politician, 
 and entertained views much in advance of the 
 orthodox Hapsburg creed. She had consider- 
 able differences with her friend, Prince Met- 
 ternich, as to the education of the young 
 Prince. Frightened by the excesses of 1848 
 she became in that year a Tory of the Tories, 
 but during the period before the revolution, 
 when Francis Joseph was growing up, she 
 inclined towards Liberalism. Some of his 
 subordinate tutors, too, were of moderate 
 views; so that when, in December 1848, 
 the new Emperor acceded, he came to the 
 throne with the natural indecision of a boy of 
 eighteen uncorrected by any really consistent 
 education. He was well trained as a soldier, 
 
6 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. ' 
 
 and had served in the earlier part of the war 
 of '48 in Italy with Radetzky's army, coming 
 under the fire of the Piedmontese in the 
 summer campaign. He was now suddenly called 
 upon to take command in an Empire which 
 had never been united in anything but name 
 and sovereignty. In the year of his accession, 
 it was shaken by no less than three revolutions. 
 In Vienna the insurrection of March led to 
 the dismissal of Metternich, and late in the 
 spring the Emperor Ferdinand had promised 
 a parliamentary constitution. One concession 
 after another was given through the following 
 months until, on the eve of the assembly of 
 Austria's first Parliament, the Emperor and his 
 family deserted the capital and retired to safer 
 quarters at Innsbruck. In his absence his 
 ministers agreed to most of the demands of 
 the insurgent populace, and on July 22 the 
 Parliament in Vienna was convened. A few 
 of the principal grievances of the people were 
 swept away by rapid legislation, but differences 
 of opinion soon appeared in the assembly, which 
 was composed partly of representatives of 
 the German bourgeoisie and partly of those of 
 the peasantry, the majority of whom were of 
 Slavonic race. It soon became clear that, if 
 the majority were to have their way, the 
 German supremacy in Austria would cease ; 
 
REACTION IN VIENNA 7 
 
 but, in fact, the peasant deputies were little 
 disposed for a stand-up fight with the Crown. 
 They voted for the equality of all citizens 
 before the law, and for the abolition of feudal 
 dues and jurisdictions; but, these points gained, 
 they were not the least interested in theoretical 
 discussions on constitutional law or in the 
 resistance to which such discussions might 
 lead. Meantime the Crown had commenced 
 that remarkable series of successes by which 
 it regained all it had lost in the early part of 
 the year, and which ended in the temporary 
 triumph of Francis Joseph over the democrats 
 of '48. On July 25th, Marshal Radetzky de- 
 feated Charles Albert of Sardinia at Custozza, 
 whilst in June Prince Windischgratz, the 
 military governor of Prag, had stamped out 
 the Liberal and Czech movement in the capital 
 of Bohemia. On October 7th, the Emperor 
 Ferdinand, who had returned from Innsbruck 
 to Schonbriinn, near Vienna, late in the summer, 
 left the capital again and withdrew to Olmiitz. 
 Windischgratz and his army were at once let 
 loose upon Vienna. As there was no organisa- 
 tion in the insurgent force, the Imperial general 
 had no difficulty in occupying it (October 31). 
 The fall of Vienna was a notable victory 
 for reaction, and left the Hapsburgs — so far as 
 Austria proper was concerned — free to deal 
 
8 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 as they thought best with the demand for a 
 constitution. The Imperial ministers, headed 
 by Prince Felix Schwartzenberg, were in no 
 mood to make large concessions to democracy, 
 but they felt that it was impossible to pre- 
 serve the old absolutist rdgime. Accordingly, 
 at the end of September, the Austrian Prime 
 Minister issued a manifesto in which he pro- 
 mised that a constitution should be granted 
 within the Emperor's hereditary estates. 
 Whilst its terms were being discussed the 
 Austrian Parliament was removed by Imperial 
 decree from Vienna, and ordered to assemble 
 at Kremsier, a small town in Moravia, where, it 
 was thought, the deputies would not be amen- 
 able to the democratic influences which were 
 at work in the capital. Whilst the members 
 of the rusticated Reichsrath were awaiting the 
 decision of the cabinet, astounding news was 
 brought to them. The Emperor Ferdinand 
 had abdicated, his brother the Archduke Francis 
 Charles had waived his right to succeed, and 
 the Crown had devolved upon the youthful 
 Archduke Francis Joseph, who had been 
 crowned at Olmiitz on December 2nd. 
 
 The accession of the young Archduke was 
 quite legal in Austria, where the Imperial 
 dynasty were under no obligations of law and 
 could make their own arrangements. But in 
 
HUNGARIAN CLAIMS 9 
 
 Hungary the the royal family were bound 
 by certain statutes passed in 1723, and the 
 Hungarians asserted that the spirit of these 
 laws had not been respected when the Arch- 
 duke Francis Joseph was called to the throne. 
 Although the Acts of 1723 contain no provision 
 as to abdication, the Magyars held that the 
 Emperor Ferdinand could not abdicate in 
 Hungary, and that his brother could not waive 
 his rights, without the assent of the Hungarian 
 Parliament ; and that no Emperor of Austria 
 could be King of Hungary till he had been 
 crowned at Pesth, and signed the declaration 
 which pledged him to observe the laws of 
 the kingdom of St. Stephen. They therefore 
 refused to recognise Francis Joseph as King 
 of Hungary. 
 
 It is difficult to agree with the Hungarian 
 contention that the Emperor had no right to 
 abdicate, or the Archduke Francis Charles to 
 waive his rights. But the Magyars were 
 on firmer ground when they said that Francis 
 Joseph was not King till he had been crowned 
 with the Crown of St. Stephen. His claim to 
 the throne of Hungary was a good one, but 
 it was subject to his doing certain things ; and 
 the first act of his reign showed that he did 
 not intend to do them. This act was the issue 
 of a liberal proclamation in which he promised 
 
io FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 to take his subjects into partnership in the 
 government of his country ; but the pro- 
 clamation made no mention of the independent 
 rights of Hungary, and contained an implied 
 repudiation of them. "We are convinced," 
 it said, " of the necessity and value of free 
 institutions, and enter with confidence on the 
 path of a prosperous reformation of the 
 monarchy. On the basis of true liberty, on 
 the basis of the equality of rights of all our 
 people, and the equality of all citizens before 
 the law, and on the basis of their equally par- 
 taking in legislation and representation, the 
 country will rise to its ancient grandeur. . . . 
 Jealous of the glory of the Crown, and re- 
 solved to maintain its privileges uncurtailed, 
 but ready to share our privileges with the 
 representatives of our people, we hope, by 
 the assistance of God and the co-operation of 
 our people, to succeed in uniting all the 
 countries and tribes of the Monarchy into 
 one integral state." It was to the words 
 " one integral state " that the Hungarians 
 objected. 
 
 In pursuance of these promises the Emperor 
 and his advisers set to work to prepare a 
 constitution for Austria and Hungary. This 
 constitution was promulgated on March 4, 
 1849. It was of a moderate type, and would 
 
A NEW 'CONSTITUTION' n 
 
 have set up for Austria and Hungary a Parlia- 
 ment about as democratic as the English 
 Parliament of the day. The constitution 
 for Austria was followed shortly afterwards 
 by separate constitutions for each of the pro- 
 vinces, which were to possess diets endowed 
 with the right of sending members to the 
 central Parliament. As, however, the nomi- 
 nation of the first diets rested with the 
 Emperor, it was clear that the so-called con- 
 stitution gave no guarantee whatever of 
 popular control. Two things also may be 
 said about it : first, that it was designed to 
 include Hungary, and to supersede the 
 Hungarian constitution ; secondly, that the 
 Emperor did not intend to allow the other 
 states of Germany to come into the new and 
 Parliamentary Austria. The inclusion of 
 Hungary in a unitary Austrian state was a 
 thing to which the Magyars would never 
 submit. The exclusion of the South German 
 states was a great disappointment to those 
 German Liberals who had hoped to arrange 
 for a democratic Parliament for the whole of 
 Germany. 
 
 The constitution of March 1849 was never 
 taken seriously by its authors, but it served 
 the young Emperor and his advisers to keep 
 things quiet at home until they had vanquished 
 
12 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 their enemies in Hungary, Italy, and Germany. 
 Hungary was subjugated before the end of 
 1849, and in Italy Marshal Radetzky practi- 
 cally put an end to all popular movements by 
 his victory over Charles Albert and his Sar- 
 dinian troops at Novara (March 23, 1849). It 
 was not till the end of 1850 that Austria 
 succeeded in securing her place in Germany, 
 and re-establishing the old constitution of the 
 German Federation as it hadr existed since 
 1 81 5. So soon as this was done, there was 
 no further reason for keeping up the semblance 
 of a constitution in Austria. On the last day 
 of 1851, a few weeks after Napoleon III.'s 
 successful coup cTdtat in Paris, the Emperor, 
 by simple edict, abrogated the constitution 
 of March. Thus Parliamentary institutions 
 in his Austrian dominions came to an abrupt 
 and humiliating end. 
 
 In abrogating the constitution of 1849 the. 
 Emperor made a mistake. He was influenced 
 in doing so by his nearest advisers, but chiefly 
 by Prince Felix Schwartzenberg, his reaction- 
 ary Prime Minister, and by Alexander Bach, 
 Minister of the Interior, who in the next 
 ten years was to become his constant guide^ 
 in the management of domestic affairs. Had 
 the Parliament of 1849 survived, it would have 
 fallen into the hands of a middle-class majority, 
 
THE ACTS OF 1723 13 
 
 and would probably have made for unity in 
 Austria. It is not likely that Hungary would 
 ever have sent members to the Austrian 
 Parliament, but Liberal feelings would have 
 been conciliated by its existence, and the diffi- 
 culties which Austria could not for ever stave 
 off would have been fairly faced. In Italy and 
 Prussia Parliamentary institutions made for 
 unity, and this might also have been so fifty 
 years ago in Austria. But the Emperor was 
 in the hands either of aristocratic advisers, who 
 hated the idea of parting with any of their 
 privileges to a middle-class legislature, or of 
 upstarts like Bach — useful tools, whose con- 
 sciences, as well as their a industry, could be pur- 
 chased. And so in 1851 we find the Emperor, 
 advised by Schwartzenberg and Bach, settling 
 down to a careful and consistent attempt to 
 govern the country from their offices at Vienna, 
 with no other ultimate support than the loyal 
 army. 
 
 In Hungary the Emperor's accession or 
 usurpation — for it was legally no better than 
 that — led to a crisis which made civil war 
 inevitable. The House of Hapsburg - Lor- 
 raine only reigned, and to this day only 
 reigns, in the kingdom of St. Stephen by 
 virtue of the three first statutes of the year 
 1723. 
 
14 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 These Acts 1 provided that the Hungarian 
 Crown should, on the failure of male heirs to 
 the Emperor Charles VI., pass to his daughter 
 and her heirs male, if Roman Catholics, or, 
 failing them, to the male and Catholic heirs 
 of his predecessors, the Emperors Leopold I. 
 and Joseph. But they confirmed also all the 
 laws and approved customs of Hungary, the 
 most important of which was the right to 
 elect and crown their own kings, and to 
 compel the new king to swear to respect 
 the liberties of the kingdom. The right to 
 crown was first conceded to Stephen, King 
 of Hungary, by Pope Sylvester II. in the 
 year iooo, as a reward for his having con- 
 verted great numbers of his subjects to 
 Christianity ; and the famous Crown of St. 
 Stephen, which is still preserved in the Castle 
 at Buda, is, in part at least, the actual Crown 
 then sent by Sylvester II. to the Hungarian 
 prince. 2 This Crown was always treasured 
 as an emblem of Magyar liberty and of the 
 
 1 They will be found in Dumont's Corps Diplomatiqrtc, vol. viii. 
 Part II. at p. 52. 
 
 2 Thus Dr. Vambery in his Hungary ("Story of the Nations," 
 1887) ; but there is now, I believe, some doubt as to whether any part 
 of the Crown is as old as 1000 a.d. This wonderful relic is preserved 
 in a case in the Castle of Buda, and guarded by two hereditary guard- 
 ians, who are of the noblest Hungarian families. The Crown may 
 not be taken out of its case without an Act of Parliament ; but such 
 an Act was passed at the time of the Hungarian millenial celebrations. 
 I was at Budapest in April and May 1896, and had an opportunity ot 
 examining the Crown with care. See Appendix B. 
 
MAGYAR CLAIMS 15 
 
 right to have kings who were independent 
 of the Holy Roman Emperor. It may be 
 urged that the Hungarian rights were swept 
 away and destroyed by the Turkish occu- 
 pation (1526- 1683) °f Hungary, that when 
 the Hapsburgs recovered the country they 
 were freed from all obligations, and that the 
 right of the Hapsburgs to hereditary succes- 
 sion in Hungary was admitted by the Hun- 
 garian Diet in 1687. Yet, even if this be so, 
 it must be remembered that the Diet of 
 1687 only accepted the male line of the Haps- 
 burgs ; and that their right to make terms 
 on accepting the female line was fully admitted 
 by Charles VI. in 1723. During the reign 
 of Maria Theresa there was no reason for 
 the Hungarians to reassert their right, but the 
 centralising tendencies of her son, Joseph II. 
 (1765 -1 790), aroused their suspicions. He 
 was never crowned in Hungary, and never 
 recognised as king by the Magyars. When 
 in 1790 Leopold II. came to the throne, they 
 obtained a full recognition of their complete 
 independence of Austria and their right to 
 their constitution. This being so, it is diffi- 
 cult to agree with disputants who urge that 
 the decree of 1687 had abolished the right of 
 the Hungarians to have their kings crowned 
 at Budapest before they assumed the royal 
 
16 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 prerogative. And even if it be admitted 
 that the reigning Hapsburg prince, whoever 
 he may be, is ipso facto King of Hungary, 
 he is clearly bound by the Acts of 1 7 2 3 
 and 1790 *to respect the country's insti- 
 tutions, the most important of which was 
 the Diet at Budapest. It is not too much 
 to say that the attempt of the Emperor 
 Francis Joseph to exercise royal rights in 
 Hungary without having been crowned was 
 unlawful ; and that the issue of the constitu- 
 tion of March 1849, which simply ignored 
 the rights of Hungary, was a violent attempt 
 to destroy rights which had been long in 
 existence, and which his ancestors had freely 
 admitted. If in such a case insurrection was 
 not justified, it can never be so. 
 
 During the early part of the nineteenth 
 century the Hungarian Diet had rarely been 
 convened, but a spirit of independence which 
 has distinguished the country for many cen- 
 turies was alive. It had been fostered by 
 a number of aristocratic leaders, and also 
 by men of the people who were possessed of 
 more or less Radical views. In 1847 the 
 Diet met at Pressburg, on the frontier between 
 Austria and Hungary, and the national de- 
 mands were stated in a programme drawn 
 up by Francis Deak, the moderate Liberal 
 
HUNGARY IN 1848 17 
 
 leader, and a lawyer of the first ability. He 
 asked for a guarantee that Parliament should 
 meet annually, and should be elected not by 
 the old county assemblies but on a ^30 
 franchise, that the nobles should no longer 
 be free from taxation, that feudal dues should 
 be abolished, that judges be appointed for 
 life, and that the King of Hungary (who was 
 also Emperor of Austria) should nominate a 
 ministry for Hungary which should be re- 
 sponsible to the Hungarian Parliament. Early 
 in April 1848 the Emperor Ferdinand appeared 
 in state at Pressburg and granted all these 
 demands. He also agreed to the complete 
 union of Hungary with Transylvania, a south- 
 eastern province of the kingdom of St. Stephen, 
 which had long claimed local independence. 
 These admissions were a great triumph for the 
 Magyar race. They gave to Hungary the 
 position which she holds to-day, and made 
 her a state of equal rights with Austria. Con- 
 sequently they aroused the jealousy of the 
 Slavonic populations throughout the whole 
 Hapsburg territory. There, every concession 
 made to the Magyars was used as a precedent 
 by weaker nationalities. 
 
 Ferdinand began to intrigue with these 
 malcontents, especially with the Croats, whose 
 invasion of Hungary he secretly favoured. 
 
 c 
 
18 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 So soon as he heard of the success of his 
 arms in Italy he refused to assent to certain 
 laws passed by the Hungarian Parliament in 
 1848 with regard to the organisation of the 
 Hungarian army. This refusal was followed 
 by evasive answers to the Hungarian demands 
 as to the relations of the Emperor with the 
 Croat leaders. In the meantime Jellachich, 
 the Ban of Croatia, who had raised a consider- 
 able Croat army, had invaded Hungary at the 
 end of July. Shortly before his abdication 
 Ferdinand declared the Hungarian Parliament 
 closed (September 9), and named the Croat 
 invader as commander-in-chief of the troops in 
 Hungary, and Viceroy of the kingdom. Out- 
 voted by his own loyal subjects, and unable 
 to reduce them to obedience, he sought to 
 conquer them by calling in the Slavs to his 
 help. His action may justly be compared to 
 the action of Charles I. of England, who, 
 unable to defeat the English Republicans of 
 1642, endeavoured to overpower them by the 
 help of Irish and Scottish soldiers, offering 
 their nationalities a high reward if they would 
 assist him in his English warfare. The policy 
 of Ferdinand was, indeed, the very policy 
 which, just two centuries before, had brought a 
 king of England to the scaffold at Whitehall. 
 Thus, when Francis Joseph came to the 
 
GORGEI 19 
 
 throne in Austria he found in Hungary a 
 heritage of tyranny and civil war. The 
 new Emperor's accession as King of Hun- 
 gary was contrary to law, and the Magyars 
 were justified in refusing to recognise it. 
 The Austrians had an army of some 150,000 
 men, including the Croats and other Slavonic 
 insurgents who had risen in southern Hun- 
 gary against Magyar rule. The Magyars 
 could not put more than 100,000 men into 
 the field, and at first their forces were 
 unable to make headway against the motley 
 army of the Hapsburg usurper. The tide 
 of Austrian success flowed until February 
 1849, when Dembinski, a Polish general who 
 had been given command by Kossuth, was 
 defeated at Kapolna (February 26th). This 
 defeat led to the appointment of Colonel 
 Gorgei, a young Hungarian officer who had 
 served in the Austrian army, to command the 
 Magyar forces. Gorgei turned out to be a 
 strategist of the highest merit, and he was 
 in addition a man for whom his soldiers fought 
 with a bravery that deeply stirred the heart 
 of Western Europe. The Hungarians gained 
 a series of successes which, in a short time, 
 brought the Hapsburg monarch to his knees. 
 Late in April 1849, though he could now com- 
 mand the regiments whom his victories in Italy 
 
ao FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 had set free, he was compelled to beg Russia 
 to intervene in Hungary. The Hungarian 
 Government had in the meantime (April 14) 
 declared the Hapsburgs banished from Hun- 
 gary for ever as traitors to her liberty and con- 
 stitution. This was a very strong step, taken 
 at Kossuth's instigation. The Hungarian 
 nobility and many of the generals, including 
 Gorgei, objected to it. One should remember 
 that it was not taken until after the Emperor 
 Francis Joseph had promulgated the Austrian 
 constitution of March 1849. This constitution 
 aimed at enveloping Hungary in a "great 
 Austria," and involved an abrogation of her 
 constitution. As Francis Joseph had assumed 
 the regal authority without having been 
 crowned, and as one of his first acts was to 
 abrogate liberties which his predecessors had 
 sworn to respect, it cannot be said that the 
 decree of banishment was without justifi- 
 cation. 
 
 It is not my object to follow at length the 
 details of the war a outrance which followed 
 (April — September 1849). The intervention 
 of Russia was resented abroad. In England 
 and Turkey, where love of liberty or affinity 
 of race had made many friends for Hun- 
 gary, feeling ran high against the Austrians. 
 " I believe," said Lord Palmerston on a 
 
PALMERSTON'S SYMPATHY 21 
 
 famous occasion, " I believe that in this war 
 between Austria and Hungary there are en- 
 listed on the side of Hungary the hearts and 
 souls of the whole people of that country. . . . 
 Such a contest is most painful to behold, as, 
 whatever may be the result, Austria cannot 
 but be weakened. If the Hungarians should 
 be successful, and their success should end in 
 the entire separation of Hungary from Austria, 
 it is impossible not to see that this will be 
 such a dismemberment of the Austrian Empire 
 as will prevent Austria from continuing to 
 occupy the great position she has hitherto 
 held among European powers. If, on the 
 other hand, the war being fought out to the 
 uttermost, Hungary should, by superior forces, 
 be utterly crushed, Austria in that battle will 
 have crushed her own right arm ! Every field 
 that is laid waste is an Austrian resource de- 
 stroyed. Every man who perishes upon the 
 field among the Hungarian ranks is an Austrian 
 soldier deducted from the defensive forces of 
 the Empire." 1 
 
 But though Lord Palmerston echoed the 
 opinion of the majority of Englishmen, Kossuth 
 never succeeded in bringing about a counter- 
 intervention, and with Russia and the Haps- 
 burgs against them, the Magyars were at 
 
 1 House of Commons, July 21,1 849. 
 
22 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 length outnumbered and crushed. Kossuth 
 went into exile, and afterwards, in England 
 and America, excited foreign audiences to 
 enthusiasm, by his eloquent vindication of 
 Hungarian rights. Gorgei, invested with 
 supreme powers, surrendered at Vilagos 
 (August 13) with 23,000 men ; yet it was not 
 to the Austrian Haynau, but to the Russian 
 general Paskievitch, that he handed his sword. 
 At the end of September the last of the 
 Hungarian strongholds, Komorn, surrendered 
 with the honours of war. The laws of 1848 
 and the fundamental charters of Hungarian 
 liberty were swept away, and, in October 
 1849, the Emperor Francis Joseph declared 
 the ancient constitution of Hungary abolished. 
 For seventeen years the ancient kingdom of 
 St. Stephen became a subjugated province 
 of Austria. 
 
 Victory over Hungary had thus been 
 obtained, but only by the help of Russian 
 troops and of the Croat levies, who were of 
 Slavonic race. We shall see hereafter how 
 great a price Francis Joseph had to pay for 
 Russian help. The surrender at Vilagos oc- 
 curred only a few days before the surrender of 
 Venice to Radetzky, and as that event brings 
 the revolutionary period in Italy to a close, we 
 turn for a moment to Italian affairs. There 
 
ITALY IN 1848 23 
 
 we find a story less discreditable to Austria 
 than that which is on record in Hungary, 
 but terminating, like the Hungarian story, in 
 the triumph of absolutism and reaction over 
 nationality and progress. At the commence- 
 ment of 1848 the Hapsburgs were kings of 
 Lombardy and Venetia, and owned Northern 
 Italy from the Adriatic and the northern 
 frontier to the Ticino and the Po. Their 
 governors and garrisons were in Venice, in 
 Milan, and their magistrates and tax-gatherers 
 dispensed justice and collected revenue. In 
 Parma and Modena Hapsburg or Bourbon 
 princes ruled absolutely, and in Tuscany the 
 Grand Duke Leopold, a direct descendant of 
 Maria Theresa, was a respectful client of the 
 Austrian Court. In Rome, Pope Pius IX., 
 elected in 1846 by French influence, had 
 already granted limited liberties to the popu- 
 lace. In Tuscany, where the Duke held 
 mildly Liberal views, some concessions had 
 been made, and the same thing had occurred 
 in Piedmont, where the House of Savoy, the 
 only national dynasty in Italy, ruled in the 
 person of Charles Albert. In Naples and 
 Sicily, on the other hand, Ferdinand II., of 
 the Neapolitan branch of the Bourbons, had 
 refused all concessions. 
 
 At the commencement of 1848 the infection 
 
24 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 of democracy spread from Paris and Vienna to 
 Italy, and violence took the place of orderly 
 reform. The revolution broke out first at 
 the extremes of Italy, Palermo and Milan, and 
 in Palermo it was successful. King Ferdinand 
 was compelled to promise a constitution in 
 February, and during the spring the Grand 
 Duke of Tuscany, the King of Piedmont, and 
 the Pope followed suit. In March the Austrian 
 governors were driven from Venice and Milan, 
 and Marshal Radetzky, who commanded the 
 Austrian army, was compelled to retire within 
 the sheltering fortresses of the Quadrilateral. 
 When on March 23 the Venetian Republic 
 was established it might almost be said that 
 Austria had nothing left in Italy but the 
 ground on which her soldiers stood. 
 
 But the Italian insurrections of 1848 were 
 isolated events, caused by local circumstances 
 in each of the little states. The Unionist idea 
 had gained scarcely any ground. But we see. 
 a first indication of such an idea in the invita- 
 tion extended by the Milanese to the King 
 of Savoy to cross the frontier and help them 
 in their struggle against the Hapsburgs. The 
 King of Savoy accepted the invitation. Unlike 
 the weak King of Prussia, he was willing to 
 answer the call for leadership in Italy ; but, 
 though willing, he was not able to play his 
 
CUSTOZZA 25 
 
 part. His action estranged Pius IX., who 
 feared the destruction of Austria, the strongest 
 Catholic power in Europe ; and the support of 
 the Pope, as temporal prince, was lost to the 
 new Italian cause. The King of Naples in 
 May succeeded in restoring his power by a 
 counter-revolution, and though this success 
 was used, as in Prussia, with moderation, 
 Naples gave no official help to the Savoyard 
 king. With Rome and Naples neutral, the 
 Austrian general was able to meet and defeat 
 the forces which Turin, Milan, and Venice 
 raised against him. Charles Albert was a 
 bad general, and hesitated to attack the old 
 Austrian marshal, whose forces were, in May 
 and June 1849, gradually recruited from 
 southern Austria. Waiting till his reinforce- 
 ments gave him an army of 120,000 men, 
 Radetzky attacked the Italians at Custozza on 
 24th July. The regular regiments of the 
 Hapsburgs easily defeated the Italian force, 
 which consisted largely of undisciplined en- 
 thusiasts, and Charles Albert was driven back 
 upon Milan. Unable to defend it, he signed, 
 on August 9, an armistice which reassured 
 the Imperial Government of its prestige and 
 possessions in Northern Italy. 
 
 The young Archduke Francis Joseph served 
 in this brief campaign, and it was shortly 
 
26 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 before its close that he was recalled to Austria 
 to succeed his uncle on the Hapsburg throne. 
 Before his accession, therefore, he had seen 
 his arms victorious in Italy, and felt, no doubt, 
 that he could defeat the ill-united forces of 
 the Italian democrats. The revolution was 
 not, however, ended by the battle of Custozza. 
 Venice was not daunted by it, and, refusing to 
 acknowledge Hapsburg authority, prepared for 
 defence. In the autumn the Grand Duke of 
 Tuscany was compelled to accept popular 
 ministers, and Pope Pius IX. was driven to 
 make concessions to the Romans which he 
 regarded as incompatible with his temporal 
 and spiritural authority. He retired to Gaeta 
 in November to await restoration at the hands 
 of Austrian soldiers. 
 
 In February 1849 republics were pro- 
 claimed in the Papal States and Tuscany, and 
 two democratic governments were thus estab- 
 lished between autocratic Austria and auto- 
 cratic Naples. The year 1849 saw the isolated 
 movements of 1848 replaced by a general 
 movement for the expulsion of the Austrians 
 and union of Italy. But the German garrison 
 in Lombardy was still more than strong enough 
 to maintain the sovereignty of Francis Joseph. 
 On March 12, the King of Sardinia, coerced 
 by no democratic fury but by a genuine out- 
 
FALL OF VENICE 27 
 
 burst of anti-Austrian enthusiasm, denounced 
 the armistice of August 1848, and, a week later, 
 crossed the frontier of Lombardy. He found 
 Radetzky and his army more than ready for 
 him. The Italian generalship was poor and 
 the Italian soldiery not to compare as a fight- 
 ing force with the Austrian troops. On the 
 23rd, after an obstinate fight near Novara, the 
 Italians retired in disorder and could not be 
 rallied. The disappointed King of Sardinia 
 abdicated on the morrow of defeat. It was 
 left to the new king, Victor Emanuel, to sign 
 with the old Austrian general an armistice 
 which finally restored the Hapsburg power in 
 Northern Italy. 
 
 The defeat of Charles Albert was followed 
 by a rapid restoration of autocracy all over 
 the peninsula. The last stronghold of Liberal- 
 ism, Venice, surrendered to a Polish general of 
 the Austrian Emperor on 27th August 1849. 
 The victory ,of Francis Joseph was complete. 
 His army had proved loyal. Moreover it had 
 met in Italy a race whose fighting qualities 
 were inferior to those of the Magyars. 
 
 Whilst the Austrian Government was en- 
 gaged in Italy and Hungary, the politics of 
 non-Austrian Germany passed through a criti- 
 cal phase. Both in Prussia and in Germany 
 at large a movement in favour of constitutional 
 
28 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 government took place early in 1848. In 
 Prussia the weak king Frederick William IV. 
 vacillated between the policy of resistance and 
 that of riding to popularity on the wave which 
 he could not stem. In Germany at large 
 the little princes, thirty-seven in all, were 
 frightened by a movement which threatened 
 their thrones and privileges. In all matters of 
 importance they had long looked to Austria 
 for leadership, and had followed Metternich 
 and the Austrian statesmen, who controlled 
 the Federal Council at Frankfort — though not 
 without occasional jealousies and backsliding. 
 In 1848 these princes were left without 
 Austrian guidance, for Austria was too busy 
 elsewhere to attend to German affairs. When, 
 therefore, the King of Prussia promised to 
 give the Prussians a constitution, and declared 
 that he would take the lead in a reform move- 
 ment in Germany, the Emperor Ferdinand 
 answered him with a declaration which simply 
 reserved all Austria's rights. Austria was not 
 represented at the preliminary Parliament 
 which met at Frankfort in March 1848 to 
 discuss a new constitution ; yet when a scheme 
 of election had been devised and a full German 
 Parliament assembled at Frankfort in May, 
 the Archduke John, a popular prince and 
 brother of the Emperor Ferdinand, secured 
 
GERMANY IN 1848 29 
 
 election as Reichsverweser or administrator of 
 the Empire. The habit of submission to 
 Austria was too strong to be shaken off, and 
 the Archduke, assisted by an able Austrophile 
 minister, Baron Schmerling, used his position 
 to delay all definite reform until Austria should 
 again be free to take up her old position in 
 Germany. Weeks and months were spent in 
 academic discussion. The revolutionary fires 
 died down and the championship of progress 
 was left to the professors and lawyers in the 
 assembly — the very last people in the world to 
 work a revolution with success. 
 
 The majority of these were in favour of 
 separating Germany and Austria, and of en- 
 trusting the control of a Federation in North 
 Germany to a hereditary emperor — the policy, 
 in fact, which Bismarck realised in 187 1. At the 
 end of March 1849 the Parliament passed re- 
 solutions to this effect, and immediately elected 
 the King of Prussia Emperor of Germany. 
 This step might have been a great blow to 
 Austria, more especially as many of her own 
 representatives voted in the majority ; but the 
 King of Prussia, Frederick William IV., was 
 not brave enough to accept the crown which 
 was thus offered him. He disliked arranging 
 matters without the assent of his Austrian 
 cousin, and he objected to becoming an 
 
3 o FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Emperor by popular election. The proferred 
 crown was refused, the position of the Frank- 
 fort Parliament stultified, and Germany plunged 
 again into confusion from which she did not 
 emerge for two years. Meantime the new 
 Emperor at Vienna, whose advisers knew 
 exactly what they wanted, proceeded to the 
 conquest of Hungary, and for the present 
 contented themselves with refusing to join 
 in any German union in which Prussia had 
 the leadership. When Prussia, Hanover, and 
 Saxony tried to take up the tangled threads 
 and work them into some fabric of Govern- 
 ment they found no support among the lesser 
 princes, who were ever jealous of Prussian 
 ascendency, whilst Francis Joseph simply 
 opposed. In September 1849 Prince Schwart- 
 zenberg, the Austrian Premier, induced the 
 Prussian Government to sign what was called 
 an Interim — a treaty by which it was agreed 
 that Austria and Prussia should direct the 
 common affairs of Germany until some per- 
 manent arrangement could be made. This 
 treaty, which was signed at the moment of 
 the close of the struggle in Hungary, marks 
 the re-entry of Austria upon the stage of 
 German politics. Frederick William seems 
 to have thought it would lead to the peaceful 
 preparation of a reformed German constitution ; 
 
GERMANY IN 1850 31 
 
 but Francis Joseph and his advisers, now free 
 to follow the path of reaction, had different 
 views. In March 1850, the new German 
 Parliament reassembled at Erfurt, but, with 
 Austria in opposition and Prussia stupidly- 
 bound to Austria, nothing could be done. In 
 April, Schwartzenberg sent a circular to the 
 German Governments inviting them to come 
 to Vienna to consider what should be done 
 when the Austro-Prussian interim agreement 
 expired, and he was now strong enough to 
 send a threatening despatch to Prussia. It 
 meant that unless Frederick William IV. would 
 consent to resume his place in the old frame- 
 work of Germany, he must be prepared for 
 war. In May 1850 the old-fashioned Diet of 
 the German Confederation resumed its sittings, 
 and though very few states sent delegates, it 
 was in September declared to be properly 
 constituted. In October, Francis Joseph, 
 accompanied by his Prime Minister, had per- 
 sonal interviews with the Czar Nicholas at 
 Warsaw, and with the Kings of Wiirtemberg 
 and Bavaria in Switzerland. He found all 
 three sovereigns ready to support him against 
 Prussia. " I am an old soldier," said King 
 William of Wtlrtemberg, " and a man of few 
 words. It is enough for me to say that I 
 shall obey my Emperor's orders, wherever 
 
32 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 he bids me march." " With such allies," re- 
 plied Francis Joseph, " I fear no enemy." 
 
 The Austrian Emperor was now as strong 
 as ever, v and his army, freed from all distrac- 
 tions, was ready to march to Berlin. The final 
 episodes of the story were complicated by 
 difficulties in Hesse. There Austrian and 
 Bavarian troops, at the orders of the revived 
 German Federal Council at Frankfort, had 
 intervened to support a mean and tyrannous 
 prince against the successful efforts of his 
 subjects. The Hessians refused to pay taxes 
 which had not been legally sanctioned, and the 
 King of Prussia had sent some troops into 
 Hessian territory to help the malcontent tax- 
 payers against their ruler. Frederick William 
 protested against the presence of Austrian 
 troops in Hesse, which was, no doubt, very 
 far north in Germany, and denied that the 
 revived Council, whose emissaries they were, 
 had any proper authority. For a moment 
 the Prussian and the Federal troops faced 
 one another in the Hessian territory, and 
 there was urgent danger of the outbreak 
 of a war which would have anticipated 
 the Austro- Prussian campaign of 1866. But 
 Prussia was not strong enough to maintain 
 her attitude in the face of threats of Aus- 
 trian invasion and Russian admonitions. On 
 
PRUSSIA HUMBLED 33 
 
 2nd November a conciliatory note was sent 
 from Berlin to Vienna, and Radowitz, the 
 Prussian Nationalist minister, resigned. He 
 had anticipated the policy of Bismarck in 
 trying to exclude Austria from North Ger- 
 many, but he was before his time. Moltke 
 had not yet reorganised the Prussian army 
 or taught Europe the meaning of a nation 
 in arms, and armed with modern weapons. 
 Austria had an army which had, after a fashion, 
 been victorious in Hungary and Italy, and was 
 ready to fight. The little German states were 
 timid, and would not be drawn into concerted 
 action against her. Russia, the dominant 
 Power in Continental Europe, was eager to put 
 down all Nationalist movements. Their suc- 
 cess could not but lead to the revival, in 
 Poland and elsewhere, of questions which she 
 dared not face. And so when, in November 
 1850, Prince Schwartzenberg demanded that 
 the Prussian troops should give way to the 
 Federal forces in Hesse, and requested an 
 answer in forty -eight hours, the Prussian 
 Government yielded. Terms were arranged 
 at Olmiitz between Schwartzenberg, who went 
 thither at the end of the month, and the 
 Prussian minister, Manteuffel. The Prussians 
 bound themselves not to oppose the Federal 
 force in Hesse, and to put their army on a 
 
34 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 peace footing, whilst in exchange they got 
 only an undertaking that a conference should 
 meet at Dresden to consider the future of 
 Germany. The conference met shortly after- 
 wards, but did nothing. In the summer of 
 1 85 1 the old-fashioned German Diet resumed 
 regular sittings. 
 
 Thus, after three years of warfare and of 
 complicated negotiation, Francis Joseph found 
 himself on the throne of his forefathers 
 triumphant over the great revolution of 1848. 
 His position in Italy was saved by the genius 
 of Radetzky and by disunion amongst the 
 Italian Liberals, who did not yet fully realise 
 that the expulsion of the Hapsburg and the 
 union of Italy were but one single cause. In 
 Germany he had won a victory without blood- 
 shed simply because Prussia was not yet ready 
 to take the lead. Count Bismarck was already 
 in the Prussian Diet in 1850, and consented to 
 the humiliation of Olmutz much as Cromwell 
 consented to the first payment of ship-money 
 in England. In the House he defended the 
 Olmutz treaty. " The honour of our army," 
 he coldly said, "does not require that we should 
 play the part of Don Quixote in Germany." 
 In Hungary the young Emperor had met a 
 more determined opposition than elsewhere. 
 He had conquered only at a serious cost — 
 
RIFTS IN THE LUTE 35 
 
 but he had conquered. No young sovereign 
 has ever been in such a position as the youth- 
 ful ruler of the Hapsburg territories at the end 
 of 1 85 1. The traditions on which he had been 
 nursed, and which in 1848 seemed to be broken 
 for ever, had been vindicated. The democrats 
 had been vanquished. His authority, direct or 
 indirect, stretched from Kiel to Syracuse, and 
 from Belgrade to the Rhine. Even in France, 
 where the revolution had upset a throne, a new 
 Emperor had established himself by a success- 
 ful coup cCetat. With his trusted Schwartzen- 
 berg to advise him, his clever mother to give 
 her experience, and, above all, a faithful and 
 efficient army, Francis Joseph might well feel 
 that the mantle of his ancestors had indeed 
 descended on his shoulders. 
 
 Yet there were signs to show that his success 
 was more apparent than real. Austria held 
 her own in Italy, but it was obvious that she 
 ruled there only by the sword. The moment 
 her army failed to serve, her cause was lost. 
 A large number of Hungarian soldiers had 
 deserted from the regiments in Italy during 
 the wars of 1848, and, with Hungary in passive 
 resistance and only held down by armed force, 
 the Hungarian soldiers could not be counted 
 upon in the future. Moreover, defeat had 
 taught Italy her destiny. The question of 
 
36 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 her unity had become a matter of practical 
 politics. It was clear that the Roman 
 and Tuscan Liberals would not be satisfied 
 with a mere restriction of the powers of their 
 local sovereigns. It was realised that Italy- 
 would not fear recourse to arms. Her sons, 
 if they had not yet learned to fight, like the 
 Magyars, knew, as they did, how to die. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 1851-1859 
 
 The "Bach System"— The Concordat of 1855— The Crimean 
 War and its results — Relations with Russia and France 
 — Victor Emanuel — Magenta and Solferino. 
 
 It will probably occur to the reader who has 
 read so far in this book that it has been written 
 without a sense of proportion. A short book 
 to describe a reign of sixty years ; and yet in 
 all this time we have got no further than the 
 end of the year 1851 ! The author can only 
 defend himself by saying that in his judgment 
 the first three years were almost, if not quite, 
 the most important in the Emperor's reign. 
 They not only foreshadow the difficulties which 
 beset him and show the weakness of his posi- 
 tion, but they also illustrate its strength. The 
 general course of the policy which the Emperor- 
 King has followed in recent times is indeed 
 very different from the policy of ruthless 
 repression which was carried out in his name 
 during his first three years on the throne ; 
 
 37 
 
38 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 but the object, though not the method of 
 Schwartzenberg, was that of the Emperor- 
 King to-day. To maintain a strong Catholic 
 mid-European monarchy, with its centre at 
 Vienna, was the chief aim of Francis Joseph's 
 first Chancellor — the personification of that 
 aristocratic caste and spirit which has so long 
 surrounded the Hapsburgs. The maintenance 
 of that monarchy is still the aim of the Emperor- 
 King, and though he has, by time and by ad- 
 versity, been taught to alter the means by which 
 that aim is pursued, the object itself has not 
 changed. At the end of 1851, the skill of 
 Schwartzenberg and the genius of Radetzky had 
 freed the Empire from those enemies who, in 
 1848, had challenged not only the autocratic 
 authority of the sovereign, but even the exist- 
 ence of " Austria " itself. Francis Joseph was 
 now given a breathing-space. As a young 
 man of twenty-one, he started to govern a 
 country in which there were many elements 
 of disloyalty, but in which the majority was 
 sincerely loyal. How did he do it ? 
 
 The answer to this question may be given 
 in a few words — he did it, or tried to do it, by 
 setting up a strong and intelligent bureaucracy, 
 by concentrating all power, legislative and 
 executive, in the offices of ministers at Vienna 
 who were responsible to no one but himself. 
 
