iH^9^- (/) o; ?: o H -i- > ? 1 i f^ pe t) 10 £ W 4^ w o- > f^ d -^1.^.' ^V4r A^i m^- p-'^ f'^'^X, -y^' s^0 ajacttell Ittiwraitg ffiibrarg ..A.-A.-yo-tcM.^.- Cornell University Ubiary arY264 Pagers relating to the torpedoing of the ■iiiiiii 3 1924 032 194 031 olin,anx Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924032194031 (Printed and distributed May 15, 1916.1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TORPEDOING OF THE S. S. SUSSEX. WASHINGTON : GOVERNMENT PRINTINQ OFFICE : Ifllfl LIST OF PAPERS. No. Prom and to whom. Secretary of State to Ambassa- ' dbs' Crenard (telegram). SecretaEy of State to Ambassa- idoB Gffitard (tetegram;). Secretary of State to Ambassa- dor Grerard (telegram). Secretary of State to Ambas- sador Grerard (telegram). Secretary of State to Ambas- sador Uerard (telegram). Ambassador Geraxd to the Sec- retary oi State (/telegram). Autbassador Sharp to the Sec- retan? of State- (telegrswai). Secretary of State to Ambas- .aador Cliezard (telegram). Aaat. NBivaJ AttacM Smith to Aimbasaador Sharp. Mr. deMargerie, of the French Miniatry of Sbreign Af- fairs, to Ambassador Sharp. Date. The French) AmbasBador to the Secretary of State. Iftie. Mar. 27 Mar. 28 Mar. 29 Apr. 1 Apr. 1 Apr. 11 Subject. Mm. 28 Apr. 1» Mar. 30 •MTar. 29 Ma.r. 25 Mar. 26 Mar. 26 Mar. 26 Mar. 27 Mar. 27 Mar, 27 Mar. 27 Mar. 27 Mar. 27 Mar. 27 Mar. 27 Mar 28 Mar.. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar 29 Mar. 29 Mar. 31 Mar. 31 Apr. i Apr. 5 Apr. 6 Apr. 9> Apr. 13 Apr. 13 States that considerable evidence has been received by the departmeiit that the steamship Sitssex with several Americans was sunk by a submarine torpedo on the 24th of March, 1916, and direfcts him to inquire of the German toeigQ: office whether aisubmarine belonging to Germany sunk the 8w$ex. Informs hiin- of department's advices that the Englishman was' torpedeed March) 3S, and instructs him to make in- qjWJty of Germfl© auithc*ities whether the vessel was sunk by a German submarine. ImEoraas him ©f departnuent's advices that the steamship Manchester Engineer with Americans on board was tor- pedoed on March 27, and instructs him to make inquiry of the German foreign minister whether a submarine be- longing to Germany or her allies sank the vessel. Informs him ■ of (tepartmient's advices that the British steamship Eagle Point, with Americans aboard, was torpedoed' on Mar. 28, and instructs him to make in- quiry of the German Government whether a submariae belonging to Germany or her allies torpedoed the vessel. Informs ^itti of department's advices that the British steamship Berwinavale, with four Americans aboard, was torpedoed on Mar. 16, and instructs Mm to make in- quiry of the German Government whether a submarine belonguiLg to Germany or her alUes torpedoed the vessel. Transmits note &om German foreign minister, replying to the notes of the 29th and 30th mtimo, on the subject of the steaanera Sv^sex, ^andiester Engineer, Englishman, Berviindmle, and tla^ts Point. Statesittiat Hsench foreign 6ffice informs him Sussex was not armed;, adds ItaitM^j,-. Logan and Lieut. Smith saw no indications of gun mountings. InsliBUfils hiiH. to digliver to the German foreign minister the, comanunication on the Sussex, with steitement of facts in the case. Beport o4 B. L. Smith, assistant naval attach^ Replies to inquiry as to whether the steamship Sussex was armed, statiiiig that the vessel was unarmed. Affidavit of Edward H. Huxley and Francis E. Drake Affidavit of Edward Marshall - Deposiition of Seeojid' Bi^neer Danger Affidavit of Mark Baldwin Affida\i* of Wilder G. Penfield Beport of Capt. Mouffet Deposition of Gertrude Lehman Barnes Deposition of Samuel Plagg Bemis Deposition of Tingle Woods Culbertson Deposition of Mrs. Calliope A. Feimell Deposition of Daniel Sargent Deposition of Gertruxte' wenzlick Warren Deposition of Edward' Harold Williams- Ashman Affidavit of Charles T. (Seeker Illd Deposition of Lilian Si ipsrde Deposition of Edna S. Hajde Deposition of John H. Hearley.... Deposition of Mrs. Dorethy W. Hilton Deposition of Edna Franpes Hilton Depositioa of Nonnan Meikle Affidavit oi Hepiry S. Beer Deposition of Edna Hale AflBHavit of Irima BSyckeboer Report of Rear Admiral Grasset, of the French Navy Report of Naval Attaches Sayles and Smith and Military Observer Log^jita Ambassador Sharp. Report of Lieut. Commander Sayles and Lieut. Smith — Affidavit of Ida E. Beer - - - Refers t© conversation as to whether the Sussex had ever acted in the capacity of a transport, and says she had ■ never been used as such. , . . Rebort of Military Observer Logan and Assist. Naval Attach^ Smith. , „ .^, Report of Naval Attaches Sayles and Smith and Mihtary Observer Logan to Ambassador Sharp. Page. ^aem-m — ■! File No. 851.857Su8/12B. The Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard. [Telegram — Paraphraee.] Department op State, Washington, March 27, 1916. Mr. Gerard is informed that considerable evidence has been received by the Department to the effect that the steamship Sussex with several American citizens among the passengers was sunk by a submarine torpedo on the 24th instant, and he is directed to inquire immediately of the German Foreign Office whether a submarine be- longing to Germany or her allies sunk the Sussex. The Department expects a prompt reply. File No. 841.857En3/ The Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard. [Telegram — Paraphrase.] Department op State, Washington, March 28, 1916. Mr. Gerard is informed of Department's advices that the Englishman, a steamer of the Dominion Line, was torpedoed March 21 after departure from Avonmouth for Portland, Me. The Englishman was a horse ship carrying several Americans on board and the survivors' list does not include some of them. Mr. Gerard is asked to inquire immediately of the Ger- man authorities whether the submarine which sank the vessel belonged to Germany or her allies and to add that the United States Government expects a prompt answer. File No. 841.857M31/ The Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard. [Telegram — ^Paraphrase.] Department op State, Washington, March 29, 1916. Mr. Lansing states that the Department has been advised that on Jilarch 27 the ship Manchester Engineer with American citizens on board was torpedoed off Waterford without warning. Mr. Gerard is directed to make inquiry of the German Foreign Minister as to whether a submarine of Germany or her aUies sank the Manchester Engineer. The Department expects a prompt answer. File No. 841.857Ea3/ The Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard. [Telegram— Paraphrase.] Department op State, Washington, April 1, 1916. Mr. Lansing states that information has been received by the Department that the Eagle Point, a British steamer with Americans aboard, was torpedoed on March. 28, after surrender. The vessel was bound from St. Johns, New Brunswick, to Cherbourg, France, and those on board were left 130 miles south of Queenstown in two small boats, with a stormy wind blowing, in a heavy sea. Mr. Gerard is directed to inquire immediately of the German Government whether a submarine belonging to Germany or her allies torpedoed the Eagle Point. A prompt reply is expected by the Department. FUe No. 841.857B46/ The Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard. [Telegram — ^Paraphrase .] Depabtment of State. WasTimgton, April 1, 1916. Mr. Lansing states that the Department is in receipt of information that the Berwvndvale, a British steamer with four Americans on board, was on March 16 torpedoed off Bantry, Ireland, without warning. Apparently the Berwvndvale was coming to the United States for cargo. Mr. Gerard is directed to inquire of the German Government whether a submarine of Germany or her allies torpedoed the Berwindvale. The Department ex- pects a prompt reply. Kle No. 851.867Su8/46 Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] No. 3735,] Ameeioan Embassy, BerUn, Ajml 11, 1916. Following note just received : "FoHEiGN Office, ''Berlin,, April 10, 1916. "The undersigned has the honor to inform His Excel- lency, Mr. James W. Gerard, ambassador of the United States of America, in reply to the notes of the 29th and 30th ultimo and the 3d instant on the subject of the steamers Sussex, Manchester Engineer, Englishman, Ber- windvale, and Eagle Point, that the cases mentioned have been subjected to a careful investigation by the Admiralty Staff of the Navy, in accordance with my notes of the 30th and 31st ultimo and the ith and 5th instantg, and that all this investigation has led to the following results: "One. English steamer Berwindvale. — ^A steamer, which was possibly the Berwindvale, was encountered by a German submarine on the evening of the 16th of March within sight of Bullrock Light on the Irish coast. As soon as the steamer noticed the submarine, which was traveling on the surface, she turned and ran away. She was called upon to stop by a shot of warning, but did not heed this warning, put out all her lights, and tried to escape. She was thereupon shelled until she stopped and lowered several boais without receiving further orders. After the crew had entered the boats and had suflBcient time to pull off to a distamce the ship was sunk. "The name of this steamer has not been ascertaimed. Even with the help of the data furnished by the American Embassy it is not possible to say with certainty that the incident described above relates to the steamer Berwind- f(de. But since the steamer sunk was a tank steamer, like the Berwindvale, it may be assumed that the vessels iare identical ; in this case, however, the statement of the embassy that the Berwi/ndvale was torpedoed without warning would conflict with the facts. "Two. English steamer Englishman. — On March 24 this steamer was ordered to stop by two shots of warning by a German submarine about 20 nautical miles west of Islay, but continued on her course without paying any attention to the warning and was therefore forced to stop •by the submarine by means of artillery fire after a long pursuit ; ^he then lowered boats without recfeivimg further ordere. After the German commander had convinced hims&lf that the crew had entered the boats and pulled away from the vessel he sank the steamer. "Three. English steamer Munehester Engineer. — It ■has not been possible to ascertain by the investigation con- ducted as yet whether the attack on this steamer, which took place off Waterford on March 27 according to the statements of the embassy, is traceable to a German sub- marine. The data furnished regarding <^e place a^d time of the incident do not afford a sufficient clue for the investigation. The receipt of more exact details concern- ing place, time, and attendant circumstances of the attack reported to the American Government would therefore be desired in order that the investigation may then be brought to a conclusion. "Four. English steamer Eugle Point. — On the morn- ing of March 28 this steamer was ordered to stop by a German submarine by signal and shot about 100, not 130, nautical miles from the southwest coast of Ireland, but |She continued on her course. She was thereupon shelled until she stopped, and without receiving further orders lowered two boats which the crew entered. After the commander had convinced himself that the boats, which had hoisted sails, had gotten clear of the steamer he sank her. "At the time of the sinking a north-northwest wind of the second strength was blowing, not a 'stormy wind,' and there was a slight roll against the wind, not a 'heavy sea,' as asserted in the Embassy's statement of the facts. The boats furthermore had every prospect of being picked up very soon, since the place of the sinking was on one of the much used steamer routes. If the crew of the steamer in rescuing themselves made use of only two small boats tliey are themselves to blame, for there were at least four large folding boats on the steamer, as the submarine was able to ascertain. 5 "FiTc. French steamer Sii8aeos.~^The establishment of the fact whether the channel steamer Sussex was damaged by a German submarme or not has been made extraordi- narily difficult, because no exact data concerning place, time, and attendant circumstances of the sinking were known and no picture of this vessel could be obtained until April C. Consequently the investigation had to embrace every one of the undertakings which took place in the channel on or near the route between Folkestone and Dieppe on March 24, the day in question. "In this locality a long black vessel without a flag, with a gray smokestack and a small gray superstructure, aind with two tall masts, was encountered by a German submarine on March 24 about the middle of the English Channel. The German commander gained the definite conviction that ho had before him a war vessel, a mine layer of the newly constructed English Arabic class. He was led to this conviction, one, by the flush deck of the vessel; tAvo, by the warship form of stern, protruding diagonally backward and then falling downward; three, by the warship like coat of paint; four, by the high speed of about 18 sea miles developed by the vessel; five, by the circumstance that the vessel did not f oUow the course to the north of the lightbuoys between Dungeness and Beachy Head, which is the customary course for mer- chant shipping according to the frequent and uniform observations of the German submarines, but sailed in the middle of the channel, pointing about for Havre. He consequently attacked the ship submerged at 3.55 o'clock p. m., Central European time, IJ sea miles southeast of BuUrock Bank. The torpedo struck and caused such a severe explosion in the foreship that the whole foreship was torn loose up to the bridge. The particularly severe explosion permits the safe conclusion that there were large quantities of ammunition on board. "The German commander has made a sketch of the vessel attacked by him, two reproductions of which are attached. The picture of the steamer Sussex, two copies of which are likewise attached, is a photograph taken from the English 'Daily Graphic' paper of the 27th ultimo. A comparison of the sketch with the picture shows that the Sussex is not identical with the vessel attacked ; the difference in the position of the smokestacks and the shape of the stern is particularly prominent. No further attack whatever was made by German submarines at the time coming into question for the Sussex on the way between Folkestone and Dieppe. "From this the German Government is forced to assume that the damaging of the Sussex is to be at- tributed to another cause than the attack of a German submarine. In order that the true state of affairs may be cleared up, the fact may possibly be of use that on the 1st and 2d of April alone no less than 20 English mines were exploded by German naval forces in the channel ; the whole of that part of the seas is dangerous owing to floating mines and torpedoes which have not sunk. The waters near the English coast will be still more dangerous 8-10 2 on account of German mines also which have been sowed against the hostile naval forces. "Should the American Government have at its disposal further material for forming judgment on the case of the Sussex the German Government begs to request that this material may be communicated to it in order that it may be able to subject this material to an examination also. In the event of differences of opinion arising between the two Governments in this connection, the German Govern- ment declares at this time its readiness to permit the facts to be ascertained by a mixed committee of investi- gation, pursuant to the third title of The Hague Con- vention of October 18, 190T, for the pacific settlement of international disputes. "The undersigned requests that the above be brought to the knowledge of the Government of the United States and avails himself of this opportunity to renew, etc. " VON Jagow." Gerakd. File No. 763.72/2597a. The /Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard. [Telegram.] Depaetment of State, Washington, April 18, 1916. You are instructed to deliver to the Secretaiy of Foreign Affairs a communication reading as follows: I did not fail to transmit immediately, by telegraph, to my Government Your Excellency's note of the 10th instant in regard to certain attacks by German sub- marines, and particularly in regard to the disastrous ex- plosion which on March 24, last, wrecked the French steamship Sussex in the English Channel. I have now the honor to deliver, under instructions from my Govern- ment, the following reply to Your Excellency: Information now in the possession of the Government of the United States fully establishes the facts in the case of the Sussex, and the inferences which my Government has draAvn from that information it regards as confirmed by the circumstances set forth in Your Excellency's note of the 10th instant. On the 24th of March, 191C, at about 2.50 o'clock in the afternoon, the unarmed steamer Sussex, with 325 or more passengers on board, among whom were a number of American citizens, was torpedoed while crossing from Folkestone to Dieppe. The Sussex had never been armed; was a vessel known to be habitually used only for the conveyance of passengers across the English Channel ; and was not following the route taken by troop ships or supply ships. About 80 of her passen- gers, noncombatants of all ages and sexes, including citi- zens of the United States, were killed or injured. A careful, detailed, and scrupulously impartial in- vestigation by naval and military officers of the United States has conclusively established the fact that the Sussex was torpedoed without warning or summons to surrender and that the torpedo by which she was struck was of German manufacture. In the view of the Gov- ernment of the United States these facts from the first made the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a Gef- man submarine unaA'oidable. It now considers that con- clusion substantiated by the statements of Your Excel- lency's note. A full statement of the facts upon which the Government of the United States has based its con- clusion is inclosed. The Government of the United States, after having given careful consideration to the note of the Imperial Government of the 10th of April, regrets to state that the impression made upon it by the statements, and pro- posals contained in that note is that the Imperial Govern- ment has failed to appreciate the gravity of the situa- tion which has resulted, not alone from the attack on the Sussex but from the whole method and character of sub- marine warfare as disclosed by the unrestrained practice of the commanders of German imdersea craft during the past twelvemonth and more in the indiscriminate de- struction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations. If the sinking of the Sussex had boon an isolated case the Government of the United States might find it possible to hope that the officer who was responsible for that act had wilfully violated his orders or had been criminally negligent in taking none of the precautions they prescribed, and that the ends of justice might be satisfied by imposing upon him an adequate punishment, coupled with a formal disavowal of the act and payment of a suitable indemnity by the Imperial Government. But, though the attack upon the Sussex was manifestly indefensible and caused a loss of life so tragical as to make it stand forth as one of the most terrible examples of the inhumanity of submarine war- fare as the commanders of German vessels are conduct- ing it, it imhappily does not stand alone. On the contrary, the Government of the United States is forced by recent events to conclude that it is only one instance, even though one of the most extreme and most distressing instances, of the deliberate method and spirit of indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations which have become more and more unmistakable as the activity of German undersea vessels of war has in recent months been quick- ened and extended. The Imperial Government will recall that when, in February, 1915, it announced its intention of treating the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland as embraced within the seat of war and of destroying all merchant ships owned by its enemies that might be found within that zone of danger, and warned all Vessels, neutral as well as belligerent, to keep out of the waters thus proscribed or to enter them at their peril, the Gov- ernment of the United States earnestly protested. It took the position that such a policy could not be pursued without constant gross and palpable violations of the accepted law of nations, partietdarly if. submarine craft were to bo employed as its instruments, inasmuch as the rules prescribed by that law, rules founded on the prin- ciples of humanity and established for the protection of the lives of noncombatants at sea, could not in the nature of the case be observed by such vessels. It based its pro- test on the ground that persons of neutral nationality and vessels of neutral ownership would be exposed to extreme and intolerable risks ; and that no right to close any part of the high seas could lawfully be asserted by the ImT perial Government in the circumstances then existing. The law of nations in these matters, upon which the Gov- ernment of the United States based that jirotest, is not of recent origin or founded upon merely arbitrary prin- ciples set up by convention. It is based, on the contrary, upon manifest principles of humanity and has long been established with the approval and by the express assent of all civilized nations. The Imperial Government, notwithstanding, persisted in carrying out the policy annoimced, expressing the hope that the dangers involved, at any rate to neutral vessels, would be reduced to a minimum by the instructions which it had issued to the conmianders of its submarines, and assuring the Government of the United States that it would take every possible precaution both to respect the rights of neutrals and to safeguard the lives of noncom- batants. -In pursuance of this policy of submarine warfare against the commerce of its adversaries, thus announced and thus entered upon in despite of the solenm protest of the Government of the United States, the commanders of the Imperial Government's undersea vessels have carried on practices of such ruthless destruction which have made it more and more evident as the months have gone by that the Imperial Government has found it impracticable to put any such restraints upon them as it had hoped and promised to put. Again and again the Imperial Govern- ment has given its solenan assurances to the Government of the United States that at least passenger ships would not be thus dealt with, and yet it has repeatedly per- mitted its undersea commanders to disregard those assur- ances with entire impunity. As recently as February last it gave notice that it Avould regard all armed mer- chantmen owned by its enemies as part of the armed naval forces of its adversaries and deal with them as with men-of-war, thus, at least by implication, pledging itself to give warning to vessels which were not armed and to accord security of life to their passengers and crews; but even this limitation their submarine coimnanders have recklessly ignored. Vessels of neutral ownership, even vessels of neutral ownership bound from neutral port to neutral port, have been destroyed along with vessels of belligerent owner- ship in constantly increasing numbers. Sometimes the merchantmen attacked have been warned and summoned to surrender before being fired on or torpedoed; some- times their passengers and crews have been vouchsafed the poor security of being allowed to take to the ship's boats before the ship was sent to the bottom. But again and again no warning has been given, no escape even to the ship's boats allowed to those on board. Great liners like the Lusitania and Arabic and mere passenger boats like the Sussex have been attacked without a moment's warning, often before they have even become aware that they were in the presence of an armed ship of the enemy^ and the lives of noncombatants, passengers, and crew have been destroyed wholesale and in a manner which the Government of the United States can not but regard as wanton and without the slightest color of justification. No limit of any kind has in fact been set to their indis- criminate pursuit and destruction of merchantmen of all kinds and nationalities within the waters which the Im- perial Government has chosen to designate as lying within the seat of war. The roll of Americans who have lost their lives upon ships thus attacked and destroyed has grown month by month until the ominous toll has mounted into the hundreds. The Government of the United States has been very patient. At every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful consideration of the extraordinary cir- cumstances of an unprecedented war and to be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and Government of Germany, It has accepted the suc- cessive explanations and assurances of the Imperial Gov- ernment as of course given in entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government so to order and control the acts of its naVal commanders as to square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations. It has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became unmis- takable and were susceptible of only one interpretation. It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come. It has become painfully evident to it that the position which it took at the very outset is inevitable, namely, the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's com- merce, is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly in- compatible with the principles of humanity, the long- established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of noncombatants. If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Governnient to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without re- gard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immedi- ately declare and effect an abandonment of its present 39398—16 3 10 methods of submatine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic rela- tions with the German Empire altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations. Lansing. STATEMENT OF FACTS IN " SUSSEX " CASE. ACCOMPANYING NOTE TO GERMAN GOVERNMENT OF APRIL 18, 1916. The French channel steamer Sussex, employed regu- larly in passenger service between the ports of Folke- stone, England, and Dieppe, France, as it had been for years (Statement of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs^), left Folkestone for Dieppe at 1.25 p. m., March 24, 1916, with 325 or more passengers and a crew of 53 men. (Declaration of Captain Mouffet ; ^ report of Rear Admiral Grasset.^) The passengers, among whom were about 25 American citizens (Telegram Lon- don Embassy, March 25,* and Paris Embassy, March 26 * and 28 *) , were of several nationalities and many of them were women and children and nearly half of them sub- jects of neutral states. (Eeport of Commander Sayles and Lieutenant Smith;" Rear Admiral Grasset's report.') The Sussex carried no armament (Statement of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs ; ^ report of Commander Sayles and Lieutenant Smith,^ affidavits of American passengers), has never been employed as a troop ship, ^nd was following a route not used for transporting troops from Great Britain to France. (British Ad- miralty statement;* Statement of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^) The steamer proceeded on its course almost due south after passing Dungeness. (Declaration of Captain Mouf- fet.^) The weather wasclear and the sea smooth. (Affi- davits of Edna Hale," John H. Hearley,'^ Gertrude W. Warren.^) At 2.50 p. m., when the Sussex was about 13 miles from Dungeness (Declaration of Captain Mouf- fet^), the captain of the vessel, who was on the bridge, saw about ] 50 meters from the ship, on the port side, the wake of a torpedo. (Declaration of Captain Mouffet.^) It was also seen very clearly by the first officer and the boat- swain who were with the captain on the bridge. (Report of Rear Admiral Grasset.') Immediately the captain gave orders to port the helm and stop the starboard en- gine (Declaration of Captain Mouffet"), the purpose being to swing the vessel to starboard so as to dodge the torpedo by allowing it to pass along the port bow on a line converging with the altered course of the steamer. Before, however, the vessel could be turned far enough ■ See pp. 13 and 61. < Not printed. ' See p. 42. »Seep. 23. i See p. 59. 8 gee p. 35. ' See p. 52. » See p. 49. 11 to avoid crossing the course of the torpedo, the latter struck the hull at an angle a short distance forward of the bridge, exploded, destroyed the entire forward part of the steamer as far back as the first water-tight bulk- head, carried away the foremast with the wireless anten- nae and killed or injured about 80 of the persons on board. (Declaration of Captain Mouffet;^ report of Bear Ad- miral Grasset;'' deposition of Henry S. Beer.