'k»>1 I'tQS'''^ mt ^ B ^^ IN THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS » '. > CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Cornell University Library DT 107.D97 In the land of the pharaohs:a short hist 3 1924 009 554 704 IN THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS PI Cornell University S Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924009554704 DUSE MOHAMED IN THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS A SHORT HISTORY OF EGYPT FROM THE FALL OF ISMAIL TO THE ASSASSINATION OF BOUTROS PASHA BY DUSE MOHAMED ILLUSTRATED LONDON STANLEY PAUL Sc CO. First Edition, igii CONTENTS CHAPTER I. Inteoductort II. "Ismail, The Magnificbnt" III. Tewfik— Political Shuttlecock IV. Tunis V. Ninth September VI. The Joint Note VII. Arabi Pasha VIII. "Fictitious Diplomacy" IX. The Bombardment of Alexandria X. Tel-el- Kebie XI. " lOHABOD " . XII. Government by Philanthropy XIII. The Hicks Expedition — and After XIV. England in the Soudan XV. The Wolff Mission XVI. "Thorns and Thistles of Diplomacy" XVII. "Le Roi Est Mort" Appendix : England's Pledges XVIII. The Nationalist Revival V PAas 1 6 18 28 39 48 62 78 90 102 114 128 140 156 172 184 196 208 215 vi CONTENTS CHAPTBB PAOE XIX. Fashoda . 236 XX. The People of Egypt . 253 XXI. MusTAPHA Pasha Kamil . 270 XXII. Lord Ceomee . 287 XXIII. "Take Coueage!" . . 310 XXIV. A Modern Rehoboam . 324 Appendix : Full Text of Resolution in Legis- lative Council, 1 December, 1908; etc . 345 XXV. Roosevelt— Imperial Democrat . 348 XXVI. Balfour's Little Band . . 357 Appendix I : More Pledges . 366 Index Appendix II : Law of Liquidation . . 368 . 370 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS FACING PAGE 5 DUSE MOHAMED .... Frontispiece Egyptians at Prayek H. H. Ismail Pasha . . . ... 16 H. H. Tewfik Pasha . 39 A Fellaheen Caf£ . . ... 62 Entrance to El-Azhar University Mosque, Cairo . . 89 A Street in Cairo ... 112 Mkhemet Ali . 133 H. H. Abbas Hilmi . ... 207 MusTAPHA Pasha Kamil . . 235 The Home of a Bey. (By kind permission of Mohwmed Tewfih Soliman Bey) . . . ... 253 An Egyptian Peasant Woman . ... 260 Nationalist School founded by Mustapha Pasha Kamil . 273 MoHAMED Faeid Bey . . . . . . 324 The Ex-Sultan of Turkey . . . . 341 Ali Kamil . . . ... 357 " I will a round unvarnish'd tale deliver " Othello, Shakespeare THE DYNASTY OF MEHEMET ALI OF EGYPT Ibrahim IsUAlL (4) I Mehsmet Tewfik (6) MEHEMET ALI I r~ I Ismail Toussoun I Abbas (2) El Hami I I Abbas Hilmi (6) = Amina I Nazli Abdul- Halim Tewhida Said (3) Mehemet Hussein Ali Ali and Zeniab Mehemet Ali, born at K4vala in Macedonia, 1769. Pasha of Egypt, 1805-1849. Created hereditary Pasha of Egypt by the Sultan's Firman, dated 1 June, 1841. Died 2 August, 1849. Ibrahim, eldest son of Mehemet Ali (1789-1848). Was regent for a few months during his father's final illness. Died 10 November, 1848. Toussoun (1796-1816). Distinguished himself during the Wahhdbi war, 1811-1815. Ismail (1798-1822) conquered the Soudan in 1820. Burnt alive with his staff in the palace at Shendy by the Nimr for his cruelties to the inhabitants. Tewhida, married Moharrem Bey, who commanded the Egyptian squadron at Navarino in 1827. Nazli, married Mohamed Bey Defterdar. Said (1823-1863), Pasha of Egypt (1854-1863). X THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS Abdul-Halim (Prince Halim Pasha), 1831-1894. Mehemet Ali the younger, 1836. Abbas I (1813-1854) commanded a division in Syria, 1831-32. On death of Ibrahim, became regent, succeeding to the Pashalik on the death of Mehemet Ali, 2 August, 1849. Being the eldest male of the family, he took prece- dence of his uncle Said. Ismail (1830-1895), son of Ibrahim. Became Pasha of Egypt 1863. Named Khedive 1867. Deposed by the Sultan 1879, and banished from Egypt. Died at Constantinople, 1895. Mehemet Tewjik (1853-1892), succeeded his father, Ismail, 1879. Married his cousin. Princess Amina, grand- daughter of Abbas. Abbas Hilmi II, born 1874. Succeeded his father, Tewfik, 7 January, 1892. II The children of Ibrahim Pasha, eldest son of Mehemet Ali, are : — Ahmed, ISMAIL KHEDIVE, and Mustapha Fazil. Of these, Ahmed, the eldest, while heir to the Pashalik, was accidentally drowned at the ferry of Kafr-el-Zayat, 1858, consequently his younger brother, Ismail, succeeded Said Pasha in 1863. Ahmed's children married their cousins, children of Ismail Pasha, viz. Ibrahim married Zeinab, Ahmed married Jameela, and Ain-el-Hayat married Hussein Kamil. THE DYNASTY OF MEHEMET ALI xi III The children of Ismail Khedive are: Mehemet Tewfih Khedive. Hussein Kamil Pasha, who married Princess Ain-el-Hayat, daughter of his uncle Ahmed. Hassan Pasha, married Khadija, daughter of Mehemet Ali, the younger. Mahmoud Hamdi Pasha,married Princess Zeinab, daughter of El-Hami Pasha. Princess Tewhida, married Mansour Pasha. Princess Fatma, married Toussoun, son of Said Pasha. Princess Jareel, married Ahmed Pasha, son of Ahmed (II). IV The children of MEHEMET TEWFIK KHEDIVE, by Priacess Amina, are : — Abbas Hilmi Pasha, Khedive, married Ikbal Hanum 1894, by whom he has issue — Prince Mohamed Ali Pasha. Princess Khadija, married Said Pasha, son of Abdul- Halim Pasha. Princess Niamet-uUah, married Jameel Pasha, son of Toussoun. xii THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS BEITISH AGENTS AND CONSULS-GENERAL IN EGYPT, DUEING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THIS HISTORY Fkom To Sir Frank Lasoblles 20 March, 1879 10 October, 1879 Sir Edward Malet 10 October, 1879 11 September, 1883 Earl op Cromer 11 September, 1883 6 May, 1907 Sir Eldon Gorst 6 May, 1907 — EGYPTIAN PRIME MINISTERS Fkom To Chbrip Pasha July, 1879 August, 1879 RiAz Pasha September, 1879 September, 1881 Cherip Pasha September, 1881 February, 1882 * Mahmud Sami Pasha February, 1882 September, 1882 Cherip Pasha October, 1882 December, 1883 NuBAR Pasha January, 1884 June, 1888 RiAZ Pasha June, 1888 May, 1891 Mdstapha Pasha Fbhmi May, 1891 January, 1893 ** EiAZ Pasha January, 1893 AprU, 1894 NuBAR Pasha AprU, 1894 November, 1895 MustaphaPasha Fbhmi November, 1895 March, 1909 BouTROS Pasha Ghali March, 1909 February, 1910 MoHAMED Said Pasha February, 1910 — ♦ Ragheb Pasha was Prime Minister from July 12, 1882, but lie was only a figurehead of Tewfik's, there being no government but that of the National Council. ** Fakhri Pasha was appointed Prime Minister by the Khedive in January, 1893, in place of Mustapha Fehmi, whom he dismissed ; but Lord Cromer compelled the Khedive to dismiss Fakhri and appoint Biaz. IN THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS CHAPTEE I INTEODUCTOEY IN attemptii to write a history, I am quite aware of the difficulties which beset my path, inasmuch as there are so many " histories " of Egypt. Many of these histories are wise, and not a few, otherwise ; but each and every one for the most part is preju- dicial to Home Rule in Egypt, and is wanting in that chief historical element — ^impartiahty. For upwards of a quarter of a century I have noted the continual growth of misrepresentation in the English Press touching Egyptian afiairs, and the Roosevelt Guildhall peroration has proved the last straw of a most weighty bundle. That I am qualified to deal adequately with the period under consideration, there need be little doubt. In the first place, I am a native Egyptian with a full knowledge of the aims of my fellow-countrymen, and consequently in sympathy with their sufferings — socially and politically. In the second place, not only was I in the city of Alexandria during its bom- bardment, but the fact that my father was an officer 2 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS in the Egyptian army and an ardent supporter of Ahmed Arabi — ^laying down his life gladly for the cause of Egyptian independence in the trenches of Tel-el-Kebir — ^gave me ample opportunities not only of coming into contact with many of the leaders of Egyptian reform, but of obtaining a first-hand know- ledge of their views ; a knowledge not imparted to any European then resident in Egypt, excepting of course Mr. Wilfrid Blunt and Sir Wilham Gregory, and I believe Dr. John Ninet. Since 1884 I have practically resided in England, where my education began in 1876. Notwithstanding this fact, I have kept in touch with the intellectual and political advancement of Egypt, and I therefore feel that in delivering this message I do so in some measure " as one having authority ". I have no " axe to grind ", nor am I identified with any political party ; the reader may therefore count upon an honest and impartial statement of facts. I might say in this connection that of late years Orientals, when conversing with Europeans — and especially is this the case with regard to Egypt — have been rather reticent regarding their pohtical views ; and this because Europeans have used infor- mation imparted by the natives for native destruction. Hence the complexity of Egyptian opinion, which is so very rarely what it seems, that no true estimate of it can be formed from superficial observation. Candour was a characteristic of the old Arab, untU the coming of the " Frank ", among whom candour was honoured more in the breach than in the observance. If, there- fore, the European finds the modern Egyptian difl&cult to understand, that diflS.culty has been produced by the Europeans themselves. Egyptian faith in Euro- peans was very great ; especially did this apply to INTRODUCTORY 3 the English, prior to the events of 1882. Since that date the Egyptians have become sadder and wiser men, and this quickening process of intellectual en- lightenment has effectually closed their lips. Let me hasten to add that we are not unmindful of, nor ungrateful for, the benefits which have been con- ferred by England. We also admit that Ismail's legacy of debt and poUtical chaos required excep- tional administrative capacity to extricate the country from its impending ruin. But it must not be forgotten that Arabi Pasha and his co-reformers were men of unquestionable abiUty, notwithstanding all that has been written to the contrary ; and that these men, although recklessly accused of the usual " Oriental incapacity ", had out- lined many of the reforms and improvements which were introduced by Lord Cromer with such con- spicuous success.^ Herbert Paul says, " Bigotry dies hard and slowly, but it dies ". Colour prejudice, on the other hand, is not infrequently shifted from one ship of state to another, but never by any chance is it cast overboard. Colour prejudice is at the root of most of the " Oriental incapacity " which bulks so largely in Enghsh literature. I have patiently awaited the death of colour prejudice for many years, and I have a rather large spade in readiness where- with to expedite its interment ; but I greatly fear its tale of years is likely to wrest the laurels from the hoary brow of Methusaleh, establishing for itself a long-distance record which no human agency will ever take away. Anglo-Saxon educational achieve- ment is accounted erudition, while Oriental edu- cational attainments are indiscriminately labelled " educational veneer ", or " a veneer of Western 1 See Blunt's "Secret History of Egypt", p. 210. 4 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS culture " ; and this applies not only to Orientals, but to all the coloured races of the world. Thus a university degree is either a valuable asset in the march of social and political progress, or it is not. If it is valuable only to the Anglo-Saxon, the European would be well advised to close his educa- tional portals immediately, and forthwith throw overboard the nauseating cant about " fitting the Oriental for self-government " ; " giving the native a share in the government when he is qualified " ; (?) and the remainder of the sentimental nonsense com- placently digested by the superficial British reader : nonsense helps to salve the official consciences of a reactionary British bureaucracy, but does not hood- wink the Oriental of even average intelligence. I have yet to learn that an English university degree may be obtained by an Oriental without mental effort — ^the " veneer of European culture " notwithstand- ing- A British soldier in India, fresh from the East End of London, wiU apply the opprobrious epithet " nigger " with equal impartiaHty to a Maharajah or a Hindoo priest ; and the " gentlemanly " snob from the London suburbs will not be outdone by the soldier in his expressed contempt for the native. Fortunately, British policy is not shaped in White- chapel, nor is it usual to select statesmen in Tooting. In like manner an Oriental bazaar may be a place for the interchange of views, but it is hardly the abiding habitation of Oriental thought. Touching this vexed question of Oriental inferiority which seems to have taken so firm a hold on the Anglo- Saxon mind, do not the edifices of India, sacred and otherwise, bear witness to a civiUsation whose an- tiquity is lost in the mists of chronological computa- ^' EGYPTIANS AT PRAYER '• God i.s present to ^[ohainiiipdans in a sense in wliicli lie is rarely ^nvst^nt to us amidst the liiirry and con- fusion of tlip WVst."— /'tVf/( StanJc'j. INTRODUCTOBY 5 tion, whilst its religions cause the Western mind to be uprooted from its foundations in its vain en- deavours to fathom the intricacies of a complex dogma ? Yet these men of India are semi-civihsed nullities, forsooth ! Those who have visited Spain, gazing admiringly on the Alhambra and other remnants of Moorish architecture, wrought by the forebears of that very Arab stock who at present inhabit the Delta, must perforce admit that these edifices were the results of Oriental intellect unaided by the " veneer of European culture or Western civiHsation ". The mirth not infrequently provoked in the breast of the Anglo-Saxon tourist, by reason of the visible signs of Mohammedan worship, which are daily observed in the streets of Cairo, is another of the many evi- dences of insular prejudice and limited understanding. It must not be forgotten that in Egypt religion enters largely into the social fabric, whereas in Europe rehgion takes a secondary place, in practice if not in theory. Islam is positive ; Christianity — especially Protestantism — is negative. There can be little doubt that irreligion among the Mohammedans, and even the Coptic Christians of Egypt, has been the result of French and British occupation and the attendant evils of the " Capitulations ". All these matters shall be dealt with in their proper places. I would add that it is because I believe the people of Great Britain to be, not only a freedom-loving race, but possessed of a genuine desire to see other nations as free as themselves, that I am emboldened to pen these pages. CHAPTEK II "ISMAIL, THE MAGNIFICENT" JUST after midnight, on the morning of 25 June, 1879, the Khedive, Ismail Pasha, was aroused from the amorous embraces of his harem by a summons to his audience chamber, there to meet Sir Frank Lascelles, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, M. Tricou and Baron De Saurma — Consuls-General of France and Germany respectively — ^who, accom- panied by Cherif Pasha, called at that unusual hour to inform him that they had just received a communi- cation from the Sultan of Turkey, deposing His High- ness and appointing Prince HaHm as his successor in the government of Egypt. ^ Hardly had he recovered from the shock occasioned by this inteUigence, when the succeeding day found him in possession of that famous telegram, " From the Sultan of Turkey to the ex-Khedive Ismail Pasha ".^ Thus, after eighteen years of misrule, the princely seat that he had bought with borrowed gold from Europe was, by the irony of an inexorable fate, ' See Cromer's " Modern Egypt", Vol. I, p. 139. ^ The following passage of the telegram taken from Lord Cromer's "Modern Egypt", Vol. I, p. 140, reads: "II eat prouve que votre maintien au poste de Khedive ne pouvait avoir d'autre resultat que de multiplier et d'agsraver les difficult^s presents. Par consequent Sa Majeste Imp&iale le Sultan, k la suite de la decision de son Conseil des Ministres, a decide de nommer au poste de Khedive Son Excellence Mehemet Tewfik Pasha, et Tirade Imperial concernant ce sujet vieat d'etre promulgu6. Cette haute decision est communiqu^e h Son Ex- cellence par une autre depeche, et je vous invite h, vous retirer des affaires gouvernmentales, conforment k I'ordre de Sa Majesty Impdriale le Sultan". "ISMAIL, THE MAGNIFICENT" 7 wrested from him by the very agency which had contributed to his vanity and ambition. His reign had begun during a period of unexampled prosperity, for the peasantry had named the reign of Said, his predecessor, " The Age of Gold ". On his accession in 1863, he found Egypt witha revenue of four millions, and a national debt of only three millions. In 1879 the debt stood at over ninety millions, with a possible revenue of £8,500,000 ! Said Pasha had abandoned the Viceroy's claim to be sole landlord of the Nile, and had recognised a proprietary right in the existing occupiers of the soil, fixing the land tax at the low figure of forty piastres to the feddan.^ In 1879 not only had the land tax risen to one hundred and sixty piastres, but Ismail, returning to the old order, seized the lands of the people, with or without valid pretexts, or so squeezed the landowners by his cruel methods of taxation that they were forced to sell their lands in self-defence. Whipping was even re- sorted to, in order to extract the last piastre from a starving peasantry. Mehemet Ali had brought his cruel method of extracting taxes to a fine art ; but the Viceroy's methods were mere child's play com- pared with the system introduced by Ismail Sadyk the " Muffetish ", and Financial Minister of Ismail Khedive ; and this pernicious system was successfully continued under Sir Rivers Wilson, Sadyk's English successor. While on the one hand the notorious Ismail Sadyk was devising means for the spoliation of the peasantry, the no less notorious Nubar Pasha was scouring Europe for the purpose of negotiating loans — a goodly commission passing into his own pockets — wherewith to aid his princely master in building palaces, enrich- ' Roughly speaking, a feddan is about or equal to an acre. 8 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS ing European women of easy virtue, lavishly enter- taining European visitors, conquering the Upper Nile, and fitting out an expensive but abortive expedition to subdue the kingdom of Abyssinia. On every side Ismail was surrounded by sycophants. The Euro- pean speculator indulged his passion for speculation, promising to make him the most rich and successful of financiers ; while his Oriental flatterers promised him a reign of dazzling magnificence and Eastern con- quest, with an African Empire which, divested of Turkish suzerainty, would not only stretch from the Mediterranean to the Equator, but would sxirpass in its magnitude any previous achievement mentioned in Mohammedan annals. From a mere landlord he had been suddenly and unexpectedly raised to the Viceregal throne, owing to the accidental drowning of his elder brother, Ahmed. By reason of the administrative and acquisitive abihty of his grand- father, Mehemet Ali, he found himself master of the most prosperous of Mohammedan states and the most progressive agricultural province, not only of the Ottoman Egypt, but of the Eastern World. Said, his predecessor, had introduced the railways and other public works, necessitating the negotiation of the first State Loan ; this, with his undiplomatic Suez Canal concession to de Lesseps, were the indirect causes of the subsequent bankruptcy of the country. Nevertheless, the national debt was counterbalanced by the sudden demand for Egyptian cotton caused by the shortage in America resulting from the Civil War. This demand for Egyptian cotton raised the export revenue from four millions in 1862 to fourteen millions in 1864. It will therefore be seen that had Ismail possessed one tittle of the administrative ability of his grandfather, the national debt might "ISMAIL, THE MAGNIFICENT" 9 very easily have been liquidated during the first years of his reign. Even the impolitic construction of the Suez Canal, and the reduced cotton export brought about by the conclusion of the American War, would not necessarily have retarded the on- ward march of Egyptian prosperity. But Ismail aimed at being the " Grand Monarque " of the East. Did he not once exclaim, " My country is no longer in Africa, we now form part of Europe " ? But that financial juggler, de Lesseps — Ismail's evil genius — was by no means a Colbert, nor was Nubar Pasha a Mazarin ; and although Ismail for a time at least carried into effect Louis's famous saying, " L'etat c'est moi," he did not possess that strength of character, remarkable energy, and indomitable per- severance which made the Grand Monarque admired by his people, and feared by the nations of Europe ; and a bitter experience taught Ismail that trickery was not statecraft, neither was fraud finance. Me- hemet Ah with all his cleverness had been outwitted by Admiral Sir Charles Napier ; ^ how, then, could he — a mere trickster — hope to outwit the united European creditors clamouring at his gate ? Lord Beaconsfield bought Ismail's shares in the Canal. ^ This gave England a preponderating interest in Egypt, but it neither nulhfied his obligations to the French bondholders nor prevented the Dual Control. He spent upwards of three millions in presents to the Sultan and in bribiag the palace officials at Stam- boul, that he might obtain the Porte's permission to negotiate loans ; also that he might become hereditary 1 See Cameron's "Egypt in the Nineteenth Century", p. 194. 2 Ismail possessed about 176,602 original founder's shares in the Canal ; being in his usual condition of impecuniosity he offered these as security for a loan; Lord Beaconsfield purchased them on 26 November, 1875, for £4,000,000 in cash. 10 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS ruler, thereby diverting the succession from the rightful heirs to his own immediate descendants.^ At the opening of the Suez Canal, when upwards of four thousand guests were invited from every clime to grace his fantastic Cairo fetes, champagne flowed in palace and hotel for weeks, even as the waters of an inundating Nile ; and banquets, balls, gala performances, fireworks, operas, were arranged to do honour to a distinguished company, which included the Empress Eugenie, the Emperor of Austria, and the Crown Prince of Prussia. Hotels, railways, steamers, carriages, were gratuitously placed at the disposal of this invading army of pleasure- seekers. For this magnificent orgy of an incredible prodigaUty the Minister of Finance dipped his hands into the National Chest, paying the demands of hotel proprietors and others without question. The loans he negotiated were the cause of his undoing ; and it was only because the European Governments knew that his son Tewfik would be as clay in their hands, that this prince was permitted to succeed to the Khediviate. He increased the tribute by £30,000, in order to acquire Suakin and Massowah. England now holds Suakin with the balance of the Soudan, and Italy at a subsequent date occupied Massowah ; but Egypt was saddled with the additional tribute. He finally professed to bow to the will of his people, and tried to hoodwink Europe by introducing con- stitutional government ; but inasmuch as he could not simultaneously become a despot and a constitu- tional ruler, he surreptitiously engineered the famous ' Prince Halim, born in 1831, was the eldest surviving xjaale of tte family of Meheinet Ali, and according to the Mohammedan law of Buccession should have succeeded Ismail in the Viceregal Chair. Ismail, however, on 27 May, 1866, obtained a Firman from the Sultan altering the succession and diverting it to his eldest son and the eldest sons of his successors, in other words, by right of primogeniture. "ISMAIL, THE MAGNIFICENT" 11 mutiny of 18 February, 1879. He then attempted to return to the old order by dismissing the Con- trollers and issuing his own fiiiancial decrees, which decrees were promptly repudiated by Bismarck, who was instrumental to his deposition.^ But craft being Ismail's chief weapon, he cleverly depleted the treasury of its current account, fleeced his friends of their valuables, and gracefully retired to his yacht on 30 Jime, 1879, with a final spoil of some three millions sterling. Now that mutiny of 1879 was destined to have far-reaching results, not only in its bearing on the eventual reduction of the army, but also because it led to the absolute extinction of free and inde- pendent government in Egypt. By the Sultan's Firman of 1873, the fourth clause gave Ismail and his successors " the right to fix the strength of the army " without reference to Constantinople. Ismail being deposed by the Sultan, this clause was rescinded in 1879, and the peace strength of the Egyptian army was limited to 18,000 men. The Sultan was fearful lest his suzerain rights should be endangered, and the mutiny of 1879 had proved that the will of the army could, by a little diplomacy, be made the will of the people. He knew that France favoured an independent Egypt, whereas successive British Governments had shown a decided disincli- nation to favour any tendency towards the dis- memberment of the Ottoman Empire. Here, then, was the desired opportunity to forestall any reform movement in Egypt by limiting the army. That a reform movement was on foot was well known to the ^ Mr, Wilfrid Blunt says that Bismarck was instigated by the Rothschilds on the information of Sir Eivers Wilson, who thereby revenged himself on Ismail for his dismissal by informing the Roth- schilds of the true state of the finances of Egypt. 12 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS Porte. Sheykh Jemal-ed-din, the great leader of thought at El-Azhar University, had, with his school — which included such constitutionalists as Ali Pasha Maburak and Mahmud Bey Sami-el-Barodi — ^main- tained that " the growing absolutism of Mohanmiedan princes in modern times was contrary to the spirit of Islam, which in its essence was a Republic, where every Moslem had the right of free speech in its assemblies, and where the authority of the ruler rested on his conformity to the law, and on popular approval ". Here were the elements not only of reform but of revolution, and Ismail's httle cowp d'etat had abundantly proved what a really strong man could do at the head of a well-disciplined Egyptian army. Nor was this all ; the Sheykh-al-Berki, the Nekib-el- Ashraf, or representative of all the descendants of the Prophet in Egypt, was carrying on a most strenuous agitation with the aid of the Notables and Ulemas, not only " against Riaz Pasha and the European Ministers ", as Sir Frank Lascelles' report to Lord SaHsbury under date of 1 April suggests, but against the House of Othman. This House caring very little about religion, had for two hundred years sunk the spiritual side of the Caliphate in the temporal ; and although the most powerful of Mohammedan princes, unless they could be induced to take a more serious view of the spiritual aspect of their position, a new Emir-el- Memenin, or head of the Moslem faith, would not have been considered a remote possibiUty by the Egyptian reformers of the El-Azhar. It was this knowledge that was in part responsible for Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda which had so alarmed the British authorities at Calcutta, as tending to under- mine the loyalty of the Mohammedans of India. "ISMAIL, THE MAGNIFICENT" 13 Notwithstanding the Sultan's decree convoking a constitutional assembly five years previously, he was a rank reactionary and opportunist rather than a constitutionalist. This is abundantly proved by his subsequent treatment of Midhat Pasha. He well knew that Ismail was also of his mind as regards repre- sentative assemblies ; this accounts for his reluctance to depose Ismail until he found the pressure of the Powers too strong for him. It must also be borne in mind that the Sultan had in his first communica- tion, when deposing the Khedive Ismail, named Hahm as his successor, until the Powers, in their own financial interests, insisted on the succession of Tewfik according to the Firman of 1873. Tewfik had been under the influence of the reformers of the El- Azhar, but Prince HaUm belonged to the old Turkish reactionary party. The appointment of the former, from the Sultan's point of view at least, meant Egyptian constitutional reform, and very probably, should England be won over to the French view of the situation, the eventual independence of Egypt both civil and religious, and the absolute extinction of the Sultan's suzerainty. Whereas, with Halim Pasha as Khedive, " the good old " Turkish regime would be reintroduced, with its tyranny, bribery, and corruption, and its wanton cruelty to the un- fortunate fellaheen. The Porte knew well that with England's approval his Empire was safe ; and as long as the financial harpies of Europe obtained from Egypt " the due fulfilment of the bond," little they cared about the abject conditions of the people groaning under the iniquitous system of taxation, in their efEorts to liquidate a liability they had not con- tracted, and from which they had derived no benefit whatever. The sequel proves, however, that the 14 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS Sultan's anxiety was quite unnecessary, so far as it affected the political sentiments of Tewfik. In bringing this chapter to a close, I must revert once more to Ismail's debt, and must examine, as far as may be, the claims of the Powers to saddle Egypt with financial encumbrances which were the results of an irresponsible individual's reckless ex- penditure. That this individual was the ruler of Egypt was no excuse for the gigantic financial con- spiracy which involved an innocent people in ruin, and fastened a foreign yoke about their necks. The various financiers of Europe, when they wantonly advanced large sums to Ismail must have been aware, that although he handled the taxes, the revenue of the country resulting from taxations was insufiicient to meet the current expenses of the Government, and at th% same time liquidate the interest on the various loans. It was this condition of affairs that compelled Ismail to sell his Suez Canal shares to Lord Beaconsfield, the coupons having previously disappeared into the insatiable pockets of one of Ismail's many creditors. AU Europe knew of this sale of shares in 1876, and that the sale was necessitated by the Khedive's extravagances and impecunious condition; yet, though to all appear- ances insolvent, he was permitted to go on for another two years before the Decree was issued appointing a Commission of Inquiry. This Commission found that not only was a very large proportion of the debt due to tradespeople, but that the Khedive and Ismail Sadyk, his Financial Minister, had indulged in the expensive luxury of " beariug " the Khedivial stock on 'Change. There was an account, for instance, among other like items, of £150,000 due to a French dressmaker, contracted by an Egyptian princess. It will there- "ISMAIL, THE MAGNIFICENT" 15 fore be observed from these few wild transactions that they were, as Lord Cromer avers, " the most astounding financial operations in which any Govern- ment in the world ever engaged ". These operations were, however, " the astounding financial opera- tions " of an individual — ^not of the Egyptian Govern- ment — which were made possible by the modern greed of gold, and the universal desire in Europe to be quickly rich, however risky the " gamble ". I wUl now turn to a parallel example in modern EngUsh history. George IV was the Western counter- part of Ismail. I have it on the authority of every writer on his time, that he was a spendthrift, a profligate, and a comparative despot ; all of which Ismail was, with this difierence : George's debts, principally contracted during his Regency, were neither liquidated by himself nor were they added to the national debt. George, however, was " the first gentleman in Europe ", while Ismail was but an Oriental ruler. The speculators in Egyptian ventures were backed by the legions of their several countries, and a man with many armies can always have his claims respected. George's creditors were Britons, therefore there could be no threat of foreign legions and an armed debt collector. Nor can I find that George, when Prince of Wales and Regent of the United Kingdom, surrendered any part of the enormous revenues of the Duchy of Cornwall to his clamouring creditors. On the other hand, Ismail did eventually surrender his Egyptian estates to his creditors. And let it not be forgotten that his huge properties, the State railways, the telegraphs, the sugar works, his palaces, the State lands, Gher- zireh Park, represented a sum not far short of the £100,000,000 which he owed ; and as Ismail's private 16 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS debts were made the liabilities of the State, the enormous sums he spent on public works must be taken into account. These, which were begun during his reign, constitute a very large portion of the present wealth of Egypt. Besides, England paid £4,000,000 for the Suez Canal shares : worth about £40,000,000 to-day, this is by no means a bad invest- ment. The afiairs of the Daira, once Ismail's private property, were wound up in 1905 with a surplus of £6,400,000.^ Ismail's heirs had abandoned their rights in favour of the creditors, but Lord Cromer did not permit the Princes to share in this surplus. Yet the engagements, entered into with the Princes when they renounced their rights, have not always been kept. For instance. Prince Hassin Kamil Pasha should have received £24,000 per annum for land which he surrendered to the State, in lieu of an in- come of £40,000 per annum, which the estate would have brought him. Shortly after this arrangement the sum was reduced to £18,000, when it was alleged that the claim was too high ; about a year later, this time on the plea of Egyptian poverty, the sum was again reduced to £12,000. It was the duty of the Commission of Inquiry to separate the liabilities of State from those which were purely personal ; charging the latter to the private estates of the Khedive, which, as I have shown, they were well able to bear, and the former to the revenue of the coimtry. I am aware that the task both of the Commission and the Controllers was of Herculean proportions, but this does not absolve them from a question of equity. Europe was, however, financially in the ' A full account of the Daira and Domains estates will be found in Chapter xvi. H.H. ISMAIL PASHA EX-KllEIiIVE iiF ];(.vrT "ISMAIL, THE MAGNIFICENT" 17 hands of the Rothschilds. The Rothschilds were Ismail's chief creditors. Europeans could not make war on each other or on weak Orientals, without gold wherewith to purchase the sinews of war ; the bankers of Europe possessed this gold. The money interest has been abundantly proved in recent times to be the controlling element in war. Conquest is no longer the battle-cry of monarchs. Modern warfare is conducted in the interest of trade and dividends. As long, therefore, as mankind shall continue to worship at the shrine of Mammon, bestowing its most liberal applause on the seekers after riches, the lust of gold will ever be the vice of the most exalted characters : aU of which pertinently calls up the sage Hues of Omar KhdyyAm : " And those who husbanded the Golden Grain, And those who flung it to the winds like Rain, Alike to no such aureate Earth are turn'd As, buried once, Men want dug up again ". CHAPTER III TEWFIK— POLITICAL SHUTTLECOCK ISMAIL having retired from Egypt — for the ever- lasting good of Egypt — to his Neapolitan asylum, there to indulge in " plots, excursions, and alarums ", Tewfik, his son, by the grace of Allah and the Powers, reigned in his stead. It is a fact that the Sultan, fearing Tewfik's indulgence in such dangerous amuse- ments as political reforms and constitutionalism — for reasons fully set forth in the preceding chapter — did withhold, or at any rate delay, the Firman order- ing Tewfik's investiture; but these little difficulties were soon overcome by Tewfik's patrons — the Powers. After a few trifling hitches, he duly became ruler of all the Egyptians by kind permission of the Dual Control — and the Sultan. Now in the early days of Tewfik's gentle dalliance with political reform, he came under the influence of the Sheykh Jemal-ed-din and his school of constitu- tional reformers at the El-Azhar University ; and when Ismail conferred that short-lived constitution on Egypt, Tewfik became President of the Council, and was thus brought into direct contact with the Notables, who considered him " Egypt's Hope ". Moreover, just prior to the promulgation of Ismail's constitution — by reason of the evil he had wrought — there was a movement on foot at the El-Azhar to demand his deposition at the hands of the Sultan ; or, failing that, his timely removal in the i8 TEWPIK— POLITICAL SHUTTLECOCK 19 same manner as he had removed his Financial Minister, Ismail Sadyk, that is to say, by a bowstring, an iron box, and a grave beneath the still mysterious waters of the Nile — Tewfik being privily named as his suc- cessor. The more aggressive reformers had really become disgusted with the entire stock of Mehemet Ah and their brood of Turkish-speaking Circassians : a crowd of pohtical vampires, who, like their prede- cessors the Mamalukes, lorded it over the country, extracting all the good things from the land, and leaving only the husks to the poor Arab-speaking fellah. On the other hand the reformers, possessing more temperate views, counselled patience inasmuch as Ismail could not Hve for ever, and they looked to Tewfik as their ultimate deliverer — Tewfik with his hypocritical professions of conversion, and fulsome promises of reform, " when he should ' rule ' Egypt ". By reason of these professions, when Ismail's Con- stitution was introduced, they very naturally be- lieved that Tewfik had influenced it ; and during the three short months of its operation the people of Egypt were happier, more hopeful and contented than they had ever been in the whole history of the country. When Nubar Pasha fell and the constitution came to an abrupt conclusion, the reformers knew that Ismail's political end was in sight ; for, should the Powers and the Sultan be unable or unwilling to re- move him, they of the El-Azhar intended to make the order of his going their especial duty. The Powers, however, by their timely intervention, shouldered the responsibility and relieved the situation. And now that Tewfik ruled, the constitutionahsts were destined to test the value of his promises ; nor had they long to wait, for the Khedive, after charging 20 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS Cherif Pasha with the formation of a ministry, promised the Minister that he would grant a Decree authorising a constitution ; on that document being presented he refused to sign the Decree and Cherif Pasha resigned. This liberal-minded Minister had experienced absolute rule in Ismail's time and knew all its attendant evils ; and being a man " of ex- ceeding honesty " — a very rare quality in an oflS.cial of those corrupt times — ^it was only upon Tewfik's guarantee of a constitution that he accepted ofl&ce. The Consuls were, however, unwilling that Constitu- tional Government should be introduced into Egypt ; at any rate, not until the finances of the country were put upon a basis favourable to themselves, Cherif being therefore unable to introduce a form of Government which experience had taught him was the best in the circumstances, tendered his resigna- tion; and the Khedive forthwith became his own Prime Minister, instantly blighting the hopes of all those in favour of free institutions, and betraying his friends at the El-Azhar, under the transparent pretext, that " liberal institutions were quite unsuited to the country at present ". Truly has the Psalmist said, " Put not your trust in princes ". In the meantime the European Consuls had other views. Riaz Pasha was summoned to Egypt, and on 22 September, 1879, was entrusted with the forma- tion of a ministry, the old Rescript of Ismail of 28 August, 1878, being resuscitated. Riaz, taking Tewfik's place as President of the Council and being the nominee of the Consulates, was very naturally expected to carry into effect their ideas of financial reform ; at the same time he was granted full powers to carry on the internal administration in the Khe- dive's name, independently of any Council or TEWFIK— POLITICAL SHUTTLECOCK 21 Assembly. " The Khedive, however, reserved to himself the right to preside whenever he thought it desirable to do so ". In other words, should the Council fail to show due appreciation for the will of the Consulates, Tewfik would preside that he might overawe them into obedience. It need hardly be stated now that the old order had been reintro- duced ; the Kurbash reasserted its dominion over the land. The courts of justice increased their powers : those international tribunals introduced by that self-seeking Armenian, Nubar Pasha, where European crimes committed in Egypt were tried in Egypt under the law of the foreigner, and where native evidence for the most part was discredited, or held in such contempt that there was little chance of justice for the native litigant. The ahen caste of Turks and Circassians continued to lord it over the people ; and the landed classes found themselves throttled by debt, whilst the poor fellaheen groaned under the extortions of Greek moneylenders. One would have thought that Tewfik's intimate experience of personal rule, and also that of liberal institutions, would have caused him to choose the latter in the interests of his people. But his culpable neglect and betrayal of his friends in this, the first important decision of his reign, not only made him the dummy prince of the Consulates, but was the cause of all his subsequent troubles ; for, like a shuttlecock, he was banged first by the battledore of the Powers, then by that of the Sultan, and again by the Nationalists and the army. Had he remained firm to his plighted word to Cherif Pasha and the reform party, summoning a Council of Notables, he would unquestionably have been spared all the in- trigues and counter-intrigues of the next two years 22 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS of his reign. He would have obtained the good-will and unconditional obedience of his subjects also ; for it must be distinctly understood that Riaz Pasha's appointment was in direct opposition of the popular will. He was known throughout Europe to be of the old Turkish regime, with its deportations, police rule, espionage, and illegal arrests. Notwithstanding these facts, I have it on undisputable authority that his object in taking ofl&ce was to assist, as expe- ditiously as possible, in extricating the country from its financial misfortunes, thereby ridding Egypt of foreign intervention. Much has been written against this man, but there is this to his credit : during his first year of office he did succeed in re- lieving the fellaheen from many of his most pressing financial burdens. Nevertheless, however sincere his intentions, it was quite impossible for him to effect anything in the nature of popular reform when it is remembered that his ministry was mainly composed of Turkish reactionaries of the old school. Of these, Osman Rifky, War Minister, was by no means the least disturbing element ; and his subsequent fall was destined to be brought about through Rifky's auto- cratic and reactionary methods. It was during these early months of Tewfik's rule that Sir Edward Malet — having succeeded Sir Frank Lascelles as Consul-Greneral — visited Con- stantinople, and declared on his return to Egypt, that " the Sultan Abdul Hamid would never agree to real constitutional government in Egypt ". This statement in a measure strengthened the weak-willed Khedive, inciting him to adopt more stringent methods in his rather fatuous opposition to reform ; for he thought that he could now rely on support from Constantinople, in addition to that of his masters. TEWFIK— POLITICAL SHUTTLECOCK 23 the Powers. He had, however, only succeeded in fanning into flame those smouldering embers of Nationalist bitterness against himself and his house, which were burning so furiously in Ismail's time. The native Press meanwhile freely attacked the unjust taxation that existed, which, being under European financial control, favoured Europeans at the expense of the native population. It attacked not only the multiplying of oj0&ces in the interests of foreigners, and the French and English control of the railway administration, but also the existing brothels, wine shops, and disreputable cafe chantants which were fostered under the protecting mantle of the capitu- lations, and were abhorred by all pious Moslems, because of their uncontrolled depravity, " We, who call ourselves Christians ", writes Cameron, " cannot but feel ashamed when we learn how, during that thirty years. Christian adventurers victimised the Moslems of Egypt, not shooting them down, it is true, but nevertheless cruelly wronging them by the abuses of privilege and capitulations, by mysterious pro- cesses of European law to which Orientals were quite unacciistomed. Whatever may be the point of view, a high or low standard of morality, a love of truth, or a pleasant cynicism in poUtics, there must be one weight and one measure. We cannot condemn the Egyptians and acquit the Europeans, and if we palUate our own offences we must condone those of Abbas and Said, and even Ismail." ^ During the period under consideration, Arab and Coptic girls were being frequently abducted from their homes to be offered up as a sacrifice at the shrine of lust and immorality, and to promote the evil traffic of the brothel ; whilst the youthful and ' Cameron's " Egypt in the Nineteenth Century ", p. 226. 24 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS hitherto temperate Moslem was initiated into the depraved mysteries of drunkenness, debauchery, and a whole catalogue of unprintable vices. This agita- tion, which began in a small way, gradually grew in proportions until it culminated in the mutiny of 1 February, 1881. Now in order to fully understand the underlying reasons of this mutiny, it is necessary to return once more to the time of Said Pasha. This Viceroy was imbued with a sincere desire to advance Egyptian commercial prosperity and at the same time raise the Arab-speaking fellah to that condition of class equality which previously had been denied him by his Turco-Circassian masters, and to which Said considered him justly entitled, inasmuch as he was the preponderating element in Egyptian nation- ality ; Said, among other efforts for the amelioration of the fellah, brought into being a scheme whereby the sons of village Sheykhs were trained as officers of the Egyptian army. This innovation gave them every opportunity of rising to the highest rank by merit «lone, and not by the old system of patronage which had elevated the Turco-Circassians to the higher posts. Among these young men was Ahmed Bey Arabi, who was quickly pushed on through the lower ranks, becoming a heutenant-colonel at the tender age of twenty ; and being favoured by Said, became his A.D.C., accompanying him to Medina just prior to his death. On Ismail's succession, being as it were, " a king that knew not Joseph ", he withdrew the favour shown to the fellah officers in the preceding reign. Arabi and the other Arab-speaking officers were treated with contumely by the Turco-Circassians, to whom promotions were now being apportioned. The monopoly of the higher army and official posts TEWFIK— POLITICAL SHUTTLECOCK 25 remained entirely in their hands, whilst the Arab-speak- ing element almost exclusively composed the army, from the common soldier up to the captain. The unsuccessful Abyssinian campaign not only destroyed Khedivial prestige, but threw up in bold relief the ignorance and incompetence of the Turco-Circassian generals, whom the returning men no longer re- spected ; and the resultant financial difficulties, while in no way diminishing the salaries of the Cir- cassians, caused the pay of the Arab ofiicers to be both precarious and irregular ; besides this the men were frequently subjected to iniquitous fines and forfeitures. These events naturally aroused discon- tent in the breasts of those who had been taught to expect better things ; and this dissatisfaction existing among the fellah officers and the rank and file, was fuUy shared by the country, where the Circassian official possessed both the wUl and the opportunity of making his presence a most hateful adjunct to Egyptian oppression. There had been previous conspiracies among the lower officers, who had at this time made common cause with the men. These conspiracies were never publicly known, but my father informed me they came perilously^ near to a violent eruption. Ahmed Arabi, because of his fellah origin and his unusual rank, became a recognised leader of this class as early as 1877. As the non-payment and irregularity of the fellah officers' salaries continued after Tewfik's succession, notwithstanding the regularity with which payment was made to the Circassians, this prompted the fellah officers to petition Riaz Pasha on 20 May, 1880, demanding an inquiry into the whole system. This petition, which was non-poUtical, was signed by all 26 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS the senior Arab ofl&cers, including Arabi and Abdul Aal Helmy. The inquiry was duly held ; and Baron de Ring, the French Consul, not only supported the just claims of the ofl&cers, granting them his protec- tion as far as was prudent, but had a rather stormy scene with Riaz Pasha in consequence, during the sitting of the inquiry. The ofl&cers gained a victory, but Osman Rifky never forgave them, subsequently revenging himself on the soldiers by subjecting them to a kind of corvie of hard labour, such as agricul- tural work on the Khedivial estates, and the digging of canals. The men very naturally objected and their ofl&cers protested ; but they were compelled to continue the work, until Arabi refused to permit the men of his regiment to be ordered away for manual labour on the Towfllkiyeh Canal. This refusal brought him for the first time into direct conflict with Rifky. Meanwhile, although half-hearted efforts were being made to improve the civil administration, nothing was done for the army, which Riaz did not under- stand, and Rifky, although War Minister, cared nothing about. Besides, many ofl&cers had been dis- missed the service without legal inquiry, whilst numerous promotions with increased pay had been made amongst the Circassians. The Khedive had become jealous of Riaz because of the free hand the Consulates had granted him in the administration, in return for his non-interference with their financial juggling. Tewfik, therefore, by underhand methods instructed his A.D.C., Colonel Ali Bey Fehmy — a fellah ofl&cer commanding the 1st Regiment of Khedivial Guards, who was attached to the Palace, because of his union with a Circassian woman — to in- form Arabi and Abdul Aal Helmy, the fellah Colonel of the Black Regiment, that he, Tewfik, was with the TEWFIK-POLITICAL SHUTTLECOCK 27 army in their quarrel with the Ministry. These three therefore drew up and signed a petition which they presented in person to Riaz on 15 January, 1881, demanding an inquiry into the promotion of the Circassians, and the removal of their " friend," the Minister of War. Riaz requested the officers to with- draw the petition, promising them an immediate inquiry. They waited a fortnight, making further efforts in the interim in the same direction, and at the end of that period they were decoyed to the Ministry and put on their trial. The fellah officers and men being privily informed of the conspiracy, marched to the Ministry of War, forced an entrance, released their commanders, and wrecked the office. The Colonels then marched to the Palace at the head of their regiments, and demanded the instant dismissal of Rifky. The Khedive ordered Osman Rifky's dismissal, and, at the instance of the Colonels, ap- pointed Mahmud Bey Sami-el-Barodi, a recognised liberal reformer, as his successor. Thus ended the mutiny of 1881 : Arabi and the other Colonels re- turning to their military duties. But this mutiny, although forced upon its leaders by the injustice of the War Minister on the one hand, and secretly in- stigated by the Khedive on the other, proved the undoubted strength of the army, and revived hope in the breasts of the much-oppressed fellaheen, who were quick to observe that their sons and brothers, who could compel the dismissal of a Minister ap- proved by the Powers, were a political force to be reckoned with, and might, with the fellah population behind them, eventually bring into being that much desired consummation, an " EGYPT FOE THE EGYPTIANS " ! CHAPTER IV TUNIS PRECEDED by paeans of Press adulation and theatrical display that might have done credit to the most exacting of Eastern potentates, the Rt. Honourable Benjamin Disraeh, Earl of Beaconsfield, and the Most Noble the Marquis of Sahsbury went forth in the summer of 1878 as befitted Her Britannic Majesty's plenipotentiaries, on their triumphal pro- gress towards the city of Berlin, Where at that famous Congress of the 13 June they were to deter- mine the fate of European Turkey, and of the Chris- tian subjects of His Subhme Majesty the Sultan. At the same time they were to revise the treaty of San Stefano, which by a British naval demonstration in the Dardanelles had been previously wrung from the persistent Muscovite, whose armed force stood with- out the gates of Constantinople. Now, Sir Henry Layard, Britain's Ambassador at Constantinople, a man well versed in Eastern know- ledge and diplomacy, some two months after the signing of the treaty of San Stefano, by reason of his great influence and his ascendancy over the youthful Sultan, Abdul Hamid, negotiated a secret Conven- tion with the Porte in which a lease of the island of Cyprus was granted to England. In heu of promises of reform in His Majesty's Dominions on the part of the Sultan, this was to be brought about through 28 TUNIS 29 the agency of certain travelling English military Consuls, who were to advise and report grievances, supervise the civil administration in the provinces, see that the recruiting grounds of the Ottoman Army were not depopulated by mismanagement, and that the farmers of taxes did not unduly squeeze the peasantry. On these conditions, Disraeli and Salis- bury estabhshed for Great Britain a sort of informal but effectual protectorate over Asiatic Turkey — guaranteeing the Sultan the integrity of his Asiatic provinces. DisraeU was, in the first place, actuated by the interested representations of a Consul as to the possible wealth of the island ; and in the second, the really important object of acquiring Cyprus was the strategic control of Asia Minor through the previously mentioned ambulant Consuls, whose chief duty was intended to check the advance of Russia in the Mediterranean, even as her progress had been checked at San Stefano. Had this Convention been carried to a successful issue, the British capitalist would have made a commercial banquet of Turkey, eventually trussing her up with the swords of an invading army in the same way as Egypt has been treated. With the Russian Army at his gates, the Sultan had no choice. It was a case of Russian aggression or English tutelage. The Sultan feared the former ; while, on the other hand, the prestige of England's name in the Asiatic provinces, and the evidence he had of her previous disinterested friend- ship, were in themselves a sufl&cient inducement for him to accept English tutelage by signing the secret Convention. Besides, the youthful monarch, even at that early stage of his eventful career, was not want- ing in that cunning which distinguished him in after years ; and he well knew that were a third Power 30 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS cognisant of England's duplicity, not only would she lose her prestige for probity in European Chan- cellories, but she would stand revealed in all her nakedness as a self-seeking hypocrite. It was about a month after the signing of this secret Convention that, principally on Disraeli's initiative, the European Congress met at Berlin. It being the most important Congress since that of Paris, which was convened for a hke object, all the plenipotentiaries were suspicious of one another, and of the part each was likely to play in the possible partition of the Ottoman Empire. It therefore naturally followed that the proceedings should open with a declaration that each Ambassador came to the Congress with clean hands, and that his Govern- ment possessed no secret engagement regarding the questions in dispute. Disraeli and Salisbury being taken by surprise, notwithstanding their secret understanding with the Sultan, formally gave their word to that effect, and thereby unwittingly fell head- long into their own snare ; for on 9 July the text of the Cyprus secret Convention was published by the " Globe ". It feU Kke a bolt from the blue upon the dehberations of the Congress. Although Marvin, a translator employed by the Foreign Office, had sold the document to the newspaper, its authenticity was denied in London ; but in spite of this denial, Dis- raeli and SaKsbury found themselves convicted of dehberate and recorded falsehood. The Congress was nearly broken up. Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian Ambassador, and M. Waddington, repre- senting France, gave warning that they would im- mediately retire from the Congress. M, Waddington even went so far as to pack his trunks. Now, as the San Stefano treaty was one of the principal acts in this TUNIS 31 diplomatic travesty, the resignation of Gortschakofi may be likened to " Hamlet " without the " Prince " ; and M. Waddington, by reason of the adjacency of Algeria to one of the Sultan's provinces, might be fittingly described as the " Ghost ". " Prince " and " Ghost " having therefore resigned their parts, and Bismarck realising that the play could not proceed without the principal characters, boldly rescued the " peace with honour " diplomats by patching up the trouble with their aggrieved colleagues, effecting the foUowiug compromise between the French and EngUsh Ambassadors : 1. " That as compensation to France for England's acquisition of Cyprus, France should be allowed on the first convenient oppor- tunity, and without opposition from Eng- land, to occupy Tunis. 2. " That in the financial arrangements being made in Egypt, France should march fan passu with England. 3. " That England should recognise in a special manner the old French claim of protecting the Latin Christians in Syria ".^ Thus at one fell swoop, in order to cover up a poUtical act of double-dealing and disgrace, two of England's foremost statesmen had bartered their honour. The Sultan was wantonly denuded of a province by his most trusted ally, and confidence in the good faith and integrity of Christian statesmen was for ever banished from the breasts of all thinking Moslems. The heel of France was thereby set upon Tunis ; and not only was the way paved for the partition of ' See Blunt's "Secret History", p. 36. 32 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS Africa among the European Powers with its attendant miseries to the native populations, but England's influence for good in the Ottoman Empire was destroyed, her name being made a byword among Moslem peoples, and the eyes of the Sultan were opened to the danger of English co-operation in the internal administration of his empire. This dis- graceful Cyprus intrigue was also responsible for Abdul Hamid's subsequent persecution of the Liberal party at Constantinople, and for his settled dislike to Western constitutionalism in Egypt ; thus giving an impetus to the idea of that Pan-Islamism which was primarily intended as a defensive weapon against the aggressive encroachments of Christendom. France's ambitions with regard to her conquest of the East may be much better understood when it is remembered that the " Great " Napoleon, in his desire to surpass all the generals of antiquity, from Alexander to Caesar, had invaded Egypt as early as 1799 ; and the Bourbon Charles X, not to be outdone by the Corsican adventurer, ordered the conquest and subjugation of Algeria in 1830 ; a conquest and subjugation which required seventeen years for its ultimate accomplishment ; and this notwithstanding France's " friendly " attitude to- wards the Sultan. Little wonder, therefore, that we find the dream of Eastern conquest again asserting itself in 1857, at which time Napoleon III was making overtures to the British Government with a view to the partition of the northern portions of Africa, According to that scheme France was to have Morocco, Tunis was to fall to Sardinia, and Egypt to England. Lord Palmerston, however, desiring to uphold the good old traditions of British statesmen in their policy of maintaining the integrity of the TUNIS 33 Ottoman Empire, threw cold water upon the in- tended conspiracy in the following characteristic letter to Lord Clarendon : " It is very possible that many parts of the world would be better governed by France, England, and Sardinia than they are now. . . . We do not want to have Egypt. What we want about Egypt is that it should continue to be attached to the Turkish Empire, which is a security against its belonging to any European Power. But we do not want the burden of governing Egypt. . . . Let us try to improve all those coimtries by the general influence of our commerce, hut let us abstain from a crusade of conquest which would call down upon MS the condemnation of all other civilised nations ".^ This letter suggests that either Lord Palmerston was utterly wrong in regard to his implied estimate of " the condenmation of all other civiKsed nations ", or by inverse ratio, the latter-day aggressions of European nations on " imcivilised " races suggests not only a lack of that high moral and political standard which is essential to those who would assume a judicial position in regard to the pohtical morals of their kind, but by placing a premium on aggressions debases the moral standard, thereby taking the reactionary path which leads back to primeval man, whose motto was, " might, not right ". France, however, was not slow to take advantage of concessions so easily obtained from " Perfidious Albion ", for Sir Eivers Wilson, the English Financial Controller in Egypt, was immediately advised by telegram to share equally with France all financial appointments connected with the Administration. As wiQ. be shown hereafter, this move was destined to pave the way for the joint note and the subsequent ' Ashley's " Life of Lord Palmerston", Vol. II, p. 125. 