* ^ -s §'"e' 2^ ^ ifl t -s .a ^ e » ^ §■ I « a g)»5 >1 * .B 5 ^ 3 := w 1 .3 -T "8 ,60 S §=0 ® a 2 S 2 e - » S Is B B «j Wj,» ^ « «* " 4) 5 B 0- e . s e % ■a « ^ >« 3h 8 B ^1 b *^ B e u - S«^«ll 1 ft, .2 J .-, fe C^ / ^ 6" 5 ^ / "World Commodity Prices Working Stej, W By Richard F. Griffea OBLD commodity prico movements during the year just closed have to a de- gree been conflicting, but in the main the trend has been cqiward tither »s"a «IiMct extension (ff the inflation initiated during the war or, as in the United States, as a conse- quence of the development of sec- ondary inflation. The coinei^enca of a etartling rise of more titan 100 per cent in. German 'irices in a single month and the rela- ^ve stability or actual decline of rices in nearby countries has been ossible because of the limitations im- osed by abnormal foreign exchange narket coiMitions upon the play of f-ircei betveen international trading enters that under more usual eircum- tances operate toward a uniform price ivel. • •- tVo nenr yp^r o»«>ns the recovery of sterling to Within 20 eenta of parity , u^seu foi the first time the ex- ;ctation that before many more ir>nths have paiaed some measure of oAsisteney unl) be achieved in the -ice movements throughout the world. ?ith sterling upon an equality with Hilars and England in fact upon a old basis there seems good reason to believe that a considerable number of the principal trading nations irill be able to return to the gold afeandard. ITTiat is the prerequisite to ttie estab- lishment of the old relationship be- tween markets when too wide a diapar- ilT between commodHy nrSees in f^e United States and England, for ex- ample, was mpossible because of the freedom with which gald shipments were available as a corrective. In Europe Swiss, BntSh and Swedish currencies have slr^sidir attained- a valuation of parity* In- the exchange market and, in Ifce-'iipinion of many leading financial ,lM|thoritieB, Spain. Japan, Ai^entina inS possibly Czecho- slovakia with these eountriea should ; be able to follow England back to a : strictly gold basis. Norway and Den- '. mark with a little time should be in a position to Join thJ* B^oup. Russia,; Germany and the Central European countries generally, excepting Czecho- slovakia, may be figured out of it for of "-"'"'- ^rradiirf. But, even so, close to thraa- fourths ot the commercial world would be back on a gol' foo^-'n". t-'^'i- • -> minimize the eo!ii;CiisloD la commodity price flnctuations. «^ Outlook Not Simple It may not be said that restoration of such a situation as outlined abovp is assured, but that economically it appears feasible. Political muddling of poesible economic solutions has been so marked a factotr in recent discus- sions that the outlook cannot be char- acterized as simple, the chief bases for confidence being the admitted com- inercial sanity of England and the evj- lencc that at Washingtotn a more lib- ■ral policy toward the European com- ilex is slowly developing. Sterline s ftunched upon a noteworthy endeavor o achieve parity, and the movement ipparently has the support of the Bnt- gb govemment,^ which in shipping, any sxoess of gold that may be available ;o this country is employing a natural nethod for restoring its currency to lormal. International bankers believe that sterling at par will clarify the Conflicting Influences Result From A: normal Foreign Exchanges; Outlook Continues Unsettled .^'. sttnation in other nations and that somo' betterment In world tradlng.con- ditions must inevitably follow. The significance , of ?uch an eventu- ality iiirith relation to the price move- ment in the United States is best de- termined by reference to the recent course of quotations here and the pres- ent position. The yeaer 1922 encom- paBsed a rise in prices of extent such as was never achieved in peacet-:me in a like period before the World War. For sevi-al months prior to January 1, the check to deflation had been defi- nitely established and there was a barely ^perceptible drift toward higher levela. This drift gradually assumed the proportions of a major upswing that is still under w«y, if somewhat abated in force, as 1923 opens. The extent of the advance is best shown by reference to the various prices indices maintained in this coun- try. Bradstreet's compilation by De- cember 1 was a full SO per cent above the low point reached in the late spring of 1921. It is still far below the post-armistice peak. The record follows: Maximum, February 1, 1920, $20,8690; minimum, June 1, 1921, $10,- 6169; January 1. 