BACH'S SYSTEM 39 
 
 As we have already seen, the constitution 
 which he had given to Austria in March 
 1849, and which had been declared to be 
 " irrevocable," was cancelled on the last day of 
 1 85 1. Its withdrawal was one of the last acts 
 of Prince Schwartzenberg's regime, and was 
 quite in harmony with the rest of his policy. 
 Indeed, it would have been difficult to maintain 
 the constitution of 1849, which provided for 
 the representation at Vienna, not only of what 
 we now call Austria, but of the conquered 
 Hungary and of Northern Italy. The dis- 
 appearance of the charter - constitution of 
 1849 left the way open for the organisation 
 of a system of centralised government. Its 
 preparation and execution were committed 
 after the death of Schwartzenberg in 1852 to 
 Alexander von Bach, who had for three years 
 been Minister of the Interior. Bach was a 
 lawyer of Vienna and a man of the people. In 
 early days he was credited with Liberal 
 sympathies, but in '49 he entered the service 
 of monarchy, and during the eight years follow- 
 ing 185 1 was the head and centre of the system 
 of government which will go down to history 
 marked with his name. He succeeded Count 
 Stadion, a man of Liberal sympathies who had 
 been in the Austrian Ministry of 1848, as 
 Minister of the Interior; and when the con- 
 
40 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 stitution of 1 849 was withdrawn he became the 
 centre of a great system of administration 
 which embraced the whole of Austria and of the 
 conquered but reluctant Hungary. Bach was 
 in some ways an instrument for good. Under 
 his system the local jurisdictions of the nobility 
 were abolished, and superseded by courts in 
 which justice was dispensed in the Emperor's 
 name. This reform aroused violent opposi- 
 tion on the part of the old nobility, but it 
 was undoubtedly an improvement. German 
 became everywhere the official language, and 
 Magyar was tabooed in Hungary. The police 
 force which was raised by Bach spoke German 
 only, and it is said that in 1 860 only one of the 
 higher police officers in Budapest was able to 
 speak the language of the people. The smaller 
 provinces, such as Istria and the Tyrol, retained 
 their old shape, but Galicia, where a Polish 
 aristocracy and a Ruthenian peasantry were 
 equally hostile to Germanism, and Hungary, 
 where the language of Vienna was the language 
 of oppression, were cut up into separate pro- 
 vinces. The very picture of the kingdom of 
 St. Stephen was wiped off the map. The 
 right of meeting was strictly limited, and all 
 political associations were forbidden. No 
 newspaper could be issued until a copy had 
 been seen and approved by the police. 
 
ROME AND AUSTRIA 41 
 
 Slav or Hungarian journalists, even when 
 acquitted by a jury, could be, and were, 
 " interned " at a distance from their homes. 
 Bach's system was not directed only against the 
 Magyars nor designed solely to suppress that 
 nationality. His hand lay as heavy on Czechs, 
 Ruthenians, and Roumans, as on Magyars. 
 Galicia and Transylvania, as well as Hungary, 
 remained in a state of siege till 1854. The 
 Hungarians took a gloomy satisfaction in seeing 
 that the Slavonic race in Croatia, which had 
 fought for the Hapsburgs in 1849, were no better 
 treated than themselves. A historian tells a 
 story of a Croat who one day met a Hungarian 
 and asked him what Hungary thought of the pre- 
 sent state of affairs. " We are pleased with it," 
 was the reply. " The Austrians give to you as 
 a reward what they give to us as a punishment." 
 In the struggle of 1848-1850 the Roman 
 Catholic Church had formed a close alliance 
 with the Emperor and his advisers. A 
 popular success in Hungary was feared by 
 the bishops, who saw in it the prelude to a 
 crusade against the wealth and obscurantism 
 of the Church ; and in the Slavonic borders — 
 Galicia, Croatia, and Southern Hungary — 
 many of the Slavs either belonged to the 
 Roman Church, or might be drawn into 
 it if they were allowed even a modicum of 
 
42 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 political liberty. The bishops assembled at 
 Vienna in 1849, condemned all Nationalist 
 pretensions, and when the Nationalist move- 
 ment was crushed, they commenced an active 
 campaign in favour of the resumption of 
 priestly control over marriage and education. 
 This control was fully granted them by the 
 Concordat of May 1855, one of the most un- 
 popular of the acts of Bach's administration. 
 Roman Catholicism was by this treaty acknow- 
 ledged as the religion of the State, and was 
 granted entire independence of legislation and 
 the right of acquiring and disposing of pro- 
 perty. The bishops were given full power 
 to try and censure the lower clergy, to control 
 the education of children, and to condemn 
 dangerous publications, which the State under- 
 took to suppress. Civil marriage was abolished, 
 and the State Courts deprived of the power to 
 punish even criminal priests without giving 
 notice to their bishops. 
 
 Such a system of government could only 
 exist so long as it was supported by physical 
 force. It would be unjust to lay the whole 
 blame for it upon Francis Joseph — a young man 
 still on the right side of thirty and brought up 
 in bad traditions which had been challenged in 
 arms, and, by arms, had prevailed. But the 
 critic can hardly avoid holding him in part 
 
FINANCIAL STRESS 43 
 
 responsible for these measures, which rendered 
 his government odious, and shook the con- 
 fidence and loyalty even of the most law- 
 abiding subjects. One evil result of such 
 misgovernment he could not prevent — 
 financial depression. Capital drifted away 
 from a country where men had no rights, 
 and where even ordinary business had to be 
 conducted under the eyes of Bach's police. 
 In 1854 a forced loan was raised in the most 
 high-handed manner in order to cover the cost 
 of re-establishing a metal currency and buying 
 back Exchequer bills ; but the money was 
 spent on military action during the Crimean 
 War. This action was undertaken at the 
 simple orders of the Emperor, who, early in 
 his reign, abolished the Ministry of War and 
 assumed complete control of the army. The 
 expenses of the occupation of the Danubian 
 principalities and of the preparations for the 
 Italian war of 1859 stopped all financial reform, 
 and though the Emperor appointed an able 
 Finance Minister in 1855, he was unable to 
 make any progress with the restoration of 
 the public credit. The breakdown of the Bach 
 system in 1859 was due to many causes, but to 
 none more clearly than the absence of any 
 guarantees for solvency and honesty in the 
 administration of Austrian finance. 
 
44 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Whilst the direction of internal affairs was 
 committed to Bach, the conduct of foreign 
 relations was given to an Austrian nobleman, 
 Count Buol - Schauenstein. He succeeded 
 Schwartzenberg as Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 in 1852, and continued in office till the out- 
 break of the war of 1859. Trained in the 
 school of Metternich and Schwartzenberg, 
 Buol was inferior in ability to either of his 
 predecessors, and during his period of office 
 the weakness of Austria's position became clear 
 to the world. The favours conferred by Russia 
 in saving Francis Joseph from his insurgent 
 subjects in Hungary and his rivals in Northern 
 Germany had left Austria deeply in her debt ; 
 and Russia, under the Emperor Nicholas, was in 
 1 85 1 the most powerful state in Europe. The 
 wave of revolution which swept over the Con- 
 tinent in 1848 broke harmlessly against her 
 frontiers. Austria owed her salvation to her. 
 Northern Germany was divided, and, as yet, 
 without a leader. The moment was conse- 
 quently favourable for the resumption of the 
 old policy of Peter the Great — expansion 
 towards the south ; and the Emperor Nicholas,- 
 seeing his opportunity, reopened the Eastern 
 Question in 1853. He demanded from the 
 Sultan the control of the Holy Places in 
 Palestine and the recognition of a Russian 
 
TURKEY AND EUROPE 45 
 
 protectorate over the 16,000,000 Christians in 
 Turkey. The Sultan could not yield to this 
 demand without a surrender of part of his 
 sovereign rights, and without giving the 
 deepest offence to his Moslem subjects. Not 
 having received a satisfactory answer, the 
 Czar, in July 1853, dispatched troops into the 
 two north - eastern provinces of Turkey — 
 Moldavia and Wallachia (which form the 
 Roumanian kingdom of to - day). This step 
 placed the Emperor Francis Joseph in a 
 serious difficulty. The two provinces lay 
 between Russia, Austria, and Turkey. Their 
 owner would command the Danube, the great 
 highway of Austrian trade, and would have a 
 dominant influence in the Black Sea. Austria 
 could not see these provinces pass to Russia 
 without anxiety ; yet amongst the Austrian 
 aristocracy, and particularly amongst the high 
 officers in the army, there was a powerful 
 party which valued the Russian alliance above 
 everything. Russia and Austria had, in the 
 last century, made common cause against 
 Turkey ; and there was no doubt that, if 
 Austria supported the Russian seizure of the 
 mouth of the Danube, she might help herself 
 to some other part of Turkish territory with 
 the tacit approval of the Czar. On the 
 other hand, as Count Buol impressed upon 
 
46 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 the young Emperor, the Turkish power could 
 not be weakened without raising insurgent 
 movements amongst the southern Slavs along 
 the bordejs of the Empire. The Czar of 
 Russia's demand was based, not only on reli- 
 gious, but on nationalist grounds. He aimed at 
 the liberation of men of Slav race and Christian 
 faith from Mussulman rule. If his claims were 
 admitted, and the southern Slavs in Turkey 
 were emancipated, might not the Slovenes and 
 Serbs in Southern Austria and Hungary rise 
 also and demand liberties which Francis Joseph 
 could not grant ? What of the Czechs in 
 Bohemia, a Slavonic race, who had asked 
 in vain for liberty in 1 848 ? Moreover, if 
 Austria supported Russia, she would incur 
 the enmity of the new French Emperor, 
 Napoleon III., who could, as he very shortly 
 did, turn the scale against the Hapsburg rule 
 in Italy ; whilst Nicholas offered to guarantee 
 to Francis Joseph his Italian possessions. 
 Between the two policies the Emperor hesi- 
 tated for many critical months. He wrote 
 a personal letter to the Czar, in July 1853, 
 begging him not to occupy the Danubian 
 principalities, and at the same time appealed 
 to the Sultan, through his ambassador, to 
 admit, at least in principle, the Russian claim. 
 Both requests were rejected, and Francis 
 
ORLOFF AT VIENNA 47 
 
 Joseph's attempt at mediation merely showed 
 that he was not strong enough to impose his 
 rule upon either party. He permitted the 
 occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia to take 
 place without protest ; and when, six months 
 later, he armed against Russia, his protest had 
 lost its force. In September and October 
 meetings took place between the young 
 Emperor and his Russian patron — for he 
 may almost be called so — at Olmtitz and at 
 Warsaw, and Francis Joseph declared that 
 he could not permit Turkish territory to be 
 violated ; but neither this vague assertion, 
 nor the protocol which he signed to the same 
 effect with Prussia, France, and England (5th 
 December 1853), had any deterrent effect on 
 Russia. The Turks declared war in October 
 1853, and had early successes on the Danube, 
 which caused Russia for a moment to moderate 
 her attitude. In January 1854 the Emperor 
 Nicholas sent Count Orloff on to Vienna with 
 a proposal that Russia should have a free hand 
 in the Balkans in return for a guarantee of the 
 whole territory of Austria, to which guarantee 
 Nicholas offered to secure the adhesion of 
 Prussia and the German Bund. The offer 
 was accompanied by the suggestion of an 
 Austro-Russian protectorate over the Balkan 
 states. Count Buol advised the Emperor 
 
48 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 to reject these suggestions, knowing that they 
 would mean a protectorate of the Balkans by 
 Russia alone; but it is interesting to recall 
 the suggestion, which has been, to a certain 
 extent, followed in modern Turkish politics so 
 lately as 1903. 
 
 On February 21, 1854, the Emperor was 
 at a ball in the Schwartzenberg Palace in 
 Vienna, and for the first time showed clear 
 determination to oppose Russia. Addressing 
 the Russian Ambassador, who assured him that 
 a Slav rising in Turkey would not mean the 
 fall of the Moslem power in Europe, he said : 
 " I thought as you do until Count Orloff came 
 here ; and I was very glad to see him. But 
 from his first words I saw that his proposals 
 were not identical with those about which I 
 spoke with the Emperor Nicholas at Olmiitz 
 and Warsaw. I had consequently to take my 
 own measures. Up till this time I was deter- 
 mined to remain strictly neutral." * 
 
 The failure of Orloff's mission marks the 
 departure of Francis Joseph from the historic 
 Austrian policy of alliance with Russia in the 
 Eastern question. It was followed by the 
 mobilisation of two army corps in Southern 
 Hungary, and in April by an Austro-Prussian 
 treaty, in which the two Powers promised, in 
 
 1 Friedjung, Der Krimkrieg tmd die osterreichische Politik (Stutt- 
 gart, 1907), p. 19, 
 
THE CRIMEAN WAR 49 
 
 certain contingencies, to join forces against the 
 Czar. In May another Austrian army corps 
 was mobilised in Galicia, and on June 3 Francis 
 Joseph sent an ultimatum to St. Petersburg 
 asking that the Czar should name the date 
 at which he would evacuate Moldavia and 
 Wallachia. Nicholas was furious, and never 
 forgave the Emperor Francis Joseph. " Do 
 you know," he asked of Count Valentine 
 Esterhazy, the Austrian ambassador at St. 
 Petersburg, "do you know who were the two 
 stupidest Kings of Poland ? " And when the 
 ambassador could not answer, he continued, 
 "John Sobieski and myself!" For both 
 Sobieski and Nicholas I. had saved Austria 
 from her enemies, one in 1683 and the other 
 in 1849, yet both were treated with ingratitude. 1 
 The Austrian demand, however, coupled 
 with large military preparations, had its effect. 
 At the end of June the Russians retired 
 from before the Turkish fortress of Silistria 
 and recrossed the Danube. A few weeks after 
 they evacuated Moldavia and Wallachia, and 
 these principalities were occupied by Austria 
 in September and October. Thus at the 
 close of 1854 the Emperor Francis Joseph 
 
 1 Sobieski wanted to follow up his victory against the Turks, but 
 the Emperor Leopold, whom he had saved from them, would not 
 support him. 
 
 E 
 
50 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 had entered definitely into the arena of Balkan 
 politics. Had he remained content with 
 occupying the principalities and abstained from 
 further action in the war, his policy might have 
 been commended. But either from ambition 
 to play a great part in Europe or from a desire 
 to conciliate the Emperor of the French, he 
 allowed himself to be drawn beyond his original 
 attitude of impartiality, and entered into agree- 
 ments with the Western Powers for the further 
 restriction of Russian power in Eastern Europe. 
 In August he had agreed to certain proposi- 
 tions put forward by France and England, 
 and known to diplomats as the " Four Points," 
 which Russia was asked, at the point of the 
 sword, to accept. When the Czar bluntly 
 rejected the proposals, Francis Joseph, who 
 was now his own War Minister, ordered his 
 generals in the principalities to admit the 
 Turks to free passage through them. This 
 was followed by a general mobilisation of the 
 Austrian army. In February 1855 the Haps- 
 burg force on war footing amounted in all to 
 the huge total of 327,000 men and 1096 guns. 
 Yet this great army was not directed by a 
 strong military policy. It was prepared and 
 provisioned at vast expense in deference to 
 Francis Joseph's policy of keeping the war out 
 of the Danubian principalities and protecting 
 
A FORCED LOAN 51 
 
 the mouths of the Danube from the Russian 
 occupation. Active intervention the Emperor 
 never contemplated and never allowed. It 
 would have been better for him had he 
 done so. France and England would have 
 sanctioned his annexation of the Danubian 
 principalities had he, by actual warfare, forced 
 Russia to sue for peace. But at the moment 
 when he might have settled the war by prompt 
 action, he failed to act. In the winter months 
 of 1854 the peace party in Vienna increased in 
 strength and drew powerful arguments from the 
 ruinous aspect of Austrian finance. A forced 
 loan of some ^35,000,000 was raised in Vienna 
 in the summer of 1854, to which every tax- 
 payer was compelled to subscribe according 
 to his means, and the unpopularity of this 
 measure, coupled with the feeling that he was 
 forfeiting Russian friendship, caused Francis 
 Joseph to incline strongly in the direction of 
 peace. England and France had forced him 
 unwillingly along the path of strong action, 
 and though in November he cancelled his 
 order of October for a general mobilisation, 
 they compelled him, by threatening to recall 
 their ambassadors, to sign a treaty which had 
 actually, in the first place, been drafted by his 
 own ministers. The treaty was signed on 
 2nd December 1854, just five years after the 
 
52 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Emperor's accession. It dealt a final blow at 
 the policy of Austro- Russian alliance, which 
 had existed ever since the fall of Napoleon I. 
 " After this," said the Czar, " I treat no more 
 with Austria." 
 
 Francis Joseph did not sign the treaty 
 without much misgiving. Count Buol, who 
 had conducted the whole policy with a view 
 to securing Austria's position in Europe, did 
 indeed get his reward, for on 22nd December 
 England and France gave him a guarantee of 
 the status quo in Italy during the period of the 
 war. But he estranged Prussia, whom by a 
 treaty signed in April 1854 he had bound to 
 make common cause with him. The lesser 
 German princes, too, became suspicious of an 
 Austrian monarch whose schemes foreshadowed 
 an eastward expansion quite incompatible with 
 the maintenance of his position as their leader 
 and as protector of their fragile rights and 
 frontiers. In January 1855 these princes re- 
 fused Count Buol's invitation to join in the 
 treaty of December, whilst at the moment when 
 he sent that invitation the Austrian Foreign 
 Minister vied with his sovereign in apolo- 
 getic expressions and professions of constant 
 friendship for the Czar Nicholas. Broken 
 down by long strain and disappointment, 
 Nicholas I. expired on 2nd March 1855. 
 
THE PEACE OF 1856 53 
 
 With the disappearance of that strong and 
 resolute ruler, the great obstacle to peace 
 was removed. Proposals for it were at once 
 made, and in the middle of March the five 
 great Powers (Prussia was not present) met 
 by their special envoys at Vienna to discuss 
 conditions. Lord John Russell went out from 
 England, and found Francis Joseph and his 
 advisers in a state of contrition, which left 
 no hope that they would agree to further action 
 against Russia. The Emperor refused to join 
 in demanding the removal of Russian war- 
 ships from the Black Sea, and on 12th June 
 orders were issued to place the Austrian army 
 on a peace footing. In the remainder of the 
 war Austria took no considerable part. The 
 victory of the Allies at the Tchernaia (16th 
 August) and the subsequent fall of Sebastopol 
 (8th September) caused no rejoicings at Vienna. 
 The Emperor's messages of congratulation to 
 France and England were delayed until they 
 had only a negative significance. 
 
 It is not for the biographer of Francis 
 Joseph to follow the final episodes of the 
 diplomacy which brought the Crimean War 
 to a close. The new Czar Alexander accepted 
 the terms of peace which Austria, in January 
 1856, offered in the name of Europe, and a 
 Congress met in Paris which brought about 
 
54 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 a formal peace in March. The terms to which 
 Russia assented, whilst humiliating to her, 
 were to the advantage rather of England and 
 France than of the Hapsburg monarchy. Eng- 
 lish trade profited by the " neutralisation " of 
 the Black Sea and the removal of the Russian 
 fleet from its waters. The new French Emperor 
 gained, at least in prestige, by forcing the Czar 
 to abandon his claim to "protect" the Christian 
 subjects of the Sultan. The Turkish empire 
 gained a new lease of life by the defeat of her 
 nearest and greatest enemy ; and, most of all, 
 the kingdom of Sardinia, the nucleus of modern 
 Italy, gained by her admission to the Congress 
 of Paris as a state of equal rank with the 
 historic Powers of Europe. Austria may be 
 said to have gained something by the pre- 
 servation of an "open door" at the mouth of 
 the Danube — the great outlet for her trade in 
 the East ; but she failed to get possession of 
 the Danubian principalities, which were con- 
 stituted an independent state, shortly to become 
 the modern kingdom of Roumania. On the 
 other hand, Francis Joseph, in forfeiting the 
 friendship of Russia, had sacrificed his most 
 important political asset. Russia alone in all 
 Europe was a determined enemy to Liberal 
 and nationalist movements, and Russia had 
 shown, by her invasion of Hungary in 1849, 
 
COUNT BUOL'S FAILURE 55 
 
 that she would, if necessary, draw the sword 
 to save Austria. Whatever else might happen, 
 Francis Joseph could no longer count on the 
 Czar as an ally ; whilst Prussia, by refusing to 
 take action against Russia, had earned the 
 gratitude of the Court of St. Petersburg, which 
 stood her in good stead in 1866. 
 
 The Emperor throughout this period was 
 advised by Count Buol, and Buol was one of 
 the school of Austrian statesmen who con- 
 stantly looked to Austria's position in Italy 
 and Germany and thought little of her pro- 
 spects or destinies in the East. Brought up 
 in the traditions of Metternich, he wished to 
 keep Austria's influence in Germany and in 
 Italy intact, and to maintain her position as 
 the leading Catholic Power in Central Europe. 
 Both in Italy and in Germany Austria needed 
 the help of France, and Buol's main idea was 
 that, by supporting the upstart French Emperor 
 in his attempt to pose as arbiter in Europe, 
 he would secure his neutrality for the day in 
 which the Italians should again rise in arms 
 against the Hapsburgs. He hoped also for 
 French, and possibly for English, assistance in 
 Germany, and thought that the friends whom 
 he was making for Austria would stand to her 
 in Germany as well as beyond the Alps. In 
 pursuing these aims Count Buol was held back 
 
56 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 by Francis Joseph ; but though he could not 
 be induced to join actively in the Crimean 
 campaign, the young Emperor went far enough 
 to lose the friendship of Russia, without gain- 
 ing any compensating advantage. 
 
 In this chapter of war and diplomacy we 
 read the character of Francis Joseph whilst he 
 was still young and under the influence of the 
 old generation : an honourable man, loyaL at 
 heart to his friends, yet allowing himself to be 
 driven to and fro by circumstances, yielding 
 alternately to his own inclinations and to the 
 advice of ministers, and, either from indecision 
 or from prudence, temporising. A charge of 
 vacillating between alternative but inconsistent 
 courses has often been brought against him. 
 How far, upon the record of his sixty years, 
 he is to be blamed for indecision and how far 
 praised for prudence we shall consider in the 
 further study of his career. 
 
 One positive result, at least, was attained 
 by the Crimean War. Sardinia, as well as 
 Turkey, attained the rank of a " European 
 Power," and Sardinia was now ruled by a 
 sovereign of a different mettle to the weak 
 Charles Albert of 1848. It is not to my pur- 
 pose to sketch the career of the great Italian, 
 Victor Emanuel of Savoy, or of the patriot 
 Cavour, his restless and far-seeing minister. 
 
THE ITALIAN QUESTION 57 
 
 Sardinia alone of the Italian states was, as 
 we have seen, under the rule of a popular 
 and a national dynasty. Whilst the Austrian 
 or Austrophile princes in Parma, Modena, and 
 Tuscany, and King Bomba in Naples, crushed 
 out the popular institutions which had found 
 an entry into their states in 1848, Victor 
 Emanuel retained a popular form of govern- 
 ment. Silently, yet without concealment, he 
 prepared for the great struggle with Austria, 
 and at the end of the year 1856 it was clear 
 that the Italian question was to become the 
 question of to-morrow in Europe. In the 
 Eastern play, one scene of which is acted in 
 1853-6, Francis Joseph was, as we have seen, 
 deeply interested ; yet in the Crimean episode 
 he takes only a secondary part. In the Italian 
 drama he necessarily plays a part of the first 
 importance. 
 
 The success of Austria in 1849 was intensely 
 unpopular in Italy, and the Emperor and his 
 officers did not know how to use their success. 
 The policy of pure absolutism which had been 
 followed up to 1848 was resumed. Imitating 
 the policy of the Austrians, the subservient 
 princes in Parma, Modena, and Tuscany per- 
 severed in their autocratic courses as though 
 the voice of revolution had never spoken at 
 their doors. In Naples, Ferdinand II., nick- 
 
58 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 named Bomba, reasserted to the full his 
 sovereign rights, and though he enjoyed to 
 the last a good deal of personal popularity, 
 his system was one which may be well de- 
 scribed by*the old phrase, " tyranny tempered 
 by assassination." The Duke of Tuscany held 
 his capital with Austrian troops ; these alone 
 protected him from the knives of persons in 
 whose eyes patriotism was a good excuse for 
 murder. The Duke of Parma was murdered 
 in 1854, at the time of the outbreak of the 
 Crimean War ; and when England and France 
 had given an implied approval to the Italian 
 cause by admitting Sardinian troops to co- 
 operation in the Crimea, Victor Emanuel and 
 his minister felt sufficiently strong to raise 
 definitely the question of Italian unity. The 
 Austrian envoys at the Congress of Paris 
 refused to discuss the Italian question, and 
 maintained an attitude of obstinate opposition 
 to all the diplomatic efforts of Cavour. Count 
 Buol, however, knew well that the day of 
 reckoning was not far distant ; and if there 
 is any excuse for his policy at the period of 
 the Crimean War, it is the desire to keep the 
 peace in Italy as long as possible. But Victor 
 Emanuel would not, perhaps could not, wait. 
 He was certain of the friendship of Napoleon 
 III., — himself of Italian blood, and in early life 
 
THE ITALIAN QUESTION 59 
 
 a member of one at least of the secret societies 
 which were formed to liberate Italy. During 
 the negotiations at Paris Napoleon had showed 
 special favour to Cavour, and the peace of 
 1856 released France from her obligation to 
 guarantee the, status quo beyond the Alps. 
 Had Francis Joseph consented in 1856 to let 
 Modena and Parma be united with Sardinia, 
 and to give the Duke of Modena compensa- 
 tion by making him Prince of Moldavia and 
 Wallachia, the course of Italian history might, 
 at all events for a time, have been altered. 
 The suggestion was made by Cavour in 1856 ; 
 and Europe would probably have accepted it. 
 But the Emperor was true to an old Hapsburg 
 principle of never surrendering territory which 
 had once been acquired without a fight ; and he 
 scorned the idea of bargaining with Sardinia, 
 where shelter was being given to thousands 
 of political refugees from Milan and Venice. 
 Had his attitude been different, we might now 
 have a Hapsburg and not a Hohenzollern king 
 in Roumania, 
 
 In 1857 the ill feeling between Austria and 
 Sardinia grew apace. The Emperor loyally 
 supported his docile relatives and allies on 
 their rickety Italian thrones. In 1855 he 
 had, as we have seen, concluded a Concordat 
 with the Pope, which committed his country, 
 
60 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 in all matters of spiritual doctrine and discip- 
 line, to the charge and control of the Vatican. 
 The Concordat was] very unpopular in Austria, 
 where the majority were good, but not very 
 strict, Catftolics. It was also hated in the 
 Emperor's Italian domain, where Roman 
 Catholicism was not a creed but a policy. 
 Victor Emanuel had refused to recognise the 
 ecclesiastical courts in his kingdom, and during 
 1857 a war of newspapers broke out in 
 Northern Italy, which resulted in November 
 in the breach of diplomatic relations. The 
 war with powder and shot was hastened by 
 Orsini's attempt on the life of Napoleon III. 
 (January 1858), and by eloquent letters written 
 by Orsini before his execution, in which he 
 implored the French emperor to draw the 
 sword for Italian unity. In July 1858 Cavour 
 visited Napoleon at Plombieres, and a secret 
 agreement was concluded. This assured Sar- 
 dinia of French help provided that it should 
 be left to France to choose the moment in 
 the Spring of 1859 for declaring war. The 
 Emperor did not join in the Sardinian plan 
 for uniting Italy, and looked to an Italy of 
 four kingdoms : Sardinia, enlarged by Austrian 
 cessions, Tuscany, Rome, and Naples. But 
 Victor Emanuel was content. He foresaw that, 
 once the war was commenced, Napoleon III. 
 
CAVOUR'S DIPLOMACY 61 
 
 would not be able to set a limit to Italian 
 ambitions. From Plombieres Cavour travelled 
 to Berlin, and, having assured himself of 
 Prussian neutrality, returned to Turin to await 
 the moment when France should throw down 
 the gauntlet. 
 
 War, however, came about by no declaration 
 of France. Francis Joseph was deeply injured 
 by the policy of Victor Emanuel, and on April 
 23rd, 1859, he suddenly demanded the dis- 
 armament of the Sardinian army, yet without 
 giving any promise that his own army should 
 be placed on a peace footing. The Emperor 
 was convinced that his soldiers were a match 
 for the Sardinians in Italy, and he took no steps 
 to make it certain that Prussia or the German 
 Bund would hold France to neutrality by a 
 demonstration on the Rhine. Prince William 
 of Prussia who, in October 1858, was declared 
 Regent of Prussia, owing to the insanity of his 
 brother, King Frederick William, was ready to 
 support Austria by a demonstration against 
 France. But he would only sell his co-operation 
 at a price which Austria would not pay — the 
 concession of the right to command the forces 
 of the Confederation. This suggestion was 
 rejected by Francis Joseph for reasons similar 
 to those which had prompted his refusal to 
 trade with Sardinia in 1856. The mission of 
 
62 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 the Archduke Albrecht, who went to Berlin just 
 before the outbreak of war, to secure, if possible, 
 Prussian co-operation, was a failure. Austria, 
 proudly refusing to give up her right to military 
 leadership o*f the German forces, went into the 
 Italian war alone. The ultimatum of April 23, 
 1859, was despatched to Turin on the very day 
 on which the Archduke Albrecht left Berlin. 
 Moreover, it was sent, not through the Foreign 
 Office, but from the Emperor's Militdr-kanzlei, 
 and on his simple fiat. 
 
 The Austrian force in Lombardy was 200,000 
 strong. Francis Joseph believed that Sardinia 
 was not ready to fight, and that he could advance 
 to Turin. On April 29, Count Gyulai, the 
 Hungarian general in command at Milan, 
 crossed the Ticino and invaded the dominions 
 of Victor Emanuel. But at this very moment 
 the heads of the French columns were across 
 the Alps, and Austria found herself without 
 allies and opposed to two formidable enemies. 
 It is not my purpose to follow the six weeks' 
 campaign which followed on the familiar battle- 
 ground of Northern Italy. The first big battle, 
 Magenta (June 4) was not decisive, though the 
 honours of the day rested with the Allies ; but 
 on June 24th the Austrians, under the nominal 
 command of Francis Joseph, but the real 
 control of Marshal Hess, were worsted at 
 
SOLFERINO 63 
 
 Solferino. They were compelled to retire in 
 spite of successes in one part of the battlefield, 
 where, in a bloody action, General Benedek 
 held the Sardinian force in check. During 
 the period of war the three princes of Tuscany, 
 Modena, and Parma were expelled from their 
 thrones, and rendered powerless to help the 
 Austrian Emperor, who had so long supported 
 them. The young king, Francis II. of Naples, 
 the brother-in-law of Francis Joseph, was "con- 
 tained " by the French force in occupation of 
 Rome, which could have intercepted any troops 
 sent to support the Austrians. After Solferino 
 both parties were ready for peace. Francis 
 Joseph was afraid of a rising in Hungary. 
 Large numbers of his troops (it is said six per 
 cent of his whole force) were unwounded 
 prisoners of the enemy, and he feared losses 
 which might ruin his prestige in Germany. 
 Napoleon, on the other hand, was deeply 
 affected by the loss of 10,000 French soldiers 
 at Solferino, and his troops were weakened 
 by fever. Moreover, he was afraid of the 
 Ultramontane party in France, which was 
 strongly opposed to the further humiliation of 
 the leading Roman Catholic Power in Europe. 
 Thus it came about that the first offers of peace, 
 which came from the victors of Solferino, were 
 readily accepted. The peace of Villafranca was 
 
64 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 signed on i ith June. Austria ceded Lombardy 
 to France, and France in turn handed it over 
 to Sardinia. Parma was also united to the 
 Piedmontese kingdom. But Francis Joseph 
 kept Venetia, and with it the strong forts of 
 the " Quadrilateral." The Grand Dukes of 
 Tuscany and Modena were restored to their 
 territories, and it was agreed that Pope 
 Pius IX. should be requested to reform the 
 government of his territories. 
 
 The news of the peace of Villafranca caused 
 intense surprise in Europe. Everywhere it 
 had been thought that Francis Joseph must 
 surrender the whole of his Italian territories, 
 and, probably, pay a large indemnity. He was 
 now to keep Venetia and its wealthy capital, 
 and this would enable him to play a great part 
 in Italian politics. Two of his subject-princes 
 — for one may call them so — were restored 
 to power ; and his position in Germany was 
 untouched. The Italian unionists denounced 
 Napoleon as a traitor. Cavour, who had been 
 dismissed by Victor Emanuel after a stormy 
 interview as to the terms of peace, set to work 
 to establish provisional popular governments in 
 Florence and Modena which should still further 
 the cause he had at heart. To review the 
 further history of Italian unity is beyond my 
 purpose. Here I need only notice that the 
 
AUSTRIA AND ITALY 65 
 
 Emperor Francis Joseph, though defeated, was 
 not disgraced. His army had shown itself well 
 able to fight, and ninety per cent of it, though 
 not the whole, was loyal. Austria, in fact, was 
 still a great power. Now, as afterwards, Francis 
 Joseph seemed like William of Orange, 
 strongest in the moment of defeat. 
 
 It has been urged against the young 
 Emperor that if he had taken an active part in 
 the Crimean war, and saved France and England 
 from the losses of the Sebastopol campaign, he 
 might have obtained a permanent, and not a 
 temporary guarantee of his Italian possessions ; 
 and that if this had been granted, he would not 
 have had to fight Marshal MacMahon and his 
 Frenchmen in 1859. In answer to this I may 
 say that, in the first place, Francis Joseph was, 
 at bottom, controlled by feelings of gratitude 
 towards the Emperor Nicholas which were 
 honourable to him, however unworthy their 
 cause, and for which he cannot be censured. 
 Moreover, with France and England com- 
 mitted to a Liberal policy in Italy, he must 
 have known that their guarantees, even if 
 obtained, would be of little value. On the 
 other hand, he seems to have nursed the hope 
 that the German Federal body could be induced 
 to take part in the defence of his Italian 
 dominions. He tried to make the preservation 
 
 F 
 
66 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 of the Hapsburg interest in Italy a matter of 
 German policy and a cause for German expendi- 
 ture of men and money. This was a mistake, 
 but one which a ruler of Francis Joseph's 
 traditions and training might easily make. The 
 Austria of Prince Eugene and Kaunitz . had 
 often fought with German troops in Italy 
 and Hungary, and with Magyars or Croats in 
 Germany, and the Emperor had been brought 
 up by statesmen. who taught him that he had 
 only to command and the rest of Germany 
 would follow. Had not the old King of 
 Wiirtemberg said so to him in so many words 
 in 1850? Well might he look back with 
 reproach to those who had started him in the 
 course of policy which now ended in mortifica- 
 tion and defeat. The most difficult task which 
 Fate has brought the Emperor has been the 
 sacrifice of old traditions, and the establishment 
 not only of a new geographical state, but of an 
 idea, a principle, a policy, which may unite his 
 subjects by a sense of common duty, common 
 purpose, and mutual confidence. 
 
 As his reign and policy proceed we shall 
 see how he endeavours to perform that task. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 1859-1866 
 
 Schmerling and Liberalism in Austria — Schemes for a new 
 Constitution in Germany — Prussia and Austria — The 
 Schleswig-Holstein Question — Sadowa — General Benedek. 
 
 The peace of Villafranca marks the end of one 
 period in the public life of the Emperor 
 Francis Joseph. The humiliation of Magenta 
 and Solferino and the loss of Lombardy were 
 a warning to him that there were forces at 
 work in Europe which tended to the dis- 
 integration, if not to the destruction, of the 
 old Hapsburg monarchy. Italian " nationality " 
 would not be checked and confined by the 
 antiquated government of Austrian satraps, 
 however honestly and efficiently these officers 
 performed their duties. The people of Northern 
 Italy were Italians, and preferred being gov- 
 erned, even badly, by themselves to being well 
 governed by foreigners. They had fought on 
 this ground, and, with the help of the French, 
 had established their right to govern them- 
 
 67 
 
68 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 selves, well or badly. Lombardy had been 
 lost to Austria, and it was more or less an 
 accident that Venetia had not been lost also. 
 The forces, which had conquered the Austrians 
 in Italy were democracy and nationalism : and 
 the Emperor, now in his thirtieth year, observed 
 quickly enough that if they could paralyse his 
 rule in Italy, they might upset his authority 
 in Austria and undermine his position in Italy, 
 Germany, and Hungary. It was time to make 
 concessions to the people in his remaining 
 territories. The old Conservative advisers who 
 had been about him since 1848 were apparently 
 in the wrong. Under their advice the Em- 
 peror had done his best to set up an enlight- 
 ened despotism and to govern the people — 
 not by their own will, but for their own good. 
 The result was an army that could not be 
 wholly trusted, a nation ill-content with its 
 government ; and, lastly, an exchequer crippled 
 by the chronic reluctance of capitalists to invest 
 their money in the country. Hungary was 
 hopelessly alienated, and watched the Austrian 
 defeat in Italy with complacency. Germany 
 caught the infection of unionism and democ- 
 racy from Italy. In the hereditary Hapsburg 
 dominions voices called for popular rights 
 which might be disregarded for a time, but 
 could not be silenced. 
 
AUSTRIA'S PROSPECT IN 1859 69 
 
 The next seven years of the Emperor's life 
 were devoted to an attempt to meet or 
 control these popular movements; and the 
 attempt was largely, though not wholly, 
 unsuccessful. In meeting them, in attempting 
 to maintain his position in Hungary and also 
 in Germany, the Emperor had a certain number 
 of resources on which he could fall back. In 
 opposing democracy he could rely on the 
 support of the Prussian Government, which 
 cared for German democratic unity as little as 
 he did. The lesser states of Germany, if they 
 disliked Austrian supremacy, were not at all 
 disposed to side with Prussia against the 
 Hapsburgs. Then the Emperor had a great 
 fund of loyalty in his hereditary dominions, 
 whose inhabitants were quite at one with him 
 in his determination to remain the first power 
 in Germany. Two difficulties lay in his way. 
 Hungary would not agree to any settlement 
 which did not give her legislative independence 
 of the Parliament at Vienna. Prussia would 
 not come into any new Federal constitution 
 which left Austria with the power of out-voting 
 her in the Federal Council or left to Francis 
 Joseph and his smaller German allies the 
 control of the policy of the northern German 
 states. In the end it turned out that the forces 
 against the Emperor were too strong for him ; 
 
70 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 but his attempt to grapple with them occupies 
 an interesting and critical period in his reign. 
 He honestly tries to meet the difficulties 
 of the present ; but fails to do so. As he fails 
 we see before him the difficulties of the future. 
 Francis Joseph began his period of reform 
 by appointing as Minister- President Baron 
 Anton von Schmerling, an Austrian politician 
 who, since 1848, had been distinguished by 
 Liberal views. Schmerling had been Austrian 
 representative at Frankfort in 1848, and had 
 assisted the Archduke Albrecht to keep things 
 from going too fast in Germany in that year. 
 He was thoroughly "German in his sympathies, 
 and hoped, after making a Parliament in 
 Austria, to construct some all-German Parlia- 
 ment of the future in which Austria's primacy 
 should be assured. After a preliminary attempt 
 in i860, he produced a constitution for Austria 
 in the spring of 1861, and this was issued by 
 letters patent under the Emperor's hand on 
 February 27. An Upper House, composed 
 of royal princes, large landowners, and the 
 princes of the Church in Austria, to whom the 
 Emperor might add life peers ; a Lower 
 House of 343 members, who were to be elected 
 by the local diets (85 for Hungary, 54 for 
 Bohemia, 20 for Venetia, and so forth), and 
 a clause for annual Parliaments, were the chief 
 
SCHMERLING'S PLANS 71 
 
 features of the " February Patent," as it is 
 called. It was a mere gift from the sovereign, 
 and recognised no previous rights whatever. 
 It again flouted the claims of Hungary, 
 reducing her Parliament to the level of a 
 provincial assembly, and setting up Croatia 
 and Transylvania, which were dependencies of 
 the kingdom of St. Stephen, as of equal rank 
 with that kingdom itself. Of the attitude of 
 Hungary towards this mandatory constitution 
 I shall say more in the next chapter. Apart 
 from the fact that the Magyars would have 
 nothing to say to it, it was not a great success. 
 The Emperor tried loyally to make it a success, 
 and supported Schmerling for two years in 
 the endeavour to work it ; but he still fell, 
 occasionally, under the influence of reactionary 
 advisers who, after 1862, seem to have con- 
 trolled him so far as Austrian domestic politics 
 were concerned. As a matter of fact, the 
 inflated Reichsrath of Schmerling's consti- 
 tution was not by any means a popular body. 
 Its members were to be chosen by the 
 provincial diets of the Empire. As these 
 were not at the time in existence and were 
 to be nominated by the Crown, it is obvious 
 that the inflated Reichsrath was not in the 
 modern sense a popular body. 
 