34 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS occupation of Egypt. Bonaparte having created a precedent in aggression by invading Egypt, it was no difficult matter for France, in May, 1881, to seize upon Tunis under the pretext of protecting the Bey from the threatening attitude of his subjects ; and by means of this highly imaginary device, to occupy the western portion of that Regency, and proclaim a French Protectorate. General Breart seized the person of the Bey, and, at the point of the sword, forced him to sign a treaty surrendering the inde- pendence of Tunis. The Western Tunisians were unable to fire a shot in defence of their ruler ; but the tribes of the Eastern Provinces took up arms against the invaders, and " before the middle of the summer the revolt had spread to the Algerian Sahara, and a wave of anger against Christendom was rolling eastward ; which, as will be seen, had begim to affect Egypt dangerously; and remains, in truth to this day, responsible for precipitating the action of the Liberal reformers there, and of the army in demanding self-government ". The Bey of Tunis had neither for- feited the good-will of his people, nor was there any danger to the Europeans, nor were there financial embarrassments ; yet this illegal usurpation of authority in the dominions of a mild and inoffensive neighbour, without parallel in modern European aggression, was calmly accepted by Lord Granville on the assurances of the French Government that " the occupation of the Regency was only for the restoration of order ", and that " it would not be continued a day longer than might be necessary to secure the safety of the Bey's Government ". Pohti- cal fictions of this nature were duly plagiarised by the noble lord himself a year later in Egypt, when the positions of the two Powers were reversed. Silence TUNIS 35 reigned in the European Chancelleries with regard to this aggressive incident. The Italian people felt aggrieved, it was said ; and the British Parliament made a great noise, but obtained no satisfactory explanation. The Marquis of Salisbury, then in opposition, maintained a sphinx-like silence which contagiously affected Berlin, and the Sultan's public protest was like an accusing voice crying in a wilder- ness of European iniquity. But as the truth slowly filtered through, it Ut a flame throughout the Mohammedan world, which neither the sophistry of historians, the repression of Ministers, nor the plati- tudes of statesmen have ever been able to effectually quench. In Egypt, meanwhile, the Khedive was being tor- tured by doubts, ambitions, fears, and jealousies. The Anglo-French harness chafed him badly, and he was disposed to kick over the traces. The enemies of Eiaz Pasha were suggesting that with the support of the Powers, to whom he owed his position, the Minister was secretly plotting against the Khedive. Arabi's growing power aroused his jealousy and suspicions. The Circassians who formed his Court, being violently opposed to the fellah officers, were untiring in their efforts to induce Tewfik to adopt drastic measures against them. At the same time Cherif Pasha and the constitutionalists were making use of them, by engineering another miUtary demonstration, in order to rid the coimtry of Riaz, and the European Consular subjection in which he found himself enmeshed. For this very reason Tewfik knew himself to be cordially hated and despised by the majority of his subjects. Thus stood the imsettled condition of Egyptian affairs in August, 1881, when the universal ferment throughout the Moslem world, created by the French 36 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS invasion of Tunis, having reached Egypt, fanned the smouldering ember of discontent at Cairo into a definite conflagration of revolt, and led up to the Nationalists' Mutiny of 9 September. It will be remembered that the three Colonels were arrested by Osman Rifky at the Ministry for their share in the military disturbance at the Kasr- el-Nil on 1 February. It will also have been noted that Rifky had been reheved of his portfolio by the Khedive through the efforts of Baron de Ring, and also because he feared to take the consequence of a trial along »with the Colonels. That dismissal was contrary to the wishes of the Prime Minister, Riaz Pasha ; and the fact that the new War Minister, Mahmud Sami-el-Barodi, was a constitutionalist and a friend of the rebelhous officers, whose ultimate aim was to restore his late chief, Cherif Pasha, to power, influenced Riaz to pursue a system of persecution and intrigue against the fellah ofl&cers which tended towards their final destruction. When, therefore, Mahmud Sami accepted ofl&ce under Riaz, he assured Arabi, through their mutual friend. Ah Bey Roubi, a fellah officer, that as his position in the Ministry gave him the opportunity of helping them actively, he would give them notice of any designs against them. This he considered could be more effectually accomplished if he did not see Arabi personally, but conveyed any inteUigence he might possess through the medium of Ah Roubi. He, moreover, made the ofl&cers a general promise that, should the Khedive become actively engaged with Riaz against them, they would either be warned directly of their danger, or they would know indirectly by his retirement from the Ministry. Meanwhile, Arabi's popularity con- tinued to increase ; and Riaz, working on the Khe- TUNIS 37 dive's jealousy of Arabi, obtained his consent to the banishment of the two leading Colonels with their regiments from Cairo, giving the order to Mahmud Sami, who, on raising objections, was summarily dis- missed ; the Khedive's Circassian brother-in-law, Daoud Pasha Yeghen, being named as his successor. Mahmud Sami, having been ordered by letter to retire to his village, where it was hoped he would cease from troubling the Government by aiding the reformers, had no opportunity of communicating with his mihtary friends ; but they, having accepted warning through his sudden retirement, were prepared for the worst ; so that when the Court returned to Cairo early in September, Arabi had already taken counsel with Sultan Pasha and the other civihan reformers as to their subsequent course of action. Riaz, having removed Mahmud Sami, and Baron de Ring having been recalled by his Government for interfering in the internal administration of the Khedive's Govern- ment by encouraging the officers to rebel, the Prime Minister began to take a rather optimistic view of the situation. That his colleague at the War Office was Daoud Pasha, the Khedive's brother-in-law, a Circassian general of the worst possible type, who, like those of his class, held the fellah officers in supreme contempt, was certainly calculated to put Riaz on good terms with himself, and delude him into the behef that he was really master of the situa- tion. Unfortunately for himself he never properly estimated the strength of the military element and its adherents, or he would hardly have pursued the system of espionage and intrigue against the officers that obtained at this time. There was also an un- founded rumour with regard to the existence of a secret Fetwa, condemning the Colonels to death for 38 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS high treason. The existence of this decree may have been credited by the fellah ojBS.cers of minor rank ; but I do not think much importance was attached to it by Arabi at the time, because Ali Fehmy was still engaged as Tewfik's go-between. Ali Fehmy encouraged the officers to overthrow Riaz in the interest of the Khedive, who wanted to rid himself of the Prime Minister and the European control, and with the aid of the military restore Cherif Pasha to power, in order that he, Tewfik, might regain his lost prestige with reformers and people. It will therefore be observed that from the Egyptian point of view, at least, military revolt was the one and only solution of the problem produced by these con- tending elements. The European tutelage disturbed the peace of the reformers, both military and civil. The invasion of Tunis, the profanation of mosques, and outraging of Moslem women by the French soldiery, stirred up rehgious feeling against the Europeans ; and the " ruler " of the country was actively engaged with his army in an intrigue against his Prime Minister, whilst the Prime Minister was secretly plotting the destruction of the leaders of the army. Here was a tangled skein of circumstances, surpassing in magnitude and complexity the wildest flights of imagination that have ever engrossed the minds of dramatist or noveUst. H.H. TEWFIK PASHA LATE KHEUIVE OF EGYPT CHAPTER V NINTH SEPTEMBER TT was on the night of 8 September, 1881, that Arabi -■- Pasha was quietly seated in his house at Cairo, when he was startled by a loud and persistent knock- ing at the outer door. The would-be intruder being unable to give a satisfactory account of himself or his business, was refused admission. On his re- luctant departure, Arabi caused him to be followed and he was seen to enter the Prefecture of Pohce. Arabi then cautiously proceeded to the residence of the other Colonels, from whom he learned that a similar incident had just occurred. The Colonels thereupon decided to take action on the following day. That there was genuine cause for alarm there can be little doubt, and that immediate action was necessary for their self-protection cannot be gain- said : for they well knew that all sorts of plots had been put in motion for their destruction, and Arabi, the recognised leader, went in fear of his life. As I have previously pointed out, all other schemes having proved unavailing, Riaz decided to banish Arabi and his regiment to Alexandria, and Abdul Aal's with its commander to Damietta. AU Bey Fehmy, the Khedive's A.D.C., was alone permitted to remain with his regiment in Cairo, which being a Guards' Regiment did duty at the Palace. By reason of his marriage, Tewfik counted on this colonel's attach- 39 40 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS ment to the Court as being sufficiently strong to guarantee his faithfulness. Daoud Pasha, therefore, on the evening of 8 September issued the order which was intended to separate the Colonels on the day- following ; but they, having carefully laid their plans, caused Arabi to send a letter to the Khedive on the morning of the ninth, in which he demanded the dismissal of the Riaz Ministry and the introduction of a constitution. This letter was sent to Ismailiyeh Palace, where the Khedive was in residence. Arabi further stated in his communication that he should march to the Abdin Palace in the afternoon to re- ceive His Highness's answer. Arabi's reason for going to the Abdin Palace, the Khedive's official residence, was to avoid giving alarm to the ladies of the household. Tewfik, on receiving the letter, sent for Sir Auckland Colvin, the English Financial Con- troller, an old and experienced Indian Civil servant. Riaz Pasha and Stone Pasha — an American officer in the Egyptian Army — were also sent for. Colvin suggested that the Khedive should summon the two loyal regiments in Cairo with all the available pohce, and personally arrest Arabi on his arrival at the Abdin Square. The Khedive demurred, pointing out to Colvin that Arabi had the artillery and cavalry with him, and might fire. They then drove over from Ismaihyeh to the Abdin barracks, where Ali Fehmy and his guards' regiment turned out. The Khedive and Riaz spoke to the soldiers, who warmly pro- tested their loyalty. Orders were then given to Colonel Ali Fehmy that he should immediately occupy the Abdin Palace with his regiment. Ali Fehmy having assented, posted his men in the upper rooms. From thence they drove to the Citadel, where there were further expressions of loyalty ; but the NINTH SEPTEMBER 41 Khedive, having learnt that the regiment had been signalling to Arabi's regiment in the Abbassiyeh barracks, began to scold and threaten their com- mander, Fuda Bey ; whereupon the soldiers, fearing that danger threatened their commander, surrounded the Khedive's carriage. He being afraid, at once drove away to the Abbassiyeh barracks, and found on his arrival that Arabi had already marched to Cairo with his regiment. Tewfik then returned to the Abdin Palace, entering through a side door. Arabi, meanwhile, on his arrival, having conversed with Ah Fehmy, that oflScer and his regiment joined Arabi in the square, so that when the Khedive entered the Abdin Square with Sir Auckland Colviri, he found that his regiment of guards was occupying the square along with Arabi's, the cavalry and artillery. Tewfik called upon Arabi to dismount, which he did. He ordered him to sheath his sword ; this order was also obeyed ; but to prevent treachery the officers, to the number of about fifty, placed themselves between the Khedive and the Palace. His Highness, after con- sulting with the generals and aides-de-camp by whom he was surrounded, demanded of Arabi the meaning of the demonstration. Arabi replied that he came to demand : 1. That the Ministers should be dismissed. 2. That a ParUament or Council of Notables be convoked, and a constitution introduced. 3. That the strength of the army should be raised to 18,000, as set forth in the Sultan's Fir- man. He added that the army had come on the part of the Egyptian people to enforce these demands, and that he would not retire until they were conceded. 42 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS " I am Khedive of the country and shall do as I please ! " exclaimed Tewfik. To which Arabi answered, " We are not slaves, and from this day forth shall not submit ourselves to be bequeathed from one master to another ". Thereupon the Khedive turned and went iuto the Palace, Sir Charles Cookson, British Consul at Alexandria, acting for Sir Edward Malet, away on leave, was then sent to negotiate with the mutineers with the aid of an interpreter. In order to ad- just the terms, there was much going to and from the Palace, Tewfik finally consenting to the full demands of Arabi, even to Cherif Pasha's appointment as Prime Minister in place of Riaz Pasha. When the soldiers and people who occupied the square heard the announcement of Cherif's selection, the shouts that greeted this announcement, " Long live the Khedive ! " were loud and universal, and the troops were drawn ofE in perfect quiet to their re- spective barracks. That evening the Khedive sent for Arabi to meet him at the IsmaiUyeh Palace, where the Colonel made his submission and offered his thanks to the Khedive for the concessions he had made. The Khedive dismissed Arabi with the injunction that he should " go and occupy Abdin ", adding, " but let it be without music in the streets ". The part Tewfik played in the events of the day was hardly heroic. He was exposed to no danger whatever at the hands of the soldiers ; and what appeared to the unenlightened minds of Cookson .and Colvin to be vacillation on the part of the Khedive in his treatment of the army and his ready agreement to their demands, " in order to save pubhc security ", NINTH SEPTEMBER 43 was really part of a deeply laid plan to rid himself of Riaz by appearing to yield to force, whilst that very force was encouraged by the Khedive himself. Colvin, being quite in ignorance of the semi-under- standing existing between the Khedive and his officers, was most anxious that violent methods should be adopted against the officers, going so far as to suggest that they should be shot — an attitude quite ur^uited to the time and the circumstances. On the other hand, Cookson, who was better ac- quainted with Tewfik's timid character, though also in ignorance in regard to the Khedive's partial under- standing with his officers, suggested compromise. This was the precise solution Tewfik had schemed to attain, so that he might bring about the fall of Riaz and the recall of Cherif Pasha. Riaz prudently took no part in the discussion, remaining inside the Palace until matters were adjusted. On that very evening he received his dismissal ; and Cherif Pasha, on being offered the Premiership, as was natural, raised objections to becoming the nominee of a mutinous army ; but being pressed by Sir Charles Cookson, M. Sienkiewicz, the French Consul-General, and Sir Auckland Colvin, and, like Macbeth, having no mind to let " I dare not " wait upon " I would '\ after a respectable show of resistance finally con- sented. But this was after the Chamber of Notables, which had been previously summoned to Cairo by Arabi, with Sultan Pasha at their head, had arrived on 13 September. When the Notables added their solicitations to those of the European officials, Cherif Pasha gracefully capitulated and was duly installed. The new Minister was nominated on 14 September, Cherif Pasha being assured that " in case the army should show itself submissive and 44 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS obedient, the Governments of England and France would interpose their good offices with the Sublime Porte, in order to avert from Egypt an occupation by an Ottoman Army ". This statement was quite unnecessary. Abdul Hamid was no fool ; he well knew, through his spies in Cairo, that apart from the constitutional aspect of the revolt, and the element of fear on the part of the officers, its main object was to rid Egypt of a Minister who, as nominee of France and England, was most likely to favour further encroachments by his patrons on the pohtical independence of Egypt. Moreover, as I have previously pointed out, the fate of Tunis had convinced the Egyptians, as no other event could have done, that their strength and safety from European aggression lay in drawing closer bonds of unity between themselves and the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the people of Egypt were naturally overjoyed at the new turn events had taken : even the doubters and waverers were com- pelled to acknowledge that the appeal to force, with its bloodless victory, had been amply justified by results. The soldiers were relieved of the fears and dangers which had so long encompassed them ; for this movement, although countenanced by the Khedive, was unquestionably evolved from and by the very human desire of self-preservation. This is proved in part by the statement of Arabi at a later period, when he said that a party of Circassians had agreed together to kill him anJ every native Egyp- tian holding a high appointment. " We heard ", he said, " that three iron boxes had been prepared into which to put us (we three colonels), so that we might be dropped into the Nile ". It must be remembered that the system was mainly to blame for the existing NINTH SEPTEMBER 45 conditions ; and although fear was at the root of the military side of the agitation, the civil reformers were actuated by the much more exalted desire for free and untrammelled political institutions. That the people were in a condition to appreciate their new-found liberty cannot be disputed. For the second time in the memory of those living had the people of Egypt been accorded an opportunity of exercising the rights of citizenship, with the prospect of being ruled according to the laws of justice and equity administered by their own representatives. It is, therefore, not surprising that they should have devoted these days to rejoicing. The Press, under Sheykh Mohammed Abdu's able censorship, being released from its old trammels, spread the news rapidly. There was a unity among the masses that had never previously existed. The Coptic Christians, the Armenian, the Jew, and the Arab fellah were all united in one bond of brotherhood. All strife of faction or rehgion was sunk in this new-found joy of pohtical freedom and free speech. Men openly gave tongue to political sentiments in the bazaars and cafes ; sentiments which a very few days previously they would scarcely have dared whisper to themselves. Strong men fell upon each other's necks : And the Sun of Hope, thawing the frozen Miseries of three hundred years, unleashed A surging flood of gladsome tears, that found A new-made channel wrought by smiles of joy. If Said's reign was named the " Age of Gold ", surely this was indeed the long-expected " Dawn of Hope " ! Tewfik not only saw, but undoubtedly understood these visible manifestations of a nation's joy ; but 46 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS it is rather questionable if he gave a moment's thought to the desires of the nation. His delight, now that the crisis had passed, was over the magical success of his plot to rid himself of Riaz, and with him the most irksome features of the Dual Control, and he counted on Cherif Pasha to remove Arabi from the scene of the conflict. Had not the Chamber of Notables, at the suggestion of Sultan Pasha, guaranteed that " as a condition of Cherif accepting the Premiership, they, the Notables, should see that the army pledged itself to absolute submission to his orders and authority as the Khedive's Minister " ? Mahmoud Pasha Sami, being once more War Minister, the army could now set its mind at rest as regarded further intrigues against it. Arabi's relations with the Khedive remained on a satisfactory basis. His attitude towards Cherif was at once dignified and devoid of arrogance. Egyptians of all classes deluged him with petitions, or bombarded his house with requests that he might redress their grievances, or obtain them preferment with " the great ones " of the land. On every side he was acclaimed by the populace as el Wahid, the only one, receiving from them such fulsome adora- tion, that I question whether the rather " superior " Turco-Ciccassian, who heartily despised the feUah Colonel, could have maintained his mental equilibrium under similar conditions. Arabi, however, preserved a cahn exterior, attending to his military duties with- out showing the slightest consciousness that he had, by his indomitable perseverance, changed the whole trend of pohtical conditions bmlt up by centuries of Mameluke and Turkish rapacity and oppression. Now that he had brought about the revolution and his work was, so far, complete, he stood aside to permit NINTH SEPTEMBER 47 his more capable civilian colleagues to carry forward its development ; and on 2 October, he marched from Cairo at the head of his regiment towards Ras-el- Wady, amidst the enthusiastic acclamations of a grateful people. CHAPTEE VI THE JOINT NOTE TEWFIK PASHA had " bowed to the wiU of the army " and of the people, and had granted a constitution to Egypt ; but now that the dispatch of Riaz Pasha had been accomplished and Arabi had re- moved himself from the vicinity of the Court, the Khe- dive, with his accustomed treacherous adaptability, began to shuffle. Having taken to himself the weapon used by his father in 1879,^ wherewith to outwit the European Consuls and Controllers by a semi-counten- anced military demonstration, which had efEectively removed their ministerial nominee, he failed to take into account the very important fact that the weapon he had chosen was two-edged, and had become sharp by frequent use. Egypt having at length shaken off the sackcloth and ashes of arbitrary rule and oppression, and clothed herself in the radiant armour of liberty and progress, went forth to battle against a reac- tionary and treacherous ruler. Observing the lower- ing clouds of unrest constantly marshalling them- selves across the political horizon, he conveyed the impression to Sir Edward Malet that the "general tone of His Highness with regard to the future was despondent, for he could no longer believe in the professions of fidelity made by the officers of his army ". The breach between the three opposing forces, the Khedive, the army, and the Nationalist 1 Vide ante, p. 12. 48 THE JOINT NOTE 49 party, was appreciably widening. Cherif's intrigue with the army, through his intermediary, Sul- tan Pasha, had now placed him at the head of a Ministry pledged to reform, and a National Constitu- tion. Notwithstanding Arabi's " continued con- fidence in Cherif Pasha, in whose hands he iatended leaving the matter ", Cherif told Sir Edward Malet on 21 September that it was his intention later on to convoke the Chamber of Notables, which he hoped by degrees would become the legitimate exponent of the internal wants of the country, and by this means deprive the army of the character which it had arro- gated to itself in the late movement. . . . The Notables would be a representative body, on which the Khedive and his Government would be able to lean for support against military dictation ". I am aware that Lord Cromer and other writers on this particular phase of the revolution, would have it appear that Arabi was at this time not only the " arbiter of the destinies of the country ", but that he was " inveighing against the employment of Europeans in Egypt ". This is true only in a general sense. Arabi, by the firm stand he made on 9 Sep- tember at the Abdin, proved beyond question that in spite of the Khedive's semi-understanding with the army, Arabi was not only master of the situation, but had the nation behind him ; and that he should stand aside and permit Cherif Pasha to carry on the work did not necessarily mean that he would also lay down his weapons. Arabi well knew the evils Europeans had introduced ; he was also aware that they had done much good in the way of introducing Western progress into the country ; but it must be distinctly understood that he was better informed as to Cherif Pasha's real character and the class to which he 50 THE LAND OP THE PHARAOHS belonged than any European could possibly have been. And having been the chief sponsor for the revolution, he had no desire to see Egypt slip gradu- ally back into the hands of that arbitrary Turco- Circassian party, whose methods of government were quite as oppressive to the Arab population as that of their predecessors, the Mamelukes. His experience in the army had taught him that " a liberated slave of Turkish extraction was freer than a freebom Arab, and that the most ignorant Turk was preferred and honoured before the best of the Egyptians ". Law and justice were practically non-existent under Circassian rule : the army, having proved itself not only a military force, but a poUtical lever, had successfully contended for law and justice, and meant to justify its acquired reputation. This is proved by a conversation Arabi had about this time with Mr. Wilfrid Blunt. " We soldiers ", said Arabi, " are for the moment in the position of those Arabs who answered the CaUph Omar when, in old age, he asked the people whether they were satisfied with his rule, and whether he had walked straightly in the path of justice. ' son of El Khattab ', said they, ' thou hast indeed walked straightly, and we love thee. But thou knowest that we were at hand and ready, if thou hadst walked crookedly, to straighten thee with our swords '. I trust that no such violence wiU be needed. As Egyptians we do not love blood, and hope to shed none ; and when our ParUament has learned to speak, our duty will be over. But until such time we are resolved to maintain the rights of the people at any cost, and we do not fear, with God's help, to justify our guardianship if need be against aU who would silence them ".^ 1 Blunt's "Secret History", p. 171. THE JOINT NOTE 51 With regard to his attitude towards Europeans, far from iaveighing against them, in the course of an interview with Sir Auckland Colvin on 1 November, we find him saying that " he himself and his two officers — Ali Bey Fehmy and Toulba Bey Ismet, who were present on that occasion — had never been to school. Intercourse with Europeans had been their school. He, and all, felt the need of it. They had no wish to question the need of Europeans in the administration ; on the contrary, if more were re- quired let them come ".^ Meanwhile the Sultan, in order to maintain his rather shadowy authority in the Delta, dispatched AH Pasha, Nizami, and Ahmed Pasha Ratib as his conmaissioners to Egypt. There was no real necessity for their presence in Egypt ; consequently they were without apparent instructions as to what they should do when they did arrive. Abdul Hamid, however, was awaiting a convenient opportunity to get in touch with Arabi ; not only that he might learn his views, but that he might set him up as a check upon Tewfik and the European Control, should he be found sympathetically incUned towards the Porte. This was most important, inasmuch as Abdul knew that the reform party at the El-Azhar University were in constant communication with the Liberal party at Mecca, who were agitating for an Arabian Cahph to supplant him in the Caliphate. When, therefore, he was informed that French and EngUsh gunboats had been dispatched to Alexandria, he first made a mild protest, and then signified his iatention of sending envoys ; because without arousing suspicion, the conmaissioners, by appearing on the scene for the ostensible purpose of upholding his suzerain rights » Cromer's "Modem Egypt", Vol. I, p. 210. 52 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS and maintaining his prestige in the eyes of Europe, could at the same time get at Arabi, whom he knew through his spies to be at Ras-el-Wady. In order to veil his real intentions, a well-arranged diplomatic skirmish was carried on with France and England as to who should leave Egypt first — the gunboats or the commissioners. Ali Nizami Pasha, the chief envoy, reviewed the Egyptian troops at Cairo, treating them to a lengthy dissertation on loyalty to Khedive and Sultan, of which thfe commissioners had already been assured by Cherif Pasha. Gunboats and envoys left Alexandria simultaneously. But the second com- missioner, Ahmed Pasha Ratib, so arranged it that the train he took to Suez and Mecca should be the one by which Arabi would travel from Zagazig to Ras-el-Wady. They greeted each other as strangers, exchanging names ; Ratib speaking of his pilgrimage to Mecca and not of his mission to Egypt. Arabi being drawn, told of the mutiny, of which he was rather full at the time ; declared his loyalty to the Sultan, and was highly commended by Ahmed Pasha Ratib for his behaviour. They parted at Ras-el-Wady on terms of friendship. The envoy subsequently sent Arabi a Koran from Jeddah ; and on his return to Constantinople he spoke favourably of Arabi to His Sublime Majesty, who in due course caused a letter of encouragement to be written to the colonel. Thus was the real object of the mission accompHshed. I have devoted some space to this incident, not only because the complete facts do not appear elsewhere, but owing to its bearing on the subsequent attitude of the Sultan towards Arabi. The champion of the fellaheen having been feted at Zagazig, where upwards of one thousand people turned out to do him honour and to give him a most enthusiastic welcome, he duly THE JOINT NOTE 53 returned to Cairo on 6 December, 1881. Shortly after the mutiny, M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire, the French Prime Minister, proposed to Lord Granville, that in order to preserve the peace in Egypt, and to obviate the repetition of the rather frequent military demonstrations, and also with the avowed object of maintaining the Khedive's authority, a joint military control representing the two countries should be established in Egypt, for the purpose of introducing order and discipHne into the Egyptian Army. Both Cherif Pasha and Sir Auckland Colvin strongly disapproved. They condemned such action on the part of the Powers, for the very cogent reason that the Egyptian Army would not be disposed to receive the proposed military mentors in a spirit of kindly cordiality ; and instead of introducing discipline, their presence would be merely looked upon as a fresh act of European aggression ; thereby not only provokiug more disorder, but indubitably pro- ducing a more serious outbreak than that of 9 Sep- tember. M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire, however, being rather anxious to obtain a miUtary hold on Egypt, which might have resulted in the loss to Turkey of another limb, on the one hand, and an addition to the North African Empire of the French Repubhc on the other, further suggested that should the Egyptian Army fail to accord due recognition to the generals, the two countries should resort to a joint naval demonstration which would make it " unmistakably manifest that the generals had the support of Eng- land and France ". Lord GranvUle did not wax enthusiastic over the diplomatic overtures of the French Premier, and further action remained in abeyance. On 5 December the Sheykh-el-Islam, who from the days of the Sultan Selim had been appointed 54 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS by the usurpation of the Court to the supreme re- ligious office in Egypt, was deposed by the students of the El-Azhar University, They substituted their own nominee, Sheykh-el-Embaber, because they feared that Sheykh-el-Abbasi, as nominee of the Khedive, could not be depended on to give an unbiased legal opinion (fetwa) regarding the constitution ; and in- asmuch as in the old days, before Sehm's time, the Sheykh-el-Islam had always been nominated by general election and not by patronage, the students, by returning to the older and more liberal order, took a weapon from the Khedive's grasp which they knew him to be quite capable of usiag for the destruction of the promised constitution. The Chamber of Notables had been convoked on 23 December by a decree issued on 8 October. The NationaUst Ministry was busy preparing its draft of the Organic Law, which was intended to confer civil liberties upon the country at large. Sir Edward Malet was in a position to write to Lord Granville on the second day of the New Year : "I found His Highness, for the first time since my return in September, cheerful in mood, and taking a hopeful view of the situation. The change was very noticeable. His Highness appears to have frankly accepted the situation ". Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, the censor, having suppressed one rather violent paper, the others remained moderate. The army was quiescent ; and Arabi having duly returned, his acknowledged political position was " regularised " early in January by his taking office as Under Secre- tary for War, with the full approval of the English and French Consuls, who at the time began to believe not only in his sincerity of purpose, but in the genuine- ness of the NationaUst movement, as apart from army tutelage or dictation. Matters were thus gradually THE JOINT NOTE 56 righting themselves when the ambitious and ener- getic Gambetta came into ofl&ce — a change of ministry having taken place in France about the middle of December. By a colossal act of diplomatic indis- cretion, in which Lord GrranvUle permitted himself to be weakly led, Gambetta changed the whole trend of political events in Egypt, setting the hitherto quiescent factions at each other's throats ; thrusting Arabi into the arms of the Sultan ; pitting Tewfik against the will of his subjects ; and forcing the re- grettable events which produced the bombardment of Alexandria, the rout at Tel-el-Kebir, and the subsequent British occupation, with its repression of Egyptian aspirations and liberty. One of Gambetta's first acts on coming into of&ce was to inform Lord Lyons, on 15 December, that " he considered it extremely important to strengthen the authority of Tewfik Pasha. On the one hand, every endeavour should be made to inspire Tewfik himself with confidence in the support of France and England, and infuse into him firmness and energy. On the other hand, the enemies of the present system, the adherents of IsmaU Pasha and of Hahm Pasha, and the Egyptians generally, should be made to understand that France and England, by whose in- fluence Tewfik had been placed on the throne, would not acquiesce in his being deposed from it . . . any interposition on the part of the Porte, M. Gambetta declaring emphatically to be in his opinion wholly inadmissible. He thought that the time had come when the two Governments should consider the matter in common, in order to be prepared for united and immediate action, in case of need". Even allowing for the fact that Tewfik had been placed on the throne by the influence of France and England, 56 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS there was no need for this mischievous interference with the Khedive's Government on the part of France, M. Gambetta being wholly ignorant with regard to local aims and conditions. Neither Ismail nor Halim possessed the smallest vestige of influence with the reformers ; and all would have been well had the matter been confined to an interchange of diplomatic suggestion. But unfortunately, Lord Granville was quite as badly informed as to the true situation as Gambetta himself ; for it is certain that neither Sir Edward Malet nor M. Sienkiewicz, his new French colleague, fully understood the trend of events, nor the real aims of the Nationalists ; and when some Kght was shed on the situation the facts were either discredited, or their belated reports to their respec- tive Governments so distorted that an altogether false impression was conveyed. The two Consuls- General depended largely upon Cherif Pasha for what information he thought fit to impart; whilst Sir Edward, in his quest of native opinion, was forced to rely upon such stray crumbs of worthless or hap- hazard information as his Greek dragoman was able to gather at the cafes in the European quarter ; these, to say the least, were hardly material from which Egyptian policy could be shaped. Lord Granville, who, Micawber-like, was waiting for something to turn up, and was consequently rather wobbly in purpose, ambiguously repUed to Gambetta, on 19 December : " Her Majesty's Government quite agree in thinking that the time has come when the two Governments should consider what course had better be adopted by both Governments. Her Majesty's Government also thinks that it is desirable that some evidence should be given of their cordial understanding ; but that it requires careful con- THE JOINT NOTE 57 sideration what steps should be taken in case of dis- order again reappearing ". Both statesmen believed that " something " should be done in the joint interests of their respective Governments ; but their ideas of that " something " were totally divergent. On the one hand, Eord Granville, if he possessed any settled opinion, and of that there is grave doubt, approved a Turkish rather than a European occu- pation as a choice of two evils. On the other hand, Gambetta, anxious for distinction, favoured an Anglo- French occupation, which in course of time, and by reason of England's " traditional " disinclination to " protect " Egypt, might very reasonably have left France mistress of the field. With the usual sagacity which characterizes the race from which he sprung, he seized upon the date coincident with the Assembly of Notables at Cairo to advance his plot a step further ; and on 24 December, he ex- pressed the obvious opinion that their meeting " would produce a considerable change in the poHti- cal situation in Egypt ". But the masterly stroke of dividing the house against itself followed, in his proposal, that " the two Governments should instruct their representatives at Cairo to convey collectively to Tewfik Pasha assurances of the sympathy and support of France and England, and to encourage His Highness to maintain and assert his proper authority. . . . This seemed to him a simple and practical measure to be adopted without delay, and the two Governments might make it a starting-point for considering in concert what further steps they should be ready to take in case of need ". This, on being commimicated to Sir Edward Malet on 26 December, provoked the following reply on the day following : " I see no objection to M. Gambetta 'a 58 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS proposal. The support the Khedive is most likely to require is towards the maintenance of the inde- pendence of the Chamber against the jealousies and suspicions of the Porte ". Now, it will be observed that notwithstanding Sir Edward Malet's limited information, for once in a way, he placed his finger unerringly upon the one and only weak spot, " The maintenance of the independence of the Chamber ". And Sir Auckland Colvin — in spite of his Anglo- Indian prejudices against Oriental adaptability to Western forms of constitutional government — con- tributed a memorandum about this time, in which this rather pertinent passage occurs : " The move- ment — though in its origin Anti-Turk — is in itself an Egyptian Nationalist Movement. For the moment it is careful in its attitude towards the Europeans because it has need of them in its duel with its im- mediate opponents ; but it cannot look on them with favour or be animated au fond by any other desire than that of eventually getting rid of them ". The desire to be eventually rid of the Europeans could hardly be accounted criminal in the circum- stances, inasmuch as the Europeans had not only been thrust unbidden upon the Egyptians, but had brought imtold evil in their train. But the point I would have the reader clearly understand is that the movement was absolutely Nationahst, and the Chamber of Notables undeniably representative ; and, on Sir Edward Malet's showing, its aim was the " maintenance of its independence against the jealousies and suspicions " not of the Porte alone, but of Europeans, " towards whom its attitude was careful ". Notwithstanding these communications. Lord Granville advised Lord Lyons to inform Gam- betta that the British Government agreed to his THE JOINT NOTE 59 quite unnecessary proposal ; and that statesman forth- with proceeded to prepare a draft of his " famous " NOTE for the approval of Her Majesty's Government. Yet Sir Edward, whilst awaiting further iustructions, informed his Government that " the reply of the Chamber to the Khedive's speech was extremely moderate and satisfactory ; and that Cherif Pasha, who looked to it for success and support, considered that to discountenance it would be to play into the hands of the Porte, increase the influence of the military, and diminish that which they were now obtaining as befriending moderate reform ". That the constitutionalists were content with moderate re- form is proved by the remark of Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, who said, " We have waited so many hundred years for our freedom that we can well afford now to wait some months ". These opiaions, however, being contrary to the forward policy which Gambetta had introduced at the Quai d'Orsay, on 6 January, 1882, the following instructions were telegraphed to the British and French Consuls-General at Cairo. " You have already been instructed on several occasions to inform the Khedive and his Government of the determination of England and France to afford them support against the diflB.culties of various kinds which might interfere with the course of pubKc affairs in Egypt. The two Powers are entirely agreed on this subject, and recent circumstances, especially the meeting of the Chamber of Notables convoked by the Khedive, have given them an opportunity for a further exchange of views. I have accordingly to instruct you to declare to the Khedive, that the English and French Governments consider the main- tenance of His Highness on the throne, on the terms laid down by the Sultan's Ficmans, and officially 60 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS recognised by the two Governments, as alone able to guarantee for the present and future, the good order and development of general prosperity in Egypt, in which France and Great Britain are equally interested — the two Governments, being closely asso- ciated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, do not doubt that the assurance publicly given of their formal intentions in this respect will tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them. They are convinced that His Highness will draw from this assurance the confidence and strength which he requires to direct the destinies of Egypt and his people ". Lord Granville, in agreeing to the above diplomatic indiscretion, did so with the rather lame and imbecile reservation, " That Her Majesty's Government must not be considered as committing themselves thereby to any particular mode of action, if action should be found necessary " (!). As though Gambetta, having once obtained the British Foreign Minister's signa- ture, was likely to be curbed in his ambitious efforts by a " reservation " so weak and undefined. The reception of the joint note by the Egyptians was, however, adequately described in 1882 by Lord (then Mr. John) Morley. "At Cairo," said Mr. Morley, " the NOTE fell Uke a bombshell. Nobody had ex- pected such a declaration, and nobody there was aware of any reason why it should have been launched. What was felt was that so serious a step on such deli- cate ground could not have been taken without deliberate calculation nor without some grave inten- THE JOINT NOTE 61 tion. The note was therefore taken to mean that the Sultan was to be thrust still further in the back- ground ; that the Khedive was to become more plainly the puppet of England and France ; and that Egypt would, sooner or later, in some shape or other, be made to share the disastrous fate of Tunis. The general effect was, therefore, mischievous in the highest degree. The Khedive was encouraged in his opposition to the sentiments of the Chamber, the mili tary, national, and popular party was alarmed. The Sultan was irritated. The other European Powers were made uneasy. Every element of dis- turbance was roused into activity ",^ That there was a National party in Egypt I have already shown. That the Khedive was " very hope- ful of the future " is also herein set forth. That Mr, Gladstone's widely advertised principles of Uberty were proved to be a sham by this premeditated act of unprovoked interference with the liberties of a people, who had vainly struggled to release their necks from the yoke of oppression, which they had practi- cally borne for upwards of three hundred years, is unfortunate for the memory of that statesman. Gambetta, the arch-conspirator, and his weak- spirited accomplice, with all their vain and transitory ambitions, have long since mingled with the dust. The evil they did in Egypt lives after them. And Gambetta ? Methinks when his proud spirit winged its flight into the presence of its Maker, the sky was rent with one long requiem wail wrung from the anguished souls of Egypt's myriad sons. ' John Morley, in "The Fortnightly Review", July, 188?, CHAPTER VII AEABI PASHA "And the children of Israel did according to the word of Moses, and they borrowed of the Egyptians, jewels of silver and jewels of gold and raiment. ^ ". . . And they spoiled the Egyptians." ^ NOW Israel having an old account to settle with Egypt, the Rothschilds patriotically took up the spoliation that had remained in desuetude since the exodus. By advancing large sums to Ismail Pasha, which they knew his reckless extravagance would preclude him from repaying, their plans were well laid for the great conspiracy of spoliation. Dis- raeli, another of the tribe, subsequently took up the chase, buying the Suez Canal shares with money advanced by the Rothschilds, thereby paving the way for the Dual Control, the joint note, and the Occupation. And Gambetta, a descendant of like forebears, completed the work with his joint note. For now that the Egyptians were in the toils of financial Israel, nothing was left to them but liberty. They were already spoiled of their wealth, past, 1 The modern Egyptians were so greatly crushed by the burden of taxation brought about by the debts of Ismail, that the tax-ridden fellaheen, squeezed on the one hand by the demands of the State and on the other hand by the Greek moneylenders, who advanced sums at 50 per cent, in order that he might meet the national obligations, had his crops mortgaged before they were planted. There being no money to purchase raiment, he was forced to till the soil in a ragged state of semi-nudity. ^ Exodus XIII. 35-6. 62 - ..KOWSafIsi 'A ! :3 ■ » 1 ARABI PASHA 63 present, and to come ; then Gambetta, by spoiling them of their projected independence — their sole remaining asset — consummated the spoliation begun by Moses. And thus, in causing history to repeat itself, the sons of Jacob were adequately revenged for their four hundred and thirty years of bondage in the land of Egypt. What between national debt and abrogated liberty, the old order being inverted, the sons of Israel's task-masters became enslaved by " the children of the bondage ". Gambetta, however, after inoculating Downing Street with the pernicious Foreign Policy of the Quai d'Orsay, upsetting Egyptian tranquillity, and blighting the hopes of enfranchisement in that un- fortunate country, went to his political doom on 31 January. In the course of seven short weeks he had demolished the superstructure of Egyptian independence, which had been evolved from the patient toil of three hundred years. As Sir Edward Malet said on 9 January in his reference to the joint note, " the communication had at aU events temporarily ahenated the English from all confidence ". For the natives, both civil and military, felt that the message contained a direct hint, if not a command, to antagonise the Khedive to reform. Its mischievous wording, connecting as it did the events of September with the opening of the Chamber, was decidedly unfavourable to the latter. There was also an obvious desire to loosen Egyptian allegiance to the Porte, and its menacing attitude regarding intervention was not justified by the tranquillity of the country. Besides, the military who had retired, leaving to the civil reformers the adjustment of the internal afiairs, for which purpose the Chamber had 64 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS been convoked, was once again upon the lips of every one. The unpreparedness of the Bey of Tunis to resist French usurpation had been a warning, and the menacing tone of the note suggested to the Egyptian that the time had arrived for him to set his house in order. Sir Auckland Colvin was loud in his condemnation of this piece of diplomatic in- discretion. Cherif Pasha appealed in vain for a peaceful explanation that would obUterate the shadow of the sword-gripped gauntlet which seemed suspended over Egypt. The British and French Consuls-General — especially the former — were in despair. Gambetta haughtily rejected Lord Granville's humble solicita- tions for a joint explanation to the people of Egypt. Even the Circassians resented the threat of foreign intervention. The Khedive was nearly frightened out of his wits, and the Nationahsts were enraged. The Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, and the cautious reformers of the El-Azhar University, at once joined the ranks of the advanced party. Once again Egyptians of every class, religion, or shade of opinion found themselves united under one flag, in one phalanx, against the common foe, and Arabi, leaning on the Sultan, stood in the forefront to lead them — whither ? Now, Arabi possessed none of that alertness which is considered an essential characteristic of the soldier or the poUtical leader ; nor was he endowed with those rare qualities of quick decision, executive abihty, and practical common sense so indispensable to the individual who would successfully lead great movements, thrusting from life's pathway those opposing forces that are weak, parrying the blows of the strong, but ever moving onward, upward to the high pinnacle of glorious achievement. He was slow in his movements, deliberate in gesture, dull of AEABI PASHA 65 countenance, with the abstracted expression of the dreamer ; but behind the heavy countenance there burned a soul pregnant with intelligence. His smile caused his face to become illumined ; he was symbolic of that grave dignity usually identified in the person of the village Sheykh ; and his towering height, massive proportions, and evident strength identified him with the industrious fellah typical of Lower Egypt. His was the type that Mameluke and Turco- Circassian Pasha had held in bondage for centuries, subjecting them to a system of enforced labour with- out pay. It therefore followed that Arabi and his class would be utterly despised by the dominant Circassians ; for, as Sir John Bowring said in 1840, " the situation of the Osmanhs in Egypt is remark- able, they exercise extraordinary influence, possess most of the high offices of State, and, indeed, are depositories of power throughout the country. They are few, but they tyrannise ; the Arabs are many, but obey ". Eiaz always despised Arabi ; and the intellectual reformers of the El-Azhar were the last party amongst the native Egyptians to take him into serious account as a political force. The peasant class to which he belonged were not only the first to recognise and acclaim him as leader, but remained loyal, singing his praises long after his exile. They recognised in him one of themselves, yet glorified above themselves, by virtue of the Azhur semi-religious culture which he possessed. For up- ward of three hundred years no fellah had been known to breathe a word of possible revolt, nor had one of their class previously risen to a position of political eminence. The negative quahties possessed by Arabi would have been insufficient to bring him to the front, but for Kiaz Pasha's insane persecution 66 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS during those months which followed the Kasr-el- Nil mutiny. Arabi possessed settled convictions in regard to patriotism which he had learned in the school of experience. He was observant, sincere in his opinions, tolerant, humane ; a faithful follower of the Prophet, but no fanatic, beUeving in the universal brotherhood of man based on that broad and com- prehensive liberty which takes no account of race, creed, or condition. These predilections caused him to entertain those early proposals of Cherif Pasha and Mahmud Sami during the summer of 1881. These two were both patriots and reformers; but they belonged to the Circassian class of which Arabi had had such unsatisfactory experience, after the death of Said Pasha, and whom he knew to be as greatly opposed to fellah Uberty as Riaz himself, because they considered themselves the only ones capable of governing the country. Both Arabi and Sultan Pasha, being of Arab stock, were used to whip up the fellah population in the iaterests of reform, which they meant to use as far as possible to their own advantage. The position was to all in- tents and purposes on all fours with Enghsh domina- tion in Ireland, and presumed Irish inferiority. The Enghsh repressed the Irish because of the erroneous assumption that the Irish were incapable of self- government, and this chiefly because the majority in Ireland were a peasant, agricultural class. In like manner the " cultivated " Circassian looked upon the fellaheen as an uncouth boor who did not possess the requisite intelUgence to appreciate reform, nor the strength to demand it. There was, however, this difference in the case of Mahmud Sami : although of Circassian extraction, his family had long been established in Egypt. Of a highly cultivated intel- ARABI PASHA 67 lect, fully conversant with Arabic and Turkish history, and a poet of no mean order, he was a loyal supporter of the Nationalists ; and being richer than any other individual identified with the movement he paid more dearly for his fidelity than any other concerned in the " rebellion ". Whilst recognising the Circassian intellectual superiority, which Cherif Pasha and Mahmud Sami possessed, there was no doubt that these were regarded with some measure of suspicion by the Notables ; especially did this apply to Cherif Pasha. The drafting of the Organic Law and the meeting of the Chamber of Notables to approve the measure, coincided, as I have previously pointed out, with the pubKcation of the joint note. Now, inasmuch as the Organic Law was intended to define the powers of the proposed Egyptian ParUa- ment, the Financial Controllers had insisted that the Ministry should not interfere with the powers they had exercised in economic matters during the preced- ing two years ; also that they should be permitted to continue to exercise their acquired right to prepare the annual Budget, which should not be subject to discussion or vote in the Representative Chamber. Cherif Pasha, having fallen in with the view of the Controllers, omitted in his draft of the projected law to assign to the Chamber any right of voting on the Budget. A majority of the delegates very naturally objected to this procedure, pointing out that the sole raison d'etre of the Foreign Financial Control lay in the fact that it was guarding the interests of the foreign bondholders ; and as the interest of the debt was being met by one-half the revenue, the Chamber was quite within its rights in its demand to control the remaining portion on behalf of the nation. During December, 1881, Mahmud Sami, the War Minister, 68 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS desiring to bring the army up to its full strength of eighteen thousand men, as granted by the Firman of 1879, and promised by the Khedive with the other concessions on 9 September, demanded £600,000 from the Controllers as the amount of the year's (1882) estimates for his department. As this meant an in- crease of about £280,000 on the previous year's War Ofl&ce estimates. Sir Auckland Colvin, finding it im- possible to go beyond £522,000, commissioned Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, whose influence with Arabi and the reformers was well known, to approach Arabi with a view to his obtaining the consent of Mahmud Sami to accept the £522,000, a reduction on the original demand of £78,000. Mr. Blunt not only successfully performed his mission, but at the same time extracted a promise from Arabi that there would be no further demonstrations, " a promise which to him they faith- fully fulfilled "-^ It is therefore quite evident that the Nationalists, having conceded to the Controllers a most vital point — that of hmiting the army which they considered necessary to their independence — they would have been quite ready to meet Cherif Pasha and the Controllers in a conciliatory spirit with regard to the entire foreign financial control, in- cluding the preparation of the annual Budget, which had been estabhshed by two years of precedent. Now, however, that the joint note had done its work by creating unrest where there had been previous tranquillity, replacing confidence with sus- picion, the Notables, believing their very existence to be threatened, took the bit between their teeth and bolted. They met Cherif's draft-law with a counter-draft, in which their powers were largely extended in a number of new articles, subjecting the » Blunt's " Secret History ", pp. 177-8. AEABI PASHA 69 half of the Budget not affected by the interest on the debt to vote by the Chamber. The Controllers were immediately up in arms ; especially was this the case with M. de Blignieres, who doubtless felt his position strengthened by the attitude of his Government — Gambetta being still in office. Cherif Pasha, having unwittingly thrown himself into the camp of the Controllers by accepting and incorporating into his draft their views of the foreign financial control, was importuned by them to show a bold front and resist the innovations of the Notables. Sir Auckland Colvin stood shoulder to shoulder with his French colleague, thinking the Notables could be overawed by firmness. Sir Edward Malet considered the trouble very serious and telegraphed to his Government on 10 January : " There was a chance of arriving at an understanding, but this apparently is now passed ; the Chamber may exercise its right with moderation and good sense, but it is a sanguine presumption. On the other hand, it is impossible now to suppress the Chamber without intervention which I earnestly deprecate. In fact, intervention could only be justified on the violation of the Law of Liquidation, not on the apprehension of its violation, and it is right to say that as yet I have heard of no such intention on the part of any one to infringe it ". The Khedive's attitude was extremely uncertain, and no doubt a rupture between him and the Chamber of Notables over the financial clause in the Organic Law would have been the very excuse that Gambetta desired to veil his sinister scheme of armed inter- vention. Sir Auckland Colvin, notwithstanding his prejudices, being perhaps the most astute European oflScial then in Egypt, had at this time a full grasp of the trend of events, and once more enlisted the 70 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS services of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, that he might use his influence with " the extreme part among the Notables to induce them to yield something of their preten- sions ".^ Thus on 17 January he met the Notables at Sheykh Mohammed Abdu's house ; but despite his arguments and the support Sheykh Abdu had given him, whilst " agreeing to modify three or four of the articles which the Controllers had principally objected to as giving the Chamber the powers of a " Conven- tion ', on the articles of the Budget they were quite obdurate ". It was very clear to them that the menace of intervention was no idle threat ; but at the same time, if they were to have a Parliament worthy of the name, they could not be expected to accept a constitution which even Sultan Pasha, the most flabby of the reformers, declared to be " like a drum ; it made a great noise but was hollow inside". It therefore followed that a rupture between Cherif and the Notables could not be long delayed. Sir Edward Malet had every confidence in the Prime Minister, and he was evidently flattered by the Consul-Generars patronage, even to the extent of treating with con- tempt the very people to whom he owed his political existence. For, said he to Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, " the Egyptians are children and must be treated like children. I have offered them a constitution which is good enough for them, and if they are not content with it they must do without one. It was I who created the National party, and they will find that they cannot go on without me. These peasants want guidance ". The peasants did indeed require a guidance that would be sincerely used in their own 1 Blunt's " Secret History ", p. 193. AKABI PASHA 71 interests, and not in the interests of tlie foreign ele- ment to the detriment of the natives. The trouble in Egypt, and in. the entire Orient for that matter, has been, and is to-day, this ingrained disposition on the part of the European or Circassian to treat the native as an unenlightened child of limited mental capacity. We never have refused to accept guidance of the correct brand ; but notwithstanding our pre- sumed mental weakness, we can distinguish between well-intentioned guidance and arrogant and repres- sive tutelage. We accept the former with child- like gratitude ; but we resist the latter, even if in so doing we forfeit our lives. Cherif Pasha therefore, by leaning on the Consular ofl&cials and Controllers and despising the peasants, was only seeking re- taliation at the hands of those who had placed him in power. I have endeavoured to show how Gam- betta's insensate ambition led him to launch his NOTE on the people of Egypt. In fairness to the British Goverjunent I must also record the fact that Lord Granville, having permitted himself to be led beyond his depth by Gambetta, on reahsing the fear- ful muddle he had made of things, did eventually try to patch up the difficulty ; but matters had been allowed to go too far. Although laudably seconded in his efforts at a subsequent date by M. de Freycinet, the new French Premier, they could not possibly " set back the universe to obtain a yesterday ", neither could they restore the conditions in Egypt as they had obtained prior to the baleful advent of Gambetta. For whereas the Egyptians had re- posed the fullest confidence in the honourable inten- tions of both Governments before the Gambetta succession, on his fall both Governments were not only mistrusted, but France was most cordially 72 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS hated, for Tunis was ever present to the Egyptian mind. As a natural result there was no possible means of patching up the difficulties ; especially as Cherif Pasha, in place of pouring oil upon the troubled waters by correctly representing the case to the French and English Consuls-Greneral from the Egyp- tian standpoint, was rather siding with them against native aspirations. Neither Arabi nor Sultan Pasha spoke French, and the Anglo-French Combine pos- sessed no Arabic between them ; so that the repre- sentatives of the Circassian " Statesman ", who believed himself to be the Gambetta of Egypt because he spoke French fluently, was all the guidance at the command of the Consuls. It therefore followed that on 1 February, whilst awaiting the result of the diplomatic argument then proceeding between their respective Governments, Sir Edward Malet and M. Sienkiewicz wrote informing Cherif Pasha " that the Chamber of Notables would not be allowed to vote the Budget without infringing the Decrees establish- ing the Control, and that an innovation proposed by the Chamber could not be introduced without the consent of the English and French Governments. If the Government of the Khedive deemed it fit to open negotiations on the subject, they were prepared to transmit its proposals to their respective Govern- ments ; but they considered that such negotiations should be on the understanding that the Governments and the Chamber were agreed with regard to the rest of the Organic Law ". In other words, Cherif's friends, the Consuls, desired the Egyptians to accept Cherif's draft of the Organic Law, inasmuch as Cherif had embodied the desires of the Control in that docu- ment. The communication, evidently inspired by Cherif, who in his conversation with Mr. Blunt had ARABI PASHA 73 said that, " if the Nationalists were not content with his constitution they must do without one ", could have only one result. When, therefore, he wrote to the Chamber informing them of the above Consular communication, advising them to " formulate a basis of negotiation with the Powers ", a deputation was dispatched from the Chamber to the Khedive, re- questing him to change his Ministers. His Highness requested them to return, and he would consider the matter in the interim. On their return he inquired whether they had chosen the new Ministry. The deputation politely informed the Khedive that the selection of a Ministry was his prerogative, which they had no desire to infringe. They were again dismissed. They returned later in the day, when they suggested that Mahmud Pasha Sami, who was then Minister of War, should be President of the Council. The wishes of the Chamber were duly fulfilled, Mahmud Pasha Sami being appointed on 5 February. Arabi Bey was also sent up to the Ministry of War. Sir Auckland Colvin, now that Cherif Pasha and his draft had been set aside, threw the weight of his great influence into the scale against the Nationalists, using every means in his power to bring about the very intervention he had previously condemned. The British Government made some further belated proposals regarding the revision of the Organic Law, which would consider- ably curtail the powers of the Chamber ; but as I have already shown, matters had gone too far. The NationaUsts, having covered half their self-imposed journey, were in no mood for retreat. Meanwhile, they had become cognisant of Sir Auckland Colvin's attitude, and the army was being strengthened ; for in addition to the prospect of European intervention there was also the threat of a Turkish army of occupa- 74 THE LAND OP THE PHARAOHS tion, which was quite as abhorrent to the Nationalists as European intervention. They had struggled against Turco-Circassian rule, and had succeeded in gaining the mastery so far : a Turkish occupation would have meant the revival of the corrupt Turkish regime which they were quite determined to resist, even as they meant to resist European intervention. But whilst Cherif Pasha was smarting under his deposition, and intriguing for Turkish intervention,^ they had unfortunately taken another viper to their breasts in the person of Mus- tapha Pasha Fehmi, the new Minister for Foreign Afiairs, who, although a constitutionalist and an ad- herent of Cherif Pasha, was also a Circassian, holding the same views as Cherif, Riaz, and the rest of that stock with regard to the inferiority of the fellah. It therefore followed that while he was with the Nation- alists, he was not of them ; and as none of the fellah Ministry possessed a knowledge of any Euro- pean language, not even of French, which was most essential in dealing with the Consulates, they were placed at a disadvantage and were forced to leave diplomatic matters entirely to Mustapha Pasha Fehmi. Two months later, when their condition was reaUy precarious, he betrayed their confidence by either maintaining a hostile attitude, or so weakly presenting their case in the ofl&cial correspondence that they were unaware of his perfidy until it was too late to remedy the evil he had wrought. About this time the Circassian plot against Arabi's life was betrayed by Raschid EfEendi Anwar — a plot Lord Cromer is disposed to attribute to " the imagination of the ignorant Arabi ", but it was really brought about by the machinations of the ex-Khedive Ismail. 1 Vide Cromer's "Modern Egypt", Vol. I, p. 243. ARABI PASHA 75 It appears that one of the followers of the ex-Khedive, Ratib Pasha, suddenly left him at Naples, and arrived at Cairo, during Cherif's Ministry, where he joined his brother, Mahmud Effendi Talaat Beg-bashi. These two secured the co-operation of Yussuf Bey Najati, Mahmud Bey Fouad, and Osman Rifki Pasha, the ex- War Minister, whose deposition had been brought about by Arabi. Their plan was the restoration of Ismail by destroying the feUah Ministers and kilhng the superior officers of the army, beginning with Arabi. Success did not at first attend their efiorts ; but they were joined eventually by forty officers of inferior rank, and upon learning that nine Circassian officers had objected to being drafted for service in the Soudan, the plotters suggested that the officers should not go without promotion. They agreed to this, but not feeling strong enough to carry their plot into execution they tried to convert a Circassian officer, Raschid Efiendi Anwar, to their views. He refused to be a party to the conspiracy, and straight- way disclosing the plot to Arabi, they were arrested and court-martialled. The plot being frustrated the incident would have died a natural death but for the wanton interference of Sir Edward Malet on behalf of the conspirators. These men had merely been banished to the White Nile, a not infrequent penalty ; but Sir Edward's interference only tended to bring the Khedive into conflict with his Ministry, for he took the case out of their hands and reduced the sentence to simple exile. According to the constitu- tion, his act was Ulegal. This procedure was due to the influence of the British and French Governments. They feared Osman Rifki, bearing as he did the Turkish title of Ferik- General — conferred by the Sultan — would result in Turkish intervention. The 76 THE LAND OF THE PHAKAOHS Sultan had desired that the matter should be re- ferred to him, and to this Tewfik assented. The two Governments feared Turkish interference, therefore M. de Freycinet immediately stated that " he was strongly of the opinion that the Khedive should him- self grant the pardon immediately by virtue of his prerogative, without waiting for action on the part of the Porte ". Lord Granville agreed, and the British and French representatives at Cairo were instructed to inform the Khedive of the advice of their re- spective Governments. The Khedive bowed to the will of the two protecting Powers and obeyed. In the meantime, Arabi was encompassed by his enemies and detractors. The British and French Ministers and Controllers were against him. M, de BUgnieres had resigned his appointment ; and Sir Auckland Colvin, who wrote that Arabi had warned him that " he was like a man trying to balance himself on a plank ", was carrying on an active campaign against him and the Nationalist Ministry in the pages of the " Pall Mall Gazette ". Sabit Pasha, the Khedive's Turkish Secretary, reported to the Sultan everything he could find out against Arabi, insomuch that the Sultan, had the Powers not objected, meant to send troops to Egypt and hang Arabi. Ahmed Pasha Eatib, the commissioner whom the Sultan had sent to Egypt in the autumn of 1881, had returned to Constantinople from his pilgrimage to Mecca. Upon relating his conversation with Arabi to the Sultan, His Sublime Majesty at once commanded two letters to be written to the Egyptian War Minister. In one of them a charge was given Arabi to uphold the Sultan's sovereign rights in Egypt, as set forth in the following extract : "As His Majesty places the greatest confidence in Ahmed Pasha (Ratib), His ARABI PASHA 77 Majesty desires me again for this to express his trust in you, and to say that, as he considers you a man of the highest integrity and trustworthiness, he requires of you, above all things, to prevent Egypt from pass- ing into the hands of strangers, and to be careful to allow them no pretext for intervention there. . . . And in a special secret manner, I teU you that the Sultan has no confidence in Ismail, Halim, or Tewfik. But the man who thinks of the future of Egypt and consolidates the ties which bind her to the Caliphate ; who pays due respect to His Majesty and gives free course to his Firmans ; who assures his independent authority in Constantinople and elsewhere ; who does not give bribes to a swarm of treacherous sub- ofl&cials ; who does not deviate one hair-breadth from his line of duty ; who is versed in the intrigues and machinations of our European enemies, who will watch against them and ever preserve his country and his Faith intact, a man who does this will be pleasing and grateful and accepted by our Great Lord the Sultan ".