mm m i> ,>i" ;i;i-:iHii ii Cornell University Library HE 2236.B63f The basis of railroad capitalization, 3 1924 013 864 016 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY EDITED FOR THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY Volume XXXV] MARCH, 1920 [Number 1 Peasant Cooperatives in Rumania . . . . M. M. Knight i ^^&e Bxisis of Railroad Capitalization James C. BonbrigHt 30 Rural Socialization Newell L. Sims 54 The British Cabinet, igi6-igig . . . . R. L. Schuyler ^y War Books by American Diplomatists . . Munroe Smith 94 The Economics of the Social Uplift . . Leon Ardzrooni 126 Reviews : Lewis's The Life of Theodore Roosevelt, Thayer's Theodore Roosevelt and Abbott's Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt (136) — Cvijic's La P^ninsule Balkanique (143) — Harriott's The European Commonwealth (147)— Satow's A Guide to Diplomatic Pratice (150) — Smith's Justice and the Poor (152) — Haynes's James Baird Weaver (154) — Von Schierbrand's Austria-Hungary (157) — ^Hollander's War Borrowing (159) — Garvin's The Economic Founda- tions of Peace (162) — Sonnichsen's Consumers' Cooperation (164) — Btttter- fleld's The Farmer and the New Day (165). Book Notes The Editors 167 ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York Entered at the Post-Office, iancaster. Pa., as Second-Class Mail Matter. Copyright 1920, by the Editors of the Political Science Quarterly. THE POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY The Quarterly is published by the Academy and edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University. 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Volume XXX V] March, ig2o \Number POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY PEASANT COOPERATION AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN RUMANIA Introduction TRANSYLVANIA, Bukovina and Bessarabia, though in- cluded in the present political boundaries of Rumania, are not dealt with in this paper because they were separated from the mother country during the development of the peculiar institutions under consideration. The first popular bank in Rumania was founded in 1894. Within a dozen years there were 2,000 of them, with a capital of 20,000,000 francs. Peasant cooperatives are an offshoot of these banks. The same period of time saw the cooperatives well established in their characteristic forms. Thus this discussion is properly confined to political Rumania, within the boundaries as they then ex- isted and continued to exist until 191 3. Southern Dobrudja, taken from Bulgaria in 191 3, was retaken by that country in 1916, held until 1918 and occupied by Allied troops in 1919, so that it has not been economically assimilated to Rumania. The period of time intensively covered in this study is from about 1895 to 1919. A brief historical introduction seems de- sirable, to make sure that writer and reader view from the same angle the general economic and social foundation upon which Rumanian peasant cooperative organizations rest, the situation which called them into being and the peculiar problems with which they have to deal. To begin with, there is practically no vestige, even in term- inology, of any agrarian institutions set up by the Romans during their occupation (106—271 A. D.) of the province of 2 POLIT7CAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV Dacia (present-day Rumania). The next thousand years, dur ing which Asiatic and North-European hordes swept through the eastern and southern parts of this territory on their way to southern Europe, have left us next to no records. Transition from a system of village communities of free landholders to feudalism, the appearance of lords, serfs, labor dues etc., re- sembled similar phenomena in more familiar parts of Europe sufficiently to render detailed discussion unnecessary. Nor was the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire over the Rumanian lands remarkably different at the outset from overlordships in West- ern Europe at about the same time. The Rumanians, a weak people numerically, merely entered into a sort of alliance with the most powerful military state of that day, paying tribute in exchange for protection against their ambitious neighbors. The Turks increasingly abused their suzerainity, until finally, under the Phanariot Greek princes (1712—1 821), civil liberty for the poorer Rumanians almost entirely disappeared. The Greek princes and tax-gatherers, ever urged to greater extor- tions by their Turkish overlords, practically took possession of the country, "farming" the last piastre out of the miserable peasantry. Such peasant proprietors as remained often had to give up their lands through inability to pay the taxes, and in similar fashion the larger proprietors, in league with the gov- ernment, usurped the holdings of the smaller. The Rumanian principalities became a country of great landlords. The outbreak of the Greek revolution in 1 82 1 was a signal for revolt against the Phanariots throughout the Rumanian country. The Russians came in their place in 1828, occupying the territory until ~l 834. Already, in 1805, the landlords had secured the right to one-fourth of the meadow land for their own private use, and to this was added in 1828 one-third of the cultivable land. Agriculture became extremely profitable after the opening of western markets by the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), and the proprietors began a steady encroachment upon peasant holdings. Hopeful of ingratiating themselves with the Rumanian boyars or ruling classes, the Russians favored them in the new consti- tution, the Reglement Organique, which they introduced. Im- No. I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA 3 munity from military service might be purchased. The Czar's plenipotentiary, General Paul Kisselev, desired a readjustment in favor of the peasants, but the proprietors stood firm and he yielded. Beyond certain jugglings with the old terminology, in- cluding the absurd assumption by the large proprietors of the title " lords of the land," the paramount Rumanian question, that of the land, was left substantially untouched.' By 1848 the proprietors had succeeded in considerably dis- torting this constitution in practice to their own advantage. A group of young Rumanians who had witnessed the revolution of that year in France returned to their own country while Europe was in the throes of social upheaval and organized a short-lived republic. A provisional government declared the peasant free from labor dues and master of the land he occu- pied. A mixed commission of seventeen peasants and seven- teen proprietors was appointed and immediately disagreed — the peasants wishing to take the land for money payment, the proprietors objecting on the ground that the peasants would not be able to pay them. The agrarian question was smothered in the Russo-Turkish intervention of the next year, but it kept on smouldering underground. Wallachia and Moldavia were united after the Paris Confer- ence of 1856 and the Conference of 1858 which met under its auspices, and the union was acknowledged by the Porte and the Great Powers in 1861. Cuza, the first Prince of united Rumania (1859-66), took up the agrarian question in a zealous spirit of reform. He vetoed a reactionary agrarian law passed by the assembly, dismissed the Conservative ministry and called Michel Kogalniceanu, a young Liberal educated in western Europe, to help draft a reform act. First, the lands of the Greek monasteries were seized — about one-fifth of the whole. When the assembly rejected his agrarian reform act, Cuza executed a coup d'itat (May 2, 1864), giving himself, with the aid of a council of state, the right to initiate legislation. A ' Jorga, Question Rurale, p. 46; also his Geschichte des RumSnischen Volkes, II, 254 et seq. But see Mitrany, The Balkans, pp. 275-6, who asserts that the peasant holdings were cut in two. Prince Nicholas Soutzo, Mimoires, Vienna, 1899, pp. 97-8, states that peasant conditions were much improved. 4 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV free and compulsory education act was promulgated; and universal suffrage was introduced, to secure the full peasant support for a new land act. This " rural law " ' of August, 1864, was a moderate measure. It abolished the provisions of the Reglement Organique, with the feudal labor dues etc., and made the peasant absolute proprietor of his holdings, the large proprietor getting full title to the remainder for the first time. The proprietors were to receive compensation for their claims to labor dues etc. It is a remarkable fact that hitherto the old communal ideas about land had never quite perished or even entirely disappeared from the laws. We may say that the year 1864 marks the birth of the idea, as we entertain it, of complete private property in land. Even then, the state recog- nized communal rights in forests and pastures. This law of 1864 has been severely and quite unjustly criti- cized.^ Prince Cuza and his minister, Kogalniceanu, did not expect to transform land tenure at a stroke, but they inaugu- rated a program which, if conscientiously carried out for a period of years, would have produced far-reaching beneficial effects. It had the approbation of the sober, industrious work- ing people throughout the country, but the privileged classes, who opposed it, were too well organized. Cuza's government was overthrown in 1866, and Carol of Hohenzollern was called to the throne. King Carol, who assumed the royal title in 1883, was a great soldier and one of the most distinguished diplomatists of Europe. This latter fact turned out to be a great misfortune for his country, directly because it resulted in diplomatic matters being left largely in his hands, and indirectly because his preoccupation with them and with military ques- tions distracted his attention and time from the one great Rumanian issue — the land. The constitution of 1866, modeled upon that of Belgium, was democratic in form but not in practice. One ministry followed another with bewildering rapidity for four years, the Conservative reaction becoming more and more pronounced. ^Basilesco, La Reforme Agraire en Roumanie, p. 167. 'E.g., Mitrany, op. cit, pp. 276-7. No. I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA 5 In 1870, Lascar Catargiu, the ultra-reactionary Conservative leader, formed a government which ruled with an iron hand for six years. Thus Cuza's agrarian reform act was effectively smothered under a decade of hostile administration. The communal pastures disappeared. The land reserve for young peasants also vanished. With the increase in population, more and more peasants had to sell their labor ; and in a country practically without industries they were at the mercy of the better-organized rich. An agricultural conventions act of 1866 permitted the peasant to contract his labor to the proprietor for a period up to five years. Worse still, it gave the latter the right of manu militari — of employing the armed forces of the state to exact fulfilment of these contracts. A peasant could legally contract his labor for only four days of each week ; he must reserve Fridays and Saturdays for himself. In practice, however, the manu militari clause often defeated this restric- tion, and the proprietor not only exacted labor on Fridays and Saturdays but also shut up the laborer over Sundays to pre- vent his escape. To understand the fluctuations in the attitude of the Rumanian government toward the peasants, it is neces- sary to bear in mind certain elementary facts of Rumanian party politics. We must realize that the anomalous Turkish suzerainty, which held over in some form to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, accustomed the peasants to the conception of govern- ment for almost purely economic ends (in the worst sense of that term, of course), at a period when young Rumanians were studying economics in French and German universities. Given the actual situation in their own country, these hand- made occidentals could hardly do otherwise than champion the peasant cause. The peasants themselves had to work very hard, and on the whole found difficulty in procuring the quantity and variety of food necessary for health. They had no chance to dream of opulence and leisure from the sweat of other mens' brows. Their relations with the government were economic — it compelled fulfilment of their hard contracts with speculators who stood between them and absentee landlords. To them an ideal government, which they attempted to realize by occa- 6 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV sional insurrections, was one which insured just instead of un- just economic relations — guaranteed the privilege of eating to those who worked, and even went so far, perhaps, as to impose some sort of effort upon those who ate. Since the days when Tudor Vladimirescu led the revolution of 1 82 1 against the nobles, there had been the tradition of a Liberal party made up of the peasants, and led by the school- teachers, priests and those who had imbibed the spirit of de- mocracy in western Europe. This group, led by John Heliade Radulescu, Jon C. Bratianu, C. A. Rosetti and others, shaped the revolution of 1848. It was represented in Prince Cuza's reign by Michel Kogalniceanu and finally took definite form as the National Liberal party, organized by such of these same men as were still living under the new constitution of 1866. This party, whatever its faults — and they have sometimes been egregious — has consistently supported the cause of the peasant. It has urged him to demand more and has often given him a much more radical program than he desired, trusting that he would be educated up to it before it could be repealed. The other important party, the Conservative, represented the large proprietors, stood for the old order and pursued a largely negative policy of opposition to change. Bratianu formed a National Liberal government in 1876, with Kogalniceanu as his Minister of Foreign Affairs. The agreement with Russia and the war of independence against the Turks in 1877—8 was their work. An act passed in 1879 gave land to 48,000 peasants but left 79,000 entirely landless.' The Liberal party declined in influence and lost some adherents during the years when it was in power, 1876— 1888. It had no consistent program. Its raison d'Stre lay in its emphasis on the economic condition of the peasants, which grew worse in spite of it. Bratianu, who was growing old and dictatorial, fell into the common habit of trying to achieve economic ends by purely political means. The results of this policy helped to convince other Liberals of its bankruptcy. The peasant revolt ' rhis estimate is given by Stradilescu, From Carpathian to Pindus, and is only approximate; there are no adequate statistics up to 1905. No. I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA 7 of 1888, fomented by Russian agents, brought about Bratianu's fall.' His successors, starting with a chastened skepticism and much uncertainty as to tactics, finally took their cue from events in the next decade, as we shall see. For the moment, the re- volt was suppressed and a scheme introduced whereby the peas- ants might purchase land in small lots. There was, however, no machinery of credit for loaning money to the poorest borrow- ers at reasonable rates, upon such security as they could give. It was customary for a peasant in need of cash to sell in ad- vance, at a ruinous discount, either his next year's labor or his next year's crop. In attempting to cure this disease of usury, the Liberals suddenly found themselves in possession of a weapon more potent than politics. Growth of the Popular Banks The large proprietors had their credit institutions, the Rural Credit Society, based on a special law of 1873 (modified in 1882 and again in 1903) and the Agricultural Bank, based on a law of 1894 (modified in 1895). The Credit Agricole was founded in 1882 as a private institution, with the needs of some- what smaller proprietors in view. It was taken over by the government in 1892, to aid in small land purchases under an act of 1889. While this institution loaned villagers on an aver- age over 22 millions of francs per year up to the peasant revolt of 1907, it was too stiffly bound by the old banking laws and traditions to get at the real difficulty, which consisted mainly of lack of initiative and of the habit of cooperation and the confidence which is born of it. Obviously, where more thorough organization and greater confidence exist, they may replace some of the visible and material security for loans. The in- justice and crudeness of the economic system was patent, but like other national economic systems it had become customary and worked by habit, tradition and inertia. Those who were supposed to direct it had little more idea of its actual workings and the reasons for them than its opponents had. ' Russian agents were very active in the Balkans at this period. Only two years before, they had forced Alexander of Battenburg from the Bulgarian throne. 8 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. XXXV The popular banks made their first cautious beginnings in 1 894-5 • The peasants were aided by the village schoolmasters and priests, and the work of study, comparison and correlation of results was enthusiastically taken up by the group of intel- lectual liberals. This conscious cooperation has progressed so far within a quarter of a century that it has produced a new economic, political and social organism within the old and one so powerful and articulate that it threatens to cast off the old like a shell and " bear the palm alone." In 1897, there were two of these banks; by 1900 there were eighty. At first, the development of the movement was slow, owing to lack of experience or special training on the part of the initiators and of any legal recognition by the state. They did not all function alike or equally well, but they all worked, without exception. In 1902 there were 256 of them, with 20,604 members and a capital of 2,346,046 francs; and in the follow- ing year the number reached 700, with 59,844 members and a capital of 4,250,600 francs. In that year a most important step was taken — the organization of a central office and clear- ing house (^Casa Centrala a Bancilor Populate si Cooperativelot Safest) in Bucarest. This functioned for the banks and especi- ally for the peasant cooperatives proper, then two or three years old. Between this Casa Centrala and the local village banks were district or regional banks (^hederales) which acted as clearing houses. The special law of 1905 interpreted and regulated the functions of the popular banks, rural cooperative societies, consumers' leagues, forest-exploitation societies, land- leasing cooperatives {obstii) etc. This law enabled the popular banks to coordinate their activities and to introduce system and uniformity. To become a member, the peasant must subscribe not less than 20 or more than 5,000 francs to the capital stock. This maximum limit was fixed to render impossible any usurpation of control by the rich and powerful. There is no limit on interest-bearing deposits, but no member can acquire more than the maximum amount of stock. In form, the bank is a limited stock com- pany. The members meet annually to elect a new administra- tive council of from five to nine members and receive the re- No. I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA ^ port of the council for the preceding year. The entire body also elects three censors or controllers with three substitutes to verify and control the work of the administrative council and to fill any vacancies which may occur in that council between the annual meetings of the stockholders. The council appoints the cashier and accountant. Its responsibility for any deficit caused by negligence or abuse of power is joint and unlimited. The Federates or regional popular banks are organized in the same manner, except that the members are local banks instead of individuals. They arrange loans from one local bank to an- other or from one region to another and look after relations of local banks with the Casa Centrala at Bucarest. This Casa Centrala is the central bureau and credit institu- tion for the whole peasant cooperative system. Later we shall mention in detail its new functions during the war and under the land-expropriation act of 191 8. Before the reorganization in December, 191 8, it had a capital of 20,000,000 lei (normally equal to francs, now much depreciated), contributed by the state, and a credit at the National Bank under guarantee of the Ministry of Finance. Until the war interrupted communica- tions and disorganized the Rumanian economic system in 1914, the relations of this Casa Centrala with the popular banks was nominal rather than intimate and organic, its chief object being to furnish a backbone of organization for the various other rural cooperative associations. It could loan the popular banks money only after the latter had fulfilled certain rather stringent requirements, individually and not as part of the system. It could also receive their deposits, either directly or through the regional banks. In 19 13, for example, the Casa Centrala ex- tended credits of over 10,000,000 francs to the popular banks, individually and through the agency of the regional banks. On the other hand, it held deposits of a little over 26,000,000 francs from them. This excess of deposits over credit ex- tended indicates how completely the banks stood upon their own feet as commu'nity and regional organizations. Beginning in 1914, peasant cooperation in Rumania under the pressure of events entered an entirely new phase of development, which may be called " integration." This will be dealt with later. lO POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV The present section may properly be concluded with a brief summary of the growth of the popular banks and a few re- marks as to their peculiar character. In 1904 there were 161 6 banks, with 121,786 members and a capital of 6,185,976.81 francs. By 1910 the number had reached 2664, with 454,187 members and a capital of 61,016,395.22 francs. In 1913, there were 2901, with 583,632 members and a capital of 107,142,- 203.10 francs. When they were transformed by the decree- law of 31 December, 1918, to meet the new requirements of the land-expropriation act, the number was 3 1 70, with a mem- bership of 645,000 and a capital, in round numbers, of 140,- 000,000 francs. Of these 3170, 500 had a capital of 20,000 lei or less; 1500, from 20,000 to 50,000 lei ; 870, from 50,000 to 100,000 lei, and 300, 100,000 or over. The 645,000 stockholders were divided professionally as fol- lows in round numbers: 600,000 peasants, 10,000 merchants, 5,000 school teachers and 4,000 priests. The overwhelming majority, more than 93 per cent., it will be noted, were peas- ants. Some stock was held by various other miscellaneous classes of people — proprietors, laborers, functionaries etc. This network of banks now covers the entire country. The yearly turnover of money naturally varies with the local eco- nomic situation. For example, the " Gilortul " bank in Novaci, a small village in the Gorj district in Oltenia, was founded in 1 90 1 with 70 members and a capital of 3,000 francs. By 191 5 it had 4,000 members, a million francs' capital and did 20,000,000 francs' business annually. The character of the institution is only suggested by the figures. The members invest part of their yearly savings from crop sales. Dividends average from six per cent, to ten per cent. Interest-bearing deposits pay five per cent. The bank is simply an orderly mechanism whereby the members of the community lend money to each other. Security for loans is required, including the personal pledge of one fellow-villager. It is evident, however, that security can often be accepted locally which, though perfectly good, would not be acceptable to an ordinary bank. The system represents community No. I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA n finance under rational control — comprehensive, articulate and substantially independent. Evolution of Peasant Cooperatives While the material benefits of the popular bank to the peas- ants were considerable, they were unimportant compared with the moral effect of the demonstration that communities could organize and protect themselves to some extent from exploita- tion. The bank ventures showed how simple and workable such organizations might be and furnished practical experi- ence. The law of 1905, applying to all peasant cooperatives, including banks, was passed with the special idea of legalizing the peasant land-leasing or land-working societies {obstii). A vicious " farmer " or speculator system had grown up and become general, whereby a shrewd middleman would lease an estate or several estates from the owners and either hire peas- ants to work them by the acre or re-lease them. The peasants were practically at the mercy of the speculator who had thus obtained a land monopoly in the neighborhood. They worked for him and he fixed the wage. Wage laws were very diffi- cult to enforce. Even the attempt after the insurrection of 1907 to establish both minimum wage scales and maximum rents was not entirely successful. In practice, it was possible for the owner and the speculator to arrange between themselves whatever rent they saw fit. One of these " farmers " explained to the writer that up to 1919 he had rented a piece of ground on which the Department of Agriculture fixed a maximum yearly rent of 30 lei per hectare for twice that sum. He hired peasants who furnished their own teams and plows to plow and sow it (the two operations are performed at once) for 32 lei per hectare. The seed cost on an average about 30 lei per hectare, the labor of harvesting about 30 more. He sold grain to the value of 250 to 275 lei per hectare from this land each year. That is, he made about 1 00 per cent, on his in- vestment. It was hoped that the peasant cooperatives might supersede the speculators on a basis of economic competition, since other means of elimination had failed prior to 1905 and the situation 12 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV was growing critical. As remarked above, the machinery of control was similar to that of the popular banks. The land- leasing associations showed an astonishing ability to compete with the speculators ; but they were all too few, and popular patience was too nearly exhausted to give them time. In 1907 a peasant revolt broke out from one end of the country to the other. 150,000 troops were called out, but in spite of a butch- ery of the peasants the trouble spread. King Carol suddenly awoke to the fact that an agrarian question existed in his coun- try. It was his personal promise to see justice done, pro- claimed far and wide, which restored order. A report had just been published showing that 1563 pro- prietors owned more than 3,000,000 hectares (nearly 7,000,000 acres) in holdings of 500 hectares or over, out of a total of about 8,000,000 hectares of arable land in the country.' An- other three million were owned in very small lots of lo hectares or less. Inheritance had divided the peasant holdings under the act of 1864 until the average small property was only 3.27 hectares, not enough with the extensive means of culture in vogue, to sustain a family except in fat years. The extent of the speculator-absentee-landlord evil was also disclosed. Practically half of the total arable surface of the country was owned in lots of over 100 hectares. A census of the revenue from these estates showed that only 35.58 per cent, of it was produced by lands exploited by the owners and 64.42 per cent, by those leased to speculators. The state had already diminished its lands greatly by grants or sales to peasants. Only one radical method of reform re- mained, expropriation of the big estates, and this was not con- sidered politically feasible. Relying on evolution by economic means, and dreading revolution, the Liberals passed a reform act known as the Agricultural Contracts Law.'' This provided for: (i) purchase of communal pastures; (2) control by re- gions or district of rents of all kinds and wages. 'N. R. Capitaneanu, Raport prezentat domnului Ministru de finante asupra rt- cemamantului fiscal din anul igoj; Bacarest, 1906. ' Lege Pentru Invoeli Agricole, Bucarest, Dec., 1907. Na I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA 13 Every hamlet containing as many as twenty-five families was to acquire a communal pasture, purchased by the local author- ity of the commune from the proprietor, institution or the state, as the case might be. The state guaranteed payment. In case the commune lacked the necessary funds, they were to be borrowed from the Casa Rurala, a new credit institution. One- third of this pasture land was to be left in pasture, the other two-thirds to produce different kinds of forage crops. Between 1908 and 1913, 1753 of these pastures were purchased, with a surface of 224,200 hectares and costing 151,000,000 francs. To regulate the speculator evil, the Ministry of Agriculture set up a commission in each region, composed of the Agri- cultural Inspector, two peasant and two proprietor delegates. This commission classified all the land in the region and fixed maximum rents, using averages of the preceding five years. A new scale of rents was to be made out every five years. Min- imum wage scales were established on a basis of the average for the preceding three years. Finally, the Casa Rurala, mentioned above, was created to help communes in the purchases of pastures and more par- ticularly to act as intermediary in assisting individual peasants in buying land of proprietors. It was also empowered to pur- chase estates and sell the land to peasants in small lots of five hectares, payments to extend over a period of fifty years. Be- tween 1908 and 1915 this institution bought 109 estates, with a total surface of 127,292 hectares, of which 99,149 were culti- vable. The price paid was 87,442,000 francs. Of this land, 20,000 hectares, valued at 16,000,000 francs, was resold to the peasants, and the rest of the cultivable land was rented to them. 13,000 hectares of pasture land were sold to communes, and further loans of 40,321,400 francs were made to them. 4,129,- 000 francs were loaned to peasants on lands bought for them. From the standpoint of the peasants the law of 1907 was defective in that it left the proprietor free to sell his land or to keep it, as he pleased. In a period of mounting prices, he asually followed the latter course. After a brief period of Conservative rule, the Liberals were again asked to form a ministry, at the close of the Balkan War in 1913, pledged to a 14 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV radical solution of the agrarian problem. Then came the war in 1914, cutting off Rumania from the outside world and creat- ing wholly abnormal economic conditions. The peasant land cooperatives {obstii) usually borrowed money from the popular banks for two or three years, until they were well established. They have successfully competed with private enterprise. The Perisoru land near Braila was formerly leased to a speculator for 80,000 francs per year. The A. I. Cuza cooperative took it over, paying the owner a little over twice as much, and prospered at that. The same speculator lost the Filiu land to the Tudor Vladimirescu co- operative, which paid one and a-half times as much. Cooper- atives hire agricultural experts to settle technical questions such as the rotation of crops, choice of seed, purchase of community breeding-stock and the like. The Perisoru society had a re- serve of 200,000 francs and subscribed half that sum to the national war loan. The average yield of the land for the best years has been nearly doubled since the peasants took it over.' Producers' leagues have been obliged to struggle against great odds. The industrial enterprises with which they com- pete enjoy exemption from duty on raw materials, special rates on the government railways and all sorts of privileges which until recently were not accorded to the cooperatives. Con- sumers' leagues have been held within small compass by the simplicity of peasant life and the fact that the peasants produce nearly everything they use. It is the gradual fusion of all the struggling forms of co- operation into solid community organizations with nation-wide liens, based on rational economics and conscious self-interest, which arrests our attention. When the war broke out there were already distinct signs of integration. Something resem- bling agricultural syndicates sprang up simultaneously in a great many localities, buying their implements and tools and selling their products in common. In 19 16 the Casa Centrala or central bureau of rural cooperative activities sold for the peas- ' Lupu, Rumania and the War, states that the average increased from 24 to 40 hectoliters per hectare. No. I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA 15 ants over 240,000,000 kilograms of grain alone to foreign purchasers. This carries us into the war period, when the wall between the popular banks and other cooperative activities was broken down. Evolution of Rural Cooperation during the War (^1^14— igi8) A certain stagnation in the producers' associations character- ized the period of the war. This amounted to practical par- alysis after Rumania entered the struggle in 1916 and placed her male population between 20 and 45 under arms. On the other hand, the provisioning of the villages and the sale of their products was turned over exclusively to cooperatives. The Rumanian government was obliged in those abnormal times to regulate exports and take charge of rationing. In the villages, only the cooperative associations were found capable of suc- cessfully performing this latter service. As the most uniform and best organized of such associations, the popular banks were given control of the work. In 191 5 and 191 6 it was only through the aid of the popular banks that the villages were able to procure the essential house- hold articles for their peasants, and in the mountain regions the banks had to assume responsibility for the food supply. Through the medium of this banking organization, the peas- ants sold over a hundred million francs' worth of their products during that two-year period. Wallachia was overrun by the armies of the Central Powers in the autumn and early winter of 1 91 6, the enemy occupation lasting nearly two years. In Mol- davia the popular banks functioned uninterruptedly, both in their normal capacity and as producers' and consumers' socie- ties. Between October, 1916, and March, 1918, they furnished the peasants merchandise to a value of over fourteen and a half millions of francs, and through them the rural population sold over 7,000,000 francs' worth of produce. War conditions stopped almost completely all capitalistic enterprise and speculative commerce in the villages. The ad- vent of peace, therefore, opened entirely new perspectives for cooperative effort. Peasants have formed the habit of getting along without the middleman and the profit-taker. The void 1 6 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV left in village life through the disappearance of these classes was rapidly filled by the dozens of community purchasing and marketing societies which appeared every week of the year fol- lowing the armistice. Of all the results of the demonstration furnished by the war of the practicability of peasant cooperation on a vast scale, the greatest is undoubtedly the moral effect of that success. The heaviest burdens of war in the army and in civil life fall upon the poor. But wide association in the army with different peo- ple and enforced observation of stratified society in its most arbitrary form change the temper of the common man. His experience in the cooperative societies had given the Rumanian peasant confidence to believe that he could exist very comfort- ably without the speculator and the aristocrat. He talked it over with his fellows in the army, and they made up their minds that it was time to reform the land system. Everybody understood that it was the obduracy of a small group of large proprietors who held title to about half the arable land in the country which had for more than half a century blocked every attempt at general social and economic justice. Men in the desperate situation of the Rumanian army in 191 7 do not stick at legal formalities. The