ALBERT H. M/IA/A,- LIBRARV AT CORNELL UNIVERS^'^" CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 924 073 972 428 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924073972428 Production Note Cornell University Library produced this volume to replace the irreparably deteriorated original. It was scanned at 600 dots per inch resolution and compressed prior to storage using CCITT/mj Group 4 compression. The digital data were used to create Cornell's replacement volume on paper that meets the ANSI Standard Z39.48- 1992. The production of this volume was supported by the United States Department of Education, Higher Education Act, Tide II-C. Scanned as part of the A. R. Mann Library project to preserve and enhance access to the Core Historical Literature of the Agricultural Sciences. Titles included in this collection are listed in the volumes published by the Cornell University Press in the series The Literature of the Agricultural Sciences, 1991-1995, Wallace C. Olsen, series editor. THE FARMER'S BOOKSHELF Edited by KENYON L. BUTTEEFIELD THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC BY ARTHUR CAPPER NEW YORK HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY I7 2:Zq V, / COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY HAKCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY, INC. ZG^fC miNTCD IN TNC U. •■ A. BY THE QUINN * BOOKN COMPANY RAHWAY. N. J EDITOR'S PREFACE Not since the so-called "Granger movement" of the late '70 's has there been so definite and "widespread an agrarian movement in the United States as at present. The American farmers during the period from about 1895 to 1915 enjoyed in the mass a considerable degree of prosperity, although during those years there was a gradually growing feeling of unrest, rooted in the belief that the farmer was increas- ingly the victim of economic injustice. When, we entered the war, the farmers soon came to feel that they had no voice in arranging mat- ters that affected them, and that the men in charge of the larger affairs had inadequate knowledge of the farmers' problems or sym- pathy with their point of view. The post-war deflation affected the farmers more seriously than probably any other class of our people, in fact, so seriously as to be all but disastrous. Meantime the organizations of farmers had been increasing in power. The Grange had vi EDITOR'S PREFACE grown steadily. • The Farmers' Union in some parts of the country had become quite powerful. The cooperative movement had made greater progress in the last half dozen years than per- haps ia any two decades of our previous history. The rise of the Non-partisan League indicated that the farmers were prepared to resist, and even to fight politically, in order to obtain what they regarded as reasonable justice. Out of this general situation grew almost over night what is at present the largest and most powerful of our farmers' organizations, the Farm Bu- reau Federation. Eecently the pressure from all of these organ- zations has been for legislation to relieve the situation, and the "Agricultural Bloc" was the result. This book describes the causes, meth- ods, and results of this political aspect of the present agrarian movement. The author has been identified with the group from the start. He comes from one of the great agricultural states, is a successful editor of farm papers, and is in close touch and sympathy with the agricultural leaders as well as with the Tank and file. The "Agricultural Bloc" may or may not EDITOR'S PREFACE vii be a passing phase. Gemparatively few farm- ers care for or believe in a farmers' party; but the fanners are determined to seek their rights. [Whether they become aggressive continuously, whether they seek to maintain permanent politi- cal groupings, depends largely upon how they are treated. As Senator Capper says, a farm group should not be necessary. The American people should have such an understanding of the farmer's position and problems and such sympathy with his point of view, as to make an agrarian movement unnecessary. One cannot avoid the reflection, however, that historically the rural people have been either neglected or exploited, or the further remark that, the world over, there is at present more rural unrest than in any recent period of history. It may also be observed that in Europe particularly, the peas- ants have more political power than they have ever had before. Consequently this book, while it treats of a particxdar phase of the agrfcrian movement in the United States, is after all dealing with the symptoms of something fundamental and wide- spread. EIenyon L. Buttebfield. CONTENTS BAPTEB I. What is the Agricultural Bloe ? II: The Crisis in Agriculture III. The Farmers' Part in the World War IV. The After-war Depression V. The High Cost of Living and the Farmer 48 VI. Deficiencies in Farm Finance . VII. The Burden of Transportation . Vin. The Prohlems in Marketing IX. The Struggles of Cooperation . X. Protection for Agriculture XI. The Public Attitude toward the Bloc XII. The Farmers' Program . XIII. The Program of the Bloc . XrV. The Record of the Bloc in Congress XV. What the Future Demands . 