 Baron Schmerling's ideas expanded as he 
 
72 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 continued in office; and he tried in 1862 to 
 realise his visions of a new Federal Parliament 
 at Frankfort, in which all Germany should be 
 represented. When, in December 1861, the 
 Prussian Government issued a Note to the 
 German Princes in favour of a North German 
 Confederation, Austria stoutly opposed it ; and 
 in February 1862 the Austrian Government 
 replied with a counter-proposal for a Federal 
 Parliament and Federal Directory at Frank- 
 fort, which should have large control over the 
 common affairs of Germany. This proposal 
 was rejected owing to the opposition of Prussia 
 and of the smaller states. Its importance is 
 that it showed the Austrian Emperor to be 
 ready to assist in a modification of the German 
 Bund, and to make some concession to popular 
 feeling. The failure of his scheme brought 
 into strong relief the differences between 
 Austria and Prussia. A new constitution had 
 been proposed by the Emperor, and had been 
 wrecked because Prussia would not consent to 
 limit her freedom of action or to resign any 
 part of her sovereign rights to a Federal body. 
 It is the essence of a Federation that each 
 constituent state should commit some por- 
 tion, however small, of her independence into 
 the hands of a supreme common authority. 
 Federation failed in Germany because Ger- 
 
BISMARCK 73 
 
 many contained two states, each of which was 
 a European Power, and neither of which would 
 consent to the exercise of any part of its 
 sovereign powers through the medium of any 
 other authority. As a matter of fact, the 
 Emperor Francis Joseph and his advisers 
 knew or hoped that they would be able to 
 outvote Prussia in the Federal Parliament ; 
 and that, in a matter of peace or war, they 
 would be able to carry it against her. Prussia 
 knew or feared this also. Hence her refusal 
 to accept the Austrian proposal of February 
 1862. The year was darkened by the shadow 
 of events to come. 
 
 Though we are not considering the history 
 of Prussia, it is worth while noticing that the 
 point at which we have now arrived — the 
 autumn of 1862 — is the moment of Bismarck's 
 entry into the arena. He became Prime 
 Minister of Prussia in September 1862, at the 
 very time when the proposals of Baron Schmer- 
 ling were rejected. At the first he appears as 
 the very opposite of a popular North German 
 leader. His appointment follows upon the 
 refusal of the Prussian Diet to sanction military 
 expenses which the Government desired to 
 incur. He agrees to take office, and enforce 
 the collection of the necessary money without 
 the sanction of the Diet. He is most 
 
74 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 unpopular in Prussia, the delight of a small 
 and nervous aristocracy, the avowed enemy of 
 the Prussian people. He is supported, some- 
 what timorously, by the King, his master, but 
 hotly opposed by the Crown Prince Frederick, 
 whose English wife, carefully trained by her 
 father, is a friend to popular institutions. He 
 stands out against popular government and 
 the will of the Prussian people as expressed by 
 the Prussian Diet. He is suspected as a tyrant 
 throughout the North German states, the very 
 states which, within a few years, he was to lead, 
 through warfare, to unity and Empire. 
 
 The proposals made by Austria in 1862 
 were renewed in a more formal manner in 
 1863, when the Emperor Francis Joseph him- 
 self appeared at Frankfort to submit to the 
 Bundestag a scheme for a Federal consti- 
 tution. This scheme had been sketched out 
 in the first place by Julius FrQbel, but it was 
 warmly approved by the Emperor Francis 
 Joseph, and earnestly supported by Baron 
 Schmerling. It had, of course, a good 
 many opponents, even in Austria. Baron 
 Rechberg, the Tory Foreign Minister at 
 Vienna, who hated democracy even more 
 bitterly than he hated Prussia, opposed it 
 with all his force, and declared that it could 
 only lead to war with Prussia. When he 
 
AT FRANKFORT, 1863 75 
 
 found the Emperor was determined to put it 
 forward at Frankfort he resigned, but, on the 
 Emperor's request, returned to office. It is 
 one of the remarkable features about Francis 
 Joseph and his Government — we shall see 
 examples of it as we go further — that his 
 ministers, if he requests it, continue in office 
 though they desire to resign, and assume office 
 at his request even though they do not wish 
 to do so. We find Count Rechberg returning 
 to office when a constitution is proposed for 
 Germany which he declares to be absurd and 
 certain to lead to war, which it did. Later we 
 shall find Count Mensdorff urging peace, yet 
 remaining in office in a war ministry, and 
 General Benedek taking command and fighting 
 a campaign which he has asserted must lead to 
 disaster. To resume. — In August 1863 the 
 Emperor proposed that the affairs of the 
 Federation should be managed, in the first 
 place, by a directorate of four members, three 
 of whom should be appointed by Austria, 
 Prussia, and Bavaria. Besides these there 
 was to be an Upper House of Princes of the 
 Empire, and a Lower House of delegates with 
 very extensive powers. The proposal was not 
 democratic enough to please the progressive 
 sense of Germany, and was certain to be 
 opposed by Prussia. As to its popularity, we 
 
76 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 know 1 that more democratic proposals were 
 suggested to the Emperor, but that he rejected 
 them. As to the Prussian opposition, it was 
 only to be expected ; but the result of it was 
 that the smaller German states became alarmed. 
 The chief guarantee that their rights would be 
 respected lay in the fact that there were two 
 great Powers — Austria and Prussia — in the 
 Bund; and when it became clear that Prussia 
 would not come into the new Federation, they 
 took fright lest they should be handed over to 
 Austria alone. " Will uns denn Oesterreich 
 Kaput machen ? " asked George V., the blind 
 King of Hanover, in his colloquial German. 
 King William of Prussia was anxious to attend 
 the Congress of 1863, and would have done so 
 had he not been dissuaded by Bismarck, in 
 whom he now placed complete confidence. 
 For Bismarck's policy the realisation of the 
 programme of 1863 would have meant ruin. 
 According to his view, the Austrian object 
 was either to provide machinery for outvoting 
 Prussia in the general affairs of Germany and 
 prevent her from being a really independent 
 state, or else to create an instrument for oppos- 
 ing democracy and throttling the spirit of 
 German nationality. The second of these ends 
 was fatal to Bismarck's policy; the first was, 
 
 1 Prince Hohenlohe's Memoirs, English edition, vol. i. p. 275. 
 
FAILURE AT FRANKFORT 77 
 
 for the moment, one in which he did not care 
 to assist. He could control the influence in 
 Prussia, and cared for nothing else. And so, 
 as Bismarck's master acted on his advice, 
 Francis Joseph's large plan of 1863 came to 
 nothing. For a few more years, Germany 
 was left in her old configuration. 
 
 The failure of 1863 was very disappointing 
 to the Emperor, who used his personal in- 
 fluence to commend the scheme in a way 
 which is foreign to his character. He re- 
 turned to Vienna in deep depression. He 
 had made a proposal of the first importance, 
 which Prussia had rejected and which could 
 not be forced upon her except at the point 
 of the sword. When Rechberg had suggested 
 going on without Prussia and forming a new 
 Federation, the smaller states had refused to 
 go on. The Prussians were in the position 
 which the Confederate States had taken up at 
 the outset of the great struggle which was 
 now being fought out beyond the Atlantic ; 
 but whereas in America the majority were 
 ready to force the minority to remain in union 
 with them upon certain terms, in Germany 
 the majority were unwilling to support their 
 traditional leader in forcing a new federal 
 contract upon the minority. It was as if 
 President Lincoln, placed at the head of the 
 
78 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Federal Government, should have found that 
 the Northern States were prepared to concede 
 to the Southern Confederacy the right of in- 
 dependent action in all the highest matters 
 of policy. "Well may the Emperor Francis 
 Joseph, brought up in the old traditions of 
 Austrian supremacy, have felt that the founda- 
 tions of his political belief, and even the 
 foundations of his empire, were trembling 
 beneath his feet. 
 
 It is difficult to understand .why, from this 
 time onward, preparations for war with Prussia 
 were not made. Bismarck had given warning. 
 " Our relations must become either better or 
 worse than they are," he said to Count 
 Karolyi in December 1862. " I am prepared 
 for a joint attempt to improve them. If it 
 fails through your refusal, you will have to 
 deal with us as one of the Great Powers of 
 Europe." But Prussia had given no proof 
 of a desire to make this joint attempt. She 
 had not attended the Congress of Frankfort 
 in 1863, and had refused even to discuss 
 Francis Joseph's proposals. The Emperor or 
 his advisers must surely have seen in Bis- 
 marck's attitude the indication of warlike 
 intention ; and if they did see it, it is hard 
 to see why no steps were taken to prepare 
 the Austrian army for the coming contest. 
 
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 79 
 
 As things turned out, the occasion which 
 Bismarck wanted — for breach with Austria 
 and promotion of Prussia — arrived suddenly 
 and with marvellous opportunity. 
 
 In November 1863 died Frederick VII., 
 last of the line of Schleswig - Holstein 
 Sonderburg - Augustenburg. A question at 
 once arose as to who should succeed him in 
 the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. It 
 is not without some trepidation that the author 
 of a short book mentions the Schleswig-Hol- 
 stein question. That question has now been 
 settled for ever, and the documents about it 
 in the Foreign Office, which are said to have 
 weighed a ton, have, let us hope, been dis- 
 posed of long ago as waste paper. If discussed 
 from its outset it would fill many pages, and, 
 for the most part, it is quite devoid of interest. 
 But the settlement of that question gave to 
 Prussia Kiel and the soil beneath the Kiel 
 Canal, things which may prove to be of im- 
 portance in the history of Europe. Moreover, 
 the manner of that settlement involved Francis 
 Joseph in his last great war, which opened 
 the way to changes in Europe, whose ultimate 
 results are still far distant in the future. Let 
 these things excuse my speaking of it. 
 
 In 1852, to go no further back, the Powers 
 of Europe had agreed to a convention signed 
 
80 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 in London, providing that the Duchies of 
 Schleswig and Holstein should for ever remain 
 part of Denmark, and that, on the death of 
 Frederick VII., he should be succeeded by 
 Prince Christian of Sonderburg - Glucksburg, 
 better known to us as the late King Christian 
 IX. of Denmark. Compensation was to be 
 given to the Duke of Augustenburg (who, 
 as a collateral, had substantial claims to the 
 Duchies), on condition of his waiving his right 
 to the succession. The duke accepted this 
 compensation. Austria and Prussia, too, had 
 bound themselves to acknowledge the indivisi- 
 bility of the Danish monarchy, even after the 
 then existing Danish dynasty — of Sonderburg- 
 Augustenburg — should die out. But though 
 the Duke of Augustenburg had accepted com- 
 pensation in respect of his own right, he had 
 not bound his heirs — nor had they bound 
 themselves — not to prosecute their claim to 
 the Duchies at any future time. The German 
 Federation was not a party to the London 
 Convention of 1852, and Schleswig was, 
 though Holstein was not, a member of the 
 German Federation. The Convention had 
 stipulated that large concessions should be 
 made to the German population in the 
 Duchies ; and these, so declared the German 
 inhabitants and their sympathisers, had not 
 
AUSTRIA AND DENMARK 81 
 
 been made. Whether the Germans in the 
 Duchies had been fairly treated or not was 
 an arguable question, but the Danish consti- 
 tution, which was promulgated in 1863 by the 
 new King Christian IX., certainly paid little 
 respect to their rights. The king signed the 
 constitution, which had been approved by the 
 Danish Diet two days before his accession, 
 with much reluctance. He was persuaded to 
 do so by a storm of public feeling in Denmark 
 which threatened his throne, and even his life, 
 should he refuse to sign it. Its promulgation 
 was the signal for an outburst of national feeling 
 in Germany. Princes and diets alike declared 
 for the freedom of the Germans in the Duchies, 
 and Duke Frederick of Augustenburg, riding 
 on the favouring wave, openly appeared as 
 Duke of Schleswig - Holstein, asserting that 
 his father's acceptance of compensation could 
 not bind him. The Prussian Diet in December 
 passed a resolution in favour of the recognition 
 of the new Duke. Then came the question, 
 What would Austria do ? 
 
 The Emperor Francis Joseph could not 
 admit the claim of the Germans. In the first 
 place, he was a party to the Convention of 
 London which recognised the unity of Den- 
 mark and guaranteed the integrity of Denmark. 
 In the second place, the demand for recogni- 
 
 G 
 
82 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 tion of Duke Frederick's claim came from the 
 Nationalist element in Germany. It was urged 
 by men who thought that blood and race were 
 stronger than treaties or conventions, who were 
 filled with the ideas which only a few years ago 
 had conquered the Austrians in Italy. More- 
 over, if the Duchies were joined to Denmark, 
 they would enjoy a democratic constitution, 
 which must create a precedent for democracy 
 throughout Germany. The Emperor, on the 
 other hand, was quite loyal to the discontented 
 Germans in Schleswig-Holstein. He refused 
 to receive the officer who came from Christian 
 IX. to announce his accession. The new king 
 was recognised as King of Denmark and of 
 the Duchies ; but was reminded that the 
 liberties to which those Duchies were entitled 
 under the arrangement of 1852 had not been 
 granted. Thus in this matter the Emperor 
 is found half-way between two policies. He 
 did not warmly champion the cause of the 
 oppressed Germans or recognise the Augus- 
 tenburg prince as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein. 
 He did not, on the other hand, conceal the fact 
 that the Germans in Schleswig-Holstein had 
 good cause for complaint. Most important of 
 all, he consented to deal with the question 
 apart from the rest of the German Federation, to 
 treat it as a matter of ordinary foreign policy. 
 
BISMARCK'S POLICY 83 
 
 This was a fatal error. It gave to Bismarck the 
 chance for which he had been waiting. 
 
 The Prussian Government was at first 
 troubled by the Schleswig-Holstein imbroglio. 
 The demand for home rule in the Duchies 
 was a democratic cry, and Prussia was as little 
 democratic as Austria. Accordingly, we find 
 that Prussia at first agreed with Francis Joseph 
 in the matter, recognised Christian IX. as 
 Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, but demanded 
 local home rule for these provinces. Bis- 
 marck's great difficulty was to get rid of the 
 Treaty of London, for, so long as it stood, his 
 master, always an honourable man, would not 
 consent to the seizure of Schleswig-Holstein. 
 Could not Denmark be drawn into war? If 
 this could only be done, the Treaty of London 
 would be abrogated by an accepted rule of inter- 
 national custom. Then Prussia might come 
 forward as a candidate for the Augustenburg 
 heritage, might take the place of Denmark, and 
 gain an invaluable outlet to the sea. Everything 
 happened as Bismarck had hoped ; and — what 
 was perhaps beyond his hopes — Austria con- 
 sented to join Prussia in a war against Denmark, 
 and to deal with the question without consult- 
 ing the Federal Council at Frankfort. Baron 
 Rechburg, who still advised Francis Joseph on 
 foreign affairs, protested against this policy of 
 
84 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 joint action, unless it were understood that the 
 succession to the Duchies should be regulated 
 by consent of Austria and Prussia. The 
 Emperor, in fact, proposed that the Duchies 
 should not \>e separated from Denmark with- 
 out such consent. But he and his ministers 
 were frightened by Bismarck's threat to invade 
 Schleswig-Holstein without them if they would 
 not go on. Austria, accordingly, joined in the 
 attack on the Danish garrison without any 
 guarantee as to what was to happen when 
 once it had been expelled. 
 
 The obvious policy for Austria was to put 
 herself at the head of the smaller German states, 
 repudiate the Treaty of London (for which there 
 was fairly good ground), and declare for a 
 German prince in the Duchies. But Francis 
 Joseph and his advisers were not gifted with 
 the foresight and courage necessary for such a 
 step. When, in January 1864, they undertook 
 to co-operate with Prussia in the invasion of the 
 Elbe Duchies, they were playing straight into 
 Prussia's hands. 
 
 The King of Denmark was obdurate, and 
 in January 1864 began the short war in 
 Schleswig-Holstein. The Danes made a 
 brave defence, and it is noteworthy that in 
 this little war there was no sign of the great 
 superiority of the Prussian over the Austrian 
 
WAR WITH THE DANES 85 
 
 troops. The Prussian artillery had been re- 
 armed with the needle-gun, and the Austrian 
 officers who saw it at work recognised that 
 it was better than anything which they had. 
 Otherwise the Austrian force seemed quite as 
 efficient as the Prussian. Danish resistance 
 was conquered by the end of April. England 
 sympathised deeply with Denmark, but she 
 remained true to her traditional policy of not 
 intervening alone in Europe in a case in 
 which she would have had to confront a 
 combination of Continental powers. As soon 
 as the Danes were driven out, Duke Frederick 
 endeavoured to take their place and to become 
 de facto Duke of Schleswig - Holstein ; but 
 Prussia refused to recognise him unless he 
 consented to conditions which would, in effect, 
 make the Duchies dependent upon Prussia. 
 Kiel must be handed over to Prussia as a 
 naval and commercial port. She must have 
 the right to make and fortify a canal connect- 
 ing Kiel with the German Ocean, and the 
 Duke must enter into a military convention 
 which would place the troops of the Duchy 
 under the command of Prussia. His soldiers 
 must even take the oath of allegiance to the 
 Prussian king. 
 
 The latter part of the year 1864 was spent 
 in negotiations between the Emperor and the 
 
86 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 King of Prussia as to the future of Schleswig- 
 Holstein. In August King William and Bis- 
 marck visited Schonbrunn and talked the 
 matter over with the Emperor and Rechberg. 
 They were still on good terms, and the two 
 sovereigns were such good friends, and so 
 anxious to deal fairly with one another, that 
 a breach between them seemed unlikely. Bis- 
 marck, however, prevented his master from 
 coming to any terms as to the future of the 
 Duchies, and shortly after the meeting at 
 Schonbrunn Rechberg, who had been Francis 
 Joseph's Foreign Minister since i860, re- 
 signed. He had, however reluctantly, com- 
 mitted Austria to dual action with Prussia. He 
 had done all Bismarck wanted, yet got nothing 
 from him. Consequently he was discredited 
 in his own country. His successor was Count 
 Mensdorff, a nobleman of French extraction, 
 whose forbears had risen to high place in 
 Austria by military service and by a fortunate 
 marriage with a Coburg princess. Mensdorff 
 united to charming manners the conventional 
 loyalty of the Austrian statesmen and a 
 greater amount of foresight than- most of them 
 possessed. He was not, however, of the mettle 
 of Rechberg, and was unable to cope with the 
 man who now directed Prussian policy. He 
 deprecated war with Prussia and constantly 
 
PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA S7 
 
 advised against it ; indeed, after the war of 
 1866 was over, he published documents which 
 show that he was strongly opposed to it. His 
 chief subordinate was Baron Biegeleben, who 
 seems to have influenced both him and the 
 Emperor Francis Joseph in the following year, 
 when Austria hurried into her fatal war with 
 Prussia. But at the critical time Mensdorff 
 was officially the Emperor's chief adviser. 
 
 In the winter of 1864-5, Austria and Prussia 
 remained in joint occupation of Schleswig and 
 Holstein, Austria pressing for the admission ot 
 Duke Frederick, and Prussia objecting to it 
 except on the terms stated above. When 
 these were formulated in a despatch sent to 
 Vienna in February 1865, the Emperor Francis 
 Joseph, through Count Mensdorff, declined 
 to agree to them. Austria made no objection 
 to Prussia having a naval port or a fortress or 
 two on the isthmus ; but, on constitutional 
 grounds, she refused even to discuss the pro- 
 posal that the Duke of Holstein's troops should 
 take the oath of allegiance to the Prussian 
 king. Such an idea was, indeed, wholly 
 subversive of the constitution of the Bund, 
 which contemplated only princes with equal 
 rights ; and Bismarck now showed openly that 
 he was not to be bound by any considerations 
 of constitutional precedent. "If Austria wishes 
 
88 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 to be our ally," he said in July 1865, "she 
 must give way to us." It is probable that the 
 war would have broken out in this year, but 
 for a meeting between the Emperor Francis 
 Joseph and !he King of Prussia at Gastein in 
 July 1865. A friendly arrangement, which 
 Bismarck contemptuously called a " piece of 
 sticking-plaster," was made between the two 
 sovereigns which postponed war for a year. 
 Schleswig was to be governed by Austria, and 
 Holstein by Prussia, which thus got control 
 of Kiel and of the roads leading to the north. 
 At the same moment Baron Schmerling, who 
 had guided the domestic policy of Austria in a 
 Liberal direction for several years, was dismissed. 
 Schmerling's fall was due to a number of 
 different circumstances. He was unpopular with 
 the Austrian aristocracy on account of his Liberal 
 views, and he was opposed by the Hungarian 
 Liberals, who would never agree with his policy 
 of a unified Austria sending members to a Parlia- 
 ment at Vienna. I n domestic policy the Emperor 
 seems to have been guided chiefly by Count 
 Maurice Esterhazy ; but be this as it may, 
 the combination against Schmerling was an 
 unholy alliance, entered into by persons who 
 were in no real agreement with one another. 
 He was succeeded by Count Belcredi, a man 
 of Conservative principles but of no force of 
 
WEAK ADVISERS 89 
 
 character. From the time of Schmerling's 
 fall to that of the Battle of Sadowa the 
 Emperor's chief advisers were Esterhazy — a 
 Tory of the Tories, who wanted to put back 
 the clock to before 1848 — and the polite but 
 invertebrate Mensdorff. As a soldier Mens- 
 dorff had a wholesome respect for the Prussian 
 army ; but as a servant of the Emperor Francis 
 Joseph he deemed that obedience was his first 
 and, indeed, his only duty. Neither Mensdorff 
 nor Esterhazy possessed at once the foresight 
 to estimate the dangers of a war with Prussia 
 and the courage to dissuade the Emperor from 
 it. Francis Joseph, nursed in the old tradi- 
 tions of the Hapsburgs, could not but appeal to 
 arms when, at the same time, the ancient rights 
 of his house in Germany and Italy were chal- 
 lenged. That he found himself without allies 
 when he drew the sword is due in part to his 
 own mistaken policy ; but the blame for it 
 must rest largely on the ministers who were 
 too stupid to foresee, or too subservient to 
 insist upon, the desperate risk of war. 
 
 Had the Emperor been well advised in 
 the autumn of 1865, he might have retired 
 from the Elbe Duchies and from Venetia on 
 highly favourable terms. During the autumn 
 months, offers were made to give Austria 
 compensation in money if she would relinquish 
 
90 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 her rights in these outlying territories. These 
 were refused on the ground that it was beneath 
 the dignity of the House of Hapsburg to 
 surrender its birthright for a mess of pottage. 
 There might have been some force in the 
 argument if the conduct of Austria had been 
 consistent; but so lately as July 1865 she had 
 agreed to sell her rights in Lauenburg, a county 
 of the Elbe Duchies, for two and a half million 
 dollars. Moreover, the Emperor and his 
 advisers, besides making mistakes abroad, 
 alienated public feeling at home by a high- 
 handed revocation of the constitution of 1861. 
 On September 20, 1865, after a precarious 
 life of four years, it was revoked by a 
 stroke of the Imperial pen ; and though a 
 formal recognition was given of the powers 
 of the provincial diets in Austria, and of the 
 Hungarian Diet at Budapest, nobody was 
 satisfied. The Hungarians throughout main- 
 tained that Hungary was not a province with 
 a mere provincial assembly, but a kingdom 
 entitled to a separate Parliament and ministry. 
 The Germans in Austria resented the revoca- 
 tion of a constitution which had been solemnly 
 declared to be " irrevocable." The Czechs and 
 other Slavonic inhabitants regarded the fall of 
 Schmerling's constitution as a victory ; but 
 those of them who understood things knew 
 
THE SPRING OF 1866 91 
 
 very well that this change brought them no 
 nearer to the realisation of Federalist dreams. 
 
 The year 1866, the most important in the 
 Emperor's life, opened with an angry inter- 
 change of notes between Berlin and Vienna. 
 In the portion of the Elbe Duchies which 
 was under her control, Austria allowed royal 
 receptions to be given to the wife of the 
 Augustenburg claimant. Bismarck declared 
 that such an action was tantamount to inciting 
 the Duchies to rebellion against the dual 
 control, and threatened to repudiate all obli- 
 gation to act in common with Austria. 
 Throughout February and March, both parties 
 prepared for war, and Bismarck opened nego- 
 tiations to secure the neutrality of Italy. These 
 resulted, on the 8th of April, in a treaty 
 which placed the Italian army at his disposal 
 for three months. Prussia did not bind herself 
 to go to war, but it was stipulated that, if she 
 should do so, the Italian army would support 
 her by an attack on Austria's Italian province. 
 If a war took place, Italy was to have Venetia, 
 but Prussia must receive " compensation " for 
 this either in the shape of Austrian territory 
 or of concessions to her policy on the part of 
 Austria. Bismarck thus bought Italian sup- 
 port with an offer of Austrian territory — one 
 of the most characteristic performances in his 
 
92 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 history. The treaty once secured, Prussia was 
 in a very strong position, and Italy, with every- 
 thing to gain and nothing to lose by war, 
 hoped eagerly for its declaration. Neverthe- 
 less, the outbreak was delayed for three 
 months by the reluctance both of the Emperor 
 Francis Joseph and of King William of Prussia 
 to appear before Europe as the aggressor. 
 Friendly notes were exchanged throughout 
 April, and at the end of the month the 
 Italian envoy in Paris spoke despondently of 
 the prospect of obtaining Venice — the coping- 
 stone of Italian unity. The mobilisation of 
 the Austrian army, which was ordered on 
 April 27, was ostensibly, and, it may be, sin- 
 cerely intended for defence against Italy ; but 
 the terms of the alliance between Italy and 
 Prussia gradually became known in Austria 
 and raised so strong a feeling in the country, 
 that it would have been difficult for even the 
 most pacific Government to disregard it. So 
 soon as the nature of this treaty became 
 known the Emperor and his weak counsellors 
 changed their tactics. At the moment of 
 mobilisation they instructed Count Metternich, 
 the Austrian ambassador in Paris, to ask for 
 the mediation of the Emperor Napoleon III. 
 in the Italian question. Had this step been 
 taken earlier it might have prevented the 
 
FRENCH MEDIATION 93 
 
 alliance between Italy and Prussia ; but the 
 Italian Government were now bound hand 
 and foot to Bismarck for three months. 
 Francis Joseph offered liberal terms, first, to 
 retire from Venetia on receiving compensa- 
 tion elsewhere ; and later, when he was harder 
 pressed, to retire unconditionally. But his 
 attempt to release his Italian army for service 
 in Bohemia failed. In asking for French 
 mediation he made a further mistake, for, in 
 a controversy between Prussia and Austria, 
 France could not be impartial. The Emperor 
 Napoleon believed, as did most people at the 
 time, that the Austrian army, if not divided 
 by two enemies, could easily overcome the 
 Prussians. If, then, Napoleon should dis- 
 suade Italy from engaging the Archduke 
 Albrecht on the Mincio, France must look 
 forward to the defeat of Prussia and to the 
 unquestioned supremacy of Austria in Germany, 
 and probably on the European Continent of 
 the future. Such a result was contrary to 
 the policy which France had followed ever 
 since the days of Richelieu ; and Napoleon III. 
 hesitated to take a step which might lead 
 to it. On the other hand, he tried to use 
 his position as a neutral to obtain con- 
 cessions on the Rhine from Prussia, and 
 allowed Bismarck to know that he had been 
 
94 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 asked to mediate. This policy which, in addi- 
 tion to being stupid, was contemptible, of 
 course prevented a fair mediation. The Italian 
 Government refused to receive Venetia at 
 the hands of France, and Austria's attempt 
 to disarm Italy and concentrate all forces to 
 strike Prussia a decisive blow was a complete 
 failure. 
 
 Though outmanoeuvred in Italy Francis 
 Joseph had still a great position in Germany. 
 Bavaria was on his side, though she did not 
 actively co-operate and refused to lend her 
 army for defence of Bohemia. Saxony was 
 thoroughly loyal to Austria. Hanover, once 
 the most formidable rival to Prussia in 
 the north, rejected Prussia's request for 
 neutrality with scorn, and Hesse and other 
 small German states were passively favour- 
 able to the Hapsburg. The Emperor 
 Francis Joseph appealed to several of the 
 smaller states for help, and, as we know, 
 Hanoyer and Hesse suffered for their 
 loyalty to him. But he had made a grave 
 mistake in allowing himself to be drawn off 
 Federal ground, and the results of this mis- 
 take were now clearly seen. He could not 
 invite the Federal body to settle a question 
 which he had, in 1864, promised to settle in 
 exclusive agreement with Prussia. Yet, on 
 
WAR 95 
 
 June i, 1866, he did call on the Bund to inter- 
 vene, alleging that he had found it impossible 
 to come to an agreement with Prussia as 
 contemplated by the treaty of 1864. The 
 Prussian Government at once denounced 
 Francis Joseph's action as a breach of the 
 treaty of 1864, and after issuing an insolent 
 circular note, denounced the treaty. On the 
 7th, Prussian troops commenced to pour into 
 the Duchies. They arrested the Austrian 
 Commissioner there, who was about to sum- 
 mon the Diet of Holstein in order to obtain 
 their opinion as to the future. On June 14, 
 when the German Council resolved, at the 
 instance of Bavaria, to place four of the 
 Federal army corps on a war footing, the 
 Prussian delegate declared that the resolution 
 was contrary to Federal law, that the Federa- 
 tion was broken, and that Prussia retired from 
 it. For this action there was no sort of legal 
 justification. The decree against which Prussia 
 protested was passed as the proposal of Bavaria, 
 and contained no menace to anybody. On 
 the other hand, the alliance between Prussia 
 and Italy of March 1866 was a flagrant breach 
 of a fundamental rule of the Bund — that no 
 member of it should enter into an alliance 
 inimical to any other. But the Prussians were 
 now ready. On June 15th they invaded Han- 
 
q6 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 over and Hesse ; and Moltke's wide-winged 
 march upon Bohemia had commenced. 
 
 A description of the Seven Weeks' War is 
 outside the scope of this essay. The Emperor 
 Francis Joseph placed entire reliance on Mar- 
 shal Benedek, and forced the command of the 
 northern army upon him against his will. In 
 acting thus he was advised by Esterhazy, 
 who warned him of the evil results which 
 might ensue if the army sustained a defeat 
 when under the command of the only other 
 general, the Archduke Albrecht. Benedek was 
 in some ways a strong man, but he was not 
 capable of taking command of 200,000 men 
 and of fighting a great campaign in Bohemia. 
 It must be remembered that he from the 
 first modestly and firmly protested his in- 
 ability. He knew Italy well, he said, but 
 could not fight a campaign in the north with 
 success. Once committed to the task he did 
 his best, but from the first he misinterpreted 
 the designs of the Prussian generals. 
 
 The concentration of the Austrian army in 
 Moravia was due to a fear that Prussia would 
 attempt a direct attack on Vienna by way of 
 Glatz. Benedek remained in Moravia gathering 
 his forces together when he should have been 
 in Bohemia to interrupt the Prussian concentra- 
 tion and establish connection with the Saxon 
 
BEFORE SADOWA 97 
 
 army to the West. The Austrian concentra- 
 tion was necessarily slower than the Prussian 
 owing to the fact that the Austrian regiments 
 were, for political reasons, not kept near the 
 place at which they were recruited. Thus, 
 recruits from Venice had to go to Hungary, 
 and recruits from Galicia or Transylvania to 
 Bohemia, in order to join their colours. 
 Despite these difficulties, however, Benedek 
 ought to have reached the scene of action 
 much earlier than he did ; and even a few days 
 before the decisive battle he had a very favour- 
 able prospect of throwing his whole force, 
 against the eastern Prussian army under 
 the command of the Crown Prince. On 
 the morning of June 28 his army was 
 quartered in and about Josefstadt, and 
 was in that position, beloved of Napoleon, 
 which enabled him to strike first at one and 
 then at the other of two converging enemies, 
 in each case with superior force. This was 
 pointed out to General Krismanitch, Benedek's 
 adviser, on the morning of the 28th by at 
 least one officer, who took the bold step of 
 advising his superiors 1 to strike first at the 
 eastern arm of the Prussian attack. The 
 advice was rejected. It seems certain that 
 the Austrian army could have reached and 
 
 1 Friedjung, Der Kampfum die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland, ii. 85, 86. 
 
 H 
 
98 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 attacked the Crown Prince late on the 28th, 
 whilst he was still half entangled in the passes 
 of the mountains, and the " Red Prince," 
 Frederick Charles of Prussia, was two or three 
 days' march away. The chance which was thus 
 offered did not occur again. 
 
 The Emperor awaited anxiously the result 
 of the first engagements. He was ill-in- 
 formed as to the course of events until June 
 30, when Benedek told him of the recent 
 retirement to Koniggratz. The general at- 
 tributed the necessity for this retreat to the 
 " dtb&cle " of the 1st and Saxon army corps, who 
 had fought an unsuccessful engagement with 
 the Prussians at Yitchin on the 29th. This 
 was scarcely just, for both the corps here 
 engaged, though defeated, had retired in good 
 order. The Emperor was surprised, but with 
 the courage which never deserts his house at 
 such times, sent an encouraging reply to 
 Benedek hoping for " favourable results " from 
 his " energetic leadership." On the night of 
 the 30th a hurried and disorderly retreat of 
 the whole army took place. In the next fore- 
 noon, as his tired men found their new positions 
 about Koniggratz, Benedek sent an urgent 
 telegram to the Emperor begging him to make 
 peace at any price, and announcing that a 
 catastrophe was unavoidable. The Emperor 
 
SADOWA 99 
 
 replied at 2 p.m., "To make peace is im- 
 possible. If a retreat is necessary, let it be 
 made. Has there been a battle ? " The last 
 words of the telegram show that Francis Joseph 
 was little aware of the course of events at the 
 front, but its first words go down to the bottom 
 of the Hapsburg creed. He would never 
 make peace whilst the enemy was in his 
 territories and he had an army wherewith to 
 expel them. The result, which has already 
 been the subject of many histories, needs no 
 description here. The Prussian forces, which 
 scattered widely for the advance, converged on 
 July 2, and on the next day attacked Benedek 
 in overwhelming force. The Austrian and 
 Saxon armies lost in killed, wounded, and 
 captured, over 44,000 men and 1 74 guns ; the 
 victors, 300 officers and less than 9,000 men. 
 Benedek withdrew his scattered army towards 
 the east, and so, through Moravia, southwards 
 towards the Danube. But for the reckless 
 bravery with which a portion of his cavalry and 
 artillery covered his retreat, the losses of the 
 Austrian army must have been much heavier. 
 
 Benedek was removed from his command 
 in July when his army had withdrawn to the 
 Danube, and was ordered to attend a military 
 inquiry into his conduct of the campaign. 
 The court of inquiry presented a preliminary 
 
ioo FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 report to the Emperor, which was not published, 
 and Francis Joseph, having read it, suspended 
 all further proceedings against him and his 
 subordinates,, Krismanitch and Henikstein, by 
 an order of December 4. A few days earlier 
 Francis Joseph had sent to Count Clam-Gallas, 
 the unsuccessful cavalry general, a letter which 
 exculpated him from all blame. Krismanitch 
 re-entered the service in 1876 and was given 
 command of a fortress. Benedek retired to 
 Gratz in Styria. Whilst awaiting news from 
 Vienna he was visited on November 19 by the 
 Archduke Albrecht. The Archduke asked him 
 to give a written undertaking not to publish 
 any correspondence which had passed between 
 himself and his generals, or between himself 
 and the Emperor, and not to make any public 
 vindication of his conduct. Benedek gave this 
 undertaking ; and was surprised by the appear- 
 ance, shortly afterwards, of an article in the 
 official Wiener Zeitung, in which he was con- 
 demned. After referring to the fact that there 
 was no law which punished incompetence, the 
 article proceeded : " For the rest, the loss of 
 the confidence of his Imperial master, the 
 destruction of his military reputation before the 
 world of to-day and of the future, the recog- 
 nition of the immeasurable misfortune that, 
 under his command, has befallen the army, 
 
BENEDEK 101 
 
 and, through its defect, has befallen the whole 
 monarchy, must be a heavier penalty for 
 the high-minded man that Benedek always 
 was, than any punishment which could have 
 come upon him by continuation of legal 
 proceedings." 
 
 Benedek deeply resented the publication of 
 this announcement after he had given a 
 promise of silence ; and in his will he declaims 
 against it as contrary to right and justice. He 
 never forgave the Archduke Albrecht, and 
 Field-Marshal John, whom he believed to be 
 responsible for it. He never saw the Arch- 
 duke again, and refused to see General John. 
 In 1873 the Crown Prince Rudolf came to 
 Gratz and wrote saying that the Emperor had 
 requested him to bring news of Benedek's 
 health : but the old general asked for no 
 audience of the young Prince, merely saying 
 that he wanted nothing but rest. He died at 
 Gratz in 1881. His will contained a special 
 direction that his corpse should not be laid to 
 rest in Austrian uniform. 
 
 It has often been stated that the Archduke 
 Albrecht persuaded Benedek to take the com- 
 mand in Bohemia by saying that if he did not 
 do so and he (the Archduke) were appointed 
 and defeated, the dynasty would be threatened, 
 whilst if Benedek took it and failed, he alone 
 
io2 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 would be sacrificed. It has further been stated 
 that the Emperor Francis Joseph always refused 
 to receive the defeated general after his with- 
 drawal to Gratz. These statements, so far as 
 I have been able to discover, rest on the 
 evidence of the general's widow contained in a 
 memorandum which she wrote in 1886 ; x and 
 on them the critics have framed a serious in- 
 dictment against the Emperor. It does not 
 seem to me material whether these facts be 
 true or untrue. We know that Benedek was 
 very unwilling to take the command in Bohemia 
 and that he took it at the Emperor's command ; 
 and it is absurd to say that a general may 
 refuse at. any time to take a certain duty 
 upon himself because he thinks that he may 
 not be able to conduct a war with success. 
 If such a doctrine were admitted into military 
 law or custom, there would be an end of all dis- 
 cipline in the highest ranks of the army. It is 
 admitted that Benedek was an unsuccessful 
 general ; and his champions have not proved, 
 though they have sometimes asserted, that his 
 hands were not really free whilst he was in 
 command of the northern army. On the other 
 hand, the mission of the Archduke Albrecht to 
 Gratz in December 1866, and the binding of 
 Benedek to silence by a written bond, is a pro- 
 
 1 Friedjung, Der Kampf, etc., ii. 579. 
 
BENEDEK 103 
 
 ceeding of which it is difficult to believe that 
 the Emperor was ignorant. The article in the 
 Wiener Zeitung of 8th December 1866 could 
 hardly have been published without his consent; 
 and the silence with which he allowed it to cir- 
 culate must be taken, by reasonable men, to be 
 tantamount to approval. If the Emperor did 
 approve the publication of this article, his ap- 
 proval conflicts with the rule of common justice 
 that a man should be allowed to defend himself 
 in public before he is publicly condemned. It 
 is further inconsistent with the Emperor's own 
 actions in ordering proceedings against General 
 Benedek to be stayed. If the Emperor did not 
 approve of the article, could he not have either 
 informed his general of the fact or have per- 
 mitted him to vindicate himself either in public, 
 or, at least, personally before his sovereign ? 
 It is impossible, on a fair view of the matter, to 
 conclude that the Emperor treated his general 
 fairly ; and the reasonable conclusion is that 
 there was something to conceal. 
 
 Speculation as to what that something was 
 is interesting, but idle. In cases of this import- 
 ance it may be that the necessities of State 
 override even the ordinary principles of justice. 
 The Austrian Government allowed their diplo- 
 macy to outrun their defensive preparations 
 and plunged Austria into a war for which she 
 
io 4 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 was ill prepared. The Austria of the day was 
 an autocracy, and autocracy can only submit to 
 the trial of public opinion if it is certain of a 
 favourable verdict. The Emperor must, how- 
 ever, have had something serious on his political 
 conscience if he thus allowed a faithful, though 
 inefficient, servant to be bound to silence, and 
 then, in his silence, condemned. And, justice 
 apart, it was an undignified thing to permit an 
 article of this kind to go forth under the im- 
 primatur of the Government. Whatever other 
 mistakes they may have made, the Hapsburgs 
 have rarely been wrong upon a point of dignity. 
 After Sadowa Francis Joseph soon sued for 
 peace, which, after preliminaries at Nikolsburg, 
 was signed in the Blue Star inn at Prag on 
 August 23rd. Austria ceded Venetia and the 
 "Quadrilateral" forts to Napoleon IJ.I., who 
 handed them over to Italy ; and so Italy, 
 though defeated on land and sea by Austria, 
 gained unity by Francis Joseph's defeat. 
 Austria recognised the new German Con- 
 federation in which she should have no part. 
 She ceded no Hapsburg lands and paid but 
 a small indemnity. Generous terms, on which 
 Bismarck insisted against the will of his 
 master, lest Austria should be estranged for 
 ever. Even in 1866 he was preparing for 
 the war with France. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 1861-1867 
 
 Dealt and the Hungarian Liberals — Passive resistance in 
 Hungary — The negotiations of 1865 — The result of 
 Sadowa — The Ausgleich of 1867. 
 