village school-teachers and priests agreed with the peasants. The Rumanian village priest, it may be remarked, is a practical creature, often grasping and not always personally popular. His religion is a mixture of superstition and ethical and economic common sense. There is little occasion for either sentimentality or mysticism on his part ; he may marry and hold property like other men, and there are no warring sects to keep the air charged with theological con- troversy. He is a pastor, clinging to monkish dress and tradi- tion, almost never the elegant apostle of things as they are. Liberal elements in the government seized upon the oppor- tunity to commit it to reforms which they had struggled for decades to achieve. King Ferdinand, in strong contrast with his predecessor, is a modest, affable man, not inclined to self- assertion, and deeply convinced that he is a constitutional monarch, not a dictator. The Constituent Assembly, elected in 1914, met in the early spring of 191 7 and promised agrarian No. I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA 17 reform. Peasants shrugged their shoulders — this was not the first time that pledges had been given. To the consternation of the reactionaries, however, the King made the promise practically irrevocable by taking the Assembly at its word and stating publicly that he would be the first to comply with its pledge. In a widely published order of the day to the army, in March, 191 7, he committed himself to expropriation of the crown lands. He said : " You have acquired . . . the right to possess in larger measure the land for which you have fought. Land you shall have ! I, your King, will be the first to set the example. You shall also be given a larger participation in the affairs of the country." To the Rumanian Liberals, national politics is a phase of eco- nomics. They have not had occasion to worship their consti- tutional document or to wreathe sentiments about it. The upper classes have not hesitated to interpret it in their own in- terest, and the common people and their leaders see no reason why they should not follow suit. This document can hardly be said to warrant such decree-laws as have given the peo- ple manhood suffrage and a larger share of the lands they till. Bratianu and his supporters have proceeded on the prin- ciple that a. fait accompli which is so obviously just that no one would dare try to revoke it is of equal practical value whether it is hallowed by express constitutional sanction before or after. The reforms were given a semblance of constitutionality by virtue of the special war powers of the executive, exercised after cessation of hostilities but before demobilization. This effective method should not strike the citizens of other warring nations as startling. A brief discussion of one fact in group psychology during the war, which deserved more attention than it received, may help us to see the Rumanian cooperative effort in its proper setting. Nearly a million Russians were on the Rumanian front and in Moldavia during 191 7, while the Russian Revolution was in progress. They were in the midst of the Rumanian troops and civil population. Their propaganda practically destroyed the morale of the Austro-Hungarian army and seriously impaired that of the German, in spite of the difficulties of communicating 1 8 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV with a formal enemy across no-man's land. Yet the Rumanian army never showed serious symptoms of collapse or disinte- gration. Here is certainly a problem in morale which requires expla- nation. Only a fundamental difference in organization and point of view can account for the fact that where the Russian soviet propagandists worked under the most favorable condi- tions they made almost no headway. They went so far as to set up soup kitchens for the country population in some parts of Moldavia, advising the peasants to stop work, since they would be fed anyway. The peasants listened, admitted much that the Russians said about the central government, the profi- teers and the idle aristocrats, but still refused to jump farther than they could see. They had formed the habit of commun- ity action and had built up a framework of community eco- nomic organization which belonged to them and in which they had confidence. In spite of some points of astonishing similarity between the Russian Soviets and the Rumanian cooperatives, the two were very — we might almost say fundamentally — different. The Russian soviet was the material expression by a group of radi- cal economists of the wishes and theories of the town laborers. On the other hand, the Rumanian cooperative was the material expression (also assisted by a group of radical economists) of the wishes and ideas of the peasants, the tillers of the soil in village and hamlet. The soviet took form very rapidly, with perhaps overmuch theoretical assistance, and was born with an opinion as to what the central government should be like. Of minority origin, it began with a prejudice against the private ownership of land and later had to yield to the majority, the peasants, on that point. On the contrary, the Rumanian co- operative had evolved more slowly, around the private owner- ship of land by the tillers as a definite ideal, and was willing to postpone fixing the details as to what sort of central govern- ment should ideally unite the smaller groups until these reached a more advanced stage in their evolution. Both were hostile (though not to the same degree) to the old type of central government, which appeared to them to play into the hands of No. I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA 19 the astute and unscrupulous by being economic but refusing to acknowledge the fact. The friends of the soviet system claim that it has since accomodated itself to the overwhelmingly rural national economy, and it is possible that the differences under discussion have diminished since 1917. The Hungarian soviet experiment of 1919, on another side of Rumania, was unable to solve the problem of meeting in the same government the requirements of both primitive agricul- tural and large, highly-developed industrial communities. The former place the emphasis on organization by localities, the latter on organization by occupations, since they are thus differ- entiated in fact. The Hungarian radicals modeled their gov- ernment to suit the urban districts, and it was unable to com- mand the support of the back country, where communistic spirit was strong (especially in Eastern Hungary, next to the Rumanian lands), but of quite a different type. The political schemes of the town laborers in both Hungary and Russia were violently opposed by the capitalists and all the conservative elements in the towns and cities of Rumania and seemed for- eign and strange to even the most radical element among the peasants in the villages. Labor groups in a few manufacturing towns, like Galatz, approved the soviet system, but they found themselves in a helpless and insignificant minority. Commun- ity economic organizations in both Serbia and Bulgaria, west and south of Rumania, accompanied astonishing resistance during the war to political and social disintegration, but they also were wary of revolutionary tampering with the central government. Russian radicals have been fully alive to the fact that if their form of central government is to stand, they must work out satisfactory interrelations between the city trade soviet and the typical rural community organization. Their Balkan neighbors have shown themselves suspicious of the soviet experiment, and their chief concern has been protection against this specific manifestation of it. In general, the Rumanian peasants cling to evolutionary methods and shrink from radical change in the form of the central government. This conservatism is practical rather than sentimental, however, and an extremely reactionary 20 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV ministry or an intolerable general situation, like the continued paralysis of trade, might conceivably lead to a change. The immediate wish of the Liberals is to make the political machinery more responsive to the popular will by either eliminating or changing the archaic and unrepresentative nature of the senate and entirely reforming the unfair three-class system of voting, to the end of giving economic evolution fair play. The Expropriation Law and other post-war Reforms The German and Hungarian troops were driven from Ru- mania in the uprising which came to a head on November 9, 191 8. After a brief temporary government, under General Coanda, the Liberals, under the leadership of Bratianu, returned to power and immediately inaugurated a series of sweeping re- forms by decree-law, to be ratified later by a duly elected par- liament or constituent assembly, in cases where the constitution explicitly demands it. Their evident purpose was to carry their program so far before an election could be held as to make re- fusal to ratify virtually impossible. The decree-laws of December 14 and 15, 191 8, expropriated all cultivable crown and institutional lands, those of all founda- tions, all lands of subjects who were foreign by birth, marriage or naturalization, and all rural lands belonging to absentees. In addition, 2,000,000 hectares (nearly 5,000,000 acres) were expropriated from private estates containing more than 100 hectares of cultivable land. These private lands were taken according to a graduated scale. For example, a loo-hectare property remained intact. One of 105 hectares retained 104.6 ; of 200, 165.7; of 300,201.17; of 500, 241.2; of 1,000, 284.9. The possessor of 3,000 hectares could keep only 351.4, and of 10,000 or over, only 500. The land to be taken was decided upon by local commissions composed of (i) the judge of the arrondissement, (2) the pro- prietor or his agent and (3) one peasant delegate. In general, the proprietor might keep any specified and reasonable part of his estate he chose, within the limit fixed by law. He could substitute other areas for petroleum-bearing land, except that only 12,000 hectares could remain in the hands of the proprie- No. I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA 2 1 tors in the entire kingdom. All maps, plans and other data as to the extent, character and value of estates must be turned over to the commission by the proprietor. Valuation was fixed from data respecting rents, sale price of lands in the vicinity, evaluation by credit institutions etc. In no case could it exceed twenty times the maximum annual rent, as fixed by the regional commissions under the law of 1907. If the decision as to value was unanimous in the commis- sion, the peasant land associations already mentioned took possession immediately; otherwise, fifteen days were allowed for appeal to the departmental commission. The Casa Ccn- trala of cooperatives and popular banks, reorganized as ex- plained below, together with the Agricultural Inspector of the Department, could create as many commissions as might be necessary to facilitate the work. Each of these departmental commissions must consist of two delegates from the proprie- tors, two from the peasants, one from the Casa Centrala and an arrondissement or other judge (acting as president), ap- pointed by the President of the Tribunal in the Department. The Casa Centrala was entirely reorganized by the decree- law of December 31, 1918, as a " Central Bureau of Coopera- tion and of the Sale of Expropriated Lands to Peasants," oper- ating under the Ministry of Agriculture. For convenience it was divided into three substantially autonomous parts : ( i ) the central of popular banks; (2) that of producers' and consum- ers' cooperatives and (3) that of the land cooperatives {obstii), agricultural exploitations, and also two special services or direc- torates: (a) mortgage credits and similar land questions; (b) surveys. Each of these bodies was made a separate entity or person before the law, but they were closely affiliated. The capital of the central of the popular banks consists of 12 millions of lei from the old Casa Centrala and 12 millions subscribed by the popular banks. The central of producers' and consumers' co- operatives was assigned the other 8 millions of the capital of the old Casa Centrala and 4 millions more by subscription. Since all financial operations were to be carried on by these two, the third central and the special bureaus did not require 22 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV any capital stock. The composition of the Administrative Council for the bank central shows how thoroughly this machin- ery is under peasant control. Four of the eight members are elected directly by the general congress of popular banks and cooperatives, and the regional Federates. Of the remaining four, one each is appointed by the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance and Education and the fourth by the National Bank. The other centrals are similarly managed. They are united by the formation of a General Administrative Council, consisting of two members from each of the three and a Director General. An expropriation such as has been outlined is in practice extremely complicated. Its faults are' bound to be many, and there is small likelihood that its enemies will overlook or fail to exploit any of them. For example, much of the expropriated land was found to be mortgaged, some of it more than once. This was foreseen in the law, but yet it raised almost infinite complications. Some of the mortgages covered entire estates, others only part of the expropriated portion together with other specific areas, and so on. These mortgages might be held by one or more government credit institutions, by one or more private corporations or by a combination of both. Legal ques- tions about wills arose, in cases where estates were unsettled. There were also questions of fact as to rents, sales etc. Land might be in any one of a number of different categories — forest, vineyard, cultivable in cereals, pasture, waste etc., and many of the surveys were wholly out of date. If land was held jointly by a foreigner and a citizen, it came under two conflicting classifications. Some was seeded and some was not — whence the question of the amount of reimbursement due under the law. Where no land cooperatives existed, they were created. These latter lacked experience, and not all of the old ones were absolutely identical as to organization and function. Proprietors were paid in land bonds, maturing in 50 years and bearing interest at five per cent. In the case of founda- tions and the like, the five per cent, is to be perpetual. Through this settlement, the state became the owner of the land and turned it over to the land cooperatives. These No. I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA 23 place it in the hands of individual peasants in lots of 5, 10, 15 and 20 hectares as rapidly as possible, looking after its exploitation in the meantime. The local cooperative is re- sponsible to the central and the central to the state for pay- ment. In parceling out the land, soldiers and their descendants have preference. Expropriation proper was practically completed by the end of June, 1 9 19. Many of its opponents had predicted disaster to the 19 19 crop from the redistribution of land; but it has recently been estimated at 75 per cent, of the normal harvest, much larger than the 191 8 harvest. At first glance it seems absurd to try to apply a uniform law to sections which vary in climate, soil, marketing facilities or even average size of holdings where other things are equal. In Moldavia, the average size of estates was much larger than in Wallachia. In some districts there were almost no estates of more than 100 hectares — hence whole villages of peasants received scarcely any land at all. In others there were only properties of thousands of hectares each, nearly all of which were expropriated under the law. Complaints arose that peas- ants could not be found to take up the land, which would re- main an intolerable burden on the hands of the cooperatives or lie idle. Eventually, the problem will solve itself. Past history in Rumania amply testifies to a sufficient land hunger on the part of the peasant to overcome any attachment to his native village if it offers him no land and land is obtainable elsewhere. In the same series were decree-laws turning over in great part to cooperatives the exploitation of forests, accelerating the creation of community pastures and providing for technical and financial aid. A report published at the end of June, 1919, stated that within three months ten million francs' worth of ligneous raw material had been turned over for exploitation by village cooperatives. Figures have already been given to illustrate the growth of the popular banks. Exact data on the growth of the coopera- tives proper is available only to 1916, the year of Rumania's entry into the war. The table on page 25 shows in detail the growth of these societies from 1908 to 191 6 and is arranged 24 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV SO as to show the increase in each kind of activity and to allow of comparison of the different kinds with each other. The figures in the last three sections of the table are given in francs. The Rumanian leu (pi. lei) is equal in value in normal times to the franc. This is substantially accurate for the entire period covered by the statistics, though the leu fell disastrously afterward. The Outlook for the Future ' It remains to be seen whether the Liberal government, which went out of power in the autumn of 1918, accelerated the evo- lution of cooperation too much. Reconstruction will compli- cate the issues for a long time to come. Wallachia was stripped of practically everything during the war by the Germans, Hungarians and Bulgarians, and the Russians did a great deal of damage in Moldavia in 191 7, the period of their greatest disorganization. Transportation within the country was almost paralyzed by the destruction of bridges and the removal of the bulk of the railway rolling-stock over the Hungarian frontier. Trade with central Europe was cut off after the armistice, and Rumania, like the rest of southeastern Europe, was thus de- prived almost entirely of manufactured goods. Prices rose to fabulous levels, and speculation flourished. A spool of cotton thread at one time cost $3, a fairly good second-hand overcoat or a pair of boots $100. Sugar sold at $1.50 a pound and even more, and other imported goods in proportion. The govern- ment did not always act wisely, and it was blamed for much that was due to abnormal economic conditions for which it was not responsible. At the time expropriation was carried out, the currency had fallen almost to a third of its normal value. The price paid for land was based largely on rents, sales and valuations which, in turn, were based on the equality of the leu and the franc, though the former was at the time worth only 34 centimes. Thus the purchasing power of the five per cent, interest paid ' Since this article was written an election has resulted in an overwhelming defeat for both the Liberal and Conservative parties. A peasant government is now in power, and sweeping constitutional changes are in progress. No, i] PEASANT COOPERATIVES TN RUMANIA 2S w > p < u p- -^ o H C) , u V < < •A IK A t 1 ^ « u~ o o o o o g Q Q o O Q Q 5 O O O o_ o o_ o_^ o o^ o__ c'vo" ooD vcT o' o* O CTi i/l "1 o o 'S'iS t-- O^ o O vD g-co in O'O -*■ t^ ■*; -rr. 8883 o o ^-O 9 '^ o 9 6 1-^ r^. C m - m u-i o"?S ■<> r^HX. " ►- ^ i/i "> ly ^ ■ "H:/: nj^ S^ -n -c _ o m\ 26 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV was and is very small. The land bonds are negotiable, but there are so many of them that any general attempt to realize upon them must disastrously affect their price. Thus any enter- prising landlord who wishes to convert his bonds into money to undertake manufacture or commerce must do so at a very great sacrifice. Ex-proprietors will be in a difficult situation until Rumanian money again reaches something like normal exchange value. When this will happen depends largely upon indemnities from countries themselves practically bankrupt and upon the unknown fate of the treasure sent to Moscow for safe- keeping just before the fall of Kerensky. Rumanian agricul- ture is badly crippled now for want of tools and either draft animals or tractors. It is impossible to say to what extent the solidarity of the peasants and the considerable uniformity of their economic views have arisen from the common hardships and exploitation they have suffered in the past. The advent of an era of great prosperity for them might conceivably weaken their community spirit and awaken ambitions in many to achieve ease and luxury by exploiting the less astute. Just now, they are convinced of the danger of allowing the economic life of the nation to be organized in such large and centralized, units that the average man can exercise no effective control over them — can have no accurate knowledge even of how they work. The communes are not vitally interested in national " zones of influence ", for- eign trade concessions or conquest. The peasants want peace and disapprove of expensive military establishments. In their simplicity, they do not see why a war (or trade entanglements capable of producing one) wanted by none of the communities in the nation, need be forced upon all of them by a group which misrepresents them at Bucarest. This is being spoken, even among the men at present mobilized. Those who have fostered the growth of the Rumanian co- operatives emphatically do not believe that the nation will suffer from a greater articulateness and a higher local organization. A letter from one of the leaders closes with this statement: " We believe that before long the entire production of the vil- lages will flow through the cooperatives. . . . Along with their No. I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA 27 economic activities these cultivate with equal zeal the sentiment of national solidarity and aid in the intellectual uplift of the communities, thus consolidating the true bases of a sound or- ganism of the State." What effect will this movement have on the larger industries of the cities? So far, nothing more is visible in the way of a policy than a general hostility to tremendous aggregations of private capital, especially foreign capital. The exploitation by great foreign corporations of mining, oil, forest and other natural resources along the lines pursued in the past is regarded with distinct disfavor. It takes millions out of the country every year without visibly benefiting the bulk of the popula- tion. The peasant pays twice as much for his kerosene as he did before the development of the oil industry in Rumania. Just where community production will leave off and strictly private enterprise begin cannot be predicted. Already the two are in conflict. Cooperatives have had to employ men who failed in their own ventures, because the first-rate men found it more profitable to work for themselves. Some think the de- velopment of cooperative effort will eliminate private capital- istic enterprise by open competition — if any meaning can be attached to the term " open competition". Others predict that when Rumania reaches the stage of development attained by western Europe, she will adopt western European institutions. But a very great fallacy lurks in loose assumptions about " stages of development". An obvious and intimate economic relationship exists between the " backwardness " of localities like the Balkans and the " advancement " of the western nations — the latter depending largely upon the former. We were never in their present condition, because we had no highly developed industrial nations like those of today to reduce us to economic dependency. It would be foolish on their part to try to become like us, first because we have a tremendous start in the economic exploitation of backward regions, and secondly because conditions are not likely to remain as favorable for ex- ploitation as they are now. These Balkan economic schemes should be of special interest to us because their leading sup- porters see both points of view — that of the West where most 28 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV of them were educated and that of the Near East where they live. They see that their politique-economique must evolve into something radically different as they become industrially and financially independent. They see also what most of us seem to overlook — that ours is no more stable and permanent. A certain familiarity with these types of organization, therefore, not only has a practical value in guiding our present relations but possesses also some theoretical interest with reference to the unsolved problems of economics and government. M. M. Knight. Hunter College. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE This study is based largely upon personal investigation by the writer on the ground. As to documentary sources, use has been made in the sections on the war and post- war periods of material in the Rumanian Ministry of Agriculture and Domains, which is not available in the Occident and some of which is not to be had in printed form anywhere, and on interviews with and letters from Rumanian officials. In- valuable help has been received from M. I. G. Duca, Minister of Agriculture, from Dr. D. Busuiocescu, Director-General of the Casa Cetitrala of Cooperation and Land Distribution under the Expropriation Act, and from M. Vintili Bratianu, President of the Rumanian Bank. Their anxiety to assist and their unfailing courtesy are grate- fully acknowledged. Books available in the Occident, some of them in America: N. Basilesco, La Question Agraire en Roumanie, 1919, a translation of a speech delivered in the Rumanian Parliament in Jassy in 1917; by the same author. La Roumanie dans la Guerre et dans la Paix, 1919, 2 vols., contains very little detailed material on this subject but is a good general political treatise; D. Mitrany, chapter on Rumania in The Balkans, 1915; N. Jorga, Geschichte des Rumanischen Volkes, 1905, 2 vols., out of date but still the standard general work; Diveloppement de la Question Rurale en Roumanie, 1917, very meager, especially on the modem period; Nicholas Lupn, Rumania and the War, 1919, very good short chapter on " Peasant Cooperation in Rumania ", but brief, and does not cover the war and post-war periods; Tereza Stradilescu, From Carpathian to Pindus, 1906, a delightfully written popular book on Rumanian peasant life; Rumdnien, an excellent statistical handbook prepared by the K. u. K. Handelsmuseums, 1917; Die Rumdnische Volkswirtschaft, 1917, German army handbook, excellent on the whole, but agrarian statistics are old and the reader is not always warned of this fact; La Roumanie, iSbb-igob, 1907, found in most university libraries; Dr. A. von Onciul, Wirtschaftspolitisches Hundbuch von Rumdnien, 1917, good chapters on agriculture, banking and credit institutions. There are a few French copies of the reform law of December 15, 1918, La Ri- forme Agraire en Roumanie (Ancien Royaume et Bessarabie), Bucarest, 1919. More difficult to find or entirely unavailable in the Occident: The Monitorui Official, publishes all laws and decrees; Anuarul Statistic (statistical annual), actu- ally published about every three years; one volume has just appeared for 1912-15; No. I] PEASANT COOPERATIVES IN RUMANIA 29 Siaiistica A§ricola u Romaniei, one volume, 191 1 to 1915, and annual volumes thereafter to close of 1918; Cronica Fmanciara, published monthly in Bucarest, contains an excellent study by C. N. Teianu in issue for March 15, 1919, on the de- preciation of the currency which made expropriation unfavorable to proprietors; Dr. L. Colescu, Progresele Economice ale Romaniei, i866-igo6, Bucarest, 1907, text in Rumanian and French; by same author, Harta Figurativa a Produselor AgricoU (Rumanie — Carte Figurative . . . lies Principaux Produits Agricoles), Bucarest, 1903; Lege pentru Invoeli Agricole (1907 Agrarian Reform Law), Bucarest, 1907; La Caisse Rurale (French edition), Bucarest, 1908; Dare de Seama asupra Apli- carii Legii pentru Invoeli Agricole (r4sum6 of application of agricultural reform law in igiz-13), Bucarest, 1914; Tabele de PreturiU Resonate Maxima si Minime (1916 tables of land classifications and rents in effect at the time of expropriation), Bucarest, 1 91 6. THE BASIS OF RAILROAD CAPITALIZATION THE many proposals for railroad legislation that have recently been brought to public attention disagree on almost every important point. All the more striking, therefore, is their unanimity on one measure hitherto subject to much dispute. Railway financiers, it is now agreed, should no longer have a free hand to issue securities in whatever amounts promise them the largest profits. Capitalization is henceforth to be subject to strict supervision by federal authority. Assuming, then, that the railroads are to remain under private ownership, one of the most perplexing tasks which the govern- ment must face will be to determine what amounts of securities may properly be issued against present and future property. The determination of a basis of capitalization is a problem fully as difficult and subject to as many differences of opinion as is the kindred problem of securing a basis of valuation for rate making. In seeking a solution the Federal Government will doubtless heed the precedents set by those twenty-odd states that have already attempted some form of security regulation. The present article undertakes to review some of these prece- dents. But before doing so it is important to take note of a wide difference of judgment as to the proper solution of the capi- talization problem. The prevailing view, which until recently has scarcely been questioned, is that the chief object of security regulation is to bring about an equality between the face value of outstanding stocks and bonds and the cost or value of the property. Securities, according to this view, should represent the actual assets, dollar for dollar. Within recent years, however, a new proposal has been made, which is opposed to the orthodox principle of equality between capital- ization and assets. Recognizing the difficulties of making par values correspond to actual values, the new plan would abolish 30 THE BASIS OF RAILROAD CAPITALIZATION 31 par values altogether and thus do away with the possibility of deception which is the chief evil of stock watering. Already the use of stock without par value has been made legal by amendments to the corporation laws of several states and has come into high fashion among industrial corporations. Its possible extension to the interstate railways is certainly worth serious consideration and deserves more attention than it has yet received. In a later article the author hopes to discuss the merits of this plan as applied to the railways. The present study, how- ever, will not take it into consideration. Here it is assumed that the old principle of equality between capitalization and assets is to be retained — a principle which underlies all the de- cisions of public service commissions to date. The problem, then, is simply this : on what basis shall the corporate assets be valued for the purpose of determining the proper amount of security issues ? At the outset of this inquiry it is highly important to bear in mind that the problem of a proper basis of capitalization is by no means identical with the more familiar problem of a proper basis of valuation for rate making. To be sure, there is much to be said for the use of the same standard with refer- ence to securities and to rates. But there is also much to be said for different standards. To choose but one example of a possible difference : market value cannot logically be used as a test of the " fair value " of public service property for rate- making purposes, since the market value itself depends on the rates that may be charged. On the other hand, it can be used with logical consistency as a basis of security issues, since the circular reasoning no longer applies to the case. Of course, the determination of a basis of capitalization may depend very largely on the determination of a standard of value for rate making. But in a discussion of the former topic, the latter problem should be assumed to be settled instead of being dis- cussed. Emphasis is" here laid on the necessity of keeping these two problems distinct, since failure to observe this dis- tinction has led to much confusion in recent discussions of the subject of capitalization. 32 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV Most writers on corporation finance have mentioned three possible bases of capitalization: original cost, reproduction cost and earning capacity. In an elementary study this three- fold classification may be acceptable ; but for a more thorough- going analysis it is quite inadequate. Revision as well as en- largement is necessary. The list that follows is by no means theoretically complete, but it includes at least the more signifi- cant standards that have been considered by public service commissions: (l) rate-making value; (2) original investment; (3) actual cost (^including surplus from reinvested earnings); (4) market value; (5) earning capacity. The reader will note the omission of reproduction cost and the substitution for it of rate-making value. The purpose of this change is to indicate that no one would propose to base capitalization on the cost of reproduction unless that cost were also to be used in fixing the value for rate making. In the latter event one might apply the same standard to security issues, not on its own merits, but simply because it corresponds to the rate-making value. Is it not better, therefore, to drop reproduction cost from the list of possible bases and to insert in its place rate-making value? We may then consider under this heading the advantages and disadvantages of keeping the basis of capitalization identical with the basis of valuation for rate making, however the latter may be determined ; while under the other headings we may discuss the reasons for some inde- pendent test of capitalization. Let us now consider in turn the five possible bases mentioned above, first noting the opinions of various public service com- missions and then summarizing the arguments for and against each basis. Rate-making Value At first glance, it would seem fairly obvious that the par value of outstanding securities should correspond to the value of the property for rate-making purposes. Such a conformity would serve to inform investors as to the return which they might be permitted to earn. Yet nearly all public service com- missions have seen fit to make a distinction between a fair value for rates and a standard for security issues. No. I] THE BASIS OF RAILROAD CAPITALIZATION 33 To this general statement, however, some exceptions must be noted. The example of Maryland is a case in point. Sev- eral years ago, the Public Service Commission of that state made a report to the legislature, in which it complained that it was not permitted, under the law as it then stood, to author- ize the issuance of stock dividends. To this restriction the commission objected on the ground that stock dividends are a necessary means of adjusting capitalization to value for rate making. The report said : But in a case where the books have been accurately kept, no disad- vantage could accrue to the public by permitting the capitalization of earnings expended in plant extensions for a period of, say, five years before the application. So far as rate making is concerned, it is based, under the rulings of the courts, upon the value of the property, and the more nearly the value of the property and the par value of the out- standing securities agree , the less likelihood there is of misunderstand- ing upon the part of the public, and the less difficulty the commission will have in administering the law justly and to the best advantage of all concerned.' Apparently this report of the commission was heeded by the legislature, for in 191 8 the public-service law was amended so as to permit corporations under its jurisdiction to issue secur- ities when necessary or desirable, in the discretion of the commission, to cause the aggregate capitalization to conform to the fair value of the property of such corporations as established by the commission pursu- ant to the provision of section 30 of this Act." " Fair value" in the above statute means value for rate-making purposes. The law does not state how it is to be measured, but the commission has used a composite of factors without accepting any one basis as alone controlling.