*) At the time no other vessel was in sight. (Affidavits of Samuel F. Bemis,* T. W. Culbertson," John H. Hearley," and others.') The apja-oach of the torpedo was witnessed by several other persons on the vessel. (Affidavits of Samuel F. Bemis,* Henry S. Beer,» Grertrude W. Warren.*) One of these, an iVmerican citizen named Henry S. Beer, was leaning on the port rail about 10 feet behind the bridge and gazing seaward when he saw the approaching torpedo about 100 yards away and exclaimed to his wife and com- panion: "A torpedo!" Immediately following his ex- claimation the missile struck the vessel. (Depositions of Henry S. Beer * and Mrs. Henry S. Beer.") In further corroboration of the fact, that the captain saw the torpedo coming toward the vessel, is the sworn statement of the engineers on duty that the order to port the helm and to stop the starboard engine was received and obeyed. (Report of Admiral Grasset.*) No reason- able explanation can be given for this unusual order other than that the captain saw something which caused him to change his course sharply to starboard. In addition to this evidence which would in itself ap- pear to be conclusive that the agent of destruction was a torpedo, is that of Lieutenant Smith, United States Navy, attached to the American Embassy at Paris, who, ac- companied by Major Logan, United States Army, of the Embassy, went to Boulogne, inspected the huU of the Sussex and personally found beneath the mass of water- soaked debris of the wreck 15 pieces of metal,'^" which they retained in their possession as they did not believe the pieces formed part of the vessel. The inspection of the hull disclosed that the vessel was wrecked by an external explosion, the boilers being intact, and that a short dis- tance forward of the bridge was a large dent showing that the vessel had received a heavy blow, the direction of im- pact being from abaft the beam along a line at an acute angle with the keel of the vessel. (Report of Lieutenant Smith, cabled April 1.") This evidence coincides with and corroborates the statement that the vessel Avas swing- ing to starboard and away from the torpedo when struck. The pieces of metal, which the American officers had collected, were compared by Lieutenant Smith, Lieuten- ant Ci^mander Sayles and Major Logan with mines and plans of mines in possession of the French Naval author- ities at Boulogne, Eochefort, and Toulon, and British > See p. 25. ' See pp. 33,35, S0,37,40,41,45,46,and 60. i See p. 53. • See p. 35. ' See p. 48. > See p. 60. * See p. 28. >• See pp. 55, tl, aod 63. • ^ee p. 30. u See p. 14. • See p. 42. Naval authorities at Portsmouth. These oflBcers are positive in their opinion that these pieces of metal were not parts of a mine. (Eeport of Lieutenant Smith, cabled April 2 and 5.^) Among these 15 pieces of metal were two screw-bolts showing the effects of an explosion, which were stamped with "K" and "56" on faces of the head of one, and "K" and "58" on faces of the head of the other. On examining German torpedoes in the possession of the French Naval authorities at Toulon, and of the English Naval author- ities at Portsmouth, the American officers found that identical screws with the letter "K" and a number were employed to fasten the "war" head (kopf) to the air chamber. (Lieutenant Smith's reports, cabled April 2, 5, and 13.") The screws used in French and English torpedoes have no markings and are of a slightly different size. (Same reports.) Furthermore, the American officers were able by comparison and close examination to posi- tively identify and locate all the remaining 13 pieces of metal as parts of a German torpedo, as follows : Fragment 3, part of inner seat of water relief valve of engine valve. Fragments 4 and 5, punto bands of engine-room casing. Fragments 6 to 10 inclusive and 12, parts of engine cylinders. Fragments 11, 13, 14, 15, parts of steel war head still bearing the distinctive red paint common to German torpedo war heads. (Eeport of Lieutenant Smith,* cabled April 5.) In view of these authenticated facts there can be no reasonable doubt but that the Sussex was torpedoed and that the torpedo was of German manufacture. As no vessel was seen by any person on the Sussex, the con- clusion is irresistible that the torpedo was launched without warning from a submarine which was submerged at the time of the attack and remained beneath the sur- face after the explosion. The conclusion thus reached from the evidence (the affidavits being those of American citizens) collected by the Department of State is substantiated by the state- ments in the Imperial Government's note of April 10, 1916. According to those statements — (a) A German submarine torpedoed a steamer 1^ miles southeast of Bull Eock Bank. Departments comment. — ^The point of attack is exactly in the course which was taken by the Sussex after passing Dungeness and about ^ mile from the place where the captain of the Sussex states he was torpedoed. (6) The attack took place at 3.55 o'clocjr p. m., Central European time. Department's comment. — 3.55 p. m.. Central Euro- pean time would correspond to 2,55 p. m., "Western European time. The time of the striking of the tor- ' See pp. 14 and 66. « See pp. 14, S6, 61, and 63. » See p. 55. 13 pedo according to the captain of the Sussex, and the stopping of the clocks on board the vessel, was 2.50 p. m., Western time. (c) The torpedo, when it struck, caused an explosion which tore away the whole foreship up to the bridge. Departmenfs comment. — The forepart of the Sus- sex was wrecked as far back as the first water-tight bulkhead, according to the official reports. {d) The German submarine was submerged when the torpedo was launched and there is no statement that it came to the surface after the attack. Departmenfs corivment. — The conclusion was reached that the submarine was submerged from the fact that no one on the Sussex saw a submarine though the weather was fine. (e) No warning was given and no attempt was made to give one since it is not mentioned. Departmenfs com,ment. — ^The evidence collected shows affirmatively no warning was given. (/) A sketch by the submarine commander of the steamer which he torpedoed does not agree with a photo- graph of the Sussex in the London Graphic. Departmenfs comment. — This sketch was appar- ently made from memory of an observation of the vessel through a periscope. As the only differences noted by the commander, who relied on his memory, were the position of the smokestack and the shapfe of the stem, it is to be presimied the vessels were similar in other respects. (g) No other German submarines on that day at- tacked steamers in that locality. Departmenfs com/ment. — ^As no vessel is reported to have been torpedoed without warning by a sub- merged submarine other than the Sussex, it is beyond question that that vessel was torpedoed by the sub- marine whose commander's report is relied upon in the note of April 10. Lansing. Kle No. 851.857Su8/16. Ambassador Sharp to the Secretary of State. [Telegram — Paraphrase — Extract.] American Embassy, Paris, March 28, 1916. Mr. Sharp reports that he has been informed officially by the French Foreign Office that the steamship Sussex was not armed and further that channel passenger steam- ers have not been and are not armed. After having made a qareful examination of the Sussex at Boulogne, Maj. Logan and Lieut. Smith have reported that they could see no indications on the vessel of any gun mountings. 39398—16 1 14 File No. 851.857Su8/50. Ee-poH of Assistant Naval AttacU Smith to Ambassador SJiarp. Amekican Embasst, Paris, March 30, 1916. Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report in regard to the torpedoing of the steamship Sussex: The principal questions upon which the investigation was conducted were : 1. What flag did the Sussex fly? 2. Was she armed? 3. Were any American citizens among those killed or missing ? 4. Was the Sussex struck by a fixed or floating mine, or by a torpedo ? The following conclusion has been arrived at by care- ful investigation: 1st. As sworn to by crew and passengers, the Sussex carried the French flag. 2d. Crew and passengers stated that she was not armed. A careful investigation showed that no armament (ma- chine guns or cannon) were carried on that part of ship now remaining. The entire forward part of the ship, from the foremast to the stem, was blown away. A thorough investigation leads to believe that no gim was carried on that part of the ship destroyed. 3d. As far as can be ascertained, no Americans are amongst those missing. The bodies of those killed have all been identified to be foreigners. 4th. The question as to whether the ship was struck by a mine or torpedo still remains undetermined. The following course of deduction has been followed, in order to ehminate any possible error: 1. Internal explosion. 2. Fixed mine. 3. Floating mine. 4. Torpedo. 1. The ship has been careftilly examined, and no injury found aft of No. 2 water-tight bulkhead, thus eliminating any cause from boiler explosion. That part of the ship destroyed contained a small cargo compartment. A careful search among the debris showed only mail, cloth used for the construction of balloons or aeroplanes, wire for aeroplane construction, and one or several motor- cycles. The captain also declares that no explosives were car- ried; that a total cargo of three tons was on board, which included mail for India, aeroplane fabric and wire, and some material for the State raUroad; also the character of the explosion showed positively that there was no in- ternal explosion. This in part proves that no internal explosion occurred. 2. Fixed mines, according to aU practices and usages, are placed at a certain distance below the surface; this is said to be about 10 to 15 feet at low water. The ship at the time of the accident was in 60 feet of water; the 15 record of the rise and fall showed that the tide was full at 1.37 p. m., March 24, and at 2.50 p. m. was about 25 feet above low water level. It is also claimed that this was an exceptional high tide. This gives that a mine would be at least 30 feet below the surface of the water at the time of the explosion. At the time of leaving Folkestone, the Sussex was drawing about 11 feet astern. This eliminates the possibiUty of the fixed mine. 3. An investigation of the ship's hull showed a large dent between the turn of the bilge and the keel, about 5 to 6 feet below the water-line, and from this indentation the character of the injury showed that this was evidently the point of impact of the explosive. This could not have been produced by a floating mine, as a floating mine, due to its characteristics, contains considerable positive buoyancy and would be foimd on the surface of the water. 4. The investigation and examination of the hull showed that the ship had received a very heavy blow between the turn of the bilge and keel, just forward of No. 1 watertight bulkhead, and seems to have come from abaft the beam and to have had a converging course with that of the ship. From the point of impact forward, the entire hull was blown away; the force of the explosion carried upward and toward the stem, completely wreck- ing that part of the ship between No. 1 and No. 2 bulk- heads. From the character of the injury it is impossible to determine positively that this was done by a torpedo but all evidence leads to beheve that it was. Several pieces of bronze, and two large bronze bolts, nmnbered and lettered, were foimd, from which a com- parison can be made with German torpedoes now in the hands of the French, which would elhninate any trace of a doubt. Photographs have been taken and will be submitted with a later report. I have, etc., B. L. Smith, First Lieutenant, U. S. M. C, Assistant Naval AttacM. File No. 851.857Su8/50. Mr. de Margerie of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Sharp. [Translation.] Mr. Ambassador: Your ExceUency was good enough to ask me on the 28th of this month by du-ection of your Government whether the steamer Sussex, of the French line crossing between Dieppe and Folkestone, was armed during the voyage accomplished on the 24th of March, in which she was damaged by an explosion. Your Excel- lency was good enough at the same time to ask me whether steamers carrying passfengers between English and French ports on the channel are customarily armed. I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Sussex carried no kind of armament, and that, in a specific 16 manner, the passenger steamers making the channel service between France and England are not armed. With the assurances, etc. P. DE MaBGERIE. Paris, March 29, 1916. File No. 851.857Su8/51. Affidavit of Edward H. Huxley and Francis E. Drake. American Embassy, London, March 25, 1916. At 5 minutes past 3, when we were about an hour and a half from Folkestone, we were seated on the deck talk- ing, a little less than halfway back on the starboard side. Without the slightest warning there occurred a loud, roar- ing explosion. Wreckage and tbns of water were thrown into the air higher than the masts, and the water came do-v^n on the boat as far back as the stern. We went for- ward and saw the entire forward part of the ship, includ- ing part of the bridge and the forward mast, gone. Some men and women jumped overboard at once, and we threw over rafts and seats to them. We then went to help get the women into the lifeboats and afterwards to help the wounded out of the debris. We saw at least 15 severely wounded and helped with 5 ourselves. Among these were Dr. Penfield and Miss Baldwin. Altogether 6 boats were launched. One of these capsized with its passengers. We suppose 25 or 30 people were lost in this boat. We helped " lower 1 boat ourselves. Of the remaining 5 boats, 3 were filled with passengers and standing off about 100 yards. Of the other 2, 1 was nearly full of water and contained only 5 men. We did not see the sixth boat. We know of only 3 Americans who got into the lifeboats — ^Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin and Miss Baldwin. After 10 minutes of watching we decided that as the ship was apparently not sinking, we would stay with her. After the small boats had been standing by for an hour, they were hailed and the people brought back on board. About dusk a sailing vessel 3 miles away, which had been standing by for some time, was signaled by rockets and waving of blankets. At least 30 exploding rockets with colored flares were sent up during the evening, but the ship continued her course and disappeared in the distance. The wireless remained intact, though the operator said it was very difficult to receive because the forward mast was gone and the antennae were loose. The boilers remained intact, as we could see the steam from the escape pipe, and the electric lights burned until we left the ship. At 11.30 a French ship came up and took off the women and children and half the men, and Miss Baldwin, who was unconscious. Then four or five other boats came up and we, with the remaining passengers, were taken on a British ship. With us there were seven wounded — ^tive men and two women. One man died on the way to England. Five dead were left on the hulk, but appar- ently no Americans among them. We arrived in Eng- 17 land at 4.30 a. m., and the wounded were transferred to a nearby hospital ship. . , The first officer (at least a commissioned officer) of the rescuing British ship told us that the captain of the Sussex reported to the captain of the British ship that he saw clearly the wake of a torpedo. He ported his helm hard and in a few seconds longer would have escaped it. No life belts were given to the passengers, and we found them with great difficulty after the explosion had taken places In our opinion the explosion took place about 50 feet from the bow and apparently on the starboard side. We solemnly swear that the above statement is true to the best of our knowledge and belief. Edward H. Huxley. Francis E. Drake. Subsci^bed and sworn to before me, this 25th day of March, 1916. „ Eugene C.Shqeoeaft, '; Third Secretary of Emhassy. [Seal of tho American Embaasy.] File No. 851.857Su8/51. Affidavit of Wmiard MarsTiaU. American Embassy, London^ March 26, 1916. There is no doubt in my mind but that the vessel was torpedoed. I, myself, did not see tho approach of the weapon, but I heard one of the higher officers of the )§^ttSj§ex say to a British navjal passenger that he had seen it, and a quartermaster who was on the bridge with the captain stated to a friend of mine who was in a small boat with him after the disaster that he, the captain, and others on the bridge saw tho wake of tho approaching torpedo an4 sheered the ship so that it might, if possible, escape. There seems to be absolutely no support for the floattQg-mine theory and every possible support for the torpedo theory. Not long before the shock came we , had passed floating wreckage, indicating the de- struction of a vessel. From the deck of the Sussex this flotsam seemed to be baled tobacco, but that is a mere guess. Concerning the identity of the shat- tered ship which bore it I have been unable to leai^u anything. I was sitting in the smoking room when the shock came. The eflfect was extraordinary. . The smok- ing room is small, containing four or five tables. I, at one of tbem, was very definitely jarred and was aware instantly that we had been blown up, but was not seri- ously shaken. At a table just aft of where I sat, not more than 6 or 7 feet distant, a heavy man was thrown high into the air, coming down head first upon the chair on which he had been sitting with force sufficient to break the chair. : Of coui-sel hurried to the outer deck. The sun was shining brightly, the sea was very far from rough, being 39398—16 5 18 aniinatecl by nothing more • than a gentle swell, but a strange, uncanny sound was in the air, vibrant, chilling. It was a moan from the ship's company. I heard no screams. There was no mad panic. Some women became hys» terical and some men lost their heads, but the reported scramble for the boats is not true. There was amazingly little excitement, but there was something quite as dread- ful, which was the lack of training on the part of the crew; ,Capt. Mouffet was on the bridge. The vessel was probably struck just aft of the bow. It may be that the shot was directed against her very cut- water. At any rate, between a third and a quarter of the ship was cut off as with a mighty knife. . I reached the outer deck in time to see this severed portion of the vessel before it slowly, imsensationally sank. StiU there were no screams, but the curious moan, as of many people in slow pain, grew louder. Women kept their heads amazingly. Mrs. Dorothy W. PhiiUips Hilton, daughter-in-law of the late Judge Hilton, of New York, came up to me. "I can't find my daughter," she exclaimed. I had seen her walking with a beautiful young girl of 22. I went with her about the deck to look for ber, but we could not find her atiVwhere. This search wa^ made difficult by a curious cause. The explosion had raised a mighty mass of water from the sea, which bad blown backward on the ship. It com- pletely missed the forward portion of the remaining deck space, leaving it quite dry, but it rushed along the space ■aft of amidships with the volume and force of a heavy sea, harming' no one, I believe. But it made the deck in-' tensely slippery, and as 1 am lame it complicated the search for the young American girl. I did not see Mrs. Hilton again for a long time. Then she came to me and told me that her daughter was not on the ship and that some one said she had gone off in one of the boats. It seemed wise, for the distracted mother's sake, to confirm this rumor, and I did so, although I had no ground for it. The crowds about the boats had become dense imme- diately after the stunned pause which followed the explo- sion. From the very first I had not the slightest thought of trying to get into a small boat, and so of these pro- ceedings I was only an interested and presently a horrified spectator. The captain on the bridge had been fully subject to the great shock of the explosion. Probably the concussion somewhat stunned him for a few moments, for the ship literally had been sheared away just forward of Ihe bridge, so near to it, in fact, that the foremast had gone down. He was not panic-stricken, but hke a man TPhose brain is duUed. ■ Subordinate officers were very competent, but imme- diately were confronted by an utterly unseamanlike crew wholly inefficient in such an emergency. Some of them began to work at the Un6s about the davits, from which the boats swung, but they worked incompetently. Pas- sengers helped tkem incompetently. Still there was no ^ani^.i . ' ., 19 But presently one of the boats touched water. Then there was a rush for it. This seemed to bo infectious." Some men slid down the ropes into the tiny craft, some women jumped for it, some threw children into it. Pres- ently it was overloaded and without much difficulty was' cast off and floated free of the vessel. This was the first boat I saw to thus float free. It then seemed certain that? the vessel presently would sink and I called to some one in the boat to get her to a distance, thinking that other-i wise the suction of the drowning vessel might take hei; down with us. But no one heard me. The crowd within the boat was not behaving well. She was beginning to earoen. I could not remove my fascinated gaze from her. Presently she capsized. I have no idea how many of her company were drowned. For a time they floated, strug-^ gling very briefly, for I am told the water was intensely cold. Then they began to perish, one by one, a few being picked up by other boats which had been lowered and drawn near. In the meantime gratings had beeii thrown overboard in large numbers. I imagine that they had been designed for such emergencyj but they were tod narrow. More than once I saw one slowly turn as a Straggler seized its edge. Usually the st^uggler did not again appear. Once or twice I saw a swimmer reach and climb upon one, only to be overset ere long by someone else. I saw only one person borne up efficiently by one. She lay back downwards, supine, arms and feet extended.' I think she was unconscious as she floated astern. On one of these gratings a stf ange thing occurred. A young woman deliberately disrobed and then plunged into the sea. On board, ere this, a curiously unexcited chaos had begim to reign. At the other boats there was a success sion of heartbreaking Vscenes. Some women dropped their children into waiting arms and then jumped after them. Some men endeavored to slide down the ropes— ^ a ticklish business, for the boat was rolling, and as often as not they presently hung between the small boat and ship. This meant that they must be crushed. When I turned from these scenes to look again at the boat which had capsized, a man was seated on her up-i turned keel, holding a swimming woman's hand. Roimd about were floating bodies; If they were not dead, the chill had dulled them to unconsciousness. Two of the boats got clear away, but came back to tho Sussex, when their inmates saw that she still floated and that the small boats probably would not float longi One passed beyond my vision. . Meanwhile the wirekss had been rerigged, some of its stays having been carried away by the explosion. It crackled out its S. O. S. The slrjr grew overcast; A sail S,ppeared and rockets were sent up; The sail made not the slightest sign that those who governed it had seen us. Later I learned that it was that of a windjammer which had been helpless, as the breeze blew, to come ta 6ur assistance, btit had picked up one of the boats. A curious thing was visible alongside. It Was as if hundreds of yafds of white cloth had been unrolled and 20 floated at a yard beneath the surface. I do not know what it was. Two of the boats, seeing that the Sussex did not sink, returned and their occupants were taken aboard ship. There were many injured to look after. One woman had been torn about the abdomen incredibly and died on deck. A man had been driven from one of the dining tables through the forward end of the ship — ^which, it must be remembered, was quite open — and htrng head downward, his legs entangled in immense quantities of wire which had been brought from somewhere by the explosion. . Disagreeable affairs developed. Some of the crew ap- peared with champagne bottles in their pockets, and staggering. This did not become as serious as might have been the case, for the ship's officers took the liquor from them and cast it into the sea. I went among the wounded. Their injuries were freakish. Both of one man's legs were twisted tUl his feet pointed backward. Another's face had been blown in by the explosion and presented an extraordinary spectacle. He was unconscious. In the meantime, now and then, we went to the ship's rail but could not see that she was settling. The sea was rising. The windjammer was slowly disappearing. We were assured that help was coming, but ceased to take much stock in the reports, the general impression being that the wireless was not working properly. This was strengthened when, oven before darkness fell, rockets were sent up from the bridge. I went below, having done all that I could, and hav- ing fallen once or twice upon the slippery decks. There, in which I think must be the steerage of the ship, we huddled, shivering, some women sobbing, one or two, definitely crazed, shrieking constantly, a few children cry- ing, by now weakly, and moans coming from the slightly injured. Presently we saw a light. Then, after hours of what mounted to dull misery, a trawler drew alongside. The transfer of the wounded was attempted but was quite impossible, for the vessels bobbed about amazingly. Many passengers were pulled aboard the little rescue ship, however, and none was injured so far as I could learn. It was as obviously impossible for me to get aboard the trawler as it had been for me to attempt to get into a small boat, although some new-made friends came to me asking me to make the effort. Presently, having taken all that she could take, and nearly all the women and children, she drew off and the dull waiting recommenced. It was ended by the appearance of a British destroyer. It pulled up alongside and made fast, although the rising seas now and then crashed it against the wreck's side viciously. I was among the last to be passed from one ship to the other. The voyage in to Dover was a quick one. I made it in the quarters of. the crew, as I could not make the climb down to the commander's cabin. There in the crew's 21 quarters half a dozen wounded were in bunks and one doctor and some very able amateurs did what could be done for them. One man died as I looked on, and the legs of another hung by mere shreds. At Dover the wifeless already bad assembled an am- bulance train of motor cars. Our landing was made by crossing a British hospital ship, at whose side, within the harbor, the destroyer moored, and on this hospital ship the living woimded were disposed in part, a few being taken to a hospital ashore. The ambulance train con- veyed the balance of us to hotels. I, myself, was rather helpless by a fall or two upon the sHppery decks of the disabled ship while I had been endeavoring to help the woimded. Among the Americans injured moved from the hospital ship to the Western Heights Hospital, at Dover, in the morning was George H. Crocker, 22 years old, of Fitch- burg, Mass. He suffered a concussion of the brain at the time of the explosion and remained imconsoious up to the time I took the train for London. He was on his way to join the American ambulance at Paris. His cousin, Charles Thomas Crocker, also of Fitchburg, was looking after him. These young men were standing near the bow of the Sussex when the explosion occurred. M. J. E. Baldwin, his wife, Elizabeth S., and their daughter Helen were standing near them. They were on their way to their home in Paris. Tinglewoods Culbertson and Daniel Sargent, respec- tively 29 and 25, also going to join the American ambu- lance, were among those taken from the Sussex by the French trawler. One American woman, Mrs. Edna S. Harde, helped everyone despite her own worry. Among those injured was Wilder Cradee Pendleton, of Wisconsin, a medical student. One of his legs was broken. He was going to France on a vacation from the medical school at Oxford. The dead were left on board the Sussex. Of these I saw the purser, who was found covered with the wire which I have mentioned as among the ship's Ught cargo. Four other men, to me unknown, lay on the upper deck. The yoimg girl with the splendid ruby stiU lay where she died. Another woman lay dead in the women's room, and there was the dead man swinging head down from the wreckage at the bow. These were all the dead I saw aboard ship; but there were those swirling, ghastly figures in the sea, turning, twisting, apparently never sinking to invisible