3 13 25 38 57 69 79 92 105 118 131 140 153 162 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOO CHAPTER I WHAT IS THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC? The Agricultural Bloc is that group of Mem- bers of Congress who have recognized that an economic upheavel threatens the Nation if the foundations of our prosperity are weakened. They recognize that American welfare de- pends upon the land and upon a permanent and prosperous agriculture. They recognize that the American farmer not only feeds and clothes us but that he is also the best customer of our industries. They recognize that the American farmer supports commerce, foreign and domestic, by producing over half of our exports; pays over half of the annual cost of transportation and maintains more than half of our public institn- tions. They recognize that national prosperity is dependent primarily upon agricultural pros- perity and that unless that third of our popula- tion who live upon the farms prospers the 3 4 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC Nation cannot hp,ve a continued growth and de- velopment. They recognize that we have passed into a new era in our national history in which we cannot allow the balance of real production which comes only from the land to get out of balance with the dependent manufacturing in- dustries, commerce, banking and government. They recognize as just the claim of the man on the land for an equal voice in national af- fairs with those who live by trade, ban kin g and manufactures which deal only with advancing stages of the raw product provided by the land. They recognize the American farm as the nursery of a genuine f reebom citizenship which is the strength of the Eepublic. They recognize as a menace to the national welfare any economic, social or political change which threatens to weaken that part of our citi- zens who live and work upon the land. They recognize that an agricultural interest cannot in the end be a selfish class interest since nature allows no monopoly in agriculture. Better food production benefits all; commerce is increased; trade is stimulated; banking must expand and progress is promoted as the people on the land increase in affluence and net revenue .WHAT IS THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC? 6 which must be spent for the products of the labor of city workers. The organization of the agricultural group in the Congress should not have been necessary. Since the foundation of the United States the fixed national policy has been to foster the op- portunity of the man on the land. Our earliest pioneers came to America because of the op- portunities to live in freedom on the land ; land that hasf become more and more the foster- mother of liberty. Even while enjoying the greatest growth ever experienced by any nation, a large part of our people have drifted away from the primary principle that the interests of agriculture must not be submerged under the interests of industrial and commercial de- velopment. While professing great faith in the man on the land our people have developed an apathy toward the real needs of agriculture until an impending disaster, long forecast and foretold, had to break upon our heads to awaken us. Even then, the apathy continued. For three whole years an almost constant series of warn- ings by our leading statesmen, economists and thinkers failed to awaken the nation to the need. Then the American farmer asserted himself, 6 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC He became convinced that he must stop the drift toward the shoals of indifference. He recognized the power of organization and there grew, ahnost overnight, large and determined groups, under the leadership of seasoned naen' who were farm-bred and trained. Finding mere appeal brought scant results, these leaders took council with their chosen representatives in the houses of Congress. Let us review some of the irritating factors in the agricultural situation which has stimu- lated Congress to give closer attention to agri- cultural needs. Crops had been sold at a loss, when marketable at all, because of the high cost of production and excessive freight rates. The factors involved in the cost of production of farm crops, principally labor and interest on capital involved, were still at high levels though the price of the fimished product had dropped far below the level of the pre-war period. Freight rates, of which the farmer pays con- siderably over half of the total, had not been reduced to any extent in 1921, and were having a paralyzing effect upon production. Farmers were forced to decide whether they should change their system of farming, as high freight rates would ultimately force them to do, or WHAT IS THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC? 7 whether they might expect freight rate reduc- tion within a reasonable time. The dollar value of crops produced on American farms had practically doubled during the war, consequently the requirements for money and credit to finance the production and movement of these crops had also doubled, and with cost of production stiU high the credit needs of