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THE SWORD OF JUSTICE 
 
THE 
 SWORD OF JUSTICE 
 
 OR THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF WAR 
 
 COMPLETED IN THE IDEA OF A LEAGUE 
 
 OF NATIONS 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN EYRE WINSTANLEY WALLIS, M.A. 
 
 BRASENOSE COLLEGE, OXFORD ; VICAR OF VVHALLEY 
 
 WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 
 
 ERNEST BARKER, M.A. 
 
 FELLOW AND TUTOR OF NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD 
 
 ^^ Ecchsia auiefn q-uaeda^n /ortna iustiiiee." — S. Ambrose 
 
 NEW YORK 
 FREDERICK A. STOKES COMPANY 
 
 PUBLISHERS 
 
' Si autem malum feceris time 
 Non enim sine causa gladium portat 
 Dei enim minister est uindex in irara 
 Ei qui male agit." 
 
 S. Padl. 
 
 
 Printed in Great Britain. 
 
AD • MAIOREM ■ DEI • GLORIAM 
 
 ET • IN ■ PIAM • MEMORIAM 
 
 lUUENUM 
 
 LANCASTRENSIUM • ET • OXONIENSIUM 
 
 QUI • BELLANDO • PACIFICI 
 
 PRO • DEO • FIDE • PATRIA 
 
 FELICITER • OBIERUNT • STIPENDIIS 
 
 CONTENTl 
 
AUTHOR'S PREFACE 
 
 This little book is an attempt to apply the relevant 
 doctrines of the Christian philosophy of war to the 
 idea of a League of Nations. That philosophy was 
 drawn from Holy Writ by S. Augustine of Hippo, to 
 whom Christian Europe owes a great, though tardily 
 acknowledged debt, in that his teaching finally 
 decided the much-debated question whether Christians 
 could be loyal citizens of a secular state. Nor have we 
 sufficiently acknowledged our great obligations to 
 S. Thomas Aquinas, who gave precision and explicit- 
 ness to what had been left implicit and vague in 
 S. Augustine's theories, and laid down lines of 
 Christian thought which were only abandoned by 
 Machiavelli and his numerous followers because they 
 were antagonistic to the doctrines of self-interest in 
 which the international policies of the last four 
 hundred years have been too deeply dyed. 
 
 The substance of some of the chapters has been used 
 in sermons and addresses at Habergham Eaves, at 
 Whalley, and elsewhere, during the last three years. 
 The writer would like to say how much he owes to a 
 book entitled L'EgUse et La Guerre, Paris, 191 3, by a 
 symposium of distinguished Frenchmen ; to La Guerre 
 Sainte, by H. Pissard, Paris, 1912; and to Father Paul 
 Bull's Peace and War. 
 
Author's Preface 
 
 Mr Ernest Barker has written an Introduction, for 
 which, as for much other help on many occasions, the 
 writer begs very gratefully to thank him. 
 
 It is hoped that the Appendixes may be useful to 
 those who are not within reach of a large library. 
 
 JOHN E. W. WALLIS. 
 
 Whalley, 
 
 September, 1919 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Mr Wallis has explored in this little volume a field 
 of perennial interest, and never more interesting than 
 to-day. He has asked and sought to answer a ques- 
 tion which in the last five years has troubled many 
 tender consciences — whether Christians may ever avail 
 themselves of force. He has investigated and brought 
 to light the conceptions which Christians have held 
 through the centuries about the conditions which make 
 war "just," and the grounds that entitle war to be 
 lifted to the dignity of a " Crusade," and termed by 
 the name of " Holy War." He has sought to show 
 what the Church has done in the past to restrain war, 
 and he has suggested what she may do in the future 
 to help the success of a League of Nations. 
 
 To many readers one of the most encouraging and 
 helpful parts of the book will be the scholarly pages 
 in which Mr Wallis goes back into the history of the 
 Church, particularly in the Middle Ages, and shows 
 how Popes and Canonists sought to bring even war 
 within the reign of law — to set to it bounds which it 
 should not overpass in the conduct of hostilities and 
 the usage of war, and to prescribe the conditions (of 
 grievances suffered, of pure intention to seek only 
 reparation, and the like) to which it must conform 
 before it could find any entry into the order of the 
 Christian Commonwealth. Whether it is wise to seek 
 to humanize war — whether it would not be better to 
 regard it as inhuman, beyond the pale, incapable of 
 being any part of a world living under Christian 
 
Introduction 
 
 principles — this is an issue on which opinions to-day 
 may well be divided. Mediaeval opinion, at any rate, 
 seems to have been in the former direction. The 
 Church, believing that her kingdom was of this world 
 as well as of the world to come, sought to penetrate 
 every reach of life, and to harmonize with Christian 
 principles every human activity and agent — war as 
 well as commerce and study ; warrior as well as trader 
 and scholar. She recognized a Truce of God, the 
 Crusade, the caste of chivalry; her Canonists had a 
 law of war; her Popes sought to enforce that law by 
 acting as judges of any breach of its rules. 
 
 The sixteenth century brought a change. Europe 
 became a home of different confessions ; some of those 
 confessions were definitely national, and bound, in 
 this way or in that, to the cause of national autonomy. 
 In the seventeenth century it was a lawyer — a lawyer, 
 it is true, who was a theologian as well as a lawyer — ■ 
 who first assumed the fallen mantle. Grotius began to 
 build a system of international relations on the basis 
 of the usage of the nations, tempered and modified by 
 the law of Nature and the law of Christ; and in 
 succeeding centuries international relations have been 
 the domain of lawyers and of diplomatists. To-day 
 the time has come for the return of the Churches to 
 the task which the Church of the Middle Ages once 
 sought to undertake. The Christian Churches cannot 
 act to-day in the same way as did the mediasval 
 Church; they have no common body of Canonists to 
 build a law, and no central Pontiff to administer that 
 law in a supreme court. Their methods can only be 
 methods of suasion; they can only seek, by their 
 prayers, to uphold the arms of secular rulers, that they 
 may do what is right and maintain what is just; they 
 can only attempt, by the thought and speech, the 
 teaching and preaching, of their individual members 
 to raise the standard of public opinion to its highest 
 
luiroaucnon 
 
 power, that it may lift in turn the endeavours of 
 statesmen to the same power. 
 
 Statesmen are not cynics. They are trustees for 
 their community. They will go as far, and as fast, as 
 they believe that the public opinion of their country 
 entitles them to go. If they were principals, they 
 might go farther than they do ; since they are agents, 
 they are sometimes stopped, by the fear of outrunning 
 the instructions of their principals, from going as far 
 as they would. Every statesman must seek to lead 
 his people, but every statesman must also have a 
 listening ear to hear what the people are saying. Too 
 often the loud clamour of some section of opinion, 
 obstinately conservative or blindly nationalist, may 
 drown the stiller and smaller voice of the many who 
 think quietly, and are too shy or too busy to join in 
 agitation, and statesmen may be misled. It is the 
 duty of aU who believe in a reign of international 
 justice not to be afraid to lift up the voice and cry 
 aloud. They will be heard — and, I believe, gladly — 
 by statesmen. 
 
 Mr Wallis has here borne his testimony to the 
 strivings of men after such a reign of international 
 justice; he has set forth the auspices and the obliga- 
 tions of the present hour. May it go far, and may it 
 hearten many, and make them bold to speak, that 
 opinion may grow bold in favour of international 
 peace and justice, and that statesmen, knowing this, 
 may grow bold to achieve all that opinion is ready to 
 receive. 
 
 ERNEST BARKER. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 author's preface - - - - vii 
 
 INTRODUCTION - - - - - ix 
 
 I. MAY CHRISTIANS EVER AVAIL THEMSELVES OF 
 
 FORCE ? - - - - - I 
 
 II. CHRISTIAN WAR: (l) JUST WAR; (ll) HOLY WAR 45 
 
 III. WHAT HAS THE CHURCH DONE TO RESTRAIN 
 
 WAR ? ..... yg 
 
 IV. HOW CAN THE CHURCH HELP FORWARD THE 
 
 LEAGUE OF NATIONS ? - . - lOI 
 
 APPENDIXES 
 
 119 
 
 INDEX ------ 146 
 
THE SWORD OF JUSTICE 
 
 I. 
 
 MAY CHRISTIANS EVER AVAIL THEM- 
 SELVES OF FORCE? 
 
 I. The Problem 
 For the purpose of living well, in justice and in peace, 
 men congregate in societies, which are called states. 
 --When a state becomes larger than the area within 
 which each citizen normally has his being and 
 interests, he sits more lightly to its obligations, and 
 frequently passes through life with no more than a 
 tacit acquiescence in his membership, and sometimes 
 even in an open disavowal of his citizenship which 
 nothing but inertia and the impossibility of founding 
 a state for himself alone prevent him from rendering 
 effective. 
 
 Others, not content with words, see that the general 
 desire for justice and peace gives to those members of 
 the state who care for neither in comparison with the 
 gratification of their base and covetous desires, and 
 who are not prepared for the self-abnegation necessary 
 for the success of man's gregarious life, an opportunity 
 to embark upon a course of injustice and violence. 
 Should any state through sentiment or lack of resolute 
 
 I B 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 determination allow these disturbers of the peace to 
 continue for long unchecked, its end would be certain. 
 It exists that men may live well, justly, and peaceably, 
 and to permit its existence to be used for the purposes 
 of injustice and violence would be so to stultify its 
 root principle that it would rapidly crumble away into 
 a number of small groups of citizens who would take 
 into their own hands the task of preserving law and 
 order. Such a process may be observed in Europe 
 during the ninth, tenth, and first half of the eleventh 
 century, when small " Leagues of Peace " were formed 
 by private citizens within the state. Though occa- 
 sionally states have committed suicide in this way (as, 
 for instance, the Roman Empire), and perhaps will do 
 so again (Russia may be cited as, in some respects, an 
 example of this process at the present day), yet as 
 long as they retain cohesion and vitality they offer 
 resistance to those who would render corporate life 
 impossible. 
 
 These societies, or states, are, indeed, so regularly 
 formed and animated, and perform their functions 
 with such vigour and efficiency, that they are classed 
 as moral persons — that is to say, as beings whose 
 conduct is not guided, like that of the brutes, by mere 
 instinct, but by a free will capable of forming a judge- 
 ment and of directing the action of their body this 
 way or that, in accordance with the laws of right and 
 wrong. As moral persons, states are bound so to act 
 that those who have to deal with them may confidently 
 reckon upon being treated with justice, honour, and 
 good faith. At the same time, states, though appar- 
 
 2 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 ently no three-score years and ten, nor yet four-score, 
 can be foretold as the days of their age, cannot look 
 for any existence in the world to come, where the 
 unredressed injustices of this life shall be corrected by 
 the all-wise Judge. In this, at least, they resemble the 
 brute creation, and differ from the followers of Christ. 
 They cannot therefore, as states, be held bound to the 
 same observance of the Christian law as single and 
 immortal persons are; and as they can look for no 
 future life of absolute justice and peace, their efforts 
 after present and relative justice must be all the more 
 persistent. It must also be remembered, in considering 
 the conduct and policies of these great moral persons, 
 that not all Leviathan's citizens are Christians. Were 
 all the world truly Christian there would be a good 
 hope that injustice and violence might disappear, and 
 then no force would be required for any purposes of 
 state at home or abroad. For it is the existence of 
 wrong-doing which brings punishment into being. 
 Contradictions cannot exist apart from that which 
 they contradict; even so, when evil disappears from 
 the world, the sword of justice, like the courtier's 
 weapon, a relic of a ruder age, will sleep for ever in 
 its sheath, unstained with blood. 
 
 In this present workaday, half-pagan world, then, it 
 is frequently necessary for the state to use force, in 
 order that the will and purpose of the constituent 
 citizens may be duly carried out. Four occasions of 
 violence may be distinguished : 
 
 I. The state must be ready to employ force as the 
 sanction and guarantee of its legislation. No law 
 
 3 
 
The Sword ot Justice 
 
 would be long regarded to the infringement of which 
 no punishment was attached. 
 
 2. The state must be ready to employ force for the 
 preservation of order. It must protect the life and 
 the property of its citizens from thieves, burglars, and 
 brigands. 
 
 3. The state must be ready to employ force for the 
 execution of justice — that is to say, to carry out the 
 punishment of recalcitrant offenders by fines, im- 
 prisonment, or other penalty. 
 
 4. The state must be ready to employ force for self- 
 protection against internal and external foes. 
 
 No state which persistently refused to employ force 
 on these occasions would be worth preservation, and, 
 as a matter of fact, would quickly fall and die. 
 
 Moreover, the employment of force in a state is not 
 confined to the sovereign independent power. Though 
 the private citizen may not use force to impose his 
 will upon other private citizens as such, yet for the 
 preservation of order he is required to be ready to 
 assist the police {e.g., in riots), or, in the absence of 
 the police, to act upon his own responsibility. He 
 may even in England arrest a person for felony with- 
 out a warrant. Soldiers employed to suppress riots 
 do so only in their capacity as private citizens and 
 under the obligation which rests upon all citizens of 
 the state in common. 
 
 Private citizens who are also parents stand in a 
 relationship other than that of mere fellow-citizen to 
 their children. They are permitted to use force in 
 order to obtain obedience, or in order to punish their 
 
 4 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 children. Guardians, and others who stand in loco 
 ■parentis, such as schoolmasters, have similar powers 
 over those committed to their charge. But the state 
 will be jealous to step in when necessary and punish 
 any abuse of these rights, such as persistent cruelty or 
 misconduct. 
 
 Private citizens have the right of prosecuting 
 criminals, suing for debt, etc., in the law-courts, 
 whereby they avail themselves of the state's employ- 
 ment of force for the preservation or obtaining of their 
 rights. 
 
 Private citizens are at liberty to use force for the 
 safety of themselves and their property against 
 burglars — by bolting their doors at night, and even 
 by shooting without parley anyone who breaks into 
 their house between sunset and sunrise. For the 
 further safety of his valuables, a private citizen often 
 deposits them — when, for instance, he goes on a 
 holiday— in the strong-room of a bank, which, besides 
 offering resistance to the thief, is, as he knows, 
 guarded by a man with firearms. For communicating 
 with his friends he does not hesitate to make use of 
 the mails which are driven along the highway at night 
 by a man armed with weapons against footpads and 
 robbers. And he himself, when he apprehends that 
 the state may not be able to extend absolute security 
 to his person, often goes about his business armed, 
 ready to use force in self-defence, knowing well that 
 should he even kill his assailant the state will not 
 indict him for murder. 
 
 Private citizens not only acquiesce in the employ- 
 
 5 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 ment of force by the state, but avail themselves of the 
 security afforded by such use, and themselves use 
 force for the purposes of justice and self-defence. 
 
 Does this necessary readiness to employ force 
 justify such a degree of violence as taking human life ? 
 Force would not be employed were there no injustice 
 or wrong-doing to be corrected or prevented. The 
 degree of force depends, therefore, not upon the will 
 of those who employ it, but upon the unjust or wicked, 
 whose actions, if unchecked, would eventually lead to 
 the dissolution of society. If the state or the private 
 citizen has reasonable grounds (for instance, by 
 proving, in the one case, that a man has committed 
 murder, or, in the other, by finding an armed man 
 holding a pistol to his head) for apprehending that 
 the offenders against law and order will not stick at 
 taking life to fulfil their evil designs, they have the 
 right to employ all the means at their command to 
 prevent such loss of life. And the ultimate means of 
 preventing the evil-doer from all opportunity of 
 murder is by depriving him of life. 
 
 In times past the state and the private citizen alike 
 were freer in their use of force than now. A few 
 generations ago in England all felonies were punish- 
 able with death, but now only murder. In early days 
 anyone might take part in a battle, but now fight- 
 ing is restricted to properly enlisted combatants. 
 But the gradual mollification of manners has led 
 modern states in some cases to substitute penal 
 servitude for life, or transportation, for the death 
 penalty, and in others to restrict capital punish- 
 
 6 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 ment to murderers and those guilty of treason. 
 But such restrictions can only be adhered to in 
 a state which is firmly based, and whose citizens 
 are of a law-abidfng character. Only the strong may 
 be merciful without imperilling justice. Similarly, in 
 a just war the state is employing force, not for its own 
 caprice, nor even to impose its own will upon those 
 who differ from it, but to execute justice upon 
 offenders. If the offenders make amends before war 
 is begun, no lives are taken. Upon them rests the 
 responsibility of resisting the fulfilment of the require- 
 ments of justice. The relationships of states, as of 
 private citizens, must be regulated by justice and law, 
 a regulation which can only be effectively maintained 
 by an ultimate appeal to force. 
 
 States and private citizens, then, for the preserva- 
 tion of their lives as moral persons in the natural 
 order, use force, even to the degree of taking life. 
 
 Is it possible for a Christian to be a member of a 
 state and to take up the full rights of a private 
 citizen ? 
 
 Membership in a state would involve a Christian in 
 at least passive enjoyment of the advantages which a 
 society obtains through the use of force. He would 
 acquiesce in the use of force, though not using it him- 
 self. He would live under the protection of the army, 
 the navy, and the air force, whose death-dealing 
 weapons would be his ultimate guarantee of security. 
 He would expect the police to protect him against 
 thieves if he were wealthy. If he were in business as 
 a manufacturer, he would prosecute thos? who refuse4 
 
 7 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 to pay him for the goods he supplied to them, well 
 knowing that the machinery of justice rests at bottom 
 on the use of force. If he wrote letters he would 
 expect them to be guarded in transit and safely 
 delivered to his correspondents, even though force had 
 to be used in protecting them from highwaymen. 
 
 In fact, he must either accept readiness to use 
 force as a necessary principle of government in 
 societies of the natural order, or deny the truth of the 
 axiom. Qui facit per alium facit per se (He who acts 
 through another, acts himself), and live as a parasite 
 in the body corporate, drawing his civic sustenance 
 from the being whose existence he attacks and. 
 weakens. 
 
 Should he, however, accept the position that a 
 Christian may, without contradicting his principles, 
 be a member of a state, he is faced by the further 
 question whether he is at liberty to engage himself in 
 such service to the state as may, on occasion, require 
 him to use force against his fellow-citizens in order to 
 prevent inj ustice and wrong-doing. May he be a mem- 
 ber of the Legislature or of the Civil Service? May 
 he be a tax-collector, who must prosecute those who 
 refuse to pay their taxes ? May he be a postman, who 
 must protect his mails ? A policeman, who must 
 arrest law-breakers ? A coast-guard, who must fight 
 smugglers ? A magistrate, who must condemn them 
 when guilty ? A prison warder, who must guard them 
 when condemned ? A hangman, who must pinion the 
 murderer and pull the bolt ? 
 
 ^f he accepts the benefits conferred by membership 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 in a state, may he readily engage himself in framing 
 and carrying out the measures necessary, not only to 
 procure justice, but to preserve the very life of the 
 society itself from internal attacks ? 
 
 The Christian must ask himself, yet again, whether 
 his acquiescence in the use of force by himself or by 
 others for the maintenance of justice and the life of 
 the state is to be confined to its use in the suppression 
 of internal attacks alone. May he be a member of a 
 state which defends its citizens against outrage, its 
 territories against invasion, its government against 
 interference, and itself against assault ? If he may, 
 then he must ask whether he may also serve in the 
 armed forces of the state as a sailor, a soldier, or an 
 airman, for the causes of justice and rightful self- 
 defence. 
 
 Lastly, as a private citizen, may the Christian bolt 
 his back-door at night, keep his cash under lock and 
 key, put a padlock on his hen-house, deposit his 
 valuables in the strong-room of his bank, chastise his 
 children, and protect himself and his wife and family 
 from the attacks of blackguards and footpads in the 
 lanes ? 
 
 The answer to these questions must be sought and 
 determined by the Christian, not from the Old Testa- 
 ment (though that was plain enough^), but from the 
 teaching and example of our Lord and His Apostles, 
 and the teaching and practice of the Church founded 
 thereon. 
 
 1 See Appendix A for the Jewish code of warfare. 
 
 9 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 2. Christ's Example and Teaching 
 
 The earthly life of our Lord was spent as a member 
 of the Jewish nation under the rule of the Roman 
 Empire. Constant attempts were made by His 
 disciples to induce Him to place Himself at the head 
 of an insurrection against the Romans — attempts to 
 which He always refused to accede (e.g-, John vi. 15). 
 Indeed, He counselled His followers to submit to 
 the Imperial government, even when its exactions 
 appeared to be unreasonable or tyrannical (Matt. 
 V. 41). He bade the Jews render to the Roman 
 government what was its due (Matt. xxii. 17-22). He 
 praised, and was the guest of, its public tax-collector 
 (Luke xix. 5, 9); He praised, and healed the servant 
 of, its responsible soldier (Matt. viii. 7, 10), without 
 any hint that either was wrong in following employ- 
 ments that demanded the use of force. 
 
 As to the government of sovereign independent 
 powers in general. He recognized the right of the state 
 to exercise dominion and authority over its citizens 
 (Matt. XX. 25); to employ force to obtain obedience to 
 its will (Matt. xxii. 13); to impose custom and tribute 
 (Matt. xvii. 25); to establish law-courts, the decisions 
 of which are, when necessary, to be carried out by 
 force (Matt, xviii. 34), which are to be the normal 
 means of obtaining justice (Luke xviii. 3), and in 
 which it may happen that His disciples will be cited 
 as defendants — i.e., as those who stand to gain if they 
 can denounce the jurisdiction of the court (Luke xii. 
 58, 59); to impose the death penalty on murderers 
 
 10 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 (Matt. xxii. 7) and on rebellious citizens (Luke xix. 
 27); to call upon the citizens to fight in its cause 
 (John xviii. 36) ; and to wage war against other states, 
 in doing which a wise government will take stock of 
 its resources, yielding to superior force and accepting 
 conditions of peace, even though unjustly attacked, 
 unless it has a reasonable prospect of victory (Luke 
 xiv. 31, 32). He recognized, further, that wars would 
 continue to be part of the natural order of things in 
 this world (Mark xiii. 7-8). 
 
 He recognized the right of private citizens to 
 employ force — for He Himself in His Father's house 
 used physical violence to expel those who were defiling 
 its precincts (John ii. 1 5) ; and bade His disciples even 
 sell their garments in order to provide themselves with 
 swords (Luke xxii. 36) — not so many as to give 
 ground for the accusation of armed insurrection, but 
 enough to protect His small party from highwaymen 
 and robbers (Luke xxii. 38). He recognized the right 
 of the great householder to exercise penal justice upon 
 his servants (Luke xii. 46, 47, 48, xx. 16); to exact 
 from his guests strict compliance with the accepted 
 usages of good behaviour (Matt. xxii. 12, 13); and to 
 secure his treasures from theft (Matt. vi. 19). 
 
 Christ Himself resisted evil when He was tempted 
 by Satan in the wilderness (Matt. iv. i-ii); when He 
 rebuked unclean spirits (Matt. xvii. 18); when He 
 expelled them (Matt. viii. 31, 32, ix. 33) by the Spirit 
 of God (Matt. xii. 28); when He healed sickness 
 and disease (Matt. iv. 24, ix. 35); and He gave His 
 disciples command and power to do likewise (Matt. 
 
 II 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 X. 8). He resisted Peter (Matt. xvi. 23), and gave 
 powers of expulsion to the Church (Matt, xviii. 17, 18). 
 There are, however, two passages which at first 
 seem to contradict the rest of our Lord's teaching on 
 the use of force. In the Sermon on the Mount He 
 said : " Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an 
 eye, and a tooth for a tooth : but I say unto you. 
 Resist not him that is evil; but whosoever smiteth 
 thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And 
 if any man would go to law with thee, and take away 
 thy coat, let him have thy cloke also. And whosoever 
 shall compel thee to go one mile, go with him twain. 
 Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that 
 would borrow of thee turn not thou away. Ye have 
 heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour 
 and hate thine enemy; but I say unto you. Love your 
 enemies, and pray for them that persecute you ; that 
 ye may be sons of your Father which is in heaven : 
 for He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the 
 good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust " 
 (Matt. V. 38-46). 
 
 1 . Our Lord was here speaking to His followers, not 
 as citizens of a state directing the administration of 
 justice or declaration of war, but as single persons 
 involved in the relationships of man and man. 
 
 2. The general aim of His teaching in this passage 
 was to discourage the spirit of private revenge which 
 the lex talionis (itself a great advance in mollification 
 on what preceded it) tended to exacerbate, and to 
 forbid Christians to act maliciously even towards 
 those who had done them evil. 
 
 12 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 3. " Resist not him that is evil." The phrase " him 
 that is evil " is frequently used in the New Testament 
 for the Devil — e.g., Matt. vi. 13, xiii. 19; i John ii. 
 I3> 14 (where S. John declares that he writes to the 
 young men " because ye are strong, and the Word of 
 God abideth in you, and ye have overcome the evil 
 one" plainly showing that he expected the young and 
 strong, in whom Christ, the Word of God, abides, to 
 struggle against and conquer him that is evil). How- 
 ever, the context here leads us to prefer another inter- 
 pretation than that the phrase means the Devil. And 
 indeed, as we have seen, our Lord resisted the Devil, 
 and evil, on many occasions, and was very far from 
 interpreting this counsel of non-resistance to evil 
 literally HimseK {e.g., John ii. 15). It seems most 
 conformable with Christ's teaching and example that 
 the reference here is to the evil element in life acting 
 through single persons, who in malice and brutality 
 take advantage of their superior strength or position 
 to rouse feelings of resentment amongst those weaker 
 than themselves. It is remarkable that the examples 
 of such malicious evil are such deeds as the Romans 
 were guilty of towards the Jews. Roman soldiers 
 were accustomed to use violence unjustly (Luke iii. 14), 
 and had a rough game in which they mocked their 
 prisoners and struck them (John xix. 2, 3). Roman 
 soldiers often accused people wrongfully (Luke iii. 14); 
 Roman soldiers exacted forced service from the Jews 
 as baggage-carriers (Luke xxiii. 26); Roman tax- 
 collectors often asked wrongfully for more money than 
 was due (Luke xix. 8). 
 
 13 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 4. "Whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek," 
 etc. Christ did not interpret this literally, but rebuked 
 His smiter by showing him that if He had spoken 
 evil he had a legal remedy; and if not, that he did 
 wrong to strike Him (John xviii. 22, 23). In this case 
 our Lord was protesting against an unjust and illegal 
 exercise of force as punishment for His supposed 
 wrong-doing. But in general " smiting the cheek " is 
 not a serious injury so much as a deliberate insult, 
 intended to rouse a man's pride and temper so as to 
 provoke him to violence — not dissimilar, indeed, to 
 our modern English " pulling a man's nose," which 
 became such a conventionalized and recognized open- 
 ing of a quarrel by the bellicose party that to start the 
 affair it was quite sufficient to say " Sir, consider your 
 nose pulled," without proceeding to actual violence. 
 Our Lord meant His disciples to learn by this not to 
 be quarrelsome, or quick to resent what was, after all, 
 only an injury to their pride, and involved no one 
 else in injustice or suffering. 
 
 5. " And if any man would go to law with thee," etc. 
 There is no hint (unless in the words " take away '') 
 that the prosecutor secured his verdict unjustly. We 
 must therefore assume that our Lord probably implied 
 here a legal trial in which the defendant was justly 
 condemned to forfeit his coat. Christ's followers must 
 learn to submit to the just verdicts of the courts 
 readily and, indeed, joyfully, in the thought that 
 injustice (even though their own) was duly punished 
 (c/. Luke xii. 58, 59). 
 
 6. "And whosoever shall compel thee," etc. Our 
 14 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force? 
 
 Lord was referring here to the Roman government's 
 custom of impressing men to carry the baggage, etc., 
 of soldiers on the march. This, which was, in fact, 
 taxation in kind (i.e., in services which would other- 
 wise have had to be paid for with money raised by 
 taxes), was recognized as legal. The distance fixed 
 for which a man might be impressed was one mile. 
 Our Lord meant His followers to understand that 
 they must not only support the government of the 
 state in its legal demands, but voluntarily assist it 
 beyond what it would exact. 
 
 7. " Give to him that asketh thee," etc. Similarly, 
 His disciples were not to refuse to contribute to the 
 forced loans and benevolences which were a recog- 
 nized means of raising revenue for the state. 
 
 8. " Love your enemies," etc. Christian love, which 
 we are to extend to our enemies, is (i) not a sentiment 
 which would prevent the infliction of pain when 
 necessary, but (2) an active and virtuous exercise of 
 all our faculties and powers for God's glory and man's 
 welfare. Our Lord teaches us elsewhere that our love 
 must occasionally involve us in bringing even our 
 brethren to justice, and, in case of contumacious refusal 
 on their part to accept just correction, must lead us to 
 separate ourselves from them. The interests of the 
 community and of the wrong-doer alike demand that 
 he shall be brought to justice by Christian love (Matt. 
 xviii. 15-18). Loving our enemies gives no sort of 
 permission to allow them to do as they like. Refusal 
 to attempt to stop a man from doing evil is a mani- 
 festation, not of love, but of hate, towards him. But 
 
 15 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 our Lord goes on to give the reason why Christians 
 should love their enemies — "that ye may be sons of 
 your Father." And we know that the Father chastises 
 and disciplines His children, and that while He allows 
 wheat and tares for a time to grow together, in the 
 end He will mete out the punishment of destruction 
 to the evil. The Christian's sonship is therefore partly 
 to be proved by his imitation of the loving justice of 
 the Father. Further, the Christian looks forward to 
 the Day of Judgement, when absolute justice shall be 
 done. But the concern of the state and of the citizens 
 is to obtain and maintain, as far as possible, relative 
 justice amongst men in the present. 
 
 The second passage in which our Lord appears to 
 forbid Christians to bear arms is : " Put up again thy 
 sword into its place : for all they that take the sword 
 shall perish with the sword " (Matt. xxvi. 52). 
 