^ > Vide Blunt's "Secret History", pp. 259-60. CHAPTER VIII " FICTITIOUS DIPLOMACY " THE situation in Egypt had by this time become not only unsettled, but extremely grave. The Khedive, first by assenting to the request of the Sultan that the matter of the Circassian conspiracy should be referred to him, and then by commuting the sentences to ordinary exile on the advice of England and France, succeeded in irritating the Sul- tan on the one hand, and widened the breach between himself and his Ministers on the other. He thereby provoked Mahmud Sami to inform Sir Edward Malet " that if the Porte should send an order to cancel the sentence of the court martial on the Circassian prisoners, the order would not be obeyed, and that if the Porte sent Commissioners they would not be allowed to land, but would be repulsed by force if necessary ". Of course, the President of the Council was unaware of Arabi's position at Constantinople ; and he, the other Ministers, and Notables, having struggled to free themselves from Turco-Circassian domination, naturally objected to Turkish intervention of any kind — ^intervention which would only result in a reintro- duction of the evil tutelage they had successfully overthrown. Besides, they also believed that inas- much as France, both under Grambetta and now under M. de Freycinet, had pursued a policy of non-Turkish 78 "FICTITIOUS DIPLOMACY" 79 intervention, they counted on the support of that Power to back them up in any resistance they might show to the Porte. In the meanwhile, relations having been broken ofi between Tewfik and his Ministers, the Chamber was convoked without his authority, the Ministry being of the opinion that the Khedive, by commuting the sentences without consulting his Ministers, was acting in a way to diminish the autonomy of Egypt. In consequence they resolved to depose the Khedive, exile the entire stock of Mehemet Ali, and with national approval, appoint Mahmud Pasha Sami Governor- General of a pro- visional Government. Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber, at the instigation of Sir Auckland Colvin and Sir Edward Malet, began to sow discord in the ranks of the Nationahsts, under the pretext that Arabi had de- ceived him regarding the causes that led up to the overthrow of Cherif. This was chiefly because he was annoyed at being overlooked in the formation of the Ministry : he considered that his efforts in the reform movement had entitled him to a place in it ; and also because of the promise of Sir Edward that, should Arabi be thrown over by the Nationalists, the Cham- ber, with its powers intact, would have the full support of Great Britain. Meanwhile the President of the Council had re- signed, because the Khedive refused to be reconciled to his Ministers. The British and French Consuls-General proposed to the Khedive that Mustapha Fehmi Pasha be ap- pointed ; failing him, they " agreed to the nomination of any one except Arabi ". The mihtary party then informed the Khedive that they would not be re- sponsible for order were the Ministry changed. The 80 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS British and French Governments instructed their Consuls at Cairo " to send for Arabi and inform him, that if there was any disturbance of order he will find Europe and Turkey as well as England and France against him, and he will be held responsible ". The Ministers informed the Consuls-General that they would only resign on the demand of the Cham- ber. Sultan Pasha, for reasons previously stated, also informed the British and French representatives that it was quite impossible to change the Ministry while the miKtary power continued to be vested in Arabi. The Consul-General then told the Khedive that as he found it impossible to form a new Ministry he must enter into negotiations with the existing one, and all "personal questions must be set aside ". It would be idle and mischievous to say that the British Government was treating the Egyptian situa- tion with contempt at this period, or that it was neglecting to carry out its share of ^the Dual Compact. Both the French and Enghsh Governments knew that matters could not continue in such an imsettled state for a much longer period ; and unfortunately their respective Consuls-General were not only misrepre- senting matters, but they were so opposed to Arabi, that by allowing prejudice to blind them, they were actively engaged in ruining the whole movement. Their pernicious device was to sow discord in the ranks of the Nationalist, by supporting the civil ele- ment against the mihtary , thereby weakening thepower \ of the entire movement. For it must be understood \ that the one could not work without the other. The Khedive, acting on the advice of the Anglo- French Control, had become recalcitrant ; and it was only because he knew the military to be with "FICTITIOUS DIPLOMACY" 81 the reformers that he consented to the deposition of either Riaz Pasha or Cherif. On the other hand, although Gambetta had fallen, and French policy in regard to Egyptian afEairs had become more liberal under M. de Freycinet, the French Minister objected to Turkish intervention, even as Gambetta had done ; and as England was still hampered by France, not- withstanding the fact that Lord Granville had long since awakened to the regrettable situation he had helped to create, he was unwilling to take the initia- tive. At a later period France's defection forced England into a position which compelled her to act alone, thereby bringing a storm of European criticism about her ears. The best that can be said is that Lord Granville was not the man for the emergency. A strong man was needed, who could think and act for himself. The noble Lord's advanced age and im- paired intellect quite unfitted him for the part. Although we expected more liberal treatment than we received at the hands of a Liberal Government, with Gladstone at its head and the peace-loving John Bright in its Cabinet, it must be admitted that not only were there troubles nearer home — for the troubles in Ireland during this stirring month, with the assas- sination of Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke, were certainly calculated to unnerve any Government — but the English and Consular Press misrepresenta- tions of Egyptian affairs could not possibly aid in the solution of a problem at once tortuous and difl&cult. Meanwhile, the pernicious system of misrepresenta- tion had at length brought M. de Freycinet to beheve in the advisability of armed Turkish intervention, and on 21 May he submitted the following proposals to the British Government for its approval : 82 THE LAND OF THE PHABAOHS 1. "An Anglo-Frencli squadron to be dispatched to Alexandria. 2. " The British and French Governments to sug- gest to the Porte to abstain for the present from all interference in Egypt. 3. " The Cabinets of Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy to be informed of the dispatch of the Anglo-French squadron to Alexandria, and to be requested to send to their repre- sentatives at Constantinople : similar in- structions to those sent to the British and French Ambassadors. 4. " The French Government agree to abandon the idea of deposing the Khedive : ' a plan which, if adopted in time, might, in their opinion, have prevented serious complica- tions '. 5. " The French Government opposed to Turkish intervention, but would not regard as inter- vention a case in which Turkish forces were sent to Egypt, operating under Anglo- French Control, on Unes to be defined by both Governments. If, after the arrival of the squadron, they should deem it necessary to land troops, which would be neither French nor British, but Turkish, on the above conditions. 6. " The Consuls-General at Cairo to be instructed to recognise as legal no other authority than that of Tewfik Pasha, and not to enter into relation with any other de facto Govern- ment, except for the purpose of securing the safety of their countrymen ".^ ^ Vide Cromer's " Modern Egypt ", Vol. I, p. 266. • FICTITIOUS DIPLOMACY" 83 Lord Granville, in assenting to tlie above, sug- gested that a guarded communication should be sent to the Sultan informing him that " it was not im- probable that further proposals might be made to him hereafter, and that the Powers should have their flags represented at the naval demonstration at Alexandria, including Turkey ". M. de Freycinet objected to the latter part of the proposal inasmuch as he considered it would annul the initiative character of the demonstration, and deprive the Anglo-French Control of the directive position assigned to it by Europe. It will thus be observed that the French Premier did not desire the interference of the other Powers, because he knew them to be, for the most part, not only in sympathy, but Switzerland and Belgium to be strongly in favour of the Nationalist movement. In Italy enthusiasm had taken concrete shape in the form of a volunteer corps, which was being enrolled, under Menotti Garibaldi, to assist Arabi against the invader ; and this despite the fact that the Italian Govern- ment was at that time a supporter of English pohcy. There was also that bugbear of Turkish intervention which he feared would be the precursor of European complications, should Turkey on occupying Egypt attempt the usurpation of her sovereign rights by remaining in the country, to the disadvantage of the European bondholders. Sultan Pasha, having been captured by Sir Edward Malet, deserted his party on 17 May, and thereafter supported the English Consul-Generars policy. Being therefore backed up by Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber, on 19 May, he. Sir Edward, with the co-operation of his French colleague, advised the Khedive " to take advantage of the arrival of 84 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS the fleet to dismiss the Ministry, and form a Cabinet under Cherif Pasha or any other person inspiring the same confidence ". The Anglo-French squadron arrived on 20 May. The Khedive asserted his inability to form a Cabinet ; and on 25 May Sir Edward Malet and M. Sienkiewicz stated that Sultan Pasha, having become dissatisfied with the Ministry, had suggested that they should issue the following ultimatum, which the Anglo- French Consuls served on the President of the Council : 1. " Temporary retirement from Egypt of Arabi Pasha, with the maintenance of his rank and pay. 2. " The retirement into the interior of Egypt of Ali Pasha Fehmi and Abdul Aal Pasha, who will retain their rank and pay. 3. " The resignation of the present Ministry ". As a consequence, the Ministry resigned on 26 May. On the following day Cherif Pasha was requested to form a Ministry, but declined on the grounds that " no Government was possible so long as the miUtary chiefs remained in the country ". The PoUce of Alexandria refused to accept the resignation of Arabi, declaring that they would not be responsible for pubhc safety. Toulba Pasha also informed the Khe- dive that " the army absolutely rejected the joint NOTE, and awaited the decision of the Porte, which was the only authority they recognised ". On 28 May Cairo rose in its thousands. Headed by the chiefs of religion, which included the Patriarch, the Chief Rabbi, all the Deputies and the Ulema, they insisted upon the reappointment of Arabi as Minister of War. The Khedive, finding the nation united "FICTITIOUS DIPLOMACY" 85 against him and his Anglo-French advisers, re- appointed Arabi and made a formal demand to the Sultan for Commissioners to Egypt; the Grand Vizier having previously intimated to Tewfik that Turkish Commissioners would be sent if ofl&cial re- quest were made. Lord Granville said that " it was never proposed to land troops or resort to a miUtary occupation of the country. Her Majesty's Govern- ment ", he contiaued, " intend, when once calm has been restored and the future secured, to leave Egypt to herself (!) and recall the squadron. If, contrary to their expectations, a pacific solution cannot be obtained, they will concert with the Powers and with Turkey on the measures which shall have appeared to them, and the French Government, to be the best ". I shall now proceed to a brief resume of the facts that led up to the arrival of the English and French squadrons, and examine, as far as may be, Lord GranArille's desire " to leave Egypt to itself and recall the squadron ". It will be remembered that in December, 1881, the Nationalist party formulated a programme with the aid of Mr. Wilfrid Blimt, which was duly pubhshed in the English Press. Up to this time, and until just after the publication of the joint note of 8 January, the Egyptians were on the most cordial terms with England. Their relations with Khedive and Control were most correct and dignified, because they be- lieved these to be sincere in their intentions to permit them to peacefully pursue their constitutional en- deavours towards self-goverimient ; and thereby assist Egypt to once more take her place among the nations, redeem her debt, and reform a corrupt system of jurisprudence. The army, having made it 86 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS possible for them to advance in the direction of Uberal government, they depended upon that in- stitution to maintain the security of these rights, and on their Parhament to aid them to obtain these ends, gradually and moderately. The joint note and its anti-Islamic threat, which, to all intents and purposes, found its counterpart in French action in Tunis, created distrust in the minds of the Egjrptians as to the bona fde intentions of England. Instead of being awe-inspiring, it created irritation and alarm, precipitating action, in the form of a national demand for the resignation of Cherif Pasha, whom they knew to be quite capable of betraying them into the hands of the Anglo-French Control. Doubtless, Gambetta's rather sudden and unex- pected exit from the councils of the mighty prevented the threat of armed intervention from being carried into immediate execution. But a plan of interven- tion was steadily pursued ; and the vexatious methods of the Anglo-French Consuls-General and Sir Auckland Colvin were abundantly fruitful in those disturbing elements of aggression calculated to provoke a resist- ance which could be construed into " anarchy ", " re- belUon against Khedivial authority ", or any of the deceptive scare-phrases current at the time in the English Press and in diplomatic circles, to bring about intervention. The English and French Controllers- General protested against the constitution granted by the Khedive on 6 February ; and their respective Governments withheld their assent to the document, because there was an Article which granted powers to the Egyptian Parhament to vote the half of the Budget which was not affected by the debt. The English representatives at Cairo, from the time of the pro- mulgation of the constitution and the overthrow of "FICTITIOUS DIPLOMACY" 87 Cherif, had persistently tried to bring about a revolu- tion contrary to the will of the Egyptian people, in order that the liberties granted them by their ruler might be utterly annihilated. The British Minister and ControUer-Greneral — the latter a paid servant of the Egyptian Government — carried on a most strenuous series of intrigues, with the purpose of creating a rupture between the Khedive and his Ministers. The English Press correspondents, having been unmuzzled by their Consul-General, opened a pertinacious campaign of injurious falsehood and misrepresentation against the Ministry. When these subjects were exhausted, they drew upon the fertile sources of an almost limitless imagination, in order to produce such sensational fictions as " Ban- ditti in the Delta ", " Kising of the Bedouins " " Revolt in the Soudan ", " War between Egypt and Abyssinia ", " Enormous Egyptian Army Expendi- ture ". Included among their scares were the general refusal of the Egyptians to pay taxes and the resigna- tion of the provincial Governors ; (1) the neglect of irrigation works, and the danger to the Suez Canal ; and that Arabi had become, by progressive stages, the paid tool of Ismail Pasha, then of Halim Pasha ; and then, as there were no other Oriental princes interested in Egypt who were prepared to enrich a venal agent, and the sources of journalistic imagina- tion having at length dried up, Arabi, according to their showing, finally became the paid agent of the Sultan. The Anglo-French Consuls took advantage of the Circassian plot against Arabi to induce the Khedive to withhold his signature from the ratification of the sentences, and thereby create a rupture between Tewfik and his Ministers. Mahmud Sami called the 88 THE LAND OP THE PHAEAOHS Notables to Cairo to decide between Ministry and ruler. The Deputies arrived, and Sultan Pasha's jealousy prompted him to refuse to preside at any formal sitting. The Consuls-General made use of this incident to encourage all anti-NationaUsts to support the Khedive against his Ministry, and thus by creating dissension spht up the party. A few rich but timid Egyptians, being more greatly enamoured of their wealth than of their country's weal, joined hands with the Turco-Circassian party ; the Consuls- General were deluded ; they launched their ulti- matum, insisting on the resignation of the Ministry and the exile of Arabi. The Ministry resigned. The Consulates were jubilant, having scored a victory — for one day ! For the nation, by demanding the return of Arabi on the day following the resignation of the Nationalist Ministry, proved beyond question how flabby and misdirected were the efforts of these tinkering diplomats. And this system of unsuccess- ful intrigue against the liberties of a people who were strugghng to throw off the yoke of oppression, was carried to its most reprehensible conclusion by the accredited representatives of a Liberal Government. This precious " Liberal " Government, despite its denials of intended intervention, had, for months prior to the dispatch of the Anglo-French squadrons, been holding consultations with Sir Garnet Wolseley on the question of an immediate occupation. At the request of Tewfik, and on the urgent suggestions of the English and French Governments, the notorious Dervish Pasha was sent as Commissioner to Egypt. The Sultan was quite as unprepared, as was the British Government, for the universahty of Nation- ahst feeling obtainiag in Egypt. These evidences of Egyptian aims and determination were sufl&cient to "FICTITIOUS DIPLOMACY" 89 convince the Porte that the methods used by Dervish Pasha to suppress Albanian pohtical progress were quite inadequate to Egyptian conditions. In the meanwhile, although threatened with a hostile fleet, and the offers of bribes to quit Egypt and abandon the NationaUsts, Arabi remained at his post, deter- mined to carry out his programme of independence with peace, and reform with economy. Had the ohve branch of peace been extended to Egypt in place of the sword of repression, the Egyptians, who had neither the desire nor the intention to repudiate their obligations, would have rewarded England with a boundless gratitude which neither change nor chance could corrupt — a gratitude which would have remained eternally engraved upon the hearts of an unforgetful people. CHAPTEK IX THE BOMBAKDMENT OF ALEXANDEIA POPULAR will having overridden Khedivial obstinacy and English intrigue in the re- instatement of Arabi as Minister of War, the acknow- ledged National Chief may be said at this time to have reached the highest point in his fortunes. As will have been gathered from the previous chapter, the Khedive, on assenting to the will of the people, at the same time requested the Porte to send a Commissioner to Egypt. The British and French Governments, with the aid of their tool, the Khedive, having lamentably failed either to suppress Arabi or stamp out Egyptian patriotism, now lent their sup- port, with a Uttle pressure from the other Powers, to the advent of the Turkish Commissioner ; they hoped he would make straight the path and ready the way that would lead to the extinction of Arabi and his peasant patriots. The Sultan, however, being already for the most part assured that the Egyptian movement in no wise tended to diminish his sacerdotal authority or his sovereign rights, was rather loth to appoint a Com- missioner, who in suppressing a loyal servant, might at the same time be aiding the Christian to ultimately subjugate the Moslem. Now all through the negotiations, even from the Kasr-el-Nil mutiny of February, 1881, the Sultan had been treated with a contempt by France and 90 BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 91 England — especially was this the case with France — which would have led the superficial observer to believe, that not only were these two Powers holding joint sovereignty in Egypt, but that there was no such document in existence as the Firman of 1841, by which Mehemet Ali and his successors were granted perpetual viceregaUty in Egypt under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey, to whom they successively paid tribute/ Without going into the undisputed merits of the Sultan's claim, or even the rather fatuous statements regarding the necessity of armed intervention, he was undoubtedly recognised by the Powers of Europe to be Egypt's overlord. Now whatever the ultimate object of Anglo-French policy might be, these two Powers, from October, 1881, did everything they could to irritate and humiUate the Sultan, and to set him in opposition to their schemes. It must be remembered that he was not likely to forget how his most trusted ally had betrayed him at the Berhn Congress. As Lord Salis- bury said in 1882, just after the bombardment : " There were two modes of going to work with the Government of Egypt. You might have used moral force as you have made use of material force. Your only mode of acting by moral force is by means of the hearty co-operation of the Sultan of Turkey. But you took the best means of alienating that hearty co-operation. If you had gone to him from the first, taken him into your counsels, and made him the in- strument of what you desired, and indicated from the first that you wished to take no steps without his concurrence and co-operation, there might have been ^ In the Sultan's Firman of 1841, the expression " Ma connaissance souveraine" appeared. The Powers have however disputed this sovereignty which was used by them to depose Ismail. 92 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS objections to the plan ; but at least you would have had him heartily with you ", Whether the noble Lord spoke in a repentant mood over the matter of BerHn, or because he was in opposition, the Blue Book sayeth not ; but the statement was not only just : it was a faithful exposition of the Sultan's feeUng in the matter. The fleet was already at Alexandria. Abdul Hamid knew that anything he might do at this late hour could only be regarded as a humorous after-piece. He therefore suggested that the fleet should leave Egyptian waters before his Com- missioners were dispatched. The Dual Powers ob- jected. The squadron was there " to protect European interests and to restore order, if necessary, in the name of the Khedive," who was the Ueutenant of the Sultan ; but with which the Khedive's Lord, the Sultan, by whose consent he held the throne, should not interfere, unless authorised by the friends of his own servant ! Truly a most diplomatically farcical situation, were it not for the grim tragedy which lay beneath this thin veneer of farce, whereby some ten thousand hapless peasants were ruthlessly butchered. The Sultan therefore introduced his comic interlude by dispatching, on 4 June, two Commissioners from Constantinople, whose instructions were diametrically opposed to each other ; and the Porte " confidently hoped that the mission of Dervish Pasha would suffice to restore the normal situation in Egypt to the general satisfaction ! " Dervish Pasha was instructed by his master to make himself guide, counsellor, and friend to Tewfik, and to attach himself to the German, Austrian, and Itahan Consuls, sohciting their advice, and so create rivalry in their ranks. He was also directed to discourage Arabi and oppose him in every possible way that the circumstances permitted or BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 93 warranted ; whilst his colleague, the Sheykh Assad of Medina, was ordered to take the Arabist party to his bosom ; but at the same time he was also ex- pected to sow the seed of discord among the foreign ofl&cials. It therefore followed that on its arrival, the Mission was welcomed according to its leanings by the two opposing forces. The Egyptians were de- lighted with the venerable Sheykh of Medina, who honoured them by taking their side of the argument, whilst Court and Circassian welcomed Dervish Pasha with outstretched arms as their political saviour. " The Khedive as head of the State, and Arabi as head of the Ministry, sent their delegates to Alexan- dria to receive the Mission : Zulfikar Pasha on the part of the Khedive, Yakub Pasha Sami, the Under Secretary for War, on that of the Minister, and both were well received "? The wily Abdul Hamid, by sending two Commis- sioners to Egypt, whose views in each case should coincide with the party to whom they were respec- tively attached, was not only preparing himself for all contingencies, but was also obtaining first-hand information in regard to the real aims and intentions of the contending factions. Tewfik, he did not trust ; and it was quite on the cards that had Arabi proved himself another Mehemet Ali, there was the by no means remote possibiUty of the Minister for War being selected by the Sultan to replace Tewfik on the vice- regal throne. It was quite immaterial to the Porte what political views Arabi held, always provided those views did not obstruct or tend to annul the religious and sovereign rights of His Sublime Majesty in the land of Egypt ; for " the Sultan had no con- fidence in Ismail Halim or Tewfik ", runs Mohammed 1 Vide Blunt's " Secret History ", p. 305. 94 THE LAND OP THE PHARAOHS Zafir's letter to Arabi on 22 February, 1882. " But the man who thinks of the future of Egypt and con- solidates the ties which bind her to the Caliphate, who pays due respect to His Majesty . . . who assures his independence in Constantinople and else- where . . . who is versed in the intrigues and machinations of our European enemies ; . . . who will ever preserve his country and his faith intact — a man who does this will be pleasing and grateful, and accepted to our great Lord the Sultan ". I have quoted the above letter a second time because of its important bearing on the Sultan's attitude, not only at this moment, but at that subsequent date when Arabi was in the hands of the enemy ; and for the reason that European writers, for the most part, when deaUng with this phase of Egyptian history, have been unmindful of the existence of this document, and arguing as they have from Western premises, have never determined the real cause of the failure of the Dervish Mission. The Mission was, to all intents and purposes, a farce from beginning to end ; and the only service the Sultan considered it would render him was that of dividing the forces of the European Powers by play- ing upon their cupidity, and by pitting envy against envy. I question whether even the Anglo-French Control expected success to attend the labours of the Mission ; otherwise the Conference of the Powers hastily convened at Constantinople on 23 June to deal with the Egyptian situation, at a time when the Commissioners were in Egypt, would have been accounted a diplomatic superfluity by the Powers. At an early period the Porte was so convinced of the vanity of the whole undertaking, that he declined to be represented at the Conference ; and Lord BOMBAEDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 95 Alcester, by precipitately knocking over the fortifi- cation at Alexandria, simultaneously knocked the bottom out of the deliberations of the Conference: which assembly was thought by Bismarck to be " a very good expedient for covering the change of policy on the part of the French Government in regard to the advisabihty of Turkish intervention ". Now, when the Commissioners arrived at Alexandria on 8 June, the condition of affairs was somewhat as follows : Arabi having been reinstated by the Khe- dive, and being a man of peace, although Minister of War, had, after making his peace with the Khedive, promised that ruler to protect his Ufe, even to the extent of forfeiting his own. The German and Aus- trian Consuls, being convinced that Arabi was the only man in Egypt who could efiectively preserve order, added the weight of their influence to the demand of the nation for the restoration of Arabi to his former Ministerial post. The Khedive, having been thwarted in his efforts to overthrow the War Minister, determined to falsify Arabi's boast to the Consulates of being able to maintain pubhc tran- quillity ; and in encompassing the ruin of his Minister he would also convince the Germans of their erroneous estimate of Arabi's authority. The Khedive there- fore permitted Omar Lutfi, the Circassian Governor of Alexandria, to engineer the unfortunate Alexandria riot of 11 June.^ It is, indeed, true that the outbreak occurred earHer than was intended ; but once started the Governor found it impossible to check it, and ' Notwithstanding Lord Cromer's contention that Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's statement with regard to the implication of the Khedive is unworthy of evidence, it is my opinion that Mr. Blunt's story is correct. I would therefore advise the interested reader to see both Lord Cromer's "History", Vol. I, p. 286-7, and the "Secret History", p. 497. 96 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS was compelled, much against his will, to call in the miUtary to quell the disturbance, and thereby proved that " the best laid scheme of mice and men gang aft agley ". The Khedive, in the meantime, had got together some £75,000, which was handed over to Dervish Pasha in the form of presents and back- sheesh. Dervish, on his arrival, consoled the Turco- Circassians with the information that Arabi would be immediately sent to Constantinople to render an account of his actions to the Sultan. The Egyptians were promised the instantaneous exit of the fleet ; and to all he said, " the Sultan will do justice ". On 10 June he had an interview with Arabi and Mahmud Sami, when Arabi was requested to resign his com- mand and go to Constantinople. Arabi rephed that he could not do that until the country was in a settled state, inasmuch as he had given his word that he would be responsible for tranquilKty ; and even were he disposed to obey the Commissioner, " ten thousand bayonets stood between him and the sea ". Dervish Pasha therefore made a virtue of necessity, informing the Consuls that, " under the urgent circumstances of the case, he would assume joint responsibility with Arabi Pasha for the execution of the orders of the Khedive ". The Europeans had meanwhile become alarmed for their safety, and " by 17 Jime, 14,000 Christians had left the country, and some 6000 more were anxiously awaiting the arrival of ships to take them away ". Arabi was once again invited to visit Constantinople, but he again declined the Porte's invitation. On 23 June the Conference met at Con- stantinople ; on the 30th of the same month Lord DufEerin reported that " the Conference had done absolutely nothing ". Seven days were subsequently used by the members in watching each other. On BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 97 2 July " the object to be obtained by armed Turkisb intervention " was reached ; as was also the high State pronouncement by the Ambassadors that " if the Sultan decKned to send troops to Egypt the Con- ference reserved the right to express an opinion as to what should be done at the opportune moment ". After this high and mighty pronouncement of diplo- matic fudge, who dare blame the Sultan for absenting himself from a Council composed of such an assembly of Solomons ? On 6 July the Conference invited the Sultan to send troops to Egypt ; but the conditions were buried beneath such a weight of bureaucratic " wisdom " that it is rather doubtful whether the Conference understood the trend of its own desires. Whilst these diplomatic wits wrestled with " high policy " at Con- stantinople, a gentleman named Cartwright was hold- ing the Consular fort at Cairo, during the enforced absence, through illness, of Sir Edward Malet. This individual wrote very good dispatches, but was hardly a fitting substitute, even for Sir Edward Malet. He, however, did all he could in the way of misrepresenta- tion of the Arabists, which may be excused on the ground of inexperience and an endeavour to show the authoritativeness of his inaccurate vapourings. It was, therefore, no matter for surprise to find him writing on 26 June : " The influence of Arabi Pasha is best shown by the unbroken ascendancy, the in- tolerable pretensions, and the threatening attitude of the army ". Fine phrases, no doubt, but one would have thought, inasmuch as " The German and Austrian representatives in Egypt urged the formation of a Ministry approved by the military party ", that the budding English diplomatist would have had the common sense to permit the army to set its house H 98 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS in order without being interrupted by his critical bleatings. On) 7 June the Khedive, acting on the advice of the German and Austrian Consuls-General, who had by this time taken a decided hand in the game, nominated Ragheb Pasha, a political derelict of Circassian rule, to be President of the Council with Arabi as War Minister. This move provoked a further crop of literature from the English representative. The English Government, in the meanwhile, having their fleet lying idle in Egyptian waters and their bluejackets spoiUng for a fight, a desire shared by their fire-eating admiral, Lord Alcester (Sir Beau- champ Seymour), found an excuse for the desired " scrap " in the preparations being made in the Alexandrian forts, which they declared were being armed " with the intentions of using them against the fleet ". The Sultan, on being approached, " ordered that the construction of the batteries should cease ". The army, seeing a hostile fleet at its gates recommenced the works, and the garrison of Alexan- dria was reinforced. On 3 July Lord Alcester " was instructed to prevent the continuance of the works. If they were not immediately discontinued, he was to destroy the earthworks and silence the batteries if they opened fire ". The French Government was informed of these instructions, and requested to co- operate. The other Powers were also advised of England's intention ; but on 5 July M. de Freycinet informed Lord Lyons that " the French Government could not instruct Admiral Conrad to associate him- self with the English admiral in stopping by force the erection of the batteries or the placing of guns at Alexandria. The French Government considered that this would be an act of offensive hostihty against Egypt ; and they could not take part in it without BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 99 violating the constitution, which prohibits their making war without the consent of the Chamber ". On 6 July M. de Freycinet, in the French Chamber, " repeated emphatically the assurance that the Arms of France would not be used without the express con- sent of the Chamber ". And on the same date Lord Alcester " sent a note to the commandant of the garrison demanding that the work of fortification and the erection of earthworks should be discon- tinued ". The commandant replied that neither guns had been recently added to the fort, nor miUtary preparations made. This statement was confirmed by Dervish Pasha. Bombardment, however, being hourly expected, to which the threatening attitude of the English admiral undoubtedly gave colour, work was recommenced on the fortification on 9 July, and guns were mounted on Fort Silsileh. Early on the following morning their fears were amply justified by Lord Alcester's notice to the European Consuls at Alexandria, in which he stated that he would " commence action within twenty-four hours after, unless the forts on the isthmus and those conunand- ing the entrance to the harbour were surrendered ".^ The Cabinets of Europe were immediately informed of the English admiral's intention. Austria upheld the legitimacy of this intended act of unprovoked aggression ; and Baron de Ring, who was then at Constantinople, and who had supported the colonels in Riaz Pasha's time at the Egyptian army inquiry of the previous year, induced the Porte to send a representative to the Conference then being held in Constantinople ; and on 10 July, the Sultan informed 1 When the British admiral cleared for action, the French fleet weighed anchor and retired to Port Said, taking no part in the bombardment. 100 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS the German Charge d'Affaires at Constantinople that " a Turkish Commissioner would join the Conference the next day but one ". On the same date (10 July), in reply to Lord Dufferin's information regarding the intended bombardment, the Sultan also told his Lordship that " he would send a categorical answer to his communication by five o'clock to-morrow ". He further requested that the bombardment might be delayed ; and having appointed a new Prime Minister, this functionary waited upon Lord Dufierin on 11 July, and informed him that " to-morrow he would be able to propose a satisfactory solution of the Egyptian question ". The Sultan's request was forwarded to London and Alexandria by Lord Dufferin, who, however, " held out no hope that the line of action determined upon would be modified ". This was no more than the Porte expected. The entire European diplomatic action over the Egyptian question had been conducted without the merest shadow of respect or consideration for the authority of the Sultan. It was not the first time he had fallen among thieves ; and as he possessed neither a fleet nor an army, which could successfully stand up against that of either France or England, he was com- pelled by force of circumstances to remaia a passive resister, hoping to solve the question by vexatious delays, during which the Europeans might become embroiled with one another by reason of their many jealousies, and so relieve the situation. On the morning of 11 July, at 7 a.m., Lord Alcester " signalled from the ' Invincible ' to the ' Alexan- dra ' to fire a shell into the recently armed earthworks of the Hospital Battery, and followed this by the general signal to the fleet, ' Attack the enemy's batteries ', when immediate action ensued between BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 101 all the ships in the positions commanding the en- trance to the harbour of Alexandria ". Shells fell fast and furious, not only in the forts, but about the city— especially in the native quarter. The engines of war reaped a rich reward in carnage, death, and conflagration. All through that day until 5.30 p.m., when the batteries were silenced, and extending far into the night, there was one long procession of maimed and mangled, dead and dying, passing from the forts, and the groans of the dying were punctured by the staccato service of the artillery. Hell with all its furies seemed let loose upon us. The inaccurately aimed shells from the ships and the rapacity of the Bedouins fired the town ; and the rearguard of a disordered army, under the command of Suhman Pasha Sanii, vengefuUy completed the destructive work of conflagration and plunder. When the army had evacuated the city, the uncontrolled mob went mad. The carnage begun by the Christians was continued by the natives. Pillage and murder were added to the horrors of the burning city, which but a few short days before sat in all her pride, with minaret and fane gracefully projected to the cloudless azure canopy of heaven, the all-beholding sun en- folding her in a brilliant mantle of resplendent light, whilst the surrounding air was cooled by the surf that musically played about her feet. Peace had now given place to hcense : fire, sword, death, devas- tation, gloom, wrought by the ruthless hand of per- verse humanity. Such is war. CHAPTER X TEL-EL-KEBIK ALL sorts of wild theories have been advanced, and still wilder statements made, with regard to Arabi's culpabihty in the matter of the bombard- ment, and the subsequent English campaign in Egypt. I have already shown that Arabi was not a strong man — I have also endeavoured to prove that he was by no means an intellectual giant. His chief claim on the notice of posterity rests on his sincere patriotism, a certain dogged determination, and his humanitarian principles. He was first and foremost a theorist and a dreamer of dreams ; he was neither a mihtary tactician, nor was he a diplomatist. Not- withstanding his rather negative qualities, his well- known patriotism and his dogged determination caused the people of Egjrpt to beheve in him, which belief enabled him to hold Egypt in the hollow of his hand just prior to the bombardment. His humani- tarian principles, and the fact that the tenets of his faith, of which he was a sincere upholder, forbade him firing the first shot or taking a mean advantage of an enemy, however strong, also prevented him from attacking the British ships when they were within range of the forts, and at the mercy of the guns of the Alexandrian batteries. The British were allowed to get their ships in position ; from whence the maximum carnage of death and destruction TEL-EL-KEBIR 103 could be dealt out to the enemy, with a minimum of danger to themselves. Whatever excuse England has seen fit to make in order to cover up this page of dishonourable history, the fact remains that the Egyptians were on the defensive and the English were the aggressors. As early as 6 January, when Gambetta's joint note was published, Arabi began to advocate preparedness for the armed intervention which the note fore- shadowed ; and on 6 July the determined and aggressive attitude of the EngUsh admiral proved beyond dispute that the long-expected crisis had arrived, and that there was no other way but to face the difficulty manfully. There was no state of anarchy existing in any part of Egypt, either before the arrival of the fleet, or after that event. The riot and massacres of 11 Jime were neither more nor less than " the natural outcome of the political effervescence of the time ", as Sir Edward Malet has it, with a little dash of Khedivial com- plicity ; for directly the miKtary were called in, the riot magically ceased. Now, when he demanded the surrender of the Alexandrian land batteries, Lord Alcester must have known that neither Arabi nor the Khedive were in a position to surrender them. They formed a part of the Egyptian dominions of the Sultan of Turkey ; and, according to the Sultan's Firman of 1879, by which the Khedive held his throne, they could not be legally delivered up to a foreign Power without express instructions from the Sultan to that efiect, or, at any rate, not without striking a blow in their defence. At the General Council held on 10 July to discuss the admiral's demands, the Khedive, Dervish Pasha, Arabi, and even Sultan Pasha, who had long 104 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS since gone over to the English, but who was present at the Council, were loud in their patriotic view that the forts should be defended ; and Arabi received precise orders from Tewfik to " prepare the forts for action and to reply with artillery as soon as the English fleet should have opened fire ". The Khe- dive having given explicit orders to his Minister of War to defend Egypt against the English fleet, it only proves the elasticity of the English diplomatic imagia- ation, when it is claimed that " the Government inter- vened to restore order and good government in the interests of the Khedive " — the Sultan's hapless Viceroy ! I maintain that if disorder existed, which I most emphatically deny, that disorder was created by the English. Pohtical matters were automatically ad- justing themselves when the joint note arrived to disturb men's minds. Then there was the joint ULTIMATUM, wMch, by its intended banishment of the leaders of the NationaKst party, made for that party's destruction; and, lastly, there was the arrival of the squadron which menaced both hfe and liberty. Is it at all Hkely that any body of patriotic Enghsh- men would have sat contentedly at home whilst a hostile fleet was anchored in the Thames ? During the late Boer War, for instance, the mere mention of Kruger's name in any theatre throughout Great Britain was sufiicient to set the house in an uproar of loud hostility ; and not a few pro-Boer meetings were wrecked by a hostile mob of patriotic Britons. Yet Kruger and the Boers were thousands of miles away from " British hearth and home ", which were in no danger of being devastated. A black pugilist defeated his white opponent in the United States of TEL-EL-KEBIR 105 America, and on the night of the victory two in- offensive coloured men were assaulted by Englishmen in Leicester Square — and this in the twentieth century and in the most enlightened City of the world ! These are only a few of many instances I could cite of some of the militant forms of British patriotism which, in the case of the Egyptian natives, would have been accounted " a fanatic rising ", or any of the numerous stock scare-phrases which are ever on tap in the editorial sanctum of English journalism. When, therefore, the Egyptians found themselves deserted by their treacherous ruler, surrounded by European hostihty, and faced by armed aggression, they rose to a man in defence of their rights and liberties. " How can a man die better Than facing fearful odds, For the ashes of his fathers And the temples of his gods ? " Sir Garnet Wolseley was dispatched to Egypt with an army, so reads the ofi&cial statement, " in support of the authority of His Highness the Khedive, as established by the Firmans of the Sultan and exist- ing international engagements, to suppress a miUtary revolt in that country " ; which revolt, I would add. His Highness the Khedive had himself put in motion and then deserted, when he found himself, in vulgar parlance, on the wrong horse. In other words, two horses were entered for the Egyptian Ascendancy Stakes : Tewfik backed both and stood to win in any event. And this is the man whom EngHsh historians and statesmen would have the English people be- lieve to have been an unfortunate, but " upright and loyal Prince ". The people of Egypt were in a better position to know his real character than any European 106 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS could possibly have been ; and it yet remains for an impartial native to declare that he was either " upright ", " loyal ", or patriotic. Grateful to the EngKsh he undoubtedly was; but he did not love even them, notwithstanding their " benefac- tions ".1 The national defence of Egypt was conducted on a perfectly legal basis, in spite of Tewfik's defection. At the Egyptian National Council of 10 July, the Khedive, by signing the orders for the defence of Alexandria, made the subsequent action of the Egyptians not only legal, but robbed it of the title " revolt ", which the Blue Books have bestowed upon it. According to Mohammedan views in relation to war, when the chief of a State publicly announces the existence of a state of war and signs his name to the declaration, and the troops of the State have gone into action, it is the duty of the people to continue the fight until they have been victorious or have sus- tained a serious reverse. During operations, should the Mohammedan ruler be captured by the enemy, this fact invalidates any orders he might issue whilst in captivity. A prince who, by going over to the enemy, has turned traitor, is thereby incapacitated from giving valid orders. It was this view of the case that prompted the Nationalists to convoke a General Council, when they found their ruler had deserted to the enemy. When it became certain that Alexandria would be bombarded, the Khedive returned to his country 1 " His Highness", said Dr. Comanos Pasha to M. de Guerville, "has often said to me in speaking of them (the English), ' Certainly I do not love them ; but I am deeply grateful, for it is to them that I owe the fact that, to-day, I am Khedive of Egypt.' . . . Therefore far from wishing his removal the English, who knew they could count on him, desired that his reign should continue". ("New Egypt", p. 107.) TEL-EL-KEBIR 107 Palace of Ramleh, where he would be out of range of Lord Alcester's guns. Arabi, who took no active part in the bombardment, remained at the Ministry of Marine, near the Ras-el-Tin, to give such instruc- tions as were necessary, and to receive reports. On the morning after the bombardment, Arabi, sus- pecting the Khedive of treachery, sent a strong guard to him with the message, that, " as there was a likehhood of the English admiral renewing the bombardment, he would evacuate Alexandria, and invited the Khedive to retire with the garrison to Cairo, out of range of the English guns ". Arabi, being busy with the evacuation of the artillery, did not revisit Ramleh ; so the Khedive, by a liberal distribution of orders and backsheesh, evaded his guards, and boarding the train which was sent to convey him to Cairo, slipped ofi to Alexandria and placed himself under Lord Alcester's protection. Dervish Pasha and the Ministers of State, being on the same train, were imwittingly made partners of his treachery. Five days later, Dervish Pasha re- ceived urgent letters recalling him to Constantinople, and his own steam-yacht being handy, he escaped, notwithstanding the vigilance of the English fleet which tried to stop him. Old Ragheb, the Prime Minister, and his colleagues being practically prisoners under a guard of seventy British bluejackets, were compelled by force of circumstances to accept the inevitable situation and remain the Khedive's slaves at Ras-el-Tin ; and thus, by reason of their presence, lending to Tewfik's administration the appearance of legality. Arabi, meanwhile, remained in ignorance of the Khedive's treachery. He was actively engaged in withdrawing his troops from the danger zone of 108 THE EAND OP THE PHARAOHS Alexandria to the strong Kne of defence at Kafr Dawar, which had been carefully placed by Mahmud Fehmi; and where for upwards of five weeks it successfully held out against the enemy under General AUson, repulsing their attacks and harassing them in turn to within a few miles or so of Alexandria. Arabi, having taken up his quarters with the army at Kafr Dawar, neither visited Cairo during the war, nor was present at the meeting of the General Council himself ; nor was he represented by any deputy, miUtary or otherwise. The General Council was assembled because the people found their ruler a willing prisoner in the hands of the Enghsh ; there- fore incapable of free and independent action either in the interests of the country, or in the conduct of the war. " It was accordingly resolved by the Coun- cil, without a dissentient voice, that the Khedive was no longer in a position legally to command, and that his decrees, while he remained in English hands, were from that very fact invalid ".^ It cannot be too strongly insisted on that this Council was not a military council, neither was it a civil council under military dictation. It was brought into existence by the Khedive's proclamation depriving Arabi of his Ministerial functions, and on the initiative of the highest dignitaries then in Egypt, both religious and civil ; this made it at once National, and representa- tive in the broadest possible sense. 2 ^ Vide Bkint's " Secret History ", pp. 381-4. 2 On 14 July the Khedive sent Arabi a letter inviting him to return to Ras-el-Tin to confer with his colleagues of the Ministry regarding the proposed evacuation of Alexandria by the English, the terms of which the Ministers were to discuss. Cartwright, the English representative, however, telegraphed Lord Granville on 15 July, " The Khedive has summoned him (Arabi) here. If he comes he will be arrested, if not declared an outlaw ". All of which Arabi instinctively knew. Vide " Secret History ", p. 384. TEL-EL-KEBIR 109 The Council was not only well attended on its inception ; but in addition to the religious Sheykhs of the El-Azhar University, the Turkish Grand Cadi, the Grand Mufti, the Sheykh el-Islam, and the heads of the four orthodox sects were also present. Also among the overwhelming number of representative Moslems in attendance were four Princes of the reigning House, who had publicly avowed their nationalistic principles; a goodly number of the provincial Governors, and the chief country Notables. Among the non-Mohammedan representatives of the population were the Coptic Patriarch and the Chief Rabbi. " The Council was, therefore, fully entitled to any claim of vahdity in its decisions which univer- sahty can give, for it comprised all sections of poHtical opinion and class divergency. Many of the chief men were of Circassian origin, but endowed with suffi- cient patriotism as Moslems to see that now it had come to fighting against a European invader, no honest choice was left but to defend Egypt against him, irrespective of party feuds ". Disregarding the Khedivial decree of dismissal, the Council unani- mously resolved that Arabi should remain in his position of Minister of War, and should continue to defend the country. Under the presidency of Yakub Pasha Sami, the Under Secretary for War, a perma- nent " Committee of Defence " was appointed, to assist Arabi in his work ; such as recruiting, supply- ing military material, and victualUng the army. The Council also resolved to carry on the civil busi- ness of Government in its various departments, which was most efficiently conducted during the two months of the campaign. The Ministry of the Interior was placed ia the capable hands of Ibrahim Bey Mawsi, Under Secretary in the Ragheb Ministry, 110 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS and the Police in those of the no less efficient Ismail Effendi Jawdat/ These two saw to it that there were no disturbances throughout Egypt, notwith- standing Lord Dufferin's exaggerations at the Con- stantinople Conference, where he stated that " during the last few naonths absolute anarchy has reigned in Egypt ". And " the fellaheen . . . are unable to pay the land tax ". The taxes during the war were regu- larly and gladly paid : the Egyptian taxpayer believed that in so doing, should the war be success- ful, he would not only for ever rid himself of the Europeans, but also of his ancient enemy, the Greek moneylender. Arabi's great influence with the country Sheykhs and the fellaheen population made recruiting quite easy ; and gratuitous supphes poured in upon the army, partly owing to national enthusiasm, and partly because trade was at a standstill. In the meanwhile, Arabi had become the recog- nised ruler of the country, although only holding his old title of War Minister. In a tent of huge proportions, once the property of the Viceroy, Said Pasha, and given to Arabi by Said's widow as a national offering, Arabi held an almost regal Court, where Ulema of the El-Azhar and the important mer- chants and dignitaries of Egypt called to do honour to the national hero. It is therefore not surprising that he should have lost his mental equilibrium by these vain flatteries, which he tried to equalise by 1 "Two or three Circassian Mudirs, who had sought to ingratiate themselves with Tewfik by imitating Omar Lutfi and inciting to disturbance, were by them (Ibraham Bey Mawsi and Ismail Jawdat) arrested and detained in prison to the end of the war, and after this no further rioting occurred. Such Europeans as remained at Cairo were carefully protected and all who wished to leave were forwarded under police escort to Port Said". (" Secret History ", p. 384.) TEL-EL-KEBIR 111 surrounding himself with holy men, when hours were wasted in useless intercession which might have been serviceably appUed to the organisation of the army, and the construction of the important defences at Tel-el-Kebir. The Conference at Constantinople was still pro- gressing backwards ; in fact, it was not until 14 August that " the Representatives of the Powers unanimously expressed their opinion that the mo- ment had come to suspend the labours (?) of the Conference ". The Turkish delegates objected to the untimely demise of this institution of Western wisdom, reserving to themselves the right to fix a date for the next meeting. But although it was never formally closed, it never met again, passing peacefully away, " unwept, unhonoured, and unsung ". Nevertheless, the Sultan carried on some rather desultory negotiations regarding the terms of the Ottoman occupation of Egypt, as to how, where, and when the troops should land. Beyond a proclama- tion published in the Constantinople papers, iti which the Sultan declared Arabi to be in " rebelhon ", these negotiations came to nothing. But throughout there was a disincUnation on the part of the Sultan to adopt drastic measures in his treatment of Arabi ; and there can be httle doubt, that had the Egyptian Minister of War been anything of a soldier, he must have won the Sultan absolutely to his cause. A victory against the Enghsh would have meant much to him, and would certainly have raised him im- measurably in the Sultan's estimation ; for it must be admitted that the Porte gave him every oppor- tunity to rehabilitate himself, by indefinitely pro- longing the negotiations with Lord Dufferin at Constantinople, to the utter disgust of his Lordship. 112 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS Nor must the fact be overlooked, tliat notwithstand- ing Arabi's honesty of purpose, he failed lamentably as a strategist at Kassassin, where he lost the oppor- tunity of his life by indecision. Nor can there be any possible doubt but that a little dash and nerve would have won the battle, and placed the Duke of Con- naught a prisoner in his hands — an undoubted asset in making terms. But what between treachery and indecision, and the absence of Arabi himself from the field, where he might have given his men that element of moral stamina which they so sorely needed, the engagement with its enormous possi- bihties was recklessly thrown away. Arabi also listened to the bombast of de Lesseps, and did not block the Canal, although the Council was in favour of such a blockade. By this omission Arabi practically handed Egypt over to the British general. At a later date Sir Grarnet Wolseley himself said, " If Arabi had blocked the Canal, as he intended to do, we should be still at the present moment on the high seas blockading Egypt. Twenty-four hours' delay saved us ". Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived at Alexandria on 13 August. He decided to move on Cairo by way of Ismailia. The Canal was seized, and the Egyptian Army totally routed on the morning of 13 September. As Napoleon found his Waterloo, so Arabi found his Tel-el-Kebir. Major Watson, r.e., with two squadrons of the 4th Dragoon Guards and a detachment of mounted infantry, having occupied the Citadel of Cairo on the evening of 14 September, Arabi, like the " Great " Napoleon, surrendered his sword to the Enghsh. The negotiations with the Sultan of Turkey re- garding the Egyptian Question were broken off on 18 September. For " the Englishman, straining far A STItKET IN (JAIRO TEL-EL-KEBIR 113 over to hold his loved India, had planted a firm foot on the banJcs of the Nile and sat in the seats of the Faithful "? ] Kinglake's " Eothen ", p. 286. I have altered three words of the original, making " will plant " to read liaA planted and substituted sat for "sit". CHAPTER XI " ICHABOD " POPULARITY", said Dr. Chalmers, "robs home of its sweets, and by raising a man above his fellows places him in a region of detraction. With his head among storms and his feet upon the treacherous quicksands, he stands a conspicuous mark for the shafts of envy, maUce, and detraction, and has nothing to lull the agonies of a tottering exis- tence but the hosannahs of a drivelling generation ".^ Arabi Pasha's popularity contributed in no small measure to his fall. His European detractors, armed with maUce aforethought, misrepresented his mission throughout the Western world ; and his Oriental detractors, armed with the shafts of envy, not only injured him among Moslems, but finally ahenated the Sultan, and the hosannahs of the Egyptian multi- tude were quite inadequate to lull the agonies of his tottering existence. The causes which led to his defeat at Tel-el-Kebir and his subsequent surrender were many and varied, and, of course, the most weighty cause was English interference. As Lord Cromer says, " had he been left alone, there cannot be a doubt that he would have been successful. His want of success was due to British interference ".^ British interference began prior to the bombardment, and did not end at Tel-el-Kebir. The arms of Britain were mighty, and it was might, not right, that over- 1 I quote from memory and therefore do not vouch for the strict accuracy of Dr. Chalmers' statement. 2 Vide Cromer's " Modern Egypt", Vol. I, p. 324. 114 " ICHABOD " 115 threw Arabi. It is to be regretted that the methods adopted by England, whether in diplomacy or in armed intervention, were not of the cleanest. There was Professor Edward Palmer, for instance, Professor of Oriental languages at Cambridge University, who was employed at the instance of Lord Northbrook to ascertain the bribable possibilities of the Bedouins of the desert east of the Suez Canal. That Palmer was a distinguished Arabic scholar, and had some per- sonal acquaintance with the district whilst working with the Palestine Exploration Society, made him eminently fitted for the task, which, according to the official reports, was the purchase of camels. From Suez to Gaza, this interesting individual travelled among the tribes, sapping their loyalty to Egypt by the promise of liberal bribes. On the other hand. Captain Gill, b.e., of the Intelhgence Department, and his assistant, Charrington, the flag-Ueutenant, upon making a junction with Palmer at Suez, after his return from the|Teyyaha country, placed £20,000 to the latter 's credit to " buy camels ". i' i These three, with a very large sum in gold, set out for Nakhl on their way to the Teyyaha and Terra- bin warriors — " camels ". The two officers were supphed with dynamite with which to destroy the telegraphic conamunication between Egypt and Syria, and so isolate Arabi and cut ofi his connection with Turkey. Their escort comprised men of the Haiwat and Howeytat Bedouins, who, on discovering that they were freighted with gold which might be had for the taking, stripped and bound the three Englishmen, secured the gold, and shot their victims by the side of a ravine.^ Palmer himself accomplished very 1 A detailed account of this mission will be found in Mr. Blunt's "Secret History", pp 410-11. 116 THE LAND OP THE PHARAOHS little beyond putting the Sheykh Saoud-el-Tihawi in touch with the British. The Sheykh's name had been supplied by Tewfik ; and the Bedouin Sheykh remained a spy in Arabi's camp, from the date of the removal of the head-quarters from Kafr Dawar till the rout at Tel-el-Kebir. He found this compara- tively easy, inasmuch as he was scouting for Arabi, and his men could easily pass from camp to camp without raising the suspicions of the injured party. The Bedouin of the desert, especially east of the Nile, may be fittingly termed the " free lance " of the Orient. He possesses no religion to speak of, and his moral standard is hardly shaped on European Unes. He is courteous and hospitable to the stranger, when the stranger appeals to his hospitaUty and sohcits his protection ; but he never permits senti- ment to override self-interest, for his services are always at the disposal of the highest bidder. Euro- pean, Turk, Arab-fellah, all are to him common prey to be indiscriminately fleeced with or without provocation, and he considers all of them beyond the sphere of his allegiance. It was this feehng that caused them to assist at the Alexandrian conflagration, in order that the spoUation of the " Franks " might be made less difficult. The Egyptian troops had not disgraced themselves at the bombardment of Alexandria ; but the Egyp- tian officers certainly anticipated a victory, and were disappointed at the failure of their arms. Even the Khedive would not board an Enghsh ship before the bombardment, for fear of its being sunk by the forts.^ It was this disappointment on the part of 1 " Shortly after the war I had a curious confirmation of Tewfik's indecision from no less authoritative a source than Lord Charles Beresford . . . who told me that in a] moment of unusual frankness, " ICHABOD " 117 the officers that made it a comparatively easy matter for Tewfik's agents to spread disaffection in their ranks by means of a liberal supply of money, and more liberal promises of promotion with a free pardon on the conclusion of the " rebelhon ". The Khedive's A.D.C., Osman Bey Kifaat, who possessed a full knowledge of the officers and their jealousies, worked upon these to some purpose. The war had not been conducted to the satisfaction of the officers, whether native or Circassian. There was the same cause for discontent as there had been during Ismail's un- successful Abyssinian campaign. The accusation of incompetence brought against the Circassian generals by the fellah officers at that time was now levelled at Arabi by both fellah and Circassian. Men who knew themselves to be more capable soldiers than Arabi looked askance at — " A fellow — that never set a squadron in the field Nor the division of a battle knows More than a spinster ",i who, if successful, would be raised to the dizzy height of Dictator, perhaps of King : an elevation he would owe to them and not to his own superior intelHgence. On the other hand, Arabi's outlawry by the Sultan had by this time reached their ears ; and as Sir Garnet Wolseley was acting as the servant of the Khedive, with the Sultan in " hearty " co-operation, they very naturally argued that defeat might be de- layed, but would assuredly overtake them eventually, and it behoved them to make peace with the strong party while there was time. There was not even the the Khedive had one day explained to him the reason of his remaining ashore during the fight, as being nothing else than his extreme per- plexity as to which of the combatants would prove the better fighter ". (Mr. WiKrid Blunt's "Secret History of Egypt", pp. 380-1.) 1 Shakespeare's " Othello ", Act I, Scene 1. 118 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS chance of dragging matters on and on by instituting a system of guerilla warfare with the enemy, until favourable terms of surrender could be arranged. Surrender was imminent, for Sir Garnet Wolseley had landed at Ismailia ; and notwithstanding the majority in favour of it, blockade of the Canal had been ne- glected by Arabi because of the promise of a French protection — a protection only existing in the imagina- tion of the bombastic de Lesseps. * Whilst Osman Bey Rifaat was actively engaged sowing discord in an already disaffected army, Sultan Pasha was dealing with the civilian chiefs. His great wealth and position — he was called the " King " in Upper Eg3rpt — lent weight to his arguments in favour of England and the Khedive ; and the fact of his having taken Arabi by the hand in the early stages of the movement made his defection appear genuine, and his arguments against his former protege convincing. The secession of the prime mover in the party's formation lent imdoubted colour to the rumour that there was " something rotten in the State of Denmark ". Jealousy was at the root of Sultan Pasha's hostility. As a man of advanced age, matured experience, and vmdeniable position, he felt that he had received an unqualified indignity at the hands of both Cherif Pasha and Mahmud Sami, when they excluded him from a place in their respective Cabinets. In addition to this, his pride would not admit of his giving priority of place to the younger and more fortunate Arabi. He permitted personal pique to outweigh his pat- riotism, and for an empty English title he bartered the political emancipation of his country.