HISTORY or TMI Twenty-First U. S. Infantry rrom 1812 to 1863 BY CAPTAIN CELWYN E. HAMPTON OfurncU Ittiuetatty Sathtara athata, SJew ^ork THE JAMES VERNER SCAIFE COLLECTION CIVIL WAR LITERATURE THE GIFT OP JAMES VERNER SCAIFE CLASS OF 1869 1919 Cornell University Library UA29 21st History of the Twenty-First U.S. infantr olin 3 1924 030 724 672 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030724672 COAT OP ARMS TWENTY-FIRST INFANTRY UNITED STATES ARMY Quarterly — 1. Argent, on a cross gules, a lion passant Guardant or. 2. Gules, a saltire az., bordered ar., charged with 13 stars of the last. 3. Quarterly — 1. and 4. Gules, a castle of Castile or. 2. and 3. Azure, three stars or., within an equi- lateral triangle argent. 4. Argent, a quiver gules, charged with ornaments or., fringed sable, containing four arrows of the last. Over all an oval inescutcheon in pretence. Gules, a cannon or. Crest. A star voided of twenty-one points enclosing the figures 21 and the letters U. S. all or. Motto: "I'll try, sir." HISTORY OF THE Twenty-first U. S. Infantry From 1812 to 1863 By CAPTAIN CELWYN E. HAMPTON 1911 THE EDWARD T. MILLER CO COLUMBUS, OHIO Copyrishi 1911 Cclwyo E. Hampton Publbhed May 15, 1911 THE EDWARD T. MILLER CO COLUMBUS. OHIO TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Prefatory Note 7 Part I— The War of 1812. 1812 to 1815. Chapter I. — Organization of the Twenty-first Infantry 13 First Roster of Officers of the Twenty-first Infantry. Chapter II. — Campaign of 1813 24 Capture of York — Capture of Fort George — De- fense of Sackett's Harbor — End of Dearborn's Campaign — Wilkinson's Campaign on the St. Lawrence — Battle of Chrystler's Field — The War in Other Fields — Changes in Command. Chapter III. — The Campaign of 1814 on the Niagara Peninsula 57 The Battle of Chippewa— The Battle of Niag- ara — The Return to Black Rock — The Defense of Fort Erie — End of the Campaign. Chapter IV.— Close of the War 93 Reduction and Reorganization of the Army. Books and Papers of Reference for the War of 1813 Period 104 Part II.— Ad Interim. Chapter I.— 1815 to 1861 107 Part III.— The War of the Rebellion. 1861 to 1863. Chapter I. — Organization of the Second Battalion. Twelfth Infantry 117 Banks in the Shenandoah — Obscuration of the Regular Regiments. Chapter II.— Early Events of the War 130 Missouri and Arkansas — West Virginia — Ken- tucky and Tennessee — Virginia. Chapter III. — Pope's Campaign in Northern Virginia 143 Battle of Cedar Mountain — ^A Retrograde Move- ment — Jackson's Turning Movement — Battle of Groveton — Battle of Manassas — Battle of Chan- tilly — Collapse of the Campaign. Chapter IV. — The Antietam Campaign 168 Surrender of Harper's Ferry— Battle of South Mountain — Battle of Antietam. Chapter V. — The Fredericksburg Campaign ... 179 Porter and McClellan Degraded— Burnside's New Plan — Battle of Fredericksburg— The Mud March. Chapter VI. — Chancellorsville Appointment of Second Lieutenants— Hooker's Plans— Battle of Chancellorsville — Fredericks- burg and Salem Church — Le Debacle. Books and Papers of Reference for the War of the Rebellion Period Appendices. 190 213 Appendix A.— The Coat of Arms of the Twenty-first Infantry 2^^ Blazon — Historical Description. Appendix B.— The Regimental Mess-jacket 220 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Page Coat-of-Arms of the Twenty-first Infantry . . Frontispiece Map — Route of the Twenty-first Infantry During the War of 1812 24 Obverse of Gold Medal Presented by Congress to Gen- eral Ripley 53 Capture of the British Battery by the Twenty-first Infantry at the Battle of Niagara 73 The Twenty-first's Trophy of Niagara .... 78 Obverse of Gold Medal Presented by Congress to Gen- eral Miller 90 General Thomas M. Anderson 133 Map — Route of the Second Battalion, May, 1861, to May, 1863 144 General Harry C. Egbert 153 General Evan Miles 154 General Emerson H. Liscum 193 Colonel James Jackson 206 The Regimental Mess-jacket 230 Prefatory Note At the time of my appointment by Colonel C. A. Williams, in Dece'mber,1906,to be Historian of the Twenty-first Infantry, I expected, of course, to write the history of the regiment down to the present day. That serious illness has prevented me from doing so has been a sore disappointment; but no mis- fortune is entirely unaccompanied by compensation, however inadequate it may be. So, the cutting short of my labors has permitted more space and more care to be devoted to a part of our history that I consider of especial importance than could probably have been given it if my work had covered the entire period of our existence. For a number of years sporadic efforts have been put forth to assemble certain limited portions of the history of various organizations. Until recently these were the products of offices rather than of individuals; they were more in the nature of official documents than of readable histories, and in most cases their value was nil. My aim, in beginning my work, was to produce something of a very different nature. As early as 1904 I had written, in the Silver Medal Essay of the Military Service Institution for that year, as follows : "Scoff as we may at tradition, it produces effects that are attainable in no other way. It is right for us to know and take a pride in the accomplishment of those that have gone before us. The hardships endured, the battles fought and the victories won by our regiments and companies in the past, have been endured and fought and won by our forefathers in arms. Let us make them our forefathers in sentiment as well as in fact. "We will rapidly do so if the opportunity be given us. Every regiment in the service should have its history written (7) in such a way as to make plain that of each of the companies that compose it. Not as a mere, dry, dead tabulation of facts, printed in a pamphlet and laid away as soon as off the press, to moulder among official reports ; but as a history is written to secure readers, and to interest and arouse in them a pride that they are the heirs to the fruits of great deeds. Let there be, not one copy nor half a dozen, but so many that every officer of the regiment can and must possess one, and every company at least five or six. Let olficers and men be encour- aged, even compelled, to read and to be well versed in the story that it tells. Let us possess it as our own. It is not a matter of boasting, but one of honor, to know and be proud of the men and the deeds that have been before us." In those days there were no regimental histories. In such as have appeared since it has sometimes happened that every- thing in the past — the really historical period — has been cursorily passed over in order that the space might be devoted to a relation of our own doings of recent days. The Revolu- tion, the War of 1812, the War with Mexico, the War of the Rebellion — all have been dismissed with a few rather dreary pages each, and the stage cleared for and held by the actors of the War with Spain and the Philippine Insurrection. It may be questioned whether or not this is a properly balanced his- tory. In so speaking, it is by no means my intention to disparage the work of others, but rather to explain my own purpose in departing from the recognized and the customary. Whether this purpose be justified, and how nearly I have accomplished it, are things that yet remain to be determined. There is some truth in the view that a nation's history is the history of its wars. Certainly the history of a regiment is mainly that of its campaigns — even of its battles. At the same time it must be remembered that something more is required than a mere enumeration of the acts of any one regi- ment. With that alone, there will be accomplished no more than an assembling of dry bones. By a proper treatment of connecting events, of foregoing cause and ensuing effect, the actions of associated organizations and of persons in whom (8) general interest centers, it is embodied and completed in the fulness of human form. In the author may reside the power to instill into this form such spirit that it becomes animate, personified, vivified with a likeness of his own soul. If he be also wholly just, impartial and dispassionate, his work may be genuinely a history. In late years, however hard, however trying, however gal- lant may be the work that we have done, our campaigns and our battles can but ill compare with those of our military ancestors. The events of our time should be set down truth- fully and clearly while they are known, but they should be given no more than an equal weight with those of the past. Our stories may be of service to the future historian. He will write our history. I had no sooner begun my work than I found that, one antf all, we were ignorant of the beginning and the past life of our regiment. Not only so, but the facts with which to make it clear were not available. Securing a leave of absence, I went to Washington for the purpose of collecting the neces- sary information from the Government archives there. Such information was difficult to obtain, and my journey came near ending in failure. With such aid as came to me, however, I have endeavored to do justice to the periods I have been able to cover. Practically all this work has been done during a gradually growing illness, and before I had finished the account of the War of the Rebellion my health broke so completely that I have been compelled to abandon all hope of carrying my labors, further. It is possible, however, that if I had pursued the work to the end, this early history might have had to be shortened and compacted, in the natural desire to include the whole in a single volume. I should have considered this a misfortune,, however necessary it might have seemed, but now that cir- cumstances have required more than one volume, there seems no present reason for limiting the scope of the work I have already done. I desire to acknowledge here my indebtedness for especial assistance in the preparation of this book to Brigadier General (9) Thomas M. Anderson, U. S. Army, retired, and to Mr. Francis B. Heitman, of Washington, D. C. To my successor in the office of Historian of the Twenty- first Infantry I hand on my unfinished work, with best wishes and high hopes for the future. CELWYN E. HAMPTON, Captain, U. S. Army, Retired. San Antonio, Texas, December 25th, 1910. (10) PART I. THE WAR OF 1812 1812to 1815 History of the Twenty-first U. S. Infantry CHAPTER I. ORGANIZATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST INFANTRY. IN the pangs of the War of 1813, our second with Great Britain, for our independence, the Twenty-first Infantry was born. Indeed, it may be considered, not unjustly, that either the preparation for or the prosecution of this war really ushered our Regular Army into life. It is true that 1T8& is commonly recognized as the official birthdate of our first regiment of infantry, and of a battalion of artillery, and that this date might be set back even as far as 1784, from -which year the organizations had been kept in a precarious •existence by annual resolutions of Congress authorizing them to serve for one year more. However, the armed forces of the young confederation were so made the toy of a vacillating public opinion that they were, by resolves of Congress, alter- nately abolished in a burst of over-confidence and revived in an access of trepidation. In one of these paroxysms of fear, in 1799, Congress went so far as to authorize forty regiments of infantry, four of dragoons, two of artillery and one of rifles ; but these were never raised, for, a year later. Congress reduced the authorized strength to a total of six regiments,^ and this, •■again, in 1803, to a total of three. It is unfortunate that the Revolutionary War was begun with so little organization, and that its earlier encounters were won by men owning no allegiance but to their separate •colonies or communities — men who acknowledged only their own wills and were soldiers one day and peaceful citizens the next, without even the customary change of clothing. Later, there was raised a force of general allegiance, by whom -the war was successfully prosecuted, and who won undying fame under the name of Continentals, but the recruiting of this force was slow and difficult, our people, as ever prefer- (13) 14 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY ring the short term of service and the careless lack of dis- cipline in the militia furnished by the different colonies. So worthless were these untrained levies, and so paltry and cowardly did they show themselves again and again, that they were roundly denounced by all the leaders of really military minds and patriotic instincts — by Generals Wash- ington, Greene, de Kalb and Morgan — whose utterances are of record. Moreover, the enthusiasm of the people for a fight declined so rapidly that the total number of men under arms fell from nearly 90,000, in 1776, to only 18,000 in 1783, so that the probabilities are that we should have lost had it not been for the aid of our French allies and the complications in which Great Britain was involved at the same time in other parts of Europe. Still, in spite of its utter failure, the short- term militia idea was popular and was riveted upon the country for all time. In 1808, when it began to be evident that we should have either to fight again with Great Britain or return to a position of dependence upon her. Congress went the doubtful length of increasing the authorized strength of the army to seven regiments of infantry, two of artillery, one of dragoons and one of riflemen. Strong opposition by a powerful group of the States to the prosecution of another war, prevented any further preparation until after war was actually declared. On June 19th, 1813, Congress bowed to the inevitable and adopted a formal declaration of war, but it was not until the 36th of that month that it agreed to a bill authorizing the increase of the army to twenty-five regiments of infantry, three of artillery and two of dragoons, having a total strength of 37,309 officers and men. In this belated and therefore hasty action, the creation of the regiments, of which the Twenty-first Infantry was one, may be likened to the mythical birth of Pallas Athene. Beset by the difficulties of being com- pelled, without a military arm, to cope with a powerful enemy. Congress smote its forehead and there sprang forth these regiments of Regular troops by whose exertions, combined with those of our navy, the war was brought to a successful WAR OF 1812 15 conclusion, although waged under most disheartening condi- tions, with the result often in grave doubt. Also, it may be truthfully said of the Twenty-first that it sprang forth mature and fully armed, for its first years form its Golden Age. May our posterity be enabled to recall our memories and our deeds with the pride with which we recall those of the men who fought at Chrystler's Field, at Erie, and at Lundy's Lane. The first year of the war on land began with uncertainty and a total lack of preparation, continued with incompetence and timidity, and ended in gloom and disgrace. Had it not been for a few brilliant exploits at sea, the year 1818 would have closed for us in the most abject failure. Anticipating that war must shortly result from our acri- monious disputes with Great Britain, the War Department at Washington had again turned, with over-confidence, to a plan for the invasion of Canada. In the spring, some 1,200 Militia were assembled at Dayton, Ohio, where they were joined by the Fourth Regular Infantry, under Lieutenant- Colonel James Miller, an officer whom we shall find, three year later, commanding the Twenty-first Infantry and winning imperishable renown at the battle of Lundy's Lane. The command of this little army was given to William Hull, the Governor of Michigan, who had lately been appointed a Brigadier-General in the army, and he was instructed to pro- ceed to Detroit. He arrived at that place early in July and, after some delay in awaiting orders from Washington, crossed into Canada, where he accomplished some small success. In the middle of July, however, a small force of the enemy seized the fortified island of Mackinac without firing a shot, thus obtaining control of the routes of communication on the upper lakes, while, from the lower ones, not being seriously menaced there by American operations, British troops were able to move toward and reinforce the threatened point. Gen- eral Hull withdrew to Detroit, where he was confronted with a considerable force of British Regulars, Indians and Canadian Volunteers. Having made practically no defense, on August .16 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY 16tb he surrendered the Territory of Michigan and his entire -army to General Brock, the British commander. The latter, judging the American Volunteers and Militia to be of little value, permitted them to return at once to their homes on parole. The Regulars were carried to Montreal and held as prisoners of war. The country, overwhelmed with humiliation by the result of this brief campaign, heaped upon Hull the most fearful -execrations, and denounced him as a coward and a traitor. He was later tried and sentenced to be shot, but was par- doned by the President. Although palpably weak, it should be remembered that he was not a military man, that he -disapproved the scheme for invading Canada, and that he was unsupported by any other undertaking, isolated as he was with a force which at best was of uncertain quality. Upon him the public vented its wrath, but the sin was that -of the public itself. Prior to this ignominious surrender, Hull had dispatched a message to the commanding officer of Fort Dearborn, on the site of the present city of Chicago, to remove his small garrison to Fort Wayne, that name being then borne by a ■fortified post on the Maumee River, in Indiana. On the very day that General Brock demanded the surrender of Detroit the little garrison of Dearborn marched out to begin the peril- ous journey through the wilderness to Fort Wayne, taking with them a number of women and children, the families of soldiers and settlers. Almost immediately they were set upon "by hostile Indians, who killed two-thirds of their number and -carried off the rest as captives to be held for ransom. It is necessary to mention but one more affair that com- pleted the chain of disasters by which the western lake region was completely lost and abandoned to the British and their Indian allies. In January, 1813, a force of about 1,000 Ken- tucky Militia was moving northward toward Detroit with the "hope of reoccupying that place, when, at the River Raisin, in southern Michigan, it was attacked by British troops and Indians and completely defeated. The entire force was either WAR OP 1812 17 killed or captured. As in nearly all cases in which the Indians were victorious, there ensued a terrific scene of savage cruelty. The wounded and helpless were massacred, and all were sub- jected to the harshest treatment. Such other operations as were carried on in the west were of rather a vicarious nature, in which the inhabitants banded together and defended the settlements against the attacks of unfriendly Indians. Farther east the war proceeded during its initial year with no more success to American arms. During the late summer and fall about 6,000 troops. Regular and MiHtia, had been gradually collected at various points along the Niagara River and, although not even a demonstration had been made to support Hull at Detroit, by the time late autumn arrived public sentiment loudly demanded another invasion of Canada. There was jealousy and lack of co-operation among the commanders of the different brigades and garrisons — a condition boding ill for the success of any proposed expedition. On the Canadian side of the river was a force numbering scarcely more than a quarter as many as the American, but it was a fairly homogeneous and disciplined army, largely made up of the troops under General Brock, hurried by that officer, after their victory at Detroit, to the now threatened Niagara frontier. Major-General Stephen Van Rensselaer, an officer of Militia, had been placed in command of all the American troops on this frontier and, on October 10th, he prepared to attack the British at Queenston before dawn the next morn- ing. Owing to a fierce storm, and to blundering in the preparations, this first attempt came to nothing. The night of the 13th was set for a second attempt, and Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer, the General's aide, was put in command of the troops that were to cross the river. The assaulting party was to consist of 350 Regulars — the Thirteenth Infantry — and 250 New York Militia. These were to be reinforced by other Militia as rapidly as the boats could carry them from the American shore. Having only thirteen boats, not all of the 18 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY six hundred could cross at once, but, as the attack aMhat point was somewhat unexpected, they did succeed in taking the heights after a severe struggle. General Brock hastened to assemble the British forces from their scattered posts, and the intrepid six hundred Americans, who had now all assembled on the heights, were forced to withstand the shocks of repeated attacks. General Brock was killed, but this did not discourage his followers, who were continually receiving reinforcements. On the American side Colonel Van Rensselaer was severely wounded, and the command, for a long time, fell upon Captain Wool, of the Thirteenth Infantry. Later, Lieutenant-Colonel Winfield Scott, who had crossed as a volunteer, his own regi- ment being left upon the American shore, assumed the immedi- ate command of the troops upon the field. By mid-afternoon the British had succeeded in assembling over a thousand men in addition to their Indian allies. Against these the little force of American Regulars, who bore the brunt of the fighting, struggled desperately while vainly awaiting the coming of the Militia who were to reinforce them. These latter, seeing the wounded returning, and hearing the noise of the conflict, were seized with craven fear. To General Van Rensselaer's frantic entreaties they replied that, under the laws, they could not be ordered beyond the boundaries of their own State. As a climax to this poltroonery, the boatmen became panic stricken and fled from the boats. The troops who had crossed in the morning, worn out with fighting and over- whelmed by superior numbers, were abandoned to their fate. At about five o'clock in the evening they surrendered, and it was then discovered that fully three hundred more Militia were on the Canadian shore, but had remained hidden under the river banks and had not entered the battle. Nevertheless, they were seized as prisoners of war and were made a part of the triumphal procession with which the British General Sheaflfe returned to Fort George. In the latter part of Noveniber, General Smyth, who had succeeded General Van Rensselaer in command, made a melodramatic attempt at another invasion of Canada, but v^ WAR OP 1812 19 this ended in such utter failure and so absolute a lack of results, as to call for no notice of its details. The humiliation of these miserable fiascos on land was, in a measure, relieved by a series of brilliant successes at sea which made famous the names of Bainbridge, Isaac Hull, Decatur, Rodgers and Jones. But it is the war on land with which we have to deal, and the time was now approaching when the Twenty-first Infantry was to make its first appear- ance in the theatre of action. As has been stated, this regiment was organized under the act of June 26th, 1812. On January 11th, 1812, Congress had passed a bill authorizing the immediate formation of ten addi- tional regiments of infantry, two of artillery, and one of dragoons, the men to be enlisted for five years unless sooner discharged. This act, however, stipulated that a regiment' of infantry should consist of two battalions of nine companies each, and that to each regiment should be appointed one Colonel, two Lieutenant-Colonels and two Majors. Most of the officers appointed under it were given rank from March 12th, 1812, and were sent on recruiting service, but not assigned to regiments. This plan of organization gave rise to so much dissatisfaction, on account of its unwieldiness and lack of field officers, that not much was done under its provisions. The act of June 26th was designed to remedy the objection- able feature of the earlier law, and provided that the infantry of the Army should consist of twenty-five regiments of ten companies each ; yet there were assigned to each regiment only three field officers — one Colonel, one Lieutenant-Colonel, and one Major. On May 22nd, the President detailed a Board of Officers to equalize the rank of all officers appointed under these two acts. The composition of this board was as follows : The Acting Inspector-General of the Army. The Acting Adjutant-General of the Army. Colonel Izard, of the Artillery. Colonel Parker, of the Infantry. Colonel Burns, of the Dragoons. Colonel Fenwick, of the Artillery. 20 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Lieutenant-Colonel Winder, of the Infantry. Captain Pinckney, of the Infantry. Captain Hayne, of the Dragoons. Former service. Volunteer commissions, etc., were consid- ered and the rearranged officers were commissioned or re- commissioned and assigned to regiments on July 23rd, being given rank from July 6th, 1812. Most of those assigned to the Twenty-first were officers who had already received com- missions dated March 12th. The first roster of the regiment's officers, given below, shows the States from which they were appointed and the dates upon which they were originally com- missioned. First Roster of Officers of the Twenty-first Infantry. Name and rank. Appointed from — Date of commission. Lieutenant-Colonel. E W Riolev Massachusetts . . . do March 12, do. do. do. do. do. do. March 24, March 12, do. do. April 9, 18 March 12, April 6, 18 March 12, 1813. Major. Samuel S Connor. . . . Captains. Daniel Libby, Jr Jeremiah Chapman . . . Lemuel Bradford do do do C E. Tobey do Charles Proctor do Joseph Grafton Joseph Treat Andrew McClary .... Benjamin Ropes J. H. Vose do 1813. do 1813. New Hampshire.. Massachusetts .. . do 13 First Lieutenants. Morrill Marston do 1813 Jonas Munroe William S. Moore Massachusetts .. . do 12. 1812. WAR OF 1812 21 First Roster of Officers — Continued. Name and rank. Appointed from— Date of commission. John Perley Massachusetts .... do March 23, 1812. Sullivan Burbank March 12, 1812. Samuel Harper Jonathan Eastman, Jr. Daniel Henderson . . . New Hampshire., do do. do. do do. Ebenezer White Second Lieutenants. Ira Aldrich Massachusetts . . . New Hampshire., do do. do. Josiah Bartlett Ira Drew do. Massachusetts . . . do do. Azor Orne do. Peter Pelham William Bowman .... Perez Loring Henry Bender Thomas Harrison .... John Downer Ensigns. Ebenezer Knox . . Massachusetts .. . Pennsylvania .... Massachusetts . . . do do. do. April 9, 1812. April 30, 1812. do do do May 15, 1812. March 26, 1812. March 12, 1812. Aaron Bigelow Francis Carr do do. do do. N N Hall do do. James Pratt do do. Thomas Bangs Joseph Cilley John Duncan Toseoh Lo'w do April 9, 1812. New Hampshire., do March 12, 1812. April 9, 1812. do May 27, 1812. Surgeon. George Bates Surgeon's Mates. Wm. Thorndike Ira Wright Massachusetts .. . do July 6, 1812. do. do July 1, 1812. 22 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY To these were added, commissioned as of the dates set opposite their names: First Lieutenant. Leonard Ross Massachusetts . . . Oct. 6, 1813. Ensigns. \Villiam Ross do Dec. Dec. 2, 1812. D. J. Hopkins New Hampshire . . 4, 1813. Recruiting for the Regular regiments was early found to be slow and difficult, and in order to create favorable conditions it was decided to localize these regiments as much as possible. As will be noticed in the above roster, most of the officers of the Twenty-first were appointed from Massachusetts, and all except one were from either that State or New Hampshire. Following out this plan, the enlisted men of the regiment were to be recruited in the same territory from which their officers came. Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley therefore made his headquarters at Pittsfield, Massachusetts, and there the regi- ment was concentrated upon the completion of its organiza- tion. Other officers were sent to various points in Massachu- setts and New Hampshire, and even some into Maine to recruit their companies. The New England States, in general, were opposed to the war. Massachusetts, in particular, bitterly resisted its prose- cution and the whole policy of the national Government. Nevertheless, there is sufficient proof of the loyalty and patriotism of many of the citizens of these States, and of the energetic activity of the officers of the Twenty-first Infantry, for its organization was completed, the companies assembled, armed, uniformed, disciplined and drilled, and nine of them, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ripley, started in October, 1812, to join the forces being assembled on Lake Champlain for service on the Niagara frontier. The tenth company, Captain Ropes, was left at Pittsfield for the purpose of obtaining and forwarding recruits to. the rest of the regi- ment. WAR OP 1812 23 It appears that this company moved about with some latitude in the prosecution of its duties, for we find it at Pittsfield until September of the next year, at Fair Haven in October, and in November back again at Pittsfield. As the other nine companies were soon in the midst of a campaign which they pursued until the end of the war, it is their course in which we are most interested, and we shall follow their story to its end. During November, 1813, these companies were at Platts- burg, New York, but the next month they crossed the lake to Burlington, Vermont, where they became a part of the Second Brigade of the Army of the North, and in this brigade, under different commanders, they remained until the close of the war. The other two regiments brigaded with the Twenty- first were the Ninth and the Twenty-fifth, and over them was placed Brigadier-General John Chandler, of Massachusetts, who had been appointed with that rank in July. General Dearborn had been placed in command of the Army of the North, with instructions from the War Department to con- centrate his army at Sackett's Harbor and Buffalo and, in the spring, to proceed with another invasion of Canada. For this purpose Kingston was designated as the principal objective point. About the middle of March, 1813, General Chandler's brigade, under orders from General Dearborn, set out on its march from Burlington to Sackett's Harbor, at the eastern end of Lake Ontario, where it arrived one month later. CHAPTER II. CAMPAIGN OP 1813. COMMODORE CHAUNCEY, during the preceding fall and winter, had collected a fleet of small vessels on Lake Ontario, and had made Sackett's Harbor his headquarters. In February it was planned that these vessels, co-operating with the troops at the Harbor, should make an attack on Kingston, but as Sir George Prevost had probably arrived at that place with reinforcements, and as Commodore Chauncey was detained in New York, it was decided to postpone the expedition until more American troops should be collected. About the first of March General Dearborn went to Sackett's Harbor and found there only about 3,000 troops of all arms. Dispatches were sent to hasten those on the way, and great exertions were made to strengthen the fleet and the defenses of the place. By the middle of April the new arrivals, among whom was the Twenty-first Infantry, swelled the total force to about 5,000 Regulars and twelve-months' Volunteers, 2,000 Militia and 1,300 sailors. General Dearborn and Commodore Chauncey agreed upon a plan of operations by which a com- bined land and naval force from Sackett's Harbor should attack and capture York, now Toronto,* Canada, and thence cross Lake Ontario for the purpose of taking Fort George, at the mouth of the Niagara. It was expected that, in the meantime, troops from Buffalo would have crossed the river and have captured Forts Erie and Chippewa, and the intention was that the two forces should then unite at Fort George for a descent upon Kingston. Their hopes for the co-operation •The reference to this town under its two names makes it interesting to note here that the name Toronto is an Indian word meaning "trees on the water," and has its application in the fact that an island near the shore is so low as to give the impression, from a little distance, that the trees on it are growing in the water. The Ftench here established a fort to which they gave the Indian name, but the British Governor Simcoe, in his policy of anglicizing the country, renamed it York. At a later date the Inhabitants commendably resumed the original name of Toronto, which the place, now grown into a city, still continues to bear. (24) WAR OF 1812 25 of the troops at Buffalo were somewhat disappointed, as both Erie and Chippewa remained in British hands until after the fall of Fort George. We will, then, follow the fortunes of the little army gathered at Sackett's Harbor. Capture of York. On April 22nd, the embarkation of troops upon the fourteen vessels of Chauncey's squadron began. These numbered about 1,700 men, and comprised the Sixth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Twenty-first Infantry regiments, a few riflemen under Major Forsyth, some artillery and some Volunteers. On the 25th, the embarkation having been completed, the fleet set sail and, after a tempestuous voyage, arrived, early in the morning of the 27th, before the town of York. The garrison of the place consisted of about 800 British troops and some Indians, 'General Sheaffe being personally in command. General Dearborn, suffering from ill health, placed his land forces under the command of Brigadier-General Zebulon Pike and remained aboard the Commodore's flagship. Carefully prepared orders for making the attack had been issued before leaving Sackett's Harbor. These provided that the troops should advance in two lines, and that the Twenty-first In- fantry, formed in six platoons, with Lieutenant-Colonel McClure's Volunteers on its flanks, should form the second line. At eight o'clock in the morning, the attacking party. Major Forsyth's Riflemen in the lead, approached the shore in small boats. It had been the intention to land opposite the old French Fort Toronto, but a strong wind drifted the boats to a point half a mile to the west and deprived them of much of the protection they had expected from the guns of the fleet. Those in the lead were fired upon by Indians and a company of British troops, but the landing was made with little loss and the continually augmented column pushed back its oppon- ents into the Western Battery, which was well armed with twenty-four pounders. The Sixteenth Infantry was preparing 26 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY to Storm this position when its magazine blew up, compelling its defenders to abandon it and retreat to the Half-moon Battery, which they also abandoned shortly afterward, at the approach of the American column. The Indians having fled from the battle, the British troops fell back to the Governor's House, whence they continued to fire with heavy guns. The Americans moved up their artillery, which, with that of the fleet, soon silenced the fire of the garrison. After waiting a short time for the white flag, which it was expected would now be displayed, a small party went forward to reconnoiter the enemy's position. General Pike was seated on a stump questioning a British Sergeant who had been taken prisoner, when the air was rent by a tremendous explosion that threw huge stones and timbers in every direction. The garrison, despairing of holding the place, had blown up the main magazine, which contained five hundred barrels of pow- der and a large number of shells. When the smoke cleared fifty-two Americans lay dead and one hundred and eighty wounded. General Pike, two of his aides, and the Sergeant with whom he had been talking, were mortally wounded. The British, however, had managed badly and forty of their own men lost their lives in the explosion. For some moments the Americans were scattered and thrown into confusion, but they soon rallied under Colonel Pearce of the Sixteenth Infantry, the senior officer after the disabling of General Pike, and pressed on, with cheers, toward the village. Here they were met by the civil officials and the officers of Canadian Militia, who surrendered the place, it being agreed that all. private property was to be respected. General Sheaffe, with his Regulars, retreated through the village, set fire to some public stores and a partly constructed vessel on the stocks, and continued on his way to Kingston. At sunset the Americans took possession of the town. As spoils of the capture they held 290 prisoners, the war vessel "Duke of Gloucester" and a considerable quantity of military and naval stores. Such of the latter as could not be removed were destroyed and, before the troops left, the public build- WAR OP 1812 27 ings were fired and burned. This act gave rise to retaliation and to much acrimonious dispute. It was stated, on the American side, that the soldiers were moved thereto by their anger at finding, hung above the Speaker's mace, in the Parlia- ment House, a human scalp. Vigorous denial was made by the British, but the statements of both General Dearborn and Commodore Chauncey, made at the time, support the American reports of the incident. The American loss in the capture of York was 66 killed and 303 wounded on land, among the latter being Colonel Ripley, of the Twenty-first, and 17 killed and wounded on the vessels of the fleet. The British lost, besides prisoners, 60 killed and 89 wounded. General Pike died on board one of the vessels, with the captured British flag as a pillow beneath his head. His fall was such as he had wished in a letter written to his father on the day he left Sackett's Harbor — "like Wolfe's — to sleep in the arms of Victory." The campaign of the Army of the North had begun auspiciously. Capture of Fort George. The Americans, believing that the place was not of suffi- cient importance to justify its permanent occupation, trans- ferred such stores as they could remove to Chauncey's vessels and, on the first of May, re-embarked, to continue their plan for a descent upon the British posts on the Niagara. Adverse winds kept them in Toronto harbor until May 8th. General Dearborn and Commodore Chauncey preceded the fleet and selected a camp site on Four Mile Creek, four miles east of the mouth of the Niagara River, where the troops were debarked upon their arrival on May 9th. The ships immediately returned to Sackett's Harbor to bring on more of the troops remaining there. All but a few of the Regulars were removed as rapidly as possible and sent to General Dearborn's camp on Four Mile Creek. Other reinforcements of Militia and Volunteers brought the total force at that place, on May 25th, 28 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY to nearly 6,000 men, exclusive of the garrison of Fort Niagara and the sailors and marines of the fleet. On that day Commander Oliver Perry, who, in September of the same year, won fame by his splendid victory on Lake Erie, arrived to take part in the proposed attack. He and Commodore Chauncey spent the following day in carefully surveying the shore about the mouth of the Niagara, and recommended to General Dearborn, who was still confined to his quarters by illness, that the attack should be made the next morning. The order directing the movement was made out and signed by Colonel Winfield Scott, who was now act- ing as Dearborn's Adjutant-General. The British had at Fort George about 1,400 troops of the various arms, and perhaps half that many more, including Volunteers and Indians, at smaller posts scattered along the Niagara. All were under the command of Brigadier-General John Vincent, who was stationed at Fort George. During the night of the 26th about 5,000 of our men were embarked on the vessels of Chauncey's fleet and in a number of small boats that had been made and brought to the camp for that purpose. Before sunrise the whole flotilla moved toward the mouth of the Niagara, the intended landing place being near the lighthouse on the Canadian side of the river. Arrived in position, the guns of the fleet soon silenced a British battery in the vicinity, and under the immediate super- vision of Commander Perry the debarkation began. It was led by Colonel Scott, who commanded his own regiment (the Second Artillery), Forsyth's Riflemen and some detachments from infantry regiments — in all, 500 men. Following these, with Colonel Porter's Light Artillery, went the brigades of Generals Boyd, Winder and Chandler. Colonel Macomb's regiment of artillery and the marines and sailors of the fleet constituted the reserve. The leading boats were fired upon without effect by some 200 British concealed in a nearby wood, but by the time the commands of Colonel Scott and General Boyd had landed and were prepared to advance, they were met by 1,000 of the WAR OF 1812 29 enemy under Colonel Myers, and a determined struggle at once began. In this Colonels Scott and James Miller,* (later Colonel of the Twenty-first Infantry) with their respec- tive regiments, the Second Artillery and the Sixth Infantry, bore conspicuous parts. At first the Americans were forced back to the lake shore, but the fire from the fleet and from the constantly increasing number of troops finally became so severe that the British were compelled to retreat. General Vincent, convinced that he could not hold Fort George against the force brought to the attack, ordered its guns to be spiked and its magazines to be blown up, and that the troops under his command should fall back and rendezvous at the Beaver Dams, eighteen miles to the west. Learning of the impending destruction while passing the fort in pursuit of the fleeing enemy. Colonel Scott hastened toward it with two companies, to save, if possible, its guns and ammunition. One of the magazines exploded when he was near the fort and he was knocked from his horse and severely hurt by flying timbers. Pressing forward on foot, he forced the gates, extinguished the trains lit to fire the other magazines and saved the remainder of the stores. Rejoining his column, he rapidly continued the pursuit, confident that he could capture or destroy the British troops, but receiving peremptory orders from both Generals Lewis and Boyd to return, he reluctantly abandoned the chase. By noon of the 37th the Americans were in full possession of Fort George and the village of New- ark. That night Forts Erie and Chippewa were evacuated, and their garrisons marched to the camp at Beaver Dams, General Vincent having ordered the abandonment of the whole Niagara frontier. The American loss was only 40 killed and about 100 wounded. Owing to the rapidity of the action after the be- ginning of the debarkation, only a small number of our troops were actually engaged. The Twenty-first, being in the third brigade, did not come under fire and suffered no losses. •Colonel Scott, who had been captured at Queenstown in October, 1812, and Colonel Miller, who had been captured at Detroit in August, 1812, had been exchanged and were again serving with their regiments. 30 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY The British Regulars lost 51 killed and 305 wounded, miss- ing and prisoners. Besides these, 507 of their Canadian Militia were captured, as well as the guns and stores of Fort George and its dependent works. All his forces having been assembled during the night, General Vincent, early in the morning of the 38th, resumed his march for Burlington Heights, where he purposed taking a new position. That same morning General Lewis, with the brigades of Generals Winder and Chandler, was sent against Vincent at Beaver Dams. On arriving in the vicinity, it was found that the British were gone. Our troops made a wide detour to assure themselves that the line of the Niagara was actually abandoned and, having encountered no resist- ance, returned to Newark. Here General Dearborn and Commodore Chauncey disagreed as to the further course to be pursued, and the remaining few days of the month were spent in inaction. Defense of Sackett's Harbor. During that time, however, exciting events occurred at Sackett's Harbor, where a few members of the Twenty-first had been left when the greater part of the troops were removed to assist in the attack on Fort George. As the course of events there was most creditable to them and to all the Regular troops involved, we will now return for a narra- tion of their story. When the expedition against Fort George was being pre- pared, nearly all the troops in camp at Sacjcett's Harbor were removed to the camp under General Dearborn near the mouth of the Niagara. Just how many were left, or how many new men arrived before the British attacked the place a little later, is uncertain. Different authorities variously esti- mate the total number of Regulars who defended the place at from 500 to 800. It is known that the force left there con- sisted of small detachments from the Ninth, Twenty-first and Twenty-third Infantry regiments, from the First Dragoons, and from both light and heavy artillery. It is known that WAR OF 1812 31 most of those belonging to the infantry regiments were recently arrived recruits, and invalids or convalescents who were not considered fit for the active operations being carried on at the other end of the lake. General Wilkinson in his memoirs stated that of the Ninth and Twenty-first Infantry there were 13 officers and 381 enlisted men. Whatever the correct figures may be, it is certain that they were few in numbers and lacking in organization, and that the detach- ments, from the nature of their composition, were poorly fitted for either offensive or defensive operations. Yet, when neces- sity called them into battle, they stood firmly amid the deser- tion of their Militia supports and the seeming wreck of the American fortunes, acquitting themselves with success and with more than honor. Sir George Prevost, the British commander at Kingston, seeing the important post of Sackett's Harbor almost denuded of defenders, at once resolved to attack and capture it. Its loss would have been a serious blow to the American Army of the North, and those left at the place were apprehensive that this very thing might occur. General Jacob Brown, of the New York Militia, had completed the six months' service for which he had taken the field at the beginning of the war, and was then at his home a few miles from the Harbor. It was agreed between him and Colonel Backus, who had been left in command, that, in case of an attack, General Brown was to call in the neighboring Militia, come to the camp and take command. On the evening of May 37th, the "Lady of the Lake," which had been cruising off Kingston to watch the enemy's move- ments, arrived with the intelligence that a strong squadron under Sir James Yeo had just set sail from that port. Gen- eral Brown came to the camp that night and sent off messeng- ers to arouse the officers of Militia all over his district. As they arrived on the following day they were sent to Horse Island, about a mile from the village, where 250 Albany Vol- unteers had been stationed for a week. This island commands 32 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY the mouth of the harbor and is separated from the mainland by a shallow strait, always fordable and often nearly dry. At midday the fleet appeared. It consisted of six vessels, mounting ten or twelve guns each, and forty bateaux. It car- ried about a thousand British troops and was accompanied by a considerable number of Indians in canoes. The whole expe- dition was under the command of Sir George Prevost, who retained personal charge of its land forces. The ships lay to some distance from shore and embarked a strong force in small boats to attempt a landing. Just at that time nineteen small American vessels were sighted, approaching from the west, and the British com- mander ordered his men aboard again and set sail with the evident intention of relinquishing his original purpose. His Indian allies, however, seeing no reason to swerve from the course on whch they had set out, dashed off in their canoes to meet the Americans. Seemingly emboldened by this spirited onset. Sir George again turned about and sent several boatloads of soldiers to join the canoes. The American boats were carrying reinforcements for Sackett's Harbor, under com- mand of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Aspinwall. Twelve of the smaller ones, with seventy men, were captured by the British and Indians. The other seven, being larger and swifter, escaped to the shore, and Colonel Aspinwall, with a hundred men, succeeded in reaching the Harbor at nine o'clock that night. About midnight, some Indians having landed on Horse Island, the Militia and Volunteers were withdrawn to the main- land and a line was formed to meet the enemy who, it was correctly supposed, would land a greater force the next morn- ing. The Militia, about 500 strong, were posted on the left of the line, with a six-pounder cannon, all having a strong position behind a sharp ridge of sand and gravel, facing the shore. On the right of the Militia the Albany Volunteers were stationed, and on their right, and separated from them by a strip of thick woods, were the Regulars. At dawn of the 29th the British troops put off in their WAR OF 1812 33 small boats and, as had been expected, effected a landing on Horse Island. As they advanced to cross the shallow strip of water between them and the mainland, the Militia, by whom they were confronted, delivered one scattering volley and then, seized with uncontrollable panic, although they had suffered no loss, rose as one man and fled. General Brown, chagrined by their conduct, ran after them and tried, without effect, to stay their flight. Most of them were heard of no more that day. On the extreme left Captain McNitt, although deserted by his men in the first panic, succeeded in rallying about eighty of them in some fallen timber and was able later to again lead them into the fight. Colonel Backus now came from the right of the line and, with the Albany Volunteers, who were still firm, although they had been compelled to retire when the Militia fled, con- fronted the enemy as they advanced upon the village. Gen- eral Brown, riding hastily to this part of the line, found Colonel Backus, with his Regulars and the Volunteers, obstinately dis- puting every inch of the enemy's progress. Overborne by numbers, they were forced back to some log barracks near the town, and these they prepared to hold to the last extremity. Just before reaching this point two disheartening disasters occurred. Dense clouds of smoke arose in the rear, and at first they were thought to have been caused by another party of the enemy. The true explanation, however, was soon given. Lieutenant Chauncey, of the Navy, who had been left in charge of the stores, seeing the wild flight of the Militia and, being told by them that all was lost, set fire to the storehouses and the new warship, "General Pike." General Brown, return- ing from an investigation of this catastrophe, found Colonel Backus had just fallen, mortally wounded, and assisted in carrying him from the field. Seeing that the position at the barracks must not be lost. General Brown set about creating a diversion. Having noticed a mass of frightened fugitives huddled in the out- skirts of the town, he rode up to them, harangued them, and induced about two hundred of them to march toward the 34 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY place where the British had landed, as if in an attempt to cut them off from their boats. The ruse was a success. Pre- vost, seeing this body of men in his rear, supposed they were reinforcements of Regulars and sounded a retreat. This, in the attempt to execute it with rapidity, became precipitate and ended in almost a flight. Our troops turned their attention to extinguishing the flames and saved many of the stores. The "General Pike," being built of green timber, was but little damaged by the fire. At about ten o'clock A. M., Prevost sent a demand for the surrender of the place, which was of course treated with scorn. At noon the British troops re-embarked and set sail for Kingston, having wholly failed in accomplishing their object. General Brown's report to the Secretary of War was strongly worded. As he was himself a General of Militia, and therefore not likely to be prejudiced in favor of Regular troops, some extracts from that report will bear quotation. "It is, however, impossible to execute such orders with raw troops unaccustomed to subordination. My orders were, in this case, disobeyed. The whole line* fired, and not with- out effect, but in the moment while I was contemplating this, to my utter astonishment they rose from their cover and fled. ***** **** "It was during this last movement that the Regulars under Colonel Backus first engaged the enemy — nor was it long before they defeated him. Hurrying to this point of the action, I found the battle still raging, but with obvious advan- tage on our side. The result of the action, so glorious for the officers and soldiers of the Regular Army, has already been communicated in my letter of the 29th. * * * * xhe enemy's force consisted of 1,000 picked men led by Sir George Prevost in person. The report of casualties by Major William Swann, Adju- tant-General, was as follows: "Killed, 29 privates, Regulars, and one Volunteer ; wounded, 5 officers and 76 men. Regulars, and 3 privates. Volunteers; missing, 9 men. Regulars and 17 Volunteers ; Militia, all classes, not to exceed 25." •Militia. C. B. H. WAR OF 1812 35 A part of his report also states: "About 400 of the Regular troops sustained the heat of the action; these consisted chiefly of the First Regiment Light Dragoons, some of the Ninth, Twenty-first, and