 1. Our Lord did not say that the sword was to be 
 thrown away, but put back into its sheath, thus imply- 
 ing that it had a proper use. 
 
 2. " They that take the sword " — i.e., those private 
 persons who presume to use violence in their brawls 
 and quarrels without any authority from the state. 
 Christ did not say " they that use the sword." 
 
 3. The saying is a condemnation of rebellious dis- 
 obedience to lawful authority. A Christian thief 
 should not resist arrest. 
 
 4. The true use of the sword by private citizens may 
 be inferred from the passage in which our Lord bids 
 His disciples to buy weapons enough to defend them- 
 selves against robbers from whom the state was unable 
 
 16 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 to protect them : that is, they might wear and use 
 weapons in self-defence (Luke xxii. 36, 38). 
 
 Finally, our Lord taught the great doctrine, which 
 was taken up by S. Peter and S. Paul, and developed 
 by Christian thinkers, until it became the normal con- 
 ception of the authority and claim of the state, when 
 in reply to Pilate's question, " Knowest Thou not that 
 I have power to release Thee, and have power to 
 crucify Thee ?" He said : " Thou wouldest have no 
 power against Me, except it were given thee from 
 above" (John xix. 10, 11). The Greek word (e^ovaia) 
 here translated " power " means also authority — es- 
 pecially authority which rests upon a moral basis. 
 Our Lord's words lead us to see that the power of life 
 and death which the state employs is not truly moral 
 power unless it is derived from God and wielded in 
 accordance with His laws. In other words, the state 
 which disregards the sacred warrant of its authority 
 will in the end forfeit its temporal power. The sword 
 of justice used for unjust ends will pierce the heart of 
 him who mishandles it. And if rulers may learn from 
 this saying of our Lord's, so also may citizens learn 
 that the state is a sacred thing, not springing fortuit- 
 ously into being, not deriving its dread powers from 
 brute force, but endued by God with power from 
 above to work out and fulfil His great purposes of 
 justice and mercy in the world. As such it has a claim 
 to the loyalty, obedience, and service of every one of 
 its members. 
 
 17 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 3. The Apostles' Example and Teaching 
 
 The example and teaching of the Apostles is, as 
 clearly as our Lord's, on the side of Christians who 
 wish to be loyal citizens of a state which employs 
 force for the purposes of justice and peace. 
 
 S. Philip baptized the treasurer of Candace, Queen 
 of the Ethiopians, and in answer to his question, 
 "What doth hinder me to be baptized?" said, "If 
 thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest " (Acts 
 viii. 36, 37), giving no indication that he must 
 renounce his official position in a government depart- 
 ment which must have used force in its work. 
 
 S. Peter baptized Cornelius, the Centurion of the 
 Italian cohort, without any attempt to make him leave 
 his calling (Acts x. 47, 48). And in his First Epistle 
 he writes : " Submit yourselves to every ordinance of 
 man for the Lord's sake : whether it be to the king, 
 as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are 
 sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for 
 the praise of them that do well. For so is the will of 
 God, that with well-doing ye may put to silence the 
 ignorance of foolish men : as free, and not using your 
 liberty for a cloke of maliciousness, but as the servants 
 of God. Honour all men : love the brotherhood : 
 fear God: honour the king" (i Pet. ii. 13-18). In 
 this passage he asks Christians to give a reasoned, 
 conscientious obedience to the Imperial government, 
 on the ground that it exists for a moral purpose — viz., 
 the punishment of wrong and the promotion of 
 
 18 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 goodness (c/. Acts xviii. 14, xix. 38, xxv. 16, 27, 
 XX vi. 32). 
 
 S. Paul was not only a learned Jew, but also a 
 Roman citizen by birth, with influential friends (Acts 
 xix. 31), proud of his citizenship, and always ready to 
 make use of its privileges for the furtherance of the 
 Gospel of Christ (Acts xvi. 37, xxi. 37, xxii. 25, 
 xxv. 11). When the keeper of the prison at Philippi 
 said to S. Paul and S. Silas after the earthquake, 
 " Sirs, what must I do to be saved ?" he was not 
 bidden to discontinue his work as gaoler, which 
 required him to go about armed with a sword, but to 
 believe on the Lord Jesus Christ. He was baptized, 
 and continued keeper of the prison (Acts xvi. 30-37). 
 S. Paul resisted Elymas, upon whom blindness fell 
 (Acts xiii. 11), and cursed Ananias, who had com- 
 manded him to be smitten on the mouth (Acts xxiii. 3). 
 
 S. Paul's writings contain many references to 
 military service, armour, and weapons, without any 
 trace of a feeling that such things are unbecoming to 
 a Christian {e.g., Eph. vi. 11-18). 
 
 In the Epistle to the Romans, S. Paul writes : " Let 
 every soul be subject unto the higher powers : for 
 there is no power but of God; the powers that be are 
 ordained of God. Whosoever theretore resisteth the 
 power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that 
 resist shaU receive to themselves judgement. For 
 rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. 
 Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that 
 which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same : 
 for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if 
 
 19 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 thou do that which is evil, be afraid : for he beareth 
 not the sword in vain : for he is the minister of God, 
 a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. 
 Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for 
 wrath, but also for conscience sake. For this cause 
 pay ye tribute also; for they are God's ministers, 
 attending continually upon this very thing. Render 
 therefore to all their dues : tribute to whom tribute is 
 due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; 
 honour to whom honour " (Rom. xiii. i-8). Again : 
 " Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and 
 powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to every 
 good work " (Tit. iii. i). 
 
 A whole book might be written tracing out the 
 history of the influence of these words of S. Paul. 
 They formed the starting-point and basis of the 
 political philosophy of the Middle Ages, and we con- 
 tinually find ourselves thrown back upon this great 
 conception of the state as a moral person, a minister 
 of God, the object of whose existence is the mainten- 
 ance and execution of God's eternal laws of justice 
 and righteousness. We are not concerned here with 
 the question whether S. Paul derived his theory from 
 Christ's words to Pilate (John xix. lo, ii); from 
 Aristotle, who laid down the principle that the aim of 
 a state is the well-being of the community; or from 
 Cicero, who went so far as to say that if a state 
 became unjust it ceased to be a state; or whether 
 S. Paul arrived at his conclusion by applying Chris- 
 tian principles to the theory of the Roman Imperial 
 government. Nor are we concerned here with the 
 
 20 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 peculiarly English perversion of the theory, which, as 
 the doctrine of " The Divine Right of Kings," was 
 much exploited in generations succeeding that which 
 broke off relations with the Papacy. What we are 
 concerned to emphasize is that S. Paul, in investing 
 the state with a sacred character, borne because it 
 fulfils a sacred task, supplies the final justification for 
 Christian citizenship, and for Christian acquiescence 
 in the use of force for the purposes of justice and of 
 peace. 
 
 One passage in S. Paul's writings, like those which 
 we have considered in the Gospel, seems at first to 
 deny the Christian's right to bear arms : " If it be 
 possible, as much as in you lieth, be at peace with all 
 men. Avenge not yourselves, beloved, but give place 
 unto wrath [o/, unto the wrath of God]; for it is 
 written. Vengeance belongeth unto Me; I will recom- 
 pense, said the Lord" (Rom. xii. i8, 19). 
 
 1. S. Paul recognizes that it is a counsel of perfec- 
 tion — " as much as in you lieth." 
 
 2. The Greek words translated "avenge" and 
 " vengeance " do not imply any animus or vindictive 
 spirit, but mean the proper execution of justice. The 
 passage is meant to teach Christians that they must 
 not take the settlement of disputes into their own 
 hands, but must submit them to the public judicial 
 authorities who have God's power from on high to 
 decide them in accordance with justice. A Christian 
 must be so anxious to see justice done without any 
 personal feeling that he is to care for the wants of his 
 malicious persecutors (Rom. xii. 20, 21). The true 
 
 21 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 interpretation of this passage, therefore, strengthens 
 S. Paul's argument in the next chapter of his Epistle 
 that Christians must obey the state. 
 
 4. The Practice and Teaching of the Church 
 
 (a) c. A.D. 100-4.00 
 In the three centuries succeeding the generation of 
 the Apostles the question whether the Christian might 
 be a loyal citizen of the Empire was consistently 
 answered in the affirmative ; and to such an extent was 
 respect for the Imperial government carried that 
 Christians renounced the right of self-defence against 
 martyrdom, and even of flight from persecution. The 
 further question whether a Christian might be a 
 soldier did not involve directly any questioning of the 
 legitimacy of war. It must be remembered that at 
 this time war for the Roman meant war against bar- 
 barians whose armies threatened the frontiers of the 
 Empire. Every war was a war for the defence of the 
 country. All other fighting was civil war, condemned 
 by the best pagan thinkers. Accordingly, the writ- 
 ings of S. Clement of Rome,^ S. Justin,^ and other 
 early Christian writers, counsel their followers to 
 pray for the success of the Imperial armies, to obey 
 the Roman government, and, if they are already 
 soldiers, not to desert their occupation. Three Fathers 
 must be mentioned, however, who took a contrary 
 view. TertuUian at iirst did not demand that Chris- 
 
 ' S. Clement, Epistle to the Corinthians, Ix.-lxi. 
 2 S. Justin, Apologia, xii. i ; xiv. 3 ; xvii. i, 3-4. 
 22 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 tian soldiers should give up their calling; but after he 
 became a Montanist his opinions hardened, and he 
 denounced war^ as being forbidden to Christians by 
 Christ's words to S. Peter. Origen admitted that wars 
 in defence of the country were just,^ and urged 
 Christians to pray for their success, but declared that 
 they ought to keep their hands clean from bloodshed. 
 Lactantius, the third dissentient, said that the just 
 man would not engage in warfare, but that justice 
 itself was his warfare.^ The opinions of these three 
 writers were not of sufficient authority to prevent a 
 great increase in the numbers of Christians serving in 
 the Imperial armies. There were, however, two ques- 
 tions on which Christian feeling expressed an adverse 
 opinion. It was generally agreed that a Christian 
 soldier who rose to the rank of Centurion might not 
 offer sacrifices to the deified Emperor or to any pagan 
 god, nor pronounce sentence of capital punishment. 
 There was also a general agreement in the condemna- 
 tfon of civil war. 
 
 In A.D. 312 the Emperor Constantine became a 
 
 * TertuUian, De Corona, 11 ; De Idololatria, 19, c. a.d. 212. 
 
 2 Origen, Contra Celsum, v. 33, vii. 26, viii. 73. 
 
 3 Lactantius, Divinw Insiitidiones (ed. Brandt, 1890), lib. vi. 
 20, 16, 17. Ita neque militare iusto licebit, cuius militia est 
 ipsa iustitia, neque vero accusare quemquam crimine capitali, 
 quia nihil distat utrumne f erro an uerbo potius occidas, quoniam 
 occisio ipsa prohibetur. Itaque in hoc Dei precepto nullam 
 prorsus exceptionem fieri oportet, quin occidere hominem sit 
 semper nefas, quern Deus sacrosanctum animal esse uoluit. 
 
 For these and other early Christian writers see further 
 L'Eglise et La Guerre, Paris, 1913, p. 8 seqq. 
 
 23 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 Christian, and during the two succeeding generations 
 Christianity gradually became the reigion of the 
 Roman Empire. The task of Christian thinkers was 
 extended from directing the lives of private citizens to 
 exercising influence upon those who controlled the 
 policies of the state. The sense of responsibility 
 sobered extremists who might have been inclined to 
 develop the anarchic line of thought of Lactantius. 
 In 314 the Council of Aries pronounced sentence of 
 excommunication against Christian soldiers who, even 
 in time of peace, threw down their arms. S. Athanasius 
 said that it was legitimate and praiseworthy to con- 
 quer one's enemies in war.^ In the Apostolic Consti- 
 tutions there are prayers for the ruler and all in 
 authority, and for all the army, that through it tran- 
 quillity and concord might be ensured. In the same 
 Constitutions directions are given that any soldier 
 who desires to be baptized shall be taught, in accord- 
 ance with S. John Baptist's words (Luke iii. 14), to do 
 violence to no man, to exact nothing wrongfully, 
 and to be content with his wages. If the candidate 
 promised to keep these rules he was to be accepted for 
 baptism ; but if not, he was to be refused. 
 
 S. Ambrose (A.D. 340-397), in his De Officiis Minis- 
 trorum^ gives a general idea of the teaching of the 
 Church in this early period, and it is worth noticing 
 that the question in debate is now rather whether war 
 is legitimate than whether a Christian may be a 
 soldier. This widening of outlook is the result of the 
 
 ' S. Athanasius, Episiola ad Amiiiiem. 
 * See Appendix B. 
 24 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 increase in the size of the area within which the 
 Christian conscience is now called to act and direct, 
 in consequence of the Christianization of the Empire 
 and its rulers, and also the result, at any rate in the 
 case of S. Ambrose, of a diligent study of the philo- 
 sophical works of Cicero, whose influence upon 
 Christian political thought was not inconsiderable. 
 
 Writing of courage, S. Ambrose says that Christians 
 may recognize the courage of the warrior, for they 
 themselves are descended spiritually from the heroes of 
 the Old Testament. But mere courage for fighting is 
 not enough. " Bravery without justice is the root of 
 evil," the greater the bravery, the greater the tempta- 
 tion to misuse it. " In the affairs of war the first thing to 
 be considered is whether the wars are just or unjust." 
 The law of virtue consists in repelling injustice : " He 
 who does not defend his neighbour from injury if he 
 is able is as much in fault as he who commits the 
 injury." For example of this principle he cites Moses 
 defending a Hebrew against the injustice of an 
 Egyptian (Exod. ii. ii, 12). It follows from this that 
 a war is just which is for the defence of the country 
 against barbarians, or a great house against brigands. 
 " The courage which is employed in war to preserve a 
 country against barbarians, or at home to protect the 
 weak or to defend comrades from robbers — that 
 courage is full of justice." To courage and justice the 
 warrior must add prudence, moderation, temperance, 
 magnanimity. " If, therefore, justice is of such value 
 in war, how much more must it be kept in time of 
 peace!" "The foundation of justice is good faith." 
 
 25 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 But because natural law often leaves men in doubt as 
 to where, in a particular case, justice lies, " the Church 
 is, as it were, the mould of justice." From the time of 
 S. Ambrose onwards the Christian philosophy of war 
 hinges upon the idea of the sacred character of the 
 state and the concept of justice as determining the 
 legitimacy of war. 
 
 {b) S. Augustine of Hippo, and Gratian's " Decretum" 
 about A.D. 400-1200 
 
 In the years between the death of S. Augustine of 
 Hippo (A.D. 429) and the publication of Master 
 Gratian of Bologna's Concordia Discordaniium 
 Canonum, or, as it soon came to be called, Decretum 
 (A.D. 1 148), practically nothing fresh was added to the 
 Christian philosophy of war.^ And as the knowledge 
 of S. Augustine's views on war was con&ned almost 
 entirely, during the years succeeding 1148, to the 
 passages cited by Gratian, it will be convenient in 
 this short sketch of the development of Christian 
 thought to keep our attention fixed on those passages 
 which contain a conspectus of S. Augustine's theories, 
 and represented them to the mediaeval world. 
 
 The Decretum Gratiani soon attained such prestige 
 and authority that it was officially adopted as repre- 
 senting the teaching of the Church, and became the 
 first part of the great Corpus luris Canonici, or Canon 
 Law of the Church. As such, it authenticated the 
 selected passages of S. Augustine as expounding the 
 
 ^ See Appendix C. 
 26 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 mind of the Western Church on war; and as such, it 
 was lectured upon and taught to every member of 
 every University of Europe, studied in every monastery 
 and cathedral, cited in every ecclesiastical court, and 
 was soon regarded as a necessary part of the intel- 
 lectual equipment of every educated man. In his 
 Decretum Gratian poses two questions on war, which 
 he answers by a collection of quotations from S. 
 Augustine's works — the first, " Is it a sin to go to 
 war ?" ; the second, " What war is just, and how did 
 the children of Israel wage just wars ?" 
 
 He declares that the precepts of non-resistance are 
 to be kept rather by an attitude of mind than by 
 outward sign, and to support his contention quotes 
 the following passage from S. Augustine's sermon on 
 the Centurion's servant : 
 
 " The just and pious man must be ready to bear 
 patiently the malice of those whose conversion to 
 goodness he desires, in order that the number of good 
 men may grow, rather than that by his equal malice 
 he should add himself to the number of the wicked. 
 So those precepts are rather for the preparation of the 
 heart than for open practice, that patience and kindli- 
 ness may dwell secretly in his heart, but that openly 
 those measures may be taken which seem to be for the 
 good of those to whom we wish well. This is plainly 
 shown by the saying of our Lord Jesus, Himself a 
 wonderful example of patience, when He was struck 
 in the face : ' If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the 
 evil; but if well, why smitest thou Me ?' Therefore, if 
 we regard the words of His precept alone. He by no 
 
 V 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 means fulfilled it ; for He did not offer the other cheek 
 to him that struck Him, but rather forbade him to do 
 it and increase the wrong. . . . Nor does it appear 
 that the Apostle Paul kept the precept of his Lord and 
 Master when, being struck in the face, he said to the 
 high-priest : ' May God smite thee, thou whited wall : 
 dost thou sit to judge me according to the law, and 
 contrary to the law commandest me to be smitten ?' 
 . . . Those precepts of non-resistance, therefore, are 
 always to be kept in the preparation of the heart, and 
 that kindliness, not to return evil for evil, is always to 
 be fulfilled in will. For action must be taken in many 
 things with regard to those who must be punished 
 with a kind of benevolent harshness, whose profit 
 must be studied rather than their desires. For a 
 father never loses his love for the son whom he corrects, 
 however harshly. But rather let that happen which 
 the offender does not desire, and let him grieve who 
 through grief, though unwillingly, will be restored to 
 moral health. And so, if the secular state will keep 
 the precepts of Christ, let not even wars be waged 
 without benevolence, but that the conquered may the 
 more easily be brought into the fellowship of justice 
 and piety. For the man from whom the power to do 
 evil is taken is the one over whom victory is most 
 useful, since nothing is less happy than the happiness 
 of sinners, which nourishes an evil sense of impunity 
 and a wicked intention which grows strong like an 
 internal enemy. . . . Now, if Christian discipline con- 
 demned all wars, those men in the Gospel who came 
 seeking the counsels of salvation would have been told 
 
 28 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 to throw away their arms and withdraw themselves 
 altogether from military service. But they were told : 
 'Do violence to no man, and be content with your 
 wages.' Those who were told that their own wages 
 ought to be enough for them were not forbidden to 
 engage themselves in military service." 
 
 Briefly, the Christian warrior's heart must be flUed 
 with the desire to benefit those who do him evil, by 
 correcting them as a father corrects his son whom he 
 loves. 
 
 The next passage is taken from one of S. Augus- 
 tine's letters to Boniface : 
 
 " Don't think that no soldier can please God. Such 
 was David . . . such were very many just men of 
 that time . . . such was the Centurion who said to 
 the Lord, ' I am not worthy that Thou shouldest come 
 under my roof.' But when you arm yourself for battle, 
 think first of this, that even your very strength and 
 courage are a gift of God. And thus will you think of 
 God's gift, so as not to act against the Lord. For 
 good faith, once given, must be kept even with your 
 enemy against whom you are fighting : how much 
 more, then, with your friend, for whom you fight ? 
 There should be peace of will, but war of necessity. 
 . . . For peace is not sought that war may be waged, 
 but war is waged that peace may be won. So that you 
 must be a peace-maker in making war, to bring those 
 against whom you fight to the benefits of peace by 
 conquering them. . . . And so let necessity, and not 
 the will, overcome the enemy who is fighting. And as 
 violence is offered to the man who fights and resists, 
 
 29 
 
T?he Sword of Justice 
 
 so mercy is due to the conquered, especially when no 
 breach of the peace is apprehended." 
 
 Soldiers can serve God by using His gift of courage 
 in His service, to win the enemy over to peace. 
 
 In answer to the question, " What is rightly repre- 
 hensible in war ?" Gratian quotes a passage from the 
 Contra Faustian : 
 
 " Cowards, but not men of religion, condemn war 
 for the risk to life. The desire to hurt, the cruelty of 
 revenge, an unappeased and inappeasible temper, the 
 fierceness that desires to renew the fight, the lust of 
 domination, and other such-like things — these are 
 what are rightly condemned in war. And it is for 
 the most part that such things may rightly be 
 punished against the violence of those who resist that 
 good men, at the command of God or some legitimate 
 ruler, undertake to wage war . . . and the natural 
 order of men which is conformable to peace requires 
 that the authority and counsel for undertaking war 
 be in the power of rulers. But if a war is waged 
 through man's cupidity it hurts not the saints, over 
 whom no one has power unless it be given from above. 
 For there is no power but of God, who either com- 
 mands or permits it. And so a just man, should he 
 chance to undergo military service under a ruler who 
 is a wicked man, can rightly serve under his command, 
 so long as (he for peace sake keeping his rank) it is 
 either plain that his orders are not contrary to God's 
 laws, or is doubtful whether they be so or not. . . ." 
 
 Material loss is not what condemns war : a war is 
 condemned by the wicked motives of bad men, to 
 
 30 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force? 
 
 punish which good men wage war at God's command 
 or the state's. The declaration of war must rest with 
 the ruler of the state, under whose command the 
 Christian may rightly serve so long as his orders are 
 not flatly contradictory to God's law — that is, even in 
 cases of doubt, where the ruler is wicked. 
 
 Dealing again with the question whether it is a sin 
 to wage war, S. Augustine says : " To wage war is no 
 sin, but to wage war for booty is a sin ; neither is it a 
 sin to engage in public affairs, but so to engage in 
 public affairs as to increase your wealth is a sin. . . . 
 What Caesar orders must be borne, what he commands 
 must be endured, but it becomes intolerable when 
 harpies heap up booty." 
 
 No question of material gain can make war right. 
 Public service in the state is as wrong as a war for 
 booty if you engage in it for private profit. When the 
 state becomes unjust the burden of obedience is un- 
 bearable. 
 
 Master Gratian next quotes a sentence, quoted also 
 by Ivo of Chartres, as coming from the writings of 
 S. Augustine. But, though it represents his teaching, 
 it cannot be found amongst his surviving works : 
 
 " To true worshippers of God those wars even are 
 acts of peace which are waged, not out of cupidity or 
 cruelty, but from a zeal for peace; in order that the 
 wicked may be repressed and good men encouraged." 
 
 To justify the use of stratagems in war Master 
 Gratian gives a passage from S. Augustine's Liber 
 Qucsstionum: 
 
 " The Lord our God bade Joshua set an ambush — 
 31 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 that is, warriors in ambush to deceive the enemy. 
 Hence we learn that such things are no breach of 
 justice when done by those who wage a just war; for 
 in these matters the just man thinks of nothing more 
 particularly than whether the war is undertaken by 
 one who has the right to wage war. For not all have 
 that right. When, then, he has undertaken a just war 
 no question of justice arises, whether he &ght in the 
 open or use stratagems. And just wars we usually 
 define as those which are waged to exact punishment 
 for injuries; so the people or state is sued which has 
 either neglected to execute justice for whatever wrong 
 its members have committed, or to return what has 
 been wrongfully taken away. And this other kind of 
 war also is without doubt just — I mean, war ordered 
 by God, who knows how to deal with all : in which 
 war the general or the people is not judged to be 
 so much the author of the war as the minister of 
 God." 
 
 Just wars are declared, by those who have the right 
 to declare war, against peoples or states which neglect 
 to enforce justice upon their criminals or to observe it 
 in their own dealings with others. Wars which God 
 orders are also just, and those conducting them are 
 carrying out a judicial sentence. 
 
 The last quotation which is given in the Decretuni 
 from S. Augustine's works is a short one which comes 
 from his Old Testament Questions : 
 
 " Be it well noted how just wars were waged by the 
 children of Israel against the Amorites. For an 
 innocent passage, which ought by the most equitable 
 
 32 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force I' 
 
 law of human society to have been open, was denied 
 them." 
 
 This short extract is important, not for the par- 
 ticular breach of justice which it condemns, but for 
 S. Augustine's underlying idea of separate and inde- 
 pendent sovereign states which are members of the 
 fellowship of mankind, and as such bound to observe 
 the laws of justice in their conduct towards one 
 another. This idea was, naturally, a difficult one for 
 men of S. Augustine's time to grasp, and did not 
 become a living and growing idea either then or for 
 centuries afterwards. Men's eyes were attracted 
 rather by the thought of the Papacy or the Empire 
 than by ideas of nationality and supernational comity. 
 But the idea of human society here foreshadowed is 
 one which is now attracting the attention of thinkers 
 of all or no creeds. It is, however, an essentially 
 Christian idea, the perfect fulfilment of which can only 
 be also Christian. 
 
 There is one other passage in S. Augustine's writ- 
 ings which, though it does not appear in the Decretum, 
 is so frequently quoted as to deserve a place alongside 
 with the rest. It is in his De Civitate Dei, i. 2 1 : 
 
 " The commandment ' Thou shalt not kill ' is by no 
 means broken by those who wage wars of which God 
 is the originator (Deo auctore), or who, representing 
 the power of the state, execute capital punishment 
 upon criminals according to the laws of the state — 
 that is, the command of a most just law." 
 
 The penetration which enabled S. Augustine to 
 perceive that the soldier and the executioner are alike 
 
 33 D 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 ministers of justice did not apparently show him the 
 inherent weakness of speaking of wars " Deo auctore," 
 " of which God is the originator." This weakness in 
 his argument was perhaps due to the fact that his 
 thoughts on war were largely influenced by his 
 studies of the Old Testament, under which God 
 openly revealed His will to His people. Modern 
 Christians, whether they hold the same views of the 
 Old Testament Scriptures as S. Augustine or not, 
 instinctively feel that God no longer so openly reveals 
 His will on particular questions as to relieve His 
 servants of the necessity of using their judgement. If 
 S. Augustine had perceived the difficulty, he would 
 perhaps have argued, founding his position on 
 Romans xiii. i, 2, that under the New Testament the 
 Christian is morally bound to obey the just commands 
 of the sovereign independent power with regard to 
 war and the execution of malefactors. 
 
 There is a quotation from another author in this 
 section of the Decretiim which also is worth giving, 
 not only to illustrate S. Augustine's thought on war, 
 but to fill out the concept of war which Gratian put 
 before his readers. It is from Isidore of Seville's 
 Etymolo gy : 
 
 "A war is just which is waged, after an official 
 edict has been issued, to win something back again 
 or to repel invaders. A judge is so called because he 
 pronounces right (jus) to the people, or because he 
 passes sentence by law (jure). To pass sentence by 
 law is to judge justly. For he is no judge unless 
 justice is in him." 
 
 34 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 This sums up S. Augustine's thoughts, that war is 
 only just when it is an official act of the state, to 
 punish wrongdoers who have offended against the just 
 laws of human society. And the latter part of the 
 definition of a judge carries us back to Cicero's 
 opinion that the state which ceases to be just ceases 
 also to be a state. 
 
 (c) 5. Thomas Aquinas : the later Middle Ages 
 
 S. Thomas Aquinas was born in 1226 in South 
 Italy, and died March 7, 1274, as Professor of 
 Theology at the University of Paris. He possessed 
 an insatiable industry, which, coupled with one of the 
 acutest intellects of his own or of any time, enabled 
 him in his short life of forty-eight years to^produce 
 such a monument of learning as the Summa Theo- 
 logica, or " The Sum of Theology." The work soon 
 came to be regarded as authoritative, and was even 
 placed, with the Scriptures and the Decreta, on the 
 altar during the sittings of the Council of Trent, 
 1 545-1 563. 
 
 S. Thomas deals with the question of war in the 
 Second Part of the Second Part, Question XL.^ 
 
 There are four questions which, he says, must be 
 considered with regard to war — (i) whether any war 
 is permissible; (2) whether it is permissible for clerks 
 in holy orders to fight in war; (3) whether it is per- 
 missible for those engaged in war to use stratagems ; 
 (4) whether it is permissible to wage war on feast- 
 days. 
 
 ^ See Appendix D. 
 
 35 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 These questions might be summed up thus : Is war 
 right ? If so, is it right for all men, by all means, at 
 all times ? He concludes that clerks in holy orders 
 ought not to fight, on the ground that their spiritual 
 work is of very great importance, but that they should 
 accompany the army, to minister to the sick and dying 
 and to bury the dead. Following S. Augustine, he 
 shows that stratagems are legitimate, on the ground 
 that, though you are bound to keep faith even with 
 your enemies, you are not bound to reveal your plans 
 and purpose to them beforehand. His opinion on 
 fighting on feast-days is that if it is absolutely 
 necessary it is permissible.^ 
 
 With regard to the main question, " Is war always 
 a sin ?" he proceeds by stating the reasons for con- 
 demning war, by laying down the conditions of a 
 just war, and then by answering the previously stated 
 objections. It will be convenient to consider the 
 objections and their answers together first. 
 
 The first objection to war is that punishment is 
 never inflicted except for sin ; but punishment is meted 
 out by the Lord to those who fight (Matt. xxvi. 52 : 
 "All they that take the sword shall perish with the 
 sword "). Therefore all war is illegitimate. The 
 answer to this is to be found in S. Augustine, Contra 
 Fausium : " The man who takes the sword is he who 
 arms himself to shed another's blood without the 
 order or permission of any superior or legitimate 
 power." But, S. Thomas explains, the man who uses 
 
 1 See under Treuga Dei in Chapter III., pp. 84, 85, and 
 Appendix J. 
 
 36 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 the sword by the authority of the ruler or judge (if he 
 be a private person) or from zeal for justice, as by the 
 authority of God (if he be a public person), does not 
 himself take the sword, but uses it as committed to 
 him by another, so that he ought not to be punished. 
 