 We must now return to Hungary, which for 
 sixteen years had been ruled by German offi- 
 cials from Vienna as a mere province of Austria. 
 The defeat of 1849 had, as I have said, been 
 followed by the introduction of the Bach system. 
 Bach not only disregarded all the rights and 
 privileges of the Hungarians, but actually cut 
 up the kingdom into districts. For ten years 
 Hungary disappeared from the map, and ceased 
 to be even a geographical expression. 
 
 The Bach system was one of the most in- 
 teresting and able attempts at bureaucratic 
 government which has ever been tried in 
 Europe ; but a description of it would be out 
 of place in this book. When the defeat came 
 in Italy in 1859, Bach was dismissed, and 
 Schmerling, who succeeded him, did his utmost 
 
 105 
 
106 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 to induce the Hungarians to co-operate in 
 working his constitution of 1861. Schmer- 
 ling's policy would have reduced the Hungarian 
 Parliament to the level of any one of the pro- 
 vincial Diets of Austria. " We acknowledge," 
 said the Rescript promulgating his constitution, 
 " that the Hungarian Diet will, in deviation 
 from former law, deliberate on all questions 
 concerning taxation and liability to military 
 service and its regulations henceforth only in 
 common with the other constitutional represent- 
 atives of the Empire." This was the essence 
 of Austrian Liberalism in 1861. During the 
 summer of that year the Hungarian Diet was 
 convened to elect members for the Austrian 
 Parliament. Debates took place upon Schmer- 
 ling's proposal, and the Hungarians refused to 
 accept it. The Hungarian Parliament replied 
 to his invitation in two remarkable addresses 
 which are the work of Francis Deak, and 
 which set out the Hungarian claim at great 
 length; and a Royal Rescript of August 1861 
 expresses the views of Francis Joseph, as 
 advised by Schmerling, upon them. The 
 Hungarian address shows that, for reasons 
 which I have already described, Hungary 
 could not accept Francis Joseph as King 
 until he had legalised his position in the 
 country by coronation. He must further admit 
 
MAGYAR CLAIMS 107 
 
 the legality of the Parliament of 1 848 by assent- 
 ing to the laws which had been passed in 
 that year, and to which his predecessor had 
 promised assent. Coronation with the Crown 
 of St. Stephen and recognition of the legality 
 of the 1848 Parliament were the two things 
 which Hungary must have. But apart from 
 them, she did not admit the right of Schmerling's 
 bogus Parliament to vote Hungarian taxes, 
 and would not take part in the proceedings of 
 any Diet in which the representatives of any 
 other country but her own were present. Her 
 leaders were, however, ready to make terms 
 with the Emperor as to the small matters in 
 which they could make concessions. Their 
 attitude throughout was as loyal as possible ; 
 but on some points they would make no com- 
 promise. The leaders, moreover, were men of 
 the first ability and knew how to wait. In 
 patience, moderation, and resource they com- 
 pared favourably with the Viennese ministers. 
 The Emperor would not listen to the 
 addresses of the Diet, and dissolved it on 
 2 1 st August. The dissolution caused profound 
 discontent, and a conspiracy to refuse to pay 
 taxes spread rapidly. The Emperor replied to 
 this combination by billeting soldiers in the 
 towns and villages of Hungary, and the taxes, 
 when collected by force, were at length sullenly 
 
io8 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 paid. The country, in the autumn of 1861, 
 resigned itself again to political inaction and 
 arbitrary rule. The results of this treatment 
 of Hungary were seen in 1866 when the Hun- 
 garians looKed on in silence at the defeat of 
 Austria by Prussia. 
 
 It is difficult to say how far the Emperor 
 was responsible for the maintenance of the 
 Schmerling policy. In German affairs he 
 seems to have supported Schmerling's views, 
 at all events till the end of 1863, when the 
 failure at Frankfort proved to him that the idea 
 of a Great Germany with Austria at her head 
 was impracticable. Towards the Hungarians 
 we know that he always had gracious intentions, 
 and there are reasons for thinking that he did 
 not altogether approve of the foolish policy of 
 attempting to govern Hungary by means of 
 Austrian ministers. A certain number of 
 noble Hungarians were always about his court, 
 and his beautiful wife was a constant friend to 
 the champions of Magyar rights. The amnesty 
 which he granted in 1862 to all political offenders 
 in Hungary was given at the request of Count 
 Forgach, the Governor of Hungary, and did not 
 come through the ministry at Vienna. About 
 the same time he spoke a few words to a deputa- 
 tion representing the Hungarian Landowners' 
 Association which made a great impression. "It 
 
DEAR'S "EASTER ARTICLE" 109 
 
 is my wish," he said, "to satisfy Hungary not only 
 in material respects, but in other matters also." 
 But until Easter 1865 nothing more was 
 done to satisfy the Hungarians "in other matters 
 also." The Hungarian question again came 
 upon the carpet when Deak wrote his famous 
 " Easter article " in the Pesti Naplo, a news- 
 paper which reflected his views. This article 
 and a series of letters with which Deak followed 
 it up were of great importance as showing that 
 the Hungarian Liberals were ready to admit 
 the existence of " common affairs " as between 
 Austria and Hungary. Whilst discussions 
 raised by the Easter manifesto were occupy- 
 ing his advisers, the Emperor in June paid a 
 visit to Budapest, and was received with great 
 enthusiasm. He made a friendly speech, which 
 gave no promises, but assured the Hungarians 
 of the sympathy of their King. Moreover, he 
 spoke in Magyar, which was at the moment 
 tabooed by his own officials. The good impres- 
 sion caused by this speech was confirmed by 
 the appointment of a Hungarian nobleman, 
 Count Mailath, as a Court chancellor; whilst 
 the ancient and honoured post of Tavernicus, 
 or Treasurer of Hungary, was given to Baron 
 Sennyei, a Conservative magnate who had long 
 been in favour of a compromise with Hungary. 
 These changes synchronised with the decline 
 
no FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 and fall of the Schmerling ministry in Vienna, 
 of which I have said something in a previous 
 chapter. That event affected Hungary only to 
 this extent, that Schmerling was essentially a 
 German, and his constitution was framed so as 
 to bring about a government by the middle 
 classes and the bourgeoisie. Hungary, at that 
 time a country of aristocrats and peasants, had 
 no middle class, and was profoundly hostile to 
 the idea of German middle-class government. 
 
 Count Belcredi, who succeeded Schmerling 
 in July 1865, was a Moravian, a Conservative, 
 and, above all, a Federalist. Under his advice 
 the Emperor, on September 2, published a 
 remarkable manifesto. This document may be 
 recommended to those who desire to become 
 masters in the art of obscure expression. The 
 gist of it was that the Emperor suspended the 
 Schmerling constitution, and exchanged the 
 policy of a strong central Parliament and 
 powerless provincial Diets for one in which 
 a large measure of power was given to the 
 Diets and the central authority proportionately 
 weakened. This change was due in part to a 
 feeling in Vienna that it was hopeless to go on 
 with Schmerling's Parliament if the Hungarians 
 would not send deputies to it. The Emperor's 
 speeches of 1 865 at Budapest have this behind 
 them \ and the Conservative advisers who 
 
CONCESSIONS m 
 
 surrounded him in that year had never been so 
 hostile to the Hungarian claims as the middle- 
 class German Liberals. Esterhazy, his confi- 
 dential friend and adviser at the time, was, of 
 course, a Magyar by blood though a cosmopolitan 
 by taste and training. Mensdorff, the Premier, 
 was first of all a soldier ; and, as a soldier, knew 
 that, difficult as it would be for Austria to wage 
 a successful war with Prussia, a success would 
 be impossible without the cordial co-operation 
 of Hungary. For the second time in a single 
 year Francis Joseph visited Budapest in 
 December 1865, and the speech which he made 
 in opening the Diet showed that he was anxious 
 to come to terms with the Magyar leaders. 
 " We are now come," he said, " to finish the 
 work which our feeling of the duties of govern- 
 ment compelled us to begin. Our object in 
 coming among you in person is more effectually 
 to remove those scruples which till now have 
 prevented the solution of the political questions 
 with which we have to deal." Proceeding with 
 his speech, the Emperor formally abandoned 
 the doctrine, long maintained by the extreme 
 Austrians, that Hungary had forfeited her rights 
 by the insurrection of 1848. He admitted 
 the existence of the Pragmatic Sanction, and 
 consequently, the conditions upon which it was 
 accepted by the kingdom of St. Stephen. He 
 
ii2 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 asked the Diet to take its stand upon that law, 
 to consider the constitutions of October i860 
 and February 1861, and the recent manifesto 
 of September 1865, and — this was the most 
 important point — " to revise or reform that 
 part of the laws of 1848 which refers to the 
 exercise of our rights of sovereignty and the 
 limitations of the attributes of government." 
 " Only when this has been done," continued 
 the Emperor, " will it be possible for the 
 King with a quiet conscience to take the Royal 
 Coronation oath to the Hungarian constitu- 
 tion . . . and be solemnly invested with the 
 diadem of St. Stephen, our Apostolic forefather, 
 with that sacred crown in which we would fain 
 insert, as its most precious jewel, the prosperity 
 of our kingdom of Hungary and the unbroken 
 love of our people." 
 
 This speech was a great advance upon any- 
 thing which the Emperor had yet said to 
 Hungary, but it did not go far enough to 
 satisfy Andrassy and Deak, now the recog- 
 nised Hungarian leaders. The acceptance of 
 the constitution of i860 or 1861 would have 
 reduced the Hungarian Parliament to the level 
 of the provincial Diets of Austria, and would 
 in consequence have left no room or function 
 for an independent Hungarian Cabinet. The 
 Magyars held out for the right to surround 
 
DEAR'S VIEWS 113 
 
 the Emperor — as King of Hungary — with 
 Hungarian advisers, who should be responsible 
 to a Hungarian Parliament. They were deter- 
 mined now, as in 1849, to resist the inclusion 
 of Hungary in any parliamentary system which 
 might be set up in Austria. They knew that 
 such a system, if set up by an autocrat, might 
 at any time be withdrawn at will, as had 
 been the case with the constitutions of 1849 
 and 1 86 1. They refused to imperil their time- 
 honoured institutions by exchanging them for 
 paper-made rights which might be cancelled in 
 a moment. The reason for this is obvious. If 
 the Hungarians came to a Parliament in Vienna 
 they would always be in a minority. They 
 would be unable to legislate for their own 
 country, and must take laws framed by the 
 deputies representing the rest of the Empire. 
 Above all, they would be prevented from pre- 
 serving the Magyar " nationality " by legisla- 
 tion as to language, franchise, and education. 
 In the history of Francis Joseph's life we read 
 a great deal about constitutional law and con- 
 stitutional machinery. Such things are only a 
 means to an end. The Hungarian end was 
 to prevent their place and nation from being 
 expunged from the map of Europe, as Poland 
 had been wiped out eighty years before. All 
 the disputes about the "laws of '48," "con- 
 
 1 
 
H4 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 tinuity of right," diplomas, patents, and so 
 forth, had this, and this only, for their object. 
 
 The address in reply which the Hungarian 
 Diet presented to the Emperor (February 24, 
 1866) was framed with these views in mind. 
 The Hungarians admitted that there were 
 matters which were common to the Kingdom 
 of St. Stephen and the other lands owned by 
 the Hapsburg dynasty. They promised that a 
 Bill should be introduced to make provision for 
 the definition and treatment of these affairs, 
 and that the revision of the laws of 1848 should 
 be considered ; but it required as a sine qua 
 non that the proposals for revision of those 
 laws should be laid before the Diet by a re- 
 sponsible Hungarian ministry. " The land," 
 they said, "still remains under absolute rule. 
 Sanctioned laws tq which even your Majesty 
 allows that no objection can be raised on the 
 score of legality are treated as if non-existent. 
 . . . We therefore plead for continuity of right 
 above all in respect of our laws, for parliament- 
 ary government and for a responsible ministry. 
 . . . All we demand is the restoration of the 
 law : for a law not enforced is a dead letter." 
 
 Such was the answer which Hungary gave 
 to the Emperor in February 1866. Francis 
 Joseph received it in the audience chamber of 
 the palace on the hill at Buda. His answer 
 
MAGYAR MODERATION 115 
 
 was short. The interest and the peoples of 
 Austria required that the principles laid down 
 in the speech from the throne of December 
 12, 1865, should be respected. So saying, the 
 Emperor turned and left the chamber. He did 
 not meet the Hungarian leaders again until the 
 Prussian legions were on the road to Vienna. 
 
 Though their demand for a ministry was 
 thus rejected, the Diet, at Deak's advice, did 
 not refuse to consider the preliminaries of a 
 possible settlement. Deak drew up a scheme 
 for the management of the foreign affairs of 
 Austria and Hungary and submitted it to a 
 large committee of the Diet. The House also 
 proceeded to discuss the revision of the laws 
 of 1848. They were engaged in these tasks 
 when on 18th June Prussia and Italy declared 
 war on Austria. After the Austrian victory at 
 Custozza on 24th June, the Emperor, however, 
 thought himself strong enough to meet his 
 enemies without having to concede the points 
 demanded by Hungary. On 24th June the 
 Magyar Diet was dissolved whilst Magyar 
 regiments were marching to the battle-fields 
 in Bohemia. On 3rd July the battle of 
 Sadowa was fought and lost. 
 
 Two weeks after the defeat in Bohemia the 
 Emperor summoned Deak to Vienna. The 
 Hungarian leader arrived late in the evening. 
 
n6 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 He was at once admitted to an audience, and 
 found Francis Joseph alone and lost in thought. 
 After a short time the monarch turned round 
 and said ab/uptly, " Well, Deak, what shall I 
 do now ? " Deak answered, " Your Majesty 
 must first make peace and then give Hungary 
 her rights." " Will the Hungarian Parliament 
 give me men to carry on the war if I give the 
 constitution at once?" asked the Emperor. 
 To his great credit be it said that Deak 
 refused. The Emperor again waited for some 
 time, and finally said, " I suppose it must be 
 so." 1 The interview terminated at once, and, 
 without seeing any officials, Deak returned to 
 Budapest. His answer to Francis Joseph's 
 request was one which only a strong man 
 could have given. The Hungarian Liberals 
 had admitted that in the conduct of foreign 
 affairs Austria and Hungary should and could 
 act together ; and surely the defence of the 
 monarchy might be said to be a matter of 
 common interest. But the war of 1866 had 
 been brought on by the mistakes and weakness 
 of the old absolutist rdgime, and Deak refused, 
 even if Hungary were now satisfied, to involve 
 Hungary in a war which was undertaken before 
 that satisfaction was given. 
 
 1 Francis DeAk : a Memoir (Macmillans, 1880), p. 237. I am 
 much indebted to this admirable book. 
 
BEUST AND TISZA 117 
 
 The defeat of Sadowa led, not unnaturally, 
 to a change of ministers at Vienna. Count 
 Mensdorff resigned, and Count Beust, till 
 lately Minister-President in Saxony, succeeded 
 him. As to Count Beust's views and policy 
 in Austria proper something will be said 
 elsewhere. With regard to Hungary, his view 
 was that the Hungarian terms must at all costs 
 be accepted. These terms were embodied in 
 the draft constitution prepared by Deak which 
 had been discussed by a committee of the 
 Hungarian Diet for some time before its dis- 
 solution. The Diet reassembled shortly after 
 Sadowa, and took up the scheme ; but opinion 
 in Hungary was divided as to its merits, and a 
 strong party in the Parliament thought that it 
 went too far in the path of compromise with 
 Austria. These men proposed to have no con- 
 nection at all with the Hapsburg territories 
 except the mere fact that the same man should 
 be Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. 
 They were led by Koloman Tisza, afterwards 
 for fifteen years (1875-1890) Prime Minister of 
 Hungary, who, though inferior to Deak in 
 logic, prudence, and consistency, was more 
 than a match for him in eloquence and the 
 craft of Parliamentary leadership. Deak saw 
 that Hungary must make some allowance for 
 Austrian susceptibilities and difficulties. Tisza 
 
u8 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 wanted to make none, and Tisza's position was 
 strengthened by the fact that, in spite of 
 Beust's advice, the Emperor was still slow 
 to admit the Hungarian claim in its entirety. 
 The debates in Hungary, which took up the 
 rest of the year 1866, cannot be detailed 
 here. At its close public opinion in Hungary 
 was embittered by the procrastination of the 
 Emperor, but in the first weeks of 1867 his 
 reluctance was gradually conquered. Early 
 in February Count Belcredi resigned office at 
 Vienna, and on the 18th a royal Rescript was 
 issued restoring the constitution of Hungary, 
 and cancelling the autocratic decrees for mili- 
 tary service, — thus accepting the Hungarian 
 military law of 1848. Count Julius Andrassy, 
 a Liberal nobleman who had been condemned 
 to death in 1849 as an accomplice of Kossuth, 
 was entrusted with the formation of a respon- 
 sible Hungarian ministry. Almost at the same 
 time a decree was issued at Vienna, signed 
 by Count Beust, convoking a Parliament for 
 the Austrian dominions of the Emperor. 
 The new Parliament was not to discuss the 
 Hungarian constitution at all, or to alter the 
 arrangements made for regulating the common 
 affairs of the monarchy. It was to accept them 
 as an accomplished fact. 
 
 This decree evoked angry protest from the 
 
THE AUSGLEICH OF 1867 119 
 
 several provinces of the Austrian Empire. 
 These provinces relied on the promise of the 
 Emperor contained in the manifesto of Sep- 
 tember 1865, which said that the arrangement 
 with Hungary should be submitted for ap- 
 proval to the provincial diets. The institution 
 of a central Parliament for the whole of 
 non- Hungarian Austria was, it was urged, a 
 breach of faith. About the objections of the 
 Bohemians and other nationalities I shall say 
 more in another chapter. Here I need only 
 say that Deak's policy was accepted by the 
 Emperor and Count Beust. It consisted in 
 establishing two nationalities — the German in 
 Austria, the Magyar in Hungary — as supreme 
 in Austria- Hungary. These two were to be 
 dominant races. The others were to be subject 
 to them. 
 
 The main provisions of the constitution of 
 1867, which still endures, may be described in 
 a few words. Austria and Hungary became 
 two states of equal rights and powers. Each 
 was to have a Parliament of two houses, and 
 in each a ministry was to be appointed to 
 advise the sovereign, and to answer to the 
 Parliaments for his acts. Certain matters — 
 the conduct of war and diplomacy, and the 
 expenditure of money necessary therefor — 
 were recognised as common to Hungary and 
 
120 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Austria, and were removed from the com- 
 petence and discussion of both Parliaments. 
 Three "Austro- Hungarian" ministers were 
 to be appointed to advise the Emperor — now 
 the " Emperor- King" — on these matters. 
 These were to be responsible, not to either 
 Parliament but to two bodies of sixty men 
 called " Delegations." Of the sixty delegates 
 forty were in each case to be elected by the 
 Lower Houses of the Parliaments, and twenty 
 by the Houses of Peers. These Delegations 
 were to meet year and year about at Vienna 
 and Budapest, and to sit and debate apart. 
 The idea of their meeting and debating to- 
 gether was strenuously opposed by Deak, as 
 such a joint meeting would surely form the 
 germ of a single Parliament. The Delegations 
 communicate by means of messages, and only 
 meet if, after three messages and answers, 
 they are unable to agree. Should such a 
 meeting take place, the members simply as- 
 semble and vote without discussion ; and the 
 Emperor has a casting vote. The army, navy, 
 and diplomatic service being the only subjects 
 of joint expenditure are supported by a fund 
 composed of, first, the yield of the customs, 
 and then of moneys contributed by the two 
 states to the common exchequer. 
 
 In addition to the "common affairs" of 
 
THE AUSGLEICH OF 1867 121 
 
 Austria and Hungary certain things are 
 declared by the constitution of 1867 to be 
 matters for similar legislation by the Parlia- 
 ments of the two countries, and for arrange- 
 ment by treaty between the two nations. 
 These are the customs, indirect taxations, 
 currency, banking, and the fixing of the pro- 
 portions in which Austria and Hungary shall 
 contribute to the common expenses of the 
 monarchy. Austria originally agreed to pay 
 70 and Hungary 30 per cent. The treaty 
 made between the two nations in 1867 lapses 
 every ten years, and has since been renewed. 
 It was renewed in 1878 and 1888, and has 
 since been prolonged so as to last till 191 7. 
 The discussions as to its renewal raised violent 
 controversy between the two parties to the 
 monarchy, of which I shall have to say some- 
 thing in a later chapter. The Hungarian 
 " quota " of common expenses has been slightly 
 increased by modern changes, and is now about 
 34 per cent. 
 
 The enactment of this constitution was 
 the most important event in the reign of 
 Francis Joseph. The history of its sub- 
 sequent years is the history of an attempt 
 to work out the compromise which it effected, 
 and to use its machinery for the government 
 and preservation of a great mid -European 
 
122 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 monarchy. In one sense the compromise was 
 an admission by Francis Joseph of the prin- 
 ciple against which he had long contended — 
 the principle of nationality. It granted to 
 the Magyars the fullest recognition of ancient 
 rights or claims, and admitted that neither 
 the surrender of 1683 nor tne conquest of 1849 
 had extinguished them. But this grant, or 
 rather recognition, of Magyar rights was in 
 reality very different from the recognition of 
 the nationalist claims of Poles, Croats, Czechs 
 or Slovacks which have so frequently been 
 put forward in modern times. Hungary had 
 a very firm basis of historic right for her 
 demands. She was not, like Ireland, a country 
 inhabited by tribes alien to the dominant 
 race, but which had never had an organised 
 government separate from England. She had 
 for many centuries had her own King and 
 Parliament, and from the year 1000 had 
 held, by grant from the then author of all 
 political sovereignty, the right to elect and 
 crown independent sovereigns. The com- 
 promise of 1867 was a recognition of this 
 right. It gave to Hungary nothing which 
 she had not had before. Their demands 
 conceded, the Hungarians admitted on their 
 part that their acceptance of the Hapsburgs 
 as Kings of Hungary carried with it certain 
 
THE AUSGLEICH OF 1867 123 
 
 obligations to the other subjects of that 
 dynasty. These obligations they fulfilled by 
 committing the control of their army and the 
 conduct of their relations with foreign countries 
 to an authority over which they could not 
 exercise complete control. The Emperor and 
 the aristocratic caste which represented, which 
 was, the old Austria, looked upon the preser- 
 vation of the Hapsburg dynasty and dignity 
 as paramount to all considerations of popular 
 liberties or nationalist aspirations. To the 
 maintenance of their principle, the existence 
 of a single army and the control of that army 
 in peace or war by the Crown was vital. In 
 the compromise of 1867 the Hungarians ad- 
 mitted that respect was due to this conception 
 of public law. This compromise, therefore, 
 was a compromise in the truest sense of the 
 word. A way was found to combine liberty 
 with discipline and reconcile two conflicting 
 theories of state. Like all compromises — the 
 institution of the Church of England is a case 
 in point — it was open to criticism by men of 
 pure logic : but as compromise is latent in 
 the nature and character of men, it is also 
 latent in the nature and character of states. 
 The question for the future was whether this 
 compromise would last. It has yet to be 
 answered. 
 
i2 4 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 On the 8th of June 1867 the Emperor was 
 crowned with the Crown of St. Stephen in the 
 cathedral of Buda. Escorted by a long pro- 
 cession of the nobles of Church and State 
 dressed in fhe splendid costume of that order, 
 he went from the church of coronation to the 
 Coronation Hill in Pesth. Mounted on a 
 white horse, he ascended the hill, and, in 
 accordance with ancient ceremony, waved his 
 sword to the four points of the compass, to 
 symbolise the readiness of the King of 
 Hungary to meet his subjects' enemies, from 
 whatever quarter they might come. An 
 English writer 1 has described the feelings 
 of the Hungarian nation on this great occa- 
 sion. " To those," she writes, " who could 
 recall the bitter experiences of war, oppres- 
 sion, and acute helpless misery which their 
 country had been doomed to undergo . . ., 
 who had followed with keen anxiety the hopes 
 and disappointments of the last six years, 
 and the slow but patient advance of Hungary 
 towards recovery of her ancient and never- 
 forgotten rights ; to them the ceremony of 
 the 8th of June was something more than an 
 imposing pageant. For beneath the quaint 
 symbolism, the gorgeous trappings that seemed 
 more befitting the glories of the Field of the 
 
 1 The author of Francis Dedk, quoted above, p. 1 1 6. 
 
JUNE 8, 1867 125 
 
 Cloth of Gold than the sober usages of the 
 nineteenth century, might be felt the beating 
 of a nation's heart. Every detail in the 
 stately and elaborate ceremony was fraught 
 with genuine significance to those in whose 
 minds the traditions of their past history were 
 so closely interwoven with the events of 
 present politics, as to be matters not of 
 antiquarian interest, but of actual practical 
 importance. It is not often that in this 
 prosaic age the deepest realities of national 
 life and feelings have their true expression 
 in so picturesque a form as on the coronation 
 day of the Hapsburg King of Hungary." 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 1867-1878 
 
 Federalist Movement in Austria — The Hohenwart Ministry 
 and its Failure — Home Rule in Croatia — Tisza's Ministry 
 — Austria and France in 1870 — The Russo-Turkish War 
 — Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 
 
 Thus, after many attempts and many errors, 
 did Francis Joseph at length make a successful 
 stroke in politics. The new monarchy, which 
 was created by the compromise of 1867, has 
 since existed, and has become an important 
 member of the society of European states. 
 It cannot be said that the compromise solved 
 all, or nearly all, the difficulties with which 
 the Emperor had to deal ; but nobody can 
 deny that it has resulted in a great accession 
 of strength to the states who were parties 
 to it. The defeats of Solferino and Sadowa, 
 which were supposed to be nails in the coffin 
 of Austria, have turned out to be something 
 quite different, and preluded the entry of 
 Austria and Hungary into a new position, 
 
 136 
 
NEW QUESTIONS 127 
 
 and a new importance in Europe. During 
 the ten years following 1867, Austria does 
 not appear on the stage of European politics. 
 She is neutral during the Franco- Prussian 
 war, yet she does not, like the France of 
 Napoleon III., try to sell her neutrality for 
 territory or compensation. The Emperor re- 
 tires from the field of Europe, and his country 
 endeavours to realise its new character and 
 position. The process takes much time and 
 causes many difficulties. Let us review the 
 period first in Austria and then in Hungary ; 
 and lastly, in 1878, look once more abroad. 
 
 One of the most important sections of the 
 act of Compromise declared that Hungary 
 could only deal with Austria so long as she 
 was in possession of a representative system ; 
 that is to say, of an elected legislature to 
 which the Austrian ministry was responsible. 
 This provision made it necessary to call a 
 Parliament in Austria, where there had been 
 no central legislature since the Belcredi 
 manifesto of September, 1865. In the summer 
 of 1867, accordingly, a Reichsrath was sum- 
 moned, but it could only accept, and not modify, 
 the agreement made by Francis Joseph with 
 Hungary. The Austrian Parliament did so, 
 and, at the same time, submitted a new form 
 of constitution for itself, which on December 
 
128 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 12, 1867, received the Imperial approval. This 
 scheme prohibited further suspensions of the 
 constitution of Austria, and provided for the 
 independence of the judges. The franchise 
 law, which *had been devised by Baron von 
 Schmerling so as to ensure a majority of 
 Germans, was left untouched. Prince Charles 
 Auersperg assumed office as Prime Minister, 
 and was supported by a Cabinet of German 
 bourgeois, who observed the compromise with 
 Hungary and acted loyally to it in the 
 arrangement of those questions which had 
 been declared to be matter for treaty between 
 the two countries. A treaty was made in 
 1868 to last for ten years, and the Austrian 
 Parliament passed to local matters which called 
 for urgent treatment. The control of the 
 Church over marriage and education, which 
 had been secured to the priesthood by the 
 Concordat of 1855, was recovered for the state. 
 This step raised a violent clerical agitation in 
 the country which, coming at the same time as 
 the Bohemian protest, occupied the attention 
 of the Austrian Ministry for many years. 
 
 The Czech leaders in Bohemia promptly 
 opposed the compromise of 1867. In August 
 1868 they issued a declaration which may be 
 said to mark the formal commencement of an 
 agitation that has since passed through many 
 
THE FEDERALISTS 129 
 
 phases but is not yet satisfied. The men who 
 signed this declaration had been returned by 
 the Czech constituencies to the Bohemian 
 Diet of 1868; but, owing to the peculiar pro- 
 visions of Baron Schmerling's electoral law, 
 they were in the minority in the Diet though 
 representing the majority of the population. 
 They consequently refused to attend the Diet, 
 and issued their declaration. It said that 
 Bohemia was united with Austria only by the 
 personal tie of a common sovereign, that the 
 " Austria " recognised by the compromise of 
 1867 was a mere invention and had no political 
 existence, that the revolution of the Austrian 
 Reichsrath could not bind Bohemia or impose 
 any burdens upon her, and that the kingdom of 
 Venceslas must be entitled to a just franchise 
 law, and an " honest election " in order that 
 the will of her people might be expressed in 
 the Diet. Moravia, a Czech province of 
 Austria, followed suit with an even stronger 
 declaration, and in the winter of 1868-9 the 
 agitation against the compromise became so 
 violent that in the following spring the 
 Emperor had to declare a " state of siege " 
 in Prag. In Galicia the Polish aristocracy 
 had no historic rights to go upon, but in 
 September 1867 they claimed a position similar 
 to that asked for by the Czechs, and demanded 
 
 K 
 
130 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 a ministry responsible to their own local Diet. 
 Thus we see that the example of Hungary was 
 followed by the outlying provinces of Austria 
 in which races alien to the German had a 
 numerical majority. The claims of these races 
 were never recognised to the full by Francis 
 Joseph. In Galicia the population consists of 
 the aristocracy of Roman Catholic Poles and 
 a numerous peasantry and working-class of 
 Greek Orthodox or Greek- Catholic Ruthenians. 
 In the old days of the Polish kingdom, and 
 indeed up to 1867, the Poles lorded it over 
 the Ruthenians. When, therefore, the Poles 
 put forward the demands of 1868, they were 
 opposed by the Ruthenians, who feared that 
 their Polish overlords might become too 
 powerful. Indeed, the Ruthenians liked the 
 idea of strong central government to help them 
 against their overlords. The Emperor refused 
 to make the concessions demanded by the 
 Poles. The chief result of their agitation was 
 that an Imperial visit to Galicia, which was 
 planned for the summer of 1868, was abandoned. 
 Small concessions were made to Galicia by 
 allowing the use of the Polish language 
 as the official tongue in the province, by 
 appointing a special minister " for Galicia " in 
 the Austrian Cabinet, and by extending slightly 
 the competence of the Galician Diet : but 
 
BOHEMIAN CLAIMS 131 
 
 beyond this the largest province of Austria 
 which " marches " for many hundred miles 
 with Russia, has remained completely subject 
 to the Parliament and Government at Vienna. 
 In Dalmatia the Servians claimed the same 
 rights as the Poles, and here again there was 
 a contest between the Italian gentry or nobility 
 and a peasantry who are of Servian race. 
 The Servians took up arms in 1869, and the 
 Government of Vienna had to send soldiers to 
 suppress them. The Dalmatian revolt was 
 not suppressed till the close of 1869. 
 
 The Emperor was determined to make no 
 concessions in Galicia or Dalmatia, but in 
 Bohemia the Czechs had a certain amount 
 of " historic justice " to support their claim, 1 
 and after waiting for a year or two, he appointed 
 a Federalist ministry with the avowed intention 
 of meeting their demands. Count Hohenwart, 
 formerly Governor of Upper Austria, became 
 Premier. He was a staunch German by tradi- 
 
 1 In 1522, Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria and afterwards Emperor, 
 married Anne, the heiress to the Crowns of Hungary and Bohemia, 
 and succeeded her brother, Louis II., as king of both countries in 
 1526 ; but, waiving his hereditary right, stood for election, and was 
 elected in October 1526. He was crowned at Prag in 1527, and 
 promised to respect the laws and customs of Bohemia. The Bohemians, 
 eighty years afterwards, disowned the Emperor Ferdinand II. as King 
 of Bohemia, and elected the Elector Palatine, son-in-law of James I. of 
 England, as king in August 16 19. He was only king for a winter, 
 however (the "Winter King"), and deserted his kingdom after the 
 defeat of Prag (November 1620). The Government of the Haps- 
 burgs was then restored, and all Bohemian rights abolished. 
 
132 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 tion, but he called two Czech politicians into 
 his Cabinet and appointed to the Ministry of 
 Commerce Dr. Schaffle, a Professor of Tub- 
 ingen University, who had been expelled from 
 his chair for publicly expressing his hatred of 
 the Prussians. This ministry entered into 
 negotiations with the Czech and German 
 leaders, and the negotiations went on satisfac- 
 torily during the early months of 1871. The 
 Germans in the Reichsrath, however, protested 
 violently, as they have since done, against any- 
 concession to the Czechs, and, on May 26th, 
 passed a vote of no confidence in the ministry. 
 The Emperor, now committed to a Federalist 
 policy, waited until the Budget was passed, 
 and then prorogued the Austrian Parliament. 
 This step was followed by a decree of dissolu- 
 tion on August 10, and at the same moment by 
 the dissolution of the Diets of Silesia and 
 Moravia, in which the Germans had a majority. 
 On September 14 the Bohemian Diet was 
 opened at Prag, and the Czech deputies for 
 the first time took their seats and found them- 
 selves in a majority. The Emperor's speech 
 at the opening was conciliatory, and promised 
 that the kingdom of Bohemia should be 
 recognised. 
 
 " Recognising the political importance of 
 the Crown of Bohemia," said the Emperor, 
 
BOHEMIAN CLAIMS 133 
 
 " calling to mind the renown and glory which 
 that Crown has conferred upon our predecessors, 
 and full of gratitude for the fidelity with which 
 the Bohemian nation has supported our throne, 
 we are ready to recognise the rights of the 
 kingdom, and to repeat this recognition by the 
 coronation oath." But Francis Joseph stated 
 that he was already under certain obligations to 
 the other races of the monarchy, and could not 
 go back upon his acceptance of the Hungarian 
 compromise of 1867. He therefore invited the 
 Diet to consider means of agreement between 
 Bohemia and the rest of the monarchy in 
 conformity with that compromise. 
 
 The Czech party in the Diet were delighted 
 at this message. Left alone by the secession 
 of the Germans, they elaborated "fundamental 
 articles " which were submitted for the approval 
 of the Crown. Bohemia was to have special 
 representatives in the Austrian Delegation, 
 and these were to be chosen, not by the Parlia- 
 ment at Vienna, but by the Bohemian Diet. 
 A council composed of delegates from the 
 Austrian provincial diets was to be estab- 
 lished with power to legislate as to the 
 common affairs of non- Hungarian Austria; 
 and the franchise and distribution of seats, 
 now regulated in the interest of the Germans 
 by Schmerling's laws, was to be revised so as 
 
i 3 4 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 to give to the Czechs the seats to which their 
 numbers and property entitled them. If these 
 proposals had been accepted, the Austrian Parlia- 
 ment must have ceased to exist. The Emperor, 
 though he* received them with goodwill, saw 
 that it was not possible to accede to them. 
 He begged the Czech leaders to secure the 
 return of Czech deputies to the Austrian Parlia- 
 ment, and to thrash out the matter in that 
 Parliament. " I will octroyer no more con- 
 stitutions," he said. It was on this point, 
 the recognition of the Austrian Parliament as 
 competent to deal with Bohemian affairs, that 
 the negotiations with the Czechs came to grief. 
 The Bohemians, and more especially the Czech 
 aristocracy, refused to recognise it, and whilst 
 the attempts were being made to wean them 
 from this view, Hungary intervened. Count 
 Andrassy, the Hungarian Premier, appeared 
 in October at Vienna and entered a firm pro- 
 test against the policy of submitting the Act of 
 1867 to the approval of the Bohemian Diet. 
 After long discussions and many meetings of 
 the Austrian and Hungarian Premiers, the 
 Magyars carried the day. A ministerial council 
 was held on 20th October, and directly after- 
 wards the Czech leaders were informed that 
 the Emperor could not be crowned at Prag 
 unless the Austro-Hungarian compromise were 
 
HOHENWART'S FAILURE 135 
 
 first accepted in toto by their followers. The 
 Czechs refused to accept it, and on 30th 
 October the Federalist Ministry sent in its 
 resignation. Count Hohenwart's Ministry was 
 ultimately succeeded by a Cabinet of anti- 
 Federalists under Prince Adolf Auersperg. 
 The Bohemian Diet was asked to send 
 deputies to the Parliament which was sum- 
 moned to meet at the end of November. 
 Copies of the Emperor's address, in which he 
 promised to recognise the rights of Bohemia, 
 were seized by the police and destroyed. The 
 Bohemian Diet was dissolved. Although the 
 Federalist deputies stayed away, a quorum was 
 obtained at Vienna, and the dual system was 
 restored as if nothing had happened since 
 1867. 
 
 Hohenwart's resignation was soon followed 
 by the retirement of Count Beust, who, 
 during the whole of these negotiations, 
 had been Foreign Minister and Chancellor 
 of the dual monarchy. The actual reasons for 
 Beust's retirement have not been made clear, 
 and his own memoirs throw little light upon 
 them. Beust was a strong opponent of the 
 Federalist policy ; and yet at the moment 
 when the Federalist policy is condemned 
 he retired and was " side - tracked," as the 
 Americans say, to the embassy in London. 
 
136 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Beust was, however, a strong opponent of the 
 clerical party, and the clericals, though they 
 had lately lost much ground, were still power- 
 ful in the entourage of the Emperor. The 
 Chancellor»was, moreover, suspected of being 
 a strong friend of the Germans in Austria, and 
 after his friendly meeting with Bismarck at 
 Gastein in May 187 1 was often charged with 
 complaisance towards the great Prussian. Of 
 this there is no evidence, but it may be that 
 the Emperor, having decided against the 
 Czechs and other Federalists, wished to 
 placate them by sacrificing a minister whom 
 they believed to be their enemy. On at least 
 one other occasion in his reign he took this 
 course. To accept the principles or measures 
 of a statesman and to sacrifice the minister who 
 has fought for them is one of his favourite 
 moves in the game of politics. It secures a 
 material victory for the side which he considers 
 right, and allows the defeated party to con- 
 sole itself with something which passes for a 
 personal triumph. 
 
 That the Emperor has on so many occasions 
 made the move with success speaks well both 
 for his own judgment and for the loyalty of 
 his servants. To the modern critic it is per- 
 plexing. It is possible, however — I suggest 
 this as an explanation of the disappearance of 
 
BEUST'S RESIGNATION 137 
 
 Beust — that the Chancellor had not really 
 opposed the policy of concession to Bohemia, 
 but had allowed it to go forward. It did, in 
 fact, go forward, and that, too, at a time when 
 he was able to stop it, or to resign if the 
 Emperor proceeded in it. He did not resign, 
 and we are therefore entitled to suppose that 
 he consented to the Hohenwart programme, if 
 nothing more. Then the Hungarians spoke. 
 Andrassy came to Vienna and said he would 
 not have a triple monarchy ; and Beust, whom 
 nobody could take for a strong man, wobbled 
 and supported Andrassy. One can well sup- 
 pose the Emperor saying to his Chancellor, 
 " Very well, if you won't advise the coronation 
 at Prag, I shan't go on ; but, as you have sup- 
 ported me in this policy, I won't have you as 
 Chancellor any more. I appoint you my 
 Ambassador in London." And so Beust goes, 
 and, as we know, goes without bitterness. This 
 is merely a suggestion offered to explain a 
 strange move in the game. The Emperor 
 is the only man now alive who could say 
 whether it is correct. 
 