agriculture were far above the limited facilities afforded in our antiquated credit system which had been developed primarily to foster commerce and trade rather than agricul- ture. The increased cost of doing business iofluenced the distributing and marketing agencies to compete with farmers for credit, and either left the farmer to carry the burden of the surplus or dump it upon an already de- clining and congested market. The hazards of farming as a business, which must always be a serious matter, were increased because of the lack of business organization among farmers and as a matter of self preserva- tion the farmers of the United States turned to self organization to dispose of their products or to control them while they were held in elevators and warehouses until consumptive de- mand require that they be put upon the market. 8 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC This organization movement met opposition from business concerns, botli large and small, and the very organization which was designed to promote orderly marketing to stabilize prices and conserve the food supply for the consumer was declared in conflict with the anti-trust legislation. Efforts to secure a definition and authority for farm cooperation under the law were met with opposition from middlemen's organiza- tions and large business concerns. Farm co- operation, which has proved successful for gen- erations in Europe and other countries, was strenuously opposed here. There was not an economist nor an authority on agriculture who did not advocate cooperation to some degree. They all knew that the methods of a corpora- tion would not do for agriculture because farms are independent units, each widely separated unit producing a variety of products, that can not be welded into a corporate aggregation. For many years the cattle men had protested against the control of the live stock industry by the packing industry, and there had been constant agitation for packer control but with- out result. The abuses of the grain exchanges had been pointed out repeatedly without any- WHAT IS THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC? 9 thing being done about it. Other measures long advocated had received no serious considera- tion. The farmers of America found themselves being opposed instead of aided, by business groups which should be the best friends of agriculture. All of these influences worked together to create the unanimous feeling among agricultural leaders that the nation must be brought to realize the danger of further delay on these questions. Early in the present administration it became evident to several Senators and Eepresenta- tives from agricultural districts that a definite plan of procedure must be agreed upon in order that the economic needs of agriculture might be carefully studied and remedies proposed which would be effective. The agricultural group, later named the "Bloc" by popular writers, was formed at a meeting called by Senator Kenyon, May 9, 1921, held at the "Washington office of the American Farm Bureau Federation, at which twelve Senators met to decide on a program for im- mediate attention. It included an equal num- ber of representatives of the two leading polit- ical parties, principally Senators from the 10 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC Middle West and South, our great agricultural sections, where the situation was most acute. Those present were Senators W. S. Kenyon, of Iowa; Arthur Capper, of Kansas; G. W. Norris, of Nebraska; F. E. Gooding, of Idaho; E. F. Ladd, of North Dakota; Eobert M. La FoUette, of Wisconsin; E. D. Smith, of South Carolina ; J. B. Kendrick, of Wyoming ; Duncan U. Fletchei, of Florida; Joseph E. Eansdell, of Louisiana ; J. T. Heflin, of Alabama, and Morris Sheppard, of Texas. At this meeting also there were present rep- resentatives of government departments, asked in to act as advisers on the program that should be adopted. There were representatives of the farmers who were asked to tell what farmers felt was their outstanding needs. The declara- tion of purpose by Senator W. S. Kenyon, of Iowa, was that this group give thorough and earnest consideration to the outstanding pro- posals to the end of securing action by Congress. Four Committees were appointed on the follow- ing subjects : Transportation, Federal Reserve Act, Commodity Financing and miscellaneous agricultural bills. From the very beginning this movement was non-partisan and a recognition of the economic YTHAT is the AGRICtlLTmiAL BLOC? 11 crisis ; an endeavor to ©ntline a plan for an eco- nomic re-adjustment rather than a scheme to gain partisan advantage. It declared for things rather than against them; for harmoniziag views, not for creating discord; for coopera- tion, not antagonism; and for all citizens, not for farmers alone. The outstanding reason that brought this group together was the fact that the general public and the majority of Congress had not realized that the nation had passed into a new economic era in which the balance between agriculture and other industries must be more carefully safeguarded. From this beginning in May, 1921, the group