 The second objection to war is that whatever is 
 contrary to the Divine precept is sin ; but to wage war 
 is contrary to the Divine precept (Matt. v. 39 : " Resist 
 not him that is evil "; and Rom. xii. 19 : " Avenge not 
 yourselves, beloved "). Therefore war is always sin. 
 In reply to this S. Thomas quotes S. Augustine's 
 words that precepts of this kind are to be kept always 
 in the preparation of the heart, so that a man should 
 always be ready not to resist or to defend himself, if 
 need be. But sometimes he must act otherwise for the 
 good of the community, or even for the good of those 
 with whom he fights. To support this he quotes parts 
 of the passage from S. Augustine's sermon on the 
 Centurion's servant beginning " For action must be 
 taken . . ." down to " . . . like an internal enemy .""• 
 
 The third objection to wax is that nothing is 
 contrary to an act of virtue except sin; that war is 
 contrary to peace; and that, therefore, war is always 
 sin. To this he answers that those who wage war 
 justly intend peace, and so are not acting contrary to 
 peace, unless to a wicked peace, which the Lord did 
 not come to send on earth (Matt. x. 34). Then he 
 quotes S. Augustine's letter to Boniface : 
 
 "For peace is not sought that war may be waged, 
 but war is waged that peace may be won. So that you 
 ,■■ See p. 28 for the whole passage. 
 
 37, 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 must be a peace-maker in making war, to bring those 
 against whom you iight to the benefits of peace by 
 conquering them." 
 
 The fourth objection to war is that every exercise 
 preparatory to a legitimate thing is permissible, as is 
 plain in the exercises for the sciences. But the exer- 
 cises for war, which take place in tournaments, are 
 forbidden by the Church, because those who die in 
 such practices are deprived of Church burial. There- 
 fore war is plainly sin. But the objection is met by 
 the consideration that not all exercises for war are 
 forbidden; but only those which are inordinate and 
 dangerous, from which skirmishes and forays arise. 
 
 The objections having been considered, S. Thomas's 
 arguments for the legitimacy of war must be reviewed. 
 He first quotes the words of S. Augustine from the 
 sermon on the Centurion's servant : 
 
 " Now, if Christian discipline condemned all wars, 
 those men in the Gospel who came seeking counsels of 
 salvation would have been told to withdraw them- 
 selves altogether from military service. . . . Those 
 who were told that their own wages ought to be 
 enough for them were not forbidden to engage them- 
 selves in military service." 
 
 From this we are to conclude that war is not 
 plainly sin. 
 
 He next goes on to say that in order that a war may 
 be just three things are required: (i) The authority 
 of a ruler, (2) a just cause, (3) a right intention in the 
 belligerents. 
 
 I. The authority of a ruler at whose command war 
 38 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 is to be waged is necessary for a just war for two 
 reasons : A private person may not begin a war, 
 because war is really only the last resort for obtaining 
 justice, and he can always get justice in the court of 
 his superior. But there is no superior's court to 
 whom rulers of independent states may apply for 
 justice. They are therefore at liberty even to declare 
 war in order to satisfy justice. Of course, the 
 weakness of this resort to force lies in the fact 
 that the side on which justice lies is sometimes 
 the weaker side and is beaten; and sometimes 
 both belligerents claim to have justice on their side. 
 Further, a private person may not assemble the 
 number of armed men required for war. By process 
 of exhaustion, therefore, S. Thomas declares that only 
 independent rulers may declare war. But he goes 
 farther, and shows that it is their positive duty to 
 protect the state committed to their care. And as they 
 legitimately defend it against internal disturbance by 
 the punishment of malefactors, so with the sword of 
 war ought they to defend it against external enemies. 
 In support of this he quotes S. Augustine's words. 
 Contra Faustum: 
 
 " The natural order of men, which is conformable to 
 peace, requires that the authority and counsel for 
 undertaking war be in the power of rulers." 
 
 2. A just cause is necessary for a just war. Those 
 who are attacked must deserve attack on account of 
 some guilt. This point seems to S. Thomas so plain 
 that, without elaborating it, he contents himself with 
 quoting from S. Augustine's Liber Qucestionum : 
 
 39 
 
The Sword or Justice 
 
 "Just wars we usually define as those which are 
 waged to exact punishment for injuries; so the people 
 or state is sued which has either neglected to execute 
 justice for whatever wrong its members have com- 
 mitted, or to return what has been wrongfully taken 
 away." 
 
 3. The third requirement for a just war is that the 
 motives of the belligerents should be right. Their 
 aims must be either to promote some good or to avoid 
 some evil. To support this he quotes the words 
 attributed to S. Augustine in the Decretum : 
 
 " To true worshippers of God those wars even are 
 acts of peace which are waged, not out of cupidity or 
 cruelty, but from a zeal for peace, in order that the 
 wicked may be repressed and good men encouraged." 
 
 He goes on to add that wicked motives, such as 
 those which S. Augustine condemns in the Contra 
 Faustum ("the desire to hurt, the cruelty of revenge, 
 an unappeased and inappeasable temper, the fierceness 
 that desires to renew the fight, the lust of domination, 
 and other such-like things "), may make illegitimate a 
 war which began with the proper authority and a 
 just cause. 
 
 There is much which S. Thomas leaves unsaid {e.g., 
 he does not develop his argument about a just cause 
 beyond general considerations), and subsequent 
 Christian thinkers on the subject chiefly occupied 
 themselves with filling in his outline, without going 
 farther with the main principles of his ideas. But it 
 is probable that in this brief consideration " On War " 
 we have as clear a perception of the points at issue 
 
 40 
 
May Christians avail themselves or Force ? 
 
 and as masterly an exposition of the Christian 
 principles which must guide us in forming a judge- 
 ment as were ever put together in so short a space. 
 
 {d) The Church of England after the Reformation. 
 
 A word must be added as to the authoritative 
 teaching of the Church of England after the Refor- 
 mation. This is contained in Article XXXVIL, 
 drawn up in 1562, which, after asserting and qualify- 
 ing the attribution of the chief government to the 
 King's Majesty, proceeds to state that they, our 
 Princes, " should rule all estates and degrees com- 
 mitted to their charge by God, whether they be 
 Ecclesiastical or Temporal, and restrain with the civil 
 sword the stubborn and evil-doers. . . . The Laws of 
 the Realm may punish Christian men with death, for 
 heinous and grievous offences. It is lawful for 
 Christian men, at the commandment of the Magistrate, 
 to wear weapons, and serve in the wars." 
 
 These statements clearly involve the doctrine that 
 Christians may avail themselves of force, and draw 
 the sword of justice in the service of the state to 
 restrain the stubborn and evil-doers, to carry out 
 sentence of death upon condemned criminals (even 
 though they be fellow-Christians), and to wage war 
 when called upon to do so by legal authority. 
 
 It is noticeable that in the authorized Latin version 
 of the Article the word iusta is inserted before bella 
 in the phrase translated "serve in the wars." Why 
 iusta was inserted in the Latin version, or, alterna- 
 tively, why "just" was omitted before "wars" in the 
 
 41 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 English, is not at all clear. As it stands, the 
 existence of a Latin version which brings the great 
 Christian conception of iustum bellum — war which is 
 just — to the mind of the educated at home and on the 
 Continent, though side by side with an English 
 version which seems to leave Christian men with no 
 question about a war except whether the magistrate 
 has commanded it or not, gives some slight indication 
 that those who framed the Articles did not wish to 
 depart from the traditional teaching of the Church. 
 
 The Church has always upheld a very high ideal of 
 the calling and duty of civil rulers in England. By 
 the Coronation Oath which every newly crowned 
 King has taken ever since long before the time of King 
 Alfred, the monarch promises to suppress all acts of 
 rapacity and wickedness in all ranks of society, and 
 in all his judgements to give decision according to 
 justice and mercy. The Book of Common Prayer 
 contains in every common service petitions that the 
 King's aim in all his thoughts, words, and works may 
 be God's honour and glory and the welfare of his 
 subjects, God's people committed to his charge. 
 Prayer is offered to God that He will so strengthen 
 the King that he may vanquish and overcome all his 
 enemies; that those in authority under him may truly 
 and impartially, with grace, wisdom, and understand- 
 ing, execute justice for the punishment of wickedness 
 and vice, and maintain truth, true religion, and virtue ; 
 that the consultations of his Parliaments may be for 
 the advancement of God's glory, the good of the 
 Church, the safety, honour, and welfare of the 
 
 42 
 
May Christians avail themselves of Force ? 
 
 Sovereign and his dominions; that all things may be 
 so ordered and settled by their endeavours, upon the 
 best and surest foundations, that peace and happiness, 
 truth and justice, religion and piety, may be estab- 
 lished among us for all generations. 
 
 Nor are the duties of the private members of the 
 state without their Christian ideal. The Church prays 
 that the King's subjects, duly considering whose 
 authority he hath, may faithfully serve, honour, and 
 cheerfully, for conscience' sake, obey him, " in Thee, 
 and for Thee, according to Thy blessed Word and 
 ordinance." The truth that lurks in prepositions 
 forbids unconditional obedience; the Christian's 
 obedience to the civil government of the state is only 
 rendered in God and for God, and according to God's 
 word and command. And while we pray to be 
 delivered from sedition, privy conspiracy, and rebel- 
 lion, we pray also that the King's heart may be ruled 
 in God's faith, fear, and love, and that he may ever- 
 more have affiance in God, and seek His honour and 
 glory, and that truth and justice, holiness and 
 righteousness, peace and charity, may abound in his 
 days. 
 
 Conclusion. 
 
 The result of the inquiry has been, briefly, to show 
 that the Christian regards the state as a being 
 invested with a sacred character entrusted by God 
 with powers of life and death over its citizens; that 
 he is taught that he may, rather that he should, 
 submit to its authority with tranquil conscience, and 
 
 43 
 
-The Sword of Justice 
 
 take part in its life and work, so long as it is just and 
 righteous, and even, as its minister, draw the sword 
 of justice which it does not bear in vain. 
 
 There has, perhaps, never been a time in history 
 when it was more necessary than now that Christian 
 citizens should take up their membership in the state 
 to the full extent of its content, and should be quite 
 clear about the duties which are involved in it. If a 
 League of Nations is to come into being it can only 
 be rendered effective and lasting through Christian 
 influence. And Christian influence can only make its 
 proper weight felt if it is based upon Christian 
 philosophy. That our citizens should be rightly 
 instructed about their relationships is the greatest 
 need of the time — in home life, in industrial life, in 
 national and in international life. Strife and war 
 bring in their train such suffering and loss, such dis- 
 organization, such threatenings even of the dissolution 
 of human society, and involve so many millions of 
 immortal souls, not voluntarily, but by compulsion, 
 that we ought to make every effort to proclaim the 
 things which are true, reverend, just, pure, and lovely, 
 so that, thinking on these things, our citizens may 
 know the peace of God upon them. 
 
 44 
 
II. 
 
 CHRISTIAN WAR— I. JUST WAR; 
 II. HOLY WAR 
 
 The Germans are not the first people in the history o£ 
 the world who have regarded war, not as a calamity 
 which statesmanship should vigorously exercise its 
 powers to avoid, but as a means of progress whereby 
 their national character may be developed and 
 strengthened, their dominions extended, and their 
 trade increased. But, as the considerations just 
 adduced have led us to think, Christians must regard 
 all violence as wrong except that which must be em- 
 ployed for the purposes of justice and peace between 
 man and man and between nation and nation. The 
 aim of intercourse between persons and peoples is not 
 mere peace, but peace based upon justice and law, 
 and in order to obtain justice if it be not present, or 
 to maintain it if threatened, war may be employed as 
 the last resort by Christians without sinning against 
 the teaching of their Master. 
 
 The employment of this means for the purposes of 
 justice, however, has been hedged about by conditions 
 which have uniformly tended (when observed) to 
 reduce the number of occasions on which a Christian 
 may lawfully wear weapons and serve in the wars. 
 The principal conditions of just war, iustum bellum, 
 
 45 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 are three in number: (i) That the war should be 
 declared by some one having proper authority; (2) 
 That the war should not be declared for any other 
 than a just and grave cause; (3) that the war should 
 be entered upon and waged with right motives. It is 
 the purpose of this chapter to consider, first, these 
 three conditions of a Just War, and, next, those of a 
 Holy War. 
 
 I. Just War 
 I. Who May Declare War? 
 
 No war is regarded as just which is declared by 
 any other than the sovereign power of an independent 
 state. This condition is not an extension to the 
 sovereign power of a privilege denied to others, but 
 rather the limitation to one source in each state of 
 what was in early times regarded as the right of all. 
 The days are now long past when feuds and vendettas 
 between persons and families were the recognized 
 means of settling disputes, but we have not yet 
 passed clearly away from the idea that duelling is not 
 entirely sinful. But Christian thinkers have steadily 
 persisted in condemning such acts of violence as 
 brigandage, private war, and civil war as acts in 
 which Christians should not engage. 
 
 Why, then, it may be asked, is not war condemned 
 altogether ? If it was wrong for half-independent 
 barons to fight one another in the Middle Ages, why 
 is it not wrong for states to fight one another now ? 
 The answer lies in the thought that not peace but 
 justice is the aim of man's intercourse with man. 
 
 46 
 
Christian War 
 
 Single persons, whether alone or as leaders of districts, 
 small communities such as towns, or members of a 
 federation of states, all have a superior to whom they 
 may appeal for a just settlement of their disputes. 
 Two persons quarrelling about an inheritance can 
 appear in a law-court, where their case will be tried 
 and justice done. If both parties accept the verdict 
 the dispute is settled; if the loser appeals on good 
 grounds, the case is tried again, and the former 
 decision affirmed or reversed. But in the vast majority 
 of cases the loser abides by the first decision, and in 
 practically all cases in civilized countries the ultimate 
 judgement of the courts is allowed to settle the matter. 
 There are people, however, who refuse to accept an 
 adverse verdict. Against these the state will in the 
 last resort enforce its decision by the exercise of com- 
 pulsion. The man who refuses to leave a property to 
 which the state, acting through the law-courts, declares 
 he has no right, will, in the end, be evicted by force. 
 
 But to whom may a sovereign independent state 
 appeal for the just settlement of its disputes ? It has 
 no superior whose verdict will be accepted by both 
 parties to the dispute, or, if not accepted by the loser, 
 enforced by compulsion. Here lies at the present time 
 the limit which separates war which Christians may 
 engage in from that which is sinful. All those who 
 have a common superior (whether a single person such 
 as a feudal lord, a state such as Great Britain, or a 
 federal government such as that of the United States 
 of America) to whom they may appeal for justice are 
 in conscience bound to abstain from war. But those 
 
 4; 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 who have no such superior are justified in taking into 
 their own hands the settlement of their disputes, 
 always having regard to justice and right. Thus war 
 is regarded, like capital punishment, as the highest 
 exercise of the sovereign power's right of penal justice. 
 But with this difficulty, that the state is both judge 
 and party in the dispute. There is a natural feeling 
 that justice is on our own side, or at any rate, if we do 
 not clearly envisage justice, we try to make out the 
 best case possible for ourselves in any dispute. But 
 upon the sovereign power in each state is laid the 
 great responsibility of considering its own case and 
 judging on which side justice lies. The wisdom of the 
 old axiom Nemo de se iudicet (Let no one be judge in 
 his own cause) is proved by almost every page of 
 European history. The conscience of the sovereign 
 power, whether it be that of Emperor, King, President, 
 Cabinet, or Senate, must be so clearly attuned to the 
 Divine teaching as to be able to lay aside all thought 
 of self-interest or of pride, and to consider, not by any 
 private code of morals, but by the Christian laws of 
 right and wrong, whether it ought to exercise its 
 greatest and final prerogative of war. 
 
 In so doing it must weigh up the value of the 
 clamouring of the people, which will often cry out 
 upon imperfect information, which will be inflamed by 
 partisan or class feeling, rendered incapable of seeing 
 justly by national pride, and (most difficult argument 
 of all to resist) empowered by the vote to uphold or 
 overthrow those in whose hands rests for the time 
 being the exercise of the functions of government. 
 
 48 
 
Christian War 
 
 Nor are those upon whom, to a large extent, men 
 depend for their opinions free from responsibility. 
 The influence of the Press rather grows than shrinks. 
 The deliberate publication of a piece of false news (as, 
 for example, of German mobilization by the Lokal- 
 anzeiger in 191 4 before it had been ordered) or of 
 inflammatory articles may easily have effects before 
 which all opportunity of impartial consideration of 
 justice will be swept away, and war will be forced 
 upon the government, not by an act of deliberate 
 judgement, but by mere sentiment and passion. 
 
 The conscience of English Christians rests assured 
 that the hrst great condition of a just war, that it 
 should be declared by the sovereign power after calm 
 consideration, after the exhaustion of other means, as 
 a last resort, was completely fulfllled in August, 191 4. 
 For the sovereign power in our state rests in the hands 
 of the Cabinet of the day, which is dependent for its 
 existence and power upon the support of the House of 
 Commons, which in its turn depends upon the electors. 
 (The passing of the Electoral Reform Act, practically 
 extending the franchise to adults of both sexes, will 
 make future governments even more fully representative 
 of the whole people.) Moreover, our state is not newly 
 risen to autonomy, and therefore eager to show its 
 independence by free exercise of all its prerogatives, 
 but is the venerable leader of a Commonwealth of 
 peoples, which has been accustomed for centuries, 
 through Viceroys, Governors, courts, judicial com- 
 mittees of the Privy Council, and in other ways, to 
 decide questions of justice and right between contend- 
 
 49 E 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 ing peoples and districts in her Empire in all the 
 continents of the world. Our statesmen, therefore, 
 inherit a tradition of impartial judgement in matters of 
 practically international dispute. Further, our people 
 have shown themselves capable of accepting in arbi- 
 tration decisions adverse to themselves, as, for instance, 
 in the matter of the Alabama^ and in the dispute 
 about the Alaska boundary on the Pacific coast. And 
 even though by traditional training and by recent 
 performance the English sovereign power was better 
 qualified, perhaps, than any other to be both judge 
 and party, it was called upon to decide the cause, not 
 of itself, but of another state, Belgium, whose inde- 
 pendence, in common with Prussia, it had guaranteed. 
 So that we were not even put to the test of judging 
 our own cause. 
 
 The difficulty of adjusting international disputes, 
 or rather of maintaining just and proper relationships 
 between separate sovereign powers, has been so great 
 that some have attempted in the past to isolate them- 
 selves completely from their neighbours. The Hermit 
 Kingdom of Thibet for many generations steadily 
 refused to have any intercourse with the surrounding 
 peoples of China and India — a policy which was 
 rendered the easier by the existence of great chains of 
 mountains round her frontiers. The Great Wall of 
 China and the Roman Walls in Britain are evidence of 
 similar attempts to prevent the occurrence of inter- 
 national disputes by the avoidance of all relationship. 
 But the most conspicuous instance of this policy is in 
 the history of the United States of America. From 
 
 50 
 
Christian War 
 
 1 77 5 1 tHe year in which the States declared their inde- 
 pendence, until their entry into the war in 191 7, they 
 kept definitely clear of European entanglements. Even 
 in the Spanish-American War, 1898, no attempt was 
 made to attack Spain in Europe or to call other 
 powers into alliance. Indeed, so wedded were the 
 citizens of the United States to their resolution to be 
 as free of international problems as was humanly 
 possible that, by their famous Monroe doctrine, they 
 tried to limit, if not to extinguish, all European 
 interference and influence in the whole continent of 
 America. But man's ever-increasing mastery over the 
 forces of Nature and the rapidity of modern communi- 
 cations tended to reduce the practicability of such 
 isolation. From August, 1868, when the electric tele- 
 graph across the Atlantic to America was completed, 
 it became inevitable that the States would be drawn 
 into participation in the task of European civilization 
 in the world. The great expansion of international 
 trade, a fertile source of dispute, and the dependence 
 of countries upon one another for supplies of raw 
 material and of manufactured articles, combined to 
 render more and more difficult the policy of the hermit 
 state. It was not, however, proximity or interdepend- 
 ence which finally convinced the sovereign power of 
 the United States of the necessity of joining in the 
 war, but rather the perception that the great issue in 
 dispute was this — whether the relationships of nations 
 are to be decided by brute force or by canons of 
 justice, right, and mercy. She perceived that the self- 
 isolated state is a selfish state, withholding from its 
 
 51 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 fellows its contribution to the great ideals of man- 
 kind. 
 
 Since the latter half of the fifteenth century and 
 the beginning of the sixteenth, in which Con- 
 stantinople was taken by the Turks, America was 
 discovered by Spain, and the Cape route to the Indies 
 by Portugal, in which the Christian republic of Europe 
 not only thus extended its borders to other continents, 
 but broke away from the moral leadership of the Pope, 
 Europe has been a congeries of separate nations 
 each struggling for territory both at home and across 
 the seas, struggling for wealth from gold-mines and 
 from trade, struggling for such power as may enable 
 it to overcome its neighbours. These struggles have 
 culminated at intervals of about a hundred years — 
 Spain's effort in Elizabeth's reign, France's as a 
 kingdom in Anne's, France's again, but as a republic, 
 in the reign of George III., Germany's in the reign of 
 George V. And it is not without significance that on 
 each occasion our state has been on the side of 
 freedom, even if she has not always exercised a 
 decisive influence on the struggle. Such an inter- 
 national system, or want of system, has resulted in the 
 creation of alliances, and in the elaboration of the 
 doctrine of the Balance of Power, by which statesmen 
 have striven so to arrange that no one nation should 
 obtain the hegemony of Europe or of the world. It 
 must, however, be emphasized that this policy is based 
 primarily upon self-interest and competition, and not 
 upon justice and right. Enlightened self-interest is 
 often clear-sighted enough to see that no man, nor 
 
 52 
 
Christian War 
 
 any state, liveth to himself alone, and that one's own 
 interest is sometimes best served by serving also the 
 interests of others; but it is generally opposed to 
 change unless thereby self will benefit. And the fact 
 of its foundation in selfishness and rivalry has pre- 
 vented it generally from attempting to solve the 
 problems of international relationship in the spirit 
 of disinterested justice and fellowship. Whatever 
 defence apologists may make for the Balance of Power 
 as a working policy, it remains true that it does not 
 lead the nations of the world onwards, but is rather 
 an incentive to competition in armaments and warlike 
 spirit. For the last four hundred years Europe has 
 been a crowd of separate nations, settling their dis- 
 putes mostly by force of arms, and recognizing no 
 superior to whom an appeal might be made for justice. 
 Such a plan could only be satisfactory if every man 
 and every state were able to form impartial judgements 
 and to guide their actions by the same code of morals. 
 States cannot for ever be hermits or cut-throats. 
 Like persons, they must work out some means whereby 
 they may live together according to the teaching of 
 Christ in justice and in charity. We have seen that 
 Christian thinkers gradually induced Europe to 
 accept, in theory at least, the restriction of the 
 declaration of war to sovereign independent states — a 
 restriction working upwards and narrowing, like a 
 tide of placid water cleansing as it rises up the sides 
 of a great rock : the crows and kites still scuffle upon 
 the summit, but below the surface of the water there 
 is peace. 
 
 53 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 If we carry forward this line of thought it becomes 
 plain that international relationships would become 
 easier if there could be found some superior to whom 
 states could appeal for justice. In the Middle Ages, 
 from the eleventh century to the fifteenth, such a 
 position was almost within the reach of the Pope. It 
 will appear from the historical chapter which follows 
 how real was his authority in settling disputes 
 between sovereign powers, and how well he generally 
 used his power. But such was not, nor could be, his 
 main work then; and now the nations of the world 
 would not consent to abide by his arbitrament. The 
 Hague Conference, happy thought of an ill-starred 
 autocrat, never really gained the popular favour, and 
 when its time of possible usefulness came in 19 14, 
 Germany and Austria refused to submit their case to 
 its court, and did not even keep the agreements which 
 they had signed at some of its previous sessions. 
 
 If there were some superior, whether single person 
 or court of judges, to whom states could appeal for 
 settlement of their disputes in accordance with justice 
 and right, there would ensue this great boon to man- 
 kind, that states would no longer be both judge and 
 party in their own cause. They would give up, as, in 
 the progress of Christian influence, single persons, 
 communities within a state, and states within a federa- 
 tion, have given up, the prerogative of declaring war. 
 But before states can be induced to give up this right 
 there must be in them a change of heart, which shall 
 lead them to aim at justice rather than at power. 
 
 Briefly, then, it v/ould be the logical sequel of 
 54 
 
christian War 
 
 Christian ideas, as to the first condition required for 
 a war in which Christians may legitimately engage, if 
 the sovereign independent powers of the world would 
 agree to give up their right to settle disputes by war 
 to some superior whom they could confidently trust to 
 judge impartially and wisely, so that he alone should 
 exercise the right of penal justice upon offenders. If 
 this proved to be too sudden a renunciation, they 
 might agree for a period not to declare war on 
 one another without the superior's permission duly 
 granted after both parties (or at least the aggrieved 
 party) had been heard. 
 
 But it cannot be too strongly laid down that no 
 machinery is of any value for this purpose unless the 
 states of the world earnestly desire to live together in 
 justice and in charity, in the Christian spirit of help- 
 fulness and self-denial, in honour forbearing one 
 another. 
 
 2. For What Causes and by What Procedure may 
 War be Declared? 
 (a) Causes Considered. — Having concluded that 
 the prerogative of declaring war rests with the 
 sovereign power in each state, Christian thinkers were 
 bound to investigate in the light of conscience the 
 causes of dispute which might arise between state and 
 state, and so give occasion for the sovereign power to 
 exercise its last dread function. 
 
 The relationships of single persons in society are 
 fixed partly by nature (such as those of the family) 
 brought under the control of some complex of ideas, 
 
 55 
 
*rhe Sword of justice 
 
 and partly by the fact of man's dependence on his 
 brethren for many of the necessaries of life. For 
 example, relationships of bargain and exchange, in 
 which men must deal justly with one another, come 
 into existence as soon as man reaches a stage of civiliz- 
 ation in which the labour of himself and his family will 
 not suffice to produce enough food, clothing, and 
 means of shelter for their wants. As civilization 
 develops, trade in luxuries is added to trade in 
 necessaries. In time, too, relationship's are established 
 through community of sentiment and exchange of 
 ideas in religion, politics, and art. 
 
 Homer pictures the Cyclopes, living each alone in 
 his cave on the mountain-side, caring nothing for 
 others, a law unto himself and his family alone, 
 because his wants were few and could be supplied by 
 his own efforts — his shelter, a cavern; his clothing, 
 sheepskins; his food, milk, cheese, and meat from his 
 flock. But Homer is careful to show us the practical 
 impossibility of such a life cut off from all relationship 
 with the rest of mankind. And indeed, when the other 
 Cyclopes ran at their comrade's cry of pain to his cave, 
 the poet intends us to understand that even these 
 rough, untamed cave-dwellers felt that a neighbour's 
 distress must be at least inquired into, if not relieved. 
 
 If we pass to the opposite extreme and examine the 
 case of the inhabitants of Tristan d'Acunha, we find 
 that all the islanders are related to one another, by 
 descent and intermarriage ; the interests of one are the 
 interests of all. They all trade with all passing ships 
 that will touch at the island ; the interests of the little 
 
 56 
 
Christian Waf 
 
 tommunity lie in establishing friendly relationships 
 with all those with whom they can come into com- 
 munication. 
 
 The relationships of nations are similarly fixed 
 partly by nature, partly by man's design. When men 
 leave their native land and settle in other parts of the 
 world they change their climate, but not their general 
 outlook on life. Their race, their language, their cast 
 of mind, at least remain the same; and often so also 
 their religion, their political ideas of justice and 
 freedom, their law, and their arts. A natural relation- 
 ship springs up between the new land and the old, 
 sometimes, as in the ancient Greek colonies, rendered 
 lively and lasting by a continuance of family ties and 
 ceremonial observances. 
 
 We may see how strong these bonds of relationship 
 may be not only from the British Empire, which has 
 for the most part remained (to its great benefit) under 
 one sovereign power, but from the example of the 
 Spanish colonies in America, which, though now 
 sundered in government and common interest from 
 Spain, still look to her lead for guidance in their 
 general attitude towards the great problems of inter- 
 national life. 
 
 The British Empire is, in fact, a great league or 
 commonwealth of nations, bound together by ties of 
 race, language, and interest, which have tacitly agreed 
 not to claim the prerogative of war, but to settle their 
 disputes by the judgement of a superior (the Supreme 
 Court of the Privy Council in London), to whom they 
 may appeal for justice. 
 
 57 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 But the relationships of other nations, which have 
 no natural community of interest, are fixed by their 
 proximity to their neighbours, by trade and commerce 
 of one kind and another. And, on the whole, it is from 
 these artificial relationships that causes of dispute 
 arise. The possession of a piece of coast-line, of a 
 river-mouth, of a port; the monopoly of some raw 
 material; such legislation as the Navigation Acts; 
 such trade regulations as hampered the American 
 colonies in the eighteenth century : things such as 
 these cause jealousy, enmity, strife. Nor in the past 
 have other causes been unknown, such as dynastic 
 intrigue and democratic ambition. 
 
 Nations, however, like single persons, should be able 
 to live together in justice and in charity, valuing 
 always justice before peace. In cases of difference 
 between nation and nation the sovereign power of 
 each is bound by the Christian law to examine very 
 stringently the details of the matter in order to dis- 
 cover on which side justice lies. It is plain that an act 
 of injustice on one side involves justice on the other 
 side. For example, every war of aggression is unjust; 
 therefore every war of self-defence against aggression 
 is countenanced by justice. 
 
 The horrors of war are so great and its results 
 generally so terrible that no cause in which there is 
 not a clear breach of justice and right can be held 
 sufficiently urgent to justify a sovereign power in 
 having recourse to war. Let us examine the various 
 possible breaches of justice between state and state 
 which Christian thinkers have considered sufficiently 
 
 58 
 
Christian Waf 
 
 grave to warrant war, failing other competent satis- 
 faction. They may be roughly divided up amongst 
 four classes. 
 