 Count Andrassy, the Hungarian Prime 
 Minister, was appointed to succeed Beust as 
 Chancellor on November 14, 1871 ; this ap- 
 pointment closes the history of four eventful 
 years. His entry into the inner counsels of 
 
138 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 the Emperor-King marks the establishment 
 of the Hungarian domination in Austria- 
 Hungary. In 1867 the Hungarians had 
 succeeded in being placed on equal footing 
 with the Germans of Austria as a ruling 
 nationality. In 1871 they secured that no 
 other nationality should have a similar position. 
 The Emperor, now no longer under the ad- 
 vice of the old school, appears in this period as a 
 moderate and judicious ruler. The Hungarian 
 compromise had not been obtained from him 
 without many searchings of heart ; but, once 
 his word was pledged, he loyally adhered to it. 
 Although the Czechs regarded his policy at 
 the end of 187 1 as a breach of faith, it must be 
 remembered that he had promised to be crowned 
 in Bohemia only upon certain conditions, and 
 that these conditions had not been fulfilled. 
 Francis Joseph hoped that as the Hungarians 
 had framed a constitution which he could 
 accept without breaking up the military and 
 diplomatic unity — if I may use these terms — 
 of his monarchy, so the Czechs would find 
 some means by which he could satisfy their 
 demands without violating either the unity of 
 the # monarchy or the constitution of 1867. 
 But the Czechs did not recognise the con- 
 stitution of 1867, and claimed that in 1871 they 
 were dealing with the Emperor as a free 
 
HUNGARY AND BOHEMIA 139 
 
 agent. He was no longer free, for he had 
 undertaken in 1867 to maintain a Parliament 
 for the whole of Austria. He could not, 
 therefore, agree with the Bohemians who would 
 not, and did not, recognise that Parliament. 
 Some critics have said that Francis Joseph 
 was wrong in not bringing on the two ques- 
 tions together. If he was going to acknow- 
 ledge the separate rights of Bohemia at all, he 
 should, they say, have recognised them in 
 1867 before closing with the Hungarian 
 leaders. In one sense, therefore, his policy 
 of 1867 may be blamed for shortsightedness. 
 After 1867 the need for an agreement with 
 Hungary was, from one point of view, no 
 longer pressing, and he might have been able 
 to effect a double bargain with Bohemia and 
 Hungary. But it is a moot point whether the 
 Magyars would have accepted a constitution 
 which gave to Bohemia a place in the monarchy 
 equal to theirs. The closest observer of 
 Hungary's policy must doubt that they would 
 ever have done so. Evidently, this was Francis 
 Joseph's view. 
 
 If the Federalist action of the Hohenwart 
 and Potochi ministries was unpopular, their 
 action in repudiating the Concordat of 1855 
 was quite the reverse. The history of Italy 
 and of Rome does not, after 1859, concern 
 
Ho FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Francis Joseph so closely as before; but Austria, 
 as a whole, was deeply interested in the proceed- 
 ings of the Ecumenical Council of 1870, and her 
 representatives amongst the Bishops took a 
 distinguished part in its debates. Cardinal 
 Schwartzenberg, Archbishop of Prag ; Cardinal 
 Rauscher, Archbishop of Vienna, who had been 
 his tutor, and Bishop Strossmayer, of Diakova 
 in Croatia, were amongst the most distinguished 
 members of the Liberal opposition, and con- 
 stantly spoke and voted against the preten- 
 sions of the extreme Ultramontanes. Count 
 Beust supported this attitude in despatches 
 to the Austrian Ambassador at Rome. The 
 repudiation of the Concordat of 1855 took 
 place on 30th July 1870, and is an event of 
 great significance. Austria had from time 
 immemorial been a close friend and political 
 patron of the Holy See. Her influence had 
 supported the Pope as a temporal monarch. 
 Francis Joseph and Pius IX. had a 
 common enemy in Victor Emanuel, and a 
 common interest in the disintegration of Italy. 
 Even after Sadowa, the Austrian Emperor 
 maintained considerable influence in Italy 
 merely by force of tradition. But this now 
 ceases. The repudiation of the Concordat 
 happened, though by an accident, to syn- 
 chronise with the withdrawal of the French 
 
ELECTORAL REFORM 141 
 
 troops from Rome, the occupation of Victor 
 Emanuel, and the final completion of the work 
 of Italian unity. At this moment Austria 
 shakes off her partial servitude to the Pope, 
 and her liberation prepares the way for a 
 rapprochement with the new kingdom of Italy. 
 In the events of 1870 we see premonitory signs 
 of the new Triple Alliance which is a striking 
 feature of the Emperor's later policy. 
 
 Between 1872 and 1878 Austria remains at 
 peace within her borders. After the fall of 
 the Hohenwart ministry the internal politics 
 of the country enter upon a period of repose. 
 Prince Adolf Auersperg became Premier and 
 remained in charge of the affairs of the country 
 for eight years. The year 1872 was devoted 
 to electoral reform, and on March 1873 a new 
 electoral law was passed which abolished the 
 old system of indirect elections by diets of the 
 provinces, and divided the Austrian electors 
 into four classes or colleges. The great landed 
 proprietors, the municipalities, the chambers of 
 commerce, and the country districts each re- 
 turned a certain number of members ; and 
 this old-fashioned system prevailed in Austria 
 until the introduction of universal suffrage in 
 1907. The Poles of Galicia objected strongly 
 to the change, and the Italian members for the 
 Trentino, a " circle " of the Southern Tyrol, 
 
142 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 also protested ; but as these last were only two 
 in number, the Emperor was able to disregard 
 their objection. He favoured the Poles by 
 appointing the Mayor of Lemberg a minister 
 without portfolio in his Cabinet, as a mark of 
 his "constant solicitude for the affairs of 
 Galicia." The cynical observer of the nation- 
 alist movements must observe with delight how 
 often and how easily provincial patriots have 
 been induced to forgo the pleasures of liberty 
 by a taste of the sweets of office. 
 
 In October 1873 elections took place under 
 the new electoral law. They resulted in a 
 centralist victory, the central group getting a 
 majority of over 100 in a House of 353. In 
 1875 the clerical policy of the Emperor was 
 completed and the last vestiges of the Con- 
 cordat disappeared. When the first decade of 
 Austria's parliamentary life closed the Parlia- 
 ment at Vienna was well in hand and the 
 Premier could count on a good majority. 
 
 In Hungary the ten years following 1867 
 were not without important events, but as 
 these have no direct bearing upon the subject 
 of this essay they need no long notice. Deak 
 remained the ruling statesman in Hungary till 
 his death in 1876. Andrassy, Premier till 
 1876, was his fast friend, and after Andrassy's 
 promotion a series of Premiers took office, ending 
 
CROATIAN HOME RULE 143 
 
 in 1875 with Tisza, whose Premiership began 
 in that year and did not end till 1890. During 
 all this time the Liberal party was in power in 
 Hungary. It took office in 1867 and held 
 it without interruption till 1904. In 1868 
 Hungary turned to Croatia, whose claims to a 
 separate government she had always recog- 
 nised, and asked her to formulate her claims. 
 " Here is a clean sheet," said Deak. "Write 
 on it what you will, and so long as it does not 
 violate the unity of Hungary we will agree to 
 it beforehand." After a negotiation unusually 
 short, generous terms were given to the Croats. 
 Three departments of state — justice, education, 
 and domestic affairs — were handed over to local 
 control, and local ministers, called chiefs of 
 sections, were entrusted with their manage- 
 ment. The collection and imposition of taxes 
 remained in the competence of the Hungarian 
 Parliament, and of the revenue collected in 
 Croatia 55 per cent was kept for the Hungarian 
 Budget, whilst the remainder was handed to 
 the local authorities for local needs. Hungary 
 guaranteed, however, that Croatia should always 
 have 2,200,000 florins for her own use, and 
 if 45 per cent of the Croatian revenue does 
 not, in any year, make up that sum, the pay- 
 ment to Hungary is reduced so as to allow to 
 Croatia the guaranteed sum. If, on the other 
 
144 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 hand, 45 per cent of the Croatian revenue 
 comes to more than 2,200,000 florins, Croatia 
 gains by the surplus. A special clause in the 
 1868 constitution provides that Croatia shall 
 not be bound to repay out of the surplus of 
 one year any sum which Hungary may have 
 had to remit out of the 55 per cent in a pre- 
 vious year. Thus Croatia knows for certain 
 what her minimum revenue will be. The Ban 
 of Croatia, an officer of ancient traditions, 
 became Lord- Lieutenant of the country and at 
 the same time chairman of the Diet, and, one 
 may say, Prime Minister of the country. He 
 is appointed by the King of Hungary on the 
 recommendation of the Hungarian ministry, 
 and therefore comes and goes with the Hun- 
 garian ministry. He answers questions as to 
 the general policy of the Government and 
 makes ministerial statements from the Speaker's 
 chair. The Diet sends twenty-nine delegates 
 to the Hungarian Lower House and two to 
 the Hungarian Chamber of Peers. These 
 attend and debate on common affairs, but leave 
 the House when a matter of purely Hungarian 
 interest is under discussion. They have the 
 right of speaking in Croat, but do not now 
 exercise it. In the Cabinet at Pesth there is a 
 special minister for Croatia. 
 
 If I have made too long a digression to 
 
CROATIAN HOME RULE 145 
 
 explain the Croatian Act of 1868, my excuse 
 must be that it is the one big experiment which 
 has been used in Austria- Hungary in conces- 
 sion to nationalist claims ; and that it has often 
 been cited as a precedent for others. The 
 Czech leaders in Bohemia often appeal to it as 
 a precedent for a concession to Bohemia, and 
 it has been cited as a precedent for Home Rule 
 in Ireland. 1 It has not been altered since 1868, 
 and generous as it was, it was resented as unfair 
 by a substantial party in Croatia. Panslavist 
 feeling is very strong in this south Slav pro- 
 vince, and the Panslavists had for many years 
 the assistance and guidance of the famous 
 Bishop Strossmayer, who was constantly a 
 thorn in the side of the Hungarian unionist 
 party. The Croats have often objected to the 
 fact that their railways have been preserved as 
 part of the Hungarian state-railway system 
 and have never been placed under local control. 
 The Magyar Government has, however, held 
 
 1 When I was in Agram in 1 894 one of the Sektions-chefs told me that 
 some years before, I suppose before 1886, an emissary of Mr. Glad- 
 stone had come to Croatia to get information about the Croatian 
 constitution, but that he had afterwards heard that Mr. Gladstone con- 
 sidered the financial arrangement so generous to Croatia that he could 
 not use it as a precedent in his Home Rule scheme. Mr. Gladstone 
 publicly cited the Croatian case in 1893, and he, as a financier, must 
 have been aware that the financial provisions such as it contained 
 would not be readily accepted by England and Scotland. If any 
 of my readers should have followed Irish affairs, they may remember 
 Mr. Gladstone's fiction of the "over-taxation" of Ireland which 
 afterwards led to so many absurdities. 
 
 L 
 
146 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 that the railway system for the whole kingdom 
 of St. Stephen must be under one control, and, 
 in spite of much opposition, still maintains that 
 view. No further concession has been made 
 to the subject -nationalities of Hungary. A 
 "law of nationalities" was passed in 1868, but 
 whilst promising justice and equality to all 
 races, it practically asserted the primacy of the 
 Magyars. It made their language the sole 
 language of the state, relegating the others, 
 at the best, to use in municipal affairs of 
 non-Magyar towns. 
 
 In 1869 and 1872 general elections took 
 place, and in both of these the Liberal party, 
 which was under Deak's real leadership and, of 
 course, loyal to the compromise of 1867, was 
 returned. The King of Hungary visited his 
 dominions twice in 1872, and, during his first 
 visit, went for a tour in the south-eastern parts, 
 which he had never seen before. He was 
 everywhere well received by the Magyars, and 
 his visit did much to obliterate bitter memories 
 upon the scene of the fiercest fights of 1 849. 
 It is interesting to notice that Francis Joseph 
 was met at Temesvar by an envoy from the 
 Sultan. The meeting symbolised the old 
 friendship between the Magyars and the Turks. 
 Men drew from it an assurance that the new 
 King of Hungary would preserve the traditional 
 
DEATH OF DEAR • 147 
 
 policy of alliance with Turkey against Slavonic 
 aggression. 
 
 In 1873 and 1874 Deak's influence was 
 gradually withdrawn, owing to his illness, and 
 with his disappearance the need for fresh 
 leaders for the Liberal party became apparent. 
 After some short or provisional ministries, 
 M. Tisza, the ablest of the opponents of the 
 Compromise of 1867, took office. In doing so 
 he assented to the programme of his former 
 opponents ; that is to say, he undertook to carry 
 on the Government in loyalty to the agreement 
 with Austria. M. Tisza remained Premier of 
 Hungary until 1890, and by his force of character 
 and brilliant eloquence became in these years 
 a very prominent statesman in Europe. He is 
 of course open to the charge of inconsistency 
 which may be brought against Mr. Gladstone 
 and Mr. Chamberlain, to mention no smaller 
 men in England. Inconsistent or not, he was 
 undoubtedly of great service to the Emperor- 
 King in carrying out the arrangement of 1867. 
 In promoting the growth of Austro- Hungarian 
 citizenship and unity, in combating the idea that 
 Austria and Hungary are opposite states, he 
 did the highest service. In January 1876 Deak 
 died at Pesth. Royal princes went to his 
 funeral, and the last procession in his honour, 
 which was four miles long, was a striking 
 
148 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 tribute to this truly great man. Without 
 either the advantage of noble birth or the gift 
 of eloquence, which are given to many of his 
 fellow-countrymen, he possessed honesty, con- 
 sistency, good judgment, patience and resource 
 in a degree rarely found in a public man. He 
 took his stand on the long-established rights of 
 Hungary, and he would yield none of those 
 rights except in return for something from the 
 other side. He had a profound belief in the 
 efficacy of law and reason. Though not a friend 
 to war, his moral courage was imperturbable. 
 He was conciliatory in 1848 when no one else 
 was so. It was his policy of obstinate consist- 
 ency, coupled with judicious conciliation, which 
 won a great and honourable triumph for his 
 country and made her the dominant power in 
 the Dual monarchy. 
 
 In the wider field of foreign affairs Austria 
 plays no part in the years 1867-77. The 
 expenditure caused by the war had been great 
 and the army needed remodelling and a new 
 gun. A great deal has been written about the 
 attitude of Francis Joseph at the time of the 
 Franco- Prussian war. Some writers have 
 accused his chief minister of pursuing a policy 
 of revanche against Prussia, and even of having 
 betrayed France into hopes of Austrian co- 
 operation against the common enemy. These 
 
FRANCE AND AUSTRIA IN 1870 149 
 
 accusations are, I believe, unfounded. Beust 
 was a Saxon, and deeply resented the treat- 
 ment of Saxony by the Prussians in 1866. He 
 wished for a strong southern confederation in 
 Germany, and he was no friend to Bismarck 
 and his ways. But I cannot find that he ever 
 gave positive assurances of Austrian help for 
 France. Nor would he have been permitted 
 to do so by the Emperor, who, in matters of 
 so great importance, leaves nothing to his 
 ministers. If Count Beust had some general 
 discussions with the French as to the possi- 
 bility of common measures, they never got 
 beyond that stage. The Chancellor's despatch 
 of July 11, 1870, 1 to the Austro- Hungarian 
 Ambassador in Paris proves that Francis Joseph 
 did not allow the French Government to remain 
 under any delusions as to the attitude which 
 would be maintained at Vienna should war 
 break out between Prussia and France. Beust 
 admitted that Austria had agreed not to make 
 any agreement with any third party without 
 the knowledge of France, and said that she 
 would not do so ; but he repudiated all idea of 
 action against Prussia even were it only to go 
 so far as the placing of a corps a" observation in 
 Bohemia. If Russia joined Prussia in the war, 
 Austria would intervene ; but in case of a war 
 
 1 Beust's Memoirs (1887), vol. ii. Appendix C. 
 
ISO FRANCIS JOSEPH I. ; 
 
 between France and Prussia alone, she would 
 remain neutral. 
 
 The Emperor-King was, however, in some 
 difficulty in the matter. A strong party in 
 Austria called for measures of revenge against 
 Prussia. Moreover, it was by no means certain 
 that if France were reduced to making terms 
 alone with Prussia ' a bargain might not be 
 struck which would be disadvantageous to 
 Austria — involving, perhaps, the loss of the 
 German portion of Bohemia. At the same 
 time the Emperor was forced to look to the 
 mouths of the Danube and the Black Sea, where 
 Russia was about to repudiate the restrictions 
 placed upon her in 1856. Prussia could not 
 help her to resist the Russian action in this 
 direction, but France, with her traditional 
 interest and influence in Eastern affairs, would 
 no doubt be able to do so. All these reasons 
 moved the Emperor to take up a sympathetic 
 attitude towards France. On the other hand, 
 the Germans in Austria and the ruling Magyars 
 in Hungary were now good friends to Prussia. 
 For them a Prussian victory meant the 
 strengthening of the Teutonic element in 
 Central Europe, which alone could balance the 
 influence of Panslavism, both within and with- 
 out their borders. Deak, as we have seen, had 
 refused to implicate Hungary in the war of 
 
ANDRASSY'S POLICY 151 
 
 1866. Andrassy, the friend, and I may perhaps 
 say, the pupil of Deak, was strongly against any 
 action in the war of 1870. Moreover, Austrian 
 finances were only beginning to recover from 
 the great expenditure of the war of 1866. The 
 artillery was being re-armed with a breech- 
 loading gun, and provided with a new equip- 
 ment. Even had Francis Joseph and his 
 subjects wished for war in 1870, they could not 
 have placed an efficient army in the field. 
 
 In the early seventies Austria-Hungary was 
 beginning to recover from the waste of war- 
 fare, and until 1878 no military expenditure 
 interferes to prevent the recovery of her 
 finances. The Emperor-King, advised by the 
 Liberal Hungarian nobleman who succeeded 
 Count Beust, engages in no further European 
 wars, and the new Austria- Hungary begins 
 to realise her position and quietly renew her 
 forces. In May 1873 the exhibition of Vienna 
 was opened, and though its success was marred 
 by a financial crisis and by the prevalence of 
 disease in Vienna, it served to attract large 
 numbers of visitors to the capital and to 
 publish the commercial possibilities of Austria 
 and Hungary. The two sovereigns who had 
 conquered Austria in successive wars — William, 
 now Emperor of Germany, and Victor Emanuel, 
 King of United Italy — visited their former 
 
152 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 enemy in his capital, and old rivalries were 
 forgotten in good fellowship and the exchange 
 of friendly assurances. In the autumn of the 
 following year Francis Joseph visited Bohemia, 
 which, three years before, had been smarting 
 under a sense of broken pledges. He was 
 well received. His uncle and predecessor, 
 the ex-Emperor Ferdinand, was still living in 
 the Hradschin Palace on the hill overlooking the. 
 Moldau at Prag, but was too ill in body and 
 mind to make any public appearance. In the 
 following year the Emperor visited his southern- 
 most province of Dalmatia, where the popula- 
 tion, of Italian race, had long resented incor- 
 poration in the Austrian empire ; but his 
 reception was, on the whole, good. Afterwards 
 he went to Venice, a former pillar of his Italian 
 power, but now contented in union with Italy. 
 The reception given him there showed that a 
 few years had sufficed to extinguish the hostile 
 feelings of the past. 
 
 The year 1875, too > was one when many 
 links with the past were severed. The ex- 
 Emperor Ferdinand died in June. "Ich 
 had' keiri Constitution, und ich mag' keiri 
 Constitution " had been his favourite saying 
 in the old days before 1848 ; but he had 
 lived on, a weak and useless old man, to 
 see the Austria which he had ruled twice 
 
THE OLD ORDER CHANGES 153 
 
 defeated and reformed into a new and pro- 
 gressive state. His funeral procession in 
 Vienna took place without any marks of public 
 regret. The heirs-apparent to five Kingdoms 
 followed him to his last resting-place beneath 
 the Capuchin church ; but the populace of 
 Vienna was indifferent. In the same year 
 died Francis, the expelled Grand Duke of 
 Modena, a Hapsburg of the Este branch, one 
 of the last of the little tyrants who, under the 
 protection of Austria, had stood out against 
 union and freedom in Italy. The exiled 
 Grand Duke had long ceased to interest the 
 public. He left no children and no friends 
 behind him ; but some curiosity was felt as to 
 how he would dispose of the valuable Este 
 estate in Central Italy which was his private 
 property. This he bequeathed to the 
 Emperor's nephew, the young Archduke 
 Francis Ferdinand (born in 1863) and the 
 present heir to the Austro- Hungarian throne. 1 
 At the same time the Emperor lost his old 
 tutor and valued friend, Cardinal Rauscher, 
 Archbishop of Vienna. Rauscher had taught 
 him politics when he was in his 'teens, and 
 the Emperor owed his strict Conservative 
 views as much to the courtly priest as to 
 
 1 Exaggerated reports were circulated at the time as to the wealth 
 of the Grand Duke. The Este estate, at the time, was worth rather 
 over ;£ 1,000,000. 
 
154 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Prince Metternich. The Cardinal was con- 
 stantly at his pupil's side in 1849 and 1850, 
 but in later years had adopted moderate 
 views. He never belonged to the extreme 
 Ultramontane party which was so powerful in 
 Austria, and, at the Ecumenical Council of 
 1870, had protested strongly against the issue 
 of the Bull of Infallibility. Though he actively 
 opposed the suspension of the Concordat and 
 the laws which gave to the civil govern- 
 ment control over marriage and education, he 
 did not dispute the validity of those laws 
 when once passed. In his last years he was 
 the most popular of the Emperor's older 
 counsellors. 
 
 Whilst these men of the old school were 
 leaving the stage a new scene in the European 
 drama was about to commence. The Eastern 
 question was re -opened by the insurrection 
 against Turkish rule in Servia and Monte- 
 negro, and by the advance of Russia to help 
 — as she said — her oppressed co-religionists 
 in Turkey. The outbreak and course of the 
 Russo - Turkish war are matters outside the 
 scope of this book, but they were of great 
 interest to the Emperor Francis Joseph, and 
 were observed with mingled feelings by the 
 different races under his sway. The Slavs of 
 all kinds, except the Poles, were heartily in 
 
RUSSIA AND TURKEY 155 
 
 sympathy with Russia, and looking at Austria 
 as a Slavonic empire, urged the Government 
 to take action in favour of the oppressed Slavs 
 in Turkey. Demonstrations of friendship for 
 Russia took place in the outlying provinces, 
 and the Russian Hymn was played by military 
 bands at Agram in the presence of an Austrian 
 Archduke. In Hungary, racial sympathy with 
 Turkey is stronger than any religious sym- 
 pathy which might have joined the Magyars 
 and the Christian subjects of the Sultan. 
 Feeling at Pesth ran strongly in favour of the 
 Moslem. In January 1877 a band of Hun- 
 garian students went to Constantinople to 
 present a sword of honour to a Turkish 
 general who had had some success in putting 
 down the Servian insurrection ; and the general 
 made a speech cursing all the wars which had 
 ever taken place between the Magyars and 
 Turks, and declaring eternal friendship. The 
 Germans in Austria were honestly neutral, 
 and though the Emperor's personal inclina- 
 tions favoured Russia, he decided to take no 
 part in the war. Lord Salisbury, Under- 
 Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the English 
 Cabinet, passed through Vienna in October 
 1876, on his way to Constantinople, and met 
 Count Andrassy in conference. Both states- 
 men agreed that the Christian subjects of the 
 
156 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Sultan were being badly treated, but they 
 agreed also that Turkey must, in the last 
 resort, be supported against Russia. After 
 seeing Count Andrassy, Lord Salisbury was 
 received by the Emperor who, in the course 
 of the interview, observed, " Our interests are 
 identical." Francis Joseph had already, in 
 1854 and 1855, made one unlucky venture 
 in Eastern politics, and he was determined 
 to avoid, if possible, another intervention of 
 the same kind. Moreover, with one -half of 
 his subjects urging him in one direction and 
 one in another, he realised that his newly- 
 made monarchy was not yet capable of pursuing 
 an active foreign policy. Before t lc " ^" i ^>reak 
 of war the Russian Government P /xnised 
 Count Andrassy not to make Sejfv' 13, ,.i scene 
 of military operations. Turke^y JliaTy gave 
 him a similar assurance. These promises, 
 secured by diplomatic action, helped to prevent 
 a general rising of the southern Slavs, which 
 must surely have spread across the Emperor's 
 frontiers. It was greatly to Austria's credit 
 that such security was easily obtained. The 
 declarations made by M. Tisza, the Hungarian 
 Premier, and Count Andrassy, the common 
 Foreign Minister, at the end of 1877 made it 
 clear that Austria- Hungary was in a far 
 stronger position in that year than in 1853, 
 
CONGRESS OF BERLIN 157 
 
 when the Eastern question had last come 
 upon the carpet. She was now able to declare 
 her policy of neutrality, her desire to localise 
 the war, and her opinion that the Sultan must 
 reform his Government ; yet she was not to 
 be cajoled by England (as she had been by 
 France in 1854) into hostile action against 
 Russia. She had no rising in Italy or Hun- 
 gary to' fear, no enemies behind her in Ger- 
 many. In 1853 and 1854 we saw a halting 
 and diffident policy actuated in turn by the 
 Emperor's gratitude to Russia, by the fear 
 of Slav uprisings in the south, and by the 
 veiled threats of France to stir up discontent 
 in Italy. We now find a fixed and steady 
 policy of neutrality coupled with constructive 
 proposals for Turkish reform and a firm vin- 
 dication of Austro- Hungarian rights on the 
 Lower Danube. Francis Joseph feels no need 
 to go into the arena, either at the bidding of 
 friends whom he cannot afford to displease 
 or for the aversion of dangers which he cannot 
 face. He stands aside and allows time to pass. 
 When the diplomats meet at Berlin to correct 
 Ignatiev's map of the Balkans, he sends his 
 able Magyar minister to the capital of his old 
 rival, to receive two valuable provinces from a 
 congress with the consent of his old enemy, 
 Bismarck. 
 
158 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 In England the occupation of Bosnia and 
 the Herzegovina was attributed to a sugges- 
 tion of Lord Salisbury. If he was the first to 
 suggest it at the Congress, it had certainly 
 been mooted before, and Hungarian ministers 
 had discussed it in the Parliament at Pesth. 1 
 The idea of the occupation was at first resented 
 in Hungary, where it was construed as amove 
 against the Turks, and as likely to encourage 
 Slav aspirations elsewhere. Tisza boldly de- 
 fended it as a counterblast to Panslavism, and 
 in the end opposition at home was silenced or 
 overcome. It was otherwise in the provinces 
 of Bosnia and the Herzegovina themselves, 
 where a hardy and courageous population of 
 Moslems vigorously opposed the occupation. 
 Turkey had yielded the provinces to Austria, 
 and did not openly interfere ; but she sym- 
 pathised with the Moslems, and her sympathy 
 assumed in some cases a material form. The 
 army of occupation, under Generals Filipovitch 
 and Szapary, began operations in July 1878, 
 and did not complete its task for three months. 
 Austria- Hungary had at one time as many as 
 200,000 men and 480 guns operating against 
 
 1 As Prince Bismarck states (Recollections, English edition by 
 A. J. Butler, vol. ii. p. 232), the occupation of Bosnia and the 
 Herzegovina was really agreed upon in a secret treaty of January 
 1877 between Austria and Russia. Russia consented to it in order 
 to secure Austria's neutrality. 
 
: BOSNIA OCCUPIED 159 
 
 the mountaineers. All organised resistance 
 was, however, at an end when the two Parlia- 
 ments met on the last day of October. The 
 ministers in both halves of the monarchy, in 
 thanking the troops for their services, could 
 say that peace now reigned in Bosnia. 
 
 The occupation of these territories was the 
 finest diplomatic stroke in the reign of Francis 
 Joseph. Coming after many defeats, it restored 
 the prestige of the monarchy in Europe, and 
 it opened new possibilities of expansion whose 
 realisation has only just commenced. Europe 
 has already tried many other prescriptions for 
 curing the (so-called) " Sick Man." She began 
 in 1856 by admitting the Turks to the Concert 
 of Europe. This meant, so far as it meant 
 anything, that the fate or future of Turkey 
 was to be a matter of common concern to the 
 whole of Europe, and not to be decided by 
 Russia alone. This was the fundamental 
 principle of the policy of Napoleon III. and 
 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the two moving 
 spirits of the Crimean war. It was re-asserted 
 at Berlin in 1878 when Europe insisted on its 
 right to intervene between Russia and Turkey. 
 In 1856, too, the Concert of Europe devised 
 three expedients for securing peace and justice 
 in the Turkish territories. One was to establish 
 areas of local Home Rule (as in Bulgaria) ; 
 
160 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 another to sever such areas from Turkey 
 (as in the case of Roumania, and, earlier, of 
 Greece) ; a third was to obtain from the 
 Porte promises of good government, and to 
 take such measures as were possible to see that 
 these promises were carried out. A fourth 
 expedient was tried in 1878 — that of commis- 
 sioning one of the Great Powers to take charge 
 of a portion of the Sultan's territory and to 
 supersede his Government. In Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina the Turks had long been, as they 
 have been elsewhere, a dominant race. They 
 always will be a dominant race, and if the 
 attempts made by outsiders to reform Turkey 
 have failed, it is because the Turks will not 
 forgo their privileges. In 1878 the Turkish 
 Government was expelled from these two 
 provinces, but they were not given Home Rule. 
 They obtain no Diet like their neighbours in 
 Croatia, no Skupstchina like their other neigh- 
 bours in Servia. They were placed under the 
 control of a dominant Power, which continued 
 to rule them autocratically, but with justice and 
 enlightenment. That power is not Austria, 
 nor is it Hungary. It is Austria- Hungary. 
 The authority which rules in these new 
 provinces is the Power which has come into 
 being under Francis Joseph's rule. The 
 Bosnian regiments are neither Austrian nor 
 
BOSNIA 161 
 
 Hungarian. The Bosnian officials are "dual" 
 officials, and are controlled by a minister not 
 of Austria or Hungary, but of the whole 
 monarchy. Austria- Hungary, lately recognised 
 by Europe, is now formally approved ; and, at 
 the same time, a common stake and interest is 
 given to the two states which have hitherto had 
 nothing in common but the sovereign and the 
 army. Here, at least, Austria and Hungary 
 can meet, not in rivalry or jealousy, but in 
 sincere co - operation for an important and 
 interesting task. Here Germans and Magyars, 
 and Czechs too if they qualify for it, can work 
 side by side as public servants, and each can 
 learn, in the friendly intercourse of officials, that 
 the others are after all not so bad as they were 
 painted. It is too soon, as yet, to say what the 
 ultimate results of the Hapsburg mission in 
 the Near East will be. We know that the 
 occupied provinces are very well governed, and 
 that they present an aspect of peace and pro- 
 gress which is, unhappily, not common in the 
 other European territories of the Sultan. 
 Radicals may object that there is no Parliament 
 in these provinces. If that great panacea for 
 all ills is denied them, they have at least been 
 free from the public murders, the organised 
 butcheries, and the wholesale corruption which 
 mark the swing of the pendulum in the consti- 
 
 M 
 
i6 2 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 tutional governments of the Near East. What 
 the future will bring forth we do not know ; 
 but the step taken in 1878 has hitherto proved 
 successful^ 1 That it was taken, and that it has 
 so succeeded, is a strong indication of the 
 prudence and policy of the Emperor King. 
 
 1 The Bosnian administration pays its own way, and the last figures 
 obtainable show a revenue of 5 1 million francs, and a slight surplus. 
 Austria-Hungary incurs some expenditure for the maintenance of troops 
 in Bosnia. This was in 1906 7^ million francs, but in 1907 ^187,000 
 was put down in the Bosnian Budget as expenditure for the common 
 army of the Monarchy. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 1879-1893 
 
 Auersperg and Taaffe Ministries in Austria — The Liberal 
 Party in Hungary — Tisza — Progress of the Nationalist 
 Question — The Balkan Question again — The Emperor's 
 Policy. 
 
 Great as were the advantages secured to 
 the Austro- Hungarian monarchy by the 
 occupation of Bosnia, the step was not popu- 
 lar either in Austria or Hungary. Politicians 
 of the provincial or parochial school have little 
 inclination to think about questions of Imperial 
 expansion or politics at large, and are apt 
 to resent them as distracting attention from 
 the meaner controversies which rage round 
 the parish pump. In Austria and Hungary 
 parochial politicians abound ; and if they con- 
 sider larger questions at all, they look at them 
 from the point of view of the party or nation- 
 ality to which they belong at home. They 
 approve or disapprove the moves on the great 
 
 chessboard of Europe according as these seem 
 
 163 
 
i6 4 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 to them to favour their chances in the little 
 game which they are playing with one another. 
 In Austria the Germans resented the annexa- 
 tion of Bosnia and the Herzegovina as im- 
 porting a fresh and vigorous Slav ingredient 
 into the composition of the Dual Monarchy. 
 The war of occupation had been costly. Lives 
 had been lost, and the general result of the 
 new move was to encourage the Drang nach 
 Osten, which has never been popular with the 
 stay-at-home politicians of the German pro- 
 vinces. The Czechs and other Slavs did not 
 like to see a new Slavonic race put into the 
 monarchy as subject to the dominant Germans 
 and Magyars. By these two objections the 
 position of Auersperg, the Austrian Premier, 
 was weakened. In the winter of 1878-9 the 
 solid phalanx of German groups which had 
 kept him in power since 1871 gradually fell 
 to pieces. In February 1879 he resigned. 
 
 Auersperg's resignation brings to an end 
 the first period of constitutional rule in Austria. 
 During the eight years of his administration 
 the German groups had been able to keep 
 a majority in the Reichsrath, and, if they 
 were aided occasionally by different sec- 
 tions of the non- Germans, it may yet be 
 said that up to 1879 the old primacy of 
 the Germans was maintained. After 1879 
 
CZECHS AND POLES 165 
 
 we find a change. During the years 187 1-9 
 the Slavs in Bohemia had been increasing 
 in numbers, wealth, and education. The 
 Emperor knew from the outset that if a 
 constitutional system was to be kept up in 
 Austria, it could only be so by the help of all, 
 or at least of the majority of, the Nationalists. 
 He waited patiently until the Bohemians who, 
 after 1871, had refused to attend the Parlia- 
 ment of Vienna should have so far forgotten 
 their grievances as to be amenable to reason. 
 Their abstention caused him much uneasiness 
 during the years of Auersperg's ministry. He 
 could not forget how many Slavs or Magyars 
 had been found unwounded 1 in the hands of 
 his enemies in Italy in 1859, and he knew 
 by experience that it was not practicable to 
 construct a popular state in Central Europe, 
 and to equip it with a strong and loyal army, 
 unless all the races of his Empire of Austria 
 were reconciled to the existing order of 
 domestic government. To the Poles in 
 Galicia he had already granted concessions, 
 somewhat greater than were allowed to 
 Bohemia. There was, as I have said, a 
 minister for Galicia in the Cabinet, and the 
 Galician Diet had wider powers of legislation 
 
 1 A valuable article in the Contemporary Review for February 1893, 
 to which I am much indebted, states the number at 15,000, or six 
 per cent of the Austrian fighting force. 
 
1 66 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 than the other provincial assemblies. These 
 concessions could be given in Poland without 
 fear that they would lead to separation ; for 
 the Poles, were next door to tyrannous 
 Russia. They could see across the frontier 
 to where their brother Poles were crushed 
 under the despotism of the Czar; and they 
 wanted nothing better than a strong and just 
 Austrian Emperor who should protect them 
 against a similar fate. Of all the nationalities 
 in Austria the Poles had been the most prudent 
 and the most loyal to the Austro- Hungarian 
 idea. Whilst not losing sight of their Nation- 
 alist claims, they had consented to take part in 
 the government of centralised Austria. Friendly 
 to the Austrian Germans, and allied by ancient 
 tradition to the Magyars, they have greatly 
 assisted the Emperor in his task of making a 
 new country in Central Europe, and are to-day 
 amongst the most trustworthy of his citizens. 
 
 The Czechs in Bohemia were not in the 
 same position. They had never recognised 
 the Constitution of 1867, and were rivals 
 both of the Germans and the Hungarians. 
 They were strong Federalists, and hated the 
 German language as sincerely as the Hun- 
 garians. It was therefore more difficult and 
 more dangerous to entrust the government 
 to them than to the Poles ; but as neither 
 
COUNT TAAFFE 167 
 
 could govern Austria alone, the Emperor 
 gradually formed the intention of committing 
 the care of the Empire to a combination of 
 them, assisted by the Clerical and Conservative 
 deputies from the Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, and 
 southern Austrian provinces. These last had 
 stood aloof from the Liberal German regime 
 inaugurated by Auersperg. 
 
 The team once selected, it became neces- 
 sary to find a man who would drive it ; and 
 a driver of extraordinary skill was discovered 
 in Count Taaffe. Edward, Viscount Taaffe 
 of Corran and Baron of Ballymote in the 
 county of Sligo in Ireland, and Count Taaffe 
 in Austria, was the son of a noble Irish 
 family who had long been distinguished in 
 Austria for gallantry in war and successful 
 administration in peace. One member of the 
 family had been ambassador of Charles II. 
 at the Imperial Court, and in 1667 an ancestor 
 of the new Premier had been made Count 
 of the Empire as a reward for bravery. The 
 Taaffes had from the first been members of the 
 Court aristocracy, a small coterie of noble ser- 
 vants immediately surrounding the Emperors, 
 and placed somewhat apart from the great 
 feudal nobles who formed a " country party." 
 A characteristic saying has been attributed to 
 a member of this coterie — " Mankind begins 
 
1 68 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 with the barons and ends with the monarch." 
 If in the old days such a maxim had been 
 theirs, the Count Taaffe who lived in the 
 Austria of the 'eighties certainly did not sub- 
 scribe to it. His motto may be said to have 
 been, " Mankind begins with the monarch and 
 ends with the last man who can be induced 
 to support his government." He had been 
 a playmate of Francis Joseph's early youth, 
 and the influence of his family was so strong 
 at Court that he might have aspired to high 
 office in early life. Yet he commenced his 
 public service at the bottom of the Civil 
 Service ladder, and it was due to a chance 
 meeting with the Emperor that, after some 
 years, he obtained quick promotion. He was 
 appointed Minister of the Interior in 1867 
 under Beust, and had been even Minister- 
 President for a short time, but in 1 871-9, 
 during the rule of Auersperg and the Ger- 
 mans, he was Statthalter of the Tyrol, a 
 post of temporary retirement which might 
 lead to anything. In 1879 he was called upon 
 to take up the position of Minister-President, 
 and with it the Ministry of the Interior. 
 
 The new Premier was a man whom the 
 Federalists might certainly claim for their own. 
 He was a Catholic, and therefore popular with 
 the loyal Catholics ; but he was no thorough- 
 
CHARACTER OF TAAFFE 169 
 
 paced Ultramontane, and had voted against 
 the Concordat. He had been in the citizen 
 ministry of the first Prince Auersperg in 1867, 
 so that even the Liberals, who were now in 
 opposition, could not think very badly of him. 
 When the Emperor dissolved the Reichsrath, 
 in May 1879, before Taaffe took office, the 
 Germans lost forty-five seats, and the Federalist 
 gains were opportune for the task which he 
 was about to undertake. From the first he 
 showed extraordinary skill in smoothing over 
 difficulties and inducing recalcitrant deputies 
 to postpone grievances or fads. He received 
 angry deputations of Czechs or Clericals who 
 wanted concessions to the language in Bohemia 
 or to the Church in the control of schools. 
 He listened to them politely, told them risky 
 stories, mimicked the attitude of their enemies 
 with a humour which had survived two 
 centuries of absence from the west of Ireland. 
 As for their complaints, these were serious, but 
 as the matters in question were too important 
 to be discussed by a single minister, he would 
 lay them before the Cabinet and see what could 
 be done. In the meantime he suggested that 
 they should reserve these questions and take 
 part in the government of the country. This 
 course would make them eligible should occa- 
 sions for promotion arise. The usual result 
 
170 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 was that the deputations went away satisfied, 
 or cajoled into acquiescence. It is scarcely 
 an exaggeration to say that these were the 
 means by which Count Taaffe maintained a 
 Government in Austria for fourteen years. 
 He was a pure opportunist and a confirmed 
 cynic, believed that every man had his price, 
 and knew no principle and had no policy but 
 unswerving loyalty to his master. 
 
 It is not necessary to describe at any length 
 the political landmarks of these fifteen years. 
 We find them a succession of protests by 
 Czechs or Germans, riots in Bohemia between 
 Germans and Czechs, or in Dalmatia between 
 Croats and Italians, concessions made to one 
 or the other, a minister appointed here because 
 he is a Czech, a judge there because he is a 
 Croat. The general trend of Taaffe's policy 
 was to give more power to the Slavonic pro- 
 vinces in the management of their affairs, to 
 teach them that Austria was able to satisfy all 
 their reasonable grievances, and to associate 
 them in the support of the established order 
 of things. Thus, in 1879, a Pole and a Czech 
 were brought into the ministry, but it also 
 contained one German Liberal. In 1880 
 another Polish minister is introduced, and 
 slight concessions made in the matter of the 
 use of Slavonic languages in official corre- 
 
THE YOUNG CZECHS 171 
 
 spondence. In 1881 two German ministers 
 leave the Cabinet and two Federalists come 
 in, whilst in the same year a Czech University- 
 is set up in Prag beside the old University. 
 The establishment of the Czech University was 
 an event of great importance, and undoubtedly 
 gave an impetus to a movement which ulti- 
 mately upset Count Taaffe's Government — 
 the rise of the " Young Czech " party in 
 Bohemia. The old Czechs, whilst loyal to 
 their race, were loyal also to the Emperor. 
 They were Roman Catholics, and Roman 
 Catholicism has always been a strong unionist 
 force in Austria. The young Czechs were 
 Slavs before everything else. They were 
 anti-Clerical, and not bound to the Hapsburg 
 dynasty by the old ties of tradition and service 
 which held the Czech nobility. Yet the 
 institution of a Czech University could not 
 have been withheld, especially by a sovereign 
 whose object was to satisfy all just claims. The 
 Emperor hoped, as he still hopes, to form a 
 middle party in Austria which would recognise 
 the compromise of 1867, and form the new 
 Austrian half of the monarchy. This hope or 
 policy lay behind the schemes and jokes and 
 compromises of Count Taaffe. His ministry was 
 a bold attempt to mitigate the violence of the 
 racial malcontents in Austria and give them 
 
172 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 time to become reasonable. It cannot be said 
 that he succeeded ; but he gained time. 
 