^ 1 Vide Appendix VII, pp. 570-74, Blunt's " Secret History ". ^ He addressed letters to his numerous former friends at Cairo, putting forward the explanation that the alliance between the Khedive and the English was a merely temporary necessity, as the English " ICHABOD " 119 It seems probable that Yakub Pasha Sami, the President of the Mihtary Committee at Cairo, had been tampered with by the Khedive's agents. For Mahmud Fehmi, the General, who was not only a good soldier, but upon whom Arabi depended for en- gineering his lines of defence, was taken prisoner by a small party of Life Guards not far from Wady Tumeylat ; and Ah Fehmy Pasha, with Easchid Pasha, being both woimded at Kassassin and put hors de combat for the rest of the campaign, there was but one efficient general left, in the person of Abdul Aal Pasha — one of the three colonels — who could be rehed upon for forward action at Tel-el-Kebir. This com- mander was allowed to remain in idleness at Damietta with his dashing and spirited Black Regiment, whilst AJi Pasha Roubi was appointed by Yakub Pasha Sami as Ali Fehmy 's successor to the important command at Tel-el-Kebir. Roubi was one of Arabi's old colleagues in the early days of the movement ; but it was a widely known fact that, although in other respects a very worthy man, he was by no means a competent mihtary leader, especially of an engagement on which rested the entire fate of Egyp- tian independence. Arabi himself placed too great a reHance on the integrity of Sheykh Saoud-el-Tihawi, who treacherously lured him into a false and disas- trous security ; first by misleading Mahmud Sami on troops would not stay in Egypt when once the Khedive's authority had been re-established ; that Arabi had lost the confidence of the Sultan ; and that the continued resistance at Cairo vras generally condemned by Moslems. These letters, distributed carefully, were not without their influence, and money again played its powerful part. Sultan, indeed, seems to have advanced the money out of his own pocket, for the very first financial act of the restored Khedivial Government after Tel-el-Kebir was to make him a public present of £10,000, under the title of an indemnity, for losses sustained by him during the war, while he also received a title of English knighthood. . . . There is no question that with the Khedive's help Wolseley's path of victory was made a very easy one. (" Secret History," pp. 414-15.) 120 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS the morning of Kassassin, and then by leading Axabi to certain destruction through withholding the news of Sir Garnet Wolseley's advance on Tel-el-Kebir. In addition to these misfortunes and betrayals, the crowning treachery was reached on the morning of the final stand, by the defection of Abd-el-Rahman Bey Hassan, commander of the advance guard of cavalry, and Ali Bey Yussuf , in command of a portion of the central hues, who, by accepting the Uberal bribes of the Khedive, evacuated two important posi- tions, abandoning them to the enemy, and thereby facilitating the victory of the English Commander- in-Chief.^ It will therefore be observed that from first to last Arabi found himself beset by insuperable difficulties. Had he, during the early stages of the campaign, lopped ofi a few heads, beginning with Tewfik, as Mehemet Ali would have done, or as the Khedive himself desired to do when the conditions were reversed and Arabi was in the power of that Prince, " he might ", as the Prindess Nazli said, " have been reigning happily to-day " } 1 " Two of Arabi's minor oificera, both holding responsible positions, had accepted a few days before the bribes offered by the Khedive's agents. . . . The first was Abd-el-Eahman Bey Hassan, commander of the advance guard of the cavalry, who was placed with his regiment outside the lines in a position commanding the desert road from the east, but who on the night in question shifted his men some consider- able distance to the left, so as to leave the English advance unobstructed. The second, Ali Bey Yusuf, in command of the central lines, where the trenches were so little formidable that they could be surmounted by an active artillery. By the account generally given, and Arabi's own, he not only left the point that night unguarded, but put out a lantern for the guidance of the assailants ". (" Secret History ", p. 420.) ^ Mr. Blunt says that on visiting the Princess Nazli on 31 January, 1887 : " She told us a great deal that interested us about Arabi, for whom she had, and I am glad to see still has, a great cvlU, talking of his singleness of mind, and lamenting his overthrow. ' He was not good enough a soldier,' she said, ' and has too good a heart. These were his faults. If he had been a violent man like my grandfather, Mehemet Ali, he would have taken Tewfik and all of us to the Citadel and cut our heads ofi: — and he would have been now happily reigning, or if he " ICHABOD " 121 Notwithstanding the claim made by English writers that Arabi's success would have meant anarchy or the rise of a Turkish Dictator, the real circumstances, however, proved such claim to have been arrant humbug, and quite foreign to the acknow- ledged facts of the conditions prevailing in Egypt during the government by the General Council at Cairo. Take, for instance, that great bugbear, finance, which was at the root of all the Egyptian difficulties. The accounts which were handed over by the Council to the Khedive's Ministers on the return of the Court to Cairo, were found to be in perfect condition ; every piastre spent during the war was accurately accounted for, and the machinery of the various departments was running as smoothly as could have been expected under the warlike conditions that obtained, and the unrest which the Khedive's agents successfully created in the minds of those in authority. The movement being primarily against the corrupt rule of the Turks, the leader did take care, and would have continued to take care that they should not again be allowed to reintroduce their system of peculation, which had thrown the country into a state of bankruptcy. Nor must it be assumed that the reformers, being for the most part a peasant class, were incapable of appreciating the necessity for modem innovations in connection with the essentially Western political system which they had introduced. That they were untried and untutored in the arts could have got the Khedive to go on honestly with him he would have made a great king of him. Arabi was the first Egyptian Minister who made the Europeans obey him. In his time, at least, the Mohammedans held up their heads, and the Greeks and Italians did not dare trans- gress the law. I have told Tewfik this more than once. Now there is nobody to keep order. The Egyptians alone are kept under by the poUce, and the Europeans do as they like ' ". (Note to p. 394, " Secret History".) 122 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS of government according to European ideals does not necessarily lead to the assumption that their efiorts would have been attended by shipwreck. I am qmte aware that there is no short cut to learning, and that it is generally considered that advanced poliiical institutions on hberal lines are the result of evolution. Such ideas and arguments are not only highly con- ventional, but essentially European ; and it is quite impossible to gauge Oriental thought by European standards. The great difl&culty, east, west, north or south, wherever the white race has held the o<5loured race in subjection, is the inability on the^art of the white man to reaUse that the coloured man may be, and ofttimes is, his intellectual equal, if not his superior. It is, therefore, quite impossible for the European to arrive at a satisfactory study of Oriental persons or conditions unless the obscuring cobwebs of prejudice are swept aside, and these subjects are approached with an open mind. The most rabid Egyptian Constitutionalist of 1882 would never have claimed universal political in- tellectuality for the mass of his countrymen. It must be borne in mind that good government is carried on by the intellectual few in the interests of the un- intellectual many. Take England, France, the United States. What do the people of these countries know of the high questions of State ? And it is ex- tremely questionable whether the boasted liberal political institutions of these countries are worked in the interests of the people. The Egyptian fellah Notables, and Ministers of Arabist procUvities, who desired to rule Egypt in 1882, were neither better nor worse than the Euro- peans holding the same positions and possessing the same aims and desires. But it will be claimed that " ICHABOD " 123 these European statesmen had gained experience and had been properly trained in the arts of government, by reason of the before-mentioned pohtical evolu- tionary process through which they had passed. This is true only in a limited sense. There is no system of poUtical economy extant which is so perfect in construction that it may be universally applied to all communities of the human race. Take the Sociahst-Labour party in the Enghsh House of Commons. Take Mr. John Burns, the foremost of them aU. Are any of these gentlemen quaUfied, notwith- standing their undoubted intellectuahty, because of mere bookish learning and experience in the arts of government ? The powers that had been, did not realise that there was a party of workers who would become a power in the State, until some forty Sociahst- Labour members marched into the House of Com- mons. Mr. Keir Hardie, upon first taking his seat in the House of Commons, was regarded by superior Enghsh statesmen as a sort of political freak ; but when the rearguard subsequently filed into West- minster Palace, it was very soon reahsed that the pohtical freak had blossomed forth into a pohtical force, Inf Egj^t the conditions were almost identical. The ruhng class of Turks and Circassians could not reconcile themselves to the fact that their heritage of misrule and oppression could be wrested from them by those they had oppressed, nor did they beheve that legislators were being evolved from the downtrodden masses. It is indeed true that they were the largest landowners ; but it cannot be truth- fully stated that the fellah reformers intended to confiscate the possessions of the Turks, neither did the ConstitutionaUsts attempt to repudiate their 124 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS European obligations; a fact which is attested by no less an authority than Sir Edward Malet.^ It has also been asserted by Arabist critics that the Ulema, who represented Arab erudition in Egypt, were a narrow class, of limited intellect, and that the Mohammedan religious system, being stationary and conservative, does not admit of liberal thought, expansion, or political progress; inasmuch as Islam, to which the Moslem is bound hand and foot, in- corporating as it does a civil dispensation, " would regulate not only the government but the social Ufe of the country upon these principles of faith which are most antiquated, obsolete, and opposed to the commonplace ideas of modern civihsation ".^ These statements are absolutely opposed to the known opinions held by the Ulema, the accepted traditions of Islam, or the liberal principles of reform on a theological basis, that had been previously taught at the El-Azhar by Sheykh Jemal-ed-din, the Afghan leader of religious and political thought at Cairo ; a leader whose teaching was taken up and contiQued by his worthy successor, Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, the recently deceased Grand Mufti of Egypt. This school of thought was effectively teaching the necessity of reconsidering the whole Islamic position ; and by leaving the past behind, was marching in- tellectually forward in harmony with modern know- ledge and progress. It is also proved that the Koran and its traditions, when rightly interpreted. Islamic law being in its essence repubUcan, were capable of a most Uberal development by no means opposed to beneficial change. Now touching the matter of anti-European feeUng 1 Vide ante, p. 69. "^ Cromer's "Modern Egypt", Vol. I, p. 326. " ICHABOD " 125 in Egypt. At no period, whether during the early NationaKst agitations, or at a later date, when constitutional government had become an accom- plished fact, were either Arabi or his colleagues aggressively opposed to Europeans. On the contrary, they were sufficiently intelhgent to understand that if they were to keep pace with modern progress it was essential that they should keep in touch with those persons who were closely identified with liberal institutions ; and, what is most important, not only did they disclaim any desire to get rid of the Euro- peans, but they were extremely anxious to be taught by this very body.^ The individual who is sincerely desirous of obtaining enlightenment cannot be con- sidered to be in a very parlous intellectual condition. And that they saw the need for social reform is proved by their very comprehensive programme, which included the abolition of the slave trade and the corvee system of forced labour, and the establish- ment of agricultural banks, through which agency they hoped to relieve the farmer from the incubus of the Greek usurer. These reforms, having commended themselves to the EngUsh, were subsequently intro- duced by Lord Cromer. It will therefore be observed that the aims and intentions of the Nationahsts in the direction of intellectual improvement and con- stitutional reform were being arranged on highly 1 " In an interview with Sir Auckland Colvin on 1 November, 1881, Arabi disclaimed in tbe plainest words the desire to get rid of Euro- peans, whether as employes or residents ; he spoke of them as neces- sary instructors of the people. He himself and the two officers (pointing to them) had never been to school. Intercourse with Euro- peans had been their school. He, and all, felt the need of it ; they had no need to question the need of Europeans in the administration. On the contrary, if more were required let them come. . . . The impres- sion left on my mind was that Arabi, who spoke with great moderation, calmness, and conciliation, is sincere and resolute, but is not a practical man ". (Cromer's " Modern Egypt ", Vol. I, pp. 209-10.) 126 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS commendable lines. They were none of them political giants, nor could they boast a Solomon amongst them. They were plain men, of good average common sense, knowing their own requirements and the requirements of their fellows ; and had they been left to work out their own poUtical salvation there is no possible doubt that they would have eventually obtained their desires. That these men made mis- takes is quite true. But we are all fallible mortals : we all blunder. There never was, nor will there ever be, a perfect statesman or political system — East or West. That European intervention was in any case inevitable I do not admit; because so long as the Egyptians kept their financial obligations, and there was public tranquillity, the sons of Israel, being only troubled about their bond and their ducats, would have left the fellah to his own political devices. As Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace says, " there can be no longer any reasonable doubt that the English Government totally misconceived the real nature of the Egyptian revolutionary movement".^ And I would add, that misconception was the result of misrepresentation and diplomatic incapacity. A movement which had for its ultimate object the emancipation of an enslaved race should have been after the heart of a British Liberal Government, whose leader was wont to bellow so loudly over the conditions in Bulgaria ; and who, but for the efforts of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt and his friends, would have permitted Arabi Pasha and his co-reformers to be left at the mercy of the Khedive, when he well knew ' Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace was Lord Duflferin's lieutenant, that nobleman having been appointed by the British Government (October 31) to inquire into the Egyptian situation and to lay down a basis upon which self-government might be established in Egypt. It was his presence in Egypt that aided Arabi and his principal associates in obtaining a fair trial. " ICHABOD " 127 that such a course meant the degrading death of a rebel, with all those refinements of bodily torture with which Tewfik's origin and traditions had made him familiar. Arabi and his principal associates were tried on 1 3 December, 1 882. On the advice of his friends Arabi pleaded guilty to the charge of rebelhon. He was sentenced to death, which was immediately after commuted into perpetual exile. After many places of exile had been suggested, Ceylon was finally selected, to which place Arabi and his principal associates sailed on 26 December, by a specially chartered ship.^ The Enghshman having planted himself firmly in the Nile Valley, the Kinglake prophecy was abundantly fulfilled. All hberal hopes and pohtical aspirations were — for the time — crushed out of the Egyptian people at Tel-el-Kebir, and Tewfik was set firmly upon the Khedivial throne with the support of British bayonets.^ The word " Ichabod " might be said to have replaced the name of " Liberty " in Egypt. With the political domination of the EngUsh, the glory — such as it was — had indeed departed. 1 Arabi Pasha was allowed to return to Egypt in 1901. ^ " I shall use my influence to maintain the rights already estab- lished, whether by firmans of the Sultan or by various international engagements, in a spirit favourable to the good government of the country and the prudent development of its institutions". (Queen Victoria's speech to Parliament, 7 February, 1882.) CHAPTER XII GOVEENMENT BY PHILANTHEOPY ENGLAND had entered Egypt with an armed force, with the philanthropic intention of restoring order in the Khedive's Government out of the chaos which her representatives had assisted to create.^ Now that order was restored, fearing that the masses might once more rise against an unpopular ruler whom she had re-established on the viceregal seat in defiance of the popular will, to satisfy certain inquisitive European neighbours, it became necessary for England to find some valid excuse for a prolonged sojourn in the home of her protege. On 20 September, M. Duclerc, M. de Freyciaet's successor, had informed the British Charge d'Affaires in Paris, " that he thought it would be in the interests of England to give at an early date some notion of what her future intentions were with regard to Egypt ". A hint of which there was no mistaking the nature and inten- tion. In the meanwhile the new Khedivial Government, — ^with Cherif Pasha once more Prime Minister, and Arabi's old enemy, Riaz Pasha, as Minister of the 1 " In talking to the various persons who have made inquiries as to my views on the Egyptian Question, I have stated that we have not the least intention of preserving the authority which has thus reverted to us. . . . It was our intention so to conduct our relations with the Egyptian people that they should naturally regard us as their best friends and counsellors, but that we did not propose upon that account arbitrarily to impose our views upon them, or to hold them in irritating tutelage". (Lord Dufiferin's Dispatch, 19 December, 1882. Egypt No. 2 (1883), p 30.) 128 GOVEENMENT BY PHILANTHROPY 129 Interior — had resigned as a protest against the non- execution of Aiabi and the principal NationaKsts; which execution they considered would have been not only an act of justice, but was a State necessity. This view was shared, as was natiirai in the cir- cumstances, by the Pashas and the Europeans resident in Egypt ; but the mass of the people did not agree with it, inasmuch as the commutation of the sentences met with their unqualified approval.^ Cherif Pasha, however, was induced to retain the Premiership ; and a Cabinet was constructed on Hues more liberal than those of its immediate predecessor, although its composition was of a less national char- acter than that which existed prior to the return of the Court to Cairo. Lord DufEerin, who arrived in Cairo on 7 Novem- ber, on a special mission to Egypt, after having expedited and concluded the proceedings against Arabi and his principal associates, then turned his attention to the real object of his mission, that of laying down a basis upon which " self-government " might be established in Egypt. This was no easy matter, as the prisons were filled to overflowing with thousands of minor individuals charged with murder, arson, and pillage. A Commission was duly "ap- pointed to make preliminary inquiries, and to send accused persons, against whom a frima facie case had been established, for trial before a Court Martial ". Some of the prisoners were executed, others were condemned to various terms of penal servitude ; a few individuals, against whom no charges could be ' la addition to the leaders of the movement, some one hundred and fifty individuals were condemned to exile from Egypt, many to exile in the provinces under police supervision. On 1 January, 1883, a Decree was issued granting an amnesty to all other political prisoners. Suliman Sami was, however, executed for his complicity in the burning of Alexandria. 130 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS established, were released ; and th.e special Commission and the Court Martial, having between them com- pleted a very busy session, were eventually abolished by decree on 9 October, 1883. On 3 January, 1883, Lord Granville addressed to the expectant Powers a circular note, which had been previously submitted to and approved by the Porte. In it his Lordship pointed out " that the course of events had thrown upon England the task, which Her Majesty's Government would wilhngly have shared with other Powers, of suppressing the military rebellion in Egypt, and restoring peace and order in that country. The work had been happily accomplished, and although for the present a British force remained in Egypt, the Government were desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the necessity for its presence was superseded by the organisation of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority ". As to his future policy. Lord Granville then proposed : In the first place, " that the freest possible navigation of the Suez Canal, its strict neutrality in time of war, and equal rights therein, be granted to all nations. In the second place, the attainment of greater economy in the management of the Daira estates. In the third place, the treat- ment of foreigners on the same footing as natives with regard to taxation. In the fourth place, the continuance of the present system of mixed tribunals for civil suits between natives and foreigners. In the fifth place, the formation of a small Egyptian army, with British officers, lent for a time to fill the higher posts, and a separate force of gendarmerie and pohce.^ In the sixth place, some new arrangement 1 The remnant of the Egyptian Army after Tel-el-Kebir was dis- patched for service in the Soudan. GOVERNMENT BY PHILANTHROPY 131 in lieu of the dual control, such as the appointment of a single European financial adviser, without authority to interfere in the direct administration of the country. In the seventh place, the prudent introduction of representative institutions in some form adapted to the present political intelUgence of the people, and calculated to aid in their progress ". Now inasmuch as the Egyptian Government was anxious for the abolition of the dual control, " on the ground that its dual nature and semi-political character had caused great inconvenience ", Sir Auckland Colvin, whose status was affected by Clause 6, on the pubHcation of Lord Granville's circular, resigned his office, and the Control was aboHshed by Khedivial Decree a few days later. France had been invited to consider the impossibihty of carrpng on, what was originally considered a provisional arrangement, after two out of the three parties to the agreement, for serious reasons, desired to withdraw from it. But France insisted that the Control could only be abohshed by the consent of all the parties to it, and refused to accept the presidency of the Commission of the Debt. It was declined on the ground that it was not " consistent with the dignity of France to accept as an equivalent for the abolition of the Control, a position which was simply that of cashier ", and, Hke Achilles, she retired to her poHtical tent in a fit of sulks, determined to " resume her hberty of action in Egypt". The position of Controller was, however, subsequently revived, under the more euphemistic title of Financial " Adviser ", in favour of Mr. (Sir) Edgar Vincent. The Egyptian decks being at length cleared for action, and the Powers having assented to Lord Granville's Egyptian policy, Lord Dufferin im- 132 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS mediately proceeded to formulate his plans for the social and poUtical regeneration of Egypt, according to the pledges laid down by Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone's Liberal Ministry. These may be roughly summarised as follows : That Egypt will be reorganised in such a way as to secure permanent order in the future. That there will be a prudent development of popular institutions ; and that the occupation is temporary, and will not be unnecessarily prolonged. With regard to the first of these pledges : inasmuch as the Bedouin tribes occasionally gave trouble, and might be tempted to make an inroad upon the richer Egyptian towns — perhaps the capital itself — if they imagined they would find them destitute of troops, Lord Dufferin proposed " that an Egyptian Army of six thousand men, which should be a latent force, be recruited by conscription. The composition of this body should he native Egyptians ". A semi-military constabulary, and an urban pohce for large towns in the Nile Valley, under the Minister of the Interior, and not, as heretofore, under the Minister for War. The combined force to total 7,390 men. In the case of the army and semi-military con- stabulary, to be organised by Sir Eveljm Wood and Baker Pasha respectively, Turco-Circassian and fellah ofiicers were to be reintroduced, military efficiency was to be the sole advancement, patronage, as in former times, being discounted, and inejG&cients were to be put on half-pay. Twenty-seven English officers were to be introduced into the services to assist in their organisation. The rations were to be of good quality according to regulation. The pay of the men to be on; piastre (2jd.) a day for privates. '^0<-„1^,^/fyy/~!*^J^^ MEHKJIET ALI \'ICERMY AND KurXDEU (IF THE Pl:p;sENT El.TPTIAX KHEIiIVIAL ])YXAM'y GOVERNMENT BY PHILANTHROPY 133 with proportionately larger sums to higher grades, to be paid regularly on the last day of the month under the personal supervision of Enghsh officers. Now, inasmuch as the fellaheen had never taken kindly to soldieriag. Sir Evelyn Wood proposed to replace long service by terms of four years with the colours, and the same terms in the reserve, with leave of absence of fourteen to thirty days, according to distance from home ; arrangements to be made with the railway administration for reduced rates ; and when away from home with the colours, facilities were to be given the men to communicate with their relatives. All of which was not only a move in the right direction, but made for a popularity of the services which did not obtain during the old regime. Mehemet Ali was the first to introduce conscription into Egypt, when he desired to raise cheap battalions to replace the more expensive and rather turbulent Albanian bands which had enabled him to ex- terminate the Mamelukes. He, however, found the fellaheen so greatly opposed to martial pursuits, that, rather than be pressed into the Viceroy's service, they not infrequently resorted to the extreme expedient of mutilating their bodies. Mehemet AU was equal to the emergency, for he forthwith formed companies of one-eyed fellaheen ; and those who had mutilated their right hands were made to use the left, or pull the trigger with such fingers as remained. The reason for this repugnance to military service on the part of the fellaheen was to be found, for the most part, iu his devotion to the soil ; and the fact that at a later period they were brought to Cairo from the rural districts in chains, with an iron collar about their necks, and the loud lamentations of their female relatives ringing in their ears, was not cal- 134 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS culated to endear to them a service possessing such cruel and harrowing adjuncts. Besides, it must also be borne in mind that these conscripts left home, family, and friends, fine upstanding youths of sixteen or eighteen, to be tied to a service where the rations were bad, the pay irregular, the " discipline " in- iquitous and oppressive, and only to be terminated by death, injury, or decrepit age. On returning to their native village without pension or honours, they would find their relatives dead, and in many cases their own names forgotten. They were as strangers among their own people. Too old and infirm to work, without even the poor consolation of " shouldering a crutch to show how fields were won ", they passed a wretched existence, to be eventually terminated by the wayside, or in the mud-hovel of some poor but sym- pathetic villager. There can be little wonder, there- fore, that the fellaheen regarded the conscript call with greater horror than the call of the Eternal Reaper. A project of judicial reform, discovered in the archives of the Ministry of Justice, was modified by a Commission working nominally under the presidency of the responsible Minister, but really under the guidance of the notorious Nubar Pa'rha, who, it will be remembered, was responsible for the "famous" International Tribunals. With a view to redeeming Lord Granville's pledge relating to " the prudent development of popular liberties ", Lord Dufierin elaborated the political institutions, which were to grant Village Con- stituency, Provincial Councils, Legislative Councils, and a General Assembly of eight Ministers responsible to the Khedive. All of these were to be in a large measure under the supervision of an advisory body of Europeans. " I cannot conceive ", said Lord GOVERNMENT BY PHILANTHROPY 135 Dufferin in his report, " anything which would be more fatal to the prosperity and good administration of the coimtry, than the hasty and inconsiderate extrusion of any large portion of the Europeans in the service of the Government, in deference to the somewhat unreasonable clamour which has been raised against them. For some time to come Euro- peans in the various departments of Egyptian administration will be absolutely necessary. ... It is frightful to contemplate the misery and misfortune which would be entailed on the population were the finances, the pubUc works, and the analogous depart- ments to be left unorganised by a few high-minded European officials. The Egyptian Government would quickly become a prey to dishonest speculators, ruinous contracts, and delusive engineering operations, from which they are now protected by the intelligent and capable men who are at hand to advise them in reference to these subjects. This is especially true in regard to financial matters. The maintenance of Egypt's financial equilibrium is the guarantee of her independence " " If ", he continued, " I had been commissioned to place afiairs on the footing of an Indian subject State, the outlook would have been different. The masterful hand of the Resident would have quickly bent everything to his will ". . . . After enumerating the various advantages to be derived from such a system, he concluded : " The Egyptians would have justly considered the ad- vantages as dearly purchased at the expense of their domestic independence. Moreover, Her Majesty's Government, and the public opinion in England, have pronounced against any such alternative ".^ 1 Vide Lord Dufferin's Dispatch, Egypt No. 6 (1883), pp. 41-83, and Appendix to chapter xvii. 136 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS But, inasmuch as it is averred that " the title deeds of all political authority are elastic ", the time was to arrive when English public opinion would become something more than elastic in regard to political authority in Egypt. The lust of conquest, and the ex- pansion of empire, would so effectively bhnd the eyes of English pubUc opinion to truth and justice, that the cry of the Egyptians for autonomy would be lost on the wings of the wind, and " the mailed fist " of the British representative would become more master- ful than the will of the most arrogant Indian Resident. It is very questionable whether Lord Dufferin himself foresaw that in time to come " the Egyptians would have justly considered the advantages as dearly purchased at the expense of their domestic independence " ; for it must be remembered that the cost of the army of occupation, indemnity to the sufferers by the burning of Alexandria, and the expedition to the Soudan, added an additional £5,000,000 to the pubhc debt. But it was a case of " J'y suis, et j'y reste ! " In the meanwhile, Sir Edward Malet was pro- moted to the position of Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Brussels ; and Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), then in India, being offered the succession through Lord Dufferin, accepted the post, and arrived in Cairo 11 September, 1883. " Dance before the monkey in the days of his power ", runs the Egyptian adage. It was in this manner that the Egyptians accepted British occu- pation and authority. There were, of course, the Turco-Circassians, who had not quite made up their minds whether they appreciated English tutelage in the affairs of the country ; but it is also evident that the presence of the British was less objectionable GOVERNMENT BY PHILANTHROPY 137 to them than that of any other European power. Also, England having pledged herself to evacuate the country " when order and good government were restored ", they looked forward to that time when they, being the ruling caste, would have the power once more within their grasp. They knew that EngUsh pubhc opinion was opposed to handing the govern- ment over to them ; but they hoped that when the English had departed they would find some means of coming into their own again, especially as all fellah leaders possessing any poUtical pretensions were now safely out of the way. The Copts, for the most part, were jubilant at the turn events had taken ; they looked to the dominant fellow Christian to accord them that preferment which their imdoubted abilities abundantly war- ranted ; a preferment, they feared, would be withheld by the Nationahsts, notwithstanding the Arabist professions of granting equal civil and political privileges to aU natives of the Delta. And the Euro- peans were influenced in proportion to the material advantages likely to accrue to them from English domination. Now it has frequently been asserted that England, on occupying Egypt, should have proclaimed a protectorate immediately after the surrender of Arabi. Had England done so, she would have violated aU those traditions of political probity which had gained for her an international respect. At the same time, it must be conceded that the withdrawal of the French from active participation in the Egyptian campaign, and the rather precipitate action of Lord Alcester at Alexandria, undoubtedly placed England in a position from which there was no retreat. Having, therefore, committed a grave political error, by 138 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS reason of a mistaken policy, and an incorrect con- ception of the Egyptian Nationalist movement, it must be admitted by all impartial observers, that England set about repairing the evil she had wrought in a manner which compelled admiration for the evident sincerity of her intentions. The appointment of Lord Dufferin was unquestionably a most happy selection, and the best obtainable at the time ; for it is extremely doubtful whether any European Power — England included — could have produced such another. That his work was well done is beyond dispute ; but at the same time, it is greatly to be feared that the unavoidable introduction and re- tention of Europeans in prominent Government positions, although with the best possible intentions, has contributed in no small measure towards the indefinite extension of the occupation ; and the fact of its being unusual to undertake the administration of a foreign country without hope of financial or commercial reward — England's Egyptian policy, as advanced at this time — caused both Egyptian and European to be rather suspicious of a programme that practically amounted to government by philan- thropy ! In bringing this chapter to a close, I cannot refrain from recording the undying debt of gratitude which the people of Egypt owe to Mr. Wilfrid Blunt and Sir Wilham Gregory ; and this notwithstanding Lord Cromer's rather cheap sneers at the expense of the former gentleman. The fact is incontro- vertible, that it was due to Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's uncompromising propaganda and unremitting zeal, that the British public were made aware of the true condition of affairs in Egypt. Sir Edward Malet and Sir Auckland Colvin having done their utmost in GOVERNMENT BY PHILANTHROPY 139 the way of misrepresentation, it was only because of Mx. Blunt^s efforts that the Foreign Office bureaucrats were brought to see the error of their ways, thereby contributing in no small measure to the appointment of the efficient Dufferin. There can be but little doubt that Mr. Blunt's blind sympathy and behef in the aims and intentions of the Nationalists led him into occasional indiscretions ; but it is quite easy to find valid excuses in his well-known humanitarian principles, and his poetic temperament. And it cannot be too greatly insisted on that he was instru- mental in bringing about a fair trial for Arabi Pasha and his chief associates ; and at the same time, by preventing his execution by the treacherous and revengeful Khedive, he also stayed the hands of Britain from the acquiescence in, if not the com- mission of, a poUtical crime which would have stained the none too clean pages of Britain's Egyptian policy in 1882. CHAPTER XIII THE HICKS EXPEDITION— AND AFTEE rpHE Egyptian Soudan/ in 1883, over which -*- the Khedive was presumed to rule, covered an area of about twice the dimensions of France and Germany. It extended from Wadi Haifa to the Equator, and from Massowah, on the Red Sea, to the western limits of Darfur — a territory of 1650 miles long by 1200 miles broad. To the north was a population mainly Mohammedan Arabs ; to the south, Negro tribes were scattered rather densely, and they were periodically raided by the Arabs to supply the slave markets of Cairo, Constantinople, and Damascus. Mehemet Ali first extended Egyptian rule to these districts; and, under him, Ibrahim Pasha carried the banner of Egyptian conquest as far south as Kordofan and Senaar, avowedly deter- mined to suppress the chronic anarchy which had previously existed as a standing menace to Egyptian frontiers, and to ensure tranquillity by the establish- ment of permanent government throughout this vast area. The Arabs sullenly accepted the invasion as long as they were permitted to continue the trafl&c in human flesh undisturbed by the conqueror. Ismail, however, on issuing his proclamation against slavery, informed the Europeans who had influenced his action, that in order to effectively stamp out the traffic, it was necessary for him to extend his rule to those regions from whence the ' The word Soudan signifies " a country of blacks ''. 140 HICKS EXPEDITION— AND AFTER 141 traders drew their supplies. Thus, in 1870, Sir Samuel White Baker led an expedition which con- quered the Equatorial provinces, of which, in 1874, Colonel (afterwards General) Gordon was appointed Governor-General. Darfur was added to Egyptian territory in the following year. Ismail then welded the Central African province into one huge Govern- ment, which he entrusted to Colonel Gordon with the most absolute dictatorial powers. The EngHsh pro- Consul ruled at Gondakoro with ability and justice in the best interests of Khedive and people ; and in due course, because of its high standard, the Government of the Soudan surpassed the system then obtaining in the Nile Valley. When Ismail fell, Gordon was recalled on economic grounds, notwithstanding the general excellence and economy of his administration, and the fact that he had successfully prevented the Soudan from burden- ing the Exchequer at Cairo. His pohcy was then reversed, and a horde of ravenous Turks, Circassians, and Bashi-Bazouks were forthwith unleashed to harass the Soudanese and devour the land. Sir Samuel White Baker, on his return to the Soudan in 1870, had found that " industry had vanished, and that oppression had driven the inhabitants from the soil " ; and Colonel Stewart, who, in the winter of 1882-3, was commissioned to report on the state of the Soudan, described the agents of the Govern- ment as " swaggering bullies, robbing, plundering, and ill-treating the people with impunity ". Egyptian government had therefore become intoler- able. Chiefl.y owing to the vastness of the country, administrative incompetence was the rule, Gordon's benevolent despotism being the exception ; and his system of economy was succeeded by annual loss 142 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS to tlie Cairo Exchequer. Egypt meanwhile was passing through the Arabist crisis ; and the re- formers being too busy with local matters of greater urgency, the Mahdi, who, like the Egyptian Nation- ahsts, was the product of Turco-Circassian misrule and oppression, not only found the moment oppor- tune to arise, but also to make converts and consoli- date his growing power. Of course, he was never accepted by orthodox Mohammedans, whether in the Soudan or in Egypt, with anything approaching the respect or recognition due to an individual who was supposed to be " con- ducted in the right path ",^ or to one who should h^ve, but did not possess, those qualifications which no less an authority than a learned Sherif of Mecca declared to be essential. " The greatest signs ", said the learned Sherif, " shall be that he shall be of the line of Fatma.* That he shall be proclaimed Mahdi against his will, not seeking such proclamation for himself, and not causing strife amongst the Faithful to obtain it, nor even yielding to it till threatened with death by them. He shall be proclaimed in the Mosque of Mecca, not elsewhere ; he shall not appear save when there is strife after the death of a Cahpha ; he shall neither come nor be proclaimed until such time as shall be coincident with that of Anti-Christ, after whom Jesus will descend and join Himself to the Mahdi. These are the great signs of his coming. . . . Whosoever shall of his own will declare himself by force, is a pretender such as have already ap- peared many times ".^ 1 " Conducted in the right path ", literal meaning of " Mahdi " 2 A Sherif or descendant of the Prophet. Fatma was the daughter of Mohammed. 3 Extract from a work published in 1883, entitled "The Conquests of Islam ", by a Sherif of Mecca. HICKS EXPEDITION— AND APTEE 143 Now the Soudanese Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed of Dongola, although a religious enthusiast and doubt- less a good Mohammedan, did not possess any of the above quaUfications ; and it is extremely doubt- ful, on proclaiming himself in August, 1881, whether he could have influenced even the ignorant tribes of the Soudan had the Government been conducted on anything like equitable Hnes. Reouf Pasha, sent to report on his plans and intentions, found him residing on a smaU island of the White Nile, with a guard of chosen followers who stood before him with drawn swords. He respectfully, but none the less firmly, declined to accede to the demand of the Egyptian oflS.cial that they should visit Khartoum in company. Subsequently he ignominiously re- pulsed a small force sent by water to effect his cap- ture. Between August and December he was left to his own devices, which time he employed in winning the neighboiiring tribes over to his banner, making Gebel Gedir his base of operations. In December, 1881, he once more defeated a force under Raschid Bey. During the early months of 1882 a third expedition of greater proportions, under the command of Yussuf Pasha, was fitted out by the Governor-General of the Soudan, Abd-el-Kader Pasha, against the rebelhous " deUverer of his people " ; but in June the Mahdi utterly annihilated Yussuf Pasha, his officers and the 6000 Egyptian soldiers comprising the force, thereby supplying his followers with a cheap consignment of sorely needed firearms, though the majority of the rebels were still only armed with sword and spear. Feeling his strength increase, the Mahdi cast aside his defensive tactics, and made an offensive assault on El Obeid, where he was re- pulsed with a loss of 6000 men. Never despairing, he 144 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS once more laid siege to El Obeid on 16 January, 1883 ; 1 he captured it without any great show of resistance on the part of the defenders, and the best part of its garrison, headed by Iscander Bey, their commander, took service under the Mahdi. In the meanwhile the Government at Cairo, realising the gravity of the situation, made elaborate preparations for an expedition under Hicks Pasha, which would at once test the value of the new Egyp- tian Army, and the loyalty of the Arabist soldiers then in the Soudan. A camp was accordingly formed at Omdurman on the west of the Nile, opposite Khartoum, where by the end of August Colonel Hicks — a retired Indian ofl&cer now in the Egyptian service — collected an army of 10,000 men, with thirty guns, rockets, and howitzers. The camels were collected under the personal direction of AUa-ed-Deen, the Governor-General of the Soudan. On 9 September Hicks Pasha began his disastrous march up the Nile. His officers were satisfied with the men, who were in excellent spirits, and they therefore determined to march through the desert on El Obeid, trusting to find enough surface pools of water to supply their needs. The troops, though insufl&cient to hold communications with their base of operations, were absolutely frittered away in this vain attempt to accompUsh the impossible. For weeks nothing was heard of Hicks Pasha, whose force, marching in square formation with luggage and camels in the centre, could only travel ten miles a day. The heat was excessive, and when they found the highly prized and long-expected wells of water, these were either filled with stones, earth, or rotting bodies of men and camels. Hicks, realising the difficulties of his unfortunate HICKS EXPEDITION— AND AFTER 145 position, determined to push, on to El Obeid, Loping to strike a decisive blow at the Mahdi, who had made tbat town his head-quarters, supported by a force of 3000 men. On 1 November a guide, in the pay of the Mahdi, led th.e force to a rocky wooden defile without water, where they were held in ambush by the enemy, who were armed with rifles and artillery. Hicks's force, unable to use their guns, gallantly defended them- selves for three days. On the fourth day, their cartridges being expended, they were ordered to fix bayonets, and Hicks Pasha placed himself at the head of the force. It was utterly annihilated, with the Governor-General of the Soudan, O'Donovan, the " Daily News " correspondent. Pashas, Beys, and two hundred ofiicers ; thirty-six guns, all war material and camels falling into the hands of the enemy. This overwhelming victory set the Soudan ablaze, and gave confirmation to the " divine " mission of the Mahdi in the eyes of an ignorant and superstitious Soudan. At Cairo, when the news duly arrived, the con- sternation it produced was absolutely paralysing. A glance at the map will prove that the Soudan is the key to Egypt, inasmuch as it commands the valley of the Nile. Now it will be remembered that England's melo- dramatic declaration with regard to the restoration of the Khedivial power was absolutely contradicted by her overt actions. The Khedive, having placed himself in the hands of England, was compelled to submit to her absolute control ; the Egyptian troops were not to be rehed upon for the reasons set forth in the previous chapter, and these were officered by Enghshmen quite independent of the desires of the 146 THE LAND OP THE PHARAOHS Khedive, Cabinet, or people. The Khedive was himself powerless to stop the Soudanese Rebellion with the 6000 troops allotted him by England ; and notwithstanding the fact that his protectress had at that time a force of 8000 idle men in Egypt, the dangerous insurrection was allowed to spread in the dominions of the ruler whose power England had pledged herself to protect and firmly establish. But mark the subtleties of British policy. The Soudan, although part of the Khedive's dominions, was not Egypt in the proper sense of the term. Therefore, while she permitted British officers to command Egyptian troops against the Soudanese rebels, she refused to employ her men for the same purpose. The English Government had entered Egjrpt to restore order; and when the real work came they tried to shirk the responsibility, which would lead one to conclude that, were it not for their crass stupidity, they were playing a political game of subterfuge, Machiavelhan in its complexity. This stupidity is proved, however, by the hasty determination of the British Government to withdraw the troops before learning the result of the Hicks expedition. The orders had actually been given for retirement. Sir Evelyn Wood had expressed his entire satisfaction with his new Egyptian army, which he declared to be sufficient to ensure security, when the news arrived " that General Hicks was massacred, together with his force of 10,000 men, in the desert of Kordofan ". The panic that ensued is indescribable. Had the Egyptian Ministers been untrammelled there is no doubt that they would at once have recruited a Turkish army to crush the rebelHon, immediately marching on Khartoum. In place of this the British Government, which had previously proclaimed its HICKS EXPEDITION— AND AFTER 147 policy of Soudanese non-intervention, now that Egypt was imperilled by tMs new danger, did not act as an ally and a friend, but forthwith proceeded to obstruct ; and aggressively interfered to prevent help being sent from Egypt to the Soudan garrisons, including Khartoum, where defensive measures were being adopted by Colonel Coetlogon, the British of3S.cer in command, who had called in, as far as was practic- able, the outlying garrisons. Thus the friend and ally, whose profuse protestations of philanthropy on be- half of her Egyptian protege had turned from re- dressing imaginary grievances to securely bind him up, prevented him from acting, and refused that support which would have extricated him from his difficulties. Truly, Tewfik's retribution had quickly overtaken him ; for his English friends considered that the best means of re-estabhshing his authority was to reduce his empire to a province, where the masterful British " Resident ", arriving in the guise of a Consul, proceeded " to quickly bend everything to his will " ! Kiedive and Ministers protested, but England enforced her order that " the Soudan in toto, including Khartoum, the capital, should be immediately abandoned ". Cherif Pasha and his Ministry tendered their resignation. No sooner did it become known that the Soudan was to be abandoned than the whole country broke forth in a rebellious conflagration. A detachment dis- patched for the relief of Tokar was surrounded by a force under Osman Digna, and cut to pieces, Captain Moncrieff, English Consul at Suakin, being among those slain. A month later an attempt to relieve the garrison at Sinkat met with an equally disastrous fate, only forty men out of a force of eight hundred sur- viving'^the furious onslaught of the conquering Arabs. 148 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS From the Red Sea to the distant provinces of Dar- fur, the English order that the Soudan was to be aban- doned had armed every man and sharpened every spear against the Eg3?ptian Government. A pitiless enemy closely invested every garrison ; Sinkat and Tokar were starving within five days' march of 8000 British in Cairo ; and 6000 of the Egyptian Army, under Sir Evelyn Wood, were living in idleness and plenty, whilst 600 faithful troops, under Tewfik Bey, at Sinkat had already consumed every horse and camel they possessed, and now that the last dog had been ravenously devoured, were eking out a hopeless existence on such stray bits of leather as they could lay hands on. Yet the supporting British Army remained unperturbed in Cairo ; and the Egyptian troops, having been recruited with the distinct understanding that they should not be sent to the Soudan, remained quietly in the capital under their English leaders, gathering confidence ; and the wretched Tewfik, well knowing that all Egyptian calamities would be attributed to him by his faithful subjects, in an agony of despair solicited Baker Pasha's^ aid in the relief of Sinkat. That leader, with his newly formed crew of ragged gendarmerie, marched forth on SuakLu : this rabble, pressed into service from the slums of Cairo, was marshalled forth on a forlorn hope. This horde of ragged humanity was expected to retrieve the fortunes of the well-drilled, well-discipKned, and well-equipped Government army, which the Mahdists had cleverly decoyed and utterly exterminated. The disinchnation of the British Government to 1 General Valentine Baker ; not to be confused with Sir Samuel White Baker, who conducted operations in the Soudan for the ex- Khedive Ismail. HICKS EXPEDITION— AND AFTER 149 interfere in the Soudan is only one more illustration of Lord Granville's halting policy — if policy it may be termed ; and the arguments adduced to uphold that policy are quite imtenable. England's position in Egypt, and her miUtary operations of 1882 on be- half of the Khedive, were purely financial. Had there been no debt there would have been no Dual Control, and consequently no intervention to uphold that Control — because it really amounts to that, and aU arguments to the contrary are vain. The Arabists wanted to vote the half of the Budget not afiected by the debt. France and England objected. The French Controller resigned ; the Englishman, Sir Auckland Colvin, sat tight, until Lord Dufierin's pro- gramme made his position imtenable. A large propor- tion of the loans Ismail obtained were sunk in the conquest of the Soudan. The Soudan was therefore a very large share of the assets of the Egyptian debtor. The army of occupation and the Hicks expedition added another £5,000,000 to the existing debt. The army was sent to restore Khedivial authority. That authority extended to the Soudan. England refused to permit her army to go into the Soudan — the army that had been sent to Egypt to restore order, and for which, and through its actions for the most part, £5,000,000 was added to the Egyptian National Debt. The Soudan was " subdued " by IsmaU with the ostensible object of suppressing slavery, which trade was repudiated and condemned by England. The success of the Soudanese rebellion meant an impetus to the slave-trader ; and Mr. Gladstone, the cus- todian of the British Nonconformist conscience, oflGicially stated that the Arabs of the Soudan were " rightly fighting for their freedom ! " And the re- quest for aid, not alone of the British Government, 150 THE LAND OP THE PHARAOHS but^of|Baker Pasha and otheriEnglish. officers in the Egyptian service, who were on the spot and thoroughly understood the conditions — that request for aid, I say, was refused ; and Enghshmen and Egyptians were allowed to go to the certain death that awaited them, whilst the British troops in Egypt, for which the Government of the Khedive was financially re- sponsible, remained in idleness and ease at Cairo. In the meantime Hicks and his army had been wiped out. The Sinkat and Tokar garrisons were starving, and Sir Evelyn Baring had " not telegraphed for fresh instructions as he thought it useless to do so until events had developed somewhat ! " ^ Nubar Pasha had meanwhile formed a Ministry in succession to Cherif Pasha. Colonel Coetlogon, finding himself in a condition of extreme peril at Khartoum, implored the Khedive's Government to issue instructions for his immediate retreat, now that there was no possibility of his being relieved. One- third of his soldiers were disafiected, and the popula- tion of the town was at enmity with the troops. The Egyptian Government telegraphed to the Colonel ordering the collection of all the troops in the Soudan, the evacuation of Khartoum, and the destruction of its stores. The difficulties attendant upon the fulfil- ment of these plans were great ; the journey had to be made by river, and the removal of the 11,000 persons comprising the Christian and civil popula- tion, could only be effected after months of careful preparation. EngUsh public opinion having by this time become thoroughly aroused. General Gordon was dispatched in hot haste by the British Govern- ment to Khartoum to assist in the evacuation ; on his arrival in Cairo he was joined by Colonel Stewart, ' Cromer's "Modern Egypt", Vol. I, p. 378. HICKS EXPEDITION— AND AFTER 151 who had been previously sent to the Soudan in 1882-3. These two took camels across the Korosko desert without escort, on a mission of cowardly evacuation after the sacrifice of 20,000 lives ! Baker Pasha's force having been cut to pieces, orders were suddenly given for the British Army to advance from Cairo to rescue the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat. General Graham assumed the command of the 4000 to 5000 British troops and started for Suakin. General Graham arrived too late for the object of the expedition. Sinkat had fallen, and Tewfik Bey, who salUed forth in the hope of being able to cut his way through to the coast, had been surrounded and destroyed ; and the garrison of Tokar made terms and surrendered to Osman Digna, subsequently using their guns against the British troops at the smartly contested engagement of Teb. The British force advanced on Tokar, burnt the village, and returned to Suakin. The Arabs refused General Graham's offer of terms, and he advanced upon their encampment at Tamai where they were defeated with a loss of 3000 men, the British losses being 130 kiUed. Having burnt a few villages, a small force was left in the garrison at Suakin, and the victorious British Army was recalled to Cairo, leaving the Arabs to take possession of the road to Berber, and so cut off the retreat of the Khartoum garrison. Now, all this was diametrically opposed to the British policy of non-intervention in the Soudan, and fully illustrates the wobbly policy of the British Government. If the Arabs were " rightly struggling for their freedom ", as Mr. Gladstone said, why were British troops sent to slaughter some 5000 of them ? On the other hand, if the pohcy of non-intervention 152 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS in the Soudan was to be modified, wliy did the British Government remain inactive until after the Egyptian Army in the Soudan had been practically exterminated ? If a British force could be dispatched after the Arabs had done their worst, without de- ranging British " policy ", could it not have been dispatched while there was yet time for that force to be of service, and hefore the Arabs had exterminated the Egyptian Army ? Naturally, the Egyptians felt that the intentions of England were either absolutely insincere and hypocritical, or it was the policy of the British Government to permit the destruction of the Egyptian troops, in order to more effectively coun- teract and nulhfy any armed resistance to a pro- longed occupation of the country. The effect of this cowardly retreat was to give the Arabs an entirely erroneous idea of British strength and courage, thereby imperilling Berber and Khartoum. The Arabs concluded that England had become over- powered with fear by reason of her losses, and General Gordon was consequently deserted by the tribes who had previously been friendly, and upon whom he relied. There is considerable excuse for the action of these tribes. They were in a hostile country, with their brothers in armed rebelHon against the Govern- ment they were supporting. The ally of this Govern- ment had won two engagements and left the remain- ing garrisons to perish. They would soon be in the same phght. Berber was attacked and taken by assault, and the greater portion of the garrison massacred. This fate awaited the friendly tribes did they not join the triumphant rebels while there was yet time. Berber having fallen, Khartoum was quickly in- vested ; Berber being the base of operations, should HICKS EXPEDITION— AND AFTER 153 reinforcements be sent across from Suakin to relieve beleaguered Khartoum. And General Gordon, the British representative, who had thrown up an appointment to serve the King of the Belgians in the Congo, in order to heroically obey the caU of his Government in its hour of need, was by that Govern- ment heartlessly abandoned and ruthlessly sacri- ficed. He telegraphed to Cairo for Zobier Pasha,^ the only man capable of co-operating with him and uniting the local tribes against the Mahdi. This request, in spite of the support given by Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), was decHned by the British Government. Subsequently, when Zobier Pasha was about to start on his own account, the British Govern- ment instructed the Egyptian authorities to detain him ! Yet British poKcy was opposed to intervention in the Soudan ! But the English Government had permitted Hicks Pasha, whom they had the authority to stop, to march to destruction. They employed General Graham to slaughter some 5000 Arabs ; and having themselves dispatched General Gordon and Colonel Stewart to Khartoum to enforce its evacuation, with an illogical reasoning, peculiar to the Solomon-hke intelligences that inhabit Downing Street, they abandoned their own Envoy to his fate. EngUsh pubhc opinion being once more in eruption, the non-intervening Government of Paradox dis- patched Lord Wolseley with a force of 6000 men; and simultaneously Lord Northbrook was sent to inquire into Egjrptian finance. The Nile was falling ^ Zobier Pasha hacl been actively engaged in the slave trade of Equatorial Africa, consequently the Anti-Slavery Society, because of his antecedents, brought pressure to bear upon the Government to refuse his services, notwithstanding the fact that Gordon's life depended upon his exertions, owing to his influence with the tribes throughout the Soudan. 154 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS before the Britisli force could reach Dongola, and Major Kitchener telegraphed, " that the unfortunate Colonel Stewart had perished — massacred with all his party, including the French and English Consuls — after the wreck of their steamer in the cataract north of Berber ". Khartoum was being closely invested by the Mahdi's troops. General Stewart was dispatched with a strong flying column across the desert from Korti to Metemmeh, whence he hoped to reach Khartoum by the Nile. They reached Abu Klea on 17 January, 1885, where the Arabs were defeated. On the following day the General resumed his march towards Metemmeh ; they were attacked, and General Stewart was severely wounded. Sir Charles Wilson, then in command, made a reconnaissance ; he found Metemmeh strongly fortified and his pro- gress barred. Omdurman had fallen in the meantime, and the advance of the successful British column having become known to the Mahdi, he immediately brought all his available force to bear upon the town ; a determined assault was made after midnight, 26 January, on the Boori gate on the east, and the Mesalamieh gate on the west side, and the Dervishes, filling the ditches with bundles of straw, penetrated the fortifications. After a siege of 317 days, Khar- toum was at length in the grasp of the Mahdi, and General Charles George Gordon, r.e., c.b., was ruth- lessly murdered by the conquerors, a martyr to duty, and the call of an ungrateful and cowardly Govern- ment ! The following is an extract from General Gordon's journal, under date of 23 September, 1884, in which he refers to the attitude of Gladstone and company, HICKS EXPEDITION— AND AFTER 155 and their exactitudefregarding " non-intervention " in the affairs of the Soudan. "It is as if a man on the bank, having his friend in the river abeady bobbed down two or three times, hails : ' I say, old fellow, let us know when we are to throw you the hfebuoy. I know you have bobbed down two or three times, but it is a pity to throw you the lifebuoy until you are really in extremis, and I want to know exactly, for I am a man brought up in the school of exactitude ' ". Was it exactitude that influenced this action on the part of the British Government, or was it a care- fully laid plan to acquire the Soudan ? I wonder ! CHAPTEE XIV ENGLAND IN THE SOUDAN TT is neither within the scope, nor is it the inten- -^ tion of this work to deal extensively with military operations in the Soudan. Such operations have been already described elsewhere by miUtary writers and others, with a fullness of detail beyond my poor mental capacity. I therefore hope that I may be excused for confining myself to the political aspect of the case, and to a simple chronicle of the principal events, with such comment as I may think advisable. Now, General Gordon, whilst accepting the position thrust upon him by the British Government to evacuate the garrisons of Khartoum and other places, from the outset declared the impossibility of carrying through this forlorn hope in the face of the hostile attitude of the intervening tribes. He had urged that the only feasible plan was to abandon the Western Soudan and the provinces of Darfur and Kordofan, but to hold Khartoum with the provinces lying between the White Nile and the Eed Sea, north of Senaar. Sir Samuel White Baker, who had pre- viously operated in the Soudan under Ismail, and was an admitted authority on Central Africa, ex- pressed very similar views ; but the warnings and advice of these experts were at first received with considerable impatience, not only by the party wire- 156 ENGLAND IN THE SOUDAN 157 pullers, but even by such organs as " The Times " and " The Daily News ", which preferred to rely upon the insight of Sir Evelyn Baring and Lord Granville. Public opinion having changed in the meantime, and the British Government having availed itself of General Gordon's services on his own terms, he was permitted to act quite independently of the Khedive, receiving his orders from the British Government alone. The Conservative journals were especially unanimous in congratulating the Government on the decision it had made ; and this feehng of approbation found a general echo in the organs of both parties throughout the coimtry. It cannot be said that the Egyptians concurred with the views of the British Government regarding General Gordon's appoint- ment. They very naturally felt that if the English Envoy was employed by the British Government to withdraw its troops from the Soudan, notwithstand- ing their unwillingness to concur in that withdrawal, the British Government should not only be re- sponsible for the cost of the evacuation, but that the British troops quartered in Cairo should aid in carrying out the intentions of the British Envoy. At the same time, although Cherif Pasha and his Ministry were anxious to carry out the Dufierin programme, the Egyptian Prime Minister was forced to resign owing to the vacillating policy of the British Government : for although disorder prevailed in the Soudan, and they had avowedly set themselves the task of restoring order in the Kliedive's Government, they not only refused the aid at their disposal to remedy the evil, but also prevented the Khedive's Government from obtaining Turkish assistance, which was the only effective means within reach ; and Nubar Pasha's acceptance of oflfice, and his apparent 158 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS acquiescence in England's contradictory policy, was not supported by Egyptian feeling, or such public opinion as existed. The English Parliament had met much earlier than was anticipated, owing to the rough handUng it had received in the country at the hands of the opposi- tion. It was not long before a vote of censure was won in the House of Lords, which found its immediate echo in the Commons, where it was soon seen that the critics of the Gladstonian Egyptian policy were by no means confined to the opposition ; for not only did Sir Wilfrid Lawson " attribute all the present troubles in Egypt to England's unjust and high- handed proceedings in that country ", but Mr.W. E. Forster, a staunch supporter of the Government, said : " I must confess that I think there was some reason for the charge that the Government did not quickly enough realise the true policy. I think that they did not quickly enough realise the meaning of what happened more than a year ago — ^that they did not realise what the battle of Tel-el-Kebir meant. NoW I think that that battle of Tel-el-Kebir ought not to have been fought. That battle put us in the position that after it there was no Power in Egypt except that of the English Government. The Prime Minister said, ' We have taken the responsibiUty of miUtary operations which reduced the country, and the army was en- tirely broken up, and the institutions of the country were gone. We have before us the work of recon- struction'. Well, how are we to deal with that work ? By giving advice ? Advice is a good thing, hut I cannot conceive anything less likely to succeed than the attempt of a Western nation to govern an Oriental country hy advice to Oriental administrators ". In the meantime the poUcy of inactivity pursued ENGLAND IN THE SOUDAN 159 by the Government had provoked further votes of censure ; and finding itself in a condition closely bordering on disruption, it seized the opportunity of the conclusion of the sittings of the Indemnity Com- mission,^ to order a report to be drawn up on the arrangement of the finances of Egjrpt, with a state- ment of the results of the administration, subsequent to the settlement by the Commission of Liquidation in 1880. This financial statement was sent on 22 April to the " Great Powers ", with a circular dispatch inviting them to a Conference in London for the pur- pose of arranging the financial system of Egypt, and making the necessary provision for present and future needs. The proposed Conference served the purpose of the Government : its assemblage disarmed criti- cism in the House, and France took this occasion to step once more into the arena of Egyptian politics ; and in order to show its good-will towards England, sagely announced the fact that " the abohtion of the Dual Control could no longer be contested ". This being an established fact, they invited the British Government to give an explanation of its plans con- cerning the pacification and future government of Egypt. The Conference of the Powers duly met in London and elected Lord Granville its President, Talk being the positive quantity of Conferences and Royal Com- missions, and achievement traditionally negative among such bodies, they manifested a touching de- votion to tradition : they talked much, accomplished nothing, and went the way of all Conferences. The Downing Street ilk, however, obtained breathing ' The Indemnity Commission was appointed to investigate the claims to property destroyed in the burning of Alexandria. It dealt with something like 10,000 claims, and the admitted liability amounted to £4,250,000. 