^ »IV Ann. Rep. Md. P. S. C. 21 (1913), P. U. R. 1917 D 857. "L. 1918, ch. 408, sec. 27. * See, for example, the rate case, Re Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1916 C 925. In at least one case the commission has already authorized a security issue under the provision of the amendment of 1918 (^Re Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., IX Ann. Rep. Md. P. S. C. 286 (1918), abstracted in P. U. R. 1919 A 1026). 34 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV The New York Public Service Commission for the First Dis- trict, while not accepting consistently any one basis of capital- ization, has several times indicated that the same standard should be used for securities as for rate-making value. In the decision on the Second Reorganization Plan of the Third Avenue Railway Company, rejecting the plea that securities should be approved to an amount equal to the original invest- ment. Commissioner Maltbie delivered the following opinion : The mere fact of investment does not establish a perpetual value not .only because a mistake in judgment may be made, but also because property may be allowed to deteriorate, because progress in the arts may make it obsolete, and because a change in economic conditions may decrease the use made of it by the public. . . . The commission believes the proposition to be sound that capitalization should have a direct relation to value.' By " value " the commissioner appears here to mean replace- ment cost depreciated. It is clear that the decision is applying to capitalization the same tests that would be applied in finding the " fair value " in a rate case. To be sure, the commission has more recently expressed a preference for actual cost rather than replacement cost as a basis for security issues, whenever that cost can be ascertained." But this preference does not in- dicate a distinction between the basis of capitalization and that of rate-making value, since the commission, in its more recent decisions, has been inclined to accept actual cost for the latter purpose as well as for the former.^ The California Railroad Commission has on at least one occasion accepted by implication the view that rate-making value, based on replacement cost depreciated, should also be the standard of capitalization. In an application of the Pacific ' II P. S. C. R. (1st Dist. N. Y.) 390 (1910). » Re Bronx Gas & Elec. Co., VI P. S. C. R. (ist Dist. N. Y.) 243 (1915). In approving the issuance of securities to purchase new property the commission has always used actual cost as the test; see the list of precedents cited in Manhattan & Queens Traction Corporation, V. P. S. C. R. (ist Dist. N. Y.) 71 (1914). ' See, for example, Re N. Y. & North Shore Traction Co., P. U. R. 1918 A 893; also, Maires v. Flatbush Gas Co., N. Y. State Dept. Repts., vol. xv (1918), p. 171. No. I] THE BASIS OF RAILROAD CAPITALIZATION 35 Gas and Electric Company for permission to issue a stock divi- dend, the commission denied the petition on the ground that the dividend would result in a disparity between the total amount of securities outstanding and the replacement cost de- preciated.' But the opinions cited above are exceptional. The more general practice is to use different tests for security issues and for rate-making value. The prevailing tendency is to authorize security issues on the basis of original investment or actual cost, while using cost of reproduction at least as one of the im- portant factors in fixing the " fair value " on which to base rates. In the following section we shall discuss the reasons for this policy. Other distinctions have also been made. In a recent reor- ganization case, the Missouri Public Service Commission gave two possible reasons for differentiation. The opinion reads as follows : The determination of fair value for the purpose of limiting the secur- ities to be issued on reorganization of a railroad company is a different question from determining present value in a rate case, in at least one respect, that the " earning power at reasonable rates "is to be taken into consideration in the former. There may also be property not used and useful for railroad purposes which might properly be included in determination of value of property in a reorganization, and excluded in a valuation for rate making.' The first distinction in the above-quoted opinion, by which earning power is considered in capitalization cases though not in rate cases, has also been maintained by the New York Com- mission for the Second District and by other rate-making bodies ; to these cases reference will be made in the section on the market-value basis. The second distinction, according to which certain property may be included in the value for capitalization but not in the value for rates, is due to the fact that railroads engage to a • P. u. R. 1916 D 276. ^Re St. L. & S. F. R. R. Co., Ill Mo. P. S. C. 664, 689, P. U. R. 1916 F 77. See also Re Dunham, P. U. R. 1916 E 544. 36 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV greater or less extent in outside business. Of course, the non- railroad property should not be included in valuation for rate making, but if it is recognized as a legitimate undertaking for a railroad, it may be considered in the capitalization allowance.' Still another divergence between rate value and capitaliza- tion value was indicated by the New York Court of Appeals, in a review of a rate decision by the Public Service Commis- sion for the First District.^ The case involved the treatment of " going-value " in the Wisconsin sense of the accrued deficit from early operation. The commission had urged against the allowance of this item in rate-value that such deficits are not properly subjects of capitalization. To this contention the court replied as follows : It may be, as is urged, that a well-conducted enterprise will charge the cost of developing the business to operating expenses and that it would open the door to an overissue of securities to permit the capital- ization of early losses. In answer, it is sufficient to say that we are dealing, not with proper methods of bookkeeping, not with the proper capitalization upon which to issue securities, but solely with the fair return which the company is entitled to receive from the public. Treating a reasonably necessary and proper outlay in building up a business as an investment for the purpose of determining the fair rate of return to be charged is far from holding that it should be treated as capital against which securities might be issued.' Accrued deficits, according to this decision, may properly be added to rate value, but perhaps not properly added to capital- ization. The court did not state the grounds on which it made this distinction, but one may surmise that it had in mind the prudence of valuing and capitalizing corporate assets at a minimum. Summing up these various opinions of courts and commis- sions, one finds sanction for each of the following distinctions between the basis of capitalization and the basis of rate-making ' On this point see D. & H. Co., I. P. S. C. R. (2nd Dist. N. Y. ) 392 ( 1908), decision reversed in People ex rel., the D. & H. Co. v. Stevens, 197 N. Y. i. 'Kings County Lighting Co. v. Willcox, 210 N. Y. 479 (1914). ^IHd., pp. 488-9. No. I] THE BASIS OF RAILROAD CAPITALIZATION 37 value: (i) the use of original investment or actual cost in the former case and replacement cost in the latter; (2) the ac- ceptance of earning capacity as a factor in the one case but not in the other; (3) the addition of the value of non-public- service property for securities but not for rates ; (4) the allow- ance of accrued deficits from early operation as an item in rate- making value but the rejection of this item in fixing the proper capitalization. Doubtless other distinctions have been made which have not come to the writer's attention.' What, now, is to be said for the use of the same standard of value in security cases as in rate cases, and why have commis- sions so generally adopted different bases? The chief reason for accepting the same basis has already been suggested : it is that the par values of securities are accepted by the unwary as an indication of the actual value, and therefore that any excess of capitalization over value for rate making might deceive in- vestors as to the return that they would be permitted to earn. Of course, such a danger would not be present if the amount of securities were less than the valuation for rate making ; and precisely that situation might be expected in most cases at the present time, where securities are based on original cost, while rates are based on cost of replacement. But original cost is not in all cases less than replacement cost ; and in the future, under a period of falling prices, the tendency may be quite the reverse. In spite of this cogent reason in favor of the same standard for securities as for rates, the argument against it is even stronger, so long as rates are to be based on cost of replace- ment. One objection alone would be conclusive against basing ' The tendency of nearly all commissions is to be much more liberal in fixing the limit for security issues than in setting a value for rate making. For example, most commissions have on occasion permitted the capitalization of replacements, and some of them have authorized the issuance of securities below par. But action of this sort has been a concession to the necessities of the case, taken by commissions with the full recognition of the fact that it violates the accepted principles of sound capital- ization. For an analysis of the decisions of public service commissions on these and similar points see the various recent articles by Ralph E. Heilman, especially " Prin- ciples of Public Utility Capitalization ", Journal of Political Economy, vol. xxiii (191S). PP- 888-909. 38 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV securities on the latter standard; namely, the practical diffi- culty of reducing outstanding capitalization in order to make it correspond to a fall in the value of the property. Once the securities are issued, they cannot be recalled except at great inconvenience to the holders. Moreover, legal difficulties might prevent a scaling-down. On that account, it is essential that the basis for security issues be stable, not subject to fluctu- ations up and down with changing physical valuations of the property. But even if the practical objections to the use of replacement cost could be overcome, the wisdom of applying that standard to security issues would be very doubtful. On many accounts it is important that the par value of the securities should repre- sent the actual investment, even though some other test of " fair value " for rate making be accepted. This point is dis- cussed in the following section. Original Investment According to this basis every dollar in par value of stocks and bonds must represent a dollar contributed to the enterprise by the investors. No securities may be issued to cover un- earned increment, and none may be issued against surplus from reinvested earnings. On the whole, one may say that those commissions which do not permit the use of stock dividends accept original invest- ment as the proper basis of capitalization; for obviously, if some other standard, such as replacement cost or market value, were adopted, it would be necessary to authorize stock divi- dends whenever the valuation should exceed the amount of outstanding securities.' In Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina and the District of Columbia, stock dividends 'This statement is subject to qualification. For instance, in reorganization cases and in consolidation cases the new capitalization may be made to correspond to re- placement cost or to any other basis without resort to the use of a stock dividend in the technical sense of the term. The practice of commissions in reorganization cases is noted below. No. I] THE BASIS OF RAILROAD CAPITALIZATION 39 are illegal," while in other states their use is much restricted by commission rulings. For many years the policy of Massachusetts has been to limit stock and bond issues of public utilities to the original in- vestment.'' Every application by companies for permission to capitalize their surplus has been denied by the regulating com- missions. This drastic restriction of security issues is in large measure the outcome of principles of rate regulation that have been accepted in Massachusetts — at least in the case of gas and electric companies. The Board of Gas and Electric Light Com- missioners of that state has always denied the right of utilities to earn on their surplus such high rates of profit as are allowed on the capital contributed by the investors. Quite naturally, therefore, it has refused to permit the issuance of securities against surplus ; for such permission would appear to concede the right of stockholders to earn the normal rate of return on the entire property .3 In the matter of security issues New Hampshire has followed the Massachusetts precedent by forbidding stock dividends.-* ' Mary L. Barron, ' ' State Regulation of the Securities of Railroads and Public Service Companies", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci- ence, vol. Ixxvi (1918), p. 181. ' This policy, however, is not in every respect consistently followed ; exceptions are noted at a later point in this article. ' Cases illustrating the position of the Massachusetts Board of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners in the matter of surplus are : (a) With respect to rate making, Springfield Gas Co., IX Ann. Rep. 6 (1893); East Boston Gas Co., ibid., p. 9; Worcester Gas Lt. Co., X Ann. Rep. 31 (1894); Haverhill Gas Co., XVI Ann. Rep. 9 (1900); HaverhiU Gas Co., XXVIII Ann. Rep. 41 (1912). Cf. also an article by Morris Schaff, Chairman of the Mass. Board of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners, on "Capitalization of Earnings of Public Service Companies ", Annals Amer. Acad. Pol, <&• Soc. Science, vol. liii (May, 1914), pp. 178-181. (b) With respect to security issues, Edison Elec. Ilium. Co. of Fall River, XI Ann. Rep. 20 (1895); Maiden & Melrose Gas Lt. Co., ibid., p. 29; Haverhill Gas Securities Co., XV Ann. Rep. 6 (1899) and XVI Ann. Rep. 11 (1900); HaverhiU Gas Co., XXVII Ann. Rep. 79 (1911); Fall River Gas Works Co., XXVIII Ann. Rep. 98, reversed by court in 214 Mass. 529. *See, for example, Grafton County Elec. Lt. & P. Co., V N. H. P. S. C. R. i6o. In this case, the commission went so far as to refuse to permit a merger on the ground that it would result in an increase of capitalization and would therefore violate the 40 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV But unlike Massachusetts, the New Hampshire Public Service Commission has not accepted original investment as the con- trolling basis in a rate case.' Here, then, is an illustration of the tendency of commissions to distinguish between the " fair value " for rate making and the basis of capitalization. Let us now consider the merits of original investment as the standard in security cases. Of course, its advantages would be clear enough if rate-making value were to be determined by the same method. But, with the important exception of Massachu- setts, public service commissions have followed the rulings of courts in refusing to accept that basis in rate cases. On what grounds, then, may it be used as the basis of capitalization? To this question the answer is two-fold. In the first place, the original investment basis has the practical merit of being stable, whereas most other bases are fluctuating. We have already noted this point as a fatal objection to the use of re- placement cost. In the second place, there is a decided ad- vantage in making the par value of the securities stand as a public record of the actual contribution of investors. Even though this contribution may not be used at the present time as the criterion of " fair value " in rate regulation, it should nevertheless be given all possible publicity. Finality in the principles of valuation has been by no means attained ; and it is quite possible that publicity of the actual investment, if it should reveal excessive rates of profit, might lead to a radical revision of the present methods of valuation. But even assum- ing reproduction cost to be the permanent method of valuation in rate cases, it is highly important that investors should know the actual rates of profit on the original investment. Those who support the use of replacement cost as the basis of valua- tion say that the possibility of gain through unearned incre- ment in the values of land and other fixed capital will serve as spirit of the law forbidding stock dividends. This decision, however, was overruled by the court (Grafton County Elec. Lt.& P. Co. v. State, 94 Atl. 193, P.U. R. 1915 C 1064). • In rate cases this commission has refused to accept exclusively any one basis of valuation, but has assumed to consider all relevant factors. See the Index- Digests- in vols, iv and vi of the Reports. No. I] THE BASIS OF RAILROAD CAPITALIZATION 41 an inducement to investors in lieu of a higher rate of return on the original contribution. But this view presupposes not merely the possibility of unearned increment but also the recognition of that possibility by investors. The best way to advertise the opportunity for future profits is to make known the actual gains in the past; and for that purpose a capitaliza- tion restricted to the original investment would be most effective. Actual Cost This standard resembles the previous one in using original rather than present cost but differs from it in taking the cost of the entire property — not merely that part of the cost that was defrayed from the proceeds of security issues. In a word, the difference is this: that actual cost equals original invest- ment plus surplus from reinvested earnings. Of the many disputable points of rate regulation few have given the courts and commissions more concern than the treat- ment of corporate surplus in fixing a " fair value ". Is a public service company entitled to a return on the earnings that have been reinvested in the property, or should it be restricted to a fair return on the original contribution only? To this ques- tion commissions have given different answers, although courts have almost invariably held that a return may be earned on surplus. We are not here concerned, however, with the merits of this controversy. That is a problem in rate making and not a question of capitalization. For us the problem is simply this : assuming that a company is entitled to a return on sur- plus from reinvested earnings, should it also be permitted to capitalize that surplus by issuing certificates against it? As we have already noted, public service commissions have to face this problem in connection with applications for per- mission to issue stock dividends. Such issues are justified by applicants on the ground that they represent actual capital secured by the reinvestment of earnings which might have been distributed among stockholders in the form of a cash dividend. On this point the laws and practices of the different states vary. We have already observed that Massachusetts and New Hamp- 42 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV shire strictly forbid stock dividends. On the other hand, the commissions of New Jersey,' Vermont," Michigan," Ohio," lUi- nois,3 Indiana* and California ' have authorized companies to issue stock dividends in order to capitalize a bona fide surplus from reinvested earnings. Where this practice has been per- mitted, the actual cost basis of capitalization is generally the accepted principle.* Even some commissions that do not directly permit the use of stock dividends have allowed the same end to be attained by indirect means. In this matter the precedent has been set by New York. Up to 1910 the law of that state provided that a public service corporation might issue securities only for one of the following purposes : ( i ) the acquisition of property ; (2) the construction, completion, extension or improvement of its facilities ; (3) the improvement or maintenance of its ser- vice ; and (4) the discharge or lawful refunding of its obliga- tions.7 These four conditions, which were copied almost ver- batim by other states,' did not seem to authorize security issues for the purpose of capitalizing reinvested earnings — at least, so it was held by the New York Commission for the Second Dis- ' P. U. R. 1917 E 720, 1918 B 240 and 1046. See also a statement by the New Jersey commission of general principles governing its action in security cases, III Ann. Rep. N. J. P. U. C. 161 (1912). »P. U. R. 1916C606, 607. 'P. U. R. 1915 A 205. * P. U. R. 1915 A 54O. * P. U. R. 1915 C 324, 1916 D 276. ' It would not be correct, however, to say that all commissions which permit stock dividends accept actual cost basis of capitalization. For example, the Maryland Public Service Commission is authorized by law to permit stock dividends when necessary. to make the total capitalization equal "fair value", i. «., rate-making value. The California commission on one occasion refused to permit the issuance of a stock dividend on the ground that capitalization would thereby be raised above the rate-making value. Both of these cases have been noted above, under the heading, Ratt-making Value. But these are exceptional cases. 'L. 1907, ch. 429, sees. 55 and 69. * Several states still retain these four conditions without the amendment presently to be noted. According to my latest information, these states are Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska and New Hampshire. No. I] THE BASIS OF RAILROAD CAPITALIZATION 43 trict.' But in 1910 the law was amended and a fifth clause added, which provides that securities may be issued " for the reimbursement of moneys actually expended from income or from any other moneys in the treasury of the corporation . . . within five years next prior to the filing of an application with the proper commission''.^ This new clause, which was soon copied by other states,' entitles a company that has reinvested earnings in its property to capitalize the resulting surplus by issuing new securities. Whether or not the amendment directly permits stock dividends is a point on which commissions have differed. The California Railroad Commission seems to have answered in the affirmative.'' On the other hand, the New York Public Service Commission for the Second District does not interpret the amendment of 19 10 as sanctioning stock divi- dends. It holds that, under the fifth clause, securities may be issued only for cash, and that this cash must be used to " re- imburse the treasury" for funds that it has already paid out on capital account.5 But whichever way the law is interpreted, the practical result is the same. For a company, under the New York ruling, may simply issue stock for cash, and may immediately afterwards pay out that cash in dividends. As the New York commission frankly recognized, the outcome in this case would be precisely the same as if the company had issued a stock dividend.* ^Re Erie R. R. Co., I. P. S. C. R. (N. Y. 2nd Dist.) 115 (1908); Re Babylon Elec. Lt. Co., ibid., p. 132. On the other hand, the Georgia Railroad Commission, acting on the advice of counsel, held that it was empowered to permit stock divi- dends under a law similar to that of New York, XXXVIII Ann. Rep. Ga. R. R. C. 31, 93 (1910). Perhaps, however, the Georgia commission may have based its de- cision on a clause in the statute, not present in the New York law, stating as a fifth condition that securities may be issued ' ' for lawful corporate purposes falling within the spirit of this provision." ' L. 1 910, ch. 480, sees. 55 and 69. 'Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin (Barron, */. cii., p. 179). *P. U. R. 1915 C 324, 1916 D 276. >Re Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co., Ill P. S. C. R. (2nd Dist. N. Y.) 386 athies were confined to " the aristocracy and the intellectuals " (page 133) ; and in Norway, where German propaganda, ineffective before the war, assumed during the war the form of intimidation by outrages (pages 136-137), the effect of which, as of similar proceed- ings against the United States, was of course to increase hostility to Germany. Mr. Gerard also writes of German influences in the Scan- dinavian countries and in Switzerland (II, chapters xvi, xvii). He makes the interesting statement that the policy of releasing and send- ing back to Russia prisoners of war with revolutionary tendencies was pursued by the German authorities as early as the summer of 1915 (I, page 413; II, pages 64-65, 225). Mr. Morgenthau de- scribes German propaganda in Turkey before the war (pages 25-35, 96-104) and the subsequent organization and " inglorious end " of the " Holy War," which was to stir up against the Entente powers all the Moslems in three continents (pages 160-170). Of German propaganda in the United States, Messrs. Egan and (rerard have much to say. Mr. Egan reminds us of the way in which religious hostility and race hatred were utilized by the Germans not only in Ireland but also among Irish- Americans (pages 178-179) ; I04 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV and he tells us of " the Cahensly plan," formed some forty years ago, to keep Roman Catholic Germans from becoming Americanized, and of Archbishop Ireland's successful opposition to this propaganda (pages 166-170). Mr. Gerard alludes to Germany's long-continued efforts to win American sympathies, and cites the Cologne Gazette as expressing surprise that America should allow the export of muni- tions of war to the Entente Allies, after Roosevelt had been per- mitted to review German troops, and after the Emperor had invited American yachtsmen at Kiel to dine with him and " had even sat through the lectures given by American exchange professors" (I, pages 73-74). Mr. Egan illustrates the reliance which Germans placed on the perpetual allegiance of German-Americans to the Fatherland by utterances of Count Henckel-Donnersmarck (pages 59-60) and of "a Prussian Serene Highness" (page 102). Mr. Gerard encountered this belief constantly, throughout the war, when he tried to convince the German government that ruthless submarine warfare would bring the United States into the world conflict. Well known already, through our newspapers, even to those who have not read Mr. Gerard's books, is Zimmermann's assertion that " we have five hundred thousand German reservists in America who will rise in arms against your government, if your government should dare to take any action against Germany ". Equally well known is our ambassador's reply, indicating the number of lamp-posts available in such a contingency (I, page 237). Mr. Morgenthau, returning to the Uiuted States by way of Berlin, early in 1916, found von Jagow as well as Zimmermann counting (or pretending to count) on the German- Americans to keep the United States out of the war (pages 400-401, 404). Of that traditional diplomacy which aims to rule by dividing, by fostering among foreign states reciprocal jealousy and suspicion, Mr. Gerard gives us interesting examples. At the New Year's reception of 1914 . . . the Kaiser talked at length to me about what he called Japan's designs on the United States. He warned me that Mexico was full of Japanese spies and an army of Japanese colonels [II, page 14]. During this winter [1913-1914] Germans, from the highest down, tried to impress me with the great danger which, they said, threatened America from Japan [I, page 32]. [In February, 1916] I think, from underground rumors, that the Germans . . . will endeavor to embroil us with Japan. Baroness von Schroeder, a von Tirpitz spy, stated the other day that Japan would No. 1] WAR BOOKS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS 105 send a note to the United States of America making demands . . in regard to the Japanese immigration question [II, page 88]. Of the corresponding propaganda in Japan and in Mexico (II, pages 270-271) we have fuller and more direct information than was accessible to Mr. Gerard; but of the belief held by all Germans, from the Emperor down, that our government and our people were eager to annex Mexico, he gives us first-hand evidence (II, pages 271-272). So also does Mr. Gibson (pages 277-278). Mr. Gerard tells us, also, that in 1915 Germany proposed to Great Britain a joint intervention in Mexico (II, pages 66, 114. As regards the date, cf. page 111). Unless there is an error in this date, such a proposal must have been made in connection with a secret effort to secure peace. Further information on this point is desirable. Pos- sibly confirmatory is an intimation given to the reviewer, in January, 1917, by the British ambassador in Washington, that the Entente Allies could at any time make peace with Germany if they would give Germany a free hand in Latin America. Of Germany's hostility to the Monroe Doctrine, of which both Mr. Egan and Mr. Gerard have much to say, further direct evidence is given by Mr. Egan, in remarks made by Count Henckel-Donners- marck (page 85) and by " a Serene Highness" (page 102). The underlying causes of the war, as well as an explanation of the manner in which it was precipitated and conducted by Germany, are sought by all our diplomatists, as they have been sought by many other writers, in the social and political organization of Prussia and of Germany, or in the " mentality " which shaped or was shaped by that organization. Dr. Hill gives us the fullest and most systematic study of the German organization ; other writers, notably Mr. Gerard and Mr. Whitlock, give us illuminating data. " In no country of Europe," says Dr. Hill, " has the feudal system continued to affect the social organization to the extent it has in Germany." Society is regarded " not as a coordination of equals but as a hierarchy of classes." " The traditions of feudalism . . are in a certain sense intensified by what is most modem in social organization, the idea of a minute division of labor." In every field of activity, the conduct of the community is to be determined by ex- perts. This idea, " logically carried out — and the German is apt to be logical — . . . would leave the field of government entirely in the hands of bureaucrats and administrative officers." The military Io6 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV organization of the Gennan people, which " is, of necessity, a systan of superimposed classes," increases and perpetuates the social strati- fication of the people (pages 145-152). Mr. Gerard tells us something of each of these classes. In many parts of Germany, notably in the eastern provinces of Prussia, it is " an unusual thing ... to find a peasant owning more than twenty or thirty acres of land." Accordingly the peasants " after working their own lands . . . have time left to work the lands of the adjoin- ing landed proprietor at a very small wage." Much agricultural work is done by women. This, together with the low rate of wages, " tends to stupefy and brutalize the rural population and keeps than in a condition of subjection to the . . . Prussian system." In the manufacturing industries Mr. Gerard finds similar conditions. The workingmen have too long hours and too little pay. The cost of their food is increased by tariff duties, " imposed for the benefit of the Prussian Junkers and landowners." In Berlin, fifty-five per cent of the families are families living in one room. Mr. Gerard maintains, further, that the compulsory insurance laws, partly because the contributions collected from the workingmen leave little or no margin for savings and partly because the insured are loath to sacri- fice accrued insurance, discom^age immigration and bind the work- ingmen to their native soil " as effectively as the serfs of the middle ages were bound to their masters' estates" (I, pages 121-127, 269). All persons engaged in commerce, in banking and in the organiza- tion and direction of industries constitute a single class. In spite of the extraordinary expansion of German industry and commerce dur- ing the last half -century, this class still stands, as in the middle ages, below the noble and military classes (I, pages 112-113). Members of the learned professions and civil servants of the state are not treated by Mr. Gerard as classes, and rightly, for the social standing of such persons is primarily that of the class in which they were bom, although it may be bettered by the bestowal of decora- tions and, in the case of those commoners who attain important political offices, by grant of nobility. " Lawyers and judges," Mr. Gerard tells us, "amount to little in Germany" (I, page 128). He might well have found room for a personal experience which he mentioned, after his return to this country, in an address delivered to the New York City Bar Association. In the early days of his oflBcial residence in Berlin, he was sometimes asked what was his position before he entered the American diplomatic service. Finding that his first reply, " a judge of the New York Supreme Court," No. I] WAR BOOKS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS 107 appeared to make a poor impression, he afterwards utilized his con- nection -with the state militia and said that he was an officer " in the New York army." This explanation of his diplomatic appoint- ment proved universally satisfactory. The Jews may be said to have constituted a separate class in Ger- many, for, even after the removal of all legal disabilities, they con- tinued to be regarded as socially inferior, and this in spite of the fact that so much of the achievement which the Germans claim, not only in the economic field but also in the sciences and the arts, is to be credited to the Jews (I, pages 137-138). The highest class in Germany is that of the nobility and the mili- tary officers. This may be regarded, for practical purposes, as a single class, because, as Mr. Gerard points out, it is difficult for any but a noble to obtain a military commission. He might have added that here, even more than in the civil service, the attainment of high rank almost automatically ennobles. The controlling element in this claBS is the Prussian landed nobility, the Junkertum. Of the ar- rangements by which this class is kept " pure " and its permanence assured, Mr. Gerard's statements (I, pages 113, 120-124) are sup- plemented by Mr. Morgenthau, quoting Wangenheim (pages 5-6). Of this entire social and economic system the reviewer is obliged to speak, as the writers speak, in the present tense. How largely it has already been modified we cannot yet determine. Of the political organization of Prussia and of Germany before and during the war, on the other hand, we may now speak in the past tense ; for whether the present constitution shall endure or shall be replaced, as in the French Revolution, by a series of constitutions, the old political system can never be reestablished in its entirety. In discussing the German imperial constitution, Dr. Hill shows, in his first chapter, how, behind a " facade of liberalism," Bismarck laid a solid basis for the development and maintenance of autocratic rule. He constructed for himself, as imperial chancellor, a position which enabled him to control the empire. To draw all this authority into the hands of the monarch, William II had only so to exercise his constitutional power of dismissing and appointing chancellors as to make himself virtually his own chancellor. Dr. Hill and Mr. Gerard are well aware, as they show in scattered passages, that the power of the German chancellor rested largely on the fact that he was usually at the same time Prussian minister, and that the power of the German emperor was even more largely based on the fact that, as king of Prussia, he was legally as well as actually supreme. Both Io8 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV these -writers are well aware also that the position of the Prussian Junkers was secured from legislative attack by the Prussian electoral system. Neither of them, however, assembles these facts in such a way as to make clear to the reader how firm was the foundation of both autocracy and aristocracy in the German political system. This system was protected not only against attack but also, to a certain extent, against criticism, partly by penalizing opposition, partly, and far more effectively, by developing and stimulating loy- alty. As a lawyer, Mr. Gerard is especially interested in the matter of prosecutions for Ihe majeste, and he summarizes several far- reaching decisions of the Imperial Supreme Court (I, pages 115-116; II, pages 51-54). Of the prosecution of Professor Quidde of Mu- nich, for the publication of an article on Caligula — in which he no- where drew but everjrwhere suggested a comparison between that emperor and William II — and of disciplinary measures taken or threatened against such loyal supporters of the HohenzoUems as von Sybel, von Treitschke and Delbriick, Dr. Hill gives us a full and interesting account (pages 35-40). The extent to which the press was controlled is indicated both by Dr. Hill (pages 44-45) and by Mr. Gerard (I, pages 117-118). In stating that there was no " pre- ventive " censorship imposed upon German newspapers even during the war, Mr. Gerard seems to have accepted official misinformation.