was enlarged to include some 22 Senators and meetings were held from time to time at the office of Senator Kenyon. From the very first Senator Kenyon was rec- ognized as the leader of the group and it was chiefly due to his sincere interest in agriculture and vigorous leadership that the Bloc became effective. The following Senators joined the group: Charles L. McNary, of Oregon; Peter Norbeck, of South Dakota; John W. Harreld, of Okla-^" homa; A. A. Jones, of New Mexico; William J. Harris, of Georgia; H. F. Ashurst, of Arizona; 12 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC Pat Harrison, of Mississippi; Wesley L. Jones, of Washington; Eobert N. Stanfield, of Oregon; Frank B. Kellogg, of Minnesota; Charles A. Eawson, of Iowa, and Claude A. Swanson, of Virginia. A similar movement was started in the House and a group of Representatives with the same purpose and non-partisan objective was or- ganized to represent the leading agricultural districts. The group has not been so thorough- ly established as in the Senate, however, nor has it functioned in such an effective manner. Agricultural matters have usually received more attention in the House than in the Senate. The Agriculiural Bloc was the result of the conviction forced upon the more thoughtful representatives of the farmers that they must unite on a simple and direct program in order to bring the nation to see the needs in the emergency and to act before it was too late. CHAPTER n THE CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE Gbeat movements have many forms and find expression in various ways. The beginnings are not clearly defined at the outset, and it often takes a long view and a perspective of years to observe the significance of a great movement, whether it be economic, social or political. Sometimes a mere incident serves to bring the big purpose into view or place it in the foreground and this incident becomes the center of public interest, though it is but a part of the greater chain of important events that are occurring. The great economic upheaval of the world, resulting from the World War, has had a tre- mendous reaction upon industries which has been most strikingly shown in its effect upon agriculture, the basic industry. The great changes that have rocked the foundations of centuries of standing and sent tremors through the whole economic structure also shook the 13 14* THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC foundations of American agriculture, long re- garded as the impregnable base of America's prosperity. The movement wasi not primarily political nor social, but economic with social and political reactions. Even fundamental economic prin- ciples of long standing have been freely ques- tioned and the entire basis of our industrial organization subjected to renewed criticism. When any great movement of this character occurs it is reflected immediately in the thought of large groups of people who discover them- selves in a new set of circumstances which they have not before experienced, which cause them to question all established institutions £ind frequently to produce new and radical depar- ture from principles that have been tried and proven true through history. Under the stress of sacrifice and pain men are driven to radical extremes. The result is great discontent, intolerance for established law and order, dis- dain for the tried rules of orderly industry, and a general economic upheavel that affecfe all industries. At such a time sane and cool-headed states- men stand fast against the waves on the surface of the storm of criticism and endeaver to seek THE CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE 16 fundamental causes and to tmcover real sources of discontent. Then it is futUe to endeavor to remedy a disease until the diagnosis has been thorough. The hopelessness of satisfying popu- lar clamor without getting at a basic need and the futility of legislation for emergency pur- poses only, is not generally understood without studying the fundamental weakness of existing laws and procedures to the end of securing per- manent improvement. When the reaction in trade following the war brought the most precipitate and crushing depression ever experienced by American agriculture, a widespread feeling of discontent resulted. There was immediately reflected ia the halls of Government, as is every great change at some time or another, the fact that American agriculture demanded special atten- tion. The American fanner arose to the war emergency in a manner which astonished the world, even those who had followed his tre- mendous growth through recent years. "Within a space of two or three years production was adjusted to the rapidly growing demand of Europe for war emergency purposes and the call upon the farmers to aid in winning the war 16 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC by feeding Europe was answered in most posi- tive terms. Then, with even greater suddenness, occurred the reaction and the depression laying bare the real weaknesses in our industrial system, bring- ing us again to realize that agriculture is the basic industry in this country and