depths. It would be difficult to describe the indignation which was felt by the American survivors. Down among the mail bags on the lower deck we held a Uttle indignation meeting while we waited for the rescue ships which few of us believed would reach us ere the rising seas should finish the torpedo's work. During the course of this extraordinary gathering I endeavored to take evidence as to whether we had been torpedoed or had struck a mine. All the testimony favored the torpedo theory. One of the seamen who was in the boat with Alfred Legresl^y, of 39398—16 a 22 the island of Jersey, which after drifting for some hoiu^ returned to the Sussex, told him that he could positively swear that he actually saw the torpedo as it came, saying that it was plainly visible 50 yards or so in front of its white fan-shaped wake. A woman passenger, whose name I did not get because she fainted, had made a similar statement to me before we left the Sussex. Further evi- dence that it was a torpedo and not a mine came to me after we had boarded the destroyer, where an officer informed me that a bit of the torpedo had been picked up on the Sussex not far from the grim place in which eight or nine sailors asleep in the forecastle had been blown to bits with the compartment in which they rested. It is impossible to speak with too much enthusiasm of the kindness of the officers and men of the destroyer. Their tenderness in handling the wounded, their gentle care for the few women who were taken aboard that vessel, the reverence with which they treated the two who died as we sped in toward Dover, their skUl and willingness to risk their own lives and limbs during the transfer of the passengers from the disabled vessel to the little iron ship alongside aU were notable. Nor must it be forgotten that her young commander risked his craft to help us. The sea was rising rapidly as he lay alongside and every now and then the vessels came to- gether with a crash that shook them both and made great indentations in the destroyer's outer skin. One Httle episode I must not forget. Perhaps it may be pleasing to those of devout religious faith. While things were at their worst aboard the Sussex, and I fear I have not indicated quite how bad they were for a long period, a sfnall group of Italians gathered and remained quite calm, droning, as they waited for what we aU knew very probably might be the end, an Ave Maria. Over and over, they intoned the chant, and so great was its restraining influence that these Latins, usually held to be the most excitable of peoples, were among the calmest of the troubled passengers. Perhaps I may be forgiven if, at the end of this imper- fect and incomplete account of this grimly fascinating experience, I mention some of the reflections which irre- sistibly affected the httle knot of us who sat on the mail bags below deck as the slow hours passed while we were waiting for assistance or the end. More women and children than men were gathered there, some of them in- jured, aU of them shivering, many of them beginning to cough rackingly as the effect of wettings or exposure. Probably there were a score there who had been im- mersed in open sea and rescued in one way or another and very likely some of these will pay as high a price for this brief, tragic journey as those who were killed outright have already paid. I presume that save for the few ship's officers, who may or may not have been armed, as ship's officers may well be at aU times, there was not an armed man on the vessel. Surely she was not a fighting ship. She did not even have a signal gun aboard. As far as I could learn she carried no munitions nor any- thing which could be of comfort to the fighting men of 23 France and England save the mails, wMch were to take them news from home. Yet she had been torpedoed with aU the ruthlessness and malevolence which would be excusable only if di- rected against an actual fighting ship. We, who talked this matter over, had seen women, had seen little chil- dren, sinking to their death in the cold sea or mangled to their death on board by the explosion. Not one of us bore any more relationship to the great war than mine, which, to this time, has been merely that of a recorder of opinion. The maddest enemy mind could not attach to the poor little old ship Sussex any military importance whatso- ever; any normally humane mind would have stayed a tempted hand at thought of the entirely innocent charac- ter of her burden. Yet, without an instant's warning, the torpedo had been launched at us. That it had failed to send the last soul on the vessel to eternity had been the merest freak of inconceivable good fortune. The little meeting was not pleasantly disposed toward German methods. Had a Grerman been on board and had the nature of his blood been learned by chance last night, as we swung, slowly settling toward what certainly was probable destruction, I am sure he would have fared ill. The above statement is true to the best of my knowl- edge and belief. Edward Marshall. Subscribed and sworn to before me this twenty-sixtli day of March, 1916. Eugene C. Shoecraet, Third Secretary of Embassy. [Seal of the American Embassy.] Deposition of Andre Paul Banger, second engineer of steamsMp "Sussex." [Translation.] French Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Boulogne, March 26, 1916. DEPOSITION OF THE OFFICER MECHANIC DANGER, ANDR^ PAUL, OFFICER MECHANIC OF MERCHANT SERVICE, REGISTERED AT DIEPPE UNDER NO. 75. This day, the 26th of March, 1916, before us, Demoliere, Administrator of the Maritime Inscrip- tion at Boulogne-on-sea, appeared the Ofiicer Me- chanic, Andre Paul Danger, No. 75, who embarked on board the Sussex in the capacity of second engineer, who made to us the followii^ declara7 tions, after having sworn to tell the entire truth: " I was on duty in the engine room for the cross- ing between Folkestone and Dieppe. I was at my post beside the control of the two engines. At 2.50^ about, I received a telegraphic order to stop the starboard engine. We were at that mo- 24 ment making 175 revolutions, which correspond to a speed of 15/17 knots. "As soon as I received the order to stop the starboard engine I Stopped it immediately; the port engine continued to turn at 175 revolutions." Q. How much time elapsed between the moment when you stopped your starboard engine and the moment of the explosion? — ^A. Three to four seconds elapsed between the moment that 1 stopped the starboard engine and the moment of the explosion. "Almost instantly after signaling 'stop starboard' the telegraph signaled 'starboard full speed astern.' In execution of this order directly after stopping the star- board engine I reversed to give fuU speed astern. "The operation of reversing can be done very rapidly, in about one second and a half, because of the change speed 'Brown' with combined pistons (steam and hy- draulic pistons). The vacuum in the condenser was normal, viz, 65 vacuum, about. With this vacuum the engine reversed immediately. "The starboard engine had scarcely begim to go astern when the explosion took place; the engine had scarcely time to make a few revolutions astern, which were probably without influence on the ship, because the screw could not have time to produce its effect upon the currents of water which the port engine was churning up in the opposite direction. After the shock took place the captain ordered me to stop both engines at once." After reading this deposition and after we had asked him whether he had anything to add, the officer mechanic. Danger, signed it with us. Done at Boulogne on the 26th of March, 1916. Dangek, Tlie Officer Mechanic. Demoliere, The Administrator of the Maritime Inscription. Certified to be an exact copy. For the President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by order the Minister Plenipotentiary Sub- Director. Jean Gout. [Foreign office seal.] Affidavit of Wilder G. PenfteU. Western Heights Military Hospital, Dovet-, March 27, 1916. I was leaning on the forward rail, as far in the bow as possible, talking to Miss Baldwin and George Crocker. Afew minutes before the explosion, Mr. Baldwin was also talking to us. Whether he had left us or not, I do not know. We were looking at some sea gulls, forward and a little to the starboard. The explosion sounded like a huge rending of boards and occurred about 3 o'clock. I felt no imusual movement of the ship before the ex- plosion. My only sensation was one of falling amid flying boards. 1 was conscious the entire time. I lifted a few boards off of me and crawled to the deck. 25 I then looked for Misa Baldwia and George Crocker. I found the latter immediately in front of the closed cabin I dragged him to the deck. He was badly entangled id small wk0 coils. These latter were everywhere in the wreckage — small steel wire coils — about 6 inches in diam- eter. Under Crocker was a young woman whom I thought was Miss Baldwin. I carried her to the deck, turned her over — and believed her not to. be Miss Baldwin. The woman was then dead or died soon afterwards. She had on a greei^ coat edged with brown or dark fur and she bad dark hair. I saw a man, almost over the water, hanging by his feet, I said to myself, "There's Mr. Baldwin." The man had iron gray, hair j and as it was impossible to reach him, I suppose he slid into the water afterwards. I noticed no change of motion of the boat just previous to the e?,plosion. I did not see a muie or torpedo, although 4 was looking out on the water at the time, to a spot about 200 yards distant. A torpedo, however, might have come directly from the left or right without my seeing it. The above statement is true to the best of my knowl- edge and behef. Wilder G. Pbnfield. Sworn to and attested before me, this 27th day of March, 1916. Eugene C. Shoecraft, Third Secrfitary of Embassy. ■ [Seal of the American Emba^y.j File.No. 851.857Su8/50. Report of Auguste Mouffet, captain of steamship "Sussex." [Translation.] THE CAPTAIN OF STEAMSHIP "SUSSEX," AUGTJSTE MOUFFET, TO MR. GUERIN, COMMANDER OF THE FLEET AT DIEPPE. I, the undersigned, Auguste Mouffet, captain of the steamer Sussex, of the Compagnie des Chemins der Fer de I'Etat, declare that I left Folkestone for Dieppe, with 325 passengers, 53 men in crew, mail for India and the baggage of the passengers, at 1.25 p. m. the 24th of March, 1916. Course, true S. 36° W. passing 1 mile off Dxmgeness, at 2 p. m- I am running east, west of that light. Headed true S. 3° W. about 2.50 p. m. I am 13 miles off Dungeness, longitude — , latitude—, I espy the wake of a torpedo at about 150 meters on the port side. I immediately order helm 30° to starboard in order to bring her about quicker and stop starboard engine which was done at once. In spite of all my efforts I was unable to avoid the torpedo which struck the bow of the Sussex at the foremast, producing a formidable explosion tearing off the entire bow as far as the first water tight bulkhead. After having found that the boat was in a critical posi- tion and in order to save human life, 1 gave the order to lower the lifeboats and rafts. This was done quietly and coolly by the crew. I also gave orders for the wireless 39398—16 7 26 «peratoi- to ««!«i signal according to instructions No. 87 of July 10, I1915. In spite of all my precautions tfee Uf e- lioats were orerloaded by the passengers, wfeo, seized with a momentary panic, jumped into tlie boats and caused two of tliem to capsize; a part of their contents was thrown into the sea and ddB«ppeai«d. It is to be regretted that in these terrible circumstances I have to mourn the death of several members of th« crew and of passengers, the number of whom I can not state even approximately, all the less as a part of thb passengers and crew were picked up by the mobilized trawler Marie Therese at 10.40 p. m., and the other part, including Ae wounded, were taken on board an English torpedo boat at midnight. Toward 1 a. m. of the ZStfe an English destroyer, seeing that it was impossible to make headway with my own engines reversed, took me in tow and towed m.e for about 45 minutes ; the ha,wser having parted, the destroyer then went in seareli'«f a tug- boat, which towed me for about 1 hour and 30 minutes, when a second one came to help the first, and they towed me into Boulogne-sur-mer with the tide, about 2 p. m. n ?— A: Buyer. 6. Q. Were you a passenger on board the steamship Sussex leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 24th instant ?--A. I was. 7. Q. Did the Sussex show a flag? — A. Not that I know of for I went direct into a cabin. 27 8. Q. Where were you standing -wbea the AxpkMietii occTured? — ^A. I was m a private cabin on the upper deck and was asleep at the time. 9. Q. Did you see atoy trace of a submarine ?— A. I saw no trace of a submarine. 10. Q. Did you see the traick of a teapedo ? — A. I (Md not see any track of a torpedo, being- in my cabin at tbe time of the explosion. 11. Q. What in your opinion caused the explosion ? — A. I do not know; I can only speak from hearsay. 12. Q. Was the Sitssex aMaed?— A. I did not see any guns. 13. Q. Were the passengers warned to put on life belts? — ^A. No; they were not. 14. Q. In what condition were the life belts i-^A, They were in a very poor condition indeed; the straps were rotten. As soon as I tried to tie the strap, it broke off. 15. Q. Were the lifeboats lowered by the crew? — A. No; not that I saw; the only ones I saw lowered were bundled by the passengers. 16. Q. Did they seem adequate to accommodate all passengers* — ^A. No; there were only six lifeboats, and every one seemed leaky. 17. Q. Was the vessel equipped with wireless? — ^A. Yes; it was. 18. Q. Do you know of your personal knowledge of any Americans having been killed by the exploJsitm or drowned as a result of it — if so, who?^ — ^A. No; I db not know of any. 19. Q. At what hour did the explosion take place and how far was the vessel from the shore at the time?— A. The explosion took place, I believe, at about 3 o'clock. I do not latKJw how far we were from shore, but as soon as it got a little dark we saw the light of a Ughthouse. 20. Q. Were there any other craft near the Sussex at the time she was struck? — ^A. No; not that I saw. 21. Q. Did you see any dead bodies lying on the deck, and if so, how many* — ^A. I saw people I supposed were dead, I did not stop to examine them, but I saw two men and one woman who seemed to be dead, though I can not be sure. 22. Q. Did you notice any persons drowning ? — ^A. Yes; but I walked away to the other side of the ship, as the sight was so dreadftil, and not to see them go down. I saw two lifeboats capsize and all the pedple stru^ling in the water; one woman and a little boy seemed on the point of going down just as I turned away. 23. Q. You remained on the steamer? — ^A. Yes; until we were taken off the Sussex by the Marie-TMrise and taken to Boulogne. GEETRtTDE LeHMAN BaRNES. Subscribed and sworn to before me, RoBT. W. Bliss, The Secretary of the Embassy of the United States of America, at Pans, this 27th day of March, 1916. [Seal of the American EmbasBy.J 28- File No. 851.857Su8/50. Deposition of Samuel' FUgg Bemis. American Embassy, , Pans, March 27, 1916. The witness, after being duly sworn, testified as follows: 1. Q. What is your name?— A. My name is Samuel Flagg Bemis. 2'. Q. Where and when were you born?-^A. At Worcester, Mass., October 20, 1891. . 3. Q, Where is your present home in the United States ? — ^A. At Medf ord, Mass. ,4. Q. What was the citizenship of your father? — A. American, native. 6. Q. What is your occupation ? — A. I am , a student, as traveling fellow of Harvard University. ,6. Q. Were you a passenger on board the steamship Sussex leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 24th in- stant? — ^A. Yes- , 7. Q. Did the Sussex show a flag?— A. It was flying a' French flag at Folkestone; at the time the explosion oc- curred it was flying no flag; I distinctly noticed this be- cause I had observed a few minutes before that th& flag had been taken down. I speak of the flag at the stern of the ship. 8. Q. Where were you standing when the explosion occurred ? — -A. I was standing on the second-class deck, near the stern. 9. Q. Did you see any trace of a submarine ?---A. I saw no submarine. 10. Q. 'Did you see the track of a torpedo ? — A. I chs- tinctly saw a white streak in the water, which was unmis- takable ; I observed this a few seconds before the explo- sion occurred, because my attention was called to it by the exclamation of the man at my side, who shouted, "What's that * * *." The streak was on the left- hand side of the ship ; as far as I can estimate, it extended out from the ship for about 200 yards, but before my eyes were able to follow. fuUy the length of the trail, and at the same time realizing the significance of what that' trail meant, my attention was drawn away from it, and the explosion occurred almost immediately afterwards.. The trail, however, was unmistakable. .11. Q. What, in your opinion, caused the explor sion ?— A. The torpedo. In saying tliis I saj^ so as a man. who knows notliing at all about marine matters. ' It seems to me that the trail was unmistakable. I observed it a few seconds, just how many I can not say, but a very few seconds before the explosion occurred, and the fact that my attention was called to the trail, that I reaUzed that it was probably a torpedo from the appearance of the wake in the water, is what con\'inces me that it was a torpedo. 12. Q. Did you see a periscope ? — A. No. 13. Q. Was the Sussex axva.ed'i — A. I can not answei as to that ; I did not see any evidence of her being armed. 14. Q. Were the passengers warned to put on life belts ? — A. Not to my knowledge. 29 15. Q. In what condition were the life belts? — A. In very poor condition, from what I saw at the time I went below for a life belt in one of the lockers in the second- class cabin. I found none in the lookers, but I found three in a corner, and these three were in a very poor condition. I attempted to attach one to myself, but the tapes fell apart and the material of which the tapes were made was rotten. However, I took parts of one on deck, and there, with a pocket knife, I succeeded in. getting a piece of light rope from a pile on deck, and with this at- tached the imperfect life belt about my chest. 16. Q. Were the lifeboats lowered by the crew? — A. I saw none lowered by the crew, but I can not answer as to whether they were lowered by the crew or not; I suppose that the one which I got into eventually and in which I was a few seconds was lowered by the crew, since pre^riously another young American and I had tried to lower it, but did not succeed, as we could not manage the ropes. 17. Q. Did they seem adequate to accommodate all passengers? — A. By no means. 18. Q. Was the vessel equipped with wireless? — A. I saw a mast with wires which appeared to me to be similar to those I had observed on other vessels; I take it that this was a wireless. 19. Q. At what hour did the explosion take place and how far was the vessel from shore at the time? — A. I can not answer precisely as to the hour, because I did not look at my watch, but as nearly as I can esti- mate the time which passed since we left Folkestone it was about 3 o'clock; I can not say just how far the vessel was from shore, but there was no land in sight. 20. Q. Do you know of your personal knowledge of any Americans having been killed by the explosion or drowned as a restdt of it; if so, who ? — -A. No; not to my personal knowledge. When I got on the boat I knew none of the Americans on board, since I was traveling absolutely alone. I was told by Americans whom I met after the accident that several Americans had been killed. 21. Q. Were there any other craft near the Sussex at the time she was struck? — ^A. I did not see any myself and I believe that there was no vessel in sight. 22. Q. Did you see any dead bodies lying on the deck; and if so, how many? — A. After I returned to the Sussex, after having been picked up from a life raft, I saw several bodies lying on the deck, but it seemed that nobody was allowed to go up to the front part of the deck, and I was asked by somebody not to go there, and hence refrained, but I saw several bodies lying on the deck; one moved his leg a little. 23. Q. Did you notice any persons drowning? — ^A. I saw one man immediately after the explosion, who ap- parently had been blown into the sea, though I can not say for sure whether he was blown in the sea; he had grasped the log line of the boat a,nd was hanging on there, his face covered with blood. Immediately after I looked again, perhaps one or two minutes after;' he 39398— ^6 8 30 was no more to be seen. While I was on the life raft I saw several persons about me struggling in the water; I did not count them exactly; I was not able to help any- one; they were all too far away from me, and I was busy caring for myself. There were quite a dozen around me ; not within reach, however. After I had been in the water for an hour or so most of these people seemed to have disappeared. There were a few, five or six, who had floated out near me on life rafts. Also, before I left the ship, I observed on the starboard side a man struggling in the water, grasping a rope which htmg over the steamer. 24. Q. Did you see the efifect that was produced, by the explosion on the steamer itself? And if so, describe what you saw.— A. The first effect I saw was a huge mass, evidently the front of the ship, which swept by the stern a few seconds after the explosion; the next I saw of the effect of the explosion was from a raft on the sea as I gradually drifted away from the boat, from which I could clearly see that the whole bow of the ship had disappeared. The final sight I had of the effect of the explosion was not so clear; this was when I was leaving on the French vessel, which took us off; we went by very quickly the bow of the ship and I could see in the faint light of the ship's lanterns the same thing, viz: That the bow was entirely torn off. 25. Q. Did you see whether there were any plates of the vessel that were bent outward or inward in the fore- part when the explosion occurred ? — ^A. I can not answer that. In saying that I am not familiar with marine matters I mean to say that I have no more knowledge than the average layman, but I do not wish to cast the inference that because of the lack of greater knowledge in this matter I might be mistaken as to the torpedo. The track in the water, to my mind, was unmistakable. I do not see how it could have been made by anything else than a torpedo fired from some distance. Samuel F. Bemis. Subscribed and sworn to before me, RoBT. W. Bliss, Secretary of the Embassy of the United States of America, at Paris, this 27th day of March, 1916. [Seal of the American Embassy.] File No. 8ol.857Su8/50. Deposition of Tingle Woods OuTbertson. American Embassy, . ^ Paris, March 27, 1916. The witness, after being duly sworn, testified as foUowa: 1. Q. What is your name?— A. Tiagle Woods Cul- bertson. 2. Q. Where and when were you bom? — ^A. At Wheeiing, W, V^,., on Jaiauary 15, 1887. 31 3. Q. Where is your present home in ike United States?— A. At Sewitfldey, Pa. 4. Q. What was the eitizenahip of your father?— A. American, native. 5. Q. What is your occupation? — ^A. Steel business. 6. Q. Were you a passenger on board the steamship Sussex leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 25th in- stant? — ^A. Yes. 7. Q. Did the Susset show a flag? — ^A, Yes; I no- ticed that it was flying a French flag when we set sail. 8. Q. Where were you standing when the explosion occurred? — ^A. I was standing at the railing that sepa^ fates the first from the second class, near the middle of the boat, on the side opposite the one on which the boat was struck. 9. Q. Did you see any trace of a submarine?— A. None whatever. 10. Q. Did you see the track of a torpedo ? — ^A. No. 11. Q. Were you in a position where you could have seen the track of the torpedo ? — ^A. No, because the tor- pedo struck on the forward port side, and I was looking toward the stem, standing on the starboard side. 12. Q. What in your opinion caused the explosion? — A. I do not know. 13. Q. Was the Sussex armed? — A. There were no arms visible from the deck, and I did not examine the boat thoroughly. 14. Q. Were the passengers warned to put on life belts? — A. So far as I know, there was no warning either before or after the explosion. 15. Q. Were the Ufe belts ia a position where they could be easily obtained ? — ^A. There was one row hang- ing arotmd the exterior rail of the boat, and there were others in chests which the sailors took out and threw on deck. 16. Q. In what condition were the life belts? — A. In very good condition. 17. Q. Did you not notice anything wrong in the belt which you put on? — ^A. No, I did not. I also noticed that the crew and aU the passengers wore belts, which were in very good condition, while on on board. 18. Q. Were the UfeboatS lowered by the crew? — ^A. One I am sure was not manned by the crew, and how it was lowered I can not say. The other boat, which was lowered on the other side, may have been manned by the crew, but I do not know how it was lowered. These two boats of which I have just spoken were large. I observed two other smaller boats, one of which capsized almost immediately on reaching the water, the other of which gradually filled with water. As far as I know, the occupants of these two Smaller boats were mostly saved. The occupants of the two larger boats were rowed about for some time, and later returned on board the Sussex. 19. Q. Did the lifeboats seem adequate to accommo- date aU passengers ? — ^A. No; because when all the boats had been put out there were between 100 and 150 people left on board the iS^sea;. 32 ' 20. Q. Was the vessel equipped with wireless ?— A. Yes, before the explosion, but afterwards the forward mast which bore the antennae was blown completely overboard, thus damaging the wireless to such an extent as to limit the transmission of messages to a very small radius, although it was still possible to receive messages from a much greater distance. 21. Q. Do you know of your personal knowledge of any Americans having been killed by the explosion or drowned as a result of it? If so, who? — ^A. Yes; I saw a girl lying dead on deck who was pointed out to me as being Miss Baldwin. 22. Q. At what hour did the explosion take place and how far was the vessel from shore at the , time ? — -A. Shortly after 3 p. m., roughly speaking, we were about mid-channel when the explosion took place. We were so informed by the crew of the submarine destroyer which came to our rescue later on. Shortly after dark I saw the light from a lighthouse. 23. Q. Were there any other craft near the Sussex at the time she was struck? — ^A. No; not at the time she was struck, but about an hour afterwards we saw a sailboat very far off to starboard; it was hard to tell whether it even noticed us. Toward dark a small saUboat seen from the rear seemed to be coming our way, but turned and saUed off in the opposite direction. 24. Q. Did you see any dead bodies lying on the deck; and if so, how many? — ^A. The one I have mentioned, which was pointed out to me as being Miss Baldwin. 25. Q. Did you notice any persons drowning ? — A. No; I saw some in the water, but later saw them rescued. 26. Q. You remained on the steamer? — ^A. Yes; I remained on the steamer until the time when I was taken off with many others by the Marie-TMrhe to Boulogne. T. W. CULBEETSON. Subscribed and sworn to before me, Heney R. Caeey, Third Secretary of the Embassy of the United States of America, at Paris, this 27th day of March, 1916. [Seal of the American Embassy.] File No. 851.857SU.8/50. Deposition of Calliope A. Fennell. American Embassy, Paris, March 27, 1916. The witness, after being duly sworn, testified as follows: 1. Q. What is your name? — A. Mrs. Calliope A. Fennell. 2. Q. Where is your residence ?— A. Majestic Hotel, New York. 3. Q. What is your nationality? — ^A. American by marriage. 4. Q. Where and when were you bom ? — A. Ithaca, Greece, 15th May, 1875. ' 6. Q. What is your occupation ?— A. . 6. Q. Were you a passenger on board the steamship Sussex leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 25th in- stant? — ^A. Yes, I was. 7. Q. Did the Sussex show a flag, and if so, what flag ?— A. I did not notice any flag. 8. Q. Where were you standing when the explosion occurred ? — ^A. I was sitting near the bow, in front of the smoking rbom, my back turned to the bow, on the right side of the ship. 9. Q. Did you see any trace of a submarine ?^A. I saw no trace of a submarine. 10. Q. Did you see the track of a torpedo ? — A. I saw no track of a torpedo. 11. Q. If so, from what side of the boat did it seem to oome ? — ^A. 12. Q. What, in your opinion, caused the explosion ? — A. I thought the explosion might be caused by a mine. 13. Q. Was the Sussex armed? — ^A. I did not notice that the Sussex carried any armament. 