^ Far more important was the cultivation of loyalty to the system by pastors and schoolmasters. Not only the Evangelical church, but also, to a large extent, the Catholic chin-ch in Germany, as Mr. Egan regretfully concedes (pages 34, 158, 215-216) cooperated in this work. Equally effective, perhaps, and far subtler, was the stimula- tion of support and the discouragement of open criticism by an elab- orate system of orders and titles. Dr. Hill (pages 42-43) and Mr. Gerard (I, pages 114-115, 118-119) both show clearly — the latter most amusingly — the operation of the " Rat " system. Fear of never becoming any sort of a "Rat" helped to tame the proprietors and editors of all but Social Democratic journals. A social stratification so marked and so definite as that which was maintained in Germany creates a social atmosphere which Americans and other democratic peoples find unsympathetic and oppressive. It tends to breed servility to those above, arrogance to those below. When the natural human desire to assert one's personality is re- 1 Military orders imposing such censorship {Vorprufung) are to be found in Grumbach, Das annexionistische Dentschland, page 23. No. I] WAR BOOKS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS loQ enforced by the desire to assert one's position in the social scale, it produces an effort for which the Germans alone have a thoroughly expressive word, to " imponieren." Of one particular form of this effort Mr. Gerard gives a humorous description (II, page 119). In the address above cited, he ventured a definition, " to make the other fellow feel like a worm." To this social system add an economic and political system in which human activity is controlled, even in minute details, from above and in which the average man is held to obedience without the exercise of discretion, and the instinctive reaction of an Amer- ican is even more hostile. It is well expressed by Mr. Whitlock. In Belgium, he writes: We floundered in a morass of regulations that made life an intoler- able burden. Much has been written of the cleanliness and order of German cities — I have written some of it myself; but I should rather live in a city as dirty as some I might name in certain parts of the Continent, governed by a machine as corrupt as some I have heard of on our own side of the Atlantic, . . . and have liberty as one does have it in them, than to dwell in one of those cities of Germany, clean and reg:ulated to the last degree, of course, but . . . with the institu- tional odor of a penitentiary [I, pages 370-371]. Granting the efficiency of the system, Mr. Gerard also points out at what cost this advantage is attained (II, page 137). Some of our diplomatists raise the question whether the system is really efficient. Dr. Hill reminds us of its fundamental fault : that it is " accom- panied by an almost complete loss of personal initiative " (page 152) . Mr. Whitlock says that The vast, elephantine deliberation of German organization would drive an American captain of industry mad in a fortnight. It is heavy, cumbersome; its complicated machinery rumbles on and on remorse- lessly, and once set in motion, there is no way of stopping it, of turn- ing it aside, of adapting it to sudden exigencies. It is blindly imper- sonal, inhuman, taking no account of persons or of the personal equation [I, page 440]. He supports his criticism with examples. He describes and explains the total failure of the German distributive agencies {Zentralen) in Belgiima (II, pages 320-325). He also gives an amusing instance of the misconstruction of statistics by the German government in Bel- gium, but leaves it uncertain whether this was a case of self-decep- tion or was an attempt to deceive (II, pages 294-295). no POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXT The chief cause of inefi&ciency in the German government during the reign of William II was conflict of authorities. The Emperor had assumed, since 1890, personal direction of the affairs of the em- pire; but since no one man, had he ten times the ability of William II, could constantly direct the action of government in fields of ad- ministration so numerous and so diverse as are those of a great modem state, the ordinary conduct of affairs necessarily remained in the hands of his ministers, and the Emperor's restless activity was rather a disturbing than a regulating influence. It was the more disturbing because he was easily influenced by new points of view, forcibly or attractively presented, and hence, even in the field of foreign affairs which he regarded as especially his province, his policy lacked continuity of aim, The most serioTis conflict, however, was between the political authorities and the Great General Staff. Because the HohenzoUem monarchy was essentially a military monarchy and because, as Wil- liam II more than once declared, the army was the chief pillar of the realm, the influence that was concentrated in the General Staff could not but be great. It was the greater because this body normally in- cluded more personal talent and energy than could be found in any other organized group in Germany and much more than was to be found in the average Prussian cabinet or imperial chancellery. Its superiority in this respect is easily explicable. Because of the social prestige attaching to the military profession, a large proportion of the ablest, most energetic and most ambitious young men in Ger- many — certainly a far larger proportion than in any other European coimtry— chose, if the choice were open to them, the career of the military ofi&cer. Because the General Staff constantly drew to itself, for temporary instruction, the young officers most highly recom- mended by their immediate commanders, its directors gained per- sonal acquaintance with all the most promising officers in the army and were able, whenever a vacancy in the Staff was to be filled, to select the fittest candidate. The General Staff may accordingly be said, by the operation both of natural and of artificial selection, to have drawn into itself the cream of the cream of German talent. Bismarck himself found it difficult to control the General Staff. After his dismissal its political influence steadily increased. "The one force in Germany," Mr. Gerard discovered, " which ultimately decides every great question, except the fate of its own head, is the Great General Staff " (II, pages 34-38). Mr. Whitlock came to the same conclusion {I, pages 220-221; II, pages 50-51). No. I] WAR BOOKS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS m Before as well as during the war, in the propaganda conducted by Germany all over the world, there were accordingly three separate and often conflicting agencies. In the United States, for example,^ the Imperial Foreign Office, which should have controlled the whole German propaganda and which, if the Bismarckian traditions had been observed, would certainly have had sole control of efforts to influence American opinion through the press, worked through Count Bemstorff; but an independent propaganda was directed by the " political division " of the General Staff, through von Papen, the military attache of the embassy ; a third propaganda was conducted by Dr. Dernburg as personal representative of the Emperor; and both von Papen and Dernburg used the American press. In speaking of the inefficiency of the German " information " or spy system, General Sir F. Maurice, in his Last Four Months (pages 65-67), remarks that the fault may have been either in the character of the reports sent to headquarters or in the way in which they were there interpreted. In his chapter on " The Errors of Efficient Ger- many " Mr. Gerard adopts the second explanation. He ascribes all the great mistakes of German diplomacy not to the lack of accurate knowledge of facts but to the interpretation placed upon the facts by the General Staff, which " failed to understand other nations, failed even to learn the lessons of history, . . . failed lamentably when- ever the human element became the factor in the situation." In its proper field the German General Staff was superior to that of any other cotmtry. In the field of politics its judgments were inevi- tably warped by military p«>ints of view (II, pages 341-342). Ac- cording to nunors current during the early months of the war and a statement which Mr. Gerard cites from '' the head of one of the great banks of Germany," it was the General Staff which, at the last moment, forced the Emperor to precipitate the war (II, pages 174-17S). It goes without saying that neither the political nor the military authorities of the empire would have ventured to throw the German people into so serious a struggle without assurance that the people themselves would generally accept the war as desirable or at least as inevitable. The influences which had long been preparing the German mind for such an acceptance have been so exhaustively analyzed by so many writers that our diplomatists are able to add little that is new. Dr. Hill emphasizes the narrowly nationalistic trend of German philosophy and political theory and the glorifica- tion of war. Mr. Gerard believes that the principal exponents of these ideas 112 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV but reflected the fashion of the day in thinking; they did not lead the nation's thought. ... I never found a German of the ruling class who had read anything written by Treitschke, Nietzsche or Bernhardi. He attributes much greater influence to the pan-Germanist literature and, in particular, to the writings of Tannenberg. " The great majority of Germans," he thinks, were infected with the " danger- ous microbe of pan-Germanism and of world conquest" (II, pages 180-185). The significance of this annexationist propaganda is of course recognized by Dr. Hill (see especially pages 184-192) and by all our ex-diplomatists. Mr. Gerard contributes to an analysis of the movement by reminding us that the demand for western annexa- tions came principally from the " great iron and steel companies," which wished to " rivet the chains of their industrial monopoly on the whole continent of Europe " ; while the Junkers favored an- nexations in the East. Especially do they eye greedily the Baltic provinces, where great estates are in the hands of landowners of German blood. What a re- enforcement to the conservative cause would these Junkers of the Baltic bel [II, pages 186-187; cf. pages 328-332]. Given so many factors making for war — and there were others — Mr. Gerard's explanation that the cause of the war was " the king business" (II, page 21 and elsewhere) should probably be regarded as propaganda. History does not justify an assumption that democ- racies are essentially more peaceful than monarchic states. A democ- racy is indeed incapable of long preparation for an aggressive war to be waged at a favorable moment ; it cannot maintain the necessary continuity of policy j but a democracy is more easily swept into war by a wave of popular emotion than is a strong monarchy. If any one factor is to be regarded as more important, more fun- damental, than all others in preparing the German mind for war, it is that emphasized by Dr. HiU. The real evil is the mystical, non-moral Prussian conception of the state as an entity existing solely for its own aggrandizement, unre- strained either by moral or conventional obligations. So long as it is believed and taught that the state is power and can do no wrong, there can be no international security [page 324]. If, as Mr. Gerard says, the German writers who most clearly ex- pressed these theories " reflected the fashion of the day in thinking " Ko. I] WAR BOOKS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS 113 — and there is much evidence that they reflected the thought of at least a generation — their utterances are all the more significant. Dr. Hill sees in democracy no guaranty of international peace. Democracy indeed brings public action to the test of public conscience. But if that is debased by the belief that in its outward relations the state is above all law and is bound by no duties, then a democracy affords no safe- guard of peace or of justice. It merely exchanges the selfishness of the mass for the egotism of a monarch, and substitutes for the vaga- ries of a single autocrat the craving, the violence and the irresponsi- hility of a multitude [ibid]. The theory that no national interest, however slight, is to be sub- ordinated to any world interest, however great, is, as we see at the present time, widely accepted in our own country and strongly sup- ported by many of our political leaders. We do not look to memoirs of diplomatists for information regard- ing military or naval campaigns. Mr. Gibson, however, saw more of the war in Belgium, in its early stages, than any of our war cor- respondents. He repeatedly crossed the fighting lines, in August and September, 1914, in journeys between Brussels and Antwerp (pages 126-149, 200-230) . In Mr. Morgenthau's book three chapters (pages 184-231) deal with the attempt of the British- French fleet to force the Dardanelles in March, 1915. Accompanjring, by invitation, a body of Turkish officials, he saw the fortifications of the straits two days before the principal and final attack. He cites Turkish and German diplomatic, military and naval authorities to show that all, except Enver Pasha, believed that the enemy fleet could force the straits, and that, at the moment when the attempt was abandoned, a single further effort would have been successful. He believes that the the straits, once forced, could have been held open by the Allies with- out Ismding troops, because he is confident that a revolution against the Young Tufks would have taken place in Constantinople and that the new leaders would have made peace. In the conduct of the war by the Turks Mr. Morgenthau finds evidence of German efforts to educate their confederates in scientific ruthlessness. When the Allies made their second attack upon the Dardanelles and landed troops on the Gallipoli peninsula, the Turks 114 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV declared that the enemy fleet was bombarding unfortified places^ and decided to remove from Constantinople three thousand British and French residents — ^most of them Levantines — and to place them on the peninsula as " hostages," that is, as fire-screens. By persis- tent bargaining, our ambassador succeeded in reducing the number of hostages to fifty and their stay on the peninsula to a week (chapter xix) . In the deportations of Turkey's Greek subjects in Asia Minor (pages 49-50, 323-32S) and in the later and vaster deportations of Armenians, Mr. Morgenthau again sees German suggestion. In their long previous history, the Turks had frequently massacred but had never deported Christian peoples (pages 365 et seq.). To Armenia and the Armenians, and to his own unsuccessful efforts to arrest the persecution of this unhappy people, Mr. Mor- genthau devotes nearly one-fourth of his volume (pages 287-382). For this black page of history his book must always be an important source of information. He shows that the Germans not only re- fused to interfere, even at the instance of their own missionaries, but also defended the action of the Turkish government (pages 364- et seq. ) . In studying the German invasion of Belgium and the prompt application of the military policy of terrorism, the government of Belgium during the years of German occupation and the deportation of Belgian civilians, the future historian will have abundant mate- rial. We have already numerous Belgian reports and the report of the Bryce commission. Much weight, however, will justly be at- tached to the statements of observers, who were at least officially neutral, as were our diplomatists, and whose character enhances the value of their evidence. Above all, these books, particularly Mr. Whitlock's, convey impressions not communicable through official re- ports: they enable the reader to visualize the situation in Belgium, to breathe the atmosphere of the German occupation and to appre- ciate the passive heroism of the Belgian people. Dr. van Dyke saw, in Holland, the flood of Belgian refugees,^ driven from their ruined homes, and heard something of their ex- periences (pages 78-80). In order to ascertain whether, after civil government had been at least nominally established in the greater 1 Cf. Mr. Whitlock's remark on " the German official lie ". This, he ob- served — and he gives examples — " was an infallible sign that some new deviltry was brewing; whenever they announced in horror or surprise that the English or the French had performed some ugly and unheard-of deed, it meant that they were about to perpetrate that deed themselves" (II, page 240). No. I] WAR BOOKS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS 115 part of Belgium, these refugees could be repatriated, he visited many of the ravaged towns and villages (pages 95-101). Mr. Gibson gives us data similarly obtained, from visits to the scenes of whole- sale massacres and destruction and from the stories of eye-witnesses (pages 150-151, 322-329). He made his way into Louvain while the shooting, looting and burning were still unchecked and while it was still possible to obtain, on the spot, from German officers and soldiers an unrevised explanation of their conduct (pages 155-172). For the effective execution of the policy of terrorism the military authorities were able to rely, as Mr. Whitlock tells us, on the cruelty that is begotten of fear. For forty years German writers had been preaching the duty of waging war not only on armies but on civil populations as well, and the German mind was saturated with the notion that in France the civil population was composed of franes-tireurs. Not only the military writers but the German romanticists had filled their books with the idea. . . . The result was that when the German soldiers entered Belgium they were in such a highly excited state, in a condition of such fear, that they saw a franc-tireur in every peasant, in every peaceful civil- ian; the lightest sound, the crackling of a twig, the slamming of a door, brought the cry "Man hat geschossen!" and the stampede and carnage began [I, pages 222-223]. Belgian friends have informed the reviewer that not only German private soldiers but also German officers came into Belgium con- vinced that all the wells were poisoned, and mistrustful of the wine supplied them in the houses in which they were quartered. Upon our legation at Brussels, charged as it was with the protec- tion of British civilians, fell the duty of trying to save Edith Cavell. Because at that time Mr. Whitlock was ill, the negotiations with the German authorities were conducted by Mr. Gibson and the Belgian legal adviser of the legation, M. de Leval. Their efforts were warmly supported by the Spanish minister. Marquis Villalobar. He indeed, by reason of age and rank, led rather than seconded the effort to persuade the Germans that mercy would be the better policy. Mr. Gibson tells the story briefly, with extracts from his journal (pages 344-360). Mr. Whitlock weaves Mr. Gibson's testimony together with that of M. de Leval and of the Spanish minister into a fuller narrative, reinforced by documents (II, pages 81-164). He gives us other illustrations of what the Germans " called, it would seem with Il6 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV accurate nomenclature, 'extraordinary justice' " (I, pages 462-469; II, pages 387-388) . Of especial interest to lawyers is his account of the efforts of the Belgian bar, under the leadership of its courageous bcttonnier, Leon Theodor, to secure the observance of article 43 of the Hague Convention, which declares that an occupying power is to respect, so far as possible, the laws in force in the occupied territory (I, chapters Ixii-lxiv). Of legal interest, again, is the question of national status raised in the case of men bom of German parents in Belgium, who on reaching full age had exercised the right given them by Belgian law to elect Belgian citizenship (II, pages 338-342) . To the German effort to utilize the long-standing friction between the Flemings and the Walloons, to protect the " Teutonic " element in Belgium from " Gallicization " by founding a purely Flemish university at Ghent, and to establish an autonomous Flanders — ^which of course was eventually to become a part of Germany — Mr. Whit- lock devotes several chapters (II,, pages 236-249, 436-448, 754-778). How Belgium was robbed, first of its financial resources, then of its means of production and finally of its labor power, is a well- known story. Here again, however, Mr. Whitlock gives us data not elsewhere easily accessible. He tells us, for example, how the Ger- man authorities repeatedly violated their express promise that, after the first levy, no more contributions were to be demanded of the city of Brussels (I, pages 565-570). Of the deportation of Belgian civilians he gives us not only a full and clear account but also epi- sodic details that enable us to see the whole process and to feel all its cold-blooded barbarism. He shows how Belgian industry, neces- sarily crippled by the war, was completely paralyzed by German governmental action ; how, finding it impossible to make the Belgians do German war work in Belgium, the Germans stripped the work- shops of their machinery and tools ; how then, under the pretext that the idleness for which Germany was responsible was demoralizing the Belgian workingmen, these were sent off in droves, where their tools had already gone — to Germany. To this story Mr. Whitlock devotes a full fourth of his second volume (beginning at page 422) ; and it is here that his narrative is most fully supported by documentary evidence. On this matter Mr. Gerard, acting under instructions from Wash- ington, made representations to the German Foreign OiSce. He also endeavored, but was not permitted, to investigate the treatment of the Belgian workingmen. Of the German deportations in eastern France he saw something, and said something to Bethmann-HoUweg. No. I] WAR BOOKS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS 117 In this matter as in many other matters, the German Foreign Office confessed its inability to control the military authorities (I, pages 333-335, 351-352; 11,98, 122). About war conditions in Germany itself Mr. Gerard gives us much information. Of especial interest is his study of German trade be- fore and during the war, of combinations for buying and selling, and of German war finance (I, pages 262-265). Of war economies, of price regulation and of food control he tells us something, but less than we should like to know (I, pages 406-412). The meticulous care with which the government strove to keep the war spirit unimpaired among civilians is illustrated by the fact that maimed soldiers were kept out of the cities. In Berlin, at least, Mr. Gerard never saw a German soldier who had lost an arm or a leg (II, page 258). He elsewhere speaks of the governmental control of the press during the war and of the suppression of unfavorable news (I, pages 117-118). Mr. Morgenthau illustrates the German military psychology in this matter. Von der Goltz and Wangenheim were astoimded, he tells us, by England's frankness in publishing a complete list of ships lost in the Dardanelles fight. They found this so " ausserordentUch " and " unerhort " that they finally concluded that the English, not really wishing to capture Constantinople for Russia, published their losses in order to convince Russia that they had done their best and that success was impossible (pages 229-230) . It is one of the little ironies of history that, in the year before the outbreak of the great war. Dr. van Dyke went to The Hague to make arrangements for the assembling of the third International Peace Conference at the earliest possible date, and that Mr. Gerard took up his duties at Berlin with instructions to persuade the German authorities to sign a Bryan peace treaty. Five years earlier, Dr. Hill was sent to Berlin to further the policy of our government " to accomplish if possible by separate negotiations what it had failed to achieve at The Hague." In this matter Dr. Hill and Mr. Gerard were equally unsuccessful, and Dr. van Dyke found all his eflForts thwarted because Germany took no interest in the matter. The atti- tude of Germany in 1913-1914 was the same it had taken at the first Hague Conference, in 1899, where Dr. Andrew D. White found the German delegates hostile " to any well-developed plan " of arbitra- tion, and at the second Hague Conference in 1907, where Dr. Hill and Mr. Choate foimd the first German delegate. Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, as Mr. Choate said in bis presence, " an ardent ad- Il8 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV mirer of the abstract principle of arbitration, . . . but when it comes to putting this idea into concrete form . . . our most formidable ad- versary." Mr. Gerard, " after many efforts and long interviews," finally learned from von Jagow why Germany would sign no arbi- tration treaties ; and the reason given was the same that Count Miin- ster gave Dr. White fourteen years earlier: that Germany could mobilize its forces more rapidly than any other power and that post- ponement of hostilities would deprive it of the advantage of " readi- ness for a sudden and overpowering attack." ^ It was on this ground, it will be remembered, that von Jagow subsequently sought to justify Germany's action in precipitating hostilities. An important connecting link between the efforts made before the war to promote international peace and the organization after the war of a league to maintain peace is given us by Dr. van Dyke. In November, 1914, when it was necessary for him to make a short visit to the United States, he was received in London by Sir Edward Grey and was entrusted with a personal, unofficial message to Washington. The presence and influence of America in the council of peace after the war, Sir Edward said, would be most welcome, if America would stand for the restoration of all that Germany had seized in Belgium and in France, and if America would enter and support, by force if necessary, a league of nations pledged to resist and punish any war begun without previous submission of the cause to international investigation and judgment [pages 241-242]. The outbreak of the European war threw upon all our European embassies and legations, first of all, the onerous and pressing duty of aiding in the repatriation of our stranded fellow-citizens. Except for volunteer assistance, prompt discharge of this duty would have been impossible. Regarding this matter our diplomatists give us interest- ing details, including not a few humorous episodes.' At the same time, in consequence of the fact that our embassies in Berlin and in Constantinople had taken over the representation of the interests of one or more of the Entente states, and our legation in Brussels had assumed not only this responsibility but also the protec- tion of German and of Austrian interests, our diplomatists had to 1 Hill, pp. 84-94, 102-103, 327-329; Gerard, I, pp. 6o-6i; van Dyke, pp. 5-7, 25-26, 28-29. 'Gerard, I, pp. 143-154; van Dyke, pp. 63-76, 81; Whitlock, I, pp. 72-77; Gibson, pp. 4-8, 24-25, 31-32, 41, 52, 59-60. No. I] WAR BOOKS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS ng arrange for the departure of such enemy civilians as were not in- terned. In Germany all enemies were interned except those con- nected with the diplomatic service or the foreign press. When Japan entered the war, the few Japanese still in Germany were similarly interned, but Mr. Gerard was able to secure their release and to ar- range for their departure. In Turkey, where the Germans urged their allies to adopt the policy of interning civilians, Mr. Morgenthau succeeded, with no little difficulty, in getting off two train-loads of non-official enemy residents. In Belgium, none of the thousands of German residents and travelers were interned, not even those of mili- tary age. The government not only permitted but even facilitated their departure. In striking contrast to the manifestations, in Berlin for example, of German hate directed against enemy civilians, partic- ularly against the English, the conduct of the Belgian people was most generous. When the tidings of German outrages in eastern Bel- giimi reached Brussels, there were some an ti- German manifestations, but these were repressed by the Belgians themselves. The crowds of German refugees waiting for trains to Holland were supplied by charitable Belgians with chocolate, hot milk for the babies and other comforts.^ Later, our embassy in Berlin was charged with the duty of pro- tecting interned civilians and war prisoners in Germany. In order to control conditions in German prisons and prison camps, Mr. Gerard secured the right of visit and inspection. Since at the same time the representation of German interests in France and in Russia had been placed in the hands of our ambassadors in these coimtries, our em- bassies became clearing-houses for complaints and reports based on investigations. Their services in this matter were particularly val- uable, because alleged ill-treatment of prisoners repeatedly evoked reprisals or threats of reprisal. On all these matters, and especially on conditions in German prison camps, Mr. Gerard gives us much information. Material contained in his journal (II, pages 57, 58, 69, 75, 79, 105, 107, 108, 123) is utilized, supplemented and presented in orderly form in two chapters, "Prisoners of War" and "Work for the Germans" (I, pages 157-197, 286-290). As the representative of British interests he was able to intervene in the case of Captain Fryatt, but with as little success as attended the intervention of our legation in Brussels in behalf of Edith Cavell. Here again, Mr. 1 Gerard, I, pp. 138-141, I55-I57; Morgenthau, pp. 130-146; Whitlock, I, pp. 76, 81-85, 86-88; Gibson, pp. 22-24, 27, 29, 33-42, 46-47, 51-52. I20 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV Gerard tells us, the Foreign Office was overridden by the military authorities. The indignation aroused, not only in the outside world, but " even in certain circles in Germany," by Captain Fryatt's exe- cution resulted, Mr. Gerard says, in the arrest of proceedings based on similar charges against another British sea-captain (I, pages 192- 194). As the authorized representative of Entente interests in Turkey, Mr. Morgenthau was able, as we have seen, to intervene successfully for the protection of a large body of Levantines (pages 232-252) > He was able also to protect a French sisterhood (pages 147-156) and to help British residents and prisoners of war (pages 253-261). He had of course as little title to interfere between the Turkish gov- ernment and its Greek or Armenian subjects as had our representa- tives at Brussels to interfere in behalf of the temporary subjects of the Kaiser in Belgiimi. In such cases the only line of direct attack was an appeal to the interest of Turkey itself, to the advantage which it would derive from showing itself to be a civilized state. In the case of the Greeks and the Armenians this argument was fruit- less; but it had its effect when it was urged in the interest of enemy civilians. It had more effect on the Turks than on the Germans, possibly because the Turks were less firmly convinced of the superior- ity of their own culture. Nor were they averse to being regarded as more civilized than the Germans. In one of his conversations with Enver Pasha, Mr. Morgenthau irrged him to be " modem." Enver replied : " No ! Howev'er Turkey shall wage war, at least we shall not be modem. That is the most barbaric system of all. We shall simply try to be decent" (page 132). An indirect line of attack by which Mr. Morgenthau occasionally carried a point was by appealing to the Turkish sense of humor (pages 22-23, 254-256, 329- 331). In one instance, he tells us, a timely jest saved seven Ar- menian lives (page 353).