 In 1883 the Bohemian Diet was dissolved, 
 and the elections resulted in sending a Czech 
 majority to Prag, but the anti-German agitation 
 was still kept under by Taaffe's dexterous 
 hands. Socialism began to grow rapidly in 
 Austria in these years, and strong measures 
 had to be taken against the Socialists in 1884. 
 Possibly the fear of Socialism was one of the 
 causes which gave the ministry a small majority 
 (192 votes in a House of 353) at the Austrian 
 elections in 1885. The Premier had, however, 
 not sufficient support to enable him to get on 
 without successive concessions to the Czechs, 
 and these were strenuously opposed by the 
 Germans. Occasionally local riots took place. 
 At KSniginhof in Bohemia, in August 1885, 
 several people were killed, and the hatred 
 between Germans and Czechs began to find 
 expression in severe criticism of the foreign 
 policy of the monarchy, now firmly based on 
 the friendship with the new Empire of Germany. 
 It is highly characteristic of the condition of 
 Austrian politics at the period that the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government was able to inaugurate 
 and carry out a foreign policy of friendship 
 with Germany which was keenly opposed by 
 ■ the Slavonic majority in the Reichsrath, whilst 
 
TAAFFE'S DECLINE 173 
 
 the Germans, who were in opposition, warmly 
 approved it. The policy of Germany in ex- 
 pelling Polish or Ruthenian workmen from 
 German territory also gave a handle to the 
 Slav deputies in the Reichsrath, and Count 
 Taaffe was more than once placed in a difficulty 
 by interpellations on this subject. 
 
 Taaffe's ministry lasted as long as he 
 could keep the Czechs in hand by conces- 
 sions. The old Czechs were contented with 
 these, but the young Czechs were not so, and 
 in 1889 the advanced party conquered their 
 opponents in the elections for the Bohemian 
 Diet. 1 Before 1889 the young Czechs had had 
 only a few seats, but after the election of this 
 year they returned 37 members, and at the 
 end of 18^0 their force had increased to 42. 
 In November 1889; the new Diet met, and 
 the German deputies absenting themselves, the 
 young and old Czechs stood face to face. The 
 young Czechs introduced a motion to erect a 
 memorial tablet to John Huss in the Bohemian 
 Museum. If anybody could be expected to 
 support such a proposal it would be, we might 
 think, the " old Czechs " : but this party was 
 under Clerical influence, and the name of 
 the great Protestant reformer of Prag was 
 
 1 By the Schmerling constitution there were 236 elected and 6 
 official members of the Diet. The elected were originally divided as 
 follows : Great landowners, 70 ; Germans, 69 ; Czechs, 99. 
 
174 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 anathema to the Roman Catholic Church. The 
 Czech nobles and old Czechs rejected the motion, 
 and the young Czechs immediately set the 
 country on fire with agitation against clericalism 
 and feudalism. They were so powerful in the 
 Landtag and the local administration that 
 Taaffe had to control them, if the govern- 
 ment of the country was to go on. By the 
 Emperor's direction he invited Czechs and the 
 moderate Germans to a conference at Vienna. 
 The old Czechs and the Germans attended, 
 but the young Czechs held aloof, and for once 
 Count Taaffe had met a party in Austria which 
 would not yield to his blandishments. A 
 compromise was made at Vienna which, if it 
 had been executed, would have kept peace for a 
 time. The provincial councils for agriculture 
 and education were to be divided into Czech 
 and German sections. Electoral districts were 
 also to be divided so that as far as possible 
 each district should contain people of only one 
 race, and petty sessional districts were to be 
 divided in the same way. In June 1890 the 
 Emperor approved this scheme. The old 
 Czechs agreed to it ; but the young Czechs op- 
 posed it with all their strength, and it was never 
 put in force. The difficulty of carrying out such 
 an arrangement was great. Speaking roughly, 
 the Czechs occupy the east of Bohemia and the 
 
CZECHS INCREASE 175 
 
 Germans the west, but modern developments, 
 especially the growth of factories, have brought 
 about a condition in which the two races 
 are inextricably intermingled. Thus it was 
 estimated in 1890 that out of 216 petty 
 sessional districts in Bohemia there were only 
 five in which the population was not mixed. 
 Yet, even had it been easy to carry out the 
 scheme, the young Czechs would never have 
 accepted it. It would have firmly rooted the 
 German element in Bohemia and have given 
 to Germanism a fixed sphere of influence. 
 It is the policy of the Czechs not to permit 
 this. Their numbers had grown rapidly 
 during the Taaffe administration. In 1856 
 Prag contained 73,000 Germans and 50,000 
 Czechs and was practically a German town. 
 In 1890, including the suburbs, it contained 
 264,000 Czechs, 40,000 Germans, and 21,000 
 Jews. 1 In 1890 there was not a single Teuton 
 in the Town Council of Prag nor a single 
 German representative of the city of Prag 
 in the Reichsrath. All were Czechs. It is 
 scarcely to be wondered at that the Slavonic 
 majority would make no terms with an 
 enemy whom they expect to be able to 
 destroy. 
 
 1 I take the figures for 1856 from the article in the Contemporary 
 Review cited above, and for 1890 from M. Cheradame's D Europe et la 
 question d'Autriche, etc. (Paris, 1906), p. 233. 
 
176 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 The failure of the compromise of 1890 
 virtually put an end to Count Taaffe's adminis- 
 tration. He remained in office till the autumn 
 of 1893, but after the rise of the young Czechs 
 to power in Bohemia it was realised that his 
 period had come to an end. His policy, if it 
 failed to conciliate the Czechs, was hateful to 
 the various German groups, and the German 
 Liberals, now ably led by Dr. von Plener, were 
 strong enough to make further concessions to 
 Federalism impracticable. In 189 1 Taaffe was, 
 indeed, hoist with his own petard. The Tyrol had 
 in 1890 caught Nationalist fever from Bohemia, 
 and early in the new year the twenty-five Italian 
 members of the Tyrolese Diet resigned because 
 the Government refused to separate the Italian 
 and German parts of the Tyrol. Ministers 
 could not govern the province without a Diet, 
 and the action of the Tyrolese brought about 
 the dissolution of the Reichsrath (20th January 
 1 891). The most significant event of the 
 elections which followed was the success of the 
 young Czechs. They returned 38 members to 
 the Reichsrath in which they had not previously 
 been represented. The German Liberals, 
 revived by twelve years in the shade of opposi- 
 tion, came back 1 10 strong, whilst there were 
 58 Poles, 17 German Nationalists, and a number 
 of smaller groups. By forming a temporary 
 
RIOTOUS DEPUTIES 177 
 
 alliance with the German Liberals Taafife 
 managed to keep a majority until 1893, m which 
 year the agitation of the Czechs for concessions 
 to their language became too fierce for longer 
 dalliance. Originally they had demanded only 
 a fair number of Czech teachers in schools, and 
 a guarantee that persons who were tried for any 
 offence should be tried in their own language ; 
 but as time went on their demands grew. They 
 now demanded that all officials should after a 
 certain time be bi-lingual, and even attempted 
 to control the language in which official corre- 
 spondence was carried on. On May 17, 1893, 
 during a debate in the Bohemian Diet, a number 
 of Czech deputies attacked a German member 
 whilst he was speaking. There followed 
 one of those scenes at which Englishmen 
 merely laugh — language which no publisher 
 would permit in these pages, ink poured over 
 Germans by Czechs, and Czechs beaten with 
 bluebooks or rulers by Germans. Scenes of 
 this sort are indeed very funny to those who 
 do not read their true meaning, which is that 
 Parliamentary government in Austria is very 
 difficult to maintain, and may at any time 
 break down altogether. The Emperor has 
 honestly and conscientiously endeavoured to 
 get the Austrian Parliament to do its work. 
 He has given to the various nationalities as 
 
 N 
 
178 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 much as can be given without dissolving 
 Austria into a confederation, and he has 
 earnestly sought to let all the Nationalist 
 leaders see that he is ready to trust them and 
 to commit a share in the government of the 
 country to their hands. It is unfortunate that 
 some of the Austrian deputies, and more 
 especially the firebrands of Bohemia, have not 
 merited the Emperor's confidence. But it 
 must be remembered, and the Emperor no 
 doubt remembers, that these deputies are new 
 men, and that the Austrian Parliament is a new 
 Parliament. It takes time for such men to 
 learn the manners and moderation of debate, 
 and to discover that they do not advance their 
 cause by throwing ink over those whose 
 opinions do not coincide with their own. 
 
 The scene in the Diet was followed by dis- 
 orders in Bohemia which had a somewhat 
 anti-dynastic colour ; and in the summer, Stand- 
 recht, or a modified state of siege, was proclaimed 
 in Prag. In recent years proclamations of 
 this kind have more than once been necessary 
 in Bohemia ; and they generally have the 
 desired result. Their effect is to suspend the 
 liberty of the Press, the right of public 
 meeting, and trial by jury. When, under the 
 observation of police and military, people have 
 had time to get cool, they feel rather ashamed 
 
TAAFFE'S FALL 179 
 
 of themselves, and the pulse and temperature 
 of the body politic returns to normal tempera- 
 ture until the next attack. In 1893, however, 
 the state of Prag was serious, and when, on 
 the day after the conflict of May 17, the 
 Emperor closed the Diet, riots took place 
 which were not suppressed without bloodshed. 
 Taaffe, who never knew when he was beaten, 
 proposed to popularise the Government by 
 introducing a Bill for partial universal suffrage. 
 Under this scheme the nobles and chambers 
 of commerce 1 were to elect members as here- 
 tofore, but in the towns and country divisions 
 all male citizens of a certain age were to have 
 a vote. The Bill was stoutly opposed by the 
 German parties under von Plener, and it 
 aroused considerable opposition in Hungary. 
 The Hungarians had, of course, no more right 
 to speak in the matter than the English or the 
 Turks ; but Hungary is always afraid that any 
 step of this kind which may be taken in Austria 
 may be used as a pretext for demanding similar 
 action by the Government at Pesth. The 
 supremacy of the Magyars in the Hungarian 
 legislature depends on the maintenance of a 
 
 1 At this time the Austrian Parliament was elected by four orders, 
 the large landlords, chambers of commerce, towns, and rural districts. 
 The first two returned 85 and 21 members respectively out of a total 
 of 353. This old constitution was of course superseded by the intro- 
 duction, two years ago, of direct universal suffrage. 
 
180 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 high suffrage; or, at least, the Hungarians them- 
 selves think so. With the Germans hostile to 
 this measure, and to his policy as a whole, the 
 Czechs cajling out for more concessions, and 
 the Hungarian government silently hostile, 
 Count Taaffe had no option but to resign. 
 
 And so, in October 1893, this brilliant and 
 attractive figure quits the crowded stage on 
 which we are trying to observe what is going 
 on. The Emperor parted most reluctantly 
 from a near friend of his early youth, who had 
 served him with unflinching loyalty and with 
 consummate ability. Taaffe had so controlled 
 the Reichsrath that for many years the Emperor 
 had enjoyed unrestricted power. In the years 
 before 1891 Francis Joseph was more autocratic 
 in Austria than at any other time in his reign. 
 His Prime Minister interested a sufficient 
 number of groups in the Government to be 
 sure of a majority ; or, if a few deputies became 
 recalcitrant and refused to come to heel, he 
 could always manage to bring in a few men 
 from some other group, who knew that there 
 was no real chance of upsetting them. He main- 
 tained constitutional rule, and thus satisfied the 
 conditions of the Constitution of 1867. During 
 his term of office the Customs and commercial 
 treaty with Hungary was renewed for a second 
 period (188 7- 1897) and, in business and finance, 
 
TAAFE'S FIFTEEN YEARS 181 
 
 the country prospered. It is true that, when 
 the fifteen years of his government were over, 
 the Nationalist feuds again broke out in Austria. 
 It is true that Taaffe did not put an end to 
 racial or religious differences, or secure the final 
 acceptance of the new idea of a state which it 
 has been the Emperor's duty to promote. But 
 it is also true that he showed how, in spite of 
 Nationalist feuds and rivalries, the government 
 might go on. He gave time for young men to 
 grow up under the new system, and for men of 
 different creeds and races to live together and 
 find out that it is possible to exist without 
 fighting. Had his tenure of office been thirty 
 years instead of fifteen, Austria would have 
 been much the better for it ; for in the forma- 
 tion of a new State and a new citizenship time 
 and repose are above all things necessary. 
 During the fifteen years the new Austria was 
 trying to make up her mind what manner of 
 state she was going to be. She did not then 
 make up her mind, and has not yet, so far as 
 we can see, finally decided what her own 
 constitution is to be. In the last few years 
 circumstances have occurred which have dis- 
 turbed her reflections, so that to-day she is 
 still undecided. But so far as the form of 
 Dual Monarchy is concerned, it may be said 
 that Count Taaffe's fifteen years were most 
 
i8 2 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 useful in that they enabled the Constitution 
 of 1867 to grow up in, at least, comparative 
 peace. Whatever may be the ultimate destiny 
 of the DuaJ Monarchy, the fifteen years' breath- 
 ing space which the Emperor and Taaffe 
 secured for her must be counted to them for 
 righteousness. 
 
 We turn to Hungary. A survey of the his- 
 tory of that kingdom during these fifteen 
 years shows us that the King of Hungary 
 has a different sort of reign from the Emperor 
 of Austria. Here there is no need of cajol- 
 ing different groups or sections, or reconciling 
 ethnographic zealots to a state of affairs which 
 they hate, but tolerate. The dominant 
 Magyars are really a dominant race — not quite 
 half of the population in numbers, but in intelli- 
 gence, wealth, and political power three-quarters 
 or more of the whole. Whilst the dominant 
 Germans are diminishing in Bohemia, and are 
 out of power at Vienna, the Magyars are 
 undisputed masters in Hungary. Croatia they 
 have quieted by the concession of Home Rule 
 on terms which, to an unprejudiced critic, must 
 appear generous. Roumanian claims to pro- 
 vincial independence they do not recognise, 
 and though there is no suppression of the 
 Rouman language, Magyar is enforced every- 
 where as the one language of the state. The 
 
KOLOMAN TISZA 183 
 
 Liberal party in Hungary, the most powerful 
 political organisation in any constitutional state 
 in Europe during the nineteenth century, was 
 supreme during the period which we are now 
 considering. Again and again it came success- 
 fully out of the battle at the polls. Its enemies 
 were the " Independence " party, who did not 
 recognise the Compromise of 1867, looked still 
 to the exiled Kossuth as their leader, and 
 wanted separate armies and ambassadors for 
 Austria and Hungary ; and a middle party, 
 who accept the Compromise as a whole, but 
 desire a change in its details. Neither of these 
 parties had, however, any large following in 
 Parliament, and neither of them had a leader 
 who, for ability and personal influence, was a 
 match for Tisza. From 1875 to 1890 Tisza 
 was the acknowledged champion of Magyar 
 Liberalism. During that period his position 
 was unassailable ; and the confidence given him 
 in Hungary not only made him one of the 
 most important of the Emperor's advisers, but 
 gave him for a time a great position amongst 
 the Liberal statesmen of Europe. He was 
 disliked by the highly-placed Clericals who sur- 
 round the Court of Vienna, and by the Court 
 aristocracy of that capital ; for he was neither 
 of noble birth nor of the Roman faith ; but the 
 Emperor-King trusted him. His policy was 
 
1 84 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 devoted to the maintenance of the Compromise 
 of 1867, and the preservation of the Magyar 
 rule in Hungary. In Austria- Hungary he 
 wished jo build up a strong and united 
 monarchy around the citadel of the ancient 
 empire of Austria. To this work of construc- 
 tion he brought the ready co-operation of a 
 free and prosperous Hungary. 
 
 In 1 88 1 the Liberal party were given anew 
 lease of power by the constituencies, and with 
 Tisza at the helm and a Hungarian, Count 
 Kalnoky, at the Austro- Hungarian Foreign 
 Office, the Magyars provided two out of the 
 three first statesmen of the monarchy. Count 
 Kalnoky, however, though a Hungarian by 
 race, was Russophile in policy. He had been 
 ambassador at St. Petersburg, and throughout 
 his tenure of office (1881-96) was suspected of 
 Russophile and Clerical leanings. The Hun- 
 garian Government, with Tisza at its head, 
 was, as always, anti-Russian. Hungary is an 
 island in a sea of Slavs, and anything which 
 tended to increase the influence of Russia, in 
 the Balkan States or elsewhere, was strenuously 
 opposed at Pesth. The Hungarian Parliament 
 was not, as yet, strongly anti-Clerical. No 
 movement for the disestablishment of the 
 Church has found popular support there, 
 although the vast estates and revenues 
 
TISZA AND KALLAY 185 
 
 of the Church were a bait which might well 
 tempt a Government anxious to increase its 
 income, and secretly opposed by reactionary 
 Clericals at Vienna. In 1882 the Emperor 
 appointed Herr von Kallay, a Hungarian 
 official, to be Common Minister of Finance, and 
 as this post carried with it the control of the 
 occupied provinces of Bosnia and the Herzego- 
 vina, Magyar influence is extended into these 
 dependencies also. The dual occupation of 
 Bosnia had been at first unpopular in Hungary 
 simply because it added more Slavs to the 
 Empire, and when in 1882 a rising in the 
 Herzegovina brought about a month's warfare 
 and much expenditure, Tisza found it difficult 
 to obtain the approval of the common budget 
 at the hands of his followers. As time has 
 passed, however, the Hungarian objections 
 have disappeared. Hungarian officials are 
 now amongst the ablest of the civil servants 
 which have made Bosnia a model to the other 
 provinces successively cut away from the 
 Sultan's dominions. In 1882 also, reforms 
 of the army took place which made it territorial 
 — that is to say, the regiments were to be 
 raised from this or that part of the monarchy, 
 and to have their depdts there. This step was 
 a distinct gain for the Hungarians, since it 
 enabled them to say that certain regiments 
 
1 86 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 were Hungarian and not Austrian. In con- 
 sidering the last ten years of the Emperor's 
 reign we shall see that this change led to a con- 
 test of vital importance, the final result of which 
 will be written in the history of the future. 
 
 Although the Liberal party were firmly 
 seated in office, and were again successful at 
 the polls in 1884, difficulties were experienced 
 in this and the following years, which showed 
 that the nationality question in Hungary, 
 though latent, would at some time have to be 
 faced. The anti-Magyar minority in Croatia, 
 led by M. Starchevitch and encouraged by the 
 arch-Panslavist, Bishop Strossmayer, became 
 restive, and in 1883 and 1884 " ots t0 °k place 
 owing to insults offered to the Hungarian flags 
 or escutcheons which are placed on public 
 buildings in Croatia. At the end of 1884 the 
 lobbies of the Hall of the Diet at Agram were 
 occupied by police, and the opposition members 
 were summarily expelled. During the follow- 
 ing years the subject Slavs here and there 
 broke out, and had to be repressed. An 
 annual occasion for Panslavist or anti-Magyar 
 exhibitions takes place at Pesth in May, when 
 the anniversary of the death of General Hentzi 
 comes round. This officer, a Croat, defended 
 the castle of Buda in 1849 against General 
 Gorgei, and fell with three hundred men when 
 
HENTZI QUESTION 187 
 
 the Hungarians captured it. When the anni- 
 versary came round in 1886, an officer of Croat 
 blood in the garrison at Pesth placed a wreath 
 on his tomb. An angry crowd of Hungarians 
 attacked his house, and broke the windows 
 with a shower of stones. Tisza was inter- 
 pellated as to the action of this officer, which was 
 condemned by the commander-in-chief of the 
 Honved. 1 He replied censuring the " want of 
 tact and foresight" of the officer who had placed 
 the wreath, and the terms of his reply gave a 
 good deal of offence at Vienna. The Emperor 
 shortly afterwards placed the commander-in- 
 chief of the Honved on the retired list, and 
 promoted the Croat officer whose action had 
 caused the disturbance. His Majesty's con- 
 duct caused profound discontent in Hungary, 
 and Francis Joseph afterwards explained it in 
 a letter to the Premier, which was made public. 
 He regretted that certain changes amongst 
 officers should have led to misunderstandings. 
 " The spirit of the army," he wrote, " is that of 
 its chief commander, which is the best guarantee 
 that it will zealously perform its duties, stand 
 apart from all political parties, keep order in 
 the land, guard the laws, and thereby the 
 constitution." 
 
 The movement for the separation of the 
 
 1 The local army of Hungary. 
 
1 88 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Hungarian from the Austrian portion of the 
 common army took its rise in these years. 
 Though it has only become important in recent 
 times, its beginning caused much difficulty to 
 Tisza. Loyal to the Emperor and the Com- 
 promise, he was not less loyal to Hungary, and 
 he was acute enough to foresee the difficulties 
 which must follow in the wake of an agitation 
 for military separation. In 1889 an establish- 
 ment for the common army was laid before the 
 Houses of Austria and Hungary, whose Parlia- 
 ments had never lost control of the recruiting 
 and terms of service to be prescribed for the 
 soldiery of the common force. It was found 
 that the draft establishment was not, as there- 
 tofore, limited to ten years. The change was 
 probably due to the fact that the Austrian 
 Government found difficulties in getting the 
 establishment passed in Austria, and wished to 
 pursue a continuous military policy undisturbed 
 by the inconvenient necessities of Parliamentary 
 approval. The Hungarians objected to the 
 change as tending to diminish civil control over 
 the army. Their opposition was so vigorous 
 that the Crown had to give way, and the ten 
 years' limit was again introduced into the Army 
 Bill. The Magyars had another victory, as 
 they deemed it, in 1889, when they succeeded 
 in having the title " Imperial and Royal " sub- 
 
ARMY QUESTIONS 189 
 
 stituted for " Imperial- Royal " as the official 
 name of the Austro- Hungarian army.; The 
 presence of the little word " and " at the head- 
 ing of official notepaper and notices may 
 seem to be a trifle. Outside critics laughed 
 when they heard that the Hungarian Cabinet 
 made its insertion a question of confidence. 
 In fact, the alteration was important, for it 
 involved the admission that the common army 
 was not one army, but two joined together 
 under a supreme head. In the survey of the 
 most recent years of the Emperor's reign we 
 shall see that it was the prelude to episodes 
 of much interest. 
 
 Before tackling the question of the common 
 army, however, the Hungarian Government 
 were anxious to alter the law as to marriage, 
 which was at the time controlled by the 
 Catholic Church ; and the introduction of 
 Dr. Wekerle and M. Szilagyi, a Lutheran 
 and a Calvinist, into the ministry in 1889 was 
 an indication that the question of Clerical con- 
 trol would be dealt with by the Liberal party 
 in the immediate future. As this question led 
 to a controversy between the Hungarians and 
 the Crown, I postpone it to the next chapter. 
 
 Tisza's long period of Premiership came to 
 an end in 1890. It is interesting to observe 
 that his fall was ultimately due to the force 
 
igo FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 of the traditions of 1848. With these he had 
 flirted in his early days in opposition (1867- 
 1875), Dut he had deserted them when he came 
 to lead the Liberal party. In 1890 Kossuth 
 was still alive, and an exile in Italy, and owing 
 to the state of the law of nationalisation he 
 would cease to be a Hungarian citizen unless 
 he returned to Pesth in 1890 or acknowledged 
 the existing Government. This he consistently 
 refused to do, and Tisza declined to make 
 special provision by law for preserving Kos- 
 suth's citizenship, and maintained that a man 
 who did not recognise the existing constitu- 
 tion, and who considered the King of Hungary 
 to be an outlaw and a traitor, could not expect 
 special privileges at the hands of the Hun- 
 garian Government. It is impossible to quarrel 
 with this view, but in Hungary, as in other 
 countries, politicians are not always reasonable, 
 and Tisza's declaration produced such an out- 
 cry that he was soon compelled to resign. 
 Though he was for many years a considerable 
 power in the Liberal party, he did not again 
 take office. His fifteen years of premiership 
 were years when Hungary enjoyed peace and 
 prosperity. The country, whilst maintaining 
 all its rights, worked in harmony with Austria 
 and assumed in partnership with her the posi- 
 tion and duties of a great European Power. 
 
NOVI-BAZAR 191 
 
 The policy of amity with Austria was highly 
 beneficial to Hungary, and was of great service 
 in developing the idea of Austro-Hungarian 
 citizenship. The Emperor-King therefore had 
 good reason to be grateful to the clever old 
 Hungarian who kept power in his hands by 
 methods very different from those of Taaffe 
 in Austria — but not less successful. The dis- 
 appearance of Tisza closes a period of harmony 
 and good-fellowship. That of his successors 
 saw the commencement of a long and complex 
 conflict between Austria and Hungary. It is 
 not yet decided. 
 
 Before concluding our observations of this 
 period we turn to the wider field of foreign 
 affairs. The Emperor of Austria has many 
 difficulties during this period, and the King 
 of Hungary has few ; but the Emperor- King 
 of Austria- Hungary has a long holiday, during 
 which he profits by the sound policy of 1878, 
 does the duties which Europe has assigned to 
 him, and maintains and improves the position 
 of his country amongst the nations of Europe. 
 Before Count Andrassy retired from the Foreign 
 Office in 1879 the advance guard of the army 
 of occupation in Bosnia pushed down into the 
 Sandjak 1 of Novi-Bazar. Thus the contact 
 
 1 In Turkish sandjak means a "flag"; but the word is also used 
 for a district. 
 
192 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 between the dominions of the Sultan and those 
 of the Emperor-King, which had been severed 
 to the southward by the establishment of the 
 minor Balkan states, is permanently established 
 to the western side of the Balkan peninsula. 
 Even after the occupation of Bosnia and the 
 Herzegovina by Austria the belt of Slav 
 territory between Turkey and the rest of 
 Europe might have been completed from the 
 Black Sea to the Adriatic, if only this rugged 
 little tongue of land had fallen into the hands 
 either of Servia or Montenegro. The Dual 
 Monarchy had, however, stretched down to 
 join hands with Turkey, and after 1879 it has 
 always been possible for Austria and her allies 
 to join forces with Turkey without crossing 
 the territory of any other Power, whether 
 hostile or not. The occupation of Novi- Bazar 
 had been sanctioned by the Treaty of Berlin ; 
 nevertheless, the Czar was extremely angry 
 at Francis Joseph's advance. The attitude of 
 the Russian press, which was at that time 
 strictly controlled by censors, became so 
 threatening, that Austria and Prussia drew 
 together in fear of a Franco-Russian alliance. 
 Prince Bismarck and Count Andrassy had met 
 at Gastein in the summer of 1879, and a treaty 
 for mutual defence, on the basis of the Berlin 
 Treaty, was prepared and agreed upon between 
 
HAYMERLE 193 
 
 them. Francis Joseph signed it on the under- 
 standing that the German Emperor would do 
 so ; but the German Emperor's assent was 
 not very readily given, for he was opposed to 
 any arrangements which might be construed 
 as implying hostility to the Czar. The conclu- 
 sion of the treaty was no doubt accelerated 
 by the militant attitude of Russia. Italy gave 
 her adherence to it in 1881, 1 and it forms the 
 foundation-stone of the foreign policy of Aus- 
 tria-Hungary in modern times. Thus the 
 Dual Monarchy stands hand in hand with the 
 two powerful neighbours who had defeated 
 her in 1859 and 1866, and is, for the moment, 
 in opposition to Russia, who had saved Austria 
 from the Hungarians in 1849. Count Andrassy, 
 who, at the time of his retirement, ranked 
 second only to Bismarck in the hierarchy of 
 European statesmen, retired in 1879 and gave 
 place to Baron Haymerle. Haymerle's period 
 of office was short, but not undistinguished. 
 In 1 88 1 he died, but not before a visit of the 
 King of Italy to Vienna had been arranged. 
 King Humbert was cordially received at 
 Vienna on October 27; and his visit was 
 assumed to mean that Austria and Italy were 
 
 1 Count Kalnoky, the Common Foreign Minister, announced the 
 adhesion of Italy to the Delegations in October 1883 ; but it was 
 obtained by his predecessor, Baron Haymerle, who died suddenly on 
 October 10, 1881. 
 
 O 
 
194 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 now allies. Haymerle was succeeded by Count 
 Kalnoky, and whilst he was in charge of 
 foreign affairs the foreign policy of Austria 
 pursued a vigorous and successful course. 
 The attempt of Roumania to control the 
 mouths of the Danube, which had been placed 
 under an international commission by the 
 Treaty of Berlin, was checked, and in the 
 autumn of 1883 Count Kalnoky said in his 
 speech to the Delegations that if Austria and 
 Russia should ever go to war, Austria would 
 not stand alone. The conclusion of the Triple 
 Alliance established a powerful concert of 
 Powers in Central Europe. From Kiel to 
 Syracuse, and from Orsova to Metz, 
 stretched the territories of these States who 
 were agreed as to the prevention of aggressive 
 war. 
 
 Shortly after Kalnoky's appointment, Austria 
 and Russia entered into an agreement with 
 regard to the questions of the Near East 
 which concerned them. The report of this 
 agreement elicited hostile criticism in Hungary, 
 where the very name of an agreement with 
 Russia gives rise to suspicions, and where 
 Kalnoky was suspected of too warm friendship 
 for Russia. Dr. Szilagyi, now a rising politician 
 in Hungary, questioned Kalnoky closely about 
 it in the Hungarian Delegation in 1884, but 
 
SERVIA 195 
 
 was reassured by the statement that Austria- 
 Hungary had written obligations with no 
 Power except Germany. The Russian agree- 
 ment was at all events beneficial to Austria- 
 Hungary, since it put a stop to the little risings 
 in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, which were 
 attributed, with some show of justice, to 
 Panslavist intrigue. Francis Joseph's posi- 
 tion in Europe was never stronger than at this 
 time; and when, in the autumn of 1885, tne 
 Bulgarians in Eastern Roumelia rose and pro- 
 claimed their union with Bulgaria, Austria was 
 able to take a decisive action without eliciting 
 any opposition from Russia. Since 1879 he 
 had maintained friendly relations with Prince 
 Milan of Servia. Austrian financiers helped 
 the Prince to build the railway from Belgrad to 
 Tzaribrod on the Bulgarian frontier, which, 
 by the Treaty of Berlin, he had been directed 
 to build; and when in 1882 the Prince, born of 
 recent swineherd ancestry, suddenly declared 
 himself King, he was recognised by the most 
 punctilious Court in Europe. Though married 
 to a wealthy Russian lady, Milan was a deter- 
 mined Western. Francis Joseph has many 
 Servian subjects, and it was desirable to keep on 
 good terms with Milan, who might cause trouble 
 in Southern Hungary and elsewhere were he to 
 call the Serb race to join in the formation of a 
 
196 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 " Great Servia." The revolution of the autumn 
 of 1885 in Roumelia set the idea of a "Great 
 Bulgaria" actually on the road to realisation. 
 Milan was jealous of the success of the gallant 
 Battenberger in the rival principality, and in- 
 vaded it on November 14, without a declara- 
 tion of war, claiming " compensation " for the 
 expansion of Bulgaria in the Balkans. Few 
 wars have been shorter than that of Servia 
 and Bulgaria in 1885. Prince Alexander 
 marched his army across Bulgaria in two days, 
 and on the 1 7th put the Servian army to flight 
 at Slivnitza. On the 26th the victorious 
 Bulgarians entered Servia, and must have 
 occupied Belgrad if they had not been ordered 
 by the Emperor Francis Joseph to halt. By 
 this summary order the short war of 1885 
 was brought to a close. Into the subsequent 
 diplomacy at Constantinople we need not 
 enter. Bulgaria was, practically, enlarged as 
 the insurgents desired, but Russia soon found 
 that Prince Alexander and his stout minister, 
 Stambouloff, would not allow her army to 
 become a division of the Russian host, or her 
 revenues and railways to be exploited by a 
 financial coterie from St. Petersburg. The 
 kidnapping of Prince Alexander followed, and, 
 nine years afterwards, the murder of Stambou- 
 loff. In Servia we have the divorce and 
 
NATIONALITIES 197 
 
 attempted expulsion of Queen Natalie, the 
 abdication of King Milan, and other epi- 
 sodes which put to shame the fancy of Mr. 
 Anthony Hope. But these events, interest- 
 ing as they were for the Emperor-King and 
 his subjects, lie beyond the limits of this 
 book. 
 
 The period which we are now considering 
 closes without further important action in 
 foreign affairs. As we look back over it we 
 see that Austria-Hungary is re-established as 
 a Great Power, and is, indeed, the centre of 
 a system of Great Powers, all of which are on 
 the best terms with her. She is still the 
 mistress of many races who, if nationality 
 and sovereignty were always to be united, 
 would quit their Austrian or Hungarian citizen- 
 ship, and join the territories of the various 
 surrounding states. There are Italians in 
 Trieste and the Trentino who sometimes ask 
 for incorporation in Italy ; Germans, a few of 
 whom are beginning to think that union with 
 Germany would be preferable to death by 
 drowning in a sea of Slavs ; Roumans in 
 Transylvania, who want home rule from 
 Hungary, and send congratulatory telegrams 
 to the King of Roumania ; Serbs yearning for 
 the august patronage of King Milan. Yet, 
 with all these surrounding Powers, Austria has 
 
198 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 contracted alliances. Germany and Italy are 
 her most intimate and important friends. 
 Russia, in spite of her Balkan pretensions, 
 has been drawn into friendship, and the 
 Emperor-King is able, in October 1886, to 
 speak to the Delegations of an Austro- Russian 
 understanding in the most cordial and con- 
 fident terms. Roumania has given her adhesion 
 to the Triple Alliance ; Servia is docile, and 
 Bulgaria, for the time at least, shows no inclina- 
 tion of going over to Russia. Thus, in 1890, 
 Francis Joseph, who for forty years had looked 
 round his frontiers to see only actual or poten- 
 tial enemies, could say that he was on good 
 terms with all his neighbours. This happy 
 state of affairs had been reached without great 
 sacrifices of men or money, and without the 
 giving of any inconvenient promises. More- 
 over, in the course of these years the territory 
 of his Empire was increased, and new lands 
 opened for expansion, whilst on the virgin soil 
 of Galicia and Hungary agriculture and com- 
 merce were growing apace. It is the habit 
 of the Emperor's detractors to say that he 
 does nothing but wait, vacillate, temporise. 
 They do not realise, as he has done, that there 
 are cases in which mere patience, and even 
 delay, are the wisest policy. The patient period 
 of 1867-93 in the Emperor's life was one 
 
TIME AJND fATlEJNUJi 199 
 
 when his subjects prospered and gained know- 
 ledge of one another. That period did not 
 put an end to all difficulties, but it showed that 
 co-operation was possible; and that if there 
 were difficulties, they were not insurmountable, 
 This was no small thing. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 1893-1908 
 
 Civil Marriage in Hungary — Progress of Events in Austria — 
 The Badeni Ordinance and its Results — The Army 
 Question in Hungary — Decline of the Hungarian 
 Liberal Party — The Renewal of the Ausgleich'xn. 1897 
 and 1907. — Conclusion. 
 
 When the year 1893 opened the Emperor- 
 King was in a position of great strength 
 abroad, but the outlook at home was uncertain. 
 Taaffe's premiership in Austria came to an 
 end during this year, and he was succeeded by 
 Prince Alfred Windischgratz, one of the chiefs 
 of a noble house who in olden times had been 
 devoted servants of the Hapsburgs, and whose 
 possessions and dignities raised them to semi- 
 royal rank. Prince Windischgratz was a 
 distinguished member of the Conservative 
 party, who by his conduct in the Reichsrath 
 had earned the respect of all men save only 
 a few extremists. His ministry was strength- 
 ened by the co-operation of Dr. von Plener and 
 
 200 
 
CIVIL MARRIAGE 201 
 
 two Polish Ministers. The young Czechs 
 were still in opposition, but the Emperor hoped 
 that with time their demands might be moder- 
 ated, and for the time being nothing was done. 
 Prince Windischgratz held office for two years, 
 but his ministry saw no events of great import- 
 ance. The agitation in Bohemia simmered, 
 but nothing more. It was not till 1897 tnat 
 any important change of policy took place in 
 Austria. 
 
 But in Hungary the year 1894 saw an 
 interesting crisis of which something must be 
 said. In 1892 the Hungarian Liberals took up 
 the question of civil marriage, and this speedily 
 led to the disappearance of the Premier, Count 
 Szapary (Tisza's successor), who, as a loyal 
 Roman Catholic, would not be a party to 
 measures disliked by the Roman Church. 
 Under the existing law as to mixed marriages 
 the children were educated in the religion of 
 their father if they were boys, and, if girls, in 
 that of their mother ; but this law was per- 
 petually evaded by the Roman Catholic priests, 
 who either refused to celebrate mixed marriages, 
 or else declined to do so unless the parents 
 gave, at the altar, a pledge that all their 
 children should be brought up in the Roman 
 Catholic faith. As the registers of marriages 
 were kept by the clergy, the law required that a 
 
202 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 clergyman who married persons of different 
 faiths should communicate to the priest of the 
 other faith the fact that he had performed the 
 service, in order that it might be entered in 
 the registers of his church. This law had also 
 been evaded by the Roman priests ; and owing 
 to their action, the number of illegitimate con- 
 nections was scandalously large. People who 
 would not bind themselves by the pledges 
 demanded at the altar often went into married 
 life without any ceremony, and owing to the 
 irregularity with which the registers were kept, 
 proofs of marriage and legitimacy were often 
 unobtainable when wanted. Certain religions 
 were recognised by the state ; but persons 
 holding to the unrecognised creeds could not 
 legally marry. The Hebrew faith was not 
 recognised, and the injustices and scandals 
 which followed in a country where there were 
 many Jews may easily be imagined. In 1884 
 a Bill was introduced into the Lower House 
 of the Hungarian Legislature for legalising 
 marriage between Jews and Christians, but 
 though it twice passed the Lower House, the 
 Magnates, who were in these matters under 
 the control of the Roman clergy, rejected it. 
 The grievance of the Jews, and indeed of the 
 Catholics who wished to marry Protestants, 
 became so obvious in the early 'nineties that 
 
CIVIL MARRIAGE 203 
 
 action could not be delayed, and at the general 
 election of 1892 many of the Liberal candidates 
 put compulsory civil marriage into their pro- 
 grammes. The elections, which took place in 
 mid-winter (January 4, 1892), caused extra- 
 ordinary scenes. The lower clergy threw 
 themselves into the fray with a zeal unknown 
 before, and went among the peasants, crucifix 
 in hand, asking pledges from their flocks as to 
 the children of mixed marriages. But despite 
 the exertions of the priests, the Liberal party, 
 which had been in power ever since 1867, 
 again carried the day at the polls ; and the 
 majority of the Cabinet were now prepared to 
 deal with the question. The three great issues 
 were : Should the priesthood be allowed to 
 forbid mixed marriages ; should they be allowed 
 to retain control of the registers, and should they 
 be permitted to exact pledges at the altar as 
 to the religion of children yet unborn ? The 
 Catholic Premier, Szapary, might have sup- 
 ported a moderate measure, but he would not 
 consent to compulsory civil marriage, and, in 
 November 1892, as I have said, he retired. 
 He was succeeded by Dr. Wekerle, a bourgeois 
 minister whose family had originally come 
 from Wurtemberg, and who had gained 
 a high reputation by his reform of the Hun- 
 garian currency. The strongest man in the 
 
204 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Cabinet was, however, the Calvinist Minister 
 of Justice, Desiderius Szilagyi, who, from the 
 Bar and a professorial chair, had come to the 
 House and^had rapidly forced his way into the 
 front rank of the Liberal party. 
 
 The Emperor is no friend to Ultra- 
 montanism, but he is a loyal Roman Catholic, 
 and was for a time opposed to the introduction 
 of a compulsory Bill. The speech with which 
 he opened the Hungarian Parliament in 
 February 1892 urged moderation in this and 
 other matters in words whose true meaning 
 could not be mistaken. During 1893, how- 
 ever, he was gradually gained over to approve 
 the introduction of the measure, and at length, 
 in the first week of December, it was laid 
 before the House. It provided that no 
 marriage should be legal unless the civil form 
 were used, and imposed a fine of ^50 on any 
 clergyman who married persons before this 
 contract of marriage had been signed at the 
 civil registry. Various details were imported 
 from the French civil code, which brought 
 divorce within the jurisdiction of the civil 
 courts, and allowed decrees of divorce to be 
 given on grounds not recognised by the canon 
 law. Thus a divorce was to be obtainable 
 for *' deliberate neglect of matrimonial duties," 
 and power was to be given to the judge to 
 
CRISIS IN HUNGARY 205 
 
 prohibit marriage of a divorced wife or husband 
 with the co-respondent in the divorce suit. 
 