14. Q. Were the passengers warned to put on Ufe belts? — ^A. They were not. 15. Q. In what condition were the life belts ? — A. They were in bad qondition; there were no straps on the one I had. 16. Q. Were the lifeboats lowered by the crew? — ^A. They were> not lowered by the crew — I did not see any one of the crew or the ofl^cers at the time; one boat cap- sized which was full of passengers. 17. Q. Did they seem adequate to accommodate all passengers? — A. There were only 4 boats for 380 pas- sengers. 18. Q. Was the vessel. equipped with wireless?^ — A. I saw no wireless apparatus, but think there was one. 19. Q. Do you know of jowc personal knowledge of any American having been kiUed by the explosion or drowned as a result of it — if so, who ? — ^A. I do not know. 20. Q. At what hour did the explosion take place and how far was the vessel from shore at the time ? — ^A. Half past 2; we were still very near Folkestone, although we did not see the land. 21. Q. Were there any other craft near the Sussex at the time she was struck ? — A. Nothing all aroimd but a sailing boat which seemed to approach, then went away. 22. Q. Did you see any dead bodies lying on the deck — and if so, how many? — ^A. I saw three prostrate bodies on one side of the boat then, two more on the other side — these last two were covered when we returned to the boat which we had left for a few hours. 23. Q. Did you notice any persons drowning? — A. I saw several people drowning — one woman who was picked up in my boat died afterwards. Have you any remarks to make ? Remarks: Yes, I wish to say it is extraordinary that there were not more lifeboats — that belts were not in a better condition — and that there was nobody to say what to do. We were in the boat wondering what to do. and when we approached the ship the captain simply said to keep far from it. One boat was sent to the nearest lighthouse to call for help. Calliope A. Pknnbll. Subscribed and sworn to before me, Arthur Hugh Frazieb, Second Secretary of the Embassy of the United States of America at Paris this 27th March, 1916. [Seal of the American Embassy.] BHle No. 851.857Su8/50. Deposition of Daniel Sargent. American Embassy,, Paris, March 27, 1916. The witness, after being duly sworn, testified as follows: 1. Q. What is your name?— A. Daniel Sargent. 2. Q. Where and when were you bom ? — A. I was bom at Wareham, Mass., August 22, 1890. 3. Q. Where is your present home in the United States ?:— A. Wellesley, Mass. 4. Q. What was the citizenship of your father? — ^A. American, native. 5. Q. What is your occupation ? — ^A. I am a teacher, 6. Q. Were you a passenger on board the steamship Sussex, leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 24th in- stant ? — A. I was. 7. Did the Sussex show a flag ? — A. I never noticed the flag. 8. Q, Where were you standing when the explosion occurred ? — A. I was in the stem, just where the second- class passengers are railed off from the first. I was in the first-class part of the stem. 9. Q, Did you see any trace of a submarine ? — ^A. I saw no trace of any. 10. Q". Did you see the track of a torpedo ? — ^A. I was Iboking toward the stern and could not have seen it. 11. Q. What, in your opinion, caused the explosion? — A. I could not really tell. 12. Q. Was the Sussex armed? — ^A. No; it was not armed. 13. Q'. Were the passengers warned to put on life belts?— A. No. 14. Q. In what condition were the life belts? — A. They seemed very old and soggy and I never knew if they could support anyone. There were some new life belts in a chest, but most of them were hanging round the side of the ship on rails; there was no sign telling where they were. Some of the life belts were without any strap, 15. Q. Were the lifeboats lowered by the crew? — ^A. No. 16. Q. Did they seem adequate to accommodate all passengers? — A. No. 17. Q, Was the vessel equipped with wireless? — ^A, Yes; imtil the explosion came; it was then destroyed 35 wiieiK the maat went dawn. I was told by an Bnglfeh newspaper man that thej bonld re(%ive mess^es but not send any out. The captain gave out that they were receiving messages. 18. Q. Do you know of your personal knowledge otf •my Americans having been killed by the explosion or drowned as a result of it? If so, who? — ^A. Only by dis- ippearance; I did not see a dead Ameriean. Miss Baldwin I saw within a minute of the explosion; after'- wards I eould find no trace of her. I saw most of the wounded but did not happen to see her; she was blown up on: the captain's bridge but I did not see her there. 19. Q. At what hoiM" did the explo^om take place and how far was the vessel from shore at the time? — ^A. I should think that the explosion took plaee about 5 minutes after 3. No shore was visible at the time. 20. Q. Were there any other craft near the Sussex at the tiiEae she was struck? — A. There were several safling craft on the horizon. 21. Q. Did you see any dead bodies lying on the deck; and if so, how many? — ^A. I saw several bodies that seemed to be dead; I would not have known if they were quite dead or not. 22. Q. Did you laotiee any persons drowning? — ^A. I did not see a single persom actimBy go down. I saw people float out and disappear and never come back, but not actually go down. The boat seemedl to have been struck on the left by something that passed through it to the right, for on that side the sheeting of the boat was entirely turned round almost Mke a horseshoe as though it had been forced baekr. The boat did not rise up in the air when it was struck. Daniel Sakgent. Subscribed and sworn to before me, KoBT. W. Bliss, StCfetcm/ of the Embassy of the Uniifgd States of America, at Paris', Ms k7th day of March, 19m. [Seal of 13ie Ameiicui Embassy.]; nie No. 851.857Su8/50. Deposition of'Gertrude WensUcJc Warren. American Embassy, Pans, March 27, 19 te. The witness, after being'diTly sworn, testified as follows.: 1. Q. What is your name?"-A. Gertrude WenzUck Warren. 2. Q. Where is' your residence ? — ^A, St. Louis> Mo. 3. Q. What is your nationality ? — ^A. American, 4. Q; Where and when were you bom?i— A. St. liouis, September 13, 188T. 5. Q. WhatisyouroccupaitiiW?— A, None. 36 6. Q. Were you a passenger on board the steamsbip Sussex leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 25th in- stant?— A. I was. 7. Q. Did the Sussex show a flag; and, if so, what flag? — ^A. I did not notice a flag. 8. Q. Where were you standing when the explosion occurred?— A. Between first and second class — aft. 9. Q. Did you see any trace of a submarine? — ^A. I did not see a submarine. 10. Q. Did you see the track of a torepdo ? — ^A. Yes; I was looking out over the water, which I had seldom seen so calm and such a deep blue; I suddenly saw a white streak approaching the ship with a kind of wigghng movement; I am no judge of distances, but I am sure it was at least the length of the ship. I exclaimed to my- self, "torpedo," and I am told that I said, "There it is," simultaneously with the explosion. 11. Q. If so, from what side of the boat did it seem to come ? — ^A. From the left side. 12. Q. What, in your opinion, caused the explosion? — A. The torpedo. 13. Q. Was the Sussex armed ?-^— A. I did not see any sign of guns. 14. Q. Were the passengers warned to put on life belts? — ^A. No; they were not. 15. Q. In what condition were the life belts? — ^A. In bad condition. 16. Q. Were the lifeboats lowered by the crew? — ^A. No; they were lowered by the passengers. 17. Q. Did they seem adequate to accommodate all passengers? — ^A. No; there were only 6 lifeboats. 18. Q. Was the vessel equipped with wireless? — ^A. Yes; it was. 19. Q. Do you know, of your personal knowledge, of any American having been killed by the explosion or drowned as a result of it — if so, who ? — ^A. No; I did not. 20. Q. At what hour did the explosion take place and and how far was the vessel from shore at the time ? — ^A. About 3 o'clock; I do not know how far, but no land was in sight. 21. Q. Were there any other craft near the Sussex at the time she was struck? — ^A. No. 22. Q. Did you see any bodies lying on the deck, and if so, how many ?— A. I saw three people prostrate on the deck, but I can not say whether they were dead or only woimded. 23. Q. Did you notice any persons drowning? — A. I saw one person who went down. Geetrude Wenzlick Warren. Subscribed and sworn to before me, Arthur Hugh Frazier, Second Secretary of the Embassy of the United States of America, at Paris, this 27th day of March, 1916. [Seal of the American Embassy.] 37 Sy© No. 851.857Su8/50. Deposition of Edward Harold Williams- Ashman. American Embassy, Pom, March 27, 1916. The witness, after being duly sworn, testified as follows: 1. Q. What is your name? — ^A. Edward Harold Wil- liams-Ashman. 2. Q. Where is youx residence ? — ^A. 68 rue de la Tour, Paris. 3. Q- What is your nationality? — A. I am a British subject. 4. Q. Where and when were you bom ? — A. In Detroit, Mich., on September 30, 1885. 5. Q. What is your occupation ? — ^A. Clergyman. 6. Q. Were you a passenger on board the steamship Sussex leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 25th in- stant? — ^A. Yes; I was. 7. Q. Did the jSussez show a flag, and if so, what flag?- - A. French flag. 8. Q. Where were you standing when the explosion occurred? — A. I was sitting midship on the starboard side of the ship facing the sea. 9. Q. Did you see any trace of a submarine ? — A. No trace of a submarine. 10. Q. Did you see the track of a torpedo?— A. No track of a torpedo. 11. Q. If so, from what side of the boat did it seem to eome ?— A. 12. Q. What in your opinion caused the explosion? — A. Something seemed to strike the side on which I was sitting; my chair swung round. 13. Q. Was the Sussex armed? — ^A. I saw nothing leading me to believe it was. 14. Q. Were the passengers warned to put on life belts ? — ^A. I was not. I do not know if other people were. 15. Q. In what condition were the life belts ? — ^A. The first two life belts which I foimd were without straps; tifter that I discovered one in good condition, and appar- ently there were others in good condition stiU imused. 16. Q. Were the lifeboats lowered by the crew?— A. One, I know, was not; the others I do not know, . 17. Q. Did they seem adequate to accommodate all passengers? — ^A. I can not say; there were either six or eight. 18. Q. Was the vessel equipped with wireless? — ^A. Yes; it was. 19. Q. Do you know of your personal knowledge of any American having been killed by the explosion or drowned as a result of it; if so, who? — A. No; I only knew of several Americans being injured. 20. Q. At what hour did the explosion take place and how far was the vessel from shore at the time ? — ^A. A^out 3 o'clock; there was no land in sight. 21. Q. Were there any other craft near the Sussex at the time she was struck ? — ^A. No. 38 22. Q. Did you soo any dead bodies lying on the deck, and if so, how many?— A. Yes; I saw two dead bodies. 23. Q. Did you notice any persons drowning? — A. I saw three persons who were drowning. E. H. Willi AMs-A8HM\N. Subscribed and sworn to before me, Abthur Hugh Fkaziee, Second Secretary of the Embassy of ike United States of America, at Paris, this 27th day of March, 1916. [Seal of the American Embaasy.] Pile No. 851.857Su8/51. Affidavit of Charles T. Crocker, Hid. Lord Warden Hotel, Dover, March 28, 1916. I was walking in the stern of the boat when the ex- plosion occurred. I was thrown off my feet and washed against the raiUng by a wave that appeared to come from overhead. There was a shght panic for awhile — the hfeboats being overcrowded, and I remember one capsizing before reaching the water. The life belts were in very poor shape. It must have been over 30 minutes before I missed my cousin, George Crocker — and it suddenly dawned on me that some must have been wounded by the explosion. I may add here that the explosion seemed terrific at the time, and even cracked the deck in the stem near where I was standing. After the explosion there was a long white sort of a ribbon which came from the bow of the ship. It was about half the length of the ship, I should say 2 feet wide and floated 2 or 3 feet imder the water. It looked something hke a strip of paper. There was also a great deal of small coil wire both in the water and all over the deck. After getting to the wounded the remainder of the time, that is, until 11.30, when a French tug came up, was occupied by helping the injured. The above statement is true to the best of my knowl- edge and behef. Charles T. Crocker, IIId. Mar. 28, 1916. Sworn to and attested before me this 28th day of March, 1916. Eugene C. Shoeciiaft, Third Secretary of Emhassy. [Seal of the American Embassy.] Pile No. 85a.857Su8/50. Deposition of Lilian S. Earde* American Embassy, Paris, March 28, 1916. The witness, after being duly sworn, testified as fol- lows: 1. Q. What is your name? — ^A. Lilian S. Harde. ay 2. Q. Where and when were you bom? — ^A. At New York, September 8, 1870. 3. Q. Where is your present home? — ^A. Hotel Ma- jestic, Paris. 4. Q. What was the citizenship of your father? — ^A. American. 5. Q. What is your occupation? — ^A. Assistant at the Pasteur Institute, Paris. 6. Q. Were you a passenger on board the steamship Sussex leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 25th instant ? A. Yes. 7. Q. Did the Sussex show a flag ? — ^A. I did not notice, myself, but was told that she flew a French flag. 8. Q. Where were you when the explosion occurred ? — A. I was dozing on deck, midships, on the port side. 9. Q. Did you see any trace of a submarine? — ^A. No; I saw nothing. 10. Q. Did you see the track of a torpedo? — ^A. No; I did not, but previous to the explosion my eyes were shut. 11. Q. What, in your opinion, caused the explosion ? — A. My opinion on this subject is based entirely upon hear- say. It was stated around me that, from the way the bow of the boat was cut after the explosion, the damage could only have been done by a torpedo. 12. Q. How would you describe the noise of the ex- plosion? — ^A. . 13. Q. Was the Sussex armed ?^A. No. 14. Q. Were the passengers warned to put on life belts ? — ^A. No; neither before nor after the explosion. 15. Q. Were the life belts in a position where they could be easily obtained ? — ^A. Yes. 16. Q. In what condition were they? — ^A. MyUfebelt, which came from downstairs, was in good condition, but I saw a number lying on the deck which had apparently fallen to pieces as a result of the wetting they got from the shower of water on the deck after the explosion. There were, however, plenty of good ones to go around. 17. Q. Were the lifeboats lowered by the crew? — A. No; the people took them and lowered them themselves. I think a great number of the crew were killed at the bow. 18. Q. ? — ^A. No. I do not think there were suf- ficient boats, but there were a great many rafts, all of which were not used. 19. Q. Was the vessel equipped with wireless? — A. Yes; but the apparatus went down in the explosion and was only repaired two hours later. 20. Q. Do you know of your personal knowledge of any Americans having been killed by the explosion or drowned as a result of it — ^if so, whom ?— A. No, I do not of my personal knowledge know of any American having been killed, although I heard at once that Prof. Bald- win and his daughter were dead, as they had been sitting in the bow of the boat. 21. Q. At what hour did the explosion take place and how far was the vessel from shore at the time? — ^A. At 3 o'clock; or, in other words, three hours before the boat 40 was scheduled to arrive at Dieppe. We wore an hour and a half out of Folkestone by my watch. It took us »ne and a half hours to reach Bovdogne frona the moment the trawler took us aboard; at that time we had drifted far out of our original course. 22. Q. Were there any other craft near the Sussex at the time she was struck ? — A. No. 23. Q. Did you see any dead bodies lying on the deck; and if so, how many ? — ^A. — . 24. Q. Did you notice any persons drowning? — A. Yes; Isaw several people drowning — some who had jumped into the water and some who were in the capsized life- boat. I 25. Q. Have you anything to add? — ^A. I should like to add that the French officers who manned the boat did admirably. Lillian S. Harde. Subscribed and sworn to before me, Henky R. Carey, Third Secretary of the Embassij of the United States of America, at Paris, this 28th day of March, 1916. [Seal of the American Embassy.] File No. 851.857Su8/50. Deposition of Edna S. Harde. American Embassy, Paris, March 28, 1916. The witness, after being duly sworn, testified as follows : 1. Q. What is your name? — ^A. Edna S. Harde. 2. Q. Where and when were you bom? — ^A. At New York, November 26, 1874. 3. Q. Where is your present home? — A. Hotel Ma- jestic, Paris. 4. Q. What was the citizenship of your father?— A. American, native. 5. Q. What is your occupation? — ^A. Doctor, special- ist in bacteriology, working at Pasteur Institute, Paris. 6. Q. Were you a passenger on board the steam- ship Sussex, leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 25th instant? — ^A. Yes. 7. Q. Did the Swsex show a flag ? — ^A I know only fifom hearsay that the Sussex flew a French flag. 8. Q. Where were you when the explosion occurred ?— A. I was asleep in a ladies' cabin. 9. Q. How long was it before you reached the deck after the explosion ? — A. A minute or two. 10. Q. Did you see any trace of a submarine or the track of a torpedo ? — A. No. 11. Q. What, in your opinion, caused the explosion?— A. I can not give an opinion on the subject, as I do not know. 12. Q. Was the Sussex armed?— A. There were no arms visible from the upper deck as far as I could see, and no arms nor munitions were loaded before the boat set sail. I watched the operations of loading very care- fully from the time I got on the boat until it was finished. 41 13. Q. Were the passengers Warned to put bn life belts? — ^A. I personally was not warned. 14. Q. In what condition were the life belts ? — A. All that I saw were in good condition. 15. Q, Were the life belts in a position where they could be easily obtained? — A. All the chairs had life belts in their backs and belts also hung around the railing of the ship. There were others under the pillows in the ladies' saloon. 16. Q. Were the lifeboats lowered by the crew? — A. I saw two lifeboats lowered, which reached the water safely. A member of the crew, whom my sister states to h-ave been a stoker, was in charge of the lowering of the boat she was in. " 17. Q. Did the lifeboats seem adequate to accommo- date all passengers? — A. No; apparently not, because there were about 100 of us left on board the Sussex; but there were many rafts. 18. Q. Was the vessel equipped with wireless? — A. It was. 19. Q. Do you know, of your personal knowledge, of any Americans having been killed by the explosion or drowned as a result of it? If so, who? — A. I was told at the time that Mr. and Miss Baldwin, who had been seen in the front of the boat, had immediately disap- peared. 20. Q. At what hour did the explosion take place and how far was the vessel from shore at the time ? — ^A. I , heard that the explosion took place at 3 o'clock. It was said at the time that we were nearer England than France. 21. Q. Were there any other craft near the Sussex at the time she was struck? — ^A. No; except three boats on the horizon, which soon disappeared. 22. Q. What was the explosion like ? — ^A. It was a , very sharp, quick explosion, over at once, accompanied and followed by a tremendous crash as of wood and glass. On leaving the Sussex on the Marie TMrese^ I noticed that the metal plates of the Sussex were bent outward on what seemed to be her left side in the extreme front of the boat. 2.3. Q. Did you see any dead bodies lying on the deck; and if so, how many? — ^A. I saw one dead body of a blonde young woman, about 25 years old, on the upper deck near the bow on the right-hand side; as a physi- cian, I am certain that she was dead. 24. Q. Did you notice any persons drowning? — ^A. Saw many in the water, but all apparently supported by life belts or rafts, etc. This was very shortly after the .explosion. I wish to add that the French crew behaved splendidly as far as I saw. Edna S. Harde. Subscribed and sworn to before me, Hen^it K. Carey, . Third Secretary of the Embassy ■; of the United States of America, at Paris, ''■■'■- ' this 38th day of Ma/rch, 1916, [Seal of the American Embassy.] File No. 851.8578^8/50. Deposition of J ohm H. Hemrhy. Amebican Embassy, Paris, Marches, 1916. t^e witness, after being duly sworn,, testified as follows: 1. Q. WKat is your name?— A. My name is John H. liearley, 2. Q. Where and when were you born ? — A. I was born at Albany, N. Y., on September 20, 1889. 3:. Q. Where is your present home in the United States ?— A. Albany, N. Y. 4. Q. What was the citizenship of your father ?— A. My father was a naturalized American of British origin. 6. Q. What is your occupation ? — A. I am a jour- nalist. 6., Q. Were you a passenger, on board the steamship Sussex, leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 24th inr stant? — A. I was. . . 7. Q. Did the Sussex show a flag, and, if so, what flag ? — A. I am not absolutely sure, but it seems to me if she showed a flag that it was a French one. 8. Q. Where were you standing: when the explosion oc^ curred "i — A. I was standing in the rear of the vessel, well back of the ship, at the end of the first class. 9. Q. Did you see any trace of a submarine? — A. I saw no trace of a submarine. ; 10. Q. Did you see a periscope ? — A. I saw nothing re- sembling a periscope. 11. Q. Did you see the track of a torpedo ? — A. I did not see the track of a torpedo. 12. Q. What, in your opinion, caused the explosion? — A. I have no certitude as to the cause of the explosion; I do not know whether a mine or a torpedo occasioned it. At first I did not believe it was an explosion, it sounded to me more like a slam of a heavy door instead of an explosion which made the Sussex, a, ship without a bow. I have not the slightest idea, of the cause of the explosion. 13. Q. Did you see a sheet of water thrown up by the explosion and falling on the deck of the vessel? — A. No; I saw no water thrown upon the deck of the vessel by th6 explosion. 1 was pacing the stern of the boat and the cabins blocked such a sight. 14. Q. What was the condition of the sea; was it calm» gl^s3y, or had it some movement? — K, The sea, as I remember it, was quite calm and with little movement. 15. Q. Was the Sussez armed? — A. I am not certain that, the Sussex was armed or hot; I am sure that per- sonally I saw no guns upon her. 16. Q. Were the passengers warned to put on life belts?— A. Personally I was never warned to put on a life be't. 17. Q. In what condition were the life belts? — ^A. Speaking of the life belts collectively, I know little or nothing about them; the one I picked up, which was the last one ii\ sight on the deck, apparently was in good condition. 48 18. Q. Were the Hfe boasts lowered "by the crew?-*- A. Alter I realized that ah expk)si«n liad ^c(miTedkt the tinae she was strudc ?— ^A. No other moving craft ^w«8 near the Sussex at the time she was stewcik, as f aa* as I «euld seie. However, a shcwt while before we had p^assed a mass of floating freigist whieh appeared to be ti^^ t& A suaken steamer. A dirigible .^wMeh bad tarailed our steamer lor some time after iwe left FoUsestionc also hadr been out of sight for a matter of 10 or 15 miniutes, it seeinedto me, when the exptoeioja oceurred, . i 25. Q. Did you see any dead bodies lying on the deekj 9ivl6. if bo, how^many?^— a. I teaw . . v 26.' Jl|. Did you notioeaay persons iiiroi#iim9g«--A; ^Otiri lifeboat picked up three -'or four ;half-«ifl»wiied w(i>isi«A'.' •Riere^ were otheis, men tmd women who were clinging' to rafts at some distance away from our boat; I am not cer*; tain 'y?hether. these, were picked up or not, but it seems probable that. some of tbera, at least, were drO-wrned, among these I think, were Granados and his wife who were fellow passengers of mine on the Motterdam, I wish to add that an interview reported with me in the Matin, of March 28, in which I am stated to have said the ^Germans were assassins and pirates, and that thb Sussex was torpedoed, is a misquotation almost from start, to finish. 1 made absolutely no mention of the word "Ger- man " or of the word " torpedo "' or " submarine " or of thp words "murderers" or "assassins" in my statement to tjie representative of the Matin^ As proof of the forer going, Mr, Philip Simms, Paris manager of the United Press, who heard the interview, and Mr. Gamier of United Press agency, will vouch. John H. Hearley. Subscribed and sworn to before me, RoBT. W. Bliss, Secretary of the Embassy of the United States of America, at Paris, this 28th day of March, 1916. [Seal of the American Embassy.] Kle No. 851.857Su8/50. Deposition of Dorothy W. Hilton. American Embassy, Paris, March 28, 1916. The witness, after being duly sworn, testified as follows: 1. Q. What is your name ? — A. Mrs. Edward B. Hilton. 2. Q. Where is your residence ? — ^A. 79 Avenue Mala- koff, Paris. 3. Q. What is your nationality ? — ^A. American, 4. Q. Where and when were you born ? — ^A» Washing- ton, D. C, June 2, 1868. 5. Q. What is your occupation ? — ^A. Rentifere. 6. Q. Were you a passenger on board th-e steamship Sussex leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 24th in^ stant? — A. I was. 7. Q. Did the Sussex show a flag; and, if so, what flag ? — ^A. I did not notice the flag. 8. Q. Where were you standing when the explosion occurred ? — ^A, I happened to be seated under the bridge on the port side. 9. Q. Did you see any trace of a submarine? — ^A. No; I did not. 10. Q. Did you see the track of a torpedo? — ^A. No; I did not. 11. Q. If so, from what side of the boat did it seem to come ?— A. 12. Q. What in your opinion caused the explosion ? — A. I do not know, I simply felt a shock — everything above fell and the explosion was followed by a great wave of water and I thought I would be drowned. 13. Q. Was the Sussex armed? — A. I saw no sign of guns. 45 14. Q. Were the paseengets warned to put on life belts?— A. No. 15. Q. In what condition were the life belts ? — ^A. In a terrible condition, thejr were no good- — the strings were broken, the canvas torn. 16. Q. Were the lifeboats lowered by the crew ?— A, No, I think not — there were font lifeboats, two on each side. 17. Q. Did they seem adequate to accommodate all passengers? — A. They were not in sufficient number to rescue all the passengers. 18. Q. Was the vessel equipped with wireless ? — A. Yes it was. 19. Q. Do you know of your personal knowledge of any American having been killed by the explosion or drowned as a result of it — if so, who ? — ^A. No, I do not know of my personal knowledge. 20. Q. At what hotir did the explosion take place and how far was the vessel from shore at the time ? — ^A. It was 2.45 ; I heard people say we were in mid-channel. 21.. Q. Were there any other craft near the Svissex at the time she was struck ?-^A. Nothing to be seen. 22. Q. Did you see any dead bodies lying on the deck; and if so, how many ? — A. No. 23. Q. Did you notice any persons drowning? — ^A. I saw people in the water with life belts on, two chnging to rafts, but no one drowning. 24. Q. Are there any remarks you would Hke to make ? — ^A. Yes, I think it is a shame that a ship carry^ ing so many passengers should not also carry the means to save their lives. I thought all the channel boats were escorted, but a lit- tle after leaving Folkestone I asked from an official on the boat whether it was escorted and he answered ' 'Pas du tout." About one-haK an hour after the explosion had occurred a sailing boat seemed to approach and then went away. Dorothy W. Hilton. Subscribed and sworn to before me, Akthub Hugh Fbaziee, Second Secretary of the Embassy of the United States ofAmeric/a, at Paris, this 28th day of Mp,rch, 1916. [Seal of the American Embassy.] File No. 851.857Su8/50. Deposition of Edna Frances Hilton. Amebioak Embassy, PariSi March 28, 1916. The witness, after being duly sworn, testified as follows: 1. Q. What is yout name? — ^A. Edna Frances Hilton. 2. Q. Where is your residence ?— A, .79, Avenue Mala- kofF, Paris. 3. Q. What is your nationality? — A. American. 46 4. Q. Where and when were you bom ? — ^A. In Paris, on the 31st of December, 1893. 5. Q. What is your occupation I — ^A. . 6. Q. Were you a passenger on board the steamship Sussex, leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 24th in- stant? — ^A. Yes; I was, 7. Q. Did the Sussex show a flag and, if so, what flag ? — ^A. I did not see any flag at all. 8. Q. Where were you standing when the explosion occurred ? — ^A. I was reading in the dining room in the front. Most of the people who were in that room were killed by the explosion; those who remained were terribly injured. I was uninjured, though. 9. Q. Did you see any trace of a submarine? — ^A. No. 10. Q. Did you see the track of a torpedo ? — ^A. No. 11. Q. If so, from what side of the boat did it seem to come ? — ^A. Yes, I know it came on the left or port side because all the windows on this side were smashed in. After the explosion occurred the ship had a slight list to the starboard. 