a few of the Twenty-third Infantry, Third and Light Artillery." The British reported one officer and 46 men killed ; 12 offi- cers and 183 men wounded, and 3 officers and 13 men missing. End of Dearborn'' s Campaign. On the Niagara, as has been stated, nothing was done during the last few days of May. On the 31st Commodore Chauncey set sail with his fleet for Sackett's Harbor. Gen- eral Dearborn, hearing that General Proctor was on his way from Detroit to join General Vincent in an attempt to recover the Niagara frontier, again resolved to strike at Vincent before the expected reinforcements could arrive. Accordingly, on June 1st, he detached General Winder with 800 men for the pursuit. This was palpably too weak a force, as Vincent took with him twice that many men when he retreated from Beaver Dams. General Winder advanced rapidly as far as Twenty Mile Creek, where, learning that Vincent had received rein- forcements from Kingston and was strongly posted at Burling- ton Heights, he halted and sent back this information, asking that he also be reinforced. General Dearborn weakly responded by sending General Chandler, with a part of his brigade numbering 500 men, to join Winder. The Twenty- first remained at Newark and so did not participate in this expedition, which proved to be fruitless and discouraging in its outcome. General Chandler arrived at Twenty Mile Creek in the morning of the 5th of June and, as the senior officer, took command of the combined detachments. Rapidly pushing for- ward, he drove in two British outposts and halted in the evening of that day at Stony Creek, seven miles from the enemy's camp. It is said that he expected and prepared for a night attack, causing his men to sleep with their arms at their sides. However, the British Colonel Harvey, who made 36 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY a reconnaissance with a few troops early in the night, sent back word to his commander that the American dispositions were weak and faulty and promised success to a night attack. General Vincent took with him 600 or 700 men and started at once to carry out the suggestion. Having obtained the countersign from a spy, he was enabled to seize the sentinels in his front and completely surprise the American bivouac. At two o'clock in the morning he charged the center of our line, sending small detachments against both flanks. There was soon inextricable confusion and both sides attacked who- ever happened to be nearest, the victims proving to be friends as often as they were foes. General Vincent was thrown from his horse and wandered into the forest, where he was lost for several days. The British soon withdrew and returned to their camp, carrying with them two pieces of the American artillery and, among other prisoners, both Generals Chandler and Winder. The American loss, in killed, wounded and missing, was 155, against 178 on the part of the enemy. Nevertheless, the affair was admittedly a substantial victory for the British, inasmuch as they had captured the two general officers and had accomplished their object of warding off an attack upon them- selves. Our troops, led by Colonel Bum, of the dragoons, retreated precipitately to Forty Mile Creek, where they were met by Colonel James Miller, with four hundred men of the Sixth Infantry. The next day they were joined by Generals Lewis and Boyd with their staffs, and a camp was formed upon the borders of the lake. On the morning of the 8th Sir James Yeo's fleet and some British troops, advancing from Burling- ton Heights, made their appearance almost simultaneously. Desultory firing ensued, without loss of life on either side, but a number of boats loaded with stores were taken by the enemy's fleet. At ten o'clock in the morning the American detachment again fell back and succeeded in reaching Fort George after losing a few prisoners on the way. General Vin- WAR OF 1812 37 cent advanced a portion of his forces and reoccupied his former position at Beaver Dams. On the 23d of June General Dearborn detached Colonel Boerstler, of the Fourteenth Infantry, with 570 men and two field pieces to attempt the capture of some stores collected by the British at De Cou's house near Beaver Dams. Before reaching their objective they fell into an Indian ambuscade that delayed them until a number of Canadian Militia and British Regulars from De Cou's and Beaver Dams arrived upon the scene. Colonel Boerstler surrendered his entire command. The enemy again pushed forward his lines, reoccupied Queens- ton, and actually threatened our army at Fort George with a formidable force. This ill-starred venture proved to be the last undertaken under General Dearborn's direction. He had disappointed all expectations of the Government and his subordinates. The earlier successes of the army under his command seemed more attributable to the efforts of Generals Pike, Brown and Boyd, Colonels Scott and Miller, and the naval officers. Commodore Chauncey and Commander Perry. Left to himself, General Dearborn seemed capable of nothing but errors. Secretary of War Armstrong resolved to remove him from command and to replace him by Major-General James Wilkinson, who was then commanding in the gulf region of the south. Paraphras- ing the famous caution of General Lee to General Gates during the Revolution, Armstrong wrote to Wilkinson : "Why should you remain in your land of cypress when patriotism and ambition equally invite you to one where grows the laurel?" Wilkinson set out on his long journey overland to Washington, and Dearborn quitted the army on the Niagara, leaving it temporarily under the command of General Boyd. In passing, we should consider several facts that throw some light upon the conditions existing in the Army of the North. General Dearborn was not a man of military train- ing or aptitude. He had had some experience during the Revolutionary War, but his public service was mainly in 38 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY offices of a political nature, where his work was generally satisfactory and at times distinguished. When commissioned a Major-General in 1812 he was Collector of the Port of Boston. Moreover, he was at this time, the summer of 1813, over sixty-two years of age. He had suffered from ill health from the very outset of his campaign and in this the medical records and reports of the time show that he shared the mis- fortune of his army. There was much disease and great loss of life in the lake camps that summer, producing, as can be well imagined, great weakness and demoralization. The surgeons' reports show the prevalent diseases to have been diarrhoea, dysentery, typhus, rheumatism, jaundice, "lake fever" and ergotism. They ascribed as the main causes bad water and poor food. It may be seen, however, that most of these were preventable diseases. Their causes may be traced to general ignorance and neglect of the principles of sanitation, and the mortality largely to ignorance of the proper methods of treatment. Under the then existing conditions the army's food consisted mainly of bread and salt meat, a diet, in itself, conducive to disease. Our men were beset by conditions that are at the present day unknown and unbelievable. Ergotism is a poison- ing derived from ergot in grain, some heads of which, instead of developing into normal kernels, are filled with a black fungus commonly called "smut." Its symptoms are nervous disorders, a gangrenous affection of the extremities, and dementia. Its source was bread made from grain containing this fungus and, as whiskey was then issued as part of the ration, the same contaminated grain being used for distilling, the poison found a second vehicle for entrance into the systems of its victims. What "lake fever" .was is not known, but a guess may be hazarded that it would now be called typhoid fever. In those days bleeding was nearly always resorted to in fever cases, and the surgeons reported that the "lake fever" patients usually died under such treatment. There can be little wonder tliat such should have been the result under the system then in vogue of freely bleeding and depriving the WAR OF 1812 39 sufferer of all drinking water. Even the lay mind now stands aghast at such monumental ignorance, but it must be remem- bered that the present generation has witnessed the final pass- ing of this atrocity. Nothing further of importance occurred on the Niagara during the summer, although the British were aggressive, and picket fights and skirmishes were continually occurring. In August General Boyd received orders from Washington to keep within his own lines and attempt no offensive move- ments. On the last day of July General Wilkinson arrived in Washington, wearied by his long journey and weakened by disease that he had contracted on the way. The Govern- ment's plans for his future actions were laid before him and he suggested a somewhat different course. It appears that these suggestions offended the Secretary of War, and the for- mer cordiality between them at once began to develop into opposition and estrangement. Wilkinson' s Campaign on the St. Lawrence. After a few days' rest in Washington General Wilkinson proceeded to Sackett's Harbor, where he arrived on August 20th, 1813. From the outset of his campaign there existed conditions that foredoomed it to failure. He was no longer a young man, being then between fifty-six and fifty-seven years of age. He came to his new post of duty weakened by the illness with which he was afflicted during his long journey thither, and in poor condition to take up the task that lay before him. Worst of all was the fact that, at the same time that he was ordered to the command of the North- ern Army, Major-General Wade Hampton, of North Carolina, had also been ordered north from Virginia and had been given command of the portion of this army then at Burling- ton, Vermont. The Government made the grave mistake, since many times repeated, of putting two commanding officers of the same rank in the same field of action, instruct- 40 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY ing them to co-operate with each other, and expecting one to exercise the chief command. General Hampton was a man sixty years of age, who had been actively engaged in a partisan warfare in the south during the Revolution. He was the owner of immense plantations and a great number of slaves in his own State and in Louis- iana, and was a typical exponent of the princely southern aristocracy. As such he possessed great military ineptitude, acknowledging no superior and submitting to no restraint or discipline. Moreover, he and General Wilkinson were bitter personal enemies, and any hope of their voluntary co-operation was unlikely of fulfillment. On his way north, Wilkinson, as commander of the army, sent from Albany his first orders to General Hampton at Bur- lington. The latter angrily wrote to the Secretary of War, insisting that his was a separate command and tendering his resignation if compelled to serve under Wilkinson. From Sackett's Harbor General Wilkinson wrote requesting, quite properly, it would seem, if he were to be considered as com- mander-in-chief of the army, that all orders for troops in his district should be transmitted through him. Any other course, he concluded, "would impair my authority and distract the public service. Two heads on the same shoulders make a monster." A little later Secretary of War Armstrong inter- jected his own personality, as a quasi commander, and, as a result, says the historian Ingersoll, "that deplorable campaign was a monster with three heads, biting and barking at each other with a madness which destroyed them all and disgusted the country." On arriving at Sackett's Harbor General Wilkinson found himself in command of, nominally, about 14,000 troops, scat- tered from Burlington, Vermont, on the east, through Sack- ett's Harbor, to Fort George, Canada, on the west. Owing to the great amount of sickness in the army, however, its effective strength was not above 9,000. On the 28th of August a council of war was held, at which it was decided to concentrate at WAR OF 1812 41 Sackett's Harbor all the troops except those on Lake Cham- plain, preparatory to resuming offensive operations. Captain Nathaniel Leonard, of the artillery, was left at Fort Niagara and Colonel Winfield Scott, with 800 Regulars and some Militia, was left in command of Fort George, with instructions, if the British troops should retire from that vicinity, to turn over the fort to Brigadier-General McClure of the Militia, and proceed, with his Regular^, to join Wilkin- son. The remainder of the army, including the Twenty-first Infantry, was embarked on Chauncey's vessels, which set sail, October 2nd, for Sackett's Harbor. A week later the British General Vincent, hearing of General Proctor's defeat by Har- rison on the River Thames, did withdraw toward Burlington Heights and, on the 13th, Colonel Scott relinquished command of the fort to General McClure, crossed the river with his Regulars and started to march overland to Sackett's Harbor. At the latter place General Wilkinson re-brigaded his army as follows: First Brigade, General Boyd: Fifth, Twelfth and Thir- teenth Infantry. Second Brigade, General Brown: Sixth, Fifteenth and Twenty-second Infantry. Third Brigade, General Covington: Ninth, Sixteenth and Twenty-fifth Infantry. Fourth Brigade, General Swartwout: Eleventh, Four- teenth and Twenty-first Infantry. The remaining troops, consisting of three regiments of artillery and two of dragoons, were formed into a provisional brigade under the command of General Porter. On the 4th of September the Secretary of War and the Adjutant-General of the Army arrived at Sackett's Harbor, having come with the avowed purpose of promoting harmony between the rival commanders and superintending subsequent operations. At first it was planned to attack Kingston and then, in case of success there, to carry an expedition down the St. Lawrence against Montreal. Later, it was decided to abandon the attempt on Kingston and to proceed down the 42 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY river at once. Orders were sent to General Hampton to move with his troops, about 4,000 men, to the Canada line at the mouth of the Chateaugay River, and to hold the enemy in check there until he could join the force proceeding down the St. Lawrence under Wilkinson. The brigades at Sackett's Harbor were ordered to remove to Grenadier Island, eighteen miles from the Harbor, where they were to be finally instructed and placed in order for their journey. On the evening of the 16th of October the Twenty-first, with the other regiments, embarked in boats and set out for the rendezvous. At first the weather was fair, but by midnight the wind freshened to a gale and the boats were scattered in every direction. The night was dark, the route confusing, and there were few pilots. A storm of rain and sleet came on and all suffered severely from the cold. In the morning the shore was strewn with wreckage. Fifteen large boats were lost and many others were seriously damaged. The storm continued violently for thirty-six hours, but on the 19th calmed sufficiently to allow the brigades of Generals Boyd and Brown to reach the island. On the 20th there arrived the brigades of Generals Covington, Swartwout and Porter. Portions of each of these, having lost their boats in the storm, did not arrive until four or five days later. Storm followed storm, and snow fell to the depth of ten inches. Winter was at hand. On the 29th, General Brown's brigade, with some dragoons and artillery, left the island and went a few miles down the river to French Creek. The rest of the army remained in camp on Grenadier Island until November 1st. While all these preparations were going on at Sackett's Harbor, General Hampton had moved to the westward as far as the village of Chateaugay, in New York, where he remained until October 21st. Having received further instruc- tions, he then advanced to the north and east along the Chateaugay River. After traversing a distance of nearly thirty miles in this new direction he found a British force, under Lieu- tenant-Colonel de Salaberry, intrenched in a wood that bor- WAR OF 1812 43 dered the river. He was ignorant of the enemy's numerical strength, which was really only about a thousand, but resolved to attack and capture his stronghold. A detach- ment that set out on the night of October 25th, to gain his rear, was lost and spent the night and most of the next day wander- ing through the surrounding swamps. It was not until two o'clock the next afternoon that General Izard, with the rest of the army, was ordered to advance to the attack. De Sala- berry, knowing himself to be confronted by much superior numbers, resorted to a clever but simple stratagem. He posted several buglers, at a considerable distance apart, along an extensive line and, when some firing was heard on the flank, caused them all to sound calls, as if to a line of troops. Gen- eral Hampton easily fell into the trap. Supposing himself to be confronted by great numbers, he withdrew from the field and slowly fell back to his former camp at Chateaugay, New York. His loss had been about forty, the British half that number. Thus ended his inglorious campaign, which was everywhere regarded as a disgrace to our arms. On the 1st and 3d of November General Brown was attacked at French Creek by a number of small British ves- sels, but succeeded each time in beating them off with slight loss to his troops. As rapidly as possible the other brigades were transported to that point and again landed to complete their preparations for the voyage down the river. On Novem- ber 3d the last ones arrived and on the 4th General Wilkinson issued his orders for the final embarkation. At dawn of November 5th the whole flotilla, consisting of nearly three hundred boats, slipped silently out and down the river, hoping to elude for a time the enemy's watchful- ness. In this they were unsuccessful, for a number of British gunboats at once took up the pursuit and harassed them throughout the day. At one point, near Bald Island, the enemy boldly attacked the flotilla's rear and several boats had to be halted to make a defense. The expedition reached Morristown early in the evening and lay there during the night. 44 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY At Prescott, on the Canadian shore, were formidable bat- teries, and a body of troops from Kingston had followed our boats, marching along the north bank of the river, and had arrived at Prescott before the boats reached that point on the 6th. In order to minimize this danger General Wilkinson halted three miles above Ogdensburg, which lies opposite Prescott, and debarked all his men except a number sufficient to handle the boats, which were to run by the batteries that night. The troops, carrying most of their ammunition, marched to the Red Mill, four miles below Ogdensburg, where they were joined, on the morning of the 7th, by the boats, all except two of which had safely run the gauntlet. These two, heavily laden with valuable stores, ran aground near Ogdensburg and were for the time abandoned. To rescue them the Twenty-first Infantry retraced its steps to the point where the accident had occurred and set to work, in broad daylight and under the furious fire of the British battery on the opposite shore. In spite of the danger and difficulty of the undertaking, they soon succeeded in freeing the im- periled boats and running them through the rapids, at the foot of which they rejoined the rest of the command that evening. Here it was learned that artillery and infantry had been posted at every available point below to contest the progress of the expedition. General Wilkinson detached Colonel Macomb, with 1,300 men, and sent him across the river to clear away these impediments. Soon after Lieutenant-Colonel Forsyth, with his riflemen, was also sent across to follow and protect Macomb's rear. On November 8th the flotilla proceeded to the "White House," opposite the Canadian village of Matilda, eighteen miles below Ogdensburg. There General Wilkinson called a council of war, which was attended by Generals Lewis, Boyd, Brown, Porter, Covington and Swartwout. The strength of the enemy between them and Montreal was reported to be, approximately 1,500 Regulars, with 3,500 more daily expected from Quebec. The Canadian Militia that could be collected between Kingston and Quebec was supposed to WAR OF 1812 45 be about 30,000. The number that had followed from Kings- ton was not known. To oppose these, General Wilkinson's strength reports showed only 7,000 men. Still, the news of Hampton's abandonment of his part of the campaign not hav- ing yet been received, it was expected that he would add about 4,000 men to the available strength before they reached Montreal. With 11,000 men, mostly seasoned troops, suc- cess was not an unreasonable expectation. The question whether or not the army should proceed to an attack on Mon- treal was considered by the council and answered in the affirmative. General Brown, with his brigade and the remainder of the dragoons, at once crossed the river to join Colonel Macomb, march down the Canadian side of the river and drive away detachments of the enemy who would otherwise impede the progress of the flotilla. Then came the news that a British reinforcement of 1,000 men had come from Kingston to Prescott, where they had been joined by a number of provincial infantry and dragoons. The next morning this force was close upon the American rear with the armed vessels in which they had descended the river. Halting at Matilda, most of these troops were debarked to pursue our forces on the Canadian shore. To meet this contingency General Boyd was sent with his brigade to reinforce General Brown. Dur- ing the 9th the pursuing enemy, now swelled to a considerable number, harassed our column on land and our flotilla on the river. In the morning of the 10th, as Wilkinson was approach- ing the "Longue Saut," a rapid eight miles in length, he was informed that a large body of the enemy had assembled at its foot, erected a block-house, and was prepared to attack him when he came down. General Brown was ordered to advance and dislodge them. At noon cannonading was heard from that direction and at the same time the British gunboats again dropped down and opened fire. General Wilkinson landed his artillery, which replied so effectively that the gunboats were driven back up the river. It being inadvisable to enter the 46 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY rapids at night, the boats were moored near Chrystler's Island, a few miles below Williamsburg, while General Boyd, with his brigade, encamped near by. Battle of Chrystler's Field. At ten o'clock on the morning of the 11th a message was received from General Brown, in which he reported that his attack had been successful, and urged that the flotilla proceed, as his troops were exhausted and without shelter in the rain. The advance was again ordered, but at almost the same moment, word was brought that the enemy was strongly threatening Boyd's rear and that his gunboats were again opening fire. The situation was now becoming critical, and it found Wilkinson so ill that he was confined to his bed. However, he again moored the boats on the Canadian shore, just below Weaver's Point, landed Swartwout's bri- gade to assist Boyd in an attack upon the enemy, and also Covington's brigade to support the other two. Swartwout, with the Twenty-first Infantry under Colonel Ripley, immediately dashed into a strip of woods from which they drove the advance guard of the enemy back upon his main line in the open fields of Chrystler's Farm. This line was well chosen, with its left resting on a swamp and its right on the river, where it was supported by gunboats. Its front was protected by a number of ravines that cut up the ground and rendered an attack upon it extremely difficult. The sudden dash of the Twenty-first was followed by the remainder of Swartwout's brigade, together with a part of Boyd's that advanced under Colonel Coles, the whole making an attack upon the British left. At the same time General Covington led his brigade against the enemy's right, near Chrystler's house. The conflict was carried on in a storm of snow and sleet, the troops wading through deep mud, but, by charge after charge, they drove the British line back for nearly a mile. Although Swartwout's whole brigade engaged in the bat- tle, the Twenty-first Infantry, from the first, fought a some- WAR OF 1812 47 what independent action. For almost the first time it was called upon, as a regiment, to show its mettle, and right nobly it responded. On emerging from the strip of wood from which it had driven the enemy's advance, it found itself confronted by two British regiments. Notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, it unhesitatingly charged and drove them back upon their supports. Charging again, with the rest of the Fourth Brigade, it again forced the British line to retire, but, with the exhaustion of its ammunition, it suffered the unlucky fate of its sister regiments. General Covington fell, mortally wounded, and the ammu- nition of our troops at length became exhausted. In their turn, they were compelled to fall back. The British pressed their advantage and captured one piece of our artillery. The bat- tle had lasted for five hours and it seemed our forces were about to be routed, when Lieutenant-Colonel Upham, of the Twenty- first Infantry, arrived with 600 fresh men, and the whole body was enabled to reform in the edge of the woods from which the Twenty-first had driven the enemy's light troops earlier in the day. Night was coming on and the British made no further attack. Under cover of the darkness our men with- drew, in good order, to their boats. The American force engaged was 1,700. That of the Brit- ish has been variously stated at from 1,000 to 2,000. Our loss was 102 killed and 237 wounded. The British reported theirs as 22 killed, 147 wounded and 14 missing. Neither side gained a victory. The British lost fewer men and retained possession of the field. On the other hand, the American troops accomplished their object, of checking a harassing and impeding enemy, without undue loss of life. The next morning they embarked and proceeded down the river without further molestation, and were rejoined by Brown's brigade at a point three miles above Cornwall. Here Wilkinson expected to hear of Hampton's arrival at St. Regis, on the opposite bank of the St. Lawrence, but, instead, received a letter from him, stating that he had retreated to Chateaugay, and imparting the amazing intelli- 48 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY gence that he intended to fall back to Lake Champlain and, from there, assist in the attack on Montreal. General Wilkin- son at first wished to order Hampton's division forward again under General Izard, but a council of his general officers de- cided that, under the circumstances, a further advance was inexpedient, and that the army should cross the river and go into winter quarters at French Mills, on the Salmon River, just south of the New York line. At noon on November 13th the army turned its boats across the St. Lawrence and up the Salmon to the proposed location of its camp, where it was ordered to build huts for winter occupation. The weather was severe and the troops had en- dured great hardships. Now that the tension of the campaign was at an end, disease broke out with redoubled fury. Before huts could be prepared for its shelter, half the army was incapacitated by sickness. The resulting mortality was fright- ful. Among other deaths was that of Major John Johnson, of the Twenty-first Infantry, on December 11th, 1813. His service had begun in the Marine Corps, but he had been commissioned a Captain in the army in 1809, promoted to Major in April, 1813, and assigned to the Twenty-first on June 36th of that year. General Wilkinson went to Malone, New York, where a hospital was established. Generals Lewis and Boyd obtained leave of absence, and the cantonment was left under the com- mand of General Brown, who did his best, with slight eiifect, to alleviate the general suffering. Supplies of food, clothing and medicine were lacking and could be obtained only from Albany, two hundred and fifty miles distant. The enemy menaced the cantonment and took advantage of the soldiers' sufferings to attempt to entice them from their allegiance by offering to give them their arrears of pay and protect them on their arrival at British posts. To their credit, it may be said that these offers produced few results. Toward the end of January, 1814, General Wilkinson received orders from the War Department to break up this post on the Salmon. The hospital at Malone was abandoned WAR OF 1812 49 and on February 13th the boats and barracks at French Mills were destroyed. General Wilkinson, with a part of the army, retired to Plattsburg, while General Brown with the greater portion, in which the Twenty-first Infantry was included, set out on their return to Sackett's Harbor. Their march along the southern bank of the St. Lawrence was not unpleasant for that time of year. After eleven days' marching they arrived at the Harbor on February 24th, 1814. Thus ended the cam- paign of 1813 on the northern border. The War in Other Fields. Indecisive and barren of results as were the land actions on the northern frontier during 1813, they were with one notable exception, the most serious of the year. In the northwest, after the catastrophe on the River Raisin, General Harrison retired to Fort Meigs, at the Falls of the Miami River, where he was attacked by Proctor with a mixed force of British and Indians. Repulsed here, Proctor assaulted Fort Stephenson, garrisoned by a small force under Major Croghan, on August 1st and 3d. Again repulsed, he recrossed into Canada and occupied the post that had been established by the British at Maiden. After Perry's naval victory on Lake Erie, Harrison advanced upon this post and Proctor retired before him. On the River Thames the enemy was overtaken and there was fought a battle which, although by no means bloody, was decisive. In it was killed the famous Indian chief Tecumseh, a man of really great character and ability who had labored relentlessly to form a confederation of the Indian tribes against the United States. Proctor went east to the Niagara and had little further to do with the conduct of the war. In the south no British troops appeared, but the Creek Indians, in Georgia and Alabama, rose against the settlers, killed a few of them on their plantations and, on August 30th, 1813, seized Fort Mimms. Here they slew about three hundred of the Militia garrison and people who had gathered there for protection. During the latter half of the year and the early 50 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY months of the next they were put down by Generals Coffee and Andrew Jackson with a mercilessness and barbarity rival- ing that of the Indians themselves. The tribe was almost exterminated. The Atlantic coast was subjected to a close blockade. The section north of Chesapeake Bay was spared from actual attack, but Admiral Cockburn, who commanded the southern squad- ron, ravaged the Virginia coast, burned many villages and farmhouses and, at Hampton, permitted the perpetration of the most shameful outrages. In December the terms of service of the New York Militia at Fort George expired, and General McClure was left with only sixty Regulars to hold that place. The failure of Wilkin- son's expedition left the British free to recapture it. General McClure abandoned the fort, at the same time mistakenly setting fire to the village of Newark, and retired across the river to Fort Niagara. The latter was carelessly defended and, on the 18th, the enemy crossed the river and took it with over 300 prisoners, almost without resistance. Unfortunately they tarnished their otherwise creditable enough exploit by bayoneting a number of helpless invalids in their beds. At the same time General Riall crossed from Queenston and took Lewiston. On the 29th he routed the Militia gathered to defend Buffalo and destroyed that town and the neighboring one of Black Rock. In retaliation for the burning of Newark, the British mercilessly laid waste every American settlement along the Niagara. At sea there were no fleet actions, but numerous duels took place between separate vessels. In these our ships were not uniformly successful, but all reflected great credit upon the daring and efficiency of American seamanship. The repu- tation of our navy steadily rose. Tlie notable exception previously mentioned, and the thing that exerted a greater influence upon the fortunes of the war than any other single action during its progress, was the victory of Commander Oliver Perry over the British fleet on Lake Erie. Perry was only twenty-seven years old when WAR OP 1812 51 ordered to the lake command in February, 1813. He found his men almost without training, and a good part of the fleet he was to handle still in the virgin condition of uncut forest trees. By untiring exertion he made ready for action ten vessels of varying sizes, carrying, all told, fifty-five guns. On the morning of September 10th, while the American fleet was lying in Put-in-Bay, Ohio, Commander Barclay appeared with six British vessels carrying sixty-three guns, nearly all with a range superior to any the American guns could boast. Perry at once put out to meet his antagonist, flying at the masthead of his flagship a burgee bearing the words of the unfortunate Captain Lawrence, "Don't give up the ship." In the desperate action that ensued he defeated and captured every one of the enemy's vessels. His laconic dispatch to General Harrison, "We have met the enemy and they are ours," has since been an expression familiar to every American ear. The news of this victory set the whole country in a blaze of enthusiasm unparalleled since the days of Yorktown. Nor was this enthusiasm unwarranted. The mastery of Lake Erie and of all the waters to the west was at one blow torn from British hands. They were no longer able to threaten Ohio, and their occupancy of Michigan at once became precarious. The way was opened for Harrison's advance, and for his suc- cess on the River Thames. In the northwest the die had fallen in our favor. Changes in Command. In March, 1814, General Wilkinson was relieved from his command by War Department orders and, later, was brought to trial on a number of serious charges alleging misconduct during his campaign on the St. Lawrence. Before the court he showed that his movements had been by the direction and with the approval of the War Department itself, the Secretary of War and the Adjutant-General having been present in person, and that the inefTectiveness of his movement on Mon- treal could be ascribed mainly to General Hampton's failure to support him. He was acquitted and at once resigned his commission. General Harrison, also suffering from the inter- 52 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY ference of the Secretary of War, with whom he found himself in disfavor, resigned in disgust, and the public began to lay the blame for the disgraceful conditions existing among our land forces upon the War Department. General Dearborn had retired on account of ill health; General Hampton had resigned and returned to his estates, while Generals Winchester, Chandler and Winder were still prisoners in the hands of the enemy. On January 24th, 1814, Brigadier-Generals Brown and Izard were commissioned Major-Generals. A little later Colonels Macomb, T. A. Smith, Bissell, Scott, Gaines and Ripley were promoted to be Brigadier-Generals. On Wilkinson's resigna- tion, Brown became the commander of the Army of the North. In the latter half of the year 1813, five resignations and one death had occurred among the officers of the Twenty-first Infantry. Captain McClary had resigned on December 15th, First Lieutenant Munroe on September 30th, First Lieutenant Perley on December 18th, Ensign Low on September 15th, and BIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL RIPLEY. Eleazar Wheelock Ripley, born at Hanover, New HampsMre, on April 15, 1782, was a lineal descendant of Miles Standish and a grand- son of the Reverend Doctor Wheelock, founder of Dartmouth College. Having graduated at Dartmouth in 1800, he settled at Winslow, Massachusetts, where he engaged in the practice of law. In 1807 he was elected a member of the Legislature of his adopted state, and in 1811 succeeded Judge Story as its Speaker. On March 12, 1812, he received an appointment in the army, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry, being assigned to the Twenty-first Infantry, then un-organized. Making his headquarters at Pittsfield, Massachusetts, he recruited and organized his regiment and removed with it, in October of that year, to Plattsburg, New York. Shifting thence, in December to Burlington, Vermont, he went with his brigade, in March 1813, to Sackett's Harbor, New York. Promoted to be Colonel of the Twenty-first Infantry on March 12, 1813, he participated with it, on April 27, in the attack upon and cap- ture of York (Toronto), Canada, where he was wounded; and in the capture of Port George on May 27, 1813. During General Wilkinson's campaign on the St. Lawrence, in the autumn of 1813, he and his regiment bore a conspicuous part in the battle of Chrystler's Field, on November 11. He was promoted to be Brigadier General on April 15, 1814, and was assigned to command the Second Brigade of the Army of the North, under Major Genera! Jacob Brown. He was engaged in the battle of Chippewa, July 5, and in the battle OBVERSE OF GOLD MEDAL PRESENTED BY CONGRESS TO GENERAL RIPLEY WAR OF 1812 53 Surgeon Bates on October 1st. Ensign Bangs died on August 17th. During the year 1813 numerous changes took place in the commissioned personnel of the regiment, due to promotions, death, resignations, etc. On March 12th, Lieutenant Colonel Ripley was promoted to be Colonel; Major Timothy Upham, of the Eleventh Infantry, was promoted to be Lieutenant- Colonel of the Twenty-first, and Major Connor, of the Twenty- first, to be Lieutenant-Colonel of the Thirteenth Infantry. Major Connor's place was filled by Major John Johnson, A. A. G., transferred to the Twenty-first on June 26th. The latter died at French Mills on December 11th, and was succeeded, on the same date, by Major Richard Pollard, promoted from Cap- tain of the Twentieth Infantry. Changes among the company officers, during the year, took place as follows : Captain Libby, resigned July 30. Captain Grafton, promoted to Major of the Twenty-first, June 26. of Niagara (Lundy's Lane), on July 25, 1814. For his gallant conduct in the latter he received the brevet rank of Major General. In the defense of Fort Erie, on August 15, and in the sortie against the British works on September 17, 1814, he led his troops with marked bravery and ability, and in the latter action received so severe a wound that he had to be removed to Buffalo, New York, where, for three months, he hovered between life and death. For his services Congress voted him the thanks of the nation and awarded to him a gold medal the obverse of which is here shown. The states of New York, Massachusetts, South Carolina and Georgia also gave him expressions of their approbation and visible tokens of their appreciation. In the re-organization of the army in the spring of 1815, he was retained in the service with his rank of Brigadier General, but on Feb- ruary 1, 1820, he resigned his commission and became a resident of the state of Louisiana, where he resumed the practice of law. For some years he served his new state as a Senator in its Legis- lature, and in 1835 was elected to the House of Representatives of the National Congress. He continued a member of that body until his death at West Feliciana, Louisiana, on March 2, 1839. On the reverse of General Ripley's medal (not here shovm), is a figure of Victory holding beneath a palm tree a tablet upon which are inscribed the names, "Chippewa, Niagara, Erie". In her right hand are a trumpet and a wreath of laurel. Above the figure are the words "Resolution of Congress, November 8, 1814". Beneath are the words "Battles of Chippewa, July 5, 1814; Niagara, July 25, 1814; Brie, August 15-September 17, 1814"- 54 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY First Lieutenant Marston, promoted Captain, June 26. First Lieutenant Moore, resigned, September 1. First Lieutenant Burbank, promoted Captain, March 13. First Lieutenant Harper, resigned, April 10. First Lieutenant Eastman, promoted Captain, June 30. First Lieutenant White, resigned, April 30. First Lieutenant Ross, promoted Captain and assigned to the For- tieth Infantry, August 1. Second Lieutenant Aldrich, resigned, March 31. Second Lieutenant Bartlett, promoted First Lieutenant, June 26. Second Lieutenant Drew, promoted First Lieutenant, August 14. Second Lieutenant Orne, promoted First Lieutenant, March 13, and served as regimental Adjutant from that time till September, 1813, when he was detailed Acting Inspector-General, with the rank of Major. Second Lieutenant Pelham, promoted First Lieutenant, April 16. Second Lieutenant Bowman, promoted First Lieutenant, August 14. Second Lieutenant Loring, promoted First Lieutenant, March 13, and Captain, February 1. Second Lieutenant Bender, promoted First Lieutenant, May 13. Second Lieutenant Harrison, promoted First Lieutenant, and as- signed to the Ninth Infantry, March 20. Ensign Knox, struck off the rolls, March 2. Ensign Bigelow, promoted Second Lieutenant, April 16, and served as regimental Quartermaster from that time to July, 1814. Ensign Carr, resigned, July 31. Ensign Hall, promoted Second Lieutenant, March 13. Ensign Pratt, promoted Second Lieutenant, March 13. Ensign Cilley, promoted Second Lieutenant, May 13. Ensign Duncan, resigned, July 31. Ensign Ross, struck off the rolls. May 10. Ensign Hopkins, promoted Second Lieutenant, June 26, and struck oil the rolls, October 11. Surgeon's Mate Thorndike, resigned, July 21. Surgeon's Mate Wright, resigned, July 21. The following-named oflScers were added to the regiment during the year: Third Lieutenant Edward Hall, of Maine, June 24, and promoted Second Lieutenant, August 15. Ensign Daniel Rose, of Maine, July 14, promoted Third Lieutenant, August 15, and detailed Assistant Topographical Engineer, with rank of Captain, July 20. Ensign Hampton C. Babcock, of New York, August 1, and promoted Third Lieutenant, August 15. Ensign John W. Holding, of Maryland, from Sergeant-Major Twenty- first Infantry, August 5. WAR OP 1812 55 Ensign Benjamin F. Larned, of Massachusetts, October 1. Ensign Nicholas G. Bean, of New Hampshire, October 1. Ensign Bradwell Farnum, of New York, October 17. Ensign Nathaniel Hinkley, of Massachusetts, from Sergeant Twen- ty-first Infantry, November 24. Ensign James Craig, of Pennsylvania, from Sergeant Twenty-first Infantry, November 24. Surgeon Amasa Trowbridge, of New York, August 1. Surgeon's Mate Joslah Everett, of Massachusetts, July 21. Surgeon's Mate Ellsha L. Allen, of Massachusetts, July 21. Before proceeding with a narrative of the events of the year 1814, it will be well to give, in advance, a list of changes among the officers of the regiment during that year, in order that their careers may be better followed. As has been stated, Colonel Ripley was appointed Brigadier- General on April 15th, 1814, and he was succeeded in command of the Regiment by Colonel James Miller, promoted from Lieutenant-Colonel of the Sixth Infantry on March 9th. Major Pollard resigned June 25, and was succeeded, on August 4, by Major Vose, promoted from Captain Twenty-first Infantry on that date. Major William Bradford, promoted from Captain Seventeenth Infantry, was assigned to the Twenty-first on August 20. Major Grafton resigned September 1. Captain Chapman, died, January 1. Captain Bradford, killed at Fort Erie, September 17. Captain Tobey, resigned, February 28. Captain Proctor, resigned, June 23. Captain Eastman, resigned, April 30. First Lieutenant Bartlett, resigned, March 1. First Lieutenant Drew, promoted Captain, June 23. First Lieutenant Orne ,promoted Captain, February 28, and resigned September 30. First Lieutenant Pelham, promoted Captain, February 28. First Lieutenant Bowman, promoted Captain, August 4. First Lieutenant Bender, resigned, September 1. Second Lieutenant Downer, struck off the rolls, June 2. Second Lieutenant Bigelow, promoted, First Lieutenant, March 7, and killed at the battle of Niagara, July 25. Second Lieutenant Hall, promoted Second Lieutenant, March 17, detailed Acting Inspector-General, with rank of Major, April 25, 1814, to June 15, 1815. Brevetted Captain for distinguished service at Fort Erie, August 15, 1814, and promoted Captain Twenty-first Infantry, September 30. 56 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Second Lieutenant Pratt, promoted First Lieutenant, March 7, and Captain, September 30. Second Lieutenant Cilley, promoted First Lieutenant, March 7. Second Lieutenant B. Hall, promoted First Lieutenant, June 2. Third Lieutenant Rose, promoted Second Lieutenant, March 7, and First Lieutenant, June 23. Third Lieutenant Babcock, promoted Second Lieutenant, March 8, and First Lieutenant, July 25. Ensign Holding, promoted Second Lieutenant, March 8, and First Lieutenant, July 31. Brevetted Captain for gallant conduct at Niagara, July 25. Ensign Larned, promoted Third Lieutenant, March 7; Second Lieu- tenant, March 8, and First Lieutenant, August 4. Ensign Bean, promoted Third Lieutenant, March 7; Second Lieuten- ant, March 8, and First Lieutenant, September 1. Ensign Farnum, promoted Third Lieutenant, March 7 ; Second Lieu- tenant, March 8, and First Lieutenant, September 30. Ensign Hlnkley, promoted Third Lieutenant, March 8; Second Lieutenant, June 2, and First Lieutenant, September 30. Ensign Craig, promoted Third Lieutenant, March 8; Second Lieu- tenant, June 23. New officers assigned to the regiment during the year were as follows: Ensign Godfrey H. Belding, of Massachusetts, from Sergeant Twen- ty-first Infantry, March 30; promoted Third Lieutenant, May 1, and Second Lieutenant, July 25. Ensign James B. Fuller, of Massachusetts, March 30, promoted Third Lieutenant, May 1, and Second Lieutenant, December 31. Ensign Piatt R. Green, of Pennsylvania, May 31; promoted Second Lieutenant, October 1. Ensign Levin Jones, of Maryland, from Sergeant-Major Twenty-first Infantry, June 24; promoted Second Lieutenant, October 1. Ensign Calvin Cummings, of Massachusetts, from Sergeant Twenty- first Infantry, June 24; promoted Second Lieutenant, October 1, and resigned December 25. Ensign Jeremiah Thomas, of Vermont, from Sergeant Twenty-first Infantry, June 24; promoted Second Lieutenant, October 1. Ensign Leonard Hoar, from Sergeant Twenty-first Infantry, July 12 ; promoted Third Lieutenant, July 13, and Second Lieutenant, October 1. Ensign John Bentley, of Massachusetts, promoted from Sergeant Twenty-first Infantry, September 21, but was killed before date of com- mission, at Port Erie, Canada, on September 17. CHAPTER III. THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814 ON THE NIAGARA PENINSULA. SHORTLY after arriving at Sackett's Harbor, after the breaking up of the camp at French Mills, General Brown received two dispatches from the Secretary of War. The first informed him that Colonel Scott had been ordered to the Niagara frontier, and directed him to march with his division to Batavia, N. Y., where other and more detailed orders would await him. The second directed him to cross the lake on the ice and attack Kingston if, on consultation with Commodore Chauncey, such a move should be considered practicable. The two commanders decided that the force at the Harbor was insufficient for the latter undertaking, so General Brown started in the middle of March to make his way by land through Northern New York to Batavia. His division con- sisted of the Ninth, Eleventh, Twenty-first and Twenty-fifth regiments of Infantry, the Third Artillery and Captain Tow- son's company of the Seconal Artillery; it numbered about 2,000 men. When they had covered nearly half the distance, having arrived at a point near Syracuse, Brown became fear- ful that the War Department had not really intended him to make this westward move. Halting the troops, he hastened back to Sackett's Harbor. There, on consultation with Com- modore Chauncey, he concluded that his first decision was the correct one, so returned to his division and resumed the march toward Batavia. At the end of the month they arrived at the latter place, remained there during April, and then moved on toward Buffalo. Before reaching their destination General Brown received alarming reports of a threatened attack upon Sackett's Harbor and, feeling responsible for the safety of that place, turned over the command of the troops to Scott, now a Brigadier-General, and again returned, with all speed, to the Harbor, to prepare for its proper defense. Upon their arrival at Buffalo the troops went into camp, and this at once became a camp of instruction in a very com- (57) 58 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY plete sense. The force concentrated there comprised seven regiments of Regular infantry, one of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry, these being divided into two brigades under the command of Generals Scott and Ripley. There was, also, a brigade of miscellaneous troops, commanded by General Por- ter of the New York Militia, composed of 600 New York and 500 Pennsylvania Volunteers, with 500 or 600 Indian warriors of the Six Nations. General Scott was a young and very enterprising man. He decided that the system of drill then in vogue, a survival from the Revolution, was unsuited to the improved weapon and methods of the day. He resolved that the army should learn without delay the later French system. First taking the officers alone, he instructed them thoroughly in the new method, and then ordered them to transmit this instruction to their men. It is said the troops were kept under arms and at drill for from seven to ten hours a day. The course was severe, but it accomplished Scott's purpose so well that, when the regiments took the field in July, they man- euvered under fire with the discipline and precision of parade. In May actions of a minor character were fought at Oswego, N. Y., and at Sandy Creek, not far from Sackett's Harbor. The British had the advantage in the former, but fared badly in the latter. Chauncey had by that time put his fleet in good condition, and General Brown felt confident that the troops at the Harbor and at Oswego could take care of themselves. He therefore set out for Buffalo, where he arrived in the latter part of June. Finding the army there in excel- lent condition, he immediately began preparations for crossing into Canada. On the Canadian shore almost opposite Buffalo stood Fort Erie, garrisoned by 170 men, mostly of the One Hundredth British Infantry. On July 1st General Brown received orders from the War Department to cross the river, take this place and Fort Chippewa, at the mouth of the creek of that name, menace Fort George and, if assured of the co-operation of Chauncey's fleet, to seize and fortify Burlington Heights at WAR OF 1812 59 the head of Lake Ontario. He was already prepared to begin this movement, and issued his orders the next day. General Scott's brigade was to cross at Black Rock and land about a mile below Fort Erie, while Ripley's brigade was to cross from Buffalo, landing at the same distance above the fort. Their principal difficulty was in the small number of boats available for conveying the troops, but it was expected that the crossing would be completed during the night and that the fort would be immediately invested. That evening Gen- eral Ripley, believing that he had not enough troops in his brigade, asked that it be increased in strength, but General Brown declined to alter his arrangements. Scott crossed before dawn in the morning of the 3d, with the Ninth, Eleventh, part of the Twenty-second, and the Twenty-fifth Infantry regiments, and a detachment of artillery. Ripley's brigade, consisting of the Nineteenth, Twenty-first and Twenty-third Infantry regiments, did not begin crossing until daylight. Scott had already begun the investment of the fort and Ripley's men joined the line as fast as they were landed. In the afternoon the commander of the place sent out a white flag and at six o'clock the garrison surrendered. It had lost one man killed, while our forces had lost four dead and two wounded. General Brown, learning that some British troops were advancing from Chippewa, on the morning of the 4th sent Scott's brigade and Towson's battery to drive them back^ Ripley's brigade, with the remainder of the artillery, followed in the afternoon. Scott, driving the enemy before him,* *A matter of considerable historical interest, connected with the in- cidents of these days and with the troops of Brown's army, is described by Lossing, in his Field Book of the War of 1812, as follows: "In fact the march of 16 miles, according to Jesup, was a "continual skirlnlsh' chiefly with the British One Hundredth Regiment under the Marquis of Tweeddale, who were driven to their intrenchments beyond the Chippewa. Believing Scott's troops to be only 'Buffalo militia,' the marquis could account for their bravery only by the fact of its being the anniversary of American Independence, which gave them patriotic inspiration and courage. He was undeceived on the following day. ****** * "General Scott explained to the writer the cause of the marquis' mistake. While at Buffalo Scott wrote to the quartermaster for a supply 60 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY marched down the Niagara River to a small stream called Street's Creek, about a mile from Chippewa. There, finding the British army strongly posted behind Chippewa Creek, he halted and camped for the night. At about midnight, General Brown, with Ripley's brigade and the artillery, arrived and joined the advance. The Battle of Chippewa. The opposing armies were now separated by two miles of level plain, each using for its protection the small stream behind which it lay. On the eastern border of this plain flowed the Niagara River, and on the west stretched a belt of heavy timber. Only the ground in the immediate front of the two camps was clear and open. Outposts and patrols, thrown forward by the Americans early in the morning of the 5th, came in contact with like bodies from the British army, and a desultory firing began that lasted during the entire forenoon and well into the afternoon before the more serious, final clash.