 The Bill was fiercely opposed by the Roman 
 Catholic Church, and although Cardinal Vaszary, 
 Archbishop of Gran and Prince Primate of Hun- 
 gary, took no active part against it, the bishops as 
 a body and the lower clergy stopped at nothing 
 — not even at the use of the confessional — to 
 stir up feeling against the ministry. After 
 long debate, in which Szilagyi again and again 
 distinguished himself by magnificent speeches, 
 the Bill was passed in the Chamber of Deputies 
 on April 7, and sent to the Upper House ; but, 
 on May 10, was rejected by a majority of 
 twenty-one. As the House of Peers contains 
 twenty -nine Roman Catholic bishops, it was 
 plain that the clerical vote had turned the 
 scale. Wekerle, using an English precedent, 
 asked the King of Hungary to create a suffi- 
 cient number of peers to out-vote the bishops. 
 The King refused, and, on May 31, the 
 Cabinet resigned. The country was now in 
 a condition of great excitement, and for the 
 first time for many years words hostile to the 
 dynasty were used in Hungary. But they 
 were premature. The King was in a difficult 
 position, which may well be compared to 
 that of the late Queen Victoria when Mr. 
 Gladstone insisted on her signing the Bill 
 
206 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 for the Disestablishment of the Irish Church. 
 Before using his constitutional powers Francis 
 Joseph desired to be assured that the Civil 
 Marriage Bill really represented the will of the 
 Hungarian people. This he did, not by dis- 
 solving the Parliament, but by summoning 
 Count Charles Khuen-Hedervary, the Ban of 
 Croatia, and asking him to form a ministry. 
 Count Khuen was a good Liberal. Had he not 
 been so, he could not, of course, have been Ban 
 of Croatia under a Liberal regime. He was, 
 however, a marked man for promotion, and 
 held views as to the formation of ministries 
 and governments which savoured rather of 
 Taaffe than of Wekerle or Szilagyi. Count 
 Khuen's attempt did not last many days. He 
 was unable to get any substantial following in 
 the Parliament ; and, having heard his views, 
 Francis Joseph loyally, if reluctantly, gave 
 way. Dr. Wekerle was reinstated, and on 
 June ii read a message in both Houses, 1 in 
 which he declared, on royal authority, that the 
 passage of the Civil Marriage Bill was regarded 
 by the King as a "political necessity." He 
 hoped, therefore, not to be forced to use his con- 
 stitutional powers in order that it might pass. 
 
 The bishops and clerical magnates now 
 surrendered; and the Civil Marriage Bill passed 
 
 1 In Hungary Ministers can speak in either House. 
 
SZILAGYI RETIRES 207 
 
 both Houses, whilst before the end of the year 
 other measures of the Wekerle-Szilagyi code 
 (providing for the children of mixed marriages 
 and for civil registration) were placed on the 
 statute book. The passage of these Bills was 
 a great triumph for the Liberal party, and was 
 not the least, though it was almost the last, 
 of their many achievements. The Royal assent 
 was given to the three Bills on December 9 ; 
 and when giving it the King of Hungary 
 asked for the resignation of his Hungarian 
 Ministers. I was in Hungary not long after 
 this event, and was told on good authority that 
 the King regretted this step, but said, " I am 
 pledged to a change of persons." The Minis- 
 ters, though they had a majority in the House, 
 resigned on December 21. A new Ministry, 
 composed of some lesser lights in the Liberal 
 party, was formed under Baron Banffy, a 
 Protestant, who had made his reputation as 
 Prefect of a restless department of Transylvania. 
 Dr. Szilagyi afterwards became President of 
 the Hungarian Parliament (which, in Hungary, 
 is a party office), and distinguished himself 
 there by his profound knowledge of constitu- 
 tional law and his great force of character. 
 To-day, Wekerle is again Premier in Hungary, 
 but in company with men who were at one 
 time his opponents. Szilagyi is in his grave. 
 
208 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 The resignation of the Liberal leaders at a 
 moment of triumph is an event which must 
 excite the curiosity of people who have the 
 ordinary English notions about constitutional 
 government. Undoubtedly the position of 
 these leaders was weakened by their victory 
 on the civil marriage question. The majority 
 of Hungarians are loyal Roman Catholics, and 
 their bishops and priests had used every effort 
 to undermine the Wekerle Cabinet. In this 
 they succeeded, and they were no doubt aided 
 by Roman Catholic influences at Court. Francis 
 Joseph had been in 1894 placed in the most 
 difficult position in which a man can find 
 himself, — when faith and duty conflict, and he 
 has to choose between the course which his 
 spiritual advisers command andTftttt which is 
 required of him in his position of constitutional 
 King. In Austria the Emperor has, always 
 looked for the support of the Roman Ophurch, 
 which is, in the main, hostile to J^atibaalist 
 pretensions and Radical digger- If it is easy 
 to criticise his conduct in dismissing the victors 
 of 1894, it is not difficult, I'think, to Appreciate 
 the difficulty in which he was placed. \ By part- 
 ing with Wekgsigj aftd* jzildgyi he regained the 
 support of the Roman Church in Austria, yet 
 without sacrificing the liberties which' had been 
 gained for his Hungarian subjects. When 
 
'AFFAIRE AGLIARDI' 209 
 
 Wekerle and Szilagyi retired they put the 
 Roman Catholic Church in its place for the 
 present generation, and that without raising 
 any such general hostility to her as has been 
 seen in the Germany of Bismarck and the Italy 
 of Crispi. They had done more than this : 
 they had, if I may say so, vindicated the liberty 
 of all the unborn children in Hungary. 
 
 After the fall of Wekerle and Szilagyi 
 the Liberal party continued in power under 
 Baron Banffy, who held office till 1899. 
 Banffy completed the programme of the party 
 by passing the remaining religious Bills, and his 
 followers did not again have to measure their 
 strength against the clerical reactionaries in 
 Austria. The ill-feeling which existed between 
 the Hungarian Liberals and the Ultramontane 
 faction at Vienna was, however, illustrated in 
 1895 by the " Affaire Agliardi," which led to 
 the downfall of the Foreign Minister of the 
 monarchy, Count Kalnoky. Mgr. Agliardi was 
 the Papal Nuncio at Vienna, and during a visit 
 to Hungary in the spring of '95 he took occa- 
 sion to speak openly against the Liberal party 
 and the recent acts, and freely encouraged 
 resistance to the law. His utterances be- 
 came so violent that questions were put in 
 the Hungarian House of Commons. Baron 
 Banffy, who had previously communicated his 
 
 P 
 
2io FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 views on the matter to the Foreign Office, said 
 that a note would be sent to the Vatican by 
 the common Government of Austria- Hungary 
 demanding an explanation of the Nuncio's 
 conduct. No such note had been sent, but 
 Banffy had assumed that a demand in the 
 substance of his communication to Count Kal- 
 noky would, as a matter ofcourse.be despatched. 
 Count Kalnoky had delayed in the matter in 
 order to satisfy himself by independent inquiry 
 of the accuracy of the Hungarian Premier's 
 information on the Nuncio's conduct. He now 
 issued an official note saying that Baron Banffy's 
 statement was a breach of confidence, and 
 tendered his resignation to the Emperor-King 
 on the ground that he could not usefully co- 
 operate with the Hungarian Premier. Francis 
 Joseph at first declined to accept the resigna- 
 tion, but shortly afterwards did so, thus vindi- 
 cating the action of the Liberal leader. The 
 affair was attributed to personal animosity 
 between the two men, into which it is needless 
 for us to inquire. Its real importance, and the 
 reason why it has a place in a survey of the 
 Emperor's reign, is that it involved the admis- 
 sion of Hungary's claim to deal with Foreign 
 Powers through the medium of the Foreign 
 Office, and not only by action in the Delega- 
 tions, according to the provisions of the 
 
COUNT BADENI 211 
 
 Constitution of 1867. Questions such as those 
 put to Banffy in the Hungarian House should 
 have been put to Count Kalnoky in the Delega- 
 tions ; and these, in fact, were about to meet 
 at the time when the dispute arose. Here we 
 find a case where a question involving diplo- 
 matic relations is put, not in the Delegations, 
 but in the Hungarian Parliament, and answered 
 by the Hungarian Premier. The action of the 
 Emperor-King in accepting Kalnoky's resig- 
 nation admitted this procedure, and the episode 
 may at any time be used as a precedent. 
 So long as a Hungarian Premier has the 
 confidence of his House at Pesth he may, it 
 seems, disregard the provisions of the consti- 
 tution which commit foreign affairs to the care 
 of the Delegates. 
 
 Turning to Austria, we find the strife 
 of nations still rampant in the 'nineties. 
 Prince Windischgratz, who had succeeded Count 
 Taaffe in 1893, retained office till the summer 
 of 1895. ^ n J un e he fell, and after a short 
 provisional ministry under Count Kielmansegg 
 (the first Protestant Premier in Austria), Count 
 Badeni took office in October. Badeni came 
 in with a programme which may be stated in 
 the words, " Austria first, the nationalities after- 
 wards." He began his period of office by 
 adding to the four curiae of electors to the 
 
2i2 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Reichsrath (nobles, chambers of commerce, 
 urban voters, rural voters) a fifth curia on the 
 basis of universal suffrage. This was a step 
 towards the introduction of universal suffrage 
 in Austria which, as my readers are probably 
 aware, was instituted in 1906-7. The fifth 
 curia was to elect 72 members, so that the total 
 number of deputies was raised from 353 to 425. 
 The elections of March 1897 resulted in the 
 return of no less than twenty-five parties to the 
 Reichsrath, amongst whom the Czechs (61) and 
 the Poles (59) were the strongest groups. 
 Count Badeni could count on their support 
 if he put Czech and German on level terms 
 in Bohemia. As he needed a majority in 
 order to carry through the renewal of the 
 terminable portions of the Austro-Hungarian 
 compromise, he issued in April ordinances for 
 Bohemia which required a knowledge of 
 German and Czech from all officials. The 
 ordinances were afterwards toned down so that 
 the obligation should not arise until 1907, but 
 even in their modified form they were opposed 
 by the whole force of the German population. 
 The new rules inflicted no hardship on Czech 
 officials, for a knowledge of German had always 
 been required from them. 1 In Bohemia every 
 
 1 Valuable articles on this subject appeared in the Quarterly 
 Review for October 1901, and in the Nineteenth Century for De- 
 cember 1899. 
 
THE BADENI DECREES 213 
 
 educated Czech knew German, but the 
 Germans, with the exception of the officials in 
 Czech districts, did not know Czech. The 
 Germans now raised an agitation which seri- 
 ously threatened the peace of Bohemia. Riots 
 took place at Eger, a centre of German industry, 
 and elsewhere, and on 4th and 5th November 
 took place a famous all-night sitting of the 
 Reichsrath, in which the German opposition 
 surpassed even the worst performances of 
 previous years. Badeni resigned in November, 
 though not until he had challenged a German 
 firebrand and been wounded in a duel. He 
 was succeeded by Baron Gautsch, an official 
 of the Vienna bureaucracy, who modified the 
 language ordinances ; then by Count Francis 
 Thun, who (in March 1898) renewed the 
 terminable parts of the Austro- Hungarian 
 compromise by Imperial decree ; and then 
 (October 1889) by Count Manfred Clary, who 
 repealed the ordinances altogether. The repeal 
 marks the end of a second period in which the 
 Emperor tried to induce the Federalists to 
 support his rule in Austria. The attempt had 
 two results. It caused the Germans to appeal 
 for help to the various societies in Germany 
 whose institution and efforts, taken altogether, 
 are summarised in the word " Pan-German- 
 ism," It also prevented the constitutional 
 
2i 4 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 renewal of the Austro- Hungarian compromise. 
 The renewal should have been approved by the 
 Reichsrath in 1897 ; but the Reichsrath and the 
 Hungarian House did not give their sanction 
 for several years. The first of these results is 
 of great importance. If I deal with it shortly 
 it is because it raises a question of to-day and 
 to-morrow which, being as yet only in its early 
 stages, cannot be fully discussed in a book 
 which is designed for biography. 1 The German 
 societies are of different ages and sizes, 
 some founded early in the last century, some 
 later ; but their activity as to Austria became 
 observable in the period of Taaffe's ministry, 
 and has since constantly increased. There are in 
 Austria, and especially in Bohemia, a number 
 of sister societies, 2 mostly founded in the years 
 1 890- 1 900, whose object is the maintenance of 
 the German language and German supremacy 
 in Bohemia. Counter societies have been 
 formed by the Czechs, and the rival organ- 
 isations have kept up a fusillade of pamphlets, 
 speeches, and demonstrations in which tons 
 of paper, hogsheads of ink, and a great deal 
 of money have been expended. The formation 
 
 1 A great deal of information on this subject will be found in 
 M. Cheradame's L'Europe et la Question d'Autriche (Paris, 4th edition, 
 1906). The book is frankly hostile to Germany, but, taken as such, 
 is highly instructive. 
 
 2 Cheradame, op. cit. p. 130. 
 
I'AIM-LrJttKMAlMbM 215 
 
 and work of these societies show how great is 
 the importance attached by the Germans and 
 Slavs to the conflict in Bohemia. In that 
 kingdom two of the great races of Europe 
 stand face to face, and it is there that the 
 battle between them will be fought out. The 
 prophets who predict an ultimate disruption of 
 Austria see in the German societies, in their 
 preachers and pamphleteers, in their school- 
 teachers whom they subsidise, in the very 
 Christmas trees which they provide for Ger- 
 man children, the advance-guard of the Hohen- 
 zollern. The Germans see in the Czech 
 societies the advance-guard of Panslavism, 
 and fear that, at some future time, the Emperor 
 of Russia may follow them up and declare 
 himself the protector of all Slavonic races in 
 Francis Joseph's dominions. Since the Russian 
 Government became involved in the Far 
 East and suffered reverses there, the advance 
 of Panslavism in Europe has been checked. 
 The agreement between Francis Joseph and 
 Nicholas II. as to non-intervention in the 
 Balkans, made in 1897, nas been loyally 
 observed in St. Petersburg, and the abortive 
 Bulgarian rising of 1903 found no practical 
 support in Russia. These circumstances have 
 given to the Emperor-King, and his Govern- 
 ment much relief from the Slavophil intrigues 
 
216 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 which were long a source of difficulty, and which 
 greatly encouraged the young Czech movement 
 of the nineties. On the other hand, the mar- 
 vellous growth and prosperity of Germany has 
 drawn Austria- Hungary to a certain extent 
 under her influence, and has compelled the 
 Emperor-King to adopt, both at home and 
 abroad, a policy consistent with the desires of 
 the Emperor William. It would, however, be 
 wrong to assert that Austria- Hungary is simply 
 the vassal state of Germany. On more than 
 one occasion, notably in the case of complaints 
 made by Austrian Poles of their expulsion from 
 East Prussia, the Austrian Premier has taken 
 up a firm attitude ; and if the Emperor-King 
 is always found on the side of the Emperor 
 William in the councils of Europe, the fact is 
 due to identity of interest and policy, and not 
 to any subservience of one to the views or aims 
 of the other. 
 
 In the Bohemian question Francis Joseph 
 has always hoped that time would bring 
 moderation and a solution acceptable to 
 reasonable men. There is no real reason 
 why Czechs and Germans should not agree 
 together. They are for the most part Roman 
 Catholics (though there have recently been 
 many conversions to Protestantism among 
 the Germans), and are by no means so divided 
 
UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE 217 
 
 as the Poles and Ruthenes in Galicia, who 
 differ both in creed" and race, or the Croats 
 and Serbs and Italians in southern Austria 
 and Croatia. The Emperor has constantly 
 and patiently waited, giving as much as could 
 be given with safety, withdrawing his gifts 
 only when he found that they went too far, 
 and trying to teach his people to be Austrians 
 first and Czechs or Germans afterwards. The 
 lesson, however, is being but slowly learnt, 
 and, except for the year 1901, when the 
 dexterity of Baron Gautsch produced a tem- 
 porary truce, the Czechs and Germans have 
 been at daggers'drawn ever since the time of 
 the withdrawal of the Badeni ordinance. The 
 necessary arrangements with Hungary were 
 prolonged from year to year, by decree, but 
 parliamentary action was paralysed, and the 
 country was frequently without a legalised 
 Budget or legally raised recruits. 
 
 In 1906 the Emperor, tired of his prolonged 
 efforts in the cause of good citizenship, readily 
 acceded to the demand for universal suffrage 
 which followed the grant of a constitution in 
 Russia. Early in 1907 a Parliament met in 
 Vienna, elected by no privileged classes of 
 voters, but by all male Austrians over twenty- 
 four years of age. Thus the Francis Joseph 
 who began his life with a paper promise of 
 
2i8 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 representative government, but who ruled for 
 nearly twenty years without a Parliament at 
 all, has lived to see a legislative assembly in 
 Austria, against which even the most advanced 
 democrats can make no complaint. Strange 
 to say, the institution of universal suffrage 
 has considerably improved the Reichsrath. 
 The new Parliament is not strongly marked by 
 the old lines of cleavage between races or 
 nationalities. It looks as though it might 
 fall into two large parties, Christian Socialists 
 on the one side and Social Democrats on 
 the other, which will mean ultimately a con- 
 flict between the Roman Church and the 
 anti-clerical elements in the country. How- 
 ever this may be, the Emperor of Austria 
 has certainly had his hands strengthened for 
 purposes of dealing with the Parliament of 
 Hungary. At the present moment he is at 
 the head of a democratic state in Austria, 
 whilst he is waiting for the dominant Magyars 
 to introduce universal suffrage in Hungary. 
 Until they have done so, the questions at 
 issue between the Crown and Hungary have 
 been postponed. 
 
 Of these the most important is the army 
 question. During the long regime of the 
 Liberal party little question was raised as to 
 the management of the " common " army. 
 
THE ARMY QUESTION 219 
 
 In 1889 a nominal recognition of the fact 
 that the Austro - Hungarian army is two 
 armies was given by a change in its formal 
 title, 1 but the Liberals did not complain of 
 the use of German as the sole language of 
 the army or armies, whichever be the correct 
 word. The " National " party in Hungary, 
 brilliantly led through many years of op- 
 position by Count Albert Apponyi, had 
 always pressed for the use of Magyar in the 
 Magyar regiments of the army, and with 
 the decay of the Liberal organisation, the 
 advance to power of the National party and 
 the Independents, who were now led by the 
 son of Louis Kossuth, the question came to 
 the front. A Hungarian Act of 1868 pro- 
 vided that recruits raised in Hungary should 
 be enlisted only in Hungarian regiments, 
 and a royal decree of the same year directed 
 that Hungarian troops should be commanded 
 by Hungarian officers. These provisions were 
 not strictly carried out, and in the higher 
 military schools German was the only language 
 used. Hungary has, of course, a large militia 
 of its own, called the Honved, a most efficient 
 force, and containing some of the finest 
 cavalry in Europe, but without artillery. 
 Count Apponyi's followers constantly com- 
 
 1 Above, pp. 188-189. 
 
mo FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 plained that the training given in the Honved 
 schools was not good enough. Some improve- 
 ments were effected whilst Baron Banffy was 
 Premier; but it was not till 1903, when a 
 Recruits Bill came before the House, that the 
 present agitation began in earnest. 
 
 The Bill of 1903 asked for an in- 
 creased number of recruits, in order that 
 Austria- Hungary might keep pace with the 
 military preparations of her neighbours. 
 Francis Kossuth, the leader of the extreme 
 Left, opposed the increase in order to protest 
 against the whole system of dual government. 
 Apponyi's followers joined in the opposition 
 with a demand that Magyar should become the 
 language of drill and command in all Hun- 
 garian regiments. The Crown refused assent, 
 and the Premier, M. de Szell, resigned. 
 Count Khuen - Hedervary, who was again 
 summoned from Agram to try to form a 
 Government, failed to do so. The country 
 was left without recruits and without a 
 Budget in the last half of 1903, and it was 
 necessary, in order to maintain the peace 
 strength of the army, to keep time-expired 
 men under the colours. In September the 
 Emperor went to Galicia to attend the 
 autumn manoeuvres, and on the 14th he 
 issued at Chlopy a remarkable army order. 
 
THE 'CHLOPY ORDER' 221 
 
 He declared that, as commander-in-chief, he 
 " must and will hold fast the existing organ- 
 isation of the army " which was " threatened 
 by one-sided aspirations." The order was 
 received with acclamations in Austria, but 
 with defiance in Hungary, and it was found 
 necessary to tone it down by a concilia- 
 tory message to the Hungarian House of 
 Commons. In October 1903 a compromise 
 was arrived at which provided that Hungarian 
 standards and emblems should be placed beside 
 those of Austria on all military buildings, that 
 instruction should be given in Magyar in all 
 military schools, and that all Hungarian officers 
 in Austrian regiments should be transferred to 
 Hungarian regiments. Other small concessions 
 were made, and Count Stephen Tisza, son 
 of the Premier of 1 875-1890, took office and 
 tried to carry on the Government. 
 
 Obstruction was, however, too strong for 
 him, and the debates became so angry 
 that strong, and even illegal, .measures had 
 to be taken to stop them. " The, Tiszas are 
 like chimney-sweeps," said one of the most 
 polite of the new Premier's opponents; "the 
 higher they go, the blacker they get!" In 
 March 1894 Count Tisza suspended the 
 measures for meeting obstruction, and' the 
 Recruits Bill was passed, mainly in order to 
 
222 FRANCIS- JOSEPH I. 
 
 allow time-expired men to return to their 
 homes ; but the Premier's proposals for deal- 
 ing with obstruction, revived after its passage, 
 led to a long and heated controversy, and 
 ended in an appeal to the country. The elec- 
 tions, which took place in January 1905 in the 
 depth of winter, put an end to the Liberal 
 party. After a life of thirty-seven years it was 
 vanquished at the hustings. 
 
 The Emperor was not discouraged by the 
 Liberal defeat. He appointed an old soldier, 
 Baron Fejervary, Prime Minister, and the 
 country was governed through 1905 and up to 
 April 1906 without even the semblance of 
 Parliamentary sanction. The most remarkable 
 feature of the elections of 1905 was the 
 appearance of a new party, consisting of some 
 twenty members, who represented the Rou- 
 manian population in Transylvania. This pro- 
 vince, situated in the south-east of Hungary, 
 is inhabited by three races — Magyars, Saxons 
 who immigrated long ago from Germany, and 
 Roumanians, who are brothers to the adjacent 
 population of Roumania. Up to 1905 they 
 abstained from sending members to the Hun- 
 garian Parliament as a protest against the 
 centralist Government of Hungary and the 
 use of Magyar as the only official language in 
 their district. They now entered the field, 
 
THE MAGYAR DANGER 223 
 
 came to Parliament, and propounded a pro- 
 gramme of universal suffrage, redistribution, 
 and the use in each regiment of the language 
 to which the greatest number of soldiers in it 
 belonged. The demand for universal suffrage 
 was taken up in 1905 all through the kingdom 
 of Hungary, and was most embarrassing to 
 the majority, now led by Kossuth and Apponyi. 
 Though unassailable in point of numbers, they 
 were simply disregarded by the stout old soldier, 
 Fejervary, whocarriedon the Governmentasbest 
 he could without them. Suffrage in Hungary 
 is the highest in Europe ; and out of 1 7,000,000 
 inhabitants, less than 1,000,000 have votes. If 
 universal suffrage were granted, the Magyar 
 supremacy would be almost certain to come to 
 an end, and the ancient Parliament of Hungary 
 would probably be reduced to the humble level 
 of the Austrian assembly. Yet the leaders of 
 the majority, who claimed to represent the 
 national will, could not very well oppose a 
 change which was about to take place in 
 Austria. Francis Joseph, with his usual sound 
 judgment, saw this. In his negotiation with the 
 Hungarian leaders in April 1906 he made dex- 
 terous use of it. Summoning Dr. Wekerle, the 
 ex- Premier of 1894, and Kossuth, whose father 
 had, in '49, proclaimed him a traitor and an 
 outlaw, he entrusted them in April with the 
 
224 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 formation of a ministry. Apponyi, now the first 
 orator in Hungary, became Minister of Educa- 
 tion, and it was agreed that the army question 
 should ,be postponed until manhood suffrage 
 had been established in the western half of the 
 monarchy. The Hungarian leaders have thus 
 been left to settle amongst themselves the 
 question of electoral reform in their country. 
 They refused to carry on the Government 
 unless concessions were made to which Francis 
 Joseph could not consent. They appealed 
 against the King to the will of the people. 
 To the people, said Francis Joseph, let them 
 go; but to the whole people. It may have been 
 his Majesty's last card ; but it was a good one. 
 Before the truce of 1906 was arranged the 
 Hungarian ministers agreed to pass the laws 
 which were necessary to renew the terminable 
 parts of the compromise of 1867. This has 
 since been done, and the present arrangements 
 will last till 191 7. After that date Hungary and 
 Austria will have free hands, and it has been 
 settled that the treaty-obligations which bind 
 both of them to foreign countries shall terminate 
 at the time when they gain freedom from one 
 another. The Emperor- King has undertaken 
 not to enforce any fresh commercial treaties 
 by decree, so that in 19 17 no treaty may be in 
 force to fetter the free action of both states in 
 
ECONOMIC RIVALRY 225 
 
 their tariff arrangements with foreign states. 
 To speak accurately, Austria and Hungary are 
 now in theory independent, but they have 
 agreed to maintain free trade with one another 
 for ten years, and to charge similar duties 
 during that period upon imported goods. 
 
 A full discussion of this complicated subject 
 would be out of place here. 1 Austria and 
 Hungary are two countries whose commercial 
 interests are by no means the same. Austria 
 was in 1867 an old-established and highly- 
 developed industrial country, with factories, 
 highly specialised industries, and a great 
 accumulation of capital. Certain parts of 
 Austria, such as the great province of Galicia, 
 were, economically speaking, in their youth ; 
 but on the whole she was a full-grown state. 
 Hungary was almost wholly agricultural — a 
 vast prairie, with land of great fertility but 
 without industries or manufactures. It can 
 easily be seen that, if there is free trade between 
 two countries in these conditions, it will tend to 
 prevent the agricultural country from develop- 
 ing manufactures. If any industrial under- 
 taking is started in Hungary, the Austrian 
 manufacturers, by making an agreement, can 
 undersell for a time the Hungarian -made 
 
 1 An article on this topic from the pen of Count Joseph Mailath 
 appeared in the Contemporary Review for September 1908. 
 
 Q 
 
226 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 product and choke the new industry in its early 
 days. So long as the Hungarians are unpro- 
 tected by a tariff this must be possible. The 
 result must be, and has been, that Hungary 
 has remained, commercially speaking, an ap- 
 panage of Austria. One can easily imagine 
 that if we in England had never permitted our 
 colonies to protect themselves by a tariff wall 
 against us, whilst they were protected against 
 other countries, they would have remained to 
 this day in complete dependence on us for all 
 manufactured goods. They would still be 
 prairies. In the case of our earliest colony, 
 Ireland, this course was adopted in the seven- 
 teenth and eighteenth centuries. The dis- 
 content which it caused in the younger and 
 weaker country has, as we know, continued 
 down to our own day. In the nineteenth 
 century we did not attempt such a policy. 
 The later colonies have set up tariffs against 
 us, and, owing to them, have commenced indus- 
 trial life. In Hungary this could not be done, 
 and it is chiefly due to the ingenious devices 
 of successive Hungarian Governments 1 that 
 Hungarian manufacture has made considerable 
 progress in spite of Austrian competition. 
 Thus the Government at Pesth has offered 
 free land, partial exemption from taxation, and 
 the first refusal of Government contracts to 
 
RESULTS OF FREE TRADE 227 
 
 Austrian manufacturers if they would transfer 
 their plant to Hungary. When this offer 
 has been accepted, the manufacturer has come 
 over to Hungary and given employment and 
 training there, whilst still retaining his Austrian 
 custom. The Austrians think this is not fair 
 play, and most people will agree with them. 
 When I was in Pesth in 1896, at the time of 
 the Hungarian Millennial Exhibition, I heard 
 the matter discussed at some length. The King 
 of Hungary was there at the moment, and I 
 remember that on ione occasion when I was 
 talking over that subject with some friends, 
 His Majesty had just been going round the 
 industrial part of the Exhibition. I was told by 
 a person who had gone round with him that he 
 repeatedly asked of those in charge, "Who are 
 your principal customers?" In almost every 
 case they answered, " Sire, your Majesty's 
 Government." 
 
 This answer was significant. It helps out- 
 siders to understand one of the causes of 
 commercial jealousy between the two states. 
 Again it is easy to imagine cases in which a 
 duty, where it may be approved in industrial 
 Austria, may be disliked in agricultural Hun- 
 gary. The one wants the newest agricultural 
 machinery, from England or the United States, 
 to come in as nearly free as possible. The 
 
228 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 other wants a high duty on such machinery, 
 so as to make a preference in favour of her 
 home - made machinery. One wants a duty 
 on foqd products, so as to favour home-grown 
 produce ; the other does not, and so forth. 
 These matters, however, take us far away from 
 the life of the Emperor-King. For an essayist 
 it is enough to mention that there is, and must 
 always be, a certain divergence of economic 
 interest and policy between the two states. 
 Its presence adds to the difficulty of Francis 
 Joseph's task — the task of welding the two 
 peoples into a single and solid monarchy 
 peopled by citizens who are willing and able 
 to work together, each for the good of the 
 whole. 
 
 As the sixtieth year of his long reign drew 
 to a close the old monarch was still at his post, 
 patient, watchful, zealous in all that was for the 
 good of his subjects, anxious to trust them as 
 far as he could, risen far beyond the tradi- 
 tions of his early life, the sovereign of a new 
 monarchy wholly different from the Austria 
 of his youth, the accepted of democracy in 
 Austria, and actually, by a freak of fortune, the 
 champion of democracy in the vaunted home 
 of Liberty beyond the Leitha. The Austrian 
 Franchise Act not only permitted universal 
 suffrage, but enabled the provincial diets to 
 
SIXTY YEARS 229 
 
 make it compulsory. In Hungary the King 
 asks his Hungarian ministers to introduce a 
 similar measure ; yet they hesitated. 1 Here, 
 then, was this autocratic Hapsburg, the grandson 
 of Francis II., who confined the earliest Italian 
 patriots in dungeons and took from them the 
 sparrows which they had tamed to share their 
 solitude, the pupil of Metternich, the execu- 
 tioner of Batthyany, not only asking his 
 subjects to share his powers, but actually 
 cramming political power down their throats ; 
 begging the very son of Louis Kossuth, who 
 declared him an outlaw and a traitor for 
 tyranny in 1848, to permit the whole of Kos- 
 suth's country to share in its government. 
 
 It would be a mistake to say that Francis 
 Joseph is a great man ; but it is certainly, I 
 believe, a mistake to imagine that he has had 
 no policy at all, and has merely lived from year 
 to year, meeting difficulties one by one as they 
 arose, without any idea as to what may happen 
 in the end. The true view seems to be that 
 Francis Joseph began his reign as one who had 
 been reared in an atmosphere of autocracy, in 
 a school where the old Hapsburg traditions pre- 
 vailed. In the first three years of his reign 
 he saw those ideas challenged and vindicated. 
 From 1849 to 1859 he continued in them. 
 
 1 See the next chapter. 
 
2 3 o FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 In 1859 he suffered his first defeat, and 
 in 1866 was defeated again. Yet in 1859 he 
 was able to make peace on very easy terms, 
 whilsf in 1866 his enemies again made peace 
 with him upon conditions which might easily 
 have been more severe. The year of Sadowa 
 is the turning - point in his reign. One may 
 almost say that he has had two reigns — the first, 
 of twenty years as an autocrat ; the second, of 
 fifty as a constitutional sovereign. The intro- 
 duction of constitutional government is always 
 a difficult process, never accomplished, even in 
 England, without bloodshed ; and in Austria- 
 Hungary it was much more difficult than else- 
 where. It was followed by a long period of 
 cautious and patient administration, the main 
 object of which is all along visible to any careful 
 observer. It is the education of a vast and 
 varied population in the duties of citizenship, 
 the development of the state-idea in races or 
 small nations which have long been rivals or 
 enemies and which are distracted from Austria 
 by external influences. In a case of this kind 
 great results are difficult of attainment in a 
 short time ; final results are unattainable. 
 The full significance and effect of this reign 
 cannot, therefore, be realised, or even well 
 estimated, until long after it has closed. What 
 Francis Joseph has done for Austria- Hungary 
 
SIXTY YEARS 231 
 
 is to give her time. In political pathology 
 time is invaluable ; and those who, like our 
 own great Queen Elizabeth and the Emperor 
 Francis Joseph, realise that time and rest are 
 necessary for political development, and who 
 secure for their subjects that long period of 
 time, are wise and good rulers. 
 
 To those who agree with this view it is a 
 cause for gratitude that the Emperor- King 
 has been spared to rule at Vienna and Pesth 
 for over sixty years. They can desire nothing 
 so much as that he should reign for a century. 
 As this is not to be, we can only hope that the 
 fine example of judgment and patience which 
 he has shown will not be forgotten by those 
 who, I trust at a very distant date, may . be 
 called upon to succeed him. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 1908— 1914 
 
 Bosnia and the Herzegovina — Congress of Berlin — Annexation 
 — Weights in the Balance — Looking backward. 
 
 The foregoing pages had been written and 
 were ready for printing when the annexation 
 of Bosnia and the Herzegovina was proclaimed. 
 The annexation caused some surprise in Europe, 
 and, oddly enough, evoked a great deal of 
 hostile comment in this country. It was de- 
 nounced as a breach of the Treaty of Berlin, 
 as though Austria- Hungary had been put under 
 some restrictions by that Treaty, whereas in 
 fact no restriction of any kind was placed upon 
 her. Those who denounced her action seem 
 to have forgotten (if they ever knew it) that 
 the commission to Austria-Hungary to occupy 
 and administer Bosnia and the Herzegovina 
 was given at the suggestion of Lord Salisbury, 
 the junior delegate for England at the Berlin 
 Conference, and that this was done in the 
 execution of the traditional policy of England 
 
 232 
 
BOSNIA & THE HERZEGOVINA 233 
 
 in the Near East, which is to preserve an 
 even balance between the contending parties 
 there, and to take all possible measures for the 
 better government of the population of those 
 parts. Before 1875 the government of Bosnia 
 and the Herzegovina was extremely bad ; but 
 the conflict of races and creeds was so keen 
 that it was impossible to establish Bosnia and 
 the Herzegovina as a principality after the 
 manner of Bulgaria. The population consists 
 largely of men of Slavonic race, the Ottomans 
 being in a small minority. After the Turkish 
 conquest which was completed about the year 
 1480, many of the Slav inhabitants were con- 
 verted to Mohammedanism, and in course of 
 time many others were converted to Roman 
 Catholicism or joined the Greek Catholic 
 Church (which holds the Catholic doctrine 
 but has services in the vernacular and per- 
 mits its priests to marry). The Mohammedan 
 Slavs had in course of time become quite loyal 
 to Turkey, and it was they who gave the 
 Austro - Hungarian generals so much trouble 
 in the campaign of occupation which took place 
 in the late summer of 1878. The Greek 
 Orthodox Slavs looked to Servia or Monte- 
 negro, and positively hoped for union with 
 one or other of these States. The Roman or 
 Greek Catholics were attracted by religion 
 
234 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 rather towards Austria or Italy. The Turks 
 knew that they could not satisfy all these 
 aspirations, and consequently adopted their 
 usual expedient of not satisfying any of them. 
 Apart from that, their government was ex- 
 tremely bad. The taxes were farmed to 
 extortionate undertakers. The land laws were 
 oppressive, and tithes were frequently raised 
 to an unjust extent. The difficulties and 
 scandals in connection with the law courts, 
 which always occur where Mohammedans are 
 judges and Christians are litigants or witnesses, 
 were rampant throughout the country. Some- 
 thing had to be done to remedy these evils ; 
 but, as I have said, the people of the country 
 were even less fit than the Bulgarians and 
 Servians to govern themselves. Fortunately 
 this was understood. The mistake of entrust- 
 ing men who have been freed from a long 
 period of Turkish misgovernment with a paper- 
 made democratic constitution has been made 
 more than once. It is the worst remedy for 
 the ills of the Near East. The impotence, 
 corruption, misgovernment, and murder which 
 have dogged the steps of popular government 
 in the' Balkans do not justify the tyranny of 
 the Sultan ; but they impress those who have 
 followed the history of the Balkan States with 
 the dangers which may follow if races who 
 
BOSNIA & THE HERZEGOVINA 235 
 
 have just been freed from tyranny are at once 
 let loose upon themselves. A humane and 
 judicious despotism is undoubtedly, so far as 
 experience goes, the best form of government 
 for such people. 1 It was tried in Bosnia and 
 the Herzegovina, and was not found wanting. 
 
 The Russo- Turkish war of 1877 was, as 
 every schoolboy knows, prefaced by a rising in 
 Montenegro and the Herzegovina, where the 
 tithes had been suddenly raised. The Sultan, 
 after quelling the insurrection, endeavoured to 
 meet the reasonable demands of the insurgents 
 by issuing a Firman and an Irade (in October 
 and December 1875), renewing and confirming 
 in their favour the privileges granted to the 
 Christians in Turkey by two charters known 
 as the Hatt-i-sherif of Gulhane^ (1839) and the 
 Hatt-i-hamayoun (1856). The rising in the 
 Herzegovina caused considerable trouble in 
 Austria- Hungary, where any Slav movements 
 which take place outside the Dual Monarchy 
 are apt to awaken sympathetic echoes. Count 
 Andrassy, then Foreign Minister in Austria- 
 Hungary, accordingly invited the co-operation 
 of the Powers which had signed the Treaty of 
 Paris to take steps for securing to Bosnia and 
 the Herzegovina that the privileges promised 
 
 1 Some interesting observations on this matter will be found in Mr. 
 Miller's excellent book, Travel and Politics in the Near East (London, 
 1897). 
 
236 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 them should be really and honestly conceded. 
 His proposals were framed in a circular sent 
 to the Powers in December 1876, and usually 
 known as the " Andrassy Note." Its sugges- 
 tions were based on the charters of 1839 and 
 1856, and it asked for guarantees of religious 
 liberty, for the abolition of tax -farming, the 
 regulation of the tithes, and the appropriation 
 to Bosnia and the Herzegovina of all revenue 
 raised by direct taxes within their borders, and 
 other things. The Porte accepted these pro- 
 posals, and in February 1876 issued a Firman 
 embodying them. The insurgents were, how- 
 ever, not yet content. They held out for a 
 reduction of the Turkish garrison, the appoint- 
 ment of Austro- Hungarian and Russian agents 
 in six towns in the provinces to supervise the 
 execution of the reforms, and the right to keep 
 their arms in their hands till they should be 
 carried out. 1 The Porte agreed to these de- 
 mands, but in fact it did nothing, and the 
 situation in Bosnia and the Herzegovina 
 remained unchanged. The preliminaries of 
 Adrianople agreed upon between Russia and 
 Turkey gave home rule to the provinces, and 
 provided that two years' revenue should be 
 hypothecated to restoring the refugees, wiping 
 off the arrears due from the local tax-payers 
 
 1 I take the facts from Spalaikovitch's La Bosnie, etc. (Paris, 1897). 
 
THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN 237 
 
 to the Turkish Exchequer, and giving the 
 people a fresh start. When the arrangements 
 between Turkey and Russia were revised at 
 Berlin, Count Andrassy openly expressed the 
 view that in Bosnia and the Herzegovina 
 home rule would be impracticable. 1 He drew 
 attention to the rivalries between Christians 
 and Mussulmans there, which had been the 
 first cause of the late war, and declared that 
 these rivalries would be rather increased than 
 diminished by local home rule. The independ- 
 ence or semi-independence of Servia and Bul- 
 garia was sure to be used as a precedent in 
 demanding Bosnian independence ; and the 
 demand must lead to an agitation which 
 Turkey could not quell. Further, if Servia 
 and Montenegro should be extended so as to 
 adjoin one another, the commercial interests 
 of Austria - Hungary would suffer, and the 
 Congress must keep this in view. Austria- 
 Hungary bordered on Bosnia, and had suffered 
 great losses owing to the perpetual disturbances 
 in the province. She had in the last two years 
 had to support 200,000 refugees at a cost of 
 nearly ,£1,000,000, and had had to keep a 
 large army on the frontier to prevent incursions. 
 Lord Salisbury followed Count Andrassy, 
 
 1 The debate on this subject at the Congress of Berlin (June 28, 
 1878) is well reported in Samwer and Hopf, Rtcueil de Traitis, etc., 
 2nd series, vol. Hi. at pp. 331-340. 
 