12. Q. What in your opinion caused the explosion ? — A. I had no idea; but I noticed something Uke a dark purple ink covered the face and hands of the people who were in the dining room. " 13. Q. Was the Sussex armed ? — ^A. No, I do not think so; if there had been guns on board it would not have failed to attract the attention. 14. Q. Were the passengers warned to put on life belts ? — ^A. No, they were not. 15. Q. In what condition were the Ufe belts? — ^A. In an awful condition; I picked up three which were without straps or strings; the canvas was rotten — there were three big holes in mine. 16. Q. Were the life-boats lowered by the crew? — ^A. When the steamer left the port they were half lowered. The crew did not lower them after the accident; most of the crew were blown up by the explosion, I think. 17. Q. Did they seem adequate to accommodate all passengers? — ^A. Certainly not; there were only four small lifeboats which were quite insufficient. 18. Q. Was the vessel equipped with wireless? — ^A. Yes; but it was smashed by the explosion. 19. Q. Do you know of your personal knowledge of any American having been killed by the explosion or drowned as a result of it — if so, who ? — ^A. No, I do not. 20. Q. At what hour did the explosion take place and how far wa? the vessel from shore at the time? — ^A. It was about 3 o'clock; we were in mid-channel; the light- house was visible aU the time both in daytime and at night. 21. Q. Were there any other craft near the Sussex at the time she was struck? — ^A. There were no vessels in sight. 22. Q. Did you see any dead bodies lying on the deck, and if so, how many ?^A. I did not. I saw some people terribly wounded. 47 23. Q. Did you notice any persons drovming? — ^A. I saw one man float by. Three women were picked out of water — one died in the boat. 24. Q. Are there any more remarks you would like to make? — ^A. There was a sailing boat coming and then going. There was nothing done to save the lives of the passengers. The lifeboats were in awful condition— there were three holes in the one I was in — and there were only four of them. I saw a number of British steamers within the harbor of Folkestone, which I was told were being held on accoimt of the presence of submarines in the channel. It therefore sm-prises me that the Sussex shotdd have been sent out without escort. Edna F. Hilton. Subscribed and sworn to before me, Arthur Hugh Frazier, Second Secretary of the Embassy of the United States of America, at Paris, this 28th day of March, WW. [Seal of the American Embassy.] File No. 851.857Su8/50. Deposition of Norman Mdkle. American Embassy, Paris, Marches, 1916. The witness, after being duly sworn, testifled as follows: 1. Q. What is your name ?^-A. Norman Meikle. 2. Q. Where is your residence ? — ^A. Holyhead, North Wales, second engineer, steamship Northem, LapaJisse. 3. Q. Wbat is yoiu" nationality? — ^A. British subject. 4. Q. Where and when were you born ? — A. New Zea- land, on May 2, 1885. 5. Q. What is your occupation ? — ^A, Marine engineer. 6. Q. Were you a passenger on board the Sussex leav- ing Folkestone for Dieppe on the 24th instant? — A. Yes; I was. 7. Q. Did the Sussex show a flag, and, if so, what flag? — ^A. The French flag was flying until the ship had cleared the land. 8. Q. Where were you standing when the explosion occurred ? — ^A. Between the first and second class barrier. 9. Q. Did you see the trace of a submarine? — ^A. No; I did not. 10. Q. Did you see the track of a torpedo 1 — ^A. No. 12. Q. What in your opinion caused the explosion? — A. I thought it was a mine. Q. Why did you think the ship struck a mine? — ^A. From the position of the wreckage and the fact thiat it seemed to strike the ship at the foot of the stem. Q, Was the Sussex armed ? — ^A. No ; to my knowledge it was not armed. Q. Was the vessel equipped with wireless? — ^A. Yes; she was equipped with wireless; it came down with the explosion. 48 Remark: If Sussex had been hit by torpedo it would have been possible for the submarine to have finished her with second torpedo. Norman Meikle. Subscribed and sworn to before me, Arthxje Hugh Feaziek, Second Secretary of the Embassy of the United States of America, at Paris, this 28th day of March, 1916. [Seal of the American Embassy.] 851.857Su8/62. Affidavit of Henry S. Beer. American Constjlate, St. OaU, Switzerland, March 29, 1916. Henry S. Beer, beiag first duly sworn, deposes and says: I am an American citizen. Together with my wife, I was a passenger on the steamer Sussex when that steamer was torpedoed absolutely without warning of any kind, in midchannel between Folkestone and Boulogne on the afternoon of March 24, 1916. I know of my own knowl- edge that the Sussex was torpedoed, for I saw the torpedo before it struck and while it was still a hundred yards or more distant from the steamer. It was just before 3 o'clock in the afternoon. I was on deck with an English friend, Mr. J. Faulkes, of Debenham & Co., London. We were standing at the railing on the left side of the steamer about 10 feet back from the ladder leading up to the captain's bridge. Mrs. Beer sat in a steamer chair just behind us. It was a clear, sunny day and, as I turned my eyes seaward, I distinctly saw the torpedo approach- ing the steamer, a hundred yards or more away. Its course in the water was clearly marked and I could not have been mistaken. I exclaimed, " a torpedo " ! and the next instant it struck the steamer some distance in front of where we stood, throwing up a mass of water that drenched us, and literally tearing away the whole fore part of the steamer. The ladder leading to the captain's bridge was torn away and fell on the deck. The torpedo struck the steamer at an acute angle and not directly head-on. Mrs. Beer and I found places in one of the boats, together with about 30 others, and rowed away from the steamer, which we expected to sink immedi- ately. We rowed about for two hours, picking up half a dozen passengers who were clinging to bits of wreckage, and then seeing that the steamer was still afloat we rowedback to it, li)ut were not allowed to go aboard. Again we rowed about for two hours more and, night having come on, we again rowed back to the steamer and this time were taken aboard. About 11 o'clock at night a French trawler came alongside and took us off and brought us into Boulogne. Henrt S. Beer. Witnesses: Frank Diminke. Emil Meile. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of March, 1916. Georoe Nicolas Ifet, American Consul. [Seal of the American Consulate.] 49 Eile No. 851.857Su8/o0. Deposition of Edna Hale. American Embassy, Paris, March 29, 1916. ' , The witness, after being duly sworn, testified as follows : 1. Q. What is your name 1 — A. My name is Edna Hale. 2. Q. Where is your residence? — ^A. I am now living in London, 17 Clarendon Street, Pimlico, SW. 3. Q. What is your nationality ? — ^A. I am an Ameri- can. 4. Q. Where and when were.you bom ? — ^A. I was bom in New York City, on March 18, 1870. , 5. Q. What was the nationahty of your father? — A. He was British. .6. Q. What is your occupation ? — ^A. I am an artist. 7. Q. Were you a passenger on board the steamship/ Sussex leaving Folkestone for Dieppe on the 24th in- stant ? — ^A. I was. ' 8. Q. Did the Sussex show a flag; and if so, what flag? — ^A. I did not notice. 9. Q. What was the state of the weather ? — A. It was a beautiful sunshiny day, perfectly calm. 10. Q. Where were you standing when the explosion occurred? — ^A. I was standing just aft of the bridge on the port side. 11. Q. Did you see any trace of a submarine ? — ^A. Not any at all. 12. Q. Did you see any track of a torpedo ?— A. No, I did not; I was not taking any notice. 13. Q. What in your opinion caused the explosion? — A. I had an impression when I was thrown down that it was a mine. 14. Q. What caused the impression that the vegsel had struck a mine rather than it was struck by a torpedo ? — A. I can not tell of course how a mine or a torpedo would strike a vessel, but I had a kind of psychic impression that it was a mine, increased by the fact that the bow was lifted up. 15. Q. Was the Sussex armed? — A. No; not in any- way. 16. Q. Were the passengers warned to put on life belts? — ^A. No, and I think that it was a great mistake; I think everyone should have a life preserver on before starting. I fortunately had looked where they were be- forehand, and when I picked myself up, which I did very quickly, I inamediately took one up. 17. Q. In what condition were the lifebelts? — ^A. Mine was splendid and so was the one hanging next to mine. 18. Q. Were the lifeboats lowered by the crew? — ^A. Partly by the crew and partly by the passengers ; I know, because I got quite calm and was watching it. 19. Q. Did they seem adequate to accommodate all passengers? — ^A, No; nothing like it. 20. Q. Was the vessel equipped with wireless? — ^A. ' Yes; it was damaged by the explosion, but afterwards repaired. 21. Q. Do you know of your personal knowledge of aiiy American having been killed by the explosion or drowned as a result of it? — A. No; not one. 22. Q. At what hour did the explosion take place and how far was the vessel from shore at the time? — ^A. I believe it was about 4 o'clock, but can not tell exactly, as I did not look. I should think we must have been in mid- channel, south of Boulogne. 23. Q. Were there any other craft near tho Sussex at the time she was struck? — ^A. No; I did not see any. 24. Q. Did you see any dead bodies lying on the dock; and if so, how many?— A. I saw several bodies on the deck; I believe one, at least, must have been dead. 25. Qi Did you nbtice any persons drowning?— A. Yes, I did; three or four; of course I could not tell for sure, but they seemed to be drowning. I also saw one or two children. Edna Hale. Subscribed and sworn to before me, EoBT. W. Bliss, Secretary of the Embassy of the ; United States of America, at Paris, this 29th day of March, 1916^ [Seal of the American Embassy.] File No. 851.857Su8/6S. Affidavit of Irima BycTcehoer. American Consulate, Calais, France^ March 31, 1916. Irima Ryckeboer, being duly sworn, upon her oath says that she was one of the passengers on board the steamship Sussex on the 24th day of March, 1916, and was one of the victims of the explosion which cut off about twelve metres of the forward portion of said boat Sussex; that at the time of the explosion she was occupying a seat in the forward part to the left in the dining room of the first- class passengers; that the explosion not only gave her a severe shock from which she is stiU suffering but also cast upon her a piece of iron which severed one of the tendons of her fore finger on her left hand which necessitated a s.urgical operation; that she did not see the wake of the torpedo in the water as was seen by others on board, but that a sailor of the Sussex who bandaged her hand for the first time after her injuries aboard told her that the Sussex had been torpedoed by a submarine because he saw the wake of a torpedo in the water about one hun- dred yards away just before the explosion took place and that Tie, the sailor, who was on the bridge with the captain, yelled out to the captain that a torpedo was coming through the water; that the sailor described the wake of the torpedo as looking Uke the water when agir tated by a great fish swimming just beneath the surface; that the captain, who also saw the wake of the torpedp,. gave immediately a command to the engineer to ma- neuver the engine so as to dodge the torpedo. 51 Affiant further swears that the sailor above mentioned m^de the foregoing statements attributed to him by the affiant while dressing her wounded hand on board the Sussex after the explosion and long before she debarked from the ship that eamc to the rescue at Boulogne-sur- mer. Affiant further says that from what the captain, the sailor, and others saw on board the Siissex that every one believed that the Sussex had been torpedoed by a submarine. Affiant further says that the explosion took place about three o'clock in the afternoon on the day aforesaid and that she took refuge in a lifeboat with a large number of other people, among whom there was an American and his wife; that while they were in the lifeboat they re- marked a long dark object on the surface of the water like that of a submarine; that she saw it afterwards disappear in the water by plun^g; that not only affiant remarked this . fact, but also other persons who were seated in the lifeboat with her; that at the time they saw this object disappear in the water it was still broad day- light. Affiant further swears that at the time of the expldt -sion the weather was fine and the sea calm; that she had walked over the decks of the boat and she did not diai- cover any guns or arms of any kind on board; that in her judgment from 60 to 70 per cent of the passengers on board were women and children: Affiant fiuiiher says that she is now in Paris and ex- pects in a few days to leave for Lisbon, Portugal, to em- bark on board a Holland ship for Bio de Janeiro, Brazil; that her address in Paris is care of Mme. Zendowan, 14 Rue Colonel Moll. Affiant further says that her profession is that, of a first fitter as a dressmaker; that she is en route to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where she intends to establish a business; that she is twenty years of age and was bom at Boulogne- sur-mer, France. Ibima Ryckebobk. Subscribed and sworn before me on this 31st day of March, 1916. J. B. MiLNER, American OonsUi. JScal of the American Consulale.] 52 File No. 851.857 Su 8/71. Report of Rear Admiral Grasset, of the French Navy} [Translation.] Paris, March 31, 1916. ' BEAR ADMIRAL A. GRASSET, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF GEN- ERAL STAFF, TO THE VICE ADMIRAL, CHIEF OF GEN- ERAL STAFF. Admiral: In conformity with your orders, I left for Boulogne, where I began an investigation relative to the Sussex. On the 24th of March the Sussex, of the Compagnie des Chemias de Fer de I'Etat, making the regular service between England and France, left Folkestone at 13.25 for Dieppe. This ship carried about 325 ^ passengers of all nationalities, among whom a great number of women and children, together with the Indian mail; the ship was not armed. The crew comprised 53 men. From the departure the speed was regulated at 16 knots; after passing a mile from Dungeness, the captain put the ship on the com-se S. 3° E. The weather was fair; the sea almost calm. Most of the passengers were on deck. Suddenly, before anything could attract at- tention, the captain, who was on the bridge, perceived 150 meters away on the port side forward the track of a torpedo. It was then 14.50; the clocks on board in stop- ing registered the exact time of the catastrophe. The second officer and the boatswain, who were on the bridge, likewise saw the torpedo quite clearly. With a good deal of calmness and decision the captain gave the order to put the helm to the right and to stop the starboard engine in order to pivot to the right and avoid the tor- pedo. These two orders were executed immediately; the depositions of the engraeers on duty are proof of this. The evolution began to take place when, about 8 sec- onds ' after the torpedo was seen, a formidable explosion was produced, lifting up an enormous geyser of water; the ship was cut in two as far as the bridge. The for- ward part disappeared entirely; the after part of the ship, thanks to the strength of the water-tight com- partments, kept afio.^t. On the deck a num.ber of passengers on board perceived the torpedo at the mom.ent of. its arrival; one of them even said to his neighbor to look at the "large fish com- ing toward the vessel." AH the persons who were forward disappeared with the part of the ship which sank, am.ongst whom the passengers who were on the deck forward and in the first class saloon, the m,en of the crew who were in the forecastle, the forward lookout, and the masthead lookout, likewise disappeared. > Transmitted with Ambassador Sharp's dispatch No. 3123. ' This approximate number Is given by the captain. According to the company, there were 383 passengers. The man who had charge of controlling the tickets was severely wounded and transported to Dover; he is not in a condition to give information. ' According to the distance at which the torpedo was seen and the time elapsed until the moment of the explosion, the speed of the torpedo must have been 36 knots , which Is the normal speed for these engines. 53 The captain, who was knocked down by the geyser of water produced by the explosion, ordered the crew to go to the life-savirtg stations. The firemen and the mechanics momited to their posts after having stopped tihe port engine and having closed the doors of the fur- naces. At the same time the wireless operator en- deavored to send a signal of distress without succeeding, the antennae having fallen with the mizzen mast. The crew went to the designated stations in order to put out the lifeboats and rafts,* but the confusion on the deck rendered any circulation very difficult. This terrible explosion produced a panic amongst the passengers which, fortunately, was short; a mother was seen to throw her child into the sea and then to precipitate herself after it; many passengers likewise threw them- selves into the sea ; others were restrained by the men of the crew. A number of passengers precipitated them- selves into the lifeboats, overfilUng them. It was neces- sary to make some of them get out of the whaleboats, but when these boats were brought near, two of them were again invaded at the moment they passed on a level with the deck and they upset by reason of overcrowding when reaching the sea.'' The two other whaleboats and the two cutters remained floating, filled with passengers; in each boat were two men of the crew. The engineers ascertained that the water-tight doors of the compartments were solidly closed and opened the safety avlves of the boilers to be ready for all emergen- cies. The woimded were transported to the cabins; the medicine chest, which was forward, having disappeared in the explosion, bandages were made with napkins, and an unknown passenger, probably an English doctor, gave the necessary care with great devotion; among the wounded a man had his two legs cut off, another had his th^ severed; several being severely wounded were in a state of coma. The vessel remained floating, with no Ust, the after part being higher than the bow by 30 centimeters. The captain and the crew reassured the passengers who had remained on board by showing them that the ship would not sink. About 5 o'clock the breeze freshening, the sea rising, the captain recalled the lifeboats and made the passengers disembark and convinced them that they woiild be in greater safety on board the Sussex. The women and children were conducted to the second-class saloon, aft, where they were warmed with blankets and with hot drinks; the men remained on deck. The wireless operator occupied himself with repairing the antennae and made it fast between the mainmast and the davit; the work was not terminated until 16.30; it was only then that he could give news of the catastrophe. The engineers having ascertained that the engines were able to turn over, the captain called together the 1 There were 6 lifeboats which could contain 184 persons. There were 22 rafts which could contain 264 persons. Moreover, 816 life belts. From the depositions these life belts were in the orlop deck; a number of them were in bad condition. ' The boatswain, 1 seaman, and 3 passengers were able to climb on the keel of an upset whaleboat. These persons were thereafter picked up. 54 second officer, the boatswain, two officers of the EngKsh Navy, who were passengers, and proposed to them to reverse the engines and thus make for the English coast at slow speed. On the advice of the English officers he gave up his plan. At 20 o'clock he decided to send a whaleboat to notify the Ughtship Colbart, which was in view and which he supposed to be connected to the land by telegraph; nine volunteers embarked in the whaleboat. Meanwhile, by an unfortunate combination of cir- cumstances, help was late in arriving. The position notified by the wireless message was erroneous by about 15 miles; moreover, during the time that elapsed between the moment of the explosion and that when the distress signal was sent, the ship drifted. As soon as the news arrived at Boulogne, at 16.30, the patrol boats received orders to go to the help of the ship in danger. They went to the indicated spot, but found nothing, and then started to search in the neighborhood. It was only at 22.40 that the Marie- TMrese, of which the captain con- ducted the search with method and initiative, came near the Sussex. The breeze was then strong from south- west and the sea heavy. The debarkation by lifeboats would have been dangerous. The captain of the Marie- Therese decided to come along the Sussex. The transfer of the passengers took place in the greatest calmness; the women and children were passed through a porthole of the Sussex, and men let themselves down by ropes. In spite of the condition of the sea no accident took place, and, at 23.45, the Marie-TMrese made for Boulogne with 192 passengers. During this operation a number of English and French ships had gathered together; an English destroyer took the place of the Marie-TMrese and embarked the rest of the passengers. The wounded, extended in ham- mocks, were placed on the companionway, which the captain of the Sussex had had sawed in two. This trestle raised by a davit allowed the wotinded to be car- ried without causing them too great pain. The English destroyer transported these passengers, numbering 49, to England. After disembarking the passengers an English de- stroyer took the Sussex in tow by the stern and made for Boulogne, but three-fourths of an hour later the tow- rope broke. Soon after some tugboats arrived from Boulogne and towed the Sussex to Boulogne, where she arrived at 14 o'clock. Much d6bris coming from the torpedo were found aboard the Sussex. Several fragments were given to the American delegates who came to Boulogne; the others will be addressed, to the department by maritime authority. The submarine which torpedoed the Sussex could not be ignorant that she was attackmg the mail boat, affecting the regular service between France and England. Not only the silhouette of such boats is known to all sailors, but the route of the Sussex and the time of her passage 55 indicated her service. It is therefore a premeditated at- tack against an unarmed merchant vessel executed with- out the least warning. One more fact brings into relief the premeditation and the relentlessness of the submarine. As it has been said before, a whaleboat was sent at 20 o'clock to the light- ship Oolhart to announce the catastrophe; this whaleboat arrived at the lightship at 23.45. Its crew was received by an English destroyer at 3 o'clock in the morning. During the transfer of the crew a torpedo was laimched at the destroyer and passed several meters to the stem. This fact was confirmed by the British Admiralty. Now, ac- cording to the distance made by the whaleboat with oars, the lightship was at 6 or 7 miles at the maximum from the Sussex. From this it appears that the submarine re- mained in the neighborhood of the Sussex to torpedo any of the ships which might come to help her victim. I will add in terminating that before leaving Boulogne I visited the room where the coflSins of the victims were placed, reposing under green plants, under the guard of an armed detachment. Photographs representing the Sussex in her actual condition wiU be sent you by the next mail. A. Geasset, Rear Admiral, Assistant Chief of General Staff. File No. 851.857Su8/61. Rep&rt of Naval AttacMs Sayles and Smith and Military Ohserver Logan to Ambassador Sharp. Ameeican Embassy, Paris, France, April 1, 1916. Sie: We have the honor to submit the following addi- tional report in connection with the Sussex affair: All fragments of metal which we personally picked up on board the steamship Sussex were sealed and tagged so as to prevent any confusion arising in the future. The fragments consist of 15 pieces, numbered from 1 to 15, inclusive. There were four possible explanations of the explosion that occurred in the steamship Sussex, vi±: (1) Internal explosion occasioned by the boilers of the ship; (2) in- ternal explosion occasioned by some sort of material contained in the ship's cargo; (3) contact with a mine; (4) contact with a torpedo. 1. An actual and careful examination of the ship and its boilers by Maj. Logan and Lieut. Smith shows con- clusively that the boilers of the ship are in serviceable condition to-day. The two bulkheads separating the boiler room from the destroyed portion of the ship are intact, and it was the most forward of these which held the water coming in through the open portion of the ship. As a matter of fact, the ship could have been backed into port had it not been for the fear that the backward pull of the water on this bulkhead would have been dangerous. It is reported that the advisa- 56 bility of this procedure was discussed by the captain and some of the passengers, but was given up. The electric-hght plant of the ship functioned all the time. For the foregoing reasons this cause of the incident may be dismissed. 2. The ship was primarily a passenger and mail carry- ing boat, and on this account had only two small cargo holds — one aft of amidships and one in the portion of the ship cut off by the explosion. The afterhold is said to have contained some Indian mail and the baggage of the passengers. This cargo hold is of course uninjured. The forward hold is reported officially to have contained at the time of the accident about 3 tons of cargo, con- sisting of aeroplane wire, a number of rolls of cloth, and a few motorcycles, together with some second-class mail matter (newspapers, journals, etc.). So far as known and officially reported, no explosive material of any kind was being transported on this ship. Maj. Logan and Lieut. Smith, who inspected the Siissex, report, and the photographs taken of the ship's injuries, particularly on the port side of the ship, demonstrated clearly that the injury to the ship was not occasioned by an internal explosion. The port side of the ship's bot- tom remaining intact, which is immediately behind the cargo hold, is bent inward to such an extent as to pre- clude any supposition of the effect of the explosion having been caused by any other than the contact and penetra- tion of the ship by an explosive weapon striking the out- side of the ship's huU. 3. The injury to the steamship Sussex is officially re- ported to have occurred at 2.50 p. m., March 24, 1916, and the ship's position at that time is reported to have been latitude 50° 42' north and longitude 1° 20' west of Paris. The ship is reported to have left Folkestone with destination Dieppe at 1.35 p. m., course 36° (true) west, passing 1 mile east of Dungeness. At 2 p. m. the ship is reported to have been abeiam of the last light heading south 3° west (true). At 2.50 p. m. (time of the accident) the ship is reported to have been in the latitude and longitude above given and about 13 miles off Dungeness. This position agrees with the reputed speed of the ship, viz, 16 knots per hour. (In other words, the ship was therefore outside of any territorial waters.) At mean low water at this position there is a depth of 31 meters. The official time of the incident was 1 hour and 13 minutes after high water. The height of the tide at this time was about 7.60 meters. The depth of the water at the time of the incident was therefore 38.60 meters. The maximum draft of the ship at the time of the incident is reported to have been 3.20 meters. From the foregoing facts the assumption may be drawn that the Sussex did not come into contact with an anchored mine. German mines. — At the French Ministry of Marine we were shown the plans of a late type of German mine. We carefully examined these plans with a view to deter- mining whether or not any of these fragments we had 57 foxind on the Sussex formed any part of such mme. We examined with particular attention not only the interior and exterior portion of the mine proper but also particu- larly the anchoring gear and other accessories. We deducted from this examination that neither of the two screw bolts in our possession formed any part of such a mine. (See later.) Of the'remaining 13 fragments we are also agreed that 7 fragments do not form part of a mine. The remaining 6 pieces we are unable to deter- mine definitely whether or not they are fragments of a mine or torpedo or very possibly of some portion of the ship's cargo. The foregoing deductions from these plans were con- firmed by an examination of somewhat similar plans of a German mine at Boulogne by Maj. Logan and Lieut. Smith on March 27, 1916; by an examination of certain pieces of a German mine at Rochfort by Lieut. Com- mander Sayles on March 25, 1916, and by an examination of a German mine at Toulon on March 31, 1916, by Lieut. Commander Sayles, Maj. Logan, and Lieut. Smith. 