160 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS time, and thinking time, during the deliberations of the Conference ; and when it dispersed the Govern- ment had found a plan ! For now that " they had recovered their freedom of action", they resolved upon sending Lord Northbrook to Egypt as High Commissioner to inquire into its finances and con- ditions, and to report to his colleagues. Lord Wolseley, having received news of the fall of Khartoum, General Earle was ordered to arrest the forward movement of the river column on Abu Hamed. General Sir Redvers BuUer, who had been sent to take command of the desert column, on account of General Sir Herbert Stewart being placed hors de cornbat at the battle of Abu Klea, was given discretionary power to act according to local circum- stances, until instructions were received from London as to the new policy and intentions of the British Government with regard to Soudanese operations. General Earle halted at Berti, and Sir Redvers BuUer arrived at Gubat on 11 February, 1885. There he found about twelve days' supplies, with an additional twelve days' supplies at Abu Klea. The camels were Tinfit for service ; therefore, on hearing that a Dervish force of about 4000 men was on the march from Khartoum to Gubat, he decided to fall back on Jackdul, and reached that place on 26 February. Meanwhile, the avowed object of the expedition being the rescue of General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, that object was nulUfied by their respective deaths, and the British Government fell back upon its original plan of non-intervention ia Soudanese afiairs. The Mahdi had, however, " repeatedly de- clared his intention of driving the infidels into the sea " ; and General Gordon had advised a policy of ENGLAND IN THE SOUDAN 161 " smashing up the Mahdi ", which was strongly sup- ported by Lord Wolseley, who contended that de- fensive operations, while they might stave off the final trouble for a few years, would not bring about a quiet state of affairs in Egypt. He therefore advised his Government to immediately face the difficulty, which might be delayed but could not be avoided, and by adopting a " smash the Mahdi " pohcy, pur- sue that which was " most befitting our national dignity and honour ". The British Government therefore instructed Lord Wolseley to " check the advance of the Mahdi in districts now undisturbed ". But " whether it will be ultimately necessary to advance on Khartoum or not cannot now be decided '!. Lord Cromer^ was also told to give the Khedive general assurances of sup- port. Lord Wolseley, meanwhile, pressed the British Government for a declaration of policy in the Soudan. On 9 February Lord Hartington telegraphed, " Your mihtary pohcy to be based on the necessity, which we recognise on the statement of facts now before us, that the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum must be overthrown". Whereupon Lord Wolseley, having determined to capture Berber and Abu Hamed, ordered a combined movement by Sir Redvers BuUer and General Earle on those places, with a force co- operating from Suakin to open the Berber road, preparatory to an advance on Khartoum at the end of the summer. Sir Redvers BuUer was instructed to take Metemmeh, and afterwards to combine with General Earle in an attack on Berber ; but the con- ditions of transport not being in accordance with his 1 Throughout the remainder of this work I shall substitute the name Lord Cromer for Sir Evelyn Baring, as the former name is now more familiar to the public. M 162 THE LAND OP THE PHARAOHS requirements, he continued to fall back on Abu Klea, thereby nullifying Lord Wolseley's original plan with regard to the taking of Berber. General Earle had left Berti, and finding the enemy in force at Jebel Kerbekan, he routed them with heavy loss and was himself killed ; and General (Colonel) Brackenbury, who assumed command of the river column, was ordered to withdraw his force to Merowi, as the desert column was in retreat. Preparations were being made for the construction of a light railway from Suakin to Berber, the work- men advancing day by day under the protection of the troops, and completed the work as they went along. General Graham, who was in chief command of the Suakin district with a force of 13,000 men — British, Indian, and Australian troops — was trying to " destroy the power of Osman Digna," who, having received a considerable acquisition to his force, was opposing the British advance into the surrounding country. The Dervishes were driven out of HasUm ; but Sic John McNeill, who was engaged in estabhshing a post between Suakin and Tamai, with a view to moving on the latter place, where Osman Digna was encamped with 7000 men, was surprised by the Dervishes, who rushed from the surrounding brushwood, and fought their way into the half-formed stockade, kilUng and wounding 283 officers and men. They were driven off with a loss of 1500 killed, which caused Osman Digna to evacuate Tamai. This place was subsequently occupied by Sir Gerald Graham on 3 April. Orders were issued from London to " hold Suakin for the present " ; the railway plant was reloaded on the transport, and the troops, originally intended for Egypt, were dispatched for India, where the Indian frontier was ENGLAND IN THE SOUDAN 163 giving English statesmen new cause for anxiety. The other troops not required in India were dis- patched to England. Suakin was now defended on the land side by a series of field works ; and, although subjected to Dervish night attacks, was not seriously attacked by them until very nearly the close of the year. Owing to the heat at and about Dongola, which afiected the health of the troops stationed there, orders were issued at the end of May that the army should withdraw within the frontier of Upper Egypt. The capture of Khartoum, which was regarded throughout England as a severe blow to British pohcy in the East, proved to be a rather barren victory for the Mahdi. His followers, who had en- dured hardships and faced dangers during the siege, in anticipation of the rich booty which they would obtain on taking the city, were grievously disappointed. Farag Pasha himself, who had deserted to the Mahdi, was butchered by the Dervishes because he was un- able to indicate the position of a supposed buried treasure ; and great dissatisfaction prevailed among the besiegers, which was aggravated by the accounts of the fighting received by them from the survivors of the conflicts at Abu Klea and Gubal. These influences contributed in no small measure to lessen the Mahdi's already waning popularity, resulting in the daily defection of his troops. The appearance of a rival prophet in Kordofan increased his difficulties and filled the cup of his bitterness ; for, in order to maintain his title, he was compelled to send a large force of those who remained faithful against his rival in Kordofan. He was consequently forced by a com- bination of unforeseen circumstances to abandon his intended invasion of Egypt until some more con- 164 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS venient period. This made the evacuation of Dongola comparatively easy, and it was therefore decided by the British Government to fix the Egyptian frontier at Wadi Haifa and Assouan. The Gladstonian Government ^ having been succeeded by the Ministry of Lord Salisbury, on 24 June, 1885, Lord Wolseley urged the new Government to adopt an ofiensive policy. The new Government, however, decided to adhere to the decision of their predecessors, and con- tinue to retreat. " On 5 July the British troops evacuated Dongola. The Mahdi died suddenly on 20 June, which was a great blow to his followers, damping their enthusiasm and alienating a large number from the Calipha AbduUa-el-Taashi, his successor, who, nevertheless, boldly attempted to carry out his predecessor's in- tention of invading Egypt. He did not make an aggressive movement until 30 December, 1885, when a mixed British and Egyptian force, commanded by Sir Frederick Stephenson, met and defeated the Dervishes at Ginniss, between Wadi Haifa and Dongola. The British and Egyptian loss was 41 killed and wounded ; the Dervish loss being 800 killed and woimded. This defeat of the Dervishes was not only a severe blow to the Cahpha, but put to rest all apprehension of a serious Dervish invasion of Egypt ; and the action at Ginniss completed for a time British intervention in the Soudan. Early in April, 1886, the British and Egyptian forces were concentrated at Wadi Haifa. That place being left ^ Lord Cromer, who was " connected ... by general sympathy with a Liberal Government, and by ties of longstanding friendship and relationship with some members of Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet " (" Modern Egypt", Vol. II, p. 368), was at this time "pursuing a phantom", for the vacillation of the Government, etc. etc., were "simply heart- breaking " Gladstone, on his retirement, conferred a peerage on the great financier, Sir Nathaniel de KothschUd. ENGLAND IN THE SOUDAN 165 in charge of Egyptian troops, the British force re- tired to Assouan on 7 May of the same year. Thus, from August, 1884, to December 30, 1885, a British force was wandering up and down the Soudan " smashing the Dervishes " with great slaughter. Not, however, for the recovery of the Soudan to the Khedive, and restoring order and good government in his dominions, but as an act of revenge for the deaths of General Gordon and Colonel Stewart ; an action which Lord Wolseley declared to be " most befitting our (EngUsh) national dignity and honour ", and the only pohcy " worthy of the EngUsh nation ". Now that England had temporarily retired from the Soudan leaving Ismail's huge African Empire to its fate, the hungry European land-grabbers were let loose to stake out their African claims. On 29 May, 1884, Lord Granville instructed Lord Dufierin to inform the Porte that " with regard to the coast eastward of Zeyla, it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government, on the withdrawal of the Egyptians, to make such arrangements as they might think desirable for the preservation of order and the security of British interests, especially at Berbera, from which Aden drew its chief supplies ". The Porte remonstrated, but in October, 1884, a British oflS.cial was appointed to administer Berbera ; sepoys and poKce were placed at the disposal of the British administrator, and in the following year Lord Lyons was instructed to notify the French Government that Berbera and the neighbouring port of Bulbar were protectorally absorbed into the dominions of Her Britannic Majesty.^ 1 " The occupation of the Port of Berbera " (Somaliland), wrote Sir Eichard Burton in 1 856, " has been advised for many reasons. In the first place, Berbera is the true key to the Eed Sea, the centre of East African traffic, and the only place for shipping upon the western 166 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS I^There was also Zeyla, a recognised portion of the Ottoman dominions on the Ked Sea, regarding which, on 1 August, 1884, Lord Dufferin was instructed to " inform the Porte that unless the Turkish Govern- ment " — which had been previously notified to the same effect in May and July respectively, 1884 — " were prepared to take immediate steps for the occupation of Zeyla, it would be necessary for Her Majesty's Government to send a force to f reserve order} " On 24 August, 1884, Major Hunter briefly telegraphed Lord Cromer : " Force landed at Zeyla. Somalis impressed. Governor obHging ". " It is now British territory," Lord Cromer laconically declares.^ France, in the meanwhile, was not idle, and just by way of taking a hand at the game which England was playing with such conspicuous success, in May, 1884, she sent a ship to Richal, a port near Tarjourrah. Ten French sailors, with the Vizier of Tarjourrah, their prisoner, landed and coolly informed the local Sheykhs who ruled the province that the place be- longed to the French and that they would return to take possession ! No official at Cairo knew anything about France's action, not even the French repre- sentative. The Sultan protested. But Tarjourrah still flies the tricolour. It will be remembered that, in the second chapter of this work, I stated the fact that Ismail Pasha had caused £37,000 a year to be added to the tribute in Erythraean shore from Suez to Guardafui. Backed by lands capable of cultivation, and by hills covered with pines and other valuable trees, enjoying a comparatively temperate climate, with a regular, although tiiin, moonsoon, this harbour has been coveted by many a foreign conqueror. Circumstances have thrown it, as it were, into our arms, and, it' we refuse the chance, another and a rival nation will not be so blind ". Burton, " First Footsteps in East Africa ", p. xxxiv. ' The reader will observe the lack of originality in regard to British official documents when annexing territory. 'Modern Egypt", Vol. II, p. 54. 2 (( 7 ENGLAND IN THE SOUDAN 167 order to acquire Suakin and Massowah. The Italian Government, having enviously observed the ac- quisitive tendencies of France and England regarding the Sultan's and Khedive's territory on the African littoral of the Ked Sea, now bestirred itself. It approached the British Government with a view to ascertaining its feeling in the matter of the Itahans obtaining a strip of free African territory ; and found Lord Granville in a friendly and benevolent condition of mind, in which " he was able to inform him (M. Mancini, Minister for Foreign Affairs) that Her Majesty's Government, for their part, had no ob- jection to raise against the Italian occupation of Zulla, Beilul, or Massowah ". Some Itahan travellers having been opportunely murdered in the neigh- bourhood of Massowah, a plausible occupation excuse was found ready to hand. A squadron both for- midable and strong therefore bore down upon Masso- wah early in February, 1885, and seized the pro- vince ; and notwithstanding the indignation of the Sultan, and his angry protests in the Chancelleries of those Powers who had guaranteed the integrity of his dominions, the flag of Italy still waves bravely over the battlements of Massowah ! The news of the annihilation of General Hicks's army reached Em in Pasha ^ early in 1884, in the province of Equatoria. His position became difficult, inas- much as " the magazines were quite empty of clothes, soap, coffee, and other necessaries ". " In Lado", he said, " there was a rabble of drunkards and gamblers, most of them fellow-countrymen of the 1 Emin Pasha (Edward Schnitzler, a native of Pruasian Silesia) was appointed by General Gordon in 1879 to be Governor of the province of Equatoria, which was created for Ismail by Sir Samuel White Baker. Kebellion and mutiny made his position precarious until Stanley cut his way through the dense forests of Central Africa to rescue him. See Stanley's " In Darkest Africa." 168 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS rebels, the clerks of his divan. The prospect was not brilliant ". Shortly after the Hicks disaster Karam- AUah summoned him to surrender, but notwith- standing his difficult position he did not submit, but held on until rescued by Stanley. Equatoria, known now as Lado Enclave, was leased to Leopold II as sovereign of the Independent State of the Congo, by an agreement signed at Brussels, 12 May, 1894, and was the subsequent cause of considerable friction between England and Leopold.^ In the latter part of 1883, England having adopted the pohcy of forcing the Khedivial evacuation of the Soudan, and being on friendly terms with King John of Abyssinia, the British Government decided to solicit his assistance in order to facilitate the retreat of the garrisons from the Egyptian posts adjoining the frontier of his kingdom. Admiral Sir William Hewitt was therefore entrusted with a mission to King John on behalf of the British Government, Mason Bey, an American officer in the Egyptian service, accompanying him to act on behalf of the Egyptian Government, as the American was well acquainted with afiairs in the Soudan. As a result of their combined efforts a treaty was signed at Adowa on 3 June, 1884 ; in which it was set forth that the province of Bogos, on which the King had set longing eyes, was to be ceded to him, and that in return he was to aid in the withdrawal of the frontier garrisons, permitting them to retreat through Abys- sinian territory. In the spring of 1885 the Egyptian garrisons of Amadib and Senhit, with the aid of the Abyssinians, were safely brought to Massowah ; and during September a large army, composed of friendly Arabs 1 Vide "Egypt', No. 1, 1906; "Egypt", No. 1, 1907. ENGLAND IN THE SOUDAN 169 and Abyssiriians, under the command of tlie Abys- sinian general, Eas Alula, advanced against the Arab tribe of the Hadendowas, under the command of Osman Digna. An engagement took place at Kafeil ; but although strongly entrenched, Osman Digna's force was defeated with great slaughter. Galabat, a most important garrison, was besieged by Dervishes. Colonel Chermside, Governor-General of the Red Sea httoral, dispatched Said Eifaat to Abyssinia for assistance. In January, 1885, Major Said Eifaat left Adowa with a large force of Abys- sinians, attacked and defeated the enemy, and brought the garrison and population of Galabat, to the number of 3000 men, women, and children, to Massowah in safety. The Abyssinians also extricated the garrison of Gera from a hke position; the King subsequently clothing and feeding the soldiers and population, numbering about 5000 souls, who were afterwards brought down to Massowah and dispatched to Cairo. In accordance with the terms of the treaty, the province of Bogos was handed over to King John, who was the only Christian Power to earn any por- tion of the Ismaihan Empire, treating the Egyptians with a fraternal sympathy which was denied them by even the " ally " who had helped to involve them in a sea of troubles. The Abyssinians, however, are African natives, and but half-civiUsed. Where on earth did they acquire these humanitarian qualities with which the European alone is supposed to be endowed ? It wiU therefore be observed that England, amder the pretext of " restoring order and good govern- ment in the Khedive's dominions ", not only forcibly 170 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS " advised " that weak ruler to abandon valuable territory which was not his to abandon, it being that of his overlord, the Sultan of Turkey ; but also, with the assistance of other Powers, divided that territory between them, eventually acquiring the hon's share for herself by the " re-conquest " of the Soudan, which in order to advance her own commercial inter- ests, Cromer, Kitchener and company, considered to be a " State necessity ". It is remarkable that what was considered a State necessity in 1898-9, was not so considered by the very administrator who had so strenuously insisted on evacuation in 1883. In December, 1888, the Dervishes were defeated before Suakin, with the object of reUeving the pres- sure brought to bear by them on that place, owing to their frequent incursions into the district, and the utter extermination of any natives who dared wander beyond the fortifications. The defeat of Nejumi's ^ force at Toski on 3 August, 1889, broke the aggressive power of the Dervishes, thereby restoring tranquilhty to the Nile Valley ; and on 19 February, 1891, Osman Digna, having suffered a severe reverse with great loss near Tokar, permitted the re-occupation of that province, thus adding ^ Wad-el- Nejumi was in early life a Fiki, like the Malidi. A thin, dark man, stern, hard, and ascetic. He planned the Hicks extermi- nation, and it was he who crept silently into Khartoum to the confusion of General Gordon. He was the incarnation of an uncompromising Mahdi-Mohammedanism, leading the Mahdist to death and "paradise " after the Mahdi had passed away. This brave man was killed at Toski by a force under Sir Francis Grenfell. On the morning of that battle he said to his followers, "We must all stand prepared to meet our Maker to-day." In the summer of 1903 another Mahdi, in the person of Mohamed- el-Amin, a Tunisian, forty years of age, of great intelligence and remarkable energy, who had previously made two pilgrimages to Mecca, established himself at El-Obeid. He took the original Mahdi for his model, and proceeding to the Taggalla mountains to consolidate his strength, was followed by Colonel Mahon, Deputy-Governor of the Soudan, who by forced marches surprised the new prophet, captured and brought him back to El-Obeid, and hung him out of hand. ENGLAND IN THE SOUDAN 171 tranquillity to the greater portion of the Eastern Soudan. Khartoum fell to Lord Kitchener on 2 September, 1898, owing to his success at Omdurman ; ^ and Sir Eeginald Wingate's victory of 24 November, 1899, near Kordofan, over the Calipha, with the death of that leader and his principal Emirs during a fiercely contested battle, completed the " re-conquest " of the Soudan. And at what a cost ! To safeguard a country which the British " advised " the Khedive to abandon as being " a useless expense and encum- brance upon the finances of Egypt ", bridges were built, barracks erected, also dwellings for Soudan officials. This country has been " re-conquered " by Egyptian troops with Egyptian money, and turned into a British colony, under the farcically euphemistic title of the " Anglo-Egyptian Soudan ", in order to develop it, not only as a market for British goods, but as a fruitful source of cotton supply, at an ad- mitted cost of £4,200,000 to the Egyptian Treasury during the ten years ending 1908. These figures the Legislative Council absolutely repudiated as in- accurate, Yehia Pasha estimating the expenditure of the Soudan at £18,700,000 ! ^ ^ To be correct, the battle was fougbt at Kerreri. 2 Vide " Egyptian Gazette ", 30 November, 1909, in which a speech by Yehia Pasha appears on this subject. CHAPTER XV THE WOLFF MISSION rriHREE years of English bureaucratic muddle J- and jfinancial juggling in Egypt at length brought matters to a standstill. We find Lord Cromer writing to the British Ministry early in 1885 to the effect that " intrigues of all descriptions were rife ; the suffering caused by the non-payment of the Alexandria indemnities was very great ; trade was slack ; and commercial transactions, as far as they were based upon credit, were almost at a stand- still "? In the previous year, it will be remembered that Lord Northbrook had been appointed as Special Commissioner to Egypt, that he might extricate the British Government from the financial dilemma in which their administrative pohcy in Egypt had landed that country : Egypt was on the verge of bankruptcy. Lord Northbrook was to " report and advise Her Majesty's Government 6n the present situation of affairs in Egypt, and as to the measures which should be taken in connection with them ", especially with regard to " present exigencies of Egyptian finance ". On the face of it the idea of this Conamission was extremely absurd. Lord Dufferin had, during the previous year, compiled a most ex- 1 Compare "Egypt", No. 1-4 (1885). They will be found very enlightening. 172 THE WOLFF MISSION 173 haustive Report on the condition of Egypt, Subse- quently a committee of experts sitting in London had produced a detailed Report of the financial situation ; which Report the International Conference had thoroughly discussed — and sat upon. Lord North- brook had been Viceroy of India, and was considered both a good administrator and a friend of Lord Cromer's,^ but there was really nothing that he could do except report and advise ; and Egypt had been reported upon, and advised upon, and commissioned upon, until at length her " Advisers ", " Reporters ", and " Commissioners " had landed her a financial wreck upon the rocks of bankruptcy.^ Lord North- brook arrived in Egypt 9 September, 1884 ; and he presented his Reports (there were two of them !) on 20 November, 1884. They included the pro- vision of an improved and extended system of irrigation ; the abolition of the corvSe ; the abolition of the Dual Administration of the Daira Domains, and railways ; greater powers on the part of the Egyptian Government of imposing taxes on Euro- peans ; a reduction both of the land tax and of the taxes on the export transit of produce ; and the issue of a loan for about £9,000,000, the interest to be guaranteed by the British Government. He also recommended that the British garrison should con- 1 There is a rather amusing passage in Lord Cromer's work re- garding Lord Northbrook's appointment. " The relationship ", he says, " between Lord Northbrook and myself, and the mutual esteem and affection which we entertained for each other, were of themselves sufBcient guarantee that we would work cordially together. It was, without doubt, the knowledge that the a/p'pointment would not he dis- pleasing to me which to some extent led Lord Oranville, . . . to nominate Lm-d Northbrook ". " Modern Egypt ", Vol. II, p. 367. 2 At two distinct periods during 1884 Sir Edgar Vincent confessed that the Egyptian Treasury was within £5000 of suspending payment. "Egypt", No. 17 (1885), pp. 51-2. 174 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS tinue to occupy the country. Like all previous Gladstonian Missions and Conferences on Egypt, it was buried after the fashion of Sir John Moore, " without a drum being heard or a funeral note". With regard to the loan of £9,000,000, the French Government suggested that it should be issued at the rate of 3| per cent under a collective guarantee of the Powers, the amount required for the service of the debt being at the same time made a first charge on the Egyptian revenue. The proposal to tax foreigners, equally with natives, was assented to ; but objection was made to the British proposals for a re-administration of the Daira,^ and Domains Lands, and the merging of the Domain Loan in the Privilege Debt, and the Daira Loan in the Unified Stocks. France, meanwhile, had busied herself with winning over Germany, Austria, and Russia to her views, which embodied a counter-proposal. It was found that the Egyptian revenues were sufficient to cover the normal expenditure, but the appointment of a Commission was requested by France to examine the subject. Lord Granville, who had no desire to be thrown out of Egypt by the Powers, whilst de- clining to consent to the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry, suggesting that the new arrangements should have two years' trial before anything of the kind was attempted, accepted an international guarantee for the new loan, and relinquished his proposal as to the Daira and Domains Lands and Loans. The counter-proposal was accepted by the French and other Governments on 28 January, 1885, and after a little wrangHng a Convention was signed in London, 18 March, by the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, ' Vide p. 190 and on. THE WOLFF MISSION 175 Italy, Russia, and Turkey, settling the terms of the loan, with the exception of the price of issue. Lord Salisbury, who, while in Opposition, did not have a policy of his own regarding Egypt, on his accession at once adopted the policy of his prede- cessors, which he had been wont to criticise most severely. Having first adopted Lord Granville's policy of retreat in the Soudan, he now decided to further follow the policy of the worthless Gladstonian Government by appointing a Special Commissioner in the person of Sir Henry Drummond Wolfi. When making his general examination of Egyptian affairs, he was to invite the co-operation of the Sultan in the settlement of the Egyptian Question, with the rather belated opinion that it was " in His Majesty's power to contribute materially to the establishment of settled order and good government " (!) in the Soudan. Province after province had been lopped off the Soudanese dominions of both Sultan and Khedive — notwith- standing the protests of the former ; and now that the Arabs, who, in the language of Mr. Gladstone, were " rightly struggling for their freedom ", had retaken possession of their lands and freedom ; and such choice bits of land on the Red Sea httoral as were worth taking had been added to the dominions of England and France and Italy, a British statesman was requested to invite " His Majesty to contribute to settled order and good government " ! What superlative effrontery ! ' Sir H. Drummond Wolfi arrived in Constantinople on 22 August, 1885 ; but it was not until 24 October that the Convention was signed with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Afiairs. This delay was caused not only by the intricacies of the negotiations, but on account of the very natural suspicion in the mind 176 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS of the Sultan, who had doubtless learned ere this to " beware of the Greeks when they bring presents " ; for was it not Lord Salisbury who helped at the spolia- tion of Tunis ? " The conclusion of any arrange- ment ", said Sir H. Drununond Wolff, in his Report dated 24 October, " of any kind has done much to allay the irritation that has existed for some time in the minds of the Turks towards England. ... It must doubtless have been very difficult ", he con- tinued, " for an Enghsh gentleman, however able and conciliatory, to come to terms with races who had suffered so severely at our hands ". P^Sir H. Drummond Wolff arrived in Cairo 29 Octo- ber ; but although the Convention had been signed, the Sultan was still smarting under the burden of recent wrongs ; and the dispatch of Ghazi Moukhtar Pasha, the Turkish Commissioner, was delayed until 27 December, on which date he arrived in Cairo. It required eighteen months of discussion and negotia- tion before the Convention was finally signed at Constantinople on 22 May, 1887, between the two Turkish Plenipotentiaries on behalf of the Sultan, and Sir H. Drummond Wolff on behalf of England. I^Now, inasmuch as the Mahdi considered himself to be " conducted in the right path ", and also to be the true representative of the Prophet, it was not at all likely that either he or his followers would be brought to accept the Sultan of Turkey as their spiritual head. When, therefore, the British Government, which was well informed, instructed Sir Henry Drummond Wolff to indicate that it was " in His Majesty's power to contribute materially to the estabhshment of settled order and good government in the Soudan ", it is greatly to be feared that, to use a vulgarism. Lord Salisbury was only " pulling the Imperial leg " THE WOLFF MISSION 177 of His Sublime Majesty ; besides, the MaMi and his supporters classified both Turks and Europeans as infidels, who were to be swept into the sea. In addition to this the Sultan was absolutely powerless to " restore order " unless he were permitted to land troops ; and neither the Enghsh Government, which was in possession, nor the French, who were en- viously awaiting an opportunity to get a foothold in the country, were prepared to permit Turkey to assume the merest shadow of authority in Egj^t. The true explanation of the so-called " usual Turkish diplomatic delays " may be found in the fact that the Sultan well knew from previous experience, bought in the rather expensive markets of European diplomacy, that whenever the Christian Powers approached him in a " friendly " spirit, he was assured of being the poorer for their visit : they never bade him good-bye after a " friendly visit " without taking a souvenir of some kind by way of remembrance. There is a mass of oflficial documentary evidence extant which conclusively proves that there was no honest intention on the part of the British Govern- ment to evacuate Egypt, Lord Cromer was riding his famous " race against bankruptcy " : in the in- terests of the English bondholders he decided to discard some of his weight, and there was no means of doing so without diverting the attention of the Powers to some more exciting object. As regards Egjrptian affairs, Turkey had been practically ignored by England for three years. The British Government was in a fix, France had called upon it to " obtain some explanation concerning the pacification and future government of Egypt ".^ ' Vide p. 159. 178 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS A Conference had been convened in London, but no satisfactory results had been arrived at. Lord North- brook's recommendations were not in accord with French desires. There was nothing for it now but Turkish intervention. Turn out the lights ! Produce the bogey ! Then the attention of all Europe will forthwith be turned from the " race against bank- ruptcy " to watch the new antics of the old bogey ! Truly Lord Salisbury was taught political stage- management under a clever craftsman. It will be remembered that early in the year 1885, Lord Cromer had said that " suffering was great . . . and commercial transactions based upon credit were almost at a standstill ". He further records in his work on Egypt, that " wp to 1888, either a deficit was annually incurred or else financial equilibrium was preserved with the utmost difficulty "^ At the end of 1886 he reports that great progress had been made in the financial administration, but he adds, " The work, however, is only begun, its continuance is dependent on the predominant influence of the British Government being preserved ; this influence being for the time dependent on the presence of a British force in Egypt. Undue haste in withdrawal would undo everything that has been done.^ Taking into consideration the difficult preserva- tion of the financial equilibrium which was main- tained until 1888, and the " great suffering " and commercial stagnation during the early part of 1885, and the sudden prosperity of Egypt at the end of 1886, when the " undue haste in withdrawal (of the British troops) would undo everything that has been done ", and taking these in their true order and 1 Cromer's "Modern Egypt", Vol. II, p. 449. 2 "Egypt", No. 11 (1887), p. 7. THE WOLFF MISSION 179 at their true value, it will be discovered that either the Report of 1886 lied, or this was a carefully laid plan to make the Wolff Mission ineffective. During the early part of 1886 Moukhtar Pasha expressed a very natural anxiety for information as to the nature of the reforms the British Commissioner wished to introduce. The English Envoy expressed his satisfaction with the internal administration of the country, the Soudan excepted ; he there thought initiative action should be left to the Turkish and Egyptian Governments. In due course the Turkish Commissioner submitted a scheme for the reorganisa- tion of the Egjrptian Army, according to which he proposed to raise the numbers from 8000 to 16,800 men, in addition to 6700 gendarmerie and police. He also proposed that the increased expenditure be met by a reduction in pay ; and indicated certain economies, which included the substitution of Turkish officers for English in the Egyptian Army, and the reUnquishment on the part of England of the sum of £200,000, .charged to the Egyptian revenue, as a contribution towards the maintenance of the army of Occupation. The army was to find its counterpart in Turkey, and it was to be utilised for the recovery of a part at least of the Soudan. These proposals, on being submitted to the British Government, were rejected on the grounds that (1) The suggested re-conquest of the Soudan or any portion of it was a course entirely opposed to the policy of Great Britain ; (2) that the number of men proposed was far in excess of the requirements of the country ; (3) that it was absolutely necessary for the maintenance of order that British officers should be associated Avith the Egyptian troops ; and (4) that the Egyptian contribution to the expenses 180 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS of the army of Occupation could not be abandoned. The Turkish Envoy, on being requested to modify his proposals, apphed to the Porte for instructions. Then a diplomatic skirmish began, which all the parties concerned knew in advance would end in smoke. However, England, in order to save her face, during January, 1887, caused the army of occupation to he reduced, by the departure of one regiment to India, and two batteries of artillery to England. In the following month Sir Henry Drummond Wolfi went to Constantinople and submitted the following proposals to the Ministers of the Sultan : (1) That the autonomy of Egypt should be acknowledged while the sovereignty of the Sultan remained unimpaired ; (2) that the capitulations should be so far modified as to put an end to the mischievous privilege hitherto enjoyed by foreigners in Egypt of being judged by their own Consuls ; ^ (3) that Egyptian territory should be neutrahsed under the guarantee of the Powers, and that the guaranteeing Powers should retain the right of transporting troops through Egyptian territory either by land or by the Canal ; (4) that England should exercise the right of appoint- ing the majority of the officers in the Egyptian Army, and should further retain the right of re-occupying the country in case necessity arose ; (5) and that the English Army should evacuate the country when all the European Powers had given their consent to the terms of the Convention. It must be admitted that the first glance at this cleverly drawn Convention would lead the super- ficial observer to conclude that inasmuch as England ^ Rather quaint that England should not be included amongst the foreigners ! THE WOLFF MISSION 181 had a stake in Egypt, chiefly because of those Suez Canal shares and the habihties to the Rothschilds and other " EngHsh " bondholders, and the fact that she was now in possession of Egypt, where she was endeavouring to adjust the affairs of the country according to her ideas of order and good government, that she could not view the prospect of evacuation with equanimity, unless she might be permitted to intervene and re-occupy the country should " neces- sity arise ". Experience had, however, proved that it was no difl&cult matter to create a diplomatic necessity. She had already done so when she illegally bombarded Alexandria and landed a force at Is- maiHa. It was well known iu European Chancelleries that neither France nor Russia would consent to the terms of the Convention ; it therefore followed that, because the Enghsh Army of occupation would not evacuate Egypt imtil " all the European Powers had given their consent to the terms of the Conven- tion ", there was every prospect of the EngKsh re- maining for ever in Eg3rpt when once the Sultan had ratified that rather elusive document.^ The Sultan therefore wisely protested that no time had been fixed for the evacuation, and that it would be necessary that a definite time be stated. There was more diplomatic fencing, and Sir H. Drummond Wolff at length gave way, setting the period at three years after the signing of the Convention. There was also considerable bitterness regarding Clause 4. The Sultan observed that any European Power could first occupy provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and ^ I would not have it understood that Sir H. Drummond Wolff knew in advance that his appointment was a farce. I believe his personal efforts to have been quite honourable, but the subsequent behaviour of England proves that there was no genuine desire to leave Egypt. 182 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS then negotiate for a Convention which would give the occupying Power the right of re-entry. France not only upheld the Sultan's contention, but also declared that Clause 4 made England at once co- sovereign of Egypt, sanctioning her domination in that country for ever.^ Any opposition to her will could be made to appear " internal unrest ", bringing back re-occupation " to restore order " ; which sub- sequent re-entry would be permanent — its very necessity proving the vaUdity of its claim to remain in a country which proved itself unable to stand alone. " The title deeds of all pohtical authority are elastic ", and they are made to stretch most in- fernally by Empire-lusting poKticians. Both France and Russia persuaded the Sultan to withhold his signature, the French Ambassador making all kinds of visionary promises on behalf of his Government. The Sultan was undoubtedly overwhelmed by this sudden burst of solicitude on the part of France, who had not hesitated to take Tunis and that other strip of the Red Sea littoral ; but he wisely held his peace, and as the rogues had fallen out, he hoped in time to come by his right. He therefore refused to sign, and Sir Henry Drummond Wolff returned to London, as other Special Commissioners before him had done, without accomplishing anything. It was without doubt very disappointing to the British Government to have this pet scheme bowled over ; but I question whether they really wanted anything to happen. I was in London at the time ; and the general opinion prevalent amongst those capable of venturing an opinion was, that nothing I Vide "Egypt", No. U (1887), p. 7 ; Ibid. No. 7, p. 5 ; Ibid. No. 8, p. 5. THE WOLFF MISSION 183 would come of the Convention ; and these views were amply borne out by the editorial expressions of con- temporary newspapers. The only visible thing that the Commission accom- pHshed was to soften native bitterness against the EngUsh ; for the presence of the Turkish Commis- sioner with the Englishman, both trying to adjust the afiairs of Egypt on terms of friendliness, did much in the way of healing old sores. On the other hand, Lord Cromer, in his celebrated " race against bankruptcy ", under cover of the Mission was granted the desired opportunity to throw away a bit of his weight ; and the British Government salved its hypocritical conscience with the reflection that it had used every reasonable means to come to an understanding with Tiirkey over the vexed Egyptian Question, and now that Turkey had declined to negotiate there was no more to be said. England would perform her self-imposed task honour- ably, come what may ! And she would remain in Egypt. Henceforth there would be no more talk of leaving. The task before her was too great to be lightly set aside. It would be costly, and it would be necessary to bring enlightened and highly civiKsed Englishmen to carry on the good work — but hang the expense ! Egypt is " the land of paradox ". The peasantry might starve — they were accustomed to that ill-bred, " barbarous " style of living — but they would pay up. Good men must be had for the work, and Egypt must understand that good men are expensive. She paid high salaries to foreigners in Ismail's time. It is now the turn of the English- man. Egypt pays the piper, but henceforth England calls the tune. CHAPTER XVI "THOENS AND THISTLES OF DIPLOMACY" HAVING attempted a general outline of British policy in Egypt, it is now necessary to take a general browse along the highways and byways of Internationalism and legislation by Diplomacy in Egypt, digesting such thorns or thistles as may be found in our pathway. Lord Granville, as stated in a previous chapter, declared in his circular to the Powers, immediately after the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir, that " freedom of navigation " should be granted to all European Powers through the Suez Canal ; and in Article V of the Wolff Convention, the great Powers " were to be invited to sign an Act, recognising and guaran- teeing the inviolabihty of Egyptian territory ", which was in direct contradiction to Lord Granville's pro- nouncement in 1882. The Powers, however, had never lost sight of the Suez Canal clause in Lord Granville's Circular, and it came up for discussion once more in 1885, when a Commission was appointed to prepare a treaty for guaranteeing the free use of the Sue^ Canal by all Powers at all times. The negotiations having ended without result, the matter was left unsettled for two years. After the failure of Sir Henry Drummond's negotiation at Constanti- nople, M. Flourens, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, issued a Circular to the French representa- 184 "THORNS AND THISTLES" 185 tives at the Courts of the Powers, couched in con- ciliatory language, in which it was intended to show that French action with regard to the Anglo-Turkish Convention had not been dictated by maUce, but in the consciousness of the high duties which she owed to herself and to Europe at large. Lord Salisbury accepted France's Circular as indicative of the French Minister's desire to faciUtate political co-operation between the two countries, and expressed a desire to bring to a close, under favourable conditions, the British occupation of the Valley of the Nile. It therefore followed that on 24 October, 1887, two Conventions were signed at Paris, providing for an arrangement between the two countries on all the points at issue. The one relating to the Suez Canal may be briefly summarised as follows : The two signatory Powers agreed to guarantee, and to invite the co-operation of the other Powers in securing the neutraUsation of the Canal, which was to remain at all times free to the ships of every nation. Even in war-time the freedom of the Canal as a waterway was to be recognised ; but in time of war the belligerent parties were forbidden to embark or disembark in the Canal and its " ports of access " troops, or munitions, or war material. The duty of superin- tending the execution of the treaty was to belong to the representatives in Egypt of the two signatory Powers, who were to meet at least once a year, and oftener should circumstances necessitate such meet- ing, and to represent to the Government of the Khe- dive the measures they deemed advisable and necessary for the preservation of the freedom of the Canal. The obligation of carrying out the necessary measures was, however, to rest primarily with the Government of the Khedive ; and in the event of 186 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS the Egjrptian Government finding itself unable, with the means at its disposal, to adequately secure the freedom of the Canal, the matter was to be referred to the Porte, who would arrange with the Powers the proper means of responding to the appeal. This Con- vention, which was subject to the consent of the Powers, was finally signed, after the usual inordinately lengthy negotiations, on 29 April, 1888.^ The British Government, however, stipulated that the Convention was not to come into force as long as the British Occupation lasted. On 8 April, 1904, the Anglo-French Agreement was signed, and the British Government at once put the Suez Canal Con- vention of 29 April, 1888, into force. The clauses providing for an International Board at Cairo to watch over the execution of the Convention were, however, omitted. Now, the Anglo-French Agreement, for which England had striven for twenty years, was destined to have far-reaching consequences in the way of re- tarding Egyptian autonomy. For, as Lord Cromer says, " Frenchmen gradually recognised two facts. One was that the British occupation of Egypt was beneficial rather than hurtful to the material in- terests of France, whilst general French political interests sufiered from the prolonged estrangement of the two countries which was caused by the Egyp- tian Question. The other was that unless the evacua- tion of Egypt was to be made a casus belli with England, the British view of the facts had to be accepted".^ The late King Edward VII and the President of the French Republic having exchanged visits in 1904, 1 "Egypt", No. 2(1889). ■^ "Modem Egypt", Vol. II, p. 389. "THORNS AND THISTLES" 187 there can be little doubt that the International Peacemaker brought the French President to see that " general French pohtical interests were suffer- ing from a prolonged estrangement of the two countries ". Besides, the affairs of Morocco, which were looming large upon the political horizon about this time, and which were considered by the Powers to require the services of a European doctor, was a prospect not only after France's own heart, but one which she had looked forward to for a fair tale of years. There were three nations who could claim the " right " to perform a surgical operation on Morocco — England, France, or Spain. England already possessed a rather large handful of African responsibihties. Spain was hardly convalescent ; in fact, having herself but recently undergone a surgical operation, she was still busy nursing wounds inflicted upon her by a none too tender American surgeon, and therefore had no time to operate upon others. To France, therefore, fell the duty of attend- ing to the African patient, and to this end England's kindly offices were required. Hence Britain, with the most cordial intentions, supported French ag- gression in Morocco, whilst France granted England a free hand in Egypt, in which the British Govern- ment acquired financial liberty in the Nile Valley, recognising the Suez Canal Convention of 1888. The French and English Governments respectively made the following important Declarations on 8 April, 1904: " The Government of the French EepubUc, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Greai Britain in that, country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other matter." " Bis Britannic Majesty's Government 188 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS decla/re that they have no intention of altering the politi- cal status of Egypt ". Verily, " The title deeds of political authority are elastic ". There is no getting away from the fact that the French Declaration, by giving England a free hand, while it set back autonomy and made the occupying army a permanent institution,^ also made for the clearance of international abuses and inept adminis- tration. For instance, the Conunission of the Public Debt originally consisted of an EngUshman, a Frenchman, an Austrian, and an Italian ; a German and Russian were added in 1885. Until 1904 the ofl&cials collecting the revenues, pledged to the service of the debt, were both to hand over all collected monies to the Commissioners, and to furnish the necessary information which would guarantee the effectiveness of the financial control. Their consent was necessary to the negotiation of a loan ; and the Commissioners, being the legal representatives of the bondholders, were empowered to sue the Egyptian Grovernment in the mixed courts in the event of any infringement of the Law of Liquidation. The Decrees of 1876 apportioned and pledged cer- tain revenues to the service of the Debt ; the other revenues being left to the Egyptian Government for administrative purposes. On 27 July, 1885, a Decree was promulgated on the issue of the Egyptian Loan of £9,000,000, which ^ The statement in the British Declaration, "His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt ", has more than one interpretation, for, as Lord Milner says, "The fulfilment of the professions made by a nation in the act of going to war is not, in common human practice, whatever ought to be the case in the ideal world, apt to be rigidly exacted of the same nation at the moment of victory." " England in Egypt", p. 26 (ed. 1904). "THORNS AND THISTLES" 189 was guaranteed by the Powers.^ " When this loan was contracted the distribution of the affected and the non-affected revenues had to be reconsidered. Care was taken to increase the relative amount of the former, so that the bondholders should not run any risk, with the result that the latter was relatively diminished. The administrative expenditure was fixed at a certain figure.^ If the non-affected revenues did not yield the sum at which the administrative expenditure was fixed, the deficit had to be made good from the affected revenues ".^ When this was accomphshed the surplus on the whole accoimt in the hands of the Commissioners was divided into two portions : one remained with the Commissioners, and the other was paid to the Egyptian Government. Therefore, to solve this international financial puzzle, the Egyptian Government, in order to spend £l in excess of the hmits prescribed by internationahsm, was forced to coUect £2, in order to meet its increased obhgations ; consequently, as the country progressed, and added to its administrative staff of expensive English " advisers " and other improved methods of civilisation, by the carefully planned system of 1885, the Government was compelled to pay double for everything that involved fresh expenditure. This administrative financial machine, evolved from the » "Egypt", No. 7 (1885), No. 17 (1885), p. 121 and on. 2 The administrative expenditure was permanently fixed at £5,237,000 ; this related to what was known as the non-assigned revenue, and the expenditure was fixed to avoid administrative abuses. 3 Cromer's "Modern Egypt", Vol. II, p. 307. "In 1892", says Lord Cromer, "the revenue of the Egyptian Government amounted to £E10,364,000, and the expenditure to £E9,595,000. It would be naturally supposed by any one not acquainted with the intricacies of Egyptian finance that a surplus remained at the disposal of the Government amounting to the difference between these two sums, namely £E769,000. . . . The real surplus in the hands of the Egyptian Treasury was only £E 179,000 "- Ibid. 190 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS superior civilisation of the West, cost the Egyptian Treasury £E40,000 per annum to maintain. In 1904 the Commissioners of the Debt became merely the receivers on behalf of the bondholders. Nego- tiation and diplomacy curtailed their administrative prerogatives. It is possible that the Commissioners may entirely disappear from the face of Egypt in 1912, should the Egyptian Grovernment decide to convert the whole of the Debt, which can be accomplished in that year. Under the Decree of 18 November, 1876, a Board was constituted to administer the railways, the telegraphs, and the Port of Alexandria. It was originally composed of two Enghshmen, two Egyp- tians, and a Frenchman, with one of the Englishmen as its President. The number was subsequently reduced to one only of each of the nationalities mentioned. Their respective Governments proposed the Euro- pean representatives, and the Board appointed its own administrative stafi. The Board proposed, and the Khedive nominated, the superior officials. Tariffs were arranged by the Board with the sanction of the Egyptian Government. The fimctions of these three individuals were un- defined, and their efforts quite irresponsible. Having no responsible head, the administration left much to be desired, internationalism having almost legis- lated the railways off the face of Egypt. In 1904 the Egyptian Government was at length allowed — by arrangement — to fully deal with the administration of its railways. Ismail Pasha owned huge estates in Egypt, to which allusion has already been made in these "THORNS AND THISTLES" 191 pages, of which the Daira formed the most consider- able part, extending as they did over an area of up- wards of half a million acres. Ismail's chronic impecuniosity necessitated his negotiating a loan of £9,500,000 on the security of these properties. These estates were administered by a Board of Directors, consisting of an Egyptian Director- General, who was the executive of3&cer, and two Controllers, English and French respectively, who, being the sole legally accredited representatives of the European bondholders, exercised the fullest possible powers of supervision. These estates, notwithstanding the supervision and inspection of the European Con- trollers, were so badly managed that they did not show a profit until 1891. ^ '■ The Daira Estates were sold to a Company in 1898, which spUt them into lots and re-sold them ; the Government share in the net profits of the liquida- tion being £E3,200,000. The Domains, ceded to the State by Ismail Pasha by Khedivial Decree, dated 29 October, 1878, were handed over to the Rothschilds in that year as security for a loan of £8,500,000. These properties were administered in a similar manner to the Daira estates, 2 a Comioission of three being also appointed : an Egyptian, a Frenchman, and an Enghshman, the two Europeans being selected by their respective Governments. The administration of the Domains found its 1 " Until the year 1891 tlie Daira expenditure was always in excess of the revenue. On several occasions the deficits exceeded £200,000, with the exception of the year 1895, when there was a deficit amount- ing to £102,000 ; the accounts of the year subsequent to 1890 showed a surplus. In the two years 1904-5 the revenue exceeded the expendi- ture by no less than £817,000 "- " Modern Egypt ", Vol. II, p. 314. 2 The Daira and Domain estates were considered the best lands in Egypt and were 1,000,000 acres in extent. 192 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS counterpart in the adnainistration of the Daira — in- competence and failure. The greater portion of these lands were also gradually sold, for the most part in lots, netting about £E 12,000, 000, and making a total of £15,200,000 netted for the two estates. Com- petent native authorities consider the sale of these lands as being unwarranted by the financial circum- stances : for instance, in the case of the Domains, after 1900 an annual surplus varying from £25,000 to £150,000 was always realised ; and in that of the Daira, after the year 1891 the surplus was very often as much as £400,000, but rarely less than £100,000. It is also contended that the value of the lands sold was really £El30,000,000 — almost twice the sum they realised — and that their sale deprived the Egyp- tian Government of an abundant source of perma- nent wealth. I cannot close this chapter without saying a few words with regard to the composition of those Inter- national Tribunals for whose establishment the great Nubar Pasha has been lauded by Europeans. Doubtless the original motives of Nubar Pasha regarding the establishment of these courts were patriotic ; but at the same time it is impossible to rid oneself of the conviction that this patriotism was not disinterested. It is, indeed, true that prior to their estabKshment the European was a law unto himself ; and as the class of adventurer who found Egypt a happy hunting-ground was not endowed with irreproachable morals, he was invariably aided — it is to be hoped unconsciously — by his diplomatic repre- sentative in the spoliation of either the State or the native. It will therefore be understood that an institution which would effectively curb such diplomatic abuses "THORNS AND THISTLES" 193 would be a blessing conferred upon Egypt. Unfortu- nately tbe sequel proves that in place of removing the CAdl, the Mixed Courts of Nubar Pasha systematised and legalised European injustice and spoliation. Even the State was subjected to its tyranny. Take, for in- stance, the action of the French and Russian Com- missioners of the Debt. At the time of the Dongola Expedition, in order to defray the cost of it, application was made by the Egyptian Government to the Commissioners of the Debt for a grant of £E500,000 from the General Revenue fund, which had been gradually accumu- lating for years. By a majority of four to two the request was granted. The French and Russian Com- missioners, being the unrelenting minority, at once took action in the Mixed Tribunal at Cairo, and obtained judgment against the Government. This small portion of the surplus, the property of the Egyptian Government, was to be returned to the Commissioners of the Debt, who were foreigners. The Government took the case to the Appeal Court — also mixed ; the judgment against the Government was sustained, and Egypt was forced to repay her own money to the Commissioners, for which purpose a loan of £800,000 was obtained from the British Treasury at an interest of 2f per cent.^ If the Government could fare so badly in a contest with the Mixed Tribunal, what chance had the native litigant against a European ? These tribunals are formed on a French model, with a procedure badly copied from the French Code, with judges who are not the mere interpreters of the law, but who make the law as they " process ", 1 Vide Cromer's "Modern Egypt", Vol. I, p. 86. 