that when it suffers, all industry suffers with it and in an increasing degree as the agricultural depression continues. When this crisis in American agriculture began to be reflected by appeals to the American Congress, through the Representatives of the regions particularly distressed, the true situa- tion was presented by them in the two Houses of Congress with great emphasis. But the coun- try's distress was not confined to agriculture alone. The public and most members of Con- gress were not yet ready to seek for the real causes and much of the protest and appeal from agricultural representatives went unheeded. The farmer's complaint was dismissed as merely that of a group in temporary need, with the unsatisfying counsel that they wait the nor- mal turn of events. When it was pointed out that the farmers had been patient during the war, withholding complaints for known injus- THE CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE 17 tices for patriotic moti)/es, they were met by tlie rebuff that others too had suffered and any remedy must be universal in application rather than to be applied to any specific industry. The more the farmers insisted, the more there de- veloped a criticism that a selfish class interest was involved rather than one that was funda- mental to prosperity in all lines. From the time of the Armistice through 1919 and 1920 there was a growing and more deter- mined protest from farmers and agricultural leaders that things were not right with the farm industry and remedial measures on a national scale must be attempted. Our older observers compared this protest with that which occurred succeeding previous wars and were inclined to dismiss the matter as merely a repetition of the unrest that follows in the wake of war. But American agriculture was in a jiew posi- tion. The period of expansion in jjew areas was practically at an end. Further expansion must be made by improvement in efficiency on the part of the individual worker on the land and not merely through expansion in numbers or in areas. For ten years statisticians had been noting the change in the trend of affairs in that Ameri' 18 THE AGMCULTURAL BLOC can agriculture was showing the first signs of not keeping pace in its growtli with the national requirem,ents. The temporary spurt in produc- tion experienced during the war, while showing what might he expected for a hrief period, was made at such a cost that it coxild not he ex- pected to .continue as a normal growth later on. It was a growth accomplished by sacrifice of the best methods for anything that would bring quick results. The United States has been a country not only self-sufficing, but an expori;ing country with regard to food-stuffs. While we were dependent upon some neighbors for the food products not grown here, they were much more than offset by the volume of our export, except in very recent years. An authority presents this matter in a few concise figures. In 1860 there were 13 acres of farm land per capita of population, while in 1910 this area had dropped to 9.5 acres per capita, thus in 50 years there was a reduction which left only 73 per cent as much farm land for each person in the United States as there had been 50 years before. Not only had there been a decrease in the number of acres, but the average quality of the land in farms had THE CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE 19 deteriorated because of the inclusion of lower grade land in the western plains and mountain counties. From another point of view, the change is emphasized even more strongly. In 1880 70.5 per cent of the population of the country was rural, while in 1920 53.7 per cent was rural. The number actually on farms was not even this large, since the latter census included vil- lages and towns of less than 2,500 inhabitants of which there were a large number. The farm population in 1920 was roughly about one-third of the entire population of the country. For fifty years the momentum of development was in agriculture ; the subduing of new and fer- tile land by a constant increase of immigrated settlers had been keeping production on an increase. But more recently this stream of new workers had been passing into industries and the growth of agriculture had been occurring through the improved efficiency of the farmer, due to the increased use of machinery and more scientific practices in f armiag. But both scien- tists and economists know the limitations of these factors in improvement, and the student of world history was beginning to issue warnings of the impending decline of agriculture, such 20 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC as has occurred -in nearly every great civiliza- tion which has disappeared. American agriculture had been developed on a basis entirely different from that of any pre- ceding great nation because from the outset the American farmer has been a citizen in equal standing and opportunity with the merchants, the traders and the manufacturers. This meant that a continued growth of commercial and industrial America, if accomplished by reaching out to distant countries for food, would be accompanied by the