^ For American relief work in Europe our embassies and legations had to obtain recognition and secure facilities. Mr. Gerard tells us something of the services of the American Red Cross and of the Yoimg Men's Christian Association in Germany and in Russia (I, pages 291-296, 300-302) and of the Rockefeller Foundation in Po- '^ Ambassador Gerard's jokes, according to our minister in Copenhagen, did not appeal to the German sense of humor but were regarded as " parables," of which they sought the hidden meaning. The German reaction to one of Mr. Gerard's stories, as narrated by Mr. Egan (pp. 173-175), is a contribution to- the study of the German mentality. No. 1] WAR BOOKS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS 121 land (I, pages 297-300). Relief work in Belgium and in the occupied districts of France was largely organized by our diplomatic representatives, and its conduct involved continual negotiations with the German civil and military authorities on the one hand and with the British and French governments on the other. In Belgium the work was started and the first funds were raised by the Belgians them- selves, and the distribution of food to households and individuals re- mained, throughout the German occupation, in the hands of local committees, under the supervision and control of a national com- mittee. The solicitation of funds in other countries and the pur- chase and shipment of food and its safe carriage to the Belgian communes devolved upon the American Commission for the Relief of Belgium, organized and directed by Mr. Hoover. In the work of this Commission, at one time or another, more than one hundred and seventy persons participated, of whom more than one hundred and thirty served in Belgium or in France. Almost all these were Americans, and four out of five were college or university men, the first in the field coming from among the American Rhodes scholars at Oxford. Of their ability and devotion both Mr. Whitlock and Mr. Gibson speak in the highest terms, but perhaps the most appre- ciative comment is that which Mr. Whitlock quotes from Marquis Villalobar, who, when our country entered the war and new relief workers had to be secured, said that gentlemen could be foimd else- where, and business men as well, " but the gentlemen are not always business men and the business men are not always gentlemen " (II, page 787). In theory, Germany was bound to feed Belgiiun. In the earliest discussions, Mr. Whitlock says, " someone would lift his eyes hope- fully and exclaim : ' But the Hague Convention !' " ; and he had to remind them that " the Belgians could not eat Hague conventions " (I, page 342). Mr. Gibson indicates the German point of view by quoting General von Liittwitz : The allies are at liberty to feed the Belgians. If they don't, they are responsible for anything that may happen. If there are bread riots, the natural thing would be for us to drive the whole civil popu- lation into some restricted area . . . build a barbed-wire fence around them and leave them to starve, in accordance with the policy of their allies [page 272]. About the Belgian relief work Mr. Gerard and Dr. van Dyke have something to say, and Mr. Gibson's journal contains interesting 122 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV details, but only for the year 1914. Mr. Whitlock gives so much space to the organization and work of the Belgian and Armenian commissions that his book and Dr. Vernon Kellogg's are the chief sources of information on this subject. > In all their humanitarian activities, in the work done by the Amer- ican embassy in Berlin for interned civilians and prisoners of war, in the efforts of our Brussels legation and of the American Relief Commission to mitigate the sufferings of war and to save the Bel- gians and the French from starvation, our representatives were em- barrassed and discouraged by the fact that arrangements made with the German civil authorities were often repudiated or evaded by the military officers. They were annoyed by the all-pervading espion- age, and they were oppressed by the atmosphere of suspicion and hatred in which they lived and worked. There was suspicion from the outset of activities which on their face seemed altruistic; Mr. Hoover himself was asked by a German captain, as Mr. Whit- lock tells us: "What do you Americans get out of this?" (I, page 540). There was hatred from the moment when the Germans learned that the Entente powers were placing contracts in the United States for munitions of war. Of this hatred Mr. Egan and Mr. Morgenthau met occasional explosions when they talked with Ger- mans; our diplomatists and relief workers in Germany, in Belgium and in the occupied districts of France had to face it all the time. The agents of the Relief Commission had also to deal with Germans who lacked even the formal politeness of the upper classes ; they had to witness brutality and outrages ; and they had to repress, as far as possible, any display of anger or of indignation lest they should imperil the continuance of their activities. Mr. Gerard wrote in his journal, in July, 1916: " Everyone in this embassy is getting to the breaking point. Nerves do not last forever " ; and in the following month : " One of my attaches has broken down completely, cries when spoken to ; . . . and I wonder how long the rest of us can hold out" (II, pages 105, 116). Mr. Whitlock's health more than once gave way under the greater strain of the Belgian environment. As to the relief workers, he writes, in March, 1916 : ■' ' C/. Gerard, I, pp. 296-297; van Dyke, pp. 101-104; Gibson, preface and pp. 181-183, 243-244, 249, 260-261, 272-273, 300-304, 308-309, 318, 322-323, 340- 341; Whitlock, I, pp. 239-240, 297-300, 340-351, 358-369, 398-416, 537-552, 571- 582, 646-661; II, pp. 76-80, 187, 195, 200-201, 229-235, 250-254, 374-380, 382- 384, 706-735, 785-807, 814-818 (list of members of the Commission, their acad- emic connections and periods of service). No. I] WAR BOOKS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS 123 Of the one hundred and fifty men who have thus far entered the Commission's service in Belgium, two were in asylums for the insane and thirty were suffering from nervous breakdown [II, page 234]. And in the autumn of the same year, when the deportations were in progress : The delegates of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium . . . came back sick with horror and full of rage at the medieval barbarities they had witnessed, so much so that after what he saw Mr. Tuck re- signed from the Commission, left Belgium and entered the British army [II, page 628]. Mr. Tuck's reaction was not that of a man confronted for the first time with the horrors of warj he had worked in Belgium and in France for more than a year {ibid., page 818). The essentially diplomatic activities of our representatives in Europe, from August, 1914, to February, 1917, consisted, first, in transmitting to the Entente Allies, through Washington, German overtures for peace. During the German attack on Liege the Ger- man Foreign Office asked Mr. Gerard to transmit to the Belgian government a proposal for peace and indemnity. The German mes- sage was sent to our legation in Holland and thence to our legation at Brussels. It was informally commimicated but not presented to the Belgian Foreign Office. It was eventually presented by the Netherlands minister for foreign affairs, and the Belgian reply, re- jecting the proposal, was sent to Berlin through the same channel.^ Before the end of 1914 the German government made tentative over- tures for a general peace through our embassy in Constantinople. Mr. Morgenthau, at the request of Baron Wangenheim, transmitted Germany's " case " — there seem to have been no definite proposals — to Washington in January, 1915. Our government declined to take any action (pages 175-183). In the winter of 1915-1916, Enver Pasha, acting apparently on the instigation of General Falkenhayn, repeatedly asked Mr. Morgenthau to intercede with President Wilson to end the war. On these overtures Mr. Morgenthau, who was about to visit the United States, reported to the President personally (pages 386-390). Of the cross movements for peace emanating from Berlin and from Washington in December, 1916, and in January, 1917, Mr. Gerard tells us something, but nothing that was not generally known (I, pages 352-355, 365-373). 1 For this episode, cf. Gerard, I, pp. 60-61; van Dyke, pp. 164-16S; Gibson, pp. 44-48 ; Whitlock, I, pp. 89-93. 124 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV Of the differences between Germany and the United States which eventually led to war, of German protests against the export of munitions from America and attempts to induce us to answer the British blockade by placing an embargo upon such exports, and of the protracted negotiations over submarine warfare, our ambassaxior at Berlin of course has much to say; and on the submarine issue in particular his books will alwa)rs be a valuable source of information.* Neither he nor our other diplomatists criticize the President's efforts to keep the peace, but, between the lines at least, indications of im- patience are discernible. After the sinking of the Lusitania both Mr. Gerard (I, page 236; II, page 44) and Mr. Whitlock (I, page 618) packed their trunks. After the sinking of the Sussex Mr. Gerard notes and describes as " quite clever " a German cartoon representing the celebration, in a German port, of the arrival of the one-hundredth note from America, when the mayor of the town and the military, flower girls, singing societies and the Turnverein were drawn up in welcoming array [I, pages 258-259]. Throughout the war the conduct of our foreign relations presented some of the anomalies noted above in the conduct of German diplo- macy. There was of course no disturbing military influence, as in Germany; but President Wilson was as distinctly his own secretary of state as William II was his own foreign minister; and it is a little difficult to say whether Colonel House, of whom we catch fre- quent glimpses in Mr. Gerard's books (I, pages 68, 221, 244, 259; II, page 81 ) , was only a super- ambassador or the real imder-secretaiy of state. There was also play at cross purposes in Secretary Bryan's assurances to the Austrian ambassador that the first Lusitania note was not to be taken too seriously. The existence of Dr. Dumba's telegram to the German Foreign Office communicating this news, was discovered, Mr. Gerard tells us, " in a manner which savors almost of diplomacy as represented on the stage" (I, pages 231- 232). That we got on as well as we did was probably due partly to the individual ability of our foreign representatives, partly to Colonel House's good judgment and tact, and largely to the Amer- ican capacity for team-work. Diplomatic memoirs have always been of special value to the his- torian by enabling him to appreciate the character of individuals who have shaped events. In these books there is a gallery of histor- 1 Gerard, I, pp. 222-253, 256-258, 339-343. 356-361, 363-364. 369-375 ; H, PP- 43-48, 73-74, 82-84, 87-93, 100-104, 108-110, 114-X15, 119-127-128. No. I] WAR BOOKS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS 125 ical portraits, and some of them are vivid and convincing. On the enigmatical personality of the last of the HohenzoUem emperors both Dr. Hill and Mr. Gerard throw some light.^ Their estimates of his ability differ widely from those now freely expressed by many of his former subjects. When a man of his unquestionable mental alertness and versatility is seen in the center of the political stage, playing the role of the autocrat with the dramatic ability which even his most hostile critics recognize, the extent to which his acts are self-deter- mined, his decisions really his own, is almost necessarily overesti- mated. On the other hand, when such a man is stripped of his trap- pings and slinks ineffectively and almost furtively from the scene, it is natural that he should be undervalued. Dr. Hill presents him as the central figure, if not the chief factor, in the history of his reign.^ Mr. Gerard finds that his correspondence with the last of the Roman- offs reveals "surpassing craft" (II, page 26). Every concession, however, into which the Emperor wheedled or drove the Czar, was nullified as soon as the latter fell again under the influence of his ministers. Was it much of a task to shape a will so pliable? Was it intelligent to expend so much effort in shaping a will that was cer- tain to be re-shaped by the next contact with other minds ? Baron Beyens, who himself knew the Emperor in the plenitude of his power, has recently cited, as illustrative of the present German view of the fallen monarch, the following description, which he had from a Berlin banker : L'Empereur, nature faible, caractere versatile et influengable, grossis- sait sa voix dans ses discours publics pour donner le change sur la mobilite de ses impressions et Tinconsistance de sa volonte.' Qualify this judgment by assvmiing that the intrinsic weakness of the Emperor and his susceptibility to the influence of others were char- acteristics which, however real, were not consciously recognized by him, and that his big talk was not intended to conceal them — that we have here an instinctive reaction of the subconscious ego — and the analysis, if not complete, perhaps comes fairly near the truth. MuNROE Smith. Columbia University. 1 Hill, pages 63-89, 97, 102, 140-143. I54-I57. i73-i8i. 319-325; Gerard I, pages 22, 199-200, 339-343; II, pages 13-31. 2 See, however, preface and pp. 323-325. ' Revue des Deux Mondes, November i, 1919. THE ECONOMICS OF THE SOCIAL UPLIFT ^ THE problems of an industrial community are problems of the production and distribution of wealth. This is eminently- true of western civilization, whose peoples, under the rule of machine technology, have achieved a degree of specialization and integration in industry hitherto unknown. In a narrower sense the conflict between labor and capital, which is perhaps a less prosaic way of referring to the modern industrial problem, has called forth the best efforts and the most careful attention of statesmen and economists. Industrial Goodwill, written by an eminent economist, makes a new approach to the human problem in industry. The author is an outstanding figure among students of the labor problem, and what he has to say on the relation between labor and capital in industry carries the weight of unusual authority and is therefore entitled to serious attention. Economists and men of affairs have held different theories as to the elements which determine the wages of labor. The simplest and perhaps the most popular is the market theory that the supply of and the demand for labor determine wages. According to Industrial Goodwill, this is the merchant's view of the situation. Latterly,- the theory has come to prevail that wages depend on the productivity of labor : " Each laborer is a machine — its value de- termined by the quantity of its product" (page 14). As a faith- ful disciple of the classical school of economics, the author thinks there is some truth both in the market and in the machine theory of wages. For a complete explanation of wages, however, a third factor must be considered — the psychological factor of the laborer's goodwill. " Goodwill is productive, not in the sense that it is the scientific economizing of the individual's capacities, but because it enlists his whole soul and all his energies in the thing he is ^ Industrial Goodwill. By John R. Commons. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1919. — 213 pp. Creative Impulse in Industry. By Helen Marot New York, E. P. Button and Company, 1917. — xxii, 146 pp. Instincts in Industry. By Ordway Tead. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918. — xv, 222 pp. 126 THE ECONOMICS OF THE SOCIAL UPLIFT 127 doing" (l>age 20). Presumably, the correct theory of wages must consist in a synthesis of the market, the machine and the goodwill theory of wages. In case of an emergency appeal may be had to a fourth factor — the public utility theory of labor (page 27). What follows in the succeeding pages of the book is an interesting itinerary of platitudinous peregrinations in the fields of " Democracy ", " Solidarity ", " Loyalty " etc., etc. The ostensible object of these excursions in homiletics is to indicate the manner in which goodwill in industry may be. developed to the end that goodwill among men may prevail. Among the several essays, the chapter on " Democracy " is per- haps tjrpical of the author's bias, which is perceptible in the entire book. The reader is informed that there have been two theories of democracy current at one time and another. One is the anarchistic theory as exemplified by the French Revolution, the other, the social- istic theory as illustrated by the more recent revolution in Russia. According to the author, both the anarchistic and the socialistic theories of democracy fall short of the ideal, mainly because both theories are founded upon a denial of the immutable fact of class struggle and hatred (page 38). In his view, the inherent depravity of human nature is an incontrovertible fact, and no social organiza- tion can hope to endure unless it is conscious of this certainty. The author regards the operation of the Food Administration during the war (page 39) and presumably the exploits of the Fuel Administra- tion as better examples of true democracy which threatens neither "the employer's property" nor "the laborer's patriotism" (page 44). At the same time it is also pointed out that the best security of true democracy consists in further organization of labor, which, in the face of " national peril ", was encouraged " both by the Presi- dent and the ex-President " quite contrary to " their earlier opinions as professor and judge ". It will be somewhat difficult to reconcile a conception of society whose foimdation is assiuned to be a recognition of class hatred and rivalry with another conception of society of which the basis may be inferred from the following : " Employer and employee are en- gaged in a common enterprise. They jointly assume the risks and share the burdens and benefits of the enterprise " (page 51) . " The employer who has not yet accepted the theory of solidarity has a wrong attitude toward the law" (page. 52). "The solidarity of capital and labor becomes the prosperity of capital, of labor, and the nation" (page 61). These sentiments are calculated to promote 128 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV goodwill in industry, but apparently the author has overreached him- self, and, presmnably fearing lest an undue adherence to these pria- ciples of " solidarity " lead to an untoward violation of the sanc- tity of private property, he hastens to interpose the following cau- tion : " But this argument of solidarity, like the argument of indi- vidualism, cannot be carried too far. . . . Carried to the extreme it is socialism" (page 102). Such are the hopes and fears which usually inspire or disturb the serenity of the common run of economists. The difficulty is caused by a confusion of points of view in current discussions dealing with the production and distribution of wealth. Production is primarily a technological problem and is conceived of in terms of the factors of production, such as land, labor, capital. As a technological prob- lem production may be viewed objectively and with little or no bias. The problem of distribution, on the other hand, is concerned with incomes and is referred to in terms of the institutional bric-a-brac of wages, interest, rent etc^ These items, like all institutional factors, are the outcome of custom, usage and habituation, and are therefore amenable to a considerable bias in any discussion which may involve a doubt as to their authenticity. As a result of the failure to dis- tinguish the functional character of labor and capital from their in- stitutional character as sources of income, economists by training and tradition have often been more occupied with ethical sermons than with scientific research. They have been more interested in justifying the ways of God to man than in understanding the won- ders He performs. That is to say, the problems of production and distribution are viewed in terms of individual incomes rather than in terms of the functional bearings of the factors of production with reference to the commimity engaged in a collective enterprise. In economic discussions industrial facts have been subordinated to busi- ness custom and usage. The conclusion is unavoidable that without a harmonious coopera- tion (" solidarity") among the various factors of production, viewed as functional categories, the economic life of modem civilized com- mxmities becomes rather precarious, as current events in this country and in Europe testify. The usefulness (productivity) of land, labor ^ It is to be noted that wages, rent, interest and other distribntive shares appear as costs of production. In so far as this is true, what may be said of them in their bearing on problems of distribution would hold equally in any discussion dealing specifically with problems of production. No. 1] THE ECONOMICS OF THE SOCIAL UPLIFT 129 and capital, employed jointly, is a palpable fact, subject to quanti- tative measurements and comprehensible in terms of cause and effect. The specific title (right) of any single individual to a specific in- come, on the other hand, is a matter of imputation. That is to say, the serviceability to the conmiunity of land, labor and capital is a matter of observation. The authenticity of rent, wages and interest is a matter of inference. But while the distributive shares may logically be inferred from the joint productivity of the respective fac- tors, the question of the individuals or groups who may come in as beneficiaries of the joint enterprise is largely a question of arbi- trary rule which under the stress of circumstances is institutionalized or codified and comes to be regarded as a standard of conduct for the community. So, for instance, it happens that in spite of the functional (technological) futility of the institution of ownership in the scheme of modern industry, the legal device of the right of pri- vate property, which may have had at one time a more secure ground on which to stand, is interposed to divert a considerable part of the community's product to groups and individuals whose contribu- tion to the productive enterprise in which the community is engaged is of doubtful validity under the test of technological necessity, and whose right, therefore, to a distributive share can be sustained only by appeal to irrelevant considerations. In the meantime, progress in the arts of industry has imposed upon modern industrial communities an increasing use of mechanical appliances, whether in times of war or in intervals of peace. That is to say, the fact is being forced upon the attention of the worker that the processes of industry and consequently the problems of pro- duction and distribution are technological rather than institutional in character. It is therefore becoming more and more diflicult, as the necessity is becoming more and more urgent, for economists and moralists at large to convince the common run of workers that the problems of production and distribution can be solved in terms of institutional rights and privileges. In the face of a technological necessity such as a large portion of the civilized world is experienc- ing today, the institutional paraphernalia of wages, rent and profit appear to be irrelevant factors in the situation which serve only to retard the wheels of industry at a time when the need for industrial activity is greatest and that for business manipulation least. Under tliese circumstances, when technological necessity and institutional rights are running at cross purposes, to the untold suffering and misery of vast communities, it does not promise well for the future I30 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV of economic science, nor does it speak great praise for the courage of economists, to avoid the issue by offering to a hungry world crying for bread the precious stones of " Democracy ", " Loyalty ", " Per- sonality " and " Education ". A good part of what passes current as economic science is founded on the theory that men are endowed with an inherent and inalienable love of indolence. The fallacy of this dictum was exposed by Thor- stein Veblen in an essay written many years ago and more recently in his book, The Instinct of Workmanship. The introductory chapter of The Creative Impulse in Industry is in the form of an indictment of the modern industrial system in so far as, in the author's view, large factories and their extensive use of mechanical devices have led to extreme specialization and have thereby dulled or thwarted the creative impulse of the laborer. It is pointed out in the succeeding chapter that the American method in industry is to substitute the mercenary, grasping and gain-getting motives of the captain of industry for the non-pecuniary, disinter- ested and workmanlike motive with which men are by nature en- dowed. By way of comparison, the German industrial method is analyzed in another chapter. The author indicates that in Germany also the creative impulse in industry is defeated but in a different manner — by making the expansion and the enrichment of the polit- ical state the chief motive in industrial enterprise. What is more interesting but less convincing than the author's quite siunmary analysis of the American and German methods in industry is the concluding chapter of the book, in which she offers a program calculated to rehabilitate the creative impulse in industry. This is to be accomplished by means of educational industry which involves the conscientious pursuit of a more or less itemized course of study. Educational industry is to be distinguished from indus- trial education in that the emphasis in the former is to be placed on education rather than on industry. The individual, whether actually employed or in the process of training for employment in a partic- ular industry, is to be made thoroughly familiar not only with his particular part in the industry but also with the interrelations and interdependence of all the processes involved in making the finished product (page 112). Avowedly, success and achievement are not to be measured by the accepted standards of business efficiency or pecuniary competency (page 133). Nevertheless, it has been made clear (pages 115-116) No. I] THE ECONOMICS OF THE SOCIAL UPLIFT 131 that the model shop would succeed better if it were to engage in the production of merchantable articles. So that, after all, the goal in educational industry is the same as in industrial education — ever onward and upward (page 118). " Not enjoyment and not sorrow Is our destined end and way, But to live that each tomorrow Finds us farther than today." This great American business principle of acceleration finds quite as much free play in a system of educational industry as it does in the present system of industrial education. The chief reason for the atrophy of the creative impulse in in- dustry is not so much the fact of machine technology nor yet over- specialization in industry but rather over-standardization and over- organization. A careful survey of the educational program ofEered seems, however, to indicate that, whatever else may have been its intention, in its operation it is likely to result in more organization and a further standardization of industry. Apparently the enemy that has been thrust out of the window has found its way in again through the back door. Even if the reader were to take a generous view of the author's proposal whereby the creative impulse is to be reclaimed, the fact still remains that the author's emphasis is misplaced. It may be doubted whether or not the particular infirmity of the worker, " the contamination of the instinct of workmanship ", in the words of Veblen, can be corrected through educational discipline. The revival of the creative impulse is more likely to come about through the gradual or sudden decay of pecuniary standards in industry. The final disposition of these standards in modem civilization is less likely to be achieved by persuasion or systematic instruction than through the force of circumstances — a matter which is largely if not wholly independent of human plans and predilections. Some two years ago the late Carleton Parker read a paper on in- stincts in industry before the American Economic Association. It appears from its preface (page xiv) that Instincts in Industry is an elaboration of Mr. Parker's essay. There is perhaps some dis- crepancy in the actual number of instincts accounted for in the earlier essay and in the present study, but since there is^ no general agreement among psychologists as to the precise number of instincts 132 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV with which human beings axe endowed, this discrepancy is not of vital importance to the study. Classical economic theory and much of the current economic thought proceed on Bentham's utilitarian calculus, whose foundation is the simple psychology of the associationist school. The criticism which has successfully been urged against the hedonic calculus to- gether with its implications is that it assumes the deciding motive in hiunan behavior to be a nicely balanced rationale of pleasure and pain. Later investigations and studies in psychology, especially the work of William James, have to a large extent discredited this simple view of human conduct The reaction which has set in as a conse- quence has resulted in a more or less arbitrary classification of so- called instincts and impulses which are presumed to determine the activities of the individual. Some studies in social psychology (for example, McDougal, Social Psychology) have done more than to tabulate the instincts. They have in a measure succeeded in analyz- ing and tracing thenx Others, such as Instincts in Industry, have been content to make use of a classification found ready to hand without attempting a scientific analysis or inquiry into these so- called instincts as applicable to human relations. Consequently, studies of this nature often give the impression of an amateurish and ill-advised adventure. Consider, for instance, the case of a leper colony (page 1), whose inmates refused to perform manual labor in exchange for some gratuities received, and who resmned work on the promise of pajrment of wages. The author offers this anecdote as " a true story of the instinct in industry" (page 2), the inference being that work for wages is instinctive. Again, as an illustration of the parental instinct, the common case is cited of workmen who, during periods of strike, walk out much against their conviction regarding the justice of the strike (page 19). Such gratuitous inferences as these must under the circumstances be viewed in the spirit of Christian charity rather than in that of scientific criticism. Even such an elemental instinct as that of sex seems to be entirely misapprehended, as appears from the following illustration : " Men will stand in line waiting for ' my waitress ' " (page 37). To be sure, but more of them will stand in. line waiting for " my barber ". The institution of private property is ascribed to the sense (instinct) of ownership (page 68). Clearly, ownership or the right of private property is a matter of institu- tions, ultimately a matter of habituation. Otherwise one may be forced to the conclusion that Providence in His inscrutable wisdom No. I] THE ECONOMICS OF THE SOCIAL UPLIFT 133 has denied the instinct of ownership to many of the primitive and less civilized tribes. Equally beside the point is the explanation of the reluctance of some workmen to transfer from one forge to an- other on the ground of the instinct of possession (page 69). It seems never to have occurred to the author of Instincts in Industry that a great deal of what may appear as recalcitrancy on the part of workmen results from the effort to disturb their habitual, mode of life and activity. It would serve no good purpose to proceed further with a critical analysis of the instincts here listed. The entire decalogue of in- stincts offers an unusual object lesson in coniident asseveration and harmless intellectual pleasantry. Under ordinary circumstances an adventure into a field so unfrequented as instincts in industry might be regarded as an act of unusual courage and laudable ambition. But when undertaken by one so ill equipped for the task and so serenely indifferent to the seriousness of the problems involved as the author of Instincts in Industry appears to be, it can scarcely be re- garded as anything short of foolhardy. The work is characteristic of the youthful exuberance of a social uplifter rather than of the patient and painstaking efforts of mature scholarship. Entirely aside from the intrinsic value of these books, they are instructive as symptoms of a general social and industrial condition. Resort to such extraneous and quite irrelevant measures as exhorta- tions to goodwill in industrial relations and evangelical campaigns to carry the gospel of education to the workers implies the failure or inadequacy of so-called economic laws to regulate business and industry. The good old remedies of higher wages and higher profits do not seem to stimulate production as they have been supposed to do. The control and management of private enterprise have reached a point which transcends the traditional methods of governmental regulation. Consequently any novel or hastily improvised scheme for meeting the situation appears alluring, not because it does in fact solve present industrial difficulties, but mainly because it avoids the issues. This is the path of least resistance. The working classes, chiefly those who work with their hands, under the strain and stress of constant industrial struggle, need tlie exhilarating stimulus of mysticism to excite their imagination, to divert their mind, to gratify their yearning, which is never keener than when the laborers are engaged upon an industrial struggle which calls for extraordinary wisdom and endurance. In earlier 134 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV times religious mysticism normally satisfied the craving of the dis- possessed classes for comfort and peace. The Methodist movement of the eighteenth century was calculated to fire the imagination of the victims of the English enclosures with visions of the beatific life to come. Modem machine industry has to a great degree brought about a disillusionment with respect to such contemplation as com- pensation for the ills and privations of earthly life. The present-day search for truth has displaced the faith of earlier times. Witness, for instance, the ardor and enthusiasm with which labor colleges, workers' universities and corporation schools are being established in many industrial centers in this country. The working-class slogan is " ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." But truth without courage is sounding brass, and faith with- out works is a tinkling cymbal. Economists and educators find it an easier task to offer anaesthetics to a diseased social organization than to cure the ills from which it suffers. Goodwill in industry, industrial psychology, labor education, employment management and all the rest of the inventory of social nostrums are as anodynes te an ailing body. A social crisis implies iisually a discrepancy between the material facts upon which the community depends for its existence and the myths which they have outgrown. In order that the life of the com- munity may continue, it is essential that an adaptation and readjust- ment of the myths (habits of thought) to the material facts (ways and means of livelihood) shall take place. Habits of thought are spiritual factors, which are often expressed in certain conventions and customs. Adaptations and adjustments in the economic life of the community usually mean a revision or discontinuance of many of the established institutions, which in turn implies an abrupt dis- turbance in the habitual life of the community. Whether or not such a disturbance is to take place peacefully and with a minimuim of suffering is a matter which cannot be foreseen and depends largely on the degree of the tenacity with which the conamunity clings to its cherished traditions. Under these circumstances an appeal to the emotions of indi- viduals in the community which articulates with the existing institu- tions is received by them with greater eagerness than an appeal t» the reasoning faculty which is not in consonance with the current habits of thought and which therefore enjoins a break with the past. This state of mind on the part of large numbers in the community accounts to a considerable degree for the unusual popularity of No. I] THE ECONOMICS OF THE SOCIAL UPLIFT 135 social uplifters, reformers, philanthropists, evangelists etc., all of whom in course of time become adepts in the legerdemain which changes conditions without altering them. In the course of human events peoples have been obliged imder the stress of circumstances to submit to changes and modifications in their manner of life and in their ways of thinking. In successire periods of human history institutional rights and privileges, often involving mastery of one group over another, have served their pur- pose and given way to new rights and privileges. The present-day confusion and consternation throughout large sections of civilized nations as well as the excitement among economists and social up- lifters is due to the fact that the forces which abolished feudal lord- ship and princely rule by divine right seem to threaten the last stronghold of privilege — the right of individuals to the exclusive »se and abuse of the means and materials on which the life of the •ommimity depends. Leon Ardzrooni. The New School for Social Reseasch. REVIEWS The Life of Theodore Roosevelt. By William Draper Lewis. Philadelphia, TheJohnC. Winston Company, 1919. — xxiv, 472 pp. Theodore Roosevelt: An Intimate Biography. By William RoscoE Thayer. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919. — xiii, 454 pp. Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt. By Lawrence F. Abbott. New York, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1919. — xvii, 315 pp. When Theodore Roosevelt is reached, the American historian be- comes a biographer, and the teacher a psychic analyst instead of a plodding annalist. It is astonishing how the personality of this perennially conspicuous man, inspired leader for some, arch-dema- gogue for others, dominates every field of public activity in his age — politics, labor, diplomacy, conservation, reform. Wherever he was, others present, whether two friends or ten thousand fellow-country- men, became his setting. He was the one figure, Joseph's sheaf. Even in a cabinet which Lord Bryce declared the strongest and ablest group of Americans he had ever known, Roosevelt's command was as inevitable as the domination of any arbitrary president who has surrounded himself with mere " secretaries " of this or that. "Others abide our question " — he compels our answer. So it has seemed of tremendous importance to our historians and our people to understand Theodore Roosevelt if we would understand our history during the last score of years. A fair biography of President McKinley, whose administration cannot be said to have covered unimportant phases- of our development, was given to the public more than a decade after his death. Materials are now being collected for a biography of Grover Cleveland, whose " Presidential Problems ", in his second term at least, were problems of prime importance. But men could not wait till Theodore Roosevelt had retired from office before they began to interpret him (Leupp, Morgan, Riis) ; nor can they wait for the compilation of Joseph B. Bishop's " authorized " biography now that the great leader has gone. The year following his death has seen, besides innumerable estimates and appreciations in period- ical literature, touching all sides of his multifarious activities, the 136 REVIEWS 137 publication of three more or less substantial biographies of Theodore Roosevelt. The most valuable of these works is the biography by William Draper Lewis, former Dean of the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania, an intimate friend of Roosevelt's and a prominent figure in the Progressive movement. To say that Dean Lewis's biog- raphy is conventional does not mean that it has those qualities which we often associate with conventionality, namely dullness and medi- ocrity, but only that it proceeds in chronological sequence to deal with the whole career of Roosevelt, distributing the interest evenly through all parts. It is so complete that one wonders what Mr. Bishop will have to add to it; and, especially in the early chapters, the reader often feels that, in view of the thoroughness with which Roosevelt himself treated his childhood, youth and first political adventure in his Autobiography, there is some needless repetition. When we come to the chapters on the Progressive movement, how- ever, we are charmed by the sympathetic portrayal of a faithful companion. Dean Lewis was the chairman of the Committee on Platform of both the national Progressive conventions (1912, 1916), and was Progressive candidate for Governor of Pennsylvania in 1914. He, with Gifford Pinchot, was summoned from Chicago to Oyster Bay in June, 1916, to hear the reasons for "the great re- nunciation " from Roosevelt's own lips. The whole story of the Progressive movement is presented in Dean Lewis's pages in masterly and definitive fashion, enlivened by a wealth of personal anecdote. One of the most satisfactory passages of the book describes clearly, for the first time, the true meaning of the famous doctrine of " the recall of judicial decisions ", advocated by Roosevelt in his speech before the Ohio Constitutional Convention at Columbus in the spring of 1912, and the explanation is doubly valuable as coming from a leader in the Progressive movement and a high authority on constitu- tional law. When, however. Dean Lewis maintains (page 343) that if Roosevelt's position on this point had not been misunderstood "it is most probable that he would have been nominated at Chicago (1912) and that the whole course of the recent history of the United States would have been other than it has been ", we cannot agree with him. The Taft-Root steam-roller at Chicago would hardly have been stalled by any single stone of judicial doctrine. It was not because the reform program was not well enough understood that Roosevelt failed to get the Republican nomination, but because his delegates were rejected. No amount of refinement of defimition would have 138 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV won the reserves of the patronage which the Administration had ready to throw into the battle. There are other places where Dean Lewis rather confidently makes statements which seem to us like the drawing of a " long bow ". He says that in executive ability " no other President can compare with [Roosevelt] except Washington" (page 249); that if the Democratic party had not clung to states' rights, Roosevelt, on graduating from college, " would have become a Democrat, if not at once, then certainly in 1884 on the nomination of Blaine" (page 320) ; that had Roosevelt lived, " there would have been a unanimous demand for his nomination" in 1920 (page 431) ; that had he made the "mistake" of becoming a Mugwump in 1884, " the kind of service which he was capable of rendering would have been narrowed " (page 67). Perhaps these judgments are true, per- haps not. Certainly the only recognition Roosevelt received from Blaine for supporting him in 1884 was Blaine's veto on Harrison's willingness to give him an office in the State Department five years later. We doubt if the taint of Mugwumpism would have kept Roose- velt out of the "consolatory" position of Civil Service Commissioner. In describing the famous conference on the anthracite coal strike of October 3, 1902, at the White House, Dean Lewis says, "both sides were obdurate " (page 200). This statement seems hardly fair in view of Mr. Mitchell's frank and immediate offer of conciliation and President Roosevelt's own testimony to the " insulting " conduct of the operators, notably Mr. Baer. The author is careful in his statements of fact, slipping only rarely into an error, as when he makes Colonel Ingersoll nominate Blaine in the famous " plumed knight" speech in the convention of 1884 (page 66) and speaks of Roosevelt as being " reappointed " to the Civil Service Commission by Cleveland (page 95). He also implies that we were to receive the Panama strip in perpetuity from Colombia by the Hay-Herran Treaty (page 220) and speaks of our " purchase of the State of California" in 1848 (page 214). Coeur de'Alene (page 284) is a typographical error. Ex- President Taft contributes a preface to Dean Lewis's book, in which he praises Roosevelt's policies with characteristic generosity, commending especially his stand on the Panama question and the Hepburn rate bill and regretting that the direction of our govern- ment in the crisis of the World War was not in the hands of the man who " would have selected, without regard to party or polit- ical embarrassment, the men whom he regarded as best adapted to No. I] REVIEWS 139 do the work in the various departments ", and who would have had no " fear that some subordinate of his would rob him of credit as a leader." No names are mentioned ! Mr. Thayer's " intimate " biography of Roosevelt is a book of quite different sort. The author, though a life-long friend of Roosevelt's, was not bound to him by close political S)rmpathy. He deplored Roosevelt's decision " at the first political crossroads " to support Blaine, after he was, as he himself confessed, " sick- ened " by Blaine's nomination. " I felt as the Abolitionists did after Webster's Seventh of March speech ", says Thayer, adding that he belonged to those " independents " for whom party was a secondary consideration, and who, if their party went in a wrong direction, left it as unconcernedly as they would leave a train going in the wrong direction (page 53). Nor did he sjrmpathize with Roosevelt's own break with his party in 1912. He tells (page 351 et seq.) how he spent five hours arguing with Roosevelt at Judge Grant's house in Boston in the evening of February 25, 1912, trying to dissuade the ex-president from accepting the leadership of the Progressive forces, on the ground that the triumph of the Pro- gressive principles would mean the destruction of representative gov- ernment and the substitution therefor of the monetary whims of the populace. Mr. Thayer did not support Roosevelt, nor did he ever (at least before 1912) vote for a Republican presidential candidate, according to his own statement (page 351) . What drew Mr. Thayer into the lists as the enthusiastic champion of Roosevelt was the stand taken by the latter in the crisis of the closing years of his life. It is Roosevelt the unsparing, hard-hitting critic of Woodrow Wilson, and Roosevelt the ardent apostle of national military pre- paredness whom Thayer celebrates. The book is vivacious, sustained and confident in style. One feels the author's combativeness on every page. But it is somewhat viti- ated by that reckless animosity against the Kaiser and Mr. Wilson which characterizes Mr. Thayer's later writings. Had it not been for Wilson's pusillanimity, " the war would have been over by the summer of 1916" (page 412), "Russia would have been spared revolution, chaos, Bolshevism" (page 413), and all the losses in men, all the devastation of territory, all the waste of incalculable treasure would have been averted. " History will hold him [Wilson] accountable for those millions of lives sacrificed, for the unspeak- able sufferings which the people, of the ravaged regions had to en- dure, for the dissolution of Russia," and so on through dithyrambic I40 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV pages ■which we cannot help feeling are the raison d'etre of the book. One is almost asked to believe that the Council of the Allies is bark- ing up the wrong tree in seeking the criminal in Holland and not in Washington. Next to Roosevelt as a critic of Wilson, Thayer is interested in Roosevelt as the vanquisher of the Kaiser (chapter xiv). Of course, it is only fair to the author to say that he does not profess to write a complete biography of Theodore Roosevelt, but "pur- posely " to bring out what he believes to be " the most significant parts of Roosevelt's character and public life" (page x). Was the combative element, on which Thayer dwells so persistently, really, however, the " significant part " of Roosevelt's character ; and should an " intimate biography " of over 450 pages dismiss the constructive works of conservation, reform and national security with the statement, "As for the great political acts of his ofiicial career. Time has forestalled eulogy" (page x). Mr. Thayer has too often been careless in his historical facts and allusions. It was not " the good old political freebooter Andrew Jackson " who invented the dictum, " To the victors belong the spoils" (page 86). Cleveland did not, according to the judgment of Curtis at least, "give invaluable help" to the cause of civil service reform in his first administration but rather " betrayed " the cause (page 89). Cleveland did not "reappoint" Roosevelt to the Civil Service Commission "in 1892 " (page 96). He simply did not re- place him in 1893. " The gold against the silver standard " was not " again the issue '' in the campaign of 1900, " although the Spanish War had injected Imperialism into the Republican platform " (page 150). The gold standard act had been passed in March, 1900, and Bryan had great difficulty in getting the silver issue recognized at all. Moreover, it was into the Democratic convention at Kansas City that the imperialism (or rather the anti-imperialism) was " in- jected ", with the huge banners displaying the sentiments : "The flag of a Republic forever — of an Empire never " ; " Lincoln abolished slavery — McKinley restored it." The Republicans stood pat in 1900 and won. It was not " the demand for representation that caused the American colonies to break away from England" (page 159). " Taxation without representation " was an evil which the colonists sought to remedy not by the grant of representation but by the ex- emption from taxation. The " old regime " can hardly be applied to the Bourbon restoration in France (page 161). It is ridiculous to call the Germany of 1914 "the most rigid of Absolute Despot- isms" (page 165). McKinley's protectionism did not, "like cheese". No. I] REVIEWS 141 grow " Stronger with age " (page 170) . In 1890 he resisted the in- troduction of reciprocity features into his tariff bill, in spite of Blaine's famous pleaj but his speech at the Pan-American Exposi- tion in Buffalo on the day before his assassination was a cordial en- dorsement of the principle of reciprocity. There was no separate Department of Commerce until ten years after the creation of the Department of Commerce and Labor in Roosevelt's term (page 308). The Payne-Aldrich bill was not " worse than the McKinley and Dingley tariffs ", however poorly it redeemed the campaign promises of 1908 (page 340). We did not "break off relations with Ger- many" on April 6, 1917 (page 430) but on February 3; and "two or three more notes " were not exchanged between the United States and Germany after the " once-a-week-to-Falmouth " order. The author's language is sometimes careless and sometimes slangy. When he says that Roosevelt " flocked by himself on a peak " in the New York Assembly (page 39), he conveys a different impression from that which we get from Roosevelt's own account of his legis- lative career. Lawrence Abbott's Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt makes no pretense of being a biography. It is an altogether delightful account of the public and private life of a very conspicuous man, as it came within the observation of a sympathetic friend during an acquaint- ance of more than twenty years' duration. It is more " intimate " than Thayer's biography. It is as appreciative as Dean Lewis's. Moreover, it has the added charm of a touch of filial devotion ; for there was enough difference between the ages of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Abbott to inspire in the younger man a certain reverence and not too much to preclude companionship and comprehension. Mr. Abbott presents sidelights on Roosevelt's character, as exhibited in a number of important activities (as politician, man of letters, re- former, diplomat etc.), which he hopes may "supply useful details for the final portrait which will be painted by the historian of the future." One is reminded of those " sketches " by the great artists which we prize as themselves finished works of art. Perhaps the most valuable, certainly the most interesting, part of the book consists of those chapters towards the end in which the author describes Roosevelt's European tour after his emergence from the African jungle. Mr. Abbott joined Roosevelt at Khartum in March, 1910, and acted as his courier and secretary during the whole trip, arranging the itineraries, cooperating in the ceremonies and meeting the various dignitaries on a plane only less intimate than 142 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV that on which Mr. Roosevelt himself met them. The reactions of the great democrat to the trimnphs and the tedium of titled fSte- making are portrayed in a fascinating manner in Mr. Abbott's pages. If the reader is stirred to some amused protest by Mr. Abbott's enumeration of the most conspicuous traits of Roosevelt's character as caution, courage, sense of humor and gentleness, the chapter on " Personal Qualities " does all that a chapter could do to convince him that Theodore Roosevelt possessed three of those traits in much larger measure than has generally been supposed. Roosevelt's cour- age no one ever doubted; it is significant that Taft, Lewis and Thayer all agree with Abbott in emphasizing Roosevelt's sense of humor, of which his intimates axe after all the best judges. But it remained for Abbott alone to insist on his being one of the most cautious and gentle of men. At times Mr. Abbott seems to us to yield too much to his aifection for his hero and to sacrifice discretion to enthusiasm. For example, he wrote an article for the Cornwall Local Press in January, 1912, on " some facts concerning the personal relations of President Taft and Mr. Roosevelt ", when these personal relations were threatening to become the issue of the approaching presidential campaign. Mr. Roosevelt, to whom the article was submitted for comment, wrote on the margin opposite the statement that he did not begin to shape his policies on lines differing from those laid down by McKinley until after the election of 1904, " No; the mere force of events had made me strike absolutely my own note by October, 1902, when I settled the coal strike and started the trust control campaign. In 1903 I took Panama." This last sentence is categorical enough. If it needed comment, there is enough in Roosevelt's reiterated jjistifi- cation of his action in magazine articles and speeches (see the Metro- politan Magazine for June, 1915, and the speech of March 23, 1911, at the University of California' — " I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate, and while the debate goes on, the canal does also"). Yet Mr. Abbott thinks it necessary, in order to clear his hero of the charge of highhandedness in which he gloried, to "edit" these five words of marginal comment. " The meaning of the phrase ", he says, " will be more clear[ !] if it is paraphrased in this way : ' In 1903 I took actiffn, guided almost solely by my own judg- ment of what was wise and proper, that resulted in the building of the Panama Canal ' " (page 72). As soon as the result of the election of 1904 was known, on the evening of November 8, Roosevelt issued the statement : " The wise No. I] REVIEWS 143 custom which limits the President to two terms regards the sub- stance and not the form, and under no circumstances will I be a candidate for, or accept another nomination." Mr. Abbott, perhaps through inadvertence, states the case thus : " Not long after Mr. Roosevelt's election to the Presidency in 1904, he announced that he would not be a candidate for a second consecutive term " (page 12) . The apologetic bearing of the word which the reviewer has italicized on the nomination of 1912 is obvious. Twice Mr. Abbott speaks of Roosevelt as the " organizer " or " founder " of the Progressive party (pages xvii, 48). If "founding" a party means more than actually starting the machinery of it, this attributes to Roosevelt more than his due. He held conspicuously aloof for months from the organized Progressive movement. It is not technically accurate to speak of a member of Assembly as " an officeholder " (page 34). The speech on the " New Nationalism " was not delivered " during the Progressive campaign in 1912" (page 115), but on August 31, 1910, at Ossawatomie, Kansas. D. S. MuzzEY. La Peninsule Balkanique: Geographic Humaine. By Jovan Cvijic. Paris, Colin, 1918. — viii, 530 pp. This book is an interesting example of new methods, one may almost say a new method, in anthropogeography. The reviewer notes the departure from the lines laid down by Ratzel and will indicate the novel features of the author's work in summarizing the contents. Entirely apart, however, from the interest of the book as a contribution to methodology, it is of first-rate importance to every one interested in the Balkan peninsula, whether his interest be that of the professional geographer, of the historian, of the statesman or of the man of affairs.. To the student of contemporary Balkan problems the book is a library in itself. Certain limitations on its value will be noted below. It is enough to say here that no other work on the Balkan peninsula, at least none written in any language of western Europe, approaches it in richness of contents. The book is based on lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in the years 1917 and 1918, but its origin may be traced back many years to the work, which the author, professor of geography in the University of Belgrade, carried on in the class-room and in the field. From 1883 to 1915, Professor Cvijic tells us, he traveled every year in the Slavic parts of the peninsula. The material which he presents is 144 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV therefore derived in large part from personal observations on the spot. The book differs from its predecessors, however, not merely in the amount of time spent and the extent of ground traversed in preparing it. The author, as has already been intimated, has a new- conception of the function of the geographer and sees on the ground which other observers have traversed some things which they have not seen. His departure from the beaten track becomes obvious as the reader progresses in the book. The first few chapters, covering the geographic environment and summarizing the physical features of the peninsula, follow the lines of old-fashioned geography. These chapters are, however, merely an introduction to detailed studies of man in the peninsula. With reference both to geography and to history, the author analyzes the zones of civilization in the Balkans and studies the migrations of the peoples. He then rises another step above the ground and surveys his field from the standpoint of the ethnographer and sociologist. He considers the distribution of nationalities, the forms of land tenure and modes of livelihood, the types of houses and of house-grouping in towns and villages. In the second part of the book, which forms about one-half of the whole, the author again advances his point of view and becomes a psychologist. He restricts his studies at this point to the South Slavs, whom he knows best of the Balkan peoples, — so intimately, he believes, that he can look into their minds and analyze and interpret for us what he finds there. He aims to tell us how these people differ among themselves in their mental habits, what are their char- acteristic virtues and faults; and he seeks not only to describe but also to explain their psychical character. He presents the results of his studies in the framework of a classification which distinguishes four main types of South Slavs : the Dinaric, the Central, the East- em Balkanic and the Pannonic. To resolve each type into its vari- eties he pushes his analysis further and presents altogether a score or more of distinct psychic groups among the South Slavs. This sketch of the plan of the book indicates, without the need of argument, the difficulty of the task which the author has under- taken. To solve all the problems which the book raises is, humanly speaking, impossible. Are the problems worth study? Has the author made progress toward their solution ? These are the practical questions which must be kept in mind in judging the work; and to both of them the answer must be affirmative. A good example of the author's method appears early in the book. No. I] REVIEWS 145 in the chapters on internal migrations. He distinguishes the great migrations of the early Middle Ages and the movements incident to military conquest from the streams of people which have been mov- ing recurrently in the peninsula through most of its history and coins a special word, " metanastasic " (from the Greek word mean- ing to change place) , to characterize these streams. He finds in his- torical documents insufficient information respecting these movements, which have not risen to the rank of political events, but which, not- withstanding, obviously explain the present distribution of peoples in the Balkans. He has looked, therefore, to private tradition, which is of course carefully cherished in societies with a strong patriarchal cast, to the history of family names, to the study of dialects, of folk- lore, of customs and ceremonies. For twenty years past studies along this line have been carried on by many collaborators working under the direction of the Institute of Geography of the Institute of Bel- grade. A map has been constructed showing the origin of each family in almost all the villages of Serbia, and the author believes that the origin of most of the families of the central and western parts of the peninsula has been determined. Similar methods of patient and detailed investigation have marked the author's study of the j>sychic characteristics of the South Slavs. In this part of his work he has obtained comparatively little in the form of direct results from history or from physical anthropology and has depended mainly on his personal observation. An illustra- tion of the reasoned plan underlying his field work appears in the account of his method of " psychic sections " In any region, ob- riously, the contrast of mental characteristics must be greatest along some one line, and an observer following that direction will be most likely to appreciate the graduations of difference. "In a ' psychic section ' from the Adriatic to the Balkans," he says, " one notes ven- clearly the differences which exist between the population of the Bocca di Cattaro and the Shopi in the neighborhood of Pirot and of Sofia. But between these extreme points there are less perceptible differences, for example between the population of the Bocca di Cat- taro and the Montenegrin tribes, between these and the populations of the Brda, of the Rashka, of the Shumadija etc." So in the west he has made his " psychic sections " from the Adriatic to the valley of the Morava-Vardar, while in the Balkans proper he has followed the north and south direction. The variety and detail of the book forbid any attempt to sum- marize its conclusions here. Attention may be called, however, to 146 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV the effective combination in the author of a remarkably extensive knowledge of local detail with the somid reason and broad view of the trained scientist. He is at his best in handling social problems, such, for example, as those raised by the mixture of Slavic and Aromounian elements in some of the villages of western Macedonia (page 398). The book is full of digested information and thought- ful speculation on similar cases of complex mixtures in Balkan society. In his broader generalizations the author is less concrete and on that account less convincing. For example, in the sketch of the psychic character of the Dinaric type (page 282) we are told that the Binaries have acute intelligence and lively sensibility, that they respond more quickly to moral than to material motives, that they are passionate and devoted, that they combine with their vigor- ous idealism a profound faith in their future and a determination to avenge the battle of Kossovo, which marked the fall of inde- pendent Serbia etc. These descriptions of psychic characteristics of the main types and of their varieties run to great length in the latter part of the book. Parts of them are based on matters of fact which the reader can accept because he can understand and verify them, such as physical environment, economic occupation, land tenure, social institutions and the like. But many of the psychic traits ap- pear unrelated to external conditions, and the skeptical reader can- not help questioning their existence as realities outside the mind of the author. Even the least favorable judgment on Professor Cvijic's contribu- tion in the field of psychic traits will concede that the book is of the greatest value. Even the most favorable judgment must corn- cede that the author is biased by his patriotic sympathies. He is a first-rate scientist, and he is a man of unquestioned mental ia- tegrity; those who had to do with him at the Paris Peace Con- ference have the greatest admiration for his honesty and candor. Yet he would have to be more than man, writing on the peoples of the Balkans during the World War, to be impartial not only in matters of fact but also in matters of opinion. The book is not a work of propaganda. The reviewer has not noticed a single instance of the distortion of fact to further the Serbian cause. Even the eth- nographic map, in which nationalistic prejudices inevitably come to the surface, would need to be rectified only in minor respects to accord entirely with the reviewer's information on the distribution of peoples in the Balkans. Yet the author is a Serb and a good patriot. He cannot writ of Bulgarians and Albanians with the No. I] REVIEWS 147 sympathetic understanding which inspires his work when he writes about Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. He cannot discuss the problems of Macedonia or of the Shopi except from the Serbian point of view — not that he deliberately chooses to do so, but because he cannot help himself. The sensible reader will understand this and will not be misled ; and for so good a book, coming under the conditions of the present, he will be grateful. Clive Day. Yale Univeksity. The European Commonwealth. By J. A. R. Marriott. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1918.— xi, 370 pp. One of the most regrettable features of American public life is the complete absence from Congress of men with specialized political knowledge, particularly knowledge of foreign affairs. Few senators, it is safe to say, had heard of many of the territories and issues in- volved in the Peace Treaty until the newspapers, reviews and dis- sentient experts showed that there was material for controversy ; and some of the speeches which have drawn most applause from the galleries in the Capitol have been based upon the knowledge of a mediocre college undergraduate, increased by resort to a couple of war books and the Encyclopcedia Britannica and presented with the argumentative skill of the average lawyer. That this is literally true will be evident to anyone with sufficient leisure to read the speeches in the Senate debate. Secretary Lansing apparently recognized this, for the press reports of his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations indicate that he anticipated that only Mr. Knox and Mr. Lodge would really understand the treaty and that the latter's " position would become purely political and therefore ineffective.'' But even conceding that Mr. Lansing might hare mentioned several other names, it remains true that members of Congress, speaking broadly, do not write books; if they wrote them according to the plan of the author of The European Commonwealth, it is doubtful whether they could be published in the United States. Mr. Marriott, who is a Fellow of Worcester College, the author of a number of well-known volumes on history and politics and a mem- ber of Parliament for the City of Oxford, prepared the material contained in his latest book for the English reviews during the four years of the war, and the chapters, he tells us, are selected from a I .g POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV much larger number of essays. The subjects treated and the diplo- matic memoirs and historical works which frequently furnish the texts of his articles are not discussed at length in the United States except in such scientific journals as this quarterly, where the review- ers are for the most part university theorists and not practical poli- ticians. In England, on the other hand, where members of Parlia- ment are frequent contributors to the quarterlies and monthly re- views, questions of domestic and international politics are threshed over by them in these wider forums. A dozen or more members of Parliament have written creditable books during the war, and, while it may be true that the character of debates in the House of Com- mons is deteriorating, a few of its members at least still have the knowledge and ability to maintain the tradition of appealing through the printed page to educated national constituencies. The members of Congress who have had anything worth while to say in print are certainly very few in number. When one mentions Senators Lodge and Williams and former Congressmen McCall and Alexander, has he not exhausted the list? It may be recalled that James Hamilton Lewis is the author of Two Great Republics: Rome and the United States and that Colonel House once wrote a novel ; but the latter never sat in Congress or held office, and his case is, therefore, not to the point. Mr. Marriott's book calls attention by contrast to the non-political authorship of American political and historical writing, which has impressed foreign observers like Lord Bryce and Sir Sidney Low. The decline of the English tradition, it should be added, is as regrettable as the failure of America to copy it. The European Commonwealth is an able and scholarly piece of work, and though a product of the war it will have more than a temporary interest. The author would be the first to admit that the connection between his essays is not always evident, but nevertheless their publication together is well worth while. In his own words, " the underlying unity of the book will be found in the problem presented to Europe by the evolution of the Nation-State and the working of the influential though elusive problem of nationality." Is the nation-state the final type of political organization? If not what is to take its place? The problem, Mr. Marriott says, is one for the political philosopher, but the historian causcontribute to its dis- cussion. Of the fifteen essays composing the book, those which are pri- marily political are of greater interest than those which are histor- ical. The latter deal with the beginnings and development of mod- No. 1] REVIEWS 149 em diplomacy, the evolution of the states system, the attitude of Great Britain toward the continent, her interests in the Low Coun- tries, the expansion of Russia and Germany, the growth of imperial- ism and the problems of Poland, the Near East and the Adriatic. They retell familiar stories with the assistance of new material avail- able in recent biographies, which Mr. Marriott reviews. His treat- ment is always interesting, he shows great skill in compression, and the essential facts are always given ; but in addition there is an im- mense amount of miscellaneous information, which comes from wide and long reading. The most important part of the book consists of the chapters that are primarily political. " How to reorganize society; to reconstruct institutions; to reshape European polity, so as to prevent a recur- rence of the cataclysm which has lately engulfed the world — this is of all problems raised by the war the largest and most insistent.'' It is an extraordinarily difficult problem, since it is doubtful whether nations are ready for the degree of self-abnegation that is essential to the establishment of international organization. Mr. Marriott relates that when the Abbe de Saint-Pierre's Pro jet de paix perpetuelle was submitted to Cardinal Fleury, the latter remarked : "Admirable, save for one omission: I find no provision for send- ing missionaries to convert the heart of princes." The reported ad- ventures of Mr. Wilson in getting his League of Nations adopted at Paris remind us that it is folly to ignore this line of argument. The most important chapter is the last, entitled " Projects of Peace: The Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe." The failure of the Holy Alliance furnishes some lessons for present- day statesmen. It cannot be attributed to the attempt to create a league of autacrats or to the insular selfishness and lukewarmness of England. The fundamental cause of the failure of the Holy Alliance is to be found in the injustice of the after-war settlement, for if peace is to last, it must be preceded by justice. No provision was made for the spread of liberalism or the rise of nationalism, and when the settlement was challenged by these great political forces it crumbled. Mr. Marriott suggests that a closer union between the English-speaking peoples may prove to be the first step in the solu- tion of the present problem, but he wisely abstains from such de- tailed specifications for world reconstruction as many prophetic his- torians have prepared. Lindsay Rogers. University of Virginia. I JO POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV A Guide to Diplomatic Practice. By the Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Satow. London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1917. — Two volumes : xxii, 407 ; ix, 405 pp. This book has the good fortune to find the field all its own from the start. Until its appearance we have not had in English an ade- quate treatment of general diplomatic practice, such as has existed for many years in French in de Marten's Le Guide Diplomatique. In these two volumes, which are announced as the first of a series of Contributions to International Law and Diplomacy, Sir Ernest Satow has made good the deficiency and given the English-speaking com- munity a scholarly treatise that will long remain standard. He is well-qualified to write it, for his experience in the world of affairs has been unusually extensive. In a career of over forty years he has filled many posts in the British diplomatic service, among them that of Minister to Japan, and to his diplomatic distinction he has added the honors of privy councillor, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and British representative at the Second Hague Con- ference. The appearance of this work coincides with a demand in the United States and Great Britain for more highly-trained diplomatic establishments and back of them for a better-informed public opin- ion. Diplomacy cannot be dismissed as a mere survival, Uke heraldry, unrelated to the realities of modem life, but comes home to men's business, as the events of the past five years have shown. The future will see not less of it but more. The greater is the need, therefore, that not only its professional exponents but all who aspire to public service in the wider sense of the word acquaint themselves with its principles. Although the author doubtless had in mind primarily the requirements of the diplomatic service, his book will in every way meet the demands of the larger constituency which will hence- forth take an interest in diplomacy and its works. Both classes of reader will find it a handbook of merit, informing, scientific and, in spite of necessary technicalities, thoroughly readable. The first volume deals with the apparatus and conduct of diplo- macy as an instrumentality of state action. The honors and immuni- ties of the sovereign, the organization of the foreign office, the right of legation, the selection, duties and privileges of diplomatic agents and all the multiform types of document employed in international inter- course are clearly set forth with ample citations, usually in the lan- guage of the original. The second volume treats of international No. I] REVIEWS 151 meetings and transactions. The chapters on congresses and confer- ences naturally attract the reader of today, but, as the author himself anticipated in the preface, they will be found to lag behind in interest. For one reason, proportion is lacking. More space is given to the Congress of Teschen than to that of Utrecht. The Congresses of Vienna and of Berlin take up four pages each, the Congress of Bucharest, eight. Further, the recital of the more or less similar de- tails of some fifty-six international gatherings does not lend itself to variety. It reads like Homer's catalogue of the ships, though, of course, equally valuable to the special student. A preferable treat- ment, possibly, would have selected the great epochal congresses for full consideration and discussed those of lesser importance chiefly insofar as points of differentiation might be brought out. As an accurate collation of facts, however, this part of the work deserves full praise. Amidst a complexity of technical details such as the author marshals there are surprisingly few statements that seem to call for qualification. One may question, however, " if the cases of a refusal to ratify [treaties] . . . might be counted on the fingers of two hands" (ii, 276). American diplomatic history would fur- nish more than this number of instances, if rejection by the Senate is tantamount to refusal. The North Atlantic fishing dispute alone was responsible for three failures to ratify, one of them British, between 1888 and 1902. On the other hand, in the third volume of Treaties vf the United States, published in 1913, some fifteen treaties or other international acts (from 1907 on) are enumer- ated as not in force, though advised by the Senate, because of failure to ratify on the part of other powers or of the President of the United States. Apropos of treaty-making, it may be added that the use of Amerique as the distinctive part of the designation of the United States need no longer be referred to conditionally (ii, 176). Under that name and style she voted and signed at the Second Hague Conference and for the same reason is given first place in the acts and protocols of the Peace Conference at Versailles. Moreover, Grande-Bretagne, as an official designation, has given way to L'Em- pire Britannique, the change having been effected, evidently, at the recent Conference. It is a matter for comment that the British sov- ereign still employs the title " Defender of the Faith " in forms of ratification (ii, 276), when it no longer occurs in the texts of the treaties themselves. In strict accuracy, the title of the court estab- lished by the Hague Convention should be the International Prize 152 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXT Court not the International Court of Appeal (ii, 160). Though the function of the court is, in effect, appellate, the United States could not have accepted it as such, and, in fact, expressly reserved on the point. Also, on reference to the text of the Treaty of London of 1913, it will be found that article vi did not refer the division of Turkish territories conquered by the Balkan allies to the inter- national commission (ii, 163). That had already been stipulated for in their treaties of alliance. The commission yias to settle ques- tions of a financial nature arising from the war. Many will find this excellent book useful, but none will appre- ciate it more than the teacher of the technique of diplomacy. It is well arranged, clearly presented and full of the sort of material needed to illustrate the intricacies of the diplomatic art. In the classroom, as in the legation or the chancellery, it is a book " to be read wholly and with diligence and attention " Henry F. Munro. Columbia University. Justice and the Poor. By Reginald Heber Smith. New York, The Carnegie Foimdation for the Advancement of Teach- ing, 1919.