194 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS possessing little ability themselves, and no know- ledge whatever of the manners and customs of the people. This is the Judicial system for which Euro- peans would have Egyptians offer burnt offerings at the shrine of Nubar Pasha. ^ The Court of Appeal sits at Alexandria. There are also three Courts of First Instance, at Alexandria, Cairo, and Mansourah, respectively. Egyptian judges sit in these courts, and it is to be feared that that is the extent of their judicial utiUty. The European judges of all the Powers are, of course, represented in the four courts ; especially is this the case in the Courts of First Instance, where all the Powers are represented without distinction. The jurisdiction of these courts covers all civil cases between Europeans and Egyptians ; they also have jurisdiction over civil cases between Europeans of different nationah- ties. The judges, until quite recently, were nomin- ated by their respective Governments. The European judges of these tribunals are not only unhampered by such fetters as legislative control, but there is none to restrain them in the autocratic display of discretionary powers. The powers of these Mixed Courts do not ex- tend to criminal cases ; these for the most part are tried by the Consul according to the laws of his country. The introduction of a new law into these courts must receive the sanction of all the Powers. As this required assent is very rarely obtained from all the Powers, the Mixed Tribunals muddle along pretty much as they did on their establishment in 1876. " Legislation by diplomacy ", says Lord Cromer, 1 It must be admitted that these courts have greatly improved during the later days of the occupation. "THORNS AND THISTLES" 195 in referring to these courts, " is probably the worst and most cumbersome form of legislation in the world. Under these representatives, it is easy to understand that the judges of the Mixed Courts are practically a law unto themselves ". ^ 1 "Modem Egypt", Vol. II, p. 319. CHAPTEE XVII "LE EOI EST MOET" IT may be truly stated that from the year 1887 the financial condition of Egypt was showing marked signs of improvement. There was much financial juggling on the part of Sic Edgar Vincent, the Financial Adviser, who it will be remembered succeeded Sir Auckland Colvin, in order to bring about this result ; but whatever the means, the desired end was obtained. On the other hand the army of Occupation had been reduced ia accordance with the scheme formu- lated to limit its numbers to five thousand men. The civil administration, however, was not working on those harmonious lines which the pro-Consul desired, as some difierences of opinion arose between him and Nubar Pasha, the Prime Minister, over the reorganisation of the gendarmerie and police. While both agreed that it was desirable to render more effective the supervision of these bodies by the Ministry of the Interior, they differed as to the lines on which the desired reforms should be efiected. As they were unable to arrive at an amicable under- standing, the matter was referred to the English Government towards the end of the year 1887. The trouble really was the unsatisfactory organisa- tion which, by centrahsiag the police in Cairo, made them to a large extent independent of the Mudirs, ig6 ''LE EOI EST MORT" 197 thereby decreasing the responsibility of the pro- viQcial Governors in their efforts to repress crime. Nubar Pasha laid stress on the necessity of in- creasing the authority of the Mudirs ; but Lord Cromer objected to arming the Governors with a semi-miUtary force, which, being under the absolute control of the native Governors, might have resulted in fanning into flame those smouldering embers of Nationahst revolt that were still floating about the country ; for it must be distinctly understood that the Arabi revolution, although scotched for a period, was by no means killed. The British representative therefore suggested that the Mudirs themselves should be supervised. Nubar at length concluded that the Enghsh administrators had failed to appreciate the real needs of the country, which was amply proved by their " struggle for a policy " ; and this struggle caused them to resort to all sorts of inept rough-and-ready methods of extirpating abuses. He was of the opinion that in order to hastily introduce reforms, the Enghsh administrators had not counted the cost, nor were they in sympathy with local conditions. He also found it impossible to govern Egypt inde- pendently in accordance with the advice of foreign controllers, who would not permit their advice to be overlooked, notwithstanding their Hmited knowledge of the country and the needs of the people ; and to govern a country on independent lines was quite impossible where perfect freedom was not allowed to its Ministers. There is much to be said both for this view and also the view of the English administrator. In regard to Nubar's claim, there could certainly be no independence of action when his methods of 198 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS government were not only supervised, but criticised in a manner not calculated to enhance his self- respect. On the other hand, the Enghsh contention was that " the protection of the native from the Turco- Circassian aggressor " was to be their first con- sideration. They very justly claimed that the rotten government introduced by the Turks had brought bankruptcy and rebelhon in its trail, and in conse- quence " the Circassians were on no account to be entrusted with full administrative powers over the native ". Of course, the English were " struggUng for a policy ", and this blinded them to all else, or they might have found, notwithstanding the banish- ment of the leaders of the Arabist movement, that there were still a few intelligent fellahs who, on being brought under a British administration, and being as it were virgin soil, could have been moulded into the required administrative article. But the great difficulty was that the then adminis- trators knew no Arabic — in fact. Lord Cromer him- self never did master it — and were compelled to depend upon the " polished ", but for the most part incompetent Circassians, who, because they had held office under the old regime, and were now entrusted with administrative powers of a rather negative quality, considered themselves the only capable governors of Egypt. I It therefore followed that Nubar Pasha's political scalp was in great danger ; and as strained relations continued to obtain during the early spring, it was no matter for surprise when Tewfik, on 9 June, 1888, suddenly dismissed Nubar Pasha and summoned Riaz Pasha to carry on the government. Because Lord Cromer had not been consulted with "LE ROI EST MORT" 199 regard to the Prime Minister's dismissal by the Khedive, the pro-EngKsh accused Ghazi Moukhtar Pasha, the Turkish Envoy, who still remained in Egypt, of bringing about the fall of Nubar ; but this statement had no foundation in fact. Nubar was at that time very much opposed to British domination rather than that of Turkey, which fact was un- doubtedly pleasing to the Sultan's Envoy. But sus- picion ever haunts the guilty mind. Riaz, although of Jewish extraction, was a very good Mohammedan ; and there is every reason to beheve that his appointment, if it did not meet with special or imiversal favour, was at any rate tolerable. He was at least honest, they said. The notorious Omar Lutfi Pasha, the incompetent Governor of Alexandria, who was the arch-conspirator iu the Alexandrian massacres of 1882, was named for the War Office ; but the British officials, who had by this time found him out, mainly through the in- criminating disclosvires at the Arabi trial, vetoed his appointment. When the Ministry was completed it was found that Riaz held the two most important appointments of the State — Finance and the Interior — together with the Presidency of the Council. Mustapha Pasha Fehmi was made Minister of War ; Fakri Pasha, Minister of Justice ; Zeki Pasha was sent to the Department of Public Works in place of an individual to whom Sir Colin Moncrieff had taken exception ; and the rather stodgy reactionary. Ah Moubarek Pasha, became Minister of Pubhc In- struction. They were not by any means a brilhant lot ; but when it is considered that they were merely the Oriental decorations of the British official system — the Enghsh 200 THE LAND OP THE PHARAOHS " Adviser " running the administration in their respective names — and being the " Land of Para- dox ", a change of Pashas meant the same " poUcy " of the previous bunch of " administrators ". Poor Pashas ! If they possessed any real talent for the arts of government they were not allowed to show it. There was one appointment, however, which requires special mention : that of Ali Moubarek, Minister of PubHc Instruction. Now, from the fall of Ismail, Egyptian education, as will be seen hereafter, had fallen into a very parlous condition. The Axabist reformers were too busy combating Franco-British aggression and mis- representation, and constructing programmes of reform, to devote much time to the execution of their very praiseworthy intentions, which, of course, included educational reform. On the other hand, when the British took possession of Egypt, although they were pledged to restore order and good govern- ment, they were too deeply engrossed in their exciting occupation of wringing the last piastre from the starving peasantry so as to win that celebrated " race against bankruptcy " in the interest of the bondholders, to trouble themselves about Egyptian education. When the enlightened and progressive Yacoub Pasha Artin was made Secretary to the Ministry of Education, he at once proceeded to formulate large schemes for the development of his department, and had made prehminary arrangements in London for the State education of young Egyptians in England. AU Moubarek Pasha, however, had no sympathy with such advanced ideas of intellectual development ; and the sudden death of the very capable Takwor Pasha Agopian having created a "LE ROI EST MORT" 201 vacancy in the Railway Board, Ali Moubarek, in order to remove his progressive Secretary, secured the promotion of Artin to the vacant post. Yacoub Artin Pasha benefited by the promotion, but the loss which Egyptian education then sustained, in spite of British promises, has never been made good. The year 1888 should be memorable in Egyptian annals as that in which the misguided ex-Khedive Ismail ceased from troubhng the land and people he had so deeply wronged. For some considerable time previous to this date he had advanced claims against the Egyptian Government to the extent of some five millions sterhng. These claims, notwithstanding Ismail's shortcomings, undoubtedly bore the stamp of justice if not of legaKty. Although apportioned a civil list by his European enemies prior to his deposition by their agency, in consideration of his having ceded the Daira and Domains Estates to the State, after his exile this civil Hst was neglected, and he very naturally considered himself entitled to the arrears. As a question of title, there was none. As a question of morals, the obligation could not be well overlooked. It is, indeed, true that he brought ruin upon the country by " a soaring ambition that o'erleapt itself ", and by trying to accomplish Aladdin-hke, in one night, if I may be permitted the metaphor, what had required hundreds of years of achievement in the case of other nations. At the same time, notwithstanding his shortcomings, Ismail's claims to a civil list, or a pension on his deposition, was quite as valid as, for instance, Arabi's. Ismail's claims, which had never been withdrawn, in addition to arrears of his civil list, included palaces at Constantinople and Cairo, and other claims for 202 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS standing crops. Sir William Marriott, being on friendly and confidential terms with Ismail, not only succeeded in bringing negotiations into line between the ex-Khedive and the Egyptian Government, but persuaded Ismail not to press for a larger sum than he was likely to get, and it must be remembered that Sir Edgar Vincent, who acted on behalf of the Egyptian Government, was neither lacking in tact nor moderation, and to Lord Cromer's credit, be it said, that he lent his diplomatic aid to smooth the difficulties away. As the result of these negotiations, towards the end of January an arrangement was concluded, by which Ismail received his palaces, a fair compensation for his crops, and a grant of Domains lands to the value of upwards of £1,200,000. In consideration of this settlement, the ex-Khedive surrendered all claims to his civil Kst. The family breach was thereby healed and he appeared quite satisfied with the financial arrangement. During the remainder of his Hfe Ismail was not permitted to return again to Egypt, not even when it was con- clusively proved that his days were numbered.^ Meanwhile those Government departments from whence the revenues were obtained were being 1 Ismail Pasha died at Constantinople 2 March, 1895, and his remains were brought to Egypt a week later. M. de Guerville says : " When he (Ismail) felt the end drawing near, he had but one desire, one thought, to die on the banks of the wondrous Nile, where he had known joy and sorrow, triumph and humiliation. He wrote to his grandson (Abbas II) asking humbly for a corner in his native land, a corner distant and solitary, where he could render up his soul to God. Abbas Hilmi would willingly have consented ; but, from high political reasons, the request was refused by England. The days drew on. The old Khedive wrote once more. He was dying. The most celebrated physicians had placed it on record, and to their written word was attached a photograph, showing, alas, that he was at the gates of death. He begged that he might be carried to his beloved land. But policy, which knows no sentiment, gives way not even to death : the refusal was curt and brief, and Ismail died in exile — far, as they said, from the country which he had ruined "- " New Egypt ", p. 104. "LE EOI EST MOET" 203 improved. The Customs and the Public Works were receiving especial attention. The Nile, having mysteriously fluctuated during 1888 — reaching a lower level than was ever recorded in Kving memory, thus diminishing the cultivable area, making as it did for a decreased wheat supply and severely injuring the maize crops — was being attacked with vigour by the Public Works Depart- ment. A Decree was also issued partially abohshing the corvee (?) ^ ; but this was to a very large extent a diplomatic fiction. The Mudirs, now that the Department of PubUc Security had been " reorganised," were encouraged to report with candour and freedom on the conditions of their provinces. The reforming hand of England was even extended to the International Tribunals and native courts ; and the inclusion of Europeans in the new scheme of taxation was proving the value of its introduction by reason of the increased revenue. Schemes for the improvement of the harbour of Alexandria were also put into operation. Active slave operations in the Soudan were, however, evi- dently filling the pockets of the Dervish Emirs, thereby enabling them to carry forward their campaign against the Egyptian Government. Domestic slavery in Egypt was aboUshed ; but, as will be seen hereafter, ^ A quarter of a million was set aside for this purpose, but it depended upon the Egyptian Government being allowed to convert its 5 per cent Privilege Debt into a new stock bearing interest at 4 per cent, in the hope of effecting a saving of £170,000 a year. A loan was arranged in London, and in May, 1889, a decree was issued sanc- tioning the issue of a 4 per cent preference stock in accordance with the conversion scheme. France refused her consent until Britain evacuated Egypt. As a result the land tax was increased. France, however, put forward a scheme of her own whereby, not the Privilege Debt alone, but the whole Egyptian Debt was converted. The Prefer- ence Loan, the 4J per cent loan of 1888, and a new loan of £1,300,000 formed the new Privileged Debt, converted into 4 per cents. The Egyptian Government finally accepted the French arrangement. See also Chapter XXIL 204 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS it is very questionable whether the manumitted slaves have been benefited by the change, notwith- standing the introduction of " Slaves' Homes ". France still remained in opposition, pressing home her old demands for the speedy reduction and evacua- tion of the British army of Occupation : a task which experience should have shown was quite hopeless, for, in spite of the fact that the British position remained undefined, either by Great Britain or any one else, it was quite evident that diplomatic protests were nothing short of wasted effort. The Prince of Wales (Edward VII) meanwhile had " shed the light of his countenance " upon Egypt in 1889 ; but although his welcome was enthusiastic, he was unable to dispel the gloom of European jealousies or to " grant them peace ". The power of making by-laws applicable to Euro- peans was also conferred on the Egyptian Govern- ment during this year ; and most important of all, Lord Cromer was able to report on 18 February, 1889, " that the ' Kace against Bankruptcy ' was practically won ! " (Hats off, please ! ) For Egypt at this time — so it is recorded — enjoyed better credit than Russia, Austria, or Italy. Notwithstanding the excellent credit of Egypt, the internal administration at this period left much to be desired. As I have frequently pointed out, the so- called reforms were in the interests of trade develop- ment and agricultural efl&ciency, whereby that race against bankruptcy would be won ; and also to prove to the Powers that England was the only country capable of developing the resources of Egypt, so that Egyptian credit might be firmly established. In accomplishing this result England well knew that by pointing to her " Marvellous financial achieve- "LE ROI EST MORT" 205 ment," the Grateful Powers, having recovered what they all considered a bad debt, were not likely to kick the bailiff out of the house of the creditor, nor were they likely to put a period upon the order of his going. The Mudirs were still using torture to extort evidence, or confessions, so as to estabhsh con- victions against prisoners. Brigandage was rife ; and the local officials were not co-operating with the native tribunal to bring justice within reach of the poor. It therefore followed that, bribery and cor- ruption being as rampant as ever they were prior to the advent of the British, the poor suitor found it much cheaper to put up with his wrongs than to seek his remedy in the local courts. The village police did not trouble about their work overmuch, as they were not being paid. Vagabonds and suspi- cious characters not only carried abundant firearms, but were using them to the great terror of the harmless and industrious fellaheen. Meanwhile, the great outcry which was raised in the provinces led to the appointment of Mr. Justice (afterwards Sir John) Scott, of Bombay, to inquire into the whole judicial system. This appointment was by no means pleasing to Riaz Pasha, who resigned in May, 1891, on the ground of ill-health,^ and Mustapha Pasha Fehmi was straight- way appointed his successor. Only one of the old Cabinet remained in the person of Fakri Pasha, the Minister of Justice, but as he was only interested in the regularity with which his salary was paid, caring little or nothing about such trifles as Justice (which by this time, he had evidently learned from ' Eiaz Pasha always made "ill-health" his excuse for resigning office. 206 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS his association with Europeans, was as blind as himself), he was shortly afterwards relieved of his portfolio, Ibrahim Fuad being named as his suc- cessor. With the exception of Artin Pasha, who was made Minister of Education, they were much the same as other Pashas before them. Tigrane Pasha, an Armenian, who, hke Nubar Pasha, knew no Arabic, was once more at the Foreign Office ; and the Khedive, having at length realised — or did Lord Cromer give him a gentle hint ? — that the Turco- Circassian Pashas and " hereditary rulers " of the Egyptians were a rather brainless herd, he, for the second time, became his own Prime Minister. In the meantime the Porte was still anxious about Egypt, and at the end of July His Sublime Majesty's representatives waited upon Lord SaUsbury, with a view to reopening negotiations for the evacuation of Egypt. Lord Salisbury was poKte, as befitted Her Britannic Majesty's Prime Minister ; but the only reopening the Sultan's representatives obtained was the reopening of the street door, when they were shown off the premises. Evacuation rumours were floating about Paris, Constantinople, and Cairo during the early part of the year. These greatly increased in the autumn, on account of what appeared to be a significant speech of Mr. Gladstone's in Newcastle, and another by M. Ribot, in Paris, wherein a demand was made for evacuation, and the gauntlet was thrown down for Lord Sahsbury to pick up — which he did. In November he made his famous declaration that " our work in Egypt was not yet done, and that it was our duty to remain there and do it." This was a decided " crib " from Sir W. S. Gilbert. For although 'm H.H. ABBAS HILMI KHEDIVE OF EGYl'T "LE ROI EST MORT" 207 the speech was paraphrased from "Patience", " Pinafore," or " Captain Reece of the Mantelpiece " — it really does not matter which — it did not end at the speech. The whole Egyptian question had been elevated from the region of farce to that of comic opera of the true Gilbertian flavour. If the reader will turn to the various pledges. Commissioners, Envoys, withdrawals of pledges, super- pledges, evasions, and the whole bag of pohtical tricks whereby England has firmly planted her feet on the banks of the Nile (they are recorded in this volume), it will be found that Lord Salisbury's handling of the Egyptian Question lifted it from the hoUow farce of GrranviUian flaccidity to the Olympian heights of Gilbertian fecundity. The great Statesman, however, was quickly moving towards the wilderness of Opposition from whence he could wail in critical language at the policy of " the other fellow." But before he departed he made Sir Evelyn Baring Eael of Cromer. His Highness Mehemet Tewfik having been gathered to his fathers 7 January, 1892, the youthful Abbas Hilrm' was called from his studies at Vienna at the tender age of seventeen to assume the heritage of Mehemet Ali and the title of Khedive of Egypt. But he had yet to learn that the belted Earl, like proud king-making Warwick, was the king's real master. Tewfik was dead, and Abbas II, by the grace of the Sultan and Lord Cromer, was sovereign of the land of the Pharaohs. Le Roi est Mort, vive le Roi ! APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVII ENGLAND'S PLEDGES THE policy of H.M.'s Government towards Egypt has no other aim than the prosperity of the country and its full enjoyment of that liberty which it has obtained under succes- sive firmans of the Sultan. ... It cannot be too clearly understood that England desires no partisan Ministry in Egypt. In the opinion of H.M.'s Government a partisan Ministry founded on the support of a foreign Power, or upon the personal iafluence of a foreign diplomatic agent, is neither calculated to be of service to the country it administers, nor to that in whose interest it is supposed to be maintained." (Lord Granville's dispatch, 4 November, 1881 ; " Egypt, " No. 1 (1882), pp. 2, 3.) " I shall use my influence to maintain the rights already established, whether by the firmans of the Sultan or by various international engagements, in a spirit favourable to the good government of the country and the prudent development of its institutions ". (Queen Victoria's Speech to Parliament, 7 February, 1882.) " The Government represented by the undersigned engage themselves, in any arrangement which may be made in consequence of their concerted action for the regulation of the affairs of Egypt, not to seek any territorial advantage, nor any concession of any exclusive privilege, nor any commercial advantage for their subjects other than those which any other nation can equally obtain ". (Self-denying protocol signed by Lord Dufierin, together with the representatives of the five other Great Powers, 25 June, 1882; "Egypt", No. 17 (1882), p. 33.) 208 ENGLAND'S PLEDGES 209 " I, admiral commanding the British fleet, think it oppor- tune to confirm without delay once more to your Highness that the Government of Great Britain has no intention of making the conquest of Egypt, nor of injuring in any way the religion and liberties of the Egyptians. It has for its sole object to protect your Highness and the Egyptian people against rebels ". (Sir Beauchamp Seymour to Khedive Tewfik, Alexandria, 26 July, 1882, published in the " Official Journal " of 28 July.) " It is the desire of H.M.'s Government, after relieving Egypt from military tyranny, to leave the people to manage their own affairs. . . . We believe that it is better for the interests of their country, as well as for the interests of Egypt, that Egypt should be governed by Liberal institutions rather than by a despotic rule. . . . We do not wish to impose on Egypt institutions of our own choice, but rather to leave the choice of Egypt free. ... It is our desire that not only should existing institutions in Egypt be respected, but that no obstacle should be placed in the way of a prudent develop- ment of these institutions. We do not desire to interfere beyond the strict necessities of the case in the internal ad- ministration of the country, or to prevent the Government of Egypt by Egyptians. ... It is the honourable duty of this country to be true to the principles of free institutions which are our glory ". (Sir Charles Dilke, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons, 25 July, 1882.) " I can go so far as to answer the honourable gentleman when he asks me whether we contemplate an indefinite occupation of Egypt. Undoubtedly, of all things in the world, that is a thing which we are not going to do. It would be absolutely at variance with all the principles and views of H.M.'s Government, and the pledges they have given to Europe itself ". (The Et. Honble. W. E. Gladstone, in House of Commons, 10 August, 1882.) " In talking to the various persons who have made in- p 210 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS quiries as to my views of the Egyptian question, I have stated that we have not the least intention of preserving the authority which has thus reverted to us. . . . It was our intention so to conduct our relations with the Egyptian people that they should naturally regard us as their best friends and counsellors, but that we did not propose upon that account arbitrarily to impose our views upon them or to hold them in an irritating tutelage ". (Lord Dufferin's despatch, 19 December, 1882; "Egypt", No. 2 (1883), p. 30.) " You should intimate to the Egyptian Government that it is the desire of H.M.'s Government to withdraw the troops from Egypt as soon as circumstances permit, that such with- drawal will probably be effected from time to time as the security of the country will allow it, and that H.M.'s Govern- ment hope that the time will be very short duriug which the full number of the present force will be maintained ". (Lord Granville, 29 December, 1882 ; " Egypt ", No. 2 (1883), p. 33.) " The territory of the Khedive has been recognised as lying outside the sphere of European warfare and international jealousies ". (Lord Dufferin's dispatch, 6 February, 1883 ; "Egypt", No. 6(1883), p. 41.) " The Valley of the Nile could not be administered from London. An attempt upon our part to engage in such an undertaking would at once render us objects of hatred and suspicion to its inhabitants. Cairo would become a focus of foreign intrigue and conspiracy against us, and we should soon find ourselves forced either to abandon our pretensions under discreditable conditions, or embark upon the experi- ment of a complete acquisition of the country. If, however, we content ourselves with a more moderate role, and make the Egyptians comprehend that, instead of desiring to impose upon them an indirect but rather arbitrary rule, we are sincerely desirous of enabling them to govern themselves, under the uncompromising segis of our friendship, they will ENGLAND'S PLEDGES 211 not fail to understand that, while on the one hand we are the European nation most vitally interested in their peace and well-beiug, on the other we are the least inclined to allow the influence which the progress of events has required us to exercise, to degenerate into an irritating and exasperating display of authority which would be fatal to those instincts of patriotism and freedom which it has been our boast to foster in every country where we have set our foot ". (lb., p. 43.) " One further institution, however, will be still necessary to render vital and effective these already described, namely, a free Press ". (76., p. 50.) " Had I been commissioned to place affairs in Egypt on the footing of an Indian subject State, the outlook would have been different. The masterful hand of a Kesident would have quickly bent everything to his will, and in the space of five years we should have greatly added to the material wealth and well-being of the country by the extension of its cultured area and the consequent expansion of its revenue ; by the partial if not the total abolition of the corvee and slavery ; the establishment of justice and other beneficent reforms. But the Egyptians would have justly considered these ad- vantages as dearly purchased at the expense of their domestic independence. Moreover, H.M.'s Government have pro- nounced against such an alternative ". (76., p. 83.) " The very fact of our having endowed the country with representative institutions is a proof of our disinterestedness. It is the last thing we should have done had we desired to retain its government in leading-strings ; for however irre- sistible may be the control of a protecting Power when brought to bear on a feeble autocracy, its imperative character disappears in the presence of a popular assembly ". (76., p. 83.) " The other Powers of Europe . . . are well aware of the general intentions entertained by the British Government, intentions which may be subject, of course, to due considera- 212 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS tion of the state of circumstances, but conceived and held to be in the nature not only of information, but of a pledge or engagement ". (Mr. Gladstone, in the House of Commons, 6 August, 1883.) " The uncertainty there may be in some portion of the public mind has reference to those desires which tend towards the permanent occupation of Egypt and its incorporation in this Empire. That is a consummation to which we are resolutely opposed, and which we will have nothing to do with bringing about. We are against this doctrine of annexa- tion ; we are against everything that resembles or approaches it ; and we are against all language that tends to bring about its expectation. We are against it on the ground of our duty to Egypt ; we are against it on the ground of the specific and solemn pledges given to the world in the most solemn manner and under the most critical circumstances, pledges which have earned for us the confidence of Europe at large during the course of difficult and delicate operations, and which, if one pledge can be more solemn and sacred than another, special sacredness in this case binds us to observe. We are also sensible that occupation prolonged beyond a certain point may tend to annexation, and consequently it is our object to take the greatest care that the occupation does not gradu- ally take a permanent character. . . . We cannot name a day, and do not undertake to name a day, for our final with- drawal, but no effort shall be wanting on our part to bring about that withdrawal as early as possible. The conditions which will enable us to withdraw are those described by Lord Granville — ^restored order in the state of the country and the organisation of the proper means for the maintenance of the Kiedive's authority. ". . . The Right Honourable gentleman (Sir S. Northcote) has treated us as if we intended to stay in Egypt until we had brought about institutions which would do credit to Utopia. We have no such views. ... In popular language we mean to give Egypt a fair start, and if we secure it order, supply a civil and military force adequate to the maintenance ENGLAND'S PLEDGES 213 of order, and with a man on the throne in whose benevolence and justice we have confidence, with institutions for the administration of justice imder enlightened supervision and in fairly competent hands — ^if we have made a reasonable beginning towards legislative institutions into which is in- corporated some seed of freedom, our duty may be supposed to be complete ". (Mr. Gladstone, in the House of Commons, 9 August, 1883.) " H.M.'s Government ... are willing that the with- drawal of the troops shall take place at the beginning of the year 1888, provided that the Powers are then of opinion that such withdrawal can take place without risk to peace and order ". (Lord Granville's dispatch, 16 June, 1884 ; "Egypt", No. 23 (1884), p. 13.) " From the first we have steadily kept in view the fact that our occupation was temporary and provisional only. . . . We do not propose to occupy Egypt permanently. . . . On that point we are pledged to Emrope ; and if a contrary policy is adopted it will not be by us ". (Lord Derby, in the House of Lords, 26 February, 1885.) " It was not open to assume the protectorate of Egypt, because H.M.'s Government have again and again pledged themselves that they would not do so. . . . My noble friend has dwelt upon that pledge, and he does us no more than justice when he expresses his opinion that it is a pledge which has been constantly present to our minds. ... It was undoubtedly the fact that our presence in Egypt, un- recognised by a convention . . . gave the subjects of the Sultan cause for a suspicion which we did not deserve ". (Lord Salisbury, in the House of Lords, 10 June, 1887.) " When my noble friend . . . asks us to convert ourselves from guardians into proprietors . . . and to declare our stay in Egypt permanent ... I must say I think my noble friend pays an insufficient regard to the sanctity of the 214 THE LAND OP THE PHARAOHS obligations which the Government of the Queen have under- taken, and by which they are bound to abide. In such a matter we have not to consider what is the most convenient or what is the most profitable course ; we have to consider the course to which we are bound by our own obligations and by European law ". (Lord Salisbury, in the House of Lords, 12 August, 1889.) CHAPTER XVIII THE NATIONALIST EEVIVAL rpHE modern disposition to subordinate intel- -■- lectual interests to material advantages is the most alarming evil of a super-materialistic age. Men no longer inquire about the morals or intellect of an individual. The question which agitates the public mind is : " What is he worth — how much money has he got ? " Intellect, by which I mean love, truth, honesty, justice, and all those high and godlike attributes, are the only things that really matter. The material civilisation of ancient Egypt crumbled to nothingness, but her iutellectual massiv- ity has left its impress upon the ages, laying the foundations and planting the seeds of subsequent reUgious and political systems. Take ancient Greece, the recognised seat of Western culture. Directly she permitted her intellectual ideals to be overshadowed by the mantle of materiaKstic conquests, and allowed herself to revel in the result- ant spoils, her ultimate dissolution was but a ques- tion of time. Thus England, in the multiplication of her con- quests, whereby trade is advanced, plutocrats wax rich and opulent, and in the interests of " civihsa- tion " and " Christianisation " of primitive races, and races that are not primitive, who are held in tutelage and subjection " for their moral welfare ", so that 2IS 216 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS there may be diamond princes, and cotton kings, and other grades of a most ignoble band of financial aristocrats, is only paving the path of materialism with the agonised groans of human subjugation, at the end of which lies her utter dissolution. It therefore follows that notwithstanding the frequently urged claim that England's business in Egypt was, and is, in the best interests of the Egyp- tian people, these statements are not borne out by the facts. Had England's actions in Egypt proved her disinterestedness, there would neither be " un- rest " nor would there be a genuine desire for political change. Until the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, suc- cessive French Foreign Ministers were continually " maintaining the cause of the Egyptian people ". I do not claim that the motives of France were dis- interested. All European nations with commodities to sell, and for which the markets of the earth are daily narrowing, are ever on the alert in their quest of new clients. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the French bondholder was regularly receiving his interest at the hands of the British, who were responsible for the financial administra- tion of Egypt. Inasmuch as it has been urged by British writers that the French bondholder was not concerned with the welfare of the native Egyp- tian, why this interference on the part of France 1 The explanation is not difiicult to discover. England had pledged herself, time and time again, to evacuate the country, and although there was no valid excuse in fact, excuses were being continually manufactured to maintain an imtenable position. If England really wanted Egypt she should have boldly estabhshed a Protectorate, or annexed the THE NATIONALIST REVIVAL 217 country, and there was no one to say her nay. France had invaded and annexed Tunis with as httle claim to legality as England possessed in Egypt. My own impression is that annexation would have been un- welcome as much to the Egyptian as to the Powers ; but " possession ", the homely adage runs, " is nine points of law ". For twenty-eight years the Enghsh have remained in Egypt without the consent of the Egyptian nation, and in spite of the protests of the Sultan and the Powers. There surely was no diffi- culty in going a step further. Hypocrisy is perhaps the most irritating of vices, and England has acted a he during all these years of the Occupation. I am of the opinion that in the early days of the Occupation — and I mean days — there was a genuine disposition on the part of Lord Granville to evacuate the country, because at that early period the re- sources of the country were practically unknown ; but as time went on and the English " Adviser " began to see the marvellously recuperative powers of the country and its great trade possibilities, it was found that England had unwittingly stumbled upon a regular commercial Golconda, which it would be the essence of folly to surrender to the Egyptians in order that some other Power might step in and exploit it in its own interests and to the exclusion of Great Britain. A coimtry that, by virtue of its natural resources, could reduce a debt of some ninety millions to reason- able proportions within the short space of a quarter of a century, was not the country to be hghtly abandoned to — according to the Enghsh view — a pack of " semi-barbarous natives ". But are these Egyptians the semi-barbarous stock which Enghsh writers. Statesmen, Administrators, and " Advisers " have declared them to be ? And how has England 218 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS kept her pledges of administrative educatioB ? Lord Cromer has asserted that the only class possessing administrative capacity are the Turco-Circassian class.^ The reason for this wild statement is chiefly owing to the fact that this class was the only one with which he came in direct contact. Nubar Pasha, Cherif Pasha, Riaz Pasha, Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, all of these have at one time or another formed ministries and held the chief positions in the State. Their well-known aversion to the fellah would not unnaturally lead them to underrate his qualities. These men being mainly of Circassian extraction be- lieved themselves the hereditary rulers of the country, with a monopoly of all the brains in Egypt worthy the name. The British official, on the other hand, could not be expected to undertake the tuition of the native who might in time supplant him. There are few men to-day who are so overweighted with self-abnegation that they would be prepared to step down and out to make way for the native official. The Englishman in the Egyptian Civil Service is for the most part an arrogant, self-seeking individual, who looks after his own interest and the interests of his class. As a general rule he is either a scion of an impoverished noble house who has been pitch- forked into some position of trust, for which neither previous training nor intellectual endowments have adequately equipped him; or, he is some obscure nondescript who by a judicious system of fawning has worked his way up from the lowest round of the official ladder to at length become " a terrible big pot ". And this is the most terrible reptile with which the Egyptian has to contend. I will cite a case. 1 "Modern Egypt", Vol I, pp. 324-5. THE NATIONALIST REVIVAL 219 Mr. T. Swellibus, a British individual of humble parentage and surroundings, has an ambitious father who desires that his son and heir should be " some- body ", and make his mark in the world. Young Swellibus is therefore trained for the Civil Service. He passes his examinations, and is awaiting a vacancy. He learns that a junior clerkship is going in the Egjrptian Civil Service. He makes application, is accepted and goes out. On arrival he meets those of his class who maUgn the climate, the native, and everything in " Beastly Egypt, don't you know ". At home Young SweUibus cleaned his own boots, and no doubt assisted to cook the humble bloater for his tea, what time his mother was at the " first house " of some music-haU or on a visit to a neighbour. Mark the transformation of Mr. T. SwelKbus. In Egypt he has a " nigger " to look after his " togs ", clean his boots, and dress him ! In a month or two he dons a monocle, exchanges his cockney accent for the regular West End drawl, joins an Enghsh club, and despises the " niggers ", whose existence have made his lordly progress towards being " some- body " with a pension at the end possible. Whereas the penny tram or a long walk were the only things possible to him at home, he must now have a vehicle of some sort. " Too hot to walk, deah boy, and too many beastly ' niggers ' on the trams ". He returns home on leave, when he has saved up enough for the purpose, where he awes the neigh- bourhood by assuming the airs of the Consul-General on leave. If he has grown ashamed of his home connections, as is not infrequent, he pays a short visit to the Continent. If he has an attractive sister, or sweetheart, he causes her to go out to him — by a Cook's excursion. 220 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS The sister, female relative, or fiancee, goes out and is greatly impressed. " Everything is so delight- ful in dear, wonderful Egypt ! " In course of time he obtains a house in the swell European suburban quarter, and he marries the girl of his heart from dear old England. There are servants on every side and abundant sa- laams whenever he appears among the natives ; for is he not the great effendi ! A kick or so to a mere native increases the respect due to an Englishman, and helps to maintain British prestige. For the menacing British Army of Occupation is in the City of the Caliphs, and the power of Britain is behind her humblest sons. He may also bask in the reflected glory of real aristocratic winter society at Cairo, and be on bow- ing acquaintance with English Princes of the blood. Mr. T. SwelKbus has grown in greatness beyond even the recognition of his humble parents, to whom by this time he is but a memory. But the poor old souls are satisfied. Their boy is doing well. Now, is it within the compass of erring human nature that T. Swellibus, Effendi, should descend from the honourable and glorious position of an exalted Egyptian official, where every one beneath him falls down and worships, and his lightest behest is im- phcitly obeyed ? Is it Ukely that this " great man " wiU voluntarily leave his acquired comforts, luxuries, with the added dignity of being " somebody ", which he has acquired by rubbing shoulders with swell society at Shepherd's Hotel, to return home and be swallowed up among the teeming millions and chimney-pots of smoky London : his identity gone, and at the very best, a jerry-built, semi- detached architectural monstrosity in Suburbia in THE NATIONALIST REVIVAL 221 which to wind up a career of brilliance and achieve- ment ? It is unthinkable. When such things can be accomplished, the lion will Ke down with the lamb, for men will then be angels. Yet, this is the very thing the British Government would have the Egyptians believe to be possible of accomphshment. It is the duty of T. Swellibus, Effendi, to keep as much knowledge as is possible away from the Egyptian ; and should the natives whom he controls show any signs of intellectual activity, such signs must be nipped in the bud, or if the natives persist in understanding too much about their department they must be removed to another department, where they will be compelled to begin their studies anew, and should there be no other means of suppressing this unheard-of precocity — throw them out of the service ! Such things have happened. As for the native official in high places, T. Swellibus, Effendi, holds him in supreme contempt, to be toler- ated as a necessary evil. Social intercourse ? Well, T. Swellibus, Effendi, would rather be excused. Put a beggar on horseback and he will ride to Hades. And the Anglo-Egyptian service is over- run with " the beggar on horseback " fraternity — and the cad. Fortunately there is another side to the picture. There are some respectable and worthy Enghshmen in the Anglo-Egyptian service ; but these are un- fortunately among a very small and uninfluential minority, whose protests against the prevaiKng super- cilious aggressions of the snob-cad class are quite unavailing, and only make for their unpopularity in the service. Therefore, though worthy and well- intentioned, they hold their tongues. 222 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS As a result, the Egyptian official is only permitted to see tlie most objectionable side of a race whose external reserve and social exclusiveness do not make for the appreciation of any good qualities they may possess; nor does it add to the efficiency or efiectiveness of a service in which the presence of harmony and the absence of bitterness are necessary and important elements to success. Matters of this kind were going from bad to worse, and the Egyptian minor officials found themselves sub- ordinate to incompetent EngKsh officials for the most part, whilst their brothers who had acquired that Western education, either in Syria or in Europe, which the English had claimed to be a necessary qualification to a post in the services, were walking about Cairo without occupation of any kind, and were not infrequently a burden on the slender re- sources of these very minor native officials. Now, arguing from the very fatuous premises that the Egyptian is either devoid of intellect or incapable of mature reflection, the Anglo-Egyptian administra- tor — and by this term I mean the British official — concluded that the Egyptian could be put ofi with vague promises, and being a mere native he would be unable to see that the English administrator had no serious intention of avaihng himself of native assistance to any material extent. On the other hand, the educated native went to the cafes, where he met other educated unemployed natives. They compared notes and discussed the situation. At first it was like the dropping of a pebble in a very large lake ; although circles were made by the pebble-dropping, the circles that reached the remotest edge of the pool were imperceptible to the naked eye. But the pebble-dropping con- THE NATIONALIST REVIVAL 223 tinued, and in course of time a big stone was found and this made a very big splash, and then it was observed that circlets not only reached the edge of the pool, but they were perceptible to the unaided vision. Then larger, and still larger stones were found which were also thrown iuto the pool, and they began to splash the English official, and his clothes being wet he took a little notice. He in- quired the meaning of the wetting, and the educated young men of Egypt said they wanted work. Now, having become a nuisance — and the British official despises anything that tends to ruffle the calm superiority of his official dignity — the British official sent some of the noble band of Enghsh incompetents to higher and newly created posts at increased salaries, and thus made room for a few Egyptians in order to stop their stone-throwing. But unfortunately there was stUl a fearful vacuum in the budding official stomach of the native, and, like Oliver Twist, he cried for more. " But ", said the British official, between 1896 and 1906 we have increased your numbers 8444 to 12,207 — what more would you have ? " " Ah ", replied the native, " I quite agree with the Pa^ha, but will the Pasha be pleased to remember that wMlst you have increased our official numbers from 8444 to 12,207 in the ten years under considera- tion, the number of foreigners has increased during those ten years from 690 to 1252, almost 100 per cent, whilst our increase has only been about 50 per cent. Moreover, Pasha, you of the English race have looked well to yourselves during these ten years, for whereas in 1896 only 286 of the 690 foreign officials were British, in the year 1906 your countrymen in the Egyptian Civil Service reached the respectable 224 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS total of 662/ more than 50 per cent of the 1252 foreigners now employed by the Government ". " What can you expect more ? " inquired the British Administrator. " On your own showing, we have treated you with fairness and consideration, and although it is natural we should look after our people " (hem !), " you see we have made Egypt what she is to-day — to the victor the spoils. I say, although it is natural we should look after our own people ; ah, well — ^you see, you don't quite understand the position — the fact is, you have the majority of the appointments and there is really no possible founda- tion for your grumble ". " I trust that the Pasha will be patient with me ", rejoined the native ; " but the Pasha has over- looked one very important point " " Well, what point is that ? You must be brief, I am very busy ". " The point you have passed over is the question of salary ". " Well ? " " Take any of the services, the Eailway, for in- stance. Of the lower grades of railway servants whose salaries are below £11 monthly there are 5428, of these 5230 are natives and only 198 foreigners ". " My dear man " (and the Pasha smiled), " you are producing incontestable proof — my own figures, mark you ! — that we are treating you fairly — 198 of the 5428 ! " ' Quite so ", rephed the native ; " but we shall find a slight change as we work our way up to the top. There are 276 sub-inspectors receiving salaries from £16 to £25 per month, of whom 147 are Euro- > "Egypt", No. 1 (1907), p. 36. Between 1896 and 1906 the total number of officials was increased from 9134 to 13,279. THE NATIONALIST REVIVAL 225 peans and 129 Egyptians. Of 93 inspectors on salaries ranging from £26 to £48, monthly, there are 74 Europeans and only 19 Egyptians. Of the 36 superintendents receiving £600 per annum or over, there are 32 Europeans and 4 Egyptians ! " ^ " There is some mistake, my good man ! " cried the British Administrator. " Evidently a misprint " " No, Great One, there is no mistake. Will you see the report ? Your own figures, 0, Pasha " " You must really excuse me — appointment. Good morning ! " On reaching the other side of the door he remarked, " The education of these natives must be curtailed. The money will be more beneficially employed on irrigation works so's to get more cotton ". And ringing the bell, which brought a meek Egyptian to the ofiice, he ordered, " Put me on to Dunlop ! " ^ As the budding native ofl&cial moved ofi to a neigh- bouring cafe, he was heard to murmur, " A chiel's amang you taking notes, and, faith, he'll prent it ". Having got over a few statistics, which I loathe quite as much as the reader, we will now return to the Nationalist revival. Now, the few cases and statistics cited above were the undoubted causes that led up to the revival of the movement, coupled of course with the ever- present menace, reproach, and insult of the British Army of Occupation. There was a rumbhng among the dry bones of Constitutionalism, and the very evils that produced the Arabi revolt were apparent on every side. Fat offices and high salaries to Euro- peans : husks and starvation wages to the poor Egyptian, who was expected to keep up an official appearance and a large family on one-half to two- 1 "Egypt", No. 2 (1907), p. 40. 2 Dunlop, " Adviser '' on Education. 226 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS thirds the salary paid to his European confrere of identical social standing. " We charge him " (Charles I), said Macaulay, " with having broken his coronation oath ; and we are told he kept his marriage vow ! We accuse him of having given up his people to the merciless inflic- tions of the most hot-headed and the most hard- hearted of prelates ; and the defence is that he took his little son on his knee and kissed him ! We censure him for having violated the Petition of Rights, after having, for good valuable considerations, promised to observe them ; and we are informed that he was accustomed to hear prayers at six o'clock in the morning ! " Similarly, we charge England with having broken her evacuation pledges ; and we are told she abolished the Kurbash ! We accuse her of cruel and repressive measures and unjust punish- ment to the natives, as in the Denshawi and Kafira atrocities ; and the defence is, she won the " Race Against Bankruptcy " ! We censure her for having kept the natives in ignorance for twenty-eight years, spending only about 1 per cent on education of the £258,000,000, revenue obtained during the first twenty-five years of the Occupation (the numbers attending the primary schools amounting to but 16 in 1000),^ and we are informed that she made a reduction in the Salt Tax ! ' In 1873 the number of those attending primary schools was 17 per 1000. Thirty years of British financial rule has reduced it by one. The population was 5,250,000 in 1873. To-day the population stands at 12,000,000 ; and in spite of the repeated claims of Sir Edward Grey that the people were being educated and advanced, we find the great ex-proconsul, the Eight Honourable the Earl of Cromer, saying at the Eighty Club, 16 December, 1908 : "The mass of the Egyptian popula- tion is still sunk in the deepest ignorance, and this ignorance must necessarily continue until a new generation has grown up "- Not bad for a British Administrator who prides himself on his Egyptian reforms. THE NATIONALIST REVIVAL 227 The delusive evacuation rumours of 1891 were again revived in 1892, when in September Mr. Gladstone's Government came into office. In Egypt the young Khedive, who had opened his reign by taking a greater interest in the affairs of his country than his father had done, caused quite a little com- motion in the Enghsh pohtical dovecot, by the inclination he showed to intervene actively in super- vising the work of his Ministers, and at the same time the impression gained currency that he was not quite satisfied with his English " Advisers." Although young, the Khedive unquestionably possessed more strength of purpose and stabihty of character than his father could boast. Moreover, he could not shut his eyes to the lack of domestic and social reform in the country, inasmuch as he saw that all other considera- tions were subordinated to finance-getting and finance-producing. Nothing was attempted that did not " pay ". There was also quite an agitation against English tutelage, with which Fakhri Pasha had much to do, and his opinions were echoed in the native Press ; and native opinion on the policy and action of the Enghsh, whether in the Press or in the bazaars and cafes, was reflected in the French papers. It was therefore no surprise to the initiated when, on 15 January, 1893, the Premier, Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, who was always known to possess Enghsh sympathies, was summarily dismissed by the Khe- dive, and simultaneously the Ministers of Finance and of Justice were required to surrender their portfohos. These officials were replaced by Fakhri Pasha as Prime Minister, Boutros Pasha in the Finance Department, and Mazloum Pasha in the Department of Justice. The Khedive also intimated that for the future he would claim the right to ap- 228 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS point whatever Minister he pleased. His action was instantly interpreted as a blow to the authority of the British, and the Press and native party loudly applauded the bold and independent attitude of their Prince. As might be imagined, Her Majesty's Consul-General lost no time in intimating to Abbas that such conduct would not be permitted ! Lord Cromer further protested against the appointments and refused to recognise the Khedive's nominees. The English Cabinet authorised Lord Cromer to make it plain to the Khedive that, so long as England occupied Egypt, she claimed a decisive voice in Egyptian poUtics, and could not allow her " advice " to be set aside. The Khedive hesitated. The modern Warwick was insistent, and the Khedive gave way. The Government was remodelled according to the high and mighty will and pleastire of the Right Honourable Consul-General, with Riaz Pasha, the pet of the European Consulates, once more Prime Minister. Riaz was moderate and amenable ; Fakhri was neither. The former had the interests of his class and the EngUsh to consider ; the latter placed Egypt before all other considerations. Boutros Pasha and Mazloum Pasha, the nominees of the Khedive, were, however, permitted to retain their portfohos, with the other members of Mustapha Fehmi's Cabinet ; but both Fehmi and Fakhri were sacrificed — ^Fakhri on the altar of Patriotism and Fehmi to the dignity of the Prince. This high-handed proceeding on the part of the Enghsh representative, and the advice he received from the Enghsh Cabinet, conclusively proved that aHJprevious evacuation rumours were mere moonshine, and all England's professions about permitting the Egyptians to govern themselves mere pohtical humbug. THE NATIONALIST REVIVAL 229 As a natural result the Press — French and Moham- medan — was up in arms, so were the natives ; the friction between English and Egyptian was in- creased ; for now that Lord Cromer, backed by his Government and supported by the bayonets of an occupying army, had set his foot firmly upon Khedive and Ministry, you may be sure that the "Enghsh resident ", whether commercial or ofiicial, did not for- get that it was due to every Briton to show the Egyptian " semi-barbarian " who were the masters of the Nile Valley. The result was a protest on the part of the medical students against English instruction ; and these having struck work were only induced to return to their studies after Riaz had spoken rather strongly to them with regard to the duty they owed to Egypt. The Nationalist Party, mean- while, showed marked hostihty to the English. Abuses were still rampant in the various depart- ments, and Riaz believing himself indispensable to the EngKsh, tightened the reins on the native officials, causing great discontent within their ranks, and at the same time increasing and consolidating his per- sonal authority. In the meantime, the British Government decided to increase the British force in Egypt, and fresh troops arrived from Malta and Gibraltar early in February. Instead of allaying bitterness this new impertinence on the part of Great Britain only fomented discord, and the dictatorial attitude of Lord Cromer only served the purpose of throwing the youthful sovereign into the arms of the Nationalist Party. The " Mokattam ", a periodical founded by two Syrian Christians first as a literary monthly magazine 230 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS at Beirout, where it acquired a wide circulation, was transferred to Cairo by its founders not long after the Occupation. The well-known energy of the Syrian caused this paper to instantly succeed to that popularity which it had enjoyed at home. Unfortu- nately, the editors, observing that the English were the real rulers of the country, forthwith proceeded to support everything British and discredit every- thing that emanated from the country of their adoption ; and as the paper was printed in Arabic and was at the same time supposed to contain the views of the occupying English, it did more to stir up strife and ill-feeling than any other agency then employed by the English. As a result, when the army was increased the " Mokattam " went out of its way to prove that Great Britaia had increased her force in Egypt with a view to crushing out any germs of Nationalism that might be found floating about Egypt. The Egyptians, knowing that this journal possessed the confidence of Lord Cromer and the Enghsh, were unable to arrive at any other conclusion than that their absolute destruction was intended. Consequently, in May, August, and November, ex- citement rose to fever heat, and so great was the friction, that not only did a Ministerial crisis seem imminent, but in December the Legislative Council which was assembled to discuss the political situa- tion expressed in unmeasured terms its hostiUty to England and censured two of its own members for calUng upon Lord Cromer, as a matter of courtesy, at Cairo. It then attacked the Budget, especially the estimates of the War Department, and the ex- penses of the Army of Occupation. It proposed to abolish the Prisons Department, the Municipahty of Alexandria, and the department for repressing the THE NATIONALIST REVIVAL 231 slave trade. It proposed to largely reduce the grants made for public works, to cut down the salaries of the European officials ! to lessen the subvention given to the European theatre, and subsidise a native theatre instead. It appointed a committee to inquire into the unsatisfactory management of the Domains Administration ; demanded a reduction in the secret service money ; denounced the extravagance of the Government, and the rapidly increasing poverty and distress of the Egyptians and the universal poverty in the country. This pronouncement of the Legislative Council offended, as was natural in the circumstances, both the Enghsh " Advisers " and the Egyptian Cabinet. Eiaz Pasha replied to the objections of the Council, and Sir Elwin Palmer contradicted their accusations regarding the financial condition of the country. Riaz Pasha induced his Government to reject the majority of the Council's proposals ; but it must not be forgotten that the Council, not the Government, expressed the feelings of the masses ; and to judge from the delight expressed in Cairo at the Councirs action, there need be little doubt that the strictures and criticisms of that body were amply justified. The criticisms of the Council were undoubtedly reflected in the Khedive's attitude ; for now that he found himself supported by the Legislative body, he felt that his position was enhanced, and being young and ambitious, he had no desire to fall into the same hopeless groove of European tutelage and inactivity which had characterised the colourless " reign " of his weak and vacillating father. It therefore came to pass that his attitude towards the Enghsh was lacking in those elements of yield and cling, which the British administrators had come to 232 THE LAND OP THE PHARAOHS regard as qualities necessary to a successful Khedive. When he made his tour of inspection during the early part of 1894, on his arrival at Assuan he com- mented in terms of great severity on the bearing and discipline of some of the Egyptian troops. These strictures were very badly received by the EngHsh ; Lord Kitchener, the then Sirdar, offered to resign ; and there were representations from the Consul-General regarding the Prince's action. Maher Pasha, the Under Secretary for War, who was sup- posed to have suggested the criticism, was transferred to another department, and Sir E. H. Zohrab Pasha, an officer of Armenian birth and a Christian by re- ligion, who had served on the staff of Lord Wolseley at Tel-el-Kebir, was appointed to succeed Maher Pasha at the Ministry of War. The Sirdar was honoured by the British Government ; and on 14 April the Riaz Pasha Ministry, of which the EngKsh had by this time become tired, ceased to exist, and Nubar Pasha once more accepted office, with Mustapha Pasha Fehmi as Minister of War, and Fakhri Pasha Minister of Pubhc Works and Instruc- tion. Boutros Pasha was made Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Ibrahim Fuad Pasha Minister of Justice, Mazloum Pasha being appointed Finance Minister. Thus matters were smoothed over for the time being ; Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, who had been sacri- ficed in the interest of Khedivial prestige, was now reinstated by the EngHsh to please themselves. Fakhri Pasha, who had been deposed from the Premiership by the British in defiance of the wishes of the Khedive, was now reinstated to please the Prince ; and Boutros Pasha, the Coptic Christian whom the Prince assumed to be a NationaHst, having aUied himself to the real rulers of Egypt during the THE NATIONALIST EEVIVAL 233 short existence of the Riaz Ministry, was rewarded with the portfolio of Foreign Afiairs as the price of his allegiance. Honours being therefore easy, a truce was proclaimed between the EngUsh rulers and their desired vassal, the Khedive. In the meanwhile the English Press and the " Mokattam " began their pro-Enghsh crusade with the maximum of violence, and the minimum of dis- cretion, indiscriminately traducing the Khedive, Riaz, and the Legislative Council ; whilst the native Press led by " Moayyad " took the opposite view, defend- ing those whom the pro-EngUsh Press attacked. The " Joiirnal Egyptien ", representing the Court, took up the cudgels on behalf of the Khedive, showing up the inconsistency of British policy and the arrogance of Lord Cromer and the English Administration. There can be no possible question that the youth- ful Khedive was, in the matter of intelligence, far and away beyond his years. The political discussions of the Khedivial family could not fail to turn upon Tewfik's betrayal of his country into the hands of the English and his greater betrayal of Arabi Pasha. Princess Nazh/ an observant lady of broad views and sincere patriotism, was ever rating Tewfik soundly for his weak and cowardly conduct. These dis- cussions one can well beheve sank deeply into the heart of the young Abbas Hihni ; and when he went to Vienna to be educated and saw that wider field of social progress and poUtical advancement, it can readily be imagined that he fully made up his mind to be the ruler of Egypt in very truth. On his sudden recall to take up the reins of government, he tried to do too much, and in his youthful enthusiasm and immature judgment, he failed to accurately estimate 1 Vide ante, p. 120, note 2. 234 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS the strength and pertinacity of those with whom he hoped to cope successfully. On the other hand, Lord Cromer, who had ruled Tewfik so efiectively, was evidently unable to believe that there might be some merit in the stripling Khedive ; and had the British intentions, pledges, promises, and what not, been of any real value, it would have been realised at a very early date that the young sovereign was no ordinary youth, but one who took his surroundings and responsibilities seriously. Unfortunately, the British proconsul was blind to the merits of Abbas, and from the time of his arrival in Egypt to sit on the throne of his fathers, Lord Cromer treated the Prince as though he were a mere child unworthy of any special consideration, whom he thought could be ordered to do this or that thing, and who must needs obey. That he got into the hands of older and, it is to be feared, designing men, there need be little doubt, and had Lord Cromer been faithfully fulfilling his trust, he should have made it his duty to guard the Prince against evil influences whilst encouraging him in all laudable ambitions ; taking, as far as was politic and consistent, a fatherly interest in the son of the deceased sovereign whom he professed to hold in such high esteem. It must be admitted that this was a task of great difficulty and considerable deh- cacy, but at the same time it would surely have been the lesser evil had Lord Cromer been accused by his detractors of trying to isolate the Khedive, than that he should have been convicted of obstructive and repressive measures — " kind hearts ", they say, " are more than coronets ". As long as the noble Lord was fully exonerated of evil intentions at the bar of his own conscience, the opinions of men for which he had MUSTAPHA PASHA KAMIL FOFN'DEr, OF THE EGYL'TIAN NATIONALIST PAKTY THE NATIONALIST EEVIVAL 235 previously shown, and continued to show, during his term of office, such utter disregard could, or should, have had very little weight with him. It is not the office or occupation that dignifies the man, but it is the man that dignifies the office. But that stodgy British bureaucratic blindness was for the most part at the bottom of Lord Cromer's early treatment of Abbas Hilmi, and his inabiUty to discover any good thing in the stock of Ismail, or the Egyptians, for that matter ; and there was that ap- parent hankering after contemporary plaudits, which caused the Consul-General to be so engrossed in material advantages whereby that celebrated financial handicap might be won, that seemingly it became a passion to the exclusion or subordination of all other considerations. But away in far-ofi Toulouse, in September, 1895, a sweet-smelling plant of patriotism had sprung up in a night. It had blossomed and had shed its tiny firstfruit into the fostering arms of Madame JuKette Adam. " It wished in the old Egypt to wake up the new ". That plant was named The Egyptian Peril, and the gardener's name was Mustapha Kamil. Mustapha Kamil, who not only wished his plant to grow and bear fruit abundantly, but who one day hoped to be the Tribune of the Egyptians. CHAPTEK XIX FASHODA rriHE Anglo-Egyptian force was resting within -■- tlie confines of Omdurman on the day follow- ing the strenuously contested Battle of Kereri,^ when suddenly a steamer — one of General Gordon's which had fallen into the hands of the Dervishes at the fall of Khartoum — mysteriously appeared upon the White Nile. The strange craft stopped. The attention of the British gunboats and the garrison was arrested by the apparition. It was then ob- served that the steamer had put about, full steam up, and was in hasty retreat. A gunboat was immediately dispatched in pursuit of this mysterious craft ; it was overtaken and fetched back to Omdurman, and her Arab captain was brought before Lord Kitchener. The captain, who had served under Gordon, in- formed the hero of Omdurman that the Calipha had sent him against a White Pasha, who had taken up his position at Fashoda, with an armed force. This Pasha, said the captain, who held a strong fortified position, had successfully repulsed the first attack of the Dervish Army sent against him ; and the Arab captain, having returned to procure a strong reinforcement from the Cahpha, was making his way unsuspiciously to Omdurman, when on looking up he suddenly espied the English and Egyptian 1 The Battle of Kereri, fought 2 September, 1898. 