decline of the American farmer to a lower grade of living. In most other countries the farmers have been held in a peasant class, subservient to a miling com- mercial class. The American farmer has been peculiarly jealous of his large part in the development of the Republic and from the outset we have regarded equal opportunity and chance of achievement as a cornerstone of our growth. Consequently, when conditions arise that fore- cast a decline in agriculture the American farmer is prompted to immediately interpret it as a reaction which will affect the nation as a whole. The rapid commercial and industrial growth THE CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE 21 of the United States dnring the past 25 years has been reflected by the growing national inter- est in these forms of development. A construc- tive long-time program of development for agriculture had been discussed at. times, but comparatively little has been done about it. Following the Civil War there was great impetus given to the development of the appli- cation of science to farming through the estab- lishment of the Federal Department of Agricul- ture, the State Agricultural Experiment Stations and later the State Colleges. Scientific farming was hailed as the means by which all of the needs of agriculture would be met and during a period of 50 years the advances made in this field have been tremen- dous. From a beginning when there was practi- cally no organized science of farming we de- veloped rapidly until we were recognized as the most progressive of all nations in our methods. Likewise, improvements in agricultural machinery came with astonishing frequency and resulted in greater production from an increased efficiency of the relatively small num- ber engaged in productive agriculture. The business of farming was organized and sys- 22 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC tematized until liie American farm had become a business unit with as high efficiency as had been obtained in manufacture and commerce. From time to time, however, foresighted statesmen had observed needs which had not been provided for and special surveys were made to uncover the true situation. When the Country Life Commission was appointed, due to an appreciation by Theodore Roosevelt of the fundamental importance of agriculture and its relation to the national welfare, there were many skeptics who felt that the surveys were unnecessary and even Congress refused for a time to recognize the merit of the conclusions which were developed by this Commission. This, served to give a nation-wide viewpoint to many, however, who had heretofore been living in relatively limited circles.^ Still later, the rapid growth of agriculture as an industry, demanding a larger volume of invested and working capital, forced attention to be given to the needs of rural credit and a commission was appointed to investigate, systems followed in older countries with a view to developing a financial system which would meet the needs of American farmers. This ct .izmission brought about the development of THE CRISIS IN AGRICULTURE 23 Uie Federal Land Bank system which was just beginning its operations when the World War began in Europe. While these surveys had given an impetus to the movement for a national policy for agricultural development, the results were piece- meal and by no means fully rounded out into a progressive program. The decade from 1910 to 1920 witnessed the development of many national advances looking to a more stable agri- culture, both in the Federal Government and in the States. But the program of progress was largely set aside when the United States en- tered the war. Representation for agriculture in Congress has been a matter of concern for several years and the war served to intensify the feeling among farmers that though their representa- tives were disposed to give a fair consideration to new proposals, when it came to a matter of conflict, agricultural interests were likely to be those last considered. During the war, there occurred a succession of incidents which inten- sified this feeling. Following the war, when the first indications of a coming crisis were to be noticed, agricultural leaders hastened time and again to Washington with warnings and ap- 24 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC peals that something be done to establish a proper balance between the agricultural indus- tries and other industries. Through 1919 and 1920 Congress was being continuously implored to give special attention to the needs of agriculture with but scant hear- ings being granted. Naturally the proposals were many and varied and lacking in organized direction. This situation continued until the election of 1920 passed, but increased with re- newed vigor following that election, thereby showing that the agitation was not a partisan, political matter, but based upon a real need. CHAPTER m THE FARMERS' PART IN THE WORLD WAR Amebican farms provided the substance neces- sary to the "winning of the war in the three- fold nature of men, food and money. Enough time has passed since the world war to give us a fair perspective view