** of new clothing for his regulars. Word soon came back that blue cloth, such as was used in the army, could not be obtained, owing to the strin- gency of the blockade and the embargo, and the lack of manufactures in the country, but that there was a sufficient quantity of gray cloth (now known as Cadet's Gray) in Philadelphia. Scott ordered it to be made up for his soldiers, and in these new gray suits they marched down the Niagara on Canada soil. Believing them to be only militia. Rial! regarded them with contempt when preparing for battle on the 5th. Because of the victory, won chiefly by them, at Chippewa on the 5th, and in honor of Scott and his troops, that style of cloth was adopted at the Military Academy at West Point as the uniform of the cadets." It will be remembered that Scott was in command at Buffalo during May and June, Brown having temporarily returned to Sackett's Harbor. **During these affairs of the outpost there occurred an unfortunate incident that created much harsh feeling in the army, the adjustment of which was unnecessarily prolonged and delayed for an entire year. Captain Joseph Treat, of the Twenty-first Infantry, had been sent out with a detachment of fifty men, apparently to act as a patrol, his orders being indefinite as to where he should go or what position he should take. About noon, while returning toward the American camp, he was fired upon and had one man wounded. His patrol was surprised by the attack and thrown into some confusion. Captain Biddle, of the Artillery, assisted in rallying the detachment and bringing off the w^ounded man, but General Brown was enraged over what appeared to him disgraceful conduct and peremptorily ordered Captain Treat to "retire from the army." In his report he recommended that Captain WAR OF 1812 61 About noon General Porter, with his Volunteers and In- dians, arrived from Black Rock. In the afternoon the British light troops began to bear heavily upon the outposts on the left of our line, and Porter was sent forward at four o'clock to dislodge them. In this kind of fighting the Indians, under their two chiefs. Red Jacket and Captain Pollard, rendered good service. Porter was successful. He scattered the Brit- ish detachments and pursued them rapidly toward the Chippewa. Suddenly, however, he found himself confronted by the whole force of the enemy advancing in line of battle. His irregular troops were no longer fit for the business in hand. The enemy's heavy line, after exchanging a round or two of musketry, charged with the bayonet. Finding himself overmatched and far from any support. Porter gave orders to retreat across Street's Creek and form on Scott's left. The retreat at once developed into a tumultuous and ungovernable rout. General Riall had received reinforcements during the pre- vious night and was now leading his army forward with the Treat and a Lieutenant who accompanied the patrol (whose name, for political reasons, was not made public) should be dismissed from the service. Later in the day, when the Twenty-first was ordered into action, Captain Treat requested that he be permitted to fight as a private soldier in the company which he had commanded. His services were accepted by Major Vose, who requested him to lead a platoon, but he declined any command and accompanied his regiment in the ranks. The next day he called upon General Brown and demanded a court martial. After long and tedious delays this was finally granted and he was tried on charges alleging cowardice. A finding was reached on May 8th, 1815. Captain Treat proved that he had received no orders as to where his detachment was to go, that the confusion following the attack was only temporary, and that he had done all in his po"wer to remedy it. Captain Biddle himself testified that, when General Brown ordered Treat to return where he had been stationed, the patrol went into the woods in pursuit of the enemy but found they had already retreated. The court found the accused oflicer not guilty of the charges and specification pre- ferred against him, and honorably acquitted him. The finding was ap- proved by General Brown, at Sackett's Harbor, on July 3d, 1815. Captain Treat secured the publication of an account of the whole affair, including a. copy of the proceedings of the court. The result showed that General Brown had acted with undue haste and illconsldered severity in the first instance, and with regrettable vindictiveness after- wards. The case left a general impression that it was an Instance of hasty action and arbitrary injustice entirely too frequent in the military service. 62 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY intention of attacking the American camp. General Brown, seeing Porter's fleeing troops and observing a cloud of dust in the direction of the Chippewa, at once surmised what was taking place. He sent word to General Ripley to take the Twenty-first Infantry and Biddle's Battery, pass by the left of our line, make a detour through the woods until he could turn the enemy's right flank, and there to create a diversion by attacking him in the rear. He then went in search of Scott, whom he found preparing to lead his brigade across the creek for a drill. Scott was incredulous of the news brought by his superior and said he should proceed with his drill, as he did not believe he- should find more than three hundred of the enemy there. There were a good many more than three hundred there, as the General perceived when he began crossing the Street's Creek bridge. By that time they had brought heavy guns 'within range and he was compelled to deploy under their fire. The development of the two lines took place simul- taneously and the battle was on. The firing soon became intense and the antagonists advanced until they were sepa- rated by no more than eighty paces distance. The British were able to bring a somewhat greater number of men into action but they were not well handled. Their regiments became separated from each other and repeatedly exposed their flanks to the American attack. Scott took advantage of these opportunities whenever they occurred and, finally, a charge by the Eleventh Infantry, into a gap in the enemy's line, threw them into confusion and started a retreat that soon became disordered and hopeless. In the meantime the Twenty-first was valiantly struggling through the thick woods in its attempt to turn the enemy's right flank. But the distance it had to cover, the difficulty of making a way through the underbrush, and the swiftness with which the events of the battle progressed prevented it from reaching its goal. The fight was ended before it could come into action. A company of the Twenty-fifth Infantry followed the fugi- WAR OF 1812 63 tives almost to their camp and took a number of prisoners. General Scott prepared to follow up his victory by a vigorous pursuit. Porter, with two hundred Pennsylvania Militia, took post on his left, and both advanced until checked by the fire from the British batteries behind the Chippewa. General Brown resolved to bring up all his artillery and force the enemy from his intrenchments by a direct attack but, on the advice of officers who had reconnoitered the position and found it too strong to be assaulted, he ordered a retrograde movement instead. A heavy rain had fallen at the close of the battle and the army marched back through deep mud where, an hour earlier, it had advanced in heat and dust. At sunset it reached its encampment of the previous night, and the two antagonists again occupied the same positions from which they had moved but a few hours before. Chippewa plain was deserted by the living, but the story of the day's . tragedy was written upon it in the blood of its victims. Out of a probable 1,700 engaged the British had lost 236 killed, 322 wounded and 46 missing. About 1,300 American troops had been brought into action, and of these there were 61 killed, 255 wounded and 19 missing. The immediate effects of this battle were most satisfac- tory to all Americans who were not positively opposed to the prosecution of the war. It was the first victory of any con- siderable importance won by our armies in the open field after a long series of failures and reverses that had been dispiriting to all, both in and out of the army. It was won against superior numbers and, best of all, it was complete and unquestioned. Englishmen admitted that Americans had again become their equals in the field. The hopes and the confidence of the army rose with a bound, and the coun- try at large once more found occasion for the display of not a little warlike enthusiasm. The 6th of July was spent by both combatants in burying the dead. General Brown, anxious to continue his advance, made inquiries for a possible route by which he might turn the enemy's position. Having been informed that there was an 64 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY abandoned timber road leading to the junction of Chippewa and Lyon's Creeks, about a mile above the British camp, he sent out working parties, on the 7th, to clear it for the passage of artillery. Ripley was directed to take this cleared road, with Porter's irregulars and his own brigade, now reduced to the Twenty-first and Twenty-third Infantry, cross the Chip- pewa and fall upon the enemy's right flank, while Scott should advance on his position at the bridge. When Ripley and Porter reached the stream, in the evening of the 7th, they found some British field pieces and a few companies on the opposite bank to dispute their passage. General Riall, learning of the American plans, had sent this detachment to act as a delaying force while he, with the rest of his army, should destroy the bridge in his front, break up his camp and retire toward Queenston. Ripley's men gathered materials and began building a bridge, despite the fire of the British guns, but before it was completed their opponents also retired. Finding all resistance had ceased, Ripley's and Porter's brigades were marched down the creek to rejoin Scott's and before morning nearly all crossed in boats to the other side. On the 8th, Porter was left at Chip- pewa to collect the baggage and rebuild the bridge, while Scott's and Ripley's brigades followed the retreating enemy and reached Queenston on the 10th. From the latter place General Riall had again retired to Twenty Mile Creek. Leaving a sufficient number of men, in Fort George and the recently built Fort Mississaga to prop- erly garrison those places, he started with the rest of his army for Burlington Heights, where he expected to find reinforce- ments. Meeting these, the One Hundred and Third and the flank companies of the One Hundred and Fourth Infantry regiments, on the way, he turned back and established him- self at Fifteen Mile Creek, thirteen miles from the American camp at Queenston. On July 14th, General Brown called a council of his officers to determine what should be their next step. Generals Ripley and Porter, with the two engineer officers, wished to attack WAR OF 1812 65 Riall that night, but General Scott and the Adjutant-General, Colonel Gardner, recommended an immediate investment of Fort George. As the latter plan accorded with General Brown's wish, the opinion of the minority prevailed. There was no seige train with the army and no means of safely transporting material from Buffalo, but General Brown was counting upon the assistance of Chauncey's fleet and expected by that means to secure his supplies. He therefore wrote Chauncey, speaking confidently of his own ability to overcome any resistance that might be offered, and imploring the Commodore to come to his assistance. On the 20th he blew up the works at Queenston and advanced upon Fort George. No sooner had he arrived before that place, than he was informed of the reinforcements which Riall had received and, seeing that his plan of investment was imperilled, he returned and reoccupied his former position at Queenston on the 32d. On the 23d a letter from General Gaines at Sackett's Harbor brought the news that Chauncey was ill, that his fleet was blockaded in the harbor, and that, lacking its aid, the forwarding of reinforcements was impracticable. Abandon- ing all hope of assistance from that quarter, General Brown ordered an immediate retreat. The army reached the Chip- pewa on the 34th, crossed the stream, and went into camp on the battlefield that a few days before had known it as victor. The movement of our troops had been rapid and con- tinuous since the recent battle, and they felt the need of rest. All looked forward to the next day for a respite and a relaxa- tion from the strain under which they had labored. Fate willed otherwise. The restlessness of General Scott and the enterprise of the British commander conspired to bring on a conflict, the bloodiest and the most exhausting of the cam- paign, the most serious land battle of the War of 1812, and one of the most famous in American history. 66 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY The Battle of Niagara.^ Toward noon on the 25th there came a courier from Lewis- ton with the news that the enemy had collected in force at Queenston, and that a number of their vessels were ascending the river. A few minutes later another arrived with the more startling intelligence that they were crossing at Lewiston, and that the stores collected at Schlosser were in jeopardy. These rumors were only partially true, but General Brown accepted t'hem as truth and was led to a false conclusion. The facts were that General Drummond had arrived at the mouth of the river the night before with 800 British troops from Kingston. Some 400 or 500 of these he had sent to disperse a small American force at Lewiston, and this expedi- tion was the basis for the reports of invasion. Not one of Riall's men had crossed the river, nor had he any intention that they should. Instead, he was rapidly pushing forward on the Canadian side, following up the American retreat. Drummond's reinforcements having joined him at Queens- ton on the 35th, he was ready to offer battle. As early as seven o'clock that morning his advance guard had reached the *This is now commonly referred to by American authors as the battle of Liundy's Lane. In British accounts, however, It is more often known as the battle of Niagara, and most of our earlier papers and docu- ments made reference to it under that name. It seems unfortunate, indeed, that, by a freak of nomenclature, its history should have de- scended to us under the name of one of the most insignificant instead of that of the most remarkable feature of the country in which it was fought. Lossing, in his Field Book of the War of 1812, says: "The battle was fought within sight and hearing of the great Falls of Niagara, and should bear that dignified name. It was so called in one of the first published accounts of it. 'The battle of Niagara,' said the Albany Argus at the beginning of August, 'commands, like the achievements of our naval heroes, the admiration of all classes of Ameri- can people, a few excepted.' The hottest of the contest having occurred in the struggle for the battery in Lundy's Lane caused the battle to be called after the name of that road. About a mile above the field of battle, on the banks of the Niagara, were mills called The Bridgewater Mills. A person attached to the American army, but not in the battle, wrote while it was in progress to some friends in the interior of New York, saying that a great battle was then raging near the Bridgewater Mills. This letter was published extensively, and the conflict was called the Battle of Bridgewater. It was so announced in Niles' Register, August 13, 1814." WAR OF 1812 67 Falls and had taken a position a short distance below, along a road called Lundy's Lane that ran at right angles to the river. But General Brown was in ignorance of all this and both he and Scott were willing, without either reconnaissance or investigation, to admit as fact the report that the enemy had invaded American territory in force at Lewiston. They believed that the best way to recall such an invasion was to march at once on the forts at the mouth of the river and, of course, having wholly credited the rumor, they believed they would find no one before them to oppose their progress. It is true General Brown had inclined toward conservatism when Scott impatiently urged,, both on the night of the 24th and the morning of the 25th, that he should be allowed to take his brigade down the river in search of the enemy, and had refused to divide his command. At four P. M. on the 25th, however, he gave orders to Scott to march as rapidly as possi- ble with his brigade, Towson's Battery and all the mounted troops, toward Fort George. It is difficult to review the occurrences of this day with entire freedom from a shadow of blame attaching to both Generals Brown and Scott. At two o'clock in the afternoon Lieutenant-Colonel Leavenworth,* of the Ninth Infantry, had transmitted to the commanding general the intelligence that a British force was at the the Falls of the Niagara, but Brown, unable to entertain a thought at variance with his belief that the enemy had crossed to the American side, refused to believe that anything more than a scouting party lay in his front. General Scott was equally credulous of the rumors of the morning and equally incredulous of the really authentic information of the afternoon. Taking no steps to verify either, or to guard against the dangers to be appre- hended if the latter were true, he precipitated his command later in the evening into what was, for all effect, an ambuscade. With the troops placed in his charge, numbering 1,300 •Lieutenant-Colonel Leavenworth afterwards became Colonel of the Fifth Infantry, and it was he for whom Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was named. 68 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY men in all, at a little after five o'clock he crossed the Chip- pewa bridge and started on a rapid march down the river road. On approaching the Falls a number of British officers gathered about a farmhouse in the vicinity were seen to leisurely inspect the approaching column through their glasses, mount their horses and ride away. The woman who occupied the house informed Scott that the British, in force, lay a few hundred yards ahead, and that General Riall himself was one of the officers he had just seen. She placed their number at less than it actually was, but Scott gave no cre- dence even to this. Emerging from a strip of timber into a cleared space only a short distance beyond the house, he was surprised to find himself in the presence and under the fire of a strong British line posted on the brow of a hill in his front. To stand still in this exposed position was impossible. To retire was to court destruction for his own brigade, and to imperil the safety of those in his rear. To fight, and to send word to Brown of his predicament, hoping that aid would soon come, was the only course left. It was plainly evident at the outset that he was at a dis- advantage in position and in relative strength of artillery. It could be seen that the enemy had a battery of seven pieces, including some 34-pounders with considerable range, and it was soon apparent that they possessed a marked superiority in numbers. At the moment the battle opened they had about 1,800 men in line, while other regiments, rapidly approaching on the Queenston road, brought the number within supporting distance up to over 4,000. Scott had with him four regiments of infantry, but these were reduced to mere skeletons of regi- ments, averaging no more than 300 men each. His mounted troops were but a handful, and the two light field pieces which made up the whole of his artillery could make no impression further than the noise that served to encourage their own supporters. The sun was just setting when the conflict began. The Twenty-fifth Infantry, under Major Jesup, had been detached WAR OP 1812 69 from the column and had borne off to the right. The gather- ing dusk favored its movements, enabling it to pass through some underbrush between the road and the river and to gain the enemy's left flank. By a desperate onslaught it forced the British left back across the road, gained their rear and cap- tured General Riall, several officers of his staff and one of General Drummond's aides. Returning a little from its ad- vanced position, it kept the enemy's left in check and main- tained its ground until the close of the battle. West of the road the fragments of the Ninth, Eleventh and Twenty-second gallantly held their own and repulsed an attack by the British right. General Scott, when he had halted at the farmhouse near the Falls, had sent an officer back to Chippewa to convey the news that some of the enemy had been seen, and, when the battle began, had despatched another to tell of his perilous situation. The first messenger arrived at the camp just as the sound of firing began to be heard. General Ripley formed his brigade without waiting for orders and, upon receiving General Brown's directions, rushed forward to the assistance of those at the front. Brown rode forward and, meeting Scott's second messenger near the Falls, directed him to con- tinue to Chippewa and bring up Porter's Volunteers as rapidly as possible. Ripley's brigade was woefully weak in numbers. It con- sisted of the Twenty-first, Twenty-third, and a detachment of 150 men of the First Infantry which had arrived only that day. On July 1st the regimental returns showed that the Twenty-first had 25 officers and 651 men present, with 341 absent; the Twenty-third had 8 officers and 341 men present, with 147 absent. The battle of Chippewa and the march to Fort George and back had intervened to further weaken their strength, and Colonel Miller, in his account of the battle of Niagara, stated that the Twenty-first entered that battle with less than 300 men in its ranks. If the Twenty-third had suffered a corresponding reduction, it is doubtful if the whole of Ripley's brigade numbered, at that time, over 650 men. 70 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY It arrived upon the field at nine o'clock at night and began at once to take its place in line of battle. Upon this little handful of men now rested the responsibility for success or failure, for Scott's troops were exhausted and badly cut to pieces. In fact the Eleventh and Twenty-second, having lost their commanders, Major McNeil and Colonel Brady,* with most of their Captains, and having exhausted their ammu- nition, had ceased to exist as regiments, and their scattered remnants gradually gathei-ed round the tattered colors of the Ninth, which still maintained its organization. General Brown, seeing that the battery on the hill was the key of the British position, and that the fortunes of the day hinged upon its possession, turned to Colonel Miller, of the Twenty-first Infantry, and directed him to assault and take the guns. Colonel Miller's prompt reply, "I'll try, sir," is one of the few sentient speeches of the battlefield that our history has delighted to transmit from generation to gener- ation. What followed is best told by Colonel Miller himself, in a letter written to his wife, from Fort Erie, three days later. "On the evening of the 25th instant, at the Falls of Niagara, we met the enemy and had, I believe, one of the most des- perately fought actions ever experienced in America. It con- tinued for three hours, stubbornly contested on both sides, when, about ten o'clock at night, we succeeded in driving them from their strong position. "Our loss was very severe in killed and wounded. I have lost from my regiment, in killed, wounded and missing, one hundred and twenty-six. "The enemy had got their artillery posted on a height, in a very commanding position, where they could rake our col- umns in any part of the field. Major McRee, the Chief Engi- neer, told General Brown he could do no good until that height was carried and the cannon taken or driven from their position. It was then night, but moonlight. General Brown turned to me and said, 'Colonel Miller, take your regiment, storm that work and take it.' I had short of three hundred •It -was for Colonel Brady that Fort Brady, Michigan, was afterwards named. WAR OP 1812 71 men with me, as my regiment had been much weakened by the numerous details made from it during the day. I, how- ever, immediately obeyed the order. We could see all their slow matches and port fires burning and ready. I did not know what side of the work was most favorable for approach, but happened to hit upon a very favorable place, notwith- standing we advanced upon the mouths of their cannon. It happened that there was an old rail fence on the side where we approached, with a small growth of shrubbery by it, and within less than two rods of the cannon's mouth. Undis- covered by the enemy I then very cautiously ordered my men to rest across the fence, take good aim, fire and rush, which was done in style. Not one man at the cannon was left to put fire to them. We got into the center of their park before they had time to oppose us. A British line was formed and lying in a strong position to protect their artillery. The moment we got to the center they opened a most destructive flank fire on us, killed a great many, and attempted to charge with their bayonets. We returned the fire so warmly they were compelled to stand. We fought hand to hand for some time so close that the blaze of the guns crossed each other, but we compelled them to abandon their whole artillery, ammu- nition wagons and all, amounting to seven pieces of elegant brass cannon, one of them a 24-pounder, with eight horses and harness, though some of the horses were killed. The British made two more attempts to charge us at close quarters, both of which we repulsed before I was reinforced, after which the First and Twenty-third Regiments came to my relief, and even after that the British charged with their whole line three several times, and after getting within half pistol shot of us were compelled to give way. "I took, with my regiment, between thirty and forty pris- oners, while taking and defending the artillery. Lieutenant Aaron Bigelow of my regiment was killed. Captain Burbank and Lieutenant Cilly badly wounded, a number of others slightly. "General Brown and his aide both dangerously wounded. General Scott and his Brigade Major, Lieutenant Smith, both badly wounded. General Ripley and his aide both shot through the hat. Major McFarland killed. Colonel Brady badly wounded. Major McNeil badly wounded so he must, it is said, lose his leg. It is unnecessary for me to enumerate a quarter of our loss, but we have very few officers left for 72 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY duty. I now command a brigade. General Ripley is Com- mander-in-Chief. I am the only full Colonel, and we have but one Lieutenant-Colonel left to all the Regular troops here. We expect reinforcements soon. "But I had forgotten to tell you we were unfortunate about our artillery at last. After General Scott, Brown and others were wounded, we were ordered to return back to our camp, about three miles, and preparations had not been made for taking ofif the cannon, as it was impossible for us to defend it and make preparations for that too, and it was all left on the ground except one beautiful brass six-pounder, which is presented to my regiment in testimony of their distinguished gallantry.* "The officers of this army all say, who saw it, that it was one of the most desperate and gallant acts ever known. The British officers whom we have prisoners, say it was the most desperate thing they ever saw or heard of. General Brown told me the minute he saw me that I had immortalized my- self. 'But,' said he, 'my dear fellow, my heart ached for you when I gave you the order, but I knew it was the only thing that would save us.' "We wounded Major-General Drummond, took Major- General Riall prisoner with between twenty and thirty other officers, how many non-commisioned officers and privates I have not heard as they were sent hastily across the river, but a very considerable number." While the Twenty-first Infantry was making its gallant asault upon the hill, and doggedly holding the guns it captured there, the shattered remnants of Scott's brigade continued the fight as best they could. At one time they were ordered for- ward to the charge, but the Twenty-first had already done the work and relieved them from this necessity. Porter's Volun- teers arrived in time to take their places in the line and to participate in the closing scenes of the battle. The losses on the American side, in proportion to the number engaged, were enormous. The closest estimate of the number of troops placed on the line, including Porter's •After about four month's correspondence, through the office of the Chief of Ordnance, In the summer and fall of 1908, it was finally found that this gun was at the Watervliet Arsenal, New York, and that It was destined to be placed at the Army War College, in Washington, D. C. > El O •^ H H Cd bd > a SI ta CQ 2 z to k! WAR OF 1812 73 Volunteers, was 2,600. Out of these, the official returns gave the loss as 11 officers and 160 men killed, 55 officers and 617 men wounded, and 8 officers and 109 men missing; a total of 960, or 37 per cent, of the whole. In the Twenty-first Infantry- First Lieutenant Bigelow was killed, and Captain Burbank, First Lieutenant Cilley and Ensigns Jones and Thomas were wounded. Second Lieutenant Fisk of the Nineteenth, and Ensign Camp of the Second Rifles, who were attached to the Twenty-first, were also wounded. As Colonel Miller stated that he took into battle less than 300 men, and that he had 126 killed and wounded, the regiment's percentage of loss could not have been less than 45. The enemy brought upon the field before the battle ended about 4,500 men, but it is probable that not all these were actually engaged; at least, not all at any one time. They reported their losses as 84 killed, 559 wounded, 193 missing and 42 prisoners; a total of 878. As the American returns showed that 19 British officers and 150 men had been made prisoners, it is probable that a good part of the 193 they reported as missing had really fallen into American hands. Both Generals Drummond and Riall, their first and second in command, were wounded, and Riall was taken prisoner and hurriedly sent with others across the river into New York. General Scott's wounds were so severe that he was com- pelled to go south for treatment, and he never rejoined the Army of the North. General Brown was not so seriously injured and less than two months later he resumed command at Fort Erie. Even on the field of Niagara he retained con- trol to the extent of directing Ripley to lead the survivors of the struggle back to the camp at Chippewa, where they might be rested and refreshed, and then to return and reoccupy the battlefield before dawn of the 26th. How this could have been accomplished does not appear. It was after ten o'clock when the firing ceased, and over an hour was then spent in collecting the wounded and the badly scattered troops that 74 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY had weathered the storm without hurt. The camp at Chip- pewa was somewhat over three miles distant, and it can be imagined what must have been the progress of a column, shattered and exhausted by over three hours' furious fighting, and burdened by the large number of its wounded. In fact it reached the camp between one and two o'clock in the morn- ing. As at that season and in that latitude dawn comes not later than four o'clock, they must needs have turned about and marched immediately back in order to have reached Lun- dy's Lane at anywhere near the prescribed hour. Had there been any real hope of retaining their hold upon the hard-won field, it would seem that the chance lay in their remaining there and intrenching in their position. As their number was now reduced to 1,600 able-bodied but battle- spent men, it seems improbable they could, even so, have successfully met and contended with double that number of the enemy, most of whom were yet comparatively fresh. Ripley acted upon his own judgment and, when dawn came, he was still at Chippewa. Brown was angered at his delay and again ordered him to march at once. On reaching the Falls it was learned that the British had received further reinforcements and themselves had reoccupied the field, so Ripley retired finally to Chippewa. Both sides claimed a victory, and both had some reason to do so. The fight had been won by the American troops against heavy odds, from an enemy in whose ranks were many veterans of the campaign in the Spanish Peninsula, where they had recently learned the art of warfare, under Wellington, in the severest of schools. Victory over such a foe surely gave just reason for pride, but it had been won at a fearful cost. Moreover, it was a victory that could result in no permanent gain, except for the example it set of calcu- lating courage, of tenacious persistence and headlong bravery upon the battlefield. Of such our history contains none more brilliant, nor is it likely to show in the future one more glorious. WAR OB* 1812 75 Later, Congress voted to Generals Brown, Scott, Ripley and Porter, and to Colonel Miller, gold medals for their ser- vices at this battle, at Chippewa and at Fort Erie; and a number of officers, among whom were Colonel Miller, Captain Burbank and First Lieutenant Holding of the Twenty-first, were rewarded by the bestowal of brevet rank of one grade higher than that they then held, "for gallant conduct at the battle of Niagara." The British, having reoccupied the field and retaken their artillery, considered that they possessed the substantial fruits of victory, and their Government properly bestowed upon its battalions the marks of commendation and approval which they undoubtedly deserved. The following order, published by the British War Department, shows the promptness with which it appreciated the value to the future of the memories of the past. 76 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Quebec, 9th August, 1815. G. O. Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Drummond, commanding the Forces, directs that the following letter from the Adjutant- General of the Forces be published in General Orders for the information of the troops in this command. Horse Guards, 19th May, 1815. Sir: I have had the honor to lay before the Commander-in-Chief your letter of the 26th February last, and am directed to acquaint you in reply that H. R. H. the Prince Regent has been pleased, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty to approve of the regiments named in the margin, being permitted to bear on their Col- ours and Appointments, in addition to any other Badges or Devices which may have been heretofore per- mitted to be borne by those Regi- ments, the Word "Niagara," in con- sequence of the distinguished con- duct of those Corps in the Capture of Fort Niagara by assault on the 19th Dec, 1813, and in the Battle at Lundy's Lane in North America on the 35th July, 1814. I have &c. (Signed) HARRY CALVERT, To Lt. Genl. Adjutant-General. Sir Geo. Prevost, Bt. or Genl. Officer Com- manding in Canada. 19th Light Dragoons. (Squadron under Ma- jor Lisle.) Royal Scots, 1st Battn. 8th or King's, 1st Bn. 41st, Flank Companies. 89th, 2d Bn. 100th. 103rd. Glengary Light Infy. WAR OF 1812 77 In the British Army, the name Niagara is still a living token that may yet lead on to other victories. In ours, un- fortunately, no such steps have ever been taken to insure its preservation. The Return to Black Rock. General Ripley, being finally left to his own devices, did not hesitate to adopt the course to which his judgment prompted him. With no hope of the early arrival of reinforce- ments, for nowhere on the northern border were any to be had, he could not fail to see that retaining his position on the Chippewa would constitute a temptation to the new British commander, Drummond, to attempt his early destruction. With no defensible works to shelter him and with a shaken force only half that his enemy could bring against him, such destruction was an imminent possibility. Hastily destroying the bridge across the Chippewa, together with a few stores that could not be removed, he began the march, in the after- noon of the 26th, to a point opposite Black Rock, where there was a ferry across the Niagara River. On arriving at that point the next day he immediately crossed and sought General Brown, from whom he requested authority to remove the troops to the American side. Brown, in his quick tempered way, was outraged at the suggestion and at what he regarded as the weakness of his subordinate. Instead of adopting the latter's recommendation he scornfully ordered him to proceed to Fort Erie and to prepare that place for defense. It is a somewhat pitiful story that relates the dififerences that arose among the three general officers of the American Army of the North during this campaign, fhese^'differences were inherent in the natures of the men afid, if not unavoid- able, there was no attempt to a^void them on the part of the two seniors. The most prominent traits of character of the three Generals, Brpwtf, Scott and Ripley, may be said to have been pertin3,Giry, impetuosity, and caution, respectively. Each 78 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY possessed the defects of his own qualities. Brown's perti- nacity sometimes degenerated into mere obstinacy, Scott's impetuosity into unreflecting impulsiveness, and Ripley's cautiousness occasionally gave an impression of timidity. Yet each was a strong man in his own way, and each alone, with the aid of his own qualities, would have gone far and rendered excellent service to his country. It would seem, too, that LOCATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF THE CAPTURED GUN. Washington, June 11, 1908. To the Chief of Ordnance, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. Sir: — I have the honor to request that the following matter be considered by your office and any information available on the subject be fur- nished me for the purpose of compiling some historical facts regarding the Twenty-first U. S. Infantry during the War of 1812. At the battle of Lundy's Lane, on the night of July 25-26, 1814, the Twenty-first Infantry, under Colonel Miller, assaulted and captured a British battery of seven guns on a hill, and held them through the night against repeated British assaults. This action is one of the most celebrated in American history. When the American army withdrew, however, the guns, excepting one small, brass six-pounder, were left behind and again fell into the hands of the British. Colonel Miller, in a letter written from Fort Erie, on July 28, 1814, states : "After Generals Brown, Scott and others were wounded, we were ordered to return back to our camp, about three miles, and prepara- tions had not been made for the taking of the cannon. It was impos- sible for me to defend it and make preparations for that too, and it was all left upon the ground except one beautiful brass six-pounder which was made a present to my regiment in testimony of their dis- tinguished gallantry." The Twenty-first, with the remainder of Brown's army, retired to Chippewa and from there to Fort Erie, where they later engaged in its defense against a British assault, and in a sortie against the British works. I believe they went to Buffalo about October 24, 1814, and so far as I know, remained there* until they were combined with three or four other regiments, in the summer of 1815, to form the Fifth Infantry. If this gun of which Colonel Miller speaks can be traced, I should like greatly to be informed of its present whereabouts. Any communication on the subject should be addressed to me at Fort Logan, Colorado. Very respectfully, CELWYN E. HAMPTON, Captain and Commissary, Twenty-first Infantry. 33920—56. FIRST ENDORSEMENT. Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Washington, June 12, 1908. Respectfully transmitted to the Commanding Officers of the foUow- •I afterward found that they returned, that fall, to Sackett's Harbor. ' ^ ^s^ i^-^^ 'M THE TWENTY-FIRST'S TROPHY OF NIAGARA WAR OP 1812 79 this very combination of three radically different, but comple- mentary natures, balancing each other, should have produced the very best possible results, as a balanced system of govern- ment is designed to do. Indeed, this very expectation might have been realized had Brown and Scott been a little less hasty and a little more tolerant. They were unable, however, to listen with patience to any expression of conservative views; Ing named arsenals in the order named, for report: Augusta, San Antonio, Benicla, Rock Island, Frankford, New York, Watertown and Watervliet. By order of the Chief of Ordnance: JNO. T. THOMPSON, Major, Ordnance Dept. U. S. Army. 33920—56. TWELFTH ENDORSEMENT. 23—23. Watervliet Arsenal, N. Y., August 13, 1908. 1. Respectfully returned to the Chief of Ordnance, U. S. A., Wash- ington, D. C. 2. The gun referred to within is now at this Arsenal and has been reserved for the War College. 3. The following is the official description, as taken from the records of this Arsenal: Field Gun, bronze, English, calibre Z% inches. Marks, On breech: "Taken at the battle of Niagara, July 25, 1814; 1° and Hy. King 1797"; English Arms. "Soni soit qui mal y pense. G. R". On right trunnion: No. 492. Face of breech: 6-0-2. Length 65 inches. Location : South side of office walk. W. A. tag marks : 18-6 pdr. English W. C. History: Taken at the Battle of Niagara, July 25, 1814; 1° and Hy. King 1797; English Arms. Reserved for War College. Under breech; U5-481. On chase: English Arms CCCCLXXXIV. This is thought to be the gun referred to within. W. W. GIBSON, Lieut. Col. Ordnance Dept., U. S. A., Commanding. 33920—56. THIRTEENTH ENDORSEMENT. J. J. C— L. c. f. Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Washington, August 18, 1908. 1. Respectfully returned to Capt. Celwyn E. Hampton, Twenty- first Infantry, U. S. A., Fort Logan, Colorado, inviting attention to pre- ceding endorsements hereon. 2. The return of this paper to this office 's desired. JNO. T. THOMPSON, Major, Ord. Dept., U. S. Army, Acting Chief of Ordnance. 80 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY they came to believe that Ripley was a coward, and at length General Brown openly flouted him before the Army as such. Of course a mass of subordinates made haste to copy the opin- ions and the manner of their commander and, after the return to Fort Erie, Ripley found that he was placed in a most humiliating position. It is still more to be regretted that few historians, in relating the incidents of those days, have taken the trouble to do him justice. Without the balancing power that might have been derived from Ripley's conservatism it must be said of the campaign that, while it included some of the most brilliant actions ever fought by our Army, its net results were those of a typical Donnybrook Fair — a generous and impartial distribution of broken heads. In the end noth- ing remained that could be pointed out as a fruitful result. The Defense of Fort Erie. Fort Erie was, at that time, a weak and insignificant work constructed by the British upon the shore of Lake Erie, de- signed for occupancy by a garrison of no more than two hun- dred men. Had Drummond pursued our little army promptly and attacked boldly, he should have destroyed it utterly, cut off from retreat as it was by the lake and river in its rear. Fortunately for us, however, he was not aware of the real extent of our weakness. He was expecting the early arrival of a further reinforcement of 1,100 men and so lay quietly at Niagara Falls until the arrival of this detachment on July 39th. Having received orders to defend Fort Erie, General Ripley led his troops thither and began, with faithful zeal, to enlarge the old work and to construct an intrenched camp within which the army could find shelter. Two bastions, with the necessary connecting curtains, were begun in front of the old fort. A small stone work to shelter two guns, and an earthen parapet, were built between the rear wall of the fort and the water line. Extending westerly from the left flank of the fort to a sand mound called Snake Hill, near the border of the lake, a continuous line of parapet was laid out, to be protected in front by two ditches and an abatis. The whole inclosed a space of fifteen acres. The work of construction was begun WAR OF 1812 81 at once, and carried on, without interruption, both day and night. Everything was in an unfinished state when Drum- mond arrived on August 2nd, drove in the American pickets stationed in the woods, and went into camp at a place about two miles distant. Still, he seemed in no haste to attack, but instead pushed forward his artillery to a position from which he could shell the fort, and there began the placing of siege batteries. The Americans feverishly continued their efforts to complete their works. Towson's battery of five guns was mounted on Snake Hill, and the rest of the artillery was placed in the fort and at various points along the half-mile of new parapet. General Brown had sent to Sackett's Harbor for General Gaines, and on August 5th the latter arrived and assumed command at Fort Erie. At sunrise on the morning of the 7th the bombardment began. The Americans were able to determine, by the sounds proceeding from the enemy's works, almost the exact stage of his preparations and intentions and were, therefore, pre- pared for the opening volley. We ultra-moderns, in our search for soundlessness and invisibility and general secrecy in our military operations, have developed almost the ancient wizardy of Merlin. It is strange to us, then, to read that the garrison of Fort Erie, that morning, "was paraded within the lines, as for a grand field-day, to receive, with becoming cere- mony, the first formal fire of the enemy. The national stand- ard was displayed at every flagstaff and, as soon as the ex- pected volley was received, the regimental bands of the entire army commenced playing the most animating national airs, and, in the midst of it, a salvo of artillery was fired from every piece which could be brought to bear upon the hostile position." Surely and sadly we are forced to the admission that the pomp and circumstance of glorious war is past and gone for- ever. It finds no place in these business-like, drab days. The cannonading on both sides was continued, from this time, daily. The American troops, always expecting an 82 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY assault, were divided at night into three reliefs, one always on watch while the other two slept with their arms at hand. Each evening the guns were freshly shotted with grape or canister for use at close quarters. On the evening of the 14th a shell from the enemy's bat- teries blew up a magazine inside our lines. This contained no great amount of powder and the damage done was small, but the British, calculating upon the confusion that would be caused by the explosion, resolved to assault that night. At two o'clock in the morning of the 15th, our pickets were driven in and the assault was delivered by two columns of British troops, one moving against each flank of our line. The American troops had been so posted that the brigade formerly commanded by Scott occupied the right of the line. Porter's brigade the center, and Ripley's the left. This threw the Twenty-first on the extreme left, with the Twenty-third on its right. On the left of Snake Hill, between that mound and the water, no parapet had been constructed, and the only obstruction to the enemy's advance was an abatis, which Gen- eral Gaines described in a letter, written shortly after the assault, as merely a pile of loose brush. Against this frail obstacle and the battery on Snake Hill one of the British col- umns was hurled, and in this open space the Twenty-first Infantry was placed to bar the way. When the assailants had approached to a certain and easy range, Towson's battery and the Twenty-first poured upon them a volley whose flame lit up the vicinity as if a bonfire had suddenly sprung into being in their front. Despite the fact that the guns of all caliber were muzzle- loaders, and that the weapons of the infantry were cumber- some flintlocks, this fire was kept up with such fury by both artillery and infantry that Snake Hill was known thereafter, among the British soldiery, as "The Yankee Lighthouse." General Ripley's report, dated August 17th, from which the following extract is taken, relates with accuracy and detail the further occurrences at this point. "The companies posted at the point of the works which WAR OF 1812 83 they attempted to escalade were Captain Ropes', Captain Mars- ton's, Lieutenant Bowman's and Lieutenant Larned's of the Twenty-first Regiment, not exceeding 250 men, under the com- mand of Major Wood, of the Engineer Corps. On the enemy's approach they opened their musketry in a manner the most powerful. "Fort Williams (Towson's battery) and this little band emitted one broad, uninterrupted sheet of light. The enemy were repulsed. They rallied, came on a second time to the charge, and a party waded round our line by the lake and came in on the flank, but a reserve of two companies, posted in the beginning of the action to support this point, marched up and fired upon the party, who were all killed or taken. Five times, in this manner, did the enemy advance to the charge; five times were their columns beaten back in confusion by a force one-sixth of their numbers, till at length, finding the contest unavailing, they retired. At this point we made 147 prisoners. "In submitting to your view the conduct of the troops under my command on this occasion I find everything to applaud and nothing to reprehend. The utmost coolness and subordina- tion was manifested by both the Twenty-first and Twenty- third Regiments. To Major Wood I feel particularly in- debted. This officer's merits are so well known that approba- tion can scarcely add to his reputation. He has the merit, with this Spartan band, in connection with Captain Towson's artillery, of defeating a vaunting foe of six times his force. "The officers I have mentioned as commanding companies of the Twenty-first and Twenty-third Regiments are particu- larly commended by their commanding officers. Captain Marston, a most valuable officer, commanded a first line of three companies opposed to the enemy's column. ****** * "I close this long report with stating to you in the highest terms of approbation the skilfulness exhibited by Doctor Ful- ler, surgeon of the Twenty-third, and Doctor Trowbridge, surgeon of the Twenty-first Infantry, with their mates. Doctor Gare, of the Twenty-third, and Doctors Everett and Allen, of the Twenty-first." In addition to the officers of the Twenty-first mentioned by General Ripley, General Gaines, in his report to the Secretary of War, commended General Ripley, Lieutenants Bowman and 84 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Lamed, and Ensigns Benn,* Jones, Cummings and Thomas, of the Twenty-first, and Lieutenant Riddle, of the Fifteenth Infantry, on duty with the Twenty-first. In this report he further says: "I also omitted mentioning that part of this regiment (the Twenty-first) pursued the enemy's right upward of a mile and took 100 prisoners." On the right of our line the combat proceeded quite as hotly but with somewhat less fortunate results. The main strength of the assault there was directed against the old fort itself. The first two attempts failed, but finally about a hundred of the enemy effected a lodgment in one of the bastions. Lieu- tenant-Colonel Drummond, who led this party, in the moment of his success forgot the humanity that most ennobles a vic- tor, cried out to his men to "give the Yankees no quarter," and personally refused it to an unfortunate American officer who had surrendered himself into his hands. The next moment Drummond himself received a bullet and a bayonet thrust in the breast, and fell dead beside the body of his victim.** Still others of the assaulting column gained the interior of the bastion, which they held against repeated attempts by the garrison to expel them. The last of these was a charge led by Major N. N. Hall, Inspector-General (First Lieutenant, Twenty-first Infantry), but this also failed on account of the contracted space in which they were compelled to move. Day began to dawn and the British reserve was seen approaching. General Gaines sent for reinforcements from the left and center, and these were dispatched in haste by Ripley and Porter. At this critical juncture, however, there was a tre- mendous roar and the floor of the bastion rose in a fountain •Probably Lieutenant Bean was meant, he having been known to General Gaines as an Ensign, his name being misspelled in the report. ••These facts lent emphasis to a further curious incident. In the pocket of the dead British officer was found a copy of a "secret order" issued by General Drummond, giving instructions for the conduct of the assault. This order directed "a free use of the bayonet," and through this paper had passed the bayonet thrust that killed the bearer. WAR OF 1812 85 of earth and stones, carrying men, guns, and everything it contained to common destruction.