 (a) Acis of Injustice connected with Territory. — ^An 
 aggressive and uninvited invasion of a sovereign 
 power's territory, the continued occupation of it, hold- 
 ing it to ransom, pillaging it and destroying the 
 buildings, fruit-trees, crops, etc., are breaches of justice 
 for which, failing adequate reparation and an under- 
 taking not to repeat the offence, the sovereign power 
 whose territory has been invaded is warranted in 
 declaring war upon the aggressor. Should one state, 
 however, be in unjust occupation of territory belong- 
 ing to another state, the state which has been robbed 
 has justice on its side in an attempt to regain what 
 rightfully belongs to it. 
 
 {h) Acts of Injustice connected with Citizens.— \ 
 sovereign independent state is bound to defend the 
 lives and property of its citizens. For this purpose it 
 maintains within the area of its own jurisdiction a 
 force of police, which will, if necessary, be supple- 
 mented by armed forces, to protect citizens from 
 violence. Suppose a great mob of rioters declares its 
 intention of burning the house of a citizen who in 
 some way is obnoxious to them, or even of killing him, 
 the state is bound to protect him and his house. It is 
 true that such protection may involve the death of 
 many rioters, police, soldiers, peaceful citizens, women 
 and children, besides the destruction of a great deal 
 of property near the obnoxious citizen's house ; whereas 
 if the state refused its protection, only one house 
 
 59 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 Would be destroyed and only one citizen would lose 
 his life. Nevertheless, a principle of justice is in- 
 volved, and the state is bound to act. Similarly, the 
 state must protect its citizens against maltreatment of 
 their persons, against the destruction or confiscation 
 of their property, without reparation, by another 
 state, unless this comes upon them as a just conse- 
 quence of their own misdeeds. Further, states have 
 always recognized their obligations to extend protec- 
 tion, where possible, to their citizens who may be 
 temporarily living or travelling in other states for 
 legitimate purposes. A sovereign power which ill- 
 treats subjects of another power who are trading or 
 travelling within its confines, or who are on a pil- 
 grimage (as to S. James of Compostella or to the 
 Holy Places of Palestine), or who are engaged in the 
 work of preaching the Gospel, lays itself open to 
 punishment if it refuses due reparation. The story of 
 the relationships of European states with one another 
 in Europe and elsewhere, and with other powers in 
 other continents, is full of examples which shov/ the 
 importance attached by all civilized powers to their 
 obligation to protect their citizens going about the 
 world on their lawful occupations. 
 
 (c) Acts of Injustice connected with Government. — 
 Under this heading come such matters as improper 
 interference in the domestic politics of another state, 
 as, for instance, by bribery, which tend to make 
 citizens look otherwhere than to the good of their own 
 state for the motive of their political action. Such 
 improper interference will soon lead on to attempts to 
 
 60 
 
Christian War 
 
 exacerbate internal trouble, to stir up and encourage 
 rebellion or revolution against a good government. 
 Christian thinkers, holding with S. Paul a very high 
 ideal of the authority and functions of the sovereign 
 power in a state, could not but condemn as unjust and 
 wrong efforts to cause such internal weakness and 
 distraction as would render the government of another 
 state incapable of properly carrying out its functions 
 at home and abroad. But if a government were, 
 beyond any shadow of doubt, wicked and immoral, 
 neighbouring states might attempt to deliver its 
 citizens, just as the state will take children from the 
 custody of persistently cruel parents. 
 
 (d') Acts of Injustice connected with the State. — ■ 
 When a state attacks another state in war through 
 mere desire to win military glory, it is a grave breach 
 of justice, which the state attacked may rightly resist 
 by force. War is an exercise of penal justice, and no 
 stretch of fancy or ingenuity can make it appear 
 that the wanton attacks of a state, which is perhaps 
 newly risen and anxious to try the power of its 
 unfleshed arms, are acts of justice for which the 
 attacking sovereign power is prepared to answer at 
 God's judgement-seat. So, too, Christian thinkers 
 have consistently condemned as breaches of justice all 
 attempts to conquer a neighbouring state which are 
 incited by a belief in the attacking party's mind that 
 he has that superiority in strength which is necessary 
 to achieve his purpose. Finally, wars begun by a 
 government in order to lull the opposition against 
 itself at home and to establish itself firmly in power 
 
 6i 
 
The Sword ot Justice 
 
 are condemned as breaches of justice which the 
 attacked state may rightfully resist. 
 
 In brief, when we consider attacks upon territory, 
 citizens, governments, or states, it is clear that 
 Christian thinkers maintain that the sole cause of a 
 just war is a grave breach of justice. 
 
 (B) The Procedure of declaring War. — The 
 actual procedure of declaring war is not without its 
 importance in the Christian philosophy of war, 
 because in each of its four stages there is given oppor- 
 tunity for reflection and amendment. 
 
 When a sovereign power suspects that it has been 
 the victim of unjust treatment as to its territory, its 
 citizens, its government, or its very existence, it is 
 bound to make the most careful inquiry possible into 
 all the circumstances of the case. In such a serious 
 matter as war no Christian power can rightly rush 
 headlong into conflict with the supposed offender 
 upon suspicion merely, or allegation. It must be 
 proved indubitably that the offence has been com- 
 mitted. More than this, the wronged state must be 
 certain that the breach of justice was intentional and 
 not accidental; and if intentional, then, further, that 
 it was not properly an act of punishment against some 
 intruding members of the aggrieved state engaged in 
 improper occupations abroad. No state, for example, 
 could overlook deliberate maltreatment of its citizens 
 going about their lawful business; but no state could 
 rightly go to war with another state which had caught 
 and punished its citizens acting as spies, agents-provo- 
 cateurs, or stirrers-up of revolution. 
 
 62 
 
christian War 
 
 Of course, in case of an invasion (that is, acts of war 
 committed by the armed forces of a state within the 
 frontiers of another state) the state whose territory is 
 invaded is bound immediately to take action in self- 
 defence against the invaders. But in other cases where 
 a deliberate act of injustice has been committed the 
 Christian power is bound to delay awhile before pro- 
 ceeding to declare war. The power attacked must 
 weigh the horrors and evils of war against the evils of 
 injustice. No merely material loss can ever balance 
 against war, but a grave injustice which threatens the 
 independence of a state, or which, if permitted to occur 
 without punishment, would tend to bring about the 
 dissolution of civilization, must be dealt with. It is in 
 the sphere of morals that the true importance of an 
 action lies, and nothing less than a grave moral 
 offence can be allowed to reckon as a cause of war. 
 
 If, after proper investigation, the aggrieved 
 sovereign power finds that a deliberate offence has 
 been committed against itself by another sovereign 
 power, and, moreover, that the offence is of such a 
 character as to involve a grave breach of justice which 
 carmot without danger be passed over unnoticed, it 
 must state the facts to the aggressor, and demand 
 explanation and competent satisfaction with a view to 
 a peaceable settlement. An exchange of notes may 
 follow, in which the aggressor may maintain that the 
 action complained of is really an act of justice, and 
 therefore may rightly be persisted in, or may admit 
 the offence and make such satisfaction and reparation 
 as is adequate. A recent example is that of the attack 
 
 63 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 by the Russian fleet, then on its way to the East, upon 
 British trawlers in the North Sea. Instead of bidding 
 the Navy sink the Russian fleet at sight, Great Britain 
 demanded explanations, which were given, and repar- 
 ation, which was made (as far as material reparation 
 can atone for bloodshed). If it appears from the 
 diplomatic correspondence that both parties believe 
 themselves to be in the right, they may agree to call in 
 a third party agreeable to both as mediator, or they 
 may submit their case to an arbitration. The arbitra- 
 tion may be conducted by a specially appointed com- 
 mission, or by a court such as that of the Hague 
 Conference, which has done much useful arbitration 
 work. But should the aggressor refuse either to make 
 explanation and satisfaction, or to submit to mediation 
 or arbitration, or, having submitted its case, should 
 refuse to abide by a decision adverse to itself, even 
 then the aggrieved party is held bound to give one 
 more opportunity for retraction before declaring war. 
 A document called an " ultimatum " is sent to the 
 sovereign power of the aggressor pointing out the 
 grave consequences which will ensue if unjust action is 
 supported and continued, and giving a last oppor- 
 tunity for reparation within a named period. Should 
 no answer, or a defiant one, be returned, a state of war 
 between the two sovereign powers exists from the time 
 named in the ultimatum, and with a clear conscience 
 the aggrieved state may call upon its Christian 
 citizens to vindicate the right. 
 
 The action of Great Britain in declaring war upon 
 the German Empire in 1914, as may be proved by the 
 
 64 
 
christian Wai^ 
 
 published official documents, followed strictly the lines 
 of action laid down by Christian thinkers. Nay, 
 more; for the breach of justice which brought the 
 Empire into the war was not committed against our 
 own sovereignty, but against that of another state, 
 whose integrity we were bound in honour to maintain. 
 Our government, therefore, was not in the difficult 
 position of teing both judge and party in its own 
 cause. No considerations of material loss or gain, of 
 damage done to its own territory, citizens, government, 
 or state, influenced its judgement. It was not led by 
 national pride to rush headlong into war. But calmly 
 and judicially it ascertained that Serbia had been out- 
 raged, and that the territory of Belgium had been 
 violated deliberately. It decided that such acts were 
 grave breaches of justice, so grave as to threaten the 
 whole fabric of European civilization, and so wicked 
 as to destroy all possibility of international trust and 
 confidence in the aggressors if allowed to pass with- 
 out protest. Even so, the British government 
 proposed arbitration of any kind acceptable to 
 the Germanic powers, and, when this was refused, 
 despatched an ultimatum giving them a last 
 opportunity of withdrawing, and of righting the 
 wrong. 
 
 It is true that, in common with the Prussian 
 government, the British had guaranteed the integrity 
 of Belgium, but such was not the case with the United 
 States of America. They had consistently kept 
 themselves as clear as possible from international 
 imbroglios, both by abstaining from interference iu 
 
 65 F 
 
The Sword of justice 
 
 European interstate politics, and by trying to limit 
 European activity in America. The intervention of 
 the British and the American sovereign powers in the 
 war was more than even the strictest Christian thinkers 
 have previously required. And it is along this line of 
 thought that we may look for an advance towards a 
 League of Nations. In civil life men will often stand 
 up to a bully and defend the weak against him, even 
 if they feel that their conscience forbids them to defend 
 themselves against attack; but hitherto no nations 
 have been so devoted to the cause of Christian justice 
 and charity as to risk incalculable material damage — 
 even their very existence — in defence of another. If 
 such a feeling had animated Europe two hundred 
 years, a hundred and fifty, perhaps even only fifty 
 years ago, the present catastrophe would not have 
 come upon us. Had the opinion and the pressure of 
 civilized Europe protested against, opposed, and 
 fought against the successive robberies and aggres- 
 sions of the brigand rulers of Prussia, the German 
 Empire, rooted in dishonour, would never have been 
 capable of such outrages upon all Christian thought 
 and conduct. 
 
 The war has aroused in the hearts of all Christian 
 and civilized peoples, not only a horror of war, but a 
 passionate hatred of the injustice which makes war 
 necessary, and a conviction, so strong as to be a 
 motive for action, that a breach of justice committed 
 by one nation against another is not a private affair 
 which the two must settle between themselves how 
 they please, but is an offence against the common life 
 
 66 
 
Christian War 
 
 of nations, for the punishment of which responsibihty 
 lies equally upon all. 
 
 3. Wiik what Intention should War be Waged? 
 
 The teaching of our blessed Lord on man's conduct 
 to his fellow-men was directed not only towards 
 enjoining on His disciples certain outward acts, but 
 still more towards cleansing man's heart from evil 
 thoughts and desires, and planting therein, as the 
 prime motive of his life, love towards God and love 
 towards his neighbour. Christian teachers of all ages 
 and climes have pursued this line of teaching with 
 unflinching clearness. Some peoples, perhaps, of a 
 severely practical turn of mind, who regard rather the 
 work accomplished than the impulses which inspired 
 it, or who are peculiarly open to the appeal to their 
 pride and reputation, have not paid due attention to 
 the importance of this element in Christ's teaching. 
 Such nations must guard themselves very strictly 
 against falling into the sin of being hypocritically 
 respectable, and of thinking that the fact of their 
 doing a thing makes it consequently a justifiable, if 
 not a virtuous action. 
 
 In no department of human activity is it of more 
 importance to be absolutely clear about motives than 
 in international relationships. So much of good or of 
 evil for single persons, for states, for civilized man- 
 kind, depends upon the decisions and policies of 
 sovereign powers that too much care cannot be 
 exercised in scrutinizing the intentions with which 
 
 67 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 governments act towards each other. Nor are the 
 great dependent issues the sole reason for care. It 
 must be considered that those who are placed under 
 the necessity of judging in their own cause must hold 
 themselves to a very strict account, Because the 
 temptation to incline to the policy dictated by self- 
 interest or ambition is stronger with them than with 
 those who have to pass judgement upon the acts of 
 others. 
 
 Accordingly, Christian thinkers have laid down a 
 right intention as the third condition necessary to 
 ensure that a war is of such a character that a 
 Christian may without violation of his principles 
 engage himself therein. A right intention — the words 
 at once bring to the mind the conception of an action 
 to which a moral character is attached. We feel that 
 we are moving, not in the world of instinct or brute 
 force, but in the higher realms where conduct is 
 determined by great laws of right and wrong, where 
 men must rise superior to the mere consultation of 
 their own interests and the gratification of their own 
 desires, and must prefer justice to all else. Regarding 
 war, therefore, as a moral act, Christian thinkers have 
 further defined it as an execution of judgement upon 
 the guilty, as the means whereby, in this imperfect 
 world, the peace which has been broken by injustice 
 may be restored and maintained. Were there no 
 injustice, were the hearts of the congregation of 
 mankind truly set upon righteousness, war would 
 disappear, as capital punishment would be extin- 
 guished automatically were there no crimes committed 
 
 68 
 
Christian War 
 
 worthy of death. War is waged to promote good or 
 to avoid evil, and to re-establish peace upon a just 
 footing. 
 
 The limitation of the definition of just wars to those 
 which are waged with a right intention enables us 
 immediately to characterize as unjust and wicked 
 many wars in European history, and to say that had 
 the nations which declared those wars been guided by 
 the teaching of Christ they would not have engaged 
 in them, and mankind would have been saved from 
 untold suffering and loss. Wars are condemned the 
 motives of which are those of the thief — waged merely 
 through covetousness of something that is our neigh- 
 bour's — whether his family life, his territory, his 
 subjects, his streams, his woods, his coal, his iron, or 
 anything that rightfully is his. Wars are condemned 
 which are waged from motives of cruelty, of vengeance, 
 or of hatred — the motives of the savage who loves to 
 torture those weaker than himself, to wreak his animal 
 lust for blood upon his enemies, and to pursue what 
 may have begun as righteous punishment beyond all 
 bounds of fitness and of justice; the motives of those 
 who judge all men by themselves and in accordance 
 with their own taste or fancy, and pursue a man, not 
 because he has done wrong to them or anyone, but 
 because they do not like him and are offended at his 
 mere existence. Wars are condemned which are waged 
 merely for the love of power — the motive of the 
 civilized but godless man — able, richly gifted, match- 
 ing his ability with his unscrupulousness, trying to 
 bend all things, human and Divine, to his service, 
 
 69 
 
The Sword or Justice 
 
 obedient, and that only with rebellious hate, to death 
 alone. 
 
 It is not as a thief, as a savage, as a super-man, 
 that the Christian takes the sword of justice in his 
 hand, but as a minister of God called to execute 
 judgement and righteousness upon them that do 
 wrong. The objects of Christian warfare are there- 
 fore strictly limited. There must be in the heart of 
 the sovereign power waging just war such a pas- 
 sionate love of justice that he makes plain a readiness 
 to cease war should just and adequate satisfaction bs 
 offered by the offender. But even should the wrong- 
 doer make no offer of reparation, the Christian warrior 
 is bound to be ready to cease war when justice has 
 been satisfied, when he has inflicted punishment pro- 
 portioned to the wrong, and is in a position to prevent 
 at any rate an immediate repetition of the crime. 
 
 This readiness to stop when satisfaction is offered 
 or justice done is the touchstone of the motives of the 
 belligerent. Contrary conduct at once exposes a 
 wrong motive in his heart. Should he refuse to stop 
 v/hen just reparation is offered, or should he attempt, 
 when victorious, to subjugate or to exterminate the 
 nation opposed to him, he shows at once that he is 
 animated by no love of justice, but by cupidity, by 
 hatred, or by ambition. It is clear, therefore, that a 
 sovereign power cannot rest satisfied with the thought 
 that it entered upon a just war, but must ceaselessly 
 scrutinize its motives in pursuing the war, lest that 
 which began in justice should continue beyond the 
 demands of justice and end in ungodliness. The 
 
 70 
 
Christian War 
 
 Collect of the Church puts this clearly before us, in 
 which we pray that by God's gracious favour and help 
 we may glorify His holy Name in all our works begun, 
 continued, and ended in Him. The sovereign power 
 engaged in a just war must endeavour always not 
 only to begin but also to continue and to end in God's 
 grace. The moment, therefore, that a just and durable 
 peace is possible the Christian state is bound to stop 
 the war. 
 
 There is, indeed, one case in which, choosing the 
 lesser of two evils, a Christian state should not go to 
 war, but should endure injustice. War is waged to 
 win a durable peace, and no peace is right which is 
 not also just. But suppose that a sovereign power 
 has unjustly invaded and occupied a town or border 
 territory belonging to its neighbour, and that the 
 invaded power perceives that an attempt to recover 
 its lost possession would only involve it in prolonged, 
 even if successful, strife, then it is bound to acquiesce 
 in the loss and bear the injustice, rather than plunge 
 two countries into endless and ever-increasingly bitter 
 struggles. 
 
 The war was begun by the Allies and the Ameri- 
 cans indisputably as a just war and has been so 
 continued and ended. Aiid it may well be that it was 
 prolonged so far in order that the sovereign powers of 
 the world might have an opportunity of redressing the 
 injustices which have been committed, but acquiesced 
 in as lesser evils, ever since the capture of Constanti-. 
 nople by the infidels in 1453, and the Pope's division 
 pf the New World between Portugal and Spain in 1493;, 
 
 71 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 That this doctrine of the necessity of a right inten- 
 tion in those engaging in a just war could be extended 
 to the members of a League of Nations is plain upon 
 a short consideration. For in such a society of nations, 
 where no war at all is allowed except to enforce the 
 decision of the judicial superior upon a recalcitrant 
 offender, the question of motive becomes rather a 
 question of the will to fulfil an unpleasant duty than 
 one in which men have to be stern in their repression 
 of the suggestions of self-interest or vengeance. No 
 one can for a moment conceive that the common hang- 
 man is spurred on to his grim task by such motives of 
 ambition or hatred as too frequently animate the 
 murderer. And there is no less difference between just 
 and unjust war than between murder and capital 
 punishment. The more rigorously the use of the 
 sword of justice can be confined to the execution of 
 judicial purposes, the less frequently will it have to be 
 drawn. None of the nations of a League (always 
 supposing them to be loyal heart and soul to the 
 spirit as well as to the letter of their agreement) could 
 have any motive in pursuing a war (and the declara- 
 tion of war would not rest with them) beyond the 
 execution of the sentence passed by the superior court 
 of justice of the League. 
 
 II. A HOLY War 
 
 So far war has been considered as an act of justice 
 between sovereign independent states. But there was 
 another kind of war in which, according to the teach- 
 ing of the Church, Christians might engage, not only 
 
Christian War 
 
 without sin, but with merit. This was the holy war, 
 waged not between states nor necessarily against 
 states, but by Christians against those who threatened 
 the safety of the Church and Christendom. 
 
 For us the importance of the idea of a holy war lies 
 not so much in what it accomplished in Europe and 
 in the Holy Land, as in the conception of the possi- 
 bility of men acting together on a great scale, not as 
 members of a secular state, but as members of an 
 organization of greater extent and with superior 
 claims, the Catholic Church. Nor must we lose sight 
 of the fact that this war was used to suppress attacks 
 upon the great body of Christian truth, and not, as a 
 just war, only to resist and punish breaches of justice. 
 That such a use of force should be possible shows a 
 recognition of the principle, to which Europe will 
 probably return before long, that conduct ultimately 
 depends, not upon law and custom, but upon ideas. 
 If this be so, the truth or falsity of any complex of 
 ideas is a matter of public concern. 
 
 The Canonists of the Middle Ages distinguish four 
 degrees or stages of a holy war — recourse to the 
 secular arm; exposure to occupation; initiation and 
 direction of a war ; proclamation of a crusade. 
 
 I. Recourse to the Secular Arm. — On learning of 
 any dangerous heresy the Church must require and 
 admonish the temporal ruler of the people affected to 
 purge his territory within a year. Writing to Ger- 
 manus. Pope Gregory IX. (1227-1241) said: "Both 
 the swords belong to the Church, but one should be 
 wielded by the Church; the other for the Church by 
 
 73 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 the arm of the secular power ; the one by the priest, the 
 other by the soldier when required by the priest."^ 
 There was some difference of opinion between those 
 who opposed and those who upheld the temporal 
 power of the Papacy as to whether the Pope was 
 obliged to have recourse to the secular arm before 
 organizing a holy war himself. But the habitual 
 practice of the Popes was to do so, and there was no 
 doubt that any ruler so called upon (and especially the 
 Emperor) was not at liberty to divest himself of the 
 obligation, under penalty of excommunication and of 
 being classed with the heretics whom he had refused 
 to suppress. 
 
 2. Exposure to Occufation. — If the temporal ruler 
 failed within a year to obey the bidding of the Church 
 to purge his lands of heresy, the Pope might proceed 
 to excommunicate him, to declare his subjects absolved 
 from their oath of fealty, and to throw his lands open 
 to occupation by any orthodox Christians who would 
 undertake to " exterminate " the heresy. 
 
 3. Initiation and Direction of a War. — There is a 
 distinction between an invitation to loyal Christians 
 to occupy the lands of a heretic and the actual 
 organization of a war. There was some confusion of 
 thought amongst the Canonists on this point, and also 
 on the question whether all Bishops with tempora. 
 power, or the Pope alone, could declare war against 
 the enemies of the Church. But, however the theory 
 may have been debated, the initiation and direction of 
 
 1 See Appendix E, Extract II. 
 
 2 See Appendix E, Extract I. 
 
 74 
 
Christian War 
 
 a v/ar involved the Church more deeply in responsi- 
 bility than mere exposure to occupation. A Papal 
 Legate was appointed to direct the war, and soldiers 
 were enlisted in the name of the Church. The aim of 
 the war was to replace heretical subjects by orthodox 
 men, who succeeded to the rights and duties of those 
 who were dispossessed. 
 
 4. Proclamation of a Crusade. — It was generally 
 agreed from the time of Pope Innocent III. (119S- 
 12 16) onwards that the power of proclaiming a 
 crusade against infidels or heretics was confined to the 
 Pope, and this on three grounds : ( i ) That he alone 
 had the power to grant the indulgences which so great 
 an expedition required; (2) that to him alone did it 
 pertain to answer for the Faith against attacks; (3) 
 that to him pertains the Votum Cruets, or vow of the 
 Cross. 1 There was at one time an opinion that the 
 metropolitan of a province, assisted by his provincial 
 council, had the power to proclaim a crusade; but as 
 the power of the Papacy grew, provincial independence 
 waned. 
 
 The right of the Church to wage war against her 
 enemies in these four v/ays was advocated and 
 defended by the Canonists upon scriptural and 
 patristic texts which spoke of God's vengeance upon 
 His enemies, and also upon the lines of argument 
 regarding a just v;ar developed by S. Augustine, 
 Gratian, and S. Thomas Aquinas. From this point of 
 view the right of the Church to wage war is based 
 upon her right to punish sinners and wrong-doers in 
 1 See Appendix E, Extract III. 
 
 75 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 the name of God. In undertaking such a task the 
 Church is executing Divine justice. There was a 
 third line of argument, which must be mentioned — 
 viz., that the right of jurisdiction gave the Church the 
 right to wage war independently. It must be remem- 
 bered that in the Middle Ages, when this theory was 
 elaborated, the prelates of the Church had considerable 
 temporal power as secular barons. The Pope had no 
 superior to whom he could appeal for justice when 
 wronged; his sovereignty was therefore in general 
 incontestable. In cases of great danger he could 
 proclaim a crusade. Bishops who had temporal juris- 
 diction could make war like temporal rulers of their 
 own standing, who owed feudal service to their 
 suzerain, and must defend their vassals. A later 
 extension of the theory gave to ecclesiastical judges 
 delegate the right to pronounce the sentence of ex- 
 posure to occupation. 
 
 The Causes of a Holy War. — There was consider- 
 able confusion about the causes for which a holy war 
 might be declared, but a modern writer^ has divided 
 them into three classes : (i) Attacks on the Faith and 
 unity of the Church ; (2) attacks on the sovereignty 
 and property of the Church ; (3) grave cases of 
 injustice. In the first class would be included wars 
 against infidels {bellum Romanum, the Roman war — 
 a title reminiscent of the wars of the Roman Empire 
 against the barbarians), the most familiar examples 
 
 ' H. Pissard, Im Guerre Sainie, Paris, 1912, p. 87. From 
 this book the main facts relating to this subject are de- 
 rived. 
 
 ;6 
 
Christian War 
 
 of which are the Crusades against the Saracens in the 
 Holy Land ; and also the wars against heretics, as, for 
 example, the Albigenses. In the second class are wars 
 to defend the patrimony of S. Peter (i.e., the Papal 
 possessions in Italy), kingdoms such as England 
 (after John's submission) and Sicily, which were 
 subject to the Pope, and wars to punish rebellious 
 subjects. The inclusion of grave cases of injustice as 
 legitimate causes of a holy war practically made the 
 Pope, as representing the Church, the moral censor 
 and justiciar of Europe. 
 
 It is not necessary here to follow out the intricacies 
 of these theories, which no doubt had their part in 
 bringing about both the Bull TJnam Sanctam and the 
 downfall of the power of the Papacy over Europe in 
 the sixteenth century; nor to consider how far the 
 Popes thought it wise or expedient to put into practice 
 the powers which their supporters attributed to them. 
 The value of these ideas for the present times lies 
 rather in the fact that the civilized world appears to be 
 turning to the thought of the creation of a greater 
 unit of corporate life and action than the state. The 
 Hildebrandine ideal of the Church as a kind of 
 militant republic including within its bounds all 
 Christian nations is still full of vitality. But its 
 literal fulfilment would require the reunion of the 
 separated portions of the Church and a very great 
 weakening of the spirit of nationalism. There are 
 indications of tendencies towards both these, but the 
 world, now Christian only in part, cannot wait till 
 they are consummated, and, even if they were, would 
 
 77 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 not endure Christian authority and rule. But the fact 
 that so great a conception, though imposed from 
 above, so nearly attained success gives good hope 
 that a similar ideal, maintained by the willing co- 
 operation of the nations of the world, may lead to the 
 rule of justice and peace in international affairs. 
 
 ;8 
 
111. 
 
 WHAT HAS THE CHURCH DONE TO 
 RESTRAIN WAR? 
 
 So far the development of a Christian philosophy of 
 war has been considered as a series of ideas grouped 
 round the central concept of war as an act of justice 
 of similar character to the enforcement of judicial 
 decisions in the law-courts. Some account must now 
 be given of the practical measures to restrain war by 
 which (other than by influencing the consciences of 
 rulers) the Church tried to promote justice and peace. 
 During the irruptions of the barbarians into Europe 
 Christian and Roman civilization suffered a grievous 
 set-back, and it was not until the ninth and tenth 
 centuries that the Church had again an opportunity 
 of exercising much influence over communities and 
 states. And even then her Bishops and leaders were 
 chosen from the class of the landed nobles, conspicuous 
 for their political power rather than for Christian 
 learning. Moreover, the power of the central govern- 
 ment was too feeble at this time to maintain order and 
 enforce justice. Disputes between great landowners 
 were settled by private war and not by appeal to an 
 inefficient King. The sword seemed to be supreme, 
 checked neither by Church nor state. Men gave rein 
 to their ambitions and passions, so that the greater 
 part of Europe was in a state of anarchy. 
 
 79 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 But in the year 996 Robert the Pious became King 
 of France, and ruled until 1031. Under his wise 
 governance there was a renaissance of learning in the 
 French Church. He chose his Bishops, not from the 
 classes whose interests lay in maintaining disorder 
 and a feeble central government, but chiefly from the 
 monks of Cluny, brought up to love peace and to stifle 
 ambition and passion. Moreover, in Cluny and other 
 monasteries the teaching of the Christian Fathers, and 
 especially S. Augustine, had been preserved, if not' 
 practised. These Cluniac Bishops, who occupied sees 
 in the North-East of France, where, strangely enough, 
 nine hundred years later, their teaching has been, 
 perhaps for ever, vindicated by the arms of the Allies, 
 brought a fresh breath of knowledge and doctrine 
 into the Church life of the time. The fruit of their 
 teaching was a movement against anarchy and war. 
 It would be difficult to overrate the importance of the 
 fact that this movement had its origin in the Church. 
 It was not inspired by materialistic pacifists who 
 prefer peace to justice and freedom and thus sap the 
 foundations of civilization, making peace impossible. 
 It did not spring from a war-weariness, which is not a 
 sufficiently strong motive to influence by tradition 
 those who have never experienced it. It was not based 
 on expediency or self-interest, which in other circum- 
 stances move men equally powerfully towards blood- 
 shed and war. But it was firmly based on the 
 Christian doctrine that the sword may be rightly 
 drawn in defence of righteousness and justice, but 
 that no Christian may wield it for the furtherance of 
 
 80 
 
What has the Church done ? 
 
 personal ambition or the gratification of passion, nor, 
 indeed, at any time unless he cannot otherwise obtain 
 justice. The French Church, under the leadership of 
 these Bishops, initiated and developed two institu- 
 tions in restraint of the belligerency of the feudal 
 nobles — the Fax Dei and the Treuga Dei. 
 