236 FASHODA 237 flags floating above the city. He said the flag of the strange Pasha was black, white, and red. That the stranger possessed arms of greater range than those possessed by the Dervishes, and that his own return journey had been greatly accelerated by the bullets of the strangers. Consternation possessed the English officers when they realised that a European had reached the goal of the Upper Valley before them. A consulta- tion was held. They extracted a few bullets from General Gordon's gunboat, and discovered that these were of French manufacture. By a species of de- duction they arrived at the conclusion that the Arab had mixed his colours ; that the flag of the strangers was blue, white, and red, and that France had arrived and held command of the sources of the Nile. Meanwhile, the wires of the civilised world were busy with news of the Battle of Omdurman and the re-conquest of the Soudan. Newspaper correspon- dents, still at the front, were embeUishing the tale of the blood-lust, and the triumph of modern arms and superior discipline over reckless bravery, an- tiquated weapons, and the blood-feud of fanaticism. Egyptian mothers, and English mothers, were being held within the vice-like grip of agonised suspense ; the fevered pulse with maddening dehberation doled out the devout wish, the question born of hope to which the Infinite makes no reply — "Does my son live ? " Nervously the banker or financier fingered his Egyptian script, while he awaited details, which would increase his wealth or land him on the shoals of bankruptcy. All the emotions — ^joy, hope, fear, despair, and cupidity — all were in a state of acute activity ;- when suddenly, with an effect which 238 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS paralysed all thought and effort, the news flashed over the telegraph from Orient to Occident, and from Occident to Orient — " Maechand is at Fashoda " ! Why should this commonplace announcement put the European Chancelleries in a flutter, cause finan- ciers to hold their breaths. Englishman and Egyptian to cease from the joyful celebrations of the victory of Omdurman, and not a few people ask, " Where on earth is Fashoda ? " If you are really interested in knowing where Fashoda is, or was, to be more accurate, because out of courtesy to France the name has been re- moved from the map ; I say, if you are really in- terested, take up the map of Africa, put your finger on Lake Albert Nyanza, and trace it along the Nile in the direction of Egypt ; you turn the bend of the river at Bahr-el-Ghazal, and at the next turn you come to Kodok, which is Fashoda under its Shillouk name. Do not put the map away. Looking towards Egypt you will find Abyssinia on your right, and what is termed the " French sphere " on your left. This will be sufficient to enlighten you, it is to be hoped, not only as regards the location of Fashoda, but why France wanted to get there. It will be remembered that I pointed out in this narrative (Chapters XIII-XIV) how the Egyptian troops had met with reverse after reverse, and how the British had demanded the Egyptian evacuation of the Soudan. England would not help Egypt in the re-conquest of the Soudan, when it could have been accompHshed with little expense to either of the two Grovernments concerned ; and France, watching her opportunity, determined to steal a march on England and Egypt by sending Marchand across the African Continent FASHODA 239 to occupy Fashoda, and the Bahr-el-Ghazal country south of Omdurman. Eight days after the capture of Gordon's gun- boat and its Arab captain, Lord Kitchener arrived before Fashoda with a flotilla of several gunboats, three thousand men, and two batteries of artillery. Four of these gunboats were armed with quick- firing guns. Commandant Marchand immediately boarded Lord Kitchener's steamer, and informed the EngUsh General that he was commissioned by the Govern- ment of France to take possession of Fashoda and the surrounding country, south of Omdurman. Lord Kitchener courteously rephed to the French Com- mandant that he would not be allowed to remain in the Soudan which was the property of the Egyptian Government, and, although abandoned for a time owing to the Dervish revolt, had now, with England's aid, been re-conquered in the name of the Khedive, and that the Coramandant would not be allowed to settle in the province over which so much EngUsh and Egyptian blood and treasure had been expended, in order to retake it. He further informed the French officer that his orders to plant the flags of England and Egypt at Fashoda were expUcit. Lord Kitchener concluded by asking after the health of the Mission, and offered to convey the Commandant and his party back to Cairo via Khartoum. Marchand smiled, thanked Lord Kitchener for his soUcitude, but de- clined to leave without instructions from his Govern- ment. Lord Kitchener had by this time lost all patience with the intrepid Frenchman. " What can you do against these ? " inquired his Lordship, as he rose and pointed to his armed force and threatening guns. 240 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS " Die at my post ! " calmly replied Commandant Marchand. Lord Kitchener instantly realised that he had to deal with one equal in bravery to himself. He, therefore, did the only thing possible to cover up the awkward situation by extendiQg the usual liquid courtesies known to Western culture — " A whisky and soda ". " There is no need for fighting or dying at your post ", declared Lord Kitchener ; " your Government sent you here and your Govern- ment will call you back ; wait and see ".^ The matter was left to the diplomatic arrangement of the two countries, England and France ; and the officers decided upon remaining " as they were ", until instructions should arrive from their respective Governments. Lord Kitchener left Fashoda, but the majority of his soldiers remained before the place tiU news should come. Now, Marchand's force comprised two hundred Senegalese soldiers and four French officers, therefore his idea of resisting or " dying at his post " was, to say the least, quixotic. It was true that he was well supphed with provisions ; but only he himself knew the extent and capacity of his ammunition. In any case, his force, whether assuming a defen- sive or aggressive attitude, was an absolute negative quantity. The CaUpha had declared war upon all " infidels ", and neither the Turk nor the abstruse problems of Western diplomacy possessed any attractions for him. Marchand was an " infidel ", and the CaUpha had sent a force to exterminate him. Had he not been defeated by Lord Kitchener, it is indisputable 1 "NewEgypt", p. 332. FASHODA 241 that the Cahpha would have sent another and stronger body to exterminate the French Mission. The Dervishes asked no quarter and gave none. Their fighting resolved itself into a short shrift, a speedy death, and no questions. Doubtless, and this theory has not to my knowledge been previously advanced, when Delcasse dispatched Marchand, if he did not intend that the Soudan should be quietly annexed, even as Tajourrah had been absorbed by ten sailors of France, early in May, 1884, the French Minister who knew the conditions in the Soudan, must have entertained the sinister intention of having the Mission exterminated by the Dervishes, so as to have a " valid " excuse for sending a French army into the Soudan. I do not claim accuracy for this statement. It is mere speculation. But looking at all the facts it seems mightily like that "... imputation and strong circumstances, Which lead directly to the door of truth." ^ French Ministers of State do not usually suffer from softening of the brain. Marchand was there- fore saved from destruction by the Anglo-Egyptian victory of Omdurman. Had the Battle of Kereri been won by the Dervishes, their whole force would have borne down upon the insignificant Mission, and swept it into the Nile ; and this notwithstanding the modern armaments of the French. These very Dervishes had exterminated Hicks and his ten thou- sand men, and captured the well-defended El-Obeid ; they had taken Khartoum despite General Gordon's bravery, his gunboats and his artillery ; and this all-conquering force was only beaten by an Anglo- Egyptian force of twenty thousand men, aided by powerful guns and several gunboats. 1 Shakespeare's " Othello," Act III, Sc. .3. 242 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS Marchand's hope was either in a union with the Dervishes, or in a revolt of the Egyptian troops, both of which hypotheses are absolutely untenable ; the former for reasons previously stated, and the latter because the loyalty of the Egyptian troops during the EngHsh regime has never been ques- tioned. ^ There was, however, some absurd suggestion that the Egyptian officers informed Marchand when he was being feted at Cairo, that had he held on they were with him ; but this assertion may be dismissed with contempt. The Egyptian officers were fighting in the Soudan for a principle just as much as the Enghsh were. If the English had lost Gordon, Hicks, and Stewart, the Egyptians had lost tens of thou- sands of their countrymen. There were sons, brothers, cousins, whose blood had soaked the arid wastes of Kordofan, and cried aloud for vengeance. The diplomatists of France and England were in the meanwhile having rather heated arguments about their " rights ". They waxed so wroth that they nearly came to blows over a desolate strip of land which nobody really wanted, and for the capture of which a handful of men had tramped wearily across Central Africa, with its untold dangers and priva- tions. Fortunately, peaceful counsels prevailed ; and as M. de Freycinet said when writing at a subsequent date on "La Question d'Egypte " : " After the capture of Khartoum we could no longer delude ourselves. It was evident that the entire squadron was open to the Anglo-Egyptian 1 Marchand himself was responsible for the statement that Egyp- tian officers had told him " had he held out they would have been with him." But this was after the event ; and if the statement was made it was proof that those responsible for the statement had supped " not wisely but too well." French vintage had produced Egyptian fiction for French consumption. FASHODA 243 army. The Marchand Mission had lost its raison d'etre as far as taking possession was concerned. We had no valid arguments against its restoration to the Khedivial authority. . . . M. Delcasse has only abandoned what he could not have retained, for it was not ours to keep ". Sir Reginald Wingate calls the Fashoda incident "a nightmare which is better forgotten", and Lord Cromer, in his history, dismisses the subject with a foot- note.^ For my part I have given it prominence, partly because of its being the key to the aggressive Nation- alist agitation that followed, and also because of the unjust accusations of disloyalty brought agaiast the Egyptian oflBicers ; and, finally, by reason of its effect upon native opiuion with regard to the subse- quent intentions of Great Britain in Egypt, No agitation would have been possible or worthy the name unless it had had the support of the people ; and although this phase of the question has been glossed over by the EngKsh " historian " and political leader writer on the one hand, or utterly ignored on the other, I shall endeavour to show that its bearing on the question was not only important, but it indicated a parting of the ways. Henceforth the relations between England and Egypt could never be the same, by which I mean educated Egypt. England, who had previously played a game of bluff, had at length shown her hand. In the earlier portion of this chapter I endeavoured to show that the Fashoda incident had temporarily suspended thought and paralysed action. During the progress of the negotiations the Press of the two countries precipitately availed itself of the abundant supply of ready-made " copy ", and its 1 " Modem Egypt," Vol. II, p. 43. 244 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS sensational statements and war-scares were not pro- vocative of level-headedness on the part of the public of either France or England. The names of either Sultan or Khedive were very rarely mentioned by the contending scare- mongers. It was a question of English versus French " honour " (!) and prestige first ; and Turkey or Egypt nowhere. Of course, they were squabbling over a worthless plot of " no man's land " ; but England was responsible for the squabble, because of her insistence that the Khedive should abandon the country ; and England, France, and Italy having each procured a sUce of the Ismailian Empire without Euro- pean protest, it is not surprising that the entire Soudan, south of Wadi Haifa and Suakin, should have been considered " no man's land ". When, therefore, the matter was finally settled, and Major Marchand was repudiated by his Govern- ment as a mere " emissary of civilisation ", and English " honour " had been vindicated, the people of Egypt were divided into two camps. The one which included the Copt, the Circassian, the Syrian Christians, and the Europeans, who had for years awaited a definite pronouncement of poUcy on the part of England, not only breathed freely, but was for the most part jubilant. The other and larger class, which represented the majority of the educated, as well as the unlettered, but nevertheless thinking class of the Moslem population, was very naturally indignant. Because the recognition on the part of France of what England pleased to term her " honour ", prestige, and " rights " only meant that an untenable position in Egypt had been made secure, and the foot that had been " firmly planted on the banks of the Nile " had now been carefully FASHODA 245 buried in the Soudan, where it would take root and grow. The British pronouncement also foreshadowed the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 ; and this, in spite of Gladstone's statement to Mustapha Kamil in 1896, two years prior to Fashoda, that " so far as he knew, the time for evacuation had arrived some years ago ".^ When the Houses met in February, 1898, to discuss the Queen's speech, we find Lord Kimberley saying that " it had been clear from the first that the Egyptian Army would be required to be stifiened by British troops ; and he did not consider it was for the interest of this country to embark in the re-conquest of the Soudan. . . . He was not adverse to the extension of our empire, but thought it should be regulated by prudence and a due regard to the limits of our resources ". This staunch Liberal Peer, therefore, recognised the fact that " England had embarked on the re-conquest of the Soudan, and the extension of her empire ". Sir Wilham Harcourt, in the Commons, also held similar views ; for, said he, " in the Soudan we were actually at war in spite of the fact that our settled ' policy ' in Egypt was founded on a determination to abandon the Soudan ". Lord Rosebery, at Perth, 22 October, 1898, had used the phrase, " the Nile is Egypt, and Egypt is the Nile " ; and Sir Edward Grey took up the parable at Huddersfield on the 27th of the same month, declaring that England, as the " trustee " of Egypt, had the obUgation of that trusteeship resting upon her, and that made 1 Mr. Gladstone, writing from Biarritz to Mustaplia Kamil, under date 14 January, 1896, said, " I sympathise with what I understand to be your feelings as an Egyptian, but I am wholly devoid of power. My opinions have always been the same — that we ought to quit Egypt after fulfilling our work for which we went there, with honour and profit to that country. So far as I know, that time arrived some years ago." 246 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS " it imperative for the Government to take the position they occupy and make it impossible for them to recede from it ". And, finally, at the Guildhall banquet to Lord Kitchener on 4 November, 1898, his Lordship of Khartoum concluded his speech with the following pertinent remarks : " During the last two and a half years they (the English) had spent £2,500,000 as a military special grant (including the grant recently made for the extension of the railway from the Atbara to Khartoum). Well, my Lords and gentlemen ", said the Sirdar, " against this large expenditure we have some assets to show ; we have, or shall have, 760 miles of railway, properly equipped with engines, rolKng stock, and a track with bridges in good order. Well, for this running concern, I do not think that £3000 a mile will be considered too high a price. This gives us £2,250,000 out of the money granted, and for the other £250,000 we have 2000 miles of telegraph line, six new and superior gunboats, besides barges, saihng craft, and — The Soudan. . . . We have hoisted the Egyptian and British flags at Khartoum — never again, I hope, to be hauled down ". And Lord Salisbury had authorised Sir Edmund Monson, the British Ambassador at Paris, as far back as 10 December, 1897, to inform M. Hanotaux, the then Foreign Minister of the French Repubhc, that Her Majesty's Government " must not be understood to admit that any other Power than Great Britain has any claim to occupy any part of the Valley of the Nile ". It will therefore be observed that both political party leaders, having recognised the conquest of the Soudan for England, notwithstanding the comic rehef of the " senior partner ", when she courteously FASHODA 247 hoisted the Egyptian flag by the side of the British over Khartoum, and Lord Salisbury having made it quite clear that no other Power nor pohtical Ishmael had any right or claim to occupy any part of the Soudan, there could now be no possible doubt in the minds of the Egyptians as to their future political status. The Anglo-Egyptian Press at once jumped into the arena to defend British prestige ; the French smarting under an imaginary indignity took up the cause of the Egyptian, and the Egyptian native organs were by no means backward iu speaking for themselves. In a very short time the poorest class of fellaheen, who did not understand what all the bother was about, upon being made aware that England had practically taken possession of the country averred that it did not much matter ; but at any rate he was rather glad, because he would now have a supply of water "in his turn", and would not be done out of it by the Pasha or " great ones " of his district. But deep down in his heart there was an imspoken malediction of appalhng magnitude and unprintable virulence which he levelled at the British, and which extended to a long and forgotten line of English ancestry. Things are not what they seem in Egypt. The calm and smiling exterior may, and very often does, cover up a very volcano of bitterness, which might break forth at any moment in eruptive devas- tation. Centuries of oppression have taught the people of the soil to cover up the inward tempest of their minds. And so the British go blundering blindly on, until they are suddenly pulled up by the act of a Wardani. 248 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS The Moslem efiendi,, or petty official, accepted the situation with the same external calm which charac- terised the attitude of the peasant. He knew the Enghsh to be in authority ; and prior to the Fashoda settlement, such vague longings as he possessed in the direction of political emancipation were in a rather chaotic condition, because all that the English had previously ordered had been in the name of the Khedive ; this meant that the Khedive, beiug the lieutenant of the Sultan, it was to His Sublime Majesty that he beUeved he should look for future political amelioration. At the same time, although the appearance of Moukhtar Pasha, the Sultan's Envoy, in Egypt, lent some colour to this opinion, he observed that the Enghsh administrators paid no attention to the desires of the Turkish Envoy, treating him as a sort of political cipher, whose inter- ference in the administration of Egypt was not to be tolerated. Here, then, was a puzzle which he coxild not solve : a puzzle that most highly trained Euro- pean intelhgences were unable to solve. As a result it was no matter for surprise, that after aU his in- tellectual efiort, he returned by a circuitous route to the original starting-point of his reasoning. When he learned that the British Government had put its foot down, declaring that no other Power had any right in Egypt other than itself, he was by no means satisfied ; but in the true Moslem spirit he accepted the inevitable and returned to his desk. He knew now to whom he should look for poKtical advancement. England had declared herself the responsible authority in Egypt ; henceforth England would be asked for those hberal institutions which she had so ghbly promised in the early days of the Occu- pation. England would also be reminded that the FASHODA 249 " Grovermnent would be handed over to the Egyptians when they were capable of governing themselves " ; and in order that there might be no excuse for the non-fulfilment of these pledges, the Egyptian ofl&cial determined thenceforth to assiduously apply himself to his allotted task ; and the richer well-to-do fathers — famihes of the efEendi class — seconded the efforts of the native officials, by sending their sons to the colleges of Europe and Syria to quahfy for that higher responsibility which was eventually to be theirs ; whilst the poorer parents who possessed like am- bitions, made the best of the rather inadequate Egyptian educational institutions. The Turco- Circassian " party ", on the other hand, who had always considered themselves the hereditary rulers of Egypt and possessed great landed iuterests, whilst assuming an attitude of utter indifierence towards the Egyptians, were strong in their hatred of English domination, because they felt that England had wrested the power of ruling from them ; and as they for the most part had been educated in French establishments, their sympathies were wholly with France, inasmuch as they hoped that should France once more gain the ascendancy in Egyptian afiairs, there would be a chance of their regain- ing at least some of their lost prestige and power, and the hated British would be humbled in the dust. When they discovered the unexpected turn events had taken they at once dissembled^ and coramenced to drift with the tide of English mastery. Meanwhile, the Copts, who for generations had been held in comparative subjugation by respective Mohammedan and Turkish masters, were overjoyed at England's diplomatic success, because they had 250 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS for some considerable period arrived at the con- clusion that poUtical advancement and oflicial pre- ferment were only to be obtained through and by English aid. Th^ir unquestioned industry and inti- mate knowledge of clerical work, which they had shared with the Syrians for centuries in the various administrative departments of Egypt, had made them valuable to the English, who largely adopted their services in the early days of the Occupation. As time went on the demand for Coptic assistance increased, and this led them to beheve that England was not only well-disposed towards them, but that by upholding British rule they would be supporting a tolerant Christian power, who would not overlook the matter of identical faith when the time arrived for the distribution of important posts. The Syrian Christians were of the same mind, and they, without in any way undervaluing the undoubted qualifications of the Copts, were the most enhghtened and progressive of these two ele- ments ; and this for the most part because of the exalted character of their schools, and the high stan- dard of Syrian education which was above and beyond anything obtaining in Egypt. The Latin Europeans — ^well, any one having ex- perience of these people is aware that they are at once emotional and mercurial. They knew that they had their own laws, which England had left alone with the rotten International Tribunals — a judicial system by this time being slightly improved by the EngUsh administrators. These would have preferred French ascendancy in Egypt, and did not hesitate to pro- claim their desires to the world ; but when once British diplomacy had efiected what they thought could not be accomplished without bloodshed, they FASHODA 251 shxugged their shoulders, lit the inevitable cigarette, and retuxned to their accustomed avocations. The less representative section of the Greeks, who had from time immemorial periodically bled the fellaheen, were by no means pleased with the altered condition. The Enghsh being masters of the country meant for them a considerable reduction in their usurious profits. In passing, I would mention that there is a large and influential class of Greeks in Egypt who are quite as disgusted with, and ashamed of, the conduct of their rapacious brethren as are the other representative foreigners in Egypt ; and it would be the height of injustice to put it on record that all the Greeks of Egypt are dishonest money- lenders. The reputable Greeks of Egypt are among the most respected class of residents ; and fortunately of late years, owing to a combination of circumstances which have operated against their unholy trade, these human vampires have been greatly reduced in num- bers, although it is very questionable whether they win ever be entirely stamped out. As long as there are borrowers there wUl be usurers ; and the much- advertised Agriciiltural Banks are so swaddled in red- tape, that their vexatious administrative delays have for the most part compelled the fellaheen, whom they were supposed to relieve, to fall back upon the ever- present Greek and Syrian of the hypocritical smile, and the ever-open purse. And last, but by no means least, the Ulema, as a body, were with the people ; and the opinions of the effendis, and the masses, were but a reflex of El-Azhar sentiments. Fashoda, therefore, stands out in bold reUef as the true starting-point of aggressive Egyptian Nationalist agitation. 252 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS Prior to Fashoda nobody in Egypt knew politically where they were, or what might happen next. They suspected that England was not there on a philan- thropic mission of self-aggrandisement ; and as a choice of evils if European rule were absolutely indis- pensable, there was hardly an individual, whether native or European — exclusive of the " Turks " and the French — who would not have preferred EngHsh domination to that of any other European Power. What irritated the native and provoked distrust in his mind was the hypocrisy of the EngUsh, and the non-fulfilment of their pledges. They performed their self-imposed tasks in the name of the Khedive. If success attended their efforts they got the credit ; but when they blundered, as they oft-times did and do even to this day, the Khedive was blamed for permitting them to make a mess of things. But subsec[uent to Fashoda, praise or blame was put upon the right shoulders. Therefore, Fashoda, in its relation to Modern Egyptian history, can neither be dispatched with a phrase, nor be dismissed with a footnote. ?#.^'i^ " Egyptian French Letters ", p. 258. "TAKE COURAGE!" 323 which was destined to be his last, he said, " A little while and I shall soon disappear ! " Illness, brought on by overwork in the cause of Egyptian independ- ence, had wrecked a frail constitution, and on Monday, 10 February, 1908, Mustapha Pasha Kamil breathed his last, to the everlasting regret of his compatriots, and the universal grief of the Egyptian nation. Before he passed unto that bourne whence no traveller has returned, to his sorrowing brother he gave this final counsel : " Take courage, work with perseverance and as- siduity so as to arrive easily at our end ". CHAPTER XXIV THE MODEEN EEHOBOAM NEVER before in the history of Egypt had there been such universal regret for the death of a private individual. Mustapha Pasha Kamil was followed to his final resting-place by half a million of all grades of his sorrowing countrymen ; young men and maidens mourned him forty days. His brother Ali Fehmi received 13,334 telegrams and 8430 letters of con- dolence. Four days after Mustapha's death the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party met and elected Mohammed Bey Farid, who had been previously nominated by Kamil as his successor, as President of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, Ali Fehmi Kamil, Mustapha's brother, being elected Vice-President. On Tuesday, 11 February, 1908, " The Egyptian Gazette " announced the death of Mustapha Pasha Kamil with a joy chastened by the event ; it also promised to pubhsh an appreciation of the young leader on the following day ; but evidently this being too much to grant a fallen enemy, the matter was quietly dropped. The anti-Nationalist Press was, how- ever, unable to contain its joy, and it averred that inasmuch as Kamil had ceased from troubling. Nationalism would be at rest. The universal native demonstrations of popular grief on the occasion of the funeral, and the Commemoration Ceremony forty 324 ilOHAMKI) FAKII) BEY i'j;K^n'f;Ni of the ];i.vi'ri\N xatiuxai.i.si cAinv THE MODERN REHOBOAM 325 days after the leader's death, had a somewhat damp- ing efEect upon their rather precipitate joy; proving to them, as nothing else could have done, the whole- hearted love of the people for their leader, and their apparent determination to respect his memory by carrying on his work. In January, 1908, whilst Mustapha Kamil lay ill, Sheykh Ali YoussefE, editor of " El Moayyad " and Alim of El-Azhar, was elected to the Legislative Council, doubtless as a reward for his surrender to the Occupationists. On the 18th of the same month. Dr. Rutherford, who had arrived in Cairo, was entertained at dinner by the " Reform Party ", Ali YoussefE, the leader of that party, presidiag. The Doctor's poUtical views being well known in Egypt, the fact of his having been received by those who had now become anti-Nationalist, and who had killed the fatted calf in honour of the Doctor, caused the British Press, led by the "Egyptian Gazette", to wax sarcastic at the expense of the NationaUsts ; and this, no doubt, led the Alim of the El-Azhar, and Editor of " El Moayyad," to believe that he had scored a point against the Nationalists by entertain- ing an Enghsh leader of much weight and influence. As a consequence, in his efiorts to out-Herod Herod, he not only proceeded to speak of the Occupation in terms of marked respect, but went so far as to advise its maintenance, subsequently stating that he wanted a constitution for Egypt with the Khedive as independent ruler, with a hint that an Arab Caliphate might be instituted and thus be transferred from Turkey to Egypt ; for this reason it would appear that his journal, which had a wide circulation in Turkey, has been forbidden in that country. There was no doubt about Nationalism making 326 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS headway in Egypt under Mustapha Kamil, notwith- standing Lord Cromer's declaration that it was a " wholly spurious and manufactured movement " ; ^ and that he should have advocated repressive measures to Orientals struggling for freedom, at a time when he himself was in the act of receiving the Freedom of the City of London, is not only grotesque, but proves the great Proconsul to be lacking in both a sense of humour and proportion.^ Of course, this was only natural. In 1904 ^ he was so seriously convinced of his popularity and that he had successfully built up native " confidence in the intentions of the rulers ", that he even contemplated withdrawing the Army of Occupation, but there was such a British outcry in Egypt against this action, that the order, which I understand had been given, was very speedily with- drawn. As Mr. Portal said in 1887, the Enghsh resi- dent knew that " it must not be supposed that the fellah is grateful to the existing administration. . . . The fellah looks upon the English as a national mis- fortune " ; * therefore his Lordship, on finding that for a quarter of a century he had pursued a chimera, of which there was abundant evidence in the Kamil demonstrations, not only experienced chagrin, but became revengeful when he saw the " spurious " agitator taking true soundings of the sentiments of the people. There were unmistakable signs of restiveness among the people long before the advent of Kamil — the ' "Egyptian Standard", 6 May, 1907. 2 " For my own part, I say, I see no method of dealing with this unrest and disturbance in Egypt and in India. . . . It is to continue steadily to do our duty towards the people of those two countries, and to come down with a heavy hand upon extremists, should they overstep the limits of the law".— "The Times", 1 October, 1907. ' "Egypt", No. 1 (1904), p. 6. 4 Rid., No. 2 (1888), p. 3. THE MODEEN REHOBOAM 327 KafEra incident, for example, which, occurred on Sunday, 27 March, 1887, near the Ghizeh Pyramids. He merely imparted impetus to the quickening pro- cess which had set in. The dry bones had assumed flesh; he merely breathed the breath of hfe upon them, and they stood forth at his bidding, living and sentient beings. Fashoda, by causing England to come into the open and declare a poUcy, gave him the first peg on which he could hang tangible aggression on the part of England ; and the Tabah incident, with its direct challenge to the sovereign rights of the Sultan, was not calculated to improve good feeUng. Tabah, which Ues near the northern end of the west coast of the Gulf of Akabah, was occupied by the troops of the Sultan early in January, 1906. The Egyptian soldiers, who had been dispatched to take up posts in the Sinai Peniusula and to occupy Tabah itself, found Turkish troops in possession, and the Turkish flag flying over Tabah. An ultimatum was sent to the Sultan to evacuate within ten days, and on 13 May of the same year, the Sultan, by agreeing to evacuate the Peninsula, ended the matter. It was during these negotiations, lasting from February to May, that Egypt was in a state of ferment. The pro-English Press did the very opposite to what wisdom should have dictated. There were two views held by the people : the prospect of war between Turkey and England which they did not want, on the one hand, and on the other, the opinion which had got abroad that England wanted to get posses- sion of the Damascus-Bagdad railway, and so seize upon the Holy Places, thus making her stay in Egypt permanent. All previous conquerors of Egypt had sought to conquer Syria and the Hejaz ; of 328 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS course, England had no such intention. In the first place, the railway was a German enterprise ; and, secondly, the Holy Places on the way to El Medina were not possessed of that commercial value which would attract the British. There was, however, no getting away from the fact that the Sultan had been made to climb down ; and being humiliated, the people of Egypt felt that, right or wrong, their religious head had received a gratuitous indignity at the hands of England. Negotiations were con- ducted in the Khedive's name, but the " trustees " of Egypt were the prime movers in the matter ; and the pro-English Press, assuming as it did an aggressive attitude, provoked the " unrest " by un- settling the minds of the people. There need be little doubt that the actions of the pro-English Press threw many waverers into the ranks of the Nationalists ; because Lord Cromer having but recently — that is, just prior to the incident — given his promise to remove at least a part of the British troops, this new act, which bore the hall-mark of aggression, was intended to remove any confidence which the native might have had in the promises of the English. Just one month after this incident was settled it was followed by the Denshawai " out- rage " ; and this, because of its transparent injustice, could not fail to discredit the name of England for all time, and was the indirect cause of the assassination of Boutros Pasha three and a half years afterwards. Lord Crolner having left for England, a Mr. Finlay, acting as British Agent and Consul-General, de- scribed the trial in his dispatches as " conducted with dignity and in strict accordance with the law — there has not been the slightest trace of panic or vindictive- ness " : and Lord Cromer's comment in his memo- THE MODERN REHOBOAM 329 randa appended to Mr. Finlay's dispatch declared that, " It may, indeed, be said that the judicial system is, perhaps, half a century in advance of the ideas and standard of civilisation of the people " of Egypt. This, after a quarter of a century of mess and muddle, but described in the noble Lord's glowing reports of earlier days as his " civilising influence ". The trial took place before a " Special Tribunal ", a sort of modern Star Chamber, which suspended all laws — one of Lord Cromer's pet schemes for oppress- ing natives when suspected of ofiences against the British Army. The proceedings lasted three days, and a bare fortnight had elapsed between the " inci- dent " and the execution of the unfortunate villagers. The court remarked " that the officers could have shot the villagers as they did the pigeons "} The Omdeh of Denshawai was deposed, and a posse of Cairo poUce were installed as rulers. This was called English justice, and was brought into bold relief by another incident which occurred but a few days prior to the afiair of the Ghizeh Pjrramids, when an Italian doctor, shooting in a cornfield at Shoubrah, had been attacked by the fellaheen, and a struggle ensued for the possession of the gun, which went off, accidentally killing the doctor. The feUaheen were acquitted in this case. ^ The gallows were ordered to be erected at Denstawai four days before the trial, and the foUowing remarkable telegram was published in the "Daily Chronicle" on 21 June, three clear days before the trial.- — "Shokt Shbift. " The preliminary inquiry into the attack on British officers . . . has been concluded. Everything indicates that the outrage was much more serious than at first supposed, and that it was prearranged (?) Fortunately this time Lord Cromer is convinced of the bad faith of the natives. They will be severely dealt with, and the sentences wiU be carried out immediately, those condemned to death being shot in public. There will be no appeal ". The shooting occurred 13 June, 1906. Inquiry held 17-19 June. Lord Cromer left for England 19 June. 330 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS But in the incident of tlie Ghizeh Pyramids, when two British officers shooting near the Pyramids accidentally wounded four Arabs, the usual struggle for the possession of the gun took place with the usual result : the peasant was accidentally killed. The villagers assembled and assaulted the officers for killing the fellah. They were brought, by no means tenderly, before a "Mihtary Commission". Twelve of them were sentenced to a severe flogging in the presence of the other villagers, and were sub- sequently imprisoned for a period of six months.^ In neither of these cases was justice done. The fellah should have been tried for manslaughter in the case of the Italian doctor, for he deserved punishment, notwithstanding the accident. Similarly the English officers in the Kaffra affair were guilty of manslaughter, for which they should have been tried. And in the case of the Denshawai incident, it was conclusively proved that Captain Bull had run a distance of two miles in the direction of his camp when he was overcome by the heat and fell by the roadside ; and, finally, a native who saw him fall went to his assistance, and when the soldiers turned out to " rescue " their captain, they found him in charge of the young fellah. Supposing him to have injured the captain, they clubbed the good Samaritan to death with the butts of their rifles. Nothing, however, was heard of the killing of this native at the trial ; but " exemplary punish- ment " was meted out to the impertinent and pre- suming native who desired to protect his own in his own country, from the EngHsh aggressor. There was that famous case of the Khedive's 1 The chief persons of several surrounding villages were also flogged as'a wholesome lesson, and three Sheykhs were fined and im- prisoned. ' Vide " Standard ", 10 April, 1887. THE MODERN REHOBOAM 331 prize bull. The bull, recently imported from Europe, was stolen, and the thief was known locally. The Parquet, representing the Procureur-General, were unable to find the miscreant, and the police were no more successful, because they thought their ex- perience and position superior to that of the Mudir, and never troubled to consult him in the matter. Both Parquet and poUce having given proof of their incapacity, the Mudir took the matter into his own hands at the instigation of a large landed proprietor in the district. The landowner, Minshawi Pasha, successfully persuaded the Mudir to send the sus- pected men, whom he had arrested, from the gaol to his ezheh, where they were bastinadoed into confes- sion, and were then sent back to prison to await the ordinary course of justice, via poKce and Parquet. Of course, the capable British Administrator was unable to discover the thieves ; but he discovered the high-handed action of the Mudir and the land- lord, who were both imprisoned on 25 April, 1902, for three and two months respectively. The action of both these personages was quite illegal ; unless the law is re- spected it were as well to abohsh it altogether. But notwithstanding the theory that even-handed justice was being meted out to these " high ones," it is a moot point whether an Englishman in authority, or even a mere English " resident " committing a similar act of violence, would have been treated with the same " even-handed " justice. There is one law for rich and poor in Egypt, but such law only applies to natives ; this is proved by the Kaffra and Denshawai incidents. The words of an English " Resident ", who boldly stated that, " several times I have come upon a ridiculous street row between two Arabs " (italics mine) " which, owing to the supine- 332 THE LAND OF THE PHAKAOHS ness of the police, might go on indefinitely and drag in others on each side, and hy a few blows to each with a thick stick, I have calmed the trouble like magic, and all was peace and quiet again ",^ only proves what a sham this " even-handed " justice is. This same sort of thing has been going on in India for the most part during the past sixty or seventy years, and, in fact, wherever the English lord it over coloured races. Take, for instance, the " Gordon (?) riots " in Jamaica, where Mr. Gordon, the coloured landed proprietor and member of the House of Assembly, was illegally taken from his bed at dead of night to answer an imaginary charge of sedition, " tried " by a sham court martial, sentenced to death and executed out of hand by the order of Governor Ejrre.^ "Although Governor Eyre approved of his execution", says Herbert Paul, "history must pro- nounce it to have been murder without even the forms of law ". The Governor was tried in England, owing to the storm raised at the time by the justice-loving members of the British pubhc ; but even he was acquitted, " in the interests of British official au- thority and prestige ". Yet this act of " even-handed English justice " was not confined to the execution of Gordon ; the ring-leaders of the rioters, including women, were taken out and whipped with telegraph wire so that justice should be established ! English aggression and repression in Egypt is therefore not wanting in precedent to maintain a system of brutality. It is very questionable whether the Khedive's bull incident impressed the natives with British impartiality.^ If the " great one " basti- 1 "A Resident" in "The Daily Express", London, 3 May, 1910. 2 " Modem England " (Herbert Paul), Vol. Ill, pp. 3-7, 9. 5 The late Minshawi Pashi, who was tried in his own native town of Tautah, was an influential and wealthy native Pasha ; he was THE MODERN REHOBOAM 333 nadoed a thief without a formal trial, the British, after a sham trial, had whipped them for offences they had not committed, or only committed under great provocation, as in the KafEra and Denshawai affairs ; and as Lord Cromer himself declares, " that the judicial system is perhaps half a century in advance of the ideas and standard of civihsa- tion of the people ",^ it is a rather remarkable fact that the system should be carried out to the letter between native and native, and should be devoid of even its spirit when operating between Enghsh and native. Besides, the degradation of a Mudir or other native dignitary for a technical breach of the law, does not enhance peasant respect for that law which permits an EngUshman of lesser esteem to go unpunished for a much greater offence against a native. When Sir Eldon Gorst returned to Egypt as Consul-General in 1907, the people of Egypt looked forward to his coming as a possible saviour. Lord Cromer's final pronouncement against the National- ists at the Opera House, Cairo, on the eve of his departure, had left a rather bitter taste in the mouths of all the inhabitants of Egypt, except the most rabid Occupationists ; but when you are bidding farewell to a sworn foe, knowing that you will shortly see the last of him, you pay little attention to his parting diatribes. The old Jeroboam was passing away with his whippings, and " Special Tribunals ", and other civiUsing influences, and a little talk more or less was after all not very harmful. The Egyptians had been compelled to bear worse things than talk actively identified with tie Arabi " rebellion " of 1882. He had saved the lives of a large number of Europeans during the troubles of 1882, and for this act was allowed to return to Egypt. ' "Egypt", No. 3-4(1906). 334 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS during his rule of a quarter of a century. Having at length got rid of him, they hoped for a " new era " of better promise from the new ruler who had served amongst them so long,^ and who, knowing their language thoroughly, was likely to be in greater sympathy by being able to personally listen to and understand their complaints : as regards his prede- cessor this was impossible. He was familiar with the people owing to his connection with the Interior Ministry, and he had a full grasp of the finances of the country of which he was Adviser. It therefore seemed that the choice of Sir Eldon Gorst was the most happy that England could have made ; and what was more pleasing, it was understood that he was the bearer of the oUve branch from England to the Egyptians, and that the new policy being in- augurated was intended to draft competent natives into higher ofl&cial posts. This was most pleasing to the Egyptians, for they felt that after years of waiting and tribulation hope had come at last. Unfortunately, Sir Eldon Gorst was not a diplo- matist, although he had been an Attache and Secre- tary of Legation. One of his first ofl&cial acts was to sow discontent by summoning the British ofl&cials to his presence, teUing them with brutal candour that in a short time their services would no longer be required, inasmuch as he had come to give Egyp- tians a larger share in the administration by at once admitting them to the higher posts, and that it was better to have the work performed according to the view of the British Government, less satisfactorily ^ Sir Eldon Gorst was appointed to Cairo September, 1886. He was made Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior in Egypt (1894) and Financial Adviser (1898). THE MODERN REHOBOAM 335 by the Egyptian natives, than by the more competent English officials. It was not his own policy, but the policy with which he was charged, and which he intended carrying out. Here was a statesman-like pronouncement which seemed to have been specially designed to defeat its own ends. I have already pointed out what manner of man the EngUsh official for the most part is hke. Is it within the compass of human nature to expect hearty co-operation from officials who were thus brutally told that their occupation was gone, es- pecially the younger men, and that their pensions, which would not materialise until they had completed fifteen years' service, would be ruthlessly wrested from them ? Were they likely to advance native efficiency to their own material detriment ? An Englishman who had been deputed by a London Daily to inquire into the Egyptian situation, al- though showing, unwittingly perhaps, how inept the whole system has proved, when dealing with this phase of the situation informs us that, " amongst a section of the British pubhc there seems to exist a rooted belief that Egypt is partially retained by England as a convenient dumping-ground for officials belonging by family or other ties to those in high places at home, and that most of the British officials in Egypt are there, not because of any special capacity, but by reason of personal favour ". He then tries to prove what an overworked, much-to-be-pitied in- dividual the British official in Egypt is ; and by im- pHcation endeavours to show that the "section of the British public " is mistaken in its " rooted belief." Perhaps this well-intentioned individual will inform us how it turns out that one, other than a member of a high-placed family, could afford to " spend in 336 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS five years £1500 more than he had earned, merely in carrying out his duties " ? ' I regret that the law of Hbel is so elastic as to bring it within the compass of " highly placed families ", or I coidd supply this gentleman with the names of a few scions of nobility operating in Egypt, " belonging by family and other ties to those in high places ". The arguments of some of the authorities (!) on poor old Egypt are indeed comic. In fulfilment of the new " policy ", Sir Eldon Gorst, on the retirement of Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, early in 1909 appointed Boutros Pasha Ghali as Prime Minister, with Mohammed Said Pasha as Minister of the Interior. These appointments were by no means satisfactory to the majority of thinking Egyptians. Boutros Pasha was a Copt in the first place, and therefore could not well be considered a representa- tive minister, any more than his predecessor, who may be termed a Turco-Egyptian. In the second place, Boutros Pasha had for years been regarded as an adherent of the Occupation ; and his ofl&cial record, extending as it did from 1875 when he was Secretary to Ismail Sadyk, Ismail Khedive's Mou- fettish, whom he served at the period of his assassina- tion, was by no means savoury to the main body of the Egyptian people. He had first been connected with the International Commission, under Lord Cromer, and was subsequently elevated to the Ministry of Finance, then to that for Foreign Affairs. He had also presided at the famous Denshawai trial, the finding of which Egyptians were not Ukely to so soon forget ; and on his appointment the Nation- aKst Press did not fail to publish his record. This » "Egypt Revisited," "The Standard," London, 10 September, 1910. THE MODERN REHOBOAM 337 being displeasing to him, he forthwith induced Sir Eldon Gorst to re-enact the Press Laws, which brought about the suppression of several Nationalist journals and the imprisonment of their editors, in- cluding that of the Sheykh Shawish, which pro- voked a demonstration of three thousand students against the Press Laws on 31 March, 1909. They demonstrated again on 1 April, when they were charged by the poUce and several arrests made. Prosecution and persecution rained upon the Nation- ahsts from every side, and his crowning treachery to his country was the launching of the Suez Canal con- cession scheme. During the ten years ending 1908, £4,200,000 was supposed to have been the expendi- ture by the Egyptian Government on the Soudan. In 1904, by the Anglo-French agreement, the Reserve Funds, established in 1888 for the accumulation of Budget surpluses, and the Casse of the debt were merged into one ; and the British management under- took to pay the coupon, the Casse being abolished. This brought £13,000,000 to the Egyptian Treasury ; another £13,000,000 should have been added to the fund from further surpluses accruing during the succeeding five years, making a total of about £26,000,000 at least in the Egyptian Treasury. Ac- cording to the official statement the Fund only amounts to about £6,000,000 ; ^ therefore it is esti- mated that no less than £20,000,000 has taken itself ofE since 1904. In presenting the annual Budget to the Legislative Council the Government never esti- mates what it means to spend out of the Fund, it merely gives an outline of the working expenses of the past year. The Government refused to give any account of the money spent from the Reserve, not- i "Egypt", No. 1 (1910). 338 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS withstanding the repeated request of the Council. Yehia Pasha attacked the financial policy of the Government with regard to their reckless use of the Reserve Fund as recently as November, 1909; and Ismail Abaz Pasha, in the Legislative Council, 3 January, 1910, exposed the wild speculations of the Government without proper account being ren- dered to the Council. It would appear that while the Government claim only to have spent £4,200,000 on the Soudan, Yehia Pasha estimated it at not less than £18,700,000 ! As a consequence the Egyptian Treasury, not being in that healthy state which should have resulted from twenty-eight years of reform and civiKsation, not to mention that frequently cited "race," in casting about for a new source of revenue turned to the Suez Canal, which the Egyptian Government offered to the present Suez Canal Company for forty years for £4,000,000, to be paid in four annual instalments. Thus the original Concession, which does not expire until 1968, would have been presented to the Company by the Egyptian Government until the year 2008, free, gratis, and for nothing; or for £4,000,000 and percentage, ranging from 4 to 12 per cent, of the net revenue, which is practically] a gift.^ The Nationalist Press got wind of the scheme and demanded that the General Assembly be immediately convoked, and also that the Government be bound by the vote of the Assembly. This prolongation of the Concession was being operated secretly ; and it looks rather suspicious that this concession, which was an undoubted gain to British interests, and does not expire until 1968, should 1 Vide "Times", 18 February, 1910. Commercial Supplement. THE MODERN REHOBOAM 339 have been engineered at a period coincident with the introduction of a Native Ministry. I wonder ? The Assembly by sixty-six votes to one rejected the scheme. In the Ministry, Mohammed Said Pasha, who had spoken rather plainly to Boutros about his under- handed and traitorous methods, was coolly informed that " no one was indispensable " : on 20 Feb- ruary, 1910, as the Prime Minister was leaving the Ministry of the Interior, Ibrahim Wardani shot him as a protest against the betrayal of his country. Boutros Pasha was taken to the hospital, where he died shortly after a necessary operation to extract the bullet. There were wholesale arrests, searches, and no smaU amount of espionage. Wardani was tried on 21 April. The medical authorities called at the trial, whether foreign or native, deposed for the most part that the Prime Minister died from the necessary operation and not from the bullet wounds. Mr. Bond, a member of the Court who had ofl&ciated at the Denshawai trial, was objected to by the defence ; but the objection was overruled. A commission of three medical men, two English and one Egyptian, were ordered by the prosecution to inquire into the cause of death. They disagreed. The English doctors held that the wounds inflicted by Wardani were mortal, while the Egyptian prac- titioner's opinion was that the operation had caused the Prime Minister's death, and but for the operation, Boutros Pasha would have lived. The Court sentenced Wardani to death. The chief counsel for the defence, Helbawi Bey — who had prosecuted on behalf of the Government at the Denshawai trial, and had earned thereby the male- 340 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS dictions of the entire Mohammedan population of Egypt, and had subsequently thrown up his official appointment to advance the cause of the Nation- alists — having made a public avowal of his convic- tions at the Egyptian Geneva Congress of 1909, now that Wardani had been condemned, turned to the prisoner, and after blessing him, concluded his address in the following remarkable language : "Go to your death with a brave heart and a firm step. For death will come to you to-morrow, if not to-day, and will not be denied. Go, my child, go to your God, Who holds the scales of sublime equity untrammelled by the necessities of circumstances. Go, our hearts go with you, our eyes will weep with you for ever. Go, your death-sentence pronounced by human justice may prove more than your life, a great lesson to your people and your country. Go. If man has no pity for you, Divine mercy is fathom- less. Farewell, my child. Farewell, farewell ! " ^ There was yet another surprise in this extra- ordinary affair. The Grand Mufti, owing to a techni- cality in Koranic Law, refused to grant a " fetwa " ordering the execution. This refusal had nothing whatever to do with the Faith of the dead Prime Minister, although great excitement was caused at the time, owing to the misrepresentations of the Egyptian pro-Enghsh papers, who seized upon the incident to misrepresent the interpretation of the Grand Mufti's finding, in order to make it appear as though this was an act of anti-Christian fanaticism and aggression, borne out by Islamic doctrine.* ^ The trial was held in camera, but Helbawi Bey's speech was printed and circulated in pamphlet form by the Nationalists. ^ The Grand Mufti's document sets forth that inasmuch as Wardani had been tried by the Civil Authority and condemned without regard to Islamic jurisprudence, this proceeding according to Koranic law being irregular, it was not in his power to grant a Fetwa. THE EX-8ULTAN OF TURKEY ADIiUL IIAMID THE MODERN REHOBOAM 341 Sir Eldon Gorst's efforts in the direction of consti- tutional reform, which the Egjrptians were led to expect him to inaugurate, merely amounted to an enlargement of the scope of the Provincial Councils without freedom of action, and devoid of initiative ; this was nothing but a bastard reform. The Com- mittee of the Legislative Council who had the matter under consideration, were by no means pleased with it, inasmuch as it was a rehash of the Organic Law of 1883. The Legislative Council was accorded the " privilege " of admitting the press and public to its sittings, and to question the Ministry ; but all questions were to be submitted five days in advance, and then the Ministers were not compelled to answer unless they so desired ; no supplementary questions were to be put, and the President of the Council was to have the right of disallowing or censoring any and all questions. Needless to say, the Legislative Council has never availed itself of these rather negative " reform " concessions. The ferment in Turkey over the Revolution and deposition of Abdul Hamid by the Young Turks brought matters to a cKmax in Egypt, and on 1 December, 1908, the Legislative Council passed a resolution demanding representative government.^ The General Assembly had passed a similar resolu- tion eighteen months earlier, and on this occasion the debate lasted three months.^ The Nationalist Press, notwithstanding the death of Kamil, had gathered strength and volume. It made its strength felt in the remotest corners of Egypt. 1 Vide Appendix at the end of this chapter. Abdul Hamid was formally deposed by a vote of the Turkish National Assembly, 27 April, 1909, his brother, Reshad Efifendi, being proclaimed Sultan as Mohammed V, and was invested with the sword of Osman, 10 May, 1909. 2 "Egypt", No. 1 (1909), p. 5. 342 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS Meetings and demonstrations were being organised everywhere, and these demonstrations ioxmd a re- sponsive echo in the active participation of the now thoroughly aroused fellaheen. The Nationalist spirit was assuming such huge proportions that an effort was made by the Government to encroach upon the rights and liberties of the Bl-Azhar University.^ Twelve thousand students once more struck, and the Rector resigned. His successor was installed by the pohce ; but this only resulted in the Ulema and students of the University throwing in their lot with the Nationalists, and street demonstrations were made against the Khedive and the British Administra- tion.^ Sir Eldon Gorst then re-introduced the Press Laws of 1881, and inpreased the Army of Occupation. The Press Laws required that printers and publishers should obtain a licence from the Ministry of the In- terior ; a heavy sum was to be deposited, and the licence could be refused or cancelled at the discretion of the Minister, whose mere order may suppress a newspaper after two warnings. The Council of Ministers had the right to sup- press any paper, without warning, which was tanta- mount to absolute annihilation ; there being no guarantee, the whim of a Minister was sufficient to terminate the existence of the most expensive journalistic production. On 4 July, 1909, the law " for placing certain per- sons under pohce supervision " was instituted. These persons, or dangerous characters " well known to be in the habit of making attempts on the life or property 1 Fide "Times", 24 February, 1909, and "Stamboul" (Constanti- nople), 23 March, 1909. 2 See Appendix at the end of this chapter. THE MODERN REHOBOAM 343 of another person, or threatening the person and property ", can be hauled before a Special Commission under suspicion, and condenmed by that body to pohce supervision at their place of residence for a period of five years, or be deported to places selected on Egyptian territory, duriag such term of super- vision, if unable to give financial or personal security for good behaviour. Similarly as a " precautionary " measure, a person acquitted by the Court of Assize, owing to " insufficient evidence ", may be treated in a hke manner. The Law having left the amount of the security for a " suspect " to the discretion of the Minister, it ranges from £100 to £1000, or even more. The Government, therefore, has no difficulty in dis- posing of, or deporting, inconvenient persons. The net was cast, and the first draw landed 12,000 sus- pects within six months. The Minister having gradu- ally revised the lists, by 1 March over 250 persons were deported to the Dakhla Oasis.^ It is not difficult to determine the trend of these two repressive weapons, and that they will be used for political purposes is as certain as that the night follows day. Though the Egyptian people well knew that the British Agency had done this abominable work as an advance effort of " reform " and " educa- tion " of the natives, so that they would be qualified to undertake the burthens of Government and suffrage ; they were also aware that Boutros Pasha, as a native Egyptian Minister, held the alternative of resigning were he not in sympathy with these reforming measures. There can be little doubt that he was only too glad of these repressive schemes, because they gave him the mastery over the mass of the people who had not forgotten his covenant with 1 "Egypt", No. 1 (1910). 