of the supreme test which agriculture underwent in this period of stress. The war began for American fanners with the outbreak in 1914 even though the full strain of the emergency did not culminate until we were joined in the conflict in 1917; that is, great economic influences began to bear which had much to do with the situation which has fol- lowed. The stimulation of manufactures, due to the demand for munitions to European nations then in conflict, immediately placed a draft upon labor which was felt on the farm. The stimulant of advancing prices for food- stuffs led the American farmer to increase his production and strive to take advantage of 25 26 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC the opportunity .afforded by an expanding mar- ket. He, therefore, began to work under high pressure, not realizing that when the United States should enter the war later he would be expected to continue this inpreased rate of en- deavor as a means of aiding our own country in the conflict. The growth in American farming as indicated by the total acreage in 15 principal crops is shown in the following table : 1910 290,000,000 acres 1914 300,000,000 " 1915 309,000,000 " 1916 310,000,000 " 1917 321,000,000 " 1918 350,000,000 " iWhile the increase was steady but slow dur- ing the period preceding 1917, amounting to about ZVz per cent from 1910 to 1914 and 6 per cent from 1914 to 1917, the great increase came in 1918 after our entry into the war. The increase in production of some of our principal crops from the average of 1910 to 1918 was not as great as the increase in acre- age would indicate. The com crop of 1918 was a little less than that of the pre-war period. The wheat crop while amounting to 917,000,000 bushels was less than the great crop of 1915 FAEMERS' PART IN WORLD WAR 27 and only about 200,000>000 bushels above the pre-war crop. While farmers could expand their operations to more crop acreage by plowing up their pas- tures and using land which normally would have been left alone, they could not control the yield factor, which, with respect to some crops, was none too favorable during the war years. There was a shortage of fertilizers in some quarters which also tended to reduce production. The farmers did their best at the outset by planting an increased acreage whenever pos- sible. The efforts to increase live stock production in the time of war could not be expected to have great results when the demand was so general for breadstuffs. Live stock producers were ap- prehensive concerning prices and so long a time was required to mature live stock that they hesitated to go into it in an emergency manner. It takes more time to buUd up a live stock busi- ness than it does to launch into crop production. But in spite of the various handicaps there was an increase in live stock kept in the United States though not equal to the increased demand of Europe for live stock products. The number of horses on farms increased 28 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC slightly, as did. the number of mules. Milch cows increased in numbers considerably, other cattle the greatest of all, and swine to an even greater extent than the larger animals. Sheep alone declined in numbers. The increase in exports of animal products from pre-war average to 1918 was a striking feature of the situation. Beef of aU forms was exported during the period of 1910-1914 to the extent of 220,000,000 pounds, while in 1918 ex- ports were over 502,000,000. Pork and lard ex- ports during the pre-war period amounted to about 900,000,000 pounds, while in 1918 the total was more than 1,900,000,000. Our exports of condensed milk alone increased from a pre-war average of around 15,000,000 pounds to 530,000,- 000 pounds in 1918. The war began to affect agriculture first through the withdrawal of surplus farm labor which was attracted to the war industries by the rapidly increasing wages that were offered. When we entered the war it was already clear that the increased program of production re- quired of the farmers would call for an unusual amount of farm labor. There immediately fol- lowed the organization by the Government of campaigns to secure for food production men FARMERS' PART IN WORLD WAR 29 above military age, others unable to enter the army on account of physical defects, and boys not old enough for army service. Those in charge of the food stimulation cam- paign did not seem to realize, however, that it is not easy to draft large numbers of untrained people into farm work and get the best of re- sults, and while great aid was rendered by the services of outside and inexperienced workers the results from this farm labor campaign were by no means so great as some had hoped that they would be. It was estimated by the Department of Agri- culture that at the beginning of the war about fourteen million men were engaged in farming. Before a year had passed about one and a half per cent of these had been drafted and in addi- tion to this a large number had joined the army as volunteers and probably a much greater num- ber had gone into the industries because of higher wages. While the draft regulations were