 Pax Dei 
 
 The usual method by which the Church in those 
 days sought to ensure observation of its decisions was 
 by pronouncing an anathema against those who dis- 
 obeyed. If, as in the case of unruly nobles who paid 
 no attention to the anathema, this was not sufficient, an 
 interdict which forbade public worship was laid upon 
 their lands. 
 
 Experience proved that even this was not an 
 efRcient sanction, for the punishment fell most heavily, 
 not on the guilty, who cared nothing for it, but on 
 their innocent people. Hence arose Leagues for Peace, 
 at Poitiers in the year lOOO, at Verdun in 1016, and at 
 Bourges in 1031. The idea was taken up enthu- 
 siastically, and the leagues spread over Northern 
 France and even into Germany. From 1030 onwards 
 the King of France, the Emperor of Germany, and 
 the Pope, were active in their support. The leagues 
 were inspired by a Christian love of justice and of 
 peace. They relied upon the two institutions which 
 in our own days are being discussed for a League of 
 Nations : (i) Arbitration courts to which members of 
 the League who had a dispute might appeal for 
 justice; (2) a military force to compel recalcitrant 
 
 81 G 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 members to obey the decisions of the court. This 
 force was maintained by the contributions of the con- 
 stituent members. The oath^ which the members took 
 ran as follows : 
 
 " I, , member of the League of Peace, swear on 
 
 the holy Gospels of God to keep the peace faithfully, 
 and to preserve in good faith all that concerns the 
 peace ; and I promise to be faithful to the peace in all 
 things, and in all that is comprised in the peace : I 
 will not spoil, attack, or condemn anyone in hate or 
 self-interest; and so long as he is my man, I will 
 protect each man's right. . . ."^ 
 
 Treuga Dei 
 
 At the same time that the Leagues of Peace were 
 trying to reduce the number of occasions on which 
 Christians might legitimately go to war, an attempt 
 was made to reduce the length of the actual period 
 during which fighting might take place. In 1027 the 
 Council of Elne decreed that no one might make an 
 attack from nine o'clock on Saturday till early on 
 Monday morning. The Truce of God rapidly became 
 popular, and spread over France and Germany. In 
 1085 the Emperor Henry IV. issued a decree ^ by 
 which the Truce of God was extended to include the 
 periods from the beginning of Advent to the Octave 
 of Epiphany, from Septuagesima to the Octave of 
 Pentecost {i.e., from about the beginning of December 
 
 1 See Appendix F for another and longer form of oath. 
 
 2 L'hglise et La Guerre, vii., p. 7. 
 ' See Appendix G. 
 
 82 
 
What lias the Church done ? 
 
 until some time in May, with a short interval of a few 
 weeks in January); Thursday, Friday, Saturday, 
 Sunday, until sunrise on Monday every week {i.e., 
 leaving only Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday each 
 week for fighting); Ember Days; all Festivals, with 
 their Eves, and Fasts. The exceptions to the general 
 prohibition to bear arms during these periods illus- 
 trate with great clearness the Christian doctrine of 
 war as a judicial process. Travellers going a long 
 distance might carry arms for self-defence on the 
 journey, but were to lay them aside on their return. 
 Besiegers might drive back a sally from a castle, but 
 might not themselves make an attack {i.e., their obser- 
 vation of the Truce was not to prejudice their position 
 as to besieged persons who did not observe it). 
 
 If the Emperor publicly ordered an expedition 
 against the enemies of the realm, or held a council to 
 judge the enemies of justice, the Peace did not bind 
 those thus summoned to serve their country. The 
 lawful exercise of judgement over thieves and robbers 
 was no violation of the Peace, and, indeed, robbers and 
 plunderers were excepted from its provisions. Non- 
 combatants, such as merchants, farmers, and agricul- 
 tural labourers, women, and those ordained to holy 
 orders, were to enjoy continual peace. Breach of the 
 Peace was punished by excommunication. Briefly, the 
 Christian as a private citizen is permitted the use of 
 force in self-defence, and as a servant of the state 
 against those who violate justice. No Christian may 
 attack a non-combatant. Unfortunately, Henry IV.'s 
 power was never so great as to enable him to put this 
 
 83 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 admirable Treuga Dei into force. It remains on 
 record as a warning to those whose powers of concep- 
 tion outrun their practical ability to put their schemes 
 into force or to persuade offenders of their injustice. 
 
 The Emperor Frederick Barbarossa issued a some- 
 what similar document^ between 1 152 and 1 157, which 
 provided, amongst other things, for the punishment 
 by deatli of those who, not of necessity, but voluntarily, 
 slew others (§ i); for punishment for assault 
 ( § § 2, 3, 4) ; for extradition of violators of the peace 
 (§ 5); for punishment for illegally bearing arms 
 (§ 12); for permission to bear arms in self-defence 
 (§ 13). Breach of the Peace was punished by death, 
 mutilation, confiscation, or fine. 
 
 The Truce of God thus gradually developed into 
 the King's Peace, and, as the central government 
 grew stronger, became the recognized condition of 
 life within a civilized state. The necessity for private 
 Leagues of Peace and for religious sanctions disap- 
 peared, and public opinion came in time to honour 
 the settlement of disputes in accordance with justice 
 in the law-courts more highly than by the vacillating 
 verdicts of force and violence on the field of battle. 
 
 Finally, S. Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa Theo- 
 logical asked whether it was legitimate to fight on 
 feast-days, and answered the question by saying that 
 as a doctor might exercise his healing ministry on all 
 days, so the healthful condition of the state might be 
 preserved, if necessity arose, by waging just wars on 
 feast-days; adding that if anyone in the face of such 
 J See Appendix H. 2 See Appendix J. 
 
 84 
 
What has the Church done ? 
 
 necessity refused to fight on feast-days he would be 
 tempting God; but that as soon as the necessity 
 ceased, so should the fighting. 
 
 The Third Order of S. Francis of Assisi 
 
 But the day of non-secular organizations for peace 
 was not yet quite over, and amongst them mention 
 must be made of the Third Order of S. Francis of 
 Assisi. The members were persons living in the world, 
 who pursued their ordinary callings, but undertook to 
 observe a special rule of life. They were pledged to 
 maintain peace in their homes and their towns, to be 
 reconciled with their adversaries, to make their wills, 
 not to go to law, not to take the oath of fealty except 
 for such grave reasons as the re-establishment of a just 
 peace, not to bear arms except (according to their 
 Rule, sanctioned by Pope Nicholas IV. in 1289) for the 
 defence of the Church, the Christian faith, or their 
 country. 
 
 This and similar organizations, such as the 
 Humiliati, the Poor Catholics, and S. Dominic's 
 Militia of Jesus Christ, while, like many private 
 societies, they had a great following and influence for 
 a time, were bound in the long-run to succumb before 
 the two great organs of corporate life and action, the 
 Church and the state, which claim men's devotion, 
 service, and obedience as no other bodies ever can. 
 Their value, however, is by no means to be estimated 
 by the length of their existence. That such organiza- 
 tions could spring voluntarily into being, uphold such 
 high ideals of justice and peace, and appeal so strongly 
 
 85 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 to the idealism of the mediaeval mind, could not but 
 be regarded as evidence of great support ready to be 
 given to those who in Church or state attempted to 
 inculcate Christian citizenship. 
 
 Christian Chivalry 
 
 It was not only from below that the Christian 
 ferment worked. The Church attempted to penetrate 
 the feudal nobility of the Middle Ages with Christian 
 ideals of justice and love of peace. She called also 
 into being the Military Orders of Knights to be the 
 defence of Christian civilization against the Moors in 
 Spain, the Turks in South-Eastern Europe, and to 
 rescue and rule the Holy Land itself. She inspired 
 the Crusades, thus blessing militant Christianity and 
 showing feudal barons a more excellent way of em- 
 ploying their military skill than in battering down one 
 another's castles and driving off stolen cattle. The 
 knight was always to respect those who were weak, 
 and to be their defender. He was to be the champion 
 of justice and truth against the unjust and the wicked. 
 The v/ords of blessing pronounced over the sword of 
 tJie new knight make this clear. They occur in the 
 Pontifical of William Durandus,^ written during the 
 second half of the thirteenth century : 
 
 " Bless this sword, that Thy servant may be able to 
 be the defender of churches, of widows, of orphans, 
 and of all those who love God, against the cruelty of 
 heretics and pagans. 
 
 ' L'Eglise el La Guerre, vii., p. 12. 
 86 
 
What has the Church done i" 
 
 " O holy God, almighty Father, God eternal, who 
 alone orderest all things, and disposest them as is 
 right; in order that justice may have a support here 
 below, that the fury of evil-doers may be restrained, 
 for these two causes alone Thou hast allowed by a 
 salutary disposition that men on earth may use the 
 sword, and for the protection of the people Thou hast 
 permitted the institution of chivalry. . . . 
 
 " Behold Thy servant, newly made a knight ; send 
 him from heaven above the strength and courage 
 which he needs for the defence of Faith and Justice 
 . . . and so further him with Thy grace that with this 
 sword he may never strike unjustly, and that with it 
 he may defend all that is just and all that is right." 
 
 Thus the Church sought to permeate European 
 civilization with the spirit of Christianity, on the one 
 hand restraining injustice and wickedness, and on the 
 other urging men on to the defence of the truth 
 against anarchy and barbarism. 
 
 The Right of Sanctuary 
 
 The right of sanctuary was a means of restricting 
 bloodshed, for it ensured that (where it was observed) 
 an interval (the length of which depended on the 
 endurance of the criminal) intervened before he fell 
 into the hands of his pursuers, whose hot temper 
 would meanwhile cool. The right extended over all 
 consecrated ground and buildings — that is, in general, 
 to churches, churchyards, and monasteries. Any 
 robber or thief might flee there, and his pursuers 
 might not seize him, but must wait until hunger forced 
 
 8; 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 him to surrender. No one must supply him with 
 weapons, food, or means of escape. In Henry IV.'s 
 Truce of God this right is sanctioned and regulated. 
 
 Restrictions on Weapons 
 
 The mediaeval Church attempted, but without much 
 success, to limit the kinds of weapons which Christian 
 soldiers might use to those which gave the advantage 
 to the skilful and the brave. Innocent II. (1130-1143) 
 held a council at Rome in 11 39 which forbade the use 
 of cross-bows, arrows, and poisoned darts. It was 
 regarded as unjust that a coward hiding behind a 
 tree with one of these weapons should have a greater 
 chance of victory than a brave soldier advancing in 
 the open with only a sword or a spear. The prohibi- 
 tion of certain weapons {e.g., explosive bullets) has 
 been agreed upon by the Hague Convention, but for a 
 different reason, that, though they inflict far more 
 suffering than ordinary bullets, no military advantage 
 is gained by their employment. 
 
 The Papacy 
 
 The Church, most democratic of organizations, 
 attempted during the Middle Ages to form Europe 
 into a Christian republic, the elected head of which 
 was the Pope. The part which the Pope played in 
 European politics was a great one, and one which, so 
 long as he spoke for the whole of Western Christendom, 
 gave him immeasurable influence for good over belli- 
 cose rulers. A brief examination of the pacific work 
 
 88 
 
What has the Church done ? 
 
 of one Pope in Europe, and a short recital of the way 
 in which the Papacy exercised its influence in this 
 respect on one country, England, will suffice to give 
 some conception of the power of the Hildebrandine 
 ideals both on the Papacy itself and on the mediaeval 
 secular states. 
 
 Innocent III. and European Peace and War 
 
 The career of Pope Innocent III. (1198-1216) illus- 
 trates well the influence of the Papacy upon the inter- 
 national relationships of Europe. In IIQQ, by threats 
 of interdict and excommunication. Innocent forced 
 Philip Augustus, King of France, and Richard Coeur 
 de Lion to conclude a truce for five years. On the 
 death of Richard a few months later the French King 
 declared himself free from his oath and began to wage 
 war on King John, who appealed to the Pope to 
 intervene. Innocent thereupon wrote to both Kings to 
 persuade them to submit their dispute to an assembly 
 of Bishops and magnates who should decide the con- 
 ditions of peace. Philip Augustus disregarded this 
 appeal, and continued the war. In 1204, therefore. 
 Innocent again wrote to the King of France, the King 
 of England, and the French clergy, ingeminating 
 peace. His letter' to Philip is worth quoting : 
 
 "As your royal highness is not unaware that with 
 us there should be no acceptance of persons, we 
 believe you will not bear it grudgingly if we carry out 
 our pastoral duty towards you. . . . We are bound to 
 preach the good tidings of peace to the sons of peace, 
 
 ' See Appendix K, Extract I. 
 89 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 especially that according to the word of the Gospel 
 our peace may rest upon them, since according to the 
 Prophet we are bound to seek peace and ensue it. . . . 
 For you, who have read it in the book of daily experi- 
 ence, know how the quarrel which has arisen between 
 you and our beloved son in Christ, John, the illustrious 
 King of the English, has brought great evils not only 
 upon both your kingdoms, but generally upon all 
 Christian people. For see how while you are fighting 
 churches are destroyed, rich men are made poor, poor 
 men are oppressed, and no consideration is shown 
 either to religion or sex. . . . The Saracens, too, who 
 when you two were at peace feared that they would be 
 driven away, have plucked up their courage at your 
 quarrel and take the field with renewed bravery to 
 destroy the Christians, especially as the French 
 nobles . . . have, contrary to our prohibition, turned 
 their arms against Christians. . . . Lest, therefore, 
 we should seem, like dumb dogs that cannot bark, to 
 be silent in this great necessity of Christian people, 
 we send to you . . . the Abbot of Casemarius . . . 
 begging your highness, and exhorting you in the 
 Lord, and bidding you for the remission of your sins 
 . . . either to make a firm peace with the aforesaid 
 King or to enter upon a fitting truce, that meantime 
 the Abbot may be able with the greater freedom and 
 security to conduct negotiations for a perpetual peace 
 between you, paying due regard to justice upon both 
 sides." 
 
 This letter failed to have the effect desired, as the 
 French Bishops wrote to the Pope saying that the 
 
 90 
 
What has the Church done ? 
 
 dignity of their King would be affronted by sub- 
 mission to his arbitration. Innocent therefore wrote 
 another letter^ to them in which he dealt with their 
 objections to his claim to arbitrate, and set forth the 
 grounds on which he considered the Papal position 
 should be maintained. 
 
 "Let no one think" (he writes) "that we mean to 
 upset or diminish the jurisdiction of the King of the 
 Franks, as he, in turn, neither wishes, nor ought, to 
 hinder ours. And as we are unable to exercise our 
 own jurisdiction to the full, why should we desire to 
 usurp another's ? But as the Lord said in the Gospel 
 (Matt, xviii. 15-18), 'But if thy brother shall sin 
 against thee . . . tell it to the Church . . .' ; and as 
 the King of the English asserts that he is ready to 
 demonstrate that the King of the Franks sins against 
 him, and that he tried to proceed to his correction 
 according to the Gospel rule, but that, being unsuc- 
 cessful, he told it to the Church, how could we, who 
 are called to rule the Church universal by supreme 
 power, fail to listen to the Divine command and 
 refrain from following its direction, unless the King of 
 the Franks should show sufficient reason to the 
 contrary before us or our Legate ? For we do not 
 intend to give judgement about the fief, the judgement 
 of which matter rests with him . . . but to decide 
 about the wrong-doing, for which the right of censure 
 undoubtedly pertains to us, which censure we can and 
 must exercise over anybody. The King, therefore, 
 should not think it unbecoming to his royal dignity to 
 1 See Appendix K, Extract II. 
 91 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 submit himself in this affair to our apostolic judgement. 
 . . . Our power is not of man, but of God. No person 
 in his senses is ignorant that it is our duty to rebuke 
 any Christian for mortal sin, and if he contemn our 
 correction, to compel him by ecclesiastical discipline. 
 . . . But perhaps it will be said that Kings must be 
 treated differently from other people. We know, how- 
 ever, that it is written in the Divine law, ' Thou shalt 
 judge the great as the small, nor shall there be with 
 thee acceptance of persons. . . .' There is no doubt 
 that we have power to proceed in this way against 
 every grave sin, in order that we may recall the sinner 
 from vice to virtue, from error to truth, especially when 
 the sin is one against peace, 'which is the bond of 
 love.' . . . Further, since whatever law a man has 
 legitimately employed against his adversary, another 
 may use against him, . . . and since the King of the 
 Franks made use in war of our office and mediation 
 against Richard, late King of the English, how does 
 he not admit for another against himself that which 
 he admitted for himself against another ? Must there 
 be with us weight and weight, measure and measure, 
 both of which are abominable in God's sight ? Lastly, 
 since a treaty of peace made between the two Kings 
 and confirmed on both sides by an appropriate oath 
 had not been observed until the appointed date, must 
 we not be able to take cognizance of the sacred nature 
 of an oath— a function which without doubt pertains 
 to the Church — in order that the broken treaty may be 
 repaired ? Lest, therefore, we should seem disguisedly 
 to favour so great a breach of peace, to hush up the 
 
 92 
 
What has the Church done ? 
 
 destruction of monasteries, to disregard the slaughter 
 of the Christian populace, we gave directions to our 
 dear son, the Abbot of Casemarius, our aforementioned 
 Legate, that he should not omit to proceed accord- 
 ing to the form we gave him unless the King 
 should make a firm peace with the aforementioned 
 King, or enter upon a fitting truce, or should humbly 
 permit the Abbot and our venerable brother the Arch- 
 bishop of Bordeaux to find out clearly whether the 
 complaint of the King of the English against him 
 were just, or whether his objection to that (which he 
 has thought right to express to us in his letters against 
 him) were legitimate. And so by the apostolic writ- 
 ings we command you all, strictly enjoining you, in 
 virtue of your obedience, after the Abbot has executed 
 this apostolic command, to receive his sentence, which 
 indeed is rather ours, with humility, and both to keep 
 it yourselves, and see that others observe it; in the 
 assurance that if you fail in this we shall punish your 
 disobedience." 
 
 The importance of this letter, which unfortunately 
 failed altogether to attain its immediate aim, lies in 
 the comprehensive statement of the Pope's claims to 
 act as arbitrator even in international affairs. 
 
 He admits without question the sovereign rights of 
 feudal jurisdiction possessed by the French King, and 
 emphatically declares that as the King ought not to 
 interfere with the Papal jurisdiction, so he does not 
 desire or intend to upset the King's by delivering 
 judgement concerning the fief in dispute. But he is 
 bound to obey the Gospel rule according to which the 
 
 93 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 King of England has appealed to him, and cannot 
 forgo the right of the Church to take cognizance of 
 breaches of the Christian law. History showed that 
 the admission of this claim was nothing of which the 
 French King need be ashamed on the score of loss of 
 dignity. And sins against peace were the gravest for 
 which the Pope must censure offenders, including even 
 Kings. Besides, what King John was doing now, the 
 French King had himself done against King Richard, 
 and surely he could not justly complain if the 
 legitimate means by which he had proceeded against 
 another in the past were now employed against him- 
 self. Finally, there was no doubt that a treaty had 
 been made between the two Kings, and confirmed by 
 oaths ; that the treaty, and with it the oaths, had been 
 broken ; and that any question of the violation of an 
 oath came undoubtedly within the spiritual juris- 
 diction of the Church. For all these reasons the Pope 
 felt that he could not withdraw his claims to act as 
 arbitrator in the matter, and called upon the French 
 Bishops to accept whatever award the Legate should 
 make. 
 
 In this question of the Papal right of arbitration is 
 seen again, as in the more limited case of the Treuga 
 Dei, that the Church's attempt to settle international 
 disputes without recourse to war is based primarily 
 upon a moral ground — that of sin and of breach of 
 moral law — which raises it at once to a higher level 
 than attempts inspired by self-interest, expediency, or 
 the relative strength of the disputants. The failure of 
 such an attempt, however much regretted, was perhaps 
 
 94 
 
What has the Church done ? 
 
 only to be expected when we consider the inadequate 
 technical equipment of the Papacy for what was, after 
 all, a by-work, and the emergence as a decisive factor 
 in European politics of a patriotism founded upon 
 national pride and consciousness of strength, rather 
 than upon a sense of vqcation and a recognition of 
 responsibility. 
 
 As an arbitrator Innocent exercised a widespread 
 influence in Europe, and it is recorded that he acted 
 in that capacity in Portugal, in Aragon, in Poland, 
 in Armenia, in Bulgaria, in Serbia, in Suabia, and in 
 Brunswick. 
 
 He kept a tight rein upon the Crusaders as they 
 marched eastwards, trying to prevent them from 
 entering unjustly upon hostilities against Constan- 
 tinople. Writing to them, he says : " We inhibit you 
 under pain of excommunication from invading the 
 lands of Christians or damaging them unless they 
 themselves wrongfully bar your way or some other 
 just and necessary reason unexpectedly occur." 
 
 He attempted also to stop a war from which the 
 right intention had disappeared, and which had 
 become a war of ambition and conquest. Though his 
 whole policy with regard to the Albigenses has been 
 called in question, it must be admitted that for a long 
 time he acted in the spirit of conciliation towards 
 people whose opinions, if put into practice, would 
 have upset the social economy of the time. It was 
 only when an official of the Count of Toulouse mur- 
 dered his Legate that he preached a Crusade against 
 them. He called to his aid the feudal barons of the 
 
 95 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 North of France. But the gross excesses of these 
 Crusaders, and the ambitious designs of Simon de 
 Montfort, who aimed at depriving even the heirs of 
 Raymond VI. of Toulouse of their inheritance, made 
 him see in 1210 that the intention with which the war 
 was being waged was no longer to attain a just and 
 durable peace, but to scheme for power and conquer 
 fresh territory. He attempted, therefore, to bring the 
 Crusade to a close. But he found it easier to rouse 
 than to still the storm of war. It was not tiU 1213 
 that he was able to write to the Archbishop of 
 Narbonne, who, with Simon de Montfort, was in 
 charge of the Crusade, in these words : 
 
 " Foxes were destroying the Lord's vineyard in 
 Languedoc, but they have been captured. By the 
 grace of God and by the virtue of military operations 
 the affair of the Faith has ended in these districts in 
 success ... we beg you to arrange with the King of 
 Aragon and with the Counts, barons, and other persons 
 whose help seems necessary to you, to hasten meetings 
 for concluding a truce of peace. Be zealous in pacify- 
 ing the whole of Languedoc; cease stirring up the 
 Christian people to war against heresy. . . ." 
 
 To Simon de Montfort he wrote in stronger terms : 
 " The forces of the Crusade you have used to spill 
 the blood of the just and to damage the innocent. To 
 the detriment of the King of Aragon, you have pos- 
 sessed yourself of the lands of his vassals, the Count 
 of Comminges and the Viscount of Beam, though 
 there are no heretics in their dominions. . . . We beg 
 you to restore these lands to the King of Aragon and 
 
 96 
 
What has the Church done ? 
 
 his vassals. It is not right that in illegally detaining 
 what belongs to tliem you should appear to have served 
 your own private interests and not the general cause of 
 the Church and of religion." 
 
 In another letter he wrote : 
 
 " It is true he [the Count of Toulouse] is guilty, but 
 justice demands that a man should only be punished 
 for the faults which he has committed, and that the 
 punishment should be proportioned to the crime." 
 
 And he did his best to preserve some vestige of 
 independence to the conquered Count. 
 
 The Papacy and England's War and Peace 
 
 The interventions of the Papacy in English history 
 from the eleventh century onwards began with Harold. 
 On the ground that he had broken his oath to William 
 of Normandy and had no right to the Kingdom he 
 was excommunicated by Alexander II. (1061-1073), on 
 the advice of Hildebrand. The Pope sent the Duke a 
 sacred standard and blessed his expedition to the 
 shores of England, as that of an outraged heir setting 
 out to take up his heritage. Gregory VII. (Hilde- 
 brand, Pope 1 073- 1 085) tried to prevent Philip I. of 
 France from fighting against William the Conqueror. 
 Innocent II. (1130-1143) recognized Stephen's claim to 
 the throne as against Matilda, and attempted to arbi- 
 trate between England and Scotland. Alexander III. 
 (11 59-1 181) and Celestine III. (1191-1198) attempted 
 to make peace between England and France. Clement 
 III. (1187-1191) in 1 189 attempted to reconcile the 
 Kings of France and England, so that they might 
 
 9; H 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 take part in the Third Crusade. His appeal was even 
 taken up by the popular poet, Pons de Capdeuil : 
 " King of France, 'King of England, make your peace 
 with one another, and he who first consents to this 
 shall have the higher honour in the eyes of the Eternal." 
 As a result of Clement's appeal, Richard asked Philip 
 to meet him, and an agreement was reached to make 
 peace and set out on the Crusade in the spring of 1 190. 
 The activity of Innocent III. (1198-1216) in the reign 
 of King John has been already mentioned. Boniface 
 VIII. (i 294-1 303) ordered Philip the Fair of France to 
 observe the truce v.'hich he had made with England, 
 and made peace between England and Scotland. 
 
 Many Popes tried to end the Flundred Years' War 
 between the French and the English — Benedict XII. 
 (1334-1342), Clement VI. (1342-1352), Innocent VI. 
 (13 52-1 362), Urban V. (i 362-1 370), and Gregory XI. 
 (1370-1378). Martin V. (1417-1431) from the time of 
 his election was especially eager for peace. In 14 18, 
 1 419, 1420, and again after the death of Henry V., in 
 1425 and 1430, he offered to mediate between England, 
 France, and Burgundy. Nicholas V. (1447-1455) 
 desired England and France to compose their differ- 
 ences and join in fighting the Turks, then at the gates 
 of C-onstantmople, and m 1455 Calixtus III. (1455- 
 1458) acted as mediator between France and 
 England. Pius II. (.(Eneas Silvius, Pope 1458-1464) 
 tried to arrange a conference between English and 
 French representatives to settle outstanding questions 
 of dispute. 
 
 Whatever difference of opinion there may be as to 
 98 
 
What has the Church done ? 
 
 the knowledge of politics and the wisdom of action 
 which the mediaeval Popes displayed in their inter- 
 vention between states as arbitrators or mediators, 
 there must be general agreement that they were 
 inspired by a deep-seated love of peace and justice, 
 and by a sense of their duty to uphold a high standard 
 of international morality. It was an ungrateful task 
 to mediate between passionate and ambitious rulers, a 
 task rendered no less difficult by the fact that it lay, 
 strictly speaking, outside the commission of the 
 Papacy, and involved it in forming judgements for 
 which it was ill-equipped. 
 
 These details of the attempts of the Church in the 
 Middle Ages to restrain war, to limit its legitimate 
 occasions, its motives, its duration, and its weapons, 
 have been thus dwelt upon because they illustrate 
 those ideals of mediaeval life to which at length the 
 world is gradually returning, and without which the 
 European character must deteriorate. They are well 
 summed up in an eloquent passage by a modern 
 historian : ^ 
 
 " A matter-of-fact prosperity is not altogether pre- 
 ferable to enlistment in the forlorn hope of idealism. 
 Had mediaeval society been more consistently secular 
 and sceptical, it might have been more prosperous, 
 more stable, the nursery of more balanced natures, and 
 the theatre of more orderly careers. But there would 
 have been the less to learn from the ethical and 
 political conceptions of the age. What appeals to us 
 1 H. W. C. Davis, Mediccval Europe, Home University Library, 
 
 p. 154- 
 
 99 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 in the mediaeval outlook upon life is, first, the idea of 
 mankind as a brotherhood transcending racial and 
 political divisions, united in a common quest for 
 truth, filled with the spirit of mutual charity and 
 mutual helpfulness, and endowed with a higher will 
 and wisdom than that of the individuals who belong 
 to it ; secondly, a profound belief in the superiority of 
 right over might, of spirit over matter, of the eternal 
 interests of humanity over the ambitions and the 
 passions of the passing hour. Without Christianity 
 these articles of faith would scarcely have passed into 
 the common heritage of men ; and without the Church 
 it is in the last degree improbable that Christianity 
 would have survived that age of semi-barbarism in 
 which the foundations of the modern world were laid." 
 These two great ideas, the brotherhood of man in 
 common sonship of the Father, and the search first of 
 all for the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, 
 are the true bases of any League of Nations which 
 aspires to resist the attacks of the self-interest of 
 classes or nations, of selfishness, injustice, and 
 languor. 
 
 lOO 
 
IV. 
 
 HOW CAN THE CHURCH HELP FORWARD 
 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ? 
 
 At tlie present time there is a more deeply rooted and 
 widespread desire to stop war for always than perhaps 
 has ever before found a place in men's hearts. It is 
 not necessary to search for the motives which have 
 given rise to this wish beyond the obvious reaction 
 against the horrors and losses of war, and a feeling of 
 anger against the rulers and peoples whose consistent 
 policy has brought about so much suffering and pain. 
 It is, indeed, doubtful whether this motive will appre- 
 ciably influence the generation during the last thirty 
 years of this, the twentieth century. For the mass of 
 European people were not influenced from 1870 
 onwards by the horrors and losses of the Napoleonic 
 Wars. Nor do we find, looking farther back into 
 European history, that mere disgust of war has been 
 so powerful a motive as to affect much more than, if 
 indeed so much as, the immediate generation of the 
 sufferers. This war, it is true, has involved more men, 
 more peoples, greater material loss and destruction, 
 than any previous conflict. But unless this generation 
 can so precipitate and mould its horror of war as to 
 hand on, not a tradition of endurance merely, but, as 
 it were, a formal consequence of that horror, the suffer- 
 
 lOI 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 ings which we have endured v/ill not deter our great- 
 grandchildren from fi-ghting. 
 