— xiv, 271 pp. Rightly understood, there is truth in the saying that courts do not exist to dispense justice but to settle disputes. Whatever justice may mean to the philosopher, to those that are aggrieved it must mean at least a chance to get a judgment that will be enforced by the state. This chance is an essential prerequisite to justice. The blindfolded lady with the even scales represents the ideal of a justice that knows no difference between rich and poor. But the lady must be wooed. It costs money to fight a lawsuit. In a very practical sense justice is something that has to be bought. Some one must pay the price. If, then, we desire the poor to have justice, we must make justice cheap; and for those who have no money, we must make it free. Without this, our boast of equality before the law is the parade of an abstraction in the face of much reality to the con- trary. An equality which is dependent on judicial decrees that are out of reach is like that implied by Anatole France in his familiar saying that " the law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep imder bridges, to beg in the streets and to steal bread." The denial of justice to the poor through their inability to en- No. 1] REVIEWS 155 force their claims in the courts is the subject of the first part of Mr. Smith's valuable study. Temperately but none the less dramatically he shows how the law's delays and the expense of court costs and counsel's fees prevent the enforcement of small contract claims and seriously impede the recovery of damages for tortious injuries. From this he passes to a detailed consideration of the agencies that have been devised for remedying the evils. Nearly half of the volume has to do with the work of legal aid organizations. Other chapters deal with small claims courts, domestic relations courts, courts of conciliation and arbitration, administrative tribunals and agencies, assigned counsel and the defender in criminal cases. Through these agencies for securing justice for the poor a substantial beginning has been made; but, as Mr. Elihu Root says in a foreword, Mr. Smith's book " shows that we have not been performing that dutv very satisfactorily and that we ought to bestir ourselves to do better." It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance or the merit of Mr. Smith's contribution. It is so packed with detail that any brief summary is necessarily inadequate. It is so admirably constructed and presented that it compels and richly rewards reading in full. One marvels at the amount of material that the author has gathered and analyzed and made to serve his purpose. Much as the subject invites to exhortation, Mr. Smith has preferred for the most part to let the facts speak for themselves. Instead of appeal to Utopian impossibilities, he presents a record of progress made, with acute appraisal of successes and failures. He finds no single panacea. The various expedients which have been of service have each a special function. Though some of the need for the lawyer's services is artificial, there remains much work for which the lawyer is indis- pensable. After all possible improvements in judicial procedure and the substitution of other devices for the existing system of litigation, there remains a wide gap between the ideal and the actual which only the legal aid organizations can fill. These organizations are necessary aids to our other agencies for social work. Necessarily Mr. Smith's volume is an indictment of lawyer and layman for grave neglect of a social duty. Happily also it is a record of progress. Of the complacency of the legal profession fifteen years ago Mr. Smith says : The realization that there are grave defects in the administration of justice came but slowly. . . . When Roscoe Pound delivered his epoch-making address on "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction 154 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV with the Administration of Justice" before the American Bar Asso- ciation in 1906, his was like a voice crying in the wilderness. From the reported discussion, one would judge that most of the lawyers present were incredulous, and that not a few were indignant at the intimation that our justice was not closely akin to perfection itself. To this blind idolatry there were notable exceptions. Mr. Root is second only to Dean Pound in striving to rouse the members of the bar from their lethargy. Ex- President Taft and Dean Wigmore and other leaders in the American Judicature Society have kept alive the recognition of our failings and have preached the way of salvation. The work of the late Arthur v. Briesen in the New York Legal Aid Society deserves especial recognition. They also serve who do the drudgery. Yet, in spite of these examples of lawyers who have ap- preciated that the test of a legal system is the way it works and who have sought to put justice within the reach of those who could not secure it unaided, the American bar as a whole is still inclined to pass by on the other side. Unfortunately there is no legal maxim that ignorance of the facts excuses no one. But the plea of ignor- ance can no longer be tu-ged by any one who has read Mr. Smith's book. To him and to the Carnegie Foundation which has made pos- sible the wide distribution of his noteworthy contribution all who care for justice for the poor and for real equality before the law must be profoundly grateful. The study is by no means as broad as its title. But within the limits which the author has set for himself he has done his work amazingly well. Thomas Reed Powell. James Baird Weaver. By Fred Emory Haynes. Iowa City, State Historical Society of Iowa, 1919. — xiv, 494 pp. In this book, as in his Third Party Movements, Mr. Haynes deals with phases of American history which offer particular promise to the research student. Viewed in the light of present-day interest in social politics, those movements in which Weaver was at times the most prominent leader appear to have been the product of the most significant forces in our political history from the rise of various independent groups in the seventies to the virtual disappear- ance of the Populist party in 1896. Yet exhaustive study of this field has barely begun. In fact, the leaders have received surpris- ingly scant attention. Hence any contribution to the subject in hand bearing the marks of scholarship is worthy of attention. No. I] REVIEWS 155 In his preface the writer correctly refers to the present work as a " study ". As such it is useful. As a biography it is far from satis- fying. The material is drawn mostly from the Congressional Record, the files of several Iowa newspapers and the Weaver Col- lection — consisting of a scrap-book, a bundle of letters and some unpublished memoranda written in Weaver's later years as the be- ginning of an autobiography but unfortunately cut short at the year 1859, just when his public career began. While much useful material is thus secured, it is mainly of an external character. The larger forces as well as the subtler influences which affected such essential matters as Weaver's party connections and his radical views are often left obscure. The private collection seems to have been espec- ially disappointing ; the story is rarely enlivened with illustrative incidents or enriched with intimate experiences. Two chapters, based mainly on the memoranda, tell of Weaver's life before the Civil War. A child of the restless frontier, he was born in Ohio in 1833 and was on the move when two years old, first to Michigan and finally at the age of nine to Davis County, Iowa, which became his permanent home. His own poverty and the scar- city of money in his section made it necessary for him to pay 33J^ per cent, interest for funds with which to attend the Cincinnati Law School ; and this experience, the writer thinks, may have influenced his later " opinions in regard to capital and the issue of money " (page 15). Law led to politics. Originally a Democrat, Weaver was swept into the tide of opposition to slavery in the late fifties " by reading the New York Tribune and Uncle Tom's Cabin ", and became first a Free-Soiler and later a Republican (pages 18, 19). He had achieved some prominence as a campaign speaker when the Civil War interrupted his career in politics. Chapters iii-v are de- voted to his services during the war. Chapter vi deals with the events which led to his withdrawal from the Republican party and to that career of leadership in suc- cessive minor parties which gives him his chief significance in his- tory. Upon the facts ascertainable in this connection depends the answer to the question whether Weaver was essentially a reformer or a politician who found it expedient to join reform forces. The writer's account is not satisfying. No reference is made to Weaver's position on any question during the important years from 1865 to 1874. In the next three years he is represented as chiefly interested in a struggle to commit his party in Iowa to prohibition. Several times the popular candidate for congressman or for governor, he jk5 political science quarterly [Vol. XXXV was each time defeated, largely by the activity of the liquor inter- ests. Meanwhile he seems to have developed radical views on the money question. What opposition he aroused because of such doc- trines does not appear, but he is said to have regarded them as " consistent with his continued membership in the Republican party " (page 91). In 1877 he again lost the nomination for governor but won his fight for the temperance plank. He expressed himself as " entirely satisfied " and pledged his support to the candidate. Six weeks later, however, he asked to be released from the pledge, giving as his reason the wide difference between his position on questions of finance and that of the Republican party (page 93). He threw himself into the campaign on the side of the Independents and the following year was sent to Congress by an alliance of that party with the Democrats. With the exception of chapters ix and xi, which deal respectively with his " First Campaign for the Presidency " and his " Political Activity, 1881-1885," chapters vii-xiii are devoted to Weaver's three terms in Congress. Much useful material is presented. While little is attempted in the way of digesting his political and economic theories, numerous rather well-chosen excerpts from his speeches are included. These give appropriate emphasis to his views on matters of finance. Convinced that the chief reason why the eastern capitalists were growing rich while the western and southern farmers were burdened with poverty and debt was because the financial policies of the gov- ernment were dictated by the " money power ", he demanded silver and greenbacks as a means of breaking that control and of supplying a currency both adequate and elastic. The writer attempts to show on page 154 that these ends have since been attained in other ways. He is quite correct as regards the question of the volume of cur- rency but is rather optimistic in saying that " the control of the currency has been definitely placed by the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act in the hands of the Federal Government." His inter- pretation — throughout the book in fact— is broadly generalized and often ambiguous [e. g., pages 128-129, 154, 211 and 441). Despite his evident desire to treat Weaver and the movements which he rep- resents with the utmost sjnnpathy and fairness, one feels that he scarcely does either of them justice. Concessions are as sweeping as claims. It is said on page 129, for example, that " the details of his diagnosis have many times been shown to be erroneous, but his main conclusions have come to be generally accepted." Chapters xiv-xvi are devoted to Weaver's connection with the No. i] REVIEWS 157 Populist party. Again the treatment deals mostly with externals. Neither the reason d'etre of Populism nor his influence in shaping its program receives the attention which one naturally expects. Fol- lowing chapter xvii, on "Later Years", are two concluding chapters on " Recognition " and " Final Tributes " Here as elsewhere in the book the reviewer feels that the writer over-emphasizes the simi- larity between the ideals of Weaver and those of Roosevelt; be- tween the achievements of the Progressives and the demands of the Populists (pages ix, 211, 338 and 441). Though Weaver and Roosevelt often spoke the same language, there were fundamental differences in their principles. And while the Progressives took up the Populist agitations for political reforms and brought about such things as popular election of United States senators, ballot re- form and the like, demands of this character constituted the least important part of the Populist program. Some of the abuses of the capitalist system have been mitigated by remedial legislation, but the problems which were of chief concern to Weaver are far from solved. A. M. Arnett. Columbia University. Austria- Hungary: The Polyglot Empire. By Wolf von ScHiERBRAND. New York, Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1919. — vii, 352 pp. The throne room of the Hofburg at Vienna is everywhere decor- ated with the symbol of the Hapsburgs, A. E. I. O. U., which stands for the proud boast: Austria erit in orbe ultima — Austria will last forever. But Austria-Hungary has disappeared, and the Hapsburgs are exiles from the dominions which they so grievously misgoverned for almost five centuries. The lands which formed the Dual Mon- archy yesterday will be the storm centre of European politics to- nfiorrow. The student cannot understand their present status or their probable future without understanding what the Dual Mon- archy was and how it became what it was. For him and even more for the general reader von Schierbrand's volume will be of real assistance. The twenty-five years which Wickham Steed spent at Vienna as correspondent of the London Times enabled him to write a work. The Hapsburg Monarchy, which is the classic in English on the subject. The splendid volume of V. Gayda, Modem Austria, has been translated into English. The student who wishes seriously 1^8 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV to Study the constitution, the politics and the foreign policy of that remarkable, political patchwork, Austria-Hungary, must turn to these works. But he will nevertheless profit by the reading of this more recent voliune, for it is written by a keen observer who has an accu- rate knowledge of history, has traveled through many lands and has written similar works of value. Moreover, his style, though jour- nalistic, is not offensive to scholarly taste. The book is very informing. It gives an admirable description of the lands that formed the Dual Monarchy and the causes of their economic backwardness, a fairly impartial statement of the races that inhabit those lands and the reasons for their poverty and illit- eracy, a searching analysis of the evils of the political life of the empire and a vivid statement of the baleful influence of the Haps- burg family and the imperial court upon the life and fortunes of the people. The last third of the book, which was written during the war, is devoted to a description of the fortunes of the monarchy during that great catastrophe. The author's judgments are gener- ally so sound that one is astonished at the statement on page 183 that the war had a unifying influence upon the races inhabiting the empire. The reader forgets such a misjudgment, however, in the conclusion arrived at : "Austria-Hungary is doomed unless she reso- lutely applies the surgeon's knife and cuts dovni deep, cuts out the cancer of race strife with all its roots." Von Schierbrand meets the great problems of the Dual Monarchy squarely. The greatest of these was, of course, the racial problem. He gives an excellent historical account of each of the chief peoples who inhabited the empire: Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ruthenians (Ukrainians), Riunanians, Jugoslavs, Italians. His discussion of their capacities and weaknesses is on the whole very fair despite a restrained German bias. His solution of the racial problem is the one so often previously recommended by those who have studied it, viz., self-govenunent for each of the races and federalism for the em- pire. It was obvious to everyone who had studied the question that this must be granted, and yet on the very eve of the debacle the Ger- mans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary refused all concessions to the subject peoples. The detached attitude of the author is evident in his treatment of other problems : the army and the gross favorit- ism within it, the bureaucracy and its hopeless inefiiciency, the church and its obscurantism. The reader will find himself wonder- ing whether the new nations that have arisen out of the Dual Mon- archy can possibly rid themselves of these evils which together make No. I] REVIEWS 159 up the cancer of Austrianism. But he will be convinced that they deserve all patience and sjrmpathy after the centuries of their op- pression in the Polyglot Empire. Stephen P. Duggan. Institute of International Education. War Borrowing: A Study of Treasury Certificates of In- debtedness of the United States. By Jacob H. Hollander. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1919.— 215 pp. While resort to short-term negotiable obligations is not new in the financial history of the United States, their use in the recent war was so large and constituted such a fundamental method of war finance that especial interest attaches to them. In the volume under review Professor Hollander has made a careful study of the certifi- cates of indebtedness issued prior to the Fourth Liberty Loan and of the effects of their issue. The certificates of indebtedness were issued in anticipation of loans and to a small extent of taxes, being offered by the Treasury through the federal reserve banks for general subscription by banks and individuals. They were put out at regular intervals of two weeks or more and thus provided the Treasury with a steady flow of funds. Pajnment at first was made by subscribing banks in cur- rent funds, but later the device of payment by credit was largely used. When the loans were finally floated the certificates were re- deemed in whole or in part. This process is called " anticipatory borrowing " by Professor Hollander, and in this very process of anticipating the proceeds of each successive loan he finds a weakness in our system of war finance. In successive chapters the results of the continuous use of certifi- cates of indebtedness in anticipation of loans and taxes are traced as to their effects upon the Treasury, the money market and the price level. From the Treasury standpoint, certificate borrowing is con- ceded to have possessed the qualities of readiness and certainty to an ideal degree, but not to have been equally economical, though any defect on this score was to be attributed to the maintenance of imnecessarily large Treasury balances. In the chapter on the money market the author concludes that there has been " an extraordinary freedom from monetary disturb- ance ", which is attributable, however, to the discount apparatus of the federal reserve banks and not to the particular method of bor- l5o POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV rowing pursued. In tracing the effects of certifioate borrowing upon the price level the problem resolves itself into the query: "Have the issue and use of certificates of indebtedness been the direct cause of an extraordinary expansion of credit or increase in currency?" (page 176). To this Professor Hollander gives an affirmative an- swer (page 191) ; certificate borrowing has involved the creation of additional bank credits in the form of governmental deposits rather than the transfer to the new government account of existing com- mercial credits, thi:is making for inflation. Moreover, the volume of new credit thus created was not contracted with the liquidation of the certificates but was dispersed among commercial accotmts. As to the last point, it may fairly be urged that such dispersion was due to the enormous government borrowing by whatever method pursued rather than to the specific device of certificate borrowing. In a final chapter Professor Hollander proposes his alternative method of war borrowing. Instead of anticipatory borrowing he would have instalment loans, " payable in evenly distributed serial instalments." The first loan should be large enough to discharge any anticipatory certificates made necessary at the beginning and thereafter to maintain a comfortable Treasury balance until the flo- tation of the next loan, which again must be ample to meet all ex- penditures until the following loan. Payments must be made in monthly instalments, and no overpayments should be authorized. By this method the dangers of certificate borrowing and the evils of inflation would be largely avoided, while loans would tend to be made from savings rather than from credit. Professor Hollander has made a valuable contribution to the anal- ysis and criticism of our war finance and has described in illumin- ating fashion tendencies of which the Treasury officials themselves were probably only dimly aware. On the other hand, his suggestion of an alternative method exemplifies strikingly the extreme diffi- culty of making a positive suggestion at all comparable in value or originality with criticism of an existing jwlicy. It is by no means certain that the method of instalment borrowing would be free from the evils attributed to anticipatory certificate borrowing nor that this latter method should be held responsible for all the weaknesses of our war finance which are attributed to it by the author. As a matter of fact the proposed method of instalment borrowing was followed in every one of the Liberty loans. Roughly, about 25 per cent, of the subscriptions for the first loan were on the instal- ment plan, and a further large though unknown percentage was paid No. I] REVIEWS l6l for through the aid of the banks on a still more liberal instalment basis. In comparing the merits of the two plans an assumption is made on behalf of the instalment plan, which would, if followed, have removed equally all objections to certificate borrowing. "The aggre- gate amount of the [first] loan, as allotted, should be enough to discharge the anticipatory certificates then outstanding and to supply the Treasury with funds sufficient to obviate further short-term bor- rowing prior to the flotation of a succeeding Liberty loan " (page 205). It is now acknowledged by all that the first loan was too small and that an additional mistake was made in refusing all over- subscriptions, but the amount was fixed at the largest point then considered feasible and larger than many bankers thought possible, while the pledge not to accept oversubscriptions was designed to en- courage large subscriptions from the banks. The Treasury thus got behind at the beginning and never caught up. It is difficult to see how the necessary foreknowledge could have been secured by a sub- stitution of instalment for certificate borrowing. Expenditures were growing at an unprecedented and unpredictable rate, and a rigid system of " equal monthly instalments ", based upon ascertained needs at the beginning of a six months' period, would have proved utterly inadequate by the end of it. There is nothing to indicate that the proposed method would not have resulted in inflation equally with the plan pursued, except the suggestion that such loans would be more likely to be met out of savings than out of credit. This, however, has not been the experi- ence in either Great Britain or Australia, where instalment borrow- ing was given a trial. The real evil in the loan policy of the United States was the excessive use of bank credit, and the only remedy was to make loans out of real savings. There is no certainty that this remedy would have been applied under the proposed method. Finally, as just indicated, it is not necessary to theorize since in- stalment borrowing was experimented with on a large scale during the war, although Professor Hollander does not mention any in- stance. In Great Britain the plan of continuous sale or day-by-day borrowing continued from October 1, 1917, to January 18, 1919, and yielded about $5,000,000,000. It was, however, given up in favor of periodic loans, of which two have followed in Great Britain since the latter date. A still earlier trial had been given instalment loans in Australia, where the fourth internal loan of December, 1916, was made payable in ten monthly instalments beginning in Feb- J 52 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV ruary, 1917. Although three further loans were made thereafter, the plan of instalment borrowing was not again resorted to, and it was necessary to issue the fifth internal loan in September, 1917, three months before the instalment payments on the previous loan were completed. It is possible that a more careful study of the actual workings of these two experiments would have led Professor Hol- lander to modify somewhat his theoretical exposition of the advan- tages of instalment loans and to place a different emphasis upon some of the features of certificate borrowing. His own plan re- sembles the Australian method, which in many respects was inferior to the British plan. E. L. BOGART. Washington, D. C. The Economic Foundations of Peace. By J. L. Garvin. London, The Macmillan Company, 1919. — xxiv, 574 pp. This book was written in one sense too late and in another too early. It was written too late in the sense that the profound truth and far-reaching wisdom of its conclusions could well have been in the public's possession in 1916 rather than in 1919. It was written too early in the sense that all the facts of the argument supporting Mr. Garvin's position are not yet a matter of public record. Based upon the earnest convictions which honest thought and the consequent change in outlook had brought (Mr. Garvin was for- merly a protectionist), the present volume is the outgrowth of the studies of Angell, Hobson, Dickinson, Woolf and others into the- relation of military activities to economic forces and motives. The work is essentially that of a journalist but of a large- visioned, states- manly journalist, whose social passion is wedded to intelligence. And the issue is a constructive outlook and proposal at once sensible and in harmony with the best modem thought on the potentialities of international economic organizations. Mr. Garvin's thesis is well illustrated in the following sentences : Eren if we take the narrowest view of the chief function of the League of Nations as that of preventing war, the most formidable deterrent . . . would be found in the thorough organization in advance of a mechanism by which the commercial interdict, embargo, or boy- cott might be applied to mutinous challengers or breakers of the peace [page 358]. There can be no safe prospect in any idea of compulsory peace; not. No. i] REVIEWS 163 even if the system were riveted by economic action in emergency. The only conception likely to be workable and lasting is that of the willing peace. That is, a peace secured by the cohesive power of common interests, by the increasing efficiency and advantages of mutual service . . . this could only be brought about by creating under the League a definite series of institutions for making inter- national cooperation a potent, beneficent reality. From that method every country . . . could only gain in prosperity and security. It would make the daily operation artd preservation of the peace an asset for every people, which no imaginable results of successful war could exceed [page 359]. The book seeks, on a basis of this thesis, to analyze the workings of whatever international economic organizations have recently ex- isted with a view to seeing what analog for future international economic arrangement they suggest. From the point of view of a careful analysis of the operation of the economic bodies used by the Allies during the war to coordinate their activities, the book is only suggestive. It could not be otherwise; but the time will soon be ripe for disinterested and understanding interpretation of the record of the accomplishment of the inter-allied economic agencies; and when it is made, it promises to suggest much as to the concrete uses and limits of usefulness of industrial organizations among the nations. Such a study will, however, need its Garvin to put its con- clusion into plain English for the people. As a popularizer of what has already been thought out this author achieves his most conspic- uous success. The weak points of the book are due to the defects of its virtues as much as to anything else. Its point of view is not new, but it is new to its author, and its author has in England a wide following which hears him with respect. If he betrays a somewhat prejudiced state of mind regarding the Bolsheviki, it is to be accounted a " ves- tigial remain " rather than a central conviction. If he slights the problem of international finance, it is to give clarity and consistency to what he does say. There is repetition ; there is undue tediousness of statement; there is sweeping generalization. But Mr. Garvin proves his point. He demonstrates that peace has its economic fotm- dation and that without that foimdation there is no peace. It is interesting to note how closely Mr. Garvin's ideas about the structure of the League of Nations conform to the proposal of Gen- eral Smuts. For this very reason the book supplies a measure of the width of the tragic gulf between the accomplishment of the Peace 16^ POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV Conference and the hopes and aspirations of those who have seen in the realignment of peace the opportunity to begin building a struc- ture based on economic sanity and serviceability in the relations of one nation with another. Ordway Tead. Bureau of Industrial Research, New York City. Consumers' Cooperation. By Albert Sonnichsen. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1919.-^xix, 223 pp. No American writer has given such a clean-cut definition and so adequate an exposition of consumers' cooperation as this book con- tains. Mr. Sonnichsen does not conceive of consumers' cooperation as merely a device for enabling consumers to save on the cost of their supplies. Like Robert Owen, the author regards these savings as only an incident. Consumers' cooperation is a self-sufficient system upon which to build the industrial democracy. Anti-capitalistic, consumers' cooperation has no affinity with so- called cooperative production like the self-governing workshop, the farmer-owned grain elevator or the fruit-shipping association. All of these, in quest of profits, have nothing in common with but are antagonistic to consumers' cooperation. Cooperators expect to suc- ceed only so far as the superiority of their system is demonstrated in actual practice. Unlike socialists, cooperators never seek to vote co- operation upon unwilling minorities. Three-quarters of the book is devoted to an interesting and in- spiring account of the growth and development of the movement up to the present year in Great Britain, on the continent and in Amer- ica. This growth is so steady and so substantial, already affecting a population nearly equal to that of the United States, that Mr. Son- nichsen expects the movement to become a force to be reckoned with in the not distant future. In the second part of the book, '' Co- operation as a Factor in the Social Revolution ", the author dis- cusses " Limiting the Field to Revolutionary Cooperation ", " Co- operation and Socialism " and " Cooperation and Labor ". Of labor we quote : Through the trade-union movement Labor has succeeded in getting a little more, but while granting the increase in wages, the capitalist simply retrenches from the cost of living by charging the public more for his product, so that the trade-unionist, as the American Federa- No. I] REVIEWS 165 tion of Labor has now finally come to admit, simply chases himself around in a circle, while the capitalist stands outside the ring and laughs at him. Under universal cooperation this leak in the middle would be stopped, and the relation between wages and the cost of living would be fixed, with nothing to change it except inefficiency and waste. The author would not permit profit-sharing among workmen as the Christian Socialists — Thomas Hughes, Charles Kingsley, Fred- erick Maurice and their fellows — ^fought for half a century to induce the British cooperators to do, but would depend upon what would be divided in " profits " getting back to the workers in lower prices. " Cooperation, then, would establish its industrial democracy on the basis of the social interests of the people as consumers. It places consumption as the chief end of society, labor being merely a means to that end." Perhaps Mr. Sonnichsen's enthusiasm sometimes leads him to gen- eralize too largely upon too slight a basis of fact, but the country has been given an exceedingly valuable book which is greatly needed. The introduction by John Graham Brooks makes us even more eager for Dr. Brooks's book now in press, Labor's Challenge to the Social Order. Emerson P. Harris. MONTCLAIR, N. J. The Farmer and the New Day. By Kenyon L. Butter- field. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1919. — 311 pp. This book is entertaining and inspirational. It has the appearance of a collection of essays or addresses, since the chapters are for the most part complete in themselves. Nevertheless, they coordinate well and make a fairly symmetrical whole. The main plan of the book may be seen in the names of the three groups of chapters : The Rural Problem, Rural Organization and Rural Democracy. In ad- dition there are several chapters added in the form of an appendix. The spirit of the book is well set forth in the first chapter, en- titled " Is the Farmer Coming to His Own?" The author shows that in the past the farmer has, as a rule, occupied a subordinate place in the business and social world. Although the American farmer is intelligent and independent in many respects, there was no adequate representation of the farmer class in the councils of the nation during the trying times of the past few years. Is the farmer l66 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY holding his own economically? Is he paying for the land he tills? Is he making himself felt as a force in the affairs of the nation? These are imanswerable questions. Concerning plans and organizations, President Butterfield as- serts that we have many policies but no policy, many parts of a great machine but really no machine. The author not only empha- sizes the conspicuous lack of a policy at the present time but also proposes a policy. It will not be necessary to attempt here to give an outline of the policy as a whole; a few samples will indicate its tenor. It must be decided whether or not we are to grow most of our own produce or rely on importations ; whether we are to assume some control over farm land or leave it entirely to the control of commercial forces; whether the distribution of foodstuff is to be controlled or left to private enterprise. As these questions are an- swered one way or another the later parts of the program will be shaped. In the chapters pertaining to democracy it is pointed out that the farmers' income is inadequate; his means of marketing are not in accordance with the needs of the times ; his rights in the matter of organization are not clearly defined ; his educational facilities require an overhauling. What is the government to do about these matters, or whit shall the farming class attempt through government in the way of remedies? President Butterfield does not offer a panacea. He asserts that farmers are not ready for peace. A constructive program is needed. Organization must be more inclusive. It is suggested that a Coimcil of Agriculture and Country Life be formed out of organizations now in existence. " Education and organization now and evermore are the only doors through which the farmer can pass to his rightful place." B. H. HiBBARD. UnITEESITY of TflSCONSIN. BOOK NOTES National Governments and the World War (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1919; viii, 603 pp.), by Frederic A. Ogg and Charles A. Beard, is based upon two volumes well known to every American student of government : The Governments of Europe by F. A. Ogg and American Government and Politics by C. A. Beard. The greater part of it is a condensation of portions of the two works men- tioned. The authors have, however, added a number of valuable and interesting chapters dealing with the governmental problems arising ■out of the war and have brought their material up to date. The introductory chapter on " National Ideals and Government ", after contrasting the democratic with the autocratic ideal of government, shows how the former has been applied in England, France and the United States and the latter in Germany. The later treatment of the several governmental systems emphasizes this contrast. It fur- nishes an admirable though brief account of the varied activities of the government of the United States in the prosecution of the war and briefly describes the administrative agencies created to carry them ■•ut. The second part of the book, devoted to a description of the gov- ernments of England, France, Italy and Belgivun, follows in frame- work and general treatment that of Mr. Ogg's earlier book. The chapter on the British ministry and cabinet contains interesting new material on the cabinet changes during the war, such as the organiza- tion of the war cabinet and the special meetings attended by represen- tatives of the self-governing dominions and the dependencies. There is also a discussion of the suffrage act of 1918 and a chapter on the goremments of Canada, Australia, South Africa and India. The new material on France and Italy treats of the growth of socialism. The third part describes the governments of Germany and Austria- Hungary. The treatment is naturally somewhat unsympathetic toward Teutonic institutions and lays emphasis on their autocratic features. The movement for political reform prior to and during the war is described. The volimie closes with chapters on "American War Aims " and " The Problem of International Government." To •describe within the compass of 600 pages the governments of the United States and the leading European countries is a formidable task — yet one which the authors have performed with a considerable 167 1 68 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV degree of success. One might wish that they had seen fit to give at least some attention to Russia and the more important states of the Balkans and that more than one-fifteenth of their space had been devoted to the highly important matter of local government. The failure to include the states mentioned may be explained but hardly excused by the fact that they are not considered in The Governments^ of Europe. In British War Administration (New York, Oxford University Press, 1919; vii, 302 pp.) Professor John A. Fairlie recounts part of the remarkable transformation wrought in British political insti- tutions during the World War. The greater part of the book is taken up with the changes that have been effected in the old depart- ments of government and with the establishment and organization of new departments. The chapter of most general interest is that on the cabinet, based upon an article by the author which appeared in the Michigan Law Review for May, 1918. In this Professor Fairlie shows clearly the revolutionary character of the changes effected in cabinet government by the establishment of the war cabinet. Under the new system the attempt was made to separate the determination of policy from the direction of administration ; the relations of the war cabinet were far less intimate than those of the old cabinet with the House of Commons ; and the prime minister ceased to be the leader of the House and rarely attended its debates. Unlike all its predecessors, the war cabinet made use of a secretarial staff, which recorded its proceedings, summoned outsiders to its meetings and pub- lished official reports, thus abandoning that secrecy which had char- acterized all previous cabinets in English history. The author indi- cates that the war cabinet was not a wholly successful experiment, that it was not able to confine itself entirely to questions of policy and that the effort to distinguish sharply between policy and admin- istration seems to have failed. Professor Fairlie's voltune is pub- lished as one of a series of " Preliminary Economic Studies of the War ", edited by Professor David Kinley for the Division of Eco- nomics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Though one may question its appropriateness in a series of " economic " studies, he should be grateful to the author for supple- menting the standard treatises on English government and constitu- tional history, all of which have been thrown out of date by the war. Experiments in International Administration (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1919 ; xiii, 201 pp.) by Francis Bowes Sayre is timely and makes a real contribution to the steadily increasing volume of No. I] BOOK NOTES 169 literature on the League of Nations. While the author is firm in his belief that necessity will compel the success of the new regime, he adds to his faith knowledge by submitting to a critical examination the various experiments hitherto made in internationalization. These he classifies in three groups according to the degree of control dele- gated to an international administrative organ by the states creating it. Brief analyses are made of international public unions, such as the Postal Union, of more purely political arrangements, like the New Hebrides Condominium, the Albanian Commission and the Congo Free State, as well as of institutions with some appearance of sovereign power, such as the Sugar Commission and certain river commissions in Europe. That many of these have proved unequal to their assigned tasks the author frankly recognizes but finds the reason " not in any fundamental impossibilities in international gov- ernment " but " in the fact that hitherto nations, loath to restrict the exercise of their own sovereign powers, have been unwilling to accord any real power of control to an international body." He insists that equality in voting power in international bodies must in practice be modified as well as the rule of unanimity which has hitherto pre- vailed. Otherwise, " if the League of Nations cannot act until all agree, it will never be capable of any but petty action ". Dr. Cecil F. Lavell in his volume of essays entitled Reconstruc- tion and National Life (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1919 ; xii, 193 pp.) sketches in broad outline what he conceives to be the development during the past hundred years of the peculiarities of four peoples — the French, the Germans, the Russians and the British — and indicates briefly the possible effects of the World War upon the evolution of these nations. He finds sources of Europe's trouble " in the thwarted development of nationality and democracy, in the mixture of good and evil in expansion, in the class conflicts and social upheavals that have come from the working-out of the indus- trial revolution," but he is far less interested in material facts than in spiritual forces. It is the " soul " of a nation rather than its f>ocketbook which he would expose. All the nations reviewed are treated most sympathetically, even the Russian and the German; and the English in particular are viewed so sjrmpathetically that the reader is likely to pity the poor little English lamb for lying down quite innocently with the monstrous, roaring Irish lion. Never pro- found and sometimes vague, the essays are frequently suggestive and may well provide an interesting supplement to manuals of nineteenth- century history. l^o POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV Among the many military critics who commented in the American press on the battles and campaigns of the World War, Mr. William L. McPherson of the New York Tribune was conspicuous for his grasp of strategical problems and for his interpretation of military events. In TTie Strategy of the Great War ( New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1919; x, 417 pp.) he reprints articles and parts of aticles which appeared in Sunday issues of the Tribune in 1919 and elaborates the theories outlined in his daily " Military Comment " contributed to the same newspaper during the spring, summer and autumn of 1918. He holds that Germany, while lack- ing in the moral qualities necessary for world leadership, possessed the material resources to achieve a limited victory, that she had in fact almost won the war by the beginning of 1917, when her eastern conquests had laid the framework for a Teutonized Mittel-Europa. But grandiose aspirations after world empire and the concomitant military program of victory in the West as well as in the East led to her gambler's venture of World Power or Downfall. The author dissents from the " attrition theory " advanced by Belloc and other writers. " Germany ", he says, " was not destroyed by the weight of outside numbers. She was destroyed by madness within." Her fatal error lay in challenging the United States and thus turning a European war into a world war. Not only was there no Bismarck to hold the German General Staff in leash, but in the General Staff the counsel of the two plungers, Ludendorff and Tirpitz, prevailed. The first part of the volvune is devoted to general outlines, the second part to particular campaigns. The value of the book for the general reader, for whom rather than for the military expert it is obviously intended, would be greatly enhanced if it contained maps to illustrate the military operations described in the text. The translation into English of Treitschke's History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century by Eden and Cedar Paul, of which the first four volumes have been reviewed in the Political Science Quarterly, has now reached its fifth volume (New York, Robert M. McBride and Company, 1919; xiv, 653 pp.), which, like its predecessors, is prefaced by a valuable introductory note from the pen of Mr. William H. Dawson. The present instalment, embracing Book IV of the original, covers a very brief period, for, excepting the survey of intellectual movements contained in the final and per- haps for the majority of readers most attractive chapter on " Yotmg Germany", the events narrated fall for the most part within the few years immediaitely preceding and following the July Revolution No. I] BOOK NOTES 171 of 1830. Both in thought and style the contents of the book are thoroughly characteristic of Treitschke. His detailed account of the revolutionary movement of the '30's richly illustrates his narrow re- actionary spirit and his dislike of everything French. His treatment, at times prolix and tedious, of the rise of the Customs Union afEords him an unsurpassed opportunity to berate Austria and the Germanic Federation and to sing the praises of an all-wise and all-powerful Prussia. His lengthy review of events connected with the establish- ment of Belgian independence enables him repeatedly to snarl at England and to bite at " small, weak states ". Relatively few per- sons will be prevailed upon now, after the collapse of that Germany of which Treitschke dreamed and toward the building of which he contributed no small part, to read carefully this whole volume, but those who do read it will be amply repaid. Not only will they have a better understanding of what has been the matter with Germany during the last generation, but they will perceive how the happenings of the past few years have made these very pages of Treitschke more amazingly ironical than even he, the master of irony, could have imagined. The late George W. E. Russell was remarkably industrious as a journalist, a reviewer and an author. He wrote many books, several •f which were of great service to students of the political history of England in the nineteenth century. Russell, as a cadet of a great Whig family, was steeped in the history and traditions of the Whigs and had accumulated a large knowledge of the i)ersonalities of men in the Whig cult. He was also, at one time, a member of the House of Commons and held minor office in a Liberal administration. With him the study of political history and contemporary English politics was almost a passion. In addition to all these qualifications he enjoyed from the time he left Oxford University exceptional op- portunities of learning, obsenring and noting developments, tenden- cies and influences in the world of politics in London. Prime Min- isters and Some Others: A Book of Reminiscences (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919; 345 pp.) is the last book, it ap- pears, that Russell wrote. It Tvill prove as informing and as ser- viceable to students of English political history as any of his earlier works. Palmerston, Russell, Derby, Disraeli, Gladstone, Salisbury, Rosebery and Balfoiu: are the premiers of whom he writes in these reminiscences. The studies of these statesmen are charac- terized by much frankness of expression as well as much eandor in appraisal. In nearly every one of them there is something that will 1 72 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV prove new and helpful to students of English political history, no matter how familiar they may be with the authorized biographies of premiers from Palmerston to Campbell- Bannerman. Better than any other man in England Russell was equipped to write a history of the Whigs from the Revolution of 1688 to their disappearance in the first decade of the present century, but, for some reason that has never been explained, he did not write the book that many students of English party history had long been expecting as his outstanding contribution to the literature of English political history. The report prepared for the Canadian Commission of Conserva- tion by Mr. J. Grove Smith on Fire Waste in Canada (Ottawa, Commission of Conservation, 1918; 319 pp.) is concerned with a subject that is rightly described as of " paramount and far-reaching importance." The fire losses of Canada since the Dominion came into existence are estimated at $700,000,000, and considering that the population at the present time scarcely exceeds seven millions, Mr. Smith does not exaggerate when he asserts that a continuation of the loss of property and life by fire at the present rate " cannot but vitally affect the economic future of the country." The average annual fire loss per capita in Canada is estimated by Mr. Smith at $2.96 as compared with $2.26 for the United States, $0.64 for England and $0.28 for Germany. The report covers a large field. It includes surveys of fire waste and fire protection, the connection of building and town planning with the spread of fires, fire insur- ance as affecting fire waste, and the conditions making for the ex- cessive fire waste in Canada. There are suggestions for the preven- tion of fire, which, Mr. Smith points out, is much more economical than provision for fighting fires, although fire protection has been much more adequately provided by the municipalities of Canada than fire prevention. The passage of legislation for better control of fire risks and the enforcement of this legislation, Mr. Smith be- lieves, should lie with the provincial governments. The relation of the Dominion government to the problem should be educational and advisory. There is favorable mention of the European system of rigorous investigation concerning the origin of fires and severe penalties in case of negligence as well as of criminality. While the report is primarily for Canadians, use is made of American condi- tions and statistics for purposes of comparison, and the general con- clusions apply almost as much to this country as to Canada. Writers of English political biography, and in particular those who are entrusted with the diaries and correspondence of the sub- No. I] BOOK NOTES 1 73 jects of their memoirs, are usually exceedingly reticent in their treat- ment of home and family life and in their references to the wives of the men with whose political careers they are concerned. To any one who understands the attitude of men and women who are high and well established in political life toward all forms of unnecessary publicity, the reasons which explain this reticence in political biog- raphy will at once suggest themselves. Miss Elizabeth Lee and Mrs. C. F. G. Masterman in writing Wives of Prime Ministers, i844-igo6 (New York, E. P. Button and Company, 1919; xix, 252 pp.) were obviously free to a large extent of this tradition of reticence. From an English point of view the field into which these ladies have ven- tured has its difficulties and its dangers. It must at once be con- ceded, however, that their book is marked by good taste ; and it must be added that it cannot fail to be both interesting and helpful to students of English political biography. It fills up some gaps in the authorized biographies of Melbourne, Peel, Russell, Palmerston and Gladstone. Sketches of the lives of the wives of these premiers are to be found in the Lee-Masterman portrait gallery, as are sketches of Lady Salisbury and Lady Campbell-Bannerman. One of the best of the sketches is that of Lady Peel. The kaleidoscopic changes that are taking place in English social conditions give the second edition of B. Seebohm Rowntree and May Kendall's How the Labourer Lives (London, Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1917 ; 342 pp.) an interest that does not often attach to second editions. The volume is concerned chiefly with the wage problems of the laborer, and a series of laborer's family budgets is presented, each one showing the impossibility of living properly on the pittance which the laborer used to receive for growing the food of the nation. It is only by a comprehension of the laborer's living conditions, such as is given by these budgets, that the great impor- tance of the changes now being made in English rural life through the operation of the new minimum-wage rates can be appreciated. The Awakening of England (London, Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1918; xii, 361 pp.) by F. E. Green is also a second edition. It presents a series of contrasted pictures. The author shows on the one hand the waste of English land given up to game in order that the rich may enjoy themselves, and on the other hand the full use of land where the authorities have put into operation legislation for small holdings. The book was originally written for the purpose of arousing Englishmen to a sense of their danger in not producing enough food to supply the needs of the nation for even half of the 1 74 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [Vol. XXXV year. The second edition appeared after this danger had become a calamity and England had experienced suffering through the stop- page of foreign supplies. Critics of the draughtsmanship of the League of Nations Covenant might find equal cause for complaint in some of the clauses of the Constitution of the United States. For lack of clarity it would be hard to rival the provision in Article 4, Section 2, that " the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." As the clause has been interpreted by the Supreme Court it means practically that no state shall dis- criminate unduly against citizens of other states. That other inter- pretations would be justified by the language of the Constitution is apparent from the difficulties which have beset the courts in picking the interpretation that has now become established. These difficul- ties are the theme of Roger Howell's The Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1918; vii, 117 pp.). After considering the history and general scope of the " comity clause ", Dr. Howell gives separate treatment to the rights protected against discriminatory legislation and those not so pro- tected, to the justifications under the police power for special treat- ment of citizens of other states and to the non-protection given to foreign corporations. The author presents a useful review of the de- cisions and some valuable criticism of the reasoning of the Supreme Court. His keenness for logical defects seems to blind him some- what to the importance of practical distinctions which have influ- enced and in many cases justified the departures which he criticizes. The work gives evidence of haste, which is undoubtedly explained by the " Second Lieutenant, 17th Infantry, U. S. A." under the author's name on the title page. We shall doubtless have a brood of war theses which fail to do full justice to their authors. Mr. Frederick J. Allen's declared purpose in writing The Law as a Vocation (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1919; viii, 83 pp.) is " to present a clear, accurate, and impartial study of the law in the hope of offering assistance to those who are attempting to choose a career or who are about to enter upon the profession." There is no doubt that the author is clear, accurate and impartial. He is also most commonplace and uninspiring. No one will doubt that " true leadership in the profession will depend upon ability, equipment, and moral and social qualities" (page 33), that "only lawyers of judicial fitness and unselfishness should be elected as judges " (page 40) or that " lawyers are found in considerable No. I] BOOK NOTES I 75 numbers in the governing bodies of towns and cities, in state legis- latures, and in the National Congress " (page 20) . There is some- thing not unpleasing in the sunday-school-quarterly-for-the-primary- grade quality of Mr. Allen's writing. If children of ten are seri- ously troubled about the choice of their future career, they will find this volume of genuine service. Its scope is accurately outlined in the preface as "a review of the nature of the law, present-day legal conditions, personal and educational entrance requirements, the dan- gers and advantages incident to practice, the high professional de- mands made upon the lawyer, the varied fields of service open to him, his probable earnings and emoluments^ — in a word, all that has a distinct and important bearing upon the law as a vocation." Any effort to reduce the waste of time and money spent in litiga- tion over the technicalities of procedure deserves commendation. Such an eifort is made in Mr. Thomas W. Shelton's Spirit of the Courts (Baltimore, John Murphy Company, 1918; xxxvii, 264 pp.). It follows by the syllogism that the book deserves commendation. Mr. Shelton believes that legislative interference is the chief cause of our procedural difficulties and that a great reform would ensue if the courts were vested with power to frame the rules governing all the details of pleading and procedure. The legislature should con- fine itself to telling the courts what to do, leaving them free to de- termine how they shall do it. The evils of our present state are conclusively demonstrated by statistics and fervent rhetoric. Neces- sarily the author has no recourse to statistics in supporting the merits of his proposed remedy. He nevertheless convinces us that it is worth a trial. Notwithstanding the voluminous 'literature on the subject of work- men's compensation, there is real need for such a volume as Durand Halsey Van Doren's Workmen's Compensation and Insurance (New York, Moffat, Yard and Company, 1918; viii, 332 pp.), which pre- sents in untechnical fashion the history of the movement, the various types of legislation and the results of experience in administering the laws that have been adopted. Especial attention is devoted to the New Jersey plan and its practical operation. There are chapters on constitutional issues, the attitude of labor and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Insurance Act. No attention seems to be paid to the Ari- zona statute which, as required by the state constitution, sets no limits to the compensation which may be recovered and leaves the assess- ment of damages to a jury. The author seems too sanguine when he thinks that the question of the extraterritorial effect of a compensa- I 76 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY tion law " does not present a problem of very great moment " (page 128). But in spite of minor sins of omission or commission, Mr. Van Doren has written a most useful accoimt of the problem of compensation for industrial accidents and of the way in which it is being met in America. The book was awarded the David A. Wells prize at Williams College in 1917. A highly technical subject is dealt with in highly technical fashion by Professor Ernest G. Lorenzen in The Ctmflict of Laws Relating to Bills and Notes (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1919; 337 pp.). The work is a valuable reminder of the difficulties of com- mercial intercourse in a world cut up into many independent sov- ereignties and of the great need of finding devices to improve the situation. In the field which he has selected for treatment Professor Lorenzen shows us where we are and points out the paths which lead to better things. His exhaustive research and constructive criticism make his work a model for similar investigations of other problems of government. In European Treaties hearing vn the History of the United States and its Dependencies to 1648 (Washington, Carnegie Institution, 1917; vi, 387 pp.) the Carnegie Institution has published a useful piece of work. It comprises a collection of forty documents, begin- ning with the papal bulls of the latter half of the fifteenth century and running on through the treaties, leagues and agreements relative to America down to the Treaty of Miinster of January 30, 1648, the purpose being " to illustrate the diplomatic aspect of the great struggle which, from the fifteenth century onwards, was in progress between the governments of the maritime powers of Europe, over the question of participation in the trade and territorial possession of the newly-discovered lands." Each document is given in the original text, accompanied by an explanatory introduction, bibliog- raphy, notes and translation (except of the French texts) . A gen- eral introduction correlates the events behind the documents and gives them historical continuity. Altogether, much valuable material has been made accessible in convenient form. A second volume will cover the period from 1648 to 1713. Columbia Mnnt^vmb^ FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Nicholas Murray Butler, LL.D., President. Munroe Smith, LL.D., Professor ef Roman Law. E. R. A. Seligman, LL.D., Professor of Political Economy. J. B. Uoore, LL.D., Professor of International Law. W, A. Dunning, LL.D., Professor of History. F. H. Giddings, LL.D., Professor of Sociology. J. B. Clark, LL.D., Professor of Political Economy. H. R. Seager, Ph.D., Professor of Political Economy. H. L. Moore, Ph.D., Professor of Political Economy. F. J. E. Woodbridge, LL.D., Pro- fessor of Philosophy and Dean. W. R. Shepherd, Ph.D., Professor of History. J. T. Shotwell, Ph.D., Professor of History. V. 6. Simkhovitch, Ph.D., Professor of Eco- nomic History. H. Johnson, A. M., Professor of History. S. McC. Lindsay, LL.D., Professor of Social Legislation. W. D. Guthrie, A.M., Professor of Constitutional Law. C. J. H. Hayes, Ph.D. , Professor of History. A. A. Tenney, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Sociology. R. L. Schuyler, Ph.D., Associate Professor of History. R. E. Chaddock, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Statistics. W. W. Rockwell, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Church History in Union Theological Seminary. D. S. Muzzey, Ph.D., Associate Professor of History. E. M. Salt, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Government. T. R. Powell, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Constitutional Law. H. L. McBain, Ph.D., Pro- fessor of Municipal Science. B. B. Kendrick, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of History. C. D. Hazen, Ph.D., Professor of History. W. F. Ogburn, Ph. D., Professor of Soci- ology. F. J. Foakes Jackson, D. D., Professor of Christian Institutions in Union Theo- logical Seminary. C. C. Plehn, Ph. D., Exchange Professor of Finance. SCHEME OF IHSTRUCTIOn Courses are oflered under the following departments: (i) History, (2] Public Law and Comparative Jurisprudence, (3) Economics, (4) Social Science. The Faculty does not aim to offer courses that cover comprehensively all of the sub- jects that are included within the fields of its interests. 6EHERAI. COURSES General courses involve on the part of the student work outside of tbe classroom ; but no such course involves extensive investigation to be presented in essay or other form. History, twenty-one general courses. Public Law and Comparative Jurisprudence, twelve general courses. Economics, thirteen general courses. Social Science, seven genera] courses. RESEARCH COURSES Research courses vary widely in method and content; but every such course involve* on the part of tbe student extensive work outside the classroom. History, thirteen research courses. Public Law and Comparative Jurisprudence, eight research courses. Economics, ten research courses. Social Science, ten research courses. The degrees of A.M. and Ph.D. are given to students who fulfill the requirements pre- scribed. (For particulars, see Columbia University Bulletins of Information, Faculty of Political Science.) Any person not a candidate for a degree may attend any of the courses at any time by payment of a proportional fee. Ten or more Cutting fellowships of jiooo each or more, four University fellowships of I650 each, two or three Gilder fellow- ships of J650 — {800 each, the Schiff fellowship of J600, the Curtis fellowship of $600, the Garth fellowship of J5so and a number of University scholarships of {150 each are awarded to applicants who give evidence of special fitness to pursue advanced studies, Several prizes of from ^50 to J250 are awarded. The library contains over 700,000 Tolnmes and students have access to other great collections in the city. -, Studies in History, Economics and Public Law Edited by tbe Faculty of Political Science of Columbia TJniTcrsity RBOENT VOLUIVIES VOLUME LXII. 1914- 414 pp. Price, cloth, $3.50. 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Westminster. 8. f; Railroad Legislation Edited by Thurman William Van Metre Published by The Academy of Political Science, Columbia Uni- versity, New York, January, 1920, Proceedings, Vol. VIII, No. 4. $1.50 paper covers, $2.00 cloth edition This volume contains important discussions of the problems of railroad legislation by members of Congress, publicists, industrial engineers, labor leaders, lawyers, edu- cators, capitalists and bankers. Every point of view is ably presented by authorities of national reputation. Senator Albert B. Cummins of Iowa discusses the main features of the Senate Railroad Bill, while Congressman Schuyler Merritt of Connecticut presents an analysis of the Esch Bill, passed by the House of Representatives on November 17. Balthasar A. Meyer, member of the In- terstate Commerce Commission, Frank Haigh Dixon, Pro- fessor of Railway Economics, Princeton University, Rich- ard Waterman, Secretary of the Railroad Committee of the United States Chamber of Commerce, and Professor Emory R. Johnson, Dean of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania, give their views on the general subject of railroad legisla- tion. The question of railroad earnings and credit is treated by Howard Elliott, President of the Northern Pa- cific Railroad, S. Davies Warfield, President of the National Association of Owners of Railroad Securities, John E. Oldham, Thomas Reed Powell, Thomas W. Hulme, Pier- pont V. Davis and Alfred P. Thom. The problems of railroad labor are discussed by W. G. Besler, President of the Central Railroad of New Jersey, Timothy Shea, acting President of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers, W. N. Doak, Vice-President of the Brother- hood of Railroad Trainmen, Ivy L. 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