1922, $11,3726; De- cember 1, 1922, $13,7835. Dun's index nun ber shows a recovery of 16 per cent from the low of 1921, of which 12.8 per cent was recorded in the first eleven months of 1922. The New York Fodersl Reserve Bank's index of prices, based upon the quotations of twenty basic commodities, is up 22 per cent during the year, the Department of Labors compilation has recovered 13 per cent. The Harvard University in- dex, based upon ten commodities and extremely sensitive, is up 40 per cent from its low point. Gold Basis of Rise The fundamental explanation of the rise in prices in this counti^ is to be found in the continued influx of gold from all quarters of the globe. Im- ports were not so heavy as in 1921, but the expansion of gold holdings during that year was not fully effective at the time because of the force of the de- flationary movement and during 1922 the cumulative influence of the gold brought in over the two-year period wa? experienced. The gold was not directly the basis of a new Inflation, bnt It was the increase in tiie Federal Reserve System's gold- reserves te above $3,000,000,000 that made that in- irtion possible if not inevitable. The growth of gptd stocks made It possible for the banks to make loans without resort to the facilities of the Federal Reserve banks, at the same time that they paid off their indebted- ness to these institutions. It imparted impetus to the speculative and invest- ment purchases of securities, and the motive was from this point passed on to industry and business in general. A considerable expansion in bank de- posits occurred,, and there was _ a marked recovery in the purchasing rower of the people wli'ch dunng 1921 had slumped so sharply. One theory offered in explanation of the stiffening of prices is that the re- sistance to wage deflation in the same degree' that price deflation had been experienced provided the check to the latter movement and was a basic cause of the turn. The maintenance of wages in the mining industry (and the djfii- oulty of bringing down the schedule of ■fimuneration to railroad workers, with attendant labor difficulties, were closely i followed by an upward revision of wages In the steel industry and by set- tlement of textile wages on a relailvfl- ly high basis. Against this may be set the contention that widiout consump- tion demand, without the expanded purchasing power of the people, wages would have had to go lower. Specific- ally, if the demand for steel products 1)»a not been great and if there had not been a scarcity of workers to raise pro- duction to the level of that demand steel, wages would not have been marked up. Production Indices Reference to production and con- sumption indices indicates that the rise has not been attributable to- a shortage of commodities available for consumption but that, on the contrary, application of the nation's new pui<- . chasing power has been the motivat- ing force. The New York Federal Re- serve Bank's indices of product on dhow that in the case of most basic commodities the output* over recent months has been close to or above nor- mal. This applies particularly to pe- troleum, cement, wheat flour, sugar, cotton, tobacco, paper, wood pulp and gasoline. Coal nroduction has recov- ered rapidly after the strike, and the production of metals, includ ng pig iroB^ steel ingots and ceppec has been steadily mounting. Wool con- sumpt on is well above normal, while tobacco and cotton consumption is not far from the average. , In Kngiand, which more closely ap- proximates the full gold basis than any other coijntry- except the United States, there has existed no expauson of gold stocks to serve as a basis for inflation, and the situation, therefor*, has proved easier to handle. Som§ inflation of security prices has not been avoided, but the commodity price 3 tuation has been held well in hand. The British price level was behind the American in the major post-armistice upswing and the turn downward' came later. During 1922, the movements in the two countries have been, in direct contrast, as Britain has sent here sucti uxcess oi gold as she has been abl* to command. The British price level bas declined during man^ months and been ipproximately stationary or gone slightly higher in others. The differ- ncc in price trends has largely ac- -•ounted for the recovery of sterling, •hich many are hop ng may achieve a :oint where gold begins to flow out of this country. The movement of, prices on the Continent of Europe usually has borne a direct relation to the currency posi- tion. Germany's note issue has lately been expanding at the rate of more than 30 per cent a month, and as a r'esuH the foreiEn -iu-!?KaBing powfi^ o the mark has dwindled to an inconsid- erable fraetion of normal, and the in- ternal value of the mark as measured in goods also has fallen away sharply. Prices have climbed in proportion. In France an advance in prices has paral- leled the expansion of note circulation, while in Italy, wore dependent upon mported goods, the value of lire in the foreign exchange market has been a controlling factor. In Scandinavia and n other countries where the currency inflation has been cheeked and where the foreign exchange moveinent has been favorable prices have tended to taper off. The price situation as 1928 gets un- der way is still complicated by the tinancial and political aftermaths of war. Only as these are smoothed out The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924013930817