238 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 and at once proposed that the provinces should 
 be occupied and administered by Austria- 
 Hungary. He declared that the Porte could 
 not restore or keep order in Bosnia and the 
 Herzegovina, and that the provinces were of 
 no use or value to Turkey. Moreover, he 
 declared that if a large part of it fell into the 
 hands of one of the neighbouring principalities, 
 a chain of Slav States would be formed which 
 would extend across the Balkans from sea to 
 sea, which would be a menace to other races 
 occupying territories to the south of that chain. 
 Lord Salisbury's proposal was supported by 
 France and Germany, and, after some hesita- 
 tion, by Italy. Count Andrassy declared that 
 Austria was ready to occupy and govern, but 
 said that, although for the purpose of keeping 
 open a commercial road to the south she must 
 have the right of garrisoning the district of 
 Novi-Bazar, she had no desire to occupy that 
 portion of Bosnia. Turkish authority might 
 therefore remain in force there. 
 
 This policy was embodied in the Treaty 
 of Berlin. Nothing was said, aye or no, as to 
 the permanence of the occupation. It must be 
 remembered, however, that Prince Gortchakoff, 
 when assenting, for Russia, to the occupation, 
 explained that the Russian vote " s'applique ex- 
 clusivement aux termes de la motion de Lord 
 
GORTCHAKOFF & SALISBURY 239 
 
 Salisbury " ; that is, it was a vote in favour of 
 occupation and administration, but of nothing 
 more. 
 
 It is fairly clear from these facts that Great 
 Britain, Germany, France, Austria- Hungary, 
 and Italy, though they did not say that the 
 occupation should be permanent, meant that it 
 should be so. If Gortchakoff had not felt that 
 this was the sense of the meeting, he would 
 hardly have made the reservation which I have 
 just mentioned. 
 
 The diplomatists at Berlin had, in fact, to 
 decide who should exercise the humane des- 
 potism over Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 
 Such a despotism was necessary in order that 
 these territories might recover from the effects 
 of ancient misrule, and from the exhausting war 
 in which their inhabitants had tried to oust the 
 Turks. Lord Salisbury's speech, which I have 
 already mentioned, shows England's reasons for 
 not entrusting Russia with the mission. His 
 objections to the extension of a Slavophil chain 
 across the Balkans, would, of course, have 
 applied with equal force to an arrangement by 
 which Russia herself would have formed or 
 held a link in that chain. Such a chain would 
 sever Turkey from Europe, and would greatly 
 increase that influence of Russia in the Near 
 East which it had been our object in 1856 and 
 
2 4 o FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 1878 to prevent. Lord Salisbury was strongly 
 opposed to a course which would enable Russia 
 and her vassal states, by a judicious policy of 
 railway tariffs, to cut off Turkey altogether 
 from Europe. The English statesmen of 1878 
 thought this a great danger. In the Victorian 
 age Russia was still regarded by England as the 
 most formidable Power in the Near East ; and 
 had often shown that she was so. We had 
 not yet occupied Egypt or Cyprus, which 
 protect the great road to India and Australia, 
 and the fear that Russia, by absorbing Turkey, 
 might assume a position which would enable 
 her to block that road, was a constant and 
 genuine motive to our diplomacy. The pro- 
 blem of 1878, therefore, was — how to secure 
 good government in Bosnia and the Herze- 
 govina, without magnifying Russian influence 
 in the Balkans. The solution — let Austria- 
 Hungary govern them — came easily. 
 
 Count Andrassy's reason for not taking over 
 the district of Novi-Bazar is not very clear. 
 At the Congress of Berlin he said that Austria 
 did not wish for the commission to govern it 
 because it did not border on Austria- Hungary. 
 His decision may have been due to a desire 
 to save Turkey's feelings, or to a feeling that 
 Austria -Hungary would have enough on her 
 hands without it. However this may be, it 
 
ANDRASSY & THE BALKANS 241 
 
 was agreed that the Turkish civil administra- 
 tion should remain in operation in Novi-Bazar, 
 but Austria-Hungary was authorised to make 
 roads and railways in the district, and to keep 
 garrisons to protect those roads. Thus was 
 Lord Salisbury's anxiety relieved, and the 
 Slav belt from the Black Sea to the Adriatic 
 broken. The agreement is typical of the 
 character of the Treaty of Berlin. It secured 
 good government in the Balkans, and restricted 
 Russian influence there. 
 
 The Treaty of Berlin may be regarded as 
 a triumph for Austrian diplomacy, because 
 Count Andrassy induced Europe to take up and 
 support the Austro-Hungarian view as to the 
 future of Bosnia. This view had been clearly 
 expressed in a speech made by Count Andrassy 
 to the Austrian Delegation on 19th December 
 1877. He then declared that if Servia should 
 invade Bosnia and the Herzegovina, whose 
 fate was then in the balance, Austria- Hungary 
 would make certain claims, and that if these 
 claims were not listened to, she would invade 
 the provinces. 1 It is indeed clear that if 
 Bosnia and the Herzegovina had been erected 
 into a Slav principality, Austria's power in 
 the south and west and on the Adriatic would 
 
 1 The sitting of the Delegations was held with closed doors ; but see 
 The Times of 21st December 1877, p. 3. 
 
 R 
 
242 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 have been gravely prejudiced. The narrow 
 strip of territory — Dalmatia — which runs for 
 many miles between Bosnia and the sea, 
 coul4 not have been held, and Austria must, 
 in the end, have retired once more, as she did 
 in 1859 and 1866, from lands which she could 
 not hold. It was, indeed, essential to Austria- 
 Hungary that if the provinces must be freed 
 from Turkish authority, they should not be 
 handed over to the government of Russia as 
 vassals. Had they been so, the balance of 
 power in South-Eastern Europe would have 
 been greatly — one may say decisively — altered 
 in favour of the Slavs, as against that combina- 
 tion of Germans and Magyars which is, so to 
 speak, personified in Austria- Hungary. 
 
 In this case the policy of the Dual Monarchy 
 was in accord with the public policy of Europe. 
 For England, for France and Italy and Ger- 
 many, it was essential that Russia should not 
 become the predominant Power in the Balkan 
 States. It was to prevent her becoming so that 
 several of the Powers of Europehad intervened 
 in 1856 between the Czar Nicholas and Turkey. 
 To allow Bosnia and the Herzegovina to pass 
 into Slavonic hands would have been to stultify 
 all that England, France, and Young Italy had 
 done, by war or diplomacy, in 1854, 1855, and 
 1856. These Powers were therefore in this 
 
BOSNIA & THE HERZEGOVINA 243 
 
 position : they wished to secure good govern- 
 ment for the Bosniaks, but they wished to 
 restrict and not increase the Russian power 
 in South-Eastern Europe. Thus their policy 
 and the Austro- Hungarian policy were found 
 to coincide, and were satisfied by the commis- 
 sion which Austria-Hungary undertook. She 
 has carried it out with an ability, a dexterity, 
 and a devotion proved by the evidence of every 
 independent witness who has seen her work. 
 
 The Berlin Congress did not arrange the 
 details of the occupation, but left Austria and 
 Turkey to work them out together, and the 
 result of Austro-Turkish discussions was sum- 
 marised in a treaty signed in April 1879. I 
 need not refer at length to this treaty. It 
 reserved the sovereignty of the Sultan in 
 Bosnia, but the Austrians refused to saddle 
 their administration, like the English adminis- 
 tration of Cyprus, with the liability to pay 
 tribute to the Porte. The Sultan took special 
 guarantees for the protection of the Moslem 
 faith ; and these have been observed with 
 scrupulous respect. It was agreed that any 
 surplus of the revenue of the provinces over 
 current expense should be spent in Bosnia. 
 Thus Bosnia has the full benefit of any im- 
 provement which may take place in her 
 economic condition. Moreover, the " Law of 
 
244 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Administration " of Bosnia and the Herze- 
 govina, which was passed through the Austrian 
 and Hungarian Parliaments in 1880, provided 1 
 that if the revenue of Bosnia and the Herze- 
 govina should not in any year suffice to meet 
 the needs of the local government, the deficit 
 should be made good out of the common fund 
 of the Dual Monarchy. This was a most 
 generous provision, and gave to Bosnia the 
 advantage of being able to rely on the Dual 
 Exchequer for works of improvement of all 
 kinds. Taken together with the financial 
 provision of the Austria - Turkish Treaty, it 
 placed her in a position which other Balkan 
 States may well envy. She could make no 
 debts ! Could Servia, with her rotten finance, 
 have given such terms? Would Russia have 
 done so ? 
 
 As to the manner in which Austria- Hungary 
 has carried out her work in Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina there cannot, I think, be any serious 
 conflict of opinion. 2 The roads, the schools, 
 the railways, the mining works, the survival 
 of her splendid forests, the hospitals and 
 gymnasia, and, above all, the security of life 
 and property, bear conclusive testimony to the 
 
 1 Spalaikovitch, op. cit. pp. 176, 178. 
 
 2 For an independent judgment I may again refer to Mr. Miller's 
 book (cited above, p. 235). His opinion is confirmed by numerous 
 newspaper reports which have since been published. 
 
AUSTRIA'S RECORD IN BOSNIA 245 
 
 competence and integrity of the Austrian 
 Government. Indeed, that competence and in- 
 tegrity have never been seriously questioned, so 
 that it is almost waste of time to dilate upon 
 them. 
 
 A traveller is as safe now in the mountains 
 of Bosnia as in London, and a good deal safer 
 than in Chicago. The Austrian and Hungarian 
 civil service has always been a training-ground 
 for young men of good, often of noble family, 
 who enter it in early years before they succeed 
 to their property, or before they turn to politics. 
 The Bosnian service has been filled with 
 civilians of this class who have devoted them- 
 selves with the utmost keenness and with high 
 intelligence to their work ; and in thirty years 
 they have literally done wonders. Complete 
 tolerance is secured to all creeds, and the old 
 land system, which would have been just enough 
 if it had been honestly worked, has been pre- 
 served and is worked with honesty. The 
 labouring peasantry can draw on the Govern- 
 ment for purchase of their holdings on terms of 
 generosity which are exceeded only in Ireland. 
 Travelling is very cheap for the poor, and can 
 be comfortable for the rich ; and the Govern- 
 ment has provided hotels in which modern 
 comforts can be obtained, and the terrors of 
 Eastern travel forgotten. 
 
246 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 " From a considerable experience," says an 
 independent witness, " of the Austria- Hungarian 
 authorities, not merely in the chief towns and 
 on the beaten track, but up country and off the 
 ordinary routes, I have come to the conclusion 
 that they resemble our own civil servants in 
 their integrity, their absolute devotion to their 
 duty, and their unflagging energy, whilst I 
 think they surpass the average Anglo- Indian 
 official in their keen interest in the welfare of 
 the people committed to their charge." 1 
 
 And now, after exactly thirty years, the 
 Emperor Francis Joseph has announced that 
 he will not retire from Bosnia and the 
 Herzegovina, and that he has superseded 
 the sovereignty of the Sultan there by his own. 
 This is not, either in form or in substance, a 
 violation of any clause in the Treaty of Berlin. 
 That treaty never stated that the occupation 
 should be temporary or provisional ; nor did 
 it safeguard the sovereignty or suzerainty of 
 the Sultan, as was done in the case of Bulgaria. 2 
 On the other hand, the Treaty of 1879 between 
 Austria - Hungary and Turkey did declare 
 that the Sultan's sovereignty in Bosnia and 
 the Herzegovina was to be maintained ; and 
 
 1 Miller, op. cit. pp. 116-17. 
 
 2 The declaration of Bulgarian independence was therefore much 
 more like a violation of the Treaty of Berlin than the Austrian annexa- 
 tion of Bosnia. 
 
THE CONCERT OF EUROPE 247 
 
 Turkey had the right to complain that this 
 treaty has been violated. The only question 
 for English diplomatists is whether, under these 
 circumstances, we have any locus standi for 
 objecting to what Austria has done. 1 
 
 The Treaty of Paris of 1856 admitted 
 Turkey to " the advantages " of the Concert 
 of Europe. I have never clearly understood 
 what this means. Those who believe that 
 they do so, say it means that Turkey is to be 
 an independent country, and that arrangements 
 or treaties with her are not to be made by 
 single states, but are a matter of common 
 concern in which the Powers of Europe are 
 to be consulted. 2 These two alleged meanings 
 are so clearly inconsistent that it is hard to 
 agree with them, or to share the opinion of 
 their sponsors that they have really mastered 
 the meaning of the Treaty of Paris. I suggest 
 that this admission of Turkey to the Concert 
 of Europe meant not that she was to be inde- 
 pendent, but that she was to be dependent on 
 all the other states of the Concert, and that 
 no one of them might deal separately or alone 
 with her in any matter which involved the 
 alteration of her territory or the diminution of 
 her rights. Before 1856 many infringements 
 
 1 The reader will remember that these passages were written in 1908. 
 
 2 See, e.g., the late Duke ot Argyll's Our Responsibilities towards 
 Turkey, pp. 14-16. 
 
248 FRANCIS JOSEPH I 
 
 of Turkish territory had taken place. The 
 Russian demand for the right to "protect" 
 the Christians in Turkey was an attempt to 
 trespass on the Sultan's prerogative. The old 
 French claim to protect the Eastern Catholics 
 and the " capitulations " may be cited as in- 
 stances of the same thing. I imagine that the 
 real meaning of admitting Turkey to the 
 Concert of Europe was that arrangements of 
 this kind were not to be made in the future 
 by any one Power without the previous know- 
 ledge and consent of all the others. Now, if 
 this suggestion be right, it may be argued with 
 some show of justice that the annexation of 
 Bosnia and the Herzegovina should not have 
 taken place without at least a previous inter- 
 change of views between the Powers. On this 
 ground only, Great Britain may have some locus 
 standi for objecting to the annexation. 1 
 
 I may notice, in passing, that the determina- 
 tion of the Austro- Hungarian Government to 
 keep a free hand in the matter of Bosnia and the 
 Herzegovina ought to have been clear to the 
 Powers of Europe very soon after the Treaty 
 of Berlin was signed. In July 1880 the signa- 
 
 1 By a treaty of 15th April 1856, Austria, France, and Great 
 Britain bound themselves to consider any infraction of the Treaty of 
 Paris as a casus belli. The strict logical result of this is that, in 1908, 
 England, France, and Austria-Hungary should have declared war — 
 upon Austria-Hungary I 
 
GRANVILLE AND HAYMERLE 249 
 
 tories of that treaty were pressing Turkey to 
 carry out some of its provisions which con- 
 cerned the Greek and Montenegrin frontiers 
 and the improvement of the government of 
 Turkish Armenia. Whilst this pressure was 
 being put upon Turkey, Lord Granville 1 pro- 
 posed to the Powers that they should sign a 
 protocol in the nature of a self-denying agree- 
 ment. Such agreements have often been signed 
 by Powers acting together for a common object, 
 and in them those Powers have bound them- 
 selves not to seek increase of territory or other 
 exclusive influence or advantage. The form of 
 agreement proposed by Lord Granville was as 
 follows : — 
 
 " The Governments represented by the 
 undersigned engage not to seek in any arrange- 
 ment which may be come to in consequence 
 of their concerted action for the execution 
 of the Treaty of Berlin, any augmentation of 
 territory, any exclusive influence, or any com- 
 mercial advantage for their subjects which those 
 of every other nation may not equally obtain." 
 
 The Austro- Hungarian Government, before 
 signing this agreement, asked for its modifica- 
 tion, and it was changed so as in substance to 
 read after "Treaty of Berlin," the words "in 
 
 1 I take the facts from the Blue Book, marked " Turkey, No. 3, 
 1881 [C. 2759]." 
 
250 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 regard to the Montenegrin question, and event- 
 ually the Greek question." The significance 
 of this change, to which the Powers acceded, 
 was »not appreciated at the time, and Baron 
 Haymerle's diplomatic explanation of it was 
 accepted. Its true significance is now clear. 
 Had Austria- Hungary signed the protocol as 
 originally drafted, she would not have retained 
 the freedom of action which she has lately used. 
 But, after all, though this annexation may 
 be formally incorrect, is it worth fighting about ? 
 It was carried out suddenly, and Englishmen 
 may feel nettled that King Edward (as they 
 say) heard nothing of it when he was abroad 
 in 1908. The step from occupation to an- 
 nexation was one which might have been 
 taken at any time, and which has very small 
 practical results. The work which Austria- 
 Hungary has done in Bosnia has been as good 
 as ours in Egypt and Cyprus ; and a time may 
 come when the step which has been so boldly 
 and frankly taken by Austria may have to be 
 taken by ourselves. If we wanted to take 
 such a step, should we like to have to consult 
 a congress first ? The attitude of the English 
 Press towards the recent action of Austria- 
 Hungary has certainly given a good handle 
 to those who would have us do so. As for 
 giving " compensation," the Sultan will hardly 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF 1908 251 
 
 expect compensation for the nominal loss of a 
 province which has already been lost in sub- 
 stance for thirty years. The annexation has 
 delivered Turkey from the unpleasant possi- 
 bility of having to call Bosnians to her Parlia- 
 ment, in which they would form a violent and 
 recalcitrant home rule party. Compensation 
 to Servia for something which never belonged 
 to her, and which was withheld from her in 
 1878, is hardly a thing to press for, even if 
 Servia had shown herself capable of decent 
 government. How much less should we press 
 for it when Servia is governed by men whose 
 titles are rooted in murder and whose hands 
 still smell of human blood. 
 
 The objections made in England to this 
 annexation, so far as they are sincere, are 
 probably due at the bottom to the suspicion 
 that Germany may be pulling the strings of 
 Austro-Hungarian policy. The new move is 
 pictured as a step in the march of German ex- 
 pansion and a sign of the approach of Germany 
 to the field of Levantine politics. The enemies 
 of Germany in England to-day are so many and 
 so bitter that a writer who does not agree with 
 them 1 may well feel it useless to argue. If, 
 however, the Emperor William should have 
 instigated this step, it is strange that the an- 
 
 1 I again remind the reader that these passages were written in 1908. 
 
252 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 nexation should not have included Novi- Bazar. 
 So far as expansion of trade to the East is 
 concerned, Novi- Bazar was very important, for 
 it enabled Austro- Hungarian goods to get into 
 Turkey without passing through any foreign 
 country, and placed Vienna in direct communica- 
 tion — actual or prospective — with Salonica. Yet 
 at the moment of annexation the garrisons in 
 Novi- Bazar are withdrawn. Austria-Hungary 
 surrenders the right of protecting her roads 
 and railway into Turkey, for which she asked 
 in 1878, and which was vital to schemes of 
 expansion towards the Levant. If the wicked 
 hand of Germany were really at work here, is 
 it not strange that this should be done ? Those 
 who do not see German design in every step 
 which is taken in Continental politics may well 
 conclude that the annexation is a step which 
 has long been contemplated and which was 
 prompted by a number of reasons. If I may 
 venture to express my own view, it is that the 
 Emperor- King, in his decree of annexation, told 
 the truth. He desired to give local powers to 
 Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and his action 
 was precipitated by the granting of a constitu- 
 tion in Turkey. Austria-Hungary is friendly 
 to the Young Turkish movement, and the 
 giving of local power to the Bosnians was a 
 method of showing her assent to the inaugura- 
 
MOTIVES FOR ANNEXATION 253 
 
 tion of popular government in Turkey. Whilst 
 the nominal sovereignty of Turkey remained 
 in Bosnia, it was quite possible that members 
 from Bosnia might be summoned to the new 
 Parliament at Constantinople, which would 
 have led to the absurdity of the provinces being 
 governed and taxed by one state whilst they were 
 represented in the Parliament of another. The 
 Emperor- King, desiring to grant local home rule 
 in Bosnia, found himself impeded by the fact that 
 the question of sovereignty was undetermined. 
 The clock had either to be put back or forward ; 
 and, after all Austria has done in Bosnia, she 
 could not put it back. Far from casting an 
 aspersion on the Young Turkish movement, 
 Austria's action has given it a tacit approval. 1 
 
 Austria has not yet got to the bottom of 
 her nationality question ; but, at least, she has 
 taken the Slavs into partnership, and aban- 
 doned a controlling caste in Vienna which shall 
 rule and over-rule all non-German Austrians. 
 Her Parliament is kept going, when it does go, 
 by effecting a compromise with two or three 
 races who agree to outvote the others ; and if 
 the Bosnian peasantry came to Vienna they 
 might in a short time find a suitable place in 
 the kaleidoscope of Austrian parties. 
 
 1 Since this was written, the Nineteenth Century (November 1908) 
 has appeared with a valuable article from Dr. Emil Reich to which 
 the reader is referred. 
 
254 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Late in 1908 the Delegations met, and their 
 proceedings passed off in unusual concord, 
 and readily approved the annexation. This is 
 remarkable for more than one reason ; first, 
 because the Delegates might fairly have ex- 
 pected to be consulted before the issue of the 
 decree ; secondly, because the occupation of 
 Bosnia and the Herzegovina in 1878 was un- 
 popular both in the Austrian and the Hungarian 
 Parliaments ; thirdly, because, at all events in 
 the Austrian Delegation, there were many 
 members who might be supposed favourable 
 to South Slav claims ; fourthly, because the 
 question wheth'er the provinces should be an- 
 nexed to Austria or to Hungary had not been 
 settled. In spite of all these reasons to the 
 contrary, a very general and loyal approval was 
 given to the action of the Emperor-King. In 
 the most important action of his later years he 
 was supported by men whose political pre- 
 decessors opposed the occupation of 1878 ; and 
 who might have given a great deal of trouble 
 had they wished to do so. The Emperor had 
 now the support of a unanimous Monarchy, and 
 in the silence of consent, which contrasted so 
 strongly with the vapouring of responsible or 
 irresponsible persons in Servia, there seemed 
 to be strength. To friends of Austria- Hungary 
 this was a cause for profound satisfaction. The 
 
SEQUEL TO ANNEXATION 255 
 
 Emperor-King's long and patient endeavours to 
 create a spirit and feeling of citizenship had 
 met with many checks and disappointments ; 
 yet here, at the end of sixty years, a step was 
 taken in which he had the ready support of 
 his subjects. The differences between Magyars 
 and Germans, the disputes between Germans, 
 Magyars, Slavs, and Italians seemed, at the 
 moment of this great experiment, to have sunk 
 into unimportance. 
 
 But 1 though in this crisis the Austrians and 
 Hungarians stood together like one man, there 
 were at the time many signs that Slavonic 
 fellow-citizens were uneasy. In one sense 
 the annexation of Bosnia and the Herze- 
 govina was an encouragement to the Slavs in 
 Austria. It showed that the Dual Government 
 did not regard the Slavs, even the most back- 
 ward of them, as a subject race, and the local 
 government which was conceded to Bosnia 
 furnished good evidence of this. This conces- 
 sion was generally attributed to the influence 
 and suggestion of the Archduke Francis Fer- 
 dinand ; and there is much reason to believe 
 that he wished to conciliate the Slavs within 
 Austrian territory by offering them full Nation- 
 alist privileges if they would but be loyal sub- 
 jects. He even dreamt of ultimately extending 
 
 1 The following pages were added to this book in December 1914. 
 
256 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 those offers to the Southern Slavs in Servia, 
 Montenegro, and Bulgaria who were outside 
 the area of the Dual Monarchy. We may 
 welj believe that an earnest, bold, and politic 
 Prince, who at a great cost had married a 
 brilliant Slavonic lady, and was much under 
 her influence, saw in this policy a means of 
 preserving and extending the Dual Monarchy. 
 It was, indeed, not a reversal, but an exten- 
 sion and development of the statecraft of his 
 careful old uncle, who still nominally ruled the 
 Danubian Empire, but whose aged hand no 
 longer kept a firm grasp of the helm of state. 
 Francis Joseph had done his best to conciliate 
 the Slavs : concessions in Galicia, universal 
 suffrage in Austria at large, a Czech University 
 in Prague — everything in fact had been con- 
 ceded except the Slav word of command and 
 organisation in the army. The Archduke, who 
 as time went on gradually became the Emperor's 
 Vicegerent, saw that if this policy could be 
 extended and expanded, it might enable Austria 
 to make a bid for the headship of a Confedera- 
 tion into which the Balkan States might ulti- 
 mately come. A' greater Austria- Hungary, 
 occupying in Danubian Europe the position 
 which Prussia does in Germany, was his dream. 
 The annexation of Bosnia was a first bold 
 step towards its realisation. 
 
AUSTRIA'S AIMS 257 
 
 As I have already said, I do not think that 
 the Emperor (or the Archduke) aimed at any 
 immediate or forcible extension of territory to 
 the south and east. The evacuation of the 
 sanjak of Novi-Bazar is strong evidence to the 
 contrary. I do not believe that the Emperor 
 would have countenanced expansion by force 
 of arms. His assurance, given in 1914 when 
 he declared war on Servia, that he sought 
 no extension of territory was, to the best of 
 my belief, quite sincere. The policy was to 
 be one of peaceful absorption, which would 
 ultimately result in the development of a power- 
 ful Balkan Confederation under Hapsburg and 
 Magyar supremacy. I do not believe for a 
 moment that the Emperor or his advisers wished 
 to wipe either Servia or Bulgaria off the map 
 of Europe ; but they desired in due course to 
 extend the power and influence of their country 
 over those states and prevent them from be- 
 coming appanages of Russia. How far that 
 policy was, from the European point of view, 
 to be commended ; how far it deserved the 
 support of those who desire to maintain the 
 Balance of Power in Europe, is a debatable 
 question. But whatever be the answer to it, 
 the policy failed. Its failure was due to two 
 causes. The first was the recalcitrance of 
 the Slavs, both in Austria and outside it. 
 
 s 
 
258 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Stimulated by Panslavist propaganda, they 
 refused to accept the fate which was offered 
 them. The second was the Balkan War of 191 2. 
 Evidence of the re-opening of Panslavist 
 agitation was plentiful even before the Annex- 
 ation, which took place in September 1908. In 
 Hungary the Government, which was fighting 
 for Magyar supremacy over the Slavocks and 
 other Slavs in the kingdom, was met by fierce 
 obstruction in the House of Commons and the 
 country. Ministers introduced a moderate 
 scheme of franchise reform which, with its 
 premiums upon tax payment and on education, 
 was far less Radical than the universal suffrage 
 which had lately been introduced in Austria. 
 Though this scheme enfranchised some of the 
 Slavocks and Serbs who had hitherto been 
 without votes, it did not put an end to the 
 Magyar control of the House of Parliament 
 at Budapest. At the same time it must be 
 remembered that the non- Magyar races of 
 Hungary are under no express electoral dis- 
 ability. Any and every Hungarian citizen, 
 Magyar or not, who has the necessary quali- 
 fications, has a vote ; and the Magyar ascend- 
 ency is maintained merely by the fact that the 
 franchise is not universal, but is restricted, 
 as in England, to the better, richer, and more 
 educated. This was so before the Hungarian 
 
SLAVOPHIL MOVEMENTS 259 
 
 Franchise Reform Act, which recently came into 
 operation, and is so in a less degree now. And 
 for this very reason the Reform Act, and all 
 consequential proceedings of the Magyar 
 Government, were violently opposed by the 
 opposition, who represent either the non-Magyar 
 malcontents or the Magyar Chauvinists, who 
 want to get rid of the compromise of 1867 
 altogether, and to have nothing in common 
 with Austria but the person of the Sovereign. 
 
 In the elections in Croatia in February 1908 
 the Magyar Government did very badly. 
 Indeed during the last years Croatian affairs 
 have been in perpetual confusion owing to the 
 inability of the Magyars to cope with local Slav 
 agitation. Its hostile influence was not less 
 active in Austria than in Hungary. In April 
 1908 the Austrian Governor of Galicia was 
 murdered at Lemberg by a Polish student. In 
 Bohemia the Czechs, who have gradually in- 
 creased in numbers and influence until they far 
 outnumber the Germans, maintained a perpetual 
 excitement. The Slavonic Congress which was 
 held at Prague in July went off amid unprece- 
 dented crowds and enthusiasm, and resulted in 
 the birth of a whole litter of Slavophil journals. 
 The annexation of Bosnia was not itself re- 
 sented by the Slavs in the monarchy. But in 
 the great world of Russia, and in Servia, it was 
 
2 6o FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 intensely unpopular, just because it opened a 
 new future for non-Russian Slavs. Matters 
 were made much worse by the way in which 
 Germany forced Russia to dissuade Servia from 
 pushing her protest against the annexation to 
 the point of war. A large part of the Austro- 
 Hungarian army was mobilised in the autumn 
 of 1908 and spring of 1909. Servia remained 
 recalcitrant, and in February everybody thought 
 that the war which did break out between her 
 and Austria- H ungary in 1 9 1 4 would come. But 
 the German Chancellor threatened Russia with 
 mobilisation (in effect with war) if Servia were 
 not restrained and Russia withdrew her support 
 from Servia. The Servians gave way and 
 reluctantly gave a formal acquiescence to 
 the Annexation. So for the moment the crisis 
 passed, the nations snarling at each others' heels. 
 From this time forward war in and about 
 Austria- Hungary drew nearer. The outbreak 
 was only a question of time. The Emperor's 
 patient hand gradually lost its grasp and the 
 Government imperceptibly lost control of the 
 situation. After a vast Czech and Slav 
 demonstration at Warsaw (August 1909) the 
 next important event was the libel action 
 brought by a number of Croatian deputies 
 against Dr. Friedjung, the well-known Viennese 
 historian, to whose works I am so much in- 
 
MARTIAL LAW IN CROATIA 261 
 
 debted. Dr. Friedjung having accused some 
 Croat politicians of taking Servian bribes to 
 oppose the Imperial Policy in Bosnia, they 
 brought actions against him. For the defence 
 certain documents were produced which had 
 been given to Dr. Friedjung by the Austro- 
 Hungarian Foreign Office. Their authenticity 
 was challenged, and there is reason to think that 
 some of them, at all events, were fabricated. I 
 give no opinion on this matter, but the upshot 
 of the trial was to discredit the Austrian 
 Government and cause a suspicion that they 
 were not over-scrupulous in their methods of 
 combating their Panslavist opponents. 
 
 The Emperor's difficulties did not diminish 
 in 191 1 and 191 2. Croatia was practically 
 under martial law, and the Serbo-Croat party 
 were so successful at the elections in 191 1 that 
 the Government of Croatia (that is to say, the 
 party which supports the Magyar supremacy 
 over that sub- Kingdom of the Kingdom of 
 Hungary) could do nothing in the Croatian Diet. 
 A Diet had also been set up in Bosnia, and 
 was formally opened in 19 10, but its competence 
 was strictly limited by a Poynings' Law, which 
 followed the Anglo-Irish precedent. The Slav 
 members in the Austrian Parliament urged the 
 removal of this restriction and pleaded for more 
 power for this, the newest Parliament in the 
 
262 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 Dual Monarchy, with a view to popularising 
 the Annexation ; but the danger of setting the 
 Bosniaks free to legislate for themselves was 
 too«great for Vienna to risk. General Auffen- 
 berg, the Dual Minister of War, declared at the 
 end of the year that Austria had been saved 
 both during and after the Annexation by "a 
 strong true friend in shining armour," a phrase 
 which has since acquired world-wide celebrity. 
 In 191 2 the Hungarian Government had to 
 suspend the Croatian constitution and replace 
 the historic " Ban " of Croatia by a military 
 governor. In June an attempt to murder the 
 governor was made by a student of Agram 
 University ; and that harassed official only 
 escaped with the loss of his secretary. In 
 Bohemia there was great agitation throughout 
 the year, and the " Sokols " or gymnastic clubs, 
 which under the cloak of athletics carry on a 
 Panslavist propaganda, were exceedingly active. 
 In Galicia there was a clamour for a Ruthene 
 University. Lemberg has already a Polish 
 University but, as I have already pointed out, 
 the Poles are the one Slav nationality who are 
 loyal to Vienna, whilst the Ruthenes.who, unlike 
 the Poles, are of the Greek-Catholic or Orthodox 
 Greek Church, were encouraged by Panslavist 
 agents to demand a separate seminary. In 
 Hungary the Emperor was compelled by the 
 
BIRTH OF "ALBANIA" 263 
 
 foreign situation to call up reservists to the 
 colours, and this action led to much obstruction 
 in the Hungarian Parliament. The Opposition 
 said that the Crown had no right to call up 
 reservists until the annual vote of recruits for 
 the Army had been passed. The agitation on 
 this point became so violent that the King of 
 Hungary only overcame it by a threat of 
 abdication. In the Hungarian Chamber the 
 Premier was actually fired at as a protest 
 against the demands of the Government for 
 military service. 
 
 At the end of 191 2 Austria had 900,000 men 
 under arms to protect her interests in case the 
 Balkan War should bring about a change in 
 the map of the Balkans unfavourable to her 
 interests. The policy of the Emperor, as of his 
 nephew, and Government, was this — ' ' We are 
 unwilling to interfere with your redistribution 
 of territory, but we cannot allow Servia to reach 
 the Adriatic, for Servia means Russia." This 
 policy Austria was able to make effective, and 
 to-day the new state of Albania connects the 
 coast of Greece with that of little Montenegro. 
 Servia, though much enlarged at the expense 
 of Turkey, has no seaboard. 
 
 We have yet to learn whether the infant 
 state of Albania will survive the political earth- 
 quake which, in the late summer of 19 14, burst 
 
264 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 upon the continent of Europe. At the moment 
 the policy of Austria regarding Albania was very 
 unpopular in Russia and Servia. The Slav 
 wor|d in the Emperor's dominions too, resented 
 it as tending to open a door to Italian advance 
 in the Balkans, since it was clear that Albania 
 must sooner or later be attracted by the influ- 
 ence of her powerful maritime neighbour. 1 
 
 Throughout 191 3 the war-party in Austria 
 increased in strength. The Russian menace 
 grew daily, and a large Russian army was at 
 one time massed on the Galician frontier. A 
 personal interchange of views between the 
 Emperors of Russia and Austria did some- 
 thing to smooth things over, but the policy 
 of the Government in regard to the Balkans 
 was repeatedly and violently attacked by the 
 Czech leaders in the Reichsrath. In the Hun- 
 garian Parliament the Reform Act passed, and 
 the measures necessary to give Hungary's 
 recruits to the common army were also voted, 
 but the most important measures were only 
 approved after the Opposition had retired from 
 Parliamentary controversy as a protest against 
 the high-handed proceedings of the ministry. 
 
 I do not extend this brief survey to 19 14, 
 the history of which is a matter of yesterday 
 
 1 At the moment of writing, Albania proclaims once more her 
 allegiance to the House of Osman. 
 
WEIGHTS IN THE BALANCE 265 
 
 and to-day. In the review which I have made 
 of the last six years — necessarily short and in- 
 complete in many respects — I have, I hope, 
 shown that the battle of the Slavs against the 
 German and Magyar supremacy in the Dual 
 Monarchy was passing through the stage of 
 preliminary manoeuvre — as it were a cavalry 
 reconnaissance and long-range artillery action — 
 and approached gradually the stage at which 
 the men of each side are drawn up in line 
 of battle, and fight out the contest at 
 decisive ranges with the rifle and the bayonet. 
 To a certain extent it is true to say that the 
 Emperor Francis Joseph had a sufficient fund 
 of inherited loyalty and discipline at his dis- 
 posal to enable him to control the centrifugal 
 tendencies which were working so powerfully 
 amidst his subjects. The 9,000,000 Germans 
 in Austria are perfectly loyal. The 10,000,000 
 Magyars in Hungary are equally loyal, though 
 their loyalty is rather to that remarkable institu- 
 tion the Magyar Kingdom than to the King 
 himself. The Poles in Galicia like Russia very 
 little, and are not amenable to Panslavist agita- 
 tions. They dream of a resurgent Poland, in 
 which Austrian, Russian, and Prussian provinces 
 may unite once more after more than a century 
 of separation. But in Bohemia, where the 
 Czechs are face to face with Pan-Germanism ; 
 
266 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 in Eastern Galicia, where the Ruthenes are 
 next door to their brothers the Cossacks of 
 Little Russia ; in Croatia and Bosnia, where 
 there are dreams of a "Great Servia"; in 
 Transylvania and the Bukovina, where the 
 Roumans are in great force, in all these districts 
 the loyalty of the Slav or Romance race is 
 questionable, and is sorely tried by the attrac- 
 tion to neighbouring Powers. The Servian 
 agitation culminated in the murder of the 
 Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo in 
 June 1 91 4, and those who realise how long 
 and bitter had been the struggle against Austria 
 in the lands of the Southern Slavs will under- 
 stand how it was that she felt herself justified 
 in making such demands upon Servia as, 
 if agreed to, would have put an end to all 
 possibility of Servian conspiracies against her 
 Government. I am reluctant to enter, at the 
 close of this biography, upon questions of 
 current politics in which the full truth is not 
 yet known. It may, I well know, be said 
 that complicity of the Servian Government in 
 the execrable murder of 19 14, though alleged, 
 was not proved before the jury of European 
 public opinion. But it must be remembered 
 that this outrage did not stand alone. It came 
 at the end of a long course of intrigue, syste- 
 matically directed against the Austrian authority 
 
THE SARAJEVO MURDER 267 
 
 in Bosnia. The murder of the Archduke was 
 not the first murder which had stained the 
 cause of Servian aggrandisement. To place 
 ourselves in the position of the Austrian Govern- 
 ment at the beginning of July 1914, we must 
 imagine that Ireland or Scotland had long 
 been kept in unrest by the agency of political 
 dynamitards supported and nourished from a 
 small state without our borders, let us say from 
 Holland ; that this intrigue, though it had not 
 made itself positively amenable to the criminal 
 law, had promoted treasonous acts on many 
 occasions, that it had kept Scotland or Ireland 
 in perpetual ferment, and that finally the Prince 
 of Wales, when on a friendly visit to Edinburgh 
 or Dublin, had been murdered in open day- 
 light in the public street. In such circum- 
 stances the British Government would no 
 doubt have made very strong representations 
 to Holland. It is at least questionable whether 
 they would have been satisfied with a reference 
 to the Hague Tribunal on the question of the 
 existence, liability, and punishment of anti- 
 English societies in Holland. 
 
 In a book which deals so fully with the past 
 some readers will look for a forecast of the 
 future. At the present moment, however, 
 when Clio is competing successfully with the 
 cinematographs and the map of Europe is being 
 
268 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 shaken like the thousand facets of a kaleidoscope, 
 I can make no such forecast. A famous Polish 
 historian once delivered himself of the saying, 
 " If Austria did not exist it would be necessary 
 to invent her" ; and there is wisdom in his words. 
 We should not identify the necessary existence 
 of the Dual Monarchy with the continuance of 
 the overweening Colossus of Berlin. Austria, 
 even "Austria-Hungary," is older than the 
 "Germany" which we know and which we 
 intend to subdue, cost what it may. It is a great 
 misfortune for the Danubian Empire that she 
 has been gradually drawn into the wake of 
 Germany, taken in tow, as it were, by that 
 insolent and unbearable Power. There is no 
 real sympathy between the Prussians, who have 
 recently taken the lead in Germany, and the 
 Austrians. Austria more than anybody has 
 suffered from the brutal policy of the Bismarck 
 school, and the preceding pages attest it. 
 Even to-day in Austria the most unpleasant 
 thing which a man (or a lady) can say of any- 
 body is to call him a " Preusse " (Prussian). 
 And even in England, where we do not realise 
 this want of harmony between our opponents, 
 we may notice that of the many spies arrested 
 in England not one, or scarcely one, has been 
 an Austrian or a Hungarian. But the ex- 
 tinction of the " Germany " of to-day will 
 
LOOKING BACKWARD 269 
 
 make the existence of Austria- Hungary not 
 less necessary, but more necessary than before. 
 This fact is obscured by the struggles and 
 controversies of the moment ; but I believe 
 that when those struggles are over, it will 
 emerge. 
 
 Looking back over the Emperor Francis 
 Joseph's period it seems as if the ideas taught 
 by Metternich were being vindicated by the 
 latest events. Metternich meant to keep 
 Austria in Germany, and Prussia a second 
 power to Austria. It would no doubt have 
 been difficult for Prussia to play second part 
 to Austria in the Germanic Empire ; but the 
 creation of the North German Empire has led 
 to many difficulties, and it seems now that it 
 will prove a failure, whilst the old " Empire," 
 partly German, partly Austrian, partly Magyar 
 and Slav, nourished for centuries. Austria, 
 when driven out of Germany, was bound to seek 
 a new destiny, commercial and political, for 
 herself; and had to go out into the Slav south- 
 east with a weakened influence and without 
 the certain support of the North Germans. 
 Prussia, intent on expansion, found herself 
 opposed by her two great neighbours, France 
 and Russia, and was forced into a path which 
 led inevitably to war with England. Had 
 Prussia and Austria been able to agree and 
 
270 FRANCIS JOSEPH I. 
 
 combine, not in the unholy alliance of to-day, 
 but in a candid and sincere alliance, the prizes 
 of the future might have been in their grasp. 
 But speculations on what might have been, 
 though interesting, are idle. 
 
 THE END 
 
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