4. With the permission of the French Government we proceeded to Toulon, where we were permitted to see a captured German torpedo and to have it disassembled in our presence. The two screw bolts in our possession found on the Sussex by Lieut. Smith were stamped on the head as follows, viz, (a) on one surface "K" and on another surface "56"; (b) on one surface "K" and on another surface "58." These bolts are shaped in the same general way for use on all torpedoes of all countries. They are the bolts used for attaching the war head of the torpedo to the air chamber and also for attaching the afterbody to the air chamber. The German torpedo we saw at Toulon was No. 1804, in white paint. Its length was 5 m. 066 by 450 mm. It had stamped on it the additional letters and figures "J. P. 357." We were given in addition complete plans of this torpedo. The iorpedo that we saw was said to have been buUt about 15 years ago and was picked up by the French on the beach near Boulogne April, 1915, after it had been dis- charged by a German submarine at a cargo ship. With •the exception of the casing of the torpedo head the entire torpedo, including engine cylinders and fittings, is made out of a bronze composition. The head of this torpedo was attached to the air chamber by 10 screw bolts and 10 screws. This made a total of 20 holes m the circum- ference of the forward end of the air chamber, each being numbered consecutively from 1 to 20. The screw bolts were set in the even-numbered holes, whereas the flat- head screws were set in the odd-numbered holes. Each screw bolt was, numbered with the corresponding num- bered hole it occupied,, and in addition had the letter " K" on it. These screw bolts are identical in size, shape, and marking with those we had picked up on the Sussex . We have two of these now in our possession which we re- moved from the torpedo at Toulon. The letter "K" on the fittmg of the head of a torpedo is said to be character- istic of German torpedoes and to represent the German 58 word "kopf," or head, and this with its number shows at a glance the position of the hole where it is to be placed. While at Toulon wc were also permitted to examine sim- ilar screw bolts used on British and French torpedoes. These had no letters or numbers and we were informed that they were not so numbered or lettered in either of the services. They were also of a shghtly different size. We have one of each of these in our possession. The fact that the numbered pieces we have in our possession are numbered "56 K" and "58 K," respectively, whereas the highest numbered "K" piece we saw on the torpedo at Toulon was numbered "20 K," leads us to believe that- the torpedo from which the screw bolts found on the Sussex came was of a slightly different model than that on the one at Toulon. The fact of the pieces being num- bered, being of the same size, and being lettered "K" is, however, very important; and is, to say the least, a very convincing circumstance. Of the seven fragments that we also agreed upon as forming no part of the mine, four of these we have agreed upon as having formed part of one of the engine cylinders used on a German torpedo. The engine in the German torpedo we saw at Toiilon was a three-cylinder recipro- cating engine. The four pieces we agreed upon have been carefuUy compared with not only the drawings, but also with the actual engine parts, and are identical in shape and composition. The torpedo which may have hit the Sussex may have been a four-cyUnder type, in accordance with some of the later models, and likewise some of its outside surfaces may not necessarily be of a bronze com- position. We have no fragments that we can positively identify as belonging to the exterior surface of the tor- pedo. A four-cylinder engine would not necessarily vary much in design in the engine cylinders. The remaining three fragments of the group which we are agreed upon as not forming part of a mine we agree are parts of the same engine from which the preceding four parts have come. On account of the sm^all size and shape of these pieces and from the effects of the explosion, we were unable to definitely place their position on either the plans or the engine we saw. We consider these particular frag^ ments, while not constituting as positive and convincing evidence as the screw bolts, to be nevertheless of the greatest possible importance in the consideration of the merits of the case and a very convincing contributory circumstance. We have the honor to be, sir, Your obedient servants, W. R. Satles, Lieut. Gomdr. U. S. Navy. James A. Logan, Major, Q. M. C, U.S. Army. B. L. Smith, 1st Lieut, U. S. M. 0. 59 File No. 851;857Su8/56. Report of Naval AttacMs SayUs and Smith to Ambassador W. H, Page. American Embassy, London, April 5, 1916. Sik: In accordance with orders received from the Secre- tary of State we have the honor to report as follows con- cerning the attack made on the steamship Sussex. From the evidence obtained by us the following facts have been adduced and have been previously reported to the American ambassador, Paris. The steamship Sussex at the time of the incident, viz, 2.50 p. m., March 24, 1916, was well outside territorial waters, proceeding on free route on the high seas. She carried no arms or armament; the cargo on board amount- ed to about only 3 tons, consisting of aeroplane wire, aero- plane cloth, and a few motorcycles. There were a large nimiber of passengers on board, nearly one-half subjects of neutral States; also a large amoimt of first and second class mail matter. No warning of any kind was given the vessel, nor was a submarine sighted. The track of the torpedo was reported to have been seen by the command- ing officer, who immediately ported his hehn, stopped his starboard engine, and signaled it to go astern. The en- gine was stopped, but there was not time to obey the lat- ter signal. This report of the commanding officer has been verified by personal conversation with the engineer on duty at the time. Three American citizens have made sworn depositions to the American Ambassador, Paris, that they person- ally saw the track of the torpedo on the water just before the vessel was hit. The exhibits in the case are tagged, sealed, and num- bered from i to 16, inclusive. All these pieces except that numbered 16 were picked up personally by Lieut. Smith from the steamship Sussex. Exhibit 16 was handed to Lieut. Smith by Capt. Balincourt, French Navy, who states that he personally picked it up from the deck of the Sussex. Exhibits rnarked 1 and 2 have been compared with the head body screws of German torpedoes No. 1804 at Toulon and No. 2121 at Portsmouth, and have been found to be identical in size, pitch of screw, and char- acteristic markings. After a comparison and close examination of German torpedo No. 1804 at Totdon; German torpedoes No. 2121 and No. 2340 at Portsmouth; fragments from Ger- maii torpedo L. S. No. 5925 at Portsmouth; and from drawings and descriptions of German torpedo No. 3362, taken from I. M. S, Emden, we have been able to posi- tively identify and locate all the other fragments picked up on board the steamship Sussex, that is. Exhibits 3 to 16, inclusive. Exhibit 3; part of inner seat of water reUeve valve of engine valve. Exhibits 4 and 5; reenforcing bands of engine-room casing. . Exhibits 6 to I'O, inclusive, and 12; parts of engine cylinders. ! 60 Exhibits 11, 13, 14, 15; parts of steel war head, still bearing the distinctive red paint common to German torpedo war heads. Exhibit 16; part of lantern frame inside of either engine-room casing or maneuvering chamber. There was also shown us at Portsmouth a piece of metal which was stated to have been picked up on board the steamship Sussex by Commander Harvey, E,. N., who was a passenger on board the ship at the time. This we identified as forming part. of a main engine piston of a German torpedo. Inspection and examination of various types of Ger- man mines at Portsmouth confirmed and substantiated the opinions we had already formed from the examina- tion of types of German mines at Boulogne, Rochefort, and Toulon; that is, that none of the fragments picked up on board the steamship Sussex could have possibly come from or formed part of any mine known to us. : We are of the opinion that the torpedo employed was one of a comparatively recent date; its serial number was probably between three and five thousand. The older types of German torpedoes employ guncotton for an ex- plosive charge; the more recent are constructed of steel and are charged with T. N. T. This being the case, the Sussex probably escaped total destruction by the fact that, as shown by the photographs which were taken of the injury done to the vessel, the torpedo struck a glancing blow, well forward, and did not penetrate any of the machinery compartments. We have, etc., William R. Sayles, Lieut. CommaTider, U. 8. Na/vy, Naval AttacM, Paris. Beenakd L. Smith, Lieut., U. S. M. 0., Assistant Naval AttacM, Paris. File No. 851.857Su8/69. Affiadvit of Ida E. Beer. American Consulate, St. GaU, Switzerland, April 6, 1916. Ida E. Beer, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: I am the wife of Henry S. Beer, and, together with my husband, was a passenger on the steamer Sussex at the time of the accident to that vessel on March 24, 1916. We were on deck, my husband standing at the rail, watching the water and talking to a friend and I sitting in a steamer chair just behind them. I heard my hus- band exclaim, " a torpedo, " and .almost instantly the ex- plosion followed. We were drenched with water and the whole fore part of the steamer was torn away. There had been no warning and no evidence of danger prior to the explosion. Ida E. Beer. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of April, 1916. George Nicolas Ifft,. American Consul. [Seal of the American Consulate.] 61 File No. 851.857Su8/ . The French Ambassador to the Secretary of State. French Embassy, Washington, April 9, 1916. My Dear Mr. Secretary: I had asked my Govern- ment after our conversation the other day whether there was anything in the statement that the Sussex had car- ried troops before, and might therefore have been sup- posed by the submarine to have been so employed when it was torpedoed — one of the many excuses put forth as an explanation of the cruel deed. The answer reached me this morning: The Sussex has never transported troops. As was well known to aU, she has been plying for many years between Dieppe and England, and was following, when torpedoed, her usual route, well known also to sailors. This is what allowed to find her after the disaster and to save part of the crew and passengers. The route followed by transport ships is qmte a dif- ferent one. Believe me, etc., ^ JUSSERAND. File No. 851.857Su8/66. Report of Military Observer Logan and Assistant Naval Attache Smith. American Embassy, Paris, April 13, 1916. We arrived at Boulogne March 26, 1916, at about 8 p. m. That night at about 10 p. m. we were met by Capt. de Balincourt of the French Navy and the Amer- ican consul from Calais. March 27, in accordance with an appointment, we all met at 10 a. m. in Capt. de BaUncourt's office. At this meeting we were informed that the findings of the French official inquiry into the Sussex incident were that the injuries to the Sussex were caused by a German torpedoi At this same meeting Capt. de Balincourt handed us fragment No. 16, which he claimed he had personally found on the upper deck after the arrival of the Sussex in Boxdogne on March 26. We agreed at this time, between ourselves, that we would not be justified in basing any of our findings on evidence of this character presented to us by French authorities or anyone else, but that our findings should be based, so far as any fragments were concerned, on the results of the actual search of the ship by one or the other of us. We had and have no reason to doubt the absolute sincerity and truthfulness of the statements made to us by the French authorities at Boulogne, but at no time did we allow these statements to influence our investigations and conclusions, as we fully realized at the time the prejudice of the French in the case. One or both of us were on board the Sussex during the mornings and afternoons of March 27, 28, and 29, with the exception of the morning of the 28th, when we at- 62 tended the questioning of certain witnesses by the French authorities. During the afternoon of March 27, while Maj. Logan was examining members of the crew with the French naval lieutenant, Lieut. Smith, who was entirely alone, found a small fragment No. 9 on the port side of the hull near the keel. The position where this piece was found was very near to the point where the ship was struck and was wedged in a very inconspicuous place between a beam and the hull plating of the ship. Further search at this time by Lieut. Smith in the general vicinity of the explosion on both the port and starboard sides, and on the various decks revealed a piece of light steel casing with red paint on it. This latter fragment was at the time considered to be of doubtful origin but was retained, as it appeared to be of material foreign to the ship's material. On the morning of March 28 we were present at the meeting referred to above. That same afternoon, while Maj. Logan was questioning Prof. Baldwin, Lieut. Smith, entirely alone, spent the afternoon on board the Sussex. Ho was unable to find any additional evidence near the explosion, so ho went to the navi- gating bridge for the purpose of inspecting the compass and binnacle, as we wanted to assure ourselves that fragment No. 16, given us by the French authorities, did not come from this source. Finding the compass and binnacle intact he began to search among the debris on the bridge. After considerable search he found the bronze fragment No. 4 engaged between the port running light and the wooden shield behind it-. He discovered this fragment while leaning out ovc the rail for the purpose of seeing in what condition the lights were. Taking a clue from this he began to work aft along the port side of the deck house. In the port scupper alongside and practically hidden from view he found a screw bolt, No. 1 fragment. Continuing aft just to the wireless cabin he found several small fragments of bronze casing and another screw bolt. To the starboard of the wireless cabin he found fragment No. 5. This latter fragment was the only one he found in a position which could be called conspicuou&. Fragment No. 3 he found by the saloon deck hatch located amidship of the deck house. During the entire time of his search he was entirely alone; in fact, during his search over the deck house no other person was on deck. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the fact that these pieces had not been placed on this ship for the purpose of deceiving us was the fact that on March 28 both Maj, Logan and Lieut. Smith were present dur- ing the cleaning out of the debris on the lower decks near the point of the explosion. This cleaning was being carried out for both the purpose of clearing the ship as well as for the search of possible dead still remaining on board. During the course of this clean- 63 ing out a portion of the leg of a man with a shoe on wad discovered in the d6bris. The dfibris on the saloon deck was some 4 or 5 feet deep, and was very closely packed due to the action of the water when the ship was afloat at high tide. It bore convincing indications of not having been touched since the explosion. Majl Logan and Lieut. Smith at this time found three frag- ments, Nos. 11, 13, and 14, which were uncovered from below this debris in their presence, and which every indication showed could not have been placed there after the explosion had occurred and the dfibris had accumulated and fallen on top. The two screw bolts bear every evidence of having been in an extremely heavy explosion and in immediate contact with explosive material which caused a distinct fusing of portions of the bolts. Sheared diagonally in the threaded body of the bolts they appear to have been in contact with a melting force which left a glazed finish. Li addition to this the bolts Jiave been slightly bent, which appears to have come from a twisting force. The twist is opposite to the shear of the bolts. This twist is very characteristic of the eflFects that woxild naturally be expected from a bolt partially embedded diagonally in a solid body, such as is the case in the war head of a torpedo. It would be practically impossible to artificially fake all of these injuries to a screw bolt of this character. From the time that the explosion occurred to the time that we made our investigations there was very naturaUy time for some party or parties to have placed fragments aboard the Sussex with a view to deceiving us. On the other hand, from the character of the fragments, their natural and inconspicuous location and their wide distri- bution, and the fact of certain fragments having been foimd imder the d6bris, leads us to believe that it is wholly improbable that they were placed on board th« ship after the explosion or that they came from any othirar source than (he torpedo that hit the ship. Jahes a. LoaAN, Jr., Major, Q. M. O. B. L. Smith, 1st Lieut. U. S. M. C. File No. 851.857Su8/65. Report ef Na/oal AUctehis Sayles and Simih and MMiary Observer Logam, to Ambassador Sharp, American Embassy, Paris, April 13, 1918. Snt: We have the honor to submit the following report to accompany the fragments of an explosive engine found on board the steamship Sussex by Lieut, B. L. Smith, U. S. M. C, and Maj. Logan, U. S. A., on March 27 and 28, 1916, at Boulogne and compared with Gennan torpe- does now in the hands of the French and Enghsh Govern- ments. T_ J r The fragments are tagged, sealed, and numbered froj^i 1 to 15, inclusive; on each tag there is also noted the 64 location on board the Sussex where each piece was picked up by Lieut. Smith and Maj. Logan. In addition to the above-mentioned fragments, there is also another piece found by Capt. Balincourt, French Navy, and turned over to Lieut. Smith. This fragment is also tagged, sealed, and bears the number 16. This comparison was made with German torpedoes, fragments, and drawings, as follows: 1st. Torpedo— serial number 1804, at Toulon, Franco, picked up afloat in the English Channel during the month of April, 1915. 2d. Torpedo— No. 2121 and 2340, at Portsmouth, England, recovered from the channel or North Sea by the English Navy. 3d. Fragments of torpedo L. S. 5825, sketch A, figure 4, taken from the English ship Orange Prince after being torpedoed by a German submarine. 4th. Detailed drawing of a torpedo foimd on board H. I. M. S. Emden after her capture. Inclosed with this report are four drawings, figures 1, 2, 3, and 4, on which are shown the places in which cer- tain of the fragments fit. These sketches were made from the detailed drawings of a German torpedo in our possession and from drawings of the torpedo found on the Emden. From the above the following results were obtained: Fragments Nos. 1 and 2, bronze screw bolts bearing the markings 56K and 58K, respectively; compared abso- lutely with body screws employed for joining head of torpedo to main body, as shown in sketch figure 1. Exhibit 1 (a) are two body screws taken from torpedo No. 1804; Exhibit 1 (b) is a body screw taken from torpedo No. 2121. Fragment No. 3 shows resemblance to the inner seat, water-relief valve of engine valve, as shown by figure 3 of drawings of the Emden's torpedo. Fragments Nos. 4 and 5, pieces of bronze with screw holes and one bearing a small screw, compared with frag- ments of -torpedo L. S. 5825, sketch B, figure 4. Fragments 7, 8, 9, and 10, pieces of bronze castings, some parts partially machined were identified as part of engine cylinder, as indicated in sketch figure 2. Fragments Nos. 6 and 12, similar fragments of casting as 7, 8, 9, and 10, could not be positively located, but from the general form, material, and thickness imdoubt- edly form part of the engine cylinder of a German torpedo. Fragments Nos. 11, 13, 14, and 15 — pieces of steel cas- ing and bearing the red paint common to German tor- pedoes were identified as fragments of the war head, sketch A, figure 1. Fragment No. 16, in appearance a piece of bronze stif- fening ring or engine frame, compared absolutely with fragment of torpedo No. L. S. 5825, which was a fragment of the steel casing, sketch A, figure 4, containing either part of the engine-room cage or a bronze stiffening frame riveted and soldered to the outer casing. AH , bronze parts were trimmed and painted identically with Exhibit Nd. 16. @5 Coi!isequen%, in view of the deductions made in our report of April 1, 1916, whereby the i^ossibility of the explosion on board the Sussex having been caused by a mine was eliminated, a;nd after due consideration of the above, we form the conclusion that the explosive engine which came into contact with the steamship Sussex at 2.50 p. m. March 24 was a German torpedo. We have the honor, etc. W. R. Satles, lA&M. Oowmander, U. 8. Navy. James A. Logan, Jr., Major, Q. M. C, U. S. Army. B, L. Smith, First Lievienant, TJ. S. M, C. File No. 851.8578u8/71. . Affidavit of Mark Baldwin.^ ■ [Translation.] DEOLAKATION of MS. MARK BALDWIN, AMERICAN CITIZEN, SHIPWRECKED ON THE STEAMER "SUS- SEX." French Eeptjblic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the yeM" 1916, tibe 26th of March, at 17 o'clock, we, Georges Jean Valteins, speraal commissary of the railway poKce, living at Boulogne sur mer, judiciary police officer assistant of the procuror of the Republic, accompanied by Mr. Sivadon, special assistant commissary, proceeded to the Hotel Sussex, at Wimereux, where, in the presence of Mr. Certeux, sous prefet of Boulogne sur mer, we heard Mr. Mark Baldwin, ©oiresponding member of the Institut de France, aged 55 years, domiciled in Baltimore, 118 West Franklin Street, American citizen in residence at Paris, 11 bis Bd Delessert, who, after having taken an oatti to tell the truth, nothing but the truth, and the whole truth, made to us the following declaration: Accompanied by Mrs. and Miss Baldwin we embarked, on the 24th of March, on board the Sussex, at Folke- stone, our destination being Paris. We left after noticing that there were on board other Americans, amongst whom two young men traveling for the American Ambulance in Paris. We were seated in the stem beside the heavy baggages, and after taking our Itmch on board my wife and I were seated there. My daughter was with the two young Americans of whom I have spoken close to the captain's cabin. Suddenly there was a shock, followed by an explosion* The shock and the explosion were distinctly separate. A great quantity of dfibris and a wave of water were thrown upon the ship. There was great confusion. Before the explosion my wife and I, who were in the stem, had seen nothing. We looked for the life belts in 1 Cop7 received from the French Ministry of Foreign A£airs by Ambassador Sharp and transmitted with his dispatch No. 3123. 66 the'saloon, and I helped my wife to get into a small boat witii other women. Then I ran to search formy daughter. I looked all over the front part of the steamer, but she was not there. The place where she had been standing with the two young men had disappeared. Not finding my daughter, I returned to my wife at the place where I had left her. She was on the deck, the sailors having made all the people who were in the boat get out. I looked for another boat in which my wife and several other ladies had been taken by three or four gentlemen. When the boat was full, I went back to look for my daugh- ter. I did not find her and I supposed that she left in another boat. I jumped into the boat where my wife was, shdiag down the ropes, when to my surprise there I found my daughter stretched out, almost dead. We remained in this boat until sunset; five other boats, I believe, were like ours, overcrowded. After a discus- sion we decided to rem.aia near the Sussex; a single boat drew away until we lost sight of it. I saw many people in the water. We were in the second boat, from which the passengers clambered aboard the Sussex with the authorization of the captain. The sea was a little rougher, and the operation was difficult, especially for my daughter, who was still imconscious. We were on the lower deck, where we remained with many others until after 11 o'clock, when it was annoimced that a ship was close to us with facilities for disembarking. Women were taken first; my wife and my daughter were the last, because it was difficult to transport my daughter. After the women, a number of men were embarked on the Marie-TMrhe until she was full. I was of the number. I noticed that a good many remained behind on the Sussex. A bed was found for my daughter, and the crew of the boat treated us admirably. They made coffee for us, and after three-fourths of an hour we arrived at Boulogne. We were the last to leave the ship, because an ambulance had been ordered for my daughter, and all three of us were transported to the General Hospital No. 14, at Wimereux. I do not know what became of the two young men with whom my daughter was talking. They were Mr. Crocker, of Boston, a Harvard student, coming over as military driver in the American Ambulance at Paris, and Mr. Penfield, a student at the University of Oxford. My daughter on her arrival at the hospital was in a con- dition of physical prostration and mental confusion, doubtless provoked by a blow on the skuU. Her right side is for the moment paralyzed. Up to the present her condition remained about the same, but this afternoon she showed better symptoms. [Printea and distributed April 4, 1917.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE. PAPERS RELATING TO MARITIME DANGER ZONES AND THE PLACING BY BELUGERENTS OF MINES IN THE HIGH SEAS. WA8HINOT0N : OOTXBNMDNI PBINTINO OFFICE : UlT LIST OF PAPERS.- No. 476 704 375 261 271 Ambassador Gerard to the Sec- retary of State (telegram). Memorandum from the British Embassy. Memorandum to the (British Embassy. Memorandum from the British Embassy. Memorandum from the British Embassy. Memorandum from the British Embassy. Memorandum from the British Embassy. The Grerman Ambassador to the Secretary of State. Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. Memorandum from the British Embassy. Ambassador Herrick to the Secretary of State. Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State (telegram). Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary oi State (telegram). The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State. Ambassador Marye to the Sec- retary of State (tel^ram). Ambassador Gerard to the Sec- retary of State. Ambassador Gerard to the Sec- retary of State. The Secretary of State to Am- bassador Gerard. Consul General Skinner to the I Secretary of State. 89244-17 1914. Aug. 7 Aug. 11 Aug. 13 Aug. 14 Aug. 19 30 Aug.-*. Aug. 23 Sept. 10 Sept. 28 Oct. 2 Oct. 9 Oct. 28 Nov. 2 Nov. 3 Nov. 5 Nov. 13 Nov. 17 Dec. 8 Dec. 11 Reports he is informed by German Foreign Office that Ger- man ports are strewn with mines and it is requested that warning be given shippers against navigating in ports which foreign forces might use as bases. Communicates telegram he received from his Government informing him that the Germans had indiscriminately mined the North Sea and that in self-defense the British Admiralty will adopt measures that will make naviga- tion even more perilous. The Department, replying to the British memorandum, states that the reported act of Germany is in disregard of Article 1 of the The Hague Convention, and sees no reason why, as a defensive measure. Great Britain should adopt a similar course. Communicates telegram from the British Government in which they state they will try to indicate certain routes and channels for trade to pass to the Scheldt. Points out that if Great Britain refrains from adopting the methods of Germany, in mining North Sea, the result is that Germany receives impunity unless the neutral Powers can find some means of making Germany feel that she can not continue to receive trade and supplies through neutral shipping. Quotes text of telegram from Sir E. Grey stating that an Iceland trawler was reported to have struck a mine 25 miles off the Tyne and sunk, and stating that no British " mines have been laid. Quotes telegram from British foreign office warning against German mines in the North Sea and stating that the British Admiralty have not so far laid any mines during the present war. . States no German port is blockaded and nothing stands in the way of neutral states' sea trade with Germany. Denies British reports that North Sea has been infested with mines by Germany. . . , ^ Transmits a protest made by the British Government against the methods pursued by the German Navy in laying mines in the North Sea. Notmcation of British mine area in North Sea Incloses copy in translation, together with its inclosure, of a note froin the Minister for Foreign Affairs, giving the text of notice relative to the use of submarine mines m the Adriatic Sea. , ,. , „ States that a German mine field has been discovered otf the north coast of Ireland and the British Admiralty warns shipping not to pass within 60 miles of Tory Island. Reports Sir Edward Grey informs him mine fields north of Ireland were laid by Germans. x, x. •*• i. Incloses copy of a telegram received from the Britisn Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in which notice is given that the whole of the North Sea must be con- sidered a military area. „ . ^ ^ c Reports official notification by Russian Government of mined zone. _ . . , , ^ • ^ 4.t.