 It is perhaps partly the perception of this necessity 
 of creating a standing protest against war that has 
 led to the popular cry for a League of Nations to 
 prevent war. And it is necessary for the Church to 
 consider seriously whether she can in any way help 
 forward the idea, either by giving precision to the 
 nebulous conception of a League, or by exerting her 
 still great influence towards its creation and per- 
 manence. 
 
 What, then, is really involved in the idea of a 
 League of Nations, when we pass from the region of 
 popular cries to that of practical politics ? A League 
 to prevent war would make war inevitable for ever. 
 For it would not avail to bind the just, who value 
 righteousness above peace; nor the unjust, who do 
 not scruple to use might against right. There must 
 be something more true to human nature than mere 
 horror of war and prevention of v/ar as the motive 
 that creates and the object that maintains so vast a 
 conception as a League of Nations. Some great 
 positive good must be shown to reside in the idea 
 before the proud nations of the world can be expected 
 to involve themselves and their heirs in so great a 
 sacrifice as a League demands. As a working hypo- 
 thesis, a step in advance of the popular cry to prevent 
 v/ar, the League of Nations may be defined as a 
 combination of states which shall agree to settle all 
 differences without recourse to war. This definition 
 brings before us the settlement of disputes rather than 
 
 102 
 
How can the Church help r 
 
 the prevention of war as the object of the League, and 
 is worth a closer examination. 
 
 Our first difficulty is connected with the thought of 
 combination. For combination of two or more 
 hitherto antagonistic parties involves surrender by one 
 or more of something or other which they value. In 
 this case combination means the surrender of some 
 part of the sovereign power of each state — viz., its 
 prerogative of fighting out its disputes with its enemy, 
 while other states " keep the ring," for the benefit of 
 the whole body. The loss of this prerogative would 
 not in practice affect all states equally. The demobil- 
 ization of the Peruvian Army would mean much less 
 to Peru and to the world than the disbanding of the 
 British Navy would mean to the British Empire. 
 States would be asked to give up their prerogative 
 power to maintain peace or to go to war, from what- 
 ever motives seemed sufficient to them to justify the 
 expenditure in men and money. And they would be 
 asked to abandon the generally acted upon considera- 
 tion that unless they deliberately bring it upon them- 
 selves they will not be interfered with by other states 
 in the course of their own conflicts, but that, just or 
 unjust, they may fight it out to the conclusion of an 
 iniquitous peace which may, without hindrance from 
 others, be dictated by a strong state, armed and evil, 
 to a weak state, beaten but righteous. 
 
 Nor is the idea of the state itself without grave 
 difficulties, especially at the present time. The growth 
 of national sentiment during the last four hundred 
 years has been so great that it is almost an accepted 
 
 103 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 axiom at the present day that a nation is entitled to 
 be a state — that is, to have a separate and sovereign 
 government, independent of all external control. The 
 Church has not yet faced the implications of this 
 nationalism, which sprang from the breakdown of the 
 Empire and the Papacy and from the extension of 
 European sovereignty to other continents. We find 
 little or no trace of it in the early and middle ages of 
 the Christian era, as witness the writings of S. Augus- 
 tine and S. Thomas Aquinas, already quoted and 
 discussed. Nor are we altogether clear in our minds 
 even as to what constitutes a nation. In some cases, 
 plainly, natural geographical boundaries, in others 
 community of race, of language, or of religion, have 
 been such as to bind people so closely together as to 
 constitute them a nation for practical purposes. But 
 it is probably true that ultimately a nation is a nation 
 because its members think so, and that sentiment, 
 founded, perhaps, originally upon reasons which may 
 have lost their validity in the course of time or by the 
 alterations of circumstances, is the final and determin- 
 ing cause of a nation's existence. And sentiment is 
 a difficult motive to deal with, especially when natifcns 
 are to be asked to surrender their prerogative of war, 
 which is one of the main marks of their sovereign 
 independence. 
 
 And in this combination of states which is to agree 
 to settle all its differences without recourse to war, are 
 all the members to have an equal voice and authority ? 
 Men differ enormously, it is true, in strength and 
 mental capacity, but still within limits which ensure a 
 
 104 
 
How can the Church help ? 
 
 reasonable equality in political matters in the presence 
 of large numbers, especially when they are in the same 
 or nearly the same stage of civilization and develop- 
 ment. But in a League of Nations there would be 
 states differing so greatly in size and strength, in 
 political and moral capacity and perception, that com- 
 bined action, if the smaller units are to do more than 
 float like corks down-stream, would be practically 
 impossible. 
 
 In fact, the more the project of a League of Nations 
 is investigated, the more difficult does it appear to be 
 to bring it into practical existence. It would, no 
 doubt, be easy enough to draw up a paper constitu- 
 tion, which might for a time deceive and satisfy those 
 who are ignorant of public affairs, or simply cry out 
 for a League because everybody else is doing so. But 
 it would be worth no more than Prussia's guarantee of 
 Belgian neutrality — an agreement kept only so long 
 as convenient. Any League of Nations which is to be 
 a lasting political possession for the world must be 
 based on something more than a written agreement 
 signed with mental reservations. 
 
 The Christian philosophy of war, as we have seen, 
 has steadily and consistently moved towards the 
 advocacy of reducing the number of people who may 
 declare a just war, the number of occasions on which 
 war may legitimately be declared, and the times during 
 which, and the weapons with which, war might be 
 waged. But the attempts of the Church during the 
 Middle Ages to impose the practice of her teaching by 
 authority on recalcitrant states met with but scanty 
 
 105 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 success. For example, she failed in her attempt to 
 prohibit the use of cross-bows, and to stop the Albi- 
 gensian Crusade. This failure was due, amongst 
 other reasons, to the fact that she had other work 
 which was more properly her own, the success of 
 which she did not wish to jeopardize by insisting on 
 obedience in what v/as not her true province of 
 authority, and partly to the fact that states found it 
 profitable to their policies to refuse to acknowledge 
 the limitations which she tried to impose. And what 
 the Church could not win the assent of Europe to 
 when she was united and strong, she could not hope 
 to succeed in now that she is divided and nationalized, 
 and thereby doubly weakened for her contest with an 
 unjust state. No merely national Church could hope 
 to stand up for long against a state which was able 
 by studying, as the Hohenzollerns studied, the self- 
 interest of the community and the citizens, to lure 
 them on to condonation, and from condonation to 
 enthusiastic support, of a policy of aggression. More- 
 over, the Reformation and the growth of national 
 sentiment and commercial empire turned men's 
 thoughts from the main lines of the traditional 
 Christian philosophy of war, so that the investigation 
 of international relationships fell into the hands of 
 civil lawyers, such as Hugo Grotius, who did not 
 belong to a great society of world-wide extent and 
 power, but were interested rather in asserting the 
 rights of national independence than the duties of 
 social fellowship. There was, indeed, one Christian 
 philosopher who glanced at the idea of the society of 
 
 1 06 
 
How can the Church help ? 
 
 nations. In his Laws of Ecclcsiaslical Polity, Richard 
 Hooker (1554-1600) says : 
 
 " Now, besides tliat law which simply concerneth 
 men as men, and that which belongeth unto them as 
 they are men linked with others in some form of 
 politic society, there is a third kind of law which 
 toucheth all such several bodies politic, so far forth as 
 one of them hath public commerce with another. And 
 this third is the Law of Nations. . . . Civil society 
 doth more content the nature of man than any private 
 kind of solitary living, because in society this good of 
 mutual participation is so much larger than otherwise. 
 Herewith notwithstanding we are not satisfied, but we 
 covet (if it might be) to have a kind of society and 
 fellowship even with all mankind. And an effect of 
 that very natural desire in us (a manifest token that 
 we wish after a sort an universal fellowship with all 
 men) appeareth by the wonderful delight men have 
 . . . to be in league of amity v/ith them [other people] : 
 and this not only for traffick's sake, or to the end that 
 v.'hen many are confederated each may make other 
 the more strong, but for such cause also as moved the 
 Queen of Saba to visit Solomon. . . . But v/hat 
 matter the Law of Nations doth contain I omit to 
 search."^ 
 
 And to this day the Church has never had the 
 enterprise or the courage to take up the search which 
 the judicious Hooker unhappily omitted. It m.ay be 
 that in the circumstances of his time and race he was 
 rio-ht, but if the minds of Christians all the world 
 
 1 Ecclesiastical Polity, I. x. 12, 13. 
 107 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 over had been turned to this great problem during the 
 last three centuries, surely they would by now have 
 escaped from the confusion of thought which at 
 present entangles them. 
 
 It may be due partly to our system of party 
 government, which often makes men ignore the fact 
 that questions of justice are involved in questions of 
 politics ; or partly to our national devotion to games, 
 such as cricket and football, in which, so long as 
 there is no foul play, there is no moral question at 
 issue (and then only between the umpire or referee 
 and the offending players), but an intense desire on 
 both sides for victory ; or it may be partly due to our 
 individualistic industrial system, that the ordinary 
 Christian citizen of to-day naturally assumes that the 
 foreign policy of the state must be guided mainly, if 
 not solely, by selfish considerations. So long as our 
 industrial life and our political life at home and 
 abroad are so open to the appeal of self-interest that 
 many good men can hardly conceive of any stronger 
 motive for their guidance, so long will a League of 
 Nations be impossible. And here the Church's task 
 begins to take shape and form. She must begin by 
 leading Christians back to the thought that the state 
 is a moral being, existing for moral purposes, and as 
 such, and only as such, entitled to their obedience and 
 support. She must hold up steadfastly a high ideal 
 of citizenship to her members, and a high ideal of 
 policy to the state. This is not the place to enter upon 
 a discussion of the value of the so-called " establish- 
 ment " of the Church in England, but this much may 
 
 io8 
 
How can the Church help ? 
 
 be said, that the value of that " establishment " is far 
 greater to the state than to the Church. For the 
 Church has in the past existed, and could again 
 survive, not only without the approval of the state, 
 but in spite of Imperial persecution, whereas no state 
 could for long exist without a moral foundation, the 
 sanctions of which must rest now in the law and 
 teaching of Almighty God. 
 
 The questions of international politics are, ulti- 
 mately and fundamentally, like all questions which 
 involve the mediate or immediate relationship of man 
 to man, questions which, if they are to be satisfactorily 
 settled, must be determined by moral considerations. 
 The Church must therefore proclaim with all her 
 power that the problem of a League of Nations is a 
 moral problem — a question of righteousness and 
 justice rather than of temporary war-weariness and 
 horror, or of self-interest and ambition. But these 
 problems are also questions of civil government, and, 
 as such, must in the end be decided by those to whom 
 civil authority is entrusted, and who are responsible 
 for the welfare of the community over which they are 
 called to rule. Statesmen, aided by political philoso- 
 phers, are the right persons to work out the solutions 
 to the problems with which they have to deal. The 
 Church's task is not to inform their minds but their 
 consciences. " The Church is, as it were, the mould of 
 justice," defining its form and its limits, and preserv- 
 ing in solid shape, according with the eternal laws of 
 truth and right and faith, the fluid thought which 
 otherwise would run to waste and miss its application. 
 
 109 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 The modern man of European stock is crying out 
 for an ideal of social relationship which shall give all 
 his faculties free play, and which shall give unity to 
 his life in every aspect. He is forced now to live 
 inconsistently in the grip of a contradiction which 
 demands that the loving father, who would die to save 
 his child's life, be compelled to struggle day by day 
 agamst his fellow-men for his bread, and to develop 
 his bodily strength at the expense of his mind, and 
 both to the starvation of his soul. Now is the time 
 and opportunity of the Church, as never before, to 
 commend her faith to mankind, as that by which alone 
 men may be saved. It will only be by adopting as 
 the ideal of man's relationship to man the Master's 
 word — " As ye would that men should do to you, do 
 ye also to them likewise " — that justice will be done to 
 all men, always, and in all places. 
 
 Now, with regard to the Christian philosophy of 
 war and its application to the idea of a League of 
 Nations this initial difficulty must be faced, that 
 hitherto the Church has, like an old-fashioned medical 
 man, rather dealt with the international relationships 
 of Europe when they are morbid than taken care to 
 regulate them in times of peace when they may be 
 presumed to be healthy, and when men's minds are 
 not inflamed by national pride. She must now be 
 careful to observe those relationships in health, so that 
 she may the more clearly assist in their treatment 
 when diseased. It is plain that the ideal for states as 
 for men is to live in justice and at peace with one 
 another, in a normally healthy activity of intercourse. 
 
 no 
 
How can the Church help ? 
 
 But there is this great obstacle to the long continuance 
 of that normal health — viz., that there exists no ready 
 and generally applied method of settling difficulties 
 and disputes which from time to time arise. War is 
 recognized as unsatisfactory because it cannot be so 
 lightly enterprised as to solve small difficulties, which 
 therefore, left unsettled, cause lasting ill-feeling; 
 because it entails such suffering and loss; and because 
 there is no guarantee that the losses will be accom- 
 panied by the victory of the side on which justice lies. 
 The first thing, therefore, which the Church must work 
 for is a League formed on the clear understanding 
 that it comes into existence for the promotion of 
 exactly the same objects as those for which society 
 exists at all, justice and peace : so that the life of 
 states, like that of men, may be no longer in "con- 
 tinual fear and danger of violent death ; solitary, poor, 
 nasty, brutish, and short." 
 
 Any League of Nations that is to be lasting must 
 therefore be, not to prevent war, but to ensure justice. 
 
 An attempt merely to prevent war opens the way at 
 once to a lowering of the moral standard and the 
 spread of a materialistic pacifism whicli prefers peace 
 to righteousness. 
 
 Justice is best ensured by making it both easy and 
 honourable to submit disputes to a disinterested party. 
 And the majority of international disputes are of such 
 a character as to render them peculiarly open to such 
 decisions. Most of them are concerned with frontiers 
 and frontier territory. With the present temper of 
 national European feeling it should not be difficult to 
 
 III 
 
The Sword of justice 
 
 settle these once for all. But the great questions of the 
 future will probably concern raw materials. Some, 
 such as cotton and rubber, can only be produced in 
 certain areas of the world's surface, and others, such as 
 coal, iron, and oil, cannot be produced at all, but are 
 only found in certain districts. It is the effort to 
 provide the means of civilized life which has led in 
 the past to the great movements and invasions of 
 peoples. Disputes over the terms on which those who 
 have raw materials shall supply them to others can 
 only be finally settled by international agreements 
 covering the whole field. It is easy to see how im- 
 portant a step towards this international settlement 
 would be taken if every state controlled the export to 
 other states of the raw materials produced within its 
 territories. 
 
 A League of Nations to ensure justice must, then, 
 provide some easy and honourable means of settling 
 disputes, which will arise no matter how just the 
 periodical rearrangements which it would also under- 
 take. And in the idea of easiness must be included 
 reasonable cheapness and speed, so that no riches or 
 dilatory methods might be employed by one or other 
 party to its own advantage ; and in the idea of honour 
 so much prestige that no state, however great or old, 
 should be ashamed to abide by the court's decision, 
 even against its own interests. 
 
 Some such court, in which all states could obtain 
 justice, and the verdict of which both parties would 
 generally agree to accept, would go far towards avoid- 
 ing occasions of warfare. But its estabishment would 
 
 112 
 
How can the Church help ? 
 
 involve what would be regarded as great sacrifices 
 from the states submitting to its judgement — giving 
 up the responsibility of judging in their cause, and to 
 some extent the power of using their armed forces for 
 their own purposes at their own will. 
 
 The decisions of this court, however just, would not 
 be for long respected unless some sanction were 
 attached to them, nor could outstanding states be 
 brought within the League unless it were very plain 
 to see that it was better, on every ground which was 
 legitimate, to be a willing consentient. It would be 
 necessary to devise some means of enforcing the 
 verdict of the court. The employment of force would 
 be regarded by the Church as a legitimate use of the 
 sword of justice, to be supported without scruple by 
 all Christians. The use of the sword is only right for 
 Christians in pursuit of justice and peace. Those who 
 disregarded the decisions of the court of the League 
 would be sinning against justice and making peace 
 impossible. Christians would therefore (and that more 
 readily than ever before, as no one but the offender 
 would be then acting as a judge in his own case) be 
 following out the traditional teaching of the Church 
 in fighting for right and peace. 
 
 It was seen in the discussion of the question whether 
 Christians might ever avail themselves of force that a 
 Christian was at liberty to fight in a just war, to act 
 as the executioner of judicial sentences, and to use 
 force in defence of himself and his family and goods. 
 The idea of a League of Nations would put states in 
 this respect upon almost the same moral plane as 
 
 113 I 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 private Christians are now — that is to say, they might 
 use force to carry out the sentences of the court, to 
 which all states could appeal for justice. It is worth 
 noticing in passing, with regard to the jurisdiction of 
 the proposed international court, that in civil life, 
 though there are some wrongs which men are at 
 liberty to pass by without prosecuting the wrong-doer, 
 there are others so grave that the state, when cognizant 
 of them, will itself prosecute the offender, whether the 
 person wronged consent or not; and, secondly, that 
 even when a defendant refuses to appear or to acknow- 
 ledge the jurisdiction of the proper court, such refusal 
 is no bar to the proceedings and to the due execution 
 of the sentence. There would, therefore, have to be 
 some supernational prosecutor to deal with wrongs 
 which, if unpunished, would menace the life of the 
 League, and to deal with corrupt bargains between 
 two or more states to the detriment of the other 
 members ; and the members of the League would have 
 to be quite resolute that no evil-doing state should 
 escape punishment by refusing to submit its defence 
 to the court. 
 
 But besides this right to draw the sword at the 
 bidding of the international court, each state would 
 naturally retain the right of self-defence for itself and 
 its lawful possessions. The size of the army or navy 
 which each maintained would depend on the size and 
 position of its territories. This constitutes a differ- 
 ence between members of the League and private 
 citizens. If a citizen arms himself at all, a revolver 
 is commonly regarded as enough for any man; no 
 
 114 
 
How can the Church help ? 
 
 man lines his carriage-drive with machine-guns or 
 plants trench-mortars beside his front-door. But 
 states are so various in size that the forces kept up for 
 self-defence must plainly be very much greater in 
 some cases than in others. Ten gendarmes and a 
 motor-boat may suffice for Monte Carlo, but the 
 British Empire must maintain a navy sufficient to 
 ensure itself power to defend its component members 
 scattered over the face of the globe. 
 
 The establishment of such a League, aiming at 
 justice in peace for all states, and such a court, pre- 
 pared to take action to enforce its decisions, would 
 give the Church an opportunity to state clearly her 
 considered philosophy of war, and to lay a definite 
 duty upon her members as the practical outcome of 
 her teaching. 
 
 The Church would teach on some such lines as 
 these : 
 
 1. That no Christian may engage in a war that 
 is unjust, either as a combatant or a non-com- 
 batant. 
 
 2. That there are just wars — that is, wars in which 
 Christians ought to serve as combatants or non-com- 
 batants, when called upon to do so. 
 
 3. That just wars are of two kinds — wars of self- 
 defence and judicial v/ars. 
 
 4. That wars of self-defence are wars undertaken 
 {a) on the authority of the Christian's own state; {b) 
 to resist unprovoked attack; (c) to preserve the life 
 and rights of his state. 
 
 5. That judicial wars are wars undertaken {a) on 
 
 "5 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 the authority of the international court ; (b) to punish 
 offenders or to enforce sentence upon recalcitrant 
 states (whether the Christian's own state were imme- 
 diately involved or not) ; (c) with a right intention — 
 viz., to fight no longer than should be necessary to 
 fulfil the purpose of the war by satisfying the require- 
 ments of justice and executing the sentence of the 
 court. 
 
 If the Church could determine to adopt a summary 
 statement of her teaching on war such as the above, 
 not only in England, but in all the states belonging to 
 the League, her influence on the side of justice and 
 peace would be enormously increased, and men would 
 appreciate more highly her witness to the truth as it 
 is in Christ Jesus. But in order that she might act in 
 this way two things at least are necessary— unity for 
 practical purposes between the separated branches of 
 the Church, and the recovery of some sort of 
 disciplinary power over her members. 
 
 The Christian's obedience to the state, as we have 
 already seen, is unilateral. The Church would have 
 every sanction in teaching that Christians owed a 
 similarly unilateral obedience to the decisions of the 
 court of the League. That is to say. Christians should 
 obey these decisions in God, and for God, according 
 to His holy Word and ordinance. In furtherance of 
 those decisions they would be prepared to draw the 
 sword, unless it was plain that they were contrary to 
 God's commands. And if the state of which they 
 were members defied justice, the Church should bid 
 Christians refuse to support or fight for that state in 
 
 ii6 
 
How can the Church help ? 
 
 its unjust policy. States must learn that their acts 
 cannot be withdrawn from the categories of morality, 
 and that Christians will not support them in deeds of 
 sin. And now that success in war depends on the 
 efforts of the whole population, which also ultimately 
 controls the policy of the state, it is no longer possible 
 either for Christians to escape responsibility, or for 
 a despotic government, relying upon a professional 
 army, to make war without regard to the opinions of 
 its people. The day has gone by when the Church 
 could influence the state through great ecclesiastical 
 statesmen such as Lanfranc, Becket, Stephen Langton, 
 Hugh of Lincoln, and Wolsey, though noble men can 
 never lack the influence that flows from spiritual 
 power. But it is now the time when the power of the 
 mass of Churchpeople may make itself felt in the 
 causes of justice, good faith, and peace. 
 
 The Church's task remains the same as it has ever 
 been : to persuade men of the Truth which alone can 
 make them free; to persuade them that in their 
 common sonship they are also brethren and members 
 one of another, and must therefore pass from compe- 
 tition and strife into unity of spirit and the bond of 
 peace; to persuade them to change their love for 
 worldly things into a passionate desire for the 
 kingdom of God and His righteousness, wherein they 
 may perceive the primacy of spiritual issues; to per- 
 suade them that self-sacrifice is the law of Christian 
 progress, so that they may vanquish selfishness by 
 service ; to persuade them that justice is antecedent to 
 law or desire, which it must ever regulate and sanctify ; 
 
 117 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 to persuade them so to love peace that to win it they 
 may even draw the sword of justice. 
 
 So teaching, she must also ever pray that she herself, 
 the Body of Christ, may be responsive to the guidance 
 of God the Holy Ghost, and may listen to the truth as 
 He reveals it, with an attentive ear, not rendered gross 
 and hard by worldly or unworthy sounds, but that, 
 gathering all her children in her train, she may nobly 
 lead them forward along the paths of righteousness for 
 ever, until His coming again. 
 
 ii8 
 
APPENDIXES 
 
 A.— The Jews' Code of Warfare. 
 
 B. — S. AMBROSE: De OFFICIIS MINISTRORUM; EX- 
 TRACTS relating to War. 
 C. — S. Augustine : Extracts from his Writings 
 
 RELATING TO WAR CONTAINED IN GRATIAN'S 
 
 Decretum. 
 
 D. — S. Thomas Aquinas : Summa Theologica, 
 Secunda Secund.^, O. XL. i. 
 
 E. — " Excommunicamus," Third Canon of Fourth 
 Lateran Council, etc. 
 
 F. — Treuga et Pax Dei, drawn up by the Bishops 
 OF Beauvais and Soissons, 1023. 
 
 G. — Henry IV., Truce of God, 1085. 
 
 H. — Frederic Barbarossa, Land Peace, 1152. 
 
 J. — S. Thomas Aquinas : Summa Theologica, 
 Secunda Secund.e, Q. XL. 4. 
 
 K. — Innocent III : Statement of claims to Inter- 
 national Jurisdiction. 
 
 APPENDIX A 
 
 The Jews' Code of Warfare {Deut. xx.) 
 
 When thou goest forth to battle against thine 
 enemies, and seest horses, and chariots, and a people 
 more than thou, thou shalt not be afraid of them : for 
 the Lord thy God is with thee, which brought thee up 
 out of the land of Egypt. And it shall be, when ye 
 draw nigh unto the battle, that the priest shall 
 
 119 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 approach and speak unto the people, and shall say 
 unto them, Hear, O Israel, ye draw nigh this day unto 
 battle against your enemies : let not your heart faint; 
 fear not, nor tremble, neither be ye affrighted at them ; 
 for the Lord your God is He that goeth with you, to 
 fight for you against your enemies to save you. And 
 the officers shall speak unto the people, saying. What 
 man is there that hath built a new house, and hath not 
 dedicated it ? Let him go and return to his house, lest 
 he die in the battle, and another man dedicate it. And 
 what man is there that hath planted a vineyard, and 
 hath not used the fruit thereof? Let him go and 
 return unto his house, lest he die in the battle, and 
 another man use the fruit thereof. And what man is 
 there that hath betrothed a wife, and hath not taken 
 her ? Let him go and return unto his house, lest he 
 die in the battle and another man take her. And the 
 officers shall speak further unto the people, and they 
 shall say, What man is there that is fearful and faint- 
 hearted ? Let him go and return unto his house, lest 
 his brethren's heart melt as his heart. And it shall be, 
 when the officers have made an end of speaking unto 
 the people, that they shall appoint captains of hosts at 
 the head of the people. 
 
 When thou drawest nigh unto a city to fight against 
 it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it 
 make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it 
 shall be that all the people that is found therein shall 
 become tributary unto thee, and shall serve thee. And 
 if it will make no peace with thee, but will make war 
 against thee, then thou shalt besiege it : and when the 
 Lord thy God delivereth it into thine hand, thou shalt 
 smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword : 
 but the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and 
 all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt 
 thou take for a prey unto thyself; and thou shalt eat 
 the spoil of thine enemies, which the Lord thy God 
 
 120 
 
Appendix A 
 
 hath given thee. Thus shalt thou do unto all the cities 
 which are very far off from thee, which are not of the 
 cities of these nations. But of the cities of these peoples, 
 which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance, 
 thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth : but thou 
 shalt utterly destroy them; the Hittite, and the 
 Amorite, the Canaanite, and the Perizzite, the Hivite, 
 and the Jebusite; as the Lord thy God hath com- 
 manded thee : that they may teach you not to do 
 after all their abominations, which they have done 
 unto their gods; so should ye sin against the Lord 
 your God. 
 
 When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in 
 making war against it to take it, thou shalt not destroy 
 the trees thereof by wielding an axe against them ; for 
 thou mayest eat of them, and thou shalt not cut them 
 down; for is the tree of the field man, that it should 
 be besieged of thee ? Only the trees which thou 
 knowest that they be not trees for meat, thou shalt 
 destroy and cut them down; and thou shalt build 
 bulwarks against the city that maketh war with thee, 
 until it fall. 
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
 S. Ambrose : De OfficUs Ministrorum 
 
 Lib. I., c. xxvii. : Siquidem et fortitudo quas vel in 
 bello tuetur a barbaris patriam, vel domi defendit 
 infirmos, vel a latronibus socios, plena est iustitiae; et 
 scire quo consilio defendat atque adiuvet captare 
 etiam temporum et locorum opportunitates, prudentise 
 ac modestiae sit; et temperantia ipsa sine prudentia 
 modum scire non possit : opportunitatem noscere, et 
 secundum mensuram reddere, sit iustitias, et in 
 omnibus istis magnanimitas necessaria sit, et quasdam 
 fortitudo mentis, plerumque et corporis, ut quis quod 
 velit, possit implere. 
 
 121 
 
The Sword of" Justice 
 
 Lib, I., c. xxix. : Quanta autem iustitia sit ex hoc 
 intelligi potest, quod nee locis, nee personis, nee tem- 
 poribus exeipitur, quae etiam hostibus reservatur : ut 
 si constitutus sit cum hoste aut locus aut dies praelio, 
 adversus iustitiam putetur aut loco prffivenire aut 
 tempore. ... Si ergo etiam in bello iustitia valet, 
 quanto magis in pace servanda est. . . . Funda- 
 mentum ergo est iustitias fides : iustorum enim corda 
 meditantur fidem; et qui se iustus accusat, iustitiam 
 supra fidem collocat; nam tunc iustitia eius apparet, 
 si vera fateatur. . . . Ecclesia autem quasdam forma 
 iustitia est. . . . 
 
 Lib. L, c. XXXV. : Est itaque fortitudo velut excelsior 
 ceteris, sed numquam incomitata virtus. . . . Alioquin 
 fortitudo sine iustitia iniquitatis materia est. Quo. 
 enim validior est, eo promptior ut inferiorem opprimat ; 
 cum in ipsis rebus bellicis iusta bella an iniusta sint 
 spectandum putetur. Numquam Dauid nisi lacessitus 
 bellum intulit. . . . Postea numquam nisi consulto 
 Domino bellum adorsus. . . . 
 
 Lib. L, c. xxxvi. : Non igitur in viribus corporis et 
 lacertis tantummodo fortitudinis gloria est, sed magis 
 in virtute animi ; neque in inferenda, sed in depellenda 
 iniuria lex virtutis est. Qui enim non repellit a socio 
 iniuriam, si potest, tam est in vitio, quam ille qui facit. 
 . . . {Cf. Exod. ii. II, 12.) 
 
 APPENDIX C 
 
 Extracts from S. Augustine's Writings in 
 Decreium Magistri Gratiani; Lipsias, 1879 
 
 Causa XXIIL, Qu. I. An militare peccatum sit ? 
 
 Qu. IL Quod bellum sit iustum, et quomodo a 
 filiis Israel iusta bella gerebantur ? 
 