drawn with a view to taking from the farms relatively a smaller number of men, this had little effect since public sentiment did not ex- cuse the able-bodied farm boy who remained at home, however necessary his services were on the farm. Then, as always, the vigorous lada 30 THE AGKICULTURAL BLOC from the farms were those who wanted to be in the front of the fight and in most cases they would not claim or accept exemption when it was offered to them. While the efforts to stimulate the removal of labor from cities to the farms were widespread, the results were not extensive when counted in numbers compared to the total number engaged in farming. In fact, the Department of Agricul- ture estimated that probably a total of around 100,000 boys who had not before worked on farms were employed at some time during the season of 1917 while a somewhat larger number helped with the harvest in 1918. The fact was that farmers continued and in- creased their field of production without ask- ing for outside help, largely by doing more work themselves with the aid of their families. There can be no measure of the sacrifices made by fathers and mothers to replace the hands of sons who went into the army. Farm wages began to increase considerably in 1917 and a year later were about double what they were before the war. The fact that there was no serious calamity due to labor shortage on farms was due more to the increased efforts of those who were left on the farms than to any FARMERS' PART IN WORLD WAR 31 addition of help from fhe cities. There was a good deal of popular talk of how city men and boys went into the country and saved the har- vest and how business organizations formed groups of men to work in the fields, but their real value in helping the farmer was compara- tively small. The work was speeded up more by the in- genuity of the practical farmer in using machin- ery and the farm women and children than by all help from the outside. All this speeding up increased the farmer's costs. Not only was it more expensive to keep more horses and trac- tors, but horse feed, gasoline and oil cost more and the burden laid upon the farmer was ex- ceedingly heavy. Added to the handicaps of shortage of labor and higher cost of machinery was the growing scarcity of fertilizer which was a serious factor in the eastern states and with special crops like potatoes. The excessively high prices of fer- tilizer added to the cost of production even more than the increased cost of labor in many in- stances. In the midst of the widespread campaign for increased production which farmers were asked to make in the face of increasing costs came the 32 >THE AGRICXJLTURAL BLOC fixing of the price of wheat. The handling of this matter by our government is not a pleasant story when viewed from the farmer's stand- point. The fact that food control was imposed with so little protest was due to the genuine patriot- ism of all the people concerned and particularly the farmers. When the committee on prices was appointed by the President and reported that the price of wheat should be placed at $2.20 for Number 1 Northern Spring Wheat at Chica- go, farmers knew at once that many would be unable to produce wheat at this price and get back the cost of production, but they continued without a murmur. The fact that some of the farm leaders pointed out that this could hardly be a fair price was made the occasion for un- warranted criticism that the farmers were try- ing to profiteer on the increased food produc- tion. While the amount that the farmer actually received for his wheat ia 1917 was considerably more than received during 1916, the increase in costs was so much more that the dissatisfac- tion continued to grow. Farmers believed and expected that the crop of 1917 would bring a higher price than they had received in 1916 be- FARMERS' PART IN WORLD WAR 83 fore the outbreak of the war and to a certain extent repay those who had had short crops for two years previously. Their complaint was not that they should be guaranteed a profit at the expense of the bread consumers, but that the costs of production had been considered in con- nection with other industries by the adoption of the cost-plus system which enabled other in- dustries to pay high wages and still maintain their usual margins of profit. If cost-plus was fair for manufacturers they contended that it should be fair for farmers. When the subject of wheat control came up in 1918, Congress made an effort to raise the price of wheat to $2.40 per bushel by passing a bill to that effect but it was vetoed by the Presi- dent. The increase in freight rates which had occurred in the meantime, since the crop of 1917 had been marketed, was presented as another argument why a better price should be offered farmers for wheat. This agitation over the price of wheat would have probably passed without serious effect upon farmers had not the charges of profiteer- ing and hoarding developed in the city press. The answer to these hoarding charges is now clearly shown by the statistics of wheat held 34 THE AGRICULTURAL BLOC ^'^* by farmers on March 1 of several jevt^ which was as follows : ■' M01i