** This explosion turned the scale in favor of the Americans. They concentrated their fire upon the ruined bastion and its approaches, and soon had the satisfaction of seeing the rem- nants of the British columns fleeing to their works. The American loss, in repelling this night attack, was 17 killed, 56 wounded, and 11 missing. For the enemy it was a disastrous attempt. They left upon the field 321 dead and 174 wounded, and in American hands 186 prisoners. Counting the wounded who succeeded in returning to their works and **The true cause of this explosion yet remains In doubt. The fol- lowing accounts are given as interesting sidelights upon an incident which the broader beam of history seems purposely to have left in some obscurity. The first is quoted from Lossing: " 'The cause of this explosion,' says an eye-witness (one of Porter's men), 'has never been ofl5cially explained. History ascribes it to acci- dent; and perhaps it would not be proper for me to state what I learned at the time. Even If it was design, I think the end justified the means. It was that mysterious explosion which, through Providence, saved our gallant little Army frona the horrors of a general massacre.' "The venerable Jabez Flsk, now (1867) living near Adrian, Michigan, who was in the fight, is not so reticent concerning the explosion. In a letter to me, dated May 20, 1863, he writes: 'Three or four hundred of the enemy had got into the bastion. At this time an American officer came running up, and said, "General Gaines, the bastion Is full. I can blow them all to hell in a minute!" They both passed back through a stone building, and In a short time the bastion and the British were high in the air. General Gaines soon returned, swinging his hat, and shouting, "Hurrah for Little York !" ' This was in allusion to the blowing up of the British magazine at Little York, where General Pike was killed." The following even more interesting version is from a letter written by Lieutenant McMahon, of the British Army: "A considerable portion of the loss on our part was occasioned by the explosion of a quantity of ammunition which the enemy had placed under the platform of the bastion at which our troops had entered and made a lodgment, and but for which the place would have been ours. It was not, however, intentionally placed there for the purpose, but, seeing the opportunity, and availing himself of it, a corporal of the American Artil- lery, having got on a red coat and the cap of a British deserter, and while it was scarce daylight, got in amongst our men, who were principally in and near this bastion, and appeared to make himself very busy in work- ing the gun, which by this time had been turned against the enemy, and In the bustle he got under the platform and effected his purpose by a slow match. He had but just time himself to slink off and get behind a stone building in the fort when this unfortunate explosion took place, which has left the 103d Regiment, who were principally at that point, but a, mere skeleton." 86 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY those killed in the river on the left flank of the camp, their total loss was probably nearly 800 men. In this action the Twenty-first well upheld the high honor it had gained at Lundy's Lane. In the subsequent distribu- tion of rewards Captain Marston was given the brevet rank of Major, First Lieutenant Hall that of Captain, and Second Lieutenant Larned that of First Lieutenant — these awards being "for gallant conduct in the defense of Fort Erie." Having failed to take the place by assault, General Drum- mond pushed his siege works forward and erected three new batteries within five hundred yards of Fort Erie. From these he threw shell and hot shot daily within the American lines. On August 28th a shell exploded in General Gaines' quarters and inflicted a serious wound that compelled him to give up his command and go to Buffalo for treatment. General Brown thereupon came from Batavia and again assumed the com- mand. The Americans were now hard pressed by the enemy, who had begun the construction of a fourth new battery still nearer to their lines. General Brown believed it necessary to make a sortie and to attempt the destruction of these new batteries. On September 9th he consulted his subordinate commanders on the subject but found few in favor of such a plan. Neverthe- less his resolution was unaltered, and he went very quietly and secretly about his preparations for carrying it into effect. Immediately after the return of the army to Fort Erie Gen- eral Porter had sent out, through northern New York, an appeal for volunteers to come to their aid. The call met with a fairly generous response, and in the second week of Septem- ber about 3,000 men arrived at Buffalo, from whence they were taken across the foot of the lake and encamped on the left flank of our works at Fort Erie. Having these reinforcements at hand, and hearing that the British strength and morale were both considerably weakened by camp sickness. General Brown determined to make his sortie before the enemy could complete his new battery. General Drummond, in carrying on the siege, had divided his army into three brigades, one of WAR OP 1812 87 which was always on duty in the advanced works, while the other two were in camp about two miles in the rear. General Brown was confident that, if he could approach the British batteries with secrecy, he would be able to defeat the brigade on duty there and destroy the guns before aid could come from their camp. Accordingly, on the morning of September 17th, he formed his troops in two columns, with a reserve, and gave orders for the carrying out of his design. The left column, under General Porter, was composed of Volunteers, detachments from the First and Twenty-third Infantry, parts of the First and Fourth Rifles, and some dismounted dragoons. These were to move from the extreme left of their camp, by a circuit- ous route through the woods, and to turn the right of the British line, where the new battery was under construction. The right column, composed of the Ninth, Eleventh and Nine- teenth Infantry regiments, was commanded by General James Miller, who had received notice three days before that Con- gress had conferred upon him this title, by brevet, for his services at the battle of Niagara. His column was to move under cover of woods and a ravine and make a frontal attack upon the batteries. The Twenty-first Infantry, with a small detachment of the Seventeenth, formed the reserve, under Gen- eral Ripley, and was posted a short distance in front of Fort Erie. Providence seemed to favor General Brown's designs. The two columns moved at noon, hidden by a dense fog that had settled over the vicinity. They delivered their assaults almost simultaneously. General Miller's column against batteries )Nos. 1 and 2, and General Porter's against Nos. 3 and 4. In forty minutes they had taken them, with the block-houses built for their defense, destroyed the guns and carriages and blown up the magazine of battery No. 3. While the struggle was in progress the Twenty-first was ordered up to the aid of General Miller. It had barely reached the face of the batteries when General Ripley was struck in the neck by a bullet and so dangerously wounded that he had to be removed from the field. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel 88 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Upham, who led the regiment into action and assisted in mak- ing victory secure. The American losses in the sortie were 79 killed and 433 wounded, captured or missing. The loss among the officers was heavy. The British reported their losses as 115 killed and 494 wounded and missing. Of the latter number 12 officers and 373 enlisted men were taken prisoners by the American troops and carried away with them to their camp. Colonel Upham, in his report of the action, bestowed high praise upon Major Chambers of the Fourth Rifles, attached to the Twenty-first, and also upon Captain Bradford and Lieu- tenant Holding of the latter regiment. Ensign Cummings, of the Twenty-first was wounded. General Drummond was so much discouraged over the effects of this sortie by the besieged, and over the growing weakness of his regiments, that he broke up his camp on Sep- tember 31st, and retreated to the Chippewa. End of the Campaign. To relieve the threatening situation at Fort Erie, General Izard, who commanded the troops on Lake Champlain, was ordered to proceed toward the northern border. Early in Sep- tember, therefore, he started from Plattsburg, with 4,000 men, for Sackett's Harbor. Upon his arrival at that place on September 17th, he received news of the repulse of the British expedition on Lake Champlain, and also a letter from General Brown, in which the latter described the peril of his little army and requested early assistance. Pushing westward as rapidly as he could, General Izard arrived at Lewiston on October 5th. Here he was visited by Generals Brown and Porter, and it was decided to combine the two forces to act against Drummond's army. On October 10th and 11th Izard crossed his troops at Black Rock and went into camp two miles north of Fort Erie. As he was senior in rank to General Brown he assumed command of the army, while Brown re- turned to Sackett's Harbor. With the recently joined Volunteers, General Izard's com- WAR OF 1812 89 mand soon numbered nearly 8,000 men. He left a small garri- son at Fort Erie, and moved toward the Chippewa with the hope of drawing Drummond into a fight in the open field. On October 18th there was a sharp engagement on Lyon's Creek, between detachments of the two armies, but Drummond, con- vinced that the American strength was now too great for him to meet with hope of success, again fell back to Burlington Heights. Winter, once more, was near at hand, and General Izard decided that further operations must be profitless, and prob- ably dangerous. He therefore retired to the ferry opposite Black Rock, blew up the fortifications at Fort Erie, and imme- diately withdrew all his troops to the American shore. The army was broken up and sent to different points for the win- ter. About a thousand men were sent to Greenbush, oppo- site Albany, on the Hudson. The Seventeenth and Nine- teenth Infantry, under General Miller, went to Erie, Pennsyl- vania, and into cantonment there. Detachments of dragoons and artillery were sent to Batavia, Williamsville, and the Genesee River. The infantry that had recently formed part of General Brown's command, the Twenty-first being one of these regiments, was led by General Winder* back to Sack- ett's Harbor,** and the remainder of the army went into win- ter quarters in the vicinity of Black Rock and Buffalo. At the end of the campaign, therefore, the contending armies found themselves in almost exactly the same positions from which they had started at its beginning. As has been said, it was without results, but it must be remembered that its battles produced a deep effect and exerted a wide influence over the temper of the people. Not one had ended in defeat. Indeed, all might be regarded as victories. Amid the humili- ations and the disgraceful failures that had prevailed else- where through the year, these battles, with the victory at •General Winder had but recently arrived from Baltimore. • •These started from Black Rock on October 24th. General Izard, in a letter dated November 2nd, 1814, says they "must now be well on their way to Sackett's Harbor." It is probable, therefore, that they went by land. 90 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Plattsburg, preserved the honor of American arms and aroused the waning enthusiasms of the public and the Congress. So prominently did these successes stand out above the general level of failure that Congress hastened to show its appreciation by awarding gold medals, together with formal votes of thanks, to Generals Brown, Scott, Gaines, Ripley, Miller and Porter, and by conferring brevet promotions upon a large num- ber of the subordinate officers of the Army. General Miller, recognizing the sore need for the recruit- ment of the depleted Regular regiments, wrote, in behalf of his own, the Twenty-first, the following letter to General Dearborn : Lincoln, Nov. 29, 1814. Sir: "The Twenty-first Regiment Infantry has suffered very BIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL MILLER. James Miller was born at Peterborough, New Hampshire, on the 25th of April, 1776. He was educated for the bar but entered the United States Army in 1808, being commissioned Major of the Fourth Infantry on July 8th of that year. On November 30, 1810, he was pro- moted to be Lieutenant Colonel of the Fifth Infantry, but remained on duty with the Fourth, with which he performed gallant services under General Harrison in the campaign against the Indians that ended with the Battle of Tippecanoe. In the spring of 1812 he led the Fourth to Dayton, Ohio, where he joined about 1200 Militia, and the whole force, under Brigadier General William Hull, started for Detroit. Upon their arrival there, early In July, they crossed into Canada, where they were successful in some small actions. Lieutenant Colonel Miller being brevetted Colonel for distinguished service at Browhstown on August 9. However, General Hull withdrew to Detroit upon the approach of a British force under General Brock, and surrendered the place and his army on August 16, 1812. The prisoners were removed to Montreal, but Lieutenant Colonel Miller was exchanged in time to enable him to join in the second In- vasion of Canada, in the spring of 1813. He had been transferred, on September 14, 1812, to the Sixth Infantry, and he led that regiment at the capture of York (now Toronto), on April 27, 1813, and at the cap- ture of Fort George on May 27 of the same year. In the fall he accom- panied General Wilkinson in the latter's fruitless campaign on the St. Lawrence River. On March 9, 1814, he was promoted to be Colonel of the Twenty- OBVERSE OP GOLD MEDAL PRESENTED BY CONGRESS TO GENERAL MILLER WAR OP 1812 91 severely during the last campaign, and the ranks are very much reduced in consequence of its great loss in killed and wounded. The campaign now being closed, it would gratify me extremely, and I believe would be no more so to me than to the brave and meritorious officers and men of that regiment to have them ordered to some point in Massachusetts, their native State, to recruit this winter. By so doing I have no doubt the ranks would be full, or nearly so, by the commence- ment of a spring campaign. The soldiers of this regiment are much pleased with the service and very proud of their corps. Could they return among their friends and old comrades I have no doubt they would induce hundreds of their acquaintance to join them in the honorable defense of their country. The Ninth Regiment I consider in the same situation, and am fully convinced, if the Honorable Secretary of War should think proper to order one or both regiments to some post or posts in this State, it would have a very great and good effect on the recruiting service. I will be extremely obliged to you, sir, first Infantry and led his regiment, which was a part of Ripley's Brigade of Brown's Army, In the third invasion of Canada, which took its departure from Buffalo on July 2. He rendered valuable service at the battle of Chippewa, on July 5th, and, with his regiment, fought most gallantly at the Battle of Niagara, on July 25th, and during the siege of Fort Brie by the British during August and September. He was brevetted Brigadier General for distinguished service at the battle of Niagara, July 25, 1814, and received, by resolution of Con- gress passed November 3, 1814, the formal thanks of the nation and the gift of a gold medal "in testimony of the high sense entertained by Congress of his gallantry and good conduct in the several conflicts of Chippewa, Niagara and Port Erie, Upper Canada". In consequence of the re-organization of the army at the close of the War of 1812, General Miller was transferred to the Pifth Infantry, as its Colonel, on May 17, 1815. He resigned his commission on June 1, 1819, and was appointed by the President to be Governor of the territory of Arkansas. This office was held by him until March, 1825, when he was appointed Col- lector of the Port of Salem, Massachusetts. In the latter position he served continuously and faithfully for twenty-four years, until stricken by paralysis in 1849. He then removed to Temple, New Hampshire, where, on July 4, 1851, he was visited by a second stroke, from which death ensued on the seventh of that month. The obverse of the gold medal presented to him by Congress is shown on the foregoing page. On the reverse (not shown) is a battle scetae upon a slope and eminence similar in appearance to that at Lundy's Lane. Over the scene are the words "Resolution of Congress Nov. 3, 1814". Below are the words "Battles of Chippewa Julv 5 1814- Niagara, July 25, 1814; Erie, Sept. 17, 1814" .^ . o^», 92 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY if it should meet your approbation to join me in an application to the Honorable Secretary of War to have them ordered on I have the honor to be Very respectfully, Your most obedient servant, JAMES MILLER, Brigadier-General." Major-General Henry Dearborn,* Com. 1st M. D. No action appears to have been taken to carry out the sug- gestions made therein, as the Twenty-first remained at Sack- ett's Harbor through the winter and was still stationed there in the following spring when the order was issued for the reduction and reorganization of the Army. •General MiUer seems to have been on leave of absence at Lincoln, Mass., when this letter was written. The country was then divided into u number of Military Districts. General Dearborn was in command of one of these, of which the state of Massachusetts formed a part. CHAPTER IV. CLOSE OP THE WAR. AT sea the war proceeded, during the year 1814, in the usual series of isolated combats, culminating in varying degrees of good or illfortune, but always undertaken in such a spirit of boldness and resourcefulness as to command the admiration of both friend and foe. In the northwest an undermanned and ill-found expedition against Mackinac, made with the hope of retaking that place from the British, utterly failed of its purpose. Aside from these and the operations on the Niagara Peninsula, such examples of enterprise as were exhibited dur- ing the year were oflfered by the enemy. They blockaded most of the Atlantic ports and subjected many on the north- ern coast to bombardment. They seized the upper part of Maine and occupied the towns of Eastport, Castine and Ban- gor until the close of the war. In midsummer they assembled a considerable force on the lower Chesapeake and made it evi- dent that they intended to undertake serious operations in that section. Although Washington was exposed from the beginning, no steps were taken to furnish any protection to the capital until in July of this year, when the instruments of its destruction were already nearing its gates. Orders were issued creating a new military district, to embrace the District of Columbia, Maryland and part of Virginia, to be under the command of General Winder, who had recently been exchanged and had returned from captivity in Canada. The governors of Vir- ginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania were requested to make preparations to furnish a force of Militia aggregating 15,000 men. General Winder at once set about the most painstaking and energetic preparations for defense but met, at every turn, only embarrassment and disappointment. The Regular troops in his district were fortress artillery and, aside from a few in Fort Washington and vicinity, were scattered among the (93) 94 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY defenses of Annapolis, Baltimore and Norfolk. General Win- der was not allowed to make requisition for the Militia men- tioned at once, but only for a few at a time, cautiously and as the exigencies of the situation might compel their use. His apparently fine army was an army orjly on paper. On August 18th, 5,000 British troops under General Ross and Admiral Cockburn landed at Benedict on the Patuxent River, about fifty miles southeast of Washington, and immedi- ately took up the march in that direction. Such Militia and Volunteers as could be scraped together were hastened out to intercept the approaching enemy. With them went about 300 Regular troops and a few sailors and marines under Com- modore Barney. General Winder found himself provided with a totally unorganized body of 5,100 men, with whom he con- fronted the enemy at Bladensburg, Maryland, on August 34th. Much as happened near Washington, forty-seven years later, many high civil functionaries of the Government went out to witness the battle and to give directions as to its conduct. These included the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War. Disregarding the General in command, they each gave orders that conflicted, not only with those of the General, but with those issued by the others directly to the troops. Militia commanders, not knowing whom to obey, dirsegarded all and issued orders of their own. Of course confusion reigned supreme. The enemy attacked shortly after noon. It would be too much to call the meeting a battle. There were too few Regular troops to make a stand and most of the Militia, hastily gathered and undisciplined, departed in greater haste than they had assembled. The British referred to the affair derisively as "the Bladensburg Races." With no further resistance they marched into the city, where they burned the Capitol, the President's house, the Treasury and War Department buildings, and a considerable amount of other property, both public and private. Having no intention of holding the place, they then retired to the Chesa- peake. The whole affair is one over which both nations willingly WAR OF 1812 95 draw a mantle of silence : the Americans because of the ridicu- lous and shameful nature of their attempt at defense, and the English because of the inexcusable vandalism involved in their wanton destruction of government buildings and archives. On Sepember 13-14th, the same British force, with the aid of several warships, made an attack on Baltimore, which ended in failure. The forts guarding the city gave so good an account of themselves that the ships were beaten off ;* General Ross was killed and his army was forced to retire. During the latter part of the summer Sir George Prevost had been collecting a formidable land and- naval force on the St. Lawrence and watching for a favorable opportunity to make an invasion of New York by way of Lake Champlain, with the design of cutting ofif the upper part of that State and the New England States from the rest of the Union. When General Izard left Plattsburg, with his 4,000 men, to go to Sackett's Harbor, and afterwards to Fort Erie, the time seemed opportune for Sir George's expedition. With an army of 14,000 men he at once started southward. Co-operating with him was a fleet of small armed vessels commanded by Captain Downie, of the British Navy, that were brought into Lake Champlain by way of the river Sorel. General Macomb, after General Izard's departure, had left under his command only 3,500 Regulars. So many of these were invalids and convalescents, or recent recruits, and so many belonged to unorganized detachments of absent regi- ments, that his effective srength was little above 1,500. However, he concentrated them all at Plattsburg, where he set them vigorously at work intrenching themselves against the *It was during the bombardment of Fort McHenry, between midnight and dawn, on the night of September 13th, that "The Star Spangled Ban- ner" was written by Francis Scott Key, then a resident of Georgetown, T>. C. Mr. Key was temporarily detained aboard one of the British -vessels within sight and sound of the bombardment, and the song expresses the anxiety of his feelings while waiting for the light of day. The words were struck hot from the author's brain and have the quality suited to a national song. The music to which they are set was not so produced. It is borrowed from an Fngllsh composition of a, much earlier date and, while dignified, is not of a stirring character, and is somewhat too com- plex to find popular acceptance with an unmusical people. 96 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY coming attack. There he was joined by Militia and Volun- teers from the surrounding country, to the number, on the day of battle, of possibly 3,500 men. To meet the British naval attack Commodore Macdonough held a fleet of similar vessels off the town. The blow was delivered on September 11th. General Macomb's troops successfully checked the assaulting columns of the enemy, yet had the result hinged mainly upon the engagement on land it is evident he would, sooner or later, have been forced to succumb to the crushingly superior num- bers brought against him. But Sir George was watching with greater care the outcome of the contest on the lake. There Macdonough was completely victorious. The British fleet was captured or destroyed. Sir George, seeing that his means of communication with his base was thus lost, and knowing that he would soon have to meet fresh bodies of American troops that were on the way to reinforce the threatened garrison of Plattsburg, at once recalled his attacking columns and retreated into Canada. The repulse of this threatening invasion was far-reaching in its influence on both sides. It chagrined and shocked the English people, who denounced Prevost as being both coward- ly and incompetent, and loudly demanded his degradation from command. On the other hand, it was the very salvation of the Government in Washington. This victory, together with those gained by Brown's army on the Niagara, revived sufficient confidence to enable the Administration to maintain its existence and to further prepare for the prosecution of its policies. Indeed the American Government was in a perilous situa- tion. It was threatened from both within and without. In Europe the allies had at last succeeded in crushing Napoleon and in forcing him to abdicate the French throne, and he had accepted banishment to the island of Elba, in the Mediterra- nean. This left free the English army, which had been operat- ing under the Duke of Wellington, and the British Govern- ment at once began transporting it to America. It resolved WAR OF 1812 97 that there should be no more dallying over the war here, and that the next spring should see begun a campaign that would crush the United States once and for all. Up to the 1st of September, 1814, there had arrived in Canada about^ 15,000 of these veteran troops, and about half that number had been transported to the Bermudas. At home the Administration was beset by difficulties and hampered by its enemies. There had been, from the beginning, a strong anti-war party, chiefly localized in the New England States. This group of States exercised so thorough a control of the finances and the com- merce of the country as to give it an extraordinary power. The reasons for its opposition were variously expressed, but the principal one was that it was bad for business. The longer the war continued the worse it became for business and the more virulent was the opposition developed. In this part of the country, where, naturally, the most wealth was accumulated, government bonds issued to obtain funds for the prosecution of the war could not be sold or, if at all, only at ruinous discounts. At the same time British securities were freely purchased and the gold paid for them, so much needed at home, went to the aid of the enemy. The military situation was even worse. To meet the veteran troops of Great Britain the United States had no trained men upon whom to call, nor could it obtain any troops to whom training and discipline could be applied. Recruiting for the Regular regiments had almost ceased and, by the autumn of 1814, these had so dwindled that there were not, all told, in the Regular army, more than 30,000 men. "Both in the military and the political point of view," says the historian, Henry Adams, "the persistence in depending on Militia threatened to ruin the national Government." In those days the claims of "State's rights" were much more strongly to the front than they are now. The separate States had, only a few years before, relinquished a part of their powers to the newly created central Government, and now each of them was consumed with jealousy of the power they had set over them- selves, and with fear that it had made the mistake of relin- 98 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY quishing too much. The Militia of none of the States could be induced to go beyond the national boundaries, claiming that such an act would be clearly unconstitutional. Most of them refused to go beyond the limits of the State in which they claimed citizenship, basing their refusal on the same grounds. The governors of the opposition States refused to issue any call for Militia except to repel actual invasion of their own territories, and many times, indeed, they neglected to issue such calls when the enemy was upon their very thresholds. At the same time they complained loudly of the incapacity of the federal Government to afford them adequate protection against the common foe. The supporters of the Government openly charged, and it was not denied, that these States wished to see the national defense fail, in order that they might use their Militia solely, and thus build up a system of State armies. At the close of 1814 nothing could have served to maintain an adequate national army but a resort to conscription; but such a policy would have met with most determined resistance, and would have set afoot an internal strife that the Govern- ment would have been unable to suppress. In view of all these circumstances, therefore, it seems highly probable that the United States would have suffered defeat during the fol- lowing year, had not a fortuitous combination of circumstances brought about an unexpected agreement upon a treaty of peace. As early as March, 1813, the Czar of Russia had tendered his services as mediator between the two warring nations. His offer was eagerly accepted by the Government of the United States, and promptly rejected by that of Great Britain. However, there were serious troubles nearer home that caused the British ministry far greater concern than anything that could occur in America. The star of Napoleon I was still in the ascendant and his threatened conquest of the whole of Europe seemed in a fair way of fulfillment. Although he had not directly attacked England it was there his most implacable enemies were to be found. If it could do so with reasonable advantage, therefore, the Government was not averse to rid- WAR OF 1S1.2 99 ding itself of the American imbroglio, and besides, it did not desire offensively to ignore the evident wishes of the Russian Emperor. Consequently, while declining the latter's media- tion, it offered, as an alternative, to appoint commissioners who should meet representatives of the United States either at London or at Gottenburg, Sweden, to discuss possible terms of peace. The United States agreed to a meeting at Gottenburg, but the city of Ghent, in what is now Belgium, was afterwards selected. The British Government moved with great deliberation in the matter and its commissioners did not present themselves there until August, 1814. In the meantime. Napoleon had faced ruin in his disastrous Russian campaign, had returned to France, where he succeeded in temporarily reviving his sinking fortunes, had suffered what then seemed to be a final defeat, and was in exile. The English envoys, therefore, assumed so obstinate and uncompromising an attitude that an agreement seemed impossible. The nego- tiations dragged on until December 24th, when it was announced that the apparently impossible had been accomplished and a treaty had been signed. When examined it was found to stipulate little except that hostilities should cease, but neither Government lost time in ratifying its terms when presented for the purpose. Owing to the slow transmission of intelligence by the then existing means, a number of battles at sea were fought after the treaty was completed, and the news reached America too late to prevent a bloody battle at New Orleans on January 8th, 1815. General Pakenham had transported thither from the Ber- mudas about 7,000 men, including those that had recently been operating on the Chesapeake. To oppose this invasion Gen- eral Andrew Jackson gathered all the troops he could muster in southern territory, Regulars, MiHtia and Volunteers, and hastily intrenched them south of the city. The British assaulted these works on January 8th, and were repulsed* with great loss of life, including that of General Pakenham himself. •A little known feature of this battle is the part played therein by the 100 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Reduction and Reorganization of Ihe Army. A Japanese warrior,* once the ruler of his country, gravely cautioned his followers, elated over their success in a hard- fought battle, saying, "In the moment of victory, tighten your helmet strings." Japan has laid his words, as a jewel, next her heart, and has profited by them. In the United States these words have never found accep- tance or even understanding. No sooner was it known that a treaty of peace had been signed than people, as ever, said joy- fully that the United States had now fought, and gloriously won, the last war in which it would ever have to engage. Peace having come again it was proper to lay aside the trappings of war, forget the cares and the thoughts of war, and enjoy peace as anything must be enjoyed — happily and in forgetfulness of the past. Having spent much money on war, it was neces- sary to economize in order to devote more money to the ex- penditures necessary for the enjoyment of peace. The army was no longer needed and the first and greatest economy could be practiced by dispensing with such an idle possession. On March 3d, 1815, Congress passed a bill reducing the army to a total of not more than 10,000 men, to be appor- tioned among the various arms as the President might direct, smuggler Jacques Lafltte. The latter had gathered about him, on Bara- teria Bay, Just west of the mouth of the Mississippi, quite a little colony of reckless men engaged In the same business as himself. There he was approached by British agents who offered him advantageous terms for his assistance. He rejected them, however, and offered the services of himself and men to General Jackson on condition that the latter and the Governor of Louisiana should intercede with the United States Gov- ernment to secure for them immunity from prosecution for their past offenses. Having received the promises of the two officials to do what they could in his behalf, he marched his men to the American camp. Many of them being trained artillerists, they rendered very valuable services on the day of battle. Lafltte secured the immunity he desired but was always regarded with suspicion. Several years later, having been made Governor of the port of Galveston by the new Republic of Texas, he became incensed at what he regarded as the espionage and interference of the United States, and set sail from that port, declaring he might as well be a pirate if he was always to be so regarded. Shortly afterwards he was killed In a, fight with a British sloop-of-war oft the coast of Mexico. •Tokugawa leyasu. WAR OF 1812 101 except that the Corps of Engineers was to remain as already organized. The Army then comprised fifty companies of artillery, one regiment of dragoons, forty-six regiments of infantry and four of rifles. The War Department decided to make the required reduction by dispensing entirely with the dragoons, reducing the artillery to thirty-two companies, the infantry to eight regiments and the riiles to one. To make the necessary reduction in the number of enlisted men was no serious problem, because their number was being continually and rapidly diminished, and any surplus that remained when the reorganization was to go into effect could be discharged at once. Although many of the higher num- bered infantry regiments had never had more than a few enlisted men assigned to them, all had been furnished with at least a partial complement of officers. What disposition to make, therefore, of the comparatively large number of officers, was a question requiring careful consideration. A board of general officers, consisting of Generals Brown, Jackson, Scott, Gaines, Macomb and Ripley, was appointed for the purpose of selecting those to be retained in service. Generals Jackson and Gaines, on account of other duties on which they were engaged, did not attend the meetings of the board. The method adopted was as follows: The forty-six infan- try regiments were divided into groups of from three to seven regiments each, and the officers of each of these groups were then considered separately. The records of all those who desired to remain in the service were carefully examined and their qualifications weighed. From the whole number so ex- amined in each group they selected from each grade the num- ber properly pertaining to one regiment and, later, those selected were transferred to the regiments thus reorganized. All others were honorably discharged. The Twenty-first Infantry was grouped, for this purpose, with the Fourth, the Ninth, the Thirteenth, the Fortieth and the Forty-sixth. From the officers of the Twenty-first the board selected for retention in the service: Colonel Miller; 102 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Major Vose to rank as captain; Captains Burbank, Marston, Pelham, and Pratt; First Lieutenants Cilley, Holding and Larned ; Second Lieutenants Craig, Belding and Green, and Surgeon's Mate Allen. Thus, out of the thirty-six officers selected for the reorganized regiment, thirteen were from the Twenty-first. This renewed organization was known as the Fifth Infantry, and to it the officers named were transferred on May 17th, 1815. In addition to these Major William Brad- ford was transferred, with the rank of Captain, to the rifles regiment, and First Lieutenant N. N. Hall to the artillery, on the same date. Surgeon's Mate Everett, although discharged on June 15th, was reinstated and assigned to the Second Infan- try on September 13th, 1815. Second Lieutenant Hoar died January 26th, 1815, and First Lieutenant Farnum was dismissed on April 10th of the same year. All the remaining officers of the regiment were hon- orably discharged on June 15th, 1815. From that time the Twenty-first Infantry existed no longer as an organization until 1861, and as a name until 1866. But in the three years of its service it had made a record for devo- tion to duty and bravery in action that cannot be excelled. It is for us to make known the past that it may animate the future. Before laying aside the record of this epoch of our history, hear a voice from out the past which these pages attempt, withal so inadequately, to portray. Would that we had heark- ened and had more duly appreciated the wisdom from which it spoke. Surely the future shall teach us yet how clear and far-seeing was the judgment which, once derided, long ignored, has entered the borderland whence it must emerge, crowned with the vindication of the years. It is in these words from the Memoirs of Major-General James Wilkinson, United States Army, who for a time com- manded the Army of the North, of which the Twenty-first In- fantry was once an honored part: "The battalions who fought at Chippewa, at Bridgewater* •Niagara WAR OF 1812 103 and at Erie earned much more distinction than they have received; the names of those corps should have been perpetu- ated on the peace establishment, without respect to numerical order ; the old First, the Ninth, the Twenty-first, the Twenty- third and the Twenty-fifth regiments should never have been abolished ; some mark of distinction should have been attached to their standards, and the men and officers should have been distinguished by medals and badges of honor. * * * * This would have had the effect to keep them always full and would have been a guarantee of future glory." 104 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Books and Papers of Reference for the War of 1812 Period. Documentary History of the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier. — Lundy's Lane Historical Society. History of the United States. — Henry Adams. The Second War with England.— J. T. Headley. The Historical Register of the United States.— T. H. Pal- mer. Memoirs of My Own Times. — General James Wilkinson. Niles Register. — Newspaper. The War. — Newspaper. Wars of the United States. — ^J. L. Thomson. Military and Naval Letters. — ^John Brannan. Official Accounts War of 1813.— Captain H. A. Fay. Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812. — B. J. Lossing. Battles of the United States. — H. B. Dawson. Army Register of the United States for One Hundred Years.— T. H. S. Hamersly. Historical Register United States Army. — F. B. Heitman. Scott and Jackson. — ^J. T. Headley. Universal Biographical Dictionary. — ^J. L. Blake. Encyclopedia Americana. PART II. AD INTERIM 1815 to 1861 Ad Interim CHAPTER I. 1815 TO 1861 THE military policy of the United States from the close of the War of 1812 to the beginning of the Rebellion in 1861, if, indeed, there was ever an idea followed with sufficient consistency to permit its being so denominated, was such as to produce in a reflective mind only feelings of amaze- ment. During the second struggle with Great Britain Congress appears to have realized the necessity for opposing organized force with an adequate organization of forces, although the conclusion came too late to save most of the military oper- ations from the stigma of blundering inadequacy and insuffi- ciency. At the close of the war it had made provision for forty-six regiments of infantry, one of dragoons, four of rifles, and for fifty companies of artillery. It is true that not all these organizations had been filled, but the evident intention indicated an amount of foresight and determination that has not since been equaled. However, it no sooner became apparent that a peace with Great Britain was to be consummated than the national legislature experienced a revulsion of sentiment that led to a hasty reduction of the military establishment. Although questions of boundary were in dispute with Great Britain in both the northeast and the northwest, and with Spain on the south, and the terms of the treaty with the former were so indefinite that no one could feel, with confidence, that a lasting peace was assured; although the western and south- ern borders were harried by Indian tribes bitterly hostile to the settlers pushing in those directions, and although there were even serious dissensions among the inhabitants of the various commonwealths themselves. Congress, by the act of (107) 108 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY March 3d, 1815, so reduced the size of the army that it became, at once, almost a negligible factor in the Government's calcu- lations. Such a proceeding can scarcely be attributed to inexperi- ence, for the worthlessness of. hastily raised and untrained levies of Militia and Volunteers had been proved in the many humiliations of the War of 1812, as well as during the trying and dubious days of the Revolution, when Washington pro- claimed this truth again and again and pleaded with the jeal- ous Government for troops organized upon a rational basis. The poverty of the young state must, of course, be admitted; but history shows that this policy was mainly actuated by traditions derived from the earlier colonists, by jealousies among the loosely confederated commonwealths and by their overpowering fear of anything savoring of a growing strength in the federal Government. Although, by the terms of the act cited, the authorized strength of the army was 10,000 men, in 1817 it had so dimin- ished that it did not reach a total of 8,000 of all arms. This little army was dispersed in small detachments on the Atlantic coast and along the three land frontiers and found itself, from the beginning, involved in the trying task of carrying on inter- mittent wars with numerous and active bands of hostile Indians. The most serious of these were the tedious and exceedingly difficult operations against the Seminole tribe in Alabama, Georgia and Florida, beginning after the close of the War of 1812 and lasting, with short periods of peace, for a space of twenty-five years. The conduct of these affairs, while marred by some acts that could hardly be called honor- able on the part of the Government, was carried through by the army with remarkable pertinacity and fortitude, under the most adverse conditions. At one time the operations against the Indian tribes threatened to involve the United States in war with Spain, to which country the Florida peninsula then belonged. Never- theless, in 1818 Congress proposed a further reduction of the army, although, so far as the economic condition of the coun- 1815 TO 1861 109 try was concerned, a period , of prosperity had begun which, up to that time, was fairly unexampled. Mr. Calhoun, who was then Secretary of War, vigorously combated the proposal before Congress, and succeeded in postponing the latter's resolve until the year 1821, when, by the act of March 2nd, it was ordered that, after June 1st of that year, the army should consist of four regiments of artillery and seven of infantry, in addition to the engineers. In the same bill the organization of the artillery was changed by giving to each of its regiments an additional company; but the really active army, the infan- try, on which fell the brunt of the day's labor, was reduced one regiment, or one eighth of its former strength. In 1833 Congress, by act of March 2nd, authorized the organization of two regiments of cavalry, and in 1838, by act of July 5th, added one company to each of the four regiments of artillery. For many years previous to these dispositions the effective strength of all arms was not above 5,000 men, and it was only just before the outbreak of the war with Mexico that the army was recruited up to about 8,000. This, too, in spite of the fact that the territory of the United States had been enormously expanded by the purchase of Florida from Spain and of the vast expanse of Louisiana from France. The acquisition of the latter practically removed the western boundary to the Rocky Mountains and increased the labors of the army by all that implies in the rapid redemption of this territory from savagery and its occupation by settlers flocking from the eastern states. The war begun in 1846 with the neighboring republic of Mexico was, in many respects, a peculiar incident in our history. Whatever the benefits which, it may be conceded, have arisen from its results, it is widely considered a blot upon our political escutcheon ; that its only bona-fide object was conquest, and that it was conceived with a purpose inimical to the national Government that lent its aid and brought about a successful conclusion. From a strictly mili- tary point of view its peculiarity lies in the facts that it was fought entirely on foreign soil, by an army almost absurdly 110 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY inferior in numbers to that of the enemy; that it consisted of a rapid and unbroken series of successful actions which, with one exception, possessed all the elements of brilliancy; and finally, that it was fought from beginning to end by the Regular Army of the United States, small as it was. It is true there were Volunteer troops in the armies of both Taylor and Scott, but the Regular regiments bore the brunt of both campaigns and, for once, could not be denied the leading role. In spite of the efforts that had long been made to draw the Administration into this war, and in spite of the con- tinued drift toward hostilities, small preparation had been made for its prosecution. By act of May 19th, 1846, Congress authorized one additional regiment of cavalry, and even this was after the beginning of hostilities. In 1847, by act of March 3rd, eight more companies of artillery were provided, two being added to each of the four regiments of that arm. General Taylor had begun his march southward from the Rio Grande in the summer of 1846, with an army whose mem- bers were made up of both Regular and Volunteer troops, but whose strength lay in its Regular infantry and artillery. By the comparatively small but conspicuously successful actions at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, he had reached Mon- terey, which he took after a long and severe struggle in the streets and houses of the city. Having so far succeeded, how- ever, he found himself unable to penetrate to his necessarily ultimate goal, the capital city of Mexico. It was determined, therefore, to send another army under General Scott, to capture Vera Cruz, and from there to ad- vance upon the capital. It was proposed to raise ten more regiments of Regular infantry to enable him to carry out this plan, but Congress hesitated and talked until the spring of 1847, permitting Scott to start south in November, 1846, with- out the necessary addition to his forces. To remedy the defect, most of Taylor's Regulars were ordered to the gulf coast to join him. No sooner had they departed than General Santa Ana hastily organized an army and attacked Taylor's remaining regiments on the field of Buena Vista, near Saltillo. 1815 TO 1861 111 Unlike the previous actions, everything was confusion in the American lines, and the battle would have been irretrievably lost had it not been for the daring resistance of the artillery. As it was, the day ended in uncertainty and the American com- mander did not know the field was won until the next morn- ing, when he discovered that his antagonist had withdrawn. Vera Cruz having fallen before Scott's guns, that General set out for the interior with 8,000 men, more than three-fourths of whom were Regulars. On his arrival at the city of Puebla, about two hundred miles from the gulf coast, he found his army reduced, by battle and disease, to only 5,000. There he halted to await reinforcements. In the meantime Congress had, by act of February 11th, 1847, authorized eight additional regiments of Regular infantry, limiting their term of serivce, however, to the duration of the war. Some of these new regi- ments were forwarded to Scott, and he again took up his march. Another unbroken series of successes gave him pos- session of the capital, and the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo transferred to the United States the vast territory comprised in the present states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada and California. To the disorganization of the Mexican state, rent by long continued internal strife that rendered fairly impossible a real unity of its people or any concert of action by its armed forces, must be largely attributed the ease with which our little army overcame all resistance. Yet these two campaigns, with the very real difficulties that had to be surmounted in their prose- cution, were excellent schools for the training of the officers who, fifteen years later, bore the most conspicuous parts in the bloody strife that was waged for four years between the northern and the southern states. A roll of the most famous and successful generals, both North and South, looks like a promotion list of the younger officers of the war with Mexico. After the close of this struggle the army returned to its native soil and again scattered in small detachments, mainly in the western country where, as settlement by the whites proceeded with greater rapidity, it came to be more and more 112 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY in demand as a frontier police, doing its best to carry out the mandates of the Government in Washington and to preserve, as far as possible, a balance of peace between the Indian tribes and the white settlers who pushed them from point to point with careless aggressiveness. Excepting the eight regiments of infantry raised for the period of the Mexican War and disbanded in August, 1848, no reduction or increase in the army took place until in 1855, when the Ninth and Tenth Infantry, and the Fourth and Fifth Cavalry were added under the provisions of the act of March 3rd of that year. From the close of the war with Mexico until 1861, the attention of the country was largely absorbed in the acrim- onious controversy that had arisen between the people of the North and those of the South, and in the political maneuvers made to forward the interests of one side or the other or with the hope of bringing about a settlement. The existence of slavery in the southern states, and the opposition to that insti- tution on the part of the people of the North, gave rise to the bitterest animosity. At the bottom of the dispute, however, and forming the real obstacle to any peaceful solution to the various questions between the two sections, was the difference in their views with regard to the doctrine of "state rights." Since the earliest days of the confederation of the colonies, our people have been seriously divided as to the rights and privileges of the component states of the union, and as to the control that the federal Government may properly exercise over them. Even yet a reference may occasionally be heard to "the sovereign state of ." Prior to the rendering of a decision by the great Judge of War in 1865, the phrase con- stituted the political confession of faith of a large portion of our population. As, in the development of any society, the tendency is to bring more and more under the curb of organization the original, individual independence of the nomad or the isolated settler, so our natural tendency has been to gather more closely the ties of federacy, and gradually to strengthen the 1815 TO 1861 113 powers of the central Government. The peculiar social organ- ization of the slave states held back their people from a clear appreciation of the inevitable drift, and indeed impelled them from the well defined way into which the course of the whole people, as a nation in process of rapid formation, was falling. In the south there was an understood policy in favor of which most of its advocates were determined and aggressive. In the north there was a disposition toward conciliation and procrastination. There, the people, as usual, refused to be- lieve in the possibility of a resort to arms. Although war was a constant menace and a growing certainty, the Govern- ment made no preparation to meet an emergency that would require force and determined action to avert calamity. PART III. THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 1861 TO 1863 The War of the Rebellion, 1 861 to 1 863 CHAPTER I. ORGANIZATION OF THE SECOND BATTALION, TWELFTH INFANTRY. AFTER all excuses have been made for the supineness of the National Administration, the apparently easy indifference of the people themselves, through all the explosive excitement of the months that preceded actual hostilities, yet remains difficult of comprehension. It is certain that neither side fully comprehended the char- acteristics of the other. Although of the same race and derived from the same nationalities, their social environments had long been so dififerent that neither was able to appreciate the sentiments of their opponents at their true worth. Although slavery was only indirectly the cause of the war, it served to bind together the people of the slaveholding States and to give them a rallying point, much as the faith of Islam serves to bind the people of a Moslem State and to urge them enthusiastically into a jehad, although the original quarrel may have had nothing to do with questions of religion. In the North there was no such binding fore — no such exciting cause. The people differed from each other in their political views, but in the main were satisfied with the progress of events, and confident of an ultimately peaceful solution of all prob- lems. To violent proposals they tendered offers of com- promise ; excepting a small party of determined Abolitionists, bitter but conscientious in their anti-slavery enthusiasm, they presented only a temperate opposition. In their minds was ever present the fallacy of the impossibility of war between brothers. The advocates of secession entertained no such specious sentiments. Where they erred was in underestimating the (117) 118 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY capacity of the North for serious and determined resistance, if need be to the extremity of a resort to arms, and for perti- nacity in such a course once the first step had been taken. Year after year the efforts to compromise, and the apparent retreat of the Unionists from point to point, had bred in them this error of judgment. To their repeated threats of secession and of war the Government had paid no heed, and for such events had made no preparation. Such patent weakness naturally gave rise to a feeling of contemptuous confidence. Finally, resolved to capture the government in toto or to disrupt the Union, they repudiated the principle of majority rule and, during the presidential electoral campaign, in which Messrs. Lincoln, Douglass, Bell and Breckenridge were candi- dates, announced their purpose to secede if Lincoln should be elected. On November 6th, 1860, the ballots were cast, and Lincoln obtained both a popular and an electoral majority. For the secessionists the die was cast. There only remained for them to make the most of the time available before the new adminis- tration should come into being on the fourth of the following March. They had succeeded, during Buchanan's administra- tion, in filling his cabinet and most of the federal offices with their partizans. The intimidation practiced by these, together with the weakness of the President, laid the Federal Govern- ment helpless at their feet. Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War, caused nearly all the arms and ammunition owned by the Government to be deposited in arsenals located in the southern states. He depleted the army, and weakened it by scattering it among remote, small stations, until its utility was destroyed. General Scott had requested, before the elections, that the army should be placed upon a respectable footing, in order to meet conditions which he could plainly foresee. His request, although compliance was the first and only step that could have saved the situation, was, of course, ignored. Congress met on December 3d, amid great excitement, and at once began again the futile and now no less than criminal talk of com- promises. The time for compromise had long passed. THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 119 On December 20th, South Carolina led the way to open rup- ture. Unwilling to wait the necessary length of time, or to trust the decision to a popular vote, a convention met and committed the State to its course by passing an ordinance of secession. The other slave states were not long in following her example. They lost no time in taking possession of government arsenals, forts and navy yards within their limits, the garrisons of these places having been reduced to such a point that they could make no resistance. The only excep- tions were Forts Pickens and Monroe, which were barely saved by the prompt action of their commanders, and Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, where eighty men, under Major Anderson of the Artillery, made a gallant resistance during two days furious bombardment, and finally evacuated the fort on April 13th, 1861. The session of Congress had ended on March 3d without anything being done to stem the tide of disruption or to place the country in condition for defense. Mr. Lincoln, traveling to Washington in disguise, assumed the office of President on March 4th. A few of the northern states had begun prepara- tion for defense, but it required the thunder of Sumter's guns to awaken them to anything like a realization of the serious- ness of the situation, although the southern forces were mobilizing, and numerous acts of hostility had already been committed. Immediately after the fall of Fort Sumter, President Lin- coln, making use of his executive powers to repair, as far as possible, the failures of Congress, called a session of that body to meet on July 4th, and at the same time issued a call for 75,000 Volunteers to defend the national cause. The loyal states immediately responded, and their levies were forwarded to Washington with surprising promptness. As an indication of the total lack of appreciation, even at that late day, of the magnitude of the struggle about to be precipitated, this Volun- teer force, in addition to being inadequate in numbers, was to be enlisted for only three months. As usual, the seceding 120 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY States were in advance with their preparations and ready to command a superior force. On May 4th the President, having obtained a clearer con- ception of the situation, and having gained greater confidence from the support of the northern states, issued another call for Volunteers — this time for 42,000 to be enlisted for a period of three years or the duration of the war. In two months four times that number had been mustered in. In the same proclamation, of May 4th, 1861, was another provision of even greater importance. This called for an addition of 22,714 men to the Regular Army, and of 18,000 men to the Navy. The addition to the Regular Army was to consist of one regiment containing twelve batteries of artillery, one regiment of cavalry and nine regiments of infantry. Following this proclamation of May 4th, then, was reborn the Twenty-first Infantry, although it was not so re- christened until five years later. The plan for organizing the nine regiments of infantry authorized by the President was to form in each regiment three battalions of eight companies each. This having been done, the battalions acted as separate units, in their subsequent operations, instead of remaining together as regimental com- mands, and so it happened that often different battalions of the same regiment were taking part at the same time in entirely different campaigns. At the close of the war, when the Volun- teer troops were mustered out, it became necessary to increase the Regular Army and so organize it that it could best keep the peace and assist in carrying on the work of reconstruction. The second and third battalions of these nine regiments were, therefore, denominated regiments of infantry, and were num- bered from the Ninth to the Thirty-seventh, inclusive. The Second Battalion of the Twelfth thus became, from Septem- ber 21st, 1866, the Twenty-first Infantry, and has so continued to the present date. The field officers of the Twelfth Infantry were appointed as follows: Captain W. B. Franklin, Topographical Engi- THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 121 neers,, to be Colonel ; Colonel Daniel Butterfield, Twelfth New York Militia, to be Lieutenant Colonel; and Captain H. B. Clitz, Third Infantry; Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Smith, New York Volunteers, and L. B. Bruen, of Ohio, to be Majors. Of these. Colonel Franklin, Lieutenant Colonel Butterfield and Major Smith held higher rank in the Volunteer service and did not join. The regimental command, therefore devolved upon Major Clitz, the senior Major, while the command of the Second Battalion fell to Captain Thomas M. Anderson, who had been promoted from Second Lieutenant of the Fifth Cavalry. Fort Hamilton, New York Harbor, was designated as the station of the regiment, while the battalions were in process of formation and, while Major Clitz was in charge of this work, the post was commanded by Colonel Martin Burke, of the Artillery. At first the plan was to permit the Captains and Lieuten- ants to recruit for their own companies, and of those first filled to form the First Battalion. Under this plan Captain Ander- son would probably have commanded the First Battalion. Having reported at Fort Hamilton in October, 1861, he was sent to his native state, Ohio, to raise recruits, and was very successful in his work. Upon his return in January of the next year, however, a new plan was announced, under which Major Clitz took the First Battalion and assigned Captain Ander- son, with his company, to the Second. The other seven Cap- tains assigned to the Second were Martin Mayer, of New York; Alexander Dallas, from Private, District of Columbia Volunteer Infantry; Thomas S. Dunn, from Captain, Ninth Indiana Volunteer Infantry ; William M. Quimbey, from Cap- tain, First Maine Volunteer Infantry ; Henry R. Putnam, from Captain, First Maine Volunteer Infantry ; Edward R. Penning- ton, of New Jersey; Moses B. Walker, of Ohio. The First Lieutenants, all appointed from civil life, were as follows : Samuel S. Newbury, of Michigan ; John S. Camp- bell, of Pennsylvania; Jacob Hoyer, of Pennsylvania; Henry C. Morgan, of New York; Benjamin R. Perkins, of Connecti- 122 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY cut ; Eugene Wells, of Missouri ; John S. Bootes, of the Dis- trict of Columbia; David D. Van Valzah, of Pennsylvania; Evan Miles, of Pennsylvania; Harry C. Egbert, of Pennsyl- vania. At the outset there were no Second Lieutenants provided. The enlisted strength of the Battalion was considerably depleted by the change in the system of organization, as the companies of the First were ordered filled up with recruits obtained by officers of the Second, in spite of the protests of the latter. In April, Major Clitz started for the front, and the officers of the Second Battalion were ordered in from their recruiting BIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL ANDERSON. It Is said no war has been fought on this continent in which some member of the Anderson family did not take part. One was with Washington at Fort Necessity. Eight were officers of the Continental army. General T. M. Anderson's paternal grandfather being Lieuten- ant Colonel of the Third Virginia Regiment. Seven served as officers in the War of 1812, his maternal grandfather as a Brigadier General. Three were in the War with Mexico, among them Major Anderson, later the hero of Fort Sumter. In the War of the Re- bellion nine fought for the Union and three for the Confederacy. In the War with Spain eight of the clan took part, but not all as officers. Thomas McArthur Anderson was born near Chillicothe, Ohio, January 21st, 1836. He received a collegiate education at a Mary- land Catholic College, which subsequently gave him an LL. D. degree. He was graduated from the Cincinnati Law College in 1858, and practiced law In Ohio and Kentucky until the fall of Fort Sumter in April, 1861. After admission to the bar in 1859 he sought a location for the practice of law in the South, and there soon saw enough to satisfy Mm that the cotton states were determined to secede from the Union. After the Presidential election of 1860 he was offered a commission in the Kentucky State Guard, an avowedly rebel organi- zation, under General Simon B. Buckner. This he declined, and when Sumter was fired upon enlisted, on April 20th, in the Sixth Ohio Infantry. On May 7th, 1861, he was appointed a Second Lieutenant in the Fifth U. S. Cavalry, of which George H. Thomas was then Colonel. On May 14th, he was commissioned a Captain in the Twelfth U. S. Infantry, but waived rank and served as a Lieutenant in Patterson's army until the campaign closed. Before reporting to his new regiment he stopped to see his uncle. General Robert Anderson, in command of the Department GENERAL THOMAS M. ANDERSON THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 123 districts to organize and prepare their companies for active service. It was possible to organize only four companies out of the men then available, and these were assigned to Company A, Captain Anderson; Company B, Captain Dallas; Company E, Captain Quimbey, and Company G, Captain Pennington, leaving Companies C, Captain Mayer; D, Captain Dunn, and F, Captain Putnam, to be filled up, trained and forwarded when a sufficient number of men could be obtained for them. The First Lieutenants present for duty with these first four com- panies were Campbell, Perkins, Van Valzah and Egbert. As may be seen by reference to the list of officers, none had had any service in the Regular Army except Captain Ander- of Kentucky. The latter had been authorized by President Lincoln to select four ofiScers to be appointed Brigadier Generals of Volun- teers, to serve in his Department. He had selected Don Carlos Buel, W. T. Sherman and George H. Thomas. Andrew Johnson and Horace Maynard of Tennessee, and a representative from Kentucky were dn his room urging him to ask that Buckner be made a Briga- dier in the Union army If he would bring over the Kentucky Guard with him. After hearing what his nephew had to say of Buckner's Guard, the Department Commander declined to apply for him. The oflBicers of the new Regular regiments had to raise their own companies. They had no recruiting parties, and no instructions save copies of the Army Regulations and Hardee's Infantry Tactics. Captain Anderson went to his native state and adopted a method which he thought promised the greatest results. He had handbills printed headed "War Talk." These designated places where he pro- posed to appeal for recruits: at court houses, churches, school houses, street corners and country cross roads. He paid for fuel and lighting and hired, when he could, a man to beat a drum or blow a horn. Other officers were compelled to adopt similarly strenuous methods, as they had to compete with Volunteer regiments being organized under the President's second call. It took him five months to raise 105 men and forward them to the headquarters of the regiment at Fort Hamilton. During the Civil War he was appointed an Acting Field Officer, and commanded a battalion or a regiment in nearly all the battles of the Army of the Potomac. He was severely wounded at the battle of Chancellorsville and did not recover for several months. While in Washington on Surgeon's Certificate he was a member of a Board to organize the Signal Corps, and subsequently, under the orders of the Provost Marshal General, he organized the Invalid Corps. On August 1st, 1864, he was given the rank of Brevet Major for gallant service in the Battle of the Wilderness, and on the same date 124 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY son, and his had been brief and in the capacity of a cavalry officer. As he himself says, they possessed no qualifications for the infantry except that they could walk; but Colonel Burke believed in giving them every advantage the time allowed. He put them all under the instruction of an old Sergeant named Shane, and insisted upon their being thor- oughly drilled, not only as infantry, but as artillery as well. They were unable at the time, to admit the advisability of this latter proceeding, but Colonel Burke was sure it was essential, and strangely enough, within the year they were actually given an opportunity to put into practice all they had learned, even as artillerymen. was made Brevet Lieutenant Colonel for gallant service at the Battle of Spottsylvania, Virginia. As General Hooker's Commissary of Musters, he enlisted and organized out of rebel prisoners a regiment to serve against the Indians, and at Camp Chase, Ohio, mustered out of service 25,000 Andersonville prisoners. Wlhen the designation of the Second Battalion, Twelfth Infantry, was changed to Twenty-first Infantry, he remained with the regiment as a Captain, serving as one of the reconstructing officers in Vir- ginia, Mississippi and Texas. While in Texas he was put on detached service as Attorney for the Government in a number of claims made by Mexico against the United States. He was promoted Major on March 26th, 1868, and was assigned to the Tenth Infantry, June 24th, 1869. He was promoted Lieuten- ant Colonel of the Ninth Infantry on March 20th, 1879, and Colonel of the Fourteenth Infantry on September 16th, 1886. While com- manding a sub-district in Alaska, in 1898, he compelled the Canadian officials who claimed the coast line to move back to the crest of the mountain range, claimed by the United States as the boundary. . During the War with Spain he served in the Philippine Islands as a Brigadier General and a Major General of Volunteers. In this service he commanded the first American military expedition to cross an ocean, and was the first American officer to come in contact with Aguinaldo and develop the fact that he was hostile, and not friendly, to the United States. He was appointed Brigadier General, U. S. Army, on March 3l8t, 1899, and was retired for age on January 21st, 1900. After his retirement he served for a time as Commandant of the Ohio State Soldiers' Home. He is an active member of the Grand Army of the Republic, the Loyal Legion, the Sons of the American Revolution, the Order of Foreign Wars, the United Spanish War Veterans, and the Army of the Philippines. THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 125 Whatever the character of their instruction, however, they were allowed little time for its mastery, for in the latter part of May, upon receipt of tidings of the perilous position in which Banks' troops had been placed by the successful raid Jack- son was then making in the Shenandoah Valley, the four com- panies of the Twelfth, with two of the Eighth Infantry, also stationed at Fort Hamilton, were ordered to the front to reenforce the troops defending the upper courses of the Potomac. On arriving at Baltimore they received orders to proceed to Harper's Ferry. Captain Anderson there volun- arily reported to Captain Pitcher, a Mexican war veteran to whom the command of the two companies of the Eighth prop- erly belonged, and the six companies thus consolidated were for some time known as the Battalion of the Eighth and Twelfth. Banks in the Shenandoah. Harper's Ferry, first famous as the place of John Brown's attempt to liberate the slaves in 1859, underwent many vicissi- tudes and changed hands many times during the early days of the war. Lying at the mouth of the Shenandoah, or as it was often called, the Valley of Virginia, from which the lower Potomac and Washington were frequently threatened, and guarding, as it did, the crossing of the Potomac by the Balti- more and Ohio Railway, it occupied a conspicuous point on the route traversed by the armies of both the North and the South operating in this region. Particularly was this true of those of which the Second Battalion of the Twelfth now and later became a part. At the beginning of hostilities it was one of the largest and best equipped United States Arsenals, but, pursuant to the faithless policy of Secretary of War Floyd, it had been stripped of its garrison until there remained only sixty-four dismounted cavalrymen under command of Lieutenant Jones. In April, 1861, a force of Virginia state troops descended upon the place, but its little garrison, before evacuating it on the 126 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY eighteenth of that month, destroyed all the arms stored there and set fire to the buildings, so that everything but some heavy machinery was consumed. It was then made the con- centrating point for a Confederate force under General Joseph E. Johnston, who, in turn, evacuated it, after destroying the railway bridge and the Ohio Canal, upon the approach from Pennsylvania of a Federal army under General Patterson. This latter force occupied it on the seventeenth of June, 1861, but held it only a few days, being compelled to withdraw by orders from the Government in Washington, issued in one of the many sudden alarms over the safety of the capital. To- ward the latter part of that month the regiments hastily de- tached from Patterson's force were replaced by others, newly formed, and he was again enabled to take possession of the railway and of the position at Harper's Ferry about the first of July. For some months later the opposing forces in that region alternately advanced and retired, the latest fierce flow of the Southern tide, and the one which called our Battalion so prematurely to the front, being Jackson's pursuit of Banks' small army down the Shenandoah in the month of May, 1862, the Federal troops being again forced across the Potomac into Maryland. Upon the arrival of the Battalion of the Eighth and Twelfth, then, on May26th,it was incorporated into Banks' Army, hastily reforming with the twofold object of relieving Washington from its haunting fear of the invasion bugaboo, and of punish- ing Jackson's temerity. It was assigned to the brigade com- manded by General Hough, forming part of the division of General Rufus Saxton, the rest of the division being made up of newly raised Volunteer regiments. Although it was not at once discovered, the tide had already begun to ebb. Jackson, having brilliantly accom- plished his purpose to throw the Federal plans into confusion and to relieve, by this diversion, McClellan's pressure upon the main Confederate army in Eastern Virginia, saw that his success would be best crowned by a rapid withdrawal before THE WAR OP THE REBELLION X27 the various Union forces could concentrate to oppose him. He at once started upon his return up the Shenandoah, leaving General Dick Taylor to cover his retreat by a series of feints and demonstrations for the benefit of the Federals gathering at Harper's Ferry. This led to an opera bouffe warfare of several days' dui-ation before the true state of affairs was dis- covered, our Battalion taking part in several skirmishes that amounted to little more than sham battles, suffering no loss, and inflicting upon the enemy, so far as it was able to discern, but one death. General Banks now announced that he would resume the offensive and, during the advance that followed, up the Valley of the Shenandoah, he met no great resistance in the execution of his resolution. General Franz Sigel assumed command of the brigade in which our Battalion was incorporated, and marched it to Cedar Creek, where it was joined by the remain- der of Banks' army, the whole force then proceeding up the Shenandoah to the neighborhood of Luray. On June 26th, orders were issued consolidating the forces of Generals Banks, Fremont and McDowell into the Army of Vir- ginia, to be commanded by Major General John Pope, and directing them to mobilize on a line along the eastern foot of the Blue Ridge. Fremont, declining to serve under Pope, was superseded by General Sigel, and the command of the latter's brigade fell to Brigadier General Henry Prince, with Major General C. C. Augur in command of the division. Both Sigel and Banks crossed the Blue Ridge at Thornton's Gap, the for- mer taking post at Sperryville. Banks' Corps, by mistake, advanced too far in the direction of Warrenton, but returned at once to its post at Little Washington. The Battalion of the Eighth and Twelfth now formed a part of the Second Brigade, Second Division, Second Corps, of the Army of Virginia, its commanders being as stated above. 128 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Obscuration of the Regular Regiments. Before following further the events which precipitated our Battalion into a series of arduous marches and bloody battles from which it had, henceforth, no rest until Lee surrendered at Appomattox, it will be well to go back and review, briefly, the stirring scenes that had been enacted in other theatres of action during the year 1861 and the first half of 1862 ; to make clear some of the causes for the humiliation of the Union armies in Virginia during that time; and to point out, in advance, a few of the reason why the campaign in which it was now about to engage, was to end at Alexandria, little more than a month later, with further humiliation and in no advan- tage to the Union cause. To trace its intimate history, in this and subsequent cam- paigns is a difficult task. During the War of 1813 regiments and sometimes companies, carried out independent actions upon the battlefield and were accordingly noticed as such, and so accounts of their doings are preserved. Now, however, the forces engaged were of such unprecedented size that their his- torical chronicles, and even orders and official correspondence seldom took notice of anything less than corps or divisions and never of anything less than brigades. Then too, the little Regular Army was soon swallowed up in the vast swarm of Volunteers. The latter had the benefit of local interests and enthusiasms and, to a great extent, they had their own chroniclers and historians; the former had none — they were lost to sight, and only professional soldiers have noted and left a record of their heroic acts where their immense esprit de corps forbade them ever to fall back before a Volunteer foe, no matter what might be the odds in his favor. In closing this chapter, the words of the Comte de Paris come strongly and fittingly to mind. "This army (the Regulars) was not only compelled to play an insignificant part in the new forces of the Republic, but the elements of which it was composed were another cause of weakness. Out of its 30,000 soldiers more than half, collected with so much difficulty, were entirely raw, and their THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 129 instruction was the more difficult because the most intelligent, the strongest and the most disinterested men were immediately prevented from joining their ranks. In consequence of the prejudices above mentioned, the proportion of newcomers was even larger among the officers than among the soldiers. ******* ** "Nevertheless, the esprit de corps, that moral influence which attaches to a word, a number or a sign, which has the power of transforming men, soon imparted habits of steadi- ness and discipline to the newcomers who, after the first com- bats, rivaled their older brethren in courage, and sustained the credit of the Regular troops. "It was especially the Regular Infantry which, in conse- quence of its reduced strength, had to play an insignificant part among the divisions of the Volunteer Infantry. Yet, in the Army of Kentucky, where it was only represented by a single battalion belonging to the Eighteenth Regiment, that detachment distinguished itself in the first battle fought by that army at Mill Springs. In the Army of the Potomac it was represented by eight battalions, or a little over 5,000 men ; these were not enough for a reserve designed to strike a decisive blow, but this corps, under able command, served as a model to the others and constantly encouraged them by its example, whereas, if it had been scattered, its traditions would have been destroyed and its efficiency neutralized. Formed into a single brigade, these eight battalions were at first entrusted with the delicate duty of protecting the city of Washington ; we shall find them again among the Volunteers, suffering themselves to be cut to pieces rather than fall back on the battlefields of Virginia." CHAPTER II. EARLY EVENTS OF THE WAR. DISREGARDING naval expeditions along the coasts and engagements at sea, which it would serve little purpose to follow, the theatre of operations, during the early days of the war, was naturally divided by the geographical features of the country into three distinct parts. The first was west of the Mississippi River, in the State of Missouri; the second, or center, between the Mississippi and the Allegheny Mountains, was confined, in 1861, to West Virginia ; the third, or eastern, was the State of Virginia. Beginning early in June, 1861, operations of a minor char- acter began in all these territories, and were carried forward contemporaneously during the war. While those in Virginia were of the most desultory character and had the least decisive results, they were, nevertheless, invested with an importance beyond their inherent qualities by reason of the connection existing between them and subsequent events in this, the heart of the Confederacy and its most hotly contested battle-ground. Missouri and Arkansas. Missouri, being a border state whose inhabitants were divided in sentiment between the North and the South, had, with Kentucky, declared itself a neutral ; but this action did not prevent a bitter contest for supremacy upon the soil of both. Governor Jackson, of Missouri, assumed an attitude which, if not openly favorable to rebellion, at least offered no encouragement to the adherents to the Union. Captain Lyon, an energetic young officer, put an end to this state of affairs by breaking up Camp Jackson, taking possession of the Arsenal at St. Louis, and defeating a Confederate force under Colonel Marmaduke at Boonville, on June 17th. (130) THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 131 General Sigel, however, was defeated in an engagement at Carthage,on July 5th, and Lyon, who had been promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, found himself forced to fight the combined forces of Generals Price and McCullough, which outnumbered his own two to one, or to abandon the southern portion of the state. Choosing the former alternative, he attacked with great vigor at Wilson's Creek, on August 10th, but his little army was defeated and he himself lost his life while leading a bayonet charge. Price's army, with increased numbers, advanced on Lexington, in the central part of the state, and forced the surrender of the garrison of three thou- sand men under Colonel Mulligan, on September 30th ; but Gen- eral Fremont, advancing from the northeast, drove Price as far south as Springfield. General Grant fought a small and indecisive action against Polk at Belmont, on the Mississippi River, on November 7th, and General Halleck, who had succeeded Fremont in command of the Union forces, drove the Confederates, during the closing weeks of the year, out of the state into Arkansas. There they were defeated by General Curtis, in a decisive engagement at Pea Ridge, on March 7th and 8th, 1862. The section west of the Mississippi may now be disre- garded, for, from this time until the close of the war it was the scene of no considerable maneuver except Banks' illstarred Red River expedition in the spring of 1864, nor was there fought in it any engagement of note. West Virg-inia. Upon the secession of Virginia, the people of the moun- tains in the western part of the state, and those living west of them in the Ohio Valley, did not share the sentiments of their brethren in the east. They wished to adhere to the Union and shortly separated themselves from Virginia, erect- ing a new state, now known as West Virginia. Although the South was entering upon a war for the pur- pose of establishing the right of one or more states to secede 132 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY from the Union, it quickly repudiated the theory when West Virginia declared her purpose to secede from her parent state, and set out to coerce her into remaining in the Confederacy. It was this paradoxical attempt at coercion that brought on the first combat in the open field, and it was here that the soon to be famous generals, McClellan and Lee, first exhibited their talents as the commanders of armies. McClellan, who was busy organizing an army in the north- ern part of the state, lost no time in marching to meet the Southern forces under Generals Garnett and Pegram, when they entered from the southeast, and the first conflict, at Philippi, on June 3d, 1861, although an affair attended by small losses on either side, resulted in a victory for the Federals. Their triumph was made complete at Rich Mountain, on July 10th, and at Carrick's Ford, on the 14th, the Conf eredate cannon and stores being taken and their army either captured or com- pletely dispersed. The forces on either side were small, but McClellan had conducted his operations with such genuine talent that he was able to report, after his very brief cam- paign, that the Union was completely in control and that the enemy had retired, even from the Kanawha Valley in the southern part of the state. It is true that, later, forces under Generals Wise and Floyd, with Lee chief in command, again advanced to the Kanawha, where they were opposed by a Federal army under General Rosecrans, but no conflicts of consequence took place, and the operations were so disjointed and so mismanaged that they reflected no credit upon either party. To all intents and pur- poses the Southern forces had abandoned this field by the end of the year 1861. Kentucky and Tennessee. The situation in Kentucky did not become sufficiently clarified, until near the end of 1861, to determine which party was to remain in the ascendant. Union sentiment was so strong, however, that the Confederates did not attempt to THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 133 hold the northern part of the state in force. The beginning of 1863 found them occupying a line ruiming from Columbus, Kentucky, on the Mississippi River, through Forts Henry and Donelson, which they had constructed on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, respectively, just south of the Kentucky line, and through the towns of Bowling Green and Mill Spring, in the southern part of the state. Generals Grant and Buell commanded the Federal forces that were to break this line. The first move was made by General Thomas, with a part of Buell's army, against Mill Spring. By a sharp action near that place on January 19th, he caused its evacuation and utter- ly destroyed, as an organization, the army allotted to its defense. General Grant led an expedition against Forts Henry and Donelson, having the valuable co-operation of Commodore Foote with a flotilla of gunboats which ascended first the Ten- nessee and then the Cumberland River, bombarding the forts in turn. Fort Henry fell after only an hour's resistance, on February 6th, but its garrison escaped to Donelson. The latter place was closely invested, and after three days of fighting, its capitulation delivered to Grant an army of 15,000 men, with all its material. The line having been pierced at its strongest point, Colum- bus and Bowling Green were immediately evacuated. The Federal armies pushed on up the two rivers to Nashville on the- Cumberland, and to Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee. At the latter place Grant was confronted by an army under General A. S. Johnson, who, learning that his antagonist ex- pected re-enforcements from Buell, preparatory to a forward movement, decided to anticipate their arrival, and vigorously attacked him at Shiloh on the morning of April 6th. During the first day's fighting the Federals were forced back, but Johnson was killed and, the re-enforcements from Buell hav- ing arrived during the night, the Confederates were, the next next day, driven from the field and compelled to retire to Corinth, Mississippi. 134 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY On the same day General Pope and Commodore Foote attacked the strong Confederate position on Island No. 10, and compelled its surrender with 7,000 men. In May the Federal gunboats destroyed the Confederate ironclads on the Mississippi and steamed up to Memphis, Corinth and Fort Pillow having been abandoned. By this series of successes the whole of Kentucky and Western Ten- nessee was wrested from the Confederacy, and the advance now paused for a reconsolidation of the forces employed. Except for Bragg's raid into Kentucky in the latter part of 1863, the Federals held undisputed possession of this section until the close of the war. Virg'inia. While the events recounted upon the preceding pages were taking place, a number of points on the Atlantic Coast had been captured, and the war had gone on, but with very differ- ent results in Virginia. It will be observed that, in the main, the campaigns in the west and center had been well conducted by the Federal lead- ers there, and that their success had had the effect of rapidly diminishing the domain of the Southern Confederacy. In Virginia, however, there had been disastrous defeats, and affairs were so wretchedly bungled as to cause feelings of shame and alarm in the minds of those who had the welfare of the Union at heart. It was not due to disparity in numbers, for, after the first few months, the Northern levies always out- numbered the Southern. Neither was it due, except, probably in a few cases, to a superior character of the Southern forces or their leaders. General Lee, unsuccessful in West Vir- ginia, triumphed in Virginia; while a number of Northern chiefs, called from the west because of their unquestioned success there, failed utterly to repeat their successes in the east. McClellan, Pope, Fremont, Halleck — all suffered the same fate, although, according to the varying natures of the THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 135 men, it overtook them in different fashion. To paraphrase a famous remark addressed to General Gates during the Revo- lution, there were many western laurels that soon turned to eastern willows. The fact is, to put it as briefly as possible, that the bung- ling and the lack of success in this theatre of the war were due to its too close proximity to Washington. In many ways this condition was made manifest. In the beginning the politically prominent demanded military recognition, and thence arose a class of appointments to the army of men who soon became known as "political Generals." Most of these sank into comparative oblivion as the war progressed and pro- fessional military capacity became more necessary to redeem their blunders and their constantly threatening failures, but they managed, in the meantime, to work irreparable harm. Public opinion, always a powerful factor in the determina- tion of national affairs, made itself felt most through Washing- ton, and often the clamors of a public that was impatiently enthusiastic, but totally ignorant of military matters, caused the wrecking of plans that might have been successful. The Government was timid and unduly apprehensive of an attack upon the capital, continually causing to be held back for its protection forces that should have been actively engaged in the field. Many times expeditions and campaigns that started with every promise of success were brought to a sud- den and unintelligible stop, and a retrograde movement ordered from Washington because of a panic fright there. Finally, although admittedly ignorant of the art and science of warfare, the civil authorities committed the characteristic mistake of insisting upon keeping commanders in the field always under their thumbs, and of issuing orders for the con- duct of campaigns directly from their offices. The President, had he been left to himself, would probably have willingly given the conduct of military matters entirely to his Generals, but the influence of the Secretary of War was in the ascendant. Mr. Stanton, unfortunately, was of a vindictive nature, and 136 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY was accused, not always without cause, of having practised treachery toward commanders who happened not to be in his favor. A General in the field, like Grant or McClellan, con- tinually received contradictory and impossible orders, had portions of his command removed from his control at the most critical moments, or was superseded by another more favored if he spoke or acted in a manner displeasing to the controlling voice in Washington. If he elected to remain there and him- self issue orders from his office, as did Halleck, he inevitably found himself involved in the political cabals with which all official life was permeated, and soon began, in his turn, to harass his subordinates, with whom he could be neither in touch nor in sympathy. , In spite of Mr. Lincoln's admonition against "swapping horses in the middle of a stream," the war was almost ended before any application of this maxim was made to the unfor- tunate armies in Virginia. Beginning in August, 1862, the command was shifted from McClellan to Pope, from Pope back to McClellan, and from McClellan to Burnside in the remaining five months of the year. In the next year it passed rapidly from Burnside to Hooker, from Hooker to Meade and from Meade to Grant; these changes taking no account of Halleck's tenure of the office of General-in-Chief, he having never taken the field. There could be no other result from such a course than disaster after disaster; while each new disaster was the basis of a change and each change paved the way for another disaster, until the sequence seemed to have become settled and everlasting. The crowning folly in interference was the Congressional "Committee on the Conduct of the War," which resolved itself into an investigator and critic of all operations ; a secret inquisition in which petty complaints and grievances were aired, where intrigues were fostered and insubordination was encouraged, until the whole machine was on the verge of ruin. Instead of the mutual understanding, confidence and hearty THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 137 co-operation so necessary everywhere to success, the inevitable result of such a condition was jealousy, suspicion and discord — in a word, failure. The first affair in Virginia, at Big Bethel, was a miserable fiasco in which two columns of an expedition sent out by General Butler from Fort Monroe, fired into each other and returned without accomplishing anything. The second, at Bull Run, on July 21st, 1861, claimed the attention of the whole country, and has since continued to be invested with a dignity and importance far beyond its deserts. The term battle, in connection with this event, is a misapplica- tion. In fact, it rose little above the level of a riot of large proportions. In the first half of 1861 most of the Volunteer regiments so hastily raised, were concentrated at Washington, where, by the middle of July they numbered about 35,000. The few Regular officers, to whom the task of their organization was intrusted, realized their unfitness for serious service, and were endeavoring, with great earnestness, to prepare them for the field. The public, however, ignorantly conceiving this unorgan- ized and untrained crowd to constitute a formidable army, complained that the time was being wasted in inaction. The country was soon ringing with the senseless cry "On to Rich- mond !" General McDowell, who had been placed in com- mand of this force, protested in vain against a premature action. He was most unjustly accused of wishing to over- throw the Government and make himself a military dictator. The main Confederate force was mobilizing at Manassas, the junction of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad with that from the Shenandoah Valley, where it served the triple pur- pose of protecting the railroad, covering Richmond and menacing Washington. About 25,000 men were there col- lected under General Beauregard. Toward this point General McDowell, much against his judgment, set out from Washing- ton, on the 16th of July, with 30,000 men. The start had more the appearance of a carnival procession 138 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY than of an army setting forth to battle. It was accompanied by a crowd of civilian sightseers, Members of Congress, news- paper correspondents, photographers and citizens of all classes, bent upon witnessing a battle which they were confident was to result in victory. At Fairfax Court House some troops looted a number of deserted houses and spent the greater part of a day in parading the streets in women's clothing, and in other forms of foolish jollification. Soon, totally unused to marching and the hardships of the field, they threw away their rations and equipments and left the ranks by squads and platoons. All semblance of organization disappeared, the col- umns dispersed and scattered over the country, and only their skeleton heads reached the designated camping places hours behind time. On arriving near the enemy's position, a column ordered to make a reconnaissance, instead brought on a conflict in which it became confused, the troops fired upon each other and finally fled in disorder. A large number of the Federal troops were Volunteers who had enlisted for only three months, under the terms of Lin- coln's first call. On the 19th, a regiment and a battery of these, amounting in all to about 3,000 men, whose three months expired that day, in spite of General McDowell's earnest entreaties, deliberately turned their backs to the enemy and the impending battle, the opening contact of which had already been made, and returned to Washington. Such poltroonery is, indeed, almost inconceivable, but it was no more than a repetition of such events during the Revolution and the War of 1813. Again there was shown the folly of short term volun- teer enlistments. The Confederates were in little better condition, but they had the advantage of fighting in a fixed position. When the combat began the opposing forces pushed to and fro with endless confusion. The day seemed about to close favorably for the Federals when General J. E. Johnston's army of 10,000 men arrived from the Shenandoah, where they had slipped THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 139 away from General Patterson, who had been placed there to prevent such a move. This decided the action in favor of the Confederates. The Federal troops broke into a leaderless mob and straggled back toward Washington. Joining the crowd of bewildered sightseers in their hasty flight, their imaginations conjured up the terrors of a pursuit by the enemy, and the retreat became an indescribable, panic-stricken rout. Had the Confederates been prepared to act decisively and aggressively they could have followed, or rather accompanied the rabble into the city, and have taken it with scarcely a blow. In their own confusion, only less than that of the Federals, they did not realize what had happened, and so made no move to assume the offensive. The defeat had a salutary effect upon the people of the North. They realized at last that the war was to be an earnest and serious contest. For a time the impatience of the public and the Government was curbed, and the military chiefs were permitted to take time for the organization and training of the army anew. McClellan was sent for and assigned to this duty. For six months his acknowledged talents were devoted to his labor without interference. Upon General Scott's re- tirement he was even appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the armies, which he designed to have operate in unison. Then misfortunes began again. He was taken sick and his plans were delayed. His enemies made it appear that he was a dangerous opponent of the Administration, which imme- diately withdrew its confidence from him and began again to manifest an unreasonable impatience. Instead of advancing upon Richmond from the north, Mc- Clellan had planned to transport the army to the peninsula lying between the York and James Rivers, and to conduct his operations from that point of vantage. His plans were approved, disapproved and approved again. The President issued contradictory orders over his head, and finally, after he had started, with two-thirds of his army, to carry out the project, relieved him from the command in chief and dismem- 140 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY bered his army, holding the remaining third in the vicinity of Washington. Early in April, 1862, McClellan landed on the peninsula with about 100,000 men, and began his advance. Unfortu- nately, he allowed himself to be delayed by a show of prepara- tions for the defense of Yorktown. After a month futilely spent before the place, it was evacuated by the Confederates on the 4th of May. Rapidly pursuing, the Army of the Potomac fought its first real battle at Williamsburg, on May 5th, and had the satisfaction of seeing it result to its advantage. It was now drawing near to Richmond, where its presence created consternation. McClellan quickly perceived that his position would be immensely improved if he had his base of supplies on the James River instead of on the York. The former was naviga- ble right up to Richmond, and steamers could land supplies directly in the midst of his army if he occupied its shores; while the York was navigable only as far as White House Landing, and from that place it was necessary to transport everything by a single track railroad or by wagon. He early resolved to cross to the James and there establish a base, but again his plans suffered from interference. McDowell's Corps, which had been kept back at the begin- ning of the Peninsular Campaign, was afterward sent to Fredericksburg, and McClellan was told to hold his army to the north and east of Richmond so as to join hands with Mc- Dowell, who was now to be sent overland to re-enforce him. It is probable that this scheme for a short time was honestly meant to be carried out. But the Confederate leaders were much more apt in matters of strategy in warfare than was the Washington Government. They realized that the best protection for Richmond was an aggressive threat against Washington, and they knew they could count upon the timidity of the authorities there to commit such blunders as would make their own moves successful. Combining the forces of Ewell and Jackson, therefore, under the latter's command, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 141 they hurled them down the Shenandoah Valley against Banks' weak corps. The plan worked as successfully as they had hoped. Banks was driven out in desperate haste, and there was such a fright in Washington that all arrangements were again overturned. Banks, Shields and Fremont were urged to co-operate against the new danger, while McDowell was diverted from his pur- pose to join McClellan, and also started upon this "wild goose chase."* Richmond, about to be crushed by the junction of McDowell's and McCIellan's forces, was relieved again. General J. E. Johnston, who was in command there, seized the opportunity to throw himself upon the Army of the Potomac. During the first day's fighting, at Fair Oaks, on May 31st, the Federal army, finding itself cut in two by the swollen Chickahominy, was beaten back on the south side of that stream. In the evening fresh troops succeeded in cross- ing from the north and in checking the attack. General Johnston was wounded and, although the Confederates renewed the combat the next morning, they were repulsed in disorder and compelled to retire into , Richmond. McClellan would now have sought his base on the James, but was again held in his position by the will-o'-the-wisp prom- ise that McDowell would be sent to join him. McDowell did not come, but Jackson did return in haste from the Shenan- doah and join hands with Lee, who had taken Johnston's place. They planned to attack again, Lee in front, while Jack- son, by a detour, should cut McCIellan's communications with White House Landing. The latter solved his problem by shifting his army to the James. Having repulsed an attack at Mechanicsville on June 26th, he began the withdrawal next day. With the entire army on the march desperate actions were fought at Gaines' Mill, on the 27th; at Savage's Station on the 29th, and at Frazer's Farm on the 30th, but still the line remained unbroken. •Among the other troops hastened to the Shenandoah to help lay the Jackson spectre was, as has been previously shown, the newly formed Second Battalion of the Twelfth Infantry. 