« Incloses German reply to the British protest against the laying of German mines. . . . Transnuts copy in translation of a commumcation received from Impenal Foreign Office, Nov. 14, 1914, relative to regulations for navigation in the German Bay of the StatS that^" copy of reply of German Government to pro- test of British Government against the laying of German mines has been forwarded to American Ambassador at London for transmission to British Foreign Office. »Incloses copy of a circular received from British Ad- miralty r^arding the navigation of the North Sea and English Channel. (3) 10 10 12 13 14 14 14 16 16 18 19 20 No. J. No. A869 615 From and to whom. Date. Subject. 193 1485 The Geiman Ambassador to the Secretary of State. Consul General Skinner to the Secretary of State (telegram). Ambassador Gerard to the Sec- retary of State. Consul General Skinner to the Secretary of State (telegram). Consul General Skinner to the Secretary of State (telegram). Consul General Skinner to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State to Am- bassador W. H. Page (tele- gram). Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State (telegram). The Secretary of State ad interim to Ambassador W. H. Page (telegram). Consul General Skinner to the Secretary of State (telegram) . Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State (telegram). The Secretary of State to Am- bassador W. H. Page (tele- gram). Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State (telegram) . Consul General Skinner to the Secretary of State (telegram). Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State (telegram). Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State (telegram). The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State. Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State (telegram). Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State (telegram). The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador. Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State (telegram) . 1915 Feb. ' 6 Feb. 27 Mar. 2 Mar. 6 May 17 May 19 May 20 June 5 June 16 June 23 July 23 July 26 Aug. 17 Sept. 3 1916 May 2 May 29 July 1 1917 Jan. 25 Feb. 15 Feb. 19 Mar. 23 Transmits warning that Germany will resist the shipment of forces and implements by Great Bntam to France with every war means at its command. , . , , ,, , . Mariners warned navigation, entirely forbidden to all ships of described area in Irish Channel. Incloses copv in translation of a note verbal* received from the Imperial Foreign Office Feb. 28, 1915, relative to the extent of the war area proclaimed by the German Admiralty. Telegraphs with reference to a warning issued by the British Admiralty for vessels navigaiting between Great Yarmouth and the English Channel. States admiralty cancels notice on navigation North Sea dated Nov. 30, 1914. Masters strongly urged to obtain latest notices before sailing from British ports. Gives principal mined areas as far as known. Incloses copy of British Admiralty notice relating to navi- gation in the North Sea and British home waters. States the Department does not fully understand the inten- tion and effect underlying the regulations of admiralty in canceling notice on navigation North Sea of Nov. 30, 1914, cabled by Skinner May 17. Instructs Mr. Page to make report on subject. Transmits reply of British Foreign Office to inquiry of Ambassador Page as to Admiralty annoimcement can- celing notice on navigation in North Sea of Nov. 30, 1914. States that the Department's inquiry is not fully answered by the note of British Foreign Office, and du'ects Mr. Page to secure further explanation. Informs Department of notice to mariners issued by Britisli Admiralty. Quotes note from Foreign Office, July 22, which states that neutral merchant vessels must apply through their diplomatic representative for special directions of the Admiralty as to the north-about route. States Department "understands requirement in Admiralty notice of Ma,y 15 that neutral' vessels bound to North Sea by north-about route must obtain from Admiralty special directions, appUes only to vessels sailing from British ports and not from American or neutral ports. Report whether this understanding is correct. Quotes note from Sir E. Grey relating to neutral vessels passing north-about from one neutral port to another. Reports Admiralty Order 764 regarding navigation in Straits Dover between Vame Shoal and Folkestone. Quotes circular note from Foreign Office, May 1, 1916, an- nouncing extension of British mine field off Belgian coast. States Foreign Office informed him May 27 that eastern limit of danger area of British mine field oft Belgian coast should be defined as the meridian of 3° 18' east instead of 3° 20' east as previously notified. Transmits copy of an Admiralty notice to mariners, relative to certain mined areas in North Sea. British notification of mine area in the North Sea. British revised notification of dangerous area in the North Sea. States that the Government of the United States, for the protection of American interests, reserves generally all of its rights in the question of appropriating certain portions of the high seas for military operations, to the exclusion of the use of th« hostile area as a common hi|^hway of commerce. British notification of dangerous area in the North Sea.. . . NOTE. For additional documents previously printed see EuEOPBAN Wae No. 1, as follows: Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State, Feb- ruary 6, 1915, page 52. The Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard, Feb- ruary 10, 1915, page 54. The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page, February 20, 1915, page 59. (5) 6 PUe No. 763.72/257. Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. [Telegram— Paraphrase.] , Ameeioan Embassy, Berlin, August 7, 1914. Mr. Gerard reports that he is informed by the German Foreign Office that German ports are strewn with mines and it is requested that timely warning be given shippers against navigating in ports which foreign forces might use as bases. PUe No. 763.72/566. Memorandum from the British Embassy. His Majesty's- Charg6 d' Affaires presents his com- pliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to communicate to him the following telegram which he received last night from the Foreign Office: "The Germans are scattering contact mines indis- criminately about the North Sea in the open sea without regard to the consequences to merchantmen. Two days ago four large merchant ships were observed to pass within a mile of the minefield which sank H. M. S. Amphion. The waters of the North Sea must therefore be regarded as perilous in the last degree to merchant shippmg of all nations. In view of the methods adopted by Germany the British Admiralty must hold themselves fully at hberty to adopt similar measures in self defence which must inevitably increase the dangers to navigation in the North Sea. But, before doiug so, they think it right to issue this warning in order that merchant ships imder neutral flags trading with North Sea ports should be turned back before entering the area of such excep- tional danger. British Embassy, Washington, August 11, 1914. File No. 763.72/566. Memorandum to the British Embassy. The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Britaimic Majesty's Charg6 d'Affaires and acknowl- edges the receipt of his Memorandum of August 11, 1914. commimicating a telegram received by him from the Foreign Office stating that the Germans are scattering contact mines indiscriminately in the open waters of the North Sea without regard to the consequences to mer- chantmen, thus rendering these waters perilous to the shipping of all nations, and that in view of the methods adopted by Germany the British Admiralty hold them- selves at liberty to adopt similar measures in self de- fense, thus increasing the dangers to navigation in the North Sea, It is not stated in the Memorandum whether the con- tact mines are floating or anchored, but it is presumed from the expression "scattering contact mines indis- criminately " that it was the intention to convey the idea that the mines referred to are floating mines. The limitation placed upon the use of floating contact mines by Article 1 of The Hague Convention of 1907 relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines is that they shall become harmless withm one hour after being laid . The Secretary of State is loath to believe that a signa- tory to that Convention would wilfully disregard its treaty obligation, which was manifestly made in the in- terest of neutral shipping. . All restrictions upon the rights of neutrals upon the high seas, the common highway of nations, during the progress of a war, are permitted in the interests of the belligerents, who are bound in return to prevent their hostile opeiations from increasing the hazard of neutral ships in the open sea so far as the exigencies of the war permit. If an enemy of His Majesty's Government has, as as- sorted, endangered neutral commeice by an act in viola- tion of The Hague Convention, which cannot be justified on the ground of military necessity, the Secretary of State perceives no reason for His Majesty's (jovemment adopting a similai course, which woidd add ftirther dan- geis to the peaceful navigation of the high seas by ves- sels of neutral powers. The Secretary of State, therefore, expresses the earnest and confident hope that His Majesty's Government may not feel compelled to resort, as a defensive measure, to a method of naval warfare, which would appear to be con- trary to the terms of The Hague Convention and impose upon the ships and lives of neutrals a needless menace when peaceably navigating the high seas. Department of State, WasMngton, August IS, 1914. FUe No. 763.72/418, Mem,mr Not printed. 15 route from America to Liverpool via North of Ireland. Peaceful merchant ships have already been blown up with loss of life by this agency. The White Star liner Olympic escaped disaster by pure good luck and but for wammgs given by British cruisers other British and neutral merchant and passenger vessels would have been destroyed. These mines cannot have been laid by any German ship of war. They have been laid by some merchant vessels flying neutral flag which have come along the trade route as if for purposes of peaceful commerce and while profiting to the fuU by immunity enjoyed by neu- tral merchant ships have wantonly and recklessly en- dangered the lives of aU who travel on the sea regardless of whether they are friend or foe, civilian or military in character. Minelaying imder neutral flag and reconnaissance con- ducted by trawlei-s, hospital ships and neutral vessels are the ordinary features of German naval warfare. In these circumstances having regard to the great interests entrusted to the British Navy, to the safety of peaceful commerce on high seas and to the maintenance within limits of international law of trade between neu- tral coimtries, the Admiralty feel it necessary to adopt exceptional measures appropriate to the novel conditions under which this war is bemg waged. They therefore give notice tnat tae whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of aU kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft and all other vessels wiU be ex- posed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been necessary to lay and from warships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft. All merchant and fishing vessels of every description are hereby warned of the dangers they encounter by entering this area except in strict accordance witn Admirjuty directions. Every effort wiU be made to convey this wanting to neutral countries and to vessels on the sea, but from the 5th of November onwards the Admiralty announce that all ships passing a line drawn from the northern point of the Hebrides through Faroe Islands to Iceland do so at their own peril. Ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark and Holland are advised to come, if inward boimd, by the English channel and Straits of Dover. There they will be given sailing di- rections which will pass them safely so far as Great Britain is concerned up the East Coast of England to Fame Island, whence safe route wiU, if possible, be given to Lindesnaes Lightship. From this point they should turn North or South according to their destiaation, keeping as near the coast as possible. Converse applies to vessels outward bound. By strict adherence to these routes the commerce of aU countries will be able to reach its destination in safety so far as Great Britain is concerned, but any straying even for a few miles from the course thus indicated may be followed by serious consequences. British Embasst, WasMngton. 16 Pile No. 763.72/1174. Amhassador Marye to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] I American Embassy, Petrograd, Novemher 6, 1914- Kussian Government officially notifies Embassy that it has placed mines in zone from fifty-eight fifty north latitude and to east of twenty-first meridian also at entrance of Gulf of Riga and around Aland Islands and consequently entrance and exit of Finnish and Riga Gulfs forbidden. Maeye. Pile No. 763.72/1268. Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. No. 261.] American Embassy, Berlin, November IS, 1914. Sir: With reference to my cipher telegram No. 823, dated November 12, 1914,* I have the honor to transmit to you herewith a copy in translation of the reply of the German Government to the protest of the British Gov- ernment against the laying of German mines. I have, etc., James W. Gerard. [Inciosure-Translation.] REPLY OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE PROTEST OP THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE LAYING OF GERMAN MINES. It has been brought to the knowledge of the German Government that the British Government addressed a Note to the neutral Powers under date September 20th, 1914 protesting against the laying of German mines. It is asserted in the protest that the mines were laid in a way contrary to international law and in forbidden localities; that they were not sufficiently anchored or under proper observance; and were not notified to the neutrals m accordance with rule. Furthermore attention is called to the declarations of the first German delegate at the Second Hague Peace Conference which are in con- tradiction with such practice and likewise to the delib- erate injury to neutral trade which Germany's action on the open sea is alleged to involve. The German Government makes the following reply to this protest: I. In condemning the alleged German practice the British Government relies on the 8th Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907, relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines. It overlooks the fact that under Article 7 of this Convention its provisions do not > Not printed: gives purport of Inclosure herewith. 17 apply unless all the belligerents are parties to the Con- vention. Now Russia, which is allied with England, has not ratified the Agreement; it is therefore not binding by international law on any of the participants in the present war. Nevertheless the German Government has voluntarily held itself bound by its provisions, with the exception of Article 2, with regard to which France as well as Germany made express reservations. The assertion of the British Government that these provisions have been violated by Germany is emphatically denied. II. To firstly the British Government finds it a breach of international law that the German mines were apparently laid by fishing vessels, possibly under neutral flag, under the pretence of following the ordinary peaceable avoca- tions of fishing. This assertion is incorrect and an invention; the German mines were laid exclusively by German warships. 2. The British Government complains that German mines were laid as far as 50 miles from the British coast and not only on British but neutral trade routes. The Convention does not stipulate how far from the coast and ports of an enemy mines may be anchored, and there is no estabUshed practice in this respect in inter- national law; moreover the English statement of the distance of the German niines from the menaced coast is much exaggerated. ^The mines have been laid as close as the conditions of the anchoring groimds and the character of the coast permitted. The assertion that neutral trade routes have been blocked is untrue; no German mines have been laid in any trade route from the high seas to a neutral port. 3. The British Protest maintains further that in numerous cases German mines were found adrift without having become harmless. The anchoring of mines by Germany has been carried out with aU possible pre- caution. If some have drifted from their moorings in consequence of currents or storms their number is certainly much smaller than that of mines laid by England which have drifted ashore on the Belgian and Dutch coasts and have caused damage there through their undiminished explosive power. 4. The obhgation of keeping mines under surveillance which the British Government complains has been violated can naturally be enjoined upon a belhgerent only as long as he retains command over that part of the seat of war where he has laid mines in a manner per- mitted by international law. As a rule therefore this obligation wiU apply only to defensive mines but not to offensive mines. When a belligerent has properly laid offensive mines and has duly notified their laying he is relieved of all further responsibility. 5. In the British protest the charge is made that the German Government never issued any proclamation as to the places where mines were laid. This charge is not founded in fact. On August 7th, 1914 the German 18 Government communicated to all the neutral powers that the trade routes to English ports would be closed by mines by Germany. Neutral shipping was therefore notified of the fact of the lajdng of the mines and the zones where it had to look out for German mines. If the German Government did not give the exact situation of the various mines this may well be imderstood from the conditions which forced the laying of the mines. III. The volume of strong words and moral indignation with which the British protest denounces the German Government to the neutral powers is not therefore justified at aU by Germany's practice. This protest is plainly nothing but a cloak to cover up the serious viola- tions of existing international law laid down in the Declaration of London indulged in by England and a pretext to prepare public opinion for the closing of the North Sea contrary to international law which has since taken place and is equivalent iu its economic importance to a blockade of neutral coasts. In view of these facts it is doubly remarkable that the British Government constitutes itseK the advocate of the "established and generally accepted principle of the freedom of the seas for peaceful trade" obviously in the eyes of England, which is at war, the only peaceful trade is that neutral trade which brings goods to England, but not that which carries or might carry goods to her opponents. The German Government is convinced that the con- tinual violation of neutral trade by England will every- where place the British protest in its true Kght. The German Government is satisfied that for its part in tak- ing the measures required by military exigency it has reduced as far as possible risk or injury to neutral ship- ping, and has strictly followed the rules hitherto applied by civilized nations to maritime warfare. On the other hand the infringement of vital neutral interests by Eng- land is capable of justification by no military exigency, since it has no connection with any military operations and is merely intended to strike at the economic system of the adversary by crippling legitimate neutral trade. This fimdamental disregard of the very freedom of the seas which it has invoked deprives the British Govern- ment of any right to appear as the advocate of this freedom in the question of the laying of mines, which is far less injurious to neutrals. Berlin, November 7, 1914. File No. 862.801/1. Amlassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. No. 271.] Ambeioan Embassy, Berlin, November 17, 1914. Sir: With reference to your cable No. 598* of Novem- ber 9, 1914, and my reply No. 850^ of November 16, I have the honor toytransmit to you herewith a copy in ■Not printed. 'Not printed. Oivesanbstance of Inclosure herewith.. 19 translation of a communication received from the Im- perial Foreign Office, dated November 14, 1914, relative to the regulations for navigation in the German bay of the North Sea. Two copies of the publication, entitled "Nachrichten fur Seefahrer," in which these regulations are printed, are likewise enclosed. I have, etc. Jambs W. Geeard. [Inclosure-Tranalation . ] Foreign Office. Nr. II U 4970-89541. The Foreign Office has the honor to inform the Em- bassy of the United States of America in reply to the Note Verbale of 12th instant, F. O. No. 1078, that the following are the material regulations, governing naviga- tion in the German Bay of the North Sea: 1. Steamships are permitted to make for the German coast, to enter or leave the mouths of rivers only from sunrise to sunset, and in clear weather. Ships attempt- ing to point for the coast in the dark, in foggy or thick weather, nm the risk of being shot at. 2. All commercial steamers bound for the Eider, Elbe, Weser and Jade must first point for the Listertief-Buoy; those bound for the Em? should make directly for its mouth. ^ 3. In the interest of the safety of the ships, a pUot is obligatory from the listertief-Buoy. 4. If ships cannot obtain pilots, on account of bad weather or for other reasons, they must either anchor or put out to sea again. The approximate location of the Listertief-Buoy is 55° 313-4' north, 8° 17J' East. For the rest reference made to issue No. 59 of the "Nachrichten fur Seefahrer" of 4th instant, pages 1006 and 1007, two copies of which are attached.* American shipping interests can obtaiti any further in^ formation from the "Nachrichten fiir Seefahrer" which is accessible to them. Berlin, November 14, 1914- Kle No. 763.72/1268. The Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard. Department of State, WashiTigton, December 8, 1914. Sir: In further acknowledgement of your despatch No. 261, of November 13, 1914, transmitting a copy in tranglation of the reply of the German Government to the protest of the British Government against the laying of German mines, you are informed that a copy thereof 1 Not printed. 20 has been foi-warded to the American Ambassador at London for tralnsmission to the British Foreign Office without comment. I am, etc., For the Secretary of State: Robert Lansing. File No. 841,801/33 Consul General SJcinner to the Secretary of State. [Extract.] American CoNStiLATE General, London, December 11, IQlJf.. Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith a full copy of a circular which I have received from the Admiralty in regard to the navigation of the North Sea and English Channel. I have, etc., Robert P. Skinner [Inclosure.] NAVIGATION IN THE NORTH SEA AND ENGLISH CHANNEL. It is requested that Shipowners on receiving these in- structions will use their utmost endeavour to communi- cate them as confidentially as possible to the Masters of their vessels, impressing upon them the necessity for preventing the information from reaching the enemy. These instructions should not be allowed to come into the hands of any persons who are not directly affected by them. The previous Notice on Navigation in the North Sea (dated the 14th October 1914) is cancelled. A. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS. 1. Local Naval or Mihtary Authorities may, at any time when they consider it necessary, close a port during certain hours without previous warning. 2. Attention is called to the notice on the inside cover of all Admiralty Sailing Directions and their Supple- ments, and tD the following Admiralty Notices to Mariners of 1914: No. 1 of 1st January. No. 1628 of 14th September, Thames Approaches. No. 1690 of 28th October, River Thames. No. 1706 of 3rd November, Mined Areas. No. 1727 of 7th November, River Mersey. No. 1730 of 10th November, Orkney Islands. No. 1752 of 16th November, East Coast Ports. In the Notice to Mariners, No. 1752 of 16th November, the position of the Pilotage station of the River Himiber to be estabhshed by the 27th November should read "7 miles E. S. E. (magnetic) from Spurn Point." 3. All Kghts may be extinguished and other aids to navigation removed or altered at any time without previous warning. 21 B. MINES. 4. So far as is known at present there are, in addition to the minefields mentioned in Admiralty Notice to Mariners, No. 1752 of 1914, the following principal miaed areas: (a) Off the Tyne (b) Off Flamborough Head (c) Off Southwold (southern limit 51° 54' N.) (d) British minefield within Lat. 51° 15' N and 51° 40' N. Long. 1° 35' E. and 3° E. C. SPECIAL INFOEMATION AS TO ENGLISH CHANNEL AND DOWNS. 5. On and after the 10th December Hghts, buoys and fog signals in the English Channel and tiie Downs east- ward of a line joining Selsey Bill and Cape Barfleur and south of the parallel 51° 20' N., will be hable to ex- tinction or alteration without further notice. Trinity House pilot stations will be estabhshed as follows by the 10th December: St. Helens, Isle of Wight: "Where ships proceeding up Channel can obtain pilots capable of piloting as far as Great Yarmouth. Great Yarmouth: Where ships from the North Sea bound for the English Channel or intermediate ports can obtain pilots capable of piloting as far as the Isle of Wight. Dover: Where ships imm. French Channel Ports, but no other, can obtain pilots for the North Sea. The Sunk Light Vessel: Where ships crossing the North Sea between the parallels 51° 40' N. and 51° 54' N., but no others, can obtain pilots for the Enghsh Channel. Pilots also can be obtained at London for the Channel and the North Sea. 6. Both before and after the above date (10th Decem- ber, 1914) all vessels entering the North Sea from the Channel, or vice versa, must pass through the Downs, where they will be given directions as to their route. D. PASSAGES — GENERAL. 7. On and after 10th December, 1914, vessels pro- ceeding up or down Channel eastward of the Isle of Wight are very strongly advised to take pilots, as navi- gation wiU be exceedingly dangerous without their aid (see paragraph 5). 8. Vessels proceeding "up or down the East Coast should keep within 3 miles of the coast when consistent with safe navigation. The only exception to this is when passing the mouth of the Tyne. Here all vessels should pass not less than 4 mUes but not more than 8 miles from the coast between Sunderland and Blyth. Vessels bound to the Tyne must take a pilot off one of the above ports, as stated in Admiralty Notice to Mari- ners, Nq. 1752 of 1914. 22 B. PARTIOULAK PASSAGES. (Note. — In each case return voyages should be made on same routes.) 9. East Coast Ports to Freilch Ports: See paragraphs 5, 6, and 8. 10. East Coast Ports to Dutch Ports: Proceed as directed in paragraphs 5 and 8. Leave the English coast between the parallels of 51° 40' N. and 51° 45' N.; proceed between these parallels as far as long. 3° E., shape course thence to destination. Vessels using this route (which passes between the British and German minefields) must clearly understand that they do so entirely at their own risk. 11. East Coast Ports to Scandinavian or Danish Ports: Proceed as directed in paragraphs 5 and 8 as far as Farn Island; then steer' for the vicinity of Lindesnaes, and thence to destination, keeping in territorial waters. 12. From Atlantic and Irish Ports or Ports on the South or West Coasts of Great Britain to Scandinavian or Danish Ports: Proceed via English Channel, being guided by paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, and 11. 13. Sailing vessels bound to Scandinavian or Danish Ports: Pass to Westward of Ireland and of St. EUda. Then make the Faroe Islands, and proceed from thence to destination, keeping 50 miles to the north of the Shetland Islands. 