 C. II. Precepla -patienticB virtuie animi non ostenta- 
 tion e corporis servanda sunt (Augustinus in Sermone 
 de Puero Centurionis). — Paratus debet esse homo 
 
 122 
 
Appendix C 
 
 iustus et pius patienter maliciam eorum suslinere, quos 
 fieri bonos querit, ut numerus potius crescat bonorum, 
 non ut pari malicia se quis a numero addat malorum. 
 Denique ista precepta magis sunt ad preparationem 
 cordis, quam ad opus, quod in aperto fi.t, ut teneatur 
 in secreto animi patientia cum benivolentia, in mani- 
 festo autem id fiat, quod eis videtur prodesse quibus 
 bene velle debemus. Hinc liquido ostenditur, quod 
 ipse Dominus Jesus, exemplum singulare patientiae, 
 cum percuteretur in facie, respondit; Si male locutus 
 sum, exprobra de malo ; si autem bene, quid me cedis ? 
 Nequaquam igitur preceptum suum si verba intueamur 
 implevit. Neque enim praebuit percutienti alteram 
 partem, sed potius prohibuit ne faceret et iniuriam 
 augeret. Et tamen paratus advenerat non solum in 
 faciem percuti, verum etiam pro his quoque a quibus 
 hsc patiebatur crucifixus occidi, pro quibus ait in 
 cruce pendens. Pater, ignosce illis quia nesciunt quid 
 faciunt. Neque Paulus apostolus preceptum Domini 
 et magistri sui videtur inplesse, ubi etiam percussus 
 in faciem dixit principi sacerdotum : Percutiet te Deus, 
 paries dealbate ; sedes me iudicare secundum legem, et 
 contra legem iubes me percuti ? Et cum a circum- 
 stantibus diceretur Iniuriam facis principi sacerdotum ? 
 irridens eos ammonere uoluit quid dixerit ut qui 
 saperent intelligerent iam destruendum esse in adventu 
 Christi parietem dealbatum, hoc est ypocrisin sacer- 
 dotii ludjEorum. Ait quippe " Nescivi, fratres, quia 
 princeps est. Scriptum est enim : Principi populi tui 
 non maledices ; cum proculdubio qui in eodem populo 
 creverat, atque in lege fuerat eruditus, ilium principem 
 sacerdotum nescire non posset, nee eos, quibus ita 
 notus fuerat, ullo modo falleret, quod nesciret. Sunt 
 ergo ista precepta patientiae semper in cordis prepara- 
 tione retinenda, ipsa quoque benivolentia, ne reddatur 
 malum pro malo, semper in voluntate conplenda. 
 Agenda sunt autem multa etiam cum invitis quadam 
 
 123 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 benigna asperitate plectendis, quorum potius utilitati 
 consulendum est quam voluntati. Nam in corripiendo 
 filium quamlibet aspere numquam profecto paternus 
 amor amittitur. Fiat tamen quod nolit, et doleat qui 
 etiam invitus dolore videtur sanandus. Ac per hoc, si 
 terrena ista respublica Christiana precepta custodiat, 
 etiam ipsa bella sine benivolentia non gerentur, sed ut 
 ad pietatis iustitiaeque societatem victis facilius con- 
 sulatur. Nam cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur utilius 
 vincitur, quoniam nihil est infelicius felicitate peccan- 
 tium, qua penalis nutritur impunitas et mala voluntas 
 uelut interior hostis roboratur. Et faiilo post : Nam 
 si Christiana disciplina omnia bella culparet, hoc 
 potius, consilium salutis petentibus, in evangelio 
 diceretur, ut abicerent arma, seque militiae omnino 
 subtraherent. Dictum est autem eis : Neminem con- 
 cusseritis, estote contenti stipendiis vestris. Quibus 
 proprium stipendium sufhcere debere precepit, militare 
 utique non prohibuit. 
 
 C. III. In bellicis armis multi Deo placere possiint 
 (Augustinus ad Bonifacium, Epist. CCVIL). — Noli 
 existimare, neminem Deo placere posse, qui armis 
 bellicis ministrat. In his erat sanctus Dauid, cui 
 Dominus tam magnum perhibuit testimonium. In his 
 etiam plurimi illius temporis iusti. In his erat ille 
 centurio, qui Domino dixit, Non sum dignus ut intres 
 sub tectum meum. Hoc ergo primum cogita quando 
 armaris ad pugnam, quia virtus tua etiam ipsa corpor- 
 alis donum Dei est. Sic enim cogitabis de done Dei 
 non facere contra Dominum. Fides enim, quando 
 promittitur, etiam hosti servanda est, contra quem 
 bellum geritur : quanto magis amico pro quo 
 pugnatur? Pacem habere voluntatis, bellum autem 
 debet esse necessitatis, ut liberet Deus a necessitate, et 
 conseruet in pace. Non enim pax quasritur ut bellum 
 exerceatur, sed bellum geritur, ut pax aquiratur. Esto 
 ergo bellando paci&cus, ut eos, quos expugnas, ad 
 
 124 
 
Appendix C 
 
 pacis utilitatem vincendo perducas. Beati enim pacifici 
 (ait Dominus) quoniam filii Dei vocabuntur. Si autem 
 pax humana tam dulcis est pro temporali salute mor- 
 talium, quanto dulcior est pax divina pro eterna salute 
 angelorum ? Itaque hostem pugnantem necessitas 
 deprimat, non voluntas. Sicut bellanti et resistenti 
 violentia redditur, ita victoriis capto misericordia iam 
 debetur, maxime in quo pacis perturbatio non timetur. 
 C. IV. QucB sint in bello hire reprehendenda? 
 (Augustinus, Contra Faustum, Lib. XXII., c. 74, 75.) — 
 Quid culpatur in bello ? An quia morituri quandoque 
 moriuntur, ut domentur in pace victuri ? Hoc repre- 
 hendisse timidorum est, non religiosorum. Nocendi 
 cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, inplacatus atque 
 inplacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido domin- 
 andi, et si qua similia, haec sunt, quae in bellis iure 
 culpantur. Qu^ plerumque ut etiam iure puniantur, 
 adversus violentias resistentium (sive Deo, sive aliquo 
 legitimo imperio iubente) gerenda ipsa bella susci- 
 piuntur a bonis, cum in eo rerum humanarum ordine 
 inveniuntur, ubi eos vel iubere aliquid tale, vel in 
 talibus obedire iuste ipse constringit. Unde neque 
 lohannes ab armis iubet discedere milites, et tributa 
 Christus Cassari monet reddi, quia propter bella neces- 
 sario militi stipendium praebeatur. Ordo autem ille 
 naturalis mortalium paci accommodatus hoc poscit, ut 
 suscipiendi belli auctoritas atque consilium penes prin- 
 cipes sit. Sed si humana cupiditate bellum geritur, 
 non nocet Sanctis, in quos non habet quisquam potes- 
 tatem, nisi desuper datam. Non enim est potestas, 
 nisi a Deo, sive iubente, sive sinente. Ergo vir iustus, 
 si forte etiam sub rege, homine sacrilego, militet, recte 
 potest illo iubente bellare, si, vice pacis ordinem 
 servans, quod sibi iubetur vel non esse contra Dei 
 preceptum, certum est, vel utrum sit, certum non est, 
 ita, ut fortasse reum faciat regem iniquitas imperandi, 
 innocentem autem militem ostendat ordo serviendi. 
 
 125 
 
The Sword ot Justice 
 
 C. V. Militare non est feccatum (Augustinus in 
 libro de Verbis Domini, Tractat. XIX.). — Militare non 
 est delictum, sed propter prasdam militare peccatum 
 est; nee rempublicam gerere criminosum est, sed ideo 
 agere rempublicam, ut divitias augeas, videtur esse 
 damnabile. Propterea enim quadam providentia mili- 
 tantibus sunt stipendia constituta ne, dum sumptus 
 queritur, predo crassetur. Item. Dominus ipse dixit 
 Reddite quae Dei sunt Deo, et quas sunt Caesaris, 
 Ca^sari. Igitur quod Caesar precipit ferendum est, 
 quod imperat toUerandum est : sed fit intolerabile, 
 dum prsedam exactores accumulant. Item. Interro- 
 gauerunt lohannem milites dicentes Quid faciemus et 
 nos ? Ait illis Neminem concutiatis neque calumpniam 
 faciatis, sed estote contenti stipendiis vestris. Sic 
 autem se cognoscere debet omnis homo qui militat. 
 Non enim de his tantum militantibus scriptura 
 loquitur, qui armata militia detinentur, sed quisquis 
 militias suae cingulo utitur, dignitatis suae miles asscri- 
 bitur, atque ideo haec sententia potest did (verbi 
 gratia) militibus protectoribus, cunctisque rectoribus. 
 Quicumque sibi stipendia publice decreta consequitur, 
 si amplius querit, tanquam calumpniator et concussor 
 Johannis sententia condemnatur. 
 
 C. VI. Pacata sunt bella qucs geruntur ut mail 
 coherceantur et boni subleventur (Augustinus de 
 diversis ecclesiae observationibus). — Apud veros Dei 
 cultores etiam ipsa bella pacata sunt, quae non 
 cupiditate aut crudelitate, sed pacis studio geruntur, 
 ut mali coherceantur et boni subleventur. 
 
 (Sic citat Ivo. Sed non inventum apud Augustinum.) 
 
 QU^STIO II. Gratianus. 
 
 Quod autem queritur quod sit bellum iustum. 
 
 C. I. Quid sit bellum iustum. (Ysidorus Ethimol., 
 1. XX., inquit.). — Iustum est bellum quod ex edicto 
 geritur de rebus repentendis aut propulsandorum 
 hominum causa. Judex dictus est, quia ius dictat 
 
 126 
 
Appendix C 
 
 populo, sive quod iure disceptet. lure autem discep- 
 tare est iuste iudicare. Non enim est iudex si non est 
 iustitia in eo. 
 
 C. II. Nihil interest ad iustitiam, sive aferie sive ex 
 insidiis aliquis pugnet (Augustinus in lib. quaestionum, 
 VI. lo). — Dominus Deus noster iubet ad lesum Naue, 
 ut constituat sibi retrorsum insidias, id est insidiantes 
 bellatores ad insidiandum hostibus. Hinc admone- 
 mur, hoc non iniuste fieri ab his qui iustum bellum 
 gerunt ut nihil iustus precipue cogitet in his rebus, nisi 
 ut bellum suscipiat cui bellare fas est. Non enim fas 
 est omnibus. Cum autem iustum bellum susceperit, 
 utrum aperte pugnet, an ex insidiis, nihil ad iustitiam 
 interest. lusta autem bella solent dif&niri, quae 
 ulciscuntur iniurias, sic gens et civitas petenda est, 
 quae vel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe 
 factum est, vel reddere quod per iniurias ablatum est. 
 Sed et hoc genus belli sine dubio iustum est quod 
 Deus imperat, qui novit quid cuique fieri debeat : in 
 quo bello ductor exercitus vel ipse populus non tam 
 auctor belli, quam minister iudicandus est. 
 
 Gratianus : Cum ergo iustum bellum sit quod ex 
 edicto geritur vel quo iniurice ulciscuntur, queritur 
 quomodo a filiis Israel iusta bella gerebantur. 
 
 C. III. Innoxius transitus fdiis Israel negabatur, 
 atque idea iusta bella gerebantur (Augustinus in quest. 
 Num., q. 44 ad c. 20). — Notandum sane est, quemad- 
 modum iusta bella gerebantur a filiis Israel contra 
 Amorreos. Innoxius enim transitus negabatur, qui 
 iure humanas societatis aequissimo patere debebat. 
 
 The following passages, though not included in the 
 selection from S. Augustine's writings which Gratian 
 put in his Decretum, are noteworthy. 
 
 S. Augustine, De Civitate Dei. 
 
 Lib. I.r c. xxi. : Quasdam vero exceptiones eadem 
 ipsa diuina fecit auctoritas, ut non liceat hominem 
 occidi. Sed his exceptis, quos Deus occidi iubet siue 
 
 127 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 data lege siue ad personam pro tempore expressa 
 iussione (non autem ipse occidit, qui ministerium 
 debet iubenti, sicut adminiculum gladius utenti; et 
 ideo nequaquam contra hoc preceptum fecerunt, quo 
 dictum est Non occides, qui Deo auctore bella 
 gesserunt aut personam gerentes publicae potestatis 
 secundum eius leges, hoc est iustissimae rationis im- 
 perium, sceleratos morte punierunt . . . ), his igitur 
 exceptis, quos vel lex iusta generaliter vel ipse fons 
 iustitias Deus specialiter occidi iubet, quisquis hominem 
 vel se ipsum vel quemlibet occiderit, homicidii crimine 
 innectitur. 
 
 Lib. I., c. xxvi. : . . . Nam et miles cum oboediens 
 potestati, sub qualibet legitime constitutus est, 
 hominem occidit, nulla civitatis suae lege reus est 
 homicidii, immo, nisi fecerit, reus est imperii deserti 
 atque contempti ; quod si sua sponte atque auctoritate 
 fecisset, crimen effusi humani sanguinis incidisset. 
 Itaque unde punitur si fecit iniussus, inde punietur 
 nisi fecerit iussus. . . . 
 
 APPENDIX D 
 
 S. Thomas Aquinas : Summa Theologka, ed. Migne. 
 Paris, 1882. 
 
 Secunda Secunda:, Quaestio XL., De Bella, Articulus L 
 
 Deinde considerandum est de bello; et circa hoc 
 quasruntur quatuor : I ° Utrum aliquod bellum sit 
 licitum; 2? Utrum clericis sit licitum bellare; 3? 
 Utrum liceat bellantibus uti insidiis; 4? Utrum liceat 
 in diebus festivis bellare. 
 
 Articulus Primus : Utrum bellare sit semper 
 peccatum. 
 
 Ad PRIMUM sic proceditur : i. Videtur quod bellare 
 semper sit peccatum. Poena enim non infligitur nisi 
 
 128 
 
Appendix D 
 
 pro peccato. Sed bellantibus a Domino inducituf 
 poena, secundum illud Matth. xxvi. 52, Omnis qui 
 acceperit gladium, gladio -peribit. Ergo omne bellum 
 est illicitum. 
 
 2. Praeterea, quidquid contrariatur divino prascepto, 
 est peccatum. Sed bellare contrariatur divino prae- 
 cepto : dicitur enim Matth. v. 39, Ego autem dico 
 vobis, non resist ere malo. Et Rom. xii. 19, dicitur : 
 Islon vos defendentes, charissimi, sed date locum tree. 
 Ergo bellare semper est peccatum. 
 
 3. Praeterea, nihil contrariatur actui virtutis nisi 
 peccatum. Sed bellum contrariatur paci. Ergo bellum 
 semper est peccatum. 
 
 4. Praeterea, omne exercitium ad rem licitam licitum 
 est, sicut patet in exercitiis scientiarum. Sed exercitia 
 bellorum quae fiunt in torneamentis, prohibentur ab 
 Ecclesia; quia morientes in huiusmodi tyrociniis 
 ecclesiastica sepultura privantur. Ergo bellum videtur 
 esse simpliciter peccatum. 
 
 Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in sermone 
 De Puero Centurionis (habetur epist. ad Marcell., 
 aliquant, a med. et cap. Faratus, 23, quasst. i) : Si 
 Christiana disciplina omnino bella culparet, hoc potius 
 consilium salutis petentibus in Evangelio daretur ut 
 abiicerent arma, segue militice omnino subtraherent. 
 Dictum est autem, eis : Neminem concutiatis; estota 
 contenti stipendiis vestris. Quibus proprimn stipen- 
 dium sufficere prcscepit, militare non prohibuit. 
 
 Responded dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquod 
 beUum sit iustum, tria requiruntur : Primo quidem 
 auctoritas principis, cuius mandato bellum est 
 gerendum. Non enim pertinet ad personam privatam 
 bellum movere, quia potest ius suum in iudicio 
 superioris prosequi. Similiter etiam convocare multi- 
 tudinem, quod in bellis oportet fieri, non pertinet ad 
 privatam personam. Cum autem cura reipublicas com- 
 missa sit principibus, ad eos pertinet rempublicam 
 
 129 K 
 
The Sword of justice 
 
 civitatis, vel regni, seu provinciae sibi subditae tueri. 
 Et sicut licite defendunt earn materiali gladio contra 
 interiores perturbationes, dum malefactores puniunt, 
 secundum illud Apostoli ad Rom. xiii. 4 : Islon sine 
 causa gladium -portat; minister enim Dei est, vindex 
 in iram ei qui male agit; ita etiam gladio bellico ad 
 COS pertinet rempublicam tueri ab exterioribus hosti- 
 bus. Unde et principibus dicitur in psalmo Ixxxi. 4 : 
 Eripite pauperem, et egenum de manu peccatoris 
 liberate. Unde Augustinus dicit, Contra Faustum 
 Lib. XXII., cap. 75, in princ. Ordo naturalis mortaliuin 
 pad acconimodatus hoc poscit, ut suscipiendi belli 
 auctoritas atque consilium penes principes sit. 
 
 Secundo requiritur causa iusta : ut scilicet illi qui 
 impugnantur, propter aliquam culpam impugnationem 
 mereantur. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. Qusest. 
 (scil. super Jos. OuEest. 16) : Iusta bella sclent definiri 
 quiz ulciscuntur iniurias, si gens, vel civitas plectenda 
 est, quce vel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe 
 factum est, vel reddere quod per iniuriam ahlatum est. 
 Tertio requiritur ut sit intentio bellantium recta; 
 qua scilicet intenditur vel ut bonum promoveatur, vel 
 ut malum vitetur. Unde Augustinus in lib. De Verbis 
 Domini (habetur cap. Apud, 23, quasst. i. sed ex 
 August, non occurrit) : Apud veros Dei cultores etiam 
 ilia bella pacata sunt quce non cupiditate, aut crudeli- 
 tate, sed pads studio geriintur, ut mail coerceantur, ei 
 boni subleventur. Potest autem contingere ut si sit 
 legitima auctoritas indicentis bellum et causa iusta, 
 nihilominus propter pravam intentionem bellum red- 
 datur illicitum. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. XXII. 
 Contra Faustum, cap. 74 : Noceizdi cupiditas, ulci- 
 scendi crudelitas, impacatus, implacabilis animus, 
 feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi, et si qua sunt 
 similia, kcsc sunt qucE in bellis iure culpanttir. 
 
 Ad PRIMUM ergo dicendum quod sicut Augustinus 
 dicit. Lib. XXII., Contra Faustum, cap. 70, ad &n., 
 
 130 
 
Appendix D 
 
 tile accifit gladium qui nulla superiort aut legitima 
 poiestate aut iubente vel concedente in sanguinem 
 alicuius armatur. Qui vero ex auctoritate principis 
 vel iudicis (si sit persona privata), vel ex zelo iustitiae 
 quasi ex auctoritate Dei (si sit persona publica), gladio 
 utitur, non ipse accipit gladium sed ab alio sibi com- 
 misso utitur; unde ei poena non debetur. Nee tamen 
 illi etiam qui cum peccato gladio utuntur, semper 
 gladio occiduntur ; sed ipsi suo gladio semper pereunt, 
 quia pro peccato gladii asternaliter puniuntur, nisi 
 poeniteant. 
 
 Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi prsecepta, 
 sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. i De Serm. Domini in 
 Monte, cap. xix., semper sunt servanda in praepara- 
 tione animi, ut scilicet semper homo sit paratus non 
 resistere, vel se non defendere, si opus fuerit. Sed 
 quandoque est aliter agendum propter commune 
 bonum, vel etiam illorum cum quibus pugnatur. Unde 
 Augustinus dicit in epist. ad Marcell. a med. : Agenda 
 sunt multa etiam cum invitis benigna quadatn asperi- 
 tate plectendis. Nam cui licentia iniquitatis ertpitur, 
 utiliter vincitur : quoniam nihil est infelicius felicitate 
 peccantium, qua pcenalis nutritur impunitas, et mala 
 voluntas, velut hostis interior, roboratur. 
 
 Ad Tertium dicendum quod etiam illi qui iuste 
 bella gerunt, pacem intendunt ; et ita paci non contrari- 
 antur, nisi malae, quam Dominus non venit mittere in 
 terram, ut dicitur Matth. x. Unde Augustinus dicit 
 ad Bonifacium, Epist. clxxxix., al. 205, a med. : Non 
 quceritur pax, ut bellum exerceatur; sed bellum geritur, 
 ut pax acquiratur. Esto ergo bellando pacificus, ut 
 eos quos expugnas, ad pads utilitatem vincendo per- 
 ducas. 
 
 Ad QuartuM dicendum quod exercitia hominum 
 ad res bellicas spectantia non sunt universaliter pro- 
 hibita; sed inordinata exercitia, et periculosa^ ex 
 quibus occasiones et deprasdationes proveniunt. Apud 
 
 131 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 antiques autem exercitationes ad bella sine huiusmodi 
 periculis erant, et idea vocabantur meditationes 
 armorum, vel bella sine sanguine, ut per Hieronymum 
 patet in quadam epist. (sed non occurrit). 
 
 APPENDIX E 
 Extracts relating to a Holy War 
 
 1. The Third Canon of the Fourth Lateran Council, 
 " Excommunicamus" Cited by Pissard, La Guerre 
 Saint e, p. 6i : 
 
 Si vero dominus temporalis requisitus et monitus ab 
 Ecclesia, terram suam purgare neglexerit ab hac 
 hffiretica foeditate, per metropolitanum et ceteros com- 
 provinciales episcopos excommunicationis vinculo 
 innodetur. Et si satisfacere contempserit infra annum, 
 significetur hoc summo pontifici : ut extunc ipse 
 vassallos ab eius fldelitate denunciet absolutos, et 
 terram exponat catholicis occupandam, qui earn, 
 exterminatis hasreticis, sine ulla contradictione possi- 
 deant, et in fi.dei puritate conservent : salvo iure 
 domini principalis, dummodo super hoc ipse nullum 
 prasstet obstaculum, nee aliquod impedimentum op- 
 ponat : eadem nihilominus lege servata circa eos qui 
 non habent dominos principales. 
 
 2. Extract from a letter from Gregory IX. ad 
 Germanum. Cited by Pissard, op. cii., p. 87, note i, 
 from Raynaldi, an. 1238, sect. 3 : 
 
 Uterque igitur gladius Ecclesias traditur, sed ab 
 Ecclesia exercendus est unus, alius pro Ecclesia manu 
 sascularis principis eximendus : unus a sacerdote, alius 
 ad nutum sacerdotis administrandus a milite. 
 
 3. Hostiensis, Summa Aurea, De voto. Cited by 
 Pissard, of. cit., p. 89, note i : 
 
 Puto quod episcopus non potest dare authoritatem 
 prasdicandi crucem. Primo quia nee remissionem 
 
 132 
 
Appendix F 
 
 potest facere quantam requirit crux; item quia ad 
 solum papam pertinet de fide respondere et periculis 
 ipsius taliter respondere ; tertio quia ad ipsum pertinet 
 votum crucis. 
 
 APPENDIX F 
 
 Treuga et Pax Dei 
 
 ^ The text of this Treuga et Fax Dei is taken from 
 Etudes sur le Regne de Robert le Pieux (996-1031), by 
 Pfister, who extracted it from Gesta Episcoporum 
 C ameracensium. III. 27. 
 
 It was drawn up in 1023 by Warin, Bishop of 
 Beauvais, and Berold, Bishop of Soissons, for the 
 seigneurs of their dioceses. 
 
 Je n'envahirai en aucune fagon les eglises ni les 
 ceUiers des egHses, sinon pour y saisir le malfaiteur 
 qui aura viole la paix ou commis un homicide. Je 
 n'assaillirai pas le clerc et le moine qui ne portent pas 
 les armes du siecle, ni celui qui se promene avec eux 
 sans lance ni bouclier, a moins que je n'aie sujet de me 
 plaindre d'eux ou qu'ils ne veuillent pas reparer dans 
 I'espace de quinze jours la faute commise contre moi. 
 Je n'enleverai ni boeuf, ni vache, ni aucune autre bete 
 de somme. Je ne saisirai ni le paysan ni la paysanne, 
 ni les marchands; je ne leur prendrai point leurs 
 deniers et je ne les obligerai pas a se racheter. Je ne 
 veux pas qu'ils perdent leur avoir a cause de la guerre 
 de leur seigneur et je ne les fouetterai point pour leur 
 enlever leur subsistance. Depuis les kalendes de mars 
 jusqu'a la Toussaint je ne saisirai ni cheval, ni jument, 
 ni poulain dans les paturages. Je ne detruirai ni 
 incendierai les maisons; je ne deracinerai ni ven- 
 dangerai les vignes sous pretexte de guerre; je ne 
 detruirai pas les moulins et je ne ravirai pas la farine 
 qui s'y trouve, a moins qu'ils ne soient situes dans ma 
 terre ou que je ne sois a I'ost. Je ne donnerai protec- 
 
 133 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 tion a aucun voleur; si par hasard, a son insu, un 
 homme a qui j'ai donne un sauf-conduit viole cette 
 paix, je reparerai le tort qu'il a cause ou je I'obligerai 
 a le reparer lui-meme dans les quinze jours. . . . 
 J'observerai ce traite a I'egard de tous ceux qui I'ont 
 jure et qui I'observent a mon egard. Je n'en excepte 
 que les terres qui sent au nombre de mes alleus ou de 
 mes benefices, celles qui m'appartiennent en franchise 
 ou qui se sont recommandees a moi, ainsi que mes 
 vicairies. J'en except encore les cas ou je batirai 
 et assiegerai un chateau, ou je serai appele a 
 I'ost du roi et de nos eveques, ou je ferai la 
 chevauchee. Mais meme alors, je ne recevrai que ma 
 subsistance, et n'emporterai rien a ma maison, sinon 
 les fers qui sont aux pieds de mes chevaux, et je ne 
 violerai point a I'ost les privileges des eglises, sinon 
 quand elles me refuseront la faculte d'acheter mes 
 vivres. Depuis le commencement du jeune jusqu'a 
 Paque, je n'assaillirai point le cavalier qui ne porte pas 
 les armes du siecle, et ne lui enleverai point par force 
 la subsistance qu'il a sur lui. Si un vilain fait tort a 
 un autre vilain ou a un cavalier, j'attendrai quinze 
 jours pour lui permettre de faire reparation et s'il ne 
 repare pas sa faute, je le saisirai en ne prenant sur son 
 avoir que ce qui est autorise par loi. 
 
 APPENDIX G 
 HENRICI IV. IMPERATORIS CONSTITUTIO PACIS DEI 
 
 In Synodo Moguntina anno 1085 Promulgata 
 
 Mon. Germ. Select., ed Doeberl, 1889, Bdndchen 3, 
 pp. 49-51. 
 
 Cum nostris temporibus ultra modum tribulationi- 
 bus sancta ecclesia affligeretur, compatiendo tot 
 pressuris totque periculis, subvenire illi Deo propi- 
 tiante tractavimus, ut pacem quam peccatis nostris 
 
 134 
 
Appendix G 
 
 exigentibus continuare non potuimus, intermissis 
 saltern diebus aliquatenus confirmaremus. Anno 
 dominice incarnationis 1085, indictione 8, Deo 
 mediante tam clero quam populo pari consentientibus 
 voto, constitutum est, ut a primo die adventus Domini 
 usque ad exactum diem epiphanie, et ab intrante 
 septuagesima usque in octavas pentecostes et per 
 totam illam diem, omnique feria quinta, sexta, sabbato, 
 dominica die, usque ad ortum solis secundae feriae, 
 addita feria quatuor temporum, omnique apostolorum 
 vigilia cum die sequenti, insuper omni die canonice ad 
 ieiunandum vel feriandum statuta vel statuenda, hoc 
 pacis decretum teneatur, quatenus iterantium domique 
 manentium securitatis sit tutissima traditio, ut cedes 
 et incendia, predas et assultus nemo faciat, nemo fuste 
 aut gladio aut aliquo armorum genere quemquam 
 ledat, et nemo quamvis culpa faicosus ab adventu 
 Domini usque in octavas epiphanie, et a septuagesima 
 usque in octavas pentecostes tollere arma presumat, 
 scutum, vel gladium vel lanceam vel cuiuscunque 
 prorsus armaturse sarcinam. Similiter in reliquis 
 diebus, idem dominicis quinta et sexta feria, sabbato 
 omnique vigilia apostolorum cum die subsequenti, et 
 omni die ad ieiunandum sive feriandum canonice 
 statuta vel statuenda non licet arma ferre nisi longe 
 euntibus, ea tamen conditione ut nulli quolibet modo 
 lesionem inferat. Si necesse fuerit alicui infra spacium 
 condict^ pacis in alium locum, quo pax ista non 
 observetur, ire, arma ferat, ita tamen ne alicui noceat, 
 nisi inpugnetur, ut se defendat, reversus autem iterum 
 arma deponat. Si contigerit ut castellum obsideatur, 
 per dies qui infra pacem comprehensi sunt ab inpugna- 
 tione cessent, nisi ab obsessis impugnentur et repug- 
 nare cogantur. 
 