142 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY One June 1st the army concentrated at Malvern Hill, where throughout that day, it was assaulted again and again by the Confederates under Lee. The latter, however, suffered so bloody and decisive a repulse that he gave up the pursuit and retired again to his intrenchments. The new Federal base was fixed at Harrison's Landing. Although, by this move, McClellan had retired a distance of seven or eight miles from the Southern capital, he had now a base with which he was assured of uninterrupted communica- tion. He had lost heavily, but the enemy's losses had been greater. From the new and better base his operations might have been carried forward with every prospect of success, but the successful shifting of his army was heralded abroad and denounced as a series of defeats. Washington could see no merit in his work or his plans, and all he had done was now to be abandoned. He received orders from the capital to transfer his army by sea to Acquia Creek, on the Potomac, and from there to re-enforce and support Pope. Subsequent developments showed that the intention was gradually to take away McClellan's army and to place it under Pope's command. By this change of position it was removed from a base within fifteen miles of Richmond, where it had perfect water communications secure from interruption, to one seventy-five miles from that city, whence all communications and lines of supply, in case of an advance, would have to be by land. However, it was once more back between the Confederate forces and Washington, and it must be presumed that this was the object of those responsible for its transfer. CHAPTER III. POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. THE positions occupied by Sigel's and Banks' corps of Pope's new army in July, 1863, have already been pointed out as Sperryville and Little Washington, respectively. McDowell's corps, composed of the divisions of Ricketts and King, was split in two, and Ricketts' division was sent to Waterloo Bridge, on the upper Rappahannock, where it could co-operate with the corps of Banks and Sigel. Against Pope's judgment, King's division was kept at Fredericksburg to protect the line of communication through that place from Acquia Creek and westward along the Rappahannock. So soon did this long land line of communication, then, begin to be a plague to its sponsors. General Pope had gone to Washington, where, prior to Halleck's advent, he was given an opportunity to formulate his new plans of campaign and impress them upon the Admin- istration. Without actually becoming commander-in-chief, he was granted many of the privileges attending such a high position, and he did not leave the capital until July 29th, when General Halleck, who had been appointed to the command of all the armies in the field, arrived and essayed to take up the great responsibilities of his new office. Out of the campaign now beginning arose many bitter ani- mosities and unseemly bickerings, a part of which may be ascribed to the effect of some orders issued by General Pope from Washington. One of his first was in the form of an address to his army, and was as follows : "Headquarters Army of Virginia. "Washington, D. C, July 14, 1862. "To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia : "By special assignment of the President of the United States I have assumed the command of this army. I have spent two weeks in learning your whereabouts, your condition and your wants, in preparing you for active operations, and in (143) 204 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY a combined attack was lost and Sickles was left far to the front, a great space in the general line in his rear being thus unoccupied. Jackson arrived opposite Howard's flank unobserved and unresisted. Personally examining the position and finding it still unprotected, he extended his troops in two lines far over- lapping Howard's to both right and left. Excepting two regiments faced toward the west, no provision had been made for meeting such an attack. It is true that Generals Schurz and Devens, of their own volition, had placed, the former three regiments and the latter two, in column, faced in that direction, but these never had an opportunity to form line. The first warning to the Federal soldiers of the coming storm was given by frightened deer and rabbits fleeing out of the woods before it. At six o'clock P. M. Howard's outposts came in pell-mell with the assaulting enemy. The Eleventh Corps was swept away as if by the breath of a hurricane. The Confederates, pouring after, occupied the intrench- ments left empty by Sickles' advance to the south. Jackson seemed destined to sweep everything before him in a terrible rout, but, out of the streaming crowd of fugitives, some bat- teries belonging to the Eleventh Corps were halted on high ground near Fair View and turned upon the enemy. New batteries were added to them and their fire began to check the ardor of the onslaught. Berry's division of Sickles' corps, which was still in reserve, was hurried forward and formed in line across the valley in front of the guns. A brigade from the Second Corps was thrown into this line. Pleasonton, returning from his expedition with Sickles, hurried forward two regiments of cavalry to charge the victorious enemy. Under cover of this heroic diversion he gathered more artillery and rallied some fugitives to its support. Before the Confed- erates could overcome its resistance Sickles led into the breach the advance of his corps which he was now striving to bring back from its perilous isolation. From the northeast Sykes' division was racing to the assist- ance of the crumbling right. Our Battalion, having been on ROUTE OF THE SECOND BATTALION, MAY, 1S61, TO MAY, 1803 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 145 respect of their commands. Whatever the Administration may have thought of McClellan, it must be said that he won, and never lost, the affections of his men to a degree second only to the devotion of those who followed "The Little Cor- poral." In a similar manner he was known everywhere among his soldiery as "Little Mac," and survivors of the Army of the Potomac yet so speak lovingly of their former commander. Against him, especially these criticisms seemed to be directed. In Washington, in July, 1863, McClellan's star seemed in the descendant, but the army still watched it with unabated inter- est. The reception accorded General Pope's address boded ill for his success. This feeling undoubtedly caused subse- quent orders to be questioned and criticised, even when they were fully justified by the conditions. Battle of Cedar Mountain. About the middle of July, acting under orders from General Pope, Banks sent forward Crawford's infantry brigade to Cul- peper Court House. It was Pope's intention to continue via Gordonsville, which was then practically unoccupied by the Confederates. General Hatch, with his cavalry brigade, was ordered to seize the place, but his slow movements enabled the enemy to anticipate him with a superior force, and the expedi- tion came to nothing. A similar result followed an attempt upon Charlottesville. On the 13th of July the indefatigable Jackson turned north again with two divisions, to try conclusions with Pope's army on the Rappahannock. It was his arrival at Gordonsville, a. few days later, that blocked the Federal advance in that direc- tion. Not having sufficient strength to cope with Pope's forces he halted there and requested re-enforcements. As long as McClellan remained in a threatening position on the James, Lee was compelled to defend himself and his capital from that quarter. In the latter part of July, however, seeing his chief adversary inactive, and the plans of the Fed- eral Government in a state of evident uncertainty, he dis- 146 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY patched A. P. Hill, with another division, to Jackson's aid. On the fifth of August, learning to a certainty that McClellan was not to be supported, he instructed Jackson to assume the offensive, and the latter, with a force aggregating about 35,000 men, set out, on the 7th, in the direction of Culpeper. On the same day the remainder of Banks' corps was advanced to that place, where Crawford's brigade had been for some time, and where Ricketts' division had also been sent a few days before. On the 8th, learning that the Confederates had crossed the Rapidan in their advance. Pope put his whole army in motion to meet them in front of Culpeper. On the morning of the 9th both armies continued to advance, and it was evident that contact of some sort must soon be made. Crawford's brigade had pushed on to Cedar Mountain, where it was soon joined by the remainder of Banks' corps. About three miles behind the latter was Ricketts' division, while Sigel's corps was at Culpeper. At this point a number of misunderstandings and miscalcu- lations on the part of the Federal commanders conspired to bring on an ill-judged and entirely useless action, bloody and disastrous to Banks' corps and barren of results. To begin with, strange as it may seem, Banks appears to have consid- erably overestimated the strength of his own corps. Neither is this altogether strange, for the official returns of the corps for the end of July show an aggregate of about 14,000 enlisted men present for duty in the infantry alone. Deducting some 3,000 who were detached and did not accompany the corps, and a probable 1,000 as sick, there would yet remain about 10,000 men. There were also five batteries of artillery and a brigade of cavalry which, after deducting over fifty per cent as unfit for service, certainly aggregated 2,000 men. Yet all authorities practically agree that the strength of the corps at Cedar Mountain was only 7,500. No one has yet accounted for the discrepancy of 4,500 men. As a matter of fact strag- gling and outright desertion had brought about a fearful state of depletion and weakness in the whole army, and there seems to have been a general fear, or at least a disinclination to make THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 147 known the truth.* The corps commander must have known much of this, but he probably did not know all, and, in addi- tion to overestimating his own, he certainly underestimated the strength of the enemy that confronted him. The orders transmitted to him orally by an ofificer of Pope's staff reached him in somewhat equivocal shape; he was to "move to the front immediately, assume command of all forces in the front, deploy his skirmishers if the enemy advances, and attack him immediately as he approaches, and be re-enforced from here" (Culpeper). Finally, it must be supposed that he had been stung by Pope's language in the address above quoted and was resolved to prove, when the opportunity presented, that he and his men were at least not cowards in the face of the enemy. Surely they gave sufficient proof this day, when they dashed upon and almost fought to a standstill three times their num- ber of Confederate troops under some of the best leaders of the South. But the pity of the deed lay in its uselessness, when they could have had the help of Ricketts' and Sigel's men had they fought merely a delaying action while they sent for these to come to their aid. Eight miles from Culpeper the road to Orange Court House crosses a small stream known as Cedar Run, from which it ascends to a sort of plateau and swerves to the right around the north and west bases of Cedar Mountain. A little over a mile from the stream it enters a strip of woodland extending nearly to the Run. Upon this plateau, on both sides of the road, the corps was drawn up in line of battle. Crawford's brigade was on the right of the road, the other brigade of Williams' division, Gordon's, being held in reserve behind the Run. On the left was Augur's division, the brigades from right to left being Geary's, Prince's and Greene's. The artill- ery was posted in the intervals between the brigades, and the cavalry was on both flanks. •still it seems impossible to believe that so great a number of men could thus have disappeared, and the matter yet remains a mystery. Neither Pope nor Banks could explain it at the time, nor, to this day has any historian been able to do so. 148 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY The Confederate line was formed of Ewell's and Winder's divisions, of three brigades each. The former pushed forward and occupied the eastern slope of the mountain with two bri- gades, while the third, Early's, leaving a considerable gap between it and the other two, took post to the left, opposite Prince's brigade of our line. Winder's division advanced astride the road, Talieferro's brigade on the right, Campbell's on the left, and Ronald's as a support. Behind them all was A. P. Hill's strong division of six brigades in reserve. About noon an artillery duel began and continued until after three P. M. During this time the enemy advanced slowly and cautiously. Our cavalry was forced back and our line of battle uncovered. At four o'clock Banks decided to com- mit his whole corps to an attack, and moved his line forward. The Battalion of the Eighth and Twelfth advanced as skirmish- ers in front of Augur's division, and opened the attack upon the Confederate center. At half past five the signal was given for a general assault. In spite of all the caution they had displayed in their advance, the Confederates were taken off their guard. They expected to make the attack themselves and, being aware of the weakness of the Federal forces, had not dreamed of being met with a display of such headlong impulsiveness. Their line was not fully formed and their right was wholly disconnected when their center received the full force of a vigorous assault by the brigades of Geary and Prince. Almost simultaneously the storm broke on their left. Crawford's brigade, swinging around that flank, dashed upon their left battalion and drove it in confusion from the field. The next regiment attempted to change front but was scat- tered as by a whirlwind, and in a few minutes Campbell's entire brigade was in a disordered rout. Its flight uncovered the left flank of Talieferro's brigade, which, attacked in front and flank, melted away even more rapidly than had Campbell's. This defection, in turn, left exposed the left flank of Early's brigade, the greater part of which also gave way before the impetuosity of the Federal onset. Ronald, leading his supports through the fugitives stream- THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 149 ing from the front, came down with his fresh brigade upon the Federal line, now becoming somewhat exhausted by continu- ous fighting, but the latter, in a sort of Berserker rage with the fury of their determination, met him with so bold a front that his troops were roughly handled and even forced back with considerable loss. Had the contending forces been anything like equal — had it not been for Hill's heavy division, that was now brought forward and pressed into the breach, the battle would have ended at this point in a Federal victory that would have won for Banks' corps the plaudits of the nation and an enduring fame. Early had seen at the outset, however, that his right was likely to be turned by Prince's brigade, and had sent for and succeeded in having one brigade of Hill's division moved up into the gap there. Being thus supported, he resolutely held his ground. Three more of Hill's brigades moved up the road and reformed the left of the Confederate line. The Federal troops, worn out by their struggles, were unable to sustain the battle against fresh forces. Crawford's men fell back across a field over which they had lately charged and reformed with the support of a fresh regiment, the Tenth Maine. The left of our line also retired to its former position. Too late Gordon's brigade was ordered up. It was less than 1,500 strong, but for an hour it stood and maintained the unequal combat with great loss. The whole line was slowly pushed back across Cedar Run, where it found that Ricketts' division and Sigel's corps had at last come to its rescue. Unaware of this re-enforcement, Jackson was determined to brush his opponent aside and push on to Culpeper that night. He undertook to shell the Federal troops out of their position, but roused so many sleeping batteries that he soon desisted from the attempt. The battle of Cedar Mountain was ended. Whatever criticisms may be made in the light of subsequent knowledge, it cannot be said that the battle reflected discredit upon anyone. Banks has been roundly blamed for exceeding his orders, for lack of knowledge of the number of his oppon- 150 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY ents, and for recklessness in attacking a much superior force. In the first place, the most natural interpretation of the order delivered to him would be "to fight," and only a very cautious man would read it otherwise. In the second place, although his overestimate of his own corps was almost inconceiv- able, lack of information regarding the strength of the enemy was so general that Banks' small store of knowledge on this subject was neither strange nor unique. Finally, he very nearly succeeded, greatly overmatched as he was, and had his attack been a complete success nothing but approbation of his course would have been heard. The total Federal loss was 26 officers and 288 men killed, 102 officers and 1,343 men wounded, 37 officers and 585 men captured and missing; a total of 2,381. Of these 163 were in Ricketts' division on the night of the 9th. Generals Augur and Geary were wounded, and General Prince was captured, late in the evening, while passing from one flank to another of his command. The Confederate General Winder was killed and their loss, as reported by Jackson, was 19 officers and 204 men killed, 114 officers and 946 men wounded, and 31 missing; a total of 1,314. Both sides, at first, looked upon the battle as a victory, and both sides were, in a way, correct. In a tactical sense only it was a victory for the Confederates — a result inevitable between such illy matched forces. Regarded merely as a fight between Banks' small corps on one hand and the divisions of Winder and Ewell, and four brigades of Hill's division, on the other, it was as certainly a victory for Banks. As this was the first battle in which the Battalion of the Eighth and Twelfth was engaged — its baptism of fire — it is interesting to note how well they bore themselves. Their loss was 8 men killed, 3 officers and 31 men wounded, and 3 officers and 14 men captured or missing; a total of 60. As already stated, they went forward as a skirmish line in front of their division and opened the infantry fight. Their bravery and steadfastness is attested by both friend and foe. THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 151 Captain T. M. Anderson, writing when a Brigadier General, in 1907, says: "General William Talieferro, C. S. A., against whose bri- gade we made our advance, paid us a high compliment for our method of attack. We were the first to advance and the last to leave the field. Captain Pitcher and Lieutenant Noble, of the Eighth, were severely wounded, as was also Captain Quim- bey of ours (the Twelfth). Lieutenants Egbert, Campbell and Fisher were taken prisoners. Captain Pennington and Lieu- tenants Andrews and Van Valzah were among the missing, but reported several days after. Captain Anderson and Lieuten- ant Perkins were the only officers left with the command at the close of the fight. Sergeant Major Miller and First Ser- geant Emerson Liscum showed such conspicuous bravery that they were recommended for and received commissions. Miller was killed as a Lieutenant at Gettysburg, and Liscum as a Colonel at the battle of Tien Tsin, China. "Corporal John Younger, of Company A, was subsequently given a medal of honor for bravery on that occasion. We were under fire from the enemy in front and our batteries in rear. Younger was sent to warn our batteries. Although badly wounded, he rushed in between the guns and delivered his message." In General Prince's report on the battle, written in Novem- ber, 1862, after his exchange and return to the north, is the following : "The first battalion (Eighth and Twelfth U. S. Infantry) was detached throughout the day and was deployed as skirmishers in front of the division, where it rendered efficient and gallant service." An excerpt from General Augur's report is as follows : "I had previously caused Captain Pitcher's Battalion of the Eighth and Twelfth Regulars to deploy as skirmishers and cover the front of the whole division, to advance continuously, discover the enemy's position, and annoy him as much as possible. How well this was done will be seen from the following extract from a letter from General Prince, written on the 16th of August, from Richmond. Speaking of Pitcher's Battalion, he says: " 'Their part, I have occasion to know, excited the admira- tion of the enemy, who inquired if they were not Regulars, as they had never seen such skirmishing. They were out during 152 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY the whole battle, and penetrated even to the enemy's position, and annoyed him so as to turn the attention of his guns away from more distant firing with shot and shell, and caused him to waste canister upon the ground of the skirmishers.' " A battalion that attracted to itself such notice, and that was singled out for such unstinted praise from among all the organizations in so hard fought and bloody a battle, may well have been satisfied with the result of its first passage at arms ; and we, their successors, may well feel a thrill of pride in this, their knightly trial. Never was there better exemplification of the Comte de Paris' remark: "Nevertheless, esprit de corps, that moral influence which attaches to a word, a number or a sign, which has the power BIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL H. C. EGBERT. Harry Clay Egbert was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on January 3d, 1839, his father, a Surgeon in the Navy who had seen service during the War of 1812, being then stationed at that place. He was educated in the public schools of the city of his birth, and at the University of Pennsylvania, from which he was graduated in 1855. After his university course he studied law and was admitted to the bar in 1859. Prior to the beginning of the War of the Rebellion he had had some military training as a member of the Liandis Battery, a militia organization composed largely of young lawyers of Philadelphia. Upon the outbreak of war, therefore, he applied for a commission in the army, and on September 23d, 1861, was appointed a First Lieutenant and assigned to the Second battalion of the Twelfth Infantry. He was made Adjutant of this battalion in March, 1862, and accompanied it when it took the field in May. At the battle of Cedar Mountain, on August 9th, 1862, he was captured by the enemy and was confined in Libby Prison, from which he was released by exchange in the following winter, returning to duty with his battalion just before the battle of Fredericksburg. At the battle of Gettysburg, in July, 1863, he was again taken prisoner while serving on the staff of General Reynolds, but this time succeeded in making his escape. Following the latter named campaign, he took part in the battles of Mine Run, The Wilderness, Laurel Hill, Spottsylvania, the North Anna and Bethesda Church, in the latter of which he was wounded. On August 1st, 1864, he was awarded the brevet rank of Captain for gallant service at the battle of the North Anna, and of Major for gallant service at the battle of Bethesda Church, Virginia. He was promoted to be Captain of the Twelfth Infantry on April 1st, 1865, and while so serving, took part in the campaign against the Nez Perces Indians, in 1877, and In that against the Bannocks in 1878. In 1881 and 1882 he led a battalion of his regiment against the White Mountain and Chiricahua Indians. GENERAL HARRY C. EGBERT THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 153 of transforming men, soon imparted habits of steadiness and discipline to the newcomers who, after the first combats, rivaled their older brethren in coorage, and sustained the credit of the Regular troops." A Retrograde Movement. Banks' exhausted corps, reduced by the battle to 5,000 men, was retired to Culpeper, where it was rejoined by the regiments that had been detached to the neighborhood of Sulphur Springs and Rappahannock Station. As it further fell back, with the retrograde movement of Pope's army, the Battalion of the Eighth and Twelfth was joined by Companies C and D of the Twelfth, lately arrived from Fort Hamilton. He was promoted to be Major of the Seventeenth Infantry on April 23d, 1890, and to be Lieutenant-Colonel of the Sixth Infantry on May 18th, 1893. In command of the latter regiment he went to Cuba at the beginning of the War with Spain. In the assault on San Juan Hill, before Santiago, he was shot through the chest and, on the same day, July 1st, 1898, was promoted to be Colonel of the Twenty- second Infantry, to take the place of Colonel WikofC, killed in the battle in which he had been wounded. For his services in this campaign he was appointed a Brigadier General of Volunteers on October 1st, 1898, a grade he held until December 1st of the same year, when he was ' honorably discharged by reason of the reduction of the Volunteer army. He joined his regiment, the Twenty-second Infantry, on January 30th, 1899, and sailed with it, two days later, for Manila, where he arrived on March 4th. Three weeks later, on March 26th, in his first engagement with the Philippine Insurgents, at Malinta, a few miles north of the city of Manila, he lost his life. He was a Companion of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion, in which he passed from the Pennsylvania to the California, and from the latter to the Ohio Commandery. He was also a Companion of the Pennsylvania Commandery of the Military Order of Foreign Wars. General T. M. Anderson, the first officer to whom Lieutenant Egbert reported for duty in 1862, and the last to whom, as a Colonel, he reported thirty-seven years later, in the Philippine Islands, says of him: "No better or braver officer ever served in the regiment, and no one could wish to have a more honorable, courteous or lovable friend." The author of this volume, who participated, as an officer of the Twenty-third Infantry, In the battle of Malinta, can testify of the shock that ran through all the line, and of the feeling of profound sorrow felt when there passed from man to man the news that Gen- eral Egbert had fallen. 154 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY The officers with them were Captain Dunn and Lieutenants Newbury, Evan Miles and Eugene Wells. The opposing armies lay facing each other across Cedar Creek for two days without hostile demonstration. The 11th of August was spent in burying the dead, under a truce pro- posed by General Pope. The latter had prudently sent to Fredericksburg for King's division of McDowell's corps, which joined him on the evening of the eleventh. That night Jack- son, fearing to be outnumbered, retreated to the Rapidan. Pope followed, and the next day his pickets watched that river from Raccoon Ford to the base of the Blue Ridge. On the 14th his force was still further increased by two divisions from Burnside's army, just arriving from North Carolina. These two divisions aggregated 8,000 men. BIOGRAPHY OP GENERAL MILES. Evan Miles was born at Waynesboro, Mifflin County, Pennsylvania, on March 28th. 1838. At the beginning of the War of Rebellion he was early in the field in support of the Union Cause. On August 5th, 1861, he was ap- pointed and commissioned a First Lieutenant in the Regular Army, and was assigned to the Second Battalion of the Twelfth Infantry. Going to the front with his Battalion in the summer of 1862, he participated with it in the battles at Chantilly, The Antietam and Fred- ericksburg, in 1862; Chancellorsville and Gettysburg in 1863; The Wilderness, The Wieldon Railroad, Peebles' Farm and in front of Petersburg, in 1864; and in several other lesser engagements. He served as regimental Quartermaster from November 19th, 1863, to January 20th, 1865, being promoted to be Captain on the latter date. He was given the brevet rank of Captain on August 18th, 1864, for gallant service during the operations on the Weldon Railroad in that year. When his Battalion became the Twenty-first Infantry, in 1866, he remained, as a Captain, with the regiment, serving With it through the reconstruction days in the South, and in Indian campaigns in the West. He took a particularly active part in the campaigns against the Modoc and Nez Perce tribes, and in February, 1890, was brevetted Major for gallant service in action against Indians at the Clearwater, Idaho, on the 11th and 12th of July, 1877; and at the Umatilla Agency, Oregon, on July 13, 1878. He was promoted to be Major of the Twenty-fifth Infantry on April 24th, 1888; to be Lieutenant Colonel of the Twentieth Infantry on April 25th, 1892; transferred to the Twenty-second Infantry on September GENERAL EVAN MILES THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 155 Pope now clearly outnumbered any force Jackson could bring against him without further reinforcements from Lee. The latter would not have dared deplete his own army had McClellan remained in a menacing attitude on the James. It would seem that the moment was propitious for Federal aggression in that quarter, while Pope could push Jackson on the north. The decision had already been made, however, to withdraw McClellan's army, and at Harrison's Landing the signs of departure had now become unmistakable. Lee had the choice of falling upon McClellan and attempting to cut up his army in its retreat, or of leaving him to his own resources and joining his forces with Jackson's against Pope. He chose the latter course. On August 13th he started Long- street with twenty-one brigades of infantry and a full comple- llth, 1895; transferred to the First Infantry on November 4th, 1895; and was promoted to be Ckjionel of the latter named regiment on May 4th, 1897. During the war with Spain he went with his regiment to Cuba, and it fell to his lot to command a brigade in the operations before San- tiago. In recognition of these services he was, on October 6th, 1898, appointed a Brigadier General of Volunteers; and in consequence of the reduction of the Volunteer establishment was honorably discharged from this service on January 10th, 1899. On the 19th of July, 1899, he was retired from active service in the army because of physical disability, and on April 23rd, 1904, was pro- moted to be a Brigadier General on the retired list. His death occurred at San Francisco, California, on May 24th, 1908. He was a Companion of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion from February 5th, 1868, holding membership, In turn, in the Commaad- erles of Pennsylvania, Minnesota and California. For one year from May 16th, 1900, he was Junior Vice Commander of the California Com- mandery. The following is quoted from the circular issued by that Com- mandery on June 6th, 1908, shortly after his death: From 1862, when he entered service, until his death, he was known as "Paddy Miles," and as one of the most genial and loveable oflBcers of the army; every subordinate from private up loved and respected him; his friends were many and his enemies so few that they have not been heard of. For the past ten years his sorrows have been many; the death of his idolized daughter and the illness of his beloved wife have been a terrible tax upon him, but with his many friends he always tried to be cheerful. We all loved him; we respected his many virtues; we admired his gallantry as a soldier, and we deeply sympathized with him in his many sorrows, which he bore so manfully. 156 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY ment of artillery, and Stuart with his cavalry, to join Jackson on the Rapidan. Their combined forces numbered very nearly 55,000. Immediately the scales were turned. Lee outnum- bered Pope by quite 20,000 men. This statement, when compared with the returns of Pope's army, would appear to be an error. Those returns, on their face, give him almost exactly the number credited above to Lee's command ; yet the most careful consideration of the numbers actually available at that time do not give him more than 35,000. Something of the mystery is here that hangs about the lessened number of Banks' corps, but detachments, sickness and desertion, together with the disordered state of the administrative departments, must account for the discrep- ancy. Repeatedly the different portions of the army failed to bring into action more than two-thirds of the number they should have had. All through the campaign this condition persisted, and the parts of McClellan's late command that joined Pope were fearfully depleted by the exigencies of their long and hurried move from the James River to the Rappa- hannock. Lee, seeing at once that the right of his army could reach the Orange and Alexandria Railroad east of Culpeper almost as soon as Pope could from his position on the Rapidan, and thus cut the latter's line of supply, directed his cavalry to seize Rappahannock Station, and prepared to throw his whole army in a turning movement against Pope's left. This move- ment was set for the 18th but, fortunately for Pope, there was some delay. Pope learned of these plans through the capture of Stuart's Adjutant General and promptly decided to fall back behind the Rappanhannock. His retirement was coolly and skilfully carried out on the 18th and 19th, without loss of men or material. His position was now fairly good, had he been free to act, but unfortunately, while he was expected to interpose between the enemy and Washington, Halleck also directed him to hold fast where he was and maintain his com- munications with Falmouth, near Fredericksburg. This com- THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 157 pelled him to protect the lower fords of the river, while ward- ing off a possible movement against his right flank., On the 20th and 21st of August Lee's main forces came up, Longstreet on the right and Jackson on the left. After a number of tentative movements in the neighborhood of the railroad he decided that a crossing higher up the river and an attempt upon Pope's right would be the most practicable. Accordingly, his whole army began, on the 22nd, a movement by the left flank, in the direction of Sulphur Springs. Pope could not long remain in doubt that a crossing would be attempted at Sulphur Springs or above, but he decided not to oppose such an attempt, putting his reliance in a plan to fall upon his enemy's right flank while he was proceeding in the direction of Warrenton. On the night of the 23nd he decided upon a new plan: namely, to cross his army at Rappahannock Station and fall upon the rear of Lee's army while it was moving up the river. Accordingly, he gave orders that set his brigades in motion in that direction. On the morning of the 23rd, however, it was found that a storm had caused the river to rise four or five feet, rendering the fords impracticable and putting an end to the idea of crossing. In the evening of the 22nd a Confederate brigade, under General Early, had crossed to the left bank at Sulphur Springs, and Pope had received information to that eflFect at the time. Relinquishing his project of himself crossing at the' lower fords, he turned nearly his whole army back up the river again, hoping the suddenly swollen stream would hold Early as in a trap on the left bank while he should fall upon and destroy him before he could be joined by reinforcements. Early did, indeed, pass the whole of the 23rd in this isolated and perilous position, but the Federal troops struggling toward him were so delayed by bad roads and swollen streams that none had reached him when night compelled them to pause. Mean- while; Jackson had made such use of the time in constructing a bridge over the river that at daybreak the next morning Early was enabled to cross it and rejoin his chief. When the 158 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Federal troops arrived, a few hours after, their prey had escaped. Before the rise of the river there had been several furious but fruitless dashes across and attacks by small bodies of both armies ; there had been an increased but equally fruitless can- nonade conducted by both parties, with, perhaps, some slight advantage to the Federal artillery. The last three days had been productive of nothing, for our troops, but a continued marching and countermarching, first in one direction and then in another, strewing the roads with provisions, baggage, used up men and stragglers. Our army was beginning to be worn out and incapacitated without any results, while Lee's had, for the most part, been able to spend its time in resting and preparing for the effort its leaders were now about to make. Jackson's Turning Movement. On the evening of the 24th Jackson fell back to the village of Jefferson, and at daybreak on the 35th set his three divisions in motion to the north. His march was observed by signal officers of the Union army, but Pope misinterpreted his actions. He believed that Jackson was again setting out to raid into the Shenandoah Valley, but that General had no such intention. He was going, instead, to march around the right flank of Pope's army and to strike it in rear. It was a most hazardous plan, that no one but Jackson could have undertaken to carry out with any hope of success. Only the most resolute daring, coupled with the disintegrated and befuddled state of the Federal command, could have made it successful in the hands of any commander. Pope was be- ginning to receive re-enforcements from the Army of the Potomac. On August 33rd General Reynolds had joined him with 3,500 men. On the 35th Heintzelman's corps of 10,000 men, and Fitz John Porter's, of 9,000, arrived. These, added to the 35,000 with which we have already credited him, gave him an army of 56,500 men. It would appear, then, that he already slightly outnum- bered his antagonist, or at all events was equal to him in THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 159 strength. Had he known Jackson's real intention he should have been able to check his march and, in all probability, to defeat him soundly while he was separated from the main body of the Confederate army. Jackson, by a march that was marvelously rapid for so large a command, brought his three divisions through prac- tically intact, reaching Salem, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, in the evening of the 35th. On that day Pope ordered the formation of a new line running from Warrenton almost directly south to Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahannock. His army, marching and countermarching, was becoming dis- heartened. His orders were badly transmitted and arrived in contradictory form. Sigel's corps, for a time, was subjected to the danger of capture or destruction. The movement was not completed until the next day, and then only with great confusion. In the meantime Jackson was moving straight to his objective. At Salem he turned east and followed the railroad through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains, and in the evening of the 26th arrived, with the whole of his 25,000 men, at Bristoe Station on the Orange and Alexandria Rail- way, Pope's line of supply. He had marched all that day straight to the rear of our army, not more than fifteen miles away during the whole afternoon. He captured the small de- tachment guarding Bristoe Station, cut the railway and the telegraph line, and pushed part of his force on to Manassas, which he captured that night with all its armament and immense store of provisions. The next morning he distrib- uted as many of these among his men as they could use, and, burning the remainder, retired, during the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, to the old battlefield of Bull Run. In the evening of the 26th, Pope, apparently concluding that Jackson's movement presaged an attack upon his right flank, ordered his line again reformed, this time running east and west, between Warrenton and Gainesville. About the sam'e time he was informed of the cutting of the railroad, and. 160 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY evidently thinking it the work of only a small party of the enemy, sent a regiment to discover what had happened. Early the next morning this regiment returned and reported having found the enemy in force. Pope thereupon ordered McDowell and Sigel to Gainesville and sent Hooker's division to drive away the enemy at Bristoe. At 3 P. M. Hooker found Ewell's division in position near that place, and in an engagement lasting until dusk, forced the enemy to retire. Pope, arriving at the close of the action, discovered the truth — that Jackson's whole force was before him, and that Ewell was there to cover the retirement of his corps. Of course, it was the intention of both Jackson and Lee to reunite their forces at the earliest practicable moment, and Lee had followed in Jackson's footsteps without delay. As yet, however, he had not emerged from the mountains, where he could have been held in check at Thoroughfare Gap. By all the rules of the game Pope should have beaten him in detail, by first crushing Jackson and then turning to meet Longstreet with a still superior force. In one of his dispatches he spoke confidently of "bagging Jackson." But from the moment he turned his back on the Rappahannock he made no provision for opposing, or even observing Longstreet's ad- vance. He ordered all his troops to concentrate at Manassas. This was very well for those south and west of that point, but unfortunate for Sigel and McDowell, who were to the north, in the vicinity of Gainesville, where they could inter- pose between the two parts of the Confederate army and prevent, or at least delay, their junction. By moving them to Manassas the road between Longstreet and Jackson was left open. McDowell, seeing this, sent a division that harassed Longstreet while he was passing through Thoroughfare Gap and delayed him at least half a day, but he did so without the orders or even the concurrence of General Pope. The latter, arriving at Manassas at noon of the 28th and finding no enemy, was at a loss which way to turn. After some hesitation as to whether Jackson had followed the rail- THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 161 road toward Alexandria or the pike toward Centerville, late in the afternoon he ordered his entire force in the direction of the latter place. While our army was thus blindly groping after Jackson, the latter did not suflfer himself to become so benighted. Strangely enough, however, it was a mistaken conclusion on his part that finally disclosed his position and brought on the engagement near Gainesville on the evening of the 28th. Seeing the whole Union army continuing toward the east, those portions still west of Gainesville pushing along the pike and passing south of him, he was convinced that they were in full retreat for Alexandria. He therefore advanced the divi- sions of Ewell and Talieferro to attack in flank and harass the retreating column. They struck King's division between Gainesville and Groveton but, instead of taking refuge in flight, the Federals turned savagely upon their assailants, and there ensued a terrific conflict that lasted from six until nine o'clock that evening. Although greatly outnumbered. King's men seized a commanding position and held it until one o'clock the next morning, when they resumed their march toward Manassas. The Federal losses were a third of the number engaged, but those of the enemy were also heavy. Both Generals Ewell and Talieferro were severely wounded. The useless retreat of King's and Ricketts' divisions that night to Manassas was but a confounding of the confusion that had reigned throughout the day. The net results of the move- ments of the day and night of the 28th were that Pope's army had missed Jackson and had marched entirely to the east of his position ; that all obstruction to Longstreet's advance had been removed, and that the way lay open for the imminent junction of Lee's disunited forces, until now placed in so perilous a situation. Battle of Groveton. That night Pope believed Jackson was retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap, and that King had met and fought his 162 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY retreating column. He ordered his various divisions to close upon the enemy. He hoped to reoccupy Gainesville with the corps of Porter and McDowell, thus cutting off the Confeder- ate retreat while he, with the troops at Centerville, should fall upon Jackson's rear and crush him. That hope was for- ever too late. He seemed to have forgotten Longstreet, and to be ignorant of the fact that King and Ricketts had been retreating all day before his advance. Longstreet was already at Gainesville on the morning of the 39th. Had General Pope realized this he surely would not have attacked the combined Confederate force. His corps and divisions were so scattered that he could not cause them to move in unison, and he did not even know the positions of some. Moreover, the destruc- tion of his depot of supplies at Manassas had made it difficult to ration his army, which was now in a half starved condition. His orders show that had he known Lee's army was reunited he would have concentrated his forces and fallen back, at least as far as Centerville. The whole of the battle of Groveton, on the 29th, was fought while Pope still labored under the delusion that he had Jackson surrounded and cut off from aid. It was begun at daylight by the two divisions under Sigel, one under Rey- nolds, and the independent brigade of Milroy. In the after- noon these were joined by four more divisions under Generals Heintzelman and Reno. The Federal troops were constantly on the aggressive, the fighting was desperate and the losses heavy; but the assaults were delivered piecemeal, and even when successful failed of support. Porter's and McDowell's corps, advancing toward Gaines- ville, found themselves confronted by Longstreet. Having received orders to establish connection with the other divisions and then halt, and having been impressed, in the same order, with the idea that the whole army was to fall back behind Bull Run, they took no part in the battle beyond some desultory skirmishing. Banks' corps was at Bristoe and Ricketts' divi- sion at Manassas, so that neither could possibly have reached the battlefield. General Pope announced, in a dispatch to Hal- THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 163 leek the next morning, that he had made important captures and had driven the enemy from the field. As no captures were made, and as the enemy occupied at night the same position held in the morning, it must be supposed that his report was a little over sanguine. The incidents of this day gave rise to the charges against and court-martial of General Porter. For years the case was to the United States what the Dreyfus case was to France. General Porter was found guilty and dismissed from the army, but years afterward the affair was reopened and investigated by a special Board of Officers that completely exonerated him and recommended his reinstatement. The case is a study in itself. It is sufficient to say here that it was generally admitted a grave injustice had been done a brave and accomplished officer. Battle of Manassas. The next day was fought the battle sometimes designated the Second Bull Run, and sometimes the battle of Manassas. It may be said to have been the culmination of uninformed conclusions and ill judged enthusiasms. Pope knew thor- oughly his inability to cope with the whole of Lee's force but, in spite of all the plain evidence that had been afforded him in the last two days, he persisted that Longstreet and Jackson had not yet reunited. General Porter, who had joined him during the night, did his utmost to disabuse his mind of this fatal idea, but Pope was angry at what he chose to regard as Porter's disobedience and failure to support him the day before and refused to listen to anything the latter had to say, pre- ferring to consider his statements as excuses for misconduct. To still further add to Pope's misconceptions, the Confeder- ates, in forming their lines during the night of the 29th and morning of the 30th, fell back over some ground they had held the evening before. Pope took this to be a retreat and at noon ordered his army in pursuit, to press the enemy vigorously. In spite of Porter's positive information that Longstreet occupied the right of the Confederate line, the Federal left was 164 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY almost stripped of protection and everything was again con- centrated against the enemy's left. Longstreet allowed the attack to expend its vigor against Jackson's line, and then threw his whole force against the Federal left flank. Troops were hastily diverted from the frontal attack to meet the new danger, and it was only by the most obstinate and bloody resistance along some heights south of the pike that Long- street was finally checked and the line of retreat of the Union army preserved. Darkness put an end to the battle and enabled Pope to fall back across Bull Run to Centerville. He was again defeated, but his retreat was still conducted in good order. It had not yet become a rout. At Centerville he was joined by the corps of Sumner and Franklin, numbering about 30,000 men, from the Army of the Potomac. With this addition of fresh troops it seemed, for a moment, as if the Federals might regain the advantage. In fact, however, the whole army was thoroughly discouraged. Its prestige and its morale were gone, and it looked forward to any new battle, under such leadership, as only a useless butchery. Battle of Chantilly. On the afternoon of the 31st Lee had moved off to the northeast, Jackson again far in the lead. He simply repeated his recently successful tactics of marching around the Federal right and throwing himself upon their line of communications. In order to escape the consequences of this movement. Pope fell back during the day to Fairfax Court House. A short distance southeast of the village of Chantilly, Jackson struck the retiring columns on the evening of September 1st. He was so far separated from Longstreet that he was again in danger of annihilation by the superior forces around him, but night and the inability of the Union forces to make a concerted movement saved him. On the Federal side the battle was fought by the divisions of Reno, Stevens and Kearney. The losses were heavy, both the latter two Generals being killed, but the result was indecisive. Longstreet came up during THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 165 the night and the Federal retreat continued toward Alexan- dria. Collapse of the Campaign. General McClellan, now left at Acquia Creek without a command, was, to the last moment, denied the privilege of going to the front. Halleck was even yet imploring Pope to try to make a stand, but the latter had at last recognized his impotence and requested the withdrawal of the army within the defenses of Washington. On the second of September President Lincoln sent for McClellan and begged him to take command and do what he could to save the situation. Washington was in another panic, and this time it had some good reason. So sure was the feel- ing that the city must fall into the hands of the enemy that when McClellan made requisition for small arms to re-quip some of his troops he found an order had been issued to ship everything to New York for safety. A steamer was prepared and kept in readiness to take away the President and his Cabi- net at a moment's notice. When McClellan rode out to superintend the placing of the fragments of the retreating army he found them in a deplorable condition. Officers and men, exhausted, half starved and ragged, plodded wearily and sadly onward, fol- lowed by long lines of the miserable sick and wounded. There was little to indicate that they were part of the splendid force he had organized on this same ground less than a year before, save the pathetic enthusiasm with which they greeted him. That night they occupied their old positions around Alexan- dria. The campaign was over. The Army of Virginia ceased to exist, and with it Pope's tenure of command expired. The only order ever published to name his successor was one announcing that McClellan was in command of the defenses of Washington. The cost of the campaign was never fully determined. In the disorganization of its end and the haste of beginning the next, only a partial list of the losses was made. Such as were 166 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY compiled for the period from August 16th to September 2nd indicated 1,747 killed, 8,452 wounded, and 4,263 captured and missing — an aggregate of 14,462. Adding the losses at Cedar Mountain, we obtain a total of 16,843. For the rest, includ- ing the losses of arms and stores, only the merest conjecture can be made, but they were undoubtedly great. The Con- federate reports for the same period, also including Cedar Mountain, indicated a loss, in killed and wounded, of 9,751. The Battalion of the Eighth and Twelfth shared, in the main, the fortunes of Banks' corps. After leaving the Rap- pahannock this corps was charged with the duty of guarding and bringing forward the trains of the army, both wagon and railway. The work was arduous, annoying and dangerous, although it did not permit their participation in any of the actual battles. Along the Rappahannock they shared in the daily shifting of position, and in skirmishes at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge. From that time until the end, always bringing up the rear of the army, they were exposed to the harassing actions inseparable from the rearguard of a retreat. At Bristoe, on the 30th of July, they were completely isolated, the entire Confederate army being interposed between them and the main body of our forces. They were in the gravest danger of annihilation. They were ordered to destroy the trains and every bit of property, even to the ambulances, and to make a wide detour to the south in order to rejoin the army. At the battle of Chantilly they were brought up and held in reserve on the Federal left, but night came on soon after and they were not put into the battle line. Our Battalion, acting in the rearguard of Banks' corps, was under fire daily from the time they left the Rappahannock until they reached the defenses of Alexandria. Few reports of casualties in the corps for this period are to be found, and that of the Battalion of the Eighth and Twelfth is among the miss- ing. Fortunately for them Lee did not press a direct pursuit of his retreating antagonist, resorting, instead, to