14. All vessels bound from East Coast Ports to West Coast Ports in the United Kingdom, and vice versa, must pass through the English Channel, and not round the north of Scotland. Admebalty War Staff, (Trade Division,) 30th Novemler, 1914. Kle No. 763.72/1440. T7)£ German Ambassador to the Secretary of State. [Translation.] J. No. A 869.] German Embassy Washington, Feiruary 6, 1915. Mr. Secretary of State: By direction of my Gov- ernment I have the honor to communicate the following to Your Excellency: It is known to the Imperial Government that Great Britain is on the point of shipping to France large forces of troops and quantities of implements of war, Germany will oppose this shipment with every war means at its command . As peaceful craft may be, from being naistalcen for vessels engaged in war operations, exposed to serious danger, the Imperial Government is placed under the necessity of warning of such danger vessels approaching the North and West Coasts of France. Mei chant vessels repairing to the North Sea are advised to steer aroimd Scotland. Accept, etc., •For the Imperial Ambassador: Haniel. 23 File No. 841.801/35. Consul General SJcinner to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] Ameeioan Consulate General, London, Fehruary 27, 1915. Mariners warned navigation entirely forbidden to all ships of area in Irish. Channel bounded on northwest by line joining latitude 55 degrees 22^ minutes, longitude six degrees 17 minutes and latitude 55 degrees 31 min- utes, longitude six degrees 02 minutes bounded on south- east by line- joining latitude 55 degrees 10^ minutes longitude 5 degrees 24^ minutes and latitude 55 02 minutes longitude 5 degrees 40^ minutes bounded south- west by line from first described to fourth described point bounded northeast by line from second described to third described point. All traffic wishing to proceed through North Channel must pass southward of Rathhn Island between sunset and sunrise. Skinner. ^^— ^— ■■■^-^ File No. 763.72/1604. Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. No. 615.] American Embassy, Berlin, March 2, 1915. Sir: With reference to my telegram No. 1719* of the 1st instant, I have the honor to enclose to you herewith a copy in translation of a Note Verbale received from the Imperial Foreign Office, dated February 28, 1915, rela- tive to the extent of the war area proclaimed by the German Admiralty. I have, etc., James W. Gerard. [Inclosure— Translation.] FoBEioN Office. Nr. Ill a 4333 26052 note verbals. With reference to its Note Verbale of the 4th instant,* the Foreign Office has the honor to inform the Embassy of the United States of America, in order to avoid any doubts as to the northward extent of the war area defined in the proclamation of the Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the same day, that the waters surrounding the Orkneys and the Shetlands belong to the war area, but that navi- gation on both sides of the Faroe Isles is not endangered. The Foreign Office begs the Embassy of the United States of America to be good enough to inform its Gov- ernment of the above by cable, and to notify the Gov- ernments of Great Britain, Japan and Servia accordingly. Berlin, February 28, 1915. To the Embassy of the United States of America. > Not printed. Qlves substance of Inclosure herewith. > See EUROFEAK Wab No., 1, pp. 52 and 53. 24 File No. 763.72/1549. Consul General SJcinner to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] American Consulate General London, March 6, 1915. Admiralty renews urgent warning to vessels to take London Trinity house pilot when navigating between Great Yarmouth and English Channel. While danger areas are publicly defined, Admiralty add, "it must not be supposed that navigation is necessarily safe in any part of the southern waters of North Sea." Skinner File No. 841.801/40. Oounsul General SJcinner to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] American Consulate General, _ Lo ndon, May 17, 1915. Admiralty cancels notice on navigation North Sea dated November thirtieth, nineteen fourteen. Masters are strongly urged to obtain latest notices before sailing from British ports. Lights may be extinguished and other changes made without previous warning. In addition to mine fields in Firth of Forth, Moray Firth and Scapa Flow, following are principal mined areas as far as known : (A) off Tyne; (B) off Flamborough Head; (C) off Southwold, southern limit fifty one degrees fifty-four miautes N. D. ( ? ) ; British mine field between latitude fifty-one degrees fif- teen minutes N. ; and latitude fifty-one degrees forty minutes N.; and between longitude one degree thirty- four minutes E., and longitude three degrees E. All ves- sels entering North Sea from English Channel must pass between two light vessels off Folkestone, proceed to Downs, keeping inshore imaginary line joining southernmost of the two light vessels to the South Goodwia light vessel, further instructions in Downs. Vessels proceeding up or down east coast should keep within three miles of coast when consistent with safe navigation. Vessels from east coast ports to Channel and French ports should proceed to Downs, keeping within three miles of coast and follow Admiralty notice to mariners 239, at Downs further instructions will be obtained. Vessels from east coast ports to Dutch ports, should keep within three miles of coast, leaviag English coast between the parallels fifty-one degrees forty minutes north, and fifty-one degrees fifty four minutes north, proceeding between these parallels as far as longitude three degrees east, shaping course thence to destination; this route passes between British and German mine fields and vessels proceed at their own risk. Vessels from east coast to Scandinavian ports should keep within three miles of coast, and proceed according to Admiralty notice 239, as far as Fame Island, then steer for Lindesnaes and thence to destination, keeping in territorial waters. 25 Route from St. Abbs Head to Stavanger, may be used as alternative. British and allied vessels wishing to use northabout route should apply to Customs, and neutral vessels must apply for permission through their foreign representatives, and failing such permission proceed southabout. Sailing vessels from Atlantic to Scandinavian ports pass westward of Ireland and St. Kilda thence Faroe Islands to destination, passing northward by fifty mUes of Shetland I^ands. Skinner. Pile No. 841.801/45. Consul General STdnner to the Secretary of State. American Consuuite General, London, May 19, 1916. Sir: Referring to my telegram of May 17, setting forth briefly the terms of a notice on navigation in the North Sea and Enghsh Channel received from the Trade Divi- sion of the Admiralty on that date, I have the honor to enclose herewith, in duplicate, a fuU copy of the circular, together with the Admiralty Notice to Mariners referred to in the said circular. I have, etc., Robert P. Skinner. [Inclosuro.] navigation in the north sea and BRITISH HOME WATERS. The previous Notice on Navigation in the North Sea and English Channel (dated 30th November 1914) is cancelled. A. — GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS. 1. Local Naval or Military Authorities may, at any time when they consider it necessary, close a port during certain hours without previous warning. 2. Before leaving ports in the United Kingdom, Masters of Vessels should be careful to obtain the latest Admiralty Notices to Mariners. Attention is called to the Notice on the inside cover of all Admiralty Sailing Directions and their Supplements, and to the following Admiralty Notices to Mariners and any subsequent ones that may be issued : No. 1738 of 13th November 1914. River Medway. No. 1812 of 10th December 1914. Bristol Channel. No. 45 of 15th January 1915. Yarmouth Roads. No. 137 of 22nd February 1915. Irish Channel. North Channel. No. 165 of 8th March 1915. River Humber PUotage, No. 228 of 26th March 1915. Dover Strait. Light Vessels established. No. 239 of 27th March 1915. North Sea, River Thames, and English Channel. No. 258 of 3rd April 1915. Portland Harbour. 26 No. 274 of 7th April 1915. Caution whep approaching British Ports. No. 391 of 5th May 1915. Firth of Forth, Moray Firth, Soapa Flow. No. 408 of 8th May 1915. River Tyne Boom Defence. Entrance Signals and Traffic Regulations. 3. Care must be taken at all tunes to ensure Masters being in possession of the latest Notices to Mariners. 4. Any lights may be extinguished and other aids to navigation removed or altered at anytime without pre- vious warning. (Admiralty Notice to Mariners No. 1627 of 9th October 1914.) B. ^MINES. 5. So far as is known at present there are, iu addition to the mine-fields mentioned in Admiralty Notice to Mariners, No. 391 of 5th May 1915, the following principal mined areas: — (a) Off the Tyne. (h) Off Flamborough Head. (c) Off Soutbwold (Southern limit 50° 54' N.). (d) British mine-field between Lat. 51° 15' N. and Lat. 51° 40' N., and between Long. 1° 35' E. and Long. 3° E. 0. PASSAGES. GENERAL. 6. AH vessels entering the North Sea from the English Channel must pass between the two Light vessels off Folkestone (see Admiralty Notice to Mariaers No. 228 of 1915), and proceed to the Downs, keeping inshore of an imaginary line joining the Southernmost of the two Light vessels to the South Goodwin Light-vessel. Further in- structions as to routes can be obtained in the Downs. 7. Vessels proceeding up or down the East Coast should keep withia 3 mUes of the coast when consistent with safe navigation. D. PARTICULAR PASSAGES. (Note. — In each case the return voyage should be made on the same route.) 8. East Coast Ports to Channel and French Ports. — Pro- ceed to the Downs following the directions in paragraph 7 and Admiralty Notice to Mariners, No. 239 of 1915. At the Downs further instructions will be obtained. 9. East Coast Ports to Butch Ports. — Proceed as directed in paragraph 7 and Admiralty Notice to Mariners No. 239 of 1915. Leave the EngUsh coast between the parallels 51° 40' N. and 51° 64' N.; proceed between these paral- lels as far as Longitude 3° E.; shape course thence to destination. Vessels using this route (which passes be- tween the British and German mine-fields) must clearly understand that they do so entirely at their own risk. 10. East Coast Ports to Scandinavian Ports. — Proceed as directed in paragraph 7 and Admiralty Notice to Mariners No. 239 of 1915, as far as Fam Island; then steer forLindesnaes and thence to destination, keeping in terri- torial waters. The route from St. Abbs Head to Sta- vangermaybeused as an alternative to the above route. 27 11. Britisli and Allied vessels wishing to use the North about route should apply to the Customs for directions. Neutral vessels wishing to use the North-about route shoidd be informed that apphcation for permission to do so must be obtained through their Diplomatic represent- atives, and that, failing such permission, they must pro- ceed South-about. In no circumstances are vessels allowed to pass through the Minches or through the Pentland Firth. 12. SailiTig Vessels from Atlantic to Scandinavian Ports. — Pass to Westward of Ireland a.nd St. Kilda. Then make the Faroe Islands, and proceed thence to destination, passing to the Northward of the Shetland Islands, and keeping 50 mUes from them. Admibaltt War Staff (Trade Division) mil May 1916 File No. 841.801/40. The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page. [Telegram.] Department of State, Washington, May 20, 1915. Admiralty announcement canceUng notice on Naviga- tion North Sea of November 30, 1914, cabled by Skinner May 17th states that British and aUied vessels wishing to use northabout route should apply to Customs, and neutral vessels must apply for permission, through their foreign representatives, and failing such permission pro- ceed southabout. Department does not fuUy understand the intention and effect underlying such regulations, and shall be glad to have an immediate report on the subject from you. Brtan. File No. 841.801/46. Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] American Embassy, London, June 5, 1916. Following reply received today from Foreign Office: "I did not fail to refer to the proper department of His Majesty's Government the notes which Your Excellency was good enough to address to me on the 22nd and 29th ultimo enquiring as to the Admiralty announcement can- celling the notice on navigation in the North Sea of No- vember 30th, 1914. "I have the honour to state in reply that the notice on navigation in the North Sea dated 15th May iutroduced no new regulations with regard to the northabout route. The notice was merely intended to summarise existing practice which has been evolved with the object of ensur- ing that trade passing northabout shall be hmited in amount and reputable in character. "Many appUcations for vessels to use the northabout route have t)een received through the Legations of the 28 Scandinavian Powers in London and permission has ^^^5 K*the honour to add that any simUarappHcations which may be made on behalf of tnited States vessels would of course receive equal treatment. Page, File No. 841.801/46. Tlhe Secretary of State ad interim to Ambassador W. E. Page. [Telegram— Paraphrase.] No. 1721.] Department of State, Washington, June W, 1915. Mr. Lansing states that the inquiry in Department's May 20th is not fully answered in the note of June 5th from the British Foreign Office. The Department is at a loss to understand the British Government's object in regulating foreign vessels' courses on the high seas as for example in paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of the general instructions of the fifteenth of May enclosed in despatch of May 19 from Consul General appears to be the case. Mr. Page is du-ected to press the British Foreign Office for a further explanation. File No. 841.801/47. Consul General STcinner to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] American Consulate General, London, June 23, 1915. Hydrographic Department, Admiralty issue notice 525, warning mariners danger passing through Pas de Calais between Le Colbart (the ridge) and French coast. Ves- sels from North must wait off Calais for pilot or instruc- tions, vessels from South must wait off Boulogne. Vessels not conforming above do so at their own peril. -Skinner. File No. 841.801/49. Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] No. 2517.] American Embassy, London, July 28, 1915. Your 1721, June 16. Following note received from Foreign Office, dated July 22 : "I did not fail to refer to the proper Department of his majesty's government the note which your excellency was so good as to address to me on the 18th ultimo re- garding the Admiralty announcement cancelling the notice on navigation in the North Sea on the 30th November 1914. "I have now the honour to inform your excellency that the action of His Majesty's Government in indicating routes to be followed by neutral merchant vessels in the vicinity of the British Isles and in the North Sea is based upon the fact that merchant vessels passing through the 29 North Sea run very grave risk unless they act in strict accordance with the (Erections of the Admiralty. Before issuing such special directions to a neutral vessel the Admiralty desires to be assiu*ed that the vessel's voyage is undertaken with the knowledge and consent of the government of the country whose flag she flies, and for this reason it is necessary that the application by a neutral vessel for advice as to special routes should be supported by the diplomatic representative of the govern- ment in question. "If such support to the apphcation is not given neutral vessels will not receive the special instructions as to the north aboutroute and will be advised to go southabout where they can be suppUed with the latest warnings and obtain the services of pilots where necessary." Page. File No. 841.801/49. The Secretary of StateW 'Ambassador W. E. Page. [Telegram.] No. 1908.] Department of State, Washington, July 26, 1915. Your 2517, July 23. Department understands re- quirement in Admiralty Notice May 15 that neutral vessels bound to North Sea by northabout route must obtain from Admiralty special directions through their diplomatic representatives appUes only to vessels sailing from British ports and not to vessels sailing direct from American or other neutral ports. Ascertain and report whether this understanding is correct. Have any Ameri- can owned or chartered vessels applied for such directions through Embassy or been interfered with for faUure to apply. Also notify Consul-General. Lansing. Mle No. 841.801/51. Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] American Embassy, London, August 17, 1915. I am in receipt of a note from Sir Edward Grey in reply to my representations based on the Department's instructions which reads as follows : ' 'I have the honor to inform Your Excellency in reply that in principle His Majesty's Government would desire that neutral vessels passing northabout from one neutral port to another should sail with the knowledge and con- sent of the Government of the country whose flag they fly and should follow a track similar as far as possible to that used by vessels sailing from British ports. The difficulty of ensuring this is however so considerable and the responsibility of His Majesty's Government in the matter is so slight that no endeavor is being made in practice to secure any such limitation of sailings." Page. 30 Pile No. 841.801/53. Consul General SUnner to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] Ameeican Consulate General, London, September S, 1915. Admiralty Order 764. Traffic in Straits Dover between Vame Shoal and Folkestone must pass between light vessels moored — ^first 2^ miles 140 degrees south 26 de- grees east magnitude (?) from Folkestone pierhead lati- tude 51 degrees 02 minutes 40 seconds north longitude 1 degree 14 minutes 10 seconds east; second 5 cables 150 degrees south 16 degrees east magnitude (?) from first. Ships disregarding this warning do so at own peril. Skinner. File No. 841.801/72. Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] American Embassy, London, May 2, 1916. Following circular note received to-day from Foreign Office, dated May first, 1916. "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the United States Ambassador and has the honour to acquaiat him for the information of the United States Government that it has been found necessary to extend the eastern limit of the danger area of the British miaefield off the Belgian coast, notified on the twenty-second October, 1914, so as to include the waters south of latitude fifty-one degrees, forty minutes north, as far as the Meridian of three degrees, twenty minutes east, instead of three degrees east as previously notified. Sir E. Grey would remind Dr. Page that the danger area as notified on thie second October, 1914, comprised that situated between latitude fifty-one degrees, fifteen minutes and fifty-one degrees, forty minutes north, and longitude one degree, thirty-five mmutes east, and three degrees east." Page. Kle No, 841.801/74. Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] British Esubasst, London, May 29, 1916. Respectiag mine field off Belgian coast, . Foreign Office inform me under date May twenty- seventh that the Eastern limit of the danger area of the British mine field off the Belgian coast should be defined as the meridian of three degrees eighteen minutes east instead of three degrees twenty minutes east as pre- viously notified^ia error. Page. 31 File No. 841.801/78. The British Ambassador to the Secretary of Stale, No. 193.] British Embassy, Washington, July 1, 1916. Sir: I have the honour, in accordance witii instruc- tions received from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to transmit to you herewith copy of an Admiralty Notice to Mariners, No. 618 of 1916, relative to the necessity for the exercise of caution in navigating on account of certain mined areas in the North Sea, I am instructed to invite the attention of the United States Government to the extension of the danger zone as indicated at (B) in the enclosed notice, I have, etc., * (For the Ambassador) COLVELLE BaROLAT. [Inclosure.] ADMIRALTY NOTICE TO MARINERS. No. 618 of the year 1916. NORTH SEA Caution with regard to Mined Areas. Former noUce. — ^No. 541 of 1916; hereby cancelled. Caution. — ;Mariners are warned that a system of mine- fields has been established by H. M. Government upon a considerable scale. All vessels are strongly advised to obtain a London Trinity House pilot when navigating between Great Yarmouth and the English Channel. It is dangerous for vessels to enter the following areas. — (a) The area enclosed between the parallels of lati- tude 51° 15' N. and 51° 40' N., and the meridians of longitude 1° 35' E. and 3° 18' E. (&) The area enclosed between the parallels of lati- tude 51° 40' N. and 52° 00' N., and the meridians of longitude 1° 55' E. and 2° 32' E. Bemarlcs. — ^Although these limits are assigned to the danger areas, it must not be supposed that navigation is necessarily safe in any portion of the southern waters of^the North Sea. Note. — ^This Notice is a repetition of Notice No. 541, of 1916, with addition of the danger area specified in para- graph (6). (Notice No. 618 of 1916.) Authority. — ^The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. (H. 3512/16.) By Command of their Lordships, J. F. Parrt, Hydroffmpher. Hydrographic Department, Admiralty, London, 9th June 1916. 32 Pile No. 841.801/80. Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] American Embassy, London, Janvxiry 25, 1917. Following notice dated January twenty-fourth received from Foreign Office with request that it be brought imme- diately to attention of United States'[Govemment. " In view of the unrestricted warfare carried on by Ger- many at sea by means of mines and submarines not only against the Alhed Powers but also against neutral ship- pmg and the fact that merchant ships are constantly sunk without regard to the ultimate safety of their crews, His Majesty's Government give notice that on and after the seventh proximo the undesmentioned area in the North Sea will be rendered dangerous to aE shipping by opera- tions against, the enemy and it should therefore be avoided. "Area comprising all the waters except Netherland and Danish territorial waters lying to the southward and east- ward of a line commencing wur miles from the coast of Jutland in latitude 56 degrees north, longitude eight de- grees east from Greenwich and passing through the foUow- mg positions: Latitude fifty-six degrees norm, longitude six degrees east, latitude Mtj-iaux degrees forty-five minutes east (?) thence to a position in latitude fifty- three degrees thirty-seven minutes north, longitude five degrees east, seven miles off the coast of the Netherlands. 'To meet the needs of the Netherland coastal traffic which cannot strictly confine itself to territorial waters owing to navigational difficulties a safe passage wiU be left to the southward of a line joining the foUowmg points: Latitude fifty-three degrees twenty-seven minutes north, longitude five degrees east, latitude fifty-three degrees thirty-one and hafi minutes north, longitude five degrees thirty minutes east, latitude fifty-three degrees tmrty- four minutes north, longitude six degrees east, latitude fifty-three degrees thirty-nine minutes north, longitude six degrees twenty-three minutes east." Page. Mle No. 841.801/83. Arnbassador Page to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] American Embassy, London, February 15, 1917. Following revised notice dated February thirteenth received from Foreign Office respecting dangerous area in North Sea which is intended to replace notice quoted my telegram 5544, January twenty-fifth, 1917: "North Sea. Caution with regard to dangerous area. Caution. In view of the unrestricted warfare carried on by Germany at sea by means of mines and submarines not only against the AUied Powers but also against neutral shipping and the fact that merchant ships are constantly sunk without regard to the ultimate safety of their crews. His Majesty's Government give notice that on and after the seventh February, 1917, the under- mentioned area in the North Sea will be rendered dan- gerous to all shipping by operations against the enemy and it should therefore be avoided. 33 "Dangerous Area. The area comprising all the waters except Netherland and Danish territorial waters lying to the southward and eastward of a line commencing four miles from the coast of Jutland in latitude fifty-six degrees north longitude eight degrees east and passing through the followmg positions: Latitude fifty-six degrees north tongitude six degrees east and latitude fifty-four diegrees forty-five minutes north longitude four degrees thirty minutes east thence to a position in latitude fifty- three degrees twenty-seven minutes north longitude five degrees east seven miles from, the coast of The Nether- lands. "To meet the needs of the coastal traffic which can not strictly confine itself to territorial waters owing navigational difficulties, it will he safe to navigate be- tween the coast of Jutland and a line passing through the following positions: Latitude fifty-six degrees north longitude eight degrees east latitude fifty-five degrees forty minutes north longitude eight degrees east latitude fifty-five degrees thirty-six mmutes north longitude seven degrees fifteen minutes east latitude fifty-five de- grees thirty-two minutes north longitude seven degrees fifteen minutes east latitude filfty-five degrees twenty- two minutes north longitude seven degrees forty-five minutes east latitude fifty-five degrees nineteen minutes north longitude eight degrees four minutes east latitude fifty-five degrees twenty-two minutes north longitude eight degrees nineteen minutes east which is three miles from the coast of Fano Island. "Also a safe passage wiU be left along the Netherland coast southward of a line joining the foUowing positions: Latitude fifty-three degrees twenty-seveft minutes north longitude five degrees east latitude fifty-three degrees thirty-one and hafi minutes north longitude five degrees thirty minutes east latitude fifty-three degrees thirty- four minutes north longitude six degrees east latitude fifty-three degrees thirty-nine minutes north longitude six degrees twenty- three minutes east." Page. File No. 763.72/3359a. The Secretary of State to (he British Ambassador. No. 1485.] DEPAE'tMENT OF StATE, Washington, February 19, 1917. Excellency: From time to time during the present war, as Your Excellency is aware, the Government of His Britannic Majesty have given notice of certain delimited areas of the high seas, designated as "military areas" or "danger areas," within which merchant ship- ping of all kinds, fishing craft, and all other vessels, were warned that they would be subject to the gravest dangers from mines laid by His Majesty's Government, and from hostile operations, and that they would enter such waters at their peril. This matter was referred to in the Department's memorandum of August 13, 1914, and has been the subject of subsequent correspondence between the American Ambassador at London and the British Foreign Office. As the question of appropriating certain portions of the high seas for military operations, to the exclusion of the use of the hostile area as a common highway of commerce, has not become a settled principle of inter- national law assented to by the family of nations, it will 34 be recognized that the Government of the United States must, and hereby does, for the protection of American interests, reserve generally all of its rights in the prem- ises, including the right not only to question the validity of these measures, but to present demands and claims in relation to any American interests which may be unlawfully affected, directly or indirectly, by virtu e of the enforcement of these measures. Accept, etc., RoBEET Lansing . File No. 841.801/88. Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.] American Embassy, London, March 23, 1917. My telegram 5701, February fifteenth. Foreign office in note dated March twenty-first state: "As from the first April, 1917, the dangerous area will comprise all the waters except Danish and Netherlands territorial waters lying to the southward and eastward of a line commencing three miles from the coast of Jutland on the parallel of latitude fifty-six degrees north and passing through the following positions : "One. Latitude fifty-six degrees north, longitude six degrees east. "Two. Latitude fifty-four degrees forty-five minutes north, longitude four d.egrees thirty minutes east, "Three. Latitude fifty-three degrees twenty-three min- utes north, longitude five degrees one minute east. "Four. Latitude fifty- three degrees twenty-five min- utes north, longitude five degrees five and half minutes east, and thence to' the eastward following the limit of Netherlands territorial waters." Page.