 Et ne hasc pacis statuta traditio a quavis persona 
 inpune violetur, ab omnibus dicta est sententia : Si 
 liber vel nobilis eam violaverit, idem si homocidium 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 fecerit aut aliquem vulneraverit, aut alio quolibet modo 
 defectaverit, absque omni sumptuum aut amicorum 
 interventione finibus confinium suorum expellatur, 
 totumque predium eius heredes sui tollant, et si bene- 
 ficium habuerit, dominus ad quern pertinet illud 
 accipiat. Si vero heredes sui aliquid illi postquam 
 expulsus fuerit subsidium et sustentaculum inpendisse 
 inventi fuerint et convicti, predium illis auferatur, et 
 regis dignitati mancipetur. Quod si se de obiectis 
 purgare voluerit, cum 12, qui eque nobiles ac liberi 
 fuerint iuret. Si serous occiderit hominem, decolletur ; 
 si vulneraverit, manu dextra truncetur; si alio modo 
 vel pugno vel lapide sive fuste vel quolibet modo 
 percutiendo defectaverit, verberetur et decapilletur. 
 Si autem cui imputatur se innocentem probare voluerit, 
 iudicio aque frigide se expurget, ita tamen ut ipse et 
 nemo alius pro eo in aquam mittatur. Si autem timens 
 iudicium quod in eum dictatum est aufugerit, perpetuae 
 excommunicationi subiaceat, et in quocunque loco 
 auditus fuerit, mittantur illuc litere, quibus denuntietur 
 ilium excommunicatum esse et quod cum eo nulli com- 
 municare liceat. Non debet truncatio manuum in 
 pueris fieri, qui nondum etatem duodecim annorum 
 impleverint ; si qui banc transgressi sunt, pueri, tantum 
 verberibus castigentur. Non infringit pacem, si quis 
 delinquentem servum vel discipulum vel quolibet modo 
 sibi subiectum scopis vel fustibus cedi iusserit. 
 Excipitur etiam ab hac pacis constitutione, si dominus 
 imperator publice expeditionem fieri iusserit propter 
 appetendos regni inimicos, vel concilium sibi habere 
 placuerit, propter diiudicandos iusticie adversarios. 
 Non violatur pax, si interim dux aut alii comites vel 
 advocati vel qui vicem illorum funguntur placita 
 habuerint, et secundum quod lex habet in fures et 
 predones et alios nocentes iudicia exercuerint. Securi- 
 tatis gratia omnibus precipue faicosis huius dominice 
 pacis statuta est traditio, sed non ut post expletam 
 
 136 
 
Appendix G 
 
 pacem rapere et predari per villas et per domos 
 audeant, quia que in illos antequam ista pax 
 statueretur lex et sententia dictata est diligentissime 
 tenebitur, ut ab iniquitate proibeantur, quia predatores 
 et grassatores ab hac divina pace et ab omni prorsus 
 excipiuntur. Si quis huic pie constitutioni contraire 
 nititur, ut nee pacem Dec promittere nee etiam 
 observare voluerit, missam illi nuUus presbiterorum 
 cantare presumat, et nuUam salutis curam inpendat ; si 
 in&rmetur nuUus christianorum eum visitare presumat, 
 et viatico etiam in fine nisi resipiscat careat. Si quis 
 autem illam sivc in present! tempore sive in perpetuum 
 apud posteros nostros violare presumpserit, a nobis 
 inrecuperabiliter excommunicatus est. Non magis in 
 comitum vel tribunorum sive quorumlibet potentum 
 quam in totius populi communiter potestate constare 
 sanximus, ut vindictas supra memoratas, violatoribus 
 sancte pacis inferant ; et hoc diligentissime caveant, ne 
 in puniendo amiciciam vel odium, vel aliud quod 
 iustitias contrarium sit exerceant, ne delicta aliquorum 
 abscondant sed potius in publicum proferant. Nullus 
 pro redimendis qui in culpa deprehensi fuerant pecu- 
 niam accipiat. Mercatores in itinere quo negotiantur, 
 rustici dum rusticali operi, arando, fodiendo, metendo, 
 et aliis huiusmodi operum dant,omni die pacem habeant. 
 Mulieres autem et omnes sacris ordinibus adtitulati 
 perpetua pace fruantur; in ecclesiis vero et eccle- 
 siarum cimiteriis honor et reverentia Deo prebeatur, 
 ut si iUuc confugerit raptor vel fur, minime capiatur, 
 sed tamdiu ibi obsideatur, donee fame cogente ad 
 deditionem cogatur. Si aliquis defensionem reo, arma, 
 victum, vel fugam moliri presumpserit, equali penae 
 sicut reus subiacebit. Banno etiam nostro interdicimus, 
 ne aliquis sacri ordinis huius sanctae pacis transgressor 
 convictus, laicali vindicta puniatur, sed episcopo 
 presentetur. Unde laici decollentur, inde clerici 
 degradentur; unde laici detruncentur, inde clerici ab 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 officiis suspendantur ; et consensu laicorum crebris 
 ieiuniis et verberibus usque ad satisfactionem 
 affligantur. Amen. 
 
 APPENDIX H 
 
 Extracts from the Land Peace of Frederic 
 Barbarossa, A.D. 1 1 52 
 
 Ausgewdhlte Urkunden, edited by W. Altmann and 
 E. Bemheim. Berlin, 1895, p. 209, No. 97. 
 
 Fredericus Dei gratia Romanorum rex episcopis, 
 ducibus comitibus marchionibus rectoribus ad quos 
 liters istae pervenerint gratiam suam et pacem et 
 dilectionem. ... i. Si quis hominem infra pacem 
 constitutam occiderit, capitalem subeat sententiam, 
 nisi per duellum hoc probare possit, quod vitam suam 
 defendendo ilium occiderit. Si autem omnibus mani- 
 festum sit, quod non necessario sed voluntate ilium 
 occiderit, tunc neque per duellum neque quolibet alio 
 mode se excusabit, quin capitali damnetur sententia. 
 
 2. Si vero violator pacis a facie iudicis fugerit, res 
 eius mobiles a iudice in populum publicentur et dis- 
 pensentur; heredes autem eius hereditatem, quam ille 
 tenebat, recipiant tali conditione interposita, ut 
 iureiurando spondeant, quod ille violator pacis 
 nunquam de cetero ipsorum voluntate aut consensu 
 aliquod emolumentum inde percipiat. Quod si 
 heredes neglecto postmodum iuris rigore hereditatem 
 ei dimiserint, comes eandem hereditatem regiae ditioni 
 assignet, et a rege iure beneficii recipiant. 
 
 3. Si quis alium infra pacis edictum vulneraverit, 
 nisi duello quod vitam suam defendendo hoc fecerit 
 probaverit manus ei amputetur et, sicut superius 
 dictum est, iudicetur et iudex in causa ipsum et res 
 eius secundum vigorem iustitiae strictius consequatur. 
 
 4. Si quis alium ceperit et absque sanguinis 
 
 138 
 
Appendix H 
 
 effusione fustibus percusserit vel crines eius aut barbam 
 expilaverit, decern libras ei cui iniuria illata esse 
 videtur per compositionem impendat et iudici viginti 
 libras persolvat. Si vero temerarius absque percus- 
 sione eum invadat, quod vulgo dicitur " asteros hant," 
 calida manu, ac verberibus contumeliisque male 
 tractaverit, 5 libras pro tali excessu persolvat. 
 
 5. Quicunque iudici suo pro excessu viginti libras 
 invadiaverit, prsedium suum pro pignore illi tradat et 
 infra quatuor septimanas invadiatam pecuniam per- 
 solvat; quod si infra quatuor septimanas prasdium 
 suum solvere neglexerit, heredes sui, si voluerint, here- 
 ditatem recipiant, et comiti infra sex septimanas 
 viginti libras persolvant; si autem comes eandem 
 hereditatem regiae potestati consignet, proclamatori 
 etiam damnum restituat et praedium a rege bene&ciali 
 iure obtineat. 
 
 12. Si quis rusticus arma vel lanceam portaverit 
 vel gladium, iudex, in cuius potestate repertus fuerit, 
 vel arma toUat vel viginti solidos pro ipsis a rustico 
 accipiat. 
 
 13. Mercator negotiandi causa provinciam transiens 
 gladium suum sue selle alliget vel super vehiculum 
 suum ponat, ne unquam la;dat innocentem, sed ut a 
 prasdone se defendat. 
 
 APPENDIX J 
 
 S. Thomas Aquinas : Summa Theologica, ed 
 Migne. Paris, 1882. 
 
 Secunda Secundae, Quasstio XL., De Bello, 
 Articulus IV. 
 
 Utrum Liceat Diebus Festis Bellare 
 
 Ad QUARTUM sic proceditur: i. Videtur quod in 
 diebus festis non liceat bellare. Festa enim sunt 
 ordinata ad vacandum divinis : unde intelliguntur per 
 
 139 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 observationem sabbati quae praecipitur Exod. xx. 
 Sabbatum enim interpretatur requies. Sed bella 
 maximam inquietudinem habent. Ergo nullo modo 
 est in diebus festis pugnandum. 
 
 2. Prasterea, Isa. Iviii., reprehenduntur quidam quod 
 in diebus ieiunii repetunt debita, at committunt lites, 
 pugno percutientes. Ergo multo magis in diebus 
 festis illicitum est bellare. 
 
 3. Praeterea, nihil est inordinate agendum ad vitan- 
 dum incommodum temporale. Sed bellare in die festo 
 videtur esse secundum se inordinatum. Ergo pro nulla 
 necessitate temporalis incommodi vitandi debet aliquis 
 in die festo bellare. 
 
 Sed contra est quod i Maccab. ii. 41, dicitur : 
 Cogitauenint laudabiliter ludcei dicentes : Omnis 
 homo quicumque venerit ad nos in bello in die sabba- 
 iorum, fugnemus adversus eum. 
 
 Respondeo dicendum quod observatio festorum non 
 impedit ea quae ordinantur ad hominis salutem etiam 
 corporalem. Unde Dominus arguit ludffios dicens, 
 loan. vii. 23, Mihi indignamini, quia totum hominem 
 sanum feci in sabbato? Et inde est quod medici licite 
 possunt medicani homines in die festo. Multo autem 
 magis est conservanda salus reipublicas, per quam 
 impediuntur occisiones plurimorum, et innumera mala 
 et temporalia et spiritualia, quam salus corporalis 
 unius hominis. Et ideo pro tuitione reipublicse 
 fi-delium licitum est iusta bella exercere in diebus festis, 
 si tamen hoc necessitas exposcat; hoc enim esset 
 tentare Deum, si quis imminente tali necessitate vellet 
 a bello abstinere. Sed, necessitate cessante, non est 
 licitum bellare in diebus festis propter rationes 
 inductas. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. 
 
 140 
 
Appendix K 
 
 APPENDIX K 
 
 The Claims of Innocent III. to Supernational 
 Jurisdiction^ 
 
 I. 
 
 Regi Francorum : Ut pacem faciat cum rege 
 Anglorum. 
 
 Ferentini VII. Kal. Junii pontif. nostr. anno 
 sexto (1203). 
 
 . . . Cum regia serenitas non ignorat quod apud 
 nos esse non debeat acceptio personarum, inde 
 credimus earn non graviter sustinere, si circa ipsam 
 pastoralis officii debitum exsequamur, ne praster 
 divines maiestatis offensam, quam si neglegentes 
 fuerimus incurremus, apud homines quoque minis- 
 terium nostrum vituperari contingat, si etiam circa 
 reges at principes aliquid ex contingentibus omit- 
 tamus, voluntati eorum consulentes potius quam saluti. 
 . . . Ne igitur nos, qui sumus secundum apostolum 
 haeredes Dei, cohaeredes autem Christi, relictae nobis 
 haereditatis exhibeamus indignos, et gratiae, quam in 
 nos abundantius effudit, ostendamus ingratos, pacem 
 evangelizare tenemur filiis pacis prassertim, ut super 
 eos pax nostra secundum verbum evangelicum 
 requiescat, cum et, secundum prophetam, inquirere 
 pacem et earn persequi teneamur. Hoc autem tanto 
 confidentius circa regiam serenitatem exsequimur, 
 quanto dilectum filium P. tituli sancti Marcelli presby- 
 terum cardinalem, apostolicae sedis legatum, quondam 
 pro simili causa transmissum benignius recepisse te 
 novimus, et soUicitudinem nostram in eo amplius 
 
 ^ For Letter I. see Innocentii III. Regesiorum sive Epistolariim, 
 Lib. VI., Ep. LXVIII. Migne, Pat. Lat. CCXV., col. 64, 65, 66. 
 
 For Letter II. see Mcdiccval Political Tlicory in the 'West, 
 R. W, and A. J. Carlyle, II., pp. 220-223, note i, quoting from 
 Tlie Decretals of Innocent III., II., i, 13. 
 
The Sword of Justice 
 
 approbasse. Nosti etenim, utpote qui hoc in libro 
 experientias quotidianae legisti, quanta mala ex dis- 
 sensione, quas inter te et charissimum in Christo filium 
 nostrum, J. regem Anglorum illustrem, peccatis 
 exigentibus, est exorta, non solum communiter regnis 
 vestris, sed generaliter universo provenerint populo 
 Christian©. Ecce etenim, vobis ad invicem decer- 
 tantibus, destruuntur ecclesias, pauperantur divites, 
 pauperes opprimuntur et dum nee religioni nee sexui 
 pareitur, veri religiosi qui consueverant orationi 
 vaeare, mendieare eoguntur, et illae prostituuntur, 
 quod dolentes dieimus, voluptati praedonum, quae 
 virginitatem suam voverant virginitatis auetori. lam 
 quoque in Christianos sumunt audaciam Saraeeni, et, 
 qui plaeatis et pacatis vobis ad invicem exsilium 
 formidabant, animis ex vestra dissensione resumptis, 
 fortiores in Christianorum exterminium surrexerunt, 
 praesertim cum principes Gallieani, de quibus apud 
 maiestatem divinam et tuam serenitatem querelam 
 deponimus, a bono proposito reeedentes, contra pro- 
 hibitionem nostram in Christianos eonverterint arma 
 sua, nee adhue adiiciant ut resurgant, sed peiora 
 prioribus, sicut nostris est auribus intimatum, propo- 
 suerint attentari. . . . Ne igitur sanguis tot popu- 
 lorum de nostris manibus requiratur, ne rei tot 
 mortium, ut sic loqui liceat, videamur, si, quod absit ! 
 tanquam canes niuti non valentes latrare tacuerimus 
 in tanta necessitate populi Christiani . . . dilectum 
 &lium . . . abbatem Casemarii ... ad presentiam 
 tuam duximus destinandum . . . rogantes sereni- 
 tatem regiam, et exhortantes in Domino, et in 
 remissionem tibi peceaminum iniungentes, quatenus 
 ad commonitionem ipsorum, imo nostram verius, cum 
 praedicto rege vel statuas flrmam paeem, vel treugas 
 ineas congruentes, ut interim de pace inter vos per- 
 petuG reformanda, salva iustitia utriusque, licentius 
 possit et seeurius pertractari. . . . 
 
 142 
 
Appendix K 
 
 The Pope sent another letter (Epist. LXIX.) in 
 identical terms, mutatis mutandis, to King John ; and 
 a third, again with the necessary changes, to the clergy 
 of the kingdom of France, adding admonitions to 
 them to receive the Legate and observe his decisions. 
 
 \\} 
 
 . . . Non ergo putet aliquis quod iurisdictionem aut 
 potestateni illustris regis Francorum perturbare aut 
 minuere intendamus, quum ipse iurisdictionem et 
 potestatem nostram nee velit, nee debeat etiam, 
 impedire, quumque iurisdictionem propriam non 
 sufficiamus explere, cur alienam usurpare vellemus. 
 Sed quum Dominus dicat in evangelio : ' Si peccaverit 
 in te frater tuus. . . . Si autem ecclesiam non audierit, 
 sit tibi sicut ethnicus et publicanus ' (Matt, xviii. 15 
 et seq.), et rex Anglias, sicut asserit, sit paratus 
 sufFicienter ostendere, quod rex Francorum peccat in 
 ipsum, et ipse circa eum in correctione processit 
 secundum regulam evangelicam, et tandem quia nullo 
 modo profecit, dixit ecclesias : quomodo nos qui sumus 
 ad regimen universalis ecclesia; suprema dispositione 
 vocati, mandatum divinum possumus non exaudire, ut 
 non procedamus secundum formam ipsius, nisi forsitan 
 ipse coram nobis vel legato nostro sufficientem in 
 contrarium rationem ostendat ? Non enim intendimus 
 iudicare de feudo, cuius ad ipsum spectat iudicium, 
 nisi forte iuri communi per speciale privilegium vel 
 contrariam consuetudinem aliquid sit detractum, sed 
 decernere de peccato, cuius ad nos pertinet sine dubio 
 censura, quam in quemlibet exercere possumus et 
 debemus. Non igitur iniuriosum sibi debet regia 
 dignitas reputare, si super hoc apostolico iudicio se 
 committat, quum Valentinianus inclitus imperator 
 
 1 This letter was addressed to the French clergy, who had 
 raised objections to the Pope's claim to arbitrate. 
 
 143 
 
The Sv/ord of Justice 
 
 suffraganeis Mediolanensis ecclesia dixisse legatur : 
 " Talem in pontificali sede constituere procuretis, cui 
 et nos, qui gubernamus imperium, sincere nostra capita 
 submittamus, et eius monita, quum tamen homines 
 delinquerimus, suscipiamus necessario velut medica- 
 menta curantis." Nee sic illud humillime omittamus, 
 quod Theodosius statuit imperator, et Carolus inno- 
 vavit, de cuius genere rex ipse noscitur descendisse : 
 " Quicunque videlicet litem habens, sive petitor fuerit 
 sive reus, sive in initio litis vel decursis temporum 
 curriculis, sive quum negotium peroratur, sive quum 
 iam coeperit promi sententia, si iudicium elegerit 
 sacrosanctas sedis antistitis, illico sine aliqua dubita- 
 tione, etiamsi pars alia refragetur, ad episcoporum 
 iudicium cum sermone litigantium dirigatur." Quum 
 enim non hum anas constitutionis sed divinae legis 
 potius innitamur quia potestas nostra non est ex 
 homine, sed ex Deo : nullus qui sit sanee mentis, 
 ignorat, quin ad officium nostrum spectat de 
 quocumque mortali peccato corripere quemlibet 
 Christianum, et si correctionem contempserit, ipsum 
 per districtionem ecclesiasticam coercere. . . . Sed 
 forsan dicetur, quod aliter cum regibus et aliter cum 
 aliis est agendum. Ceterum scriptum novimus in lege 
 divina : " Ita magnum iudicabis ut parvum, nee erit 
 apud te acceptio personarum," quam B. Jacobus inter- 
 venire testatur, " Si disceris ei qui indutus est veste 
 prasclara," etc. Licet autem hoc modo procedere 
 valeamus super quolibet criminali peccato, ut pecca- 
 torem revocemus a vitio ad virtutem, ab errore ad 
 veritatem, pra^cipue tamen quum contra pacem 
 peccatur, " quas est vinculum caritatis." . . . Porro 
 quum secundum legitimas sanctiones quod quisque 
 iuris in alterum statuit, alius eo uti valeat contra ilium, 
 et sapiens protestetur : " Patere legem, quam ipse 
 tuleris," et rex ipse Francorum contra claras memori^ 
 R. quondam Anglorum regem, qui, ut salva ipsius regis 
 
 144 
 
Appendix K 
 
 pace loquamur, quia non ad confusionem eius, sed ad 
 
 excusationem nostram hoc dicimus, non eo erat 
 
 deterioris conditionis, in belle fuit of&cio et beneficio 
 
 nostra usus, quomodo quod pro se adversus ilium 
 
 admisit contra se pro alio non admittet ? Numquid 
 
 apud nos debet esse pondus et pondus, mensura et 
 
 mensura, quorum utrumque est abominabile apud 
 
 Deum ? Postremo quum inter reges ipsos reformata 
 
 fuerint pacis foedera, et utrinque praestito proprio 
 
 iuramento firmata qua tamen usque ad tempus 
 
 praetaxatum servata non fuerint, numquid non 
 
 poterimus de iuramenti religione cognoscere, quod ad 
 
 indicium ecclesise non est dubium pertinere, ut rupta 
 
 pacis foedera reformentur ? Ne ergo tantam dis- 
 
 cordiam videamur sub dissimulatione favere, dis- 
 
 simulare religiosorum locorum excidium, et stragem 
 
 negligere populi Christiani, dilecto filio abbati Case- 
 
 marii pr^dicto legato dedimus in praeceptis, ut nisi 
 
 rex ipse vel solidam pacem cum prasdicto rege 
 
 reformet, vel treugas ineat competentes, vel saltem 
 
 humiliter patiatur, ut idem abbas et venerabilis frater 
 
 noster archiepiscopus Bituricensis de piano cognoscant, 
 
 utrum iusta sit querimonia, quam contra eum proponit 
 
 coram ecclesia rex Anglorum, vel eius exceptio sit 
 
 legitima, quam contra eum per suas nobis literas duxit 
 
 exprimendam, iuxta formam sibi datam a nobis pro- 
 
 cedere non omittat. Ideoque universitatibus vestris 
 
 per apostolica scripta mandamus, et in virtute 
 
 obedientias districte praecipimus quatenus postquam 
 
 idem abbas super hoc mandatum fuerit apostolicum 
 
 exsecutus, sententiam eius, imo nostram verius, 
 
 recipiatis humiliter et vos ipsi servetis et faciatis ab 
 
 aliis observari, securi, quod si secus egeritis inobedi- 
 
 entiam vestram puniemus. 
 
 145 
 
INDEX 
 
 JEsBAS SiLvius, g8 
 Alabama, 50 
 Alaska, 50 
 
 Albigenses, 77, 95-97 
 Alexander II., Pope, 97 
 Alexander III., Pope, 97 
 S. Ambrose, 24-26, 121-122 
 Apostolic Constitutions, 24 
 Aquinas, S. Thomas, 35-41, 75, 
 
 84-85, 104, 128-132, 139-140 
 Aristotle, 20 
 Aries, Council of, 24 
 Article XXXVII., 41-42 
 S. Athanasius, 24 
 S. Augustine of Hippo, 26-35, 
 
 36, 37. 38, 40, 75. 80, 104, 122- 
 
 128, 129-131 
 
 Balance of Power, 52-53 
 Barbarossa, Emperor Frederic, 
 
 84, 138 
 Benedict XII., Pope, 98 
 Bishops, 74, 76, 79, go, 89, 137 
 Boniface VIII., Pope, 98 
 British Empire, 49, 52, 57, 103, 
 
 "5 
 
 Calixtus III., Pope, 98 
 Capital punishment, 6-7, 23, 33, 
 
 41,48 . 
 Celestiue III., Pope, 97 
 Chivalry, 86 87 
 Cicero, 20, 25, 35 
 Citizen, private, use of force by, 
 
 4-7, II, 39; duty, 43 
 Civil viax, 22, 23, 46 
 S. Clement of Rome, 22 
 Clement III., Pope, 97 
 Clement VI., Pope, 98 
 Cluny, 80 
 
 Crusade, 75, 77, 86, 95-96, 98 
 Cyclopes, 56 
 
 S. Dominic, Militia of Jesus 
 Christ, 85 
 
 Empire, Roman, 10, 18, 22, 24, 
 
 25. 33. 76, 104 
 England, Church of, 41-43 
 
 Force ; used by states, 3-4, 6 ; 
 
 by private citizens, 4-7, 11 ; 
 
 teaching of Christ, 10-17 '• of 
 
 the Apostles, 18-22 ; of the 
 
 Church, 22-44 
 S. Francis of Assisi, Third Order 
 
 of, 85 
 
 Gratian of Bologna, 26 35, 
 75, 122-127 
 
 Gregory VII., Pope, see Hilda- 
 brand 
 
 Gregory IX., Pope, 73-74, 132 
 
 Gregory XI., 98 
 
 Grotius, 106 
 
 Hague Conference, 54, 64 
 Henry IV., Emperor, 82, 83, 134 
 Hildebrand (Gregory VII., 
 
 Pope), 77, 97 
 Holy War, 72-78, 132-133 
 Hooker, Richard, 107 
 Hostiensis, 75, 132 
 Humiliati, 85 
 
 Innocent II., Pope, 88, 97 
 Innocent III., Pope, 75, 89-97, 
 
 98, 141-145 
 Innocent VI., Pope, 98 
 Isidore of Seville, 34, 125-127 
 
 146 
 
Index 
 
 JtJsT War, 7, 25, 27, 32, 34, 35, 
 38-40, 41-42, 45-72, 105, 115- 
 116 
 
 S. Justin, 22 
 
 Knights, Military Orders of, 86 
 
 Lactantius, 23, 24 
 Land Peace, 84, 138-139 
 Lateran Council, Fourth, 74, 
 132 
 
 League of Nations, 44, 66, 72, 
 
 81, I02-II8 
 
 Leagues of Peace, 2, 81, 82, 84, 
 133-134 
 
 Martin V., Pope. 98 
 Monroe Doctrine, 51 
 
 Navigation Acts, 58 
 Nicholas IV., Pope, 85 
 Nicholas V., Pope, 98 
 
 Origen, 23 
 
 Papacy, Popes, 33, 52, 54, 71, 
 74. 75, 76, 77. 81. 88-99, 104, 
 132-133 
 
 Pax Dei, 81 82, 134-138 
 
 Pius IL, Pope, see ^Eneas Silvius 
 
 Poor Catholics, 85 
 
 Press, the, 49 
 
 Privy Council, 49, 57 
 
 Robert the Pious, 80, 133 
 
 Sanctuary, Right of, 87-88, 137 
 State, a moral person, 2, 17, 20- 
 
 21 
 
 Stratagems, 31-32, 35, 36, 127, 
 128 
 
 Tertullian, 22-23 
 
 Thibet, 50 
 
 Tournaments, 38, 129, 131-132 
 
 Treiiga Dei, 81, 82-85, 94, 133" 
 
 134 
 Tristan d'Acunha, 56 
 
 Ultimatum, 64 
 
 Unam Sanctam, 77 
 
 United States of America, 47, 
 
 50-52, 65-66 
 Urban V., Pope, 98 
 
 VotumCrucis, 75, 133 
 
 Weapons, Restricted, 88 
 
 INDEX OF PASSAGES OF HOLY SCRIPTURE 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Exodus ii. II, 12 . . 
 
 25, 122 
 
 ix. 35 
 
 II 
 
 Deuteronomy i. 17 
 
 • 144 
 
 X. 8 
 
 
 II 
 
 Deuteronomy xx. . . 9, 
 
 II9-I2I 
 
 x-34 
 
 
 37i 131 
 
 oshua viii. 2 
 
 31. 127 
 
 xii. 28 
 
 
 II 
 
 saiah Iviii. 
 
 .. 140 
 
 xiii. 19 
 
 
 .. 13 
 
 I Maccabees, ii. 41 
 
 140 
 
 xvi. 23 
 
 
 12 
 
 8. Matthew : 
 
 
 xvii. 18 
 
 
 II 
 
 iv. Ill .. 
 
 II 
 
 xvii. 25 
 
 
 10 
 
 iv. 24 
 
 II 
 
 xviii. 15-18 
 
 • 15, 9>, 143 
 
 v. 38-46 .. 121-6, 
 
 37. 129 
 
 xviii. 17, 18 
 
 12 
 
 V. 41 
 
 10 
 
 xviii. 34 . . 
 
 10 
 
 vi. 9 
 
 II 
 
 XX. 25 .. 
 
 10 
 
 vi. 13 
 
 .. 13 
 
 xxii. 7 . . 
 
 10 
 
 viii. 7-10 .. ..10, 
 
 29, 124 
 
 xxii. 13 - . 
 
 10, II 
 
 viii. 31, 32 
 
 II 
 
 xxii. 17-22 
 
 10 
 
 ix. 33 
 
 II 
 
 xxvi. 52 
 
 
 [6-17, 36, 129 
 
 147 
 
Index 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 KAOE 
 
 S. Mark xiii. 7-8 . 
 
 II 
 
 Acts: 
 
 
 
 
 
 S. Luke : 
 
 
 viii. 36, 37 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 iii. 14 .. 13,24, 29, 38, 124, 
 
 x. 47, 48 . . 
 xiii. II 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 19 
 
 xii. 46, 47, 48 
 
 129 
 
 .. II 
 
 xvi. 30-37 
 xviii. 14 . . 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 19 
 
 xii. 58, 59 
 
 10, 14 
 
 xix. 31 . . 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 xiv. 31, 32 
 
 II 
 
 xix. 38 . 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 xviii. 3 . . 
 
 10 
 
 xxi. 37 . 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 xix. 5, 9 .. 
 
 10 
 
 xxii. 25 . 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 xix. 8 . . 
 
 .. 13 
 
 xxiii. 3 . 
 
 
 • 19, 
 
 28, 
 
 123 
 
 xix, 27 . . 
 
 II 
 
 >XV. II . 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 XX. 16 . . 
 
 II 
 
 xxv. 16 . 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 xxii. 36 . . 
 
 11,16 
 
 XXV. 27 . 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 xxii. 38 . . 
 
 II 
 
 xxvi. 32 . 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 xxiii. 26 . . 
 
 13 
 
 Romans : 
 
 
 
 
 
 S. John : 
 
 
 xii. 18, ig 
 
 
 21-22, 
 
 37, 
 
 129 
 
 ii. 15 
 
 II, 13 
 
 xii 20, 21 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 21 
 
 vi. 15 
 
 10 
 
 xiii. 1-8 . 
 
 
 19-21, 
 
 34. 
 
 129 
 
 vii. 23 . . 
 
 140 
 
 Ephesians vi 
 
 . ii-i 
 
 8 
 
 
 19 
 
 xviii. 22, 23 
 
 . 14, 27, 123 
 
 Titus iii. 1 . 
 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 xviii. 36 . . 
 
 II 
 
 S. James ii. 3 
 
 . 
 
 
 144 
 
 xix. 2,3.. 
 
 13 
 
 I S. Peter ii. 
 
 13-18 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 xix. 10, II 
 
 17, 20 
 
 I S. John ii. 
 
 13. 14 
 
 
 13 
 
 BILLING AND SONS, LIMITED, PRINTERS, GUILDFORD, ENGLAND, 
 
borii 
 
 of ^mtitt 
 
 OR THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF 
 
 WAR COMPLETED IN THE IDEA OF A 
 
 LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN EYRE WINSTANLEY WALLIS, M.A. 
 
 :,V WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 
 
 ERNEST BARKER, M.A. 
 
 ^7T In this book the author asks whether Christians 
 ^\\ may ever avail themselves of force as citizens of 
 jU a scculat State. He works out the answer his* 
 torically, tracing the development of thought from 
 primitive to modern times in the writings of represen- 
 tative Christian philosophers. He shows also what 
 the Church has done to restrain and mollify war in the 
 past. He applies the salient doctrines of the Christian 
 use of force to the idea of a League of Nations, and 
 concludes by outlining a scheme of teaching applicable 
 to the present and consistent with the past trend of 
 Christian opinion. The Appendix contains many 
 historical documents of great interest.