parallel marches and turning movements. The combats in the rear, therefore, were of a desultory character. THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 167 About this time there were several changes in the commis- sioned personnel that may be mentioned. During one of the skirmishes on the Rappahannock Captain Pennington left without permission and never rejoined. Later he was allowed by the War Department to resign from the service. Captain Mayer, who had joined at Harper's Ferry at the beginning of the campaign, was there detailed by General Sigel as a Provost Marshal and did not again serve with the Bat- talion. About the close of the campaign Captain Dallas, who had been detached at Harper's Ferry, and also Lieutenants Bootes, Morgan and Netterville joined their companies, the latter hav- ing been promoted Second Lieutenant from Commissary Sergeant on May 25th, 1862. Captain Dallas resumed com- mand of his company, B ; Lieutenant Welles was assigned to the command of E in place of Captain Quimbey, absent, wounded, and Lieutenant Morgan to that of G, vice Captain Pennington. The Second Battalion of the Twelfth was now transferred to Buchanan's brigade of Sykes' division of Regulars, of Por- ter's army corps. To denominate these fractions by their numbers, it was a part of the First Brigade, Second Division, Fifth Army Corps. Joining its new brigade, it went into camp at Hall's Hill, just beyond the Chain Bridge over the Potomac, and found itself, for the first time, beside the First Battalion of its own regiment. CHAPTER IV. THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN. AFTER the battle of Chantilly, Lee ceased all pursuit of the Federal army and turned toward the northwest, marching in the direction of Leesburg, Virginia. Mc- Clellan, under the authority vested in him as commander of the defenses of Washington, began, as soon as the pressure was removed from his army, hastily to reorganize the wreck into which it had been thrown. It soon became apparent that much of this reorganization would have to be effected while his regi- ments were on the march — even while they were fighting, for the reports brought in indicated that Lee intended to cross the Potomac and invade Maryland. The crossing and invasion did, in fact, take place at White's Ford, near Leesburg, on the 5th of September. The Confederate troops, reduced to positive suffering by the hard-driven campaign through which they had just passed, hailed the movement as the entrance into a promised land. They had hitherto regarded Maryland as a state whose natural affiliations were with the South, but which was unwillingly held in the old Union by force of arms. They were prepared to play the role of liberators, and upon crossing the river their bands struck up the stirring and popular Southern air of "Maryland, My Maryland." General Lee issued a proclama- tion in which he declared himself hopeful of aid from a state he considered friendly and had no desire to coerce, preferring, instead, to receive its voluntary help and good will. These hopes and enthusiasms, however, were destined to disappointment. The Southern army received but a cool reception. Union sentiment was strong in the state, and even the Southern adherents were unwilling to risk their standing by a display of active sympathy. Surrender of Harper's Ferry. An important influence upon the subsequent events of the campaign was the situation at Harper's Ferry, and it is neces- sary here to digress briefly for its consideration. Federal (168) THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 169 troops to the number of 3,500, under General White, had been placed at Martinsburg, and 9,500 under Colonel Miles at Har- per's Ferry, to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and close the mouth of the Shenandoah Valley. The Confederates having already crossed the river at another point, these at once ceased to fulfil the purpose for which they had been posted there. It is true they still remained a menace to Lee, who could not afford to carry his army to the west of the mountains while they remained on his flank and occupied his chief line of communication with the South. On the other hand, they could not hope to hold the place against a deter- mined attack, and could not afford to remain in their position if Lee should turn his attention toward them. General Mc- Clellan recommended that they should evacuate the place and endeavor to join his or other forces then being formed in Pennsylvania, but Halleck directed that they should remain where they were and that McClellan should open communica- tion with them. General Lee seems at first to have expected the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, but finding that it was not to take place, and that the Army of the Potomac was advanc- ing slowly through Maryland, resolved to crush the force there before McClellan could come up. General McClellan, upon quitting the defenses of Washing- ton, had formed his army in three parts, the whole extending in an arc of a circle twenty-five miles in length, to the north- west of the capital, with its left resting upon the Potomac. The First and Ninth Corps, under General Buraside, formed the right wing; the Second and Twelfth, under Sumner, the center; and the Sixth, to which were added the divisions of Couch and Sykes, formed the left, under Franklin. The re- mainder of Porter's corps, with other troops to the number of about 73,000, were left behind, under command of General Banks, to insure the safety of Washington. On the 11th Por- ter was ordered to the front and rejoined the army with his corps, before the Antietam. At first the authorities there were sure that, although Lee was moving to the north and west, he would only feint in that 170 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY direction to draw off our army, and would then rapidly return to attack and capture the capital. On the 7th of September, however, McClellan definitely quitted Washington and began his advance. For many reasons his movement was a slow one. As has been said, he was reorganizing his army on the march. He was not yet sure of Lee's intentions, and he was constantly being cautioned that he must not uncover Washington and expose it to attack. On the 13th the bulk of the army was concentrated at Frederick, a small town in Maryland forty miles northwest of Washington. Franklin's corps was still some five miles to the left and rear, but Sykes' division was now advanced to Frederick. At that place McClellan had the good fortune to find a letter of instructions from General Lee, which a Con- federate officer had crumpled up and thrown away. It was dated September 9th, and completely disclosed all of General Lee's plans. His army was to move toward Hagerstown, and the commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker were to surround and capture Harper's Ferry and the Federal troops occupying it. On the 13th, when this letter was found, they had almost entirely surrounded the place and cut off the retreat of the garrison. On the 14th they completed their investment, seized the heights overlooking the town and planted cannon for its reduction. At 6:30 P. M. on the 13th General McClellan sent an order to Franklin to advance at daybreak the next day, via Crampton's Gap, to the relief of Harper's Ferry. Had his corps moved that night he might have passed the Gap with little or no opposition. When he did arrive there, however, he found it necessary to force its passage during the after- noon, with a loss of 530 killed and wounded ; and although he inflicted an equal loss upon the enemy and, in addition, cap- tured 400 prisoners, one field gun and 3 colors, night found him still six miles from the beleaguered place. Early on the morning of the 15th all the Confederate batteries opened fire, and in about an hour General White, who had succeeded to the command of the place when Colonel Miles was killed. THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 171 surrendered 11,000 men and 73 guns, with many small arms and other stores. This part of the Confederate program had been successfully carried out, but it left Lee's army divided in the face of its enemy, with what came near being fatal con- sequences. Battle of South Mountain. General McClellan saw the danger to which Lee was ex- posed and prepared to take advantage of it by attacking his main force before it could be rejoined by the divisions detached for the capture of Harper's Ferry. Perhaps he did not appre- ciate the full magnitude of his own opportunity, or perhaps the army was not in condition for such rapid and aggressive movements as the circumstances required. At any rate the attempt of his right wing upon Turner's Gap was not made until the morning of the 15th. On both sides the fight was begun by quite small numbers, the Confederates having hur- ried back some troops to the Gap during the night, and was continued by newly arriving units throughout the day. It was a series of disconnected, successive engagements, rather than a joined battle, and ended, that night, in the withdrawal of the Confederate forces, leaving the Gap free for the passage of the Union army next day. The Confederates had in action fourteen brigades to defend the pass against eighteen taking part in the assault. The Fed- eral loss was 312 killed, 1,234 wounded, and 22 prisoners. The Confederates lost about as many in killed and wounded and, in addition, about 1,500 prisoners. The two Gaps, Turner's and Crampton's, are six miles apart, but as the fighting in both took place at the same time, and was by portions of the same armies, the two affairs are usually referred to as the battle of South Mountain. The result, while a tactical victory for the Union army, was cer- tainly a strategical victory for the Confederates. They so delayed the Federal advance that they were able not only to take Harper's Ferry but, after having done so, to reunite their forces. During the night of the 15th Jackson marched to 172 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Sharpsburg, and McLaws, although watched by Franklin's corps, withdrew through the town and set out after Jackson, to rejoin his chief. Among the Federal losses at Turner's Gap was General Reno, killed on the morning of the 14th, shortly after reaching the line of battle. The Second Battalion of the Twelfth was present, but Sykes' division had no active part in the combat. Battle of Antietam. During the 15th of September the Confederates fell back west of Antietam Creek, where Lee proceeded to form his line for a defensive action. His position was one of considerable strength. The ground was somewhat in the nature of a plateau, although greatly diversified by an uneven surface and stretches of woodland, covered with rocks and intersected by stone fences. The creek in his front was a deep, sluggish stream, passable only by means of four bridges and one known ford in the vicinity of the upper bridge. It is true the Potomac was behind him, but it was at a low stage of water and pos- sessed fords by which it could easily be crossed. It was a menace to him only in case he should be so severely beaten that his troops would be thrown into panic. McClellan led his army through the passes of South Moun- tain on the morning of the 5th, but his divisions did not move with the celerity or the co-ordination of purpose necessary to follow up their advantage and deliver a general attack upon the weakened Confederates, who had not yet received any of the re-enforcements they expected from Harper's Ferry. Sykes' division, with Buchanan's brigade at its head, led the way. When, in the afternoon, they reached the summit of the acclivity bordering the valley of the Antietam on the east, and were saluted by the Confederate batteries on the other side, the brigade was so far in advance that it was almost isolated, being in touch only with Averal's cavalry. Here they halted while the rest of the army came up and was brought into line behind the ridge. THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 17 S During the remainder of the day reconnaissances of the ground in front were made, and McClellan formed his plan of battle. It was to attack strongly with his right wing and, when he had well engaged the enemy's attention, to throw forward his left and center. It was well conceived and should have succeeded admirably. The reasons that it failed of com- plete success seem to be that there was a reprehensible dila- toriness in some commands, and again that fatal lack of co- ordination. Nearly the whole of the 16th was spent in inaction, except for some artillery firing across the valley. Some accounts make it appear that this inaction was the result of a heavy fog that overhung the battlefield, preventing concerted move- ments, but McClellan himself makes no such statement. He says the day was spent by him in placing the different parts of his army for the attack, in making reconnaissances and clearing approaches, but especially in bringing forward the supply and ammunition wagons that had been delayed by the movement of troops along the roads through the South Mountain passes. General Jackson had arrived at Sharpsburg on the morn- ing of the 16th, and all this delay practically insured the arrival of the remainder of the Confederates from Harper's Ferry in time to participate in the battle, as they did, indeed, on the 17th. However, Franklin's corps and Morell's division of Porter's were en route and would join McClellan on the morning of the 17th, and at any rate the Federal army con- siderably outnumbered the ene my. If it could have been brought into action as a body it should have administered to Lee a crushing defeat. At two P. M. on the 16th McClellan ordered Hooker, on the right, to cross the Antietam, to be followed by the corps of Mansfield and Sumner. At four o'clock Hooker crossed by the upper bridge and ford, turned toward the south, drove in Jackson's outposts, and fought a spirited engagement which was terminated only by the approach of darkness. Mans- field's corps crossed during the night and took a position about 174 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY a mile in Hooker's rear. Lee, warned by this preparatory movement, hastened to strengthen his left wing. Sykes' division, posted in the center, south of the Sharps- burg and Keedysville road, remained, much of the next day, in reserve. Our Battalion of the Twelfth formed part of this re- serve, but a large detail from it was sent to the aid of some light batteries that were short of men. It was here that Colo- nel Burke's insistence that they should be drilled as artillerists, even if they were infantry, finally received its vindication, for their training enabled them to do intelligent and effective work with the guns. As they suffered no loss and took part in no action as infantry, however, a brief and general account of the battle will suffice for our interest. At daybreak on the 17th the combat was renewed on the right by General Hooker, and at the same time Sumner's corps crossed the creek and advanced in the direction of the firing. Hooker drove the enemy back to a strip of woods, where he encountered such strong resistance that he called General Mansfield's corps to his support. Sumner's corps arrived and entered the battle at about 9 A. M. These three corps sustained a desperate action, with varying success, dur- ing the forenoon. About eight o'clock A. M. McClellan sent orders to Burn- side to carry the bridge in his front and attack the Confederate right. The attempts to force the bridge were so weakly made that they resulted in failure, and McClellan's orders were twice repeated before sufficient force was used to accomplish the object. It was then after one o'clock P. M. Nothing having been done during the whole forenoon by our left, Lee had almost stripped his right and center to repel the attacks made by our right. These attacks had been delivered successively rather than in combination and, although Franklin's corps had been thrown into that part of the line between noon and one P. M., affairs there looked so unpromising that aggressive action was abandoned, and was not resumed during the re- mainder of the day. Burnside, having failed to carry out his part of the program during the forenoon, had, in turn, to make THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 175 his belated movement on the left, in the afternoon, unsupported by the necessary diversion on the right. Lee had no reserves whatever, having placed his whole available force in his line of battle, but he was now able to shift troops from his left to support his right. Burnside's divisions were at first successful, and were rapidly pushing the enemy back upon Sharpsburg, when A. P. Hill's fresh troops arrived from Harper's Ferry, fell upon their left flank, forcing them to pause and finally to retire toward the Antietam. The Confederates followed them slowly, with artillery fire and darkness soon put an end to the battle. During the whole of the next daj"^ the two armies lay facing each other where night had overtaken them, each too exhausted and too uncertain of the issue to resume the com- bat. A re-enforcement of two divisions, Couch's and Humph- rey's, reached the Union army that morning, and McClellan gave orders for the attack to be resumed on the morning of the 19th. When morning came, however, there was no enemy to attack. Lee, recognizing the inevitable, had withdrawn his army during the night, and had recrossed the Potomac into Virginia. The battle of the Antietam was the most extensive, the bloodiest and the most important that had yet been fought. The Federal casualties aggregated 13,410; being divided as follows: officers, 139 killed, 474 wounded, 7 missing; enlisted men, 1,969 killed, 9,075 wounded, 746 missing. Among these casualties were ten general officers ; General Mansfield being killed, Generals Richardson and Rodman mortally wounded, and Generals Crawford, HartstufF, Sedgewick, Dana, Hooker, Meagher and Weber more or less severely wounded. The Confederate losses are not exactly known and it is hard to choose between conflicting reports. On the one side these minimized, and on the other they magnified the facts, until it is difficult for an impartial investigator to judge the truth. McClellan, in his official report dated October 15th, 1862, stated that officers under his direction counted and buried about 2,700 of the enemy's dead, and that they had previously 176 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY interred others. This, he said, was conclusive proof that the enemy's losses were much greater than his own; and, if the number 2,700 is correct, no fault can be found with his deduc- tions. Against this is to be said that McClellan, as usual, greatly overestimated the strength of his opponent, and that the Con- federate reports of casualties showed a much smaller number. On the other hand, McClellan's report of his own casualties, compiled on September 29th, shows only 59 greater than the revised returns of later date, indicating that data showing results of the battle was tabulated with considerable care. It is not unfair, probably, to conclude that the numbers of killed and wounded, on both sides, were nearly equal. Among the Confederate casualties, Generals Starke, French, G. B. An- derson, Branch and Garland were killed; the latter at Tur- ner's Gap, on the 14th; and Generals Wright, Lawton and R. H. Anderson were wounded. There is almost no mention in Confederate reports of pris- oners or arms lost, but McClellan stated, in the report to which reference is heretofore made, that he had taken, in the battles at Antietam, Turner's Gap and Crampton's Gap, 39 colors, upward of 15,000 small arms, 13 cannon, and more than 6,000 prisoners. It must be considered, of course, that these captures were more than offset by the losses entailed by the surrender of Harper's Ferry, an event in the same series. In order to name the victor in the battle of Antietam the number of men engaged on each side must first be considered. The returns of both armies give an idea of a much greater number than really took part in the combat. In the Union army not nearly all those present were available in the line, and not nearly all those available took part in the actul fight- ing. On the Confederate side all available men were used in the battle, but their divisions were greatly diminished by forced marches and the like. After sifting all the probabilities, the actual number of combatants would seem to have been about 40,000 Confederate and 60,000 Union troops. On this assumption it may be concluded that Antietam THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 177 was, tactically, a drawn battle. Strategically, and in its politi- cal results, it was decidedly a Union triumph. Lee's invasion of the North was absolutely defeated and his army, reduced to nearly one-half the numbers with which it had set out, was turned back into Southern territory. The North gratefully accepted the outcome as a victory. President Lincoln indorsed this sentiment in an impressive manner. He had often been importuned to declare slavery at an end, but had not yet decided that the time had come to do so. He had, it appears, prepared a proclamation to that effect some time before, and had resolved to issue it upon the occa- sion of the first important Union victory. FeeHng, after the battle of the Antietam, that the time was now at hand, on the 23nd of September he published his famous "Emancipation Proclamation," declaring that, unless the states then in rebel- lion should return to their allegiance before January 1st, 1863, all persons held in bondage within their borders should be free. Of course they did not return to their allegiance, and this was, in effect, the end of slavery.* During the night of the 18th the Confederates were enabled, by the low stage of water in the Potomac, to withdraw rapidly and safely across its fords into Virginia. Next morning Por- ter's corps and the cavalry under Pleasanton followed them to the river and found they had emplaced artillery on the oppo- site shore. General Porter determined to clear the fords and capture some guns. Accordingly, he lined the left bank with skirmishers and posted guns to command the right. At dark a small force under General Griffin crossed and succeeded in capturing five field pieces. A reconniassance in force, under the command of Generals Sykes and Morrell, was made at seven o'clock the next morning, but it ended somewhat dis- astrously. The cavalry failed to co-operate as was expected and A. P. Hill, returning with two strong divisions, attacked *To show what were thought the real causes and objects of the war, we must note that the Proclamation "was not unanimously approved in the North. Many men of Volunteer regiments in the field grumbled loudly and even threatened mutiny, declaring they had not enlisted ta fight for the negro. 178 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY the Federals sharply and drove them back across the river with considerable loss. Lee withdrew to the vicinity of Winchester, where his army was rapidly augmented by rejoining stragglers and scat- tered bands that had been unable to accompany him into Mary- land. McClellan reoccupied Harper's Ferry, guarded the line of the Potomac, and busied himself with reorganizing and equipping his army. An acrimonious dispute soon arose between him and the authorities in Washington over the delay and the lack of energy which they respectively displayed in supplying the army and preparing it for a forward movement. The President became so impatient that on October 6th he instructed Gen- eral Halleck to telegraph orders to McClellan to cross the river and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. McClellan, however, still did not consider he was warranted in making such an advance. During this period of inaction the two companies of the Eighth Infantry were transferred from what had remained, until that time, the Battalion of the Eighth and Twelfth, to the Headquarters Guard. About this time Companies F and H of the Twelfth were organized at Fort Hamilton. Captain Henry Putnam was assigned to Company F, and First Lieu- tenant Walter S. Franklin, regimental Quartermaster to Com- pany H. The Second Battalion now stood complete, but was not yet united. It is impossible not to conclude that there was fault on both sides in the controversy that again raged between Mc- Clellan and his detractors. The former, it would seem, would have been wiser to have assumed more risk and to have pur- sued the enemy with less preparation. On the other hand, it is certain there was too great delay in forwarding the supplies needed by his army, for many of them were received so late they could not be distributed to the troops until after the long march south had been begun. The crossing of the river did not begin until October 36th, and was not completed until November 2nd. CHAPTER V. THE FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN. AFTER Lee had fallen back across the Potomac he gradu- ally withdrew into the valley of the Shenandoah, where, while recruiting and reconcentrating his army, he could fairly subsist it upon the surrounding country. Instead of fol- lowing him directly, McClellan decided to keep to the east of the Blue Ridge, seizing the passes as he advanced, and guard- ing them in his rear as long as his communications might be threatened by forays made through them. In pursuing this course he felt sure, if the Confederate army did not continue its retreat, of being able to place himself in its rear. If it did he hoped either to separate it and attack it in detail, or to compel it to retreat so far that he should be free to choose whatever course he liked for a new advance upon Richmond. His plans were carried forward without pause, no resistance being en- countered except the nearly constant skirmishing by the cavalry of the two armies. The only exception was at Snicker's Gap where, on Novem- ber 2nd and 3rd, there were small combats in which infantry and artillery participated. On the former of these two days the Second Battalion of the Twelfth bore a part, but the whole affair, amid the great events of the time, appeared so trifling that it received little notice. Just at this time Longstreet, with part of the Confederate army, emerged from the Shenandoah Valley by way of Thornton's and Chester Gaps, and con- tinued to the vicinity of Culpeper. Jackson, with the rest, remained near Millwood, on the Shenandoah River. The Union cavalry, rapidly pushing forward, took possession, in turn, of Ashby's, Manassas and Chester Gaps. Porter and McClellan Degraded. On the 6th of November the whole army had reached the Manassas Gap Railroad, by means of which it could now draw its supplies directly from Washington. Re-enforcements were arriving. Bayard's cavalry had joined and, on that day, Sigel's (179) 180 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY corps was at Thoroughfare Gap and Sickels' division at Manassas and Warrenton. The army was concentrating upon the latter point as its depot of suppHes. It now found itself in such a position that, in one day's march, it could interpose be- tween Longstreet and Jackson, who were sixty miles apart, with only D. H. Hill's division at Thornton's Gap to keep up communication. Our Battalion, with the rest of Porter's corps, was marching from Snicker's Gap over almost the ground by which it had advanced to the disastrous campaign of the sum- mer before. In the evening of the 7th of November General Bucking- ham arrived from Washington with an order which had there been issued two days before, relieving General McClellan from command of the army and designating General Burnside as his successor. McClellan was directed to proceed to Trenton, New Jersey, and it was apparent that the Government meant completely to sever his connection with military affairs. At the same time General Porter was relieved from his command of the Fifth Corps, to which General Hooker was assigned. General Porter was ordered to Washington, where he was brought to trial on charges growing out of the affair at Manassas in the preceding August. Again, on the very eve of battle, when everything looked favorable for the Union cause, all plans were overturned in a moment. Once more confusion and disaster loomed ahead. Burnside" s New Plan. Orders having already been issued for the concentration of the army on the 8th and 9th, these were faithfully carried out. Then came a fatal pause. General Halleck had ordered Burn- side to submit to him a new plan of campaign. Having ob- tained it, it met with his disapproval. He then went to Warrenton in person and, on the 12th and 13th, conferred with General Burnside, but they still failed to agree. Halleck returned to Washington and on the 14th telegraphed that the President assented to General Burnside's plan. In brief, this was to accumulate four or five days' rations THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 181 and forage, make a feint toward Culpeper, and then shift the whole army rapidly eastward to Fredericksburg, with a view to moving on Richmond again from that point. As the Rappahannock is there a stream of considerable size its crossing could be assured only by means of ponton bridges, the boats for which were all on the Potomac, at or near the village of Berlin. These were to be taken down the river to Acquia Creek and hauled across to Fredericksburg. The suc- cess of the whole undertaking depended upon the feasibility of bringing the boats to that place coincidentally with the arrival of the army. General Burnside had at once introduced a new system of organization in the army by dividing it into three Grand Divi- sions. The Second and Ninth Corps, under General Sumner, formed the Right; the First and Sixth, under Franklin, the Left, and the Third and Fifth, under Hooker, the Center Grand Division. This reorganization, by assigning General Hooker to a higher command, left Brigadier General Butter- field, formerly Lieutenant Colonel of the Twelfth Infantry, in comtaand of the Fifth Corps. The army left its encampments on the 15th and 16th of November, and reached Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, two days later. Qur Battalion formed the head of the column in which the Center Grand Division marched. General T. M. Ander- son, who then commanded it as a Captain, says that when they arrived at Falmouth he rode down to the river and assured himself that no Confederate troops were upon the opposite side. He expresses himself as confident that a cross- ing at that time would have met with no opposition. It is said that both Sumner and Hooker asked permission to cross at once and occupy the town and the heights behind it, but were ordered not to do so until the pontons arrived. These did not come until the evening of the 35th, one week later. That week the Union army spent inactively in camp, while Longstreet was marching with desperate haste to place his troops across its front. How well he succeeded was indi- cated by General Burnside's statement, when the ponton 182 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY material did at last arrive, that it had then become "necessary to make arrangements to cross in the face of a vigilant and formidable foe." As a matter of fact, Lee's army was not yet wholly concentrated at Fredericksburg, and Burnside still possessed an overwhelming advantage in numbers with which to turn Longstreet's position and place himself between the two parts of the Confederate army, for Jackson, with his corps, was forty miles away, at Orange Court House, until the 26th of November. Heavy winter rains were falling, the streams were flooded, and the weather conditions generally can only be described as frightful. The Confederates, settling into quiet possession of the heights lying about a mile back of the right bank of the Rappahannock, crowned them with a formidable system of fortifications. Swinton is authority for the statement that General Burn- side was opposed to any attempt to continue the campaign until spring, and that he wished then to transfer his army to the James River and carry out the same plan McClellan had begun upon the year before. The Administration, however, had discredited this plan, along with its author, when it had peremptorily ordered McClellan back, almost in disgrace. Furthermore, McClellan had just been again degraded, and Burnside was the man selected to fill his place. Something had to be done to justify such a procedure, and the demand for it to be done at once was too urgent to be resisted. Battle of Fredericksburg. Fredericksburg and Marye's Heights have become familiar names in America, but, were it not for the heroic bravery of the men who again and again dashed against the stone wall and the numerous fortifications there, we would willingly draw over it all the mantle of charitable silence. Nothing was gained, and nothing could have been gained, by an assault upon the wellnigh impregnable Confederate position. The battle's only fruits were the thousands of dead and wounded that, in THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 183 a few hours, covered the bleak hillsides and the banks of the Rappahannock. Burnside was mined by this, his first and only battle, and no reviewer of his work has hesitated to criticize him in scathing terms. General Franklin, with much less rea- son, suffered and went down with his commander. The enemy, having been permitted to select and fortify the strongest available position, was now to be driven out by direct assault, all suggestions of attempting to take the works in flank or rear being ignored. The ridges on the left bank were crowned with numerous batteries, under the protection of whose fire the crossing of the river was to be effected. It was planned to construct three ponton bridges, one at the upper and one at the lower edge of the town, and the third about a mile below. In the vicinities of these proposed bridges the three Grand Division Commanders were ordered to con- centrate their troops — Sumner at the upper two, with Hooker in his rear, and Franklin at the lower. The bridges were to be thrown early in the morning of the 11th of December. Presumably it was expected that the crossing would be rapid and the attack immediate. Our Battalion did not take part in the actual movement of concentration. On the 10th it had left its camp near Stafford Court House for a three days' tour of outpost duty. The battle did not occur at once. When it did, on the 13th, the Battalion had returned, so that it went into action with its brigade. About three o'clock in the morning of the 11th work on the bridges was begun. The lower one encountered little resistance and was finished by half past ten. The building of the other two was opposed by Confederate riflemen in the town, who drove away the working parties at daylight, and it wa's not until afternoon that they were completed. One division crossed the middle bridge, and one brigade each the other two that evening. The next day the remainder of Sum- ner's and Franklin's troops crossed and formed on the right bank. Hooker's were still retained upon the left, to be moved 184 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY where occasion might indicate that their presence was neces- sary. It is axiomatic that a commander should avoid doing what his enemy wants him to do, but it cannot be denied that Burn- side could scarcely have complied more fully with the wishes of his antagonist. To walk into a hidden pit is excusable, but to have a pit dug before one's eyes, to have its location pointed out, and yet to walk into it, surely argues something of the simple mind. Even after the concentration clearly indicated the full extent of the Federal intention, two whole days were given the enemy to mass his strength at the exact points where it would be needed. No movement in the contemplated attack was made until late in the morning of the 13th. By that time General Franklin's command had been aug- mented by two divisions from the Third Corps, one from the Ninth, and by Bayard's cavalry. From this augmentation it might be supposed that the real effort was to be made in his front, and indeed the configuration of the country furnishes support to such an hypothesis. He received orders, however, at 7 :30 A. M. on the 13th, to keep his whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and to send out a division, at least, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's house, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open. As this incon- gruous order was all that reached him until half past one in the afternoon it cannot be a matter for surprise that the left of the army accomplished no more than it did. The move- ment of "one division, at least," had become one of five divi- sions, three of which were used up in the process, and no impression had been made upon the Confederate right. It was against the works on Marye's Heights and Ceme- tery Hill in rear of the town that the most desperate, and the most hopeless efforts were being made. Along the slope of the former is cut a roadway on both sides of which are stone retaining walls. That on the lower side extends above the roadway in a parapet, forming, altogether, a solid wall five or THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 185 six feet in height. It is this which played so sinister a part in the battle. Behind it and their well constructed earthworks the Confederates lay in comparative safety and beat back the successive Federal assaults. The attack here was begun by Sumner's divisions about eleven o'clock. The assaulting col- umns dashed, in waves, to within a few feet of the wall, where they melted away under the fire of its defenders. It was a useless butchery. About 2 P. M. Hooker was ordered to cross the river with the troops remaining under his command, and to renew the assaults where Sumner's men had failed. Upon reaching the ground and seeing the hopelessness of his task, he returned to request that his orders be countermanded, but received the reply, "That height must be carried this evening." His attack was no less daring and no less futile than those that had gone before. In the dusk of evening he, too, drew off his shattered brigades. Our Battalion of the Twelfth had rejoined Sykes' brigade just as it was crossing the upper bridge on this advance. It was posted near the edge of the town until after sunset, when it advanced and took its place in the line that still clung to the slope of Marye's Heights within a hundred yards of the fatal wall. To that perilous position, with the Fourth In- fantry on its right and the Fourteenth on its left, it held fast during the next day and until nine o'clock the next night. That day, the 14th, the attack was not renewed. Both sides held the positions they occupied the evening before and con- tented themselves with an interchange of shots. For General Burnside these heights held a hideous fascina- tion. In his desperation over his failure of the 13th he pro- posed personally to lead a new assault by his old corps — the Ninth — but was dissuaded by all his officers. On the 15th he resolved to recross the Rappahannock. He asked a few hours' truce to succor the wounded, who had lain for two days between the contending armies. That night his troops filed quietly back across the bridges. To cover the withdrawal some Regulars remained until the next morning. Our Bat- 186 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY talion, with the Fourth Infantry, was posted, during the night, in a line of rifle-pits through the Martha Washington Ceme- tery. At daylight in the morning of the 16th the enemy opened upon them a lively fire which they returned with spirit. Between nine and ten o'clock that morning a blinding rain came on, enabling this rearguard to withdraw and cross the upper bridge in safety. Our Battalion was the last to leave the stricken field, and the Confederate skirmishers, again advancing, reoccupied the ruined town of Fredericksburg. The reports of the two armies credit the Federal with 113,- 000, the Confederate with 78,000 men. To discuss these figures or to try to determine how far they are from accuracy would serve no purpose; the Union army suffered a severe defeat, from whatever point the action may be viewed, and it was acompanied by so little skill on either side, except for that displayed by the Confederates in selecting and fortifying their position, that a study of the battle is without interest. On the Union side the losses were 134 officers and 1,160 enlisted men killed; 654 officers and 8,946 enlisted men wounded, and 30 officers and 1,749 enlisted men captured or missing; an aggregate of 13,653. Among the killed were Brig- adier Generals Bayard and C. F. Jackson. On the Confederate side the casualties reported were 458 killed and 3,743 wounded ; a total of 4,301. Among their dead were Brigadier Generals Gregg and Cobb. No division be- tween officers and men, and no report of captured or missing is available. Franklin's troops on the Union left, with a loss only three- fifths that sustained by the right, inflicted upon the enemy opposing them a loss twice as large as was suffered by those defending the heights above Fredericksburg. This was to be expected in view of the different character of the ground and fortifications. Our Battalion suffered a loss of only four enlisted men wounded and two missing. The officers with it in the battle were Captain T. M. Anderson, commanding; Captains Dallas, THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 187 Company B, and Dunn, Company D; First Lieutenants Per- kins, Company G ; Wells, Company A ; Van Valzah, Company C; Tracy, Company E; Egbert, Adjutant, and Campbell, Quartermaster.* The Mud March. Wishing to make one more attempt to repair his shattered fortunes. General Burnside obtained the President's approval of a new plan of campaign. It was to cause Crouch's corps to make a demonstration on the lower part of the river, leave Sigel's to maintain communication with Falmouth, and with the rest of the army to cross the river and attack the enemy somewhere above Fredericksburg. Finding that the stream was unguarded at Banks' Ford, the Grand Divisions of Franklin and Hooker were concentrated within easy reach of that point on January 20th. At that time of the year the place was no longer a ford, but the pontons were hauled up the river and placed in readiness for use. For the moment Fortune seemed to smile upon the under- taking. The demonstrations below Fredericksburg had acom- plished their purpose in diverting the enemy's attention, and he was not prepared to resist a crossing at the really threat- ened point. The bridges were to have been constructed at daylight on the 21st, but on the night of the 20th a fearful rain began to fall and the swampy soil was soon converted into a sticky mass into which men, horses and wagons sank deeper and deeper at every step. A few boats were already afloat, but enough for a single bridge could not reach the river. All day, in a ceaseless downpour, the men and horses worked vainly to push the wagons forward. A few Confederates on the opposite shore cried out ironically that they would come over and help. Every hour gave Lee a chance to concentrate his army. In the morning of the 22nd the rain was still falling, and all forward movement had ceased. Rations were exhausted •Lieutenants Egbert and Campbell had been confined in Libby Prison since their capture at the battle of Cedar Mountain, but had recently been exchanged, and had returned to duty about the first of December. 188 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY and it was impossible to move supplies from Falmouth. The game was lost and all that remained was for the army to withdraw with the least possible loss. Fortunately, the swollen river saved them from annoyance and pursuit by the enemy. Resort was had to the building of corduroy roads and, by almost superhuman efforts, all the guns and wagons that had not absolutely broken down on the road were saved. On the 33rd of January this "Mud March" was completed, and the Army of the Potomac settled down in its camps in Stafford County, Virginia. All thought of further aggressive effort was abandoned, and the remainder of the winter was spent in drilling and in trying to keep the army from absolutely melt- ing away. General Burnside, knowing that many of his chiefs lacked confidence in him, requested the President to deprive a num- ber of general officers of their commands, requesting that four of them be dismissed from the army. This request not meet- ing with approval, he then tendered his own resignation, which was accepted, although he still retained his rank of Major General. His attitude toward his subordinates was not one to win him sympathy. At the same time, Sumner, broken by age and infirmities, asked and obtained relief from his command, and General Franklin, although the senior Major General, was deprived of his command with the army, and General Hooker received the dangerous honor of being named its leader. Without necessarily agreeing, in toto, with its author, we may well ponder the closing paragraph of General F. W. Palfrey's careful discussion of "The Antietam and Fredericks- burg." "It would be too much to say that there are no sadder stories in military history than that of the Army of the Potomac, but its story is sad enough. Always better than its commanders, always ready to 'stand in the evil hour,' and 'having done all, to stand,' it marched and fought and hun- THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 189 gered and thirsted for four long years, hardly ever animated by victory. * + * ** ***** "It fought through to the end, it did its work and gained its crown, but its path was long and rough and seldom cheered, and one of its saddest and sharpest experiences was its brave, hopeless effort at Fredericksburg." CHAPTER VI. CHANCBLLORSVILLB. SELDOM has a modern army fallen into a state so peril- ously near dissolution as did the Army of the Potomac in the closing weeks of the year 1863 and the beginning of 1863. Discouragement and discontent were the prevailing sentiments throughout its ranks. Desertion had increased to an ominous degree. In a report made by General Hooker on February 15th, 1863, it was stated that, of 82,000 enlisted men and nearly 3,000 officers then absent from the command, more than half had obtained leave of absence by irregular methods. General Hooker set about correcting these abuses. His very name reinspired some of the confidence the army had lost during the preceding months. The cumbersome system of Grand Divisions was abolished, and the administration by Army Corps was resumed. A policy which combined severity and clemency was adopted to check desertions and unauthor- ized absences. The President, on the 10th of March, issued a proclamation promising clemency to all who should return to their commands by April 1st, and at the same time relin- quished to the commander of the army his right to review sentences of courts-martial. As, during the winter months, w'hile the army was bound to inaction, the services of the men could be spared temporarily, a system of leaves of absence was established. Every regiment in good standing was authorized to have continuously on leave two officers and one enlisted man out of every fifty of its strength. These leaves were granted for periods of ten or fifteen days, in order that as many as possible might be enabled to visit their homes. At the same time stringent orders to prevent desertion were put into effect, and some deserters who had been apprehended were quickly tried, sentenced to death, and shot in the pres- ence of the army. All these measures had a salutary effect upon discipline, and the whole force began to feel itself (190) THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 191 regaining a condition of readiness for any task to which it might be called when spring opened. A number of changes were made in the composition of the various corps and divisions, and also in their commanders. General Butterfield having been appointed by Hooker to be his Chief of Staff, the command of the Fifth Corps was given to General Meade. It was at this time that distinctive corps badges were adopted with good results. Appointment of Second Lieutenants. Up to this time only a few Second Lieutenants had been provided for the new regiments of Regular Infantry. To the Second Battalion of the Twelfth only Lieutenant Netterville had yet been assigned. During the fall of 1863 the officers of the battalions in the field had held meetings to discuss recom- mendations for commissions to certain enlisted men in their ranks. Most such recommendations were of non-commis- sioned officers who had already served a considerable length of time in older regiments — old Sergeants, in fact. The officers of the Second Battalion, however, considered that it would be preferable to recommend younger men who showed some conspicuous natural ability, or who rendered some notable service. They named Sergeant Major Silas A. Miller and First Ser- geant Emerson H. Liscum, of Company A, both previously mentioned for bravery at Cedar Mountain, and Sergeant James Jackson, of Company C. Miller and Liscum were commis- sioned Second Lieutenants on February 19th, and Jackson on April 23nd, 1863. All received notice of their promotions in time to enter the battle of Chancellorsville as officers of their Battalion, and all rendered distinguished and noteworthy ser- vice during their subsequent careers. Miller was killed a few months later at the battle of Gettys- burg. Liscum was severely wounded there, but recovered in time to win the brevet rank of Captain for gallant service in the campaign of 1864 before Richmond ; fell again at the battle of San Juan Hill, in 1898 ; again recovered, was made a Briga- 192 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY dier General of Volunteers, and finally was killed at the head of his regiment before Tien Tsin, China, in 1900. Jackson was brevetted Captain for gallant service at the battle of the North Anna in 1864; Major for gallant service at, the battle of the Weldon Railroad; Lieutenant Colonel for BIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL LISCUM. Emerson Hamilton Liscum was born July 16th., 1841, in Hunt- ington, Chittenden County, Vermont. While yet a child he removed, with his father, to Burlington, where he spent his boyhood and received his early education. Apparently he had always a taste for military life, for as soon as he was of sufficient age he joined the "Howard Guards," one of the few uniformed companies of militia in the state prior to the outbreak of the Civil War. When the news came of the firing upon Fort Sumter he hastened to volunteer his services for the Union, and was mustered in. May 12th, 1861, as a Corporal of Company H, First Vermont Infantry. With this regiment he went to Newport News, Virginia, and took part in the engagement at Big Bethel on June 10th. The services of these Volun- teer regiments were but brief, and he was discharged on August 15th, 1861. On February 1st, 1862 he again enlisted, but this time in the Reg- ular Army. In Companies E and A of the Second Battalion, Twelfth Infantry, he served through the grades of Private, Corporal, Sergeant, and First Sergeant. At the battle of Cedar Mountain, August 9th, 1862, he was wounded in the left elbow, and for his admirable conduct was recommended for a commission. On February 19th, 1863, he was ap- pointed a Second Lieutenant in the Battalion with which he was serv- ing, and went into the battle of Chancellorsville as an officer in his old command. He was promoted to be First Lieutenant on May 4th, 1863. On the second day of the battle of Gettysburg he received a severe wound in the right thigh. During the Wilderness campaign, in the following spring, he was ambulance officer for his division — a position of much risk and respon- sibility — and was commended by the Chief Ambulance Officer of the Fifth Corps for his coolness in danger and faithful performance of duty. On August 1st, 1864, he received the brevet rank of Captain for gallant service in the battle of Bethesda Church on June 4th, of that year, and during the campaign before Richmond. Except when pre- vented by wounds and sickness he participated, with his Battalion, in all the marches and battles of the Army of the Potomac. On July 25th, 1866, he was promoted to be Captain of the Twenty- fifth Infantry, and was reassigned to the Nineteenth Infantry on July 5th, 1870. On May 4th, 1892, he was promoted to be Major of the Twenty- second Infantry, and to be Lieutenant Colonel of the Twenty-fourth Infantry on May 23rd, 1896. Much of his service in the years following the close of the Civil War was in the west, against the Ute and other tribes of Indians, but it was markedly that of a friendly concllator and a tactful adminis- GENERAL EMERSON H. LISCUM THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 193 gallant and meritorious service in action against Indians at Lost River, Oregon, in 1872, and at Clearwater, Idaho, in 1877; was awarded a medal of honor for distinguished gallantry in action at Camas Meadows, Idaho, in 1877, and was retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1897. trator. He took the view held by many Army officers, that the Indian must not always be held to be in the wrong, and that much could be accomplished with him by firm kindness and by just and honest dealing. At the outbreak of the War with Spain he went to Cuba in com- mand of his regiment. During the assault upon San Juan Hill the death of Colonel WikofE and the wounding of Lieutenant Colonel Worth devolved upon him the command of his brigade. He had exercised it but a few minutes when he was struck in the right breast by a Spanish bullet which inflicted so severe a wound that there seemed little hope of his recovery. He did indeed mend, but it was but slowly, and the recovery was never complete. On account of this wound he was granted a sick leave for nine months, and as a reward for his services was appointed Brigadier Gen- eral of Volunteers on July 12th, 1898. On April 25th, 1899, he was promoted to be Colonel of the Ninth Infantry. Owing to the discontinuance of the Volunteer establishment his appointment as Brigadier General of Volunteers expired in December, 1898. At the end of his leave, therefore, he was ordered to the Philip- pine Islands to take command of his new regiment, which was already there. Soon after his arrival at Manila, however, in June, 1899, he was assigned to the command of a brigade operating in the province of Tarlac. He cleared the Manila-Dagupan railway, made many captures of arms and insurgent forces and pacified the district by a wise and humane administration of the government. In April, 1900, a shifting about of General Officers of the Eighth Corps caused him to revert to the command of his regiment. In June, 1900, the Ninth Infantry was selected as part of the American con- tingent to be sent to the relief of the foreign legations during the Boxer rebellion in China. It landed at Taku on July 9 th and pushed on to take part in the assault upon Tien Tsin, a fortified city that lay in the way to Pekin. On July 13th Colonel Liscum was ordered by the British General Dorward to support the Japanese troops in an attack upon the city. In a charge over marshy ground the American soldiers met a fire so heavy they could no longer advance against it. Their color-bearer fell, and Colonel Liscum seized the colors. A moment later he also fell, shot through the abdomen. "Don't retreat — keep firing," were his last words. At nightfall, under cover of the darkness, his men retired, carry- ing with them the body of their beloved Colonel, with those of their other dead and wounded. On the spot stands a monument erected by the regiment, bearing the one word — "Liscum." His character was one that impressed everyone with whom he came in contact by its lovable qualities. In the words of a former com- rade and commander, he was a "true gentleman and a most excellent soldier." 