344 THE LAND OP THE PHARAOHS the Englisli at Denshawai. It miglit therefore be con- cluded that the Press Laws were to throttle a Press which would not fail to make itself heard against an unsatisfactory Ministry, and a still more unpopular and inept Proconsul. The Special Commissions, though aiming at the ordinary criminal, were intended to be a sort of sword of Damocles suspended over the head of the Nationalist leaders. The assassination of Boutros Pasha is a proof that the people have been thoroughly aroused ; and that regrettable incident was a protest against a form of repression which may spread itself over the face of the country, reappearing like a thief in the night. The people of Egypt are not a revengeful people ; but even the worm has been known to turn, and the Administrator who was commissioned to bring peace and goodwill may be likened unto Rehoboam of old, for he has abundantly demonstrated that his little finger is thicker than Lord Cromer's loins ; for whereas the ex-Proconsul chastised the Egyptians with whips, the modern Rehoboam has chastised them with scorpions. According to the words of Mohammed Parid Bey, " In order to taste the water you must first uncork the bottle ". The Egyptians have not only uncorked the Occu- pation bottle but have drunk deeply of the bitter waters of British Administration, until they have become sick, even unto death. APPENDIX TO CHAPTEE XXIV PULL TEXT OP RESOLUTION IN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1 DECEMBEE, 1908 THE Legislative Council solicits from the Government of H.H. the Khedive the preparation of a project of law conferring on the nation the right of efiective partici- pation in the internal administration of the country and in the direction of local affairs. The project of law asked for ought to confer on the new Assembly to be created the right of voting law without appeal, on condition that the laws so voted may be applicable only to natives in what concerns the levying of taxes and direct or indirect contributions. The law asked for shall have no influence on international treaties, and there shall be excluded from it everything that concerns the capitulations, the Law of Liquidation, the rela- tions with Europeans, and the rights recognised by the treaties with different Powers. This law ought not to touch the question of tribute paid to the Ottoman Government, nor the rights acquired by the Egyptian Govenunent for the con- clusion of treaties with foreign Governments ". ARTICLE m OF NATIONALIST PARTY PROGRAMME " The respect of treaties and financial conventions which bind the Egyptian Government to pay its debts and to accept a financial control like the Anglo-French condominium, so long as Egypt remains the debtor of Europe and Europe demands control ". (In a speech by late Mustapha Pasha Eamil at Alexandria, 22 October, 1907.) " Egypt would be disposed to grant of its own will free passage through the Canal at the expiration of the present concession, except for a minimum right of administration and control, if Europe would guarantee to her from now all free- dom from interference or foreign occupation, and would ask 345 346 THE LAND OF THE PHAKAOHS the English to withdraw from the Nile Valley. Egypt would sacrifice all her benefits from the Canal in exchange for her hberty and independence. " This is a personal idea of mine, which I submit to those who are interested in the freedom of the Canal, and to my compatriots who are not less interested in the freedom of their country ". (Mohammed Farid Bey at a " Conference " in Paris, 13 June, 1910. " Campagne de Mohammed Farid Bey", pp. 37-8.) THE LATE GRAND VIZIER HILMI PASHA OP TURKEY, AND MOHAMMED PARID BEY, LEADER OP THE EGYPTLVN NATIONALIST PARTY [Hilmi Pasha authorised the " Temps " correspondent at Constantinople to state that the Turkish Government had had no relations with the Egyptian Nationalist Party, and had no intention nor desire to have any such relations, inas- much as the Ottoman Government regarded the condition of Egypt as satisfactory — " Temps ", 5 October, 1909.] In the " Nouvelles ", 6 October, 1909, Mohammed Farid Bey made the following reply : " The words of Hilmi Pasha have surprised me, the more as he declared to me — ^yes, to me, as he received me, as leader of the Nationahst Party, together with a delegation of the party which came to Constantinople in July last year to take part in the constitution festivities — that the Ottoman Govern- ment would never forget Egypt, and would do nothing either to recognise the existing state of things or to render it worse. Only, he said, the Government was not sufficiently strong to open the Egyptian question, but it would certainly open it when it was strong. If His Highness Hilmi Pasha should pre- sume to repudiate his own words, I shall only remark that the delegation at whose head I was consisted of ten members, all of whom are still ahve. For the rest, the same assurances were given to me by Ahmed Riza, President of the Chamber ; by Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha, Vice-President of the Senate, who had received us in the absence of the President, Said Pasha, APPENDIX 347 and by a number of other high Ottoman personages. A few weeks previously my friend, Dr. Osman Ghaleb Bey, had asked of the Sultan himself for the application of the consti- tution to Egypt, in the course of an audience which was granted to the first delegation sent by our party with that object to Constantinople. On the following day a number of Ottoman poUticians declared their desire that the Sultan should pay a visit to Egypt, as an integral part of the Otto- man Empire ". [Hilmi Pasha was severely censured by the " Tanin " for his untruthful and indiscreet pronouncement in the " Temps ", this censure making his ultimate resignation absolutely im- perative.] " To all men of ordinary intelligence, it must seem obvious that the experiment now being tried in Turkey is apparently conducted under less favourable conditions than would be the case if it were carried out in Egypt ". (Mr. Edward Dicey, in September " Nineteenth Century ", 1908.) CHAPTER XXV EOOSEVELT— IMPERIAL DEMOCRAT ON the morrow of the Roosevelt Gruildhall pero- ration, the Egyptian Special Correspondent of a well-known halfpenny purveyor of sensationalism, who had been deputed by his employers to meet the great Imperial " Democrat " on his return to Egypt and civilisation, informed a wondering and expec- tant British public, that, judging from the ex- President's condemnatory speech levelled at the people of Egypt regarding Boutros Pasha's assassina- tion, and the subsequent demonstration of the students outside Shepherd's Hotel, Cairo, he " felt sure that Mr. Roosevelt would break out in England on the subject of Egypt ever since he gave in Cairo the speech which so inflamed the young Egyptians against him ". Amongst other inconsiderate trifles, he averred, from a superlatively sublime eminence of insularly superficial superiority, that when " the procession of young Egyptians marched round to hoot Mr. Roosevelt at ' Shepherd's ', it was noticed that they were mostly boys " ; and therefore by imphcation, being a movement operated by a howling crowd of youngsters, it was quite unworthy of the serious consideration of a British Government or People. Permit me to state that I have no intention of crossing swords, metaphorically or otherwise, with this evidently well-intentioned, but none the less badly informed. Special Correspondent. He was there earn- ing his bread and butter, and no doubt did his best 348 ROOSEVELT— IMPERIAL DEMOCRAT 349 according to his lights, but as Burke says, " Men httle think how immorally they act in rashly meddling with what they do not understand. Their delusive good intentions are no sort of excuse for their pre- sumption. Those who mean well must be fearful of acting ill ". This statement of Burke's should be painted above the entrance of aU public buildings in letters of gold, and printed on the notebooks of all special and other correspondents, not to mention ex-Presidents of American RepubUcs making royal progresses in Europe and elsewhere. I have merely instanced this correspondent as one of the many other evidences of misrepresentation, in addition to those set forth in this narrative. I would add in passing, that an Oxford University " rag ", for instance, on a visiting German Professor, who had adversely criticised England's " Dread- nought " poHcy, while an evidence of British patriotic feeling, would hardly be considered to represent the conduct of the thinking Britisher, who, while ap- proving the views underlying the " rag ", would very naturally consider it derogatory to his dignity to " demonstrate ". Were the German Professor, there- fore, a superficial observer even as Mr. Roosevelt, and more especially our Correspondent, he might reasonably declare on returning to the Fatherland, that the English movement in favour of " Dread- nought " building was confined to a few hundred mad imdergraduates. The German would be quite in error, as every one is well aware. This Professor, therefore, arguing from such premises, would find himself standing— according to Rooseveltian diction —on " a real live wire ". Similarly, the Britisher who imagines that the Egyptian NationaUst move- 350 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS ment is confined to a few hundred students, " mostly boys ", is not only playing with a " very live wire ", but one of high voltage and extremely light casing. And what is true with regard to Egypt applies to the entire European "protected" Orient — recent develop- ments in India fully bearing out my statement. Meanwhile, Press telegrams inform, but do not enlighten ; Press correspondents and globe-trotting ex-Presidents continue to mislead, because of their superficiality or prejudice ; and in spite of repeated warnings, the British bureaucrat goes blundering blindly to the precipice of " another native rising ", at the bottom of which is a beach littered with lost opportunities, while the rising tide of " war taxes " draws the helpless British taxpayer into the fathom- less depths of impecuniosity. Human nature being what it is — East or West — men of thought and leaders of political movements rely upon argument to have the justice of their claims allowed, and like ^Esop's " Old Man And The Boy In The Apple Tree ", first use words, then tufts of grass, resorting to stones only after the virtue of lighter missiles has proved ineffective. " The most unpleasant truth ", said Mr. Roosevelt at Cairo, "is a far safer companion in the long run than the pleasantest of falsehoods ". This by no means original platitude is the very thing Mr. Roose- velt lost sight of as soon as, or before, he had uttered it. The Egyptians, ever since the year 1898, have been telling the English that they want them to evaciiate the country according to pledges made,^ and this is the acme of truth, however unpleasant or distasteful to England it may be. And on Mr. Roosevelt's declara- tion, this " safe companion " of his has been ignored ^ Vide Appendices to Chapters XVII and XXVI. EOOSEVELT— IMPEEIAL DEMOCRAT 351 by the British Foreign Office ; and in place of Sir Eldon Gorst's claim that, " I have no hesitation in saying that the leaders of the Nationahst Party are morally responsible for the murder of Boutros Pasha ", it is the British regime at Cairo that is morally responsible for the murder of the Coptic Prime Minister.^ Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, 15 June, 1910, admitted that Mr. Roosevelt's speech was shown to him before it was dehvered. He also trotted out that old formula about " trusteeship " which he had previously used at the Huddersfield Junior Liberal Association on 27 October, 1898 ; and further, " that it was the poHcy of His Majesty's Government to maintain our Occupation of Egypt, because we cannot abandon without disgrace our responsibilities which have grown up around us ". In order to " maintain British Occupation ", within a month from this declaration, a Khedivial Decree was issued legaKsing three measures of the most reck- less repression, which measures had been previously rejected by the Legislative Council. The first of these measures intended to " maintain the Occupation without disgrace ", was the graceless act by which the pressman of Egypt may be handed over like an ordinary felon directly to the Assize Courts, where there is no jury, and from whence^is is there no appeal. The second graceless act was levelled against students who should participate in demonstrations, in or out of school, write for, or give news to news- papers — great pains and penalties being attached to such misdemeanour, including expulsion. 1 Vide Mohamed Farid Bey in "The Times" (London), 25 February, 1910. 352 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS But the most sublime act of diplomatic graceless- ness to " maintain the Occupation without disgrace ", was that by which all criminal agreements hetween two or more persons — this to include any kind of " con- certed action " or " conspiracy ", or determination to act jointly in a " criminal " way — was to be punished with various terms of imprisonment. This was, in the language of Mr. Roosevelt, " tidying up " with a vengeance " in the welfare of mankind and in the future of civilisation ". Now in the first place, I would say that Mr. Roose- velt with all his platitudes did not know what he was talking about, especially when we are informed that, " sentimentality is the most broken reed on which righteousness can lean ". Ever since Mr. Roosevelt's speech I have been examining British official reports about Egypt and elsewhere, but I have been quite unable to discover either " senti- mentahty " or special evidences of " righteousness " in the official acts of Great Britain towards subject races. But the remarkable part about the bombastic puerility of the ex-President, which is also a " most unpleasant truth ", is the fact that the great Demo- cratic ImperiaUst has so many little matters of his own at home which would benefit by that " tidying brush " he so strenuously suggests should be used in Egypt. For instance, the lynching of innocent Negroes without trial, and the lawlessness existing South of " Mason and Dixon's " line. I believe " Mason and Dixon " to be the correct term ; at any rate, Americans know where I mean, and I hope they will enlighten the ex-President. Crispus Attacus and other Negroes fought in the cause of American Independence at the Battle of Bunker's Hill ; simi- ROOSEVELT— IMPERIAL DEMOCRAT 353 larly, they fought for the " Union ", but they have been treated neither with " sentimentahty " nor " righteousness ". Yet, they shed their blood and gave their lives for American Independence and " Union ", assisting to make a Roosevelt possible. There were those famous Chicago riots, when Mr. Roosevelt's white fellow-citizens made that city a hell, even as some of them have done for the coloured people, South of the above-mentioned line. Does this represent a state of high civilisation to the " real — not mock — democrat, a man who feels that his first thought is bound to be the welfare of the masses of mankind, and his first duty to war against violence and injustice and wrong-doing " 1 " Charity ", it is said, " begins at home ". The number of strikes in the United States of America for eight years, ending December, 1886, were 5453, involving 1,879,292 persons,^ at a time when Lord Cromer's " new system of government was grow- ing up with quite a great degree of success ", in Egypt. Between 1876 and 1886, 206,595 divorces were granted in the United States of America. The divorce courts have been reformed since then, but divorce has meanwhile increased 75 per cent. Surely these are " grave menaces " both to America " and to civilisa- tion ". Then there is that giddy exclusive New-York-cum- Newport 400, founded by the late Ward Macalister, who, as Juvenal said of the Roman matrons : " All glowing, all athiist For wine, whole flasks of wine, and swallows first Two quarts to dear her stomach and excite A ravenous, an unbounded appetite ", — ^ 1 From official statistics by Broadstreet and Carrol D. Wright, 1888, United States Commission for Labour, for eight years ending December. I regret I have no later statistics, but American strikes have not decreased. ^ Sat. VI. (GiflFord's Trans.). 2A 354 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS an idle rich group whose frequent matrimonial and other sexual adventures surely deserve the attention of Mr. Roosevelt in his " War against . . . wrong- doing ". Then there are those Sybaritic orgies of New York City, which even the efforts of Dr. Comstock and his " Society for the Suppression of Vice " have been unable to stamp out, which presents subjects in plenty for the " unwritten law ", and the law that is written. Surely these are " a menace to civihsation ". The assassination of Presidents Lincoln, Garfield, McKinley, and the recent attempt on the life of the Mayor of New York — are these evidences of an " anarchical condition of murderous chaos " in the United States of America, or are they proofs that the ex-President of the American Republic and those in authority are " neither desirous nor capable of guaranteeing even that primary justice, the failure to supply which makes self-government not merely an empty but a noxious farce " ? Lynching and burn- ing of defenceless Negroes, who, in the sweat of their faces, have helped to make the power of the United States which is unable to protect them, convicts that Government of being " incapable of guaranteeing even primary justice", and exposes its Government before the civilised world as "an empty and noxious farce ". " Go forward in the path you have marked out " in Uganda, is the pronouncement of the greatest political mountebank of modern times, " which is all that is necessary ". As a matter of fact, I feel that this ink is really being wasted on such a superficial mass of political puerility. " Uganda has been the scene of an extra- ordinary development of Christianity " (!), proceeds ROOSEVELT— IMPERIAL DEMOCRAT 355 the American law-giver. " In East Africa you have a land which can be made a true white man's country " (italics mine), " and all that is necessary is to foUow the lead of the Governor, Sir Percy Girouard ". I must admit that I have not visited East Africa : Mr. Roosevelt has. Notwithstanding this I have come in contact, not with " settlers ", but with those British subjects (!) who were not permitted to settle ; and these informed me that throughout East Africa, including Uganda, with its " extraordinary develop- ment of Christianity ", and where " white South Africans " had emigrated, that having brought their prejudices with them, the Asiatic officials in the Government services were compelled to resign, because colour prejudice had debarred them from rising or obtaining promotion. Colour prejudice is as strong there as it is against the Negroes in the Southern States of America. Can it therefore be a matter for surprise that Mr. Roosevelt should have appreciated conditions which reminded him so " strikingly of his own men in America " ? There is not a single hotel in British East Africa, except in Zanzibar, and there only in a restricted sense, where an Asiatic would be allowed to stay ; the proprietor simply would not have him as a guest. If no one would accommodate him, in spite of the " extraordinary development of Christianity ", he would be forced to wander about the streets night and day, and very possibly stand a good chance of being " run in " as a suspicious character. There- fore, follow " the lead of the Governor ", for he and other Englishmen " in Africa are doing a great work for the British Empire and they are also doing a great work for civilisation " ! Even in sport the colour line is drawn, for a rule of the Narobi Turf 366 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS Club forbids a coloured man to act as jockey ; and the Sultan of Zanzibar, although possessed of excel- lent racing stock, must perforce engage a European jockey to ride for him. Of course, " Christianity being extraordinarily developed " in East Africa, it is most sinful and unseemly that the coloured people should think of sport. " Pray without ceasing " is the first and great commandment for " niggers " ; and the second is very important, " Obey your masters ". " No one at present ", said an Englishman recently returned from East Africa, " who is not European can rise above a clerkship, no matter what his merits are or his knowledge of local customs and languages. Colour prejudice is as strong throughout British East Africa and Uganda as it is against the Negroes of the Southern States of America ".^ " All that is necessary in East Africa is to follow the Governor, Sir Percy Girouard ". Like many another globe-trotting and scribbling interloper, Mr. Roosevelt evidently imagined that he could pay a flying visit to Cairo, remain a week, and write a book that would startle the world. I am afraid that I am taking the ex-President as seriously as he takes himself. I sincerely hope that I shall be alive when the memoirs of the Emperor William II of Germany are pubhshed, as I am rather curious to learn what suggestions Mr. Roosevelt made to His Imperial Majesty, during the review, with regard to the possible improvement of the German Army. > London " Daily Chronicle ", 6 September, 1910. ALI KAMIL YICE-PRESlnENT OF THE EGYPTIAN NATIONALIST PARTY CHAPTER XXVI BALFOUR'S LITTLE BAND FOUR days after the death of Boutros Pasha, Mohammed Said Pasha, a prominent Nationahst who, as previously stated, had been Minister of the Interior under Boutros Pasha, was appointed Prime Minister. He had been formerly a judge of the Court of First Instance at Alexandria, and his elevation to the chief office in the State, with the appointment of Ismail Pasha Sidky, another promi- nent NationaUst and former Government Municipal official, to the post of Under Secretary to the Interior, was undoubtedly a Nationalist triumph. There can be little doubt that Mohammed Said Pasha is a very capable man, notwithstanding his love for the plaudits of the multitude; and as he represents the nation in a manner which did not obtain in the case of Boutros Pasha, there is no reason why his appointment should not give universal satisfaction. Up to the present, despite the rather stringent acts, noted in a previous chapter, his Ministry has been rather a success, and this might be largely owing to his well-known and widely ex- pressed political opinions ; but it is greatly to be feared that he will not have any more voice in the afEairs of the Government than his Turco-Egyptian- Circassian-Jew predecessors. The Egyptians are a peace-loving people, and a little sympathy with their aims goes a long way towards softening bitterness ; they can and will be led, but they will not be driven. 357 358 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS They only ask bare justice at the hands of Great Britain, and it is for the recognition of their just claims that they have agitated. They are not un- grateful to England, but the English claim upon their gratitude has been of a rather negative quantity. These pages have, I trust, abundantly proved that their grievances are real. Their political aspirations for the most part are analogous to those of the women of England at the present day. All the women of England do not trouble about a vote, because they do not reaUse what the power of the vote means to them in the way of enhanced social conditions and adequate legislative amelioration. The apathetic, unintellectual majority are the stum- bling - block to the intellectual and progressive minority. No one possessing a knowledge of the subject will say that the masses in England knew or appreciated the political benefits conferred upon them by Lord John Russell's great Reform Bill ; nor must it be forgotten that the Tories of the time were absolutely opposed to the measure. Yet, in the light of subsequent events, the Bill has proved to be the starting-point for greater liberal and politi- cal reform in England, thereby justifying its existence. The Barons at Runnymede, by wresting the Great Charter from the unwilling John, built the foundation of all subsequent liberty in England ; but the yeo- men of England were unable to appreciate the magnitude and far-reaching results of the efforts of the Barons. In like manner the claim has been made that the Egyptians are not ripe for self-government. No more were the people of England ripe for Lord John Russell's Bill ; for it is indisputable that they did not understand what it was all about, nor did they BALFOUR'S LITTLE BAND 359 appreciate what it meant for them. It is also asserted that the peasantry of Egypt are too ignorant to appreciate the difference between arbitrary rule, to which they have been accustomed for centuries, and the benefits to be derived from self-government, inasmuch as they had to be driven to the polls to vote for such limited representation as they already possess. This is arrant humbug. The people of England, until the subsequent efforts of the Labour Party, were quite as ignorant as the people of Egypt, possessing no more knowledge of their rights and liberties than the people of Egypt, and prior to the Corrupt Practices Act their votes were openly bought and sold, and this within contemporary memory. That a people are presumed to be unable to appreciate a benefit con- ferred is no reason why a benefit should be withheld ; and that the people of Egypt are so deeply sunk in ignorance as to be unable to appreciate the blessings of self-government is one of the greatest falsehoods that has ever been uttered. Mere bookish learning, as pointed out elsewhere, does not necessarily imply a lack of inteUigence, and the Nationahst Press of Egypt, although by no means perfect in other respects, has at any rate broadened the outlook of the Egyptian peasant ; and I maintain without fear of contradiction that, notwithstanding his lack of " letters ", after taking all the educational dis- advantages under which he has laboured into consideration, it will be found that he compares favourably with any peasant class in the world. The greatest trouble in Egypt has been, and is, the desire to keep the administration in the hands of a small band of narrow-minded Enghsh bureau- crats, who in order to maintain an illegal and un- warranted usurpation, underrate Egyptian intelH- 360 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS gence in the pages of their Ij^g and contradictory reports, and the columns of their journals. Knowing that they are supported by the Government at home, they do pretty much as they like ; and when they observe that intellectual progress is being made, they dehberately provoke breaches of the peace in order to impress the English public with " Egyptian intolerance ", and " native turbulence and unrest ". The Egyptians do not love England, but England has herself produced this condition of ill-feeling by her oppressive measures, and her ever-present menace in the Army of Occupation. Twenty-eight years have now passed since England aggressively occupied Egypt, and what has she to show for it in the way of intellectual progress ? Education at a standstill : Liberal institutions practically where Lord DufEerin left them in 1883 : Native Government ofl&cials bereft of initiative. Truly a great work ! We are told that the native official is incapable of using his brains, and that he is a mere machine. What incentive has the native. had to use his brains ? He is taught by the British official to do as he is told ; when he does this he is accused of incompetence. If an official be sent to perform some allotted task, his instructions are minutely set out. He knows the British official to be an arrogant individual exercising unlimited power ; should he act upon his own initiative, because of some occurrence which did not come within the ken of the " master mind ", he is roundly rated for not obeying instructions ; and when he carries out his instructions to the letter, should there be some unexpected development which the English head did not foresee, and the native, BALFOUR'S LITTLE BAND 361 in order to avoid censure, feared to remedy, he is accused of lack of intelligence and want of capacity. Last February, in the House of Commons, Mr. Balfour urged the Government " to take steps to maintain our prestige in Egypt by letting the little band of our countrymen in Egypt feel that they were absolutely supported by the authority at home ". It is this knowledge that the little band is being supported in their aggression in Egypt which causes them not merely to keep the native officials down, but to commit unprovoked assault, such as that cited in a previous chapter.^ While this little band of Mr. Balfour's is so " supported by the Government at home ", there can never be any peace in Egypt. The httle band has squandered the Reserve Fund on official residences and useless bridges in the Soudan, when a part at least of that money might have been more beneficially spent on education, or pajang off the Public Debt. This little band has kept native salaries down while they took good care to see that their own salaries were adequate, thereby fostering bribery and corruption on the part of the native official. If the salary of an individual is inadequate, there is the ever-present incentive to his turning a dishonest penny. When English writers recklessly accuse Egyptians of corruptibility, in order to maintain arguments which make for the discredit of Egyptian morals, these writers close their eyes to bribery and corruption at home, which include the wholesale convictions of London Boards of Guardians for muni- cipal bribery and peculation. All arguments ad- ■ Vide "A Resident" in the "Daily Express", London, 3 May, 1910. 362 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS duced against Egyptians are one-sided, and few of them will stand the light of minute investigation. Doubtless those reading these pages wiU long ere this have arrived at the wholly erroneous im- pression that I am anti-Enghsh. If I have conveyed any such impression I regret it, inasmuch as I have hved too long among the English not to learn to appreciate their good qualities and their sense of justice. But the unfortunate and in- explicable fact is, that the Englishman at home is so different an individual from the Englishman in the various colonies and dependencies of Great Britain. Evidently that old Roman blood which he undoubtedly possesses, making as it does for conquest and mastery, has caused the Briton when abroad to display those latent elementary characteristics in the interests of prestige and power to the annihila- tion of his nobler quahties. In no other way can I account for his dual personahty. " There is nothing," says Matthew Arnold, " like love and admiration for bringing people to a likeness with what they love and admire ; but the English- man never seems to dream of employing these in- fluences upon a race he wants to fuse with himself. He employs simply material interests for his work of fusion ; and beyond these nothing but scorn and rebuke. Accordingly, there is no vital union between him and the races he has annexed." It is this lack of love and admiration, the employ- ment of material interests in the work of fusion, and the ever-present scorn and rebuke for annexed races, that have produced unrest in India and discontent in Egj^t. No race possessing the most rudimentary elements of manhood wants to be molly-coddled ; but by the same token, subject races expect that BALFOUR'S LITTLE BAND 363 their aims and desires will be treated with considera- tion and respect — a consideration and respect which in no wise detract from the merit or dignity of an Administrator, but which tend to enhance such merit and dignity. Great men prove their greatness in small things. Repressive measures are more fre- quently a sign of weakness than an indication of strength, and are the weapons of small men. There are no great men in these degenerate days. " In the past," says Professor Pearson, " the great man, whether he were a successful soldier, a Caesar, or a Napoleon, or the organising statesman, an Augustus Caesar, a Richeheu, or a Chatham, was a man who had a poKcy of his own, which he was pre- pared to carry out single7handed. His deeds were the big things he bequeathed to posterity." Whether in the strenuousness of war or the peaceful arts of government these were men of iron. In these days of modem collectivity, in peace or war, there are a group of small men of lath, labelled " statesmen " and " soldiers," deftly painted to look hke iron. They make much noise ; strut across the world's stage during their Httle hour of bombast and vanity ; disappear, and are quickly forgotten. But they per- petrate considerable evil, which they bequeath to other vainglorious tinkerers, and so it goes on. Mess and muddle, muddle and mess, in the interest of party gain. Pride without profit and party without patriotism. Accordingly, proper pride and whole- hearted patriotism in subject races are accounted criminal and presumptuous. The East has, however, found it high time to awake from the slumber of centuries. Japan's position in the congress of Nations and her defeat of a Power previously dreaded by the nations 364 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS of Europe have changed Oriental conditions and pohtical aspirations for all time. China is also pro- gressing unostentatiously. The treaty between Great Britain and Japan expires in 1915. One of two things is bound to happen. I have it on reliable authority that, unless there is some extraordinary development within the next few years, that treaty will not be re- newed, and Japan and China will either come to grips for the mastery in the Far East ; or, in the event of Japan finding China too strong, there will be a coalition. Should this happen, it were well that Europe keeps her powder dry against the day. Eng- land is bound to lose India in any case. Japan has her eye on that strip of Asia, and she will have it. Indians may dissemble, but they do not love England. Royal progresses and coronations may be brilliant spectacles, in which native Princes will participate and which the multitude will applaud, but they will not wipe out decades of scorn, repression, and humilia- tion. Nemesis is slow, but she is certain to arrive. Egypt is not the property of England. England has vested interests in that country ; so have other Powers. There is yet time to do a graceful action whereby hatred and bitterness may be turned into an undying gratitude, if the party wire-pullers in England have the good sense and perspicacity to improve the shining hour. The time will come when England will need all the available goodwill of other peoples. It behoves her to make preparation against that time. Rome was mighty ; but Rome fell, and no subject nation wept her fall ; they only turned to rend her. Materialism, greed, and the war of faction produced her fall. History is repeating itself. " wad some Pow'r the giftie gi'e us To see oursel's as ithers see us.'' BALFOUR'S LITTLE BAND 365 It is because of my express intention of enKghtening the people of England with regard to the true situa- tion in Egypt that I have been seemingly so drastic in my criticism of British Administrative methods. I trust that no offence will be caused nor ill-feeling engendered by my poor endeavours to portray such facts of Egyptian conditions as I am familiar with, in the hope that mutual appreciation may result there- from, a better amderstanding be arrived at, and the just claims of the Egyptian people to self-government be recognised at the hands of a race whose traditional motto is Freedom, Justice, and Impartiahty. " Therefore I do not grieve. Oh, hear me, Egypt ; Even in death thou art not wholly dead. And hear me, England ! Nay : thou needs must hear me. I had a thing to say, and it is said ".^ 1 " The Whirlwind ", by WUfrid Scawen Blunt. APPENDIX I MOKE PLEDGES " T CANNOT do otherwise than express my general con- JL currence . . . that the occupation of Egypt is in the nature of a burden and difficulty ; and that the permanent occupation of that country would not be agreeable to our tra- ditional policy, and that it would not be consistent with our good faith towards the Suzerain Power, while it would be con- trary to the laws of Europe. ... I certainly shall not set up the doctrine that we have discovered a duty which enables us to set aside the pledges into which we have so freely entered. . . . The thing that we cannot do with perfect honour is either to deny that we are under engagements which preclude the idea of indefinite occupation, or so to construe that indefinite occupation as to hamper the engagements that we are under by collateral consideration ". (Mr. Gladstone, in the House of Commons, 1 May, 1893.) " The Government of Her Britannic Majesty declares that it has no intention of altering the political status of Egypt ". (Text of the Anglo-French Agreement of 8 April, 1904.) " There are insuperable objections to the assumption of a British Protectorate over Egypt. It would involve a change in the ' pohtical status ' of the country. Now in Art. 1 of the Anglo-French Agreement of 8 April, 1904, the British Government have explicitly declared that they have no intention of altering the political ' status ' of Egypt." (Lord Cromer's report, 3 March, 1907 ; " Egypt ", No. 1 (1907), p. 12.) " It has been said that Great Britain proposes shortly to proclaim the protectorate or the annexation of Egypt to the 366 APPENDIX I 367 British Empire. Will Sir Eldon Gorst permit me to ask him whether this rumour is well founded or not ? " " The rumour has no foundation, and you may contradict it categorically. Great Britain has engaged herself by official agreements with Turkey and the European Powers to respect the suzerainty of the Sultan in Egypt. She will keep her engagements, which, moreover, she reiterated in 1904 at the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-French Agreement. England stipulated in that Agreement that she had no intention to change the poHtical situation in Egypt. Neither the people nor the Government wish to rid themselves of these engagements ". (Sir Eldon Gorst's interview with Dr. Nimr, Editor of the " Mokattam," 24 October, 1908. This interview was subsequently acknowledged as official by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons.) " There exists among the better-educated sections of society a limited but gradually increasing class which interests itself in matters pertaining to the government and adminis- tration of the country. This class aspires quite rightly to help in bringing about the day when Egypt will be able to govern herself without outside assistance. This is also the end to which British policy is directed, and there need, therefore, be no antagonism of principle between the Egyptian and EngUsh reforming elements ". (Sir Eldon Gorst's Eeport, 27 March, 1909 ; " Egypt", No. 1 (1909), p. 1.) " Since the commencement of the Occupation the policy approved by the British Government has never varied, and its fundamental idea has been to prepare the Egyptians for self-government, while helping them in the meantime to enjoy the benefit of good government ". (Sir Eldon Gorst, ib., p. 48.) " British policy in Egypt in no way differs from that fol- lowed by Great Britain all over the world towards countries under her influence, namely to place before all else the welfare of their populations ". (Sir Eldon Gorst's Keport, 26 March, 1910; "Egypt", No. 1, 1910, p. 51.) APPENDIX II THE LAW OF LIQUIDATION ^ AT the beginning of April, 1880, a Commission was insti- -LX. tuted composed of the members of the Caisse, under the chairmanship of Sir Rivers Wilson, to deliberate on the finances of Egypt, the Great Powers having previously bound themselves to sanction any and aU decisions of the Com- mission. The Commission sat for three months, and the results of their labours were embodied in the law known as the Law of Liquidation. This law was sanctioned by Khedivial decree, dated 17 June, 1880. By that law the Egyptian revenue was taken at £8,576,000. The interest on the unified debt was taken at 4 per cent, together with I per cent sinking fund, making a total of 5 per cent, against the former combined rate of 7 per cent. The debt charges were thereby reduced by about £2,000,000 per annum. To compensate for this sacrifice the Eaw provided that in all cases the surpluses from the assigned revenue should be used exclusively for the redemp- tion of stock, and that in some cases the surpluses from the non-assigned revenue should be made contributory to this end, so as to complete an annual redemption equal to J per cent of the nominal capital of the unified debt — over £57,000,000. A fresh loan of £5,600,000 was to be raised and added to the privileged debt, so as to pay the floating debt. The privileged debt was thereby raised to £22,530,000, secured on the railways, harbours, telegraphs, customs, and the revenue of four provinces. The holders of the floating debt (of which the aggregate • "Egypt", No. 1 (1881), pp. 1-14. 368 APPENDIX II 369 amount claimed was over £12,000,000) were divided into various categories ; of these some were paid their full claims, while others were compelled to accept a reduction of their claims of varying extent. Sir Rivers Wilson had undertaken to pay off a floatiug debt of £9,000,000. Thus the European controllers, in their rearrangement of the debt, only proceeded on the same hnes suggested by Ismail in 1876, and to which the Powers would not then consent. 2 B INDEX A Abbas II, Hilmi Pasha, Khedive, succeeds on death of his father, 207, 270 ; intervenes in Govern- ment, 227, 228; supported by Legislative Council, 231 ; and dis- cipline of Egyptian troops, 232, 233 ; and Lord Cromer, 234, 235, 281, 282, 283, 285 ; opens Assouan Dam, 316 ; negotiations in name of, 252, 328 ; his prize bull, 330, 331, 332 ; students demonstrate against, 342 ; and marriage, 265 ; his industry, 285, 286 ; and Mus- tapha Kamil, 282, 283-5 Abd-el-Kader, Pasha, Governor- General of the Soudan, 143 Abdul Aal Pasha, fellah Colonel, 24, 26, 39, 84, 119 Abdu Sheykh Mohammed, religi- ous reformer (afterwards Egyptian Grand Mufti), his opinions, 45, 59, 124 ; leader of reform at the El-Azhar University, 19, 54 ; joins Arabi's movement, 64 ; supports Mr. Blunt's arguments of moderate reform, 70 Abdul Hamid, Sultan of Turkey, signs Cyprus Convention, 28, 29, 30 ; published by "The Globe," 30; his Pan-Islamic views, 12, 32 ; re- garding reform, 11, 13, 22, 32; sends Commissioners to Egypt (1881), 51, 52 ; his letter to Arabi, 76, 94 ; his later attitude towards Arabi, 111 and following ; sends Dervish Pasha to Egypt, 90, 91-4 ; his proclamation of Arabi, 111 ; and the Powers, 18, 90, and follow- ing ; Powers divide Red Sea Lit- toral, 165-70, 182; the Wolff Convention, 175-83 ; the Tabah incident, 327-8 ; Pirman con- firming Abbas II, 270 ; and Mus- tapha Kamil, 271, 274; Turkish Commissioners in Egypt, 51-2, 90, 92-6, 103, 107, 176, 179, 180, 183, 199, 284 ; revolution in Tur- key and deposition, 241 and note Alexandria, riot, 95, 96 ; bombard- ment and burning of, 100-1 Ali Fehmy Pasha, fellah Colonel of Guards, A. D.c. to Khedive: inter- mediary between Tewfik and Arabi, 26, 27, 38, 39; with Arabi at Kasr-el Nil, 24, 36 ; his conduct at Abdin, 40, 41, 42; in com- mand at Kassassin, 119-20 ; exiled, 127 Ali, Mehemet, Viceroy of Egjrpt, his method of taxation, 7 ; his ability, 8, 9 ; Princess Nazli on, 120 note ; and conscription, 133 ; conquest of Soudan, 140; and the Sultan's Firman of 1841, ix, 91 ; National University, 279; Industrial School, 283 ; and irrigation works, 317 Alla-ed-Deen, Governor-General of the Soudan, 144 ; killed, 145 Arabi, Ahmed Pasha, his early history and character, 24, 25, 26, 27, 66 ; he advocates fellah rights, 50 ; Colonel of 3rd Regiment at Cairo, 23-4 ; arrested at Kasr-el-NU, 24, 26, 27, 36 ; his appearance, 65 ; his demonstration at Abdin, 40, 41, 42 ; his great popularity, 27, 36, 46, 52-3, 65 ; leaves Govern- ment in hands of Cherif, but is watchful, 49, 50 ; his communica- tions with the Sultan's Envoys, 52, 76, 92, 93 ; his connection with Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, 50, 68; ex- plains Nationalist programme and reforms to Mr. Blunt, 85, 300 and note ; Under-Secretary for War, 54 and following; view of the Joint Note, 103 ; Minister of War, 73; Sultan Pasha and, 79, 83, 118 ; Circassian plot, 74, 75, 76, 78 ; Ultimatum demanding his exile, 84 ; his attitude, 88, 89 ; resigns, 84 ; and is reinstated, 85, 90-3 ; refuses to go to Constanti- nople, 96 ; his alleged connection vrith Alexandria riot, 95 ; his al- leged connection with Prince 371 372 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS Halim and the ex-Ehedive Ismail, 87 ; proscribed by Khedive, 108 ; retained in his position by General Council, 109-10 ; allows Tewfik to escape to the English, 107 ; his conduct of war criticised. 111, 112, 116, 117; at Kafr Dawar, 108, 109, 110, 116; neglects to block Suez Canal, 112 ; his behaviour at Tel-el-Kebir, 120 and notes; at Cairo, affer the battle surrenders, 112 and following ; trial and exile, 127 ; returns, note ib. Arabian Caliphate, 51 ; Ali YoussefiF, editor of " El Moayyad" and, 325 Assad, Sheykh Ahmed, of Medina, Sultan's Secret Agent Commis- sioner in Egypt, 03 Azhar, University, 19, 20, 51, 54, 109-10, 124, 251, 267, 271, 341-2 B Baker, Sir Samuel White, conquers Equatorial provinces for Ismail, 141 ; reports on oppression of inhabitants of Soudan, ib. ; warns British Government to hold Sou- dan, 156 Baker, General Valentine, Pasha, or- ganizes Egyptian Army, 132 ; on his forlorn hope, 148 ; extermin- ated by Mahdi, ib. ; Gladstone, Nonconformist conscience and aid to, 149, 150, 151 Balfour, Rt. Hon. Arthur James, M.P., his "little band " in Egypt, 361; one of the "little band," 331-2 Bedouins, 87, 101, 115 ; character of, 116, 132, 255 Beresford, Admiral Lord Charles, 116 note Bismarck, Prince, German Chancellor, responsible for Ismail's deposition, 11 ; rescues "peace with honour" diplomatists, 31 ; on the Constan- tinople Conference, 95 Blignieres, M. de. French Financial Controller in Egypt, 69 ; resigns, 76 Blunt, Mr. Wilfrid Scawen, 2 ; and Arabi Pasha, 50, 68, 120 and notes, 126, 127 ; and Nationalist, 85, 93 ; and Lord Cromer, 95, 300, 315; and Foreign Office, 138, 139 Boutros.PashaGhali, Egyptian Prime Minister ; appointed Finance Minister by Abbas II, 227-8 ; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 232 ; appointed Prime Minister, xii, 338; and the Denshawai trial, 336 ; and the Suez Canal Concession, 337-8 ; and Mohammed Said Pasha, ib. ; his assassination, 338-9 ; opinion of in Egypt, 342-3 ; and Roose- velt, 348 ; the blame for his death, 351 ; his successor appointed, 357. BuUer, General Sir Redvers, 160, 161 Buonaparte, Napoleon, invades Egypt, 32, 34 Burns, Mr. John, Rt. Hon., M.P., 123 Cartwright, Mr. William, of Foreign Office, replaces Malet, 97, 108 note Cave, Mr., M.P., his financial mission to Egypt, 289 ; speech regarding condition of fellaheen, in Com- mons, 311 Charles X, Bourbon, King of France, orders conquest of Algeria, 32 Charrington, Lieut., K.N., 115 Cherif Pasha, informs Ismail of depo- sition, 6 ; entrusted with formation of a Ministry by Tewfik, immedi- ately resigns, 20, 21 ; efforts of Con- stitutionalists to restore, 36, 38 ; reappointed by Tewfik at the in- stance of colonels, 42, 46 ; intrigue with army through Sultan Pasha, 49, 87 ; and Commissioners, 52 ; disapproves Joint Note, 53, 64 ; Consuls depend on, for informa- tion, 56 ; opinions of Nationalists in regard to, 66-7 ; joins Con- trollers, 69, 71, 72 ; is deposed by Nationalists, 73, 79 ; declines to form Ministry, 84 ; reappointed Prime Minister, 128, 129 ; resigns, 147, 150, 157; Lord Cromer's opinion of, 218 ; and the Budget of 1882, 290 Chermside, Colonel, Governor-Gen- eral Red Sea Littoral, 169 Circassian Plot, the 74-8 Coetlogon, Colonel, in command of Khartoum Garrison, 147, 150 Colvin, Sir Auckland, English Finan- cial Controller in Egypt, his action at Abdin, 40, 41 ; professes sym- pathy with Nationalists, 51, 58 ; his message to Arabi by Mr. Wil- frid Blunt, 68, 70 ; condemns Joint Note, 53, 64 ; his influence with Malet, 73, 76 ; resigns, 131 Conference at Constantinople. See Wolff and Dufiferin INDEX 373 Connaught, H.R.H. Duke of, almost taken prisoner at Kassassin, 112 ; opens Assouan Dam, 316 Constitution, Egyptian, 41, 49, 54, 67, 68-9, 70, 72 ; Malet promises to respect, 79 Cookson, Sir Charles, Consul at Alexandria acting for Sir Edward Malet, negotiates with the colonels at the Abdin, 42 ; presses Cherif Pasha to accept Premiership, 43 Cromer, Earl of, and Ismail's finan- cial operations, 15 ; on Arabi Pasha, 49, 114 ; and the Circassian Plot, 74 ; is appointed Consul-General, arrives at Cairo, 136 ; waiting for developments after Hicks's defeat, 150 ; supports Gordon's request for Zobier Pasha, 153 ; and the capture of Zeyla, 166 ; on in- trigues and suffeiing, 172 ; and Lord Northbrook's friendship, 173 and note ; race against bank- ruptcy, 177 ; and the difficult financial situation, 178 ; throws oflF weight during "race", 183; on the dual interest of France and England, 186 ; and Egyptian rev- enue, 189 note ; sells Daira and Domains lands, 191 and note, 192 ; and "legislation by diplomacy," 194-5 ; disagrees with Nubar over reorganisation of police, 196-7 ; and Nubar's dismissal, 198-9 ; helps Ismail to obtain arrears of Civil List, 202 and note ; on ignor- ance of natives, 226 note ; oom- pells Khedive to dismiss Ministry, 228 ; throws Abbas II into ranks of Nationalists, 229 ; and ideas of Egyptian University, 279-80 ; and the Khedive-Adam courtesies, 282-3 ; and his misleading com- parisons, 288 ; and the Dual con- trol, 290 ; nursing the financial achievement idea, 291 ; and irri- gation, 292; gives "Nature a chance," 293 ; and the Commis- sion of Liquidation, 294 ; suspends funding of the debt, 295 ; paints the terrible condition of the peasan- try in lurid colours, 296-8 ; be- comes optimistic, 299 ; on the new method of tax remission, 300 ; "abolishes the corviti" 300-1; military service revenue dodge, 301-2 ; and the Kurbash, 303-9 ; and British opinion as regards his reforms^ 313 ; leads movement to repress English women, 313-4 ; and success of Agricultural Banks at Sheffield, 314-5; and Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's history, 315 ; and the Assouan Dam, 316-7; sup- presses tobacco cultivation and ruins the sugar industry, 318 ; as a " Free Trader ", 319 ; as a bene- factor, 319 ; and the Denshawai atrocities, 321 note ; his promise to remove British troops, 328 ; and his modern Star Chamber, 329 and note ; at the Opera House, Cairo, 333 ; suggests repression whilst in the act of receiving the Freedom of the City of London, 326 D Daoud Pasha, Tewfik's brother-in- law ; appointed Egyptian- War Minister, 37 ; orders banishment of colonels, 40 Denshawai incident, 321 note, 328 ; "short shrift," 329 and note ; the murder of the good Samaritan, 330 ; a precedent established by Jamaica Riots, 331-3. Digna, Osman, exterminates detach- ment sent to relieve Tokar, 147 ; evacuates Tamai, 162 ; defeated at Tokar, 170 Disraeli (Earl of Beaconsfield) pur- chases Suez Canal Shares, 14 ; their value, 16 ; Berlin Congress, 28 ; and Asiatic Provinces, 29, 30; "Peace with Honour," 31, 32, 275 Duclerc^ M. , French Foreign Minis- ter, requests information on England's intentions, 128 Dufferin, Marquis of. High Commis- sioner to Egypt, and Ambassador at Constantinople, reports Con- stantinople Conference had done nothing, 96 ; and the Porte re. bombardment of Alexandria, 100 ; his exaggerations at the Con- stantinople Conference as to anarchy in Egypt, 110 ; his mis- sion to Egypt, 126 note ; on England's friendship for the Egyp- tians, 128 note ; his amval in Cairo, 129 ; on the composition of the Egyptian Army, 132 ; and "the prudent development of popular liberties," 134-5 ; recom- mends Lord Cromer as Consul- General, 136 ; his general policy in Egypt, 138-9, and (appendix to chapter xvii), 208-11 ; and his zbs 374 THE LAND OF THE PHABAOHS report 290 ; optimistic view of the finances, 297; and the Kurbash, 304-6 Dunlop, Educational "Adviser "in Egypt; ejects M. Lambert from Khedivial Law School, 277 ; his "professors," 278 ; National Uni- versity and, 280 E Earle, General, 160, 161, 162 Education in Egypt, efiforts of Artin Pasha for adequate, 200-1, 226 note. See also Dunlop and Cromer Edward VII, R.I., and President of French Republic, 186 ; visits Egypt, 204 Egypt, people of, 253-69; ques- tion of the real Egyptian, 274-6 Emin Pasha, Governor of the Pro- vince of Equatoria [Lado Enclave], 167-8 Eakhri, Hassan Pasha, Minister of Justice, 199 ; troubles little about justice and is relieved of office, 206 ; professes Nationalist views, and is appointed Prime Minister by Abbas II, 227; Lord Cromer protests against his appointment, is dismissed, 228 ; appointed Minister of Public Works and Instruction, 232 ; is decorated with K.C.M.G. at opening of Assouan Dam, 317 Farid, Mohammed Bey, President of Nationalist Party, contributes to Nationalist movement, 274 ; the question of his origin, 275 ; elected on death of Mustapha Eamil, 324 ; on tasting the Occupation Water, 344 ; on the Canal Concession, 345-6 ; and the Grand Vizier, 346-7 Fehmi, Mustapha Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Arabist Ministry, 74 ; his appointment as Prime Minister suggested by French and British Consuls, 79 ; succeeds Eiaz as Prime Minister, 205 ; deposed by Abbas II, 227 ; appointed Minister of War, 232 ; retires from public life, 336, xii Floureus, M., French Minister for Foreign Affairs, issues Circular to French Representatives on Anglo-Turkish Convention, 184, 185 Forster, Mr. W. E., m.p., on the worthlessness of Western advice to Oriental administrators, 158 Freycinet, M. de, Prime Minister of France, succeeds M. Gambetta, 71 ; and the Circassian Plot, 76 ; Nationalists count on his support, 78, 79 ; supports non-Turkish in- tervention, 81 ; proposes Turkish intervention, 82, 83 ; refuses to sanction Admiral Conrad's partici- pation in bombardment, 98-9 ; on the " Question d'Egypte," 242-3 G Gambetta, M., Prime Minister of France, decides to strengthen Khedive's Government, 55 ; ap- proaches Lord Granville, 56 ; in- structs consuls to encourage Khedive to assert his authority, 57 ; Lord Granville agrees to Gambetta's proposals, 58 ; his Joint Note, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 ; refuses to explain note, 64 ; his fall, 71 ; and de Freycinet's policy, 78, 81 ; and his plan of intervention, 86 ; Arabi and the Note, 103 Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., and Egyptian liberty, 61 ; and Bul- garia, 126 ; and Arab "freedom," 151 ; Gordon and, 154-5 ; fall of his Ministry, 164 ; evacuation pledges, 208-13 ; at Newcastle, 206 ; on the time of evacuation, letter to Mustapha Eamil, 245 and note ; in the Commons (Ap- pendix I), 366 General Assembly, vote on Suez Canal rejecting renewal of Con- cession, 338 ; demands representa- tive Government, 341 Gordon, General Charles George, R.E., Governor-General of Soudan under Ismail Pasha, appointed to Sou- dan, 141 ; recalled on economic grounds, ib.; his administration of Soudan, 141, 142 ; despatch by British Government to Soudan, 150, 151 ; deserted by tribes, 152 ; throws up appointment with King of the Belgians, 153 ; murdered at Khartoum, 154 ; extract from his journal, 155 ; his representation to the British Government, 156 ; Egyptian opinion regarding his appointment, 157; on "smashing the Mahdi," 160, 161 ; Lord Wol- sey's revenge for death of, 165 ; INDEX 375 his appointment of Emin Pasha &s Governor of Equatoria, 167 note ; death nullifies object of expedition, 160 Gorst, Sir Eldon, British Consul- General, takes University out of hands of Nationalists, 280 ; and the Agricultural Banks, 315 ; re- turns to Egypt, 333 and note ; Egyptian opinion as to his ap- pointment, 334 ; and the British officials, 334-5 ; appoints Boutros Fasha Prime Minister, 336 ; re- enaets Press laws, students demonstrate, 336-7, 342 ; and reforms, 340-1 ; his pledges on behalf of England (Appendix I), 366-7 Gortsohakofif, Prince, Russian Am- bassador at the Berlin Congress, 30-1 Graham, General Sir Gerald, 151, 162 Granville, Lord, British Foreign Sec- retary, mildly accepts French in- vasion of Tunis, 34 ; is approached by St. Hilaire to preserve the peace in Egjrpt, 53; is led by Gambetta, 55 ; his ambiguous reply to Gambetta, 56 ; thinks " something should be done," 57 ; agrees to Gambetta's proposal for joint interference in Egypt, 58-9 ; signs Joint Note, his flabby reser- vation, 60 ; his desire for joint explanation rejected by Gambetta, 64 ; tries to extricate himself from Egyptian muddle, 71 ; intervenes with France in the Circassian Plot, 76 ; his ineptitude, 80-1 ; agrees with de Freyoinet to despatch Anglo-French squadron to Egypt, 82-3 ; desires Turkey to be repre- sented, de Freycinet declines, ib. ; does not propose to land troops, 85 ; Lord Dufferin forwards Porte's request for delay in bombardment, 100 ; requested by France to state future intentions in Egypt, 128 ; his Circular Note to the Powers re England's business in Egypt, 130 ; suggests abolition of Dual control, 131 ; Lord Dufl'erin and his pledges, 133-4 ; his "policy" in the Sou- dan, 148-9 ; permits Englishmen and Egyptians to be slaughtered in Soudan, 150 ; English opinion rouses him, ib. ; sends General Gordon to his doom, ib. ; abandons Gordon to his fate, 153 ; despatches Lord Wolseley,153; and his muddle in the Soudan, 156-8 ; summons Conference of Powers to discuss Egyptian finance, 159 ; is elected president, ib. ; sends Lord North- brook to Egypt, 160; annexes Berbera and Bulhar to restore order, 165 ; Zeyla annexed to preserve order, 166 ; consents to the Italian occupation of Massowah, 167; gives Bogos to King John of Abyssinia, 168; accepts international guar- antee for the Egyptian Loan of £9,000,000, 174 ; and farcical dip- lomacy, 207 ; desire to evacuate Egypt, 217 ; and the restoration of order, 297 Grenfell, General Sir Francis, 170 note Grey, Sir Edward, Foreign Secretary, on " trusteeship " at Huddersfield, 245-6 ; training the Egyptians for self-government, 279 and note ; and the EooseveltGuildhaU speech, 361 H Halim Pasha, Prince, 6, 13 ; robbed of his inheritance by Ismail, 10 note ; Sultan's opinion of, 77, 93 ; and Arabi, 87 Hardie, Mr. Keir, M.P., 123 Helbawi Bey, counsel defending Wardani, 339-40 Hewitt, Admiral Sir William, his mission to King John, 168 Hicks, Pasha, his disastrous march up the Nile, 144 ; annihilated by the Mahdi, 145, 146 ; is extermin- ated while Cromer waits, 150 I Ismail, ex-Khedive of Egypt, his de- position, 6 ; his debt, 7, 8, 9 ; opening of Suez Canal, 10 ; in- crease of tribute to become Khe- dive, 10 and note, 11 ; and the El- Azhar University, 12 ; his extrava- gances, 14 ; value of State lands, 15 ; value of Canal shares present day, 16 ; and Nationalist, 23, 24 ; Abyssinian campaign, 25 ; and the Rothschilds, 62, 191, 192; Sultan's lack of confidence in, 77 ; he plots in Naples, 74, 75 ; his desire to suppress the slave trade in the Soudan, 140, 141, 149, 156; and education, 200, 226 note ; death of, 202 and note ; marries slave, 264 ; and the Kurbash, 310 ; 376 THE LAND OF THE PHAEAOHS his claim for arrears of Civil List, 201, 202 ; and irrigation works, 317 ; and the Law of Liquidation, 368 (Appendix II) Jemal-ed-din, Sheykh Afghani, Az- har Reformer, 12, 18, 124 John, King of Abyssinia, British Government solicits his assistance for retreat of Egyptian garrisons, 168 ; Bogos ceded to in considera- tion of help, ib. ; feeds and clothes garrison and population of Gera, 169 ; receives province of Bogos, ib. K Kamil, AH, Vice-President of Nation- alist Party ; reduced to the ranks, 274 ; elected Vice-President, 324 Kamil Mustapha Pasha, founder of new Nationalist Party, writes the "Egyptian Peril," 235 ; and Fasho- da, 245 ; and Mr. Gladstone, ib. note ; educates through " El-Lewa, " 256 ; and Sheykh Ali Yousseff, 271 -2 ; and Madame Adam's introduc- tions, 272-3; founds Nationalists' School,273 ; and the Grand Vizier and Abdul Hamid, 273-4 ; and his critics, 276 ; announces National University Scheme, 279 ; founds "Egyptian Standard," 280; and French contributors, 5281 ; Cromer on Kamil's connection with Khe- dive, 282 ; and his interview with the " Berliner Tageblatt," 282-3; and the Khedive's encouragement of, 284-5 ; severs relations with Court, 286 ; and practical reforms, 320 ; his last illness, 321 ; writes Sir Campbell Bannerman, 322 ; final speech and death, 322-3 ; his funeral, 324 ; Article III, National- ist Programme, 345 Kamil, Prince Hussein, the Khedive's uncle, xi ; defrauded of his in- heritance, 16 ; his comments on the condition of the natives, 320 Kitchener, Lord, telegraphs the massacre of Gordon, 154 ; and commercial interests in the Soudan, 170 ; his success at Omdurman, 170 ; offers to resign because of Khedive's criticism of Army, 232 ; honoured by British Government, ib.; Arab captain from Fashoda brought before, 236, 237 ; arrives before Fashoda with reinforcement, 239 ; interviews Marohand, ib. ; "a whisky and soda," 240 ; leaves Fashoda, i6. ; at the Guildhall, 246 Lambert, M. , ex-Director Khedivial School of Law ; ejected from his post, 277 and note Lascelles, Sir Frank, British Consul- General, 6, 12, 22 Lawson, Sir Wilfrid, M.P., criticises Gladstone's Egyptian "policy of injustice," 158 Layard, Sir Henry, British Am- bassador at Constantinople ; and the Cyprus Secret Convention, 28 Legislative Council : severely criti- cises British administration, 230- 1 ; resolution asking the Khedive's Government for a representative Assembly, Appendix I, p. 345. See also Sir Eldon Gorst, Suez Canal and Yehia Pasha. Lesseps, Ferdinand de, constructor of Suez Canal, and Ismail, 9 ; and the Arabi blockade of the Canal, 112, 118 Liquidation, Law of, Appendix II, p. 368 Lufti, Omar Pasha, and Alexandria Riots, 95, 96 ; named for War Office, 199 M McNeill, General Sir John, 162 Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed of Don- gola, the product of Turco-Cir- cassian Rule, 142 ; a Sherif of Mecca on the true, 142 and notes ; his qualifications and rise, 143 ; besieges El-Oheid and captures garrison, 144 ; defeats Hicks Pasha, 145; Soudan "friendly tribes " and, 152 ; waning popu- larity of, 163 ; rival prophet in Kordofan, ib. ; death of, 164 ; Mohammed El-Amin of Tunis (New Mahdi) establishes himself at El Obeid, is captured and hanged by Captain Mohan, note 170 Malet, Sir Edward, succeeds Sir Frank Lascelles at Cairo, 22 ; absent on leave,, Cookson acts for, 42 ; on the general tone of Tewfik, 48 ; and Cherif's political views, 49; on the Khedive's "cheerful- ness," 54 ; did not understand trend of Nationalist movement. INDEX 377 56; on Gambetta's "support "to the Ehedive, 57, 58 ; on Chamber and Khedive, 59 ; on the Joint Note, 63 ; considers trouble seri- ous, 69 ; reports non-interference of Arabists with Law of Liquida- tion, ib. ; [refuses permission to Chamber of Notables to vote Bud- get, 72 ; interferes with sentences on Circassian conspirators, 75, 78 ; conspires with Sultan Pasha to overthrow Arabists, 79; advises Tewfik to retain Ministry, 80 ; captures Sultan Pasha, 83 ; issues Ultimatum, with French Con- sul, banishing Arabi, 84 ; un- muzzles English, Press which disseminates falsehood, 87; Mr. Cartwright acts for, 97 ; on the Alexandria Eiots, 103 ; is appoin- ted Minister at Brussels, 136 Marchand, Colonel, at Fashoda, 238 ; board. Lord Kitchener's steamer, 239 ; "die atmy post," 239, 240 ; his force, 240 ; Delcass^ and, 241, 242; French vintage and Egyptian fiction, ib. and note; M. De Freyoinet on, 242, 243; repudiated by his Government, 244 ; meets Mustapha Kamil, 272 "Mokattam," newspaper, founded by Syrian Christians at Beiront, 229 ; transferred to Cairo, 230 its pernicious policy, 230, 233 duel with "El Moayyad," 271 interview with Sir Eldon Gorst (Appendix I), 366-7 Minshawi Pasha, fellah Notable, and the Khedive's bull, 331; European lives saved in 1882 by, 332 and note (2), 333 Moncriefif, Captain, English Consul at Suakin, killed at Tokar by Osman Digna, 147 MoncriefF, Sir Colin Scott, of the Public Works Department, on the condition of Egypt, 297 ; and the corvie, 305 N Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, suggests partition of Nor- thern Africa, 32 Northbrook, Lord High Commis- sioner to Egypt, instigates ap- pointment of Palmer, who bribes the Bedouin tribes, 115 and note ; Commissioner to Egypt, 160-72; his Reports, 173-4; refuses tc seize tribute, 298 ; and the land tax, 299 Nubar Pasha, negotiates loans for Ismail, 7 ; and Ismail's Constitu- tion, 19 ; and International Tri- bunals, 21, 192, 193 ; guides new judicial reform, 133 ; forms Ministry, 150 ; and English Ad- ministration, 197, 198, 199, 206 ; succeeds to office, 232 ; on condi- tion of peasantry, 297 O'Donovan, Mr., "Daily News" correspondent, killed with General Hicks Pasha, 145 P Palmer, Sir Elwin, Financial Adviser, defends financial policy, 331 Palmerston, Lord, his policy in Egypt, 32-3 Pledges, Britain's, Appendix to chapters xvii and xxvi E Eagheb, Pasha, nominated Presi- dent of the Council, 98, 107 Has Alula, Abyssinian general ; rescues Egyptian garrisons and defeats Osman Digna, 169 Eiaz Pasha, 12 ; summoned to Egypt by Europeans, 20 ; his appoint- ment as Prime Minister unpopu- lar, 22 ; is petitioned by Fellah officers, 25, 26, 27 ; is suspected of treachery by the Khedive, 36, 36 ; requests Mahmud Sami's resigna- tion, 37 ; decides to banish Arabi, 37, 39 ; at Abdin Palace, 40 ; de- posed at Arabi's instigation, 42, 43 j Tevirfik's delight at fall of, 46 ; op- posed to Fellah liberty, 65, 66, 74 ; Minister of Interior, 129 ; re- appointed Prime Minister, 199, 228 ; resigns, 205 ; and the students, 229 ; rejects proposals of Legislative Council, 231 ; re- lieved of office, 232 ; praises occu- pation, 283 Eifky, Osman Pasha, War Minister, 22 ; and fellah officers, 26 ; dis- missed by Tewflk, 27, 36 ; and the Circassian Plot, 75 Eing, Baron de, French Consul -Gen- eral ; supports claims of Fellah officers, 26, 36 ; recalled by his Government, 37 ; induces Sultan 378 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS to bo represented at Constanti- nople Conference, 99 Roosevelt, ex-President, his Gnild- hall speech, 1, 348, 349, 350, 351 ; and American Negroes, 352, 353 ; and the "400," 353-4; and Uganda, 354 ; East Africa, 355, 356 ; and the German Army, 356 Sadyk, Ismail, " Muffetish " to Ismail Khedive, 7, 8, 14, 19, 336 Said Pasha, Viceroy, 7, 23, 24, 45, 317 Said Mohammed Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister, 336, 338, 357 St. Hilaire, M. de Barthelemy, French Foreign Minister, suggests Anglo-French military control, 53 Salisbury, Marquis of, Berlin Con- gress, 28, 30, 35 ; on soliciting Sultan of Turkey's co-operation, 91, 92 ; succeeds Gladstone, 164 ; adopts policy of his predecessor in Soudan, ib. ; sends Sir H. D. Wolil to Constantinople and Egypt, 175 ; " pulling the Imperial leg " of the Sultan, 176 ; accepts the friendly overtures of France, 185 ; Glad- stone and M. Ribot throw down gauntlet, 206 ; Gilbertian diplo- macy, 206-7 ; on the evacuation pledge in the Lords, 213 (Appen- dix) and 214 ; and the Nile Val- ley, 246 ; and the British right in the Soudan, 247 Sami, Mahmud, Pasha, el Barodi, Liberal reformer ; succeeds Osman Eifky as War Minister, 27, 36; dismissed by Riaz, 37 ; reap- pointed Minister of War under Cherif, 46 ; and his early proposals of reform, 66 ; Notables' suspicions of, 67; and the Army estimates, 67-8 ; Notables name him Presi- dent of the Council, 73 ; threatens to resist Sultan's Commissioners, 78 ; Ministry resolve to appoint him Governor-General and depose Tewfik, 79 ; Dervish Pasha and, 96 ; deposed by Khedive in favour of Eagheb Pasha, 98 ; wounded at Kassassin, 119-20 ; exiled, 127 Scott, Sir John, of Bombay, ap- pointed to inquire into the judicial system, 205 Seymour, Admiral Sir Beauohamp (Lord Aloester), arrives off Alex- andria, 84 ; knocks bottom out of Constantinople Conference, 95 ; spoiling for a fight, 98 ; demands discontinuation of works on Alex- andrian fortification, 99; notifies European Councils of intended bombardment, ib.; signals "Invin- cible" to fire shell into hospitaJ battery, 100; signals fleet "attack the enemy's batteries," 100, 101 ; knew Arabi could not surrender land batteries, 103 ; Khedive under protection of, 107 Shawish Sheykh, editor of "Lewa," and education through Press, 256 ; objections to his Tunisian origin, 275 ; imprisoned, 336 Sienkiewioz, M., French Consul- General at Cairo, 43, 56, 59, 84 Stephenson, General Sir Frederick, 164 Stewart, Colonel, reports on state of Soudan, 141 ; crosses Korosko Desert with Gordon, 150, 151 ; abandoned with Gordon in Khar- toum, 163 ; massacred at Berber, 154 ; death nullifies object of ex- pedition, 160 ; revenge for, 168 note Stewart, General Sir Herbert, 154, 160 Stuart, Mr. Villers, M.P., 303, 312 Suez Canal, concession granted to de Lesseps, 8 ; opening of, 10 ; shares bought by British Govern- ment, 9, 14 ; present value, 16 ; scheme for prolonging concession, 337-8 ; vote of General Assembly on, 338 Suliman Pasha Sami, and the burn- ing and looting of Alexandria, 101 ; executed for burning of Alexandria, 129 note Sultan of Turkey. See Abdul Hamid Sultan, Omar Bey, prominent Na- tionalist and friend of Mustapha Kamil, subscribers to Nationalist movement, 274 ; offers £E1000 to National University, 279 Sultan Pasha, fellah Notable, Presi- dent of Chamber of Notables Arabi takes counsel with, 37 ; ar- rives at Cairo with Notables, 43 used by Mahmud Sami and Cherif to bring Arab population into re- form movement, 66 ; on Cherif Pasha's Constitution, 70 ; sows dis- cord among Nationalists at instiga- tion of Sir Edward Malet, 78 ; in- forms British and French Consuls INDEX 379 of impossibility to change Ministry while Arabi in power, 80 ; backs up Sir Edward Malet, 83 ; sug- gests ultimatum, 84 ; actively agitates with fellah chiefs against Arabi, 118 and note ; on the state of the country under Cromer, 296 Tewfik Mehemet Fasha, Ehedive, is nominated Khedive by the Powers, 10, 13 ; and Ismail's Constitution, 18, 19 ; becomes his own Prime Minister, 20, 21, 206 ; opposes reforms, 22; Nationalist bitterness against, 23 ; plots against Riaz Pasha, 26, 27, 35 ; the Kasr-el-Nil mutiny, 1 February, 27, 36 : and the Nationalist, 37, 38, 39; mutiny, 9 September, 40, 41, 42 ; counten- ances mutiny, 43, 44 ; delights at Riaz Pasha's fall, 46 ; grants Con- stitution, 48 ; Gambetta and, 55, 57 ; and England and France, 59, 60, 61 ; and strength of army, 68 ; and Egyptian Chamber, 69, 73 ; conflictwith Ministry, 75; Sultan's opinion of, 77 ; breaks off relation with Ministers, 79, 80 ; dismisses Arabi's Ministry, 83, 84 ; and Circassian Plot, 87, 88 ; asks for Commissioner to Egypt, 90 ; sends delegate to meet Turkish mission, 93 ; and the Alexandrian Riots, 95 ; backsheesh to Dervish Pasha, 96 ; nominates Ragheb Pasha Premier, 98 ; and Lord Aloester, 103, 116 note; and the General Council, 107, 108, 109 ; his agents, 117, 119 ; and Arabi, 120, 121 ; and notes, 126, 127, 139, 233 ; and the English, 128, note, 130, 145; abolishes Dual control, 131 ; and the Soudan, 146, 147 and on ; Powers divide Soudan, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170 ; no love for England, 106 and note ; death of, 207 Tunis, the Bey of, seized by General Br^art, who annexes Tunis ifor France, 84; influence of invasion on Egyptian Nationalist movement, 34, 36, 44, 61 Turkey. See Abdul Hamid. Vincent, Sir Edgar, Financial Ad- viser, reports on imminent bank- ruptcy in 1885, 173 note, 299; his financial efforts, 196 ; and the wretchedness of the peasantry, 296 W Waddington, M,, representing France at the Berlin Congress, 30-1 Wilson, General Sir Charles, 154 Wilson, Sir Rivers, English Finan- cial Controller, 7, 11 note, 33, (Appendix II) 368 ; his recommen- dation to Ismail, 289 Wingate, General Sir Reginald, 170, 171, 243 Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond, High Commissioner, appointed by Lord Salisbury, 175 ; arrives in Con- stantinople, ih. ; on the Turks and England, 176 ; signs Convention with Turkey, ii. ; and the in- effectiveness of his mission, 178, 179 ; his proposals, 179, 180 ; sets period of evacuation at three years, 181 and note ; and " internal un- rest " in Clause 4, 182 ; France and Russia object to Sultan's signa- ture, ib. ; returns to London, ib. ; London opinion on mission, 182, 183 Wolsey, Lord, General, Commander- in-Chief in Egypt, consults with British Foreign Office on immedi- ate occupation of Egypt, 88 ; des- patched to Egypt, 105 ; on Arabi's neglect to block Suez Canal, 112 ; the servant of the Khedive, 117 ; at Ismailia, 118 ; at Tel-el-Kebir, 120 ; sent to the Soiidan, 153 ; operations in Soudan, 160, 161-3 ; retreat ordered, 164; on "the dignity and honour of the English nation," 165 Women, Egyptian, 23, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267 Women, English, and Lord Cromer, 313-5 ; political aspirations analo- gous to Egyptian Nationalist, 358 Wood, General Sir Evelyn, Com- mander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army, organises Egyptian Army, 132 ; satisfaction with Egyptian Army, 146 ; idle in Cairo during Soudan rebellion, 148 Yehia Pasha in the Legislative Council on Soudan expenditure, 171 and note ; and the reckless use of Reserve Fund, 337 380 THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS Yousseff, Sheykh Ali, editor of " El Moayyad ", educates people, 256 ; and Lord Cromer, 271-2; enter- tains Dr. Butherford, 325 Z Zobier Pasha telegraphed for by Gordon, 153 ; and the anti-Slavery Society, 153 note WILLIAM BKEHDOH AMD SON, LTD, PRINTERS, PLYMOUTH