194 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Sergeant Thomas L. Alston, of Company C, also was recom- mended for commission about this time, and was appointed Second Lieutenant on June 1st, 1863. He had an excellent record throughout the war, was brevetted Captain for gallant service at the battle of Spottsylvania and during the campaign before Richmond, in 1864, and was honorably discharged, at his own request, on December 31st, 1870. Captain Newbury rejoined the Battalion from temporary detached service just after the battle of Fredericksburg. At this time, also. First Lieutenants Hoyer and Sartell Prentice reported for duty ; the latter having been assigned to the Bat- talion upon the promotion of Lieutenant Newbury to be Cap- tain on the 21st of the preceding July. During the winter First Lieutenants Campbell, Bootes and Hoyer resigned and left the army, their resignations taking effect as follows: Lieutenant Campbell, January 19th; Lieu- tenant Bootes, February 7th, and Lieutenant Hoyer, April 27th, 1863. In the spring of 1863 a re-arrangement was made of the companies of the Second Battalion that has given rise to some confusion on the part of those who have since attempted to follow its vicissitudes. Recruiting, even for the volunteer regiments, had at that time fallen off until the filling of the ranks was a difficult and uncertain process. The regular regiments had become much depleted, and were receiving almost no additions. The Sec- ond Battalion of the Twelfth had become so reduced in num- bers that it was decided to combine some of the companies, and to let the regiment act, for the time, as an undivided unit. Companies B, E and G, therefore, were consolidated with A, C and D of the Second Battalion, and it appears, also, that a similar, but less extensive consolidation, was made in the First Battalion. Companies F and H of the Second, it must be remembered, were still at Fort Hamilton, New York. This disposition was temporary, and appears to have been only a field expedient for tactical and administrative conveni- ence. All the companies still retained their official standing THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 195 and organization, but in the field B, E and G were reduced to formal fictions, their men and officers, while still remaining members of those companies, acting, in fact, with A, C and D. Thus it has come about that conflicting statements regarding the strength of the Battalion appear in different places, even sometimes originating in official sources. In these statements it is variously described as consisting of three, five, six and eight companies. How these apparently irreconcilable figures are obtained may now appear. Later, when companies F and H had joined those in the field, and when these latter had received enough recruits to make each a workable unit, the Second Battalion was again expanded to its former status and condition. Hooker's Plans. During these winter months the Confederates were by no means lacking in efforts to improve their own condition. Their number was less than that of the Union Army, but their men were not dispirited by failures. So far victory had flown with their banners. Nevertheless they had put in force a thorough system of conscription and had carefully reorgan- ized their army, distributing reward and punishment in a manner to secure the greatest efficiency in an armed force. Unfortunately for the Federal cause, the theory of a voluntary enlistment for a short term of service had not yet been abandoned by the Northern Government, and another of its evil fruits was about to be gathered. In the Army of the Potomac were about 33,000 men whose terms of enlistment expired in May, 1863. Some of these had been enlisted for two years, and some for only nine months. Now, at the opening of another campaign, when their services were essen- tial to success, there was nothing to do but to watch them calmly walk away and return to their homes. Many, of course, would have re-enlisted, but anomalous as. it may appear, were prevented from doing so by the monu- mental folly of the bounty system, which had now been adopted by both state and national governments. To obtaia 196 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY these bounties the men returned to their native states, where they joined new organizations of Volunteers and, when they did return to the ranks, rejoined as scattering and ineffective parts of new levies. In order to utilize the services of as many as possible of these trained men, therefore, it was incumbent upon General Hooker to give battle before they could be discharged, and he accordingly laid his plans to that end. These were ambitious, inasmuch as they contemplated not only the defeat but the capture or destruction of Lee's whole army. At the same time they were simple and efficacious, and promised success, at least for the defeat of his opponent. They were, in brief, to continue a series of demonstrations at and below Fredericksburg by three corps under the direc- tion of General Sedgewick, while the other four should make a detour to the northwest, cross the Rappahannock and the Rapidan above their junction and descend the river to take the Confederate position in rear. Hooker's great numerical superiority fully justified him in undertaking the usually haz- ardous process of dividing his army in the presence of an enemy, although it deprived him of the personal direction of one or the other of its parts. So far, the object was simple and the requirements of the situation were plain. A part of his plan, however, was that General Stoneman should start, with practically all his cavalry, two weeks in advance of the infantry, cross the upper fords of the Rappa- hannock, and sweep down upon Lee's line of communication with Richmond, capturing supplies and destroying railway and telegraph lines. By thus embarrassing the Confederate comimissariat it seemed probable that Lee would be forced to begin a retreat in face of the two parts of the Union army closing in upon him and, possibly, by interposing the cavalry as a barrier between him and his base, he might be compelled to surrender or to abandon a great part of his forces in order to extricate himself from the trap. Here, again. Fate, in the forms of inclement weather and the wretched Federal military policy, interposed to bind THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 197 Hooker's hands and to save the threatened Confederacy. The spring rains began falling in torrents and the many streams emptying into the Rappahannock became so swollen that Stoneman's columns could make no headway. The two weeks that should have taken them completely to the rear of Lee's army left them, instead, inactive upon the north bank of the river. Several Volunteer regiments whose terms of enlistment had expired left the army and returned to their homes, while others, whose terms of enlistment were about to expire, impatiently awaited the day that would permit them to quit the scene of the struggle. Seeing he would thus soon suffer a loss greater than that to be feared from a general battle. Hooker decided to move without further delay. Infantry, artillery and cavalry crossed the river together, and the result was that the battle was over before the cavalry reached its objective. Its operations, and that part of Hooker's plans depending upon them, came absolutely to nothing, while the services it might have rendered as a screening and scouting force with the main army about Chan- cellorsville were sadly lacking. Battle of Chancellorsville . From the 21st of April feints at crossing the river below Fredericksburg were begun by troops of the First and Sixth Corps. On the 27th Meade's (Fifth), Howard's (Eleventh) and Slocum's (Twelfth) Corps, each accompanied by three batteries, started for Kelly's Ford, above the junction of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. Couch, with two divisions of the Second, was placed near the U. S. Ford to effect a crossing when the other three corps should have cleared it by descend- ing the river. His third division, Gibbon's, being encamped in plain view of the enemy, near Falmouth, was left there in order not to disclose the movement. The three corps above mentioned reached Kelly's Ford on the evening of the 28th. With the aid of some temporary bridge equipment they succeeded in crossing the river during the night and took up their march for the Rapidan, Meade's 198 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY corps going to Ely's, and the other two to Germania Ford. Without waiting there for bridge construction they plunged into the swift and swollen river, forded it and proceeded on their way to Chancellorsville, having encountered but trifling opposition at any point. General Stuart, with two brigades of Confederate cavalry, was in the vicinity but, hearing of the passage at Kelly's Ford, was deceived into thinking the col- umn was advancing upon Gordonsville, placed himself at Brandy Station, and thus allowed the Federals to march away from him and to separate him from the rest of the Confederate army. Upon discovering his error he sent one of his brigades toward Gordonsville to oppose the Federal cavalry, and started, with the other, on a rapid march to outstrip the Fed- eral columns and rejoin his chief. At Slocum's approach, on the 30th, the Confederate troops in the vicinity fell back and abandoned the U. S. Ford, which was at once crossed by Couch's two divisions of the Second Corps. On the evening of the 30th of April, therefore, Hooker found himself at Chancellorsville with four army corps. As yet the Confederates had made no dispositions to meet this condition. Lee had been warned, on the 39th, of the approximate strength and apparent intention of the turning columns, but in the morning of that day two divisions of Sedgewick's troops had passed the river near where Franklin had crossed in December of the year before. The three corps there stationed were so maneuvered as to appear to threaten an immediate and serious attack on Franklin's old battle- ground, and Lee was still uncertain from which direction the greater danger menaced. During the 30th Sickles' (Third) Corps of Sedgewick's command was ordered to proceed up the river, to cross at the U. S. Ford and to join Hooker at Chancellorsville. That night Lee, having received more accurate reports from Stuart, and perceiving that Sedgewick made no further advance, saw that the movement in his front was a feint and that the real danger threatened his rear. Leaving one division of Jackson's and one brigade of Longstreet's corps to hold the heights of Fred- THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 199 ericksburg, he turned, with the rest of his army, and marched rapidly to meet Hooker. By eight o'clock the next morning he was in position at Tabernacle Church, with the three brigades Anderson already had there, fortifying himself anew against an attack. Had the Federal troops continued their advance in the evening of the 30th of April or the early morning of the 1st of May, they would have encountered only the three brigades of Anderson, and possibly some re-enforcements under Mc- Laws, so that this position at Tabernacle Church, as well as Banks' Ford, certainly one of the main objectives in the whole movement, would have fallen into their hands with little opposition. The reserve artillery, which was massed at this ford, could then have been advanced at once, and Sickles would have been enabled to join hours before he did. Further- more, Sedgewick, with the whole of his two corps, would have been brought twelve miles nearer, and could have been brought into action on the new front or supported, as developments might have required, with comparative celerity. Instead, they halted at Chancellorsville and remained there until eleven o'clock A. M. on the 1st of May. When the advance was resumed the army moved in four columns. Slocum's corps, followed by Howard's, took the "plank road," the southernmost of three running toward Fred- ericksburg. Sykes' division of Meade's corps (our Battalion, it will be remembered, forming part of this command) fol- lowed by Hancock's division of Couch's corps, took the turn- pike, the central road. The other two divisions of Meade's corps took the river road leading to Banks' Ford. French's division of Couch's corps moved to the right front, toward Todd's Tavern. Sickles' corps ,which arrived that morning, had one brigade at the U. S. Ford, one at Dowdall's Tavern, and the remainder at Chancellorsville as a reserve. Hooker expected to form line of battle with his right near Tabernacle Church and his left at Banks' Ford. Instead of being able to brush away a feeble opposition merely by the heads of his advancing columns, however, he found the ground 200 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY he wished to occupy now held by the enemy in force. Fur- thermore, Jackson, arriving at eight o'clock that morning, had insisted upon leaving the ititrenchments and advancing in line of battle. Hooker, then, instead of finding the enemy defend- ing a position, or falling back before him, encountered them far in advance of where he had expected and aggressively on the offensive. The country in which the army was now forced to maneu- ver is locally known as "The Wilderness." Later "The Wilder- ness" became known over half the world as a name of fear- ful import. It is overgrown with woods and thickets so dense, in parts, as to be almost impenetrable. These are inter- spersed by clearings, but the ground is most difficult for anyone not thoroughly familiar with its details. Organiza- tions attempting to maneuver over it became confused and broker^ into crowds without order or object. It was next to impossible to move troops off the roads, or even to deliver orders to them with certainty and despatch. Syke's division, with the brigade of Regulars at its head, was the first to move out along the turnpike. A mile from Chancellorsville they met the advance of McLaws' Confed- erate division. The opposing columns were ascending oppo- site sides of a hill. The Regulars, without hesitation, charged to the top, met McLaw's men and drove them back for fully a mile. The Confederates were then reinforced by Anderson's division and Ramseur's brigade. Owing to the divergence of the roads Sykes found himself considerably in advance of and entirely disconnected from Slocum's corps on his right. The Confederates, by reason of their greatly augmented num- bers, began to overlap his flanks. He tried, by throwing out a regiment on his right, to connect with Slocum, but did not succeed. To save ,his flanks from being overwhelmed, he then retired upon Hancock's division in his rear, but he had made a lively fight of it. Slocum soon came up and formed line to Hancock's right, his own resting upon elevated ground. Sykes and Hancock occupied a commanding ridge with an open space in front, THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 201 and General Warren urged that it be retained. The troops on the river road had almost reached Banks' Ford, which they had gone out to seize, and from that position they could strike the right of the enemy's line. The army was nearly out of the thickets and began to congratulate itself upon hav- ing secured a good position. It was with deep disgust, there- fore, especially in Sykes' division, which had fought for and won its ground, that it received, at this juncture, the order to retreat. Generals Couch, Warren and Slocum demurred, but their proposals to hold their positions were overruled, and the entire army fell back upon Chancellorsville. Som'e loss occurred in Hancock's corps during the with- drawal, owing to his right flank becoming exposed, but fortu- nately the Confederates did not press the retiring forces. The troops on the river road and in French's division retired with- out having become engaged. There was considerable con- fusion attending the concentration, but gradually, during the night, the divisions were placed in line and a defensive position was prepared. The Confederates gradu- ally followed until, before dark, they had drawn a line facing that of the Federals at all points. The Union army found itself in the anomalous position of being invested by a force numerically its inferior. The Federal line formed, roughly, a quarter circle, its left resting on the Rappahannock three-fourths of a mile below the U. S. Ford, its center at Chancellorsville, and its right on the plank road about a mile west of that place. The troops form- ing this line occupied relatively the same positions they had had in their previous advance. Howard's (Eleventh) corps formed the right of the line, and his right flank rested upon no obstacle, or naturally defensible position. As this corps met with overwhelming disaster during the next day's fight- ing, it will be well to describe a few of the circumstances attending the unfortunate affair. The Eleventh Corps was made up largely of Germans, was known as a German corps and was officered chiefly by men of that nationality. Until recently they had been com- 202 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY manded by a German General, Franz Sigel, in whom they felt the pride of race as well as the admiration due his admitted achievements. In course of the upheaval that overtook the army after Fredericksburg, however, Sigel had been relieved from his command and General O. O. Howard had been assigned to his place. Some resentment was felt throughout the corps at this proceeding, and the feeling was none the less because of General Howard's reputation for pronounced religious tendencies, he having been previously educated for the ministry. These circumstances paved the way for laying a great deal of blame upon the German contingent when the disaster came, but it is not believed by those familiar with the case that such aspersions were in any way justified. In the evening of May 1st, Hooker, observing that How- ard's right flank was exposed, sent Graham's division of Sickles' corps to re-enforce that part of the line. General Howard, however, seemed to feel this as a reflection upon him and told Graham that he was not needed, saying in a confi- dent manner that he would send his compliments to the whole rebel army and invite them to attack him. Hooker felt he could not afford a controversy with the commander of the Eleventh Corps, and Graham's division was withdrawn. That night Hooker sent orders for Reynolds' (First) corps to march from below Fredericksburg and to join him by way of the U. S. Ford. In the morning he placed a division from Sickles' corps between those of Slocum and Howard, where the interval was considerable. The Confederates had followed our troops closely in their retrograde movement of the afternoon of May 1st, and had spent the evening in feeling out the positions to which they retired. The dense thickets covering the ground in all direc- tions did not admit of ready movement by either side in an offensive action, and the Federals began, along nearly all parts of their line, to prepare hasty defensive works of felled timber and brushwood. Lee's feints disclosed no point that offered fair promise for a successful attack. In his situation time pressed for aggressive action and the outlook was not encour- THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 203 aging. At dawn of the 2nd of May Lee and Jackson received a message from General Stuart, saying that his observations had disclosed the fact that Howard's right flank was entirely unprotected and easily assailable. Jackson, with his accustomed daring, proposed to take all the troops under his command, make a detour and fall upon this exposed flank. It was a hazardous undertaking because if he did not succeed in effect- ing a surprise, and if Howard had so disposed his troops as to resist an attack from either direction or had fortified his posi- tion so as to enable him to support the shock of such an attack, Lee's army would be hopelessly divided and either part in danger of being crushed by greatly superior numbers. Jack- son received the permission he desired and at once set out by a road through the forest, south of the plank road, to gain the Federal right. To distract attention from this turning move- ment Lee began and kept up a series of demonstrations against the Federal front. In spite of all Jackson's precautions his column was observed from the south front, and its numbers were computed with some accuracy as it passed over a hill about a mile and a half distant. This was reported to General Hooker who, at 9 :30 A. M., sent a letter to Generals Slocum and Howard, stating that good reasons existed to believe the enemy was moving on our right, where no defenses worth naming had been prepared ; that there seemed to be a scarcity of troops at the threatened point, and that those there were badly posted. He directed that strong reserves be provided and that preparations be made to meet an attack from any direction. At one o'clock P. M. Sickles started out with two divisions to attack Jackson's flank. Although greatly delayed he finally reached the road and captured a Confederate regiment. He planned to interpose between Jackson's column and the troops of McLaws, who still remained in our front, and then to attack the latter in flank, but permission was denied him. Instead, Slocum's men were advanced against McLaws' front, but made no progress and were retired. The opportunity for 204 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY a combined attack was lost and Sickles was left far to the front, a great space in the general line in his rear being thus unoccupied. Jackson arrived opposite Howard's flank unobserved and unresisted. Personally examining the position and finding it still unprotected, he extended his troops in two lines far over- lapping Howard's to both right and left. Excepting two regiments faced toward the west, no provision had been made for meeting such an attack. It is true that Generals Schurz and Devens, of their own volition, had placed, the former three regiments and the latter two, in column, faced in that direction, but these never had an opportunity to form line. The first warning to the Federal soldiers of the coming storm was given by frightened deer and rabbits fleeing out of the woods before it. At six o'clock P. M. Howard's outposts came in pell-mell with the assaulting enemy. The Eleventh Corps was swept away as if by the breath of a hurricane. The Confederates, pouring after, occupied the intrench- ments left empty by Sickles' advance to the south. Jackson seemed destined to sweep everything before him in a terrible rout, but, out of the streaming crowd of fugitives, some bat- teries belonging to the Eleventh Corps were halted on high ground near Fair View and turned upon the enemy. New batteries were added to them and their fire began to check the ardor of the onslaught. Berry's division of Sickles' corps, which was still in reserve, was hurried forward and formed in line across the valley in front of the guns. A brigade from the Second Corps was thrown into this line. Pleasonton, returning from his expedition with Sickles, hurried forward two regiments of cavalry to charge the victorious enemy. Under cover of this heroic diversion he gathered more artillery and rallied some fugitives to its support. Before the Confed- erates could overcome its resistance Sickles led into the breach the advance of his corps which he was now striving to bring back from its perilous isolation. From the northeast Sykes' division was racing to the assist- ance of the crumbling right. Our Battalion, having been on THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 205 the right as it lay in line, now found itself at the head of the laboring column. General Sykes led it in person as it sped across the gloomy and fire-swept field. Beyond the Ely's Ford road they formed again in line and stood against the enemy's advance. It was nine o'clock P. M., and Jackson's men had pushed dangerously near to Chancellorsville, but here the wave broke. Darkness had fallen, and in the forests it was impossible to preserve any orderly arrangement. The men were becom- ing exhausted by their efforts, and the furious combat had broken up their organization. In a word, the force of the onslaught was spent and, in spite of Jackson's persistent efforts to carry them forward, his men stopped and began to take account of their surroundings and their losses. In their turn they became careless of the dangers that environed them. Some, in rear, set about plundering Howard's abandoned camp. Their leader, knowing he must be alert to secure what he had won, hastily began trying to reform his lines and place them in favorable positions. He rode forward, with his staff, to make a reconnaissance on the plank road, and unexpectedly received the fire of some Union troops stationed there. Re- treating in haste from this danger, he and his escort were mistaken by his own men for a party of Union cavalry and were fired upon at close range. In the two encounters nearly all his escort were either killed or wounded and Jackson him- self was struck by three bullets, one of which shattered his left arm and severed an artery near the shoulder. As he was being carried to the rear a discharge of Federal artillery killed some of his attendants, wounded A. P. Hill, who was by his side, and caused Jackson to be thrown violently to the ground. From his injuries he expired one week later. A great scourge of the Union and a great military genius had fallen. It may be noted that after this, his crowning achievement, the Confed- erate Army of Northern Virginia never again won a general engagement in the open field. As Jackson had anticipated, the Federals advanced to re- cover the ground they had lost; gropingly, it is true, in the 206 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY darkness and among the thickets where no command larger than a company could remain intact, but still with some effect. At least they were not overcome with fright. Here and there, over the field so confusedly occupied by the contending forces, as they from time to time unexpectedly discovered their enemy, their volleys continued to rattle in the darkness until two o'clock in the morning. By that time nearly all sounds of the struggle had ceased. During the night Reynolds' (First) corps arrived on the battlefield and took position on the Ely's Ford road to the right of Sykes' division. General Pleasanton had spent the night fortifying the important heights of Hazel Grove, but Hooker, unfortunately, had directed the occupation of a line in his rear. Pleasanton, therefore, was compelled to retire in the morning, as the Confederates again moved to attack. The latter, supposing they had driven out the defenders, BIOGRAPHY OF COLONEL JAMES JACKSON. James Jackson, born in New Jersey, on November 21st, 1833, is a lineal descendant of Benjamin Loxley, of Philadelphia, who served with distinction during the Revolution, rising to the rank of Major in the Continental Army and becoming a volunteer aide on Washington's staff at Valley Forge with the rank of Colonel. He enlisted in the Second Battalion of the Twelfth Infantry on November 8th, 1861; was instrumental in securing for his battalion a large number of recruits in Iowa and Minnesota; was almost immediately appointed a Sergeant in Company C of that battalion, and largely on account of his success in obtaining recruits, was recommended for a commission. As an enlisted man he participated in the battles of the Antie- tam and Fredericksburg; on April 22nd, 1863, was appointed a Second Lieutenant in his regiment, and on August 31st, 1863, was promoted to be First Lieutenant. As an officer he participated in the battles of Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Mine Run, The Wilder- ness, Spottsylvania, Bethesda Church, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, The Weldon Railroad, The North Anna, Peeble's Farm and Hatcher's Run. He was granted the brevet rank of Captain on August 1st, 1864, for gallant service in the battle of the North Anna, and of Major on August 18th, 1864, for gallant service in the battle of the Weldon Railroad. Upon the reorganization of the army in 1866 he was trans- ferred to the Thirtieth Infantry on September 21st, and was pro- moted to be Captain on February 17th, 1868. COLONEL JAMES JACKSON THE WAR OP THE REBELLION 207 exultantly occupied these heights and mounted guns that swept the entire plain about Chancellorsville, enfiladed a part of Slocum's lines and took those of Couch's corps in reverse. The Confederate troops repeatedly assaulted the lines that now formed three sides of a somewhat contracted square about Chancellorsville and, although these assaults were several times beaten off, they gradually pushed the Federals back at all points. Hooker was importuned for re-enforcements, which could have been furnished in plenty, as the whole of the First and all but Sykes' division of the Fifth Corps had as yet taken no part in the battle. The Eleventh had also re- covered from its panic of the day before and would have wel- comed an opportunity to repair its damaged reputation. At one time he seemed inclined to bring forward some of this reserve force, but the time of pressing urgency slipped by without action. On December 31st, 1870, he transferred to the cavalry, and was assigned to the First Regiment of that arm. There followed a period of very active service in various campaigns against the Modoc, Nez Per-ce and Pi Ute Indian tribes, during which he added high honors to those gained in his already suflBciently remarkable career during the War of the Rebellion. On February 27th, 1899, he was given the brevet rank of Lieu- tenant Colonel for gallant and meritorious service in action against Indians during the Modoc War, especially in the action on Lost River, Oregon, on November 29th, 1872, and for gallant service in action against Indians at the Clearwater, Idaho, on July 12th, 1877. On August 17th, 1896, he was awarded a medal of honor for "most distinguished gallantry in action against Indians at Camas Meadows, Idaho, on August 20th, 1877, under heavy fire from the enemy secur- ing the body of a soldier of his command who had been killed in action, and with the aid of one or two men, conveying it to a place of safety, while serving as Captain, Troop B, First Cavalry." He was promoted to be Major of the Second Cavalry on January 23d, 18 89, and to be Lieutenant Colonel of the Fourth Cavalry on June 19th, 1897. He was transferred to the First Cavalry on August 11th, 1897, and was retired for age on November 21st of the same year. On April 23d, 1904, he was promoted to be Colonel on the retired list. At the beginning of the War with Spain he was appointed by the Governor of Oregon to be Inspector General of the militia of that state and to assist in organizing its Volunteer regiments. Since that time he has been on the staff of every Governor of the state and has devoted his time and training to aiding and benefitting the Oregon National Guard. 208 HISTORY OP TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY At about ten o'clock A. M. a pillar of the Chancellor House, against which he was leaning, was struck by a cannon ball and Hooker was stunned. For more than an hour the army was practically without a leader. When he did recover consciousness his mind was no longer alert. The army fell back to a line which he had caused to be laid out north of Chancellorsville, and there prepared again to meet the attack which was expected soon to be renewed. Fredericksburg and Salem Church. Lee gave his troops only the necessary breathing time, and was, indeed, preparing to renew his attack when his attention was called to a movement which threatened him from the east. The night before Hooker had sent word to Sedgewick to advance against and drive Early from the heights above Fred- ericksburg, and then to continue so as to strike the rest of Lee's army in rear. Sedgewick started promptly, but it was nearly noon of the 3rd before he succeeded in capturing Marye's Heights, and he did not resume his march until 3 P. M. This delay gave time for a Confederate brigade that earlier was driven from before Fredericksburg to occupy a strong position before Salem Church and to be re-enforced by four more brigades that Lee had dispatched to bar the way. When the Federal column reached the place, in the evening, it was checked by their lively resistance. Morning of the 4th of May found the two armies occupying strange positions. Both were divided, but the Confederates were separated only by distance, while between the two parts of the Federal army lay the whole of their opponent's. Ag- gessive and determined action by Hooker surely must have succeeded, for his superiority in numbers was now accentuated by the depletion Lee had made in his forces at Chancellorsville to send aid to Salem Church. But the latter, counting with certainty upon his opponent's vacillation, dis- patched General Anderson, with his division, to Salem, to make an end of Sedgewick at once. It is useless to conjecture how the situation might have THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 209 been saved. It was already lost. As our Battalion was not concerned in any of the fighting that took place from this time on, it is sufficient to say that Sedgewick was defeated in a desperate battle on the 4th, while the main part of the army lay inactive at Chancellorsville. "Le Debacle." In the Union army all sense of leadership and direction had passed, and had given place to the apathy of a realization of inefficiency. All that could be thought of, from this time on, was to extricate themselves from danger with the least possible loss. Sedgewick's corps crossed the Rappahannock at Banks' Ford at about two o'clock in the morning of the 5th. Hooker remained on the right bank during the whole of that day, but the possibility of further accomplishment grew hourly more remote. The Volunteer regiments whose time had expired, or was about to expire, set up a clamor to be sent home. Some of them flatly refused to take part in further combat. At seven in the evening the crossing of the river began, and it continued all through the night under the diffi- culties of a rainstorm and a rapidly rising stream. It was only by good fortune that escape was made without further loss. The Confederates were preparing to attack again with their reunited forces, but the storm delayed victor as well as vanquished. Morning came before the crossing was completed. The Fifth Corps was the last left upon the right bank. The post of honor — the rear guard — was left to the bri- gade of Regular Infantry. It was eight o'clock before it could cross, but the foggy darkness of the morning saved it from the interference of the enemy. Two days later, after another depressing march through rain and mud, the Union troops settled down again, dispirited and dejected, upon their old camping ground near Falmouth. The Confederates also reoccupied their works overlooking Fredericksburg, but they were elated by another victory and by the knowledge that, for half a year, they had completely 210 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY frustrated every attempt of a greatly superior enemy to pene- trate to the interior of their country. There can be no doubt that the result, to the Union army, of this brief campaign, was thorough defeat. It was the more humiliating in that the available Federal forces were, at the outset, nearly double those of the Confederates. When they left the Falmouth camps, in the latter part of April, the total disposable Union troops numbered about 114,000. At the same time the Confederates had about 63,000. It is true that not nearly all the Federal troops were used at any one time, but that must be held to be the fault of their commander. At any rate, the number actually brought into action at Chan- cellorsville still outnumbered the Confederates there present. Moreover, it cannot be averred that the latter fought in an advantageous position, for they were continually on the offen- sive, while the Federals, on the defensive, had whatever advan- tage they could derive from their hastily improvised field 'works. The Confederates, quitting their works, struck boldly — even rashly — and won. The Federals, beginning an attack, weakly allowed themselves to fall back into a defensive atti- tude, and lost. The Union losses, in all the related actions, from April 27th to May 5th, were as follows : Killed, 165 officers and 1,441 enlisted men ; wounded, 664 officers and 9,098 enlisted men ; captured or missing, 173 officers and 5,747 enlisted men; an aggregate of 17,387. Among these were Major Generals Berry and Whipple, killed ; and Brigadier Generals Mott, Dev- ens and Hays wounded, the latter being captured. General Lee stated, in his report of the battles, that he had captured 5,000 prisoners, exclusive of wounded, 13 pieces of artillery, 19,500 small arms and 17 colors. The dead and most of the seriously wounded had to be left upon the field, where many of the latter perished miserably in the flames, the woods having been set on fire during the battle of the 3rd of May. The losses of the Confederates cannot be given with as much accuracy. Their reports showed 10,381 killed and wounded, and 3,753 missing. These, however, did not include THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 211 all engagements or all organizations, and the number of missing was acknowledged to be very uncertain. They prob- ably suffered a considerably heavier loss. Hooker, in a Gen- eral Order dated May 6th, stated that he had captured from them 5,000 prisoners, 7 pieces of artillery and 15 colors. Their losses of General Officers was heavy. The greatest and the irreparable one was the death of Lieutenant General Jackson. Brigadier General Paxton was also killed, and Major General A. P. Hill, and Brigadier Generals McGowan, Heth, Pender, Hope and Nicholls were wounded. As our Battalion was acting with the First Battalion of the Twelfth, the report of casualties was for the regiment. As tabulated in the official reports a loss is shown of 5 enlisted men wounded and 18 captured or missing. This, however, is certainly incomplete, for Captain T. M. Anderson, who com- manded our Battalion, was himself seriously wounded, and was, consequently, unable to take part in the Gettysburg cam- paign or subsequent operations in Virginia for several months. 212 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Books and Papers of Reference for the War of the Rebellion Period. The Army Under Pope — John C. Ropes. History of the Civil War in America — Comte de Paris. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, War of the Rebellion. The Army of Virginia from Cedar Mountain to Alexan- dria — General John B. Gordon. History of the Second Army Corps — General Francis A. Walker. Life of Abraham Lincoln — Isaac N. Arnold. McClellan's Own Story — General George B. McClellan. History of the War Department — IngersoU. Army Register of the United States for One Hundred Years— T. H. S. Hamersley. History of the United States — ^Julian Hawthorne. History of the United States — ^John B. McMasters. Scott and Jackson — ^J. T. Headley. Historical Register of the United States Army — Francis B. Heitman. The Antietam and Fredericksburg— General F. W. Palfrey. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg — General Abner Double- day. The American Conflict — Horace Greely. Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac — William Swinton. APPENDICES Appendix A" THE COAT-OP-ARMS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST INFANTRY. (See frontispiece.) In 1903 the regiment was stationed in the Department of Dakota, headquarters and eight companies being at Fort Snell- ing, Minnesota, two companies at Fort Lincoln and two at Fort Kepgh, Montana. During the summer of that year a feeling grew up among the officers at Fort Snelling that the regiment ought to adopt some distinctive symbol which would visually indicate, every- wliere and at all times, the Twenty-first Infantry; which should be known as its hall mark of excellency upon its pro- ductions, and as the seal of its approval upon its social and semi-official acts. Colonel Jacob Kline, then in command, appointed to con- sider the subject a Board composed of Major Hunter Liggett, Captain Herman Hall and Captain Celwyn E. Hampton. This Board, after some time spent in investigation, considered the •The events here related, as well as those connected with the adoption of the regimental mess-jacket, as described in Appendix B, of course occurred at a date much later than that with which the main body of this volume closes. The coat-of-arms and the mess-jacket of the regiment, however, are things which are peculiarly its own, and are likely to be of important interest in both the social and the official life of its members in the present and the future. As no records of these proceedings were kept, their facts are apt to pass from the recol- lection of those to whom they were once known and to become unob- tainable to those by whom, later, they may be sought. As I had a somewhat intimate part in the preparation and adoption of both coat-of-arms and mess-jacket, and in the changes made in the former, I can,, perhaps, do no better service than to record here the facts of the occurrences as nearly as I can. Owing to the lack of records concerning them, I am compelled to depend almost wholly upon my memory, and this does not enable me to give exact dates. As to the times at which the various actions were taken, I can be no more explicit than to name certain months, and sometimes merely seasons of a year. Aside from the Question of dates, however, I believe the information herein contained to be accurate. As regards the reproduction and the description of the coat-of-arms, as adopted in 1907, these were prepared at that time and preserved in print, so that their accuracy may be depended upon. (215) 216 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY individual suggestions of its members and decided upon a coat-of-arms, of which the general purpose and design were similar to those of the one shown in the frontispiece and hereinafter described. The crest, a twenty-one pointed star of gold, was the same, but the escutcheon was different in detail and simpler in appearance, carrying only two colors — red and blue. At a meeting of the officers at Fort Snelling this design was submitted by the Board as its recommendation, and was adopted. The views of officers at other stations were obtained by the Adjutant, through correspondence. After the return of the regiment from the Philippine Islands, in the fall of 1906, it went, for station, to Fort Logan, Colorado. The appointment of the author to be regimental Historian, in December of that year, was the beginning of a revelation of certain facts concerning the regiment's early history that led to an agitation in favor of an addition to the symbols of the coat-of-arms, and finally to the adoption of the design here pictured and described. To the enlisted man of the regiment should be accredited a share in bringing about the change, for it was from Private Terence McGloin, of Company B, that the suggestion first came, as the result of his own independent researches into our early history, his interest in the subject having been aroused by the above mentioned appointment. One indication of the propriety and the success of the change was the organization by the enlisted men at Fort Logan, shortly after it was made, of their "I'll try, sir" Club ; the new motto being taken by them for their name. It was felt that there were stirring events in this early history that should be symbolized by the regiment in its coat- of-arms, thus fittingly perpetuating and emphasizing the glory of its past. These were the events of its share in the cam- paigns of the War of 1813, in which it had been more than ordinarily conspicuous, and especially its deservedly famous action at the Battle of Niagara, on July 35th, 1814. The subject was freely discussed during the spring of APPENDIX A 217 1907, and in April of that year Colonel C. A. Williams called a meeting of the officers for its consideration. Views both favorable and unfavorable to a change were there expressed, but upon a vote being taken, it was decisively for a change of escutcheon and motto. Colonel Williams then announced another meeting for a date two weeks later, at which designs incorporating the desired alterations should be submitted. In the meantime all officers absent from the post were notified by letter and given an opportunity to express their wishes in writ- ing. At this second meeting, which was held some time in May, the design which had been prepared and drawn by the author during the preceding winter and spring was the only one sub- mitted.After an explanation of its significance it was approved and adopted. The following is the description there given, shortly after- ward printed and, in the spring of 1909, incorporated in the book, "The Twenty-first's Trophy of Niagara." Blazon. Quarterly — 1. Argent ; on a cross gules, a lion passant guard- ant or. 2. Gules ; a saltire azure, bordered argent, charg- ed with thirteen stars of the last. 3. Quarterly — first and fourth gules, a tower of Castile or ; second and third azure, three stars or within an equilateral triangle argent. 4. Argent; a quiver gules, charged with orna- ments or, fringed sable, containing four arrows of the last. ■ Over all an oval inescutcheon in pretence, gules; a cannon or. Crest: A star voided, of twenty-one points, enclosing the figures 31 and the letters U. S., all or. Motto: 'I'll try, sir." 218 HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST U. S. INFANTRY Historical Description. The coat-of-arms is designed to indicate the history of the regiment and its name. The escutcheon is divided quarterly, each quarter bearing charges that represent one or more wars in which the Twenty- first Infantry has been engaged. The first quarter, indicative of the War of 1812, is of a silver field, bearing a rectangular red cross upon which is charged in gold, a lion of the royal English form. Without the lion, this quarter is a reproduction of the British man-of- war's flag with the canton omitted. The second quarter, indicative of the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865, is of a red field, bearing a silver cross of the Greek form. Upon this is charged a blue cross of the same form, and upon the latter are charged thirteen silver stars. The whole is a reproduction of the battle flag of the Confederacy. The third quarter is divided quarterly. The first and fourth of a red field are charged with a tower of Castile, from the Spanish coat-of-arms, and indicate the Spanish-American War. The second and third, of a blue field, are charged with an equilateral triangle of silver inclosing, in its angles, three stars of gold. These are the Katipunan symbols and indicate the Philippine Insurrection. The fourth quarter, of a silver field, is charged with a red quiver containing four arrows of black and fringed with hair of the same. The quiver is also charged with a sun and minor designs of gold. The whole indicates the Indian campaigns in which the regiment bore a part. These were against the Apaches, in Arizona, in 1869-70; the Modocs, in Oregon and California, in 1873 ; the Nez Perces, in Idaho, in 1877 ; and the Bannocks and Pi Utes, in Oregon, in 1878. An oval inescutcheon, centrally located, is Ijorne as an augmentation of honor, being of a red field charged with a gold cannon. Motto, in gold on a blue scroll beneath the escutcheon, "I'll try, sir." This, as well as the augmentation above described. APPENDIX A 219 is derived from the incidents of the battle of Niagara, July 25th, 1814. Colonel James Miller, then in command of the Twenty-first Infantry, being ordered to capture a British bat- tery located in a commanding position, replied in the words we have used as our motto. The regiment charged and captured the battery, and held it against repeated, desperate attempts at recapture, although almost destroyed in so doing. The crest is a twenty-one pointed star whose center is voided and encloses the numbers 31 and the letters U. S., all in gold. The supporters are two rifles, crossed behind the shield. The crest and supporters show the name of the regiment. Appendix B THE REGIMENTAL MESS-JACKET. The coat-of-arms in its first form had been adopted prior to the departure of the regiment for the autumn maneuvers at Fort Riley in September, 1903, and the discussion of that sub- ject was a unifying force fresh in the minds of all present there. As there were then more officers of the regiment assembled than probably would be together again for some time it was felt that several matters of interest to all should be settled before their separation. Among these was the question of adopting a distinctive mess-jacket, recently authorized by the War Department. The night before camp was to be broken Colonel Kline called the officers together for a discussion of these subjects, and it was then decided that a jacket with decoration such as to make it as distinctive as possible should be adopted for regimental use. Colonel Kline appointed, to prepare such a design, a Board composed of Captains Herman Hall, William M. Morrow, Celwyn E. Hampton, and Cromwell Stacey, and First Lieutenant Lieutenant Thomas L. Brewer. These officers were all stationed at Fort Snelling, where, after the return of the regiment, they met frequently with the purpose of accomplishing the business with which they had been charged. The suggestions of various officers were tried, and either rejected or incorporated as parts of the approved plan. These discussions were extended into the following Janu- ary, when the Board submitted its completed design to the officers of the regiment, by whom it was adopted without change. The following is its description :* •Captain Stacey had printed a, description of the design as it was adopted, but, unfortunately, I have not one of these descriptions now available. The specifications, as I give them here, are written from the jacket I had made for myself from those prepared by Captain (220) THE REGIMENTAL MESS-JACKET. APPENDIX B 221 The jacket is to be of material, color, cut and general orna- mentation, in all respects as prescribed by General Orders of the War Department. In addition, as follows: Lapels to be faced with ivory white, gros-grained silk ; said facing to extend to within one inch of edge of lapel, except at top, to which it extends, meet- ing and covering seam at which peak of lapel is joined to col- lar; said facing also to extend inside front of jacket a distance sufficient that lining will not be exposed. ' Lining to be black, of suitable material. Back to be cut so that blade seams will meet rear arm seams at shoulder seams. Gold soutache braid, 1 line (about one-tenth of an inch in width) , to be placed continuously on edge of collar, lapels and bottom of jacket; same to be placed continuously over rear arm seams of sleeves and down blade seams of back. Crest of coat-of-arms in gold or gilt metal and enamel, one and one-half inches in diameter, to be worn on left lapel, so fastened as to be located midway of width of lapel, upper edge of crest to be one and one-quarter inch below collar seam. To be worn with white vest. Vest to be double breasted ; the six buttons, to be disposed in two rows of three each, to be of white, matte surface, com- position. To be worn with white tie.** Studs of shirt to be white.** Stacey, so It Is unlikely there is much difEerence, except In choice of words. With this description and the picture printed herewith, I believe no trouble will be experienced in reproducing the garment correctly, as it was designed by the Board and approved by the officers of the regiment. The service it may be found to render for this purpose, will, I hope, prove sufficient excuse for my temerity in printing my own photograph. *•! believe recent War Department orders now prescribe differently regarding these two items for all mess-jacket wearers in the army.